Essay Thirteen Part One: Lenin's Disappearing Definition Of Matter
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Much of this Essay still exits only in note form; what you see here are those parts I have deemed fit to publish. At a later stage, when other Essays have been finished, I will re-post this Essay with these extra notes written up for publication.
As is the case with all my work, nothing here should be read as an attack either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary thirty-five years ago.
The difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained here.
Some readers might wonder why I have quoted extensively from a wide variety of DM-sources throughout these Essays. In fact, a good 10-20% of the material in many of them is comprised of just such quotations. Apologies are, therefore, owed in advance for the length and extremely repetitive nature of most of these quoted DM-passages. The reason for their inclusion is that long experience has taught me that Dialectical Marxists simply refuse to accept that the their own classicists -- Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao (alongside countless 'lesser' DM-theorists) -- actually say the things attributed to them -- especially after they are confronted with the absurd consequences that flow from this theory -- unless they are shown chapter and verse and in extensive detail. In debate with them, when I cite or quote only one or two passages in support of what I allege, they simply brush them off as a "outliers" or as "untypical". Indeed, in the absence of dozens of proof texts drawn from many such sources they tend to regard anything that a particular theorist had to say -- regardless of whether they are one of the aforementioned classicists -- as either "far too crude", "unrepresentative" or even(!) unreliable. Failing that, they often complain that any such quotes have been "taken out of context". Many in fact object since -- surprising and sad though this is to say --, many are largely ignorant of their own theory, or they simply haven't read the DM-literature with due care, or at all! The only way to counter such attempts to deflect, reject and deny is to quote DM-material frequently and at length.
In addition, because of the highly sectarian and partisan nature of Dialectical Marxism, I have to quote a wide range of DM-texts from across the entire spectrum. Trotskyists object if I quote Stalin or Mao; Maoists and Stalinists complain if I reference Trotsky -- or even if I cite "Brezhnev era revisionists". Non-Leninist Marxists will bemoan the fact that I haven't confined my remarks to what Marx or Hegel had to say, advising me to ignore the confused or even "simplistic" ideas expressed by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Mao and Trotsky! This means I often have to quote the lot!
That itself has had the benefit of showing how much and to what extent they all agree with one another in the end!
Several others have complained about the number of links I have added to these Essays, because they say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly grumble about that since they believe everything is interconnected, which must surely apply to Essays that attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those who find such links do make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access further supporting evidence and argument related to a particular point, or a specific topic fires your interest.
Still others wonder why I have linked to familiar subjects and topics that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of recent US Presidents, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of popular films or the definition of certain words in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't assume that something which is part of common knowledge in 'the west' is equally well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies', or any at all. Many of my readers aren't native English speakers, either, so any help I can give them I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links connect to web-pages that regularly change their URLs, or which even vanish from the Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent that they have changed or have disappeared, I can't possibly keep on top of this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers informed me of any dead or incorrect links they happen to notice. In general, links to 'Haloscan' no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
Phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius). They are intended to highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. Up until recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run the system for the elite.**
However, that will become the central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is directed here, here, and here for more details.
[**Exactly how and why this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays published at this site (especially here, here, and here). In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the argument (but this time aimed at absolute beginners!) here.]
The aim of this Essay is to examine in greater detail the comments that Lenin (and to a lesser extent other comrades) have made about the nature of matter and our apprehension of it. In addition, several other issues arising from Lenin's much-maligned book (MEC) will also be tackled.
[MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism; i.e., Lenin (1972).]
It is also worth mentioning that a good 50% of my case against DM has been relegated to the End Notes. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more smoothly. In many cases, I have added numerous qualifications, clarifications, and considerably more detail to what I have to say in the main body. In addition, I have raised several objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments -- which I have then answered. [I explain why I have done this in Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any qualms or objections readers might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments and clarifications.
[Since I have been debating this theory with comrades for over 25 years, I have heard all the objections there are! Many of the more recent on-line debates are listed here.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of November 2024, this Essay is just over 81,500 words long; a much shorter summary of some of its main ideas can be found here.
The material below does not represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
[Latest Update: 05/11/24.]
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the "Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
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(1) Introduction
(a) Lenin And 'Vanishing' Matter
(a) Is Matter Dependent On Mind?
(b) Hasty Repairs
(4) Some Things Aren't Material
(a) Externalism And Its Discontents
(b) Colour
(c) Other Contentious Examples
(a) At Last -- Lenin Constructs An Argument!
(b) Bluster Central
(c) Image Conscious
(d) Tumblers
(e) Hold The Press! Did Lenin Really Believe In Santa Claus? Surely Not!
(f) Images Fail To Make The Grade
(h) Lenin's Answer
(6) 'Objectivity'
(a) WTF Is It?
(b) 'Subjective' No Less Defective
(d) Lenin, Objectivity And Existence
(7) What Exactly Is Dialectical Materialism?
(b) Is Matter Just An Abstraction?
(c) Cherry Picking
(d) Prevarication -- One Thing Dialecticians Do Well
(e) Lenin 'Advances' By Going Backwards
(8) Notes
(9) References
Summary Of My Main Objections To Dialectical Materialism
Abbreviations Used At This Site
Essay Thirteen will largely be concerned with what might loosely be called 'scientific issues'. Part One will focus on Lenin's attempt to 'define' matter (or rather, his successful attempt to avoid telling us what it is!), and the means by which he thinks we come to know it, or know about it. In the course of which I hope to show that Lenin's theory of knowledge -- or, more specifically, his focus on "images" as the basic source of our knowledge -- undermines not just the nature of matter, but scientific knowledge itself.
Part Two (to be published sometime in 2023) will concentrate on the attempts made by DM-theorists to understand science and scientific change in general; Part Three will examine in detail their efforts to analyse language and cognition -- concentrating largely on Voloshinov and Vygotsky along with several more contemporary DM-theorists. In the process of which I will also examine what dialecticians have to say about the nature and evolution of language. In order to do that I will endeavour to show how and why dialecticians have carelessly allowed various ruling-class forms-of-thought to compromise theories of theirs devoted to these topics, as they have in relation to other areas (which we saw in earlier Essays). More specifically, I will show how their commitment to the Platonic-Christian-Cartesian Paradigm (introduced largely via Hegel's Mystical Hermeticism) -- a serious error that was further compounded by their acceptance of traditional forms of Representationalism -- has led them astray.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on context.]
In MEC, Lenin attempted to confront, and then refute, contemporaneous interpretations of physics that appeared to him to question the reality of matter. Time and again he asserted things like the following:
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), p.311.]
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., p.312.]
"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of nature's existence outside the mind and perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid., p.314.]
"The fundamental characteristic of materialism is that it starts from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality reflected by science." [Ibid., pp.354-55.]1
Lenin insisted on maintaining this view in the face of the revolutionary new concepts that were being introduced into the Physics of his day, which, under certain interpretations, seemed to indicate that matter did not exist -- at least, not as it had previously been understood. Lenin was fully aware of these changes; however, he argued that those who think this refutes materialism ignore:
"…[the] basis of philosophical materialism and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical materialism. The recognition of immutable elements…and so forth, is not materialism, but metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialism…. Dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another." [Ibid., p.312.]
Again, concerning those who claimed that these new developments made the idea of matter redundant, he had this to say:
"[T]he expression 'matter disappears', 'matter is reduced to electricity', etc., is only an epistemologically helpless expression of the truth that science is able to discover new forms of matter, new forms of material motion, to reduce the old forms to the new forms, and so on." [Ibid., p.378.]
In addition, Lenin would have nothing to do with the idea that matter was simply energy:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside the mind, independently of man…or are these only ideas?… Energeticist physics is a source of new idealist attempts to conceive motion without matter." [Ibid., pp.324, 328.]
In these passages, Lenin's views were consistent with those he expressed elsewhere (even if his ideas developed considerably over the next ten years). It is also worth noting that Lenin clearly saw no problem with running together epistemological and ontological issues, just as it is equally obvious that he failed to appreciate the extent to which this undermined his entire world-view -- fatally compromising several core DM-theses along the way.2
In fact, despite his repeated protestations to the contrary, what Lenin wrote in MEC amounted to the abandonment of belief in anything that is recognizably material.
Small wonder then that he looked to that notorious Idealist, Hegel, for philosophical advice.
As is easily confirmed, Lenin didn't actually tell his readers what he thought matter was; indeed, he explicitly refused to do so.4 In common with other DM-theorists, he confined his comments concerning the nature of matter to a few rather vague statements, statements which, as things turn out, fatally compromise its presumed ontological status, and hence the status of DM as a materialist theory.
Turning to what Lenin actually said, he appeared to believe that it was a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be material that it should exist "outside the mind" as an "objective reality". Apart from a few passing comments about matter and physical reality, that is all he had to say about this supposedly core DM-concept! While he pointedly brushed aside familiar, traditional definitions of matter -- i.e., its impenetrability, composition, inertia, location in space and time, causal interaction, extension, etc. (cf., p.311) --, he continually referred to matter as that which exists as an "objective" reality "external" to, and "independent" of "consciousness".
He clearly regarded this criterion to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for something to count as material. This can be seen by the way he posed the following question:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question is energy material? Does the transformation take place outside the mind…?" [Ibid., p.324.]
Presumably, the background reasoning was something like the following:
L1: Any transformation that takes place (objectively) outside the mind is material.
L2: This particular transformation takes place (objectively) outside the mind.
L3: Therefore, it is material.
Hence, an affirmative answer to the following questions would provide sufficient grounds for the conclusion to follow (i.e., L3):
"...[D]oes matter move? [becomes]...the question is energy material? Does the transformation take place outside the mind…?" [Ibid., p.324.]
If Lenin's criterion had merely been a necessary condition, the above questions would have been pointless, since the conclusion (L3) wouldn't have followed (that is because, outside of mathematics and other formal disciplines, a necessary condition on its own plainly isn't sufficient).
Moreover, had Lenin's strictures merely been sufficient (but not necessary), they wouldn't have ruled out the possibility that material and mental entities or processes are coterminous (a là Spinoza, perhaps?), or even identical. Indeed, if it wasn't essential (i.e., necessary) that material processes take place extra-mentally, his criterion would have been totally useless.
Hence, Lenin's criterion was both necessary and sufficient. I propose to call this requirement (when augmented with additional DM-theses outlined below), "Externalism".
Externalism appears to be committed to one or more of the following theses:
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T3: The world is composed of objects, processes, relations and events in continual change.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
T5: Scientific knowledge of the world (coupled with practice) is our most reliable guide to its nature and laws.
T6: Our knowledge of the world is continually changing as our understanding grows and develops.
T7: There are no a priori limits to what we can know about the world, and our knowledge is subject to continual revision.
T8: Knowledge is historically-conditioned, but it isn't reducible to such conditioning (otherwise T1 and T2 would be compromised).5
Earlier on (in Essays One to Eight Part Three), the tensions that exist between this view of the world and those aspects of DM-epistemology that supposedly underpin it were examined in detail. It was argued there that DM-theses -- like those above --, when coupled with DM-epistemology, collapse into Idealism.
Notwithstanding this, it might seem possible to challenge that conclusion if, say, theses T1 and T2 above turn out to be correct.
Despite this, there are serious problems with all of the above theses, not least with T1, T2 and T4:
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
If certain parts of nature are indeed independent of each other (as T1 and T2 assert) then not all of reality is interconnected, contrary to what T4 says. T1 and T2 claim that while mind is dependent on matter, matter isn't dependent on mind. In that case, clearly, matter and mind cannot be inter-dependent. Although they might be connected, they cannot be inter-connected (in this sense).
Even if we grant for the present that the human mind is dependent on all the matter in the universe (i.e., on the "Totality", full-blown -- if, that is, the universe is the "Totality"; on that, see here), it is a pretty safe bet that no 'Materialist Dialectician' would want to argue that the converse is the case: that is, that any or all matter in the universe is dependent on mind. Naturally, that idea wouldn't have bothered Hegel too much, but it is reasonably clear that DM-theorists may only accept this converse idea as true if they are prepared to abandon materialism.5a
Nevertheless, it is surely an empirical matter whether or not any of the above conditions actually obtain (including the alleged fact that certain parts of reality are dependent on each other). Or, rather, it is to those who refuse to impose DM on nature -- as dialecticians constantly declare is the case with them.
Despite this, we have seen that DM-theorists appear to regard T4 as an a priori truth of some sort, since they tell us that everything in reality is interconnected (follow that link for proof), and they assert this in advance of there being an adequate body of supporting evidence to that effect. In that case, if they are consistent, they should draw the conclusion that their belief in universal inter-connectedness also commits them to the equally a priori view that every atom in the universe does in fact depend on the human mind.
Either that, or they should jettison the idea that everything in reality is inter-connected.
Well, perhaps this is being a little too hasty. Maybe the above 'difficulty' has arisen because of the emphasis DM-theorists place on the unity of knowledge and the identity (in difference) of knowledge and 'Being', and/or 'the thing-in-itself'. As Lenin tells us:
"There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known." [Lenin (1972), p.110.]
Admittedly, these ideas are often further qualified with the extra claim that this identity doesn't deny the primacy of matter over mind, nor does it imply that knowledge isn't relative or approximate, nor does it imply that the 'knower' and the 'known' are the same. Far from it, they tell us that they are dialectically inter-related.6
Could this help solve the problem posed above and show how mind can be dependent on matter, but not the other way round, while holding on to the thesis that everything is inter-connected?
Unfortunately, even if all the above considerations were either relevant or valid, the status of T1 and T2 would still fatally compromise T4. That is because, if T1 and T2 were true, it would mean that while our knowledge of nature (at least) was in fact dependent on the physical universe (mediated perhaps by social development and practice, etc.), the opposite couldn't be the case. That is, it wouldn't be true to say that the world as a whole is dependent on our knowledge of it howsoever much 'dialectics' we threw at it. Plainly, this would in turn imply that there is something in existence (i.e., the 'content' of our minds) which, while it is connected with, it isn't inter-connected with, the rest of the universe. In that case, the alleged link must be one-way, not two-way, undermining T4.
[Henceforth, I will often drop the hyphen between "inter" and "connected. It was only introduced to help make the above points a little clearer.]
If matter isn't connected with mind (in the above sense), then not everything can be interconnected.
It is far from clear how waving the word "dialectical" about can solve this conundrum.
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
On this view then, even if human activity has, or had, a limited and local affect on nature (confined at present to the Earth and this part of the Solar System), it would still mean that most of the universe is unaffected by what is known about it, or with what humanity is capable of thinking, or is capable of interacting with and then manipulating in practice. Hence, given Externalism, while the configuration of matter inside each of our heads might very well be causally linked to nature in one direction -- which configuration is supposedly responsible for the 'emergence' of 'consciousness' --, it wouldn't be 'back-related', as it were, to most of the rest of the universe.6a
Once again, while there would certainly be a connection here, there wouldn't be an interconnection.
The introduction of practice into the story at this point wouldn't help, either, nor would it reduce the serious nature of the difficulties Externalism faces: plainly, most of the universe is too far away for human beings to affect in any way at all. So, while distant parts of the universe might influence our knowledge of them, the human mind has no return effect on the vast bulk of the universe on the return journey, as it were. And, even if a 'sort of link' could be shown to exist (in that it requires human 'consciousness' to arrive at any such conclusions about distant parts of the universe), remote regions of space would clearly not be dependent on our mental activity. In short, most of reality, past, present and future is unaffected by, or isn't dependent on, our thoughts about it.
Plainly, those considerations are sufficient to remove the "inter" from "inter-related", fragmenting the Totality by making T4 false.7
Some might be tempted to think this is no big deal, and that the DM-Totality is unaffected by such quibbles. However, as we will soon see, that fall-back position only succeeds in putting off the evil day.
[Of course, the DM-'Totality' faces far more serious problems than these relatively minor points; on that, see Essay Eleven Parts One and Two.]
One way to avoid the above untoward conclusions might be to re-write T4 in the following manner:
T4a: Some elements of reality are independent of each other; others are interconnected.8
However, given the longevity and size of the universe, this would mean that T4a needs to be replaced with this, far more honest, alternative:
T4b: Some elements of reality are independent of each other and some aren't interconnected with the vast bulk of the rest of the universe.
Indeed, since the present is entirely ephemeral (while the past is either finite and extensive, or infinite), most events are, or will have taken place, in the past, not in the (now) present. But, unless we subscribe to the view that past events are somehow influenced by present events (i.e., unless we are prepared to admit that past events aren't just connected, they are interconnected with events in the present) --, T4b must be correct. That is, the vast majority of events in the history of the universe can't even be connected, let alone interconnected -- since they no longer exist. So, T4b completely undermines T4, turning an important DM-thesis into a rather bland statement -- and one over which few would want to get their metaphysical knickers in a twist.9
On the other hand, if T4 is still held to be true (and thus if T4b is rejected), what is in fact a potentially fatal defect re-emerges right at the heart of DM-epistemology. That is because it would imply that all of reality (past, present (and future?)) depends on our knowledge of it --, since T4 declares that everything is interconnected within the "Totality" -- and our thoughts surely exist somewhere in the universe.
So, it seems that the only way this Idealist conclusion can be avoided is if T4 is replaced by T4b. Unfortunately, as already noted, such a theoretical retreat would turn this DM-thesis (T4) into an uninteresting platitude (T4b).
Looking at things from the 'reverse direction', as it were, T1 and T2 themselves emphasise the fact that the link between the world and our knowledge of it -- or the connection between the human mind and reality itself -- is (largely) unidirectional. That is, they underline the fact that while our knowledge of the world is dependent on the material universe, the material universe isn't dependent on our knowledge of it. But, that is precisely what sinks T4. Hence, it looks like the only way to rescue these core DM theses (i.e., T1 and T2) is to abandon T4 altogether and replace it with the rather innocuous T4b.10
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
T4b: Some elements of reality are independent of each other and some are not interconnected with the vast bulk of the rest of the universe.
On the other hand, if T4 is left in place, that would imply matter is dependent on mind, as we have seen.
Clearly, while it might seem appealing to some to try to avoid this Idealist impasse by abandoning T4 (along the lines suggested above), the thesis that the "Totality" conditions everything by means of universal inter-relationships would collapse as a result. Along with this would go the doctrine that the entire nature of the part is determined by its relation to the whole, and thus that "truth is the whole". Hence, if some parts of the Totality aren't interconnected, then their individual natures can't be determined either by the whole or by each and every other part. As now seems plain, when this DM-Whole is allowed to develops just one small hole it soon begins to make a colander look rather leak-proof in comparison.10a
Figure One: Compared With DM, Relatively Leak-Proof!
Alternatively, we could tough it out and acknowledge the implicit Idealism in DM and admit that the world (including the past) is in fact conditioned by our knowledge of it, and that matter does depend on mind --, holding on to T4, but abandoning T1 and T2.
This would at least have the advantage of bringing closet DM-Idealists out, loud and proud, into the open.11
Externalism And Its Discontents
Ignoring the above problems for the present, and returning to Lenin's thoughts, he certainly regarded 'externality' as a criterion that distinguished rival Idealist theories from DM itself. That is obvious from the way he repeatedly castigated any opponent who denied, half-denied, or only half-heartedly accepted this condition.12
However, this raises another awkward question: if 'externality' is Lenin's sole criterion for materiality -- and is a necessary and sufficient condition for it, too --, what are we to say of the many non-material things there are that also seem to possess 'externality'? What about colours, smells, tastes, sounds, shapes, shadows, holes, surfaces, 'empty' space, relations, the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy (henceforth, CMG), averages (such as the average lager drinker), the past, the present and the future?
Now, some readers might consider most (if not all) of the above examples highly contentious. For example, it could be argued that colours are certainly material. However, such a response would be a mistake. Colour perception may have causal and/or material concomitants, but colours can't be material. If they were, it would make sense to ask of what they are composed.12a Of course, colour isn't made out of anything not already coloured and it has no constituent parts (which aren't already coloured, too). So such a question would have no answer that wasn't viciously circular (i.e., it would be rather like saying matter is made of matter).13
Again, it could be objected that colour is actually made out of photons of different energies, or of light of different wavelengths. However, that response simply confuses the causal agent responsible for our colour perception with colour itself.
Once more, it might be objected that colour is caused by the interplay between light rays and the microstructure of atoms, or that colour is a dispositional property of material objects -- or perhaps even a dispositional property of perceivers themselves. Whether these claims are true (or not) won't be entered into here; but, once again, these responses confuse the causal agents and/or concomitants responsible for colour perception with colour itself.14 As Professor Laurence Goldstein notes:
"Take blueness, for example. What enters our eyes -- the blue light -- is simply (objectively) electromagnetic radiation. Yet the electromagnetic radiation is not blue. Colour has at least three dimensions -- hue, brightness, and saturation -- and four of the hues -- red, green, yellow, and blue -- are primary, that is, visibly non-composite. There can be reddish blues, but no yellowish blues or reddish greens. Yet such characteristics of colour are not characteristic of electromagnetic radiation. For example, no unique wavelength can be identified with a unique hue, since identical colour experiences may be produced by different combinations of wavelength. So light of any particular wavelength cannot be identified with a colour, that is, light is not coloured.
"Blueness, then, is not a property of electromagnetic radiation. Perhaps it is a property possessed by blue objects, that is, a property that they possess whether or not anyone is looking at them. But are objects intrinsically coloured? There is a strong temptation to suppose that all the objects that we perceive as blue have something, for example a certain molecular surface structure, that makes them so. Yet, when we actually conduct a detailed analysis of the different kinds of blue things that we see, it soon becomes clear that this supposition is incorrect. The blueness of the sky is due to the scattering of white light by particles of a certain size, and the same cause is responsible for the blueness of the eyes of some Caucasians and of the facial skin of many monkeys. But the blue of a rainbow has quite a different cause from that of the blueness of certain stars. And what makes sapphire blue is quite different from what makes some birds blue, and both are different from what causes the blue of certain beetles." [Goldstein (1990), pp.185-86. Spelling altered to conform with UK English. Italic emphases in the original. Links added.]
Although, Professor Goldstein finally concludes that colour isn't an "objective property of things" (p.186), that observation isn't so much false as non-sensical. [On the status of such hyper-bold claims about 'things-in-themselves', see Essay Twelve Part One. See also Stroud (2000).]
Be this as it may, the point is that Professor Goldstein is right when he points out that electromagnetic radiation itself isn't coloured.
Some, like the above Professor, might claim that colours are 'mental' phenomena and exist only in conscious minds, not in the external world. But, that, too, is an age-old mistake. Colours don't exist merely in the mind since (plainly!) they exist in the outside world; any theory that located colours exclusively in the minds of perceivers would clearly have misidentified them. So, when, for instance, a scientist describes Copper Sulphate crystals as blue, she is referring neither to the contents, nor to the state, of her mind or central nervous system. Anyone who thought otherwise would simply have drawn attention to their own misuse of language.15
Of course, Lenin would have been the first to point out that scientific materialism must incorporate into its view of the world all the properties of matter that scientists ('objectively') determine for it, including colour. But, the policy of waiting for scientists to tell us what reality does or doesn't contain isn't without its own problems (as we discovered in Essay Eleven Part One).
Hence, if scientists tell us that matter is little more than a convenient shorthand for the effect of scalar and/or vector fields (or Superstrings -- or anything else, for that matter -- no pun intended) on their measuring instruments, or on perceivers, it might well be wondered what there is left of the material world that could possibly act as the bearer of any properties at all. Indeed, given such an austere view of the world -- which pictures it as nothing more than a complex array of vectors, tensors, scalars, geodesics, differential equations, and the like --, the relationship between 'nature' and the 'mind' would amount to nothing more than a set of complex 'interactions' between one set of scalar/vector/tensor fields (i.e., "the world") and another set of scalar/vector/tensor fields (the "brain/mind", only now of dubious composition and constitution). Not only would matter more than appear to disappear (on this account), so would perceptions, thoughts and properties, too! In that case, both matter and 'mind' would seem to vanish; the entire universe would thus become an array of sets of…, well, what?16
To be sure, the serious problems DM-theorists face arose much earlier than this. By contracting-out to scientists the right to tell us what matter is, or what the world contains, Lenin and other dialecticians should feign no surprise when everything disintegrates in front of them, and the Idealism implicit in every aspect of class society (including that which influences and motivates certain areas of modern science) forces itself upon them.17
Nevertheless, we all already know what colour is (or, at least, competent speakers of the language already know) -- we learnt what it is when we were taught how to speak about it and how to interact with coloured objects. In fact, we must already understand what colour terms mean if we are to be informed by scientists what its physical concomitants and properties are supposed to be. We certainly couldn't be educated (or re-educated) by them concerning the physical nature of colour if no one understood what the word "colour" already meant.
That non-negotiable logico-linguistic constraint applies with equal force to scientists themselves; they too must grasp what ordinary colour terms mean (and they must do so in the same way that the rest of us do, or they won't be speaking about colour, but about 'colour') if they are to study successfully the physical properties of the correct natural phenomenon. So, scientists (and/or sceptics) can only undermine the ordinary use of the word "colour" (if that is what they do) at the cost of making all they say about 'it' entirely vacuous. If colour isn't what we suppose it to be when we use the ordinary language of colour, then we must surely lose the solid ground upon which scientists sought to build a properly scientific explanation of 'it'.18
This means that the claim that colour is a (dispositional) property of material objects can't be the whole truth about it, in that it isn't all that colour is. And this "all" can't be accommodated to any theory without a prior recourse to the ordinary language of colour. And, this has nothing to do with Lenin's "externalism", either, since, plainly, our perception of colour isn't independent of the existence of sensate life -- in this case, our own.19
Of course, it could be objected that the nature of colour is a scientific not a linguistic issue --, but that rejoinder would be equally misguided. As we saw earlier (in relation to the word "change"), it isn't up to scientists, philosophers or dialecticians to tell us what our colour words mean (and that constraint applies to the rest of our everyday vocabulary, too). Any attempt to do so would plainly undermine the language used in any endeavour to do just that.20
Again, it could be objected that this isn't something that can be settled by (or, indeed, brushed aside with) an appeal to the ordinary meaning of words. This is a scientific and/or a philosophical issue.
However, scientists, philosophers and/or dialecticians will have to use language in order to tell us what they take colour to be (i.e., if they are to address the right subject of their enquiries), and, plainly, in order to make a correct start they themselves will have to begin with terms drawn from the vernacular -- otherwise they would be aiming their comments at some other target, not colour.
Now, it is precisely here that any attempt to revise (or even tinker with) the vocabulary of colour that we already have will back-fire. Since the details underlying that observation have been worked-out in detail elsewhere, and because further discussion will take us too far from the main theme of this Essay, I will leave the reader to re-familiarise herself with that discussion (in the course of which, she will need to replace the word "change" with the colour terms of her choice).
Naturally, this is a contentious topic, and not one around which I want this Essay to revolve. So, let us consider some of the other items mentioned above; Lenin's criteria would categorise holes, surfaces and shadows, for instance, as 'material' (in that they are "external to the mind") -- but, plainly, they are in no way material.20a Not, that is, unless the word "material" is re-defined to make them so -- in which case, this part of Lenin's theory would become 'true' simply because of yet another example of terminological tinkering.
It would also mean that this area of DM, at least, will have been imposed nature, not 'read from it'.21
And what is so material about the relations between bodies and/or processes? But such relations are 'external to the mind'. In that case, given Lenin's criteria, the distance between you and the planet Jupiter, say, is just as material as you are! And so is the fact that you are smaller than Jupiter (if you are).21a
Indeed, several of the other items from the above list of allegedly non-material entities appear to be equally if not more problematic than the nature of colour, relations, holes and shadows. What, for example, are we to make of the CMG? It is clearly not material (in fact it doesn't physically exist in any meaningful sense -- it occupies a zero volume interval in space, for example), and yet it exercises a decisive causal influence on the movement of every particle in the entire Galaxy. But, the CMG is manifestly 'external to the mind', so it must be 'objective', according to Lenin. But, is there anything actually in reality that 'corresponds' with it?
Should a hard-nosed supporter of Lenin be tempted to argue that the CMG is material just because it is external to the mind, then we would be owed an explanation as to how something that has no physical correlate could possibly be material. This requirement would, of course, be accompanied by yet another annoying reminder that a brave 'dialectical' conclusion such as this could only ever have been imposed on nature.22
Again, it could be objected that the CMG is surely a consequence of all the matter in the Galaxy. But, the CMG is actually part of a mathematical model that we use to explain motion. Nothing actually exists in the outside world that answers to 'it', and yet 'it' is certainly not located inside our skulls (any more than the Prime Meridian is).
Moreover, the CMG can't be a property of matter since it doesn't exist in the same way that material bodies and their properties do (it doesn't share any of the features or the properties of tables and chairs, atoms and galaxies, for example). In fact, the claim that the CMG is a property of all the matter in the Galaxy is about as accurate as the idea that the average lager drinker is a property of all (or any) lager drinkers. Of course, in this case, if 'he/she' -- i.e., the average lager drinker -- were a property, 'he'/'she' couldn't then be a 'he' or a 'she', and hence wouldn't be an average person to begin with.23
It is becoming obvious that Lenin's "externality" thesis permits (or could permit) the existence of several non-material things -- in addition to the above, such things as lines of force, mirages, optical illusions, the perspectival properties of bodies, vectors, tensors, scalars, co-ordinate systems, and so on -- all the while ruling out-of-court other seemingly material things (like, 'the mind' itself).24 In addition, the past, present and future seem to pose problems for Lenin in that they all appear to possess "externality", but neither is obviously material -- nor are they the consequence of the properties of material objects (or, at least not in any obvious way).25
Worse still, empty space doesn't appear to be material, either.26 In fact, Lenin himself believed in the existence of the Ether:
"That is why Engels gave the example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is, from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Lenin (1972), p.312. Bold emphases added.]27
And, Lenin was still referring to the Ether several years later, in PN! [Cf., Lenin (1961), p.250.]
Unfortunately, the Ether doesn't exist, and never did -- even though Lenin here describes it as an "objective" feature of reality, simply because it passed his "externality" test (and it seemed to conform with contemporaneous scientific fashion). If the existence of the Ether had ever in fact been "objective", that would suggest that something could be "objective" even though it didn't actually exist, and never did. In this particular case, that would in turn mean -- if Lenin's criterion for materiality were correct -- that although there is nothing in reality answering to it, the Ether would nonetheless be material. "Objectivity" would, of course, then become synonymous with "completely fictional in some cases". Naturally, that would fatally undermine Lenin's already shaky attempt to refute the ideas of the other Fictionalists and Idealists he was criticising in MEC.
As we saw earlier, Lenin seriously over-used the word "objective"; if the latter term now allows for the 'objectivity' of fictional entities, it would make Lenin's arguments about as convincing as Tony Blair's 'case' for the invasion of Iraq.28
At any rate, and despite what he thought, Lenin's 'imaginability'/'image-ability' criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to count as 'objective'. That is because, as we have seen, there are countless things that exist outside the mind that aren't 'objective' in any clear sense of the term (e.g., mirages, the perspectival properties of bodies, surfaces, rainbows, corners, images in actual mirrors -- as well as statistically constructed entities, like the average worker), and there are 'objective' things that aren't external to the 'mind' (for example, the human 'mind' itself -- the word "mind" has been put in 'scare' quotes here for reasons that will be explained in Essay Thirteen Part Three) -- just as there are 'objective' material entities that are dependent on the human mind, and which are constituted in and by social activity (such as money, theatre tickets and revolutionary newspapers).
And, as if to complicate matters further, there are non-existent things (such as the Ether), that Lenin imagined were "objective"!
Indeed, what are we to make of the Ether? Was Lenin (or, has anyone ever been) able to form an image of this allegedly universal substance? If he (they) could, then according to the above passage it must exist. On the other hand, if he (they) couldn't form an image of it, why did Lenin think that it existed and was 'objective'?
More to the point, does the ability to form an image really matter? Who can form an image of four dimensional Spacetime? Or of a black hole? Or of a Superstring? Or of the CMG?
In fact, if imaginability/image-ability implied existence, science would surely be pointless; in such an eventuality we could rely on Hans Christian Andersen and Enid Blyton to inform us of the contents of reality, and abandon scientific research.
As is well-known, scientists were forced to conclude (in the end) that the Ether didn't exist, even though had it done so it would have satisfied Lenin's criterion of 'externality' (and it would have been 'objective' in that it would have existed independently of the mind).
[Oddly enough, some scientists (including Einstein and perhaps even Paul Dirac) still believe there is an Ether. And now, in 2011/12, there is even a Higgs-ether!29]
Nevertheless, whatever else might be true of Lenin's thoughts about material existence, it looks like scientists themselves require there be more to something than the mere possibility of its external existence (and/or its imaginability/image-ability) for it to be 'objective'.
Unfortunately, Lenin himself failed to inform his readers exactly why his 'criterion' should be adopted as a definition of matter (that is, if it was indeed a definition; on this, see Note 4) -- he just left it as a bald assertion that anything that existed 'objectively' outside the mind must be material, even when this clearly isn't a condition that only material objects satisfy or fulfil. For Lenin, it seems that just because something isn't inside the mind it must be material, otherwise it can't be. On that basis, as noted above, that would mean that the mind itself is neither 'objective' nor material! Lenin's criterion, therefore, appears to commit him to the existence of a non-material mind, since it plainly can't exist outside itself.
Paradoxically, therefore, it looks like Lenin's materialism is committed to the existence of non-material/immaterial minds!
If Lenin's 'criterion' is now watered-down, so that it allows the mind to enjoy some sort of 'objective' existence (perhaps as part of the activity of the brain, or maybe even as an "emergent" property of matter), then clearly 'externality' will have to be abandoned -- otherwise, there would be no point to Lenin's question (quoted earlier):
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside the mind, independently of man…or are these only ideas?...." [Ibid., p.324. Bold emphasis added.]
As we have seen, this passage indicates that material objectivity is definitionally connected to externality in Lenin's own mind (i.e., as a necessary and sufficient condition).
However, and even worse, this quotation seems to imply that the mind uses no energy, that it has no 'objective' existence, or that it doesn't move. Plainly, any particular mind is 'external' to all other minds, which must mean that while every other mind is 'objective' in relation to any given mind (being external to each), it isn't 'objective' with respect to itself, since it isn't external to itself. Hence, when generalised, this indicates that for Lenin all minds must be both 'objective' and non-'objective' all at once, depending on from where they are viewed. And this seems further to imply that from certain viewpoints, the mind doesn't use any energy, while from others it does -- if from some directions it is material, but from others it isn't!
It might be thought that the above difficulties could be circumvented if all minds were lumped together and classified as non-objective (or non-material), as a sort of job lot. But, in that case, as a group mind, the human mind plainly couldn't be external to itself -- if Lenin's 'criterion' is applied literally. This brave response would then mean that this 'collective mind' wouldn't be 'objective', but would be non-material, and psychologists, for example, should abandon their claim to study 'objective' features of reality embodied in the skulls of their subjects (now "clients"). If all human minds are 'non-objective', then it seems that study of them can't fail be tarred with the same 'subjectivist' brush. Psychology would thus cease to be an 'objective' science -- or, at the very least, its concerns and results could only ever be 'subjective'.30
Far worse, Lenin's thoughts about externalism, which surely once existed inside his mind, can't have been 'objective', either, by his own 'definition' (since they, too, couldn't exist outside themselves) -- and, by parity of reasoning, neither could any other DM-thought (about anything whatsoever) be 'objective'. In fact, given Lenin's 'definition', in the entire history of Dialectical Marxism, not a single one of its theorists has ever (or could ever have) had an 'objective' thought!
And if Lenin were right about this, he would be non-objectively right about it, too -- which blessed mental state might be of interest to his biographers, but would be of no concern to 'objective' science (or, indeed, to the rest of us) -- since the 'rightness' of his views would, of course, be 'subjective' by its own 'definition', in that he thought it at all. If we accept what Lenin had to say about 'objectivity' (that is, that for something to be 'objective', it had to be independent of the human mind), then nothing a DM-supporter had to say (even about 'objectivity' itself(!)) could be 'objective', could it?
"To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972), p.148. Bold emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid., p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
Moreover, just as soon as such thoughts entered the world (as materially spoken or written tokens in the air, in books, or in newspapers (etc.)), they would plainly become "external" to the mind, and would therefore become 'objective' (given Lenin's 'definition').
Unfortunately, that means that while DM-thoughts can't be 'objective', DM-sentences (etc.) themselves, when spoken or written, can be and are 'objective' -- including the false ones. Indeed, false sentences are just as 'external to the mind' as those that are true. Furthermore, and by the same token, the negation of any and all DM-theses (when written down or spoken) must be 'objective', too!30a0
On the other hand, such sentences aren't independent of the human mind. If so, and if Lenin is to be believed, they can't be 'objective'/material, they must be 'subjective', after all! But, if we take Lenin's "independent of man" caveat too seriously, nothing in human history or society would be objective, and that includes revolutions! Furthermore, that would mean that it would be impossible to appeal to practice in order to ground any of this in objectivity, since practice isn't "independent of man", either. Out of the window goes that core DM-concept!
This in turn means that just as soon as anyone reads or hears these formerly and supposedly 'objective' DM-sentences (etc.), they would become non-objective again, since they would now be part of the content of someone's mind (and hence no longer "external" to all such). But, that would mean that no one could read, interpret or regard a single DM-thesis as 'objective' unless they succeeded in keeping it 'out of their minds'. [This might be one contradiction that not even ultra-orthodox dialecticians will want simply to "grasp".] Hence, if anyone were to conclude that such an 'external' sentence was 'objective', they could only do so by means of a 'non-objective' thought to that effect -- or, indeed, by not thinking it! In that case, they could conclude nothing about the meaning of any physical embodiment of a DM-sentence without compromising its 'objectivity' -- that is, as Lenin conceived things.
At this point, it would surely tax the patience of any reader who has made it this far if the above 'objective' sentences -- in that what they say is 'objective' just in case they are aren't read or understood by anyone, if Lenin is to be believed -- were dwelt upon any longer. However, odd though this might seem, the content of the above words will be 'objective' only for those who haven't made it this far, who have never read them, or who didn't understand them -- again, if Lenin is correct. And the same goes for anything written in MEC and other DM-books or articles; their content is 'objective' only if no one, including the original author, ever read them!
It is perhaps unnecessary to underline the confusion that would be introduced into epistemology if Lenin's non-objective thoughts about 'objectivity' were ever taken seriously. Fortunately, only those already "suffering from dialectics" (to quote Max Eastman) seem foolish enough to do so.
However, Lenin's 'criterion' faces far more serious problems than the relatively minor 'difficulties' that have already been aired.
Despite the damaging conclusions that follow from some of the things Lenin unwisely committed to paper (examined earlier), he had other things to say about our knowledge of reality (incidentally, which was part of one of the few detectable arguments in the entire book!) that raise serious difficulties of their own:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
This shorter passage is even clearer:
"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added.]
Both of these appear to commit Lenin to the idea that if it is possible to form an "image" of something it must of "necessity" exist, since "an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and the latter must exist independently of that which imagines it", and an "image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images'". So, not only must it exist, it must exist "objectively".
Unfortunately, once more, Lenin forgot to say how he knew this was the case. It looks like he, too, was imposing yet another dogmatic idea on reality.
In Lenin's defence, it could be argued that this fact (if fact it be) is tautological: "an image cannot exist without the thing imaged" -- if by this he meant that "the thing imagined" exists in the mind of the one doing the imagining/imaging. In that case, Lenin would be pointing out the obvious but uninspiring fact that if an image exists (in the mind of the one doing the imaging) then manifestly it exists in that mind.
That interpretation would undermine seriously Lenin's 'materialism', which as we have seen, depends on our images reflecting objective reality. If they merely reflected what was in the mind, and only that, he would be no different from a solipsist.
Of course, the above proffered attempt to defend Lenin was shot down in flames by Lenin himself:
"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added.]
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), p.311. Bold emphasis added.]
So, if 'the mind' "images", say, an apple, it must exist objectively -- i.e., it must exist outside and independently of the mind. The problem is that this is in effect an blank epistemological cheque that Lenin has just signed, since it implies that if we can form an image of something it must exist, no matter how fanciful that image is. I will return to explore that unexpected consequence below.
Even if this were (implausibly!) what Lenin meant, the rest of what he says can't be right. It certainly isn't tautological that whatever is imagined "exists independently of that which imagines it", that is, that such things exist in 'objective reality'. It may or may not be true that imagined things actually exist 'outside the mind', but it certainly isn't the obvious truth that Lenin seems to think it is (that is, if we go along with this traditional way of depicting things for the moment)'; and it certainly doesn't follow that images imply the independent existence of the objects we take them to reflect (that is, if we do).
It could be argued that the word "image" implies that an image is an image of something, which is all that Lenin needs. Whether or not the word "image" does in fact imply this we will leave to one side for now, but one thing it does doesn't imply is the independent, 'objective' existence of whatever that image is an image of. If that were so, scientists could abandon research and engage in day-dreaming. Plainly, just because Lenin imagined that what he said was true, that doesn't make it true.
In fact, Lenin's claim is far from true; as will be demonstrated presently (here); there are many things which actually exist that we can imagine not to exist -- indeed, we can even form images of things being destroyed, or having been destroyed. And, it is also true that there are many things that we can imagine (or form images of) that do not and have never existed, as well as those that couldn't exist.
As is well known, one of Lenin's conclusions in MEC was that scientific knowledge is based on a reflection of the 'objective' world in the minds of observers or inter-actors, suitably revised over time. However, as is equally well known, representative theories of perception and knowledge (like Lenin's) have (i) Motivated the dogma that what we might take to be 'objective' features of the world are no more than 'subjective', inner shadows of dubious provenance, or they have (ii) Prompted the idea that 'reality' itself is just the play of "impressions", "sensations", or "qualia" in 'the mind'. Indeed, it could be argued that Lenin's "externalism" actually invites Idealist conclusions such as these, even though he declared himself an implacable enemy of any and all theories that overtly or covertly imply anything like it.
In the present case (concerning "images in the mind"), this worry isn't helped by the awkward realisation that despite Lenin's confidence in the deliverances of scientific theory, practically every theory that has ever been constructed has been wrong -- in many cases wildly wrong. [This claim will be substantiated in Essay Thirteen Part Two; in the meantime, see here.] In fact, with respect to Traditional Philosophy, considerations like these have always stood in the way of the formation of convincing epistemological theory of knowledge -- at least one that hasn't been supported by a sufficiently robust ontology.
In view of the fact that MEC has been -- and still is -- widely regarded by revolutionaries as the definitive response to Phenomenalism (etc.) -- if, that is, it is beefed up with material taken from PN --, naïve readers would be forgiven for thinking that MEC aired a series of devastating counter-arguments, which severally or collectively, but decisively, consigned every other rival theory to the philosophical dustbin of history.
However, as it turns out, MEC is largely an argument-free zone. Having picked through the endless pages of bombast, repetition and bluster that fill most of this book, I have been able to locate and identify only a handful of clearly recognisable philosophical arguments that Lenin marshalled in order to substantiate his hyper-bold claims, and which present a superficially credible challenge to Phenomenalism, etc. In place of a considered, critical response to alternative theories, Lenin almost invariably resorted to invective, ridicule, sarcasm, invention and abuse. Elsewhere, in order to settle issues where even his own wafer-thin arguments could be stretched no further, Lenin clearly thought it enough to quote the DM-classicists (most notably, Engels) as authorities. Failing that he limited himself merely to asking a set of rhetorical questions -- many of which would have been more profitably directed at his own theory --, all the while constantly repeating the "externalist" mantra as if it were some sort of talisman. It isn't without justification that MEC has been described as "Philosophy practised with a mallet".
Now, for those already convinced on other grounds that MEC is the non-existent deity's gift to polemic, this is all good, knock-about fun. However, for those not so easily amused (or bemused), a more pressing question suggests itself: Why have generations revolutionaries been so easily taken in by hundreds of pages of repetitious, ill-informed, abusive and ignorant bluster?
By any standards, MEC is easily one of the worst books ever to have been written on Philosophy --, certainly by a revolutionary.
And I say that as a dyed-in-the-wool Leninist.
Fortunately, there is far more to the refutation of the (epistemological) content of MEC than a handful of impertinent accusations and allegations, like those above.
As noted earlier, one of the few recognisably philosophical arguments to be found anywhere in that book (aimed at countering the theories promoted by Idealists and Phenomenalists, etc.) is the following:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Lenin (1972), p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added.]
That's it! On the basis of this half-formed, quasi-argument, Lenin hoped to counter philosophical theories some still regard as definitive -- especially when they are set against the sophomoric version of naïve realism Lenin tried to advance in MEC.
[I hasten to add that I don't consider the aforementioned philosophical theories in any way definitive! In fact, I regard all philosophical theories as incoherent non-sense. Again, I am merely drawing attention to Lenin's self-defeating approach to such questions in MEC.]
Before we consider whether or not Lenin's argument is successful in its own right, it is worth pointing out (to those dialecticians who question the deliverances of 'commonsense' -- which I take to be more-or-less the same as "naïve realism" referred to by Lenin --, and who also regale us with the 'appearance'/'reality' distinction) that 'commonsense' can't in fact be called into question if it is to act as a basis for Lenin's theory of knowledge.
[Those who think this is an unfair criticism of Lenin should read on before they draw that rather hasty conclusion.]
Despite this, and given the other complexities that DM introduces, Lenin's alleged foundation stone soon starts to crumble into dust. According to DM-epistemology, knowledge depends on the completion of an infinite process before the very first thing can be known about anything in the DM-"Totality" with anything other than infinite uncertainty.
As we have seen (follow the previous link for proof), this approach to knowledge means that nobody is in any position to determine what even a simple tumbler is before everything about everything is already known.
In reply, it could be argued that the above anti-DM counter-claim is just another unfair caricature of dialectical epistemology. But, it is worth remembering that anyone who objects on those lines is similarly in no position to assert it successfully until we are given a clear (and non-defective) account of DM-epistemology. After only 150+ years, we are still waiting.
Indeed, given DM-epistemology, no one would be in any position to assert that the above anti-DM counter-claim is unfair and know they were speaking the truth until they too had completed the aforementioned infinite ascent of 'Epistemological Mount Olympus'.
This means that all forms of 'dialectical knowledge' are permanently trapped in this sceptical quagmire -- that is, if Engels and Lenin are to be believed.
[The above seemingly controversial claims were fully substantiated in Essay Ten Part One. Readers are directed there for more details.]
Despite this, it is worth reflecting on the sort of response that, say, a Phenomenalist might make to Lenin's assertion that his theory begins with the "naïve" beliefs of ordinary folk, and builds from there:
"The 'naïve realism' of any healthy person who has not been an inmate of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the idealist philosophers consists in the view that things, the environment, the world, exist independently of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our self and of man in general. The same experience (not in the Machian sense, but in the human sense of the term) that has produced in us the firm conviction that independently of us there exist other people, and not mere complexes of my sensations of high, short, yellow, hard, etc. -- this same experience produces in us the conviction that things, the world, the environment exist independently of us. Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., pp.68-69. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
She (the supposed Phenomenalist) might wonder what, for instance, the word "image" is doing in such prosaic surroundings. Indeed, she might even suggest that if we were to ask the average human being about their knowledge of the world, the word "image" would appear nowhere in the reply.
Hence, not only is the aforementioned dialectical meander through infinite epistemological space counter-productive (since it implies infinite and permanent ignorance of everything and anything), it begins in the wrong place! 'Commonsense' and/or "naïve realism" -- whatever they are -- neither start nor end with 'images'.
[Admittedly, certain forms of phenomenalist psychology might do so, but 'commonsense' doesn't. Or, if it does, we still await the proof. That 'proof' would be worthless, anyway, since it, too, would merely consist of, or would be based on, yet more 'images', if Lenin were to be believed!]
It is worth pressing this point home: there is no evidence that the "naïve" beliefs of anyone -- not even the naïve beliefs of Dialectical Marxists -- are based on 'internal images', but there is much to suggest they aren't. Hence, there is no evidence that ordinary people, or even sophisticated socialists, believe any of the following (that is, before they had encountered the DM-classics, traditional epistemology and/or 'pop science'):
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world…." [Ibid., p.69. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The gist of his theoretical mistake in this case is substitution of eclecticism for the dialectical interplay of politics and economics (which we find in Marxism). His theoretical attitude is: 'on the one hand, and on the other', 'the one and the other'. That is eclecticism. Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces. I have shown this to be so on the example of politics and economics....
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world.... Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more. Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel...." [Lenin (1921), pp.90-93. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
In order to see this, consider the following example; suppose worker, NN, asserted the following:
L1: "That policeman hit me over the head with a truncheon!"
Now, only a rather desperate cop-defender would respond with this remark:
L2: "You are mistaken. What you experienced was in fact only an image of a policeman assaulting you."
We can be reasonably sure that NN doesn't need to wait for the asymptotic-train-of-knowledge to hit the buffers-of-absolute-certainty before she can claim to know what happened on the said picket line as the cops attacked it. Indeed, NN would be justifiably angry if a DM-fan tried to tell her that her knowledge of these uniformed assailants was only relative and partial, and that she had failed to consider all those pesky "mediacies" before arriving at such a 'rash' conclusion. Moreover, we can be quite certain now (without the presence of an accompanying 'image' -- and even before the epistemological train leaves the dialectical sidings on its endless meander to nowhere-in-particular) that NN knows she was hit on the head and who was responsible for it.
Indeed, that would be the line Socialist Worker and other revolutionary papers would (correctly) take if one of its correspondents witnessed Police violence -- in cases like the Police riot in Chicago in 1968, or in Red Lion Square London in 1974, or in relation to the death of Blair Peach in Southall 1979, the UK Miners' Strike, the picketing at Wapping in 1986, the march against the Nazis at Welling a few years later, the Police riots in Trafalgar Square in 1990, those in London in April 2009, Genoa in 2001 and 2003, those in New York and San Francisco in 2003, or even those in 2011 to clear the Occupy Movement off the streets, etc., etc. In fact, their readers would know precisely when they could stop trusting Socialist Worker and other Marxist papers: just as soon as they began describing such events in the way that Lenin characterised "knowledge", or if they started referring to the "images" in people's heads, offering the latter as 'solid evidence' substantiating claims made about Police violence -- as opposed to reporting the actual incidents themselves, referring them to video footage, photographs, witness statements and medical reports (etc.). Or, if those papers were foolish enough to insist that every "mediacy" had to be taken into account before anyone could decide what had actually happened on a given picket line or demonstration, and what to do about it.
Unsurprisingly then, in the Miners' Strike, for instance, the actual incidents were reported in Socialist Worker and other Marxist papers/articles (the same is true of subsequent analyses presented in their more theoretical journals and publications -- that also includes their websites). All wisely omit any reference to "internal images", or even "partial" and "relative knowledge", let alone any obvious "asymptotes" that might otherwise only be of interest to sundry Idealists.
Hence, in practice not one single revolutionary paper, book or article begins with "internal images" when covering the class war -- nor do they bang on about concepts eternally converging on reality. Not even the worst union bureaucrat in the history of the labour movement would adopt such language as a way of excusing the latest sell-out! That is, that everything that happens is just an "image"! Or that nothing should be done to help build a given strike before the infinite asymptote of knowledge had finally reached the safe haven of the 'x-axis'.
Update, May 1st 2024: Here, for example, is how Socialist Worker is currently reporting the murder of student protester, Jeffrey Miller, at Kent State University, Ohio, in May 1970 by The National Guard (in connection with Police violence on display in connection with the pro-Palestinian protests sweeping across the USA at present):
"Sometimes an image can capture a turning point in history. The photograph of Mary Ann Vecchio kneeling over the body of Jeffrey Miller [the picture is reproduced in the report, but it has been omitted from this quoted passage -- RL], who was shot dead by the Ohio National Guard at Kent State University on 4 May 1970, is one of those photos. On that day 54 years ago, national guards murdered four students who had been rallying against the United States. extension of its war in Vietnam into Cambodia. Not two weeks after, the police killed two students at Jackson State University, a historically black university. Revulsion that the government had brought killing sprees onto US soil spread across the country. It wasn't long before millions of students were on strike and protesting on the streets. It was a disaster for the ruling class and for president Richard Nixon, who eventually could no longer withstand the pressure from the anti-war movement. Finally he was forced to abandon his plans to expand the ruling class's war in Vietnam. The students now fighting for Palestine and battling the cops stand in the same spirit as the anti-war movement in the 1960s and 70s. And their resistance can also help bring the ruling class to its knees. A mass movement for Palestine that spills out of the campuses, onto the streets and into the workplaces could make it impossible for the US state to continue its support for Israeli slaughter in Gaza. And we have to try to do the same in Britain." [Quoted from here; accessed 01/05/2024. Links in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
The only image spoken about in fact concerns a widely circulated photograph of that poor student's lifeless body. Readers are invited to check if the article mentions any 'images' in people's heads. [Spoiler: it doesn't!]
Here, too, is a report posted at the World Socialist Web Site concerning attacks launched by New York Police on another group of pro-Palestinian protesters:
"At around 9 p.m. Tuesday night [i.e., 30/04/24 -- RL], hundreds of New York Police Department (NYPD) riot police descended on Columbia University to conduct mass arrests of students protesting the ongoing genocide in Gaza. Video shared on social media shows heavily armoured police arresting students and faculty attempting to block their access to the university. In order to prevent objective documentation of their brutality, police forced legal observers, press and medics to leave the campus area, and even public streets nearby, before they began their assault. As of this writing it is unclear how many protesters have been arrested and the extent of their injuries. The police brutality witnessed at Columbia Tuesday night was replicated across the country. At the University of South Florida in Tampa, riot police were recorded firing tear gas and rubber bullets against unarmed and peaceful protesters. The coordinated and violent assaults on non-violent student encampments have been ordered from the White House. On Tuesday, the Biden administration issued a series of statements doubling down on the lie that anti-Gaza genocide protests continuing to spread across US university campuses are anti-Semitic, signalling its support for stepped-up police attacks and arrests of peaceful protesters." [Quoted from here; accessed 01/05/2024. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Paragraphs merged.]
Other than the video footage mentioned in this report (which film doesn't exist inside anyone's brain, anyway), can any of my readers spot a single mention of 'images' in anyone's head?
In fact, it is more than a little surprising that die-hard supporters of Lenin's theory never point out to the publishers and editors of Socialist Worker and other Marxist papers, journals, books and websites where they are going wrong -- i.e., when they foolishly report on actual events in the real world and ignore all those 'images' in diverse skulls. Why hasn't a single admirer of MEC written to these publications to insist that reports of, say, neo-Nazi violence be replaced with descriptions of 'images' in victims' heads? Whatever one thinks of the far left press, none of them have ever even hinted that their reports are defective because they foolishly write about actual events in the real world, recklessly and irresponsibly ignoring 'images' inside the skulls of observers and victims alike. Or, that they failed to mention any of those pesky "mediacies" and annoying "asymptotes".
Anyway, despite what he said, Lenin didn't actually begin with the "naïve" beliefs of mankind, he did the opposite: he undermined them from the start. Indeed, he began with theories concocted by notorious ruling-class hacks, even if he modified and adapted them to his own ends. This he did by reducing ordinary belief (partially or completely) to images, or he based such beliefs on them. The same can be said of any socialist (reporter or otherwise) who does likewise -- for example, by writing about the images of Police brutality inflicted on the images of miners in an image of 1984, which images of events occurred in their image of Orgreave --, in their paper (or an image of it).
[And it is little use being told that Lenin argued that such 'images' reflect 'objective' reality; the point at issue is whether or not he began with the naive beliefs of ordinary people. The question whether they actually reflect 'objective' reality will be considered below.]
In general, the actual starting point for DM-supporters is invariably consistent with an overt denigration of the vernacular. That is often accompanied by a condescending devaluation of the lives and experience of ordinary workers -- since it is claimed that many have been 'bought-off' by super-profits, or have been mesmerised by the 'banalities' of 'commonsense', hypnotised by 'formal thinking'/'commodity fetishism' --, which elitist paradigm DM-fans have in general copied from the patronising, dismissive and belittling attitude perennially displayed toward workers by the aforementioned ruling-class hacks.
[There is more on this in Essay Twelve (summary here).]
Clearly, this is the real "copy theory of knowledge":
(i) Reproduce the ideas and thought-forms of ruling-class ideologues; and,
(ii) Make sure your theories are an exact image of theirs!
It is little use defenders of Lenin objecting that in order to gain scientific knowledge of the world (and how to change it), the following words of his are crucially important (partially quoted earlier):
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world. A tumbler is a heavy object which can be used as a missile; it can serve as a paper weight, a receptacle for a captive butterfly, or a valuable object with an artistic engraving or design, and this has nothing at all to do with whether or not it can be used for drinking, is made of glass, is cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth. Moreover, if I needed a tumbler just now for drinking, it would not in the least matter how cylindrical it was, and whether it was actually made of glass; what would matter though would be whether it had any holes in the bottom, or anything that would cut my lips when I drank, etc. But if I did not need a tumbler for drinking but for a purpose that could be served by any glass cylinder, a tumbler with a cracked bottom or without one at all would do just as well, etc.
"Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more. Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93. Italic emphasis in the original. Several paragraphs merged.]
in the above, there is no mention of 'images in the head', so the criticisms aired in this Essay are completely misguided.
Or so it could be argued....
I have discussed this important passage at length in Essay Ten Part One (here). Readers are directed there for more details.
Hold The Press! Did Lenin Really Believe In Santa Claus?
Nevertheless, whether or not ordinary human beings see the world in the way Lenin supposed they did, his argument stands or falls on its own merits.
As we are about to see, it stands about as well as the average drunk on roller skates.
Here follows one of the few attempts made by Lenin to construct a philosophical argument (of sorts!) in MEC -- as opposed to merely quoting Engels, hectoring his opponents, thumping the table, endlessly repeating himself or simply asserting things without proof --, which, as we are about to see, possesses a few untoward implications of its own:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Lenin (1972), p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
Again, later on in MEC, Lenin was even clearer:
"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added. In both of these, the quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
There are several serious problems with these passages:
(A) Contrary to what Lenin imagined, images not only can, they actually do exist without there being anything 'objective' corresponding to them in reality. For instance, it is easy to conjure up an image of Santa Claus, but apparently only children and foolish parents believe he exists.
However, if we take Lenin at his word -- "The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images'" (emphases added) --, it must mean we should add Lenin to the list of those who believe in Santa Claus!30a
The following considerations show that this untoward example isn't unique:
(1) The existence of mirages doesn't commit us to their 'objectivity'.
(2) It is possible to form images in the mind's eye of people who no longer exist -- which plainly doesn't imply they do exist.
(3) It is easy to induce vivid but formless coloured images (phosphenes) 'inside' the eyeball by gently pressing one or other of them with a finger. Clearly, this doesn't mean that these artificial images reflect anything 'objective' in the 'outside world'.
(4) Again, by re-focussing, or by pressing one eye, it is possible to form two images of the same object (which our system of sight normally merges into one). But, no one believes that there are in fact two identical copies of the same object in reality answering to these two pre-merged images. By a similar trick, it is also possible to see a three-dimensional image in a two-dimensional "magic eye" picture. Similarly, this doesn't mean that these images correspond with anything in the 'external world'.
(5) We see stars every night (or are they merely images of stars?); according to scientists, many of them no longer exist. Does this mean that they are mistaken and they do exist, after all?
(6) A scientist photographs a bent stick in a bucket of water. Does this image of the bent stick prove that there really are bent sticks in buckets of water?
(7) Someone claims to see an image of Christ in the clouds. Should we all become Christians? [Maybe not.]
(8) Those who have lost limbs claim they can still feel them long after they have been amputated. Does this odd sensation (or is it an image?) prove that the surgeon who performed the operation was in fact incompetent? Others experience sensations in artificial limbs. Does that show they aren't artificial after all?
Examples like these can be multiplied almost indefinitely. Any book (or website) devoted to optical illusions will provide numerous further examples.
If so, why did Lenin claim that DM begins with the "naïve belief" of humankind if this introduces "images" of things that only the severely disturbed actually believe picture things in 'objective' reality? Few ordinary people (not in the grip of superstition, drink, drugs, or mental illness) would be fooled into believing that phantom limbs, mirages, and dragons actually exist -- or that sticks bend when immersed in water.
"The 'naïve realism' of any healthy person who has not been an inmate of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the idealist philosophers consists in the view that things, the environment, the world, exist independently of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our self and of man in general.... Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., pp.68-69. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Lenin can't have been unaware of this. In which case, it isn't easy to understand why he concluded that anyone (not afflicted in the above manner) begins with "images" rather than with a healthy distrust of them. Or, even better: Why should anyone mention "images" in this connection, to begin with, if only the mentally ill, the terminally naïve, the superstitious or those high (perhaps) on LSD or Mescaline would even think to base their knowledge of the world on them?
(B) There are many things that exist -- to which we can easily refer -- of which we can form no images. For example, who among us can imagine (or 'image') a light ray, a π-meson, a gene, 10100 elementary particles (or even one elementary particle) --, or, indeed, the universe itself?
This shows that "objectivity" has nothing to do with 'imaginability' (or even 'image-ability').
Of course, the above examples merely confirm that images don't have to correspond with anything in the 'real world'; however, as are about to see, they can't correspond with them.30b
(C) Images can't correspond with the objects they supposedly depict or represent. If anything, this observation is even more true of the sort of objects and processes studied in the sciences -- or, indeed, those mentioned by Lenin.
To be sure, Lenin did attempt to argue as follows:
"It is beyond doubt that an image cannot wholly resemble the model, but an image is one thing, a symbol, a conventional sign, another. The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Lenin (1972), p.279.]
"A reflection may be an approximately true copy of the reflected, but to speak of identity is absurd. Consciousness in general reflects being -- that is a general principle of all materialism. It is impossible not to see its direct and inseparable connection with the principle of historical materialism: social consciousness reflects social being." [Ibid., p.391. Bold emphases added.]
How Lenin knew this to be the case is somewhat unclear. Indeed, and quite the opposite, Lenin couldn't possibly have known that an image is an "approximate" copy of the "thing reflected" unless he had independent access to the "thing reflected" with which to compare it. Was he able to 'jump out of his own head'?
Even so, and annoyingly, he then went on to assert (or imply) the opposite of the above:
"There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is 'beyond' phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) -- all this is the sheerest nonsense, Schrulle, crotchet, invention." [Ibid., p.110.]
"What two lines of philosophical tendency does Engels contrast here? One line is that the senses give us faithful images of things, that we know the things themselves, that the outer world acts on our sense-organs. This is materialism -- with which the agnostic is not in agreement. What then is the essence of the agnostic's line? It is that he does not go beyond sensations, that he stops on this side of phenomena, refusing to see anything 'certain' beyond the boundary of sensations. About these things themselves (i.e., about the things-in-themselves, the 'objects in themselves,' as the materialists whom Berkeley opposed called them), we can know nothing certain -- so the agnostic categorically insists. Hence, in the controversy of which Engels speaks the materialist affirms the existence and knowability of things-in-themselves. The agnostic does not even admit the thought of things-in-themselves and insists that we can know nothing certain about them." [Ibid., pp.116-17.]
"All knowledge comes from experience, from sensation, from perception. That is true. But the question arises, does objective reality 'belong to perception,' i.e., is it the source of perception? If you answer yes, you are a materialist. If you answer no, you are inconsistent and will inevitably arrive at subjectivism, or agnosticism, irrespective of whether you deny the knowability of the thing-in-itself, or the objectivity of time, space and causality (with Kant), or whether you do not even permit the thought of a thing-in-itself (with Hume). The inconsistency of your empiricism, of your philosophy of experience, will in that case lie in the fact that you deny the objective content of experience, the objective truth of experimental knowledge....
"The Machians love to declaim that they are philosophers who completely trust the evidence of our sense-organs, who regard the world as actually being what it seems to us to be, full of sounds, colours, etc., whereas to the materialists, they say, the world is dead, devoid of sound and colour, and in its reality different from what it seems to be, and so forth.... They do not recognise objective reality, independent of man, as the source of our sensations. They do not regard sensations as a true copy of this objective reality, thereby directly conflicting with natural science and throwing the door open for fideism...." [Ibid., pp.142-43.
"Acceptance or rejection of the concept matter is a question of the confidence man places in the evidence of his sense-organs, a question of the source of our knowledge, a question which has been asked and debated from the very inception of philosophy, which may be disguised in a thousand different garbs by professorial clowns, but which can no more become antiquated than the question whether the source of human knowledge is sight and touch, healing and smell. To regard our sensations as images of the external world, to recognise objective truth, to hold the materialist theory of knowledge -- these are all one and the same thing...." [Ibid., p.145. In all of the above, bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
These passages seem pretty clear: there can be "no difference in principle" between "the phenomena and the thing-in-itself"; "objective reality" belongs to "perception"; sensations are a "true copy of" objective reality they are "images of the external world" and are part of the recognition of "objective truth". No hint here of Lenin's much more tempered 'relativism':
"In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact." [Ibid., p.111. Italic emphases in the original.]
"Dialectics -- as Hegel in his time explained -- contains the element of relativism, of negation, of scepticism, but is not reducible to relativism. The materialist dialectics of Marx and Engels certainly does contain relativism, but is not reducible to relativism, that is, it recognises the relativity of all our knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense that the limits of approximation of our knowledge to this truth are historically conditional." [Ibid., p.154. Italic emphases in the original.]
But, from the above rather dogmatic pronouncements concerning non-dogmatism (for which he offered no proof, not even a single argument in support), it looks like Lenin thought he had already reached the end of that "infinite journey" (upon which we are all supposed to be involuntary wayfarers) that takes each DM-acolyte ever closer to 'The Truth' (here, quoting Engels):
"Here once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of generations of mankind." [Ibid., p.149. For the exact reference to Engels, see below.]
[We have already seen that this approach to 'truth' would condemn anyone foolish enough to adopt it to infinite ignorance.]
Hence, Lenin doesn't say that perception or sensation is an approximate copy of "objective reality", but that it is a "true copy", and that "objective reality" belongs to "perception". Nor does he claim that "the phenomena" roughly correspond to "the thing-in-itself", he dogmatically asserts there is "in principle" no "difference" between them.
Again, how he knew all this he annoyingly kept to himself. Admittedly, he refers to practice in a vain attempt to to rescue his theory, but we have already seen that such an appeal can't rescue his theory, either. [We will return to this specific topic again, below.]
Be this as it may, if we have to view things in this 'traditional' way (again, no pun intended), then, as it turns out, an image can't even approximately resemble that of which it is allegedly the image. On the contrary, an 'image' doesn't even remotely correspond to its intended target, nor could it (even in theory, never mind in actuality). Hence, whether or not Lenin spoke about the approximate, or even the absolute, correspondence or identity between an "image" and "objective reality", his theory falls flat on its face even before it reaches the very first hurdle, as we are about to find out.
In order to appreciate this point, consider an observer's view of, say, one of Scotland's greatest mountains, Liathach (in Torridon, Wester Ross).
[Pronounced, "Lee-ah-Gach", with a hardened "ch", like someone clearing their throat, but not like the "ch" in "chips". Others pronounce it "Lee-ach" (again with that guttural "ch").]
First, let us assume that Lenin is 100% correct about observers, their "images" and what they supposedly reflect. In that case, let an observer stand (or use a drone fitted with a camera) n metres from the base of this mountain at a height of k metres above sea level (0 < k < 1056 (metres), initially -- Liathach's height is 1055m). Clearly, the view this person would now have of that mountain will alter as she circles around it and as n or k vary. Let us say that for every degree circled around the base (in one plane), each view of the mountain will change sufficiently enough for it to be, or for it to produce a recognisably different "image" experienced by that observer. Now, each such sighting of Liathach will in fact represent 1/360th (or approximately 0.3%) of the entire set of such perimeter "views" of this mountain, in that plane, at that height.
If the viewing plane is now rotated, an entirely new observational circuit can be generated for this one mountain. Hence, if each plane is inclined at one degree to the next, then there will be 180 of these. Of course, this assumes that Liathach can be viewed from below ground level --, which would clearly be ridiculous -- but if Liathach is now replaced by The Moon, the same point can be made just as easily. Anyway, an 'objective view' (that is, an observer-less 'view') of anything can't surely be embarrassed by the limitations of human perceptual modalities, or by the presence of other objects in the line-of-sight.
Below, I have added several photographs of Liathach, taken from different points on the compass, at different heights, angles, seasons and in varying lighting conditions, so that the reader may better appreciate the point being made. Alternatively, readers might like to 'fly around' Liathach using Google Earth or visit it on Street View (click here if you want to skip past these photographs):
Figure Two: 'Google Street View' Of Liathach (From The East)
Figures Three And Four: Liathach From Loch Clair (From The East South East)
Figure Five: Liathach From The West North West (From Beinn Alligin)
Figure Six: Close-Up Of Liathach From The East (Above The A896)
Figure Seven: Liathach From The East (From Glen Torridon And The A896)
Figure Eight: Liathach In The Distance, From The North North West
(Probably From The B8056, Or The A832, Near Gairloch)
Figure Nine: Liathach From The North West (From The Flowerdale Forest)
Figure Ten: Liathach From The South South East
(From The Summit Of Maol Cheann-Dearg -- Pronounced "Mole Khin Jerrig")
Figure Eleven: Liathach From The South West
(From Creag An Eirich, On The South Shore Of Loch Torridon)
Figure Twelve: Liathach From The West South West (Near Shieldaig)
Figure Thirteen: From Spidean A' Choire Leith (The Main Summit Of Liathach, At 1055 Metres/3456 Feet
-- Pronounced "Spid-jee-an A Corrie Lee-ach"), Looking West Toward The Second Summit
(Mullach An Rathain,1023 Metres/3133 Feet -- Pronounced "Mullach An Raan")
Figure Fourteen: Looking East To Spidean A' Choire Leith From Mullach An Rathain
Figure Fifteen: Landsat Of Liathach
Figure Sixteen: A (Very!) Approximate Location Of Liathach
(The Red Dot Should Be A Few More Millimetres To The Right!)
And here are a few of my pictures (taken in May 2008):
Figure Seventeen: Liathach From The East
Figure Eighteen: Spidean A' Choire Leith
From The East North East (At Approximately 700 Metres)
Figure Nineteen: Looking West Toward The Second Summit, Mullach An Rathain
Figure Twenty: The Northern Pinnacles Of Mullach An Rathain
From East (At Approximately 800 Metres)
Figure Twenty-One: The Northern Pinnacles Of Mullach An Rathain
From The North North East (At Approximately 250 Metres)
Figure Twenty-Two: Close-Up Of The Northern Pinnacles Of Mullach An Rathain
From The North North East (At Approximately 250 Metres)
And here is a video of this mountain, shot by an 'internet friend' of mine -- my use if this video does not imply its owner agrees with any of the views expressed at this site:
Video One: Liathach, The 'Grey One'
This means that there are 360 x 180 possible views of this mountain (minus the 180 common overlapping points) -- i.e., 64,620 --, each one representing approximately 0.0015% of the total available for this mountain, at that height and distance. [By "at that height" here I mean the height of the centre of rotation.]
Keeping the height constant, we can now vary the distance. Assume that this mountain is clearly visible for up to 25km (16 miles), and that for every extra metre further away a distinct view may be had. If, for each of these metres 64,620 circuit views are also possible, that would mean that there are, for this one object at this height, 64,620 x 25 x 1000 (or 1,615,500,000) possible views. Each of these sightings will therefore represent approximately 6 x 10-8 % (or approximately 0.000000062%) of those available for this one mountain.
Of course, a finer-grained division of viewing angles would make even this small percentage look rather large in comparison, as would adjusting the distance from which this mountain can be viewed. So, assuming the base of this mountain is approximately 3km (2 miles) from its geometric centre, a one-degree turn about Liathach represents roughly a 50m arc at the base; at 25km (16 miles), one degree represents roughly 420m.
In addition, if the lighting and weather conditions are varied, even the above figure (i.e., 0.000000062%) would itself become rather large in comparison, too.
Assume further that for each 'view' there corresponds one 'image' (or 'potential image') in 'the mind' of this observer. That would mean that even if each image is a perfect copy, it wouldn't even remotely correspond with the 'objective' mountain -- which is, of course, a perspectiveless 'object' situated in at least three dimensions, possibly four, 'condensed' out of the vector and scalar fields that scientists assure us are, like 'God', everywhere.
Now, it could be argued in response to this that each of these images does in fact correspond with, and is a copy of, an 'objective' view of Liathach from whatever position the latter is experienced, which is all that Lenin needs. But, this reply is unavailable to anyone who actually agrees with Lenin. He requires each image to correspond with objective reality, and/or vice versa. He said nothing about images corresponding with 'views' of objective reality. In an 'objective' universe, there are no viewers -- nor even hypothetical viewers --, nor are there any 'views' to which images might or might not correspond. This means that each image of Liathach can't correspond to an 'objective view' of anything, since there is no such thing as an 'objective' view (if, that is, we leave 'God' and the mythical 'Ideal Observer' out of the picture). Plainly, that is because a 'view' requires a viewer (a sentient being, a man or a woman); as already noted, that is because in an 'objective world' truth is "independent" of humanity, and so can't be based on any such 'views' . As Lenin himself argued:
"To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972), p.148. Bold emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid., p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
But, if "objective truth" is "independent of man", then, at best, images must 'correspond' with an 'independent' world, not 'views' of it.
Anyway, a hasty appeal to 'views' of 'objective reality' would immediately concede dangerous ground to Phenomenalism by admitting that 'objects' in reality amount to nothing more than actual or possible perceptions (or 'views') of 'them'.
Hence, given Lenin's theory, and as pointed out earlier, no 'image' would (or could) even remotely resemble the object in 'reality' it is supposed to 'reflect'.
As seems plain, these insurmountable problems confront the 'images' that supposedly 'reflect' any given object or process, not just magnificent mountains in Scotland. Indeed, with regard to the sort of things we can't see (such as the theoretical particles we find in modern Physics, like, say, electrons -- or, worse, centres of mass), we can't even begin to form an image of them so that they could correspond, or fail to correspond, with any such 'view' there might be of them. Since, as noted above, there is no such thing as a 'view' of anything in an observerless, a-sentient universe.
[The word "theoretical" here doesn't mean the present author doubts the existence of electrons, only that they are precisely defined components of a highly complex and (so we are told) well-founded body of theory. So, their nature is integral to the theory to which they belong. Any significant change to that theory (which regularly happens in science, as we have seen in Essays Ten Part One and Eleven Part One) can't fail to have a knock-on effect on the defined nature of the electron. That is all that is meant by the word "theoretical" in such a context in this Essay (unless stated otherwise). I will say much more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Some might appeal to photographs at this point, but a photograph is a 'view' of some object or other only to a human viewer. We can certainly view photographs, but photographs themselves have no eyes (and neither do cameras), so they can't view anything -- except perhaps metaphorically -- as in "This is a view of Uncle Joe at the side of the house....", or "Use the viewfinder like this...". We can take photographs from certain views, but is we who see these views, not the cameras we use -- still less the photographs we take of them.
Of course, with respect to, say, the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy [CMG], there is in fact nothing there for anyone to form an image of, and yet the CMG exercises a decisive causal influence on the movement of the entire Galaxy. In which case, 'objectivity' appears to have little to do with physical presence, or, indeed, our capacity to form images.
We might try to circumvent these difficulties by arguing that since both images and objects are both parts of 'objective' reality, the contrast outlined above is spurious. If both object and image are 'objective' (since, presumably, they both really exist), then the universe must contain 'objective' images as well as 'objective' objects.
However, this reply would completely scupper Lenin's distinction between "objective reality" and the "subjective" contents of the mind. If "objectivity" is now equated with Lenin's doctrine (that I have labelled "externality"), then mental images (even of objects and processes in "objective reality") couldn't themselves be "objective" unless they, too, were external to the mind. A fortiori, an "objective" image would thus have to be external to any and all minds -- that is, it would have to be external to itself!
Naturally, this means that not only could no mind be "objective", no image could, either!
However, should the example of the Scottish mountain seem out of place in a scientific context, consider the image of, say, a hand. Presumably, such an image will be occasioned either by looking at it (which is what Lenin appears to think an image of a hand is -- he seems to think images result from direct perception), or by forming one in the mind's eye (from memory perhaps). But, the real 'objective hand' -- as 'revealed' by science -- 'looks' nothing like this, or, for that matter, any 'imaged' hand. The 'scientific hand' is a complex ensemble of elementary particles (and/or tensor, vector, scalar fields), spruced up with a few probability density distributions, residing in a three-, or a four-dimensional manifold. It is unlikely that this is how anyone actually imagines (or 'images') his or her own hand to be. Worse still, it is unlikely that anyone could form an image of a 'scientific hand' -- and that includes scientists themselves!
It could be argued that the above 'analysis' completely ignores the dialectical process of cognition, as the human mind progressively refines its images of reality through practice and, as result, increases the objectivity of its knowledge of the world -- indeed, as Lenin argued (quoting Engels):
"'Here once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much un limited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition..., its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual expression and in its realisation at each particular moment....'
"'Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth'.... Here follows the example of Boyle's law (the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The 'grain of truth' contained in this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The law, it appears, is a truth 'only approximately'.
"Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge." [Ibid., pp.150-51, quoting Engels (1976), pp.108-09, 114. The on-line and published translations are slightly different. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link added.]
Unfortunately for Lenin and Engels (and anyone who agrees with them), this approach would consign humanity to infinite ignorance (that was established here). [See also below.]
But, even if sense could be made of this 'process' (and in Essay Three we will see that the answer to that question is definitely negative -- where it has also been shown that the more 'sophisticated' theory of knowledge that Lenin aired in PN failed to fix the problems left by the 'simpler' theory presented in MEC), it can't provide an effective response to the criticisms advanced in this Essay. That is because not even expert dialecticians and scientists can 'leap out of their heads' to check whether or not their "images" correspond with anything in reality. And, even if they could, their images would, at best, still only 'correspond' with 'views' of certain 'objects', which can't be 'objective' for reason explored earlier. Not even a 'god-like' image of anything could correspond with its supposed object unless that object were viewed from all angles and all times, at once. Even then, those images would still correspond to 'views' of that object, not the object itself. Whatever one thinks of 'God', not even 'He'/'She'/'It' can leap out of 'His'/'Her'/'Its' 'head'. Finally, even if 'God' could do that, 'He'/'She'/'It' would still be comparing views of objects with other views of objects, not those objects themselves.
Alas for Lenin and other DM-fans, there is no mind-independent way of viewing objects.
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks, i.e., Lenin (1961); MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, i.e., Lenin (1972).]
So, for sentient beings -- given the traditional way of framing and then 'solving' this pseudoproblem -- there is no way out of this metaphysical cul-de-sac.
[Why this is a pseudoproblem and why there are in fact no 'philosophical problems' associated with perception and knowledge (or in connection with anything whatsoever) is explained in Essay Twelve Part One.]
To sum up: we have seen from the last few sections of this Essay that the following appear to be the case:
(1) It is possible for images to be radically different from the 'reality' they supposedly depict.
(2) We can form images of things that don't exist.
(3) We can't form images of many things that do exist.
(4) It is impossible to form an image of most, if not all, 'objective' scientific objects and processes.
And:
(5) No image could correspond with anything other than a "subjective view" of anything -- if even that.
In which case, Lenin's rock solid "foundation" looks about as solid as a jellyfish in a blender.
[At this point, it is worth emphasising that the argument and the 'thought experiments' outlined above do not contradict what was said earlier (in Essay Three Part Two, for example) concerning the widely-held belief that common sense has been undermined by science, since it is clear that the given contrast is meant to apply to images and 'realities' as scientists themselves supposedly experience or interpret them -- but, only if we accept Lenin's theory of perception and knowledge. As such, the above observations were specifically meant to undermine Lenin's version of naïve realism, not common sense. Indeed, they were intended to show that images (as conceived by Lenin) can be (and mostly are) totally different from their supposed 'referents' -- that is, should they have any referents, or should we have any 'images' of them, or should we be able to say with what such 'images' are supposed to correspond by any avenue available to us that hasn't itself been 'subjectively' compromised or biased. Or even if our images were objects of comparison, to begin with --, and thus are totally different from their supposed causes. In addition, they were meant to counter Lenin's claim that knowledge begins with an extrapolation from images. Since ordinary folk plainly do not do this (and neither do scientists -- or DM-theorists(!) --, and that includes Lenin), the above considerations have no effect (or bearing) on common sense; nor do they challenge our use of ordinary language.]
In contrast -- as we all seem to be aware -- knowledge-that claims (as in "NN knows that the Tories are liars") are typically expressed by using indicative sentences, which in turn manifest themselves in linguistic form.30c Now, such indicative sentences aren't part of any particular individual's 'mental universe', unlike images. They are publicly-, and socially-sanctioned expressions, written on paper in very material books, articles and reports, or they are conveyed by equally material sound waves through eminently physical media.
Hence, when Darwin, for example, attempted to revolutionise evolutionary theory, he didn't even once refer to his or anyone else's mental imagery. Nor did he begin from there, either. He wrote sentences. Lenin can't have been unaware of this easily confirmed fact.
(D) Finally, it is worth asking whether or not it is possible for images to be just that -- i.e., images simpliciter, but not of 'objective' realities? After all, some of the images we do in fact experience are of mythical (non-existent) creatures. Clearly, those images don't relate to anything 'objective'. If so, Lenin's argument backfires, once more. The images he took to be of objects and processes in the real world could similarly turn out to be just like those we are able to form of fabulous/mythical beasts (unicorns and dragons, for example). In that case, for all we know -- for all Lenin knew -- our knowledge of the world could be no more secure than belief in Gryphons and Harpies.30d
Of course, this isn't to suggest that the above is the case, or that it is sensible even to suppose that it is, or even that the present author thinks it is. It merely serves as a reminder that Lenin's disastrous theory about the source of our knowledge, and, indeed, knowledge itself, invites Phenomenalist suspicions such as these.
Nevertheless, it is clear that with respect to images, at least, Lenin didn't actually mean what his comments (recorded above) might suggest. According to him, all knowledge of the world is based on -- or starts from -- images derived from sense experience. Admittedly, he went on to argue that the 'objectivity' of such images had to be confirmed by science (and/or practice), refined over the centuries, subject to possible future revision, etc., etc., which he subsequently re-configured with a few obscure phrases drawn from his study of Hegel's Logic, in PN. But, because of the avowedly infinitary process required by his theory, it turns out that objects and events in reality (which supposedly answer to, or which cause, our images of them) often turn out to be less like the original images that actually initiated this epistemological process than those that had been the motivators of the aforementioned "naïve beliefs". Indeed, the "naïve beliefs" of the ordinary man or woman correspond with little that modern science finds in nature. For instance, when the average human being looks at a (solid) table, is that what modern science (supposedly) tells us about the 'real' nature of sundry items of furniture? When they talk about colour do they really see the effect of light on the atomic structure of surfaces, on the shifting orbitals of electrons?
[Added on Edit, April 2024: As noted above, I have now written a detailed criticism of Lenin's (supposedly superior) 'dialectical theory' of cognition, set out in PN. It has been published in Appendix Three of Essay Three Part Two.]
That being so, it is worth asking the following: According to Lenin (or his epigones), with what (if anything) do these ordinary, naïve 'images' actually correspond? Given Lenin's account, they must in fact relate to nothing at all. That is because scientific knowledge (allegedly) shows that they are largely (if not entirely) illusory.
So, while the average person might claim to see the Sun rise each morning, their 'image' of it corresponds with nothing (or with no process remotely like it) in the 'objective' world, given this way of depicting 'reality'. Not only does the Sun not rise, what the average man or woman 'sees' isn't even the Sun, but an 'image' of it created by the perception of light from this object, delayed by over eight minutes. In short they 'see' a "retarded image" of the Sun (again, only if we insist on depicting things in this way; for an alternative way of framing such questions, see Ebersole (2001, 2002a, 2002b)).
Moreover, this 'image' of the Sun is itself doubly misleading, for not only is the 'real', 'objective' Sun not coloured yellow, it is neither flat and circular, nor 'objectively' hot (since heat is a 'subjective response' to phenomena, which in no way 'resembles' that phenomena -- i.e., the cause of heat does not even remotely resemble the experience of heat), again, given this odd way of looking at knowledge (no pun intended).
Nor is the 'objective' Sun actually made of anything substantial. It is largely "empty space" (so we are told). In fact, the 'objective/scientific' Sun is just a complex set of processes best pictured by sophisticated differential equations, vector and tensor operators in an abstract mathematical space/field of some sort or description -- or, perhaps, even in Spacetime (etc., etc.). Who on earth -- or anywhere else for that matter -- could possibly see, or 'image', anything like that? Given this approach, each ordinary 'view' of the Sun is no view at all. And what goes for the Sun goes for all that lies beneath it.
Of course, there are well-known, and fatal, weaknesses associated even with the 'scientific view of reality' -- not least that this approach would make the identification of the 'real', 'objective' 'Sun' problematic in itself. If all our ordinary descriptions of the Sun are wrong, and the 'Sun' really is nothing but a complex set of processes in four-dimensional Spacetime, it would thereby be impossible for anyone to comprehend the supposed subject of the scientific study of 'the Sun'. No one would know what 'it' was that is said to exist in this four-dimensional world, to which all this complicated mathematical or scientific language supposedly 'refers'. If enough of our beliefs about the ordinary Sun are wrong or misleading, it would become impossible to say what the ordinary word "Sun" in fact referred to -- or even if it referred at all.
Hence, it seems that not only can scientists not undermine the solidity of ordinary objects, like tables and chairs (more on this in a later Essay, but see here and here in the meantime), they can't plant the Sun (i.e., the ordinary Sun, not its scientific/theoretical cousin) in four-dimensional Spacetime, either -- that is, not without losing the right to call it "the Sun", to begin with. At which point, of course, this 'object', residing in four dimensions, would eclipse any theory in which it so featured, casting one or both into eternal darkness -- for no one would know what the hell was being spoken about.
[This isn't to deny the usefulness of scientific theory; it is merely to point out that (in this case) much of it applies to a mathematical model -- and, plainly, the universe isn't a mathematical model. The above line-of-reasoning is a continuation of that found in Essay Three Part Two -- as well as Essay Four Part One --, where it was more fully motivated and developed. It will be expanded upon in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
This means that if Lenin were correct (in believing that our images of the world 'reflect' external realities when they have been confirmed by scientific practice), then, paradoxically, he would also have been wrong on that very score, for nothing about our 'images' (of anything) would actually correspond with the "objective" entity to which they supposedly refer, according to 'scientific practice' itself. This is, of course, because "objective" objects and processes (in physics, at least) are perspectiveless, mathematical entities and processes residing in three-, or four-dimensions -- about which we are incapable of forming any images. [Plainly, we can only form perspectival images in three dimensions (or non-perspectival ones in two or less). Some claim to be able to form four-dimensional images, but, even if that were so, they would still be images from a certain perspective. There are no perspectives in nature independently of perceivers.]
Lest the reader is confused at this point, it needs emphasising (again!) that the above comments aren't aimed at attacking ordinary language and common sense (or even science!), only at undermining Lenin's naïve realism and his inconsistent reliance on a decidedly odd view of all three. Just as inappropriate interpretations of the deliverances of modern science suggest that we can form no images of external reality that correspond with their supposed referents, so Lenin's 'theory' also suggests that none of our images can possibly correspond with anything at all in 'objective' reality.
And, with that observation, much of MEC simply disintegrates.
Now, apart from baldly extrapolating from thoughts about "images" to truths about the world, Lenin offered his readers no proof -- not even a weak argument in support of the idea -- that "images" aren't all that would emerge at the end of this process. There is no hint in MEC how "images" may successfully be grounded in "objective reality". On the contrary, Lenin's theory suggests that all we will ever have are "images" piled up on top of yet more "images".
And the same conclusion emerges even when practice is factored-in, DM-style. Hence, if Lenin is correct, human beings will only ever have images of human practice (which likewise fail to correspond with a 'scientific view' of this part of 'objective reality', and for the same reason), as images are piled on top of more images of people trying to put their own images into practice (or, rather, into their images of images of practice), crowned by yet more images of them succeeding (or failing) to form still more images of the successful testing (or otherwise) of their image of the theory/idea they were hoping to check, or test...
Worse still, as was argued in detail here, given DM-epistemology, humanity will only ever attain to knowledge that is based on images that are individuated in what turn out to be socially-, and epistemologically-isolated brains. Hence, on this view, the very best that a member of the human race could ever hope to attain in this regard is the formation of relatively less 'valid' images of 'something-they-know-not-what' -- possibly even of nothing at all --, all restricted to an image of the space between their ears. Any attempt to appeal to inter-subjective knowledge here would flounder, too, since Lenin's theory implies that humanity will only ever possess images of other human beings and their practice. The bottom line here is that, if Lenin were correct, we would all be trapped in a solipsistic (image of a) world.
Given Lenin's theory, the object of knowledge would remain forever (and infinitely) obscure, since, ex hypothesi, 'dialectical objects' can only really be 'identified' (made 'concrete') at the end of an infinite asymptotic meander toward 'absolute knowledge' -- assuming, of course, that there are such 'objects' to begin with and there is such a meander (and not simply an "image" of it!). And, even that seems unlikely, since no image we are ever capable of forming could conceivably correspond to an "objective" object or process in reality, let alone an infinitary one, and for reasons outlined above.
It could be argued at this point that Lenin is interested in relative truth as it slowly converges on absolute truth. But the above conclusions would prevent this, turning 'knowledge' into some form of relativism, or subjectivism. At this point it is worth reminding ourselves that DM-epistemology (as outlined by Engels and Lenin) itself implies that knowledge will always remain infinitely far from 'the truth'. So, far from it being the case that Lenin was interested in 'relative truth', his own theory reveals he was actually talking about infinite error.
Moreover, the approach adopted at this site is neither relativist nor subjectivist. As pointed out in Essay One, that approach is more accurately to be described as nothing-at-all-ist -- and that shouldn't be confused with nihilism. In fact, this stance represents a total rejection of Traditional Philosophy as just so much self-important, ruling-class hot air -- indeed, repudiating it along lines advocated by Marx himself.
Hence, given Lenin's theory, each individual would now only possess what are in fact images of an infinite search for yet more images!. Worse still, on this view, no single 'knower' will ever know whether he/she had the 'same' image as anyone else, of anything. Each 'knower' will remain forever trapped in their own private 'inner auditorium', sat alone contemplating the images that 'something' had sent their way, 'testing' them, if they so chose, with images of practice projected, represented, or experienced in the very same 'internal sanctum'. And that would be the case with every other individual -- or, rather, it would be the case with images of every other human being, along with their imputed images of practice, the existence of which no one could confirm without yet more images getting in the way! As noted above, inter-subjective practical confirmation would be locked forever in a privatised, ghostly world of rootless 'images'.
[Of course, given other DM-strictures, we already know that no one could have the same image as anyone else, since nothing is identical with anything else in this crazy DM-universe, including images! Worse still, no one could even have the same image of 'approximately the same image' of anything, including their own images!]
Now, Lenin might have firmly believed that there exists a 'we-know-not-what out there in objective reality' (which is, in effect, a Noumenon by another name) that is the true cause of our images of 'it', and that this 'it' is indeed the object of our ('relative'/approximate) 'knowledge' or beliefs about 'it'.
Indeed, Lenin repeatedly says things like the following:
"Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it. There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known.... The sole and unavoidable deduction to be made from this -- a deduction which all of us make in everyday practice and which materialism deliberately places at the foundation of its epistemology -- is that outside us, and independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and that our perceptions are images of the external world. Mach’s converse theory (that bodies are complexes of sensations) is nothing but pitiful idealist nonsense." [Lenin (1972), pp.110-11. Paragraphs merged.]
"Natural science leaves no room for doubt that its assertion that the earth existed prior to man is a truth. This is entirely compatible with the materialist theory of knowledge: the existence of the thing reflected independent of the reflector (the independence of the external world from the mind) is a fundamental tenet of materialism." [Ibid., pp.136-37.]
"Recognising the existence of objective reality, i.e., matter in motion, independently of our mind, materialism must also inevitably recognise the objective reality of time and space, in contrast above all to Kantianism, which in this question sides with idealism and regards time and space not as objective realities but as forms of human understanding.... 'Space and time,' says Feuerbach, 'are not mere forms of phenomena but essential conditions...of being'.... Regarding the sensible world we know through sensations as objective reality, Feuerbach naturally also rejects the phenomenalist (as Mach would call his own conception) or the agnostic (as Engels calls it) conception of space and time. Just as things or bodies are not mere phenomena, not complexes of sensations, but objective realities acting on our senses, so space and time are not mere forms of phenomena, but objectively real forms of being. There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time. Human conceptions of space and time are relative, but these relative conceptions go to compound absolute truth. These relative conceptions, in their development, move towards absolute truth and approach nearer and nearer to it. The mutability of human conceptions of space and time no more refutes the objective reality of space and time than the mutability of scientific knowledge of the structure and forms of matter in motion refutes the objective reality of the external world." [Ibid., pp.202-03. Paragraphs merged; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[In fact, I have listed at least 46 separate occasions in MEC alone where Lenin asserts, over and over again, something like the above.]
But, beginning with, and always remaining inside, the parameters set by Lenin himself, an image is all that he will ever possess at any point in this infinite 'dialectical meander toward the light'. Constantly repeated assertions, no matter how fervently they are believed or how emphatically they are stressed, are incapable of penetrating the screen of 'images' Lenin unwisely inserted between himself and (his image of) the 'outside world'. The bottom line is, therefore, that all Lenin now has left is faith that there is 'a world out there', somewhere...
So, it now transpires that the half-baked theory Lenin invented is little different from the "fideism" he rightly castigated elsewhere in the same book. This means that key ideas of MEC are based on nothing more substantial than an act of faith! Paradoxically then, while Lenin wished to destroy faith in order to make room for knowledge, all he seems to have done is demolish knowledge, leaving himself with nothing but faith -- and, it is faith in graven 'images', too!
Fortunately enough for the common man or woman, their knowledge of the world isn't based on anything remotely like Lenin's caricature -- and neither is scientific knowledge.
And, truth be told, neither was Lenin's.31
It could be objected that in MEC Lenin actually shot the above criticisms down in flames, in the following way:
"For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensation is indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world; it is the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness. This transformation has been, and is, observed by each of us a million times on every hand. The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a wall, separating consciousness from the external world -- not an image of the external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as the 'sole entity.'" [Lenin (1972), pp.45-46. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
As Sean Sayers now tries to argue:
"In the theory of ideas, sensations, appearances, ideas are regarded as purely subjective entities, which cut us off from any possible contact with the objective world. Lenin, by contrast, insists that sensation is the contact and the connection of consciousness with the external world. Sensation, that is to say, is the subjective form of appearance of the thing-in-itself, the form in which objective reality is manifested to consciousness. The thing-in-itself is transformed in the process of sensation into the thing-for-us, into appearance. There is no barrier, no impassable divide, between the object and the subject here; there is rather a constant process of transition and of transformation of the one into the other. As Lenin says, 'in practice each one of us has observed time without number the simple and palpable transformation of the "thing-in-itself' into phenomenon, into the "thing-for-us". It is precisely this transformation that is cognition' (p.132)." [Sayers (1985), p.10. Bold emphasis added. Sayers is here quoting Lenin (1972), p.132.]
The argument here appears to be that since sensation provides direct access to the outside world, our 'images' of that world are reliable and accurate (if validated in practice). This is just a revamped version of Direct Realism, discussed below. [Although Sayers rejects Direct Realism and claims Lenin accepted a 'dialectical' version of Representative Realism. I will say more about that in Appendix Five of Essay Three Part Two.]
The problem is that all Lenin has are 'images' of his sense organs and hence no way of determining whether or not they give direct access to this 'external world'. As I point out below:
Again, Lenin might have sincerely believed he possessed eyes, ears, skin and other sense organs, and that they connected him with 'objective reality outside of himself', but, if his theory is correct, all he actually had were images of these organs, and hence images of the 'external world'.
Here he is again:
"This is either an idealist lie or the subterfuge of the agnostic, Comrade Bazarov, for sense-perception is not the reality existing outside us, it is only the image of that reality." [Ibid., p.124. Bold emphasis alone added.]
There is no hint in the above of any such 'direct access to reality'. Indeed, Lenin has inserted a layer of 'images' between himself and the 'outside world', the existence of which can now only be taken as an act of faith. Because Lenin has built a screen of 'images' between himself and the 'outside world', there is no way around or through this barrier. He is forever trapped behind it.
Lenin half recognised this himself in the passage quoted at the beginning of this sub-section:
"The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a wall, separating consciousness from the external world -- not an image of the external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as the 'sole entity.'" [Lenin (1972), pp.45-46. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
How does Lenin know these 'images' correspond with sensation? Again he might believe they do, but he has no way of knowing this, and that means this can in no way form a secure basis, or any basis, for knowledge.
At best, even if we were to take sensation at face value, all Lenin has is an image of a 'something-we-know-not-what' to which sensation supposedly connects him. His thoughts merely connect him with 'images'. He still as no way of knowing it these 'images' are of the 'external world', or even if there is an 'external world' for them to be of. He has yet to show that these 'images' aren't just a figment of his imagination and that he actually has a body capable of sensing anything to begin with.
The bottom line here is, therefore, that Lenin's 'answer' is no answer.
He remains trapped behind this wall of 'images', just like the Idealists he derides.
One obvious objection to all this could run along the following lines: if Marxism is neither objective nor approaches the truth asymptotically, then it must be an Idealist or subjectivist theory. But, since it is neither of these (indeed, it has been tested in practice over many generations), it must be objective, etc., etc.
In response, it is worth recalling that even Hegel regarded his theory as 'objective' (in his sense of the word), so 'objectivity' itself provides no guarantee that a theory is either materialist or valid.
Moreover, we have already seen that standard accounts of DM are thoroughly Idealist, and that practice (even if it could discriminate truth from error) has been very unkind to Dialectical Marxism, anyway.
Unfortunately, for those fond of using the word "objective" theoretically, it seems to work as some sort of talisman, capable of turning base metaphysics in epistemological gold.
However, it turns out that the meaning of the word "objective" is as unclear as it is unhelpful; indeed, it seems to mean different things to different theorists.32 To some, it appears to be synonymous with the word "true" -- which is a misleading equation in itself. Or, at least, it seems to refer to an industrial strength form of truth. It is misleading because falsehoods can be 'objective' (if by "objective" we mean "independent of the mind", or "invariant under all descriptions", etc.).32a
For example, the claim that there is life on the Moon is 'objective', but false. If it weren't 'objective' -- i.e., if it were 'subjective' --, not only would we not be able to investigate it to see whether or not it was true, no one would bother. In fact, it might be an important discovery to find out whether or not something is false -- such as the fact that a certain disease is isn't caused by diet or stress but by a bacterium. In this case, the falsehood of the claim that there is life on the Moon, or that this disease isn't caused by diet or stress, would be as 'objective' as the truth of the claim that there is life on Earth, or that a certain bacterium causes that disease. This means, of course, that 'objectivity' isn't synonymous with truth.33
Moreover, while a similar claim that there is no life on Mars is in fact true, it doesn't actually refer to life on Mars, since there is none there for it to be about!34 It is, of course, the contradictory of the claim that there is life on Mars, and because the latter is false, the former is true. But, as odd as this sounds, there is nothing in reality to which either of these 'corresponds', or fails to 'correspond'. Hence, in one sense both are 'non-objective' (since they 'refer' to no 'objects', but allude only to a lack of certain sorts of objects and processes on the said satellite) -- and yet, in another sense they are 'objective', because they presume to tell us about a world that is independent of any and all observers!34a
All this shows that something can be 'objective' whether or not it is true, and 'objective' whether or not it 'corresponds' with anything in reality -- and, it can be both 'objective' and 'non-objective' at the same time!
That should be enough to tell us this word, when employed philosophically, is totally useless.35
As noted above, still others appear to mean by "objective" something like "independent of all thought/observers", "a view of reality outside of space and time", or "invariant under all descriptions".36
However, despite what they might say, those who talk this way often manage to inform us of these startling truths this side of the 'observerless' divide, while clearly resident in space and time. They also generally succeed in using some thought in the process.
Unfortunately for us humans, successful reference to the 'objective' world outside of space and time (and possibly even independent of any categories whatsoever), without recourse to language, is quite beyond us. Presumably, given the "view from nowhere" definition, 'objectivity' could only ever be achieved by a non-sentient, thoughtless, languageless, mindless, dead alien -- who exists (or not) everywhere and nowhere all at once. Alternatively, perhaps, 'objectivity' can be achieved by an impersonal, category-free, thoughtless set of 'forces', from the 'fifth dimension' (??), or beyond...
Now, these aren't just cheap debating points; they serve as a timely reminder that while it is true that the world itself doesn't depend on the application of human linguistic categories to it, any reference made to that world, or anything in it, is. Moreover, any attempt to state truths or falsehoods about it (of necessity) requires the use of such linguistic categories. The 'problem' (if such it may be called) is that objectivists tend to think that the achievement of the latter -- aimed at providing an 'objective' account of the former -- is capable of succeeding while avoiding the projection of linguistic categories onto nature.36a They seldom even consider the possibility that the representational forms they are forced to use in order to depict reality have already coloured the austere picture they hope to paint. In fact, they simply ignore the most important factor here: the very forms of representation used in the process.37 This then motivates the idea that an 'objective' view of nature is a picture of a world independent of the words that have been used in order to do just that! Words like: "object", "entity", "thing", "being", "reality", "scalar", "vector", "tensor", "field", "manifold", "matrix", "geodesic", "dimension", "picture" (etc., etc.).
All that emerges at the end of such an exercise is a ersatz, cartoon-like world sketched in metaphorical ink. And, as is the case with cartoon superheroes, bogus Super-science like this is at home in a comic-strip-world of its own making, and is no less insubstantial for all that.
[Naturally, the above comments aren't meant to imply that modern science fails to provide us with a series of theories and empirical truths about nature, only that the word "objective" obscures what science delivers, and hence it is totally out of place in such a context. (There is more on this in Essay Thirteen Parts Two and Three.)]
Another problem with several of the above 'definitions' of the word "objective" is that they imply that no social or historical fact, event or process could be 'objective'. Clearly, that is because social and historical facts, events and process aren't "independent of human cognition" -- nor are they "invariant under all descriptions", and neither do they represent "a view of reality outside of space and time".37a That fact alone should give socialists pause, since it would indicate that no revolution, for instance, could ever have an 'objective' outcome (i.e., one that is "independent of the mind", etc.), unless it had been brought about by robots -- or, indeed, robots that hadn't been constructed or programmed by anything with a "mind" -- for and on behalf of the robots themselves.
Now, any attempt to modify the already shaky 'definitions' of the word "objective" (in order to by-pass the above difficulties) would stand in danger of allowing patently 'non-objective' aspects of social reality (such as the claims made by clairvoyants) to be lumped in as 'objective'. That is because, if 'objective reality' is now allowed to include features of the world that are mind-dependent (such as socialist newspapers and revolutions), then, and on that basis, it would be impossible to exclude other mind-dependent objects and practices -- except, of course, and ironically, on a 'subjective' basis. Hence, given this awkward turn of events, mystical practices and fancies would turn out to be no less 'objective'.
Once again, this shows how useless a (metaphysical) word "objective" really is.
Unfortunately, there is an almost universal tendency among objectivist thinkers to bang the 'metaphysical table' (as it were) whenever 'objectivity' is even so much as questioned. This involves the emphatic re-assertion -- almost mantra-like -- of the unquestionably real nature and existence of objects and processes in nature -- something we saw Lenin do literally dozens of times in MEC, for example.
[Again, this doesn't imply I reject the existence of objects and processes in nature. I just don't make a fetish out of 'objectivity'.]
This neurotic approach to Metaphysical Objectivity isn't helped by the use of the equally empty phrase "objectively true" -- an unhappy couplet in itself --, which unfortunately contains an implicit admission that there could be objective falsehoods. Either that, or the affix "true" is merely ornamental.38
Indeed, the whole point of using an 'industrial strength' phrase like "objectively true" is far from clear. If something is true, it is presumably 'objectively true' (that is, it won't have been made up). On the other hand, if it is untrue, then the word "objective" contributes nothing to the phrase. No matter how impressive a word combination "objectively true" might appear to be, that couplet itself can't work magic and turn something into a truth that wasn't one already (any more than repetition or shouting can transform a falsehood into a truth, as Lenin seems to have thought). Hence, the only apparent reason for gluing the word "objective" to the word "true" seems to be to lend weight to the former by hijacking the kudos of the latter.
[I have said much more about the 'objectivity' of science in Essay Three Part Two.]
'Subjective' Equally Defective
Apparently, the opposite of "objective" is "subjective", but this term-of-art is no less vague. Truths can be subjective -- for example, when somebody reports truthfully that they like Mozart's music. Worse still, statements can be objective and subjective all at once; for instance, a scientist could truthfully report that she is disappointed that there is no life on the Moon. Not only that, but the 'subjective' part could be true while the 'objective' part is false! For example, the aforementioned scientist could be genuinely glad that there is life on Mars, while no less genuinely mistaken about it -- and she could even be shown to be in error by an appeal to the available evidence. Clearly, few would bother to modify, or even confirm or confute a purely 'subjective' (presumably 'idiosyncratic', or made-up) belief or affectation. And no one would (normally) try to test (i.e., verify) someone's avowed preference for milk chocolate or the music of B.B. King, even though some 'subjective' beliefs can be verified.39
Returning to the couplet, "objectively true"; it could be argued that this phrase invites contrast with "subjectively true", and because of that it has a clear sense. But, "subjectively true" -- if it implies anything -- perhaps means "believed by X, Y or Z to be true", or "true for A, B or C" (or some such, where these capital letters stand for named individuals). To be sure, in the previous paragraph it was noted that something could be subjective and true; the couplet "subjectively true" was deliberately avoided. That is because the combination of these two terms would have the same effect on both words as would conjoining, say, "near" with "death" to yield "near death". While something could be near (to a speaker) and dead all at once, anything near death need be neither dead nor near. Hence, the use of "subjectively true" seems to be a polite way of saying that a certain belief or claim isn't true, or even that the holder of that belief is either deluded or they live in a world all of their own (at least with respect to the belief in question).
All this is unnecessary. We already have far better (and more reliable, and materially-grounded) words in ordinary language to express claims about the world (etc.), and which are neither problematic nor vague -- for example, mundane terms like "true", "false", "valid", "accurate", "precise", "correct", "incorrect", and so on. Our ability to form complex, but readily understandable sentences about familiar situations (and even about events that occurred long before human beings evolved), without the use of these metaphysical terms (i.e., "subjective" and "objective") is as unremarkable as our ability to breathe. This fact alone should have alerted those who feel compelled to use "subjective" and "objective" in such surroundings that their presence in scientific contexts is about as useful as a chocolate fire door.
Finally, with respect to the asymptotic metaphor mentioned at the beginning of this main section: that figure of speech has already been examined in detail and shown to have untoward, sceptical implications all of its own. Its appearance here in connection with 'objectivity' is, therefore, doubly unfortunate.
Lenin, 'Objectivity' And Existence
Earlier, we examined several theses connected with what I have called 'externalism', among which were the following:
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T3: The world is composed of objects, processes, relations and events in continual change.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
T7: There are no a priori limits to what we can know about the world, and our knowledge is subject to continual revision.
However, the status of T1 and T2 -- while apparently inconsistent with T3, T4 and T7 (as we saw earlier) -- hasn't yet been examined in any detail. We have already had occasion to question the temporal constraints that seem to qualify Lenin's ideas (that is, whether they only apply to the present), but these sentences themselves merit closer scrutiny on their own terms.40
Clearly, theses T1 and T2 can't relate to the nature of the world as it will be in the future -- plainly because that doesn't yet exist.41 Obviously, similar difficulties arise in relation to the past.42
The serious problems that confront Lenin's view of 'objective' existence will become clearer if consideration is given to the following sentences -- which concern 'mere existence', as it were. In what follows, four different senses of "exist" are distinguished:43
R1: Paris exists. ["Exist", sense E1.]
R2: Carthage once existed. ["Exist", sense E2.]
R3: Atlantis once existed. ["Exist", sense E3.]
R4: Vulcan exists. ["Exist", sense E4.]44
[Naturally, several of the above might need to be re-written, perhaps in a more stilted form to bring out the particular sense of "exist" each tries to express. For instance, R2 might have to become:
R2a: Carthage exits at t1, where t1 is earlier than the present.
Also where the phrase, "the present", is indexed to the day and (local) time of each reader.
Such technicalities will be ignored here -- as will legitimate questions raised by philosophers like Bertrand Russell about whether or not sentences like R1 and R4 are ill-formed.
For the sole purposes of this discussion, let us say that:
(1) E1 relates to objects, events and processes extant at present (that is, it concerns objects, events and processes that are unambiguously 'objective' in Lenin's sense and where, once again, the phrase, "the present", is indexed to the day and (local) time of each speaker/reader);
(2) E2 relates to objects, events and processes that are no longer extant (but which were once 'objective' in Lenin's sense);
(3) E3 relates to objects, events and processes whose existential status, while somewhat dubious, is such that they might once have existed ('objectively', perhaps); and,
(4) E4-existence relates to objects, events and processes that have never existed (and thus never were 'objective').
[I am, of course, assuming that some sense can be made of Lenin's use of "objective".]
Given the above, it is a unclear to which one of E1-E4, T1 and T2 commit DM and/or Lenin. If the answer is E1, then T1 and T2 (as they stand) are going to be of little use to dialecticians -- that is, unless the meaning of the phrase "the present" is widened to include objects, events and processes that no longer exist (but which once did). Clearly, that is because it would be difficult to give an 'objective' account of history in terms of 'Materialist Dialectics' if E1-existence were all that these two theses implied, and "the present" is narrowly understood.
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
In that case, T1 and T2 must involve E1-, and E2-existence. However, a concession like this presents Lenin's "externalism" with serious problems since this broader sense of "exist" (i.e., incorporating E1-, and E2-existence) implies that the overwhelming majority of "objective" processes and things do not in fact exist since they took place in the past, and thus are longer actual. In that case, such entities couldn't be described as "external to the mind" since they don't exist to be external to anything. On the other hand, if they are still to be counted as "external to the mind" (even though they don't exist), they would be about as 'objective' as the Tooth Fairy, and for the same reason.
[To be sure, it could be argued that the Tooth Fairy never existed, whereas events in the past clearly did, so they aren't at all the same. However, as we will soon see, things aren't quite that straight-forward.]
Alternatively, if it is objected that such things do still exist then it would only be the case if they existed 'in the mind' ('conceptually', perhaps), which would make them 'non-objective', once more. E2-objects and processes are only supposed to 'exist' in the sense that we can think and write about them; in that sense they aren't independent of the mind, and aren't therefore 'objective', according to Lenin.
Well, perhaps these things 'exist' only metaphorically -- that is, they 'exist' in the intellectual or imaginative by-product of some mind or other (such as in, say, a book, or a poem)? But, if there are such things that don't literally exist (or which do so only non-literally, in this sense), but which are nevertheless still to be counted as 'objective', then there seems to be no consistent way of denying 'objectivity' to other non-existents that have similar claims on our 'mental' space, such as mythical figures, goblins and the countless deities that litter the world's religions. Clearly, an unwise concession on these lines would plainly blur the distinction between E2-, E3-, and E4-existence. If so, Lenin's "externalism" might implicate DM in a commitment to the 'objectivity' of, for example, 'God', to say nothing of Gryphons and Harpies.45
We might now try to circumvent these difficulties by flatly denying that E1-, and E2-existence allow the inclusion of these absurdities like these -- which approach would unfortunately be the equivalent of someone sticking a finger in each ear, singing "La, La, Lah!"
At this point, it is worth recalling that we are endeavouring to ascertain what (if anything) Lenin and other DM-theorists could possibly mean by their use of the word "objective", or by their reference to "objective existence outside the mind". If existence (and hence, presumably, 'objectivity') is allowed to include things that don't now exist (i.e., in this case, things in the past), on the grounds that such things merely exist "external to the mind", then E1-, and E2-existence clearly threaten to spill over quickly into E3-, and perhaps even E4-existence -- and thus into 'non-objectivity'!
Again, it could be argued that objects, events and processes supposedly enjoying E3-, or E4-existence are to be distinguished from those possessing E1-, or E2-existence by the fact that only the latter enjoy evidential support; the other two do not.
But, are things quite this clear-cut? What if it should turn out that the actual admission, or even denial, of E3-, or E4-existence to any object or process depends on evidence that might itself once have existed, but which is no longer available?
Naturally, that untoward outcome would materialise if the said evidence itself belongs in either the E2-, or the E3-categories. If, therefore, 'objectivity' is dependent on evidence, then we might never be in a position to say where its boundaries lie (especially given the DM-view that all knowledge is infinitely incomplete). If controversial and mythical entities are to be excluded as viable candidates for E2-existence, for instance, and that is based on evidence which itself enjoys the same sort of existence (i.e., it is based on evidence that itself falls in the E2-category), then we are no further forward. After all, evidence that is not now extant could one day emerge to promote objects, events and processes from E3-, to E2-existence. How can anyone who agrees with Lenin -- that all knowledge is incomplete and/or relative -- rule this out?
Indeed, this happens all the time. How else did humanity manage to discover new objects and processes in nature?
Indeed, it isn't beyond the bounds of possibility that evidence could one day emerge that proves Atlantis, for example, did in fact once exist, thus promoting it from E3-, to E2-existence. And if that can happen with Atlantis, it could happen with much less likely objects and processes. Can we rule out evidence one day emerging that supports belief in the 'objective' existence of, say, Valhalla, Nirvana, the Garden of Eden, or The Tooth Fairy -- especially if we admit that current knowledge is infinitely limited, as Lenin himself believed? Because the DM-notions of 'objectivity' and 'externality' are so vague, and DM-epistemology so Noumenon-friendly (as we have seen), who is to say where such ontological boundaries might be drawn, if anywhere?46
On the other hand, if we rule out the existence of all of the above weird and wonderful 'objects' on grounds other than a failure to satisfy the requirements of 'externality', then Lenin's criterion can't be a necessary and sufficient condition for 'objectivity', or even materiality. But, what other DM-grounds are there?47
Failing that, we might have to acknowledge that a commitment to 'objectivity' permits the possible existence of all manner of strange beings -- and await evidence that might demonstrate their actuality (past or present), or otherwise. While this sounds eminently reasonable and scientific, it is worth recalling that this strategy would unfortunately allow the existence of 'God' to be 'objective', since evidence might turn up one day to prove that 'He' does indeed exist. DM-theorists certainly can't rule that possibility out. Once again, they openly admit that human knowledge is partial and incomplete -- indeed, infinitely so.
On the other hand, if the existence of 'God' is to be ruled out on grounds other than 'externality', then the word "objective" can't mean what theorists like Lenin tell us, since, manifestly, if 'God' exists 'He' exists external to the human mind!48
In that case, it would seem that T1 and T2 are in need of urgent supplementation -- or, of course, long overdue rejection.
Once more, if DM-theorists wish to rule out (on non-evidential grounds) the existence of various ontological 'undesirables' (such as, Vishnu, Odin and the Archangel Gabriel) -- while permitting others (such as contradictory wave/particles, contradictory forces, UO-style magnets, negating cells and seeds, to say nothing of contradictory cats strolling about on assorted floor coverings) --, then 'externalism' would be working for them like any other stipulative convention. That is, it would serve as a criterion enabling dialecticians to delineate the conditions under which certain (in this case, existential) 'propositions' were deemed true, or judged false (or, in this case, perhaps, both!), legitimating the inferences their theory sanctions. [More on this in Essay Twelve Part One.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
However, while the above would indeed be a convention of sorts, it would, alas, have no materialist roots in social practice. Quite the contrary, in fact: it would be aimed at defending a theory inherited from the class enemy -- using concepts, jargon and thought-forms drawn from ruling-class ideology.
As noted in Essay Eleven Part One, if this strategy were materially-grounded, this wouldn't be a problem, for that is precisely how scientific theories themselves work. Moreover, if adopted, it would mean that DM-theorists would have to modify their views of 'objectivity' (and hence, too, of matter), since, of course, it would turn their theory into an open and honest form of conventionalism -- and a non-materialist version, to too.49
[By "materially grounded" I mean "based on ordinary language, common understanding and everyday practice".]
If DM-theorists are to rescue T1 and T2 from oblivion, some way must be found of distinguishing E2-, from E3-, and then from E4-existence.
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
E2 relates to objects, events and processes that are no longer extant (but which were once 'objective' in Lenin's sense).
E3 relates to objects, events and processes whose existential status, while somewhat dubious, is such that they might once have existed ('objectively', perhaps).
Perhaps the above might be achieved in the following manner?
R5: Externalism requires only that scientific investigation confirms the existence of certain objects and processes for them to counted as objective.
However, as we have seen, R5 would permit the (possible) existence of all manner of unwelcome 'objects' on the basis that one day scientists might be able to show they do in fact exist (E1-, or E2-fashion). And this could come about if the evidence that turns up in the end itself currently exists E2-, or E3-style. Unfortunately, this brings us back to where we were only a few paragraphs back, since researchers might have to appeal to what are now perhaps E3-, or even E4-objects and processes in order to do that!
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
For example, one only has to look at the way scientists themselves have to appeal to all manner of weird and wonderful objects and processes in QM to see this is a real possibility. Many of these objects and processes might turn out to be what we would now classify as card-carrying E4-existents. [Can particles really go backwards in time? Is there such a 'particle' as the graviton? Could there be? Is 'Dark Matter' myth or reality? If these 'objects' don't exist, or the processes in which they feature don't in fact take place, this won't be by accident.]
Again, consider the change that took place a generation or so ago in the Earth Sciences when a process which many had once regarded as ridiculous or patently false was dusted off and transformed into cutting-edge geology: Plate Tectonics. In this instance, E3-, or even E4-, objects and processes were promoted into one of both of the E1-, and E2-categories.
Nevertheless, it might be thought that these difficulties could be circumvented if we changed R5 to the following:
R6: Externalism requires only that scientific investigation has actually confirmed the existence of certain objects and processes for them to counted as objective.
But, this would still compromise Lenin's criterion since acceptance of R6 would have counted as 'objective' such things as the Ether, Caloric, Phlogiston, Mermaids, Piltdown Man, Sea Monsters, Wolf Men, N Rays, Subtle Fluids, Cold Fusion, and the like, at the time when they were accepted as such by the scientific community (or by significant sections of it).
Again, we could adjust R6 in order to rule out such annoying exceptions, perhaps in the following manner:
R7: Externalism requires only that scientific investigation has actually confirmed the genuine or objective existence of certain objects and processes for them to counted as objective.
Apart from being circular (in that it defines "objective" in terms of "objective"), DM-theorists' commitment to the infinitely defective nature of human knowledge means they will never be in a position to say whether anything at all is genuinely genuine, as opposed to only 'temporarily genuine'.
Indeed, it is worth recalling that scientists were convinced for well over one-and-a-half millennia that the heavenly bodies were 'glued' to crystalline spheres and that the centre of the earth was the natural place toward which all bodies gravitated. Hence, a medieval Lenin would have declared that these aspects of the Aristotelian Universe were 'objective', just as his modern day counterpart declared the Ether to be.
On the other hand, if it is now argued that such a revolutionary change in our knowledge of anything will never happen again, then the DM-commitment to the infinitely limited nature of knowledge will have to be abandoned.
Once more we see that this jellyfish-of-a-theory can't be squeezed anywhere without some of it slipping through our fingers somewhere else.50
There is no obvious way for DM-theorists to avoid being caught in this 'epistemological vice'. Whatever methods scientists, or even DM-theorists, employ to confirm the existence (or otherwise) of any given object or process in reality must, of necessity, involve the use of human cognitive capacities, skills and resources. It will therefore be forced to depend on social and conventional criteria that constrain one and all. As social beings, we have no other way of advancing knowledge.
That being so, an entirely new account of the 'objectivity' of science is required -- along with a different account of matter.51
It could be objected here that even though social and linguistic factors must enter into the portrayal of reality, that doesn't imply the world itself is dependent of such social conventions. Indeed, it could be maintained that externalism is still viable, especially if suitably chosen concepts or conventions permit us to refer to an independently existing material world (with which we are related via collective labour (etc.)). Given this modified view, the objective world could be said to exist because human beings interface with it in their practical activity. That is indeed the point Lenin wished to make (quoting Engels):
"'Here once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much un limited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition..., its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual expression and in its realisation at each particular moment....'
"'Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth'.... Here follows the example of Boyle's law (the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The 'grain of truth' contained in this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The law, it appears, is a truth 'only approximately'.
"Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge." [Lenin (1972), pp.150-51, quoting Engels (1976), pp.108-09, 114. The on-line and published translations are slightly different. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link added.]
Now, this version of externalism isn't affected by the above petty-fogging objections; the world can be said to be objective because of our long-term practical relationship with it.
Or, so it could be maintained.
Apart from the fact that this revamp of 'externalism' makes the 'objectivity' of reality dependent on human action and intervention (thus changing the meaning of "objective" to something rather more like "subjective", or even "historically inter-subjective"), this latest twist now puts those committed to 'externalism' in an impossible position. Even though DM-theorists wish to retain belief in the social nature of knowledge, they also want this to avoid compromising the 'independence' of the world to which this knowledge is supposedly ('dialectically') related. This impossible trick is pulled off by the bluff insistence that our knowledge of the world, while relative and incomplete, is nonetheless about a world that is itself (i.e., is "in-itself", to use the jargon) independent of the 'dialectical' process of cognition (in the sense that it existed before sentient life evolved, and would continue to exist if all such life ceased tomorrow). Hence, the world itself (or, "in-itself") is, on this view, unaffected by our knowledge of it (saving, of course, those parts with which we interact in our practical activity).
The infeasibility of this position soon becomes apparent if we attempt to fill in the gaps DM-theorists conveniently leave out.
First of all, this approach suffers from all the weaknesses inherent in any attempt to account for knowledge in pragmatic terms. These were outlined in an earlier Essay and won't be rehearsed here.52
Secondly, the serious defects in Lenin's attempt to delineate 'externalism' (exposed earlier) still remain, despite the above response. For example, it was pointed out that T1 and T2 were seriously compromised by T4, and vice versa.
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
The requirement that everything in the Totality is interconnected (expressed by T4) is the rock upon which the parallel DM-view of the independence of the world must always founder --, for, if everything is inter-related, then not only must our thoughts about nature be dependent on the physical world, nature itself must be dependent on our thoughts about it (which means, obviously, that one or both of T1 and T2 will have to be jettisoned). On the other hand, if 'objective' material reality is genuinely independent of the 'mind', then everything can't be interconnected, and T4 itself will have to go.
This shows that DM-commitment to 'externalism' (even if this includes the re-vamped, watered-down version outlined a few paragraphs back) is little more than a gesture -- a statement of belief, or even of faith. As soon as the details are filled in, the much-vaunted 'independence' of the world soon vanishes, and we discover that conventional aspects of language and science have to be employed to secure the reliability of scientific knowledge.
This is no accident; as noted several times, all human knowledge depends on the practical and conventional aspects of our social existence.
The only oddity is that there were any Marxists who thought to question it.53
Finally, we have also seen that practice can't rescue Lenin's 'theory', since, if he were right, all that humanity would have access to are images of practice. [That allegation is substantiated in Note 53a.]53a
It isn't easy to see how a theory based on nothing but images (and, indeed, images of practice) can establish the 'objectivity' of anything at all. Moreover, we have also seen that images not only do not, they can't reflect anything in 'objective' reality.
What Exactly Is Dialectical Materialism?
As far as can be ascertained, there appears to be little agreement among dialecticians over the precise nature of DM (and thus of 'Materialist Dialectics', too) -- or even what its central tenets are. As we shall see, despite the fact that most DM-apologists pay lip-service to a commonly-held set of (unchanging) core theses, each DM-author individually promotes one or other of these into pole position, demoting the rest (or even rejecting one or more of them altogether). Still other DM-theorists will then move these demoted theses to the top again. So, theorist A will declare that the fundamental DM-thesis is the 'fluid nature of reality', while B will swear it is 'universal interconnection', and C will insist that it is the 'unity and identity of opposites'. Theorist D, on the other hand, will assure us that the fundamental 'law' is the 'change of quantity into quality'. Still others will try to convince us that DM is just a 'method', while someone else will insist that the "Totality" and 'change through internal contradiction' are paramount. Either that or theorist E will declare X to be the most important principle, and yet a few pages later swear it is really thesis Y, or 'law' Z.
There are many other permutations on similar lines, as we will see.
In addition, while some DM-theorists seem to regard this theory itself as compatible with current scientific theory -- even though the latter appears to have spirited matter away -- others hold that DM is incompatible with these developments. That certainly was Lenin's view.
Finally, as we are about to see, other than declare it is just an "abstraction", not one single DM-theorist will tell us what matter really is!
Is Matter Just An 'Abstraction'
As noted above, for well over a century, not one single DM-theorist has been prepared to tell us precisely what matter actually is!
In fact, Engels controversially said the following:
"It is the old story. First of all one makes sensuous things into abstractions and then one wants to know them through the senses, to see time and smell space. The empiricist becomes so steeped in the habit of empirical experience, that he believes that he is still in the field of sensuous experience when he is operating with abstractions.... The two forms of existence of matter are naturally nothing without matter, empty concepts, abstractions which exist only in our minds. But, of course, we are supposed not to know what matter and motion are! Of course not, for matter as such and motion as such have not yet been seen or otherwise experienced by anyone, only the various existing material things and forms of motions. Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted and motion as such nothing but the totality of all sensuously perceptible forms of motion; words like matter and motion are nothing but abbreviations in which we comprehend many different sensuous perceptible things according to their common properties. Hence matter and motion can be known in no other way than by investigation of the separate material things and forms of motion, and by knowing these, we also pro tanto know matter and motion as such.... This is just like the difficulty mentioned by Hegel; we can eat cherries and plums, but not fruit, because no one has so far eaten fruit as such." [Engels (1954), pp.235-36. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"N.B. Matter as such is a pure creation of thought and an abstraction. We leave out of account the qualitative differences of things in lumping them together as corporeally existing things under the concept matter. Hence matter as such, as distinct from definite existing pieces of matter, is not anything sensuously existing." [Ibid., p.255. Bold emphasis added.]
These are rather odd things for an avowed materialist to have to say. If matter is an abstraction, how can "definite existing pieces of matter" fail to be abstract, too? Actual examples of an 'abstraction' can't fail to be abstract, surely?
It could be replied that the noun "man" is an abstraction, but that doesn't prevent individual men from being concrete.
However, as we saw in Essay Three Parts One and Two, an appeal to 'abstraction' to account for anything whatsoever would be the equivalent of trying to explain off-side in soccer with 'words' drawn exclusively from the Voynich manuscript. We also saw in the aforementioned Essays (as well as Essay Ten Part One) that, given DM-epistemology, there can't be any concrete objects. [Readers are directed there for more details.]
Nevertheless, none of this should surprise us since arch-Idealist, Hegel, was also of this opinion (according to Lenin):
"If abstraction is made from every determination and Form of a Something, indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure abstract. (-- Matter cannot be seen or felt, etc. -- what is seen or felt is a determinate Matter, that is, a unity of Matter and Form)." [Lenin (1961), pp.144-45. Italic emphases in the original; bold added. The original passage from Hegel has been reposted in Note 57.]
It is instructive, therefore, to see a card-carrying Idealist like Hegel agree with such avowed materialists that matter is just an "abstraction"!
Nevertheless, and independently of this, it isn't too clear from the above what Engels imagined the 'process of abstraction' was supposed to work on, or what it was supposed to be applied to. What are the 'common features' of all material objects that distinguish them from the non-material? Lenin seemed to think this was 'objective' existence "outside the mind" -- but we have seen that that characterisation is no use at all. In contrast, Engels appealed to motion and several unspecified "common properties", to explain matter:
"Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted and motion as such nothing but the totality of all sensuously perceptible forms of motion; words like matter and motion are nothing but abbreviations in which we comprehend many different sensuous perceptible things according to their common properties.... Subject-matter -- matter in motion.... The different forms and varieties of matter itself can likewise only be known through motion, only in this are the properties of bodies exhibited; of a body that does not move there is nothing to be said. Hence the nature of bodies in motion results from the forms of motion." [Op cit., pp.236, 248.]
However, not everything that moves is material (on that, see Essays Five and Twelve Part One); but even if what Engels said were 100% correct, it is little help being given a circular 'definition' of matter and motion:
"Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted and motion as such nothing but the totality of all sensuously perceptible forms of motion...." [Ibid.]
What we still don't understand (philosophically) are the words "matter", "material", and "motion" (however, on motion, and Engels's rather odd views about it, see Essay Five again). The appearance here of such words as part of their own definition is about as useful as this would be:
"Schmatter is nothing but the totality of schmaterial things from which this concept is abstracted and schmotion as such nothing but the totality of all sensuously perceptible forms of schmotion...."
And there is little point appealing to the everyday words we have for material things and moving objects for they are far too varied to be restricted in this way. [Once more, that was demonstrated in Essays Five and Twelve Part One.] As with many other things, the language we have for such objects and processes is our best guide; but that language is itself incredibly rich, and doesn't favour the mystical spin Engels (or Hegel, or Lenin) wished to impose upon it.54
Furthermore, Engels's rather odd observation about cherries is no less misguided. Paul McGarr had this to say about it:
"Engels…attacks those who fail to see [that scientific] concepts are abstractions from real experience, and [who] ask about what is 'matter as such' or 'motion as such'. 'Matter as such and motion as such have not yet been seen or experienced by anyone, but only the various, actually existing material things and forms of motion. Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted, and motion as such nothing but the totality of sensuously perceptible forms of motion; words like matter and motion are nothing but abbreviations in which we comprehend many differently sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties. Hence matter and motion can be known in no other way than by investigation of the separate material things and forms of motion'. Engels gives us an analogy, 'We can eat cherries and plums, but not fruit, because no one has so far eaten fruit as such.'" [McGarr (1994), pp.152-53; quoting Engels (1954), pp.235-36. Paragraphs merged.]54a
But, exactly how McGarr knows that matter and motion are abstract terms he failed to say -- apparently, Engels's word was enough for him. But, since we can "eat..., etc." matter, it must be concrete, surely? Is it possible to eat an 'abstraction'?
Nevertheless, and in view of what he goes on to say, McGarr might reply that his reason for saying what he does is that "matter as such" can't in fact be "eaten…, etc." -- except as it manifests itself as various sorts of matter. But again, he failed to say what the word "matter" means here. If it means "abstract matter" then the rest of his argument is circular. If it doesn't mean this, then his argument is far too vague to be of any use.
It is worth noting here that Engels and McGarr's arguments are reminiscent of a point made by Hegel, in his 'Logic':
"When the universal is made a mere form and co-ordinated with the particular, as if it were on the same level, it sinks into the particular itself. Even common sense in everyday matters is above the absurdity of setting a universal beside the particulars. Would anyone, who wished for fruit, reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the ground that they were cherries, pears or grapes, and not fruit?" [Hegel (1975), p.19, §13, quoted from here. Italic emphases in the original.]
[As we will see in Note 57, the idea that matter is an abstraction in fact originated with Hegel and Bishop Berkeley, both notorious Idealists!]
To be sure, it isn't at all clear whether or not Hegel was making the same point as the above two comrades, but even if he were, what sense can be made of these claims? Certainly, those eating "cherries and plums" consume fruit. In which case, people do indeed eat fruit. Even Hegel seems to admit that much.
Naturally, too, Engels and McGarr wouldn't deny this; what they appear to be saying is similar to something Rees pointed out in TAR: no one can eat an abstraction:
"[A]ll science generalizes and abstracts from 'empirically verifiable facts.' Indeed, the very concept of 'fact' is itself an abstraction, because no one has ever eaten, tasted, smelt, seen or heard a 'fact,' which is a mental generalization that distinguishes actually existing phenomena from imaginary conceptions. Similarly, all science 'deductively anticipates' developments -- what else is an hypothesis tested by experimentation? The dialectic is, among other things, a way of investigating and understanding the relationship between abstractions and reality. And the 'danger of arbitrary construction' is far greater using an empirical method which thinks that it is dealing with facts when it is actually dealing with abstractions than it is with a method that properly distinguishes between the two and then seeks to explain the relationship between them." [Rees (1998), p.131. Bold emphasis added.]
As we will see in Essay Twelve Part Four (when it is published), Rees isn't alone among dialecticians in arguing that abstractions can't be "eaten, etc."
[In that Essay, however, it will be shown that it is surprisingly easy to eat alleged 'abstractions'.]
Contrast this, too, with what Marx and Engels had argued in the 1840s:
"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction.…
"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -– 'Fruit'….
"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….
"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.
"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….
"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975a), pp.72-75. Italic emphases in the original.]
Plainly, in this regard, Engels abandoned his earlier clarity of thought. [On that, see the comments I have added here.]
Be this as it may, what Engels had to say (in DN, quoted earlier) still fails to resolve the problem of the existence and nature of abstractions. If abstractions can't be "eaten…, etc.", what on earth are they? Are they figments of the imagination which relate to nothing whatsoever in the material world? Are they more than a simple play on words? Indeed, are they no more than convenient classificatory terms we use for our own purposes (i.e., "abbreviations" as Engels calls them), like "fruit", and hence more than merely "useful fictions"? If so, what form do they take in nature?
Unfortunately, readers will look long and hard (and to no avail) for any answers to such questions in DM-texts. [This entire topic is discussed in more detail in Essay Three Part One.]
Putting this awkward quandary to one side for now, does the Hegelian/Engelsian/McGarrian argument work even in its own terms? Is it legitimate to claim that even though we eat "cherries and plums", we don't eat "fruit as such" (since it is an abstraction)?
Well, to turn this around: what are cherries themselves? Has anyone ever eaten 'cherries as such'? Have they not only ever eaten cherries of a particular variety, or have they only ever consumed samples bought or taken from a certain tree, shop, bowl, bag, or punnet? Cherries in fact come in a host of varieties; today we have the following: Montmorency, Morello, Marasca, Balaton, Napoleon, Lambert, Tartarian, Ranier, Hartland, Summit, Emperor Francis, Kristin, Ulster, Schmidt's Bigarreau, Black Gold, Lapins, Hedelfingen, Sweetheart, Hudson, Regina, Somerset, Danube, Gean, Jubileum, Surefire, Kentish Early Richmond, Stockton, Vladimir and North Star, among many others. In fact, as one expert points out, there are several distinct species of cherry:
"Cherries occupy the Cerasus subgenus within Prunus, being fairly distinct from plums, apricots, peaches, and almonds. They are members of the Rosaceae family, subfamily Prunoideae. Prunus avium L. is the Sweet Cherry, and Prunus cerasus L. the Sour Cherry. As a group, cherries are relatively diverse and broadly distributed around the world, being found in Asia, Europe, and North America. In addition to the main species above, P. fruticosa (ground cherry) and P. pseudocerasus (Chinese cherry) are minor fruit species in the former USSR and China. While sweet cherries are virtually all P. avium, the term sour cherry may include hybrids between P. avium and P. cerasus (referred to as 'Duke cherries'), ground cherry, and hybrids of ground cherry with P. cerasus.
"Many sweet cherries were introduced from Europe, although several breeding programs worldwide have produced cultivars of regional importance. When Romans dispersed cherries throughout Europe, cultivars of local importance were selected; contemporary sweet cherries are genetically very similar to these initial selections. Cultivars are sometimes categorized into 'heart' (syn. Guigne in French, Gean in England) and 'Bigarreau' groups; the former are heart-shaped, softer fruits, while the latter are round, firm, crisp fruits. 'Bing', 'Napoleon' (syn. 'Royal Ann'), and 'Lambert' are the most important cultivars in North America. 'Ranier' is rapidly increasing in importance, having unique light-red blush over yellowish skin colour…." [Mark Rieger, Professor of Horticulture at the University of Georgia, USA. Downloaded from here; accessed 09/03/04. Spelling changed to UK English. Unfortunately this particular page is no longer available. However, a similar page, written by the same author, can be accessed here. Quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; several paragraphs merged]
In view of this, the word "cherry" surely refers to an 'abstraction' just as much as "fruit" does.
And what should we make of each variety of cherry? According to evolutionary biology, and not just dialectics, no two individuals from the same variety are identical. In that case, each variety is just as much an 'abstraction' as fruit is. Moreover, as we saw in Essay Ten Part One, according to the DM-worthies, only when a particular (such as an individual cherry) has been interconnected with an infinite number of its "mediacies" will it be 'concrete'. In that case, each individual cherry, this side of Epistemological Judgement Day -- only then will they have been so 'interconnected' --, must be an 'abstraction'.
[It is in this sense that we can eat 'dialectical abstractions' --, unless, that is, we all go on a protracted fast which will last way beyond the cooling of the Sun, and would only end on Epistemological Judgement Day when items of food, and not just fruit, become 'concrete'! (More on that in Essay Three Part Four.) The counter-objection that when Lenin referred to all these "mediacies", he was applying 'subjective dialectics' won't wash, either, since we can't say that 'real cherries' (as opposed to our 'concept' of cherries) are 'concrete' until Epistemological Judgement Day, either.]
What possible justification could there now be for the view that while human beings can eat 'cherries as such' they can't consume "fruit as such"?
Perhaps the answer to that question is that the word "cherry" refers to a natural kind? Whether or not that is correct I will leave to one side for now, but, if that were correct, surely the word "fruit" refers to a natural kind, too? Furthermore, even assuming cherries form a natural kind and fruit doesn't, the above argument would still flounder. That is because natural kinds, as far as can be ascertained, are no less 'abstract' than other types of material objects/processes. After all, you can't "eat..., etc." a natural kind. So, if the 'eating' criterion works for "fruit" as much as it does for "facts", we are forced to conclude that no one has ever eaten 'cherries as such' (or even a 'cherry as such'). Just as there are different varieties of cherry, there are different kinds of fruit. Why our two authors decided we could do one thing to different varieties of the former and not to the various types of the latter is difficult to comprehend, therefore.
Perhaps, here as elsewhere, they uncritically accepted Hegel's word and abandoned their materialist good sense a little to hastily?
Maybe, Paul McGarr would now like to eat his own words, "as such"?
Prevarication -- One Thing Dialecticians Do Well
DM-theorists are in general aware of serial prevarication like this -- i.e., the failure to tell us what matter actually is. Indeed, far from regarding this as presenting their theory with a few difficulties, they view it as one of its strengths.
Here is Lenin prevaricating with the best of them:
"Bogdanov, pretending to argue only against Beltov [Plekhanov? -- RL] and cravenly ignoring Engels, is indignant at such definitions, which, don’t you see, 'prove to be simple repetitions' (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, p. xvi) of the 'formula' (of Engels, our 'Marxist' forgets to add) that for one trend in philosophy matter is primary and spirit secondary, while for the other trend the reverse is the case. All the Russian Machians exultantly echo Bogdanov's 'refutation'! But the slightest reflection could have shown these people that it is impossible, in the very nature of the case, to give any definition of these two ultimate concepts of epistemology save one that indicates which of them is taken as primary. What is meant by giving a 'definition'? It means essentially to bring a given concept within a more comprehensive concept. For example, when I give the definition 'an ass is an animal,' I am bringing the concept 'ass' within a more comprehensive concept. The question then is, are there more comprehensive concepts, with which the theory of knowledge could operate, than those of being and thinking, matter and sensation, physical and mental? No. These are the ultimate concepts, the most comprehensive concepts which epistemology has in point of fact so far not surpassed (apart from changes in nomenclature, which are always possible). One must be a charlatan or an utter blockhead to demand a 'definition' of these two 'series' of concepts of ultimate comprehensiveness which would not be a 'mere repetition': one or the other must be taken as the primary. Take the three afore-mentioned arguments on matter. What do they all amount to? To this, that these philosophers proceed from the mental or the self, to the physical, or environment, as from the central term to the counter-term -- or from sensation to matter, or from sense-perception to matter. Could Avenarius, Mach and Pearson in fact have given any other 'definition' of these fundamental concepts, save by pointing to the trend of their philosophical line? Could they have defined in any other way, in any specific way, what the self is, what sensation is, what sense-perception is? One has only to formulate the question clearly to realise what utter nonsense the Machians are talking when they demand that the materialists give a definition of matter which would not amount to a repetition of the proposition that matter, nature, being, the physical -- is primary, and spirit, consciousness, sensation, the psychical -- is secondary." [Lenin (1972), pp.165-67. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the original; bold added.]
[That is, Lenin refused to go any further than to define matter in the way indicted earlier, as an "epistemological category" (p.144).]
That is because it allows DM-fans to argue that their theory is compatible with any future (genuine) development in the physical sciences. A fixed definition of matter, it seems, would compromise their desire to tail-end Physicists.
"In a word, the 'physical' idealism of today, just as the 'physiological' idealism of yesterday, merely means that one school of natural scientists in one branch of natural science has slid into a reactionary philosophy, being unable to rise directly and at once from metaphysical materialism to dialectical materialism. This step is being made, and will be made, by modern physics; but it is making for the only true method and the only true philosophy of natural science not directly, but by zigzags, not consciously but instinctively, not clearly perceiving its 'final goal,' but drawing closer to it gropingly, hesitatingly, and sometimes even with its back turned to it. Modern physics is in travail; it is giving birth to dialectical materialism. The process of child-birth is painful. And in addition to a living healthy being, there are bound to be produced certain dead products, refuse fit only for the garbage-heap.
"[Added in a footnote -- RL:] And the entire school of physical idealism, the entire empirio-critical philosophy, together with empirio-symbolism, empirio-monism, and so on, and so forth, must be regarded as such refuse! If our Machians who write books and articles on philosophical subjects were capable of thinking, they would understand that the expression 'matter disappears,' 'matter is reduced to electricity,' etc., is only an epistemologically helpless expression of the truth that science is able to discover new forms of matter, new forms of material motion, to reduce the old forms to the new forms, and so on." [Ibid., pp.377-78. Quotations marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. The on-line version differ slightly from the published version I have cited. Bold emphasis added.]
[We have already seen that the 'zig-zag' or 'spiral' theory of the development of knowledge is also defective.]
Unfortunately, this strategy presents yet another hostage to fortune; in fact, it has backfired on DM-fans now that many Physicists have decided that matter "has vanished" -- i.e., that it is now just a perturbation in "the field", or it is merely a 'subjective' aspect of how 'conscious beings' experience their existence in a four-dimensional manifold, etc., etc. [On this, see Brooks (2016).]
[I have covered this approach to knowledge -- i.e., one that tail-ends scientists -- more fully in Essay Eleven Part One.]
DM-theorists have so far failed to address this gaping hole in their version of 'materialism'. In fact, far too many have been content to bury their vanishing heads in their 'image' of these disappearing sands.
Others have 're-defined' materialism in such loose terms that it renders their understanding of materialism compatible with practically anything at all (including, for example, belief in angels, 'gods' and mythical beasts, as we saw above).
Unless a satisfactory resolution of this critical problem can be found, DM itself might now just as well stand for Disappeared Matter.
Lenin 'Advances' By Going Backwards
As is well known, Lenin's ideas matured and developed considerably between publishing MEC and writing PN -- largely as a result of studying Hegel's Logic (but not because of any obvious intervention in the class struggle, nor because of any relevant advancement in the sciences).55
In that case, dialectics is perhaps the only area of human endeavour where, in order to advance knowledge, its acolytes have to delve into ancient forms of mysticism -- albeit, prolix versions of the latter that have had a superficial 'enlightenment' veneer applied to them, courtesy of Hegel.
[More on this in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here).]
However, this major change of emphasis didn't stop Lenin speaking about the "objective" nature of reality -- something, of course, that not even Hegel wished to deny.56
Nevertheless, Lenin began to maintain that other elements of DM should take primacy over his former criterion of 'externality'. For example, the following:
"The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal characteristics or features) of dialectics." [Lenin (1961), p.357. Bold emphasis added.]
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development." [Ibid., p.222. Bold emphasis added.]56a
To be sure, the second of these two passages appears at the end of a long list of other important features of dialectics, but few (if any) of these made any appearance in MEC, and the former sine qua non of "objectivity" (i.e., "externalism") has simply been dropped. As detailed in Note 1, Lenin constantly repeated (almost neurotically) his "externalist" mantra in MEC; in PN, as far as can be ascertained, it is completely absent.
The problem is that this has now left DM with no 'definition' of matter.57
The Dialectical Menu -- Pick-And-Mix
[This is one of the most incomplete sections of this Essay; more details and examples will be added over the next few years.]
This peculiar fact isn't just a quirk of Lenin's theoretical progress. Admittedly, scientific knowledge is continually developing and growing, and theorists find they have to revise, modify or eliminate certain aspects of their earlier work, or even abandon former hypotheses and theories in their entirety. However, those working within a particular tradition often agree on certain core ideas (what Thomas Kuhn calls a "paradigm"). By way of contrast, what we find in DM is a situation where its theorists list its essential features in widely varying ways, emphasising different theses as its most important precepts, which vary from book to book, article to article, page to page -- even when they have been written by the same author!
Naturally, this raises a serious question: What is the real nature of DM? For example, TAR itself defines DM quite differently from Lenin. First of all, Rees downplays the so-called 'three laws of dialectics', which other DM-theorists regard as centrally important:
"The three laws [of DM] are not…the only way in which dialectical development can take place. They cannot be understood without the broader definition of the dialectic discussed above…. [T]hey are useful developments in dialectical understanding." [Rees (1998), pp.8-9.]
In fact, it is TAR's own definition of DM (in terms of Totality, change through contradiction and mediation)58 that is non-standard; not even Trotsky depicted DM in this way:
"These terms -- totality, change, contradiction and mediation -- are the key terms of the dialectic." [Ibid., p.8.]
The three so-called 'laws of dialectics' (discussed in detail in Essay Seven Part One) -- UO, Q↔Q, and NON -- don't appear to be all that important for Rees. Indeed, they assume only a minor or derivative role in his book, which is something that Alex Callinicos pointed out in his review:
"One of Trotsky's most intriguing suggestions is that 'the fundamental law of dialectics is the conversion of quantity in to quality, for it gives [us] the general formula of all evolutionary processes -- of nature as well as of society'. He goes on to argue, 'The principle of the transition of quantity into quality has universal significance, in so far as we view the entire universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and transformation and not as the fruit of conscious creation.' This claim has much to be said for it." [Callinicos (1998), pp.99-100. Emphasis in the original.]59
And, in a more recent work, Callinicos went further, back-tracking somewhat on his earlier stance of opposing the idea that there is a dialectic in nature:
"It was this experience [i.e., the use of dialectics in the Lysenko affair -- RL] that first motivated many Marxists to conclude that Engels was wrong, and that real contradictions are unique to the social world. This used to be my own view, but two reasons have led me to change my mind. The first is the refinement of the dialectic of nature offered by Trotsky.... [I.e., in Trotsky (1986) -- RL] Trotsky reduces the three 'laws of the dialectic' to one: the transformation of quantity into quality...." [Callinicos (2006), p.212.]
I will be saying more about Callinicos's comments in other Essays (but see Note 16). However, once again, we have here yet another (in this case, half-hearted) 'natural dialectician' offer up his own 'sanitised' version of Engels's mystical 'theory' -- reminiscent of the way theologians 'sanitise' the Bible in their vain attempt to make it compatible with modern science. Unfortunately for Callinicos, the usual reasons for accepting a 'sort-of-dialectic' in nature have been exposed in Essay Seven Part One as entirely bogus. Moreover, his application of 'the dialectic' to social development (attempted at length in the above book -- in fact it is part of what is an almost totally unreadable chapter) has also been shown to be based on a series of spurious verbal tricks and sub-logical moves originally performed by Hegel, in his badly misnamed book, 'Logic' (here, here, here, and here).
Indeed, Callinicos's book is yet another example of the deleterious effect (on the minds of otherwise alert comrades) of reading far too much Hegel that is good for anyone, a dire situation compounded by studying and equal amount of post-Heideggerian, Continental Philosophy. Hence, we see once again a prominent Marxist, who can write with enviable clarity and exemplary skill on economic, political and historical topics when he wants to (for example, in Socialist Worker and several of his other books), reduced to stringing together incomprehensible, jargon-dominated sentences, when it comes to re-packaging ideas drawn from the Hermetic wing of philosophical confusion and ruling-class ideology.
In a similar fashion, other DM-classicists (and more recent DM-apologists) seem to be equally divided over the fundamentals of their own theory. Engels himself appeared to have been content with the aforementioned "three laws" forming a basis for DM (both in his reply to Dühring and in his notebooks).60 In DN, even though he defined DM by means of his usual reference to these 'laws', they appear in a slightly augmented form:
"Dialectics [is] the science of universal inter-connection. Min[imum] laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [Engels (1954), p.17.]
Later on in DN, these 'laws' were re-iterated in a more orthodox, concise fashion:
"[The laws of dialectics] can be reduced in the main to three; The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites; The law of the negation of the negation." [Ibid., p.62.]
Engels also makes an attempt to link both the UO and the IO to his criticism of the LOI, another defective set of ideas he uncritically lifted from Hegel. [Cf., ibid., pp.214-15.] Anyway, "Totality", "mediation" and interconnection, while clearly present in his writings (albeit in a somewhat watered-down form) don't appear to be as important to Engels as they were for, say, Lukacs (or for Rees). Indeed, for much of DN, Engels largely ignores his other two 'Laws' (i.e., UO and NON)!
Even so, as already noted, Lenin's earlier sine qua non of materialism (i.e., the epistemological aspects of the "externalism" prominent in MEC) doesn't make its appearance anywhere in Engels's account -- and neither is it prominent in (and, in most cases, it is absent from) the writings of many other DM-theorists; it assumes no significant role in TAR, as far as can be ascertained.
Admittedly, complex theories have many sides to them, but each DM-author appears to possess his/her own list of fundamental tenets that others relegate more-or-less to the sidelines. In addition, these lists seem to change over time, even if the set of elements common to the entire list remains largely the same -- so that the overall package can serve as a creed which the orthodox regularly intone at the recalcitrant, and for reasons exposed in Essay Nine Part Two. [A recent example of this quasi-scriptural phenomenon can be found here.]
Apart from this 'pick-and-mix' approach to basics, there appears to be very little development in DM-concepts -- so that 150 years after Engels began toying with these alien-class ideas, DM has changed very little.61
We have already seen that Trotsky regarded:
"…the law of the transition of quantity into quality [as the]…fundamental law of dialectics." [Trotsky (1986), p.87; repeated on p.88.]
But, he also noted that:
"Dialectics is the logic of development. It examines the world…as a result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became the way it is as a result of lawlike development. In this, its fundamental and most general sense, the dialectical view of nature and humanity coincides with the so-called 'evolutionary' view of nature…." [Ibid., p.96. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
Once again, we discover another "fundamental" element -- but still no development (and Trotsky seems to be totally uninterested in change through 'internal contradiction', and he never once mentions the NON). Indeed, for many DM-theorists, evolution, or even universal change, seems to be the central plank of this theory.62
The comments of more recent dialecticians, however, merely add to the confusion. For George Novack, it looks like the Heraclitean Flux at one point is basic:
"The dialectical method seeks to accommodate itself to these fundamental features of reality. It must take them as the starting point and basis of its own procedure…. Dialectical thought too must be concrete, changeable, ever fresh and flowing…. Dialecticians recognize that all formulas must be provisional, limited, approximate…. Dialectics itself grows and changes, often in a contradictory fashion…." [Novack (1971), pp.70-71.]63
Hence, all theories are "provisional" -- except, of course, this one!
So, even though dialecticians predict change everywhere else, the set of ideas to which all or most DM-theorists assent remains rigidly fixed (despite what Novack says about DM growing). All we ever find in DM-texts is the constant repetition of the same handful of 'fundamentals', rotated a little here, a little there, over time and between authors, as already noted. At best, the only change apparent in this "fresh and flowing" theory is confined to the items each author idiosyncratically pulls out of the dialectical hat, and puts at the top of the pile (to vary the image).
In the work quoted above, Novack did go on to re-affirm the familiar DM-trinity:
"The real truth about things is that they not only exist, persist, but they also develop and pass away. This passing away of things…is expressed in logical terminology by the term 'negation'. The whole truth about things can be expressed only if we take into account this opposite and negative aspect." [Ibid., pp.84-85.]
"Just as affirmation transforms itself of necessity into negation, so in turn negation exhibits its positive character, as the negation of the negation…. This is the dialectic of development, the necessary transformation of processes into other processes." [Ibid., p.89.]
"A thing is not only itself but another. A is not merely equal to A; it is also more profoundly equal to non-A." [Ibid., pp.91-92.]64
"The dialectical process of development does not end with the transformation of quantity into quality…. The process continues in the opposite direction and converts new quality into new quantity." [Ibid., p.92.]65
For Cornforth, on the other hand, DM is to be characterised as follows:
"Materialism is not a dogmatic system. It is rather a way of interpreting, conceiving of and explaining every question." [Cornforth (1976), p.17.]
This appears to mean that DM is merely a method. To be sure, Cornforth later emphasised the more 'orthodox' and familiar aspects of DM:
"Materialism teaches that the world is by its very nature material…. [T]hat matter is objective reality existing outside and independent of the mind…. [T]hat the world and its laws are knowable and that…there is no unknowable sphere of reality which lies outside the material world." [Ibid., p.25.]65a
But, despite Cornforth's claim to the contrary (in the first of the two passages quoted above), this latest assertion looks pretty dogmatic; he certainly provided no detectable (or, rather, adequate) evidence or argument to substantiate it. Hence, it isn't surprising to find that he went on to maintain that DM is able to explain everything -- he simply neglected to add that it does so in a thoroughly doctrinaire manner.66
On the other hand, Cameron (an otherwise enthusiastic advocate of DM) manages to find fault with the NON, a 'law' Stalin and Mao also appear to have neglected, or perhaps even rejected.67 After quoting Engels's illustration of this 'Law' (with reference to a grain of barley), Cameron points out that:
"Engels seems to argue…that the sequence seed-plant-seed is itself a negation of the negation. But, if so, where is the higher level of development? There appears to be none, only a change from one quantity to another, from one seed of barley to many…. Accumulated repetition will not produce evolutionary change…. Engels, in short, does not demonstrate that the negation of the negation is a developmental phenomenon, a 'law' bringing about a 'higher' form of the original entity. In fact, the more he talks about it, the clearer it becomes that it is essentially an idealist concept -- as it is in Hegel. It should simply be dropped." [Cameron (1995), pp.69-70. Paragraphs merged.]
This means, of course, that Cameron is left with only two 'Laws' of dialectics to be getting on with. In fact, the rather flimsy reason he gives for his objection to the NON (which sits in stark contrast to his rather naïve acceptance of the other two 'Laws') is, in the event, rather puzzling.68
"Engels talked about the three categories, but as for me I don't believe in two of those categories. (The unity of opposites is the most basic law, the transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites quality and quantity, and the negation of the negation does not exist at all.) The juxtaposition, on the same level, of the transformation of quality and quantity into one another, the negation of the negation, and the law of the unity of opposites is 'triplism', not monism. The most basic thing is the unity of opposites. The transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites quality and quantity. There is no such thing as the negation of the negation. Affirmation, negation, affirmation, negation...in the development of things, every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation. Slave-holding society negated primitive society, but with reference to feudal society it constituted, in turn, the affirmation. Feudal society constituted the negation in relation to slave-holding society but it was in turn the affirmation with reference to capitalist society. Capitalist society was the negation in relation to feudal society, but it is, in turn, the affirmation in relation to socialist society." [Mao (1964). Bold emphases added. On this, see Note 67.]
And here is an 'explanation of his 'argument' (published recently at a Marxist-Leninist site):
"Engels makes use of this Hegelian language in referring to the negation of the negation as a dialectical law, but this has the potential to create some confusion among Marxists that we would benefit from sorting out. Materialist dialectics is concerned with material reality, not just ideas. So to illustrate this sequence, let's consider capitalism as our first affirmation. Marx says the bourgeoisie creates its own gravediggers. In other words, bourgeois society creates its own negation, the proletariat, a class born out of capitalism itself. Capitalism itself gives rise to the necessity of socialist revolution. The proletariat, through socialist revolution, therefore negates the bourgeoisie, capitalist relations, and so on, step by step. But in doing so, the proletariat also eliminates the conditions for its own existence as a class. This is what Lenin describes in The State and Revolution as socialism's 'withering away,' which allows for a stateless and classless society -- communism -- to come forth. This is the second negation, the negation of the negation, by this way of looking at it.
"Taken step by step we see that first we have the original affirmation, the thesis. This is capitalism in our illustration. This is followed by an antithesis, which arises from and negates the original thesis. This is the first negation: socialism. Finally we have the synthesis, which negates the antithesis that had negated the original thesis: communism. Thus the final synthesis is the negation of the negation. Essentially, in this progression of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, the final synthesis serves to negate the antithesis that itself negated the original thesis, while also preserving elements of both in a new unity or identity.
"In this process, the 'law of the negation of the negation' is what accounts for the 'spiral development' that makes progress, rather than mere repetition, possible. This synthesis carries forward something from both the original affirmation and the first negation, synthesizing them, that is uniting them, into something qualitatively new. This new unity becomes a new thesis, or a new affirmation, and the sequence begins again, but at a higher level than before. This conception of the dialectic accounts for progress by describing how this step-by-step process leads from one thing to the next, based on resolving the contradictions that arise from the process. Of course this isn't entirely incorrect, but it is inaccurate. This inaccuracy can lead to some confusion as to what is really taking place, dialectically. The 'law of the negation of the negation' is helpful to a point, but we have to go further. Revolutionary science can't rest with simple explanations.
"The thinking behind the 'law of the negation of the negation' confuses the issue in two interrelated ways. First, it gives us too linear an understanding of dialectics, which doesn’t account for the complex processes where multiple contradictions are at work at the same time.... And second, by starting and ending with identity, it enshrines identity, or unity, as primary over contradiction, or struggle. To truly put the dialectic on a materialist basis also means, as Mao says in his 'Talk on Questions of Philosophy,' to understand that 'every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation.' In other words, thesis, antithesis and synthesis aren't separated from each other in a metaphysical way. Affirmation and negation are present at every moment of any given process.
"In his essay 'On Contradiction,' Mao made a great contribution to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of dialectical materialism by clearly explaining that the materialist dialectic cannot be understood as a simple, linear sequence, but as a complex structural matrix of many unevenly developed contradictions all at work simultaneously. It is important to note that if we ignore the complexity of contradiction in favor of a simple, linear sequence, we risk taking a mechanical approach to solving problems by failing to recognize the significance of secondary contradictions in the situation. People who claim that everything that isn't pure class struggle is a distraction are guilty of this error.
"Furthermore, the 'law of the negation of the negation' preserves a Hegelian metaphysical framework. The Hegelian dialectic begins and ends with identity, mediated by struggle. This first identity is the 'thesis' of Hegel's triad, the original affirmation, and the Hegelian 'synthesis' (the negation of the negation) is a new identity, with struggle ('antithesis') acting merely as a bridge between them. This is an important point: in the Hegelian sequence contradiction exists primarily between identities rather than within them. Here identity is absolute and struggle is relative. In reality, on the contrary, contradiction is present within and essential to every moment of the process. Bourgeois society contains a multitude of contradictions (affirmations and negations), as does socialism, and so will communism. Struggle is inherent in every part of the process. Every identity is teeming with contradictions. If we don't grasp this point we will think that external contradictions should be the focus of our attention, rather than internal contradictions that tend to drive things forward....
"In privileging identity over struggle, the 'law of the negation of the negation' can also put Marxists at risk of a kind of fatalism, where Communism exists as the 'final cause' at the End of History, drawing everything towards it as the final identity where everything is ultimately resolved. Communism isn't a final identity without any contradictions. Contradictions will exist within communism as well. Change and progress will continue. History will never end.
"Again, the 'law of the negation of the negation' is useful to a point, but if we don't take it farther we are left open to metaphysical errors. It gives us too linear a description of the dialectical process, and it separates affirmation and negation in a metaphysical way that privileges identity. As Marxism-Leninism has advanced it has advanced the philosophy of dialectical materialism beyond the metaphysical, linear framework of Hegelianism. Mao accomplished this by theorizing the concepts of the principal contradiction, principal and secondary aspects of contradictions, and the uneven development of contradictions within a process. Mao's writings on dialectical materialism give us a powerful weapon to analyze the forces at work in the complex processes we face." [Quoted from here; accessed 14/08/2022. Bold emphases and links added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
But Mao didn't say the NON was "inaccurate", "helpful" or "useful to a point", he said there is "no such thing as the negation of the negation" and that it "does not exist at all". In which case, the above attempt to try to argue Mao was no 'Revisionist' fails badly. Furthermore, the accuracy of the above 'explanation' can be judged by the fact that the article confuses Fichte's method of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis' with Hegel's, which Mao also did in the article in question [Mao (1964]. We also saw in Essay Nine Part Two (here and here), that all this dialectical jargon allowed the Stalinists and Maoists to excuse or explain away the 'contradictions' (the social tensions) that manifestly failed to disappear in Russia post 1924 and China post 1949.
[I will say more about the above 'explanation' in a future re-write of Essays Two and Ten Part One.]
More to follow...
1. Of course, for Lenin, the writing of MEC had a specific purpose: it was aimed at countering what he regarded as serious theoretical and interpretative errors, which weren't just academic quibbles; they had what he viewed as dangerous political implications. As John Rees notes:
"[T]he defeat of the 1905 revolution, like all such defeats, carried confusion and demoralisation into the ranks of the revolutionaries…. The forward rush of the revolution had helped unite the leadership…on strategic questions and so…intellectual differences could be left to private disagreement. But when defeat magnifies every tactical disagreement, forcing revolutionaries to derive fresh strategies from a re-examination of the fundamentals of Marxism, theoretical differences were bound to become important. As Tony Cliff explains:
'With politics apparently failing to overcome the horrors of the Tsarist regime, escape into the realm of philosophical speculation became the fashion….'
"Philosophical fashion took a subjectivist, personal, and sometimes religious turn…. Bogdanov drew inspiration from the theories of physicist Ernst Mach and philosopher Richard Avenarius…. [Mach retreated] from Kant's ambiguous idealism to the pure idealism of Berkeley and Hume….
"It was indeed Mach and Bogdanov's 'ignorance of dialectics' that allowed them to 'slip into idealism.' Lenin was right to highlight the link between Bogdanov's adoption of idealism and his failure to react correctly to the downturn in the level of the struggle in Russia." [Rees (1998), pp.173-79, quoting Cliff (1975), p.290. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
This helps explain Lenin's tone in MEC. His wording at times resembles that of a desperate man vainly trying to hold back the tide of contemporary thought, rather like a dialectical version of King Canute.
For example, there are numerous places in MEC where Lenin seems compelled almost neurotically to say the same thing over and over again: materialism is committed to the 'objective' nature of reality, to objects and process that exist independently of 'the mind'. Cf., Lenin (1972), pp.1-2, 50, 58, 61, 63, 69, 86, 111, 123, 136-37, 165, 177, 191, 197, 200, 202-03, 211, 212, 215, 216-18, 221-22, 259, 270, 287-88, 306, 311-14, 320, 322, 324, 326, 354-55, 364, 366, 373, 377, 394, 407, 418, 420 (twice), 422, 425, and 426. This is an incomplete list!
Admittedly, Lenin was trying to re-assert what he took to be the real Dialectical-Marxist position; he wanted to neutralise the political influence of ideas of various contemporary Phenomenalists, Idealists, Immanentists, Conventionalists, and Subjectivists (some of whom claimed to be Marxists). Again, this might help explain his almost obsessive desire to repeat the same theme time and again.
In spite of this, it isn't easy to see how the relatively sophisticated theorists (at whom MEC was aimed) would be impressed by the mere repetition of the same handful of phrases -- no matter how much better it made Lenin (or his supporters) feel. Did Lenin honestly think that people like Mach, Poincaré, Avenarius and Bogdanov (or their supporters and collaborators) needed to be reminded yet again of the naïve realist view of 'objectivity' -- several dozen times?! Did he honestly think that if he said the same thing fifty-nine times they would continue to disagree with him, but on the sixtieth reminder they would fold?
Whenever Lenin turned to discuss a rival theory he almost invariably thought it sufficient simply to bat it out of the park with the constant refrain that the 'objective' world existed before human beings (or minds) had evolved. On other occasions, he confined himself to lampooning the views of his opponents -- which, as is now plain, he barely understood. He clearly thought it unnecessary to produce any arguments (of note) to substantiate his own position or to buttress his criticisms of rival theories. His tirade was plainly aimed at exposing what he thought were the obvious absurdity of ideas that undermined belief in matter defined in his own rather idiosyncratic way -- and which ironically collapses into a naïve version of the very views he was attacking, as we will see.
Hence, Lenin relied on a combination of continual repetition, relentless ridicule and incessant misrepresentation -- tactics he obviously learnt from Engels, which subsequent DM-theorists have not only taken to heart, they have perfected into an art-form. Because of this, it is easy to understand why MEC has won so many admirers amongst revolutionary traditionalists: it provides them with simple answers to complex questions, which is always a crowd pleaser.
What few arguments Lenin strung-together in support of his own ideas will be examined below, and in the main body of this Essay.
2. Many of these difficulties will be examined at length in the course of this Essay.
3. This term isn't to be confused with the title of a metaphysical theory of the same name currently fashionable in contemporary Analytic Philosophy.
4. Notice that the phrasing in the main body of this Essay avoids the use of the contentious word "definition". In fact Lenin's refusal to say what he thought matter was presents DM with more serious problems than would otherwise be the case by his merely not defining it. More on this later and in Note 54.
5. Here are a few quotations from Lenin that support this interpretation:
"We have already seen that this question is particularly repugnant to the philosophy of Mach and Avenarius. Natural science positively asserts that the earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it. Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that there was no sentient matter, no 'complexes of sensations,' no self that was supposedly 'indissolubly' connected with the environment in accordance with Avenarius' doctrine. Matter is primary, and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development. Such is the materialist theory of knowledge, to which natural science instinctively subscribes....
"...[O]nly one solution is possible, viz., the recognition that the external world reflected by our mind exists independently of our mind. This materialist solution alone is really compatible with natural science...." [Lenin (1972), pp.75-76, 82. Bold emphasis added.]
"Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it....
"There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is 'beyond' phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) -- all this is the sheerest nonsense, Schrulle (whim), crotchet, invention.
"In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.
"Once we accept the point of view that human knowledge develops from ignorance, we shall find millions of examples of it just as simple as the discovery of alizarin in coal tar, millions of observations not only in the history of science and technology but in the everyday life of each and every one of us that illustrate the transformation of 'things-in-themselves' into 'things-for-us,' the appearance of 'phenomena' when our sense-organs experience an impact from external objects, the disappearance of 'phenomena' when some obstacle prevents the action upon our sense-organs of an object which we know to exist. The sole and unavoidable deduction to be made from this -- a deduction which all of us make in everyday practice and which materialism deliberately places at the foundation of its epistemology -- is that outside us, and independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and that our perceptions are images of the external world...." [Ibid., pp.110-11. Bold emphasis added.]
"The example given by Engels is elementary, and anybody without the slightest difficulty can think of scores of similar truths that are eternal and absolute and that only insane people can doubt (as Engels says, citing another example: 'Paris is in France'). Why does Engels speak here of 'platitudes'? Because he refutes and ridicules the dogmatic, metaphysical materialist Dühring, who was incapable of applying dialectics to the relation between absolute and relative truth. To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth. And it is this 'one way or another' which distinguishes the metaphysical materialist Dühring from the dialectical materialist Engels. On the most complex questions of science in general, and of historical science in particular, Dühring scattered words right and left: ultimate, final and eternal truth. Engels jeered at him. Of course there are eternal truths, Engels said, but it is unwise to use high-sounding words...in connection with simple things. If we want to advance materialism, we must drop this trite play with the words 'eternal truth'; we must learn to put, and answer, the question of the relation between absolute and relative truth dialectically. It was on this issue that the fight between Dühring and Engels was waged thirty years ago. And Bogdanov, who managed 'not to notice' Engels' explanation of the problem of absolute and relative truth given in this very same chapter, and who managed to accuse Engels of 'eclecticism' for his admission of a proposition which is a truism for all forms of materialism, only once again betrays his utter ignorance of both materialism and dialectics....
"'Here once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much unlimited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition..., its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual expression and in its realisation at each particular moment.' [Quoting Engels (1976), p.108 -- RL.]
"This argument is extremely important for the question of relativism, i.e., the principle of the relativity of our knowledge, which is stressed by all Machians.... For Engels absolute truth is compounded from relative truths. Bogdanov is a relativist; Engels is a dialectician. Here is another, no less important, argument of Engels from the chapter of Anti-Dühring already quoted:
"'Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error and error truth'. [Quoting Engels (1976), p.114 -- RL] Here follows the example of Boyle's law (the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The 'grain of truth' contained in this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The law, it appears, is a truth 'only approximately.'
"Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge...." [Ibid., pp.148-51. Bold emphases added.]
"Knowledge can be useful biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid., p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
"…[the] basis of philosophical materialism and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical materialism. The recognition of immutable elements…and so forth, is not materialism, but metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialism…. Dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another." [Ibid., p.312. Bold emphasis added; in all the above, italic emphases are in the original. Quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
There are dozens of other passages in MEC (and elsewhere -- on that, see below) where Lenin continually repeats the above assertions.
Even so, how Lenin knew the following was the case is unclear:
"There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is 'beyond' phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) -- all this is the sheerest nonsense, Schrulle (whim), crotchet, invention. [Ibid., p.110. Bold emphasis added.]
Did Lenin have independent access to 'things-in-themselves' so that he could deliver the good news to the rest of us, who are not quite so epistemologically blessed? That is, that there is no (important) difference between these 'things-in-themselves' and our perception of them? If so, he annoyingly kept the details to himself.
[But, as we will see later, Lenin isn't even remotely correct in this regard. As we will also see, neither scientific knowledge nor practice is capable of providing him with any support, either.]
Lenin's commitment to universal interconnectedness has already been examined. Here is a reminder of what he believed:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc...." [Lenin (1961), pp.221, 359-60.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Emphases in the original.]
Sure, these passages come from later work, but in view of the fact that Lenin was a stout defender of Engels, who also accepted this Hermetic idea, it isn't credible to suppose that Lenin only adopted this doctrine after he had completed MEC.
5a. It could be objected that the argument in the main body of this Essay is dishonest since it slides between the use of "interconnected" and "interdependent". The two aren't the same. That objection will be neutralised in Note 7, below. This worry is, of course, quite independent (no pun intended) of the fact that DM-theorists have yet to tell us with any clarity what they mean by universal "interconnection". [On that, see here.]
6. On this, see Note 5, but, add to that the following:
"...Avenarius designates the physical or matter by the terms absolute and metaphysics, for, according to his theory of the principal co-ordination (or, in the new way, 'complete experience'), the counter-term is inseparable from the central term, the environment from the self; the non-self is inseparable from the self (as J. G. Fichte said). That this theory is disguised subjective idealism we have already shown, and the nature of Avenarius' attacks on 'matter' is quite obvious: the idealist denies physical being that is independent of the mind and therefore rejects the concept elaborated by philosophy for such being. That matter is 'physical' (i.e., that which is most familiar and immediately given to man, and the existence of which no one save an inmate of a lunatic asylum can doubt) is not denied by Avenarius; he only insists on the acceptance of 'his' theory of the indissoluble connection between the environment and the self....
"As the reader sees, all these arguments of the founders of empirio-criticism entirely and exclusively revolve around the old epistemological question of the relation of thinking to being, of sensation to the physical. It required the extreme naïveté of the Russian Machians to discern anything here that is even remotely related to 'recent science,' or 'recent positivism.' All the philosophers mentioned by us, some frankly, others guardedly, replace the fundamental philosophical line of materialism (from being to thinking, from matter to sensation) by the reverse line of idealism. Their denial of matter is the old answer to epistemological problems, which consists in denying the existence of an external, objective source of our sensations, of an objective reality corresponding to our sensations. On the other hand, the recognition of the philosophical line denied by the idealists and agnostics is expressed in the definitions: matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation, and so forth." [Lenin (1974), pp.164-65. Emphases in the original; quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
6a. Of course it could be argue that:
(1) The mind isn't the sort of 'thing' that can be interconnected with anything, and
(2) Knowledge isn't the sort of thing that could be interconnected with matter, either.
However, on (2), see Note 7, below. As far as (1) is concerned, if what it says were the case, then the idea that the 'mind' is connected (in some way, perhaps causally or 'dialectically') with matter will have to be abandoned. If "the mind isn't the sort of 'thing' that can be interconnected with anything" then it can't be connected either. That being the case, the 'mind' must be independent of matter, which means that the Idealists were right, after all.
7. This line of argument may, perhaps, be brought out more precisely in the following way:
A1: Let M1 represent that configuration of matter (in someone's brain or their CNS) from which dialectically 'emerges' thought, B1: "The Sun is approximately 93 million miles from Earth."
A2: While B1 itself (based as it is on a certain configuration of matter, M1) depends on the fact that the Sun is approximately 93 million miles from Earth, the fact that the Sun is approximately 93 million miles from Earth does not depend on the thought that B1.
A3: Now, let the configuration of matter that results in the Sun being approximately 93 million miles from Earth be M2.
A4: Assume that everything in the Totality is inter-related, and that any state of matter, S1, is dependent on at least some other state of matter, S2, and vice versa. [Such states could be defined as generously as is required by other DM-principles, involving change through contradiction, constant change, mediation, spiral development and relative knowledge, etc., etc.]
A5: Let M1 be in state S1, and M2 be in state S2.
A6: By A4, S1 of M1 is dependent on S2 of M2, and vice versa, which means that M1 is dependent on M2, and vice versa.
A7: Hence, the material configuration that results in the fact that the Sun is 93 million miles from Earth is dependent on the material configuration from which emerges thought B1, and vice versa.
A8: Again, in the Totality, all items are inter-related, and mediate one another.
A9: Hence, B1 is related to and is mediated by M1, and vice versa.
A10: So, (by A6-A9) B1 is related to and is mediated by M2, and vice versa.
A11: Consequently, the material configuration that results in the fact that the Sun is approximately 93 million miles from earth is related to and is mediated by B1, and vice versa.
A12: Anything that mediates something else exercises a causal influence of some sort on it so that the one is dependent on the other.
A13: Since B1 is mediated by and mediates M1, B1 is both caused by and causes M1, and hence is both caused by and causes M2.
A14: Hence, B1 has a causal influence on the configuration of matter that results in the Sun being approximately 93 million miles from Earth.
A15: Therefore, at least one thought (i.e., "The Sun is approximately 93 million miles from Earth") exercises a causal influence upon at least one material state in nature (i.e., the fact that the Sun is approximately 93 million miles from Earth).
A16: Hence, matter isn't independent of mind.
Naturally, there are several rather vague aspects of this argument, but that just means its conclusion can only be neutralised if DM-theorists clarify (for the first time ever!) what they mean by T1, T2 and T4 (or their preferred DM-equivalents):
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
Of course, the above conclusion could also be challenged by questioning the equation of causation with "mediation", or even with "dependence", but that would only postpone the evil day, for it is surely the case that if matter is independent of mind, it isn't "mediated" (or caused by) by mind, either.
Anyway, it is difficult to see how "mediation" isn't a form of causation or dependence (at least in the sense that it is a formal, and also perhaps structural, cause). That is after all the point behind all that dialectical talk about "internal relations", "bad infinities" and the DM-criticism of the many and varied errors of "mechanical materialism". [There will be more on this in Essays Three Part Three and Four Part Two (when they are published).]
Moreover, we have already seen in Essay Eight Parts One and Three that the distinction dialecticians draw between 'external' and 'internal' causation -- or perhaps between 'external' and 'internal' relations/"mediations"(?) -- can't be sustained. In that case, if "mediation", dependence and causation are to be distinguished from each other, yet another central plank of DM will have to be abandoned.
This takes care of the objection noted above (in Note 5a) -- i.e., the claim that the argument here confuses "inter-dependent" with "interconnected", since it is now clear that "inter-dependent" means "has an inter-causal link with".
Another way out of thus Dialectical-Dead-End, and perhaps one that only the most desperate of DM-acolytes might want to take, is to deny we have minds so they can't be inter-connected with anything. I'm not too sure whether any DM-fans will be keen to clutch at this rather insubstantial straw.
The only other conceivable way this argument could be challenged would seem to be based on the claim that the remoteness of the vast bulk of the universe means that distant parts of nature can be ignored (because their effects are vanishingly small and thus insignificant). That response has already been neutralised in Essay Eleven Part Two. Anyway, the 'remoteness' response can't work on local bodies of matter, for the above argument shows that DM implies there is an interconnection between thought and matter in, say, the solar system, and even more locally right here on earth. In that case, the above argument (suitably modified) shows that DM implies that, for instance, Mount Everest (the actual mountain, not its 'concept') is interconnected with your thoughts about it -- i.e., that you have a causal/'mediational' connection with Mt Everest just by thinking about it!
A1a: Let M3 represent that configuration of matter (in someone's brain or their CNS) from which dialectically 'emerges' thought, B2: "Mount Everest is 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high."
A2a: While B2 itself (based as it is on a certain configuration of matter, M3) depends on the fact that Mount Everest is 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high, the fact that Mount Everest is 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high does not depend on the thought that B2.
A3a: Now, let the configuration of matter that results in Mount Everest being 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high be M4.
A4a: Assume that everything in the Totality is inter-related, and that any state of matter, S3, is dependent on at least some other state of matter, S4, and vice versa. [Such states could be defined as generously as is required by other DM-principles, involving change through contradiction, constant change, mediation, spiral development and relative knowledge, etc., etc.]
A5a: Let M3 be in state S3, and M4 be in state S4.
A6a: By A4, S3 of M3 is dependent on S4 of M4, and vice versa, which means that M3 is dependent on M4, and vice versa.
A7a: Hence, the material configuration that results in the fact that Mount Everest is 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high is dependent on the material configuration from which emerges thought B2, and vice versa.
A8a: Again, in the Totality, all items are inter-related, and mediate one another.
A9a: Hence, B2 is related to and is mediated by M3, and vice versa.
A10a: So, (by A6-A9) B2 is related to and is mediated by M4, and vice versa.
A11a: Consequently, the material configuration that results in the fact that Mount Everest is 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high is related to and is mediated by B2, and vice versa.
A12a: Anything that mediates something else exercises a causal influence of some sort on it so that the one is dependent on the other.
A13a: Since B2 is mediated by and mediates M3, B2 is both caused by and causes M3, and hence is both caused by and causes M4.
A14a: Hence, B2 has a causal influence on the configuration of matter that results in Mount Everest being 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high.
A15a: Therefore, at least one thought (i.e., "Mount Everest is 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high") exercises a causal influence upon at least one material state in nature (i.e., the fact that Mount Everest is 8,848 metres (29,029 feet) high).
A16: Hence, matter isn't independent of mind.
That would, of course, make this mountain Ideal -- or it would mean that you're a minor deity of some sort.
And this shouldn't surprise us, since that is largely how Hegel viewed things (if we ignore his convoluted and opaque jargon, of course).
No wonder then that Hegel asserted the following:
"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle…." [Hegel (1999), pp.154-55.]
Rotating Hegel -- putting him "on his feet" -- has no effect, therefore, on the Idealist implications of his theory. If everything is interconnected then either (1) We have no minds, or (2) The world is Ideal!
8. In addition, it would have to be maintained that our knowledge of the world isn't dependent on events that took place before human beings evolved -- otherwise T8 will have to be rejected:
T8: Knowledge is historically-conditioned, but it isn't reducible to such conditioning (otherwise T1 and T2 would be compromised).
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
That is because, if knowledge were (directly) connected to events that took place before we evolved, it wouldn't be historically-conditioned (except in anything other than a trivial sense) -- taking "historically-conditioned" to mean "constrained by human development". Plainly, if human knowledge were (directly) connected to events that took place before we evolved, then the developments that took place in the intervening years would have been by-passed and wouldn't have been "constrained by human development", having by-passed it! [On this, see Note 10, below.]
9. Of course, some readers might object to the idea that the past should be counted as part of 'reality', but until we are told what DM-theorists regard 'reality' to be (the mysterious "Totality", perhaps?), it isn't easy to make much of this complaint. Certainly, as far as important strands in modern Physics are concerned, the past is as 'real' as both the present and the future, frozen as all three are in a four-dimensional manifold. Such objectors should, perhaps, take issue with Einstein (etc.), not the present author.
However, and independently of this, if the past isn't part of 'DM-reality' (or it isn't part of the DM-"Totality"), then 'DM-reality' would be ephemeral in the extreme. That is because the present is exceedingly fleeting. [The reader is directed here for further details.] And this is quite apart from the fact that if the past isn't part of 'reality', DM-theorists will find it hard to explain anything that happens in the present without recourse to unreal and non-existent causes (in, or from, the past).
10. These comments aren't meant to deny the active role of practice in the formation of knowledge (even if the precise concerning about how this is supposed to work have yet to be specified with any clarity (by dialecticians) -- not that much thought has been devoted to this knotty problem -- indeed, we have already seen that DM-epistemology implies extreme scepticism). These comments are on the contrary aimed at the idea that DM-theorists require the vast bulk of the 'objective' world to be independent of our knowledge of it, and they are being aired here in order to show that the DM-case against Idealism self-destructs once more.
To reiterate, that is because:
(a) As we have seen, the doctrine of universal interconnectedness implies that material reality is dependent on our thoughts about it; and,
(b) DM is predicated on the thesis that cognitive states underlying knowledge are materially-grounded (even if they somehow mysteriously "emerge" from their material base).
If these are so (and as argued in Note 7, above), the material foundations of thought -- which are also interconnected with every particle in the Totality -- must be back-related to every other item in the Totality, too (that is, unless DM-fans are prepared to abandon universal interconnection). The reason for this is plain: according to DM-theorists no element in their Totality is independent of any other, which, naturally, includes thoughts about the material contents of the Totality, and vice versa. That is why interconnectivity implies Idealism: given this view, it now turns out that every state of matter is mind-dependent.
Now, if any DM-supporters want to reject this disastrous conclusion (for whatever reason), the 'dialectical' integrity of the Totality will be thrown into question (since some processes -- namely thoughts -- would be connected, but not interconnected, with material reality).
This point can be generalised by means of the following argument:
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
T4: None of these are independent of each other; all are interconnected.
W1: Let W stand for the set of objects and processes that comprise the world which exists independently of our knowledge of it.
W2: Let K stand for any set of truths or partial truths about W, relativised to a time.
W3: Let R stand for a set of dependency relations between W and K. Furthermore, let R1 be any sub-set of R at time t1.
W4: Let R, W and elements of K be subject to change and development according to the dialectic in nature and human history.
W5: Hence, after the development of 'human consciousness', the relation between W and K will have altered; that is because practice, intervention and activity change both the world and humanity's understanding of, and relation to, it.
W6: Let R1 be the dependency relation between K and that part of W (i.e., W*) that existed before humanity became cognitively aware of it. Hence, if t1 is taken to be the present, KR1W* represents the relation that holds between, say, current knowledge and events that occurred before we evolved.
W7: By T1 and T2, KR1W* must be non-symmetric (or asymmetric). [I haven't applied the stricter antisymmetric condition here.] That is, while it is the case that KR1W* it isn't the case that W*R1K.
W8: In other words, current knowledge of the world that existed prior to our having evolved is dependent on that world, not the other way round.
W9: But, by T4 everything is inter-related.
W10: Let S be the set of relations (of any sort) between elements or sub-sets of T (the Totality), and let W* be a sub-set of T; further let S1 be any sub set of S at t1.
W11: Let e1, e2 and e3 be any three elements common to both T and W*, related to each other by S1, at least.
W12: But, by T4, e1S1e1, and (a) if e1S1e2 then e2S1e1, (b) if e1S1e3 then e3S1e1, (c) if e2S1e3 then e3S1e2, and (d) if e1S1e2 and e2S1e3, then e1S1e3.
[That is, e1 is related to itself (this relation is therefore reflexive), and the relation S1 between any two eis is symmetrical; in addition the relation S1 is transitive between these three elements.]
W13: This makes S1 an equivalence relation -- call it, E. By an induction clause (here omitted), it is possible to show that every element in S is closed under just such an equivalence relation (if T4 is true).
W14: Now either R1 is an S-relation or it isn't.
W15: If it is, then W7 is false, since in that case R1 is symmetric, after all. On the other hand, if R1 isn't an S-relation then there is at least one counterexample (namely R1) to the claim that every member of S is closed under equivalence relation E, implying that T4 is false.
[Any who object to my use of sets here need only replace the word "set" with "class". My use of "set" does not imply I accept the validity of set theory, but I am arguing with those who appear to do so.]
Admittedly, W14 depends on the LEM, but if that 'Law' is rejected by dialecticians, then R1 would be both symmetric and non-symmetric (asymmetric) at the same time. The final result would in fact be no different -- except, we would end up with two inconsistent conclusions. In that case, we would find that T4 was both true and false, and I rather think DM-apologists will want to hold onto the truth of T4 -- or, perhaps, modify it to T4a (given in the main body of the Essay, repeated below). They wouldn't, I think, want to claim that T4 is both true and false.
Of course, there could be a few die-hard DM-fans who might want to 'grasp' this 'contradiction' (i.e., declaring that T4 is both true and false -- thus 'Nixoning' it), maintaining that this was yet more 'proof' of the fundamentally 'contradictory' nature of reality. But, the problem would then be with the theory, not reality, and dialecticians certainly reject other theories that are defective in this way (on that, see here). They certainly don't argue that any and all contradictory theories are true -- except when and where it suits them.
However, it could be argued that Essays Three Part One and Four Part One (here and here) argued that relations aren't objects, and so they can't serve as elements in, or members of, a set. So, it looks like the present author can't make her mind up. Which is it to be: are relations objects or not?
In answer, I am quite happy to concede that relations aren't objects and thus be elements in, or members of, a set -- however, we might be able to circumvent this difficulty, as they do in mathematics, by re-defining a relation as a "set of objects functionally related to other objects" -- if DM-fans are prepared to admit the same. In that event, another central tenet of dialectics will bite the dust: abstractionism.
Finally, but more desperately, it could be objected that the argument (outlined in W1-W15 above) is convoluted and obviously contrived.
All I can say to any desperate soul who might want to argue along those lines: "Welcome to the world of modern logic and careful attention to detail, Hermetic bumbler!"
Nevertheless, the basic point is reasonably clear: if the world exists independently of our knowledge of it, then not everything is inter-related (hence the need to replace T4 with T4a and/or T4b, below). Plainly, this would mean that some things, while connected, are only one-way connected --, and hence aren't interconnected.
For ease of reference, T4a and T4b were:
T4a: Some elements of reality are independent of each other, while others are interconnected.
T4b: Some elements of reality are independent of each other and some are not interconnected with the vast bulk of the rest of the universe.
10a. It could be argued once more that this is really a minor problem which doesn't affect the scientific fact that the vast bulk of nature is interconnected. However, as Essay Eleven Parts One and Two have shown, even if that were the case (and there is good reason to conclude it is a couple light years from the truth), there are far more serious problems facing the DM-Totality than this.
11. Of course, the argument presented in the main body of this Essay (and above, in Note 10) only works because the said inter-relationships have been construed as equivalence relations. This is unlikely to be the case with objects and processes in the real world (in that the reflexive relation could be, and should be, challenged), compared to the relations between objects in a formal system.
Having said that, if DM is supposed to be Hegelian dialectics 'put back on its feet', then his 'logic' should still apply (as, indeed, Lenin argued). So, if Hegel's 'logic' is a formal system (and many suppose it is -- on that, see Ioan (1990)), then it is arguable that these inter-relationships are equivalence relations, after all.
However, the argument at least has the merit of focussing attention on the extremely vague nature of the doctrine universal interconnection upon which dialecticians have hitherto relied.
Finally, the argument set-out in W1-W15 above doesn't in fact depend on certain relations being equivalence relations; the key is the closure clause.
At any rate, it isn't easy to see how DM-theorists can extricate themselves even from an informal version of this dilemma. To repeat: if everything in the Totality is inter-related, then the material world must be a function of our knowledge of it -- implying T1 and T2 are false.
T1: There exists a world that is both external to, and independent of, the human mind. Material objects and processes pre-date any and all minds. Mind depends on matter, not vice versa.
T2: This world exists objectively -- which means that it pre-existed human evolution --, and is independent of all cognitive capacities.
However, since DM-theorists don't seem to know anything about the extent of the Totality -- what its boundaries are, or if it has any -- or on which temporal zones it is centred (i.e., whether it includes the past, the present or the future, for instance), or, indeed, anything about the nature of the relations inside the Totality, nor yet what it contains, what it is made of, or even what it is (!) (on that, see Essay Eleven Parts One and Two), it isn't easy to determine whether or not this informal dilemma is fatal to their theory. In fact, not even DM-theorists will be able to decide (should they want to!) without considerably clarifying their ideas --, and thus, of course, risk being accused of "Revisionism!"
Nevertheless, given the strife-ridden, highly fragmentary, and sectarian nature of DM-politics, any attempt to specify exactly what this terminally vague theory actually implies is bound to lead to yet more internecine bickering.
12. This allegation was substantiated in Note 1, above.
12a. Nor does colour possess many of the other characteristics and classic qualities of matter: it isn't impenetrable and has no inertial properties, for example. It could be argued that light has momentum (or, rather, "carries momentum"); that is undeniable, but colour isn't the same as light. We might ask "What momentum does red light carry?" but not "What momentum does red carry?"
13. In that case, it is little use being told that a certain colour is F, or is G (where "F" and "G" go proxy for suitable reductive phrases or (compound) clauses, such as "energy of a certain wavelength", or "a disposition to excite in us certain perceptions"), for unless F and G contain or use terms drawn from the vocabulary of colour, we would be no further forward. Manifestly, "energy of a certain wavelength" has itself only been identified as causing the perception of colour because of the fact that we already perceive colour and have a specific vocabulary to match.
On the other hand, if F and G do contain or use words drawn from the vocabulary of colour, all such reductive definitions would be circular.
[Which is just another way of saying that we can't get behind the vocabulary of colour without already presupposing a mastery of it, rendering pointless the entire exercise.]
For example:
C1: The colour red is a neural event E whereby a subject sees red.
C2: The colour red is a neural event E whereby a subject reports seeing red.
C3: The colour violet is caused by light of wavelength of approximately 400nm hitting the retina creating a perception of violet.
Here, as seems clear, a prior understanding of the use of "red" or "violet" would inform the imputed scientific facts (and this would be the case for both subject and researcher), not the other way round. [The significance of that particular observation is explored in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
On this, see Stroud (2000).
14. These and other related topics are discussed at length in Wittgenstein (1980). Cf., Glock (1996), pp.81-84, Hacker (1987), Hanfling (2000), Harrison (1972, 1973), and McGinn (1991).
Cf., also Hardin (1993), and Westphal (1991). However, the approach adopted by those two sources is incompatible with the method employed at this site. They are offering a theory of colour, I am not -- nor will I (and for reasons outlined in Essay One). Nevertheless, both contain much that is inimical to the idea that colour is in any way material.
Even so, on this topic, the reader should consult the following minor modern classic: Stroud (2000). I can't recommend this book too highly.
15. On this see Note 13. The late Bernard Williams constructed a powerful argument that colour, for example, isn't an objective feature of the world, although, to my knowledge, he doesn't put it quite as crudely as that! He rather says that it isn't part of an "absolute conception of the world", that is, it isn't part of a completely scientific account of nature. [Cf., Williams (1978), pp.65-67, 211-12, 239, 245-49, 301-03.] Williams's arguments have been rebutted in Hacker (1987), pp.177-205, and Stroud (2000), pp.21-44, 61-62, 70-72, 80-81.
In fact, Stroud's book is an effective response both to Williams and to any who think like him. [Cf., also Putnam (1992), pp.80-107, and Rorty (1999b). However, the reader mustn't assume I agree with everything that either Putnam or Rorty have to say. See also Note 32a.]
16. Of course, Lenin himself also appreciated this point, but his ideas actually undermine materialism just as quickly, but from a different angle, as we will see.
Be this as it may, anyone committed to this austere view of reality needs to explain in physical terms (or in any other terms, for that matter) how differential equations, vectors, scalars, tensors (and the like) can possibly exercise a causal influence on anything in the material world. If in reality there are only differential equations, vectors, scalars and tensors (with a few geodesics and probability distributions thrown in for good measure), etc., what is there in nature for anything to causally interact with, or be acted upon by?
Admittedly, it isn't easy to find anyone who openly accepts this austere view of reality, but the way that many modern physicists speak, one would be forgiven for thinking they do -- or for thinking that many of them believe that there is an invisible mathematical world anterior to, and causal of, surface 'appearances', which somehow runs the entire show behind the scenes, 'mathematically', as it were.
This seems to be the view motivating Greene (1999, 2004) and Penrose (1989, 1995, 2004); it also appears to be (partially) exercising Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006). Another prominent advocate of this theory is Max Tegmark, who has constructed a theory he calls the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis. Cf., Tegmark (2008, 2015). (The first of these links to a PDF.) See also, Livio (2009).
[There will be more on this in a later Essay. Until then see my comments on this over at Wikipedia, here and here.]
It could be objected that the argument in this part of the Essay ignores the fact that mental phenomena supervene upon -- or emerge from -- material complexity. Because of that objects and processes can't be reduced to the vector, scalar or differential fields (etc.) from whence they came. This objection might appear to gain strong support from one of Engels's three 'laws' -- namely, Q«Q. However, as we have seen in Essay Seven, all three of his 'laws' (and not just Q«Q) are far too feeble to lend support to anything heavier than a hydrogen atom on a crash diet.
Moreover -- and quite apart from this --, if everything in nature is indeed 'insubstantial' (that is, if all there is to reality are differential equations, vector, scalar and tensor fields, etc.) then it is difficult to see how anything at all could 'emerge' from such a mathematically thin broth.
This is, of course, part of the classical problem of interaction, discussed in more detail in Essay Eight Part One. Mathematical objects, it would seem, are only able to interact, and thus make things happen, if they are surreptitiously re-interpreted, or re-configured, as material bodies -- which, naturally, only shifts the problem to the next stage. On this, see also Note 17, below, and my comments at Wikipedia to which I linked above.
Moreover, as we have also seen in Essay Seven Part One, Q«Q can't sustain 'emergentism' (i.e., the idea that as the level of investigation rises, the phenomena under scrutiny undergo a qualitative change, where new features of reality 'emerge' from the underlying substratum) --, as, for example, Alex Callinicos seems to believe:
"The transformation of quantity into quality does by contrast seem genuinely universal in so far as it highlights two crucial features of the world -- first the phenomenon of emergence and stratification -- the existence of qualitatively different levels of physical being each governed by specific laws, including the human species, with its peculiar capacities and distinctive history, and second, qualitative transformations from one state of being to another." [Callinicos (2006), p.212.]
[The Über-Dialectician, Roy Bhaskar, also appeals to 'emergence' as an example of the operation of this 'law'; cf., Bhaskar (1993).]
It was pointed out in Essay Seven Part One (here and here) that even if some sense could be made of "emergence", it still wouldn't be governed by Engels's Q«Q. There seems to be no way of subsuming a difference of "levels" to any sort of "quantitative" change of the sort Engels had in mind:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
What new energy or matter has been added to a body or process as we pass between these "levels"? The increase or decrease in magnification (to which some might point) that takes us between levels isn't a quantitative change of the right sort (that is, if it is even one to begin with). He pointedly asserts:
"...qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Ibid. Bold emphases added.]
Magnification is something we bring to the phenomena, it isn't something already there, nor do we add energy to, or subtract it from, the system under examination when we magnify things.
Of course, it could be objected that we do indeed add energy when we observe nature (be it in the form of light or electron beams, etc.), but that energy has no bearing on these allegedly 'emergent' properties. No one imagines -- it is to be hoped(!) -- that the supposedly 'emergent' properties of the 'mind', say, depend on their being viewed under a microscope, or having light shone upon it. Or, that the 'emergent' properties of water (e.g., its ability to flow) depend on human observers and what they choose to magnify.
In fact, this emphasises yet again just how vague Engels's 'law' actually is; as was pointed out in Essay Seven Part One, it isn't too clear what does, or what does not, constitute an "addition" of energy/matter to any system under review --, or, indeed, what constitutes a "system", or even a "body". [On that, see here and here.]
That is, of course, one of the reasons why I labelled DM, "Mickey Mouse Science".
So, if there are indeed new 'laws' -- or even 'emergent' properties (as we ascend or descend between levels of complexity and stratification in nature and society) --, Engels's Q«Q can't have anything to do with them, unless, of course, this 'law' is altered to accommodate this fresh batch of awkward facts (for example, by the removal of the "addition of matter and energy" clause). And if that happens, the link between matter, energy and change will have been broken, since the above 'changes' would take place independently of the addition or subtraction of matter and/or motion. This is quite apart from the fact that such a re-jig of Engels's 'law' -- just to cater for these untoward facts -- would introduce an element of subjectivity into what is supposed to be an 'objective' law. Either that, or it will amount to yet another imposition onto nature and society of this dogmatic theory.
Again, it could be countered that it isn't a question of seeing how mental phenomena could emerge from material complexity; the fact is, they do.
But, if DM-theorists are right and matter doesn't really exist (or, to be more accurate, if matter is just an abstraction, as Engels believed; on that, see here and here), if everything is simply an aspect of the all-pervasive Field (the physical nature of which is obscure, to say the least), then neither mind nor matter could be emergent properties of anything physical. Hence, the fact that we can and do think (etc.) can't be used to support a theory that sees mental phenomena arising out of something that dialecticians call an 'abstraction', and which many scientists now claim is a myth (i.e., matter itself). At least no more than others can use such phenomena in order to try to prove that thought is the product of a 'non-material mind', or 'soul' -- a là Descartes -- as many philosophers and theologians maintain and which some scientists also seem to accept. The alleged fact (aired in the previous paragraph) that 'thought' just 'emerges' can't distinguish between the DM-theory that matter is an abstraction and thought just 'emerges' from it, and the 'theory' that there is an immaterial 'soul' from which 'thought' originates.
What would a DM-fan say to, say, a theorist who argued this way: "it isn't a question of seeing how mental phenomena could emerge from an immaterial mind; the fact is, they do."? As seems clear, they would reject the claim this was a fact. But is this DM-'fact' any the less questionable?
[I hasten to add that I don't accept any of these theories; I am simply using them to put pressure on DM-fans.]
Given this austere view of the world, it would now seem that matter is just a misperception (on our part) of this mysterious 'field'. But, should that alleged fact turn us all into Christians or Buddhists? Or, even Christian Scientists -- arguing that matter is just an "error of mortal mind"? Clearly not. The same applies to DM.
This is quite apart from the claim that it mind "emerges" from matter has yet to be shown to be a fact, and not just another process that DM-fans casually impose on the phenomena.
[This idea itself will be subject to extensive criticism in Essay Thirteen Part Three (Sections 4-6).]
17. It shouldn't be news to Marxists that the tendency (in class society) is for theory to drift steadily into such Idealist back-waters -- as, even Hegel himself warned:
"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle…." [Hegel (1999), pp.154-55.]
And so did Marx:
"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.'" [Ibid., pp.64-65, quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]
Hence, now it is clear that DM-theorists have bought into ruling-class forms-of-thought (by their acceptance of Hegelian 'concepts', and 'dialectical logic', for example), it shouldn't surprise us that they, too, turn out to be Idealists. [There is much more on this in Essay Twelve Part One.]
However, on a positive note -- and as was argued earlier (in relation to attempts to revise our views of "solidity" or of "change") --, anyone who claims that matter doesn't exist owes us a clear account of exactly what it is they are ruling out. Just what is it that doesn't exist? If no one knows, then no one will be able to say precisely what is being denied existence. If we are all mistaken about 'it', then when we use the word "matter" (or "material", and other terms related to that word) we must be alluding to a misperception or a misapprehension of some sort (but of what?); either that, or we are simply using empty strings of words. But, if the latter were the case, then those who seek to correct others must also be using empty strings of words in the very act of attempting to re-educate others. That would, of course, render what they have to say equally vacuous, thus neutralising that very attempt!
[The rest of this argument (if expressed in full) would proceed along similar lines to the one set-out in Essay Four, here. The reader is directed there for more details. Somewhat similar comments on the use of "solidity" will appear in a later Essay. Again, on this, see my comments over at Wikipedia, here and here.]
Someone might reply that this must mean that we would be unable to deny the existence of mythical figures like the Tooth Fairy or Santa Claus. This isn't so, since we at least know what we are talking about when we tell children tales about these two 'characters'. [For example, we can show them pictures, or provide them with a verbal description, etc.] That isn't the case with "matter" (or "material" or other terms related to the use of this word), if those who doubt its existence had their way. Dialecticians also have no idea what matter is; indeed, they think it is an "abstraction", but what sort of "abstraction" it is they have yet to tell anyone. Indeed, in that case, they might just as well be telling us that schmatter is an "abstraction", for all the good it does.
On the other hand, if our belief in matter (or in 'material constitution') is caused by a 'misperception' of "the Field", for example, we would require a convincing explanation of the nature of this "Field". And such an explanation will have to avoid the use words normally associated with the vocabulary of material substance, otherwise it would be a circular explanation. For instance, it would have to be an explanation of what "the Field" is made of. But, "the Field" is actually "made of" nothing; it is in fact a mathematical object/structure. If so, in what way is "the Field" different from nothing? On the other hand, if "the Field" is made out of something, how is this "something" different from material substance? [Which, plainly, can't now be a further misperception of "the Field"!]
[Readers shouldn't conclude at this point that I am questioning the existence of the Field. What I am doing is questioning whether it can account for anything physical, or explain why anything actually happens in nature. (On this see the discussion between myself and Paul Cockshott, here, and another between myself and a comrade who posted under the name "Lynx", here.]
Of course, as has already been noted, this problem originated much earlier. If we allow scientists and/or mathematicians to tell us that matter 'really' is, for example, a misperception of a mathematical object (i.e., "the Field"), then we have only ourselves to blame when materialism collapses into Idealism, and then into incoherence.
It might be wondered how the present author defines materialism, or what she thinks matter actually is. The beginning of a historical materialist (but non-theoretical) account of the constitution of things, can be found in Hacker (1979, 1982a, 1982b, 1987, 2004, 2007) -- although it must be added that Hacker doesn't express his ideas in Marxist terms. Nor would he regard himself, I think, as a materialist. [The 2004 link above is to a PDF.] I will be adding my own thoughts to Hacker's comments in a later Essay.
18. As noted above, we saw a similar quandary arise over attempts to 'revise' other words taken from ordinary language, such as "change", here. Cf., Note 17 above, with respect to "matter"/"material".
19. In fact Lenin connects colour with movements or vibrations in the Ether!
"If colour is a sensation only depending upon the retina (as natural science compels you to admit), then light rays, falling upon the retina, produce the sensation of colour. This means that outside us, independently of us and of our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us say of ether waves of a definite length and of a definite velocity, which, acting upon the retina, produce in man the sensation of a particular colour. This is precisely how natural science regards it. It explains the sensations of various colours by the various lengths of light-waves existing outside the human retina, outside man and independently of him. This is materialism: matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation." [Lenin (1972), p.50. Bold emphasis added.]
How 'objective' does this seem to us now? And, of course, while we may sense warmth and cold (and the like), we don't sense colour. When was the last time you had a 'feeling' of colour? Or detected a 'sensation' of colour, in the same way that you might be aware of, say, an itch, or have a toothache? When was the last time you said anything like this "I sense the colour red in this tomato."? Nor do we experience sensations of sounds or tastes, either. Admittedly, our senses have a role to play here, but we have a rich vocabulary to cater for what they reveal to us, one of whose words isn't "sense" or "sensation", except in very restricted areas and circumstances. While we might speak about a warn sensation in our feet, for example, who talks about a "sensation of classical music", the "sensation of the taste of pepper", or "the sensation of the colour of a sunset"? Only someone struggling either with language or sanity. [On this, see Hacker (1987).]
But, even if we did, that still wouldn't tell us what colour is. [On this, see Stroud (2000).]
20. Cf., Note 17 and Note 18, above.
20a. On holes, surfaces and shadows, see the references included in Essay Eleven Part One, here and here.
21. But, this is all so unnecessary; in ordinary language we already have the vocabulary allowing us to describe the constitution of objects and processes in seemingly limitless detail. Again, on that, see Hacker (1979, 1982a, 1982b, 1987, 2004, 2007). [Once again, the 2004 link is to a PDF.]
21a. If relations are to be counted as material, then if, for example, A loves B, love would be material! But, these relations aren't independent of minds; hence, these relations will be both material and non-material, 'objective' and non-'objective', if Lenin is to be believed.
22. Naturally, such a tactic would confirm the earlier allegation that for Lenin "externality" isn't just a necessary condition (for materiality), it is also a sufficient condition.
23. It could be objected that the CMG is in fact a property of Spacetime, and that its geometrical centre (i.e., the location where certain geodesics might be said to cross) is material in that sense. Unfortunately, this rests on a mistake. Geodesics are theoretical entities that form an integral part of a mathematical model (a "form of representation") of the Galaxy and the rest of the Universe. While the CMG lies at the apparent confluence of 'warped' geodesic 'curves', only the most fanciful of thinkers would imagine that such 'curves' possess a physical nature of some sort, and hence actually intersect anywhere. Even though geodesics delineate how Spacetime is supposed to be 'warped' by matter, their reification (alongside equally confused interpretations of space and time) would amount to yet another example of LIE (that is, it would mean that what we say and how we make sense of the universe were in fact part of what we were trying to make sense of, implying that material reality is constituted by linguistic and/or mathematical structures). This special sort of fancy seems to originate from the further belief that just because we are able to construct formal systems that assist us in explaining the world the world must either have such a structure, or these formal systems must have physical correlates of their own. The formalism made flesh, as it were.
This is about as sensible as arguing that, say, the solar system must be a graph (or possess axes) simply because we use graphs to explain it. Plainly, the success of science no more proves geodesics 'exist' in nature than it proves graphs do.
[I will examine this error in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published. However, see Note 16 and the discussions here and here.]
It could be objected that the comparison drawn in the main body of this Essay between the average lager drinker and the CMG is defective because the former is a mathematical construct that exercises no causal influence on the world, whereas the latter does. Perhaps so, but Lenin's "externalist" criterion is no help at all in distinguishing between the two, since both are manifestly 'external to the mind'. No one supposes that the average lager drinker resides in the mind -- manifestly, 'he/she/it' resides nowhere at all -- or even that the CMG does, too. Hence, as far as Lenin's "externalist" criterion is concerned, not only must both be material (when clearly neither is), they must both have causal relations with other objects and processes in 'objective reality' (when only the latter does).
Anyway, Lenin himself didn't add any such 'causal protocols' to his wafer-thin criterion; it is far from clear whether one would have been of much help, anyway. [It might perhaps have allowed him to rule out magic!]
To be sure, Lenin spent a whole chapter in MEC on causality and necessity, but he failed to link either of these with his externalist criterion; in fact he pointedly asserted:
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), p.311.]
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., p.312.]
"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of nature's existence outside the mind and perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid., p.314. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphases added.]
No mention here of causality in this "sole" and "nothing but" criterion or property.
[For a more balanced account of causation, however, see Hacker (2007), pp.57-121.]
Once more, it could be objected that the average lager drinker isn't a mind-independent concept -- plainly because it depends on human beings to invent and comprehend it. Maybe so, but then that would mean that things like motor cars, bus tickets, revolutionary newspapers and money weren't 'objective' either, since they aren't mind-independent. In addition, it would also mean that the Prime Meridian, lines of longitude and latitude aren't 'objective'. [In fact, this merely underlines once again how useless the word "objective" is in philosophical contexts. On that, see here.]
Of course, the point being made in the main body of this Essay is simply that the CMG is no more a property of matter than the average larger drinker is a property of all lager drinkers (or the average price of Weekly Worker over the last ten years is a property of Weekly Worker) -- or, indeed, that it is a property of anything, or even that it is a property, to begin with. [On properties and powers, see Hacker (2007), pp.29-56, 90-122.]
Furthermore, the CMG itself isn't causally related to all the matter in the Galaxy (in any intelligible sense) -- not unless we are to suppose that nature is involved in a complex and ongoing series of calculations, re-evaluating the CMG every zillionth of a second, re-positioning it to its new location under the influence of all the causal inputs operating on it as the Galaxy rotates and interacts with other Galaxies. All of these inputs would also have to act in concert while the CMG dutifully 'obeys its orders' and moves to its new location, perfectly and instantaneously (or, perhaps, with subluminary velocity --, i.e., at less than the speed of light), without a Sat Nav or star map to guide it. The fact that all matter in a Galaxy averages out its influence so that the aggregate moves as if there were a CMG causing that motion can't be the result of a calculation -- any more than the average rate of profit at any point in the development of Capitalism is a result of a series of calculations performed by commodities, currency tokens, or even Capitalists themselves (even though the majority of Marxist economists talk as if Capitalists do in fact do this, or are aware of it), despite the fact that it likewise appears to have a significant causal effect on the economy.
24. I do not propose to defend or even justify the presence of each and every item in this list. Several of them have already put in an appearance in the suggested 'definition' of the "Totality", considered in detail in Essay Eleven Part One. Lenin's optimistic belief that the development of science will sort out the final inventory of nature isn't at all reassuring, since, given his account, humanity will never attain to anything remotely like that blessed state. In fact they will always remain infinitely far from 'it', if he is to be believed.
It is worth recalling at this point that Lenin's criterion for something to count as material was implied by the following question:
"Does the transformation of energy take place outside the mind, independently of man…or are these only ideas?" [Lenin (1972), p.324.]
As already noted, for Lenin the 'objective' existence of objects and processes outside the mind appears to be a necessary and sufficient condition for their materiality.
It might be thought that the phrase "independently of man" would be sufficient to deny each of the items mentioned earlier their material status, but that can't be right. If it were, as noted above, motor cars, buses, aeroplanes, bridges, canals, railway lines, questionnaires, ships, buildings and bullets wouldn't be material! Indeed, if that were so (i.e., if objects that aren't independent of humanity were to be classified as non-material -- meaning that motor cars, buses, aeroplanes, bridges, canals, railway lines, questionnaires, ships, buildings and bullets wouldn't be material), the next time a Leninist is hit by a 'non-material' bus he/she should suffer no ill effects, and the 'non-material' bullet that nearly killed Lenin would have only 'inflicted' on him a psychosomatic 'injury'!
25. It might be thought that the temporal zones -- past, present and future -- are properties of material bodies (or, "modes" of their existence) -- but, if anything, we employ these concepts to help decide what counts as material, not the other way round. Thus, if something had no causal past, or contemporary effects, and had no effect on the future course of events, we (historical materialists!) would be inclined to say that such an 'entity' or 'process' was immaterial (or non-material), or even that it didn't exist. If, on the other hand, matter explained time, the above reasoning would be circular.
Anyway, it is bizarre to describe past, present and future as "properties". Two of them at least don't appear to exist (the Past and the Future), and the third (the Present) is of decidedly limited duration, if not of completely ephemeral nature (when viewed in a traditional manner).
In fact, Lenin's comments on space and time are rather odd themselves:
"Recognising the existence of objective reality, i.e., matter in motion, independently of our mind, materialism must also inevitably recognise the objective reality of time and space, in contrast above all to Kantianism, which in this question sides with idealism and regards time and space not as objective realities but as forms of human understanding. The basic difference between the two fundamental philosophical lines on this question is also quite clearly recognised by writers of the most diverse trends who are in any way consistent thinkers." [Lenin (1972), pp.202-03. Bold emphasis added.]
Apart from quoting Engels as some sort of authority, Lenin doesn't tell us how he knew that space and time were "objective". To be sure, he asserts all manner of things (quoting others who agree, or half-agree with him), such as the alleged fact that we "perceive" space:
"It is one thing, how, with the help of various sense organs, man perceives space, and how, in the course of a long historical development, abstract ideas of space are derived from these perceptions; it is an entirely different thing whether there is an objective reality independent of mankind which corresponds to these perceptions and conceptions of mankind...." [Ibid., p.217.]
But, the above barrage of assertions in no way refutes Kant (or even Leibniz), and only those who think that pounding the table, constantly repeating the same points, time and again, attempting to discredit opponents by name-calling and abuse will think otherwise. Moreover, he pointedly failed to explain how it is possible to "abstract" ideas of space from sense perception -- or, indeed, "abstract" anything whatsoever from anything.
[In Essay Three Parts One and Two, we saw there were insurmountable obstacles confronting of anyone who thinks we are capable of 'abstracting' anything at all.]
And yet, even if Lenin were right, the fact that he thinks space and time are "objective" must mean they are material in nature, for his criterion of materiality implies they are. But, what is so material about space and time? In fact, Lenin also inconsistently believed that both of these were "forms" of the existence of matter; quoting Engels (approvingly):
"'The basic forms of all being,' Engels admonishes Dühring, 'are space and time, and existence out of time is just as gross an absurdity as existence out of space.'" [Ibid., p.205; quoting Engels (1976), p.64. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Of course, for Lenin, to quote Engels is as if to reference Moses and The Prophets on anything and everything. However, none of this makes sense even from Lenin's perspective. For if space and time are "forms" of the existence of matter (or rather, of "all being", which must include matter), they could hardly be material, or they would be forms of their own existence! In that case, Lenin must either (i) Abandon the idea that space and time are "objective", or (ii) Relinquish his claim that it is sufficient for something to be material that it exists "objectively" outside the human mind -- or even (iii) Reject Engels's dogma that space and time are "forms" of the existence of matter/"all being".
Anyway, many of the creations of the human mind are no less "objective" than natural events and processes (as we saw in Note 24). Who doubts that the Prime Meridian is "objective", that a bus ticket is "objective", or that money is "objective"? But, would any of these exist without human intervention? Aren't our concepts of space and time somewhat similar?
It could be objected that space and time would still exist whether or not there were human beings or sentient life, unlike the other items just mentioned. But, it is far from clear what it means to say that space and time "exist". Surely, even for Lenin, they are the preconditions for anything material to exist. Without them nothing could even begin to exist. In that case, they appear to be preconditions for anyone to comprehend the existence of matter, or even of material bodies. But, that just takes us back to the question at the end of the last paragraph.
Well, I won't attempt to resolve obscure Kantian puzzles like this here. Suffice it to say that Lenin failed to establish that space and time are 'objective' and are thus material. Indeed, if we stick to the letter of Lenin's 'definition', and if space and time are viewed as "forms" of the existence of matter/"all being", they can't be material and thus can't be 'objective'.
[On this, see Hacker (1982a) and Read (2007), pp.79-115. (Some of Read's work can be found here; more specifically here.) See also Westfall (1996, 2002), and Suter (1989b).]
26. Cf., for example, Lenin (1972), pp.202-18.
However, in a recent article Paul McGarr argued that empty space may not be "empty", after all:
"Even the very notion of 'empty space', the vacuum, will no longer do. Quantum mechanics predicts, and this has been confirmed, that particles can spontaneously come into existence out of the vacuum which itself is bubbling with energy." [McGarr (1994), p.150. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
But, McGarr doesn't appear to appreciate the absurdity of what he is saying, for if the very notion of "empty space" (or, indeed, "the vacuum") has to go, it would be impossible for him to specify what the said "particles" had emerged from -- or even what was being denied of what. If the concept (not the fact), the "notion" of empty space (or the vacuum) is no longer applicable, then clearly he can't use that term to inform us in the next breath that it is still out there producing things. If, on the other hand, McGarr still wants to employ the phrase "empty space", or "the vacuum" -- and he wishes to mean something by one or both -- then it is patently not the case that these notions are defunct, since he at least will have just found a role for one or both in producing things.
McGarr's predicament underlines once again the problem that scientists face when they endeavour to translate theoretical terms into "prose" (to use Wittgenstein's term) -- that is, when they attempt to explain their ideas to one another, or to the rest of us in ordinary language. What they say invariably turns out to be incomprehensible, self-defeating or patently absurd. This is part of the reason why many leading physicists tell us that no one understands Quantum Mechanics. [On this, see Note 16, Note 23 and the discussion here and here.]
Oddly enough, some scientists are perhaps beginning to see that questions like this are connected with language (although, it is plain from what follows that the great physicist, Niels Bohr, was arguing along these lines eighty or ninety years ago). According to the late David Peat, writing in the New Scientist:
"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as Lee Smolin's The Trouble with Physics and Peter Woit's Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that string theory, the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use Stephen Hawking's words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.
"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.' At first sight that seems strange. What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result.
"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of 1925, when the young Werner Heisenberg worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values. Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.
"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts. This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.
"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist Michael Green a few years after he and John Schwartz published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory mainstream. Green remarked that when Einstein was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply in philosophy.
"In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done. The American quantum theorist David Bohm embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably hindered.
"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role.... Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat (2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases and several links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Except, ordinary language isn't the least bit "Newtonian", and neither is common sense.
[However, as far as the Ether is concerned, perhaps that 'idea' isn't as dead as some might suppose. On that, see here.]
27. Lenin seems almost compelled to perseverate about many things in MEC; for some reason, he was particularly fond of Alizarin.
"What is the kernel of Engels' objections? Yesterday we did not know that coal tar contained alizarin. Today we learned that it does. The question is, did coal tar contain alizarin yesterday? Of course it did. To doubt it would be to make a mockery of modern science. And if that is so, three important epistemological conclusions follow:
"1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.
"2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is 'beyond' phenomena (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) -- all this is the sheerest nonsense, Schrulle, crotchet, invention.
"3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.
"Once we accept the point of view that human knowledge develops from ignorance, we shall find millions of examples of it just as simple as the discovery of alizarin in coal tar, millions of observations not only in the history of science and technology but in the everyday life of each and every one of us that illustrate the transformation of 'things-in-themselves' into 'things-for-us,' the appearance of 'phenomena' when our sense-organs experience an impact from external objects, the disappearance of 'phenomena' when some obstacle prevents the action upon our sense-organs of an object which we know to exist. The sole and unavoidable deduction to be made from this -- a deduction which all of us make in everyday practice and which materialism deliberately places at the foundation of its epistemology -- is that outside us, and independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and that our perceptions are images of the external world...." [Lenin (1972), pp.110-11. Cf., also: pp.108, 127, 153, and 312. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added; some paragraphs merged.]
However, all the reader has to do is substitute the word "Ether" for "Alizarin" in the above to see Lenin's bluster for what it is. We have already noted that Lenin declared the Ether to be "objective", but since it is now widely regarded as fictional, this rather makes a mess of the three "epistemological conclusions" he said followed from that supposed fact.
Of course, this doesn't mean that the present author rejects scientific truth, but relying on Lenin to defend scientific knowledge would be like relying on Laurel and Hardy to mend your car, or repair your roof. And I say that as a Leninist!
There are better ways of defending HM than utilising the rather weak, quasi-phenomenalist, naïve realist 'arguments' Lenin threw-together, and which DM-supporters have appropriated uncritically ever since.
Despite this, there is a half-hearted defence of Lenin's ideas in Ruben (1979) -- particularly on pp.165-221. Unfortunately, the account of materialism on offer there is a dilute, watery version, and one that Rubin adopted for reasons even Lenin would have considered decidedly mealy-mouthed.
On page 5, for example, Ruben identifies materialism with "scientific realism" (despite Lenin's disapproval of the term; cf., Lenin (1972) pp.57, 403, 410-12, 426), and on pp.107-09, Reuben even denies that there might be any sort of a posteriori justification for materialism. Not only that, Ruben describes the deductive support it enjoys as "circular"; this appears to be based on the disdain Ruben has for "transcendental arguments" (henceforth, TAs).
Even so, several important issues arise from this:
(1) Ruben attributes the use of TAs to something he calls "the Wittgensteinian tradition". Now, while it might be true that certain Wittgensteinians have toyed with or employed TAs (i.e., those who have perhaps confused Wittgenstein's method with Kant's), Wittgenstein himself neither used the term nor employed any TAs in his own work.
On pp.109, 141 (note 23), 206-07, 219, Ruben attempts to argue that the conclusion to Wittgenstein's "private language argument" (henceforth, PLA) actually depends on a TA. This is a serious mistake. Not only is there no actual conclusion to the PLA, TAs are themselves based on the tactic of arguing 'backwards', as it were, inferring (or 'positing') the existence of specific conditions that must obtain (or presuppositions that must be valid) for certain propositions to be true. In contrast, Wittgenstein's method is primarily aimed at demonstrating that traditional philosophical theses are disguised non-sense, not at establishing what must or must not be the case for something else to be true. In fact, if anything, the PLA is perhaps more analogous to a reductio.
(2) Even if he were right about the PLA, Ruben's objection to TAs is itself based on a faulty piece of traditional logic (an error many others have accepted, and, worse, have helped disseminate). In his discussion of Roy Bhaskar's use of TAs, Ruben argues as follows:
"[N]o argument from the sole premiss that science or experimental activity exists to the conclusion that the world is structured into essences and appearances can be valid unless the premisses give us some reason to discount…[the] alternatives…. [I]n a valid deductive argument nothing can appear in the conclusion that is not already in the premisses." [Ruben (1979), pp.132-33. Bold emphasis added.]
And, in relation to the PLA itself, Ruben adds:
"I do not subscribe to any form of the private language argument since it is a transcendental form of argument. I claim that no deductive argument could be valid whose conclusion is that there is a public language and none of whose premisses assume that there is a public language." [Ibid., p.141, note 23. Bold emphasis added.]
However, these claims are based on a defective understanding of logic and of the connection between the premisses and conclusions of valid arguments. Contrary to what Ruben asserts, there are countless deductively valid arguments whose conclusions "contain" more than their premisses. Consider, for example, the following:
R1: All cats are mammals.
R2: Therefore the head of a cat is the head of a mammal.
And,
R3: Anyone who lives in London lives in Europe.
R4: Therefore, the public language of someone who lives in London is the public language of someone who lives in Europe.
With R1 and R2 we have deductively valid argument with one premiss and a conclusion -- but the conclusion 'contains more' than the premiss.
R3 and R4 we have another deductively valid argument with only one premiss, which doesn't "assume" that there is a public language. Not only that, the conclusion doesn't "assume" it either. The argument would be valid even if there were no public languages!
Of course, it could be argued that the above two arguments are in fact enthymemes (i.e., they both have a suppressed premiss). But that isn't so, and that response confuses rules of inference with assumptions/premisses. [On that, see here.]
Consider this further example:
R5: If there are no public languages then New York is in Canada.
R6: New York is not in Canada.
R7: Therefore, there is at least one public language.
The conditional premiss, R5, "assumes" nothing. At best, it expresses an hypothesis to the effect that there are no public languages.
[True, there are logicians who reject material implications like this on "relevance" grounds, but it is doubtful whether Ruben is one of them.]
In a similar manner, reductios themselves are aimed at deriving conclusions from premisses not all of which are asserted.
In addition, Ruben's defence of Lenin adds little to the debate between metaphysical realists and anti-realists; it also fails to address the sorts of points raised in this Essay (many of which should have been obvious to a trained philosopher like Ruben). Small wonder then that TAR's only reference to Ruben's book is rather dismissive.
Nevertheless, TAR's own rejection of Ruben's defence of Lenin is instructive in itself. Even though Rees notes that Ruben concedes too much ground to Lenin's critics, he concurs with Ruben that in MEC Lenin conflates his theory of reflection with an erroneous correspondence theory of perception. But, far from actually answering the many fatal charges that have been levelled against Lenin's embattled work over the years (some of which have been aired in this Essay), TAR just adds the following rather bald comment:
"Because a dialectical approach handles the relationship between theory and reality in a manner which neither requires that we abandon the correspondence of the two, nor reduces the former to the latter, it has an inherent claim to superiority over more mechanical approaches." [Rees (1998), p.183.]
But, that won't do. The fundamental philosophical weaknesses in Lenin's theory can't be brushed aside in such a disarming, cavalier manner with yet another hackneyed reference to "dialectics" (as if that word worked like a magic wand). As we have seen in this Essay (and earlier), the "dialectical approach" completely undermines knowledge. "Mechanical approaches" to theory would have little to fear if DM were the only game in town. Indeed, in such an environment, DM would serve as a timely and salutary warning how not to proceed.
[Having said this, Ruben's book is in fact a breath of fresh air compared with much that passes for contemporary 'Marxist Philosophy'. Even though I have major disagreements with Ruben's entire approach, he is a careful theorist who has brought to the genre an attention to detail other 'Marxist Philosophers' would do well to emulate. I will say much more about Ruben's book in Essay Three Part Six.]
28. Exception may be taken to this comparison, but, to speak plainly, those who dine with pigs shouldn't expect to rise unsullied. Hence, Lenin's logical and epistemological problems began when he appropriated the class-compromised ideas he found in Hegel's 'Logic' (and the work of other traditional philosophers) in order to construct this weak and indefensible theory.
"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism. The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
[I have posted a dozen or more similar comments from other DM-theorists (classical and contemporary) in Essay Nine Part Two.]
In fact, had the early DM-classicists displayed the same circumspection in relation to the philosophical dogmas they imported into Marxism as they rightly did in connection with ruling-class social, economic and political theories (which they rejected), Hegel, never mind DM, would have been consigned to the dustbin of history.
29. On this, see Note 26, above.
30. This problem might be a direct consequence of inheriting Hegel's 'view' of 'Mind' as a sort of collective 'process'. He seems to assume that all of us must think the way he says we do, or should do, if only we could emulate, or apply, 'dialectical thought'. On the other hand, if he doesn't think this, then his conclusions only apply to his own thought, and thus will have no bearing on anything other than that.
t could be argued that Hegel's work is far more complex than this in that it encompasses the entire course of human thought. But, that just generalises the above problems, it certainly doesn't remove or solve them. [There is more on this in Essay Three Part Two -- and will be in Essay Twelve Parts Four, Five and Six (when they are published).]
30a0. It could be objected that while such sentences would be objective -- in that they are physical objects and as such are external to the mind -- what they say might not be.
This seems to undermine some of the conclusions drawn in the main body of this Essay. However, Lenin's criterion is totally useless in this respect, since what such sentences say is plainly 'external to the mind', too, and hence must be 'objective'.
30a. This particular argument didn't go down too well with the revolutionaries I tried it out on at RevLeft, and elsewhere (here is another benighted Marxist-Leninist DM-fan floundering badly in his vain attempt to defend Lenin). This is what I argued:
Did Lenin Believe in Santa Claus?
Apparently so, since he argued as follows:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it." [Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p.69. Bold emphasis added. Cf., also p.279.]
This can only mean that if you can form
an image of something in your mind, it must exist in reality!
So, not only are there unicorns and hob-goblins in Lenin's universe, it is
graced with Big Foot and dear old Santa....
Almost to a 'dialectical clone' they all reacted emotively and irrationally to the above argument. [See, for example, here and here. (Why they all tend to respond in this way is explained in Essay Nine Part Two.)]
Anyway, as I pointed out in those debates, the fact that Lenin didn't actually believe in Santa Claus means that his claim that images of "necessity" imply the objective existence of whatever they are supposedly the image of is mistaken, leaving him in no better position than Mach or Bogdanov -- since he now has nothing left but faith to support his belief in the existence of the outside world.
However, in the above debate, one of the more rational attempts to defend Lenin ran along the following lines:
We have images of things like colour and shape because of our interaction with the world. So, even if we have an image of Santa Claus, that doesn't imply that Lenin believed he existed. That is because Lenin was merely committed to the view that, for example, the coloured parts we imagine belonging to Santa (etc.) have been derived from experience. Out of such parts, and as a result of various cultural influences, we can construct at will, or otherwise, images (on paper, in the mind, in film, etc.) of various things, some of which do, and some of which do not exist, even though their parts manifestly do exist. In that case, Lenin isn't claiming that just because we have images of, say, Big Foot or the Tooth Fairy that they exist. All that Lenin is arguing is that the images we have of such parts imply that those parts must exist in reality, since we couldn't have derived them from anywhere else.
This brave but futile attempt to defend Lenin fails in several places. First of all Lenin argued as follows:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge." [Ibid., p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
And:
"The image inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'" [Ibid., p.279. Bold emphasis added. In both of these, the quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
No mention here of "parts".
Secondly, those whom Lenin was criticising in MEC could easily have responded:
"And how, comrade Lenin, do you know that the images you have (whether they are of parts or of wholes) represent objects, or even the properties or parts of objects in the real world, and aren't just figments of your own imagination?"
Now, Lenin plainly had no answer to this in MEC, and none in PN, either --, indeed, his theory of knowledge seems not to have advanced much beyond that of Descartes and Locke.
"Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain. By checking and applying the correctness of these reflections in his practice and technique, man arrives at objective truth." [Lenin (1961), p.201.]
How human beings can check these "reflections" without yet more "reflections" getting in the way is something of a mystery. Can any of us 'jump out of our heads' to do the checking?
As far as can be ascertained, no DM-theorist (who agrees with Lenin) has been able to answer to the above question. That is largely because they are content merely to regurgitate Lenin's defective non-arguments, copy his bluster, or emulate his dismissive invective. Naturally, this leaves Lenin (and his followers) in the same predicament as the subjective Idealists he criticised in MEC. That is, he had no proof that the 'external world' exists, or that our "images" are actually reflections of objects/properties in 'extra-mental reality'. [On this, see also Essay Five, here.]
When faced with this, DM-fans tend to retreat to the fall-back position of saying that only madmen, sceptics or Idealists would even think to question the existence of the outside world, often appealing to the reader's 'commonsense' to reject such an absurd view of reality.
However, that reply merely labels the problem, it doesn't address it, let alone resolve it. Those whom Lenin was criticising in MEC are unlikely to have been persuaded by such a cop-out, and would no doubt have wanted to know how Lenin could possibly know that any of his 'images' of what he thinks are the beliefs of ordinary folk themselves represent anything in reality and aren't just another figment of his own over-active imagination. Or even that there are any "ordinary folk" in reality, as opposed to 'images' supposedly of 'them'. Hence, it is little use trying to take on sophisticated phenomenalist theories if in the end all that a supporter of Lenin can do is appeal to what one imagines madmen, sceptics and Idealists do or do not believe, when the existence even of these individuals (as opposed to their yet to be validated 'images') has yet to be demonstrated.
One last desperate fall-back position might involve an attempt to argue that we determine in practice that what we take our images to be reflections of actually do exist. The problem with this response is that, if Lenin were right, all we would have are images of practice, and it is difficult to see how such images could help anyone escape from the solipsistic world Lenin has created for himself and anyone who agrees with him. Similar intractable problems face those who say we should rely on the deliverances of science to tell us which images are valid and which aren't. That is because -- and once again -- if Lenin is to be believed, we would only have 'images' of science alongside 'images' scientists and what they have to say, leaving us neck deep in the same Idealist quagmire.
Hence, despite their denials, dialecticians who have bought into traditional representational theories of mind/knowledge are now trapped in this solipsistic 'world' along with Lenin (as we will see is the case in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three). Indeed, those who accept and use the methods and concepts handed down to them from previous generations of ruling-class hacks get used to their self-imposed fate. They are the ones who dropped themselves into this subjective, Idealist swamp --, and, in the vast majority of cases, they are also the ones who refuse even to consider effective ways of avoiding these and similar pitfalls (for instance, the deflationary anti-metaphysical method adopted at this site). Nor do they even seem inclined to consider, let alone accept, Marx's diagnosis of the obvious source of such 'problems':
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis added.]
Indeed, the idea that these 'problems' are a direct result of a use of distorted ordinary language is laughed out-of-court as patently ridiculous. [Here is a recent example. There are plenty more like this over at RevLeft, and elsewhere. Of course, labelling this new method 'ridiculous' can only mean that Marx was advocating a ridiculous remedy. How many DM-fans are prepared to acknowledge this clear implication of their dismissive hand waving?]
Finally, as noted earlier, it is a bit rich of those who spare no effort telling us of the limitations of 'commonsense' now turning round, informing us that 'commonsense' underpins their theory of knowledge!
[This topic is discussed in more detail in Essay Three, especially Part Two, here, where it is connected with the 'appearance/reality' dichotomy -- another bogus distinction DM-fans have unwisely inherited from Traditional Thought. Other attempts to escape from this solipsistic nightmare -- including, for example, those proffered by the so-called "Critical Realists" -- will also be taken apart when the rest of Essay Three has been published.]
30b. There is an interesting defence of Lenin in Goldstick (1980). I will comment on that article at a later date; until then, I added a few relevant comments to Note 53a.
Some might think that modern science has shown that the brain processes information the senses send its way (and somehow turns them into ideas and images, etc.). This topic has been discussed in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three. In the meantime, readers are directed to Bennett and Hacker (2008, 2021), Bennett et al (2007), Hacker (1987), and Hyman (1989, 2006).
30c. The linguistic means we have available to us to express our knowledge are in fact much more varied than this might suggest. For example, we have: "NN knows that p", "NN knows how to φ", "NN knows MM", "MM knows where to φ", "NN knows when to ψ", "MM knows who φ-ed", and so on. More on this in Essay Thirteen Part Three. See also here.
[In the above, "NN" and "MM" go proxy for Proper Names (such as "Tony Blair" or "Leon Trotsky"), "p" is a propositional variable (such as "The Nile is longer than the Thames" or "There are no WMDs in Iraq"), "φ" and "ψ" are verb phrase variables (such as "score a goal" or "organise a paper sale").]
30d. Of course, some might want to argue as follows:
We have images of things like colour and shape because of our interaction with the world. So, even if we have an image of Santa Claus, that does not imply that Lenin believed he existed. This is because Lenin was merely committed to the view that the parts we imagine belonging to Santa (etc.) have been derived from experience. Out of such parts, and as a result of various cultural influences, we construct images (on paper, in the mind, in film, etc.) of certain things, some of which do, and some of which do not exist, even though their parts manifestly do.
That argument was in fact neutralised earlier.
31. There is more on this, here, here and here.
32. The words "objective" and "subjective", used by Roman Catholic theorists in the late Middle Ages, meant almost exactly the opposite of what these terms now seem to mean today. As Daston and Galison point out in their exhaustive study:
"The word 'objectivity' has a summersault history. Its cognates in European languages derive from the Latin adverbial or adjectival form obiectivus/obiective, introduced by fourteenth century scholastic philosophers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. (The substantive term does not emerge until much later, around the turn of the nineteenth century.) From the very beginning, it was always paired with subiectivus/subiective, but the terms originally meant almost precisely the opposite of what they mean today. 'Objective' referred to things as they are presented to consciousness, whereas 'subjective' referred to things in themselves....
"The words objective and subjective fell into disuse during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and were invoked only occasionally, as technical terms. It was Immanuel Kant who dusted off the musty scholastic terminology of 'objective' and 'subjective' and breathed new life and new meanings into it.... Kant's 'objective validity'...referred not to external objects...but to the 'forms of sensibility' (time, space, causality) that are preconditions of experience. And his habit of using 'subjective' as a rough synonym for 'merely empirical sensations' shares with later usage only the sneer with which the word is intoned. For Kant, the line between the objective and the subjective generally runs between universal and particular, not between world and mind." [Daston and Galison (2007), pp.29-30. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added.]
As these authors go on to argue, the significant change took place in the nineteenth century as scientists substituted a depersonalised "objectivity" in place of their earlier endeavour to be "true to nature". This meant that all traces of the observer were supposed to have been removed -- except, these scientists still had to use language, which meant that they now had to rely even more on metaphorical and analogical terminology (much of which turned out to be highly inappropriate and misleading). [See also Megill (1994b).]
Inwood makes a similar point:
"From their first occurrence in Duns Scotus until the eighteenth century, 'subject' and 'object' were used in a sense that is the reverse of their modern sense: the 'subject' was the underlying subject of discourse (or object), while the 'object' was thrown against or towards it, viz. the subjective conception or predicate." [Inwood (1992), p.203).]
Inwood goes on the point out that the German language has two words for "objective"/"object": Gegenstand ("what stands over against") and Objekt. He adds:
"In Hegel Objekt differs from Gegenstand in three respects: (1)...A Gegenstand is an intentional object, while an Objekt is a real object. (2) When the Objekt is the object of something, it is usually the object of a Subjekt, while a Gegenstand is the object of knowledge (Wissen), consciousness, the I.... (3) A form of consciousness and its object are, on Hegel's view, interdependent and have a comparable richness and complexity. Thus since the Objekt is correlative to the Subjekt, and (in the Logic) the subject involves the concept, the judgment and the inference, the Objekt must be a complex system of objects (such as the solar system) related by the forms of inference. A Gegenstand, by contrast, may be the object of a simple form of consciousness, such as a sensory certainty, which is not yet a fully fledged subject." [Ibid., p.204. Italic emphases in the original.]
I will not enter into whether these Hegelian distinctions hold, or even if they make sense. I will merely note that the roots of Lenin's conflation of epistemological with logical issues clearly owes its inspiration to woolly thought such as this (that is, woolly thought courtesy of Hegel, not commentators like Inwood!). For an Idealist of Hegel's ilk, running-together issues in this manner was Moses and the Prophets.
However, it is important to reiterate that I am not questioning the ordinary use of "objective" and "subjective", merely their metaphysical employment.
32a. Indeed, Lenin characterised "objectivity" as follows:
"To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972), p.148.]
However, as we will see, one of the problems this 'definition' creates is that things like revolutionary papers, theatre tickets, strikes and money can't be 'objective'!
Non-Marxist philosophers have adopted similar characterisations of 'objectivity. For example, the late Professor Bernard Williams argued that what he calls an "absolute conception", or "absolute standpoint", of the world would be independent of any observer. [Williams (1978), p.66; Williams (1985), pp.138-39. I owe the latter reference to Stroud (2000), pp.30-31.]
Moreover, this view:
"combines the notions of the material world as it is understood by natural science, and of that world as it really is. The idea of the world as it really is involves at least a contrast with that of the world as it seems to us.... By the same token, the world as it really is is contrasted with the world as it peculiarly seems to any observer...and that line of thought leads eventually to a conception of the world as it is independently of the peculiarities of any observers...a conception of the world as it is independently of all observers." [Williams (1978), p.241. Italic emphasis in the original.]
As I have pointed out in Essay Three Part Two, the problem with this is that it would mean that none of the sciences could be performed by human beings, or by any sentient life that relied on observation. In which case, science itself wouldn't be scientific! [A somewhat similar, but more austere approach can be found in Smart (1963).]
An extended refutation of this way of looking at the world -- and, indeed, of doing philosophy -- can be found in Stroud (2000). See also Note 15.
33. It could be argued that the falsehood of the claim that there is life on the Moon implies the truth of the claim that there is no life on the Moon. If so, 'objectivity' is connected with scientific truth, after all.
However, this riposte only gains plausibility if we ignore the fact that such allegedly 'objective' facts turn out to be consonant with what are in effect falsehoods just as much as they are with truths. Hence, the truth that there is no life on the Moon implies the falsehood of the claim that there is life on the Moon (i.e., if we argue thus: ~(p & ~p), p; ergo ~p); but, this implication is, alas, two-way (viz.: ~(p & ~p), ~p; ergo p). Until we have an independent argument ruling the one out in favour of the other, the unique identification of truth with objectivity remains unsupported.
[Some might object to the use of the LOC here, but it was included to make the inference more syntactically obvious. The truth of either p or ~p here could be obtained from the falsehood of each taken singly; but that would be based on the PB.]
34. It could be argued that the claim that there is no life on Mars is in fact about life on Mars --, and in a sense it is (that is, in so far as this is the 'topic of conversation', as it were). Even so, it is not about any life actually on Mars (in the sense that it refers to life on Mars), for there is none -- just as the claim that there is no truth in a baseless rumour isn't about the truth actually in that rumour, for there is none.
34a. It could be objected that the sentence "There is no life on Mars" in fact corresponds to the absence of life on Mars. However, this alleged correspondence relation isn't unique, for this sentence also 'corresponds' with the absence of life on Jupiter.
Again, exception might be taken to the above on the lines that the two sentences expressing these are true or false under completely different conditions, and so they can't be logically equivalent. Indeed so, but until we are given some sort of proof that "corresponds" means the same as "true/false under the same conditions", that objection itself can't succeed.
Once more, all this depends on what is meant by "corresponds"; that topic will be explored at more length in Essay Ten Part Two. However, see Note 39, below.
35. These observations, of course, depend for their validity on the entire case being presented in this Essay, and, indeed, at this site.
36. For example, Price (1996), pp.3-21.
Several comments on recent attempts to define these terms more carefully will be added at a future date. Until then, the reader is directed here, and to Daston and Galison's monumental work -- Daston and Galison (2007).
36a. The use of the word "objectivist" here doesn't refer to a dogmatic 'theory' Ayn Rand inflicted on her readers, but to those who like to use "objective" theoretically, or 'philosophically'.
37. This set of assertions might appear to ignore much of post-Kantian Philosophy, but that isn't so. On this, see Note 36 above (when it is completed). Forms of representation will be explained in more detail in Part Two of this Essay; in the meantime, see here.
37a. The phrase "a view of reality outside of space and time" gives the game away, one feels. As we have seen, there are no "views" of anything in 'objective' reality, since there are no viewers. And it is no use replacing "view" with "description", since 'objective' reality contains no descriptions or describers, either.
Unless, of course, we wish to make 'objective reality' mind-dependent, once more.
38. And the metaphysical table has been well-and-truly thumped in recent punch-ups between Scientific Realists and anyone who has the temerity to question the 'objectivity' of science, for example.
A slightly more substantial (but vastly more sinister) example of 'intellectual fisticuffs' can be found in Gross and Levitt (1998). These two authors present their readers with 300 pages of indignant prose largely devoted to establishing the implausible thesis that only scientists can informatively criticise science. On the way to reaching this 'novel' conclusion they ignore the fact that many social constructivists (one of their pet hate groups) are highly qualified scientists themselves (Harry Collins, Andrew Pickering and Steven Shapin, for example). Also omitted from their account is the far more revealing fact that most scientists are often as ignorant of specialist areas of science outside their own narrow discipline as (non-scientist) lay-critics of science are well-informed.
Moreover, in terms of a systematic understanding of science, Imre Lakatos (also a qualified scientist) once wrote:
"This…bears out my pet thesis that most scientists tend to understand little more about science than fish about hydrodynamics." [Lakatos (1978), p.62, Note 2. I owe this reference to Dupré (2001), p.113.]
Furthermore, Gross and Levitt also completely ignore this additional, but not-insignificant, detail: practically all scientists are philosophically illiterate (as Lenin himself pointed out -- cf., Lenin (1972), pp.189, 322).
In this regard the half-baked metaphysics and sophomoric philosophy that grace Gross and Levitt's book provide ample evidence for the prosecution -- enough in fact to secure conviction. Indeed, the high level of philosophical naïvety found in popular accounts of science written by scientists (etc.), and the amateurish philosophy contained in their more technical works, is now as ubiquitous as it is lucrative. Even great scientists aren't above reproach on this score -- as Einstein himself pointed out (although I have temporarily lost the reference for that comment of his!). This one comes close to the one I had in mind:
"I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today -- and even professional scientists -- seem to me like someone who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is -- in my opinion -- the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth." [Quoted from here.]
As noted above, Gross and Levitt's main argument appears to be that no one ignorant of science should criticise it. That seems reasonable enough in itself if we restrict our attention to technical aspects of that discipline, but, science isn't a hermetically-sealed profession. It has historical and ideological roots, as well as social and environmental consequences -- and it can be (and has been) used to legitimate notoriously reactionary ideas and right-wing dogma. Furthermore, its prestige and the limelight scientific achievement casts upon its more prominent practitioners often means that any old rubbish that scientists spout receives inordinate attention and undeserved respect -- a fact confirmed by the lionisation of the popular work of any scientist who defends the 'objectivity' of science, or who attacks religious belief, regardless of its quality (another fact confirmed by the positive reception given to, say, Richard Dawkins' recent book, The God Delusion).
The same observation applies to rather too many contemporary philosophers, who, it seems, have been all too easily seduced by the ephemeral hypotheses and transient theories scientists promote. [In fact, much of this hype is now called "science by press release" -- i.e., science that hasn't been peer reviewed -- a phenomenon that grew exponentially during the Covid 19 Pandemic.] Hence, with respect to these concerns alone (never mind other motivating factors), non-scientists (but especially among Marxists) have a legitimate and pressing interest in helping deflate such windy pretension.
Furthermore, Gross and Levitt aren't averse to offering the reader their own philosophical observations which were themselves beginning to look 'shop worn' when Aristotle was a lad. Indeed, they succeed in rehashing a handful of hackneyed and superficial epistemological 'insights' in the defence of Scientific Realism almost as if no one had ever aired them before. In the event they end up stringing together a raft of reactionary (and by now trendy) ideas, all the while pretending to be friends of the Left. The low point of the book is reached when they resurrect their very own version of the "HIV-is-a-Gay-Plague" theory. [Gross and Levitt, pp.182ff.] With friends like these, who needs friends?
Fortunately, the first edition of Gross and Levitt's book was subjected to a sharp critique by Richard Lewontin [Lewontin (1995).] See also, Dupré (2001), pp.113-16, Gieryn (1999), and Ross (1996). [Gross and Levitt attempted to respond to some of this in the second edition.] Levitt (1999) contains more of the same, as does Weinberg (2002). I will be saying much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
Another recent example of this was provided by that self-appointed custodian of 'objectivity', Raymond Tallis. In a book review (that had itself been about theorists like Michel Foucault), Tallis argued as follows:
"Foucault, as every schoolchild knows, denied that there were such things as objective truths. So-called true statements are not about how things really are but about who is in charge…. [With respect to the death of Foucault], [t]he consequences of denying the truth of objective truths are rarely so attributable, immediate and brutal." [Times Literary Supplement, 5151, 21/12/01, p.3. In the ensuing exchange, my contribution was not published; the substance of it is reproduced below.]
I rather doubt that many schoolchildren have ever heard of Foucault, just as it is equally likely that relatively few adults have. One can only suppose that this particular hyperbole was deliberately chosen to conjure up an opening aporia over the 'objectively true' status of this patent falsehood -- ironically enough appearing in a review of a book about 'objectivity'.
Nevertheless, Tallis has only two responses to make to those whom he thinks undermine faith in 'objective truth'. One involves a predictable use of the 'self-refutation argument':
"All attempts to demonstrate that the truth about truth is that it is not really true fall foul of the Cretan Paradox…. [If a] critique of truth were true, then it would be false." [Ibid., p.3.]
However, Tallis failed to notice that this hastily constructed 'truth about truth' is itself highly questionable. Indeed, as far as the Paradox of the Liar is concerned (if this is what he was referring to), the whole point was to show that naïve beliefs about 'truth' are misguided, and this, of course, includes Tallis's own rather amateurish version of it. In fact, it is worth asking what the Cretan Paradox --, which was ostensively about what liars (or at least what Cretans) are capable of consistently asserting about their own semantic bona fides -- has to do with the refutation of beliefs about something as obscure as the "truth about truth". It looks, however, like his own fondness for hastily cobbled-together, 'knockdown' arguments has once again led Tallis astray. With friends such as these, 'objective truth' -- whatever that is -- might prefer to remain friendless.
Tallis's other line-of-attack is to appeal to the 'objective truths' that sceptics are themselves forced to accept in order to support their rejection of this misbegotten concept. Unfortunately, Tallis's eagerness to defend his own version of 'Slightly-Less-Naïve-Realism' prevented him from noticing that the problem lies not so much with the 'notion of truth' as it does with his attempt to support it by saddling it with the ill-defined and philosophically useless term, "objective". Tallis happily goose steps here where others fear to tiptoe. In the same article (p.4) he turns this otherwise overworked notion into something grander still, calling it "objective, deindexicalized truth". Clearly, this is meant to transform the ordinary, rather puny word "truth" into an Industrial Strength Super-Word. However, only those hoodwinked by what can only be described as the linguistic equivalent of Clark Kent's glasses will be duped. The Cretan Liar paradox undermines Tallis's own position far more effectively than anything a relativist might use against it, for it throws into question the PB, the LEM and the LOC -- principles usually counted among the cornerstones of Scientific Realism.
Thus, after enduring the Tallis Treatment, truth is sadly transformed into "objectively demolished truth". It seems, therefore, that Tallis is to his notion of 'truth' what Kryptonite was to Superman.
39. One way to block this line of reasoning would involve the denial that anything 'objective' could be false. But, as noted in the main body of this Essay, if supposed falsehoods weren't 'objective', there would be little incentive to demonstrate they were indeed false, and knowledge would cease to advance. Several of the classic experiments in the history of science wouldn't have been performed if such (presumed) falsehoods had merely been 'subjective'; the latter would simply have been ignored. Indeed, before such investigations actually began no one would be able to say whether these presumed falsehoods were in fact false. A classic example in this regard would be, say, Pasteur's demonstration that belief in the spontaneous generation of life was false. If this weren't an allegedly, or a possibly 'objective' fact about the generation of life would Pasteur have bothered to determine its status?
It could be argued in response to this that falsehoods are neither 'objective' nor 'subjective' (they lie perhaps in the epistemological 'pending' tray). But, if that were so, the following proposition:
F1: The Moon is now (date and time supplied) in the Earth's shadow,
would be now true, now false, now 'objective', now… (well what?) as the Moon went on its way. However, it is surely a 'mind independent' truth that the Moon either is, or is not, in the Earth's shadow (or maybe even both) at different times, and if that is true, then F1 is 'objective', for on that basis it would be 'mind independent', whether true or false. Naturally, those enamoured of the word "objective" might baulk at such a conclusion, but that is their subjective problem.
The point is, of course, that our (ordinary) use of the words "true" and "false" undermines any application of words like "objective" and "subjective" in Philosophy. Once again, material practice makes perfect non-sense of Metaphysics.
Again, it could be objected that falsehoods relate to things that don't exist (or that do not obtain) in the material world, and in that sense they aren't 'mind independent', since only minds can think them. But, if what falsehoods supposedly are about do not exist, then with what would their true negations 'correspond'? If the latter correspond with nothing at all, where does that put the CTT?
For example, consider the following falsehood:
F2: Tony Blair is over eight feet tall.
If F2 is false then this is true:
F3: Tony Blair isn't over eight feet tall.
But, with what does F3 correspond? Plainly, it can't correspond to anything in 'reality', for there is no relevant object that is "not over eight feet tall" for it to relate to. And it is little use pointing to the supposed set of objects that are less than or equal to eight feet tall (to which set Blair belongs), for not only does that fail to solve the problem just posed, there is nothing in reality answering to this set for Blair to belong to, either. No one supposes, it is to be hoped(!) that there is a sort of metaphysical membrane surrounding a collection of such nondescript 'objects', turning it into this supposed set. And if that is so, if there is no such set, we still have an 'objective truth' (F3) to which nothing in 'reality' corresponds.
Be this as it may, if the argument is that the presumed content of F2 doesn't exist (or fails to obtain), and that is what makes it false, then by parity of reasoning, the same must be the case with F3.
It could be argued that F3, for example, follows from one or more true propositions that do correspond with reality. For instance, let us suppose that Blair is six feet tall. If so, the proposition "Blair is six feet tall" is true, and F3 follows from that. Hence, F3 (and hence the falsehood of F2) follows from at least one proposition that corresponds with the (presumed) fact, or true proposition, that Blair is six feet tall.
The problem with this response is that F3 also follows from "Blair is six feet tall and Paris is in France", as well as countless other propositions (such as "Blair is six feet tall and the Nile is longer than the Thames", as well as "Blair is six feet tall or New York is in Japan"). Moreover, as we will see in Essay Ten Part Two, it is impossible to give a non-circular, or even non-question-begging account of the correspondence relation that is supposed to hold here.
[In the meantime, readers are referred to Davidson (1990, 1997, 2005a). However, readers shouldn't assume I agree with everything Davidson has to say! The latter should be read in conjunction with Glock (2003).]
F2: Tony Blair is over eight feet tall.
Should anyone take exception to the use of F2 (perhaps because it is rather fanciful), then consider the following falsehood:
F4: Cambrian rocks are younger than Silurian rocks.
But, the falsehood of F4 implies the following is true:
F5: Cambrian rocks aren't younger than Silurian rocks.
The question is, with what does the 'mind independent' truth expressed in F5 correspond? It can't be the fact that Cambrian rocks are older than Silurian rocks, for F5 allows for the fact that they might be the same age! So, if anything, it relates to the 'fact' that Cambrian rocks are older than, or the same age as, Silurian rocks. And yet, where in reality is that 'disjunctive fact'? Even so, F5 is true for all that. Once again, this just means that its truth doesn't arise from 'correspondence relations'.
Hence, we have here yet another 'mind independent truth' that corresponds with nothing at all in 'reality', but which is nonetheless 'objective'. And once that is allowed, the 'objective' status of falsehoods can't reasonably be called into question either.
It could be argued against this that the couplet "objective truth" relates to whatever is known to be true (or, perhaps known to be irrevocably true -- such as the fact that Copper conducts electricity). In that case, presumably -- if we now wish to give this phrase an epistemological spin -- the couplet "objectively false" should relate to whatever is known to be false (such as: "Mars has canals on its surface"). But, if we insist on accepting this particular formulation, then we would surely know that F5 is, for example, irrevocably true, too. And if that is so, all the problems that F5-type propositions pose for 'objectivity' now re-assert themselves -- since nothing in the universe 'corresponds' with it! Hence, this particular 'irrevocably true objective truth' actually has nothing in reality answering to it! In that case, and in terms of 'objectivity' and what that is supposed to imply, this wouldn't distinguish such 'truths' from irrevocable falsehoods, which also have nothing in reality corresponding to them, either.
F5: Cambrian rocks aren't younger than Silurian rocks.
Anyway, there is something decidedly fishy about an understanding of 'objectivity' that makes it dependent on irrevocability. What has mind independence got to do with irrevocability? While we may come to recognise that something is irrevocable, anything that is allegedly 'mind independent' has got to be above and beyond such petty-fogging, mundane concerns, surely?
Anyway, Copper only conducts electricity under certain conditions. Introduce enough impurities, for example, and this 'objective truth' becomes 'objectively false'. As with other alleged scientific facts, 'objective truths' fall foul of the countless ceteris paribus clauses attached (or which are attachable) to them. Now, this 'objective truth' about 'objective truth' (which holds that the latter notion only applies in an Ideal World, one that is free of ceteris paribus clauses -- and one that is, alas, also inhabited by The Ideal Observer -- if, that is, we insist on connecting 'objectivity with irrevocability) is often omitted from accounts of truth promoted by Metaphysical Realists. The latter are more concerned to defend 'objective truth' with 'subjective' make-belief than they are with any semblance of objectivity (in that word's ordinary sense). [On this, see Cartwright (1983).]
[However, there is a forceful rebuttal of this way of interpreting ceteris paribus laws/clauses, here.]
[I will add some comments on this article in a later re-write of this Essay.]
[See also, Earman, et al (2002), and this paper by Marc Lange (which links to a PDF). There is more on this in Essays Thirteen Part Two, Ten Part Two and Three Part Four.]
40. Lenin's ideas about space and time were briefly examined in Note 25.
Contemporary, but no less traditional accounts of time can be found, for example, in the following: Dainton (2001), Grünbaum (1973), Lange (2002), Le Poidevin (1991, 1998, 2003, 2007), Le Poidevin and MacBeath (1993), Lockwood (2005), Mellor (1998), Newton-Smith (1980), Price (1996), Prior (1957, 1967, 2003), Savitt (1995), Sider (2001), Sklar (1976, 1985, 1992), Smart (1963, 1964), Smith (1993), Tooley (2000), Torretti (1999), Turetsky (1998), and Wang (1995). Anti-traditional and non-Traditional accounts of time have been listed here.
We have already seen that relativistic ideas involving Spacetime appear to be incompatible with DM. Thus, if objects and processes in the universe can be represented by world lines in a four-dimensional manifold, then they don't actually change. Given such a view, each 'event' would in effect be a proper part of an orthogonal three-dimensional 'slice' (i.e., a hyperplane) through this manifold. In that case, change either wouldn't be possible or it would at most represent our 'subjective' perception of 'reality' as we 'pass along' our individual world lines -- there being no such process as 'objective', mind-independent change. Naturally, this might motivate a DM-redefinition of change so that it is reinterpreted as something like an 'illusion' created by just such a 'subjective' view of our own ('diachronic'?) 'passage along' our individual world lines. But this would mean that change itself was merely an 'appearance' and not the least bit 'objective'. And that would further imply that 'objective' four-dimensional 'reality' is as changeless as Plato's Forms. With that would go the idea that the world is essentially changeable, and DM would disintegrate -- or, a least appear to do so -- according to the set of hyperplane slices representing the 'lifelines' of anyone who has swallowed either theory.
[I hasten to add that I am not expressing my views here, merely pointing out that DM, as it stands, is incompatible with Relativity. This might explain why dialecticians a few generations ago were suspicious, if not highly critical of that theory. On that, see here and below.]
[Cf., Geach (1972a) and Simons (1987). On the incoherence of "time slices", see Read (2007), and his online article, here.]
Incidentally, Lenin seems to have taken a dim view of the fourth dimension linking it somehow with priestcraft (a rather odd prejudice he might have caught from Engels):
"In his Mechanik, Mach defends the mathematicians who are investigating the problem of conceivable spaces with n dimensions; he defends them against the charge of drawing 'preposterous' conclusions from their investigations. The defence is absolutely and undoubtedly just, but see the epistemological position Mach takes up in this defence. Recent mathematics, Mach says, has raised the very important and useful question of a space of n dimensions as a conceivable space; nevertheless, three-dimensional space remains the only 'real case' (ein wirklicher Fall) (3rd German ed., pp. 483-85). In vain, therefore, 'have many theologians, who experience difficulty in deciding where to place hell,' as well as the spiritualists, sought to derive advantage from the fourth dimension (ibid.).
"Very good! Mach refuses to join company with the theologians and the spiritualists. But how does he dissociate himself from them in his theory of knowledge? By stating that three-dimensional space alone is real! But what sort of defence is it against the theologians and their like when you deny objective reality to space and time? Why, it comes to this, that when you have to dissociate yourself from the spiritualists you resort to tacit borrowings from the materialists. For the materialists, by recognising the real world, the matter we perceive, as an objective reality, have the right to conclude therefrom that no human concept, whatever its purpose, is valid if it goes beyond the bounds of time and space. But you Machian gentlemen deny the objective validity of 'reality' when you combat materialism, yet secretly introduce it again when you have to combat an idealism that is consistent, fearless and frank throughout! If in the relative conception of time and space there is nothing but relativity, if there is no objective reality (i.e., reality independent of man and mankind) reflected by these relative concepts, why should mankind, why should the majority of mankind, not be entitled to conceive of beings outside time and space? If Mach is entitled to seek atoms of electricity, or atoms in general, outside three-dimensional space, why should the majority of mankind not be entitled to seek the atoms, or the foundations of morals, outside three-dimensional space?" [Lenin (1972), pp.211-12. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Well, this might be being a little unfair to Lenin, for he also appears to separate the use of n-dimensional space from theology by his appeal to 'objectivity'. However, if there are more than four dimensions, then, manifestly, they will exist "external to the mind", and if 'gods' and 'ghosts' 'inhabit', say, the fifth dimension, then they will surely be as 'objective' as we are (who by default also occupy such a dimension -- that is, if each (n-1)th dimension is embedded in a 'higher' n-th dimensional manifold).
It is difficult to see how Lenin can escape from the Ideal trap he has just set for himself. Anyway, as noted above, this probably accounts for the suspicion with which Russian scientists and Philosophers greeted Einstein's ideas -- until they had to be accepted as valid so that the 'Soviet' military machine could compete with the US nuclear weapons programme. Realpolitik clearly took precedence over the 'scientific' implications of DM! [On this see, Graham (1971, 1987, 1993), Joravsky (1961), Krementsov (1997), Pollock (2006), Vucinich (1980, 2001) and Wetter (1958).]
In like manner, US educationalists in the late 1950s found they had to take Darwin seriously when it became clear that the USSR was more scientifically advanced than the US, and had just put a man in space.
Engels in fact took an even dimmer view of the fourth dimension; on this, see van Heijenoort (1948), a copy of which can be found here (as well as at this site, here).
41. That is, assuming for the moment that the future doesn't exist -- or rather, that it makes no sense to suppose it does. See Note 40 and Note 42.
42. The comments in Note 40 indicate why -- for those DM-theorists who aren't too bothered about remaining consistent with Relativistic Physics -- the future can't be said to exist.
Of course, if the language used in physics were interpreted along lines suggested in the present work, these 'problems' would simply vanish. That is because, for example, whenever the word "time" appears in a theoretical context it can't have the same meaning as the typographically identical word, "time", used in ordinary language. I will call the former "timeP" (which is short for "the use of the word 'time' in Physics and/or Traditional Philosophy" -- the reader can decide for herself which is which), and the latter "timeE" (which is short for "our everyday use of the word 'time'"). Hence, any 'solutions' to the philosophical and/or scientific 'problems' about timeP will, naturally, relate to the specialised use of the word, but not to timeE. This, of course, means that timeE won't have been addressed, which in turn implies that philosophical and scientific theories that are aimed at informing us about the nature of timeE will relate, not to timeE, but to timeP -- leaving the nature of timeE unscathed.
[This isn't to suggest that the above reference to the ordinary employment of "timeE" implies that that word has only one use or meaning.]
2500 years of wasted effort sorted in a paragraph!
[On this, see Rundle (2009).]
As Peter Hacker notes (in relation to Philosophy, not Physics!):
"For two and a half millennia some of the best minds in European culture have wrestled with the problems of philosophy. If one were to ask what knowledge has been achieved throughout these twenty-five centuries, what theories have been established (on the model of well-confirmed theories in the natural sciences), what laws have been discovered (on the model of the laws of physics and chemistry), or where one can find the corpus of philosophical propositions known to be true, silence must surely ensue. For there is no body of philosophical knowledge. There are no well-established philosophical theories or laws. And there are no philosophical handbooks on the model of handbooks of dynamics or of biochemistry. To be sure, it is tempting for contemporary philosophers, convinced they are hot on the trail of the truths and theories which so long evaded the grasp of their forefathers, to claim that philosophy has only just struggled out of its early stage into maturity.... We can at long last expect a flood of new, startling and satisfying results -- tomorrow.
"One can blow the Last Trumpet once, not once a century. In the seventeenth century Descartes thought he had discovered the definitive method for attaining philosophical truths; in the eighteenth century Kant believed that he had set metaphysics upon the true path of a science; in the nineteenth century Hegel convinced himself that he had brought the history of thought to its culmination; and Russell, early in the twentieth century, claimed that he had at last found the correct scientific method in philosophy, which would assure the subject the kind of steady progress that is attained by the natural sciences. One may well harbour doubts about further millenarian promises." [Hacker (2001), pp.322-23.]
Once again: wasted effort.
If, on the other hand, it is still insisted that the 'future' does exist (and that reality is indeed a 'four-dimensional object', with every temporal zone 'existing simultaneously' -- whatever that means!), we should still have to employ the present tense (or one of its cognates) to talk about to it. In which case, paradoxically, the future would cease to be the future, it would be part of the present! Naturally, that would in turn mean that the hypothetical four-dimensional manifold in which the universe is supposedly embedded must collapse for want of a fourth dimension. On the other hand, if any other tense is used to talk about the future, it would cease to exist in the present. In that case, no one could truly assert that the future exists, since they would have to use the present tense to do just that.
On the other hand, if the future is said to exist only 'in the future', that would be tantamount to saying that it doesn't exist now, and is therefore non-existent now (assuming, of course, that the phrase "doesn't exist now" is synonymous with "non-existent now"). Moreover, before any consensus could be reached over whether the idea that all times zones exist 'simultaneously' is true (i.e., that they now all exist simultaneously and that we must use the a-temporal form of the verbs involved), we should first of all require some sort of indication what the word "simultaneous" could possibly mean in such company -- without appealing to some other measure of time that hadn't already been baked into this 'problem' from the get-go. That is because, obviously, "simultaneous" means "at the same time as". Furthermore, if the word "simultaneous" means "at the same time as" (which it does), then, clearly, there would have to be another time zone (which is neither past, present nor future) in which to embed the other three!
Some might object that several of the verbs used here are in fact tenseless. Even so, it is still far from clear how the future can exist now and yet also exist tenselessly! If it doesn't now exist, then it doesn't exist now (plainly). On the other hand, if it exists in another time zone, the verbs used to express that supposed fact can't be tenseless. [See also here and here.]
In order to avoid these difficulties, some might be tempted to try to alter (openly or even surreptitiously) the meaning of words like "exist" and "future". In fact, this 'revisionary' option is part of the reason why Relativity Theory isn't incompatible with our use of superficially similar-looking words drawn from ordinary language. That is because (as noted above) these two words ("exist" and "future") wouldn't now have the same meaning as their ordinary, typographically identical counterparts drawn from the vernacular. Whatever roles such words or phrases occupy (related to time in Relativity Theory, or timeP) -- ex hypothesi -- they can't be replaced by typographically similar-looking words employed in ordinary language, nor vice versa. Problems only occur if attempts are made to 'translate' the one into the other (in either direction) at the same time as it is imagined that such typographically similar words (i.e., timeE, and timeP) have the same meaning (or the same reference -- that is, if they are referring expressions). The failure to take into account these differences is what lies behind the spurious plausibility to the idea that 'time travel' is possible -- and that includes the 'paradoxes' that supposedly arise in this area. If time were an 'object' (or a 'substance') of some sort, like space (if it were an extra ‘dimension'), then it would appear to make as much sense to travel in time as it does to move in space. [We saw this in Note 25, above.] But, it is this unjustified translation into talk about 'dimensions' that has prompted these moves, and nothing more. [No pun intended.]
[On this in general, see Read (2007), Rundle (2009), and Westphal (1996). See also Rupert Read's papers on time, here.]
43. Naturally, the logic of the word "exist" (and its cognates) is far more complex than this section of the Essay would appear to indicate. These four senses of this word (explored at this point in the Essay) were distinguished merely to make a specific point. No permanent logical significance is attached to them by the present author. [On existence, however, see Williams (1981) and Nelson (2020).]
44. On the planet Vulcan, see Hanson (1962).
45. As is the case with so many other things, DM-theorists' depictions/discussions of the non-existence of 'God' are highly unsatisfactory (an allegation I won't attempt to substantiate here, and for reasons hinted at below). It should, however, be pointed out that this observation doesn't imply that the present author accepts 'God's' existence, either! Since I don't wish to become sidetracked by this topic, I will adopt the implicit DM-assumption that 'God' is an 'object', that 'He' doesn't exist, and that 'He' represents man's alienated view of 'Himself' (etc., etc.), a là Feuerbach. Naturally, this transforms 'God' into a 'non-existent' intentional object (whatever that means!).
For more on this, see Note 47 and Note 49, below. [For some idea how I would tackle this topic, check this out. (That link is now dead! However, readers can now check out my Quora comment.)]
46. This was established in Essay Eleven Part One.
It might be objected that the existence of imaginary beings (like The Tooth Fairy, or Gryphons and Harpies, etc.) doesn't merit serious attention, whereas objects and events in the past do. However, as will be argued at length in Essay Eleven Part One, the problem is that the DM-"Totality" is so contradiction-, and paradox-friendly that it is in fact impossible to say what it does and what it doesn't contain -- or even what it can't contain. The solution, therefore, isn't to point to the absurdity of the supposition that Gryphons and Harpies might exist, but to abandon belief in that equally mythical object, the DM-"Totality".
See also Note 47 and Note 49, below.
47. For example, the usual attempt to exclude 'God' from this list -- that is, by treating 'Him' as an of 'object' or a rather peculiar sort -- with or without special 'properties'/'qualities' -- somewhat like a distant planet or star, perhaps appealing to 'negative evidence' and 'rational' argument to demonstrate 'His' non-existence, implying that belief in 'Him' is irrational -- only encourages the opposite view that 'He' might exist after all (just as the planet Vulcan might have existed). This would clearly alter 'His' supposed actuality, changing it from E4-, to E3- (and maybe even E2-) existence.
(1) E1 relates to objects, events and processes extant at present (that is, it concerns objects, events and processes that are unambiguously 'objective' in Lenin's sense and where, once again, the phrase, "the present", is indexed to the day and (local) time of each speaker/reader);
(2) E2 relates to objects, events and processes that are no longer extant (but which were once 'objective' in Lenin's sense);
(3) E3 relates to objects, events and processes whose existential status, while somewhat dubious, is such that they might once have existed ('objectively', perhaps); and,
(4) E4-existence relates to objects, events and processes that have never existed (and thus never were 'objective').
However, if something can't exist (or if we just don't know what certain words mean when they supposedly refer to something that is said to exist, as is the case with 'God'), lack of evidence and proof become irrelevant. In contrast, it certainly makes sense to consider the possible existence of E2-/E3-type 'objects'; evidence, or even lack of it, only becomes relevant if it is possible for such objects to exist (that is, if we know about what it is that we are speaking). This helps explain why, on the one hand, no one bothers to look for any evidence proving the existence of, say, the round square, or the Jabberwocky -- while, on the other, others seek evidence that shows extra-terrestrial life, for example, exists.
Incidentally, this equivocation between E2-, E3-, and E4-objects might also help explain why some comrades find they can believe in 'God' while remaining Marxists. Clearly, DM inadvertently encourages this ideological compromise because it treats 'His' existence as a sub-species of E3-, or E4-existence -- or, perhaps better: it blurs the distinction between E3-, E4-, and what we might now want to call E5-existence, illustrated in P1 and P2.
P1: The Adhedral Triangle exists.
P2: The round square exists.
So:
(5) E5-'existence' concerns of 'objects' objects that can't exist, which are (i) denoted by meaningless 'words', or are (ii) what we take to be 'impossible', for whatever reason.
By treating 'God' as an 'object' whose existence or non-existence is capable of being established by evidence, the distinction between E3-, E4-, and now E5-existence, has been blurred.
[However, see Note 49.]
48. And 'God' might not turn out to be (or to have) a 'mind', after all. As the Bible says: "To whom or what can you compare the Lord?" If that is so, since 'He' is external to all 'minds' -- and (on this assumption) 'He' wouldn't possess, or be, a 'mind', anyway --, the existence of 'God' could turn out to be materially 'objective', in Lenin's sense of that word!
49. Of course, if this conclusion is rejected (i.e., that science is conventional) it would move DM back into the metaphysical fold. On this, see Essay Eleven Part One (here, here, here, here, and here).
However, if there were valid reasons for excluding the existence of, say, 'God' (and for claiming that ascriptions of existence to 'Him' are false, and always will be false), based on the meaning of certain theoretical terms found in DM (but not on any evidence), then that would indicate yet again that DM is a form of LIE. That is because, in this instance, such a negative conclusion would involve an extrapolation from the meaning of certain words to 'His' non-existence. Here, linguistic, as opposed to empirical considerations, would determine what the world does or doesn't contain. A terminological argument would have thereby established the non-existence of 'God', the flip side of Anselm's notorious Ontological Argument in favour of it.
On the other hand, if evidence were even relevant to establishing 'God's' non-existence, then, as we saw above, DM-theorists would in effect be admitting that they were closet theists. This isn't just because it would concede ground that it is relevant to seek evidence for 'His' non-existence (meaning that the obverse proof of 'His' existence is possible, too), but because, according to the DM-classicists (quoted once more below), human knowledge is and will only ever be partial. In that case, it is entirely conceivable (given DM-epistemology) that one day the required evidence might turn up to prove 'God' actually does exist!
"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), pp.457-58. Bold emphasis added. The online translation renders this passage slightly differently.]
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object." [Lenin (1961), p.195.]
If so, DM-theorists must be prepared to countenance the possibility that such evidence might indeed turn up one day. This isn't something that can be ruled out on a priori grounds. Hence, asymptotic theism is, it seems, consistent with DM!
This is no surprise since asymptotic theism was central to Hegelian Idealism.
Hence, dialecticians who think along such lines have placed themselves in a permanent bind. Successful escape from the above dilemma would involve them in having to reject several fundamental DM-theses: metaphysical 'objectivity', 'externalist' (pseudo) materialism, the 'eternally-partial'/'relative' status of knowledge, the 'asymptotic' approach metaphor, along with the mysterious "Totality" -- that is, should we ever be told what it is.
Ironically, we seem to 'know' more about 'God' than we do about the DM-Totality!
50. DM-theorists might dispute the claim continually made at this site and in this Essay that they are committed to the infinitely limited nature of human knowledge, but they may only legitimately do so after having explained how Engels's 'infinite asymptotic approach' metaphor can be tamed (along with the similar ideas Lenin kept promoting) in order to avoid a literal interpretation of their use of the word "infinite" --, which is what Engels and Lenin plainly meant by it. [On this, see Note 49.]
51. Detailed comments relevant to this topic will appear in in Essay Thirteen Part Two, as well as in an Additional Essay to be published at a later date.
52. On this, see Essay Ten Part One.
53. Naturally, the wording here does doesn't suggest that any form of Relativism or Idealism is acceptable. Relativism itself will be considered in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
53a. Several critics of the claim that if Lenin were correct, humanity would only ever have 'images', have objected that that isn't Lenin's position, nor is it even remotely like it. However, when asked precisely what these 'other elements of knowledge' are, or might be, that have been omitted or ignored, they grow suspiciously quiet. [Here is just the latest example; check out the prevarication and desperate diversionary tactics of one, "ravn". (Unfortunately, this link is now dead!)]
In fact, Lenin had the following to say about sensation, knowledge and 'images':
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world...." [Lenin (1972), p.69. Bold emphasis added. Notice the use of "only" here.]
"All knowledge comes from experience, from sensation, from perception. That is true. But the question arises, does objective reality 'belong to perception,' i.e., is it the source of perception? If you answer yes, you are a materialist. If you answer no, you are inconsistent and will inevitably arrive at subjectivism, or agnosticism, irrespective of whether you deny the knowability of the thing-in-itself, or the objectivity of time, space and causality (with Kant), or whether you do not even permit the thought of a thing-in-itself (with Hume). The inconsistency of your empiricism, of your philosophy of experience, will in that case lie in the fact that you deny the objective content of experience, the objective truth of experimental knowledge...." [Ibid., p.142. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, Lenin has just told us that:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world...."
[Ibid.,
p.69.
Bold emphasis added.]
And:
"All knowledge comes from experience, from sensation, from perception." [Ibid., p.142. Bold emphasis added.]
Hence, if "all knowledge comes from...sensation", and sensation is an "image of the external world", the only conclusion possible is that, according to Lenin, all we have as a basis for our knowledge of 'the external world' are 'images', even if they have been derived from "perception"/"sensation".
Lenin then proceeded to underline the point:
"For instance, the materialist Frederick Engels -- the not unknown collaborator of Marx and a founder of Marxism -- constantly and without exception speaks in his works of things and their mental pictures or images..., and it is obvious that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations. It would seem that this fundamental standpoint of the 'philosophy of Marxism' ought to be known to everyone who speaks of it, and especially to anyone who comes out in print in the name of this philosophy.... Engels, we repeat, applies this 'only materialistic conception' everywhere and without exception, relentlessly attacking Dühring for the least deviation from materialism to idealism. Anybody who reads Anti-Dühring and Ludwig Feuerbach with the slightest care will find scores of instances when Engels speaks of things and their reflections in the human brain, in our consciousness, thought, etc. Engels does not say that sensations or ideas are 'symbols' of things, for consistent materialism must here use 'image,' picture, or reflection instead of 'symbol,' as we shall show in detail in the proper place." [Ibid., pp.32-33. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"[S]ensation is an image of the external world...." [Ibid., p.56. Bold emphasis added.]
"The doctrine of introjection is a muddle, it smuggles in idealistic rubbish and is contradictory to natural science, which inflexibly holds that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations, i.e., the images of the external world, exist within us, produced by the action of things on our sense-organs." [Ibid., p.95. Bold emphasis added.]
"The sole and unavoidable deduction to be made from this -- a deduction which all of us make in everyday practice and which materialism deliberately places at the foundation of its epistemology -- is that outside us, and independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and that our perceptions are images of the external world." [Ibid., p.111. Bold emphasis added.]
"Thus, the materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images." [Ibid., p.119. Bold emphasis added.]
"For the materialist the 'factually given' is the outer world, the image of which is our sensations." [Ibid., p.121. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"This is either an idealist lie or the subterfuge of the agnostic, Comrade Bazarov, for sense-perception is not the reality existing outside us, it is only the image of that reality." [Ibid., p.124. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality." [Ibid., p.320. Bold emphasis added.]
"What has annoyed this most worthy 'recent positivist'? Well, how could he help being annoyed when he immediately realised that from Haeckel's standpoint all the great doctrines of his teacher Avenarius -- for instance, that the brain is not the organ of thought, that sensations are not images of the external world, that matter ('substance') or 'the thing-in-itself' is not an objective reality, and so forth -- are nothing but sheer idealist gibberish!?" [Ibid., p.428. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link and bold emphases added.]
There doesn't appear to be much wiggle room here. Lenin clearly believed that sensations are images of the 'external world'. He repeatedly says things like this: "Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world..." and "[S]ensation is an image of the external world...." [Both quoted above.]
[However, it might well be wondered how an itch, a noise, or a smell could be an 'image', or what they could possibly be an 'image' of --, and he is quite clear that sensation (or perception), and hence 'images', are our only source of knowledge.]
Admittedly, Lenin did make some attempt to argue that we validate these 'images' by means of practice:
"Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice." [Ibid., p.119. Bold emphasis added.]
But, as has already been pointed out, if Lenin is to be believed, all we have are images of practice, and hence no 'objective' way of distinguishing reliable from unreliable, valid from invalid 'images' of the latter. Unless human beings were somehow capable of 'leaping out of their heads', 'by-passing their sensory organs', there would be no way of escaping from the 'epistemological prison' Lenin has just constructed for himself.
Others have tried to argue that Lenin believed we have direct access to the outside world via our senses (otherwise known as Direct Realism -- we see this defence attempted in, for example, Goldstick (1980)) -- which theory supposedly by-passes all these 'images'. Well, Lenin might or might not have believed this (even though there is precious little textual support for such an interpretation; there is far more in support of the view that Lenin was a rather confused Representational Realist, of sorts -- but on this, see my comments earlier in this Essay concerning one passage from MEC some have quoted in support of the claim that Lenin accepted this form of Realism), the question is: how could he possibly know we have such 'direct access' if all we have are 'images' to guide us and rely on?
Again, Lenin might have sincerely believed he possessed eyes, ears, skin and other sense organs, and that they connected him with 'objective reality outside of himself', but, if his theory is correct, all he actually had were images of these organs, and hence images of the 'external world'.
Here he is again:
"This is either an idealist lie or the subterfuge of the agnostic, Comrade Bazarov, for sense-perception is not the reality existing outside us, it is only the image of that reality." [Ibid., p.124. Bold emphasis alone added.]
There is no hint in the above of any such 'direct access to reality'. Indeed, Lenin has inserted a layer of 'images' between himself and the 'outside world', the existence of which can now only be taken as an act of faith. Because Lenin has built a screen of 'images' between himself and the 'outside world', there is no way around, or through, this barrier. He is forever trapped behind it.
It could be objected that Lenin had in fact anticipated the above 'problem' since he quoted a reply to it that had already been offered by Engels:
"Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation there was action. Im Anfang war die That (sic). And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves....
"And whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them.... So long as we take care to train and to use our senses properly, and to keep our action within the limits prescribed by perceptions properly made and properly used, so long we shall find that the result of our action proves the conformity...of our perceptions with the objective...nature of the things perceived. Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense-perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perceptions of it." [Ibid., pp.118-20. Bold emphases alone added. Lenin is here quoting the Introduction to the English Edition of Engels (1892), p.381 (this links to a PDF). Bold emphases alone added.]
About which Lenin then remarked:
"Thus, the materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice." [Ibid., p.119. Bold emphasis added.]
However, as noted above, Lenin made the mistake (which Engels didn't) of inserting a veil of 'images' between himself and the world, which he has yet to prove actually exists. He even reiterates the claim that originally created this 'problem': "Our perceptions and ideas are their images." Admittedly he also added that "[v]erification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice", but no amount of observation, practice or science can remove this screen, since all Lenin now has are 'images' of science, 'images' of practice and 'images' of their supposed results.
How anyone is able to check and see, or otherwise discover, whether or not an "object [agreed] with [their] idea of it" when all they have are 'images' of said 'object', and no way of accessing 'it' independently of sensation (according to his own words), Lenin unwisely kept to himself.
[The difficulties Engels's theory itself faces are different from Lenin's, but they are equally insurmountable; they will be exposed in Essay Three Part Six, when it is published. Spoiler: Just like Lenin, Engels failed to explain how anyone could possibly find out "that the object does agree with our idea of it", so that they were able validly to conclude that "our perceptions...agree with reality outside ourselves". No good appealing to further practice in support, since, even on this theory, all anyone has are 'perceptions of practice'. Unless there were some way to access 'reality' that bypassed all the 'perceptions' that had just been inserted between 'the knower' and 'the known', appeal can't be made to "practice", "success" or even "science". They all exist or take place in a world Engels signally failed to prove exists. So, like Lenin, all Engels could fall back on was his unsubstantiated faith that there is such a world. This recurring 'problem' ought to suggest (to Dialectical Marxists) that this entire approach to cognition and the source of knowledge is defective from top to bottom. But, once more, this self-imposed predicament should hardly surprise a single DM-fan while they insist on taking philosophical advice from a Christian Mystic (upside down or the 'right way up'!).]
In which case, Lenin remains trapped behind a wall of 'images' all of his own making.
54. On this topic, see Hacker (1979, 2004, 2007).
Despite this, Lenin said similar things about "matter", too:
"Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them." [Lenin (1972), pp.144-45.]
But, this is no better than Engels's rather weak attempt to tell us what "matter" is.
However, if Lenin (or, indeed, anyone else) doesn't know what the words "material" and "matter" mean (or, they refuse to tell us), then any sentence containing them will be incomprehensible. And that includes any such sentences used in a proposed re-definition of matter. [Unless, of course, it is a stipulative re-definition.] In that case, Lenin would merely be proposing a new terminological convention for the use of this word, which is yet another move he failed to justify.
So, short of an explanation of what the word "matter" means, should a DM-theorist now declare that "matter is thus and so", he/she will in effect be saying nothing at all.
As we have seen, Lenin declared that:
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), p.311.]
But, if no one knows what "matter" is, he might just as well have used the word "schmatter" -- along the following lines, perhaps:
"The sole 'property' of schmatter with whose recognition philosophical schmaterialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind."
As should seem plain, it isn't possible to say what is being said to be an "objective reality existing outside the mind" if we no one understands the word "matter", or if we haven't a clue to what it refers.
It could be countered here that the word "matter" and the phrase "objective reality existing outside the mind" in fact mean the same.
But, if that were the case, the above quotation would be an empty tautology, somewhat akin to:
"The sole 'property' of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind, with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind."
Lest anyone cry "Unfair!" at the above substitution, it is worth recalling that for anyone who knows that "matter" and "objective reality existing outside the mind" mean the same, Lenin's attempt to tell them that they mean the same would be pointless (as the above passage sought to bring out). On the other hand, anyone who doesn't know that they mean the same would still be in the dark, since they wouldn't know what the words "matter"/"schmatter" meant. Once more, if Lenin was simply re-defining this word, then he offered no reason to accept this new 'definition'. On what basis, therefore, could Lenin reject the following alternative 'definition' of matter?
"The sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being composed of elementary particles, existing outside and inside the mind."
It would be no good objecting that no justification has been given for this 'new definition' without that objection backfiring on Lenin's lack of justification for his re-definition.
Finally, it could be objected that Lenin was using a perfectly acceptable word, inherited from previous generations of materialists. Unfortunately, Lenin torpedoed that response when he rejected all previous 'definitions' of matter:
"'Matter is disappearing' means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter is vanishing and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are likewise disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter. For the sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), p.311. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
If 'objective existence' "outside the mind" is the "sole property" of 'matter', as Lenin plainly thought, then he has openly abandoned those earlier definitions and characterisations. In which case, he is no longer using the word "matter" in any of its previous senses, confirming that he had indeed altered its meaning.
Hence, the above comments still stand: Lenin might just as well have been referring to "schmatter" for all the good it did.
54a. The fact that DM-theorists (be they Stalinists, Maoists or Trotskyists) all copy examples off one another, or off Hegel, or Engels, or Lenin (and this they do almost word-for-word), is amply confirmed by this quotation from Spirkin:
"One quite often hears people say 'all things consist of matter'. They do not consist of matter. They are the specific, concrete forms of its manifestation. Matter as such is an abstraction. Looking for a uniform matter as the principle of everything is like wanting to eat not cherries but fruit in general. But fruit is also an abstraction. Matter cannot be contrasted to separate things as something immutable to something mutable. Matter in general cannot be seen, touched or tasted. What people see, touch or taste is only a certain form of matter. Matter is not something that exists side by side with other things, inside them or at their basis. All existing formations are matter in its various forms, kinds, properties and relations. There is no such thing as 'unspecific' matter. Matter is not simply the real possibility of all material forms, it is their actual existence. The only property that is relatively separate from matter is consciousness as an ideal and not material phenomenon." [Spirkin (1983), p.67. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, instead of using a different example, Spirkin chose cherries again! Are there no other usable examples anywhere in the entire universe?
The reader will note, too, that the substitution of "schmatter" and "schmaterial" (in Note 54) for "matter" and "material" here will not substantially alter the content of the above quotation --, for until we know what Spirkin is talking about (i.e., until we know what matter is), he might just as well be using "schmatter" and "schmaterial" for all the help this passage is.
"Schmatter as such is an abstraction. Looking for a uniform schmatter as the principle of everything is like wanting to eat not cherries but fruit in general. But fruit is also an abstraction. Schmatter cannot be contrasted to separate things as something immutable to something mutable. Schmatter in general cannot be seen, touched or tasted. What people see, touch or taste is only a certain form of schmatter. Schmatter is not something that exists side by side with other things, inside them or at their basis. All existing formations are schmatter in its various forms, kinds, properties and relations. There is no such thing as 'unspecific' schmatter. Schmatter is not simply the real possibility of all schmaterial forms, it is their actual existence. The only property that is relatively separate from schmatter is consciousness as an ideal and not schmaterial phenomenon."
More recently still Camilla Royale, of the UK-SWP, quoted Engels approvingly:
"Engels uses an example that actually comes from Hegel: 'We can eat cherries and plums, but not fruit, because nobody has so far eaten fruit as such'. Similarly, nobody has ever experienced matter or motion 'as such' but we have come across different individual material things or types of motion. So, Engels is not only essentially in agreement with Hegel but actually borrows his examples." [Royale (2021).]
The Engels's ('cherry' and matter is really just an abstraction) passage was also quoted approvingly by two STD's, Mitin and Yudin, here, and has been reposted (seemingly with official approval) at the IMT's website, here.
[For more examples, also see Note 56a, Note 57 and Note 65a, below.]
[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; IMT = International Marxist Tendency.]
55. Alas, Lenin sought refuge in the mystical confusions that other unfortunates have also latched onto in Hegel's Logic, and this he did because of the profound shock experienced by revolutionaries after (i) The failure of the 1905 revolution, (ii) The collapse of the Second International and (iii) The capitulation of its leading figures (Kautsky and Plekhanov, to name but two) in the face of the rabid nationalism whipped up by the outbreak of World War One. [On this, see for example, Anderson (1995).]
But, it is worth pointing out that Lenin's philosophical views matured, not because of progress in scientific knowledge, nor yet in response to developments in the class struggle (other than the shock produced by the above sell-outs), but as a result of his studying an obscure book on 'Logic' written by a card-carrying mystic and ruling-class hack, Hegel. This fact is never commented upon by dialecticians who still imagine that 'advances' in DM are consequent on twists and turns in the class struggle, or which follow upon the progress of science and the experience of the revolutionary party. Indeed, as noted earlier, it is difficult to think of a single DM-concept (not shared by HM) that has been modified as a result of the class struggle. This would, of course, mean that the development of DM is independent of revolutionary practice, and consequently can't have been derived from it. [I have said much more about this in Essay Nine Part One.]
It could be objected that the above comments are ridiculous since Lenin sought to explain the criminal capitulation of the Second International, for instance, in terms of its theoretical failings. Inter alia, this was because its leading figures failed to understand (or did not fully accept) the materialist dialectic of Marx and Engels. Hence, Lenin concluded that a thorough study of Hegel's Logic was long overdue in order to counter their crude, mechanistic and one-sided version of Marxism.
Well, this is the comforting tale dialecticians tell one another on cold and stormy nights, but, as Lenin himself was well aware, Dialectical Marxists turn to mysticism as a source of consolation in times of crisis. Part of the problem with Second International Marxism wasn't that its leading theorists half-rejected or even only half-accepted dialectics, but that they didn't reject it root and branch. That is because dialectics allows those whose brains it has colonised to argue in support of any conclusion they like and its opposite, sometimes in the very next breath, and often by the very same individual. What better theory, therefore, to 'reconcile' these opposites -- internationalism and national chauvinism -- than dialectics, the theory that glories in 'contradiction'? Hence, at best, Lenin's drift back into Hermetic Mysticism was motivated as much by the treachery of the leaders of the Second International as it was by a disagreement over how much mysticism was permissible -- or, indeed, acceptable -- in what its members had fondly imagined was an atheistic --, or at least a secular -- movement.
In short, at the philosophical level this was little more than a dispute between softcore and hardcore, consistent and inconsistent, mystics.
[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Theorist.]
So, in that sense, while Lenin's studies represented an ideological reaction to this turn of events, they were nevertheless a regressive response since they were clearly an expression of Lenin's need for consolation in the face of these set-backs, rather than his desire to understand the class war scientifically. As I pointed out in Essay Nine Part Two:
Despite this, it might still be wondered how this relates to anything that is even remotely relevant to the ideas entertained by hard-headed revolutionary atheists. Surely, it could be argued, any attempt to trace a commitment to DM back to its origin in allegedly alienated thought-forms is both a reductionist and an Idealist error.
Fortunately, Lenin himself supplied a materialist answer to this apparent conundrum, and John Rees kindly outlined it for us when he depicted the period of demoralisation following upon the failed 1905 Russian revolution in the following terms:
"[T]he defeat of the 1905 revolution, like all such defeats, carried confusion and demoralisation into the ranks of the revolutionaries…. The forward rush of the revolution had helped unite the leadership…on strategic questions and so…intellectual differences could be left to private disagreement. But when defeat magnifies every tactical disagreement, forcing revolutionaries to derive fresh strategies from a re-examination of the fundamentals of Marxism, theoretical differences were bound to become important. As Tony Cliff explains:
'With politics apparently failing to overcome the horrors of the Tsarist regime, escape into the realm of philosophical speculation became the fashion….'
"Philosophical fashion took a subjectivist, personal, and sometimes religious turn…. Bogdanov drew inspiration from the theories of physicist Ernst Mach and philosopher Richard Avenarius…. [Mach retreated] from Kant's ambiguous idealism to the pure idealism of Berkeley and Hume…. It was indeed Mach and Bogdanov's 'ignorance of dialectics' that allowed them to 'slip into idealism.' Lenin was right to highlight the link between Bogdanov's adoption of idealism and his failure to react correctly to the downturn in the level of the struggle in Russia." [Rees (1998), pp.173-79, quoting Cliff (1975), p.290. Bold emphases and links added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some paragraphs merged.]
Cliff himself continues:
"With politics apparently failing to overcome the horrors of the Tsarist regime, escape into the realm of philosophical speculation became the fashion. And in the absence of any contact with a real mass movement, everything had to be proved from scratch -- nothing in the traditions of the movement, none of its fundamentals, was immune from constant questioning.... In this discussion Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Bazarov and others tried to combine Marxism with the neo-Kantian theory of knowledge put forward by Ernst Mach, and Richard Avenarius. Lunacharsky went as far as to speak openly in favour of fideism. Lunacharsky used religious metaphors, speaking about 'God-seeking' and 'God-building'. Gorky was influenced by Bogdanov and Lunacharsky.... Lenin's reaction was very sharp indeed. He wrote to Gorky, 'The Catholic priest corrupting young girls...is much less dangerous precisely to "democracy" than a priest without his robes, a priest without crude religion, an ideologically equipped and democratic priest preaching the creation and invention of a god.'" [Cliff (1975), pp.290-91. Bold emphases and links added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged; minor typo corrected.]
It is quite clear from this that the experience of defeat (and the lack of a significant materialist input from a mass working-class movement) re-directed the attention of certain revolutionaries toward Idealism and the search for mystical explanations for the serious set-backs Russian Marxists had witnessed in and around 1905.
Plainly, this search provided these comrades with some form of consolation -- just as Marx had alleged of religious belief pure and simple, and as Lenin himself implied.
But, there is another outcome that Rees and others have failed to notice: this major set-back turned Lenin toward philosophy and dialectics. These were subjects he had largely ignored up until then. While it is true that Bogdanov and the rest turned to Mach, Berkeley, Subjective Idealism, and other assorted irrationalisms, it is equally clear that Lenin himself looked to Hegel and Hermetic Mysticism.
Nevertheless, Lenin's warning shows that revolutionaries themselves aren't immune from the pressures that prompt human beings in general to seek consolation in order to counteract disappointment, demoralisation and alienation. As we have seen, Lenin was well aware that ruling-class ideas, which 'satisfy' such needs, could enter the revolutionary movement from the "outside", or which would become much more prominent in such circumstances.
Even more profound disappointments confronted Lenin a few years later when WW1 broke out. Kevin Anderson takes up the story (without perhaps appreciating its significance):
"The outbreak of World War 1 in 1914 shattered European liberals' belief in peaceful evolutionary progress. To Marxists, however, most of whom already believed that capitalism was a violent and warlike system, an equally great shock occurred when, yielding to the pressure of domestic patriotic sentiment, most of the world's socialist parties, including the largest and most important one, the German Social Democracy, came out in support of the war policies of their respective governments.... So great was the shock to Lenin that when he saw a German newspaper report on the German Social Democracy's vote to support the war, he initially thought that it was a forgery by the Prussian military for propaganda purposes.... Once he arrived in Bern, Lenin moved quickly in two seemingly contradictory directions: (1) he spent long weeks in the library engaged in daily study of Hegel's writings, especially the Science of Logic, writing hundreds of pages of notes on Hegel, and (2)...he moved toward revolutionary defeatism...." [Anderson (1995), p.3. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged. See also Krupskaya's remarks, here.]
Just as Christians often turn to the Bible in times of stress or when depressed, so Lenin looked to the writings of that Christian Mystic, Hegel. Thoroughly disappointed with the course of events (in this capitalist "vale of tears"), Lenin turned his face toward this source of quasi-religious consolation and away from the material world of woe, in the direction of a hidden world governed by a veritable army of invisible entities -- 'abstractions', 'essences', 'concepts', and, of course, the Hegelian Trinity, 'Being', 'Nothing' and 'Becoming' -- allied with a battery of mysterious forces comprising the DM-Trinity, 'contradiction', 'sublation', 'mediation'.
Is it possible, then, that revolutionaries of the calibre of Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Plekhanov and Trotsky were tempted to seek metaphysical consolation of the sort depicted in this Essay and at this site? Is this really so even though Lenin accused others of this himself? Is it even conceivable that they opened themselves up to the alien-class ideas that later found expression in DM, and for these reasons?
As we have seen in other Essays posted at this site (especially Essays Three Parts One and Two, Twelve Part One, the rest of Twelve, and Fourteen Part One (summaries here and here)), and as Lenin himself acknowledged, dialectics is shot-through with ideas, concepts and thought-forms imported from Traditional Philosophy (which ideas, concepts and thought-forms were in turn invented by theorists who, undeniably, had a material and ideological interest in rationalising the status quo and ruling-class hegemony). Indeed, in many places it is hard to tell the difference between DM and open and honest Mysticism (as Essay Fourteen Part One will demonstrate, when it is published -- until then, check this out).
Especially since Marx also had this to say:
"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the [alienation -- RL] of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases and link added.]
A turn to Philosophy is a turn to religion, according to Marx, and religion has been the main source of consolation throughout history:
"Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again.... Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification.... Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions...." [Marx (1975c), p.244. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
STDs and MISTs became experts in the use of this 'proxy religion' (DM) over the next few generations, using it to 'justify' all manner of contradictory, opportunist, anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary nostrums.
However, since this is one of the main topics of Essay Nine Parts One and Two, no more will be said about it here.
56. For example, Lenin (1961), pp.187-91. Of course, as we saw above, this means that Absolute Idealism is consistent with both "objectivity" and "externalism". Given Lenin's account, the only apparent difference between Absolute Idealism and "externalism" is that the latter implies that mind is dependent on matter, not the other way round. But since matter is characterised by Lenin in terms of its relation to mind, that means that matter and mind are inseparably interconnected, even for Lenin!
To be sure, Lenin also argued that matter preceded mind, but he was only able to do that on the back of an appeal to evidence and argument that aren't themselves mind-independent.
Be this as it may, we have already seen (here, here and here) that core DM-theses imply that matter is indeed dependent on mind.
Incidentally, the comment in the main body of this Essay about Hegel's view of "objective" reality isn't meant to suggest that Hegel and DM-theorists (at least, at the level of rhetoric) understand 'objectivity' in the same way as each other, only that despite their using superficially similar words to talk about it, neither of them in fact meant (or had ever meant) anything by this word -- even if they thought they did. That is, of course, because the (philosophical) use of this word is about as barren and empty as the main square in Pripyat:
Figure Twenty-Three: Objectively Barren
[This was demonstrated earlier, and in Note 32.]
[Incidentally, I am using "meaningless" in one of the senses I listed here -- i.e., that it is impossible to give a coherent or consistent explanation of what "objective" does in fact mean.]
56a. As noted earlier, those who look to Lenin for guidance on such issues almost invariably echo his thoughts, often word-for-word. Here is Mitin:
"Consequently, the law of the unity and mutual penetration of opposites becomes the most fundamental, the most important law of dialectics, and the law of determinate significance.... In his Philosophical Notebooks Lenin described the unity of opposites as the kernel of dialectics.... The law of unity of opposites is the most universal law of the objective world and of cognition." [Dialectical and Historical Materialism, p.222; quoted in Knight (2005), pp.78-79.]
As we will see, Mao also held this to be the only dialectical law.
57. This follows on Hegel's obscure and equivocal handling of this matter (no pun intended):
"Essence becomes matter in that its reflection is determined as relating itself to essence as to the formless indeterminate. Matter is therefore the differenceless identity which is essence, with the determination of being the other of form. It is consequently the real basis or substrate of form, because it constitutes the reflection-into-self of the form-determinations, or the self-subsistent element to which the latter are related as to their positive subsistence. If abstraction is made from every determination, from all form of anything, what is left over is indeterminate matter. Matter is a sheer abstraction. (Matter cannot be seen, felt, and so on -- what is seen, felt, is a determinate matter, that is, a unity of matter and form). This abstraction from which matter proceeds is, however, not merely an external removal and sublating of form, rather does form, as we have seen, spontaneously reduce itself to this simple identity." [Hegel (1999), pp.450-51, §§ 978-979. Bold emphasis alone added. Typos in the on-line version corrected. Paragraphs merged.]
Well, that clears things up and no mistake!
This rather odd idea appears in a much clearer form in Berkeley's work:
"37. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it....
"67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that -- though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, movable substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter -- yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain -- since all place or extension exists only in the mind, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.
"68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words 'to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend.
"69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.
"70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner." [A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge, quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Remove the references to 'God' along with the rather flowery language, etc., and much of the above could have been written by Lenin! You doubt me? Then check this out:
"We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or not? This hoary philosophical query is confused by Mach. If you hold that it is not given, you, together with Mach, inevitably sink to subjectivism and agnosticism and deservedly fall into the embrace of the immanentists, i.e., the philosophical Menshikovs. If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them. Therefore, to say that such a concept can become 'antiquated' is childish talk, a senseless repetition of the arguments of fashionable reactionary philosophy. Could the struggle between materialism and idealism, the struggle between the tendencies or lines of Plato and Democritus in philosophy, the struggle between religion and science, the denial of objective truth and its assertion, the struggle between the adherents of supersensible knowledge and its adversaries have become antiquated during the two thousand years of the development of philosophy?...
"As the reader sees, all these arguments of the founders of empirio-criticism entirely and exclusively revolve around the old epistemological question of the relation of thinking to being, of sensation to the physical. It required the extreme naïveté of the Russian Machians to discern anything here that is even remotely related to 'recent science,' or 'recent positivism.' All the philosophers mentioned by us, some frankly, others guardedly, replace the fundamental philosophical line of materialism (from being to thinking, from matter to sensation) by the reverse line of idealism. Their denial of matter is the old answer to epistemological problems, which consists in denying the existence of an external, objective source of our sensations, of an objective reality corresponding to our sensations. On the other hand, the recognition of the philosophical line denied by the idealists and agnostics is expressed in the definitions: matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation, and so forth....
"'Matter is disappearing' means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter is vanishing and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are likewise disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter. For the sole 'property' of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin (1972), pp.144-45, 165, 311. Bold emphases alone added, quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Hence, like Berkeley, Lenin defines matter in terms of human sensation, and 'images' in the 'mind'. He waves away the usual properties of matter (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and reduces matter to that which is an "objective reality...outside [the] mind". This is its "sole property". But, Lenin's theory of 'images', as we have seen, makes this 'concept' completely empty since all he ends up with are images of what he thinks is an "objective reality" (which is just another abstraction, anyway!)
His differences with Berkeley are, therefore, superficial and, at best, rhetorical.
As we have seen in Note 54a, Note 56a and Note 65a other DM-theorists agree with Lenin. Here is yet another:
"Matter is an abstract concept which pinpoints that which common to all objects and processes." [Krapivin (1985), p.101. Bold emphasis added.]
One brave dialectician (and none other than the Right Reverend Bob Avakian) even went this far (without actually telling us what matter is, either), in response to Karl Popper's claim that Marxism was unfalsifiable:
"There are definitely things in Marxism that are falsifiable. For example, dialectical materialism. If the world were made up of something other than matter in motion -- if that could be shown -- then clearly Marxism in its fundamentals, in its essence and at its core, would be falsified, proven wrong. Or, if it could be shown that, yes, all reality consists of matter, but that some forms of matter do not change, do not have internal contradiction and motion and development -- that too would be a fundamental refutation of dialectical materialism." [Quoted from here.]
Unfortunately for The People's Prophet (Blessed Be His Name!), there are trillions of unchangeable objects in each gram of matter -- namely electrons and protons -- to say nothing of photons. [Any who think these particles do in fact change are encouraged to follow the given link, and then perhaps think again.]
Moreover, since our very own Dialectical Seer accepts Lenin's 'definition' of matter (i.e., as that which "exists objectively outside the mind"), he has already ruled out (by fiat) anything that isn't in fact material that does exist extra-mentally. [We saw there were many such items in an earlier section.]
So, Avakian's challenge is an empty one. Who is going to discover something "outside the mind" that is not actually outside the mind?! -- which is what this 'challenge' of his finally amounts to.
Be this as it may, the comments in the main body of this Essay aren't meant to suggest that Lenin subsequently abandoned "externalism" (in PN, for example), since he does refer to some ideas that are consonant with it in several places in that work. However, it is perfectly clear that this (formerly) centrally important criterion has been demoted to a lesser role in PN. He doesn't even mention it!
59. Alex Callinicos, quoting Trotsky (1986), pp.88-89. [See also Callinicos (2006), pp.209-16.]
Admittedly, Callinicos outlined what he thought was valid about this 'law', in contrast with what he considered misleading. Nevertheless, he failed to mention the fact that Lenin himself didn't appear to think this particular 'law' was all that significant -- indeed, he seldom refers to it. That is possibly because Hegel didn't regard it as all that important, either. [On that, see Levine (1984), pp.111-26.]
Indeed, Trotsky admitted as much:
"Hegel himself undoubtedly did not give the law of the transformation of quantity into quality the paramount importance which it fully deserves." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88-89.]
More significantly, Callinicos only half recognised the fact that Trotsky seems to have viewed this 'law' as a sort of a priori truth, one with "universal significance" for the "entire universe without any exception" (ibid., p.88; emphasis added). There is no way that Trotsky could have known this for a fact other than by inferring it from a law which he also viewed as an a priori 'truth' of some description. After all, he was happy to use the word "axiom" in relation to DM:
"[B]ut by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing…. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradiction, conflict and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc…." [Trotsky (1971), pp.65-66. Bold emphases added.]
Trotsky offered no evidence in support of these 'axions'. In fact, Trotsky derived this 'law' (as both Engels and Hegel had before him) from an extremely narrow and shallow evidential base (which is one reason why I have called this aspect of DM, "Mickey Mouse Science"), as well as from the 'concepts' supposedly involved in all this --, that is, from the alleged meaning of words like "quality" and "quantity".
Of course, this 'law' seemed so certain to Engels and Trotsky because it is based on little other than an odd use vague language -- but not on evidence (in fact, the evidence offer by DM-fans is best described as a joke), and that meant it could be imposed on nature. [On how this metaphysical con-trick works, see Essay Twelve Part One.]
However, one thing is clear, the above generalisation can't be obtained from:
"…a patient empirical examination of the facts...." [Rees (1998), p.271.]
[There is much more on this in Essays Two and Seven.]
Furthermore, Callinicos failed to notice something else that seems rather obvious: the reason Rees omitted a detailed discussion of this passage (of Trotsky's) was because it might otherwise encourage the unhelpful (but accurate) conclusion that DM isn't an a posteriori theory after all, but is as a priori and dogmatic as any other branch of Metaphysics.
Callinicos also expressed the view that this 'law' is illustrated by certain developments in "chaos theory". However, his comments are far too brief and enigmatic to make much of. [He also referred his readers to Paul McGarr's article [McGarr (1994)], which was discussed in Essay Seven.]
The connections between this 'law' and "chaos theory" are much more fully developed in RIRE; there is more on this, too, in Essay Seven Part One.
60. This isn't strictly true; the first half of AD is long, rambling and weaves its way across a wide range of subjects. There, Engels defined dialectics as:
"[T]he general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976), p.180.]
Elsewhere, he added:
"Dialectics...comprehends things and their representations, ideas, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending. Such processes as those mentioned above are, therefore, so many corroborations of its own method of procedure." [Ibid., p.27.]
"The recognition that these antagonisms and distinctions, though to be found in nature, are only of relative validity, and that on the other hand their imagined rigidity and absolute validity have been introduced into nature only by our reflective minds -- this recognition is the kernel of the dialectical conception of nature." [Ibid., pp.15-16. I have used the on-line version here.]
In connection with this, it is worth asking how Engels could possibly have known that reality is actually different from the way that "thought" pictures it to us (in that certain aspects of 'reality' have been "introduced into nature only by our reflective minds", and is only of "relative validity"). If he were right, and reality is different from our thoughts about it, then, clearly, that very thought would be different from reality, too, and we should treat it with suspicion.
Indeed, how could Engels have been so sure that thought is "rigid" on the one hand while on the other nature isn't? And, how could he "recognise" this truth without thinking rigidly while attempting to do just that?
It could be objected that dialectical thought isn't rigid, so the above conclusion is misguided. And yet, dialecticians seem rather rigid in their opinion that non-dialectical thought is itself rigid -- to say nothing of their view that change is a result of 'internal contradictions', that 'quantity passes over into quality', that change is universal, and that everything is interconnected (etc., etc.), which set comprises a range of dogmatic ideas that have been set in concrete for over a hundred and sixty years.
This can only mean that either:
(i) Dialecticians don't in fact think dialectically (or they would change their minds about such things all the time!), or,
(ii) 'Dialectical thought' is just as rigid as non-dialectical thought is said to be.
Take your pick...
[It would be interesting to see if DM-fans are prepared to reject the above 'either-or' of 'formal thought' by opting for both halves of it -- that is, whether they are prepared to acknowledge that (i) they don't think dialectically and that (ii) dialectical thought is rigid.]
61. This assertion will be substantiated in Essay Fourteen Part Two (when it is published).
62. More on that, too, in Essay Fourteen Part Two. See also Essay Thirteen Part Three (here and here).
63. This isn't meant to imply Novack fails to consider the usual 'definitions' that others tend to give of DM, it is just that he adds yet another fundamental element to the list.
64. Novack illustrates the limitations of the LOI with some rather dubious 'logic' of his own:
"It is logically true that A equals A; that John is John…. But it is far more profoundly true that A is also non-A. John is not simply John: John is a man. This correct proposition is not an affirmation of abstract identity but an identification of opposites. The logical category or material class, mankind, with which John is one and the same is far more and other than John, the individual. Mankind is at the same time identical with, and yet different from, John." [Novack (1971), p.92.]
This 'argument' was examined in detail in Essay Three Part One, and Essays Four and Six, but it serves as a salutary warning about the level of confusion that results when the "is" of predication is conflated with the "is" of identity, and rank amateurs are let loose in logic. As Bertrand Russell observed (of the original version of this Hegelian muddle):
"This illustrates an important truth, namely, that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise." [Russell (1961), p.715.]
Unfortunately, Novack's 'logic' deteriorates even further:
"Consider…the two propositions we have been analysing. The second, 'All that is rational is real', does assert the opposite of the first and, in fact, contradicts it: All that is real is rational. Hegel was not at all bothered by this contradiction. On the contrary, as a dialectician, he seized upon this contradiction as a clue to the essence or gist of reality. He understood that it was a genuine contradiction and accepted it and operated with it, because both opposition and contradiction are genuinely real and rational. This particular contradiction expresses the inherent nature of things and arises from the contradictory character of reality itself." [Novack (1971), p.93.]
Exactly why "All that is rational is real" and "All that is real is rational" are opposites, let alone contradictories, Novack annoyingly kept to himself -- as it seems did Hegel, too -- which fact appears not to have bothered any of the latter's admirers too much. Worse still, these 'opposites' haven't, nor will they ever, turn into one another, as the dialectical prophets assure us they must.
Formally, however, the 'contradictory' of "All that is rational is real" is "There is something rational which isn't real", and the 'contradictory' of "All that is real is rational" is similarly "There is something real which isn't rational." Of course, if the real and the rational were identical, then these two counterfeit 'contradictions' would be more like tautologies -- as in "All that is false is untrue" and "All that is untrue is false". Now, it should have concerned Novack that he failed to take this simple fact into consideration: if the real and the rational are identical then, far from being contradictories, these prize examples of confusion would ironically be the 'opposite' of this: they would be tautologious, and no more contradictory of each other than these two are:
N1: Cicero is Tully.
N2: Tully is Cicero.
[Of course, N1 and N2 aren't tautologies, but the point still remains apt.]
Had Novack spotted this flaw in his 'world-view' it might have led him to conclude that harmony and consilience more closely reflect the tautologious "gist of reality". If the "is" of predication is indeed an "is" of identity (in, for example, "All that is real is rational"), it would surely reveal to us the remarkable truth that all of nature is essentially -- i.e., "below the surface" -- a 'harmonious whole', and not the least bit riddled with strife and conflict (the latter being confined merely to surface 'appearances', perhaps). Hence, on the basis of loopy logic like this, an equally whacky 'harmonious view' of 'Being' could now be constructed. In that case, belief in 'dialectical contradictions' would simply be a consequence of our incapacity to see the universal accord that exists 'essentially', behind 'superficial appearances' of nature and society -- which those with the right sort of 'eyes' to see, can see, i.e., those who "understand" anti-dialectics.
This universal accord is in fact, on this 'harmonious' view of reality, built into our predicative sentences and may be "divined" only by those with the right amount of 'tenderness for things'. Given this novel 'theory' then, feelings of love and sympathy are what move things in nature and society (with harmonious laws of attraction governing everything) --, not those nasty, ruling-class, Hermetic conflicts.
Of course, there is absolutely no evidence for the above crazy, anti-dialectical 'theory' --, that is, over and above the dotty 'logic' rehearsed in the last few paragraphs. But, why should that bother us? After all, Hegel and Novack certainly didn't shown any concern over the dotty 'logic' they employed.
The sad but unavoidable fact is that Novack's shaky grasp of 'logic' (and ancient logic, too!) isn't confined to him; it is shared by the vast majority of DM-fans who have ever pontificated on the subject -- from atop the 'secure' vantage point of self-inflicted ignorance like this.
65. Novack attempts to illustrate these 'laws' with an idiosyncratic example of his own. He claims that the opposition between "appearance" and "essence" culminates in "essence" dominating "appearance" in ascending "grades of perfection", embodied, naturally, in that cosmically significant event: the foundation of the Fourth International!
"Marxism, for instance, was relatively realised in each of the first three internationals, realised with ascending grades of perfection. It is being more thoroughly realised through the Fourth International…." [Novack (1971), p.115.]
Novack should have spotted his error; it was staring him in the face. This Dialectical Mystery in fact works itself out only in threes, so there is no way that the Fourth International could have been the most perfect member of the litter. Indeed, as things have panned out, it was the runt.
Small wonder then that the Fifth International stalled even before it made it onto the starting grid (to vary the image).
Nevertheless, anyone familiar with Christian Theology, Neo-Platonism and/or Hermeticism will, I take it, recognise the provenance of Novack's own peculiar brand of Marxisante Millenarian Mysticism.
Interested readers can find an excellent example of this phenomenon, but from much more open and honest Mystics, here.
65a. More recent DM-fans agree with Lenin and Cornforth; here for example, is Peter Mason:
"There are various definitions of 'materialism' in philosophy. Marxists have a unique definition. For Marxists, in this context, materialism can be described as the philosophy that the world exists independently of the human mind. Ultimately, the material world is primary, and thought is secondary." [Quoted from here. This now appears as an Appendix to Mason (2012).]
As we have seen, this can only mean that 'the mind' isn't material!
[Full marks, though, for regurgitating Lenin thoughtlessly, comrade!]
[This forms part of Note 66.]
In one his books, Cornforth does at least attempt to provide some of the missing detail that is omitted by other DM-theorists. [Cornforth (1976).] [Anyway, much of Cornforth's Mickey Mouse Science is demolished in Essays Two to Eleven Part Two.]
However, having said that, it is nonetheless true that Cornforth's affirmation of the fundamental role that the "three laws" play in DM is seriously compromised by his subsequent attempt to enlist those very same laws in support of the orthodox Communist line on "socialism in one country" (etc.); cf., pp.71-120. [There is more on this in Essay Nine Part Two.] Indeed, he takes Trotsky to task for rejecting this obvious 'dialectical truth'. Hard though this might be to believe, but, according to Cornforth, Trotsky apparently rejected this Stalinist Shibboleth because he forgot that "truth is always concrete"! With such a poor memory, Trotsky must have needed daily reminders about things like the colour of the sky, or of grass, and maybe even the complex and intricate procedures necessary for opening and closing doors. Exactly how he successfully led the Red Army in the Civil War is, therefore, something of a mystery.
"Lenin and Stalin showed that this scheme [of Trotsky's]…was false. For if the revolution did not take place in the advanced capitalist countries, the alliance of workers and peasants in the Soviet Union had still the forces to build socialism…. In [this example]…it will be seen that the acceptance of some ready-made scheme, some abstract formula, means passivity, support for capitalism, betrayal of the working class and of socialism. But the dialectical approach which understands things in their concrete interconnection and movement shows us how to forge ahead -- how to fight, what allies to draw in. This is the inestimable value of the Marxist dialectical method to the working class movement." [Cornforth (1976), pp.79-80. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
Presumably, according to the above, since the former USSR was (once) a concrete fact, any formula implying that socialism was impossible without an international revolution to secure it must be abstract.
It isn't easy to see how this conclusion can be resisted successfully on DM-grounds alone. Adherence to the idea that "truth is always concrete" would seem to blunt completely any attempt to pose a theoretical challenge to anything whatsoever, and not just Stalinism, because, according to the DM-Classics, the concrete nature of anything will only in fact emerge as such on Epistemological Judgement Day, at the end of an infinite dialectical meander!
Be this as it may, there is little point arguing that this handy, knock-down DM-response to everyone else's pet theory (i.e., the mantra that "truth is always concrete") is itself internally inconsistent in that it is an abstract formula asserting truth only of 'concrete facts'. So it seems there is little point bringing anyone's attention to this, least of all DM-fans, since the Hermetic Hydra with which we are wrestling feeds off objections like this, gaining strength from all such challenges. As each contradictory head is loped-off this Hermetic Monster, it grows yet another, indeed several --, for to contradict a dialectician is to confirm her theory. To show her theory is contradictory is in fact to praise it highly!
[But, even this dishonest tactic can't work; on that see Essay Eleven Part One. In internet debates I have encountered numerous DM-fans who maintain that to argue against DM or Hegel is to confirm his theory! I then point out to such comrades that since DM and/or Hegel are far too vague and confused for anyone to be able to say what his theory does in fact maintain, they can't possibly know what actually confirms or confutes it. So, my argument isn't that DM and/or Hegel are mistaken, false, or even wrong, but that both are far too vague and confused for anyone to be able to decide one way or another!]
In fact, as we saw in Essay Nine Part Two, DM-fans hurl this abstract accusation at each other all the time (along with many others, some far less complimentary). So, for any randomly-selected DM-fan, every one else (often, but not always, belonging to a different party or tendency) is under the malign influence of an "abstract formula", or a "ready-made scheme" of some sort; either that or they are guilty of "formal thinking". By way of contrast, each dialectically-blessed soul sat in judgement on all the rest is, naturally, guided by the concretist of concrete thoughts, lifted from tablets of dialectical truth originally to be found in the Mecca abstract thought, Hegel's 'Logic' (upside down or 'the right way up')!
However, to spoil the fun, the above mantra (about truth) mischievously contradicts Lenin when he claimed that:
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961), p.171.]
Now, the temptation to conclude from this abstract passage that Lenin didn't appear to "understand" dialectics should be resisted, that is, until it dawns on such an individual that Lenin would be in good company, since no one understands it.
Others might object that the 'dialectical interplay' between the 'concrete' and the 'abstract' (oddly enough, this is something Cornforth seems to have forgotten) means that the above comments are as misguided as any could be. But, that particular riposte might still not be enough to neutralise the awkward fact that the claim itself that there is or could be such a 'dialectical interplay' is yet another abstraction. Once again, if 'truth is always concrete', that abstract claim about this supposed 'interplay' can't itself be true! Indeed, any attempt to refute this general point (about abstract claims like these) would be no less abstract itself. This is one gaping hole in the Good Ship Dialectics that is impossible to plug without punching several even larger ones in its already sieve-like hull.
Figure 24: DM, After Many Of Its Holes Have Been Plugged
It might be wise therefore to give this abstract mantra its long-overdue burial, and then lay six feet of concrete on top.
Of course, as events subsequently revealed, truth isn't "always concrete". The former USSR is no more; it has returned to the abstract realm from whence it came (post 1924). This means that Lenin's claim that "truth is always concrete" must be rejected as false -- either that or we must conclude that revolutionaries should abandon their abstract faith in the international revolution.
[Unless, of course, we go the whole DM-hog and reject the "either-or of understanding", arguing that truth is both 'concrete and abstract' -- that abstract truth itself further refuting the idea that truth is always 'concrete'.]
To all appearances then, the concrete facts of history have refuted Dialectical Marxism, but this fact will only be appreciated by those who haven't swallowed a 'theory' that has more holes in it than a lorry load of Polo Mints.
Figure 25: Sweets Modelled On DM?
So, the concrete facts seem to show that the 1917 revolution finally unravelled in the early 1990s -- even though a more theoretical (abstract) analysis actually demonstrates that another option is more likely: the USSR became State Capitalist in the late 1920s. Naturally, this highlights a genuine clash between the concrete and the abstract that most Orthodox Dialecticians seem happy to reject. Even so, in this area, as noted above, such theoretical qualms are clearly abstract themselves (they certainly aren't concrete). In which case, according to this particular DM-mantra, both pro-, and anti-State Capitalist theories can't be true (in that they are both abstract!).
Nevertheless, there is an easy way to avoid this Dialectical Dilemma: yet another hasty appeal to 'dialectics'! It could be argued that an all-round consideration of every relevant concrete fact and every relevant interconnection/'mediacy' proves that the USSR (since at least 1928) was indeed State Capitalist. However, those tempted to play this handy escape-from-DM-jail-free card must first of all explain how yet another abstract formula (such as: "Any regime that has commandeered the means of production, undemocratically controls the State, slots itself into world capitalist military competition and subjects its workforce to super-exploitation (etc., etc.) is State Capitalist") is capable of rescuing a doctrine about the concrete nature of truth from the abstract jaws of error.
[These comments don't imply that the present author rejects the State Capitalist analysis of the former USSR -- far from it. However, they do imply that I repudiate the metaphysical DM-baggage that often accompanies it, and then negates it (irony intended).]
Oddly enough, Cornforth didn't actually get round to explaining how dialectics justified the 1939 pact between Stalin and Hitler. This must presumably be because principled opposition to the Nazis is 'abstract', whereas an alliance with them is eminently 'concrete' -- as indeed are all the graves of those who at the time sought both to justify and oppose this particular dialectical betrayal, and whom the Nazi war machine slaughtered a few years later.
And it gets worse: Dialectical Marxists, who find it impossible to resist the temptation to sneer at Stalinist opportunism and its blatant class treachery, might like to explain how Trotsky's use of 'dialectics' was capable of 'justifying' his (and other OTs') "revolutionary defence" of the former USSR -- which also included Stalin's murderous invasion of Finland. [Cf., Trotsky (1971), pp.68-76.] As noted elsewhere at this site, the obscure and contradictory nature of DM in fact (and in practice) 'allows' it to be used to defend anything deemed expedient and its opposite, no matter how contradictory they might otherwise appear to be -- and perhaps just because they are contradictory.
As The Great Leader Himself deigned to inform us:
"It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
This handy, in-built facility allows DM-fans to 'justify' any political line they find opportune -- and its opposite (often by the same author), 24 hours later, or, as was the case with The Great Teacher, in the very same speech!
[Many more examples of the above ploy have been posted here.]
Moreover, the rejection of 'abstractions' should rule out-of-court Marx's famous (but clearly 'abstract') maxim that the emancipation of the working class must be "an act of the workers themselves".
Naturally, with 'logic' like this anything may be 'justified', anything condemned, any revision to, or abandonment of, basic principles accommodated, any class-compromise and any treachery explained away.
Hence, with regard to the complex dialectical choreography that determines the theoretical footwork of these DM-casuists, the question isn't whether truth is concrete, but how many tons of the stuff they have buried it under.
Interestingly, Cornforth went on to assert that dialectics shows that the principle of contradiction today is illustrated by the forces of "imperialism and national liberation movements", even quoting Mao Tse-Tung in support. [Cornforth (1976), p.113.] This is, one presumes, yet another example of a dialectician not imposing dialectics on reality, since the latter conclusion is surely based on a "patient examination of the facts" -- unfortunately omitted, once again, by this 'non-dogmatic' comrade.
In the end, the crumbling concrete edifice of the former Communist Block finally caught up with Cornforth. In one of his last books [Cornforth (1980)], he systematically retracted most of the theses he had formerly declared were the cornerstone of the "world view of the proletariat".
Alas, he didn't live to see it all turn to dialectical dust -- nor did he survive to witness the working class help demolish it (between 1989 and 1991).
In which case, the results so far are the following:
Concrete Reality: 1 --- 'Materialist Dialectics': 0
67. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Mao repudiated not just Engels's third 'law' (the NON) but his first 'law', too (Q«Q)! This is a "Revisionist" fact that has somehow managed to escape otherwise alert Maoist heresy hunters worldwide:
"Engels talked about the three categories, but as for me I don't believe in two of those categories. (The unity of opposites is the most basic law, the transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites quality and quantity, and the negation of the negation does not exist at all.) The juxtaposition, on the same level, of the transformation of quality and quantity into one another, the negation of the negation, and the law of the unity of opposites is 'triplism', not monism. The most basic thing is the unity of opposites. The transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites quality and quantity. There is no such thing as the negation of the negation. Affirmation, negation, affirmation, negation...in the development of things, every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation. Slave-holding society negated primitive society, but with reference to feudal society it constituted, in turn, the affirmation. Feudal society constituted the negation in relation to slave-holding society but it was in turn the affirmation with reference to capitalist society. Capitalist society was the negation in relation to feudal society, but it is, in turn, the affirmation in relation to socialist society." [Mao (1964). Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]
"It used to be said that there were three great laws of dialectics, then Stalin said there were four. In my view there is only one basic law and that is the law of contradiction. Quantity and quality, positive and negative...content and form, necessity and freedom, possibility and reality, etc., are all cases of the unity of opposites." [Mao Unrehearsed, quoted in Schram (1989), p.141. Bold emphasis added. (Speech At Hangchow, December 21 1965; this can now be accessed here.)]
[On this, see Schram (1989), which should be read in the light of Tian (2005), pp.163-67, and Knight (1997).]
Of course, Mao forgot to explain how quantity and quality manage to 'struggle' with one another, nor yet how they turn into one another -- forgetting what he had said elsewhere about this:
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another.... All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]
[Dozens of other DM-theorists who say the same have been quoted here.]
It is clear also clear that Stalin wasn't too interested in the NON; for example, it makes no appearance in his essay, Dialectical And Historical Materialism [i.e., Stalin (1976b)].
Update March 2015: Knight's introductory chapter of Mao (1990) pretty much settles the question whether Mao accepted the NON; he concludes that he did. The relevant material has been reproduced here. [This links to a PDF.]
Even so, many Maoists still dispute this alleged fact. On that, see here.
68. Cameron appears not to have seen Plekhanov's 'answer' to this criticism. [Cf., Plekhanov (1956), pp.92-95. Plekhanov's 'solution' was considered in more detail in Essay Seven Part One.]
Paul McGarr and Philip Gasper also endorse the main theses of DM. [McGarr (1994), pp.150-76, Gasper (1998), pp.143-52.] However, these two comrades clearly failed to appreciate the incongruity of accepting DM on the one hand and modern Physics on the other (which is rather odd, since McGarr has a PhD in Physics, and Gasper is definitely not a philosophical novice). On the contrary; they claim the two are entirely consistent -- though they both mischievously left the reader to guess their reasoning.
In fact, it seems these two are content to base their opinions solely on Engels's and Lenin's authority in order to substantiate their claim that there is no conflict between DM and Physics. For example, McGarr argues as follows:
"[A]ll the known 'particles' and 'forces' of matter are simply different transient manifestations of the same underlying essence (which most scientists would today call energy). They are all capable of being transformed into one another…. Whatever the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics turns out to be, there is no doubting that it is not a challenge to materialism, but a step forward in a materialist understanding." [McGarr (1994), pp.166, 164.]
But, unless McGarr's comments are based on a commitment to Lenin's "externalism", they offered little in the way of justification. Anyway, as both of these comrades know, scientists have (as a matter of fact) drawn anti-materialist conclusions from modern Physics. McGarr doesn't say why materialism isn't threatened by these developments, he just flatly denies it. This glaring omission can perhaps be traced back to the fact that DM provides its acolytes with no clear concept of matter, which in turn means that it isn't easy for any of them to see whether or not Modern Physics has eliminated it. In that case, whistling in the dark is perhaps all that is left to such comrades. But, that tactic will only ever work on 'true believers' and those who unthinkingly swallow the dogmatic philosophy of the DM-classicists for whom the need for carefully constructed arguments supported by adequate evidence went out of the materialist window well over a century ago.
If matter really is just energy, then the belief that the world is basically material should surely be consigned to appearances; the "essence" of the world (McGarr's word) isn't material in any recognisable sense of that word, if this 'scientific' view is correct. Hence, just as some would no longer want to say that the earth is stationary -- because it moves, according to classical Physics --, or just as others would want to say the earth doesn't 'move' in any way at all -- since it is a motionless 'object' or manifold in Spacetime -- we should no longer want to say the world is material, since, really it isn't, it is just "energy" (whatever that is).
Of course, some attempt might be made to rescue this part of DM from the jaws of oblivion by changing the meaning of the word "matter" (even as Lenin did by turning it into an epistemological category and by rejecting all previous definitions of it -- MEC, p.311), but this would only work at the cost of transforming DM into some form of conventionalism, once more.
In addition, the fact that matter and energy are inter-changeable can't be used to defend DM, either. If matter is energy, then whatever it was that was formerly called "matter" should now be viewed as shorthand for a scalar and/or vector field (etc.) -- and we should dispense with all talk of matter (except as a sort of "useful fiction"), just as we have done away with other obsolete concepts in science -- such as "substantial form" and "luminiferous ether".
The rejection of "reductionism" can't help DM-fans defend their theory, either. If matter is in fact reducible to energy (something McGarr doesn't deny), then it really is energy (which is itself made out of what?), and any other descriptor applied to it fails to represent the 'objective' (i.e., "independent-of-human-observer") truth.
To be sure, DM-apologists might want to continue imposing their belief in the existence of matter (defined in 'externalist' terms) on the world -- but they can do this only in defiance of unwelcome 'facts' like these, and in the face of the constant refrain that this is not what they do.
Again, these comments shouldn't be read as yet more proof of the present author's abandonment of materialism -- they are directed solely at exposing the confused account of matter one finds in DM.
There are far better ways of defending HM than this! [More on that in another Essay.]
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