Essay Twelve Part One:
Why All Philosophical Theories -- Including Dialectical Materialism -- Are
Incoherent Non-Sense
January 2024: This
Essay Is Currently Being Completely Re-Written And Re-Structured So Some Links
Might Not Work Properly And Some Numbering Might Be Out Of Sequence.
The Entire Process
Should Be Finished By The Beginning Of 2025.
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As is the case with all my Essays,
nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between Dialectical Materialism
[DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
First, it is important to point out thatphrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published; until then, the reader is
directed
here,
here and
here for
further
details).
[**Exactly
how these comments apply to DM will be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially
here,
here, and
later in this Essay). In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph,
I have summarised the argument (written for absolute beginners!)
here.]
Second, this has been one of the most
difficult Essays to write for at least three reasons:
(i) It
tackles issues that have sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest
minds in human history. I hasten to
add, though, that I claim no particular originality for what follows (except,
perhaps its highly simplified mode of presentation and its political
re-orientation); much of it has in fact been based on
Frege and
Wittgenstein's work, and, less importantly,
on that of other Fregeans and Wittgensteinians.
(ii) It
is far from easy to expose the
core weaknesses
of Traditional Philosophy in everyday language, even though after well over
fifty
re-writes I
think I have largely succeeded. [I have explained why that is important
here.]
(iii)
Unfortunately, those to whom this material is primarily directed (i.e.,
Dialectical Marxists) are almost all totally ignorant of
Analytic
Philosophy (particularly the work of the
above two philosophers -- in fact, manywon't even have heard
of Frege, fewer still will have read anything he wrote!). For that
reason, I have tried as far as possible to keep the
material presented below
as basic as possible, free of academic complexity. Hence, this Essay
isn't aimed at professional philosophers. In that case, those who would like to
read more substantial versions
of the approach to language and metaphysics I have adopted at this site should consult the relevant works referenced in the
End Notes (and in
several other Essays on
language published at this site -- for example,
Essay Three Parts
One and
Two, Essay
Four and Essay Thirteen Part Three).
Apologies
are therefore owed in advance to readers who know enough of Frege and Wittgenstein's work to make the ideas rehearsed in this
Essay seem rather trite and banal, but, as noted above, my target
audience isn't well-versed in this area of
Analytic
Philosophy, nor do they find it at all
easy to appreciate the importance of this novel approach to theory, let alone grasp
its significance.
[In fact, many regard Wittgenstein in a negative light, as both a mystic and a
conservative; I have addressed those specific issues
here,
here and
here.]
Hence, I have
written this Essay with them in mind, which means I have had to make things as
straight-forward and basic as possible.
Incidentally, some might
be tempted to conclude that the
ideas presented below are indistinguishable from the discredited
theories put forward by the
Logical
Empiricists/Positivists. I respond to that
erroneous inference
here.
Also
worth adding: the ideas presented below in no way affect the negative case
against DM developed across this site, but the following material does help form the basis of
a positive account of the origin of the dogmatic ideas that litter Traditional Thought and DM.
Finally,
this Essay is much more repetitive than many of the others
published at this site. Experience has also taught me that if the difficult
ideas it contains aren't
repeated many timesover (often from different angles), they
either tend not to sink in or their significance is easily lost. Unfortunately,
that is especially so with respect to the Marxist readers mentioned above.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Third: Several readers have complained about the number of
links I have added to these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult
to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they
believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply even to
Essays that attempt to debunk that
very idea. However, to those who find such links do make these Essays
difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have linked to familiar
subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of
recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of
popular films, or certain words
that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
Fourth: a good 50% of my case
against DM and Traditional Philosophy has been relegated to the
End Notes.
This has been done to allow the Essay itself to flow a little more smoothly.
Naturally, this means that if readers want to appreciate more fully my case against DM
(and Metaphysics), they should also consult this material. In many cases, I have
added numerous qualifications, clarifications, and considerably more detail to what I have
had to say
in the main body. In addition, I have raised several objections (some obvious,
many not -- and some that might have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments
and assertions, to which I have then responded. [I explain why I have adopted
this tactic in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my
reply to any
qualms or objections readers might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments,
references
and clarifications.
Fifth, on a more technical note:
Although I refer to the
sense of a proposition (i.e., those conditions under which
it would be deemed true or those under which it would be deemed false) in this
Essay, that is merely shorthand
for the requirement of true/false bi-polarity for empirical propositions (i.e.,
propositions concerning matters of fact). This contraction has been adopted to
save on needless complexity in what isn't meant to be an academic
exercise.
Bipolarity (not to be confused with the so-called 'Law of Excluded Middle'
[LEM]) is taken to be necessary for any (indicative)
sentence to be counted as an
empirical (i.e., factual) proposition.
[However, concerning my (presumed) appeal to,
or my supposed use of, the LEM, see
here
and
here.]
The subtle differences between these two ways
of characterising the sense of a proposition -- indeed, what the sense
of a proposition and what the LEM actually are -- are explained
here,
here,
here
and
here. [See also Palmer (1996).]
Once again, because this isn't meant to be an
academic exercise, I have on occasion deliberately blurred the distinction between bi-polarity
and the LEM. In addition, the reader's attention is also drawn to the
difference between
"non-sense" and "nonsense", as those two terms are
used throughout this Essay. [Incidentally, my use of "sense" is explained
here.] 01
Sixth: I have also blurred the distinction one would normally
want to draw between propositions, sentences and statements
since I don't want
to become bogged down with technical issues in the Philosophy of Logic
and the
Philosophy of Language. Even so, it will soon become apparent that I prefer to
use "proposition".
[On this, see Geach (1972b, 1972c). Also see Glock
(2003), pp.102-36, and Hacker (1996),
p.288, n.65. (Nevertheless, it shouldn't be assumed that Geach would agree with
everything the other two authors have to say, nor vice versa -- or, indeed, with anything
posted at this site!)]
Seventh: throughout
this Essay, I have used rather stilted expressions such as: "It is possible to
understand an empirical proposition without knowing whether it is true or
knowing whether it is false", as opposed to "It is possible to understand an
empirical proposition without knowing whether it is true or false". I explain
why I have adopted that odd way
of expressing myself,
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of July 2023, this Essay is just
over
167,000 words long; a much shorter summary of some
of its main ideas can be found
here. I have now written an even more concise summary of
oneof the core ideas presented in this Essay, entitled
Why
All Philosophical Theories Are
Non-sensical.
The material presented
below does not
represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in
progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work,
anyway!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
Among the
aims of Essay Twelve Parts One to Seven are the following --
to:
(1) Substantiate the
claim that
DM is a metaphysical theory
(Part One);
(2) Demonstrate how and why all philosophical theories (and not just
DM) collapse into
incoherentnon-sense (Part One);
(3) Show
that Metaphysics and hence (derivatively) DM are ruling-class forms-of-thought (Parts Two and Three);
(4) (i) Trace
Metaphysics and DM (again) back to their origin in early forms of class society;
(ii) Connect them with the
various 'world-views'
directly or indirectly promoted or patronised by successive generations of ruling elites;
(iii) Demonstrate that, despite their many differences,
there is an identifiable theoretical thread running through all of the above
thought-forms; and,
(iv) Connect
them all with ideology that finds expression in Traditional Thought and which
serves the interests of ruling classes throughout history (Parts Two, Three, and
Four);
(5)
Substantiate the accusation that DM is a fourth-rate form of LIE (Part
Four);
(6) Expose the Mystical Christian and
Hermetic origin of Hegel's thought
and then expose it for what it is: sub-logical
and incoherent
non-sense (upside down or 'the right way up') (Parts Five and Six); and
finally,
(7)
Show that the defence of ordinary
language and
common understanding
is a class issue (Part Seven).
[LIE =
Linguistic Idealism(follow that link for an explanation); DM = Dialectical
Materialism/Materialist depending on the context; MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,
i.e., Lenin (1972); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]
This will make Essay Twelve
easily the longest
work at this site, hence
its division into Seven Parts.
However,
my ideas on many of these issues are still in the
formative stage, so much of this material will be published far more slowly than
has been the case with other Essays posted at this site, and, as such, they will all be revised continually.
As indicated
above, each of these topics will be tackled in various Parts of this Essay, but
to address the first two we need to examine a rather odd claim concerning matter
and motion made by
Lenin (in MEC).
In MEC,
Lenin quoted the following assertion (by Engels):
M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable."
[Lenin (1972), p.318.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
Which
we can paraphrase slightly more neatly as:
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
Here, is Engels
on this:
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a
system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here
all material existence extending from stars to atoms, indeed right to ether
particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the last named. In the fact
that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one
another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It
already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion."
[Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]
Here, both Lenin
and Engels were asserting a typical
metaphysical
'proposition'. Dialecticians will, of course, reject that particular
characterisation of their words, but that repudiation would itself be as hasty
as it is
misguided. [Why that is so is explained below, and in
Note 1, but more specifically,
here.]
Sentences like M1/M1a purport to inform us of fundamental truths about
'reality', valid for all of space and time -- albeit in this case disguised as part of Lenin's admission of his own
incredulity. [Henceforth, I will generally just refer to M1a.]
Nevertheless,
we aren't meant to conclude from M1a that Lenin was merely recording his own personal
beliefs, feelings or opinions. On the contrary, he certainly thought that
matter and motion were fundamental features of "objective reality", that they
were inseparable and that this was a scientific, or even a philosophical, fact.
That was because, like Engels, he also held the view that motion was "the mode of the existence of matter" -– that is, he believed that
matter couldn't exist without motion, nor vice versa. Motion was
therefore one
of the principal ways, if not the principle way, that matter expressed itself
"objectively", exterior to the mind.1
Indeed, we find Engels saying things like the following:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion,
nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it
can only be transmitted." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe,
from mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels (1954), p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]2
In
that case, the 'content' of M1a may perhaps be paraphrased in one or more of the following ways:
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
P3:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is necessarily false.
[M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.]
All
of which are based on the presumed truth of P4:
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[There is more
about these and other alternatives later in this Essay. Why the word "content"
has been put in 'scare' quotes will become apparent as this Essay unfolds.]
The metaphysical nature of Lenin's
pronouncement can be seen by the
way it bypasses the need for any supporting evidence. For Lenin (and Engels),
this was such an obvious truth about
the connection between matter and motion that its denial was deemed "unthinkable".
Nevertheless, if humanity had
access to evidence and information about motion and matter many orders of magnitude greater than is available
even today, that still wouldn't be enough to show that the
separation of matter from motion is impossible, let alone unthinkable. No amount of data could
warrant such an extreme view. While it might in the end prove to be false that the
two can be separated, its
"unthinkability" can't be derived from any body of evidence, no matter
how large it happened to be. As, indeed, Engels admitted:
So,
evidence alone can't supply the necessity, the inconceivability or the
unthinkability that these two DM-theorists claim to be able to see here.
If not,
the question immediately arises: from where does this idea originate? As is the
case with
other DM-'Laws', maybe it arises from a "law of cognition"?
"This aspect of dialectics…usually
receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum
total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and
as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin (1961)
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Be
this as it may,
the above claims (i.e., about the metaphysical nature of DM-theories like this and
the lack of conclusive evidential support) might strike some readers as rather controversial, if not completely misguided. In
that case, much of the rest of this Essay
will be
aimed at explaining, defending and substantiating them.
Indicative
Sentences Aren't What They appear To Be
The seemingly profound nature of
statements like M1a is linked to
rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed; that
is, they are connected with
the fact that their main verb is often in the
indicative
mood. Sometimes
subjunctive
and
modal
qualifying terms are thrown in for good measure, which only succeeds in creating
an even more misleading
picture.
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
As we are
about to discover, this
superficial indicative veneer hides a much deeper logical form that only becomes
apparent when sentences
like these are examined a little more closely.
As noted above,
expressions like these look like they reveal, or express, profound truths
about reality, and that is plainly because they resemble empirical propositions -- i.e., propositions
about matters of fact. In the event, they
turn out to be nothing at all like them.
This can be seen if we examine the following,
similar-looking, indicative sentences:
M2: Two is a number.
M3: Two is greater than one.
M4: Green is a colour.
M5: "Green" is a word.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
M2-M9 appear to share the same form: "ξ
is F" -- or sometimes "ξ
is a φ-er", or perhaps more accurately "ξφ-ies".
Despite this, there are
profound differences between them.
[The use of Greek letters as gap markers (i.e., "ξ") was explained
in Essay Three Part
One (here
and here). "F(...)" is a
general
predicate variable
(and goes proxy for clauses like "...is a colour", or "...is greater than one",
etc.),
while "φ(...)"
is a more specific variable letter (standing for clauses like "...owns a
copy of TAR", "...fibs more often than not", "...runs tens miles at least four
times a week", or even "...thinks something is unthinkable", etc.).
In what follows, when I refer to logical differences, I generally have in mind
those aspects of indicative sentences that affect their capacity to be true or their
capacity to be false --, or, indeed, those that are relevant to the inferences we can validly
draw from, or with, them.]
The
logical difference of interest here
(between, for instance, M6 and M2) lies
in the fact that knowing that M2 is true goes hand-in-hand with claiming to
understand it, and, vice versa, claiming to understand M2 goes hand-in-hand with knowing
it is true. Both conditions are inextricably linked. Hence,
any claim to be able to comprehend M2 is one with knowing it is true, and anyone who failed to see
things the way they are expressed in M2 would be judged not to understand the use of
number words (like this).3a
M2: Two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
On the other hand,
it isn't necessary to know whether M6 is true,
or know whether it is false, in order to (claim to) understand it. Indeed, it is a
pretty safe bet that everyone reading these words will understand M6 even though they haven't
a clue whether or not it is true. Hence, unlike M2, comprehending M6 isn't the same as knowing it is true.
[In future,
I will omit the prefixing clauses "claim to" and "claiming to" (etc.), but
in what follows they
should be understood to be applicable where relevant, unless
stated otherwise.]
Nevertheless, knowing what would
make M6 true, or would make it false, is integral to understanding it even if neither of those options has
yet been ascertained or, indeed, will ever be ascertained. Again, it is a pretty safe bet that the vast
majority of those reading this Essay will be able to say what would make M6
true and what would make it false even if they have no idea which of
those options is
actually the case. Furthermore, they will still understand M6 even if they
never find out whether it is true or whether it is false, nor care a fig about ascertaining either
alternative.
[The significance of those comments will
become apparent as this Essay unfolds -- for instance,
here.]
So, it isn't necessary to know whether Blair in
fact owns a copy of TAR to be able to
understand someone who asserted that he does. In contrast, comprehending that two is a
number is to know it is true (except with respect to a handful of trivial cases, about which, more later).
M2: Two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
P3:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is necessarily false.
M9 (which is, perhaps, a more 'objective' version of M1a) is
somewhat
similar to M2. For Lenin (and anyone who agrees with him), comprehending M9 involves
automatically acknowledging its
veracity. The truth-status of sentences like M9 seems to follow from the 'concepts' they express
(or the definitions from which they follow), which is why their veracity can be
acknowledged without examining any evidence.
Their validity appears to be based solely on
language or thought -- or, perhaps even on a "law of cognition".4
Or, as noted above, the truth of M1a follows from a specific definition, such as:
In
that case, it the truth of M9 seems to be basedsolely on themeaning of certain words -- i.e., those in P4.
Hence, with respect to M2 and M9,
meaning
and 'truth' appear to go hand-in-hand, so much so that as soon as their
constituent words are comprehended, the 'truth' of both becomes obvious, if
not "self-evident". The source
of their veracity is 'internally generated', as it were. Indeed, that is
why the negation (or the repudiation) of M9 (or the rejection of its content -- expressed in, for example,
P1, P2 or P3) was so "unthinkable" to Lenin and Engels. Plainly, their overt certainty followed from the definition (expressed in P4) that "Motion is the
mode of the existence of matter". So, it would seem P4
represents
the core idea here, the bedrock principle that Lenin and Engels considered integral to the nature of,
and the connection between, matter and motion. That helps explain why they
asserted it so dogmatically, why Engels declared its opposite
"nonsensical" and Lenin pronounced the latter "unthinkable".5
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
P3:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is necessarily false.
In stark contrast, once more, it is possible to understand M6
without
knowing whether it is true or whether it is false.5a0
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
In fact, it is quite easy to
suppose
M6 is false (which it probably is). Even ifM6 were true, and known to be
true, it would still be
possible to imagine it false (and vice versa). On the other hand,
it isn'tpossible to imagine that M2 is false without altering the meaning of
key words in that sentence. And, for those who agree with Lenin and Engels,
the same is the case with M9 and P4. [Why that is so will be explained
below.]
M2: Two is a number.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
The
actual or even possible falsehood of M6, on the other hand,
would in no way affect the
meaning of any of its constituent words.
Despite this, in order to establish the actual truth or actual
falsehood of M6 evidence isn't an optional extra. An examination of the concepts/words
involved wouldn't be enough. No matter how much 'pure thought' were devoted
to M6, it would still be impossible to ascertain its truth or determine its
falsehood. So, the veracity (or otherwise) of M6 can't be established by thought alone; its
truth-status isn't 'internally generated', but 'externally' confirmed or
disconfirmed, as the case may be. An appeal to evidence is clearly essential, here.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
However,
and on the contrary, it isn't possible for anyone who agrees with Lenin and
Engels to regard, suppose, surmise, imagine or even entertain the idea
that one or both of M9 and P4 are false. This
shows that there is a fundamental difference between these two sorts
of indicative sentences -- one that their apparently identical grammatical outer
form
conceals.
As it turns out, the pseudo-scientific status and much of the 'plausibility' of metaphysical
(or 'essential
truths')
like M9 and P4 derive fromthis masquerade.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
In that case, it looks like the obviousness of M9,
for example, is what motivated
Lenin's incredulity (reported in M1a), for it certainly seemed to him that as soon as the
words M9 contains are read, or thought about, its truth
would be clear for all to see -- so that its opposite would indeed be
"unthinkable!".
[The objection that M1a and M9
in fact express a summary of
the scientific evidence currently available -- or even the evidence that was
available in Lenin/Engels's day -- has been neutralised in Note 4,
Note 5
and Note 5a.]
So, for Lenin, the first half of M1a was "unthinkable" (i.e., the
"Motion without matter..." part). As we will see, that is because its denial
-- or the repudiation of M9 -- would undermine (or, at least, change) the
meaning of words like "motion" and "matter", and hence would countermand the import
of the concepts
these words supposedly express (when
put in sentential form), given that the definition of "motion" is that it is
"The
mode of the existence of matter" (P4). This would indicate that
anyone rash enough question the veracity or P4 had simply failed to understand
the words "matter" and "motion".
It is also why the
rejection of M9, P1 and P4 can be ruled
out withoutthe need to examine any evidence. What these
sentences say gains our assent on linguistic or conceptual grounds
alone. Hence, it also seems impossible to deny the truth of M1a. Such a
denial would be inconceivable -- or, as Lenin himself said, it would be
"unthinkable". That is also why claims like M1a (i.e., P1 and M9) require
no evidence in
their support, and why none is ever given -- and why it is difficult to imagine
any
evidence that could even begin to substantiate them.5a
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Hence, in
connection with establishing the veracity of M1a, P1, P4 and M9, the actual state of the world drops out of
the picture as irrelevant. No experiments need be performed, no data collected,
no observations planned or carried out, and zero surveys undertaken.5b
That aloneshould have given someone like Lenin
-- who wasn't ignorant of the scientific method -- pause for thought.
Unfortunately, like so many others before him -- indeed, just like the vast
majority of theorists since Ancient Greek times -- he failed to notice the
significance of these seemingly trivial facts.6
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
The
seemingly absolute certainty that M1a,
M9, P4
and P1 appear to generate in all those who accept their veracity
plainly derives from what their constituent terms are taken to mean. The subsequent
projection of P1 onto the world, for instance, is clearly a reflection of that
conviction. If such ideas express
indubitable truths, who could possibly deny they apply across the entire
universe? That is, of course, why DM-theorists like Engels, Plekhanov and
Lenin were -- and others still are -- happy to continue imposing such
ideas on
reality (follow the next link for proof) and thereby regard them as valid across all regions of space and time.
What else can the scores of passages
from the DM-classics and the rest of the 'dialectical' literature imply?
But, the alleged truth of M1a, P1,
M9 -- and particularly P4 --, bears no relation to the
possibilities that the material world itself presents. This can be seen from the
fact that if the truth of these sentences were related to what might or might not
obtain in 'reality', evidential
support would have been not only appropriate and imaginable, it would be absolutely
essential. However, with respect to these sentences no
such evidence is even conceivable. What fact or facts could possibly show that motion
is inseparable from matter? Or that motion without matter is "unthinkable"?
Or that motion is "The mode of existence of matter"?6a
This
shows that M1a, M9, P1, and P4
aren't about the material world; they are (indirectly) about (or rather they
arise from) a specificuse of certain words -- or
they reflect the (assumed) relation between the concepts they supposedly express.
[In fact,
they indirectly 'reflect' an (Ideal) World anterior to experience,
originally invented by
ruling-class theorists, who began such talk in Ancient Greece, as the rest of
Essay Twelve will seek to show.]
It might now prove instructive to compare M1a, P1, P4, and M9 with M7 and M8:
M7: A material body is extended in space.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Claims like these
litter
the history of Metaphysics, but the
above considerations help explain why Traditional Philosophers were only too
ready
to project them onto the world, dogmatically. The content of such 'Super-Truths'
seem to be based on something much deeper than anything that empirical
evidence or factual confirmation could provide. Indeed, they appeared to express
indubitable, 'necessary truths' about 'God', 'The Mind', 'Essence', 'Being',
'Time', 'Existence', and the like. The truth of Cosmic Verities like these was
prior to, but not dependent on, the deliverances of the senses. In fact,
theories like these determined the logical profile of reality itself.
That is, they give voice to concepts and categories that
express not mere human judgement and opinion, but the
logical form of
the world, and for many the very 'Mind of God'.
Indeed, in
subsequent versions of this idea, Super-Truths
like this delineated the nature ofany possible world.
In short, they pictured not just the logical form
of any conceivable or possible world, they governed any and every 'philosophically true'
thought about 'Reality Itself'.
In previous centuries, it
was believed that such Cosmic Verities expressed 'God's Thoughts' about the world, or they depicted 'divinely-ordained laws' governing,
all of 'Reality', which meant that Metaphysics was widely seen
as an attempt to re-present or 're-flect' 'Divine Truth' in the human
mind,
and hence it was traditionally seen as a legitimate extension to Theology -- a
point Marx himself made.7
"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. Bold emphasis added.]
In class divided society, this now intimately connected
Metaphysics with the rationalisation of the status
quo -- and hence with 'justifying' the inequality, oppression and exploitation that fed off it.
[There will be much more on this in
Parts Two and Three of this Essay (summary
here).]
This
meant that if these Super-Truths reflected 'The Divine Mind' -- or, indeed, the
'Cosmic Order' --, they could be legitimately and dogmatically
projected onto nature.
No world was conceivable
without them. Indeed, if no configuration of matter and energy could fail to conform to
Universal Truths like these, supporting evidence became irrelevant. The material
world itself could thus drop out of consideration, at least in so far as confirmation
was concerned.
[To be sure, an
after-the-event appeal to nature
might be made in order to illustrate
such 'Super-Truths', perhaps so they could be sold more readily to the
easily fooled -- which is, indeed, what we find dialecticians doing in their
dissemination of
Engels's Three 'Laws', for example.
But that would be the only use to which evidence (supposedly derived from the material world) could be put.]
As
far as
those who propounded them were concerned, 'Metaphysical Truths' appeared to be so obvious,
so certain, that few were in any way concerned that they were regularly
imposed on 'reality'. On the contrary, in fact; the role each
philosophical theory was supposed to occupy (i.e., a sort
of "master key" capable of unlocking
the 'Underlying Secrets of Being') justified the whole sordid affair.
Of course, Super-Verities
like these had to be distinguished from ordinary, contingent, everyday, hum-drum
empirical truths. So, because they looked as if they pertained to a set of 'essences' that underpinned
all possible worlds, these Cosmic-Truths
were subsequently given a grandiose title -- they were now dubbed "necessary truths".8
However, philosophical
theories like this were (and
still are) based on the misuse of a severely restricted set of words, and thus
on an aberrant and distorted use of language (as
Marx himself noted -- quoted in the next sub-section). Their
projection onto any and all possible worlds (based on no evidence at all)
is proof enough of that. How else would it be possible for theorists to
delineate what mustbe true across all possible worlds other than by a
use of language that isrooted in this corner of the universe? Since the
semantic
status of these 'Super-Truths'
is
'known' prior to the examination of any evidence, their supposedly
'necessary status' can't have been derived from anything other than the
(presumed) meaning of the words they contained, and hence on the (presumed) linguistic rules
that governed their employment insuch highly specialised contexts.9
[Semantic status: this
pertains to the truth or falsehood of an indicative sentence, whether or
not that has already been established -- always assuming it can be. Any
other (possible) option -- such as any such sentence being permanently truth-valueless
(depending on the reason for that) -- would mean it wasn't an (empirical)
proposition to begin with, whatever else it turns out to be.]
[In Essay Two, numerous examples were given of the
many
dogmaticassertions advanced by dialecticians, which were supposedly
true for all of time and space, even though they were in fact supported by
little or no evidence and argument --, that is, over and above a superficial
gesture toward the analysis of a handful of specially-chosen examples, sketchy "thought experiments",
compounded by the use of ill-defined, obscure
jargon
imported from Hegel and other assorted mystics.]
"The
philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. Bold emphasis added.]
With the above in mind, we are
now in a position to see why DM-theories appear to possess such universal validity. As we have see
(in other Essays published at this site) that is because they are:
(i) Based on a radical misuse of
language; or they,
(ii) Depend on a misconstrual of
linguistic rules as if they represented substantive truths about 'reality'.
In short, such theorists confuse the meansby which we represent the world for the world itself.
The rest of this Essay (and the other Parts of Essay Twelve) will aim to substantiate these
seemingly controversial claims.
Of
course, Traditional
Philosophers and
DM-theorists will both reject this way of viewing their ideas, but their opinion of how
they think they use certain words is at odds with how they actually
employ them.
Why that is so will also become clearer as this Essay unfolds.
Once more, as we saw in
Essay Two, while DM-theorists never
tire of telling anyone who will listen that they
don't impose their ideas on nature and society, they simply 'read' them
from the facts, their
actual practice belies this. Dialecticians, en masse, regard their doctrines as universal
truths, valid for all of space and time. Hence, in practice
dialecticians do the exact opposite of what they say they do; they are quite
happy to impose their ideas on the world, declaring them true
prior toand independent of sufficient (or, in some cases, any)
supporting evidence and argument. This dogmatic approach to knowledge places DM way beyond
confirmation by any conceivable body of evidence.9a
M1a,
P1, and P4 are just the latest
examples of such dogmatic DM-apriorism. In common with other metaphysical
systems, the projection of DM-theories like these onto any and all possible
worlds reveals they are
based solely on linguistic and/or conceptual considerations. Since the status of these
Super-Truths is 'known' well in advance of supporting evidence,
their veracity can't have been derived from anything other than the meaning of the
words they employ, and thus on the linguistic rules that supposedly govern them.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Furthermore, the
actual origin of every single
DM-doctrine lends support to the above accusations. They weren't derived from a scientific study of nature but from
Ancient Greek, Hermetic and
Mystical Hegelian thought (upside down or 'the right way up').9b
The origin of DM-doctrines dates back to a time when there
was very little or no scientific evidence. And, as Marx pointed out, those
theories
were themselves based on distorted language.
Hence, the class-compromised origin of DM means that aprioristic, ruling-class ideas and thought-forms
have been imported into revolutionary
theory -- and "from the outside", too.10
Unfortunately for Lenin and other DM-apologists,
a priori theories like this turn out to be incapableofreflecting
reality. As we will see,
reality can't be as metaphysical-, or as DM-theories attempt to depict it.11
There are logical features of language that prevent
theorists like Lenin and Engels from (truthfully) saying the sorts of things they
want to say about the world and which won't allow them to 'depict' nature in the way they think they
can. Or, rather, they can't do so without those ideas collapsing into incoherent non-sense, as we will
also see.
This means that,
in the end, DM itself ends up saying nothing
at all.
DM-theories turn out
to be little more than empty strings of words.
The above observations aren't
unconnected with the origin and nature of metaphysical
theories themselves. As will be demonstrated in later parts of Essay Twelve, at a linguistic level
Traditional Philosophy was motivated by a
determination to use a narrow range of expressions idiosyncratically
-- that is, Ancient Greek thinkers were determined to employ words in ways they wouldn't normally be used in every day life.
This odd use of language in turn involved a failure on the part of these
'linguistic innovators' to notice that it is only a misuse and distortion of language that
'allows' them to derive the 'universal and necessary truths' we find in
Traditional Philosophy, and now in DM.
[Much of the
mechanics (if that is the right word) underlying the above moves was exposed in detail in Essay Three
Part One.]
As the detailed analysis below
will show, the distortion and misuse of language
(to which that Marx referred) results in the production, not of 'necessary' or
universal truths, but of incoherent non-sense.11ao
Is Anything That Is Thinkable
Actually Unthinkable?
In order to see this
more clearly with respect to DM we need to examine Lenin's
words a little more closely.
Concerning Lenin's
assertion reported in M1a and P1 (both based on P4), it is worth
asking the following question: What is it about these words (or what they
express or 'reflect') that made them seem so "unthinkable"?
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Curiously, in Lenin's case at least, it is obvious
that he must have thought the above words (or what they
'expressed', 'represented' or 'reflected') in order to declare that they
were unthinkable! The phrase "motion without matter" and
what it supposedly conveyed must have gone
through his thoughts at some point. [The objection that this point confuses
use with mention will be
dealt with presently.] Even
if Lenin then went on to think the additional
words tacked on at the end (i.e., "…is unthinkable"), he must have
cognised
the three 'offending' words first (i.e., "motion without matter"). No one imagines that his
thoughts switched on just as they reached the relative safety of the last two
words in
M1a!
In that case,
Lenin must have done what he declared couldn't be done; he must have thought the "unthinkable" in the act of declaring
that no one could do what he himself had just done.
Naturally, this means that in practice
it looks like
Lenin contradicted himself, for he managed to do what he said
couldn't be done. That is why in practice Lenin's theory becomes
not just impossible to
comprehend, it is impossible even to state. That is, it is impossible to
say what on earth Lenin meant by what he said. If he managed to do what he said no
one could do (in the very act of telling us they couldn't do it), why can't anyone else do it?
What is so special about Lenin? How was he able to think the "unthinkable" in
the act of telling us it can't be done?
Worse still, if the rest of us can think
M1a's offending words
(i.e., what the phrase "motion without matter" seems to convey -- or
maybe even "motion can exist without matter"), and understand their content whenever we read Lenin telling us that we
can't do the very thing we must have done in order to grasp the point he was
trying to make, we, too, must contradict
Lenin in practice whenever we consult this part of his work. Indeed, the very act of
telling us we can't think
these words (or what they express/convey) prompts us to do just that!
Even those who agree with Lenin that "motion without matter
is unthinkable" must think the three 'illicit' words along with what they
convey.
Hence, even the most slavishly obedient Lenin-groupie can't avoid disobeying the
master every time he or she reads this contentious sentence.
Have such characters not noticed that to
read Lenin -- and try to think/grasp the content of his words -- is to disobey him in that
very act?
Some might try to defend Lenin by arguing that his claims about matter and
motion were plainly meant to be read as
hyperbole. Hence, it could be maintained that Lenin certainly didn't think that the words "motion without
matter" were literally unthinkable, merely that it made no sense to suppose
there could be any motion without matter. It could even be argued that the
wording of Lenin's 'controversial' sentence meant he was simply rejecting the
immobility of matter out-of-hand, as a ridiculous or patently false supposition
on a par with, say, denying (liquid) water is wet or fire is hot.
Or so the case for the defence might go...
That must
mean the section of MEC entitled "Is
Motion Without Matter Conceivable?" was misnamed; but that is the very section in which M1 occurs,
What is more, Lenin even italicised the word "unthinkable":
M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable."
[Lenin (1972),
p.318.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
The entire passage reads as follows:
"Is Motion Without Matter Conceivable?
"The fact that philosophical idealism
is attempting to make use of the new physics, or that idealist conclusions are
being drawn from the latter, is due not to the discovery of new kinds of
substance and force, of matter and motion, but to the fact that an attempt is
being made to conceive motion without matter. And it is the essence of this
attempt which our
Machians
fail to examine. They were unwilling to take account of Engels' statement that
'motion without matter is unthinkable.'
J.
Dietzgen in 1869, in his The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind,
expressed the same idea as Engels, although, it is true, not without his usual
muddled attempts to 'reconcile' materialism and idealism. Let us leave aside
these attempts, which are to a large extent to be explained by the fact that
Dietzgen is arguing against
Büchner's
non-dialectical materialism, and let us examine Dietzgen's own statements on the
question under consideration. He says: 'They [the idealists] want to have the
general without the particular, mind without matter, force without substance,
science without experience or material, the absolute without the relative'
(Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit, 1903, S.108). Thus the endeavour
to divorce motion from matter, force from substance, Dietzgen associates with
idealism, compares with the endeavour to divorce thought from the brain. 'Liebig,'
Dietzgen continues, 'who is especially fond of straying from his inductive
science into the field of speculation, says in the spirit of idealism: "force
cannot be seen"' (p.109). 'The spiritualist or the idealist believes in the
spiritual, i.e., ghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force' (p. 110).
'The antithesis between force and matter is as old as the antithesis between
idealism and materialism' (p.111). 'Of course, there is no force without
matter, no matter without force; forceless matter and matterless force are
absurdities. If there are idealist natural scientists who believe in the
immaterial existence of forces, on this point they are not natural scientists...but seers of ghosts' (p.114).
"We
thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable
without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this
point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is
the connection between philosophical
idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from
force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter?
"The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of
idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation,
perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective
reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our
consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds
the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more
than the objective reality which is given us in sensation. Therefore, to
divorce motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from objective
reality, or to divorcing my sensations from the external world -- in a word, it
is to go over to idealism. The trick which is usually performed in denying
matter, and in assuming motion without matter, consists in ignoring the relation
of matter to thought. The question is presented as though this relation did not
exist, but in reality it is introduced surreptitiously; at the beginning of the
argument it remains unexpressed, but subsequently crops up more or less
imperceptibly.
"Matter has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to draw
epistemological conclusions. But has thought remained? -- we ask. If not, if
with the disappearance of matter thought has also disappeared, if with the
disappearance of the brain and nervous
system ideas and sensations, too, have disappeared -- then it follows that
everything has disappeared. And your argument has disappeared as a sample of
'thought' (or lack of thought)! But if it has remained -- if it is assumed that
with the disappearance of matter, thought (idea, sensation, etc.) does not
disappear, then you have surreptitiously gone over to the standpoint of
philosophical idealism. And this always happens with people who wish, for
'economy's sake,' to conceive of motion without matter, for tacitly, by
the very fact that they continue to argue, they are acknowledging the existence
of thought after the disappearance of matter. This means that a very
simple, or a very complex philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a very
simple one, if it is a case of frank solipsism (I exist, and the world
is only my sensation); a very complex one, if instead of the thought,
ideas and sensations of a living person, a dead abstraction is posited, that is,
nobody's thought, nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, but thought in general (the
Absolute Idea, the Universal Will, etc.), sensation as an indeterminate
'element,' the 'psychical,' which is substituted for the whole of physical
nature, etc., etc. Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism
are possible and it is always possible to create a thousand and first shade; and
to the author of this thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for
example) what distinguishes it from the rest may appear to be momentous. From
the standpoint of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely
unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential
is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in
thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism."
[Lenin
(1972),
pp.318-21.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
[I have
reproduced the entire passage to prevent
accusations that I have quoted Lenin 'out of context'!]
It clear
from the above that Lenin was denying what certain
scientists claimed -- i.e., that motion without matter was conceivable.
Or, as he puts it, once more:
M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable."
[Lenin (1972),
p.318.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
Later he added the additional claim that
matter and motion
were
inseparable (again quoting Engels):
"In
full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it,
Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring
(read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....'
'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin
(1914), p.8.]
Hence, the unthinkability of the
separation of matter and motion was integral to his case against
Idealism. Indeed, if motion is "The mode of the existence of matter" -- its "mode of
expression" -- then these two 'concepts' can't be
separated, even in thought. As soon as any attempt is made to try to separate
them, the one trying would no longer be talking about matter, or even about
motion (as far as Engels and Lenin were concerned), no more than someone
who tried to separate the concepts "even number" and "two" (whatever that
might mean!) would still be talking about the number two, or even about
even numbers (which are
defined in terms of their
divisibility by two, the result being an
integer).
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[Incidentally, Lenin is wrong. Marx didn't readAnti-Dühring
[AD]
"in the manuscript". In fact, after Marx's death, Engels claimed
he read AD to Marx. Just think how long that would have taken. Can you
imagine how many times
the ageing Marx will have nodded off, not realising the sub-logical material
AD contained that would later also be
attributed to him, or with which some would subsequently claim he acquiesced? Does anyone think that Marx would have approved of the
ridiculous things Engels
said about mathematics in AD? Marx was a competent mathematician
(even though his knowledge in this area was at least half a century
out-of-date), whereas
Engels wasn't. Those who now tell
us that Marx agreed with everything Engels said have plainly not thought through
the implications of that unwise claim. (I have considered this issue in much more detail
here and
here.)]
As
noted above, Lenin
was simply echoing Engels's
non-hyperbolic language:
"Motion
is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable
as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and
indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes)
expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same.
Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred....
A motionless state of matter is therefore one of
the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
Not much hyperbole in there from Engels, then.
He clearly meant every word he said to be taken literally -- and that is
precisely how subsequent DM-theorists have understood him.
In fact, this is a core DM-principle. Both Lenin and Engels meant what
they
said.
At this point, someone could object that contradictions
like this are only to be expected (i.e., when Lenin argues that what he had just
thought couldn't in fact be thought). After all, this is dialectics! In that case,
in the very process of thinking these supposedly controversial words, thought is driven to
the opposite pole and is forced to conclude that they (or what they
express) can't be thought.
[That response is in fact a variant of the
'Nixon Defence' we met in
Essay Eight Part One. (Follow the link for an explanation!)]
Except: Lenin did say those words (or their content) could be thought, after all!
However, and what is far more likely,
those who read Lenin and whose thought hasn't been compromised by
swallowing far too much of what they read in the
work of Mystical Idealists will conclude that in view of the fact that they,
too, have just thought those very words (or their content) in the act of being
told they can't do
that,
motion without matter (or its
sentential equivalent, P1) is
plainly not unthinkable!
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
Indeed, in view of the
additional fact that belief in motionless matter was an integral part of
Aristotelian Physics (which theory
dominated scientific thought for the best part of fifteen hundred years), they
would be right to conclude that the idea that there can be motionless
matter is indeed thinkable. Manifestly, that thought is
plainly more thinkable
than its opposite given the fact that it lasted far longer than DM has!
Hence, far from thought being driven to an
"opposite pole", the above considerations suggest it will be riveted to just the one,
at least for many centuries.
It could be countered that the above
material promotes what is in fact a
specious
anti-Lenin argument. Indeed, one critic has so argued:
"3. It is impossible to build a perpetuum mobile....
"An also quite clear illogicality
-- or perhaps even a sophism -- is the discussion
of Lenin's assertion that 'motion without matter is unthinkable'. It is held
that, since Lenin obviously thought the words 'motion without matter', he has
contradicted himself, showing that it is perfectly possible to think 'motion
without matter'. But this is clearly an invalid reasoning. The use of the words
'motion without matter' doesn't actually imply thinking motion without matter.
The example of sentence 3. above may explain what I am saying. A similar idea
can be expressed by
"6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.
"If we follow the text, we will exclaim, 'but you have just thought of a
functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!'
What happens, though, is that when I think the words 'functioning perpetuum
mobile' I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile.
Indeed, any machine of that kind that I -- or anybody else -- can think of is
either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably,
neither). So while I can utter the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile',
I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for
'triangular circle', 'the opposite side of a
Moebius
strip' (sic), or 'a man who is
his own father'. And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that
a correct analysis easily shows are different." [From
here. (That links is now dead!) Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Emphases in the original. Minor typos corrected.]
However, a supporter of this site argued in reply:
"Rosa actually
considered that objection in the long Essay she wrote (she had to since I posed
that very point to her back in 1998 or 1999!), and posted a short version of it
in the passage Chris quoted. The point is that Lenin would have to know what any
sentence containing the phrase 'motion without matter' implied.
"As she says at
her site:
'In order to
rule motion without matter out of court, he would have to know what he was
trying to exclude. He would have to know what motion without matter was so that
he could exclude it as unthinkable, otherwise he might be ruling out the wrong
thing. Hence, it would have to be thinkable for Lenin to tell us it wasn't!'
"So, he would have to
think these words just to rule out the possibility that there was any motionless
matter in the world. Otherwise, he would have no idea what he was ruling out.
But, if he had no idea what he was ruling out, he'd have no idea what he was
ruling in, either. So, the real problem is not that Lenin was contradicting
himself, it's that not even Lenin knew what he was talking about.
"Moreover, as Rosa goes on to point out (I
think you must have missed this), it's not possible to contradict non-sense.
Since a non-sensical sentence cannot take a truth-value, no sentence can count
as its contradictory. So Lenin wasn't contradicting himself (Rosa toys with that
possibility until she shows that he isn't even doing that!); he is far
too confused to be doing it. [It's the same point she makes about dialectics;
it's far too confused for anyone to be able to say if it's true or if it's
false, let alone contradict it!]
"You then offer us this example:
'6. A functioning
perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.'
'If we follow the text, we will exclaim, 'but you have just thought of a
functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!'
What happens, though, is that when I think the words 'functioning perpetuum
mobile' I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile.
Indeed, any machine of that kind that I -- or anybody else -- can think of is
either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably,
neither). So while I can utter the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile',
I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for
'triangular circle', 'the opposite side of a Moebius strip', or 'a man who is
his own father'. And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that
a correct analysis easily shows are different.'
"And yet, how
would you know what you were ruling out? Unless you know what a functioning
perpetual motion machine is, or could be, your claim that it is unthinkable is
just an empty phrase. [Suppose I say I can think it? Suppose inventors of these
machines,
who still turn up regularly, also say they can think it? And, isn't
the universe in perpetual motion? According to
some scientists, it is. So they
can think of perpetual motion; even if they are wrong, they can certainly think
it.]
"Same with the
other examples you mention. If time travel is possible, a man can be his own
father. Now, time travel might not be possible, but we can still think a man
could be his own father. A triangular circle is also a possible object of
thought; given
homeomorphisms, it is possible to map a triangle onto a circle.
So, topologically, a circle is the same as a triangle,
hence, we can think it in mathematics! And we can easily
define the opposite side of a
Möbius Strip
as follows: hold the strip between thumb and forefinger; the opposite side to
that which
touches your thumb is the side that touches your index
finger. That might be a cheat, sure, but
it allows us to think of the opposite side of a Möbius Strip.
"So, instead of
asserting that, say, 'A triangular circle is unthinkable', you'd be better off
following Wittgenstein's advice here (albeit given in another context) and say
that certain combinations of words aren't part of the language; we have no use
for them.
"However, this
can't even be the case with Lenin's declaration, since immobile matter is not
unthinkable; indeed, motionless matter had been a cornerstone of Aristotelian
physics, which went largely unquestioned for over a thousand years....
"Now, the real
problem with Lenin's declaration isn't that he ends up in an awful muddle, but
that it follows from an a priori thesis invented by Engels: 'Motion
is the mode of the existence of matter'. So, his declaration that 'motion
without matter is unthinkable' wasn't based on evidence (since the latter is
ambiguous), or on argument, but on this a priori thesis, which Rosa has shown is
non-sensical."
And,
as we
have just seen, Lenin admitted it was possible to think what he said
was "unthinkable" -- according to him, Idealists do just that!
C1 doesn't imply that the individual alluded to above has
actually thought of abandoning Taiwan, which they would have to have done if
the criticisms aired in this Essay were correct.
Or, so it could be argued...
[VP = Verb Phrase, which in this case is
"Abandoning Taiwan...".]
Of course the clause "VP is unthinkable" can mean many things;
for instance (in this instance):
C2: "We will never abandon Taiwan."
C3: "I can't think of any circumstances under
which we would abandon Taiwan."
C4: "Abandoning Taiwan isn't an option,
and never will be."
C5: "I personally can't bring myself to imagine
we'll ever abandon Taiwan."
And so on.
Many of these alternative readings allude to the incredulity
or intellectual stubbornness of
the individual concerned; that is, they record the psychological impossibility
of accepting --
or even the refusal
of that individual coming to believe -- that the USA would ever abandon
Taiwan. Now, if Lenin meant what he said about motion and matter in this sense,
it would weaken
considerably his opposition to the immobility of matter. That is because it would sever
the connection his theory had with Engels's claim that "Motion is the mode of
the existence of matter", which was for both of them a defining characteristic of matter
not a throw-away property the existence of which depended on the limitations of
human credulity. [Anyway, I have discussed this option further,
below.]
More-or-less the same can be said of the other readings; they,
too, cut that link.
I will
return to this topic when we consider the deeper, logical problems associated
with M1a.
Continuing
with the above objection, it could be argued that it is perfectly clear what Lenin meant:
it is impossible to think about matter
without conceiving of it as also moving in some way, and vice versa. In other
words, B1 doesn't imply B2.
B1: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
B2: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.
In that case,
and once more, maybe Lenin was merely making a
psychological point. It could be that he was saying that given what we know about the
world (and, indeed, about ourselves and our relation to the world), we are psychologically, conceptually or physically incapable of forming the thought,
giving credence to the claim,
that motion is possible without matter (and/or vice versa) -- or even of
conceiving of that thought as true.
[That line
of defence was partly neutralised earlier,
and in the last sub-section.]
Alternatively, it could be argued that Lenin considered it impossible to agree with P1a:
P1a:
It is thinkable that motion can exist without matter.
But, if Lenin was saying
we are psychologically, conceptually or physically incapable of forming
the thought that motion is possible without matter, he offered no
evidence to substantiate what would now be a scientific claim about
what human beings are capable of cognising. And, if that was his
reasoning, it is pretty clear why he wouldn't have been able to produce such data (even had he
tried to do so). That is because, plainly,
even to pose that question is not only to think the forbidden words (or their content), it prompts
any target audience to think
them, too!
Moreover, and alas for Lenin, there is abundant evidence to the contrary. As
noted above, previous generations easily managed to think this very thought, and they
did so for many centuries. The
passivity of matter was a basic tenet of
Aristotelian
Physics.11a
Having said that,
Aristotle's
own ideas about earthy
matter are more complex than the above comments might suggest. Nevertheless, it is still true that he believed that when situated at the centre of the universe,
earthy matter would be motionless.
[On this, see Morison (2002), Sorabji (1988), and Copleston (2003a), chapter 30.]
As Aristotle himself argued:
"Now all things rest and move naturally and by
constraint. A thing moves naturally to a place in which it rests without
constraint, and rests naturally in a place to which it moves without constraint.
On the other hand, a thing moves by constraint to a place in which it rests by
constraint, and rests by constraint in a place to which it moves by constraint.
Further, if a given movement is due to constraint, its contrary is natural." [Aristotle
(1984b), p.458, 276:22-26.]
[By
"constraint",
Aristotle meant "enforced motion"; that is, something "forcibly moved by some other
mover". On this see
Bodnar (2023), Dijksterhuis (1986), pp,24-32, Guthrie (1990), pp.243-76, and
Sorabji (1988), pp.219-26.]
So, Aristotle and his many followers could, and
actually did think
about motionless matter (i.e., at rest).
Moreover, as my former colleague, "Babeuf", pointed out, it has
been possible to think of motion without matter since at least Biblical times:
"1. In the beginning God created the heaven and
the earth. 2. And the earth was without form, and
void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. And the spirit of God moved upon
the face of the waters." [Genesis,
Chapter One, verses 1 and 2. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]
Now,
it won't do to argue that the above is false, mythical or
even ideological, since the only reason it has been quoted is to show that,
whether or not it is one or other of these, some human beings (hundreds
of millions, possibly even billions, in fact) can
think about motion without matter, and have been able to do so for at least
3000 years.
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks, i.e.,
Lenin (1961).]
Later, in PN, Lenin
added the following comment about
Feuerbach's essay on
Leibniz:
"The feature that distinguishes Leibnitz (sic)
from
Spinoza: In Leibnitz (sic) there is, in addition to the concept of
substance, the concept of force 'and indeed of active force...' the
principle of 'self-activity'.... Ergo. Leibnitz (sic) through theology arrived at
the principle of the inseparable (and universal, absolute) connection of matter
and motion." [Lenin (1961), p.377. Italic
emphasis in the original; paragraphs merged.]
This confirms, of course, the a priori nature and origin of this
particular idea, since Leibniz manifestly did not obtain it via
observation, and would have had a stroke at any suggestion he had done so. Also
worthy of note is the fact that Leibniz was as heavily influenced by
Hermetic
mysticism as Hegel. [This will be
one of the many topics discussed in
Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here); until then, see Ross (1983, 1998).]
As Lenin notes, the doctrine of the inseparability of
matter and motion is connected with "self-activity", which is
intimately linked with the contradictory nature of matter, as we saw in Essay
Eight Part One. So, the 'inseparability thesis' is a
'logical' notion which 'follows' from
Engels's Second 'Law'. Small wonder
then that Lenin found its rejection "unthinkable".
However, if
the above objection along with the alternative interpretation of Lenin's theory
(i.e., that his claims about motion and matter relate to the psychological
limitations of human beings) are to remain viable, then, at best, we
would have to interpret what he said as perhaps a confession of
Lenin's own limited powers of imagination --, even though he too seemed able to rise
to the occasion and think the forbidden words (or their content) while casting
them into outer psychological darkness in the very act of bringing us the good news
that what he had done couldn't be done!
Furthermore, Lenin offered no
evidence in support of the supposed limits on credibility, or otherwise, of anyone else, and he mentioned only
two other individuals who thought as he did: Engels and
Dietzgen. That being so, his
confession merely records the limits of his, Engels and Dietzgen's own credulity
(which, as we have seen, appeared to undermine itself in the very act of its own confession). Clearly, such
asseverations (no matter how sincere) are out of place in what purports to be a
scientific or philosophical analysis of matter and motion.
In any case, what could Lenin have said to someone who
claimed that they could imagine motion without matter, or vice versa?
What if Lenin had encountered a latter-day Aristotle? Several
examples have been
given (in this Essay) where it seemed
quite natural to speak about motion without matter. They may only be ruled out
if it can be shown they are either metaphorical or are judged irrelevant. But, who is to say that Lenin's
employment of these
words was itself literal?
Or
that that is
their only correct use? Or even that it is the most natural way
of using them? In fact, a rejection of the above counter-examples could only ever be based on Lenin's own
lack of imagination (or on that of his modern day epigones), or,
perhaps, on other criteria which Lenin unwisely kept to himself (as have
subsequent DM-theorists).
However, as the above indicates, it is possible to
form the thought that motion can take place without matter. Nothing is easier.
Not only does the last sentence itself prompt such a cognitive infringement, so
do the sentences Lenin himself committed to paper. If they are unacceptable, it
can't be for psychological
reasons -- since, manifestly, they are ridiculously easy to think. If
both B3 and B4, for instance, are to be ruled out as examples of a thought, that
would have to be done on logical or linguistic, not psychological, grounds,
especially if the act of reading Lenin's words seems to disprove what he says in the very act
of doing so.
B3: This particular instance of motion is
separated from matter.
B4: This lump of matter is motionless.
At
this point, it is worth reminding ourselves that Lenin himself acknowledged that this
forbidden thought canbe thought, after all (perhaps not realising
what it was he was admitting):
"From the standpoint of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely
unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential
is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in
thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism."
[Lenin
(1972),
p.321.
Bold emphases alone added.]
Here,
Lenin entertains the thought that motion could be "divorced from matter" (even
if only to brand it "Idealist"), which means that he was wrong to conclude this
was "unthinkable". He had just thought it! So, it can't be
psychologically impossible to think these forbidden words, after all.
But that, of course, just takes us right back to the beginning.
We are still no clearer what Lenin could possibly have meant by what he said.
At this point, it is worth asking:
"Why did Lenin conclude that motion without matter was 'unthinkable' as opposed
to claiming it was simply
contradictory?". Apart from saving him the trouble of having to do what he
said couldn't be done -- think the very
thoughts he wanted to convince the rest of us were "unthinkable" --,
it would at least have allowed him to make his point much more succinctly, and, dare I say
it, more 'dialectically'. Indeed, it would seem to be the obvious thing to say about
matter and motion; that is, that immobile matter is
contradictory -- or, rather, that propositions asserting there can be motionless
matter imply a contradiction.
Indicative sentences used to assert that matter is, or can be, motionless would
certainly appear to contradict sentences used to claim motion is
the
mode of the existence
of matter, or that motion is the way matter expresses itself.
On the other hand, it seems pretty clear why he didn't
do this: if Lenin had done it, it would have given the 'dialectical' game away.
That is because, if he had ruled certain things out on the basis that they were
contradictory then much of DM would have disappeared down the
U-bend with it.
Clearly, the next question he would have faced is: And why is just this
contradictory state of affairs considered so objectionable in contradistinction
to all the other contradictions that DM-theorists believe litter the entire
universe and
aren't declared "unthinkable"? Why don't dialecticians tell us that motion
itself,
for example, is impossible (or "unthinkable")
since it implies a contradiction? Or, that
wave-particle duality is impossible (or "unthinkable") for the same
reason?
In fact, the existence of matter without motion ought to make
perfectly good 'dialectical' sense, if only because it is contradictory.
After all, the Hegelian roots of DM seem to imply that matter moves because of its
inherently contradictory nature (even though the precise details
are somewhat hazy).
As Hegel himself declared:
"[B]ut contradiction is the
root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a
contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Hegel (1999),
p.439,
§956. Bold emphasis added.]
Indeed, it would seem from this doctrine that bodies must move because mobility
and passivity are a product of the internal struggle going on in all objects or between
them, since they are UOs. So, why not a
'unity of motion and non-motion'? Anyone inclined to believe the cracked 'logic'
Hegel peddled shouldn't find it too much of a "leap" to derive motion itself
from the 'contradictory nature of matter'. The mobility of matter could then be predicated on its lack of
motion! Hence, far from immobile matter being "unthinkable", this theory seems to require
it!
It could be
objected that that is ridiculous. Dialecticians don't believe that
motion is a UO of itself and its opposite, lack of motion. Indeed, it could be
pointed out that the above caricature isn't the contradiction, or even the sort
of contradiction, to which Hegel
was referring when he spoke about motion --, as Engels himself indicated:
"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change,
their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in
contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change
of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in
another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same
place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution
of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976),
p.152.]
Or, so a response might proceed...
However, this (proffered, hypothetical) DM-reply merely highlights the
profound confusion lying at the heart of the DM-'theory-of-change' -- highlighted
here,
here
and here. The problem is that
according to what
DM-theorists themselves have to say, it is unclear whether things
change:
(a)Because of their 'internal contradictions' or
'opposites';
(b) They change into these 'opposites'; or,
(c) They create such 'opposites' when they change.
So, if all things are UOs, and can only change because of
this, it seems that a moving body must be a dialectical union of motion and
rest, otherwise it couldn't change.
In that case, if the
above objection is
"ridiculous", it is only because it makes plain the incoherence at the
heart of the DM-'theory-of-change'.
Moreover, as we saw in
Essay Five, the alleged contradiction to which Engels refers
(i.e., that a moving body is "both in one place
and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the
same place and also not in it") can't be what makes an object move.
In fact, it seems that that is what becomes apparent as it moves. But,
then who can say with any clarity what this part of DM implies, if anything.
Nevertheless, if Hegel is right, and objects
move because of their inherently contradictory nature, they must be a UO of
some sort. And what else could that be but a union of motion and its
opposite, rest.
Nothing else appears remotely relevant.
Others might be tempted to argue that this is precisely the point: because
matter is contradictory, it is incessantly mobile.
But once more, if matter is
truly contradictory -- if we accept no half measures and express no "excessive
tenderness" toward moving things --, matter must be mobile and at rest all at
once. In that case, resolute Hegelians must at least
be able to think, and actually do think, the illegitimate words (or
what they 'represent') -- that matter is
motionless (at least, in part).
In fact, the good news is that there is no need to speculate any
further about this Hermetic conundrum, for
that is precisely what we observeeverywhere.
The seemingly 'contradictory' nature of matter (i.e., that it both moves and
does not move) is not only an everyday occurrence, it is a scientific fact --, for it is true that
with respect to one
inertial frame
an object can be at rest, but with respect to
another it can be moving, and these two conditions can both be true at the same time,
and concerning the same body.
Unfortunately, however, for beleaguered dialecticians, this familiar fact doesn't
imply that motion is
fundamentally contradictory 'in itself' (whatever that means!), but that given
different reference
frames we can picture it in no other way: as mobile with respect one
frame, at rest with respect to another, at the same time. There is nothing deeply
metaphysical about this; it is a spin-off of the conventions we use
to depict the world.
This socially-motivated fact, though, does give sense to propositions about the
mobility (or otherwise) of matter, and that is because we would currently have no other way of conceiving of movement
scientifically except this way --, even if it doesn't actually make anything move (or,
indeed, sustain movement), which is what one imagines DM/Hegelian
'contradictions' should do.
Of course, the
implications of unhelpful conclusions like the above can only
be resisted on linguistic, or conceptual, grounds. That is, they may only be defused by
clarifying what words like "motion", "immobile", "inertial frame",
"same time", and "contradiction" should be taken to mean. Naturally, anyone
tempted to go down that route would merely end up underlining the fact that Lenin's own ideas
in this area are, at best, creatures of convention (or the way he
chose to talk about this), and hence aren't the least bit "objective".
Moreover, given the additional fact that
Lenin's philosophical ideas fall apart so
readily (as do Engels's -- on that see
here and
here), this DM-'convention' is never likely to
catch on with the scientific community. In
fact, neutral observers should feign no surprise if his ideas fail to make the bottom of the
reserve list of viable candidates that scientists might even deign to consider.
As pointed out earlier,
it seems that Lenin must have thought the words
"motion without matter" (or their content) in order to deny they were
thinkable. If so, it is difficult to see what he was driving at if the very act of saying what he
said appears to undermine the point he wished to make.
Perhaps, as
noted earlier, he meant the following?
B1: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
[B5:
Literal motion without matter is
unthinkable.]
However,
B1 won't do either. Just as soon as the quoted sentence in B1 (i.e., B5) is
entertained, it seems that that cognitive act itself will make B1 false!
Plainly that is because the embedded sentence in B1 (i.e., B5) appears to be false whenever anyone thinks it
(or its content).
It could be objected that the above argument confuses
B1 with
the following:
B2: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.
Lenin
certainly didn't mean B2. That riposte will be
considered presently. [And anyone who thinks this confuses use with mention is
referred to the
next sub-section that deals with this.]
Moreover,
it seems that B1 itself becomes false whenever B5 (or its content) is itself thought; and yet
by thinking B1, B5 must be entertained. The only way anyone could agree with
B1 is by thinking B5 (or its content). Unfortunately, this just means that we may only agree
with B1 by doing what B5 says can't be done -- it looks like we have to think the unthinkable,
thereby making B1 false. In that case, B1 would be 'true' just in case it
were 'false'; we may assent to it only if
we neverallow its content to cross our minds.
B5: Literal motion without
matter is unthinkable.
B1: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
It could be argued that this shows that
B1 is true since it is
indeed the case that matter without motion is unthinkable. And yet, that
is precisely the point: even to assert this alleged fact requires that the
'forbidden' words "matter without motion" (or their content) pass through the
mind;
so it looks like it isn't the case that these words (or their content) can't be thought.11b
But,
what about the counter-claim that the above confuses B1 with B2? That objection will be
considered in the next sub-section (and again later in
this Essay).
B2: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.
As
noted earlier, it
could be objected that the above argument
simply confuses these two propositions
(in other words, I have confused use with mention).11c
R1: "Matter without
motion" is unthinkable.
R2: Matter without
motion is unthinkable.
Where R1 means:
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
Or even:
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
Or, indeed, from earlier:
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
Clearly, R3 is susceptible to the points I have already made. But, it could be
argued that Lenin plainly
didn't mean this. He obviously meant R2. It is certainly possible to think the
'offending words' without imagining them to be true. So, the above
argument is entirely spurious.
Or so it could be argued...
The question therefore becomes: Is R2
vulnerable in the same way? Is the claim valid that Lenin had to contradict himself
in order to make his point?
R2: Matter without
motion is unthinkable.
Indeed, it seems to be so. As we will see, in order to rule motion without matter out of
court, Lenin would have to know what he was trying to exclude. But,
to do that he would have to
know what 'motion without matter' amounted to so that he could exclude that
possibility from consideration on the grounds that it is unthinkable -- otherwise, for all he knew,
he could be ruling out the wrong condition, or, indeed, he might be ruling out nothing at all.
Hence, the content of R2 (i.e., what it was supposedly being used to say) would have to be
thinkable so that Lenin could tell us it wasn't a viable possibility.
It
could be objected that R3, R4, P1, and P2 aren't what Lenin was asserting when
he argued that motion without matter is unthinkable. But, as we will see, it
isn't possible to make sense of what he was trying to say whether or not he intended
one or more of R3, R4, P1, P2 or even R2.
[That is a brief summary of a much
longer argument I have developed
below.
I also explain what I mean by "content,
here. See also
here.]
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
R2: Matter without
motion is unthinkable.
Now,
if we assume for the moment that
Lenin was right after all, what on earth could he possibly have meant by what he
said if it seems that everyone
(including himself) could so easily disprove in practice this supposedly
self-evident truth? That is, if it is so easy to think about matter devoid of motion?
Precisely what is so unthinkable here that is
also so easily thought? What is it about M1a/R2 that is supposed to command
our assent --
but only in
the very act of undermining what it appears to say?
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Perhaps
we are
being too hasty? Maybe Lenin merely meant that the
truth of an indicative sentence like M1a (containing the unqualified words "motion without matter")
is unthinkable? Or, that such a sentence could never be true or thought of
as true? Maybe he did mean one or more of R3,
R4, P1, and P2?
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
But, are these
options faithful to Lenin's intentions --, or, even viable in themselves?
Maybe not, for when Lenin's words are examined even more closely, it becomes
impossible to understand what it was he was trying to say, or, indeed, precisely what 'truth' he
was attempting to communicate to his readers. Or even whether what he appears
to be saying could in any way be true, or even thought of as true.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
Consider the following as a possible variant of M1a,
P1 and M9:
M10: Motion without matter can never be thought
of as true.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
M10 looks
rather awkward and it isn't obviously correct.
P2 looks a little less awkward. But, is it correct? Well, it is possible to
think of many examples of motion that don't involve the
movement of matter or the locomotion of bodies, as such. Several dozen such were
aired in Essay
Five. [Readers are directed there for more details.]
Here is
another (a few more have been posted in Note 12):
M11: NN's thoughts moved to a new topic.
Indeed, Engels indirectly endorsed this possibility:
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from
mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels (1954), p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]
M11 could be true even if no matter
was relocated in the
process, or even as a result.12
Alternatively, maybe Lenin meant the following?
M12: The occurrence of literal motion
without matter can never be thought of as true.
Which appears to imply, or be implied by, the following:12a
M13: Literal motion without
matter can never take place.
This seems to be closer to what Lenin
might have meant, even if
it still looks a little stilted. Be this as it may, M13 presents problems of its
own. Consider this apparent counter-example:
M14: NM moved the date of the strike from Monday
to Tuesday.13
Now, M14 seems to depict literal
movement, and yet it isn't easy to see whether any matter has to be
re-located as a result. Perhaps we might appeal to the movement of atoms in NM's
brain, or the re-arrangement of ink molecules in a diary or on wall planner --
when the new date is committed to paper, etc. (as examples of matter in motion, here).
But, at best, that would simply mean motion was indirectly associated
with matter, since even in a real life situation
the supposed strike itself wouldn't actually exist to be moved anywhere, even though it has still
been moved.
It
might be objected here that this sense of "move" wasn't at
all what Lenin had in mind. But, Lenin himself appealed to a wider sense of
"move" in his argument against the Idealists he was criticising:
"Let us imagine a consistent idealist
who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take
'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical
idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that
the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas,
sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject
and regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his
ideas come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' --
and that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of
thinking. And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the
solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view.
"The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Here,
Lenin appeals to the movement of ideas as examples of motion (indeed, as did
Engels before him), so it can
hardly be objected when this wider meaning of the relevant words is used against his
assertion in M1a.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Again, it could be objected that in this
particular example what has
actually changed is the date of the said strike. It is this that has been
moved not the strike itself. But again, if it were only a date that had been moved, it would
still be unclear whether any matter has to be relocated as a consequence.
Once more, the date is in the future, and doesn't exist yet, even though it
has still been moved.
Now,
it would be little use referring to the altered marks in a diary or on a
wall-planner (or those located anywhere else, for that matter) in order to illustrate
the material changes directly or indirectly implied here. Certainly, such things may
change, but if
anyone were to imagine that the dates of strikes, or even strikes themselves,
are simply marks on paper, then bosses could easily put a stop to trade union
militancy just by tippexing-out the relevant marks (or by destroying such
wall-planners/diaries), and be done with it. The class struggle surely can't be so easily erased, can
it?
At best, therefore, the movement reported in M14 is indirectly
associated with matter. Nevertheless, M14 appears to indicate that we can at least
understand sentences where the connection between motion and matter isn't
obvious or clear-cut as Lenin seems to think it is. So, maybe we can think the unthinkable, despite
what Lenin said?
M14: NM moved the date of the strike from Monday
to Tuesday.
This
still leaves the status of M12 and M13 unresolved. However, if we ignore awkward
cases like M14 and concentrate on examples of movement located only
in the present, we might perhaps be able to ascertain Lenin's intentions.
[Unfortunately, this restriction would make the temporal quantifier
(i.e., "never") in M12 and
M13 seem rather superfluous, if not redundant. I will ignore that awkward complication.]
M12: The occurrence of literal motion
without matter can never be thought of as true.
M13: Literal motion without
matter can never take place.
However, if we are careful to stipulate that "literal motion" involves
change ofplace, then maybe the following re-write of M12 and M13
might work?
M15: Literal motion without
matter is unthinkable.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Of course, M15 is just a variant of M1a. But, is it/are they, true?
Maybe
not.
One obvious example of literal
movement that takes place without matter -- which is not only thinkable,
it is actual
-- is the motion of the Centre of Mass [CoM] of the Galaxy [CMG].
The CMG is located in empty space, but it exerts a decisive causal influence on
everything in the Galaxy while not being material itself (it isn't made of
anything, it is
merely a theoretical point, a 'mathematical abstraction'). In its turn, it moves under the
influence of something else that isn't material either -- the centre of
mass of the cluster of galaxies of which ours is a part, and so on.14
This example, of course, omits any
reference to the geodesics of
Spacetime
as causal factors in this case. However, introducing that complication at
this stage wouldn't affect the point being made since geodesics
are, of course, non-material. Arguably, they aren't even 'extra-mental'.
Of course, exactly what makes matter, or, indeed, anything, move
along geodesics is a moot point itself, which I will leave no less moot for now.
Despite this, it could be argued that because matter 'creates'
these geodesics, all movement in the end is related in some respect to
matter. If so, Lenin's original claim needs to be watered-down to something like
the following:
N1: Motion without matter causing it
somewhere is unthinkable.
[Of course,
that response assumes geodesics are extra-mental
entities when they are in fact mathematical objects, and, like lines of force,
their physical status is rather puzzling, if not entirely dubious. (On that, see
here and below.) If so, it isn't easy to see how matter can 'create' a
single
geodesic.]
But,
N1 might not even be true (and that is quite apart from the
fact that it, too, is "thinkable"; you, dear reader, have just
thought it, or what it supposedly 'represents'!), and that could even be
the case with or without the need to appeal to a single DM-precept. Anyway, as
we saw in
Note One,according to
DM-fans, motion is "The mode of the existence of matter"; its demotion to
a factor that merely plays a causal role in the whole affair would seriously undermine yet another core DM-theory.
More importantly,
of course, it isn't what Lenin actually
said.
The reason why N1 might not be true is discussed in more detail
in Essay Thirteen Part One.
Briefly, that is because we do not as yet have a theory that
connects QM with
General Relativity,
and, to date, the leading candidates manifestly depend on the
reification
of some highly abstruse mathematics, which strategy itself has serious Idealist
implications for Physics (as Lenin himself recognised).
Such acts of reification either imply -- or are based on the unacknowledged
pretence -- that mathematical entities (differential
equations, tensor,
vector and
scalar fields -- or 'the
field' in general, etc.) can act as causal agents. Unless we subscribe to some
form of
Mystical,
Cosmic,
Pythagorean-Platonism,
that idea isn't even plausible. [I have said more about
CoMs -- also called "Barycentres" -- in Essay
Eleven Part One, here.]
It could be argued that the CMG
is external to the mind, and so
the above claims are subject to the following rebuttal by Lenin:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the
predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the
question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place
outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas,
symbols, conventional signs, and so forth?" [Lenin (1972),
p.324.]
Hence, in view of the fact that scientists' ideas about the
nature of matter and energy are constantly changing and developing, the facts of Relativity in no
way embarrass DM. Whatever is objective and external to the mind is matter, and
that includes the CMG. Again, as Lenin argued:
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with
whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind....
Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically
implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human
mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., pp.311-12. Italic emphasis in the
original. Paragraphs merged.]
Or so it could be
maintained, once more...
But,
the CMG doesn't actually exist -- at least, no more than any
other averaged quantity does. Is there in existence anywhere an
individual answering to the following descriptor: "The average man/woman in
the UK"? How then either that or the CMG can be 'objective' is
still a mystery. And if 'objectivity' is supposed to be "existence independent
of the mind", and since both are creations of the human mind, they can't be
'objective' in Lenin's sense.
Of
course, Lenin's catch-all definition -- that whatever has "objective existence outside the mind" is material
-- would
plainly
include the CMG by definitional fiat. But, why should we accept such a
definition? Lenin's continual assertion that this is what matter is, isn't,
I'm sorry to have to announce, a sufficient reason for the rest of us to accept it -- unless, of course,
we conclude that Lenin was a Minor Deity of some sort.
Would we be prepared to accept a
'definition' of "fairness" promulgated by a supporter of the current
system which
meant that word applied to everything and anything that happened inside Capitalism
and had been initiated by the ruling-class or their ideologues? Or that wages
paid to workers were "fair"? I suspect not.
Indeed, would we be happy to accept a definition of 'God' as "The Supreme and
Eternal Being who exists of necessity but whose existence can't be proved"?
Well,
since 'His'/'Her'/'Its' existence can't be proved, the sentence "God is The Supreme
and Eternal Being who exists but whose existence can't be proved" must be true,
by definition.
But
then, if 'His'/'Her'/'Its' existence can be proved, 'He'/'She'/'It' exists
anyway. So, either way, 'He'/'She'/'It' must exist.
Now, it is
little use pointing to the weaknesses, nor even the
'contradictions' in the above 'argument', since a smart theologian will
simply play the Nixon card
(beloved of DM-fans) to silence all opposition. And, if you persist, you will
simply be accused of not "understanding" 'Theological Dialectics'.
The problem, of course, began with the definition.
Same
with Lenin's.
Now,
I don't expect the DM-fraternity to accept any of this, but
when they see what odd entities permitted by Lenin's overly generous definition of
words like "material" and "matter", I think
they might be among the first to disown it.
Perhaps we
should modify M15 to accommodate or neutralise such
annoying counterexamples --, in the following way:
M16: Literal motion without
some matter somewhere causing it is unthinkable.
Alas, M16 now concedes the point that motion can take place while
spatially-, or, perhaps even temporally-, divorced from matter, since it isn't
specific about contiguous or concurrent causation (which, of course, may not be
what Lenin meant by M1a anyway -- who can say?). And, as we will see in Essay
Thirteen
Part One,
Lenin's concept of matter (if such it might be called) is so vague and confused
that little sense can be made of it.15
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Nevertheless, despite these apparent problems, M15 and M16 face far more serious
difficulties than the inconvenient astronomical (or even ordinary)
facts mentioned above.
As we have seen,
and will continue to see as the rest of Essay Twelve unfolds, the problems Lenin and
other metaphysicians face are a direct consequence of their peculiar use of language,
a failing compounded by their rather odd choice or words. But, there are other aspects of
the language they employ that are perhaps less well
appreciated (or, rather, aren't appreciated at all), which means that a slide into metaphysical incoherence doesn't just
implicate DM; with respect to
Metaphysics in general, such a collapse is unavoidable.
While it is true that Marxists
hold that language is a
social product and a means of communication, few seem to have thought through the
ramifications
of those two basic tenets.17
On the contrary, one of the least well appreciated consequences is that it
implies language is
conventional. Indeed, if language is social, how could it be other
than conventional? Human beings invented language; it wasn't bestowed on
us from 'on high', nor was it a gift from an advanced civilisation of aliens. This means that at some point in
their history human beings must have adopted, acquired or integrated one or more series of linguistic conventions.17a
In fact, an even less well appreciated corollary of the
above considerations is that language is
primarily a means of communication, not representation.18
While it is undeniable that some
Marxists have acknowledged the (perhaps limited) validity of the former
corollary -- that language is conventional --, hardly any
(perhaps none at all) have considered the full implications of the second -- that
language isn't primarily
representational. Certainly Marx and Engels failed to do so, as have
subsequent
Marxists. Indeed, much of what they have to say about this topic -- especially
in relation to
'abstraction', 'cognition' and knowledge --
suggests the
opposite is the case.18a
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Interlude Two --
Representational Theories of Language
Undermining
a commitment to the social nature and origin of language --
replacing it with what turns out to be a mystical theory that language in effect contains a secret
code that is somehow capable of reflecting the underlying 'Essence of Being', which has
also been stitched into the 'fabric of reality' -- so that the one can 'reflect' the
other, on a like-recognises-like sort of basis -- helped motivate, and in
some way render superficially plausible the theory that
language is primarily
representational (as we will see in the next two Parts of Essay Twelve
-- summary here).
If
the world is the special creation of a 'Deity' (reputedly achieved by the use of language), and is essentiallymind-like,
it seemed obvious to many that human thought must be capable of re-presenting to itself
that 'Deity's Mind', there being some
sort of isomorphism between them --
since
'we' are supposed to have been made in 'His image'. In this way Representationalism
turns out to be little other than the flip
side of Idealism and Theism -- as Hegel himself noted:
"Every philosophy is
essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the
question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel
(1999),
pp.154-55; §316.]
Which
observation also
lies behind Marx's comment:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thoughtand expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases
and link added.]
According
to this ancient dogma language contains hidden messages;
it is in effect an esoteric code which may only be
accessed (and 'understood') by the elite, their ideologues, their hangers-on,
or their lackeys -- or, indeed, by specially-trained professional
'philosophers'. Cosmic Verities such as these, buried in or
behind words, lie
way beyond ordinary comprehension -- or so the story goes -- since ordinary folk
are 'intellectually handicapped', trapped as they are in a world of 'banal commonsense', their lives dominated by 'appearances', 'formal
thinking' and the vernacular. In the Christian Tradition, this
'Hidden Code' was thought to have been stitched into the
'primary language' given
to Adam by 'God', but similar myths abound in other religions and cultural traditions.
Indeed, much of
Hermetic,
Neo-Platonic,
Alchemical
and Kabbalistic
Mysticism is
based on this view of the relation between 'God', language and 'reality'.
[On that, see Bono (1995), Eco (1997), and Vickers (1984b). This topic
will be explored more fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here), and
other Parts of Essay Twelve.]
Various
signs, portents and
'hidden messages' were also believed to be 'written in the stars', in
sacred books, tea leaves, the flight of birds, the organs and entrails of slaughtered animals -- or,
indeed, in a more recent re-incarnation of this doctrine they have somehow been encrypted in our central nervous system as a
"transformational grammar"
("unbounded
merge") or
"language of thought".
[On that, see Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Among
Dialectical Marxists, this
ancient idea resurfaces as an integral part of the theory that thought is dialectical because reality is dialectical
-- which 'profound secret' is, alas, hidden from those who refuse to see, or
those who
just do not
"understand" dialectics. Fortunately for believers, DM can
be regarded as an "Algebra of Revolution", which supposedly works because it alone is
fine-tuned to match the "pulse of reality"
--
or, perhaps even because reality
'dances'
to its highly syncopated rhythm.
As I argued in Essay Four Part One (here slightly modified),
in relation to the mystical dogma that there is a 'dialectical logic' of
some sort that runs the entire universe:
To be sure,
the confusion of rules of inference with 'logical' or metaphysical 'truths'
dates back to Aristotle himself (and arguably even further back, to Plato,
Parmenides,
Heraclitus,
Anaxagoras, Anaximander
and Anaximenes). And, it isn't hard to see why. If a theorist
-- or, indeed,
if practically everyone -- believes that everything was created by a 'deity' (or
'deities') of some
sort, they won't find it too difficult also to believe that fundamental principles
underpinning that 'creation' somehow express how 'the gods' actually went about creating
all we see around us -- including their own capacity to think -- and therefore that their own
thought
processes were capable of reflecting how 'he'/'she'/'it'/'they' reasoned while
so doing. This idea would
then automatically connect 'correct thinking about reality, society and human cognition' with
the divinely-constituted order that governs absolutely everything. Logic
itself would then be seen as an indirect way of studying 'divine thought',
but interpreted now as a sort of
Super-Science supposedly capable of reflecting
core principles underlying 'Reality Itself'/'Being'.
This general approach to 'philosophical knowledge' later came to be known as "Metaphysics".
However, when Logic is
re-described as the study of 'how we actually think and reason', that only
succeeds in conflating it
with psychology and hence with science itself. In light of the foregoing,
such moves originally aimed at connect Logic with how the 'deity' also 'thinks'.
This meant that early on Logic became intimately linked
with the search for 'ultimate truth, 'divine truth', not simply the study of
inference (which role was largely sidelined until recently).
Furthermore, if only aselect few
are capable of 're-presenting' 'God's thoughts' (for instance, by studying
Logic), why would they concern themselves with anything
as menial as evidence? That is indeed how Hegel 'reasoned', except in his case
such
'thoughts' were buried under several layers of gobbledygook -- for
example, here dutifully echoed for us by
Herbert Marcuse:
"The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.'The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth.
The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential
from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse
(1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse
is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Minor typo corrected; bold emphases added.]
[I have covered this topic in
much more detail in Essay Three Part Two (here,
here and
here), where this overall attitude was traced back to an ancient, aristocratic view of
'philosophical knowledge' and with the theory that 'surface appearances' -- i.e.,
those that result from sense
impressions caused by the material world, a world largely occupied by the great
'unwashed', which produces in them a 'superficial', 'un-philosophical'
and 'uneducated'
comprehension of 'reality' -- are fundamentally deficient/flawed, an idea later
transmogrified into the Hegelian dogma that 'appearances' are
'contradicted' by 'underlying essence', a belief itself motivated by the
Platonic idea that all 'true knowledge' must be based on the latter, not the former.]
As a result, those who had been (and
still are) seduced by
this almost hypnotic way of thinking and talking felt fully justified in imposing
such ideas on 'reality'
-- with no evidence to back
them up (since, according to them, none was needed).
[Essay Seven
Part One and
Essay Two demonstrated this was also
the case with DM-fans, who have been only too ready to copy Hegel (and Plato) in this regard,
imposing their theory on the world.]
As
Umberto Eco
points out (in relation to the 'Western', Christian Tradition -- which, of course,
drew heavily on Greek Philosophy and Religion):
"God spoke before all things, and
said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for
with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation
itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names
that he created them and gave them their
ontological status.... In Genesis..., the Lord
speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke
to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior
illumination, in which God...expresses himself....
Clearly we are here
in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of
the
nomothete, the
name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Paragraphs merged.]
Fast forward a score or
more centuries and these ancient presuppositions re-surfaced in Hegel's work (which,
ironically,
was supposed
to be
presuppositionless!) where they now became
a part of a mystical/ontological doctrine connected with what he took to be a
series of 'self-developing' concepts -- which idea itself arose out of an
egregious error committed over the nature of
predication (a topic covered in detail in Essay Three
Part One), further compounded by an even more serious blunder
over the nature of the LOI.
[LOI = Law of identity.]
'Presuppositionless'?
Attentive readers might be able to spot the 'non-existent presuppositions' (and Hegel's acceptance of the above
traditional thought-forms) in the following passage:
"This objective thinking, then, is the
content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it
standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it
is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to
employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not
external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the
absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of
pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is
without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the
creation of nature and a finite mind. Anaxagoras
is praised as the man who first declared that Nous,
thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be
defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual
view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic.
"What we are dealing with in logic is
not a thinking about
something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from
it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks
of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of
thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel
(1999), pp.50-51, §§53-54.
Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. I have
reproduced the published version, since the on-line version differs from it; I
have informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. They
have now corrected the on-line version! Several paragraphs merged.]
In the above book alone,
readers will find page-after-page of 'presuppositionless',
dogmatic assertions like these. Hegel even manages to contradict himself (somewhat
ironically, one feels) within the space
of just two paragraphs, in the following quotation taken from his Shorter Logic:
"Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other
sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural
admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of
cognition,
either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted. The objects
of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion.
In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which
God
and God only is the
Truth.
Both in like manner go on to treat of the finite
worlds of
Nature
and the human
Mind,
with their relation to each other and to their truth in God. Some
acquaintance with its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must
presume, that and a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other
reason than this: that in point of time the mind
makes general images of objects, long before it makes notions
of them, and that it is only through these
mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking mind rises to know and
comprehend thinkingly.
"But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes evident
that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity
of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their
nature and qualities. Our original acquaintance with them is thus discovered to
be inadequate. We can assume nothing and assert
nothing
dogmatically;
nor can we accept the assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make
a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption,
or rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a
beginning at all." [Hegel
(1975), p.3., §1. Bold emphases alone added; links in the on-line
version.]
So, in one breath, Hegel says we can
"assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically", but in the previous paragraph
he has done just that,
dogmatically asserting that the object of Philosophy is "Truth" and that "God
and only God is Truth", that "the mind makes general images of objects long
before it makes notions of them", all the while asserting that
"philosophy may and even must presume" certain things about "objects", and that
to make a start in Philosophy is to make an "assumption" (paragraph
two)!
After having read that
one may well wonder why anyone takes this bumbling fool seriously!
Well,
WRP-theorist, the late Cliff Slaughter, certainly did:
"Hegel insisted on a Logic which was not
something separate from the reality which confronted man, a Logic which was
identical with the richness and movement of all reality, a Logic which expressed
the whole process of man's growing consciousness of reality, and not just a dry
summary of formal principles of argument, reflecting only one brief phase in the
definition of reality by thinking men." [Slaughter
(1963), p.9.]
I suspect many will agree
that that, too, looks like a pretty dogmatic set of pre-suppositions.
Be this as it may, when this
ideologically-compromised 'ontological'
interpretation of Logic is abandoned (or 'un-presupposed'), the temptation to identify
it with science
(i.e., with the "Laws of Thought", or even
with 'absolute' or 'ultimate' truth) loses whatever
superficial plausibility it might once seemed to have possessed. If Logic is
solely concerned with the study ofinference, then there is no good reason to
saddle it with such inappropriate metaphysical baggage, and every reason not to. On the other hand, if there
is indeed a link between that discipline and metaphysical, scientific or 'ultimate' truth -- as both
legend, Hegel and DM-theorists would have us believe --, then that theory
will need substantiating.
It isn't enough just to assume or merely assert that such a connection
exists (especially since it has easily confirmed links with mystical theology, as we have seen),
which
has
generally been the case in Idealist and DM-circles ever since.
Despite this, the idea that 'fundamental
truths about reality' may easily be discovered by an examination of how
human beings think they reason is highly suspect in itself. But, like most things, much
depends on what is supposed to follow from that assumption; and that in turn
will depend on what it is taken to mean. As we will see, the
many differing views that have been expressed on this topic sharply distinguish
materialist theory from
Idealist
fantasy. Unfortunately, DM-theorists have so far shown themselves to
be far more
content to
tail-end Traditional Philosophers
by supposing
(alongside Hegel)
that logic functions like a sort of cosmic code-cracker, capable of
revealing profound
truths about (what would otherwise be) 'hidden aspects of reality' buried
beneath
'appearances' --
aka the
perennial search for all those elusive 'essences' -- than they
have been with attempting to justify this entire approach with a single
cogent supporting
argument. In its place they have shown they prefer a heady mixture of dogmatic assertion
and unsubstantiated presupposition (again, rather like Hegel). Nor have they been
at all concerned to examine any of the motivating forces that gave rise to this class-compromised
approach to
Super-Knowledge, concocted over two thousand years ago in
Ancient Greece by card-carrying ruling-class ideologues.
[Concerning the other
(ancient) dogma that language
somehow 'reflects'
the world, and that truths about it can be derived from words/thought alone, see Dyke
(2007). However, the reader mustn't assume that I agree with Dyke's
own metaphysical conclusions (or, indeed, with any metaphysical conclusions whatsoever).
As Essay Twelve
Part One shows,
the opposite is in fact the case: I regard them all as
non-sensical and
incoherent.]
Of course, contemporary
logicians are now much clearer about the distinction between rules of inference and
logical truths than their counterparts were in the Ancient World -- or even
in the Nineteenth Century. That fact alone means the criticisms DM-theorists
level against FL are even more anachronistic and difficult to justify.
[FL = Formal Logic.]
[The clear distinction between assumptions
and rules of inference (between propositions that can be true or false,
and rules than can be neither) was neatly illustrated by
Lewis
Carroll over a century ago in his dialogue,
What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.
A PDF of that classic paradox can be accessed
here.]
Anyway, if materialists
are to reject the mystical view of nature prevalent in Ancient Greece, which
view is both
implicit and explicit in Hegelian
Ontology --, as surely they must --, then the idea
that FL is just another branch psychology -- or physics, or even that it is the
'science of thought' -- becomes even more difficult to sustain.
Indeed, how is it possible for
language to 'reflect' the logic of the world if the world has no logic to it? Which it couldn't have unless Nature were 'Mind',
or the 'product of Mind'.
If the development of Nature isn't in fact
a
(disguised or camouflaged) development of
'Mind'
(as Hegel supposed),
how can concepts drawn from the development of 'Mind' apply to
Nature, unless, once more, it were itself 'Mind', or the 'product of Mind'?
Of course, dialecticians have responded to
this sort of challenge with an appeal to the RTK (i.e., the sophisticated version of
that theory); but, as we will see (in Essay Three
Part Five and
Twelve Part Four), that, too, was an unwise move.
[RTK = Reflection Theory
of Knowledge, to be covered in Essay Twelve Part Four.]
This means that if FL is
solely concerned with the study of the inferential links between propositions and conclusions -- and isn't
directly
involved
with their
truth-values -- then the criticism that FL
can't account for change becomes even more bizarre.
It is instructive to recall
that since the Renaissance, 'western' society has (largely) learnt to separate
religious fantasy from scientific knowledge, so that the sort of things that used to be said as a
matter-of-course about
science (for example, that it was the "systematic study of God's work", etc.,
etc.) look rather odd and anachronistic today (that is, to all but the incurably
religious or the naively superstitious). In like manner, previous generations of logicians used to confuse
logic not just with science, but with the "Laws of Thought", also as a matter-of-course; and they did
so for
theological and ideological reasons, too. In that case, one would have thought
that avowed materialists (i.e., dialecticians) would be loathe to promote
and then spread this ancient confusion.
Clearly, they aren't.
As will be argued at length later
on at this site,
only if it can be shown (and not simply presumed or even merely asserted) that nature has a
rational structure, would it be plausible to suppose that there is
any connection at all between the way human beings think they think and the underlying
or inner constitution of
nature. Short of that, the idea that there is such a link between the way we
think we draw conclusions and fundamental aspects of 'reality' loses all credibility. Why
should the way we knit premises and conclusions together mirror
the structure of the universe? Why should our use of words have such profound 'ontological'
implications, valid for all of space and time?
Did the rest of us miss a
meeting?
It could be objected that if language
is part of the world, it must have coded into it all sorts of things that
are also
part of or which reflect aspects of reality.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Added To End
Note 6a Of Essay Four Part One:
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that it
requires human beings to code anything, which further implies that this
coding, if it exists, was:
(a) Intentionally inserted into language by an individual or group
of individuals; or it was,
(b) Incorporated into language by a non-human
'mind' of some sort.
Option (b) directly implies a form of Idealism (for
instance, LIE, as argued earlier). So does (a), but only indirectly. In Essay Twelve Parts
One and Two, it will be shown
just how and why that is the case. [I have also dealt with Option (a) briefly
again,
below.]
It could be countered that
our minds work the way they do because it proved evolutionarily advantageous
for our species. Individuals whose thoughts didn't mirror the world would find it
difficult to survive and hence reproduce.
That is in fact a rather poor argument,
which I will dispose of in Essay Thirteen
Part Three. Again, for present
purposes, all we need note is that even if that were the case, our thoughts need
only 'mirror' the material world, not all those 'underlying essences'. How,
for example, could the thoughts of our ancestors have 'mirrored' the
hidden world of 'essences' -- a world only
'revealed' to us by
the speculations of Traditional Philosophers
and Mystics a few
thousand years ago -- if they are, by definition, inaccessible to the senses? How could such
invisible imponderables assist in our survival in any away at all?
It could be objected that
a capacity to form abstract thoughts would enable humanity to grasp general ideas
about nature, which would free them from the "immediacy of the present",
allowing them to take some -- albeit limited -- control of their lives and their
surroundings. That would
definitely assist in their survival.
However, as argued at length
in Essay Three Parts One and
Two, abstraction in fact
destroys generality. Hence, if our ancestors had access to these 'hidden
essences' by means of a 'process of abstraction', that would have seriously reduced
their chances of survival. [On our ancestors' alleged use of abstractions, see
here.]
That is, of course, quite
apart from the fact that it is bizarre in the extreme to claim that our
ancestors, hundreds of thousands of years ago, were aware of these invisible
'essences' -- and thus coded them into language --, but which 'essences' were in fact
conjured into existence only a few thousand years ago by a set of
grammatical and logical verbal tricks concocted by Greek Philosophers!
[On that, see Essay Three Part One, again, link above.]
[The verbal tricks performed by Ancient Greek Philosophers that 'allowed' them to invent
such fanciful ideas are detailed in
Barnes (2009),
Havelock (1983), Kahn (1994, 2003), Lloyd (1971), and Seligman (1962) --
although, the latter authors don't characterise the aforementioned terminological gyrations in the pejorative way that
I have! I
will be dealing with this topic in more detail in Essay Twelve Part Two (summary
here).]
This isn't to argue, either, that our
ancestors didn't use general nouns, but general nouns aren't the same as the
'abstract general ideas' of Traditional Lore. Readers are directed to the
above Essays (and the academic studies listed in the previous paragraph) for more details.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Even to ask such questions is
to answer them:
how
is it possible that 'metaphysical
truths' were only capable
of being derived from, or expressed in,
Indo-European languages,
which is the only language family that has the required grammatical structure --
the subject-copula-predicate form -- that allows such moves? Was that group of humans blessed by the 'gods'?
Are there really 'subjects', 'copulas'
and 'predicates' out there in nature for just this language group to
'reflect'?
[Follow the first of the above links for more details.]
On the other hand, if it could be shown that
the universe does have an underlying, 'rational' structure, the
conclusion that nature is 'Mind' (or, that it was 'constituted by Mind') would
be all the more difficult to resist. If all that is real is indeed 'rational', then
the identification of rules of inference with the "laws of thought" and
then with fundamental metaphysical truths about "Being Itself" would become
nigh on irresistible.
As noted above: the History of Philosophy,
Theology and Mysticism reveal that from such esoteric assumptions it is
but a short step to the derivation of 'philosophical truth' from thought/language alone.
Dogmatic, a
priori theory-mongering and Idealism thus go hand-in-hand.
If Nature is
Ideal, then it would seem truths can legitimately follow from thought/language alone
--
a point underlined by George Novack:
"A consistent materialism cannot
proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason,
intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source.
Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon
evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in
practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17.]
In
several other
Essays posted at this site
(for example, this Essay and
Essay Two) we
will see that this is a step DM-theorists and metaphysicians of every stripe
were only too eager to take -- and, many times over, too.
Nevertheless, there is precious little
evidence to suggest that DM-theorists have ever given much thought to thisspecific implication of the
belief that DLreflects the underlying structure of reality -- i.e., they
have given little or no consideration to the idea that
their 'logic'actually implies'Reality is Ideal'. If logic does indeed reflect the structure of 'Being', then
'Being' must be 'Mind', after all.
[On this, see Essay Twelve Part Four (to be published in 2024) -- a partial summary of which can be
accessed here.]
The above considerations
further strengthen the suspicion that the
much-vaunted materialist "inversion" -- supposedly inflicted on
Hegel's system/'method' by early
dialecticians -- was either illusory or merely formal. That in turn implies DM is
simply a version of inverted Idealism, which still means it is aform of Idealism. If so, questions about the nature of Logic cannot but be related to the serious doubts raised at this site about the
supposedly scientific
status of 'dialectics'. In that case, if Logic is capable of revealing fundamental,
scientific
truths about nature -- as opposed to its only legitimate role in the systematic
study of inference -- then
it becomes much harder to resist the conclusion that DM is indeed just another
form
of Idealism that has yet to 'come out of the closet'.
Whatever the precise details turn out to be in each case, this almost
universally-held doctrine, this
ruling idea, only succeeded in 'populating' nature with invisible "Forms", Essences",
"Abstractions", "Universals", "Concepts", "Ideas" and
immaterial 'rational
principles'/'laws', which were somehow capable of being reflected in and by language/'thought'. These
clandestine 'principles' were supposedly encoded in language in an abstract
form, and were revealed only to those capable of performing complex
feats of mental gymnastics (and, of course, those with sufficient leisure time
allowing them to indulge in this bogus enterprise) -- an exclusive skill
invariably accompanied by an even more impressive ability to invent
increasingly
baroque
but, nonetheless, entirely vacuous jargon.
This meant
that the attack on the social nature of discourse represented just one wing of
this class-motivated assault on ordinary language and common understanding, and hence on
grass-roots materialism, which soon degenerated into LIE. [More details
about the latter will be
given in the next two Parts of this Essay (summary
here).]
As noted
above, this anti-materialist view
of language regards discourse as primarily representational.
However, as we will soon discover, instead of the arcane terminology
Philosophers have invented, which they imagine capable of mirroring 'reality', the
vacuous jargon mentioned earlier actually
reflects constantly changing ruling-class priorities, and hence mirrors their
overall perception of the 'natural-' and 'social-order' -- issues that are conducive to their aims,
interests and the maintenance of power.
[Dialectical
Marxists are generally aware of the above facts but they then fail to see how
the above ideological priorities have fed into and corrupted their own use of
language in DM.
That was one of the main topics of Essay Nine Parts
One and
Two, and will be covered again
from a different angle in Essay Fourteen Part Two.]
Theorists who
(because of their class position) were removed -- or alienated -- from the everyday world of work
seem
'naturally predisposed' to remove -- or 'abstract' -- ordinary words from their
role in communal life and inter-communication.
This approach to language thus became an integral part of an epistemological feed-back loop, helping to reinforce the idea
that 'Reality' was itself linguistic and fundamentally abstract,
the product of some 'Mind'. Hence: if this is true of language, it must be true of the
world, and if it is true of the world it must also be true of language.
These two ideas fed into and reinforced one another. The old
Hermetic adage, "As
above so below" now became "As below so above". 'Reality' reflected what
Philosophers said, not the other way round.
Umberto Eco pointed out
the following in relation to
the Christian, Jewish and Muslim traditions (but, as we will see in Parts Two
and Three of Essay Twelve, this view of the magical connection between
language and 'Reality' can be found across many religions, cultures and philosophical
traditions -- until then, readers are directed to
this site for more
details):
"God spoke before all things, and
said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for
with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation
itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names
that he created them and gave them their ontological status.... In Genesis..., the Lord
speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke
to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior
illumination, in which God...expresses himself....
Clearly we are here
in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of
the
nomothete, the
name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Paragraphs merged.]
This in turn
implied that only those capable of concocting greater, broader, deeper or more
general abstractions (based less and less on
any real connection with the material world they supposedly 'reflected') were capable of truly grasping such esoteric
mysteries. Or, since Hegel's day, that was true only of those able to "understand" the 'dialectic',
harmonise with the "the pulse of
reality",
'dance to its hypnotic
rhythm and thereby decode the "algebra of revolution".
Unfortunately, as we will
also see, metaphysical 'profundities'
can't be based on ordinary language. That is, they can't be derived from a
social resourcethat serves
primarily a means of communication. The vernacular actually prevents such
flights-of-fancy from being engineered in a comprehensible form. It is precisely
for this reason that ordinary language -- along with its roots in the communal
life and the experience of working people -- had to be
down-played, denigrated and then set-aside by theorists possessed of a well-focussed ruling-class agenda.
Such theorists were
intent on showing that the oppressive and exploitative social system from which
they benefitted was either ordained of the 'gods' or was 'natural' -- predicated on, or an expression of, a hidden, 'rational' order
-- situated in a 'reality' that was itself based mysterious 'essences', which they alone were
capable of detecting. This complex web of ideas was
further motivated by the systematic fetishisation of language,
so that what had once been the product of the relation between human beings
(language) was inverted and transformed into the relation between these
invisible 'essences' and
the human 'mind' -- or, in may cases that product was transformed into those 'essences' themselves. In Hegel (and
later in DM) 'dialectical logic' --
supposedly implicit
in discourse -- thus became the logic that ran the show 'behind the backs
of the producers', as it were.
Here is Hegel again:
"This objective thinking, then, is the
content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it
standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it
is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to
employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not
external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the
absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of
pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is
without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the
creation of nature and a finite mind.
"Anaxagoras
is praised as the man who first declared that Nous,
thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be
defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual
view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic. What we are dealing with in logic is
not a thinking about
something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from
it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks
of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of
thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel
(1999), pp.50-51, §§53-54.
Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. Some
paragraphs merged. I have
reproduced the published version, since the on-line version differs from it; I
have informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. They
have now corrected the on-line version!]
"[B]ut contradiction is the
root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a
contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Ibid.,
p.439, §956. Bold emphasis added.]
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are.... Contradiction is the very
moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is
unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction
is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when
cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of
the contrariety. The proximate result of opposition (when realised as
contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference
superseded and deposited to elements in the completer notion." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence, §119.
Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
The
theoretical results of the above moves were imported into the workers' movement by
early Dialectical Marxists who appropriated ideas Hegel had himself borrowed from earlier Mystics and Idealists.
[And that remains the case whether or
not Hegel's system is left 'upside-down' or subsequently flipped the 'right way
up'.] All this was facilitated by the
unwise introduction of an age-old, ruling-class approach to language, logic
and 'cognition' by revolutionaries who thereby implicitly rejected
Marx and Engels's insistence that discourse was rooted in communal life and
arose out of collective labour, operating as a means of communication, not representation.
[More details on this
were given in Essay Nine Parts
One and
Two, which were then elaborated upon
in Essay Thirteen Part Three. They
will be further discussed in later Parts of Essay Twelve (summary
here). It is
important to add that
neither the social-, nor the representational-nature of language is being
asserted or denied as philosophical theories in this Essay. It is possible, however, to
develop an understanding of the social and communicative role of language as a
"form of representation" -- indeed, as just such a form integral to
HM -- which is
also easily expressed in ordinary language and is thereby consonant with the
experience of
working people. (The
term "form of representation" is explained
here. See also Note 18b,
and Note 19.)]
However, that topic won't be covered in this Essay.Nevertheless, it is
important to underline what
has been taken for granted at this site, that
ordinary language is "alright as it is" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein).
Having said that, it will be agued -- indeed, it will be
demonstrated --
that any attempt to undermine the
vernacular results in the inevitable production ofincoherent
non-sense on the part of anyone who
ventures down that blind alley.
The rest of
Essay Twelve (all Seven Parts) will be devoted to substantiating many of the
above rather bald, seemingly dogmatic, statements.
[The only other (seemingly viable) alternative would be to claim (alongside Chomsky) that
language is 'innate', that it isn't a social phenomenon and isn't therefore primarily a
means of communication. Despite what some revolutionaries say, there is no
way that that theory can be made consistent with Marxism -- nor can any sense be made
of it. Again, I have dealt with that specific topic at much greater length in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.
Readers are directed there for more details.]
In this respect, once more, dialecticians aren't alone. Until recently, little critical attention has
been paid to the traditional assumption that language
is primarily representational, i.e., that it first of all enables
human beings to re-present the world in "thought", in the "head", the
"mind", "consciousness", or "cognition" before communication can
even begin.18b
This
underlying assumption has rarely been questioned (again until recently): that
is, that only after language users have learnt to picture reality
to themselves are they then able to communicate their thoughts to others. That observation
also applies to those who at least
give lip service to the competing claim that the primarily role of language lies in communication
(i.e., DM-theorists). This means that, despite what
they might say, the social nature of language is
seen by the vast majority of Marxists as a consequence of the isolated (but later pooled) cognitive
resources of each individual, as an expression of their attempt to share
the 'contents' of their 'minds', their 'abstractions', with one another, not the other way round.19
As
Baz pointed out (quoted in Note 18b), theorists who
privilege the representational nature of language
tend to focus on its ability to 'reflect' the 'objective'
world in 'thought' -- or, rather, they emphasise our ability to 'reflect'
it in 'thought', mediated perhaps by language. Although social factors might bementionedin passing, the
prevailing, 'representational' theory only succeeds in undermining the role such factors play in meaning and
communication. So, if we all (naturally) 'reflect' the world (or parts of it) in our
heads, or in 'consciousness', what need is there for socialisation in the
formation of language and thought? What role can it possibly play in that
respect? That is why
Representationalists often view ordinary language as an obstacle, somethingto be 'revised', overcome, by-passed, or even undermined in the quest for
'philosophical', 'objective' or scientific truth. For such theorists, if language were
indeed social
(or conventional), philosophical -- and allegedly scientific -- notions of
'objectivity' could gain no grip. This also helps explain why Representationalists
of every stripe advance the same complaints against ordinary language and
'commonsense' -- that they both stand in the way of building an 'objective
picture of reality'.
That is also why they all invent obscure jargon,
by means of which they hope to by-pass the vernacular (and confuse those not 'in
the know').
It also explains their hostility both to OLP and Wittgenstein's work.19a
[In
addition, that approach is tantamount to conceding the point (advanced at this site) that the vernacular actually
prevents such obscure theories from being successfully constructed.]
Naturally,
this puts dialecticians in something of a bind. On
the one hand, they
can't
acknowledge
the conventional nature of language without ditching their commitment to 'objectivity';
on the other, they can't reject the conventional nature of language without compromising their
(avowed) commitment to its social nature. This dilemma, this fittingly 'contradictory'
approach to discourse (along with the
arcane and convoluted thinking it
forces on both theorists
and active revolutionaries alike as they try (unsuccessfully) to harmonise
the two competing ideas) will be examined in more
detail Essay Thirteen
Part Three. There, we will see that
these remarks also apply to
Voloshinov and
Vygotsky,
as well as those who look to them for
inspiration.
[The philosophical use of the word "objectivity" is subjected to
detailed criticism in Essay Thirteen Part One --
here. See also Note 20.]
It seems to
many (even on the revolutionary left) that here at least we have a genuine
example where private (mental) production
somehow contributes to public gain. That is because, on this view, it is the isolated activity of lone abstractors
that enables cognition, which is what supposedly creates language and hence
helps drive the social advancement
of knowledge -- but only after the resulting 'abstractions' have somehow been pooledor
shared.
The order of events, therefore,
appears to be something like the following (give or take a few additional steps,
expressed in suitably 'dialectical language' and 'tested in practice'):
(i)
Sensation;
(ii)
Abstraction;
(iii)
Representation/reflection;
(iv)
Inter-communication.
[Readers are
referred to Essay Three Parts One
and Two
for supporting evidence and argument that the above indeed forms the core
structure of
the DM-Epistemology, and in the order specified. The only thing missing is that
there is a feed-back loop that flips each lone abstractor back to Stage
(i), which is reinterpreted in light of Steps (ii), (iii) and (iv), all modified
and shaped by practice -- all clothed in dialectical jargon, as if it will
somehow 'oil the wheels of theory'.]
The fact
that inter-communication is last in the listand the most problematic
factor is something that
at least one leading dialectician has acknowledged (indeed, as noted in Essay
Three Part Two):
"What, then, is distinctive about Marx's abstractions? To begin with, it
should be clear that Marx's abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely
from the abstractions of other thinkers both then and now. There has to be a lot
of overlap. Otherwise, he would have constructed what philosophers call a
'private language,' and any communication between him and the rest of us would
be impossible. How close Marx came to fall into this abyss and what can be
done to repair some of the damage already done are questions I hope to deal
with in a later work...." [Ollman (2003),
p.63. Bold emphases added.]
Well, it remains to be seen if Professor Ollman can
solve a problem that has baffled everyone else for centuries -- that is,
of those who have even so much as acknowledged it exists!
It
is to Ollman's considerable credit, however,
that he is at least aware of it.
[In fact,
Ollman is the very first dialectician I have read (in over thirty years) who even so much as acknowledges this
'difficulty'!
[Be this as it may, I
have devoted Essays Three Part Two
and Thirteen Part Three
to an analysis of this topic; the reader is referred there for further
details. Update November 2024: After
over 21 years, there is still no sign of Ollman's 'solution' to this 'problem'.
Nor is there any indication that others have taken up the challenge on his
behalf, or that a single DM-fan (since Ollman raised this issue) even regards this as a 'difficulty'
that needs addressing!]
Hence, the
above approach
to language formation/acquisition by each user, as an individual, relegates meaning to a private
domain located in that individual's 'mind', something each one of us then brings to
language --, perhaps as an expression of their own biography or the ideological
and social
influences that constrain and shape us all. So, given this scenario, the individual,
her cognition and her abstractive skills come before social input can
even have an effect,
the latter of which is somehow then constructed out of the separate contributions we all make to an overall
'pool of meaning' and knowledge.
[In Essay Thirteen
Part Three (Section (4) onward) we will see
that this is
certainly true of the approach taken by theorists like Voloshinov and Vygotsky,
along with those influenced by them.]
Dialecticians will even speak
about ideas living in 'tension' with
one another, in our heads!
"How do
our brains and our consciousness develop? That's one of the biggest
conundrums in science, and one that Engels' work on human evolution
brings us on to. Some of the most interesting arguments came from
thinkers in revolutionary Russia, before it was crushed by Stalinist
counter-revolution in the 1920s and 30s.
Lev
Vygotsky helped develop a number of sophisticated views on how we
develop consciousness. Building on Engels' theory of how humans evolved,
he argued that language can be understood as a tool that early humans
used -- a tool that then shaped their consciousness.
"This
is important in theories of teaching. A child's ability to learn is not
predetermined by some limit in their DNA. If children are nurtured they
have the potential to achieve and to develop in ways that you couldn't
imagine.
Valentin
Voloshinov took this further. He argued that our consciousness
develops through struggle. There's a constant dynamic tension between
the ideas inside our head. Through struggle our ability to consider new
ideas increases." [Parrington
(2012), p.15. Several paragraphs merged.
It is important to note that comrade Parrington does not accept
Chomsky's view of language and mind.]
This
back-to-front theory -- which transforms ideas into agents and
humans
into
patients -- is examined in more detail in Essay
Thirteen Part Three. Suffice it to
say that Parrington's commitment to the social nature of language and thought is
fatally compromised by his
bourgeois
individualist theory of 'consciousness'.
[I am here
using the word "patient" with its older meaning, as that which is acted upon not
that which acts.]
Whatever the
aetiology, this is one idea that has
ruled in one form or another for over twenty centuries.
As we saw in Essay Three
Part Two, post-Renaissance
thinkers (Rationalists and Empiricists alike) took the public domain (where meaning is created), inverted it, and
then projected
it back into each individual head, now privatised and re-configured as the
social
relations among 'images', ideas or 'concepts'!
This resulted in the systematic
fetishisation of language and thought, leading to the conflation of the
'objective' world with the 'subjective contents' of the 'mind'. ["Fetishised",
since, as noted above, words themselves were now viewed as agents.] The outer, social
world was thus re-located and placed in each individual head, the latter seen as primary, the former as secondary
(or, in some cases, as non-existent). In this way, the social was
privatised, internalised and thereby neutralised. Knowledge thus became as
function of the social life among ideas, the battle fought out in each
head, as Parrington tried to maintain.
No wonder then that
modern philosophy soon lapsed into full-blown, overt Idealism (subjective
at first, later 'transcendental',
later still, 'objective'), with
Immanuel Kant complaining that
it was a scandal that philosophers had so far failed to prove the existence of the 'external' world!
Small
wonder, either, that Dialectical Marxists felt they had to re-invert things --
supposedly putting them 'back on their feet' -- all the while failing to
notice that their (individualist) theory of 'mind', language and 'cognition' actually prevents
this from happening.
More recently, this ruling-class thought-form
(individualism in the formation of knowledge) has re-surfaced in several novel
disguises: sometimes reduced to, and re-configured as, an inter-relationship between neurons (as
they
'communicate' with one another), supposedly controlled by the overarching
power of the gene, which now seems to operate as a sort of surrogate inner
Bourgeois
Legislative and Executive Authority; sometimes as the expression of a computational device
at work in each head (or at
least a device that helps 'the mind' write/use the 'software').
Given this view, while human beings might be
born free (of language), everywhere
they
are chained by linguistic constraints manufactured and controlled by this inner,
surrogate 'state' -- 'consciousness' --, which is a cognitive system comprised of
'modules' or 'neural
nets', dominated by the genetic inheritance of each individual). The social
doesn't even get a look in -- except perhaps as a by-product, or even as a mere
afterthought.20
The
aforementioned inversion (the political and social roots
of which will be analysed briefly below,
but more fully in Parts Two and Three of this Essay)
completely undermines the claim that language is a social phenomenon.
And no wonder: it perfectly mirrors
the bourgeois view of language and 'mind',
not Marx's view of the social nature of language and cognition.
In fact, this is
an ideological inversion that has remained upside down (but in different forms) for thousands
of years, and which is largely the source of the other 'inverted ideas'
concocted by Traditional Philosophers and Dialectical Marxists.
Inverted now, as in a camera obscura, these rotated
concepts cloud
the thoughts of all those whose brains they have colonised -- which, of course, helps
explain why the ideas of the ruling-class always rule.
In this case, among DM-fans, they have found willing
subjects, accomplices and proselytisers.
[This
recent (2023) video,
by a rather sophisticated Maoist, underlines this collective slide into
subjective Idealism. In the comment section I tried to point this out, but
that message sailed right over the heads of those so easily led astray,
including the author of the video himself!]
Nevertheless, there seems little point arguing that
language is a social phenomenon -- its key role lying in
communication -- if it is primarily representational (or, if
it is representational first, and only communicational second). If that were
the case, the social nature of language would be anterior to, if not parasitic
upon, its supposedly primary, private role. No surprise then that this
view of discourse introduces its own Robinsonades,
analogous to those that
Marx railed against in politics and economics. Except in this case, Robinsonades were
introduced to explain the supposed origin of language in each private
-- if not each socially-atomised skull --
and not just in connection with the 'social
contract' or the economy.
If there is a point to be made
here, it is
perhaps as much ideological as it is anything else: If language is primarily
representational then human beings must acquire language, meaning and knowledge
first (as social atoms) before they are capable of entering into, joining or
participating in a linguistic community.
But,
that presents this entire (neo-bourgeois) approach with intractable problems: How is it possible for anyone
to represent the world to themselves first, as an individual, and then
later use language to communicate with others? Given that
view, as far as language is concerned, each human being would be first and foremostasemantic
individual, and only
second a communicating, social being.
[That was the point of referring to
those
Robinsonades, earlier; a similar worry also lay behind
Ollman's comments.]
In fact, as is easy to show, given
this approach to language, communication would be impossible. Indeed, if it were the case
that we represent the world to ourselves first before are capable of conversing with
others, we would find ourselves
incapable of
communicating, and humanity would be, for all intents and purposes, universally autistic.
[This
point will be elaborated upon and substantiated in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Given the
representational approach, the role that communal life plays in the shaping of
language would drop out as irrelevant.
Atomistic implications like these shouldn't be lost on those cognisant of the
History of Philosophy and its relation to ruling-class interests and their
associated ideologies
(particularly as the latter were represented in thought-forms that have dominated
Traditional Philosophy since the Seventeenth Century
-- i.e., ideas that are intimately connected with
Bourgeois
Individualism).
Revolutionaries have generally resisted the idea that language is
conventional because it would seem to imply that science is conventional, too, which
would in turn threaten to undermine its 'objectivity'.21
In fact, revolutionaries have in general rejected the connection between the
conventional nature of language and the 'objectivity' of science with arguments
that have only
succeeded in undermining both. Either that, or they have simply assumed
that conventionalism must always collapse into relativism or some form of Idealism.22
However, the truth here is the exact opposite: it is the rejection of the
conventional nature of language and science that compromises both. How and why
that is so will be explained briefly below, but in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Two. In this Essay, I propose only to examine the
connection between the above considerations and Metaphysics.
If
language is a social phenomenon, then, clearly, what human beings say or write
must be guided by normative
conventions that govern discourse in general, if they are to make sense. That is
why it isn't possible to utter absolutely anything, make random noises,
and hope to be understood. Naturally, scientific language will have its own specialist
and technical
protocols layered on top, over-and-above or in place of, the ordinary conventions underlying
use of the
vernacular. In addition, this entire ensemble will change and develop in accord
with wider social and historical forces.
But one thing is reasonably clear: if language is to be a means of communication, whatever lends sense to its empirical propositions must be independent of
(and prior to) any truths they supposedly express.23
If that weren't so, language users would have to know whether
an empirical proposition was true before they could understand it!
That is patently absurd
since no one
could assent to the truth, let alone repudiate the falsehood, of a proposition before
they had first comprehended it. Indeed, as seems obvious, if they failed to
understand what was said, they couldn't even begin finding out whether or not it was true.24
Plainly,
this connects the social nature of language with the
earlier discussion of propositions like M1a-M9. There, we saw that in the case of
ordinary empirical propositions (like M6), it is possible to understand them before
their truth-status is known:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
The
overwhelming majority of English language speakers will understand M6 on hearing or reading it -- providing, of course, they know who Tony Blair
is
and that The Algebra of Revolution is a book -- even if they haven't a
clue whether it is true or whether it is false (or, indeed, whether or not they
ever find out which of these is the case, or even care to know which is the
case). Communication (at least with respect to the conveying of information)
would cease if that weren't so.
After all, how would
anyone be able to convey their thoughts to someone else if that individual had to
ascertain that what was said to them was true before they could
understand it? How could they even go about discovering its truth if they hadn't
the faintest idea what they
were being told?
By way of contrast, it was
also argued that with respect to
metaphysical/DM-propositions things are radically different: understanding a
proposition like M9 is of a piece with knowing it is true. To reject it as
false would amount to changing the meaning of "matter" and/or "motion".
Why that is so will be explained later on in this Essay, but it is
intimately connected
with the status of P4:
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
These two
alternatives hang together: to understand M9 is ipso facto to
accept it as true; to reject M9 as false is to change the meaning of some of its key terms.
We are now in a position to understand
why
that is so.
If,
per impossible, the sense of an empirical proposition were dependent
on truth, or, indeed, on other truths (which would themselves have to be expressed
by still
further propositions), they, too, would have to be
understood first before their truth-status could be ascertained. If not,
then it would plainly be impossible to determine their truth-status. Once again, it
isn't possible to ascertain the truth of a proposition before it has
been
comprehended.
[CNS = Central Nervous System.]
So, if,
per impossible, the sense of an empirical proposition were
dependent on knowing still further truths, on knowing the facts of the matter, or
even on some form of
Ontology,
this process, or hierarchy, of dependency (of facts upon further facts, upon
further facts,
upon...) couldn't continue indefinitely. There appear to be
only two ways an infinite regress
[henceforth, IR] like this can be avoided (in such circumstances)
as language users learn to employ it (in what follows I have left the word 'truths'
deliberately vague
so that several options aren't closed off from the start):
(1)
Language users must have -- or have had programmed -- in their 'minds'/brains a 'set of truths'
(possibly even a 'set of rules') that aren't themselves expressed in, or
expressible by, empirical propositions. That is, such speakers must have direct access to
what can only be called 'non-linguistic truths', or maybe even a set of 'linguistic
rules' that have been 'hard-wired' into the CNS -- perhaps written in a 'code'
of some sort (which, paradoxically, wouldn't be a code or the above IR would simply kick in again;
why that is so is explained in Note 25).25
Or:
(2) The
'truths' upon which the sense of empirical propositions depend must be
'necessary truths', whose own truth can't be questioned (hence the word
"necessary"), and whose
semantic status follows directly
from the meaning of the words or concepts they contain, but not from still further truths. In other
words, these 'necessary truths' act rather like the buffers at the end of a
railway line. The buck
stops there -- at least in terms of semantic status.
Figure One: Are Buffers Necessary
To Halt A Train-Of-Thought?
Unfortunately, as we will soon see, 'necessary truths'
themselves have no
sense and are incapable of being either true or false (so, they incapable of
acting like literal or metaphorical buffers, too). That will, of course, rule
out Option (2).
Anyway, Option (2) concedes
an earlier point -- that meaning has to precede truth -- since the truth-status of such 'necessarily' true propositions follows from
the meaning of their constituent terms. In that case, there would be no
good reason to postulate the existence of such 'necessary' truths in order to
lend support to the opposite idea -- that meaning in the end depends on truth, not
truth on meaning -- since,
as seems plain, Option (2) relies on the fact that meaning is sui generis,
and hence that truth depends on meaning, after all.
With respect to
Option (1), as we will also
discover, the idea that there could be sets of 'non-linguistic truths' (or
'rules') in nature (whether we are aware of them or not) that govern the sense
of propositions is based on an ancient dogma -- that Nature is Mind, the product of Mind, constituted by Mind, or that it
is in fact Ideal (i.e., it is comprised of Ideas "all the way down", as it were).
In this
particular case, this overall theory originally traded on the (quasi-religious) belief that language itself is governed by:
(i) Nature's
own 'pre-linguistic ideas' (perhaps those that pre-exist in the 'Mind of God',
or which are expressed in physical form, somewhere, somehow); or by,
(ii)
Physical 'laws' of some sort;
and hence that it is the intelligent or rational universe
(or, indeed, its ultimate originating, supernatural cause)
that lends to human
discourse the meaning it has. Meaning is thereby alienated.
As should now seem obvious, this set of
ideas meshes seamlessly with certain forms of Representationalism,
for, given this approach,
human beings
represent meaning to themselves automatically and naturally (by means of
principles 'programmed' into us 'lawfully' by 'God', nature or even by evolution).
On this view, meaning is once again created in
each individual human being, as if each one were a social or linguistic atom.
Hence, on
this account, meaning is a 'natural', not a social, phenomenon.
[The
above ideas are explored at greater length in Essays Three
Part Two and Thirteen
Part Three.]
In fact,
more-or-less the same comment could be made in
relation to the idea that language is governed by rules that are genetically
programmed in
the CNS. This would,
of course, make such 'rules' part of the 'rational structure' of the universe,
only now more widely understood. However, as we will see (mainly in Essay Thirteen
Part Three), that idea would only be acceptable if we
were prepared to anthropomorphise the brain, and
view it as intelligent,rather than human beings.
Intelligence is thereby alienated.
The
(traditional) view of discourse is now also based on the (suppressed) premise that
language users rely on 'intelligent' neurons that 'communicate' with each other, sending
and carrying 'messages' to various areas of the body, or to one
another. They are the linguists; we merely bend to their 'will'. This
further implies that 'intelligent' neurons (or 'modules') decide for each language user what their words mean,
and it is this that enables their brains to mirror the outside world.
In addition,
as a sort of spin-off, the above would help explain how we
end up using language that suggests nature itself is intelligent/'rational',
and is the source of our intelligence/rationality.
If nature is (simply) assumed to be rational then the language we use
(if viewed this way) will only seem to confirm that assumption.
So, this
entire approach implies
that language, or something pre-linguistic -- alongside the neurons/modules underlying one or both
-- are
the agents here, we are the patients. In turn,
it ends up fetishising the products of social interaction as if
they (a) mirrored the
real relation among things, (b) represented or reflected the real relation
between intelligent neurons/modules, or (c) are those things themselves
(to paraphrase Marx).
In short, thisconfuses the
means by which we
represent the
world with the world itself.
[The liberal use of
obscure jargon, inappropriate analogies, opaque and misleading metaphors,
countless neologisms
and 'scare' quote encrusted words by those who attempt to give
concrete expression to this ideological inversion (i.e., that nature is the agentwhile human beings are the patient, at least with respect to the meaning of words)
rather gives the game away, one feels.]26
Naturally, philosophers of a more 'robust' theoretical
temperament (for want of a better term) might be inclined to rejected responses like this (for all manner of reasons), arguing that there
must be physical or causal laws of some sort governing the way human beings form
empirical propositions or sentences,
or which give meaning to the words they use --, concluding, perhaps, that
our understanding of language should be 'naturalised' accordingly.26a
First, we
have as yet no idea what such 'laws' would evenlook like, let
alone what they are.
Second, this account of the origin and nature of language
would simply reduplicate the 'problem' it was meant to solve. There is and could be no
conceivable 'law' (or set of 'laws') capable of doing all that is claimed
for 'it' (or 'them') which doesn't at the same time anthropomorphise nature, or read into it the very linguistic
categories it was originally introduced to explain.27
Third, if language is a product of,
or has been caused by, a set of laws (that allows users to acquire language in
order
picture the world to themselves -- i.e., if discourse is fundamentally representational) then reference to its
social nature will, of course, be an empty gesture. As noted above,
Marxists who have been seduced into accepting one or other version of the above
'robust view' -- as a result perhaps of their unwise adherence concepts promoted
in and by DM (originating, for instance, with Lenin and what he had to say in
MEC) concerning the nature of cognition, or,
perhaps, ideas based on
Chomsky
and/or
Quine's work --
have universally failed to appreciate this anti-Marxist corollary.28
Finally, but more importantly, another implication of the idea that
understanding language is at some point parasitic on truth (as set out
in Option (1) and Option
(2) from earlier) is that if, per impossible,
that were the case,
paradoxically, it couldn't be the case. That is because this way of viewing
discourse gets things the wrong way round (i.e., the supposed relation here has once
again been inverted). As we have seen, the establishment of the truth-value of a proposition is
consequent on its already having been understood. Humans do not first
appropriate or ascertain 'truths' and then proceed to comprehend them. Both communication
and representation would be impossible if that were so.29
On the contrary, as was also pointed out
earlier, if the sense of a proposition weren't
independent of its actual truth-value, then, plainly, the mere fact that
a proposition had been understood would entail it was true, or, as the case may
be, it would entail
that it was
false! Naturally, if either
alternative
were viable, linguistic or psychological factors would determine the
truth-status of
empirical propositions and science would become little more than a branch of
hermeneutics.29a
Hence, given the above 'inverted' approach, as soon as a proposition had been understood,
its truth (or its falsehood) could be inferred automatically. Clearly, that
would destroy the distinction between empirical and non-empirical propositions,
for, on such a basis,
as soon as anyone understood M6, for example, they would know it was true,
or they would know it was false.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
Evidence either way would thus become irrelevant
in such cases.
In this way,
we can see how representationalism requires all indicative sentences to be of
the same logical form (whether or not that was
immediately obvious). At some point, given representationalism, all indicative
sentences
would be, or would depend on, a 'necessary truth' or set of such 'truths' --
or, as the case may be, they would be,or would depend on, a 'necessary
falsehood' or set of such 'falsehoods' -- which
would 'reflect' in our 'minds' how
things must be and can't be thought of as otherwise -- i.e., that their
'opposites' are
"unthinkable".
And, that is why this view of language, knowledge and 'mind' so
naturally aligns itself with aprioristic dogmatism, with the idea that
fundamental truths about nature are accessible to thought alone, and
which as a result can safely be imposed on reality.
Hence, if M6
ultimately depends on a necessary truth of some sort, or if it is a disguised
necessary truth itself (that is, in relation to M6, if, despite
'appearances to the contrary', Blair had absolutely no choice, his ownership of TAR was determined by the operation
of a 'necessary law' of some sort (maybe, a là DM), or by the unfolding of his 'concept'
(perhaps, a là Hegel), by his implicit predicates (possibly, a là Leibniz), or
even by 'God' (could be, a là
Calvin)), then ultimately its
truth would be ascertainable without any need for supporting evidence. All one would
need do is 'comprehend' the associated indicative sentence/'law', or the
'concepts' supposedly expressed, for it/them to be deemed automatically true.
[Naturally, that
would make falsehood difficult, if not impossible, to explain. Why that is so is
reasonably obvious -- for those to whom it might not seem all that obvious, the answer is hinted at
below. A much
fuller explanation will be set out in in Essay Three Part Four, where it will be
argued that this theory also implies there can't be any false propositions!
Until that Essay is published, the argument supporting this controversial claim
has been summarised here.
See also Essay Eleven Part One,
here.]
As
should now seem plain, this theory, or family of theories, implies that scientific
knowledge is based on some form of LIE; that is, it is founded on the
belief that truths about
the world may legitimately follow solely from language or 'thought'. The 'mind', when it
'reflects
the world', would merely be reflecting itself, or even the
thoughts of a more grandiose version of
itself -- perhaps even a 'Cosmic Mind' in 'self-development' -- because,
on this view,
the world is either 'Mind' or it is the product of 'self-developing Mind'.
[The last of the above was, of course,
the conclusion Hegel himself drew. It is revealing,
therefore, to discover that the same result follows from the alleged 'inversion'
of Hegel, in DM.]
Apriorism and
LIE thus go hand-in-hand
-- indeed, as George Novack argued:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Small
wonder then that Marx connected Philosophy with religious mysticism:
"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis
and link added.]
Fortunately, this way of looking at language and knowledge
is undermined by
the vernacular itself -- which is, perhaps, one reason why
Marx himself recommended
a different approach.30
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in
consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring
independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with
these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the
systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and
that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German
petty-bourgeois conditions. The
philosophers have only to dissolve
their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order
to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that
they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases
alone added.]
In that case, whatever lends sense to empirical propositions (i.e.,
whatever sets the conditions under which they are true or under
which they are false) can't itself be a set of antecedent truths. Neither could it be a set of
ex post factotruths
(that is, truths established, or recognised as such, at a later stage).
In contrast, since the socially-motivated rules governing our
ordinary use of language are incapable of being true or false, they
aren't subject to the above constraints. [These points will be explained more fully below
and then defended.]
The above constraints also apply to scientific language
--
that is,
if it is also to function as a
means of communication (and, derivatively, as a means of representation).[On that, see Note 31 and Note 33. But this particular topic will be
covered in much greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
[The
following material used to form part of Note 31.]
Given the above considerations, we can
now add the following remark: whatever lends sense to empirical, scientific propositions,
it can't
be a set of truths, either. If the sense of an empirical proposition were dependent on
just such a set, scientists would only be able to understand one another after
they had ascertained, or learnt the truth-status of, this extra set. In which case, of course, they couldn't
be learnt. Clearly, there are no propositions by means of which this could be
achieved that
are exempt from the above constraints.313233
If
the sense of an empirical proposition or indicative factual sentence were dependent on
the truth of a further set of propositions or, indeed, other sentences of the same type,
comprehension and hence communication could only be achieved
at the endof each individual's education. [Which couldn't be delivered to each
aspiring student, plainly because they wouldn't
understand anything said to them until the end.] Hence,
their education couldn't even commence until mastery had been achieved of these
further 'truths', which would be required at the very beginning so that each one
could grasp the sense
of even one of
the propositions that expressed these elusive 'extra truths' -- each of
which would in turn require the same stage-setting, which
is
absurd.
[Notice, I have
spoken about the sense of these propositions as opposed to their truth-value.
This is an
important distinction to keep in mind in order to understand the points made in the
first half of Note 31.
More on that as this sub-section unfolds.]
So, if the sense of an indicative sentence, S1,
for example, were dependent on the truth of another sentence, S2, then in order to
understandS1 (NB,
not in order to ascertain theactual truth of S1), the
truth of S2
would have to be known, first. But, in order to ascertain the actual truth of
S2 (NB, not in order to grasp its truth-conditions), it, too, would also have
to be understood first. [Plainly, as noted several times already: it isn't
possible even to begin ascertaining the truth of a sentence one hasn't already
understood.]
However, if the sense of S2
were itself dependent on the truth of yet another sentence, S3, then the truth of S3 would have to be known,
too. But, in order to ascertain the truth of S3,
it, too, would have to be understood, first -- and so on, ad infinitem...
Hence, if this
approach to scientific knowledge were to be believed, in order to understand
any sentence the truth of a potentially infinite set of sentences -- {S2,
S3, S4,...,
Sn}
--
would already have to be known. In that case, communication would only begin at the
(infinite?) end of one's education, which makes no sense at all.
[There
seem to be only two
ways this infinite regress can be halted; they were discussed
earlier and
were both shown to fail.]
It could be objected that the above reasoning depends on an appeal
to human understanding. Surely, a scientific account of language
should consider only objective truths, which will be such independently
of human cognition. In that case, the above argument is
misguided, at best.
Or so it might be
maintained...
That
objection is itself misconceived. Plainly, scientists have to understand their
own sentences and those of other researchers, let alone those of their teachers,
if they are to function effectively -- or at all! To state the obvious, scientists are social beings;
they are only able to develop their ideas, construct their theories and
hypotheses, and then test them when the
empirical propositions that follow from them are
expressed, or are expressible, in a comprehensible form, in some language or other.
Even supposing such theories,
hypotheses and propositions were highly technical and were related to
a world that is independent of, and anterior to, human cognition, scientists
can neither rise above nor countermand the constraints placed on them by social
interaction and learning (briefly outlined above).
[More details can be found in Stroud (2000), particularly
pp.21-60.]
As we have seen several times
already, the supposition
that this can be done (i.e., that this even presents
a possibility) relies on a fetishisation of language: the reading
of human cognitive and social capacities into nature. That clearly defeats the
whole point of the exercise; far from avoiding LIE, it collapses right
into it.
Nevertheless,
for some
readers, the above rejoinder might itself look like an a priori,
transcendental argument, but
that, too, would be a mistake. When spelled-out
in detail it is analogous to reductio, as should be plain from all that
has gone before. [There will be more on this again in Essay Thirteen
Parts Two and Three.]
Such a reductive technique has been employed many times throughout this site.
On those occasions, metaphysical-, and DM-theories have been reduced to absurdity -- for example, by demonstrating that they
either imply an infinite
regress, as we have just seen, or that they are based on a radical misuse of language
--, which means, of course, that they are incapable of being
true and incapable of being false. As such, they aren't just non-sensical,
they are incoherent non-sense.
Naturally,
any and all analyses
of this sort (presented in these Essays) is reactive, if not therapeutic.
[On that, see Fischer (2011a, 2011b).] They aren't aimed at the derivation of
a new set of truths
about language (or even the world itself), nor are they directed at the construction of an alternative
set of philosophical theories. They simply respond to the claims
made by metaphysicians and DM-supporters alike, just as they endeavour to expose
the latent non-sense expressed by both sets of theorists. Their main
objective (other than their overt political orientation) is to remind us of what we already know
by constantly turning the argument back toward the ordinary use of
language -- indeed, as
Marx
himself enjoined. Any technicalities or
neologisms employed to that end are dispensable
or can be paraphrased away;
they merely serve as shorthand.
Even so, whatever
its motivation happens to be, the above argument
might still appear to be, at least, factually wrong, for it is plain
that when they are studying science, students, for example, have to learn countless
facts before they
can even begin to understand the subject. Hence, an understanding
of science is manifestly based on the acquisition of a body of truths,
data and information --
contrary to the clams advanced earlier.
Or so it could be objected, once more...
That picture is
also misleading.
First of all, a
broad understanding science isn't the same as understanding
an empirical proposition.
Second, science and mathematics are taught and learnt in a variety of ways, but novices must first have some grasp of ordinary
language, everyday skills and techniques beforetheir scientific
and
mathematical educationcan even commence. These include the ability
to count, listen, concentrate, follow instructions (basic skills, alas,
beyond some students in the present capitalist system!), read, write, handle
equipment reliably without breaking, misusing or misreading it, check dials, take notes, operate a computer,
and (often later) carry out independent research, etc., etc. If students are to progress
beyond Science and Mathematics 101, these skills must also be amplified
by careful attention to detail, an emphasis on accuracy and precision, coupled
with a suitable 'work ethic'; they must also display 'natural' curiosity,
resourcefulness, self-motivation and a willingness to study (independently) way beyond the
subject matter in hand. The vast majority of these skills are based on knowing how rather than
knowing that -- although the latter will in turn modify the former, and
vice versa. Their understanding is then extended by means of
illustrative examples, analogical and metaphorical reasoning, augmented by leading questions -- all of which are
themselves modulated by the setting of (numerous) practical exercises, the use of simple
models, pictures and graded tasks, among many other things. Only when an extension
to their vocabulary, understanding and mastery of practical skills like
these have been
established are
students capable of comprehending -- as opposed merely to regurgitating -- any of
the new facts, explanations or theories
they encounter, or which are presented to them by their teachers. Indeed, only
then are they able to extrapolate beyond this into new areas of knowledge (even
if many do not choose to go down that route). All of these are presented to students by
their teachers as integral aspects of
countless
inter-linked forms of representation -- rules which are used to interpret
any
facts learnt, unifying them into a comprehensible explanation that also conforms
with other areas of current knowledge -- or, "normal
science" as
Thomas
Kuhn has called it.
[I will say more about this
below, where I outline a distinction Wittgenstein drew between "criteria"
and "symptoms".]
This means that
any novel
truths or facts learnt by students depend on (and are concurrent with) an extension to
their
understanding, practical expertise and technical competence. As
should seem obvious, unless
students understand what their teachers have to say -- or, unless they
succeed in grasping
the import of what they read or study --, and only if they are capable of successfully carrying out
the graded tasks and exercises set, new facts could only ever be accepted as
such on
trust or on the basis of deference to authority. If students are to advance beyond the
parrot-learning and regurgitating stage, they must undergo an extension to their
comprehension. Indeed, if education were just about fact learning, no
facts would actually be learnt, merely parroted. That is why, of course, the word
"learning" is attached to the word "rote" only ironically.
[To be sure,
some forms of rote-learning are an integral part of the mastery of
several specific techniques -- for example, learning the "Times Tables"
in mathematics -- or when preparing for an exam, when attempting to follow
directions in order to find an address in a strange town, etc., etc. If the
aforementioned Times Tables haven't been leant by heart, a student's
mathematical education will be seriously impaired, if not crippled. The use of
electronic calculators doesn't mean that necessary step can
be bi-passed, either (as any mathematics teacher will attest,
a view also supported by
educational research). The above doesn't imply that facts are unimportant or that
they don't assist in further comprehension. Indeed,
as argued earlier, learning of any sort
depends on one or more "webs of belief". However, further excursion into this area would take us too far
afield into Wittgenstein's ideas about the nature of human understanding and
learning. An excellent account of that aspect of his work can be found in Greenspan
and Shanker (2004); cf., also Williams (1999a), pp.187-215, Williams (2010), and Erneling (1993).
See also Robinson (2003b) and Hanna and Harrison (2004), especially pp.159-90.]
This is, indeed, partly
how scientific advance itself is motivated and initiated -- i.e., by means of an extension to the meaning of the words used in other,
possibly similar, maybe even analogous contexts and practices (alongside the
establishment of new inter-relationships between them), as I hope to show in Essay Thirteen
Part Two.
In this way, 'old' facts are set in a new light and novel connections become
possible --, which, in effect, change these 'facts' by analogical and figurative extension. [On this, see Sharrock and Read (2002)
and the work of
Thomas
Kuhn in general. Cf., also Hadden
(1994).]
This also takes care of the objection that if
this were true -- that is,
only if a proposition were part of a body of propositions
would it be possible to ascertain its truth-value --, speakers wouldn't be able to understand what was said to them until they had mastered an
entire language. As education and socialisation grows, so does
comprehension of language itself (and that includes an understanding of science, too). Neither takes precedence.
There
is also a "division of labour" with respect to science, and, indeed, knowledge
in general, as the late
Hilary
Putnam, for example, pointed out:
"[T]here is division of linguistic labour. We could hardly use such words as
'elm' and 'aluminium' if no one possessed a way of recognizing elm trees and
aluminium metal; but not everyone to whom the distinction is important has to be
able to make the distinction. Let us shift the example; consider gold. Gold is
important for many reasons: it is a precious metal; it is a monetary metal; it
has symbolic value (it is important to most people that the 'gold' wedding ring
they wear really consist of gold and not just look gold); etc. Consider our
community as a 'factory': in this 'factory' some people have the 'job' of
wearing gold wedding rings; other people have the 'job' of selling gold wedding
rings; still other people have the job of telling whether or not something is
really gold. It is not at all necessary or efficient that every one who wears a
gold ring (or a gold cufflink, etc.), or discusses the 'gold standard,' etc.,
engage in buying and selling gold. Nor is it necessary or efficient that every
one who buys and sells gold be able to tell whether or not something is really
gold in a society where this form of dishonesty is uncommon (selling fake gold)
and in which one can easily consult an expert in case of doubt. And it is
certainly not necessary or efficient that every one who has occasion to buy or
wear gold be able to tell with any reliability whether or not something is
really gold.
"The foregoing facts are just examples of mundane division of labour (in a wide
sense). But they engender a division of linguistic labour: every one to whom
gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word 'gold'; but he does not
have to acquire the method of recognizing whether something is or is not gold.
He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. The features that are generally
thought to be present in connection with a general name -- necessary and
sufficient conditions for membership in the extension, ways of recognizing
whether something is in the extension, etc. -- are all present in the linguistic
community considered as a collective body; but that collective body divides the
'labour' of knowing and employing these various parts of the 'meaning' of
'gold'. This division of linguistic labour rests upon and presupposes the division of
nonlinguistic labour, of course. If only the people who know how to tell whether
some metal is really gold or not have any reason to have the word 'gold' in
their vocabulary, then the word 'gold' will be as the word 'water' was in 1750
with respect to that subclass of speakers, and the other speakers just won't
acquire it at all. And some words do not exhibit any division of linguistic
labour: 'chair', for example. But with the increase of division of labour in the
society and the rise of science, more and more words begin to exhibit this kind
of division of labour." [Putnam
(1973), pp.704-05. (This links to a PDF.) Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK
English; several paragraphs merged.]
[Putnam was a Marxist, once, which perhaps helps explain the economic metaphor/analogy
he drew here. I distance myself, however, from his theory of
meaning/reference. I will say more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
To state the
obvious, if a student wishes to become proficient in any of the specialised areas of science, for example, he or she will have to master the
technical use of such terms as "electron", "allele", "self-adjoint operator",
"wave function", "base pair", "subduction zone",
"aldehyde", and the like.
Incidentally, this helps explain why new theories often look
plausible only to those prepared to move into the new conceptual
landscape carved out by any such novel theories (i.e., 'forms of
representation'), practices, vocabularies or "world-views" (even if they are motivated by
differentially-situated class-inspired, or, indeed, class-biased reactions
to social change in tandem with any associated ideologies), while to others who
aren't so amenable/flexible, or who are more, shall we say, conservative-minded,
novel developments like these will
seem paradoxical,
ridiculous
or even patently false. This also explains why older members of the
scientific community find it much more difficult to accept new conceptual landscapes.
Indeed, to them they will often
appear to be totally false, absurd, or even incomprehensible.
This fact alone would be inexplicable if science advanced by
the mere accumulation of facts or was predicated on the development of greater and
greater 'abstractions'.
This also
helps account for the way that new theories not only (partially, or even completely)
change 'our view of the world' -- by modifying the language we use to
depict, understand, or interact with it. Often that is done by feeding off discourse and vocabularies that have already been altered
or reshaped
by social and economic development elsewhere -- an
example of which is given below
(in relation to the work of Richard Hadden). Novel theories enable new
discoveries that had been unavailable to those whose ideas are still dominated
or held fast by older theories/world-views. [There is an excellent description of this
very process at work
today, in Smolin (2006),
although the author, I think, fails to see its significance.]
In addition,
the above considerations link scientific advance to conceptual
change -- i.e., to changes in the use of a range of general
terms -- motivated by, and coupled with, developments in the
ambient
Mode of
Production, and hence in connection with innovative areas of research that
have been promoted or enabled by such changes. Both
of these factors locate and place such
developments in the open, in thesocial arena, thus removing them from
the world of 'inner representations' and 'abstractions' beloved of traditional
'abstractionist' and/or representationalist theories of language and knowledge, and that includes
those held by DM-theorists.
[On this, see Note 32 as well as Essay
Thirteen
Parts Two and Three.]
As
far as Marxism is concerned, this theoretical re-orientation allows an
HM-account to be given of the entire
process. For example, as Richard Hadden (in Hadden (1994)) shows, developments in medieval society
(mainly concerning the growth of market relations) motivated the establishment of
innovative
conceptual connections between specific general nouns -- the possible
relation between which had either made no sense in earlier centuries with different
Relations of
Production and Exchange -- and were thus of no use to anyone because they were
regarded as incommensurable (often for the same reason), and hence weren't
capable of being connected by analogy.
Social
Constructivists
have also more generally explored the close connection that exists between linguistic innovation
and scientific change, but, as far as I am aware, there has been no
serious attempt made by Marxists (other than, perhaps,
Hadden (1994) and Robinson (2003) -- but see also
Robinson's essays, posted at this site and those referenced
earlier) to link these
developments with changes in the Relations of Production, or to innovative
conceptual possibilities that became available because of the emergence of
a new Mode of
Production.
However, in
general,
Social Constructivists lack a scientific
account of history (i.e.,
HM) to provide their piecemeal theories with an overall
structure, direction and rationale.
[Nevertheless, for a clear survey of work accomplished in
this area, up until recently, see Golinski (1998). These issues will be discussed in more
detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
See also Note 32, Note 33,
Note 40a, and Note 45a, below.]
Finally, if the sense of
empirical (scientific) propositions were dependent on certain truths about the
world -- so that, for example, their comprehension implied they were automatically true --, that would mean that
scientists could abandon experimentation and simply take up linguistic analysis.
Science would then become indistinguishable from Metaphysics, or, indeed, from
LIE.
In that case, the simple expedient of understanding an empirical proposition would
automatically mean that that proposition was true.34
Naturally, this ratifies the claim (surely uncontroversial for Marxists) that scientific language is,
like the vernacular, conventional.
Admittedly, these ideas are controversial.35
They appear to imply that science isn't 'objective'. However,
that belief is itself based on a misconception.
[As noted earlier, this
entire topic will be addressed in
more detail in Essay
Thirteen Part Two. Readers are also referred to important remarks made about
'objectivity' in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
The above claims are
in fact a consequence of a commitment to the social nature of language. They
can't be swept under the 'dialectical carpet', or negotiated away without seriously
undermining that fundamental Marxist insight.36
Hence, the rest of this Essay will be devoted to:
(i) Explaining in more detail why the above conclusions are valid; and,
We are now in a position
to understand what went wrong with Lenin's claim (expressed in M1a) and thereby explain
why it is that certain indicative sentences (i.e., especially those that litter
metaphysical systems and theories) lapse so readily into non-sense, with some
even collapsing into incoherence.36a
[Much of
what follows in this short sub-section depends heavily on results established
earlier.]
As argued above, this problem
(if such it might be called) is connected with the use of what appear to beempirical
sentences to state 'necessary truths' (or even to exclude their logical opposites
as 'necessarily false'). Unfortunately, such moves end up distorting fundamental
features of language, rendering metaphysical sentences non-sensicaland incoherent.
Exactly why that is
so has yet to be explained.
The supposed truth of metaphysical sentences follows
directly from
the meaning of the words they contain (which why no supporting evidence, other
than linguistic, is required). As a result Traditional Theorists claim
to be able access, in the comfort of their own 'minds', Cosmic Super-Facts that
supposedly reflect
fundamental truths about 'Reality'. Metaphysics thus goes hand-in-hand with representational theories of language and thought.
Moreover, as
also noted above (and as we saw
here),
this entire way of viewing meaning and language inverts, and then internalises,
externally-ratified social practices (i.e., comprehension and
communication), re-configuring them as private, individual acts of intellection,
which are supposedly 'immediate to
consciousness', etc.
So, given this view, meaning isn't a
social aspect of discourse it is a direct result of the internal processing of
'images', 'ideas', 'concepts' and 'abstractions' in and by the 'mind', integrated
or coupled these days
(according to some) with the supposed use of "inner speech"
--, or, even more recently, as a component in the 'language of thought'.
Plainly, this is a
thoroughly bourgeois
way of viewing language, thought and meaning, an accusation that has itself
been further amplified by an
earlier allegation
that this area of contemporary Cognitive Theory -- and the 'Dialectical Philosophy of
Mind' -- haven't advanced much beyond the ideas and methods concocted by
Hobbes,
Descartes
and Locke.
Alas, DM-theorists
have also bought into this way of 'doing philosophy', and have thereby failed to appreciate how
it completely undermines their commitment to the social nature of language, meaning and
knowledge, just as they failed to see that this approach to 'cognition'
doesn't even deliver what had all along been claimed for it.37
In his
endeavour to inform his readers about the supposed relation between matter and motion, Lenin
asserted that "motion without matter" is "unthinkable". Unfortunately, the
content of that assertion involved him in doing the exact
opposite of what he claimed could not be done. That meant he had to
think the very thoughts (i.e., the content of what) he was trying to rule out as "unthinkable".
Clearly, he had to
understand what it meant for motion to exist without matter so that he could
rule it out as something that could
ever be entertained -- otherwise he would have had no idea what it was he
was excluding, rendering that exclusion an empty gesture. Unfortunately, that involved him in a radically non-standard use of
language, which meant he was unable to say what he thought he wanted
to say. In
practice his own words implied the opposite of what he imagined he
intended.
In fact, this suggests that there wasn't actually anything there
for Lenin to have intended to say or to have thought. That is because it isn't possible to say (in one sense of "say") anything meaningful
that is in principle incomprehensible -- even when that 'something' is
incomprehensible to the one trying to say it. While
a speaker might utter complete babble, it isn't possible for them to mean
anything by it (unless, of course, it is part of an elaborate code or it is
aimed at simply creating an effect of some sort, such as eliciting surprise, puzzlement
or consternation). One might
intend to utter babble, but
not intend to mean anything comprehensible by it (if the above trivial examples are
excluded).38
With respect to sentences like M1a, it now becomes impossible say
what it was that Lenin intended to communicate to his readers. Every attempt to
translate his words in less confusing terms only seems to have further undermined them.
Hence, it is pertinent to wonder what (if anything) Lenin could
possibly have meant by what he said.39
We have already encountered similarly incoherent DM-claims (for
example,
in connection with 'dialectical logic',
Trotsky's attempt to critique
the LOI, Engels's 'analysis' of the
'contradictory' nature of
motion, Lenin's claim
that everything is "self-moving"
and "interconnected",
TAR's effort to
explain
DM-Wholism, among many other
topics).
This regular and unrelenting slide into unintelligibility isn't just bad luck.
It is a direct
result of the careless use, and reckless distortion, of language, among other
factors (such as interpreting claims (like the one expressed in M1a) as
super-empirical propositions that purport to reveal fundamental
truths about reality,
when they turn out to be nothing
of the sort).39a
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
An empirical proposition derives its
sense from the truth
possibilities it appears to hold open, which options can then be decided one
way or the other by a confrontation with the evidence. That is why the actual truth-value of, say, M6 (or
its contradictory, M6a) doesn't need to be known before it is understood,
but it is also why evidence is relevant to establishing one or the other: its truth-value as
"true" or its truth-value as "false".
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
All that is required here is some grasp of the
same possibility that both of the above hold open. M6 and M6a both have the
same content, and are both made
true or false by the same situation obtaining or failing to obtain.40
When a proposition and its negation
picture the same state of affairs they have
the same content, which is what connects the two and makes one of them the
contradictory of the
other. If that weren't so, they wouldn't be contradictories,
for there would be nothing (relevant to both) that linked them. One of them has
to be capable of being used to deny what the other one can be used to assert,
and vice versa. If they failed to 'overlap' in this way, they couldn't be used
in this way, to
contradict/gainsay each other. So, if a given proposition is true, the state of affairs it
expresses will obtain; if it is false, the same state of affairs won't obtain.
[Of course, what constitutes a specific
or relevant state of affairs will be intimately
connected with the
propositions involved. I will leave that gnomic remark in its currently obscure
form, but I will say more in Essay Thirteen Part Two -- but the reasons for this
should become a little clearer as this Essay unfolds.]
These factors enable us to know what to look for or what to expect
in order to ascertain whether
the proposition in question is true or, indeed, declare it
false (if we are so minded).
This is just another way of saying that negation does not alter the content
of an empirical proposition. If negation could alter content -- or,
as we will see, if negation seemed to be able to do this -- then the sentences involved can't have been empirical,
or, alternatively, can't have been contradictories, to begin with.
[The significance of those
remarks will become clearer as this Essay unfolds. But, it should be clear that
that paragraph, if correct, strikes at the very heart of Hegel's theory of
negation, and by implication at the core of DM, too.]
Consider again the following two empirical propositions:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
The same situation obtaining --
i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of M6 or M6a true, the
other false. If Blair does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false;
if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate
intertwining of the truth-values of M6 and M6a is a direct
consequence of the same state of affairs linking them.
If a given speaker didn't know that M6 was
true (and hence that M6a was false) just in case Blair owned a copy of the said book,
and that M6 was false (but M6a was true) just in case Blair didn't own a
copy of the said book -- or they were unable to determine or recognise what to look for, or to expect, if they wanted to ascertain the truth-value of M6
or M6a -- that would be prima facie
evidence they didn't understand either or both of M6 and M6a. These two
sentences stand or fall
together. If one of them stands (as true), the other falls (as false), and vice versa.
This might seem an obvious point, but its ramifications are
all too easily missed, and have been missed by the vast majority of Philosophers.
[More on
that in these references and much
of the rest of this Essay (especially here
and Note 45a).]
Of course, it could be argued that:
(1)
Owning or not owning a book is a complex social fact; and,
Both of these objections (which overlap
somewhat) will be considered in more detail in Note 40a.
The above
considerations also help explain why it is easy to imagine
M6 as true even if it turned out to be false, or false even if it
were true. That is, it is easy to imagine what would have made M6 false if it is
actually true, and what would have made M6 true if it actually is false. [Vice
versa
with M6a.] In general, the comprehension of an empirical proposition involves an
understanding of the conditions under which it would or could be true, or
would or could be false. As is well known, these are otherwise called their
truth
conditions. That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm the
actual truth status of any given empirical proposition by an appeal to the
available evidence,
since they would in that case know what to look for or expect. And that
would still be the case if no one ever wanted to ascertain their actual
truth-values. A totally disinterested individual who understood M6 (or
M6a) would nevertheless still know what would make it true (and the other
false). [It is worth recalling what the word "disinterested"
means here!]
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
These
non-negotiable facts about (at least this area) of discourse also underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social nature of language and knowledge
(advocated at this site). The above facility allows interlocutors to exchange information which they can grasp
independently of knowing whether what they have been told is true and
independently of knowing whether what they have been told is false. If that
weren't the case, if they had to know something (i.e., some other proposition) was true
before they could understand any given empirical proposition, the entire process would stall, and
communication (at least in such contexts) would be impossible.
[Naturally, it is certainly possible -- in fact, it is quite common -- that
in order to ascertain the actual truth-value of an empirical proposition,
the truth-value of other such propositions will also have to be known; but, as
has already been indicated, truth-values aren't the same as truth conditions.
It is by confusing these two concepts that many go astray in this area.]
These everyday truisms
about language fly in the face of metaphysical
theories which emphasise the opposite: that in order to understand a
metaphysical proposition is
ipso facto to
know it is true (or
ipso facto to know it is false, depending on circumstances, or the theory
in question), by-passing the confirmation
and disconfirmation stage, thus reducing
the usual 'truth conditions'
to one option only.
[How this
relates to what we might call 'patent truths' (about matters of fact) -- such as
"Fire is hot" and "Water is wet" -- has been dealt with in Note 40a, link
below.]
Which is, of course, why
Traditional Theories of Knowledge found it
hard to account for falsehood.
If we represent the world to ourselves 'in our heads', how could anything befalse? It is no use replying that we can check these representations against the
facts, or against the world, since, if that were so, all we would be doing is checking one set of representations
against another. Furthermore, relying on testimony, evidence or argument provided by other
individuals would be no help either. Again, if representationalism were true,
all we would be relying on in such circumstances would be representations of testimony,
representations of evidence and representations of argument.
How can
one representation validate another representation, which is itself based on
another representation, which is based on...?
As a
species, we have as
yet found no way of 'leaping out of our heads' in order to check our
'representations' against 'reality' in order to by-pass the need for any further
validating 'representations'.40a
[So, for
example, how would the 'contents' of one mind be communicated to another if
there were no
prior means of communication that enabled it? In fact,
this pre-condition is undermined (or even denied) by
representational theories. Indeed, how would
it be possible for anyone to communicate with anyone else if they could only
figure out what their interlocutors had meant, or what their words might mean, after they had ascertained the truth
of what was said? (There is more on this in Essays Three Part Two
and Thirteen Part Three.)]
However,
there are other serious problems that traditional approaches to
language face over and above the fact it would make shared knowledge impossible.
As we are
about to discover, intractable logical
problems soon begin to emerge (in relation to such supposedly empirical, but
nonetheless
metaphysical, sentences) when any attempt is
made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired
semantic
possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions -- i.e., truth and
falsehood.
This occurs, for example, when an
apparently empirical, or seemingly
Super-Empirical, proposition is
declared to be "only true" or "only false" -- or, more pointedly, 'necessarily'
the one or the other. Or, more likely, when a
'necessary truth' or a 'necessary falsehood' is mis-identified as a particularly
profound sort of empirical claim that employs the indicative mood (etc.), once more.
As we will soon see, this results in the
automatic loss of both options, and with that goes any sense the
original proposition might have had, rendering it
non-sensical.
That is because an empirical proposition
leaves it open whether it is true or whether it is false. That is why its
truth-value (true/false) can't simply be read-off from its content, why
evidence is required in order to determine its semantic status (true/false), and why it is possible to understand it before its truth or its
falsehood is known. If that weren't so, it would be impossible to
establish its truth-status. Once again, it isn't possible to confirm or confute an
'indicative sentence' if no one understands what it is saying, or what it is
being used to say.
When that isn't the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or
falsehood) is closed-off, or when a proposition is said to be "necessarily true"
or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant.
So,
while the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition can't be ascertained
on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood
of a proposition were capable of being established solely, or
purely, on the
basis of linguistic, logical, conceptual or structural factors, it can't be empirical --
despite a use of the indicative mood, and in spite of any of its users
trying to uncover Super-Facts about 'Reality'
If, however, such a proposition is still regarded by those who
hold it true --, or, indeed, who promote it as a Super-Fact about the world, about its "essence"
-- it thereby becomes metaphysical.40b
Otherwise the
actual truth or
the actual falsehood of such a proposition would be world-, or
evidence-sensitive, not
solely
meaning-, or concept-dependent. That is, its actual truth or actual falsehood would
depend on how the world happens to be, not solely on what its words are
imagined to mean. [Note
the use of "solely", here.]
And that
explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appears to go hand
in hand with 'knowing' their 'truth' (or 'knowing' their 'falsehood', as the
case may be): their
truth-status is based solely on thought, language or meaning, not
evidence.
Of course, it could be claimed that
"essential' thoughts"/"truths"/'propositions' 'reflect' deeper truths about the world,
those that are philosophically significant and more profound than
common-or-garden, 'empirical truths'.
But, if thought
does indeed 'reflect' the world, it
should be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a
thought in advance of knowing whether it is true, or knowing whether it is false, otherwise confirmation in practice, by comparing it with the world, would become an
empty gesture.
In
response, it could be argued that "essential truths" are different. That
objection will be examined presently.
So, if the truth of such a
thought or sentence could be ascertained from that thought or sentence
alone (i.e., if they were "self-evidently
true"), then the world drops out of the
picture,
which would in turn mean that this 'thought' (or sentence) couldn't be a reflection of
the world, whatever else it might be.41
Furthermore,
but worse, if a proposition is still
supposed to be empirical
-- or if it is said to be about underlying "essences" --, and can only be true or can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, M20, below, according to
Lenin), then, as we will see, intractable paradoxes emerge.
Consider the following sentence (which Lenin would presumably have declared necessarily false, if not "unthinkable"),
M20:
M20: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare M20 necessarily and always false
(or "unthinkable"), the
possibility of its truth must first of all be entertained -- even if only to be
ruled out immediately --, otherwise he would have no idea what he was ruling out. But, if the possible truth of M20 couldn't even be entertained
by Lenin (howsoever briefly), then that would either mean M20 is incomprehensible
(because of what M1a itself has to say), or that even if it were
somehow comprehensible, Lenin himself couldn't understand it. Either way, Lenin
would have absolutely no idea what it was he was rejecting. As we will see, that would have
a knock-on affect on the status of M1a itself.
Of course,
it could be argued contrary to the above that Lenin doesn't need to entertain M20
to begin with, still less
its possible truth. But, as we are about to see, if Lenin (or anyone!) didn't, or couldn't,
entertain its possible truth,
they would be in no position to assert M1a, or comprehend its alleged
content, either.
Thus, if the
truth of M20 is to be permanently excluded by holding it
necessarily false, then whatever would make it true would also have to be ruled out
conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what M20 rules in
so that they could comprehend what was being ruled out by its rejection
as always and necessarily false. And yet, that is precisely what can't be done
if what M20 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic or conceptual grounds.42
[I
cover this ground again from a different, perhaps more profound, angle,
below.]
Consequently, if a proposition like M20 is necessarily
false, this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) can't actually take
place. That is because it would be impossible to say
(or even to think) what could possibly count as making it true so that
that possibility could be rejected. Indeed, Lenin himself
had to declare it "unthinkable", so he not only
couldn't inform his readers what would make it false, he couldn't even think these words
(in the sense that he couldn't think their supposed content -- the state of
affairs this sentence supposedly pictured or represented -- more on that
presently).
Hence, because the possible truth of M20 can't even be conceived, no one,
least of all Lenin, would be in any position to say
what is excluded by its rejection.43
M20: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.
Unfortunately, this now prevents any account being given of what would make M20
false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, and paradoxically,
M20 would now be 'necessarily false' if and only if it wasn't capable of being
thought of as necessarily false! But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make M20 true
can't even be conceived, so that train-of-thought can't be joined at any point. And, if the truth of M20
-- or the conditions under which it would be true -- can't be conceived, then
neither can its falsehood, for we wouldn't then know what was being ruled out.43a
Anyone who disagrees with the above need only ask
themselves: "What exactly is Lenin ruling out by his assertion of M1a?"
As soon as they answer that question (i.e., as soon as they reply, "Lenin
is ruling out the truth of this sentence 'Motion occurs without matter', or
'Matter can be motionless'"), they will have given the game away. In that
event they will have just done -- i.e., thought -- what Lenin said was couldn't
be done because it is "unthinkable". On the other hand, if they had no idea
what Lenin was trying to rule out (i.e., if they can't answer the above
question), that would concede they have no idea what M1a actually means.
In
that case, the supposed negation of M20 can neither be accepted nor rejected by
anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that that
content could either be countenanced or repudiated.
Hence, M20 would lose any sense it had, since it couldn't under any circumstances be
considered true, and hence under any circumstances be considered false. [That
is, if we accept M1a.]
If, according to Lenin, we are
incapable of thinking the content of the following words, we certainly can't
declare M20 false.
[In what follows, by "content" I mean what an indicative, empirical sentence purports to tell
us about the world (or any other legitimate subject matter), what state of affairs it
supposedly expresses.]
Our
inability to conclude that certain 'propositions' -- or indicative sentences -- are false
is in fact a consequence of several of the points raised earlier: i.e., that an
empirical proposition and its negation have the same content (they express the
same possible state of affairs). If one of these options is ruled out, the other
automatically goes out
of the window with it. And that is what we have just seen happen with Lenin's
hyper-bold assertion about matter and motion. In
order to appreciate why this is the more fundamental reason for the
collapse of his -- and other metaphysical -- sentences into incoherent non-sense we need to
back-track a little.
We can see
exactly why
such problems arise if we consider another typical metaphysical sentence,
L1, and
its supposed negation, L2:
L1: Time is a relation between events. [Paraphrasing
Leibniz.]43b
L2: Time isn't a relation between events.
As we have seen, the alleged truth of L1 is derived directly from the meaning of
the words it contains (or the concepts it supposedly expresses) -- or,
in some cases, from related principles, precepts and definitions (that also
depend on the meaning of the words they contain). The supposed truth of L1 manifestly hasn't been derived from
evidence (even if some attempt were made to "illustrate" its truth from
'evidence', or it was used to help explain certain phenomena -- more about that in Note 45a).
However, the unique
semantic status of sentences like L1 has the consequence that if some attempt
were made to deny its truth by means of, say, L2,
that would amount to a change in the meaning of the word "time".
That is because sentences like L1 define what a given philosopher means by
"time", how he or she intends to use that word, conceive of its
related
'concept', or situate it in any theory being developed. Elsewhere L1-type sentences are sometimes call "essential propositions".
They
purport to reveal or even define 'the essence' of the concept(s) involved. So,
the word/concept, "time", with a
different 'essence' -- or where the 'essential properties' that had been attributed to it
are now denied of it -- would have a different meaning. If time isn't a relation between
events then the word "time" (used to assert this supposed 'super-fact'
about 'time') can no longer mean the same as it did, in L1. "Time" must
either possess no meaning in L2 or it must have a new meaning, one yet to be given it.
[So, "time" for Newton was absolute, which tells us he meant something
different by that word when compared with Leibniz. On that, see, Alexander
(1956), Ariew (2000),
DiSalle (2002),
Earman (1989),
Mcdonough (2024), Rynasiewicz (2011),
Vailati (1997).] Either way, the bottom line is that the meaning of "time" has a different meaning in L1
and L2 -- that is, if we also understand by "no meaning" a "different
meaning". (But even then "time" would not mean the same between these two
sentences). And, if that is so, L1 and L2 can't represent or 'reflect' the same state of affairs. They
thus have a different (supposed) content.
In that case, and despite appearances to the contrary, L2 isn't the negation of L1!
That is because the subject of each sentence is different.
To see this point, compare the following to sentences:
L3:
George W Bush crashed his car on the 3rd of May 2012.
L4:
George H W Bush didn't crash his car on the 3rd of May 2012.
Whether or not one or both of these is true, L3 and L4 aren't negations of one another
since they relate to two different individuals, George W Bush and his father,
George H W Bush. L3 and L4 thus have two different
subjects. They are true or
they are false under entirely different circumstances; they don't have the same
sense,
the same empirical content. Plainly, they expressdifferent possible states of affairs.
[That isn't to suggest L3 and L4 are
like L1 and L2 in any other respect. The change of subject matter is less easy to see in relation to L1 and L2 since
they both use a typographically identical word, "time". The difference
between them is nevertheless made obvious by the fact that L1 defines a specific meaning for
the word "time" while L2 denies it that very meaning. L3 and L4 are
only being used to make this particular point abundantly clear.]
Mutatis
mutandis, the same comment applies in general to all metaphysical (many
of which are also "essential") propositions (like L1) and what
appear to be their negations (i.e., in the case of L1, this was L2).
L1: Time is a relation between events.
L2: Time isn't a relation between events.
Why is this important?
Well,
if L1 is deemed "necessarily true", under normal circumstances (to be
explained presently) that would
be tantamount to declaring its
alleged negation (L2) "necessarily false". And yet, L2 isn't the
negation of L1. So, that specific inference isn't possible. Again, that
is because L1 and L2 are logically unrelated sentences since they have
a different (supposed) content, they 'express (supposed) different states of affairs'. The 'truth' or
'falsehood' of the one has no bearing on the 'truth' or 'falsehood' of the other
-- unlike M6 and M6a. There are no logical links between them.43c
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution. [TAR]
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
As was argued earlier:
The same situation obtaining --
i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of M6 or M6a true, the
other false. If Blair does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false;
if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate
intertwining of the truth-values of M6 and M6a is a direct
consequence of the same state of affairs linking them.
If a given speaker didn't know that M6 was
true (and hence that M6a was false) just in case Blair owned a copy of the said book,
and that M6 was false (but M6a was true) just in case Blair didn't own a
copy of the said book -- or they were unable to determine or recognise what to look for, or to expect, if they wanted to ascertain the truth-value of M6
or M6a -- that would be prima facie
evidence they didn't understand either or both of M6 and M6a. These two
sentences stand or fall
together. If one of them stands (as true), the other falls (as false), and vice versa.
This might seem an obvious point, but its ramifications are
all too easily missed, and have been missed by the vast majority of Philosophers....
The above
considerations also help explain why it is easy to imagine
M6 as true even if it turned out to be false, or false even if it
were true. That is, it is easy to imagine what would have made M6 false if it is
actually true, and what would have made M6 true if it actually is false. [Vice
versa
with M6a.] In general, the comprehension of an empirical proposition involves an
understanding of the conditions under which it would or could be true, or
would or could be false. As is well known, these are otherwise called their
truth
conditions. That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm the
actual truth status of any given empirical proposition by an appeal to the
available evidence,
since they would in that case know what to look for or expect. And that
would still be the case if no one ever wanted to ascertain their actual
truth-values. A totally disinterested individual who understood M6 (or
M6a) would nevertheless still know what would make it true (and the other
false). [It is worth recalling what the word "disinterested"
means here!]
So, if or when
it has been determined that M6a is true, the falsehood of M6 can
automatically be inferred
-- and vice versa if M6 turns out to be true. Hence, M6 may be
rejected if
M6a is true just as M6a may if M6 is true. The same content tells us what
we can rule in and what we can rule out. This shared content
connects the two sentences, and allows these valid inferences to go through.
That
couldn't be done if M6 and M6a didn't have this shared content.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
However, as we have
seen, between a
metaphysical proposition and what might appear to be its negation,
there is no shared content -- because of a change of subject. Two metaphysical sentences
like L1 and L2 fail to relate to the same supposed state of affairs,
since there is no such shared content. [In fact, as we are about to discover,
metaphysical sentences have no content.]
So, there is nothing that connects L1 and L2 in the above manner.
Hence, the 'truth' of L1
can't be ruled out by means of the 'truth' of L2 (nor vice versa),
because we now have no idea what we are ruling out, and therefore no idea what we are ruling
in. [Why that is so will also be explained presently,
but it is connected with the fact that L1 and L2 express no actual or
possible state of
affairs.]
L1: Time is a relation between events.
L2: Time isn't a relation between events.
Or, rather, what we might imagine we are
trying
to rule out (i.e., L2) by the use of L1 won't in fact have been ruled outsince L2 has a different subject and hence a different supposed 'content'.
Connected with this is another important principle: to declare a sentence "true" is
ipso facto to declare it "not false". These two semantic
conditions go hand-in-hand.
[Some might
think the above represents an unwise concession to the so-called 'Law
of Excluded Middle' [LEM]. I can't enter into that topic here, so any who do so
think are advised to read
Note 39a, follow the link at the end of that Note, and then maybe
think again.]
But, if can't declare L1 "not false" (and we plainly can't do that if we have no idea what we are ruling out -- as soon as
any
attempt is made to do
so
by means of L2 ends up changing the subject!), we can't then say the original sentence is
true.
Why that is so will now be explained.
By declaring a
sentence like L1 "necessarily true", we appear to be conclusively
ruling something in, and thereby conclusively ruling something else out (as "necessarily false").
Hence, if L1 is deemed 'necessarily true', that would seem to imply L2 is
'necessarily false'. In that case, we would appear to be talking about -- and
hence ruling out -- thesame state of affairs.
But, in this case there is no shared state of affairs to be ruled out, and that
is because the two sentences have a different subject.
In
fact, there is no state of affairs here at all, shared or otherwise. L1
picks out no state of affairs -- even in theory.
As we will see, L1 uses of certain words in a specific way; it isn't
about the world as such. L1
actually expresses an idiosyncratic rule for the use of "time", but
it is usually interpreted, or misconstrued, as a fundamental truth
about the world. We can see that is so since L2 represents a change in meaning
to a typographically identical word, "time", which
shows this is about the meaning of words, not 'facts about reality'.
If, per impossible,
there were a state of affairs that L1 expressed, we would be able to negate
L1 legitimately (i.e., by using L2), and thereby conclude that the state of affairs it
supposedly expressed doesn't actually obtain, even in
theory. That is, it would be possible use L2 to show that what L1 says
doesn't obtain. But, as we have just seen, we can't even do that. In relation to L2, what we
think we are ruling out is what L1 expresses. But, L2 has a
different content to L1, so we aren't in fact ruling out what L1 says!
L1
thus has no content at all, and neither has L2. They
are both telling us nothing at all about the world, just about two idiosyncratic,
but different,
uses of the word "time".
L1: Time is
a relation between events.
L2: Time
isn't a relation between events.
When sentences like L1 are entertained, a pretence (often
genuine) has to be made that they actually mean (i.e., "say") something
determinate, that they are
capable of being understood and hence that they are capable of being true or
are capable of being false. That is, in this case, that they at least depict
an actual or possible state of
affairs, even in theory. To that extent, a further pretence has to
be maintained that we understand what might make such propositions true -- and
hencewhat will make
their 'negations' false -- so that propositions like L2 can be declared "necessarily false",
and its content ruled out accordingly.
So, we imagine they (both) actually depict (at the
very least) a theoretical
state of affairs -- which is something they can't do, as we have just seen.
That is because L1 and L2 concern the use of words (in this case a specific
word. "time"), not 'reality'. Neither expresses a fact about the world (unlike
M6 and M6a) since they both express a (peculiar) rule for the use of the word "time" (albeit
in this case two different rules).
Compare that with M6 and M6a:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
The truth or the falsehood of the above two has
no effect on the meaning of its words, unlike L1 and L2. Again,
unlike L1 and L2, M6 and M6a are about the world, are about the
same state of affairs, either holding or failing to hold.
L1: Time is
a relation between events.
L2: Time
isn't a relation between events.
If there were a state of affairs that
L1 pictured, we would be able to negate it legitimately (by means of L2), but, as we have seen,
that
can't be done without changing the subject.
Hence, the use of philosophical 'propositions' like L1 and
L2 is completely vacuous; the entire exercise is an empty charade, for no
content can be given to such indicative sentences. They depict no state of affairs, even in theory!
Again, in order to declare L1 true, we might pretend that a
theoretical state of affairs (at least) is being ruled out -- that which is
expressed by L2. But, we have just seen that that isn't so. Nothing is being ruled in or
rule out, since L1 is
incapable of depicting anything, even theoretically! It has no content.
Hence, anyone who accepts L1
as true is in no position say what it depicts, even in theory. That isn't because it would be psychologically
impossible for them to do so; it is because it is logically impossible. If
L1 could depict something (even in theory), we
could legitimately negate it; but doing sochanges the subject (in L2).
Hence, it isn't possible to specify conditions that would make L2 false, even in
theory, without
changing the subject. Nor can we say under what conditions L1 is true, and for
the same reason.
But, if we
can't say under what conditions L1 is true (since it depicts nothing at all),
we can't say it is or isn't false, either. In which case, we are in no position to declare
L1 either true or
false! Any attempt to do so falls apart, for that would imply that two
logically unrelated sentences (L1 and L2) were related after all.
Hence, metaphysical propositions can't be true and they
can't be false. They have no content. They express no state of affairs,
even in theory.
In which case, given what was said
here about sense and non-sense,
metaphysical 'propositions' lack a sense, and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the
situation.
Our use of language actually prevents
them from expressing a sense, let alone being true.
They are therefore non-sensical, empty strings of words.
They represent non-standard and quirky rules
for the use of certain words misconstrued as fundamental truths about 'reality'.
And that includes the 'propositions'
DM-theorists have cobbled-together (or have borrowed from Hegel, upside down or
the 'right way up').
[Incidentally,
the word "proposition"
is in 'scare quotes' above, since it isn't clear what is being
proposed, or put forward for consideration by metaphysical sentences (since, in such cases,
those like
L1, L2 and P4 have no
content). Hence, nothing (i.e., no content) has been proposed
or put forward for consideration. (On vagueness, see
here.)]
P4: Motion is the mode of existence of
matter.
Some might
wonder why there can't be necessary states of affairs that are independent of
language and independent of human beings, which are, or can be, reflected by metaphysically-, or necessarily-true, propositions. The above argument just
assumes (without proof) that there can't be any such.
In fact, the
answer to that objection was given earlier.
Let us
assume for the purposes of argument that L1 is necessarily true and that there is a
'necessary',
or even a 'metaphysical', 'state of
affairs' in the world (or 'behind appearances', etc.) accurately reflected by L1 (independent of language,
independent of humanity, etc., etc.); i.e., that time is actually and
'objectively' a
relation between events.
L1: Time is
a relation between events.
L2: Time
isn't a relation between events.
We have
already seen that this would automatically throw the semantic status of L2 into doubt, since
there is a now change of subject in that sentence which means it isn't talking about
what L1 is talking about, despite appearances to the contrary. Anyone who holds
L2 true (for example, a
Newtonian), can't now mean by "time" what anyone who holds L1 true means
by this typographically identical word. On the other hand, if L2 is declared false (for instance, by a
Leibnizian), it can't now suddenly be about
"time", as that word is understood by anyone who holds L2 true. In such
circumstances, it would be impossible to explain how, when L2 is true, it could
fail to be about time (again, as understood by a Leibnizian), but, when
it is false, it is about time!
Impossible, unless, of course, we acknowledge the fact that these are two
different uses of typographically identical words.
As we have also
seen, if L1 is declared "necessarily true", its falsehood is
(seemingly) automatically ruled
out. But, it now becomes impossible to rule out the falsehood ofL1,
for to do that we would (normally) have to entertain the truth of L2, or at least
know what would make it true. However, by declaring L1 "necessarily true"
we are ruling out its falsehood and thereby seemingly ruling out the truth of L2.
But, L2 is totally unrelated to L1. They both have a different subject. In
that case, we can't rule out the falsehood of L1 on the basis of the actual
falsehood of L2. But if that is so, we can't declare L1 "necessarily true", either.
That being the case, L1 can't reflect a 'necessary state of affairs in reality'.
Otherwise all of the above would be possible: L1 would be connected to L2 by the
same state of affairs, and the truth of one would rule out the truth of the
other. But a change of meaning, a change of subject, between L1 and L2 rules
this out,
As pointed
out
earlier, our use of language actually prevents metaphysical sentences from being either
true or false. In that case, they are incapable of 'reflecting' anything.
But,
it might now be objected that there could be
states of affairs in the world that language can't reflect,
which are nevertheless metaphysically necessary. Surely, the incapacity
of language to reflect the world doesn't imply
there are no such necessary states of affairs. Any attempt to assert there
are none, based on the presumed fact that they can't be represented in language,
would be guilty of the very thing such an approach aims to criticise. That is,
by denying there are such metaphysical states of affairs, the above analysis
attempts to derive certain truths about reality -- namely, that there are no
metaphysical states of affairs -- from language (i.e., from its supposed
inability to represent their actual existence).
Attentive
readers will no doubt have noticed that nowhere was it asserted that
metaphysical or necessary states of affairs do not or cannot exist, only that
any attempt to state such supposed truths will always be non-sensical and
incoherent.
However, as
soon as it is asked what is implied by the phrase, "necessary states of affairs", the whole
sorry mess falls apart. A "necessary state of affairs" is one that can't be
otherwise -- for instance, if time were necessarily a relation between events
(independently of language), it can't fail to be a relation between events. It
would necessarily be a relation between events and "couldn't be otherwise".
But, for such an "otherwise" itself to obtain it would have to be the
case that time failed to be a relation between events!
And yet, as we have just seen, there is no such thing as an "otherwise" when it comes to such
'necessary/metaphysical states of affairs'. In that case, it is impossible
even to describe an "otherwise" when it comes to a
'necessary/metaphysical state of affairs', for to do so would be to change the subject again!
In such an eventuality we'd no longer be speaking about time1
but about time2,
where time1
was a relation between events but time2
wasn't! But if we can't speak about an "otherwise" without changing the subject, no
coherent (or even comprehensible) possibility will have been presented for
consideration. Or, at least, no more than would have been had someone asked about offside
in chess or the square root of your left foot. No one is capable of theorising about offside in chess,
or even begin to do so about the square root of your left foot, and the same is the case
with 'necessary/metaphysical states of affairs'. There is no "otherwise" to
offside in chess! There is no onside in chess.
Moreover, because the negation of DM-propositions (like P4) also fail to picture anything that could be the case in any possible world
(for logical, not psychological or scientific reasons), they,
too, have
no content. Naturally, that automatically empties the content of the original
non-negated DM-'proposition' (such as P4, again), rendering it non-sensical, too.
P4: Motion is the mode of existence of
matter.
Once again,
the
above might appear to be yet another example of a priori dogmatics
promoted
at this site -- in
that it denies that
DM-propositions could "picture anything that could be the case in any possible world",
but that isn't so. It is rather to say that it makes no sense to suppose they
were capable of picturing anything. They present us with nothing that can be given a sense, even in
theory. Indeed, for all the 'sense' they do make, DM-propositions might as well have
been taken from The
Jabberwocky, a poem that makes about as much sense as Hegel's 'Logic':
Except, of course, The Jabberwocky is more obviously incoherent non-sense.
This brings us full circle, back to a point made earlier:
[I]ntractable logical
problems soon begin to emerge (in relation to such supposedly empirical, but
nonetheless
metaphysical, sentences) when any attempt is
made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic
possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions -- i.e., truth and
falsehood.
In which
case, it isn't possible to restrict or exclude one of these paired semantic
options (for instance, falsehood) in favour of the other (i.e., truth),
as metaphysicians generally try to do without the above problems
arising, this preventing anyone from doing just that.
On the other hand,
if a proposition and its negation have the same content (which will be the case
if one is to count as the negation of the other), they stand or fall together. But, that isn't
so with DM-'propositions';
they stand alone, since they have
no content and hence can't share content with any other indicative sentence, least of all with their
own supposed negations. But
that just means they too collapse as incoherent non-sense, just as we have seen happen with M1a.
This means that we
need another way of
explaining why DM-'propositions' were invented in the first place. [More on that presently.
Why they all (and not just M1a) also collapse into incoherence will also be explained
below.]
As we can now see, the radical misuse of language
that results in the production of
what look like empirical propositions (e.g., M1a, again) involves
an implicit reference to the sort of conditions that underlie the normal
employment of such sentences.44
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M20: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.
Hence, and
once again, when sentences like the above are presented for consideration, or
are entertained (even for a short while), a pretence (often
genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they
are capable of being understood, and hence that they are capable of being true or
are capable of being false.45
[This takes place even if certain restrictions are later imposed on
any attempt made to 'process them, theoretically', as was the case with M1a.] In that case, a
further pretence has to be effected
that we understand what (in nature or society) might make such 'propositions' true,
or their 'negations'
false -- so that those like M20 can be declared 'necessarily' false, or
even "unthinkable".
[This
'display of comprehension' (if that is the right phrase) is evident
whenever dialecticians are confronted with the accusation that they don't actually
understand the weird claims they come out with. They are genuinely shocked,
if not puzzled and offended by such allegations. I
used to make this point in public 'debates' I had with DM-fans many years ago --
that is, when they were actually prepared to discuss their own theory. {The word
"debates" is here in 'scare' quotes because DM-fans can't actually debate this
theory; they are far too emotionally invested in it, as I demonstrate in Essay
Nine
Part Two. This is perhaps most notoriously obvious from
Trotsky's
extreme reaction
to anyone foolish enough to question DM.} In public, comrades used
to heckle me, shouting: "You don't understand dialectics!", to which I
always replied "Well, in that case, I'm in good company, since no one understands
dialectics!" That used to shut them up. But, those days are long gone. The 'DM-Counter-Reformation'
has well and truly set in, and, en masse, DM-fans have circled the wagons
and now refuse even to debate this misbegotten theory, content merely to post
abuse and personal attacks (even when they deign to respond!).
Here is an example
from a few years ago. (I have covered that non-debate in more detail
here.) And
here is another recent example where I accused an HCD of not understanding the
obscure, quasi-Hegelian gobbledygook he kept spouting. Needless to say, he
was 'somewhat miffed' that I had the temerity to so accuse him, but, try as hard
as I could, I couldn't get him to explain what he actually did mean by his use
of the odd language he kept spouting. The irony of his total incapacity to make himself
understood without using yet more obscure jargon (which he also couldn't
explain) in order to try to 'explain' the last batch, was clearly lost on him,
despite
the fact that I kept making that very point to him! Of course, he isn't the only
comrade who has bought into this 'pretence' --, in effect they have ideologically sold
their 'radical souls' to the other side in the class war in this way. As is easy
to demonstrate, they haven't a clue
what their theory means any more than Christians have concerning the Doctrine of the
'Holy Trinity'.
Nevertheless, theologians and dialecticians are both avid users of jargon they
can't explain to anyone, least of all one another.]
The entire exercise is a
theoretical and practical charade, for no content can be given to 'propositions' like
M20 and M1a, nor in fact to any metaphysical
'proposition'.45a
There
is another, rather odd feature of metaphysical theories that is also worth highlighting: since the
supposed truth-values of defective sentences like those below aren't determined by
examining actual evidence, they have to be given a 'truth-value' by fiat. That is, they have
to be declared "necessarily true" or "necessarily false".
That in turn is because their supposed truth-status hasn't been derived from any
comparison with the
world but (solely) from the supposed meaning of the words they contain. As we will see,
thatdivorces them from the world,
with which they can't now be compared.
Or,
perhaps with much moregrandiosity, their opposites are
anathematised as "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- an 'Edgy',
'Radical' Philosopher, a Dialectical Magus,
maybe even a"Great
Teacher".
Metaphysical pronouncements like the
following are as common as dirt
in Traditional Thought -- and, as we can now see, that is also the case with DM:
P4: Motion is the mode of existence of
matter. [Engels and Lenin.]
L1: Time is
a relation between events. [Paraphrasing Leibniz and Kant.]
L5: To be is to be perceived. [Paraphrasing
Berkeley.]
L6:
God and God only is the Truth. [Hegel.]
L7:
Self-relation in Essence is the form of
Identity or of reflection-into-self. [Hegel.]
L8:
Everything is opposite. Neither in
heaven nor in Earth...is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or'. [Hegel.]
L9:
Contradiction is the very moving
principle of the world. [Hegel.]
L10:
All bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never
equal to themselves. [Trotsky.]
L11:
And so every phenomenon...sooner or
later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite. [Plekhanov.]
L12:
Motion
is a contradiction. [Paraphrasing
Zeno,
Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin.]
L13:
Internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature
['The Great Teacher Himself' -- Stalin.]
L14:
It
is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion. [Engels.]
L15: All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of
the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute. [Engels.]
L16: Cognition is the eternal, endless
approximation of thought to the object. [Lenin.]
L17:
Truth
is
always concrete. [Hegel, Plekhanov and Lenin.]
L18:
Every universal is (a fragment, or an
aspect, or the essence of) an individual. [Lenin.]
L19: Contradiction is universal and
absolute...present in the...development of all things and
permeates every process from beginning to end.
[Mao.]
L20:
The unity of opposites...is
relative and transient...the struggle of opposites is absolute, expressing the infinity...of development.
[Kharin, paraphrasing Lenin.]
[Most
of the above have been quoted or excerpted from
Essay Two. The incoherence of many
of them was exposed in Essays Two to Thirteen Part One.]
Of course,
the aforementioned 'ceremony' (from the previous sub-section, whereby a sage-like figure
pronounces the
Universal Veracity of sentences like those listed above) must be performed in abeyance of
any
evidence (as we saw was the case with respect to Engels's 'Three Law' in Essay Seven Part
One, for example). Indeed, no evidence need ever be sought. Quite the contrary, in fact.
Evidence would detract from, or even debase, the pre-eminent status
enjoyed by such Super-Truths. They are all now in effect
Metaphysical Gems, often credited with apodictic
certainty by their promulgators. Such claims have by-passed, by
simple decree, the usual 'grubby' social
practices that help determine the veracity of
ordinary, boring empirical propositions.
Such
banausic protocols
are way too proletarian for the soft, un-sullied hands of genuine philosophers.
We
have already seen Lenin declare that:
"This aspect of dialectics…usually
receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum
total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and
as a law of the objective world)." [Ibid.,
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added.]
So,
the need to provide evidence appears to be a distraction, an
otherwise necessary step dedicated
dialecticians should rightly avoid or reject. In the above passage, the claim that
'dialectical opposites' exist everywhere -- governing every
single example of change, right across the entire universe, for all of time -- expresses
a "law of cognition", a "law of the objective world", and
it is those very "laws" that justify, if not "demand", the imposition of
dialectical dogmas like these on nature and society.
"Dialecticsrequires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logicdemands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)….
[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth
is
always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin (1921),
pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added.]
"Flexibility, applied objectively,
i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world."
[Lenin (1961),
p.110. Bold emphasis added.]
"Knowledge
is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate,
not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the
formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws,
etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally,
approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing nature.... Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as
a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality,' he can only
eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a
scientific picture of the world...." [Ibid.,
p.182. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as
formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that
seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a
higher basis ('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals,
not in a straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; --
'breaks in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the
inner impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the
various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given
phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest,indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a
connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of
motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the
ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914),
pp.12-13.
Bold emphases alone added.]
Hence, the search for evidence
begins and ends with DM-fans either leafing through Hegel's Logic or
the work of some other obscure Mystic, like
Heraclitus, Zeno,
Plotinus,
Spinoza
and Jakob
Boehme.
"Hegel brilliantly
divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature)
in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more
popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the
alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97.
Italic
emphases in the original. First bold
emphasis only, added.]
Here is
Herbert Marcuse endorsing this a priori
(evidence-free) approach to knowledge:
"The doctrine of Essence seeks to
liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that
appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of
dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the
apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Minor typo corrected.
Bold emphasis added.]
'Observable facts' just get in the way of all aspiring, and dedicated, dogmatists.
[Again, I
have posted well over a hundred examples of this doctrinaire frame-of-mind in
Essay Two (and that number is no
exaggeration, either!).]
James White
highlighted this attitude to 'philosophical knowledge', in this case exhibited
by the German Idealists, the intellectual grandparents of DM:
"Already with
Fichte the
idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of finding
a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be based.
Thinkers from
Kant
onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from
experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error,
incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be
foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been
established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers
believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied in the
laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the
Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise
empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these
laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996), p.29. Bold
emphasis added.]
In fact, the
above approach to 'philosophical truth' has dominated this
ruling-class discipline since its earliest days in Ancient Greece, reinforced more
recently and more forcefully in and by the work of early modern
Rationalists like
Descartes,
Spinoza,
Leibniz
and
Wolff.
In this,
they followed in Plato's footsteps -- true knowledge
is 'of the mind' and bypasses the senses:
"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I
say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and
apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in
no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be
regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for
they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted
in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by
true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by
persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in
true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men.
Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is
always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into
itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and
imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to
intelligence only." [Plato (1997c), 51e-52a,
pp.1254-55. I have used
the on-line version here. Bold emphases added. The published edition translates
the third set of highlighted words as follows: "It is indivisible -- it cannot be perceived
by the senses at all -- and it is the role of the understanding to study it."
Cornford renders it: "[It is] invisible and otherwise imperceptible;
that, in fact, which thinking has for its object." (Cornford (1997), p.192.)]
As we saw in
Essay Three Part Two (here
and
here), DM-theorists do likewise -- i.e., when they also speak about unreliable
'appearances', telling all who will listen that genuine knowledge is based on
countless invisible 'underlying essences' (which 'contradict appearances').
[Follow the
previous two links for quotations from the DM-classics and subsequent
DM-theorists in support.]
Nevertheless,
Super-Scientific Gems like these had to have their
semantic pre-eminence bestowed on them as a gift. They couldn't be
expected, nor must they be allowed, to consort with vulgar empirical truths,
besmirched as the latter are by so much worldly, working-class 'grime',
otherwise known as the "banalities
of common sense".
Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their (supposed)
truth-status, the veracity of Super-Truths like this is derived solely from,
or compared only with, other related claims of similar Intergalactic Status,
other Super-Truths, all part of a
bogus 'terminological gesture' at 'verification'. 'Confirmation', therefore, takes place only in the head of
whichever DM-theorist has cut and polished such Philosophical Gems.
Their bona fides
are thus thoroughly Ideal, and hence completely phony.
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
M1b:
Motion without matter isn't unthinkable.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
P4a: Motion isn't the mode of the existence of
matter.
As we have
seen in
earlier sections, it is impossible to depict
the material conditions under which M1b, for instance, can be declared true so that
DM-theorists could specify what was
actually being
ruled out by the 'necessarily true' status of M1a. As is the case with
other metaphysical claims, there is no legitimate negation of M1a that would
(ordinarily) make
M1b true. That is because the DM-concept of matter is predicated on the
'necessary truth' expressed in and by P4. That sentence tells us what DM-theorists mean by the word
"matter". But, this isn't an empirical fact about matter -- that it moves
(which could be otherwise in some other possible world, or even in this world had
the universe developed differently) -- it is one of itsdefining characteristics. Deny that (as in P4a) and the meaning of the word
"matter", as DM-theorists conceive it, must change, too.
So, Lenin's
acceptance of P4 is what makes 'motion without matter' "unthinkable".
In that case, anyone who
attempted to deny M1a by means of M1b -- or deny P4 by the use of P4a -- would be operating with a
different understanding of the word "matter". Any such rejection of P4
(by an acceptance of P4a) would mean that there had been a change of
subject between these four sentences (P4/P4a and M1a/M1b. This means P4a and
M1b are no longer about "matter", as
Lenin and other DM-fans
conceive of that word, but about 'matter' (which now has different defining
conditions). Hence,
despite appearances to the contrary, M1b isn't the negation of M1a, nor is
P4a the negation of P4. Between each pair there has been a change of subject.
Unfortunately, this means that there is
no state of affairs that
P4 or M1a could 'reflect'; if there were, there would be legitimate negations of
those two sentences.
But, as we have just seen, P4a and M1b can't assume that role since they are no longer about
matter, but about 'matter'. As we have also seen, this implies P4 and M1a have
no content -- there are no circumstances under which either could be false, and
hence none under which either could be true.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
P4a: Motion isn't the mode of the existence of
matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M1b:
Motion without matter isn't unthinkable.
Similarly
with M1a; it
can't be false, since, if it were, M1b would be true. But, M1a and
M1b aren't logically linked; there is no state of affairs they share because of
the change of subject between them, and hence no state of affairs answering to either.
Compare M1a and M1b
(and P4 and P4a) with what was said about M6
and M6a, from earlier:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution. [TAR]
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution....
The same situation obtaining --
i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of M6 or M6a true and
one of them false. If he does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false;
conversely, if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate
intertwining of the truth-values of M6 and M6a is a direct
consequence of the same state of affairs linking them.
The same situation obtaining --
i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of M6 or M6a true, the
other false. If Blair does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false;
if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate
intertwining of the truth-values of M6 and M6a is a direct
consequence of the same state of affairs linking them.
If a given speaker didn't know that M6 was
true (and hence that M6a was false) just in case Blair owned a copy of the said book,
and that M6 was false (but M6a was true) just in case Blair didn't own a
copy of the said book -- or they were unable to determine or recognise what to look for, or to expect, if they wanted to ascertain the truth-value of M6
or M6a -- that would be prima facie
evidence they didn't understand either or both of M6 and M6a. These two
sentences stand or fall
together. If one of them stands (as true), the other falls (as false), and vice versa.
This might seem an obvious point, but its ramifications are
all too easily missed, and have been missed by the vast majority of Philosophers....
The above
considerations also help explain why it is easy to imagine
M6 as true even if it turned out to be false, or false even if it
were true. That is, it is easy to imagine what would have made M6 false if it is
actually true, and what would have made M6 true if it actually is false. [Vice
versa
with M6a.] In general, the comprehension of an empirical proposition involves an
understanding of the conditions under which it would or could be true, or
would or could be false. As is well known, these are otherwise called their
truth
conditions. That, of course, allows anyone so minded to confirm the
actual truth status of any given empirical proposition by an appeal to the
available evidence,
since they would in that case know what to look for or expect. And that
would still be the case if no one ever wanted to ascertain their actual
truth-values. A totally disinterested individual who understood M6 (or
M6a) would nevertheless still know what would make it true (and the other
false). [It is worth recalling what the word "disinterested"
means here!]
So, if or when
it has been determined that M6a is true, the falsehood of M6 can
automatically be inferred
-- and vice versa if M6 turns out to be true. Hence, M6 may be
rejected if
M6a is true just as M6a may if M6 is true. The same content tells us what
we can rule in and what we can rule out. This shared content
connects the two sentences, and allows these valid inferences to go through.
That
couldn't be done if M6 and M6a didn't have this shared content.
In that case, DM-'propositions' lack a sense and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the
situation. Once again, our use of language actually prevents
them from expressing a sense, let alone being true.
They are therefore non-sensical, empty strings of words.
Just
like other metaphysical 'propositions', M1a was 'conceived in an Ideal
World divorced from the language of everyday life' and ordinary workers. The
Super-Truths concocted in the brains of individual thinkers (as if those
Super-Truths 'reflected' the 'essential form of reality') relate to nothing ay
all
in nature or society -- despite appearances to the contrary and irrespective
of the intentions of those who dreamt them up. The conventions of ordinary language -- the language
of the proletariat -- actually prevent them from doing this, rendering them
contentless, as we have seen.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Since
it isn't possible to specify what would count as
evidence that showed a proposition like M1a was true -- or even that it
wasfalse -- neither is
materially-grounded. That is, their semantic status isn't sensitive to any state of
affairs in the world, and that is because they have no such status. As such
they can't assist in any attempt to understand the world, nor can they be used to help
change it.
[But, as we
will see in Essay Nine Part Two,
they often manage to get in the way.]
That, of
course, helps explain why it was concluded (in Essay Nine
Part One) that DM-theories can't be used to
propagandise and agitate workers, nor can they even be employed during an actual revolution, such as 1917
--
as we have also seen.
Instead of reflecting
the world, these sentences do the exact opposite -- the world back-reflects them. They determine the way the world must be, not the way
it happens to be. The Ideal World
of Traditional Philosophy is a reflection of the
distorted language
and ruling-class interests on which it is based.
In a similar
manner to
Traditional Thinkers, DM-theorists also dictate to the world
how it must be and how it can't be otherwise.
This is the exact
opposite of genuine science, which allows the world
to tell scientists how it happens to be.
That is why 'profound
philosophical truths' can only be read from
distorted language (as Marx
himself said) found in sentences like M1a and P4, not from nature.
Metaphysical sentences represent an attempt
to impose a set of ideas on the world, hence they are 'true' only in the
sense that they reflect an Ideal World concocted by their inventors, not the
material world we see around us. And that is why their actual truth, or their actual falsehood,
was never, and could never, be determined by
a confrontation with the facts, but has to be bestowed on them as a gift by those
who dreamt them up.46
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
The usual
protocols that help determine when something is true or when something is false (i.e.,
a
systematic
search for evidence engaged in by genuine scientists) have to be set
aside, a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it.47
With
respect to DM, this
bogus ceremony is
invariably carried out after the
event -- that is, after a set of ideas had been borrowed from Hegel's 'Logic'.
DM-theorist then try to 'illustrate' various 'laws' and 'principles' of their
theory (they don't even attempt a rigorous, scientific analysis of the
evidence) by
appealing to a narrow range of specially-selected and regularly
recycled examples (as we found, for instance, was
the case with Trotsky's criticism of the
LOI, Engels's analysis of motion,
the Three 'Laws' and
Lenin's theory of knowledge).
This evidential
'display'
exhibits four inter-related features:
(1)
It is invariably performed in the 'mind' as part of a hasty consideration of the
'concepts' supposedly involved. No actual experiments or scientifcally-designed
observations/surveys are carried out, no mathematical modelling is undertaken,
no computer simulations are even contemplated. If this were ever to be presented
as genuine science, it would be laughed out of court even before it was
subjected to peer-review. Instead of being compared with material
reality in order to ascertain their truth-values, DM-'propositions' are compared with
or linked to
other related 'propositions' -- such as P4 -- or more often, they are compared with yet more
obscure doctrines lifted from Hegel --
as part of a jargon-riddled gesture at 'verification'. This means that DM-theories are
both
quintessentially Ideal
and consistently anti-materialist.48
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
(2) It often
consists of a series of superficialthought experiments, which are
accompanied by ill-informed 'logical' analyses of a few key terms,
'supported' by the frequent use of modal (or quasi-modal) terms -- such as "must", "inconceivable",
"demand", "insist", "unthinkable", and "impossible". A classic example of this
approach is Engels's 'analysis' of motion, which is based
exclusively on the words (or the concepts) involved. He nowhere appeals to evidence in support of what he claimed
was true of
every moving body in existence. In fact, it is impossible to imagine any
evidence that could be offered in
support. [I have dealt with this specific topic at greater length in
Essay Five; readers are referred
there for more details.]
(3) Almost
without exception the application of
DM-'laws' is illustrated by an
appeal to a few specially-selected (and endlessly repeated) 'supportive'
examples -- which are themselves often mis-described or left unfathomably vague.
In Essay
Seven, we saw that DM-theorists offer their readers what can only be
described as laughably superficial
'evidence' in support of Engels's Three 'Laws'. As a result I have
called DM a classic example of "Mickey Mouse
Science". We can now see why it merits just such a name: the supposedly "self-evident"
or "obvious"
nature of DM-theories means
that little (or no) empirical support is required. Hence, a few trite,
specially-selected examples
are used merely to 'illustrate' (they certainly don't prove) these 'laws', which are
then repeated, ad nauseam, year-in, year-out.
Incidentally, that is why DM-fans soon resort to using the following knee-jerk response, "You
don't understand dialectics", directed at critics. That is because their theory isn't based on evidence, but on a certain
(and rather quirky) 'understanding' of a limited range of ill-defined 'concepts'.
(4) On other occasions, the
'evidence' used to 'illustrate' DM-'propositions' turns out to be the
result of superficial forays into 'linguistic' or 'conceptual' analysis, often based on a series of 'persuasive definitions'
or even more mysterious 'abstractions' (of dubious provenance).49
More specifically, as we saw in Essay Three
Part One, this
'method' is applied to predicative expressions that supposedly 'name'
invisible 'abstractions', the latter of which turn out to
be Proper Names of abstract
particulars, vitiating the whole exercise by destroying the generality of
the concepts they supposedly 'reflect'. [Follow the above links for an
explanation.]
Whatever
linguistic sleight-of-hand is involved in this, direct or indirect reference has at some point to be made to the ordinary
meaning of the words used so that they can be 'revised'. Unfortunately, since the opening moves
now involves
a misuse of these terms, they no longer possess their usual meaning, which in
turn means that the whole exercise has become
doublypointless. Which is, once more, why Marx said this:
"The
philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
For example, DM-theorists en masserepeatedly, almost neurotically,
use the term "contradiction", but they don't mean by that word
what ordinarily means, nor yet what it means in FL. What
they think they mean is the subject of Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three. [Spoiler -- in those
Essays we discover
that it is completely obscure what they mean by this term, as,
indeed, was Hegel before them. Despite this, even if DM-fans and Hegelians can't
quite say with any clarity or consistency (no surprise there, then!) what they
do mean by "contradiction", they most definitely don't mean by
that word what ordinary speakers or logicians mean by it. As I also
demonstrate in
Essay
Five, while dialecticians tend to 'see' contradictions everywhere they look,
they never bother to derive them logically, as Hegel at least attempted
(notoriously,
but
invalidly, in connection with the 'master-servant' relation, for instance).
Other than in relation to the supposed link
between the proletariat and the capitalist class (which
also fails), they never even attempt
to show these 'contradiction' are in any way 'dialectical'. By the way, the
DM-use of "contradiction" can legitimately be called a distortion since
dialecticians indiscriminately apply it to such diverse things as opposites,
inconsistencies, absurdities, contraries, paradoxes, puzzles, quandaries,
oddities, irrationalities, oppositional processes, antagonisms, interacting
forces, events that go contrary to expectations alongside a whole host of other
idiosyncrasies, as I have shown in Essay Eight
Part Two, when, in
ordinary speech, the word is confined to what is said and then
gainsaid. In
Philosophy and Logic the word has several meanings depending on the theorists
and the theories involved; in Essay Eight
Part Three I have taken issue with most of them. On this topic in general,
see here.]
While
DM-theorists can use words anyway they please, revising their meaning as they
see fit, no
process of revising a word can begin if that word has been
distorted from the
beginning. It
isn't possible to revise such words if they aren't actually being used --
i.e., where a distorted term has been substituted for them -- or they have been replaced by
a typographically identical inscription, which is thenused
idiosyncratically.
In such circumstances, dialecticians only create confusion (among themselves --
no one else is being fooled) by their odd and twisted use of this word. [There are more details about this 'process',
here.]
Hence, in such circumstances
what at first sight might appear to be ordinary
terms putting in a brief appearance -- e.g., "motion", "unthinkable", "opposite", "equal", "place",
"moment", "quality", "identical", "negation", "contradiction",
"change", etc., etc. -- a second glance shows that not to be the case.
By no stretch of the imagination do these words mean the same as their
intended
equivalent in the vernacular. That is
because of the extraordinary use to which they are now being put. [I have
shown this in detail in Essay Five
with respect to words associated with "move" and "place", for example.]
This can be seen
when an actual appeal is made to the usual, often diverse, meaning these ordinary words already possess (an
approach that has been adopted on numerous occasions at this site -- for example,
here and
here) --, the seeminglyobvious
validity of every single DM-claim soon falls apart.
Nevertheless, this is precisely what creates the spurious 'obviousness' and
'self-evidence' that DM-'laws' might appear to possess. This also helps explain
the consternation DM-fans often display when their theory is demolished (as it has been at this site);
after the initial shock, their reaction almost invariably involves a predictable appeal to the "pedantry"/"semantics"
defence. The rationale behind the repudiation of DM at this site is completely
mystifying to those held in its thrall. How
such apparently
"self-evident", 'obviously true' DM-'laws' could fail to be true,
or could even be questioned,
becomes "unthinkable".
Indeed, as noted above, dastardly critics just don't "understand" dialectics.
This also helps explain why
DM-fans soon become abusive -- which is almost invariably their first
post-shock reaction.
Naturally,
such incredulity
is a direct result of the fact that the 'truth' of these 'laws' has been built into them by linguistic or conceptual fiat
-- or as a mere gift by a DM-Prophet.
That is also
why DM-fans find it difficult to understand anyone who denies, for
instance, that 'a moving object is in two places at once, in one place and not in it at the same time', even though our
ordinary use of words associated with motion and place shows that our ideas in
this area are far more complex than
Hegel,
Zeno or DM-theorists imagined.
As Essay Five shows, our use of the
vernacular
allows examples of movement that demonstrate Engels's theory of motion (if such
it might be called -- he expressed this 'theory' of his in less than a hundred
words and offered zero proof!) is seriously
flawed -- that is, where any sense can be made of it.50
It is hardly
surprising that a novel/distorted use of what (superficially)
look like ordinary words generates paradox.
That is because the everyday meaning of such terms seems to 'carry over' into these new contexts,
bringing in its train endless confusion. That, of course, helps explain why
'contradictions' seem to crop up all over the place in the DM-'Ecosystem' like
Japanese Knotweed.
[Detailed examples of the above were given in Essay Three Part
One, in Essay Four, here
and here, and throughout
Essays Five and
Six.]
To compound the problem,
these paradox-generating moves are often
based on what are claimed to be the 'obvious' or 'real' meaning
of the terms involved. The wide diversity of connotations
that such ordinary words possess are brushed aside as 'unscientific', 'un-philosophical', "valid
only within certain
limits" --, or they are rejected as uninteresting, inessential, compromised by banal "commonsense"
and "formal thinking", or even that they reflect the 'prejudices of
the age'. For example, the real meaning of
motion is supposed to imply that it is 'contradictory' and
paradoxical; the real meaning of 'identity' is actually its opposite
(when confronted with change); the real
meaning of "matter" implies motion; the real meaning of
"contradiction" or "opposite" means this, or that..., and so on.50a
The original
terms are then discarded as of limited utility, or even as defective and
unsuitable for use in either philosophy or science. However, as we have seen,
and will repeatedly see, ordinary language is castigated
because it actually prevents 'philosophical' moves like those metaphysicians
have always tried to pull.
Hence, according to Traditional Theorists (and now
DM-fans), if ordinary language stands in the way, it is ordinary language
which is to blame, not the moves themselves!51
The late
Professor Havelock
pinpointed the origin of these linguistic con-tricks (my phrase, not
his!) in the moves the
Presocratics tried to pull, but similar comments could very well apply, mutatis
mutandis, to Traditional Philosophers and DM-theorists in general:
"As long as preserved
communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained
only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is
gods.
Hesiod
takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great
story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of
gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas,
mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a
style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the
manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of
events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the
Presocratics
were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated
philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking
was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could
describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter,
body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity,
quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of
abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of
doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour
of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms
systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished
by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic
statement.
"The history of early
philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary
was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own
language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....
Nevertheless, the
Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They
had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of
orally memorised speech, in particular the language of
Homer
and
Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and
manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had
the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a
cosmic rather than a particular reference."
[Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling adapted to agree with
UK English. Links added; several paragraphs merged.]
Ordinary
language is thus caught in a what amounts to 'philosophical vice'. On the one hand,
the everyday meaning of words doesn't sanction the theories metaphysicians try
to generate from
them, on the other, ordinary terms are said to be inadequate because they
imply 'paradoxes', when, in reality, that 'defect' is a direct result of a
cavalier misuse
of the medium.52
As Glock pointed out:
"Wittgenstein's ambitious claim is that it is
constitutive of metaphysical theories and questions that their employment of
terms is at odds with their explanations and that they use deviant rules along
with the ordinary ones. As a result, traditional philosophers cannot coherently
explain the meaning of their questions and theories. They are confronted with a
trilemma: either their novel uses of terms remain unexplained
(unintelligibility), or...[they use] incompatible rules (inconsistency), or
their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary use --
including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts in terms
of which the philosophical problems were phrased." [Glock (1996), pp.261-62.
See also,
here.]
In
view of the above,
Marx's advice once again becomes all the more
relevant:
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
The exclusion of one
or other of the
semantic options ordinarily open to indicative sentences completely undermines thelogical role of the non-excluded, twin -- truth in favour of
falsehood, or falsehood in favour of truth. For, as we have seen, if such sentences can
only be false, and never true, they can't actually be false -- nor vice
versa. That is because, if an empirical proposition is false, itisn't true.53
But, if we can't say under what circumstances such a sentence is true
then we certainly can't say in what way it falls short of this so that it
could be untrue, and hence false. Conversely, if it can only be true,
the conditions that would make it false are similarly excluded; if we can't say under what circumstances such
a sentence is
false then we certainly can't say in what way it falls short of this condition so that it
could be true, and hence not false. In which case, its
truth similarly falls by the wayside.
Again, this forms part of understanding the
sense of a proposition; in order to grasp
its sense, a
speaker
has to know under what conditions a given empirical proposition could be true or
could be
false. These two stand or fall together -- so, knowing what would make such a proposition
true is ipso facto to know what would make it false, and vice versa.
Consider the following:
C1: Barak Obama owns a copy of Das Kapital.
C2: Barak Obama doesn't own a copy of Das
Kapital.
Anyone who knows the English language, and knows who and what
Barak Obama and Das Kapital are will understand this sentence. Even if
they haven't a clue whether it is true or whether it is false, they would
know what state of affairs would have to obtain for it to be true, the absence
of which would make it false. The same state of affairs thus serves in both cases
-- to
make C1 true or make C1 false. If that weren't the case, if a speaker didn't (explicitly or implicitly)
know this, then that would
provide prima facie evidence that they didn't
understand C1 or C2.
Of course, DM-theorists aren't really interested in banal
propositions like C1 and C2; they are more interested in change and hence in propositions
that express any such phenomena. In such circumstances, the negative particle seems, to them, toadd
content to a given sentence. Perhaps via the NON.
[NON = Negation of the
Negation.]
This
supposition involves 'the
power
of negativity', which drives change, supposedly by adding content. This idea will
be examined in more detail in Parts Five and Six of Essay Twelve. Suffice it to
say here that if this were the case, it would prevent the following two
propositions from being contradictories:
C3: Moving object, B, is located at
<x1, y1,
z1>,at t1,
C4: Moving object,B, isn't located at <x1,
y1, z1>,at t1.
[Where
"x1",
"y1", and "z1"
are Cartesian
ordinates, and "t1"
is a temporal variable.]
Which is, of course, contrary to what Hegel and Engels
maintained:
"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change,
their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in
contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change
of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in
another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same
place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution
of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]
"If, now, the first
determinations of reflection, namely, identity, difference and opposition, have
been put in the form of a law, still more should the determination into which
they pass as their truth, namely, contradiction, be grasped and enunciated as a
law: everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that
this law in contrast to the others expresses rather the truth and the
essential nature of things. The contradiction which makes its appearance in
opposition, is only the developed nothing that is contained in identity and that
appears in the expression that the law of identity says nothing. This
negation further determines itself into difference and opposition, which now is
the posited contradiction.
"But it is one of the
fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking
that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a
determination as identity; but in fact, if it were a question of grading the two
determinations and they had to be kept separate, then contradiction would have
to be taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence.
For as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple
immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and
vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it
that it moves, has an urge and activity.
"In the first place,
contradiction is usually kept aloof from things, from the sphere of being and of
truth generally; it is asserted that there is nothing that is contradictory.
Secondly, it is shifted into subjective reflection by which it is first posited
in the process of relating and comparing. But even in this reflection, it does
not really exist, for it is said that the contradictory cannot be
imagined or thought. Whether it occurs in actual things or in
reflective thinking, it ranks in general as a contingency, a kind of abnormality
and a passing paroxysm or sickness....
"Now as regards the assertion that
there is no contradiction, that it does not exist, this statement need not
cause us any concern; an absolute determination of essence must be present in
every experience, in everything actual, as in every notion. We made the same
remark above in connection with the infinite, which is the
contradiction as displayed in the sphere of being. But common experience itself
enunciates it when it says that at least there is a host of
contradictory things, contradictory arrangements, whose contradiction exists not
merely in an external reflection but in themselves. Further, it is not to be
taken merely as an abnormality which occurs only here and there, but is rather
the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all
self-movement, which consists solely in an exhibition of it. External,
sensuous movement itself is contradiction's immediate existence. Something
moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at
one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at
once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions
that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is
no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction
itself.
"Similarly, internal self-movement
proper, instinctive urge in general, (the appetite or nisus of
the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple essence), is nothing else but the
fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and
deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity
has no vitality, but the positive, being in its own self a negativity, goes
outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive
only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this
power to hold and endure the contradiction within it. But if an existent in its
positive determination is at the same time incapable of reaching beyond its
negative determination and holding the one firmly in the other, is incapable of
containing contradiction within it, then it is not the living unity itself, not
ground, but in the contradiction falls to the ground. Speculative thinking
consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it,
its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary
thinking, where its determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other
determinations or into nothing
"If the contradiction in
motion, instinctive urge, and the like, is masked for ordinary thinking, in the
simplicity of these determinations, contradiction is, on the other hand,
immediately represented in the determinations of relationship. The most
trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on
ad infinitum, all contain opposition in each term. That is
above, which is not below; 'above' is specifically just this, not to be
'below', and only is, in so far as there is a 'below'; and conversely,
each determination implies its opposite. Father is the other of son, and the son
the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other; and
at the same time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other; their
being is a single subsistence. The father also has an existence of his
own apart from the son-relationship; but then he is not father but simply man;
just as above and below, right and left, are each also a reflection-into-self
and are something apart from their relationship, but then only places in
general. Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in
the same respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each other
and are indifferent to one another. Ordinary thinking when it
passes over to the moment of the indifference of the determinations,
forgets their negative unity and so retains them merely as 'differents' in
general, in which determination right is no longer right, nor left left, etc.
But since it has, in fact, right and left before it, these determinations are
before it as self-negating, the one being in the other, and each in this unity
being not self-negating but indifferently for itself.
"Opposites, therefore, contain
contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to
one another. Ordinary thinking when it passes over to the moment of the
indifference of the determinations, forgets their negative unity and so
retains them merely as 'differents' in general, in which determination right is
no longer right, nor left left, etc. But since it has in fact right and left
before it, these determinations are before it as self-negating, the one being in
the other, and each in this unity being not self-negating but indifferently for
itself." [Hegel (1999),
pp.439-41,
§955-§960.
Bold emphases alone added.]
However, we
have
already seen that the negative particle can't do what DM-fans require of it.
With respect to metaphysical-, and DM-'propositions', we have seen that negating them
changes the subject, which in turn means that such 'propositions' and their
supposed negations are devoid of content. So, instead of adding
content, 'dialectical negation' reveals they had no content to begin with.
On the other
hand, if negation were capable of adding content, then
C3 and C4 would thereby end up with a different content.
So, if as DM-theorists insist, 'dialectical negation' adds content, then
none of the propositions involved would of could be "contradictories".
Of course,
they might mean something different by "contradiction";
if so, what?
C3: Moving object, B, is located at
<x1, y1,
z1>,at t1.
C4: Moving object,B, isn't located at <x1,
y1, z1>,at t1.
[However, as we have seen in Essay
Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three, it is in fact impossible
to ascertain what DM-fans do mean by their odd use
of the word "contradiction". And, as we
will discover in Parts Five and Six of this Essay, it is equally impossible to decide
what, if anything, Hegel meant by his idiosyncratic use of it, too.]
So, our comprehension of empirical propositions is
intimately connected with the inter-relation between these logical 'Siamese Twins'
(i.e., truth and falsehood) --, and hence with the social norms governing the use of
the negative particle -- coupled with the fact that an empirical proposition and its
negation have the same content. The abrogation of socially-sanctioned
rules like these means that 'necessarily true' and 'necessarily false' sentences
(like those considered earlier) aren't
just senseless, they are non-sensical. That is, they are incapable of
reflecting anything in the world, which means they are incapable of
being true and incapable of
being false
-- i.e., they are incapable of expressing a
sense.
Whatever we try to do with them collapses into incoherence.54
For the last two-and-a-half
thousand years metaphysicians have consistently
overlooked or ignored this logical feature of empirical propositions. [So, in
this respect, DM-theorists are merely
Johnny-come-latelies.]
This age-old error
duped Traditional
Philosophers into imagining that the 'necessity' of metaphysical
'propositions' derives from the nature of reality,not from the distorted
language on which they are based.
Innocent-looking
linguistic false-steps like these helped motivate the invention of theories that were
supposed to 'reflect'
the 'essential nature of 'reality', accessible to thought alone. But, if such 'truths'
are based on nothing more than
linguistic chicanery, on distortion and/or misuse, then no evidence could
be offered in their support --,
except, of course, 'evidence' based on yet more linguistic
legerdemain.
Metaphysical 'necessity' is thus little more than a shadow cast
on the world by distorted language
(to paraphrase both Wittgenstein and
Marx).
Over the centuries metaphysical systems
were
developed, not by becoming empirically more refined or
increasingly useful (in connection with, for instance, technology or medicine) -- which
has proved to be the case with the growth of science -- but by becoming
increasingly labyrinthine, convoluted and
baroque as
further incomprehensible layers of jargon were layered on earlier deposits of
linguistically
deformed bedrock.
Hegel's
system alone provides ample evidence of that.
Naturally, this confirms the fact that these two semantic
possibilities -- truth and falsehood -- must remain open options
if a proposition is to count as empirical, subject to evidential confirmation,
and thereby count as "thinkable", in this sense.
In which case, as the above shows, no sentence can
express a 'necessary truth' about the world while remaining empirical.55
So, despite appearances to the contrary,
Lenin's appeal to the 'unthinkability' of 'motion without matter' doesn't in fact say anything
at all --, that is, it doesn't say anything empirically determinate.
[This section represents something of a side-show
and may be skipped by anyone wanting to concentrate on the main theme. The only
caveat is that the next
section after it might not be fully understood if it is by-passed.
Readers who still want to skip this section can begin again
here.]
Considerations like these show that indicative sentences conceal a set of diverse logical forms, which is why it is unwise to take superficially
similar grammatical features of language at face value. This in turn demonstrates that
while sentences like M2-M9 might well be indicative -- with several of them also
appearing to be empirical -- as we have seen, they masquerade as empirical
propositions, and, as such, fail to express a sense.
That in turn is a consequence of the
conventions ordinary language users have established over the millennia -- by
their practice, not in
general by their deliberations --, which alone constitute the nature of empirical propositions.
Even so, not
every indicative sentences is, or need be, metaphysical.
For example, consider the following:
M2: Two is a number.
This appears to be unconditionally,
or even necessarily, true. However, its 'negation':
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number,
isn't false; it is
either incomprehensible or, despite appearances to the contrary, it
isn't
about the number two. [On that, see below.]
[In what follows, I have confined my comments to
seemingly banal sentences, like M2 and M21, in order to explain in what way they
are true and to help distinguish them from metaphysical-, and
DM-'propositions'. However, this isn't meant to be an Essay about 'the nature of
mathematics', so more complex mathematical 'propositions' will in general be
ignored.]
M21
isn't just contingently false -- if it is taken to be a mathematical and not
simply a terminologicalproposition (that is, if it isn't viewed
as a proposed revision to the names we use in our number system, what I later
call the "trivial" option) -- it appears to be necessarily false.
But, if we put trivial examples
to one side for now (on that, also see below), it is impossible to specify
what could possibly make M21 true. In that case, we are in no position to
specify what M21 is trying to rule out, and hence we are in no position to say in
what way it falls
short of that for it to be false.
Unlike empirical propositions, M2 and M21 don't have the same content, nor do they relate to the
same state of affairs, since neither relate to any state of affairs, to
begin with. If they did, a comparison with the world, a reference to facts, would be relevant to
ascertaining their truth or establishing their falsehood. In turn that is because (as we saw
earlier), between M2 and M21 there is a
change of subject, since if two isn't a number (according to M21) then that use
of "two" is different from its use in M2.
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M2 expresses a rule for the use of the number word "two"
(as a number), since
it reflects the role this word occupies in our number system. At best,
M21 (perhaps) records the rejection of that rule -- again, if we ignore
trivial examples.
To think
otherwise -- i.e., that M21 could express a supposed
truth or a supposed falsehood (again assuming M21 doesn't represent a simple terminological revision,
which would be the trivial case mentioned earlier) would be to misconstrue the
ordinary use
of the word "two" (in such a context). Such a major change of meaning would significantly alter any of the mathematical
propositions (equations, etc.) in which this word (or the numeral "2") occurred,
and that in turn would have a knock-on effect throughout the number system..
Some might
think that M21 is "logically false" (and thus that M2 is "logically true"), but that would merely attract the sort of questions posed
earlier about "necessarily false" and "necessarily true". If it isn't possible to specify
conditions under which M21 would be "logically true" (trivial examples
excepted, once more), then it would be equally impossible to
say under what conditions it would fail to be "logically true", and hence
"logically false" (or "necessarily false").
[Of
course, it could be argued that M2 is "definitionally true", but that would
merely amount to acknowledging that M2 was an expression of a rule, after all.]
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
Consider now one of the aforementioned trivial cases:
suppose that in the
course of development of the English language a
different word had been chosen in place of "two". In such an
eventuality, plainly, not much would change. Suppose,
therefore, that in English "Schmoo", or a different symbol for "2"
(perhaps "ж"), was used in
place of "two" (or "2"). M2 and M21 would then become:
M2a : Schmoo is a number.
M21a: It isn't the case that Schmoo is a number.
But, as
noted above, that, too, would simply represent another minorterminological
revision. If this word (or this new symbol) were used as we now use "two" (or
"2") then there would be no substantive difference. [On this, see also Note 60.] Clearly, the same
would apply to number words
(and symbols) used in other languages.
Others might argue that M21 is self-contradictory.
When spelt-out this 'self-contradiction' might be expressed as
follows, in M21b or M21c:
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M21b: It isn't the case that the number two is a number.
M21c: The number two is a number and the
number two isn't a number.
But, as seems plain, the first use of
the word "two" in M21c isn't the same as the second use of "two"
in this sentence. In that case, M21c is no more
self-contradictory than this would be:
Of
course, M21d isn't meant to express the same logical form
as M21c (plainly M21c contains definite descriptions); it is merely meant
to make explicit a change of denotation between the first and the second use of
the relevant words. Plainly, in M21d, the first name refers
to a different individual from the second. Similarly, in M21c, while the first
occurrence of "two" is the familiar number word; the second isn't.
Indeed, the second actually says it isn't! Hence, the two halves of M21c do not constitute a contradiction.
So, M2 would itself only become 'false' if one or more of
its constituent words changed their meanings (this is the trivial case
once more -- for example, if "two" was no longer used to designate the
whole number between one and three, and instead came to be the name of, say, a newly
discovered planet).
But even then, M2 wouldn't be about what we now call "two". Plainly, as soon as anyone
attempts to deny that number two is a number, they automatically cease to talk about the
number two. [Once more, what they might bedoing in such circumstances is
rejecting a rule, but that wouldn't affect how the rest of us use
the rules or the number vocabulary we now have.]
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M21e:
Two isn't a number.
Hence, despite appearances to the contrary, M21/M21e and
M2 don't
in fact contradict one another. That is because M21 and/or M21e are either incomprehensible,
or they are about something else -- this would be the trivial case, once more. Again,
a use of negation here
would, at best, amount to the rejection of a rule, or it would be trivial.56, 56a
Conclusions to the contrary may only be sustained by
maintaining (i) The false belief
that M2 actually stands alone as a mathematicalunit, and isn't is
part of a number system, or (ii) The idea that M2 is a
contingent (or even perhaps an empirical) proposition.
But, what makes M2 mathematical is its use in a system of propositions,
which is itself one aspect of a historically-conditioned
set of practices inter-linked by rule-governed operations,
direct and indirect proofs,
inductions and definitions, etc., etc. Moreover, M2 isn't a contingent proposition (except
with respect to trivial cases, once more), it the expression of a rule. M2 it tells us how we use,
and
are supposed to use, this
word or symbol. It situates both in an wider system of symbols.
The 'truth'
of M2 doesn't derive from the way it relates as an 'atomic unit' to an alleged
mathematical fact hidden away in some sort of
Platonic Heaven (or, indeed, by the way it might relate to an 'abstraction'
lodged in
someone's brain/'consciousness'), but from its role in the aforementioned
system of propositions, connected by proofs -- and by the way it has grown out
of, and
developed in, wider social practices. [On this, see
Note 56.]
That is why none of us would be able to comprehend an investigation aimed at testing the truth of M2
empirically. In fact, the inappropriateness of any sort of empirical verification of
propositions like M2 is connected with their total
lack of truth conditions.57
Our use of such propositions -- which,
as we can see, differs markedly from the way we use and comprehend empirical
propositions -- indicates that they have a radically different logical form. The
failure of a proposition like M2 to correspond with anything in the world (or,
indeed, in 'Platonic Heaven') is
revealed by the fact that (barring trivial cases, once
more) we
would ordinarily fail to understand its 'negation' -- i.e., M21. Trivial cases
to one side, again, anyone who asserted M21 wouldn't be making an ordinary sort
of factual error -- as
they would had they said the following on or after the 25th of June, 2016: "It isn't the case that
David Cameron has resigned as UK Prime Minister".
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
This can also be seen by
the way that mathematics is learnt. Children learn this by one or more of the
following: repetition (number drilling/recitation), rote learning, repetitive
calculation, practical application, problem solving, or by the use of
simple proofs. They do not do so by 'abstraction'. Children aren't taught to
'abstract' numbers, but to count, and at
some point the 'penny drops', as it were -- at which point parents and carers
often find it impossible to stop their pupils counting on and on.... But this is
true in general. Understanding mathematical propositions goes
hand-in-hand with mastering a skillor a technique, and subsequently by learning proofs,
in tandem with the
completion of a variety of operations and guided tasks, etc.57a
In
that case, it wouldn't be possible to declare M2 true because
it 'corresponded' to a fact --, or, indeed, false because it didn't -- either in reality or
in 'Platonic Heaven'. And that is because it isn't possible to determine what M2
rules out, and hence what it rules in (trivial cases to
one side, again).
This
is, of course, independent of the fact that it wouldn't be possible to confirm M2 by comparing it with an abstract fact (even
if we could make sense of such a 'fact', never mind how a sentence can be
compared with
any sort of 'abstraction'). To understand M2 and its use is to master a technique or a rule; it
isn't to have identified a confirming fact or 'abstraction against which it is
to be evaluated. No fact could tell a pupil how to proceed
mathematically, or how to use M2 correctly. Only the mastery of a rule could
do that. In addition, as we have seen, contingent facts can
be false. If M21 were an empirical or a contingent proposition, the 'falsehood
of M2' would appear to make it true. But, there is a change of subject between
M2 and M21, so the supposed truth of M21 would have no bearing on the
semantic status of M2 (trivial cases to one side, again). As we have seen, M2 has
no negation.
In that case, the mere insertion of a negative particle into a
sentence doesn't automatically create the negation of that sentence
(where "the negation" here means "A proposition with the opposite
truth-value"), as we have repeatedly seen.58
In this way we can see once more that the superficial grammatical structure of
indicative sentences often obscures their deeper logical form. While empirical sentences may be
mapped onto
their contradictories by means of the (relevant) addition of a negative
particle, that isn't so with non-empirical
indicative sentences. This isn't, of course, unconnected with the
fact that empirical sentences can be understood before their truth-values are
known, whereas propositions like M2 are comprehensible independently of that
pre-condition -- they are fully grasped only by those who know how to count and
to calculate, etc. In that case, the meaning of
M2 must be accounted for in a different way to that of, say, M6:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
As
has already been noted, M6 can be understood well in advance of its truth-value
being known; that truth-value can't be ascertained on linguistic
or logical grounds alone. That is quite unlike, say, M2 (or even, M1a).
This means that sentences like M2 aren't empirical. In fact, they express rules for the use of certain words (or they are the
consequence of the application of those rules); that is, they express the
normative
application of their key terms, because of which they are incapable
of being empirically true or empirically false. Any attempt to view them as
empirical soon
collapses into incoherence, as we have seen.
[Of
course, it isn't being suggested here that children are taught mathematics by
leaning to repeat, or internalise, sentences like M2. Children demonstrate they
(implicitly) understand M2 by being able to count and do simple arithmetic, etc.]
As it turns out, the confusion of rules with empirical
sentences underlies the failure on the part of theorists to see language as a
social phenomenon.59
That is because such a failure is itself motivated by a determination to view the
'foundations of language' as
solely truth-based. Given an approach, language is thought to be predicated on empirical or
quasi-empirical factors -- such as a capacity to 'represent reality', on its
ability to function as medium that allows the world to be reflected in the 'mind' or in 'consciousness'
--
rather than on socially-sanctioned rules, conditioned by social practices and norms.
Given the (traditional)
view, falsehood is merely an erroneous or a 'partial' application of the
'contents of consciousness', howsoever they are conceived, or it is
the result of an incorrect connection established between these factors.
However, because these 'representations' are
compared only with other 'representations', this leaves the world out of
the account, obviating the whole exercise!
[As we will see in Essay Three Part Four, this 'traditional view of falsehood' is not
just circular, it is also incoherent.]
Hence, this approach to knowledge misconstrues social norms
(such as those expressed in sentences like M2)
as
if they were empirical, or even Super-Empirical, propositions. In that case, normative aspects of language
(i.e., rules), which are the result of a lengthy process of social
development and human interaction, are
re-interpreted or re-configured as if they expressed the real relation between things, or
were even those things
themselves. That is, they are misconstrued as 'necessary' truths that underpin
reality, reflect its "essence" or 'mirror' abstract truths in 'Platonic Heaven'. In this way, they become
Self-Certifying Super-EmpiricalTruths, in no need
of evidential support. It is this slide that underpins the fetishisation of
language upon which Metaphysics (and now DM) is based.
That
is why the falsehood of M6, for example, isn't like the 'falsehood' of M2. To
repeat, in order to understand M6, no one need know whether it is true or
whether it is false. The falsehood of M6 (in this case expressed by the possible
truth of its
negation, M6a) doesn't affect the meaning of any of the terms it contains.
That isn't so with M2 and its apparent negation, M21:
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
M2 can't be false. Its 'falsehood' would amount to a
change of meaning, not of fact. Hence, M2 may only be accepted or rejected
as the expression of a rule of language -- or, indeed, mathematical language.60
In fact, modification to sentences like M2 -- by means of
analogy or metaphorical extension -- underlies the many major and minor
conceptual revisions that mathematical or scientific concepts regularly undergo
(saving, of course, trivial examples, once more).
In
stark contrast, the rejection, or modification, of propositions like M6 wouldn't herald profound change.
It is unlikely that Blair's failure to
own a copy of TAR will initiate a significant conceptual revolution.
The fundamental conceptual changes that are set in motion
by alterations to the rules that 'govern' a mathematical, scientific
or empirical use of language are also connected with factors that make metaphysical-,
and DM-theses
seem so
certain, their rejection so completely "unthinkable" by those who
dote on this way of talking. Because metaphysical sentences arise out of a
distorted use of language.
In fact, they often rely on a misconstrual of rules that seek to establish, or which
actually constitute,
new meanings, and it is this
that generates the impression that they represent novel/profound 'truths' about 'Being',
'consciousness', 'essence', or even 'truth' itself. All of which are generated from language alone,
not from a practical interface with the world, or even with one
another. This further motivates the impression that their truth-status is resolvable,
or verifiable, by 'thought' alone.61
Consider M2 and M9, again:
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M2: Two is a number.
At first sight,
it might
look like M9 resembles M2 -- in that its apparent truth-value (true) is
given by the meaning of its constituent words.
However, M2 isn't a rule because of the meaning of the
terms it contains; it is a rule because the social and historical practices upon
which it is based constitute and hence express the meaning of its terms. It is
how human beings have already used such terms (in this case, counting,
measuring, calculating and proving, etc.) that establishes their meaning. These rules (i.e.,
those like M2) merely express what ispart of established practice.
This can be seen from the additional fact that mathematics was invented by human beings
who were already social animals; it wasn't given to humanity by visiting aliens,
nor was even
'a gift the gods'.62
On the other hand, if M2 were a rule because of
the prior meaning of its terms, determined by separate individuals -- as they 'abstracted' them into existence,
de novo, each time (which is what Traditional Theory suggests happened), then
their meaning would be independent of use. Plainly, in that case, meaning
wouldn't be based on social
factors but on metaphysical or even psychological principles of dubious provenance, and even more
suspect logical status, as we have seen. [I have covered this topic in much more detail in
Essay Three Parts One and
Two, and Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
Indeed, if that were the case, the
meaning of M2's constituent terms would have to have been established before they were
used in any social practices, such as in counting, measuring, calculating or proving
-- and that could only have been achieved by independent 'abstractors' relying
(piecemeal) on just such metaphysical or psychological principles as socially
atomised 'thinkers'.63
In sentences like M2,
each word would gain its meaning
by 'naming' a 'particular' or a 'universal', or by representing this or
that 'abstract' concept/'essence' underlying reality, the entire process having
taken place in the head of each lone abstractor.
It would then be the atomised meaning of a term (its 'representation in the
mind') that would tell each user how it should be used. That would transform each word
(or its inner 'representation') into an agent and each human being into a
patient, once more.64
That is because no fact,
abstraction, mental image or 'inner
representation' is capable of supplying the normativity that social
reinforcement, education and training provides. Hence, if the
Traditional Picture is to work, these 'abstractions', 'images',
'representations' or 'concepts' would have to replicate inside each head all
that external social factors already provide. So, they would have to become agents in their
own right, thus fetishising them. This aspect of the social world would
therefore need to be projected into each head.
As Peter Hacker argued:
"It is indeed true that a
sign can be lifeless for one, as when one hears an alien tongue or sees an
unknown script. But it is an illusion to suppose that what animates a sign is
some immaterial thing, abstract object, mental image or hypothesised
psychic entity that can be attached to it by a process of thinking.
[Wittgenstein (1969), p.4: 'But if we had to name anything which is the life of
the sign, we should have to say that it was its use.'] One can try to rid
oneself of these nonsensical conceptions by simple manoeuvres. In the case of
the idealist conception, imagine that we replace the mental accompaniment of a
word, which allegedly gives the expression its 'life', by a physical correlate.
For example, instead of accompanying the word 'red' with a mental image of red,
one might carry around in one's pocket a small red card. So, on the idealist's
model, whenever one uses or hears the word 'red', one can look at the
card instead of conjuring up a visual image in thought. But will looking at a
red slip of paper endow the word 'red' with life? The word plus sample is no
more 'alive' than the word without the sample. For an object (a sample of red)
does not have the use of the word laid up in it, and neither does the
mental image. Neither the word and the sample nor the word and the mental
pseudo-sample dictate the use of a word or guarantee understanding.... It seemed to
Frege,
Wittgenstein claimed, that no adding of inorganic signs, as it were, can make
the proposition live, from which he concluded that [for Frege -- RL] 'What must
be added is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere
signs'. [Wittgenstein (1969), p.4.] He [Frege -- RL] did not see that such an
object, a sense mysteriously grasped in thinking, as it were a picture in which
all the rules are laid up, 'would itself be another sign, or a calculus to
explain the written one to us'. [Wittgenstein (1974a), p.40.].... To understand a
sign, i.e., for it to 'live' for one, is not to grasp something other than the
sign; nor is it to accompany the sign with an inner parade of objects in
thought. It is to grasp the use of the sign itself." [Hacker (1993a), pp.167-68.
Italic emphases in the original. Link added; paragraphs merged.]
But the normative use of language can only be based
on, or arise out of, by social
factors.
Hence, the atomisation of
the meaning of words amounts to a fetishisation of language (on this, see Note 64). It would make the 'social' interaction of words (or their inner
'representations') the determinant of
how human beings use, or are supposed to use, language. This would be to invert
what actually happens: it is human agents who determine the
meaning of their words by their social interaction and their relation to the
world; it isn't words, 'abstractions', 'representations', 'ideas', 'images' or 'concepts'
that do it for them.65
In that case, it is the
pattern underlying the linguistic and social contexts that sentences like M2
encapsulate which gives expression to our rule-governed use of symbols like
these, and
which therefore constitutes their meaning. That
is because patterns like this are based on generality of use -- i.e., on the possibility and
the actuality of norm-governed, open-ended social
employment of such expressions.65a
The stark
difference between mathematical and ordinary (indicative) sentences can perhaps
be seen by the way the use of their terms may be justified. So, if someone were
challenged and asked why they had used "2" in the following way, "2 + 7 = 9"
(trivial cases to one side, again), all that the one questioned could appeal to would be
sentences like M2, and the other rules of arithmetic. Either that, or simply
retort "That's what I was taught! Were you taught differently?" The above simple equation couldn't be confirmed or justified
(nor would it) by comparing it with anything in the world
-- or, indeed, with any 'abstractions', 'representations', 'concepts' or 'images' in anyone's head
or brain, still less with any 'objects' tucked away in an Ideal form in 'Platonic
Heaven'.
It might be thought that an attempt could be made to justify "2 + 7 = 9" by
actually counting some objects. Certainly an attempt could be made
to do that, but
that attempt itself would only work if the parties
involved already understood how to use the relevant vocabulary, rules of
arithmetic and how to count. So, this 'justification' (by actually counting) would in effect be an
application of rules already understood and agreed upon.
This can be seen from the fact that if someone were to count two
objects, and then count another seven, but declare that there were in total ten objects,
they would be told they had made a mistake. Manifestly, we use the rules
of arithmetic
to decide if counting has been done correctly. We wouldn't even think to revise our rules,
or our use of sentences like M2,
if they had been so easily 'falsified' in this way.
Once more, that response is entirely different
from our reaction if M6 were shown to be false. In that eventuality, no one would think
to revise the application or the meaning of any of the words used in M6.
In which case, sentences
like M2 are used to
decide whether or an interface with reality (such as counting) has been carried out correctly.
The opposite is the case with M6. Facts are what determine if M6 is true; M6
isn't used to decide if the world is correct.65b
M2: Two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
This is how mathematical words gain their meaning: as
'cogs' in systems of concepts that have grown in relation to our social
development across many centuries.66 They didn't acquire the meaning they now have piecemeal; that is, they didn't gain their meaning atomistically, before
being
used socially, practically or contextually.66a
Mathematical
propositions don't gain their semantic status from the way they correspond with objects or structures
tucked away in some Ideal, Platonic Realm, or from the way they match
'abstractions' and 'representations' lodged in each individual head.67
This means that they aren't 'true' because a process of abstraction
established their status (which is
quintessentially an
individualistic
process). They are 'true' because of the proof systems to which they belong
(which are themselves reliant
on highly regimented social
practices), or because they are in some cases constitutive of the practices to which they belong.68
Consequently, two isn't a
number because of what the word "two" (or its original equivalent in ancient
languages) 'meant' before it was used in mathematical propositions
or in counting, and the like.69
On its own divorced from such practices, the sign "2" (or the word "two")
would mean nothing.69a
It would just be a mark
on the page -- or a sound pattern in the air. It gains its life from its use in
rule-governed, socially-conditioned contexts, which were (and still are) those
that occur in everyday life.
More formally, a
mathematical context is a system of propositions that has grown up alongside
specific social practices that are an extension to the above. So, "two" doesn't gain the meaning it
has in isolation, as might appear to be the case if
examples like M2 were read as trivial, terminological expressions. M2 can't supply "two"
with a meaning that wasn't already there in a surrounding system of
practices. Unless the logical space already existed for "two" to slot into as a
number term, "two" could be the name of a cat, or the colour of the sky,
or it might even be a meaningless
inscription. "Two"
gains its meaning from the rule-governed, normative role it plays in everyday
life, and hence in mathematics, linked by systems of proof, not as a result of
any correspondence relations, or
even by means of the process of abstraction.
This can be seen by the
way mathematical propositions are confirmed. We don't subject them to empirical
test or perform experiments on them. Nor do we run brain scans to see if others
have understood number words in the same way. We apply
them successfully within the systems and practices in which members of
a speech community
were socialised to apply them.70
In which case, M2 is empirically neither true nor false; it expresses a normative convention,
a rule.71
In a way that might seen
analogous to mathematical propositions, it could be argued that M9 is true because
of what its constituent words mean, but the status of sentences like M9 is much more problematic.72
As noted above, M2 expresses a rule whose use constitutes the
meaning of the number words it uses; hence, it is
incapable of being either true or false. Rules like M2 are either useful or
they aren't,
either practical or they aren't.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M9a. Motion is separable from matter.
M9b. Motion is possible without matter.
M9c. Matter without motion is possible.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M2: Two is a number.
But,
as far as DM-fans are concerned, M9 seems to be 'necessarily true'. Its supposed opposite
(which would appear to be M9a, or perhaps more naturally, M9b or M9c)
is, according to Lenin, "unthinkable". That might help explain why any attempt made to question the veracity of
sentences like M9 would be met with the counter-claim claim that sentences like M9
are true because of what words or concepts like "motion" and "matter"
really mean, or even because of the nature of reality, perhapsexpressed by P4. This can be seen from the fact that if critics were to
reject
M9 (for whatever reason), it would be no use dialecticians asking such a sceptic to look harder
at the evidence -- of which there is none anyway in this respect. After all, what evidence
could show M9 is the case? As we know, many Ancient Greek theorists accepted the
evidence of their senses -- indeed, everyone's senses, it seems -- that
matter is 'naturally motionless' and has to be set in motion by some motive
force. In that case, all that a dialectician could do in such circumstances is appeal to the
words or concepts involved, and then, with Lenin, declare that motion without
matter is "unthinkable" -- which is, of course, why Lenin didn't
simply say "It is false/incorrect to claim that motion can occur without matter, and here's the evidence
that proves it".
It is also why dialecticians (almost to an individual) respond to
critics with a "You just don't understand dialectics. They never say
-- concerning the veracity of P4 or M9 -- "You should
look at the evidence more carefully".
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
This hypothetical response
-- that dialecticians could only
refer doubters to what certain words or concepts 'really' mean or imply --
itself depends on an archaic
way of viewing language. That approach sees discourse as a system of labels
attached to -- or which 'represent'or 'reflect' (individually,as linguistic atoms) -- objects and processes in the world.
Either that, or words stand for or name 'Forms', 'Essences' or 'Substances' that
exist
in an 'abstract world', 'Platonic Heaven', Aristotelian 'concept-space', or even as
'images, 'ideas'
and 'concepts' in 'the
mind'), but they don't serve as a means of communication, a dynamic expression of our communal and
inter-personal life.73
Once more, this helps
explain why the (proffered) rejoinder
noted earlier (i.e., "M9 is true because of what its
constituent words mean") could only ever be
the last court of appeal for DM-theorists. There is nothing more that
could be said to a sceptic who doubted the 'truth' of such DM-sentences. What
little evidence there is that 'substantiates' even a narrow range of its 'laws' soon proves to be of no
help at all (as
we have seen in other Essays posted at this site --, especially
this one). It would be no use a
prospective defender of Lenin pointing to more
evidence if the meaning of his words is what causes the problem.
This 'linguistic defence' (i.e., "M9
is true because of what its constituent words mean") gives the game away.
In the end, DM-sentences are amenable to no other defence. Evidence is in the end
irrelevant. DM-'laws' are the product of an idiosyncratic/odd use of language, and, as
such, can only be defended linguistically, or 'conceptually'.74
But,
DM-apologists are social
agents, too, so, their theories are sensitive to, or are reflective of, their
class origin, current class position and/or ideas they had forced down their throats
when they were socialised as children -- indeed, as I have argued elsewhere at this site:
The founders of
[Dialectical Marxism] weren't workers; they came from a class
that educated their children in the Classics, the Bible and Philosophy. This tradition
taught that behind appearances there lies a 'hidden world', accessible to thought
alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.
This world-view was concocted by ideologues of the ruling-class, initially over
two thousand years ago. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from,
or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and
exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.
The first and most obvious way is through violence. That will work for a time,
but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation
(among other things).
Another way is to win over the majority -- or, at least, a significant
proportion of 'opinion formers' (bureaucrats, judges, bishops, imams, 'intellectuals', philosophers, teachers, administrators,
editors, etc., etc.)
-- to the view that the present order either: (i) Works for their benefit, (ii) Defends 'civilised
values', (iii) Is ordained of the 'gods', or (iv) Is 'natural' and so can't be
fought against, reformed or negotiated with.
Hence, a world-view that rationalises one or more of the above is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling
"in the
same old way". While the content of ruling-class thought may have changed with
each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same
for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth (about this 'hidden world') can be
ascertained by thought alone, and therefore
may be imposed on reality dogmatically and
aprioristically.
{Some might think this violates central tenets of
HM, in that it asserts
that some ideas remained to same for many centuries; I have addressed
that concern, here.]
So, the non-worker founders of our movement -- who had been educated from
childhood to believe there was just such a 'hidden world' lying behind
'appearances', and which governed everything -- when they became
revolutionaries, looked for 'logical' principles relating to this abstract world
that told them that change was inevitable and part of the cosmic order.
Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of that ruling-class mystic,
Hegel. The dialectical classicists were quite happy to impose
their 'new' theory on the world (upside down or the "right way up") -- as,
indeed, we saw in
Essay Two --
since that is how they had been taught 'genuine' philosophers
should behave.
That 'allowed' the founders of
[Dialectical Marxism] to think of themselves as special, prophets of the new order,
which workers, alas, couldn't quite comprehend because of their
defective education, their reliance on ordinary language and the 'banalities
of commonsense'.
Fortunately, history has predisposed these dialectical prophets to ascertain truths about
this invisible world on their behalf, which 'implied' they were the
'naturally-ordained' leaders of the workers' movement -- 'Great Helmsmen', no
less. That in turn meant that
they were in addition teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who
could thereby legitimately substitute themselves for the majority -- in
'their own interests', of course -- since workers have in general been
blinded by 'commodity fetishism', 'formal thinking', or they have been bought off
by imperialist 'super profits'. This meant that 'the masses' were 'incapable' of seeing the truth for themselves....
In
that case, and in view of what has
gone before in this Essay (and this site), DM-theories are little more that
misconstrued, or mis-applied linguistic rules. Appearances to the contrary,
DM-'laws' aren't expressed by means of what turn out to be empirical propositions; they are
mis-interpreted rules for the use of Hegelian jargon, imported into Marxism
from an ideological tradition that has unimpeachable ruling-class credentials.74a
This also helps account for the
frequent use of
modal, emphatic, almost hyperbolic expressions
right across the DM-literature; for example: "Motion
must involve a contradiction" (several of which were quoted
earlier, but more
fully in Essay Two), which follow from this comment by
Engels:
"Motion is the
mode of existence of matter.
Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes)
expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same.
Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted….
"A motionless state of matter therefore
proves to be one of the mostempty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976),
p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]
Engels elsewhere informs his readers that
certain things are "impossible":
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
alone added.]
Add to that
Lenin's comment from earlier -- "Matter without motion is 'unthinkable'"
-- and his statement that dialectical logic "requires" or "demands" this or that:
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)….
[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth'
is
always concrete, never abstract, as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin (1921),
pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Flexibility, applied objectively,
i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world."
[Lenin (1961),
p.110. Bold emphasis added.]
The Great Teacher was no less dogmatic, no less hyperbolic:
"Dialectical materialism is the world
outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party.... The dialectical method therefore holds
that
no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself....; and that,
vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its
inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by
surrounding phenomena.
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics
holds that
nature is not in a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability,
but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and
development.... The dialectical method therefore
requires
that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their
interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their
movement and change....
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics
holds that
internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature,
for they all have their negative and positive sides...; and that the
struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new,
between that which is dying away and that which is being born..., constitutes
the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the
transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes....
"If there are no isolated phenomena
in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent,
then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history
must be evaluated not from the standpoint of 'eternal justice'.... Contrary to idealism..., Marxist
philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable,
that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is
authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there
are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are
as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of
science and practice." [Stalin (1976b), pp.835-46. Bold emphases added;
several paragraphs merged.]
Likewise with Mao:
"The law of contradiction in things,
that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist
dialectics.... As opposed to the metaphysical world
outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to
understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its
relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be
seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in
its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of
contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in
the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the
process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from
beginning to end.... There is nothing that does not
contain contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"Thus it is already clear that
contradiction exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the
simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or
ideological phenomena.... Contradiction is universal and
absolute, it is present in the process of the development of all things and
permeates every process from beginning to end...." [Mao
(1937),
pp.311-18. Bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
"The dialectical method demands
first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in
their interconnections with other things.... This struggle is not external and
accidental….
The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from
the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not
independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or
aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the
basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….
"Movement and change result from causes
inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions…. Contradiction is a universal feature
of all processes…. The importance of the [developmental]
conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly
expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes
place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal
law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.72, 90, 95, 117; Bold emphases alone added;
several paragraphs merged.]
Finally, John Rees's comment, "Totality is an insistence...",
also sprang straight out of this emphatic/dogmatic tradition.
This is so
whether or not such hyper-bold claims are
accompanied by an appeal to
the alleged definitions of certain words/concepts (e.g., "Motion is the mode
of the existence of matter"). Empirical propositions have no
need of modal 'strengtheners' of this sort. Whoever says, "Copper must conduct
electricity!", or "Science demands that light travels at
such-and-such a velocity!"
The opposite is the case with
respect to DM-'laws', as Lenin himself admitted:
"This aspect of dialectics…usually receives
inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective
world)." [Lenin (1961), p.357.]
So, a "law of cognition" needs no help from the grubby,
working class world of
evidence and facts. Which fact reminds us why DM-theorists are quite happy to
impose their ideas on nature. [On
this topic, see also here.]
That is
also why
the following wouldn't normally be asserted by anyone:
M6b: Tony Blair must own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
That is, not unless
M6b were itself the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he
owned a copy, so he must own one", or it were based on a direct observation statement
-- for example, "I saw his wife give him a copy as a present, and I later
spotted in his bookcase". But even then, the truth or falsehood of
M6b would
depend on an interface with the facts at some point.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
With M6-type
propositions,
it is reality
that dictates to us whether or not they are true. Our use of sentences
like this means we aren't dictating to nature what it must contain or what
must be true of
it. The exact opposite is the case with metaphysical and
dialectical theories.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M9-type sentences purport to tell us what really must
be like, what it must contain. The world has to conform to what
they say. Such propositions can't be based on an inference
from the evidence, either, since there is no body of evidence that could
confirm, or even hint at, the truth of any claim that motion
is inseparable from matter, or even that it is "The mode of the existence of matter".
Nevertheless,
despite appearances to the contrary, M9 can't
be true solely in virtue of what its words mean. Normally, the ordinary-looking
words that sentences like M9 employ gain whatever meaning they have from the
part they already play in other areas, in wider human practices, those that
involve their application in everyday contexts. Divorced from that background the isolated use of specialised or jargonised
expressions in sentences
like M9 means that they are like fish out of water, as it were. Even though the
words used in DM-theories look like ordinary words, their odd use divorces them from the vernacular
-- rather like the way that the theological use of words like
"father" and "son" to describe 'God' and 'Christ' divorce them from their
everyday meaning, too.
There are no
real world systems -- i.e., systems pertaining to material practice and everyday
life -- in which the idiosyncratic employment of M9's constituent terms has a life (hence,
a meaning) other than these novel, specialised, isolated contexts. And, as we saw in
Essay Nine Part One,
DM-theories play no part even in the day-to-day activity of revolutionaries, nor do
they feature in their agitation and propagandisation of the
working class.
Indeed, metaphysical 'sound
bites' like M9 provide the only semantic backdrop for the use of such
words. Artificial and contrived DM-contexts provide a unique background for these
'dialectical nuggets', and this they do in non-practical (hence, non-material)
surroundings
-- quite unlike mathematical propositions, which they might appear to
emulate.
Isolated from material contexts in this way, the connections that the
ordinary-looking words dialecticians use have with the typographically similar, everyday words (from
which they have allegedly been 'derived', or 'abstracted') have been
irreversibly cut. Because DM-jargon isn't based on
material practice (that was demonstrated in Essay Nine
Part One) -- and
can't be used in connection
with the working class, or even the day-to-day activity of revolutionaries -- it
either has
no meaning, or the usual meanings of the words employed denies
sentences like M1a
any sense, as we have seen. This,. of course, renders them not just
non-sensical, but incoherent to boot.74a1
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
It is no surprise, therefore, to find that
the use of such terms in sentences like these results in confusion and incomprehension. Nor is it any
surprise to see Lenin's words fall apart and then collapse
into incoherence so readily.74b
However, sentences that
express (or attempt to express) the rules governing our use of words are invariably mis-interpreted by DM-theorists
and metaphysicians in general as empirical propositions
of
a special, more profound sort. That is, they are viewed as
Super-Scientific Truths,
capable of revealing the underlying 'secrets' of nature. Unfortunately, we have seen
this means that the
sentences used turn out to be non-sensical.
Even worse, because they misuse and thereby
distort language they are incoherent non-sense.75
Theories like M9 -- but more
specifically, P4 --, tend to depend on, just as they give rise to, a range of associated 'propositions' from which they have
been 'derived', or which help 'explain' their supposed content. But, as
'metaphysical statements', they stand-alone. That is, they confront the reader as isolatedphilosophical
'gems', as fundamental 'truths': "I think, therefore I am" (the
Cogito
of
Descartes); "To be it be perceived" (Berkeley); "Time is a
relation" (paraphrasing
Kant and Leibniz); "The whole is more than the sum of the parts"
(Metaphysical Holists of every
stripe), "Every determination
is also a negation" (Spinoza
and Hegel); "Truth is always concrete, never abstract" (paraphrasing Plekhanov
and Lenin); "All bodies
change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour...they are never equal to
themselves" (Trotsky), and so on.75a0
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Philosophical 'jewels' like
these have traditionally been
mined, cleaned and polished into their glittering state by socially-isolated thinkers,
who 'discovered' these treasures buried just below the surface of
'appearances' by the
exercise of thought alone.75a
[By
"socially-isolated, I don't mean to suggest they weren't part of, or weren't
operating within, a philosophical tradition, or that in some cases they didn't belong to a
group or school of other thinkers, or even that they all lived
alone, like hermits. What I am suggesting is that, as far as their philosophical
'discoveries' were concerned, they were in general divorced from ordinary life (i.e.,
they were in general isolated from the working class and ordinary human beings).
In addition, the vast majority enjoyed a privileged lifestyle, free from daily toil,
and were often
supported, subsidised or patronised by a member of the ruling-class. Either that
or they were 'employed' by the Church, had
'independent means' or belonged to the 'privileged elite' themselves. (I will cover this
topic in more detail in Part Two of Essay
Twelve.)]
But, ideas like these were never based
on -- nor were they even
derived from -- ordinary practice and everyday language,
otherwise the rest of us wouldn't need to be informed of them.75b
Indeed, if 'philosophical discoveries' like these had ever been based on
the above, they wouldn't have struck their inventors (or anyone else, for that matter) as
especially 'profound', excavated for us by their valiant efforts, aided or not by what is, in effect,
the metaphysical
equivalent of a
JCB: Hegel's Logic.
In fact,
theories like these stage a dramatic entrance
into the world of 'learning' as glittering linguistic 'jewels' (solitaire diamonds,
if you will).
They gain their 'meaning'
-- their metaphysical shine -- solely from the artificial setting
arranged for them by their inventors, making such an entrance as if they were "news
from nowhere", shafts of metaphysical light, 'Cosmic Verities' written
as if on tablets of
stone.
They thus appear before humanity as if from
On High.
And, surprise, surprise: the vast majority of educated individuals fall for these
linguistic con-tricks time and again.75c
Nevertheless, the 'Metaphysical
Prophets' who invent such Scintillating Truths -- acting like Divine
Intermediaries, each a latter dayHermes
(who was the Greek Messenger of the 'Gods') -- act as if the 'real' meaning of the ordinary-looking words they use
in fact arise from the novel role bestowed on them by such pioneering efforts in
reconstructive linguistic surgery. To that end, these 'intrepid thinkers' often
concoct a series of Proper Names/Neologisms as labels for the
'abstract' objects and concepts they now re-christen, "Essences",
"Forms", "Universals" and the like.76
The above
supposition (whereby Traditional Theorists imagined they were dealing with
'real meanings' and not 'distortions') was further motivated by the idea that
words gain their meaning individually, atomistically, as linguistic or semantic 'units'.
That is because of (i) A direct, unmediated connection they supposedly enjoyed with reality
(since, as we saw in Essay Three Part One,
despite appearances to the contrary they were all really the Proper Names of
'Universals', 'Ideas', 'Concepts', 'Essences', 'inner representations',
'images', etc., etc.), or
(ii) The intimate link the concepts involved in all this had with various 'mental processes' taking place in
each individual
theorist's brain (via the mythical 'process of abstraction'). That helps explain why such an
'innovative' (or distorted)
use of language is central to Metaphysics and DM --
again, as
we saw in Essay
Three Part One
and elsewhere at this site.
Hence, for Traditional Thinkers, the assumption that
such 'names' gain
their meaning directly and solely from whatever they allegedly named seems
entirely
plausible, just as it seems no less plausible to suppose that language (i.e., real
language, philosophical language -- not the 'woefully defective
vernacular') is based on an atomised, socially-isolated naming
ritual of some sort, which is uniquely able to home in on the 'Essence' of "Being" by the mere expedient of wishing
that were so. Naturally, this trades on the further (unsupported) idea that there are
such things as 'Essences', to begin with. This is yet another dogma which
was simply assumed
to be true, but never actually shown to be so.77
That is, of course, one reason why Traditional Philosophers
insisted that the meaning words is determined by such atomistic criteria (as part of a
'private language' of some sort -- these days 'inner speech', or maybe even a 'language of thought'), the result
perhaps of an 'inner act' of naming
certain Ideas, Categories, or Concepts 'in the
mind'/'consciousness', a 'process of abstraction', a
stipulative re-definition, or the "unfolding
of a genetically determined program".
This
is a danger
Bertell
Ollman warned about (in relation to 'abstractionism') a few years ago, noted in Essay
Three Part Two
(quoted earlier):
As is the case with
Ollman, and, indeed, everyone
else who has pontificated about this obscure 'process' [abstractionism], we aren't told how we
manage to do this, still less why it doesn't result in the construction of a
'private language'.
Indeed,
this is something Ollman himself pointed out:
"What, then, is distinctive about Marx's abstractions? To begin with, it
should be clear that Marx's abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely
from the abstractions of other thinkers both then and now. There has to be a lot
of overlap. Otherwise, he would have constructed what philosophers call a
'private language,' and any communication between him and the rest of us would
be impossible. How close Marx came to fall into this abyss and what can be
done to repair some of the damage already done are questions I hope to deal
with in a later work...." [Ollman (2003),
p.63. Bold emphases added.]
Well, it remains to be seen if Professor Ollman can
solve a problem that has baffled everyone else for centuries -- that is, those who have even so much as acknowledged it exists!
It
is to Ollman's considerable credit, therefore,
that he is at least aware of it.
[In fact, Ollman is the very first
dialectician I have encountered (in nigh on thirty years) who even so much as
acknowledges
this 'difficulty'! Be this as it may, I
have devoted Essay Thirteen Part Three
to an analysis of this topic; the reader is referred there for more
details.]
It is no accident,
therefore, that this approach not only torpedoes belief in the social nature of language, it is based on a class-motivated
rejection of the material roots of
discourse in everyday life (explored in Part Two of Essay Twelve -- summarised
here).
Nor is it merely coincidental that thinkers openly sympathetic to wider ruling-class interests
who almost invariably favoured this anti-Marxist view of language.78
Conversely, it is no coincidence either
that ordinary language assumed its central role in
Analytic Philosophy, among
left-leaning "Linguistic Philosophers" (and those influenced by Marx,
like Wittgenstein),
just when the working class was entering
the stage of history as a significant political force.79
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
The truth of 'atomic'
sentences (like the above) is
supposed to depend somehow on the meaning of the words they contain. But, such a use of words can't determine the sense of any sentences formed
from them.80
Words gain their meaning from their applicability in an indefinitely large set
of socially-sanctioned, communally-crafted contexts.81
They don't have a meaning bestowed upon them first, divorced from
linguistic or social contexts, which 'meaning' then enables them to
function in sentences, any more than a lump of gold first gains its value in nature,
or even in society, on its own, as an isolated 'commodity' unconnected with
certain forms of social
organisation and collective labour, only to enter the economy afterwards with
a value
already attached to it. Meaning is no more a natural,
individualistic property than value. If the contrary supposition were the
case, communication would be impossible (as Ollman pointed out).82
However, ex hypothesi, there are noother contexts
in which metaphysical atoms (like M1a, M9 and P4) can feature -- that is, other than
those that
fuel endless academic debate. The fundamental
propositions of Metaphysics (such as, P4, M8 and M9) stand alone as isolated nuggets
of truth, foundational principles, core precepts. This means that in such
airless surroundings the
constituent words of M9, for instance, are in fact meaningless
-- despite the typographical similarity they have with ordinary words. That is because they possess no connection with ordinary contexts
that are themselves embedded in, or related to, material practice. That is, of
course, one reason why M1a, for example, so readily collapses into incoherence.
[Of course,
the above depends on how we interpret the word "meaning"; I will say more
about thatpresently.]
In a
similar vein (no pun intended), Gold isn't just valueless in nature,
it is incapable of gaining a value by itself and of its own
efforts -- or, indeed, by the efforts of lone prospectors and refiners. And gold,
too, would remain valueless if it had no connection with
historically-conditioned material practice in a sufficiently developed economy.
Of course, to suppose otherwise --, i.e., to imagine that words,
or their 'inner representations', determine their own meaning independently of the use to which human
beings
put them in everyday contexts -- would be to fetishise them, as noted
above.
Indeed, this would be
tantamount to believing that words (again, or their 'inner representations') enjoyed a social life
of their own anterior to,
and explanatory of, the linguistic communion that takes place between human beings.
If words (etc.) did in fact acquire their own meanings, piecemeal, in
such a manner, and those meanings followed words about the place like
shadows, then the idea that language is a social phenomenon would itself assume
an entirely different meaning. In that case, discourse would still be social, but
that would be because words were the social beings here. That would in
turn mean that they had gifted that property to our use of language, not
the other way round!
If that were so, humanity would be
social because our words already were!83
We are now in a position to understand
why: the supposition that a word (or, at least,
its physical embodiment, its 'inner representation', perhaps) can motivate a
human agent (causally or in any other way)84
to regard it as the repository of its own meaning -- so that inferences can be
made from ink marks on the page (or from 'images', 'ideas', and 'representations' in the
head) to 'Super-Empirical Truths' about 'Being', or whatever -- would be
to misconstrue the products of the social relations among human beings (i.e.,
words) as if they were their own autonomous semantic custodians, as creators and
carriers of meaning themselves. In effect, that would be to anthropomorphise words, treating them as if they had
their own history, social structure and mode of development. In this way, the
social nature of language would reappear in an inverted form as an expression of
the social life of words (etc.). Humanity would be atomised, linguistic signs
(etc.) socialised!85
In that case, M9
and P4 can't be true in virtue of the meanings of any
of their words -- for no meaning has yet been given to such an idiosyncratic use of
language by human beings engaged in any form of material practice.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
If, however, an attempt
were made to specify the meaning of constituent words in a
piecemeal fashion, a rule would be
required.86
To suppose that there is some sort of connection between a rule and
reality (determined, perhaps, by a physical law) would be to no avail, either. If a rule were to depend on such a
connection,
it would become an empirical proposition, and thus cease to be a rule.87
Unfortunately, the vast majority of philosophers have
so far overlooked
this seemingly insignificant point.88
[This
sub-section is a recap of earlier results, but from a slightly different angle.
It can be skipped by anyone who has 'got the point'. Begin again
here.]
Elsewhere in MEC, Lenin went on to say:
M22: "[M]otion [is] an inseparable property
of matter." [Lenin (1972), p.323. Italic emphasis added.]
In so far as M22 purports to inform us about the properties of
matter (in the real world), it lookslike a scientific statement. However,
as we have seen, when examined it turns out to be nothing of the sort. Contrast
M22 with the following:
M23: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
water.
M23a: Liquidity isn't an inseparable property of
water.
Here, we can imagine
conditions under which M23 would be false and M23a true (think of ice or steam).
But, M22 is a very much stronger claim than M23, and is clearly connected with
M1a (or, indeed, with M9 and P4). We can see that if we
examine it more closely.88a
If M22 is re-written slightly and tidied up to eliminate the
unnecessary detail, it would become M24:
M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M24 is
apparently always true; its 'truth' is clearly connected with the supposed meaning of words like "motion" and
"inseparable", etc., both of which were ultimately based on the
presumed truth of P4.
By
asserting M24, Lenin certainly didn't mean to suggest that
even if we were to try really hard we would still fail to separate the two
words or 'concepts', "motion" and "matter" (what they meant
or what they allegedly referred to) in our thoughts. Lenin plainly wasn't informing us that while such a
separation was a
particularly difficult physical or mental task, we could still make some
attempt to imagine a scenario where they were separated. He was claiming that we would always find we
would always fail
-- even more so that any suggestion an individual could eat an entire adult Blue Whale in less than two minutes.
Figure Two: Tuck In! You
Have All Of 120 Seconds To Beat...
Lenin was clearly alluding to a connection between matter and
motion that was much tighter than this. He was perhaps reminding us of the
futility of even trying -- that this wasn't an
option --, just as it wouldn't be an option for anyone to try to disassociate
oddness from the number three, or the concept, king-killer, from
regicide, for instance.89
Hence, if we were to view M23 exactly as
Lenin viewed M24, it would mean that not only could water not be
non-liquid, nothing
other than water could be liquid, either. It would thus imply that water
wasn't just the only liquid, it was the only one that could exist in the
universe -- and that liquidity was the only conceivable form of water.
M23: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
water.
M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.
That is because, for Lenin, motion wasn't just
one of the defining characteristics of matter,
nothing that moves (outside of the 'mind') would fail to be material. Motion is, as it were,
super-glued to matter, and only to matter --
and, indeed, vice versa -- according to Lenin. [Lenin says this over and over
again in
MEC; on that see
here.]
Hence, the same would have to
be true with respect to water, if we were to read M23 as strictly as we are meant to
interpret M24.
M23: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
water.
M23a: Liquidity is not an inseparable property of
water.
M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.
M24a: Motion is not an inseparable property of
matter.
The main verb in M24 is clearly in the indicative mood.
But, if M24 were an empirical proposition, its negation, M24a, would make sense,
but for Lenin it doesn't -- indeed, it is "unthinkable", unlike the negation of
M23 (i.e., M23a). That is because, once again, M24 holds open no truth
possibilities; it asserts only one
envisaged necessity.
Lenin obviously believed that
it was impossible even to think the falsehood of M24 -- any more than it
might be possible to think there were or could be triangles with four vertices. As we
have seen, in this he openly agreed with Engels:
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe,
from mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels (1954), p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion,
nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it
can only be transmitted. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty
and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
Nevertheless,
and once again, the indicative mood of the main verb in M24 hides its real
nature. Only a consideration of the overall use of this claim (that is, its role
within Lenin's 'system' of ideas) in the end reveals it is a metaphysical sentence,
which hasn't been derived
from the evidence but from the supposed meaning of a handful of words, once more.
To this end,
it is worth asking what could possibly make M24 'true', and, a fortiori, what could conceivably make it false.
Indicative sentences are normally true or false according to the way the world
happens to be, but this sentence can't be false no matter what happens in
the world. So, its falsehood can't be based on any conceivable state of
affairs. As noted
earlier, its truth seems to arise from linguistic (or conceptual) considerations
alone, not from reality. This can be seen not just because of its imputed necessity
but from the way Lenin actually imagined he had established its veracity. He simply relied on
its supposed
self-evidence, the self-evidence of P4 and his 'definition'
of matter. He didn't even think to support it with any data (or
even with much of an argument!). Its semantic status was underpinned by what Lenin
plainly took its words to
mean. Its truth was thus internally-generated, not 'externally'
confirmed.89a
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Nevertheless, what could possibly make this set of words
'necessarilytrue', according to Lenin? M24 is just a string of words. It
would have to have some sort of projective or representational relation to the real world for it to
be true, for it to be a true
picture of our world, and some alternative, 'parallel', or fictional 'universe'.90
Well,
whatever it is that succeeds in achieving that must also make the following sentences
false:
M18: This particular instance of motion is
separated from matter.
M19: This lump of matter is motionless.
[M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.]
But, ex hypothesi, M18 and M19
(or their content) are "unthinkable",
according to Lenin. As soon as we think either of them (or their content) we face the sort of
problems we encountered earlier.
Such 'necessary' truths make the possibilities they rule out
(such as M18 or M19) not just 'false', but Super-False, and hence
"unthinkable". This they do while at the same time requiring us to have to think about
whatever it is
they seek to exclude so that it can be rejected out-of-hand.
But, in order to do that, we should have to be able to separate, in thought,
motion from matter in order to be able to declare that it can't be done --
even in thought! Unless we could separate motion from
matter in thought we would have no idea what we are supposed to rule out,
and hence no idea what we were meant to rule in by accepting
M24.
Hence, if we are capable of grasping the truth of M24, we must
already have some comprehension of what would make it false, i.e., what M24 is
ruling out.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
This
(by-now-familiar) problem has arisen from the fact that Lenin entertained a 'necessary' truth (M24)
the content of which is impossible to state in any comprehensible form.
Hence, sentences
like this are above reproach and beyond exoneration.
Metaphysics consigns countless 'propositions' like M18 and M19 to
linguistic limbo in this way. By adopting this approach to 'knowledge',
DM-theorists similarly consign their ideas to outer darkness.
As we have seen several
times throughout this site, both metaphysical and DM-sentences readily decay into non-sense.
They can't fail to do this.
While
appearing to mimic empirical propositions they turn out to be radically different, masquerading as ordinary, but
far more profound,
declarative
sentences. Central to this role as especially deep 'truths' is
their distorted use of language; in many cases they also turn out to be garbled rules of linguage.91
Such
sentences often attempt to say what
can only be shown by the ordinary use of language.92
And this they do surreptitiously and dishonestly.
Metaphysics misconstrues
conventions and forms of representation expressed in and by our socially-, and
materially-conditioned use of language, but in a form that re-configures
whatever this supposedly uncovers as Super-Empirical, 'necessary truths',
quite
unlike the ordinary, mundane truths associated with everyday practice -- or even
with genuine science. Empirical propositions hold open two possibilities: truth or
falsehood. Metaphysical sentences, while purporting to be empirical, close one
of these off. In doing that, they end up denying for themselves any
sense whatsoever; they collapse into incoherent and non-sensical strings of words.93
Despite appearances to the contrary, the complete rejection of Metaphysics
outlined at this site doesn't draw an a priori limit to the search
for knowledge -- it merely reminds us that truths about nature can't be
stated by misusing language. Moreover, they can't be formulated in a way
that makes supporting evidence irrelevant, either.
Since
metaphysical theses don't present genuine empirical
possibilities, their repudiation and subsequent eradication can't adversely affect the
scientific investigation of the world,nor can they interfere with any attempt to change it.
Metaphysical theses don't represent profound, ambitious or risky conjectures
that merit our attention or even respect. They contain nothing but empty phrases -- they are
indeed
"houses of cards" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein -- Investigations,
§118) --, which at best express
self-important confusion, at worst a ruling-class 'view of reality'.
[More on
that in Parts Two and Three of this Essay.]
Metaphysical pseudo-propositions violate the rules governing the formation
of comprehensible empirical sentences by undermining the semantic possibilities
that the latter hold out.
In addition, they misuse ordinary words while pretending to extend, alter or
'sharpen' their meaning. Supposedly providing insight into the "essential"
structure of reality, metaphysical and
DM-theses
attempt derive substantive truths about the world from
thought or
from words alone. They thus possess an entirely undeserved
mystique,
which arises from their chameleonic outer facade -- that is, they resemble ordinary empirical
propositions, but pretend to inform us of 'necessary', aspects features of
reality. But that outer facade only succeeds in concealing the fact that they thereby reduce
themselves to non-sensicality
and incoherence.
As should seem clear, these deflationary conclusions rule
out the possibility of any future Metaphysics (including that fourth-rate
version, DM). This of course means that this
approach to philosophical knowledge isn't a viable option. But that doesn't mean that if we were cleverer than we now are,
if we knew much more, we would be able to
formulate and comprehend such
Super-Truths. There is nothing
there which Metaphysics could even pretend to find -- nor vaguely hint at -- so that anyone might go in search of it. The
language that metaphysicians (and DM-theorists) themselves use rules this out as a
viable option
from the start. This ancient 'discipline' presents us with no
viable possibilities --, any more than the supposition that there is or might a
'free kick' in chess
or LBW
in basketball. The search for metaphysical 'truth' is therefore analogous
to looking for a goal in tennis or a home run in snooker. We should therefore treat the
search for
such 'truths' as we
would a proposed expedition to hunt and then capture the
Jabberwocky.93a
Contrary to expectations, the repudiation of Metaphysics in fact opens up the conceptual
space for science to flourish. In this way, scientists are free to formulate
theories that possess true or false empirical implications. A fortiori,
such truths won't depend solely on the meanings of the words they
contain, but on the way the
world happens to be. This couldn't be the case if science
were based on Metaphysics; in such an eventuality scientific truth would depend
solely on the meaning of words, not on any
actual state of the world.
Hence, to paraphrase Kant: it is necessary to destroy Metaphysics
-- and thus DM -- in order to make room for science.94
This subsection has now been extensively updated and
re-posted
here.
I have already quoted the following passages:
"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and
almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine
that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity
existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple,
etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring
that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the
almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the
apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence,
perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and
then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real
fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the
substance' -– 'Fruit'….
"Having reduced the different real fruits to the
one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order
to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from
'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary
real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real
fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this
abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the
opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….
"The main interest for the speculative philosopher
is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to
say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins.
But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative
world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances
of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for
they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of
the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind….
When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the
mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the
contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into
sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of
'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the
mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the
Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses,
for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond.
Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their
natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which
gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute
Fruit'.
"The ordinary man does not think he is saying
anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when
the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says
something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the
real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….
"It goes without saying that the speculative
philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally
known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as
determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the
real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of
reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes
from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity
of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation
is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an
inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension
constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx
and Engels
(1975a), pp.72-75. Italic emphases in the original.]
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their
language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to
recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that
they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
"With the theoretical equipment inherited from Hegel
it is, of course, not possible even to understand the empirical, material
attitude of these people. Owing to the fact that Feuerbach showed the religious
world as an illusion of the earthly world -- a world which in his writing
appears merely as a phrase -- German theory too was confronted with the
question which he left unanswered: how did it come about that people 'got' these
illusions 'into their heads'? Even for the German theoreticians this question
paved the way to the materialistic view of the world, a view which is not
without premises, but which empirically observes the actual material
premises as such and for that reason is, for the first time, actually a
critical view of the world. This path was already indicated in the
Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher -- in the
Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie and Zur Judenfrage.
But since at that time this was done in philosophical phraseology, the
traditionally occurring philosophical expressions such as 'human essence',
'species', etc., gave the German theoreticians the desired reason for
misunderstanding the real trend of thought and believing that here again it was
a question merely of giving a new turn to their worn-out theoretical garment --
just as
Dr. Arnold Ruge, the
Dottore
Graziano of German philosophy,
imagined that he could continue as before to wave his clumsy arms about and
display his pedantic-farcical mask. One has to 'leave philosophy aside' (Wigand, p.187, cf., Hess,
Die letzten Philosophen, p.8), one has to leap out of it and devote
oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, for which there exists
also an enormous amount of literary material, unknown, of course, to the
philosophers. When, after that, one again encounters people like
Krummacher
or 'Stirner',
one finds that one has long ago left them 'behind' and below.
Philosophy and the study of the actual world have
the same relation to one another as
onanism
and sexual love.
Saint Sancho, who in spite of his absence of thought -- which was noted by us
patiently and by him emphatically -- remains within the world of pure thoughts,
can, of course, save himself from it only by means of a moral postulate, the
postulate of 'thoughtlessness' (p.196 of 'the book'). He is a bourgeois
who saves himself in the face of commerce by the banqueroute cochenne
[swinish bankruptcy -- RL] whereby, of course, he becomes not a proletarian, but
an impecunious, bankrupt bourgeois. He does not become a man of the world,
but a bankrupt philosopher without thoughts." [Marx
and Engels (1976), p.236. Bold emphases
alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Links added. I have quoted the whole passage so that readers can see
this is not out of context.]
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world,
in various ways; the point is to change it." [Theses
on Feuerbach.]
"If we had M. Proudhon's intrepidity in the matter of Hegelianism we should say:
it is distinguished in itself from itself. What does this mean? Impersonal
reason, having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an
object to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose
itself, is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and
composing itself -- position, opposition, composition. Or, to speak Greek -- we
have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For those who do not know the Hegelian
language: affirmation, negation and negation of the negation. That is what
language means. It is certainly not Hebrew (with due apologies to M. Proudhon);
but it is the language of this pure reason, separate from the individual.
Instead of the ordinary individual with his ordinary manner of speaking and
thinking we have nothing but this ordinary manner purely and simply -- without
the individual.
"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction -- for we have here
an abstraction, and not an analysis -- presents itself as a logical category? Is
it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the
individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is
composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a
body; that, if you leave out of account the limits of this body; you soon have
nothing but a space -- that if, finally, you leave out of the account the
dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity,
the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged
accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in
the final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical category. Thus the
metaphysicians who, in making these abstractions, think they are making
analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine
themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their
core -- these metaphysicians in turn are right in saying that things here below
are embroideries of which the logical categories constitute the canvas. This is
what distinguishes the philosopher from the Christian. The Christian, in spite
of logic, has only one incarnation of the Logos; with the philosopher
there is no end to incarnations. If all that exists, all that lives on land, and
under water can be reduced by abstraction to a logical category -- if the whole
real world can be drowned thus in a world of abstractions, in the world of
logical categories -- who need be astonished at it?
"All that exists, all that lives on land and under water, exists and lives only
by some kind of movement. Thus, the movement of history produces social
relations; industrial movement gives us industrial products, etc.
"Just as by dint of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical
category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic
distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition
-- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement. If one finds
in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has found in
the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only
explains all things, but also implies the movement of things....
"Up to now we have expounded only the dialectics of Hegel. We shall see later
how M. Proudhon has succeeded in reducing it to the meanest proportions. Thus,
for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is
happening in his own mind. Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the
history of philosophy, of his own philosophy. There is no longer a 'history
according to the order in time,' there is only 'the sequence of ideas in the
understanding.' He thinks he is constructing the world by the movement of
thought, whereas he is merely reconstructing systematically and classifying by
the absolute method of thoughts which are in the minds of all." [Marx
(1976), pp.162-65. Italic emphases
in the original. Minor typos and a few major errors corrected. (I have informed
the editors at the Marxist Internet Archive about them!) Quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
For all the
obsessive interest shown in the subject by subsequent Marxists, there is
little more that Marx says about Philosophy after
the late 1840s. Clearly, he meant what he said when he told us he had
"left philosophy aside". Even in the 1840s -- when compared to the vast
majority of subsequent Marxists on this topic -- it is clear that Marx
wasn't "a Marxist"!
01.Much of the background to this Essay is based on Wittgenstein's work, helpfully
outlined for us in Harrison (1979) and Hanna and Harrison
(2004). See also, Baker and Hacker (1984, 1988, 2005a). Some of what I have to
say here coincides with the anti-metaphysical views expressed in
Rorty (1980)
(this links to a PDF). I distance myself, however, from Rorty's anti-Realism,
his (inconsistent) attempt to establish a
'metaphysics of mind', and his rather odd equation of Philosophy with some form of literary criticism.
[Rorty defends his view of Wittgenstein in Rorty (2010). On that, see Horwich
(2010), which is an effective reply (not that I agree with
everything Horwich has to say!).]
1.
Some might take exception to my use of "metaphysical" to describe such
sentences. If so, they can substitute the words "dogmatic", "essentialist"
or "necessitarian" for "metaphysical" in phrases like "metaphysical theory" used
throughout this Essay. That done, not much will be changed by such
terminological alterations. It is the logical status of such sentences
that is important, not what we call them. [More on that
below.]
Here are a few
relevant quotations about motion and matter from
Engels and Lenin.
Here,
first, is Engels:
"Motion
is the mode of existence of matter.Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable
as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and
indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes)
expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same.
Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred. When motion is
transferred from one body to another, it may be regarded, in so far as it
transfers itself, is active, as the cause of motion, in so far as the latter is
transferred, is passive. We call this active motion force, and the
passive, the manifestation of force. Hence it is as clear as daylight
that a force is as great as its manifestation, because in fact the same
motion takes place in both. A motionless state of matter is therefore one of
the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphasis alone added.
Paragraphs merged.]
"Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the
mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes
and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to
thinking." [Engels
(1954), p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
Here,
second, is Lenin quoting Engels:
"In
full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it,
Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring
(read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....'
'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin
(1914), p.8. Bold emphasis added.]
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with
whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin
(1972), p.311.]
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically
implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human
mind and reflected by it." [Ibid.,
p.312.]
"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole
unconditional recognition of nature's existence outside the mind and
perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist
agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid.,
p.314.]
"The fundamental characteristic of materialism is
that it starts from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of
objective reality reflected by science." [Ibid.,
pp.354-55.]
Nevertheless,
as we will see in Essay Thirteen
Part One, even though these two dialecticians believe motion
and matter are inseparable, Lenin's other defining criteria for anything to be
classified as matter
fail to exclude the existence of motionless matter.
Anyway, as these passages reveal, Lenin characterised matter in a rather odd
way: i.e., as that which exists "objectively" outside, and independently of, the
mind. He also quoted Engels approvingly to the effect that motion is the "mode" of the existence of matter.
But, if
all motion is relative to a given
reference frame, then it is entirely possible to
picture certain bodies as motionless with respect to some frame or other. The contrary
view may only be maintained if space is held to be
Absolute.
That condition aside, this means that motion is reference
frame-sensitive. If it can disappear when we change reference frames, motion
can't be themode of the existence of matter, as Lenin and Engels surmised. In which
case, it is perhaps more appropriate to characterise Engels and Lenin's way of
depicting motion as a
form of
representation and, as such, regard it as
convention-sensitive.
"Form of representation"
will be explained more fully Essay Thirteen Part Two; however, it is
connected with the following comments of Wittgenstein's:
"Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description
of the world. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on
it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always
approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the
surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every
square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a
unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional, since
I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or
hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the
description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the
surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than with a fine
square mesh (or conversely), and so on. The different nets correspond to
different systems for describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of
description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the
description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of
propositions -- the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for
building the edifice of science, and it says, 'Any building that you want to
erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these bricks,
and with these alone.'
"And
now we can see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (The net might
also consist of more than one kind of mesh: e.g. we could use both triangles
and hexagons.) The possibility of describing a picture like the one
mentioned above with a net of a given form tells us nothing about the
picture. (For that is true of all such pictures.) But what does characterize
the picture is that it can be described completely by a particular net with
a particular size of mesh.
"Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian
mechanics tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something
about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these
means. We are also told something about the world by the fact that it can be
described more simply with one system of mechanics than with another."
[Wittgenstein (1972),
6.341-6.342, pp.137-39.]
Of course, a form of representation is much more involved than
this passage might suggest (for instance, it leaves out of account how
theories are often inter-linked or are coordinated with one another, and it seems to suggest that physics is an
a-historical, non-social discipline).
Thomas
Kuhn's more considered thoughts about what he calls a "paradigm"
are, in some
respects, a little closer to what is meant by "form of representation" at
this site; on this, see Kuhn (1970, 1977, 1996, 2000). See
also Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) -- especially Masterman (1970) --, as well as Sharrock
and Reed (2002). This topic
is also connected with Wittgenstein's ideas about "criteria" and "symptoms". [On
that, see here. Cf., also, Glock (1996), pp.129-35. As noted above, I will say more about this
in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Update October 2011: A recent example of the employment of just
such a form of representation (or, rather, several such forms) might assist the reader understand this phrase a
little more clearly. In
late September 2011, the
news media were
full of stories about
an experiment which appeared to show that a beam of
neutrinos
had
exceeded the speed of light. Here is how the New Scientist handled the
story (the relevant aspects of a range of different but intersecting forms of representation
being employed here -- albeit expressed rather sketchily -- have been highlighted
in bold):
"'Light-speed' neutrinos point to new physical reality.
"Subatomic particles have broken the
universe's fundamental speed limit, or so it was reported last week.
The speed of light is the ultimate limit on travel in the universe,
and the basis for
Einstein's special theory of relativity, so if the
finding stands up to scrutiny, does it spell the end for physics as
we know it? The reality is less simplistic and far more interesting. 'People were saying this means Einstein is
wrong,' says physicist Heinrich Päs of the Technical University of
Dortmund in Germany. 'But that's not really correct.'
"Instead, the result could be the first
evidence for a reality built out of extra dimensions. Future
historians of science may regard it not as the moment we abandoned
Einstein and broke physics, but rather as the point at which our
view of space vastly expanded, from three dimensions to four, or
more.
'This may be a physics revolution,' says
Thomas Weiler
at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee,
who has devised theories built on extra dimensions. 'The famous
words 'paradigm shift' are used too often and tritely, but they
might be relevant.'
"The subatomic particles -- neutrinos -- seem
to have zipped faster than light from
CERN, near Geneva,
Switzerland, to the OPERA detector at the
Gran Sasso lab near L'Aquila, Italy. It's a conceptually simple
result: neutrinos making the 730-kilometre journey arrived 60
nanoseconds
earlier than they would have if they were travelling
at light speed. And it relies on three seemingly simple
measurements, says Dario Autiero of the Institute of Nuclear Physics
in Lyon, France, a member of the OPERA collaboration: the distance
between the labs, the time the neutrinos left
CERN,
and the time they arrived at Gran Sasso.
"But actually measuring those times and
distances to the accuracy needed to detect nanosecond differences is
no easy task. The OPERA collaboration spent three years chasing down
every source of error they could imagine...before Autiero made the
result public in a seminar at CERN on 23 September. Physicists grilled Autiero for an hour
after his talk to ensure the team had considered details like the
curvature of the Earth, the tidal effects of the moon and the
general relativistic effects of having two clocks at different
heights (gravity slows time so a clock closer to Earth's surface
runs a tiny bit slower).
"They were impressed. 'I want to congratulate
you on this extremely beautiful experiment,' said Nobel laureate
Samuel Ting
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after
Autiero's talk. 'The experiment is very carefully done, and the
systematic error carefully checked.' Most physicists still expect some sort of
experimental error to crop up and explain the anomaly,mainly
because it contravenes the incredibly successful
law of special relativity which
holds that the speed of light is a constant that no object can
exceed. The theory also leads to the famous equation E =
mc2.
"Hotly anticipated are results from other
neutrino detectors, including
T2K in Japan
and
MINOS at
Fermilab
in Illinois, which will run similar experiments and
confirm the results or rule them out (see 'Fermilab
stops hunting Higgs, starts neutrino quest').
In 2007, the MINOS experiment searched for
faster-than-light neutrinos but didn't see anything statistically
significant. The team plans to reanalyse its data and upgrade the
detector's stopwatch. 'These are the kind of things that we have to
follow through, and make sure that our prejudices don't get in the
way of discovering something truly fantastic,' says
Stephen Parke
of Fermilab.
"In the meantime, suggests
Sandip Pakvasa of the University of Hawaii, let's suppose the
OPERA result is real. If the experiment is tested and replicated and
the only explanation is faster-than-light neutrinos, is E =
mc2 done for? Not necessarily. In 2006, Pakvasa, Päs and
Weiler came up with a model that
allows certain particles to break the cosmic speed limit
while leaving special relativity intact. 'One can, if not rescue
Einstein, at least leave him valid,' Weiler says.
"The trick is to send neutrinos on a
shortcut through a fourth, thus-far-unobserved dimension of space,
reducing the distance they have to travel. Then the neutrinos
wouldn't have to outstrip light to reach their destination in the
observed time.
In such a universe, the particles and forces
we are familiar with are anchored to a four-dimensional membrane, or
'brane',
with
three dimensions of space and one of time. Crucially, the brane
floats in a higher dimensional space-time called the bulk, which we
are normally completely oblivious to.
"The fantastic success of special
relativity up to now, plus other cosmological observations, have led
physicists to think that the brane might be flat, like a sheet of
paper.
Quantum fluctuations
could make it ripple and roll like the
surface of the ocean, Weiler says. Then, if neutrinos can break free
of the brane, they might get from one point on it to another by
dashing through the bulk, like a flying fish taking a shortcut
between the waves....
"This model is attractive
because it offers a way out of one of the biggest
theoretical problems posed by the OPERA result: busting
the apparent speed limit set by neutrinos detected
pouring from a supernova in 1987.
As stars explode in a
supernova,
most of their energy streams out as neutrinos. These
particles hardly ever interact with matter (see 'Neutrinos:
Everything you need to know').
That means they should escape the star almost
immediately, while
photons of light will take about 3
hours. In 1987, trillions of neutrinos arrived at Earth
3 hours before the dying star's light caught up. If the
neutrinos were travelling as fast as those going from
CERN to OPERA, they should have arrived in 1982.
"OPERA's neutrinos were about 1000
times as energetic as the supernova's neutrinos, though.
And Pakvasa and colleagues' model calls for neutrinos
with a specific energy that makes them prefer tunnelling
through the bulk to travelling along the brane. If that
energy is around 20
gigaelectronvolts -- and the team don't yet know
that it is -- 'then you expect large effects in the
OPERA region, and small effects at the supernova
energies,' Pakvasa says. He and Päs are meeting next
week to work out the details.
"The flying fish shortcut isn't
available to all particles.
In the language of string
theory, a mathematical model some physicists hope will
lead to a comprehensive 'theory
of everything', most particles are represented by
tiny vibrating strings whose ends are permanently stuck
to the brane. One of the only exceptions is the
theoretical 'sterile
neutrino', represented by a
closed loop of string. These are also the only type of
neutrino thought capable of escaping the brane.
"Neutrinos are known to switch
back and forth between their three observed types (electron,
muon
and
tau
neutrinos), and OPERA was originally designed to
detect these shifts. In Pakvasa's model, the muon
neutrinos produced at CERN could have transformed to
sterile neutrinos mid-flight, made a short hop through
the bulk, and then switched back to muon before
reappearing on the brane.
"So if OPERA's results hold up,
they could provide support for the existence of sterile
neutrinos, extra dimensions and perhaps string theory.
Such theories could also explain why gravity is so weak
compared with the other fundamental forces. The
theoretical particles that mediate gravity, known as
gravitons, may also be closed loops of string that
leak off into the bulk. 'If, in the end, nobody sees
anything wrong and other people reproduce OPERA's
results, then I think it's evidence for string theory,
in that string theory is what makes extra dimensions
credible in the first place,' Weiler says.
"Meanwhile, alternative theories
are likely to abound. Weiler expects papers to appear in
a matter of days or weeks.
Even if relativity is pushed
aside, Einstein has worked so well for so long that
he will never really go away. At worst, relativity will
turn out to work for most of the universe but not all,
just as Newton's mechanics work until things get
extremely large or small. 'The fact that Einstein has
worked for 106 years means he'll always be there, either
as the right answer or a low-energy effective theory,'
Weiler says." [Grossman (2011),
pp.7-9. Bold emphases added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some links added.
Several paragraphs merged. See also a report in
Socialist Review.]
The long-term success of Einstein's theory and the fundamental
nature of the speed of light mean that physicists will search for other
explanations of this anomaly while remaining committed to the TOR (even if
this implicates other theories, such as
M-theory, for example). So, the TOR (combined or not with other theories) is used as a
form of representation; that is, it is employed -- analogously like the square or the triangular mesh to which
Wittgenstein alluded above --, in order to make sense of, or re-interpret,
experimental evidence, even if the latter might seem to have refuted already
accepted theory, so that it no longer appears to
do so. This approach also sanctions certain inferences as 'legitimate', others as
'illegitimate' or 'suspect'. In this way, too, scientists police their own discipline
(otherwise known as "peer
review").
As we now
know,
several errors were later discovered in the above readings, meaning that this
experiment in the end failed to threaten fundamental tenets of modern physics.
But, other forms of representation were used to decide even
this!
It is interesting to note, however, that some scientists were quite happy to
weave these bogus results -- before they were 'exposed' -- into new, or
into other, theories in order to make sense of them, so that this anomalous data
(rather than accepted theory) remained 'valid'. The significance of that observation will become
clearer in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.
[Incidentally, this highlights a growing problem in contemporary science,
covered in more detail in Essay Eleven
Part One -- science by press release.]
Returning to the main theme (i.e., whether or
not motion is reference-frame sensitive or a "mode of the existence of matter"):
Some might think that QM has shown this
to be incorrect (in that it holds that all forms of matter are in ceaseless
motion), but this is 'true' only because of a theoretical inference.
There is no conceivable way that this supposedly universal truth can be
confirmed throughout nature, for all of time. In that case, it has to be read
into nature, or imposed on it, metaphysically -- or, indeed, perhaps
also as a "form
of representation" in its own right.
But, even if it could be confirmed,
the depiction of motion as a "mode
of the existence of matter" (rather than as a highly confirmed property of matter) would still depend on
space being Absolute.
Moreover, there is no conceivable observation, or body of observations, that could confirm
the supposed fact that motion is a "mode of the existence of matter". Indeed, as noted
above, if a relevant reference frame is chosen, which is moving at the same relative velocity as any
'particle' it is 'tracking', that would render it motionless relative to that frame (even if
the location of one or both of these was thereby
indeterminate, according to certain interpretations of QM).
Of course, it is controversial whether or not there are any
sub-atomic particles, as opposed to probability waves (or excitations of
'the field' -- I have covered this in more detail in Essay Seven
Part One), but, even if such particles were viewed as probability waves (or
the like), the specification of a particle's probable
velocity (relative to some frame) would similarly mean it was zero. [On this in
general,
see Castellani (1998).]
It could be argued that this just shows that all bodies are in
constant motion relative to one another, which is all that DM-theorists
need. But, as was pointed out above, even then motion would still
be reference-fame sensitive, and hence it couldn't be a "mode" of the existence
of matter, otherwise that wouldn't be the case.
It would
seem, therefore, that Lenin and Engels need space to be Absolute if their claim
that motion is a "mode of the existence of matter" is to
hold water.
It could be objected once more that Lenin's views aren't
metaphysical. That objection might itself be based on Engels's own loose
characterisation of Metaphysics:
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental
reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and
apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is
"yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.'
[Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.] For him a thing either exists or does not exist;
a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and
negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid
antithesis one to the other.
"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us
very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound
common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four
walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide
world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even
necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the
nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a
limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in
insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets
the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets
the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their
motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels
(1976), p.26. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Other
DM-fans have also endorsed this view of Metaphysics (as we will see below)
So,
Engels appears to believe that metaphysicians are committed to the belief that:
(1)
"Things" exist in isolated units with no interconnections.
(2)
They don't change.
(3)
They exist in "irreconcilable
antitheses", which appears to imply that the LEM applies across the board.
And that:
(4)
Metaphysics is the same as, or is expressed by, "commonsense", which works
reasonably well in everyday circumstances, but beyond that, in scientific or
even philosophical surroundings it soon becomes "one-sided, restricted,
abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions", and, among other things, can't
see "the wood for the trees".
[LEM = Law Of Excluded Middle.]
Given
the above description, it could be argued that DM isn't metaphysical.
First
of all, Engels offered his readers absolutely no evidence in support of these
sweeping allegations (for example, taken from the History of Philosophy).
Second, there have been countless Philosophers and Mystics who believed that
everything is interconnected, and which changed as a result of a "unity of
opposites". [On that, see
here, here
and here.] Of
course, DM-supporters classify thinkers like this as fellow-travellers (of
sorts), who thought 'dialectically' not metaphysically. However, it is even more
revealing to classify this tradition as just another strand of the set of ideas of the
ruling-class that always rule.
Third, we have already seen that it is impossible to make sense of DM-criticisms
of the LEM -- on that see
here. If so, 'commonsense' (whatever it is!) would be well advised to stick with the
LEM.
Finally, in the Essays posted at this site, we have witnessed DM-theses regularly
collapse into incoherence, so there is little room for DM-fans to crow about
the superiority of their theory. Indeed, Essay Seven
Part Three shows that if DM were true, change would be impossible.
However, Engels's depiction of Metaphysics would unfortunately rule out
as non-metaphysical much of previous 'non-dialectical' philosophy. Even Plato would have admitted
that things change (albeit if only with respect to appearances).
It could be countered that this
is incorrect; only DM pictures things as fundamentally
changeable, fundamentally
Heraclitean,
and only DM relates this to change through internal contradiction (etc.).
Well, we have seen, here,
here and
here that that isn't really
so. Even in DM, some things stay the same until or unless a sufficient
quantitative change induces a commensurate qualitative change -- namely,
and at least including, all those "essences" that Hegel borrowed from Aristotle, which Engels
also
unwisely appropriated from one or both of them -- just as dialecticians also
tell us that some things are 'relatively stable'
(whatever that means!).
"It is even more important to remember this point when we
are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of
development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one
cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old
and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a
dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their
struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a
whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for
opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the
unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and
transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex-pressing the infinity
of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a
relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite
objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its
constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of
thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They
are constantly in conflict, fighting each other." [Spirkin
(1983), pp.143-144. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"All rest is however
relative, while motion and change are absolute. This is to be understood
as an indication of the self-activity of matter, rather than in the sense
that motion is possible without rest.... Any state is temporary and
transient, and any thing or phenomena has a beginning and end to its existence.
The motion of matter is uncreatable and indestructible. It can only change
its forms. No single phenomenon or object can lose its ability to change or
be deprived of motion under any conditions....
"The source of the
internal activity of matter lies within it, in its inherent potentiality for the
perpetual changeability of its concrete shape and form of existence.
Motion is absolute, for it is unrelated to anything external that could
determine it. There is nothing else in the world except eternally moving matter,
its forms, properties and manifestations...." [Kharin (1981), pp.62-63. Bold
emphases added.]
"To
say that everything is in a constant process of development and change is not,
of course, to deny that things can be relatively unchanging and stationary. It
is, however, to say that rest is 'conditional, temporary, transitory [and]
relative' whereas 'development and motion are absolute'...." [Sayers (1980a), p.4. Sayers is here
quoting
Lenin (1961), p.358, and not p.360 as Sayers has it. Bold emphasis added.]
It
isn't easy to see how the above can be reconciled with the idea that "motion is
the mode of existence of matter".
Be this as
it may, Engels's view of Metaphysics is (yet again!) a crude version of Hegel's
ideas on this topic. As Houlgate points out:
"Metaphysics is characterised in the Encyclopedia
first and foremost by the belief that the categories of thought constitute 'the
fundamental determinations of things'.... The method of metaphysical philosophy, Hegel maintains,
involves attributing predicates to given subjects, in judgements.
Moreover just as the subject-matter of metaphysics consists of distinct
entities, so the qualities to be predicated of those entities are held to be
valid by themselves.... Of any two opposing predicates, therefore, metaphysics
assumes that one must be false if the other is true. Metaphysical philosophy is
thus described by Hegel as 'either/or' thinking because it treats predicates or
determinations of thought as mutually exclusive, 'as if each of the two terms in
an anti-thesis...has an independent, isolated existence as something substantial
and true by itself.' The world either has a beginning and end in time or it does
not; matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; man is either a rigidly
determined being or he is not. In this mutual exclusivity, Hegel believes, lies
the dogmatism of metaphysics. In spite of the fact that metaphysics deals with
infinite objects, therefore, these objects are rendered finite by the employment
of mutually exclusive, one-sided determinations -- 'categories the limits of
which are believed to be permanently fixed, and not subject to any further
negation.'" [Houlgate (2004), pp.100-01. Paragraphs merged.]
But, as has been argued
elsewhere
at this site, this puts Hegel himself in something of a bind, for he certainly
believed that metaphysics was this but not that (i.e., it was
either this or it was that, not both), and that unfortunately
means
even he
had to apply the LEM to make his point!
Of
course, it could be argued that the above observations aren't
"judgements" about the fundamental nature of things -- but then again,
that objection itself must use the LEM to make its point, for it takes as
granted that the above paragraph is saying this, but not that
(again, that it was either this or it was that, not both) about the
fundamental nature of things. Indeed, even
Hegel's
conclusions about the content of any metaphysical 'judgement' (i.e., that it says
either this or that, not both) would require an implicit, or even an explicit, use of the LEM.
We can go
further, any 'leap' into 'speculative' thought to the effect that this or that, or whatever,
has been
'negated', must implicate the LEM, too; for it will either be the case, or
it will not, that for any randomly-selected dialectical 'negation', it will have
taken place
or
it won't. Naturally, this would imply that Hegel's thought (and that of
anyone who agrees with him) -- i.e., that Hegel said this or that, not
both -- was
as
metaphysical as anything
Parmenides
or Plato came out with.
That is,
if we were foolish enough to rely on Hegel to tell us
what "Metaphysics" means!
The
conventions of ordinary language (partially codified in the LEM, in this case)
aren't so easily side-stepped, even by a thinker of "genius".
[Again,
on
the LEM and Hegel, see Essay Nine
Part One.]
Independently of that, it
might now be wondered: What marvellous solution to the
antinomy concerning the origin of the universe did Houlgate manage to find
in Hegel's work? Or even the one concerning the infinite divisibility of matter?
Apparently
only this:
"Oh dear! It's
all so contradictory!"
Well, that
clears things up and no mistake.
Hegel's
ideas, not science, were the source of Engels's confused musing in this
area, although, oddly enough,
much of what Hegel had to say about Metaphysics in the Preface
to the First Edition of The Science of Logic, actually agrees with much of what is
said about it in this Essay (even though Hegel also drops a heavy hint that this
characterisation is now obsolete, or so he thought). Here is part of it:
"That which, prior to this period, was
called metaphysics has been, so to speak, extirpated root and branch and has
vanished from the ranks of the sciences. The ontology, rational psychology,
cosmology, yes even natural theology, of former times -- where is now to be
heard any mention of them, or who would venture to mention them? Inquiries,
for instance, into the immateriality of the soul, into efficient and final
causes, where should these still arouse any interest? Even the former proofs of
the existence of God are cited only for their historical interest or for
purposes of edification and uplifting the emotions. The fact is that there
no longer exists any interest either in the form or the content of metaphysics
or in both together. If it is remarkable when a nation has become indifferent to
its constitutional theory, to its national sentiments, its ethical customs and
virtues, it is certainly no less remarkable when a nation loses its
metaphysics, when the spirit which contemplates its own pure essence is no
longer a present reality in the life of the nation.
"The exoteric teaching of the Kantian
philosophy -- that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else
the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which by itself generates
nothing but fantasies of the brain -- this was a justification from a
philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought. In support of
this popular teaching came the cry of modern educationists that the needs of the
time demanded attention to immediate requirements, that just as experience was
the primary factor for knowledge, so for skill in public and private life,
practice and practical training generally were essential and alone necessary,
theoretical insight being harmful even. Philosophy [Wissenschaft] and
ordinary common sense thus co-operating to bring about the downfall of
metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without
metaphysics -- like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a
holy of holies. Theology, which in former times was the guardian of the
speculative mysteries and of metaphysics (although this was subordinate to it)
had given up this science in exchange for feelings, for what was popularly
matter-of-fact, and for historical erudition. In keeping with this change,
there vanished from the world those solitary souls who were sacrificed by their
people and exiled from the world to the end that the eternal should be
contemplated and served by lives devoted solely thereto -- not for any practical
gain but for the sake of blessedness; a disappearance which, in another context,
can be regarded as essentially the same phenomenon as that previously mentioned.
So that having got rid of the dark utterances of metaphysics, of the colourless
communion of the spirit with itself, outer existence seemed to be transformed
into the bright world of flowers -- and there are no black flowers (there
are now! -- RL), as we know." [Hegel (1999),
pp.25-26, §§2-3. Bold emphases alone added. Minor typo corrected; I have
informed the on-line editors.]
Of course, modern metaphysicians would laugh at
Hegel's question "Where are they now?" since metaphysics (as traditionally
conceived) has roared back over the last century-and-a-half. and is, alas, alive
and well and being practiced in a University/College near you.
Independently of that, we have also seen that Hegel was the main source of the slippery reasoning
one encounters time and again in 'dialectical thought', the sort that 'allows'
dialecticians to ignore the contradictions and equivocations in their own theory while
pointing fingers at others for the very same alleged misdemeanours and sins. [There is
much more on this in Essay Eleven Part
One and
here.]
However, Cornforth (1950)
presents two main arguments aimed at
countering the standard view of Metaphysics employed in this Essay:
(1) Cornforth claims that the modern characterisation of
Metaphysics derives from
John
Locke (p.94), even though Cornforth himself had already pointed out that the term was
in fact introduced by Aristotle (p.93). [And it seems to be inconsistent with
Hegel's depiction of it, above.] He makes this connection because he wants
to maintain that modern
Philosophers reject Aristotle's search for the "essential nature of the real"
(p.94), deliberately running-together the ideas of the
Positivists
he is attacking with the views of every modern (non-Communist) Philosopher. This allows him to
reject the Positivists' understanding of Metaphysics as if it were held by each and every
non-Communist Philosopher!
First of all,
even when Cornforth was writing
this (circa 1950), only a
tiny minority of Analytic Philosophers (never mind the rest of the profession) were Positivists, so this can't be a valid reason for rejecting
the standard interpretation handed down from Aristotle. And it can't be a good reason
either for present-day dialecticians
to reject the interpretation promoted in this Essay, which in no way depends on Locke.
[Although Cornforth is right when he says that
Empiricism
and Positivism are both metaphysical; but then so is DM.]
Second, even if every (non-communist) Philosopher on the planet in 1950 had been
a Positivist, it is clear that they would have rejected Metaphysics because, as Positivists,
they accepted
the traditional view of Metaphysics, which itself stretches way back beyondLocke. Cornforth just asserts
that these Philosophers could trace their understanding of this word
(i.e., "metaphysics") back to
Locke, but he provides us with no evidence whatsoever that this is so -- not even one citation!
Anyone who reads the work of the Positivists, or even the
Logical Positivists, will see that they weren't just hung up on the nature
of "substance" (which Cornforth focuses on simply because of what Locke had
said about it), but all areas of Traditional Metaphysics.
More reliable accounts of this
(now) obsolete current in
Analytic
Philosophy can be found, for example, in the following: Copleston (2003b), Friedman (1999), Hacker (2000c), Hanfling (1981), Misak (1995), and
Passmore (1966). See also, Conant (2001).
[I
would recommend Soames (2003a, 2003b), here, but Soames is
highly unreliable in his discussions of Wittgenstein and
Ordinary Language Philosophy. On that, see
Hacker (2006); this links to a PDF.]
(2) Cornforth then argues
as follows:
"Such an attempt, however, to define 'metaphysics' in
terms of its subject-matter, is hardly satisfactory. For in a sense all science,
as well as philosophy, is concerned with the substance of things and with the
nature of the world. If, then, to speak of the substance of things and the
nature of the world is 'metaphysical', then science itself has a 'metaphysical'
tendency." [Cornforth (1950), p.94. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
To be sure,
metaphysical ideas have dominated much of science, but that is because "the
ideas of the ruling-class always rule". And yet, science has progressively
distanced itself from the influence of metaphysics, especially in areas where an
interface with the material world becomes paramount (for instance, in Chemistry,
Geology, much of Biology, most of Physics -- and, of course, Technology). [Why
that is so will discussed in Essay Thirteen Part Two,
when it is published.]
Even so, Cornforth's argument still depends on
the
unsupported claim that Metaphysics is as he says Positivists define it.
Anyway, Cornforth is being disingenuous here, for DM itself goes way beyond modern science in seeking
to pontificate, for
example, about motion, telling us that it is a "mode of the existence of matter",
or that it is "contradictory"
-- or, indeed,
about the "essence of Being" ("Thing-in-Itself"), the "interpenetration of opposites", the "negation of the negation",
and so on. These
vague and dubious 'concepts' certainly fit the traditional interpretation of Metaphysics.
To be
sure, the exact boundary between Metaphysics and Science might be hard to
define, but that doesn't mean there is no difference between the two. There is a
difference between night and day even though the boundary between them is
impossible to delineate. [Again, I will say more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
These
appear to be the only two substantive arguments Cornforth offered in support of
his rejection of the traditional interpretation of Metaphysics, and thus in
favour of his adoption of the characterisation he found in Hegel and Engels
(pp.95-98) -- although, oddly enough, Cornforth doesn't mention from whom Engels
pinched this idea. But, it is quite clear that all three had to modify
considerably the meaning of "metaphysics" to make their fanciful ideas seem
to work -- plainly in order to try both to distinguish and to distance Metaphysics from DM
(pp.98-101). This is, of course, just another excellent example of the sort of
special pleading DM-fans are well practised at invoking.
Of course, all this is independent of Marx's
own characterisation of Metaphysics. For example, in The Poverty of
Philosophy, he had this to say:
"We shall now have to talk
metaphysics while talking political economy. And in this again we shall but
follow M.
Proudhon's 'contradictions.' Just now he forced us to speak English, to
become pretty well English ourselves. Now the scene is changing. M. Proudhon is
transporting us to our dear fatherland and is forcing us, whether we like it or
not, to become German again. If the Englishman transforms
men into hats, the German transforms hats into ideas. The Englishman is
Ricardo,
rich banker and distinguished economist; the German is Hegel, simple professor
at the University of Berlin.
"Louis
XV, the last absolute monarch and representative of the decadence of French
royalty, had attached to his person a physician who was himself France's first
economist. This doctor, this economist, represented the imminent and certain
triumph of the French bourgeoisie. Doctor
Quesnay
made a science out of political economy; he summarized it in his famous
Tableau économique. Besides the thousand and one commentaries on this table
which have appeared, we possess one by the doctor himself. It is the 'Analysis
of the Economic Table,' followed by 'seven important observations.' M. Proudhon is another Dr.
Quesnay. He is the Quesnay of the metaphysics of political economy.
"Now metaphysics -- indeed
all philosophy -- can be summed up, according to Hegel, in method. We must,
therefore, try to elucidate the method of M. Proudhon, which is at least as
foggy as the Economic Table. It is for this reason that we are making seven more
or less important observations. If Dr. Proudhon is not pleased with our
observations, well, then, he will have to become an
Abbé
Baudeau and give the 'explanation of the economico-metaphysical method'
himself....
"Apply this method to the
categories of political economy and you have the logic and metaphysics of
political economy, or, in other words, you have the economic categories that
everybody knows, translated into a little-known language which makes them look
as if they had never blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason; so much do
these categories seem to engender one another, to be linked up and intertwined
with one another by the very working of the dialectic movement. The reader must
not get alarmed at these metaphysics with all their scaffolding of categories,
groups, series, and systems. M. Proudhon, in spite of all the trouble he has
taken to scale the heights of the system of contradictions, has never been able
to raise himself above the first two rungs of simple thesis and antithesis; and
even these he has mounted only twice, and on one of these two occasions he fell
over backwards." [Marx
(1976), pp.161-65. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Links added; several paragraphs merged. I have used the on-line version here, but
have also corrected any typos I managed to spot.]
As seems clear from the above, Marx doesn't
appear to agree with Engels over the nature of Metaphysics, clearly linking
it with "dialectics" (albeit the 'dialectical method' Proudhon extracted from
Hegel's work).
Be
this as it may, I don't want to get hung up on a terminological point, so I recommend that anyone who objects to the
usual definition of "Metaphysics" (and its cognates) -- or even
the phrase "Traditional Philosophy" -- used at this site,
perhaps, preferring Engels's own characterisation, substitute the following for
it:
"[T]he branch of philosophy concerned with
explaining the ultimate nature of reality, being, and the world."
The
above is a description of Metaphysics we find over at Wikipedia,
which is, I think, reasonably accurate, if a little brief. The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy is a little more specific:
"Metaphysics, most generally the philosophical
investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality. It is
broader in scope than science..., since one of its traditional concerns is the
existence of non-physical entities, e.g., God. It is also more fundamental,
since it investigates questions science does not address but the answers to
which it presupposes. Are there, for instance, physical objects at all, and does
every event have a cause?" [Butchvarov (1999), p.563.]
Here is how the Stanford Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy characterises it (re-formatted):
"If metaphysics now considers
a wider range of problems than those studied in
Aristotle's
Metaphysics, those problems continue to belong to its subject-matter. For
instance, the topic of 'being as
such' (and 'existence as such', if existence is something other than being) is one of the matters that belong to metaphysics on any conception of
metaphysics. The following theses are all paradigmatically
metaphysical: 'Being is; not-being is not' [Parmenides];
'Essence precedes existence' [Avicenna,
paraphrased]; 'Existence in reality is greater than existence in the
understanding alone' [St
Anselm, paraphrased]; 'Existence is a perfection' [Descartes,
paraphrased]; 'Being is a logical, not a real
predicate' [Kant,
paraphrased]; 'Being is the most barren and abstract of all categories' [Hegel,
paraphrased]; 'Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the
number zero' [Frege];
'Universals
do not exist but rather subsist or have being' [Russell,
paraphrased]; 'To be is to be the value of a
bound variable' [Quine];
'An object's degree of being is
proportionate to the naturalness of its mode of existence'
[McDaniel]."
[Inwagen, Sullivan and
Bernstein (2023).
Italic emphases in the original. Links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
"Philosophers of all stripes have theories to offer, for
better or worse.... Theories in philosophy, whether good or bad, aim to explain
something, to answer certain explanation-seeking questions.... What is being?
What is thinking? What is knowledge? What are we?... Rare is the philosopher
with no theory whatsoever to offer. Such would be a philosopher without a
philosophy...." [Moser (1993), p.3. I owe this reference to Hutto (2003),
pp.194-95.]
Finally, here is Dario
Cankovic's characterisation of 'Western Philosophy' (with which I largely
agree):
"Philosophy, at least in the Western tradition
(and this includes Islamic philosophy which is a direct continuation of the
tradition of Late Classical-era philosophy), goes through two-phases. The first
metaphysical pre-Kantian phase of philosophy conceives of its activity as
investigation of the mind-independent necessary metaphysical structure of the
world. The second transcendental Kantian phase conceives of its activity as
investigation of the mind-constitutive world-constituting necessary
transcendental structure or structuring principles of thought itself. While
Kant's Copernican revolution is certainly a revolution in philosophy, insofar as
in trying to render philosophy scientific it radically changes the way
philosophy is done, it doesn't represent a complete break with philosophy.
Philosophy remains an effort to understand the world and ourselves a priori.
Furthermore, both conceive of the objects of their investigation, whether
metaphysical or transcendental, as necessary and immutable, as ahistorical
or transhistorical, without or outside of history.
"Self-conceptions of philosophers aside,
philosophy is not a transhistorical category, it is a human activity and a body
of theories with a history. It is conceptual investigation and invention
born out of a fascination with and misunderstanding of necessity. It is
decidedly pre-scientific in that it is an attempt to understand nature,
ourselves and our place in it through the lens of language, though not
self-consciously so. This fascination and misunderstanding is a consequence of
our alienation from our collective agency. While humanity shapes and is shaped
by nature and our concepts, this collective capacity doesn't extend to
individual human beings. We create concepts in an never-ending exchange with
nature, but you and I as individual human beings are inducted into a community
of language-users of an already formed language and brought forth into an
already reformed world. We -- collectively and individually -- we are ignorant
of our own history." [Quoted from
here.
Italics in the original. The rest of this article is an excellent antidote
to the idea that Marx was a philosopher. Typo corrected; link and bold
emphases added.]
Even so, whatever this
ancient
intellectual pursuit is
finally called, it is abundantly clear that DM-theorists attempt to do
some of the above themselves --, i.e., they endeavour to "explain the ultimate nature of reality, being
and the world" in their own idiosyncratic, dogmatic, sub-Hegelian
fashion. They also ask and attempt to
answer similar questions along similar lines, albeit
with a view to changing the world. Indeed, they
have adopted
much the same approach to Philosophy
as the Traditional Metaphysicians to whom Moser (above) alludes -- that is, they attempt to derive fundamental
truths about reality from a handful of jargonised expressions, which are then imposed on
nature, and said to be valid for all of space and time.
[This was demonstrated in detail in
Essay Two. Precisely how this
series of verbal tricks
works is, of course, the subject of Parts One to Seven of the present Essay! See also Essay Three
Part One, where
much that will be argued here in Essay Twelve was set up.]
As far as the attempt to define Metaphysics as
the study of things that don't change, this is what the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
had to say:
"Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have
said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its
subject matter: metaphysics was the 'science' that studied 'being as such' or
'the first causes of things' or 'things that do not change.' It is no longer
possible to define metaphysics that way, and for two reasons. First, a
philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as
constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics -- first causes or unchanging
things -- would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion.
Secondly, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be
metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no
way related to first causes or unchanging things; the problem of free will, for
example, or the problem of the mental and the physical." [Inwagen,
Sullivan and Bernstein (2023).
Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this
site; bold emphasis added.]
And, one might add, the 'problem' of change itself.
A useful (and thoroughly traditional) account of the nature of Metaphysics can be
found in Van Inwagen (1998), but there are countless books that cover the same
ground. For a
useful review of attempts to define Metaphysics, see Moore (2013), pp.1-22
-- although, it is revealing that philosophers can't even agreeamong
themselves what this
word means!
This
underlines what I posted on Quora recently (in answer to the question:
"Where should I begin if I want to study Philosophy?"):
First, dial down
your expectations. Not one single 'philosophical problem' posed by Ancient Greek
thinkers (or any others since) has been solved, or even remotely solved. Nor are
they likely to be. After 2500 years of this, we don't even know the right
questions to ask, for goodness sake!
As Oxford University Philosopher, Peter Hacker, noted:
"For two and a half millennia some of the best minds in European culture have
wrestled with the problems of philosophy. If one were to ask what knowledge has
been achieved throughout these twenty-five centuries, what theories have been
established (on the model of well-confirmed theories in the natural sciences),
what laws have been discovered (on the model of the laws of physics and
chemistry), or where one can find the corpus of philosophical propositions known
to be true, silence must surely ensue. For there is no body of philosophical
knowledge. There are no well-established philosophical theories or laws. And
there are no philosophical handbooks on the model of handbooks of dynamics or of
biochemistry. To be sure, it is tempting for contemporary philosophers,
convinced they are hot on the trail of the truths and theories which so long
evaded the grasp of their forefathers, to claim that philosophy has only just
struggled out of its early stage into maturity.... We can at long last expect a
flood of new, startling and satisfying results -- tomorrow.
"One can blow the Last Trumpet once, not once a century. In the seventeenth
century Descartes thought he had discovered the definitive method for attaining
philosophical truths; in the eighteenth century Kant believed that he had set
metaphysics upon the true path of a science; in the nineteenth century Hegel
convinced himself that he had brought the history of thought to its culmination;
and Russell, early in the twentieth century, claimed that he had at last found
the correct scientific method in philosophy, which would assure the subject the
kind of steady progress that is attained by the natural sciences. One may well
harbour doubts about further millenarian promises."
[Hacker (2001c), pp.322-23.]
Second, begin with Bertrand Russell's Problems of Philosophy, which as about
as good an introduction to Traditional Philosophy as you could wish to find --
which is also well written.
Then, perhaps read some of the more accessible 'classics', such Descartes's
Meditations, or his Discourse, Hume's Enquiries, Berkeley's
Three
Dialogues, Plato's Republic, or his Meno (Aristotle is, alas, far too
difficult!), Kant's Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics -- steer clear of
Hegel (who is impossibly difficult).
All of the above
(except Hacker) -- and much more besides -- are available here:
Traditionally
Philosophy has been regarded as a sort of 'super-science', a discipline capable
of revealing fundamental truths about 'reality', valid for all of space and
time, ascertainable from thought, or from language, alone -- or, indeed, as some
sort of uniquely authoritative moral or political guide, or perhaps even a clue
to the 'meaning of life'. But it isn't like any science you have ever heard of.
Traditional Philosophers typically spend a few hours in the comfort of their own
heads -- by-passing all those boring observations and experiments, with their
expensive equipment and a requirement that the individual concerned becomes
technically competent --, and, hey presto, they emerge with a set of
super-cosmic verities.
This isn't to deny
that some philosophers engaged in empirical work -- for example, Aristotle --
but that wasn't a core aspect of their work. Moreover, the sciences have
gradually freed themselves from Traditional Philosophy by subjecting their work
to empirical test (howsoever one interprets this). Nor is it to deny that
scientists don't indulge in amateur metaphysics (especially in their
popularisations), speculating about the nature of space or time, for example.
But, Traditional
Philosophy is quintessentially a 'conceptual enquiry', which, directly or
indirectly, revolves around what certain words mean (such as, 'time', 'space',
'matter', 'knowledge', 'belief', 'existence', 'identity', 'meaning', 'language',
'causation', 'justice', 'freedom', 'fate', 'good', 'evil', 'god', 'soul', etc.,
etc.), but this is in fact provides us with a clue to its fatal defects, and why
it hasn't advanced one nanometre closer to a 'solution' to its 'problems' than
Plato or Aristotle themselves managed.
I have attempted
to explain why that is so, here (using Wittgenstein's ideas):
[Which essay
actually part of a political debate on the Marxist left. But you don't have to
know anything about the latter to follow my argument!]
The deflationary
approach to Metaphysics adopted at this site is discussed in more detail in
Baker (2004b) and
Rorty (1980)
-- however, concerning Rorty's work, readers should note the caveats I posted
earlier.
Incidentally, the ideas presented in this Essay shouldn't be
confused with those developed by the
Logical
Positivists (henceforth, LP-ers) -- although there are several
superficial similarities, 'only at the margins', as it were -- for example, a handful
of those expressed in
Ayer (2001), pp.1-29.
[This links to a PDF.]
Even so, the differences between my ideas and those
expressed by LP-ers are
quite profound. For instance, I am not offering a criterion of meaning
(in fact, I hardly mention this term (i.e., "meaning") as LP-ers intended it
to be understood, in
this Essay. Moreover, and by way of contrast, I begin with how we
ordinarily understand empirical or factual propositions, and to that end I use a term Wittgenstein
introduced, "sense", to capture
it. This approach shows that the LP-ers got things the wrong way round; it is
our grasp of the sense of a proposition that enables us to determine
whether or not it is capable of being verified or falsified, not the other way
round. As I point out,
if we didn't already understand a given proposition, we wouldn't be able to
verify/falsify it, or, for that matter, know whether or not it is capable of being
verified/falsified. Indeed, how would anyone go about trying to verify a proposition they
hadn't already understood? Finally, "meaning" is a highly complex term that was
grossly oversimplified by the LP-ers. [I say more about this in Essay Thirteen
Part Three; see
also here, and
below.]
So, verification can't be
a fundamental, or
even a significant, factor in
connection with our ordinary use of factual language. Hence, even though
The
Verification Principle has now been totally abandoned, its defects (real or
imagined) have absolutely nothing to do with the ideas expressed in this Essay,
or at this site.
2.
Again,
Essay Two highlighted
the many occasions where modal terminology was employed by DM-theorists (in place of more tentative or
reasonable summaries of the available evidence, or intended to 'beef up' their use of the
indicative mood).
Here are a few such
passages from
the DM-classicists and 'lesser' DM-luminaries:
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Lenin (1921), pp.90. Bold emphases added.]
"As we already know that all things change, all
things are 'in flux', it is certain that such an absolute state of rest
cannot possibly exist. We must therefore reject a condition in which
there is no 'contradiction between opposing and colliding forces' no disturbance
of equilibrium, but only an absolute immutability…." [Bukharin (1925), p.73.
Bold emphases added.]
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook,
the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand
the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations
with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as
their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its
movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development...." [Mao
(1961), pp.313. Bold emphasis added.]
"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist
without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This
'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and
events. Both attraction and repulsion are
necessary properties of matter. Each attraction in one place is
necessarily compensated for by a corresponding repulsion in another place…."
[Conze (1944), pp.35-36. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Nature cannot be unreasonable or reason
contrary to nature. Everything that exists must have a necessary and
sufficient reason for existence…. The material base of this law lies in the actual
interdependence of all things in their reciprocal interactions…. If
everything that exists has a necessary and sufficient reason for existence,
that means it had to come into being. It was pushed into existence and forced
its way into existence by natural necessity…. Reality, rationality and
necessity are intimately associated at all times…. If everything actual is necessarily rational,
this means that every item of the real world has a sufficient reason for
existing and must find a rational explanation…." [Novack (1971), pp.78-80. Bold
emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Positive is meaningless without negative. They
are necessarily inseparable....
This universal phenomenon of the unity of
opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in
nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible
as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the
heart of all forms of matter." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), pp.65-68. Bold emphases
added; paragraphs merged.]
3.
Plainly, this isn't meant to
be an exhaustive list of such sentences; the examples listed were chosen
to make a particular point about the connection between metaphysical sentences
and what look like ordinary empirical propositions. Several more
examples, taken from Traditional Metaphysics and DM-sources, have been quoted
below.
"Wittgenstein's ambitious claim is that it is
constitutive of metaphysical theories and questions that their employment of
terms is at odds with their explanations and that they use deviant rules along
with the ordinary ones. As a result, traditional philosophers cannot coherently
explain the meaning of their questions and theories. They are confronted with a
trilemma: either their novel uses of terms remain unexplained
(unintelligibility), or...[they use] incompatible rules (inconsistency), or
their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary use --
including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts in terms
of which the philosophical problems were phrased." [Glock (1996), pp.261-62.]
3a.
However, I will have to qualify this comment
later on in this Essay since it is clear that mathematical
propositions can't be true in the same way that empirical propositions plainly can.
4.It could be
objected that to acknowledge, say, M9 as true does in fact require some input from the
material world, on an appeal to evidence.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Certainly, human beings have to live
in this world to be able to assert things like M9 -- if only to
learn what
the relevant words mean. But, as we will see later,
even though ordinary-looking words are being used in such sentences, they (or, rather,
the novel expressions invented by metaphysicians and the ordinary words they
then use in radically new ways) can't
be
part of the vernacular, as
Glock pointed out above.
Notwithstanding this, the
fact remains that, unlike M6, it isn't possible to establish the (alleged) truth-status of M9 by
comparing it with reality.
In response, it could be
argued that M9 is a general proposition whereas M6 is particular.
That is
undeniable, but
it isn't relevant. Consider another general, but no less empirical proposition:
E1: All
badgers living within a five mile radius of the centre of
Luton
on August 25th 2017 have eaten hazel nuts at least once that day.
Now,
you can 'reflect' on E1 until the cows next evolve, but that will still fail to tell you whether or
not it is true. Even though E1 might never be fully confirmed (although, it
wouldn't be
impossible to do so if it were to be investigated promptly with enough resources devoted to
the task -- while it might prove easier to falsify),
the collection of data coupled with detailed observation (etc.) would only be accepted as relevant to
that end. Understanding E1 in fact tells us what to look for, what
sort of evidence/investigation will confirm
it and what sort will confute it, even if we never succeed in ascertaining
either, or had any desire to do so.
That isn't
the case with
M9.
Finally, it could be
objected that M9 (and M1a) are in fact summaries of the evidence we
currently possess. This objection
has already been fielded in Note Two,
but more fully in Essay Two. [See
also here.]
Anyway, as we will see
later, M9 and M1a aren't
even empirically true -- if we were to insist on reading them that way.
[But, on
this, also see Note 5
andNote 5a, below.]
5.As should seem obvious, M9
has been included in this list not just because of its connection with M1a and other DM-claims,
but because dialecticians appear to regard it (or, at least, P4) as an a prioritruth which
they feel they can assert dogmatically
--, or, rather, the language they
use makes
it difficult to defend them from just such an accusation.
However, even though M9 might look self-evident
(to DM-theorists), not everyone
would agree. Up until relatively recently (i.e., before, say, 1600), the idea
that matter was naturally motionless (or, rather, the belief that effort had to be
expended in order to put material bodies into motion and keep them
moving) was uncontroversial. Indeed, that theory was
a cornerstone of Aristotelian Physics,
supported by countless observations over many centuries. It took a conceptual revolution
to persuade post-Renaissance theorists to accept the idea that motion is a
'natural' state of material bodies (or, to be more honest, Aristotelians had to
die out before such a conceptual shift became possible). Of course, that
intellectual development was itself motivated by NeoPlatonic
and
Hermetic
ideas circulating around Europe at the time, and wasn't based on observation,
either.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[References supporting the above assertions can be accessed
here. The idea that matter is self-moving
originated in Plato, but it is arguable that it pre-dated even him; on that see
here.]
We have also seen -- here
and here -- that Lenin's theory that
matter is 'self-moving' would in fact make of Newtonian mechanics obsolete, and was itself
based on the ancient, mystical
dogma that
nature is in effect a
self-developing
Cosmic Egg.
The point is, of course, that even though DM-theorists themselves believe that matter is always in
motion, it is possible to think of it otherwise.
Indeed, as noted above,
if a suitable reference frame is chosen, a moving body
can be regarded as stationary with respect to that frame. Hence, not only is matter
without motion 'thinkable', most people who have thought about this topic have
found little difficulty in so thinking. Indeed, the idea is now
theoretically respectable. Anyone who doubts that claim should check
this and this
out, and then perhaps reconsider.
5a0. If this weren't the case, then nothing determinate will have been proposed (i.e., put forward for
consideration) and sentences like M6 would fail even to be propositions.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
It is this that enables us to understand M6 without knowing whether or not it is
true, or even if M6a is the case instead:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
On the other hand, if neither
M6 nor M6a could be the case (whether we knew which alternative was
true), they would both fail to be propositions. In that eventuality it
would be entirely unclear what they were proposing or putting forward for consideration.
Of course, to those of a 'dialectical' frame-of-mind, the above
(apparent)
application of theLEM
is
anathema, a sure sign of 'formal thinking' -- i.e., the implication that
both M6 and M6a are either true or false. In response, it is worth
pointing out that that endlessly recycled DM-objection is in fact self-refuting,
since it, too,
relies on the LEM. That is because it must be the case that any application of
the LEM is either an application of the LEM or it isn't -- it can't be both.
Indeed, we can go further: any exercise of 'formal thought' is either an example
of 'formal thought' or it
isn't; it can't be both. A (alleged) defect in the LEM is a defect or it isn't. Hence, any DM-fan brave enough to attack the LEM will
have to use it (explicitly or implicitly) in order to criticise it or highlight its supposed limitations, rendering that
criticism null and void.
[Of course,
if it is unclear whether or not a supposed application of the LEM is in fact an
application of the LEM, then that, too, will be either unclear
or it won't, and we are back where were in the previous paragraph.]
Incidentally, throughout this
Essay I have used
rather stilted phrases like "It is possible to understand every word of M6
without knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false". That is because there is a world of difference between
the following:
A1: It is possible to understand every word of M6 without
knowing whether it is true or false; and,
A2: It is possible to understand every word of M6 without
knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false.
As will be explained later, it is
implicit in the rules we have for
the application of words like "empirical" and "factual" -- that
is, that an empirical
proposition can only assume one of two truth-values (true or false). In other
words, such propositions are "bivalent" and have true-false polarity, but it
isn't part of those rules that we must know whether any such
proposition is true or know whether any such proposition is false in order
to understand it. All we
need know is that it could be one or the other, not both. In fact, this rule lies
behind the fact that we can understand such sentences before we know
whether they are true or whether they are false. [Why that is so will
become apparent as this Essay unfolds.] This involves comprehending
what would make them true or would make them false.
If that weren't so, it would be indeterminate
what
was being proposed or put forward for consideration -- which
would in turn be enough to deny that the sentence in question was an empirical proposition
to begin with.
[I
have explained this idea in greater detail
below. On Hegel's 'apparent' rejection of the LEM, or even his (ill-advised) attempt to
criticise it, see
here. Even so, the limitations of
the LEM lie elsewhere. On that, see Peter Geach's article, 'The Law of
the Excluded Middle', in Geach (1972a), pp.74-87.]
5a.It could be objected that DM-theorists do
in fact supply evidence in support of this theory. Often they appeal to the
'whole of science', or, perhaps, the 'human experience' in general in support. Molyneux (2012), quoted
below, is just the latest example
of
Mickey Mouse Science of this sort.
However,
as we have seen, this entire theory follows from the claim that motion is "The mode of the existence of matter" (i.e., P4):
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Hence,
for dialecticians, these two
'concepts', matter and motion, can no more be separated than, say,
the words "number" and "six".
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter.
Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be
created; it can only be transmitted…. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to
be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74.
Italic emphasis in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
While evidence can and has been used to show that matter
moves (not that that was ever in doubt!), no amount of evidence could show that
motion is "The mode of the existence of matter",
or that motion without matter is "unthinkable" --,
that is, that matter can't exist unless it is moving, or that we can't
think about it except in this way.
And that is what
makes the 'evidentialdisplay'
aired in the DM-literature the charade it is. What little evidence DM-theorists bother to scrape-together is used solely illustratively;
i.e., it isn't
used to establish the truth of a given DM-theory, merely make it seem
clearer, more plausible, or perhaps even more 'scientific' -- and plainly
this is aimed at those new to the theory.
No independent expert in the relevant fields would accept it a proof. In
Essay Seven, this approach to knowledge was
dubbed, "Mickey
Mouse Science". And the accuracy of that observation is itself
confirmed by the further fact that this particular theory (about the universal
nature of motion) was based on Hegel's dogmatic assertion (as is much
else in
DM), who arrived at that conclusion before
very much evidence was available.
Of course, this idea was ultimately derived from
Heraclitus, who
advanced claims like this before there was any
scientific data at all! Indeed, he arrived at this 'Super-Scientific
truth', valid for all of space and time, by merely thinking about the
possibility of stepping into the same river more than once!
Unfortunately, Heraclitus screwed even that up! [On this, see
Essay Six.]
All DM-theses possess little other than a priori, dogmatic credentials like this, so it is
no use dialecticians pretending their ideas were originally motivated by evidence,
or even by a summary of evidence available now, in the 21st century.
[There is more on this topic
here, and will be in several
subsequent
Parts of Essay Twelve (when they are published).]
5b.In fact, it is hard to imagine single experiment that could be carried
out aimed at confirming such hyper-bold theories. Because they are derived from
thought/language alone, they reflect their inventor's determination to use words
idiosyncratically. Each of these
Cosmic Verities is then used as a rule to interpret
experience (as a form of
representation -- albeit an incoherent form or representation, as we will see), and
hence they
are used to dictate to nature how it must be, what it must contain and how it
must
act. That is, of course, why they seem so 'self-evident' to those who
concoct them, why so
many modal terms are used in their formulation, why
no confirming experiments are called forand whynone are ever carried out.
After all, has a single DM-supporter ever even so much as proposed a method for testing -- let
alone actually proceeding to test -- the veracity of the vast majority of DM-theses?
After all, why test what appear to be self-evident truths? Who ever tests
whether vixens are female foxes?
It could be objected that Trotsky, for
example, did in fact propose an experiment -- whereby bags of sugar could be
weighted to test the validity of the LOI. However, anyone who thinks that what
Trotsky proposed could rightly be described as an "experiment" has a novel
understanding of the nature of that word. Since I have covered this
topic at length in Essay
Six, the reader is directed there for more details.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
Unfortunately for dialecticians, this
immediately divorces their 'Super-Truths' from a materialist account of nature
and society. If, however, the 'truth' or the 'falsehood' of DM-theories like these
is dependent on thought alone, how could these 'Cosmic Verities' be anything other than Ideal?
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Worse still: if DM-claims are indeed
Idealist, how could they be used to help change
the world?
Well, as we saw in Essay Nine
Part Two, that
isn't strictly true. They can be so used -- but onlynegatively
--, in
ways that benefit the ruling-class, heaping ordure on Marxism.
Small wonder
then that DM has presided over 150 years of almost total failure. [More on
that in Essay Ten
Part One.]
Admittedly, some
of these pronouncements are 'supported' by a series of short, or even a few
protracted
arguments, which are merely used to help 'derive' these 'Super-Truths' from
still other a priori
theses, 'self-evident truths', assorted 'thought experiments,
stipulative definitions and hence, ultimately from words. However, their 'veracity' isn't
based on evidence, but on what their constituent words or concepts (and those of any
supporting ideas) seem to mean. The nature of their derivation means they
can be viewed as universal truths in no need of evidential support.
We saw this was the case with Engels and Lenin, whose conclusions about matter
and motion followed from P4:
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[The
significance of the above comments will be explored as this Essay
unfolds.]
6a.Again, it could be
objected that Lenin actually devoted an entire
section in MEC to supporting this claim of his. Hence, the allegations advanced
in this Essay are entirely baseless.
Or, so it could be claimed....
Unfortunately, Lenin
actually spent the bulk of the aforementioned section
of MEC to picking
a fight with various Idealists, which makes much of what he had to say irrelevant to the
concerns addressed in this Essay (and, indeed, irrelevant to supporting the above objection!).
However, in order to consider every conceivable avenue
open to DM-fans to defend Lenin, it is necessary to check whether or not his arguments hold together,
even in their own terms.
Lenin's opening point
in this part of MEC (I am ignoring the preamble on pp.318-19
since it seems to add nothing substantial) is this:
"Let us imagine a consistent idealist
who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take
'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical
idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that
the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas,
sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject and
regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his ideas
come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' -- and
that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of thinking.
And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the solipsist
if he consistently adheres to his view." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20.
In the above, and in what follows, the quotation marks have been altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
As we will see in Essay Thirteen
Part One, Lenin's principal tactic
when confronting ideas he doesn't like is to caricature them -- the above being
an excellent example of this. "The entire world is his sensation"?! I can think of
no Idealist of note who has ever argued this. [Email
me if you disagree and can name a few such (with proof!).]
Even so, the force of Lenin's
argument depends on his running-together two senses of "move". This allows him
to insinuate that any Idealist who claims that "the world is motion" must
somehow be contradicting herself, since her thoughts (and hence her world,
presumably) "move". Now, even if we allow Lenin to get away with this
conflation, how this shows that "motion without matter is unthinkable"
is still far from clear.
It could be argued in defence of Lenin that for an
Idealist, even
thinking about matter involves motion, namely the motion of their own
thoughts. In that case, motion without matter is indeed unthinkable. But,
and once again, even if we accept Lenin's equivocation between these two senses
of "move", we have already seen that he declared that:
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
In that case, if an Idealist thinks of something non-material
(such as 'god'), and his/her thought 'moves' in order to do this, then motion
without matter is thinkable, nay actual, after all! [Whether 'God' is material or not
will be discussed in Essay Thirteen
Part One, but it is difficult to think of a single DM-fan who would want to argue
that 'He/She/It' is!] Moreover, a consistent Idealist (of the sort Lenin is
caricaturing) would probably conclude that while her ideas might move this
doesn't
imply the motion of matter, since she denies there is such a thing as
matter (i.e., as conceived by materialists).
Nevertheless, what
devastating dialectical argument does Lenin deploy in order to cast even
this straw doctrine into oblivion? Wonder no more:
"The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation. Therefore, to divorce motion from matter is equivalent to
divorcing thought from objective reality, or to divorcing my sensations from the
external world -- in a word, it is to go over to idealism. The trick which is
usually performed in denying matter, and in assuming motion without matter,
consists in ignoring the relation of matter to thought. The question is
presented as though this relation did not exist, but in reality it is introduced
surreptitiously; at the beginning of the argument it remains unexpressed, but
subsequently crops up more or less imperceptibly.
"Matter
has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to draw epistemological
conclusions. But has thought remained? -- we ask. If not, if with the
disappearance of matter thought has also disappeared, if with the disappearance
of the brain and nervous system ideas
and sensations, too, have disappeared -- then it follows that everything has
disappeared. And your argument has disappeared as a sample of 'thought' (or lack
of thought)! But if it has remained -- if it is assumed that with the
disappearance of matter, thought (idea, sensation, etc.) does not disappear,
then you have surreptitiously gone over to the standpoint of philosophical
idealism. And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to
conceive of motion without matter, for tacitly, by the very fact that
they continue to argue, they are acknowledging the existence of thought
after the disappearance of matter. This means that a very simple, or a very
complex philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a very simple one, if it is
a case of frank solipsism (I exist, and the world is only my
sensation); a very complex one, if instead of the thought, ideas and sensations
of a living person, a dead abstraction is posited, that is, nobody's thought,
nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, but thought in general (the Absolute Idea,
the Universal Will, etc.), sensation as an indeterminate 'element,' the
'psychical,' which is substituted for the whole of physical nature, etc., etc.
Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism are possible and it
is always possible to create a thousand and first shade; and to the author of
this thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for example) what
distinguishes it from the rest may appear to be momentous. From the standpoint
of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely unessential. What is
essential is the point of departure. What is essential is that the attempt to
think of motion without matter smuggles in thought divorced
from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism." [Ibid.,
pp.320-21. Emphases in the original.]
This passage more than most
exposes Lenin's philosophical naivety, if not incompetence; this topic will be discussed in detail in Essay Thirteen
Part One.
However, for present purposes, we need only note that all that the above 'argument' demonstrates is that
Lenin based his own ideas on the fact that he had 'images' of
something-or-other, and that what they 'reflect' must therefore exist. He supported
this inference with a dubious claim that whatever is reflected in the mind must
exist in the external world -- on that, see
below.
But,
even if we were recklessly charitable, the very most that this 'argument'
could conceivably establish is that Lenin's images correspond to his own image of reality,
since all he has are images with which to compare his other images! He has
no way of comparing his images with anything which isn't also an image. He
couldn't jump 'out of his head' to access the world 'directly' in order to
check his images against the reality he thinks they 'reflect'.
An appeal to
practice at this point would be to no avail
either, since, if Lenin were right, all he would have are images of
practice!
[I
hasten to add that this doesn't imply that I doubt the
existence of the external world! But, anyone who agrees with Lenin faces serious
problems, since they can only
appeal to faith in support of their belief in 'objective reality'. In which case,
they are philosophically no better off than
Bogdanov and the others Lenin was criticising in MEC -- the "Fideists", as he
called them. (As noted above, I have gone into this at much greater length in Essay Thirteen
Part One.)]
Hence, at most
all that the above passage shows is that materialists (according to Lenin's
definition of them) have a different view of reality from Idealists, not that
Idealists can't think about motion. Indeed, he all but admits that they
can do so:
"And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to conceive
of motion without matter...." [Ibid.]
"We
thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable
without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this
point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is
the connection between philosophical
idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from
force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter?"
[Ibid.,
p.319. Bold emphasis and link added.]
"What is essential
is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in
thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism."
[Ibid.,
p.321.]
He
does, however, lay this rather odd argument across his readers:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only
an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot
exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists
independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes
the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge."
[Ibid.,
p.69.
Bold emphasis added.]
This one is even clearer
and more direct:
"The image inevitably and
of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'"
[Ibid.,
p.279.
Bold emphasis added.]
[Nevertheless, how
Lenin knew the above was true for other minds -- which
can't actually be minds, since they exist outside his mind, since, by his own
criterion means they must be material! -- he kept
to himself.]
Now,
the inference that images imply the existence of the thing imaged is manifestly
absurd. If that were the case, we would have to start believing in the
real existence of Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy, for example. [On this,
see
here and the
extended discussion
here. Of course, since Lenin didn't believe in Santa Claus and the
Tooth Fairy, it is clear that he either didn't really believe
"The image inevitably and
of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'",
or he hadn't thought through the implications of his theory too well. And the same can be
said of his epigones, who have uncritically swallowed this view of perception
and knowledge.]
But, even if Lenin were right,
how does any of this show that motion without matter is inconceivable or "unthinkable"? Indeed, not only is motion without
matter conceivable, it is actual. Several examples of this everyday
phenomenon have been itemised later on in this
Essay.
Again,
the most this argument is
capable of
establishing is that the idea of motion and the idea of matter are
inseparable, or that the idea of motion without the idea of matter
is unthinkable, but then only for "materialist" and "matter" defined in Lenin's rather odd way.
Lenin had no way of breaking out of this Idealist circle.
However, Lenin has another argument up the image of his sleeve. After a detour
that took him into a consideration of
Bogdanov's ideas, he declared:
"Ostwald's
answer, which so pleased Bogdanov in 1899, is plain sophistry. Must our
judgments necessarily consist of electrons and ether? -- one might retort to
Ostwald. As a matter of fact, the mental elimination from 'nature' of matter as
the 'subject' only implies the tacit admission into philosophy of thought
as the 'subject' (i.e., as the primary, the starting point, independent
of matter). Not the subject, but the objective source of sensation is
eliminated, and sensation becomes the 'subject,' i.e.,
philosophy becomes
Berkeleian, no matter in what trappings the word 'sensation' is afterwards
decked. Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative
(materialism or idealism) by an indefinite use of the word 'energy,' but this
very endeavour only once again goes to prove the futility of such artifices. If
energy is motion, you have only shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the
predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the
question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place
outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas,
symbols, conventional signs, and so forth? And this question proved fatal to the
'energeticist' philosophy, that attempt [sic] to disguise old epistemological errors
by a 'new' terminology." [Ibid.,
p.324.]
This
amounts to arguing against 'energeticists' (i.e., those who claim that matter does not exist, or that
it is
simply energy) that they have merely:
"shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the
predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the
question, is energy material?" [Ibid.]
Well, if Lenin's words alone were sufficient, they would
settle the issue. Unfortunately, they aren't. So, what argument does he offer in support of his idiosyncratic
'translation' of "Does matter move?" into "Is energy material?"
Apparently none
at all -- or, none other than the following idiosyncratic re-definition of
"matter" (which he repeats endlessly
throughout MEC without once trying to justify it):
"The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation." [Ibid.,p.320.]
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with
whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Ibid.,
p.311.]
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically
implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human
mind and reflected by it." [Ibid.,
p.312.]
"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole
unconditional recognition of nature's existence outside the mind and
perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist
agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid.,
p.314. Italic emphases in the original.]
So, Lenin's only justification seems to be that to deny, or
reject, what he
or Engels asserts is to brand oneself an Idealist. However, since Lenin failed to show that
his own ideas (supposedly about reality, 'reflected in the mind', etc.) don't
collapse into Idealism themselves this is no help at all.
Exactly how Lenin's ideas collapse into Idealism will be examined
at length in Essay Thirteen Part One, but the argument will revolve around his only apparent argument
for the existence of the external world (which we examined briefly above):
that an image implies the existence
of the thing imaged!
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only
an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot
exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists
independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes
the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge."
[Ibid.,
p.69.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The image inevitably and
of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'"
[Ibid.,
p.279.]
But, as pointed out earlier, all that Lenin had to
rely on here was his own image of a mirror
-- assuming that this is what lay behind his use of this
ancientHermetic
metaphor. His knowledge of mirrors was his only guide when it came to using that figure of speech
-- i.e.,
the trope concerning 'reflection'. So, all he had were images of mirrors!
In which case, the most
this argument establishes is that images reflect other images!
Now, it could be argued that mirrors actually reflect the images
of objects, or they reflect objects themselves. This is undeniable; but
that response can only be maintained by those who reject Lenin's hopelessly confused epistemology,
who don't think that all we have available to us are images. That is because Lenin has yet to show that there
are real mirrors, as opposed to images of mirrors. Or, indeed, show that these images of mirrors
reflect objects as opposed to reflecting the images of images of 'objects'. His version of the traditional
representative theory of knowledge, whereby we represent the world to
ourselves (as 'ideas', 'concepts', 'images', or even 'representations') in our heads undercuts all
talk of an 'objective' world independent of our knowledge of it, as was
abundantly clear to
18th century Idealists
like Berkeley.
Now Lenin, and/or his apologists, might try to belittle, deny or repudiate that
line-of-argument, and then maybe kick up an image of
a cloud of dust (by
the use of the sort of repetitive bluster they learned from Lenin) to hide the fact that this image of Lenin's argument
doesn't work. But, to all but true believers it is plain that his
'theory' would transform the world into a set of images and, indeed, images of images.
And, as we will see below, it is no use Lenin, or one of his epigones, appealing
to the 'commonsense' ideas of ordinary folk to bail him out:
"Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of
its theory of knowledge." [Ibid.,
p.69.]
However, if we now to address Lenin's actual inference, images don't in
fact imply the
existence of anything, since they are 'uninterpreted inner objects of cognition'
(to use traditional jargon). And an act of interpretation (i.e., which re-configures such objects as the images of this, or of that) would have nothing but
still other images
(interpreted or not) to assist it to that end. And, as we will see in
Essay Ten, practice can't turn
an image into something it isn't.
Still
less is it any use arguing that the human race wouldn't
have survived had their images of the world not approximately, oreven
exactly, corresponded with the world (or at least local parts of it),
since all Lenin and his supporters have in their heads are images of humanity
surviving. Both have yet to show that their images of humanity
doing anything actually correspond with anything outside the image they
have inside their heads/brains. Whatever evidence
they produce will be no more than another set of images, given this
defective epistemology and even more ridiculous starting point. Lenin has given us
no way of producing anything other than these yet-to-be-authenticated-images.
After all, no image can authenticate itself or, indeed, validate another image.
In addition, we have
already seen that Lenin's
approach to knowledge implies extreme scepticism. Hence, far from beginning with
the "naive beliefs" of ordinary folk, his theory in fact obliterates them
and their beliefs! If we were to believe what he says, both would just
be 'images' in his head.
The rest of Lenin's 'argument' in this section of MEC adds little
to the above (as will become apparent in Essay Thirteen
Part One); in that case, Lenin
failed to demonstrate by argument or evidence that motion without matter is "unthinkable".
7.Of course, it is worth adding here that metaphysical theories aren't set in
concrete; they change and develop in accord with the rise and fall of each Mode
of Production, in line with the
ideological imperatives of each ruling elite, or those of any insurgent class
intent on replacing the old ruling elite -- or, indeed, in line with those of
these "prize fighters". [On this, see Shaw (1989).] Having said that, there is a common thread
running through each version of ruling-class Philosophy: the doctrine that Cosmic
Verities, valid for all of space and time, can be inferred from thought or language
alone.
To be sure, the very first Greek Philosophers didn't use the
word "metaphysics";
that term was introduced much later, by Aristotle. Nevertheless, the
various world-views on which Super-Knowledge like this feed certainly date back (in the
'West')
at least to Anaximander
and Anaximenes.
In the 'East',
of course, it stretches even further back. [More on that in Note I above, and
in Parts Two and Three of this Essay.]
8.These days 'necessary truths' tend to be defined
extensionally,
that is, they are said to be
true in every possible world [Kirkham (1992)]. That
rather odd idea will be examined
elsewhere at this site.
However, this isn't to suggest that all metaphysicians attached such modal
qualifications to the word "truth" -- certainly not pre-Leibniz. Hence, the use of the phrase "necessary truth" in these Essays (in
order to highlight the confusion that is alleged to exist between necessary and
contingent truths) is merely a handy way of underlining a common thread running
through the entire history of Metaphysics.
Clearly, some sensitivity needs to be shown when
analysing the metaphysical ideas of thinkers who wrote before this phrase
entered philosophical currency. Having said that, it is the use to which
a theorist puts his/her ideas that is important. If that use is no different from
the employment of genuinely necessary truths (as these have been conceived more recently), no serious distortion of
the original ideas need result.
On this, see the extended comments in "Grammar and Necessity" in
Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.263-347. Much that these two authors have to say is
consistent with the view adopted at this site -- but that work of theirs should be read in the light of
other references given below, particularly the work of David Bloor and
Martin Kusch. Nevertheless, it greatly extends and amplifies the comments made
about that topic in this Essay.
9.The
ease with which all metaphysicians perform this trick (i.e., deriving necessary truths
from a handful of words) isn't the only clue we
have about the real nature of the dogmatic theories Traditional Philosophers
conjure out of less than thin air. A detailed consideration of different
interpretations of the words used -- coupled with a demonstration that there are
other ways of viewing them (which are equally,
if not more, plausible) -- shows that metaphysical theories depend on little
other than a grim determination to use language in odd ways and/or
distort it.
Hence, it is possible to show that these 'Super-Truths' decay into incoherence
because they:
(a) Undermine key semantic features of discourse; and,
(b) Are based on a highly specialised,
limited, distorted or implausible use of language.
In which case, they can't be reflections of the 'necessary' or 'essential' features of
this universe
(or, indeed, of any universe). Far from depicting the 'logical
or essential form
of the world', they either express, or depend on, identifiable ruling-class
assumptions about the sort of universe that is conducive to their interests,
their determination to maintain power and reproduce contemporaneous relations of exploitation, or
they reflect
their inventor's determination to use language
idiosyncratically.
[These contentions will be substantiated in the next two Parts
of Essay Twelve; the other allegations will be substantiated in the later
Parts of the same
Essay.]
It
could be argued that the philosophical language is legitimate in itself, and
shouldn't be beholden to ordinary usage.
In response, the reader is referred back to
Glock's comments above, as well as
the following -- even though these words were largely aimed at Cognitive Scientists
and the analogy they draw is with
computers, they still in general apply to the point at issue:
"As
to the widespread disparagement of attempts to
resolve philosophical problems by way of appeals to 'what we would ordinarily
say', we would proffer the following comment. It often appears that those who
engage in such disparaging nonetheless themselves often do what they
programmatically disparage, for it seems to us at least arguable that many of
the central philosophical questions are in fact, and despite protestations to
the contrary, being argued about in terms of appeals (albeit often inept) to
'what we would ordinarily say...'. That the main issues of contemporary
philosophy of mind are essentially about language (in the sense that they
arise from and struggle with confusions over the meanings of ordinary words) is
a position which, we insist, can still reasonably be proposed and defended. We
shall claim here that most, if not all, of the conundrums, controversies and
challenges of the philosophy of mind in the late twentieth century consist in a
collectively assertive, although bewildered, attitude toward such ordinary
linguistic terms as 'mind' itself, 'consciousness', 'thought', 'belief',
'intention' and so on, and that the problems which are posed are ones which
characteristically are of the form which ask what we should say if
confronted with certain facts, as described....
"We have absolutely nothing
against the coining of new, technical uses [of words], as we have said. Rather,
the issue is that many of those who insist upon speaking of machines' 'thinking'
and 'understanding' do not intend in the least to be coining new, restrictively
technical, uses for these terms. It is not, for example, that they have decided
to call a new kind of machine an 'understanding machine', where the word
'understanding' now means something different from what we ordinarily mean by
that word. On the contrary, the philosophical cachet derives entirely from their
insisting that they are using the words 'thinking' and 'understanding' in the
same sense that we ordinarily use them. The aim is quite
characteristically to provoke, challenge and confront the rest of us. Their
objective is to contradict something that the rest of us believe. What the 'rest
of us' believe is simply this: thinking and understanding is something
distinctive to human beings..., and that these capacities set us apart from the
merely mechanical.... The argument that a machine can think or understand,
therefore, is of interest precisely because it features a use of the words
'think' and 'understand' which is intendedly the same as the ordinary use.
Otherwise, the sense of challenge and, consequently, of interest would
evaporate.... If engineers were to make 'understand' and 'think' into technical
terms, ones with special, technical meanings different and distinct from
those we ordinarily take them to have, then, of course, their claims to have
built machines which think or understand would have no bearing whatsoever upon
our inclination ordinarily to say that, in the ordinary sense, machines do not
think or understand." [Button, et al (1995), pp.12, 20-21. Italic
emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
Hence, if philosophers use, for example, the word "knowledge" in
an attempt to inform us what knowledge really is, but their use bears no
relation to how that word is normally employed, then what they have to say will
relate to 'knowledge', not knowledge, leaving the 'philosophical problem' of knowledge unaffected. [On that, see also Baz (2012)
and Coulter and Sharrock (2007).]
9a. Some might object
at this point and counter-claim that this emphasis on evidence, confirmation
and proof shows that the present author is indeed a
positivist,
or at least an
empiricist. Neitheris the case. The present author is merely
holding DM-theorists to their word:
"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]
"All
three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought:
the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being;
the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of
his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures
as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake
lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of
thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and
often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be
arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the
product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954),
p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment.
"Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the
dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin
Hegelians of the older and younger line." [Ibid.,
p.47. Bold emphases alone
added.]
"The general results of the investigation of the world are
obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points
of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in
one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the
world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every
species of materialism hitherto existing.... As Dühring proceeds from
'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one
only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they
appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one
can only read something into them...." [Marx and Engels (1987), Volume
25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator from
painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]
"Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the
Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be
applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics
cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their
nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973),
p.233.
Bold emphasis added.]
The above source renders this passage slightly
differently, though:
"Dialectics and materialism comprise the basic elements of
the Marxist cognition of the world. But this by no means implies that they can
be applied in any field of knowledge like an ever-ready master-key. The
dialectic cannot be imposed on facts, it must be derived from the facts, from
their nature and their development." [Ibid.
Bold added.]
"Whenever any Marxist attempted to transmute the
theory of Marx into a universal master key and ignore all other spheres of
learning, Vladimir Ilyich would rebuke him with the expressive phrase
'Komchvanstvo' ('communist swagger')." [Ibid.,
p.221.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphases added.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay
claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint
which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they
are…without disguises and without fantasy….
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added.]
"[The laws of dialectics] are not, as Marx and
Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult empirical task of
tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key
whose only advantage is to turn up when no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998), p.9. Bold emphasis added.]
"'[The dialectic is not a] magic master key for
all questions.' The dialectic is not a calculator into which it is possible to
punch the problem and allow it to compute the solution. This would be an
idealist method. A materialist dialectic must grow from a patient,
empirical examination of the facts and not be imposed on them…."
[Ibid., p.271. Bold emphases added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
If this means I'm an empiricist/positivist,
then so was Marx:
"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones,
not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material
conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing
and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in
a purely empirical way....
"The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are
productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and
political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance
bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the
connection of the social and political structure with production. The social
structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of
definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or
other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate,
produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits,
presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." [Marx
and Engels (1970), pp.42, 46-47. Bold emphases added.]
Was Engels an
empiricist/positivist when he wrote the following?
"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment." [Engels
(1954),p.47. Bold emphases alone
added.]
9b. On the
ruling-class origin of the ideas promoted by DM-theorists, see Essay Nine Part
Two,
here.
10.These allegations will also be
substantiated in later parts of Essay Twelve, as well as Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).
However, it is important to
register the following caveat (added to
Essay Nine Part One):
Having said that, it needs stressing up-front that it isn't being maintained here that leading
revolutionaries adopted ruling-class ideas duplicitously or
willingly. What is being alleged is that they did this
unwittingly. Exactly how and why they did so will be revealed in
Part Two.
11.The word "can't" isn't meant to suggest a physical limit, here. It expresses
the fact that metaphysical theories soon descend into incoherent non-sense and can't fail to do
so. That is because, by means of them, their inventors attempt to transcend the expressive limitations of
language. [More on that below; see also Note 9.]
11a0.
It is worth pointing out that at this site "non-sense"
is not the same as "nonsense". The latter term
has various meanings ranging from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a
shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$
6y3n3& 8FT34n").
"Non-sense", as this word is being used here, characterises indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of
expressing a sense no matter what we try to do with them. ["Sense" is
explained below.] That is, such sentences are
incapable of being true and they are incapable of being false. In
Metaphysics, as we have seen,
the indicative or fact-stating mood is plainly being mis-used, mis-applied or
misconstrued. So, when
sentences like these
are employed to state supposedly 'fundamental truths about reality', they badly misfire
since they can't possibly do that. [Later sections of this Essay will explain why that is so.]
Hence, non-sensical sentences as such are neither patently false nor plain
gibberish. [However, there are different sorts of non-sense. More about that later.]
Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the
following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case for the
proposition in question to be true or what we understand to be the case for the
proposition in question to be false, even if we don't know whether it is
actually true or whether it is actually false -- and may never do so or even wish
to do so.
T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.
For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair is, and that
Das Kapital is a book that is capable of being owned) will understand T1 upon hearing or reading it.
They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what (certain parts of) the
world would have to be like for it to be true and what (certain parts of) the
world would have to be like for it to be false.
More importantly, the same situation that makes T1 true (if it obtains)
will make T1 false
(if it does not obtain).
These conditions are integral to our capacity
to understand empirical propositions before we know whether they are true
or before we know whether they are false. Indeed, they explain how
and why we know what to look for (or what to expect) in order to show,
ascertain or
recognise that such propositions are true, or in order to show, ascertain or
recognise that they are false
--
again, even if we never succeed or even wish to succeed in doing either.
[Alternatively, if we didn't know
such things (implicitly or explicitly), that
would indicate we didn't actually understand T1.]
11b.
Conversely, it could be argued that this shows B1 is false. That
possibility will be tackled presently.
B1: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
11c. This apparently clear distinction has
been challenged several tomes. On this, see, for example, Moore (1986).
12.However, if 'thought itself' is to be linked with the motion of matter -- at
however deep or complex a level it is deemed to take place -- then the second of these sentences (i.e., "This could be true even
if no matter was in fact relocated in the process") would plainly be incorrect. Anyway,
such a theory (about 'thought' and matter) seems to depend on the truth of
reductive materialism, a doctrine Lenin would certainly have
rejected.
M11: His thoughts moved to a new topic.
But, even if M11 were contestable on other
grounds, it wouldn't be difficult to think of other examples that aren't so easily dismissed. Consider, therefore,
the following:
E1: The author moved his characters to a new
location.
E2: The date of the
Battle of Hastings
moves
further into the past each year.
E3: You say you will mend the fence, but that job
seems to move further into the future by the day.
E4: Easter moves to a new date every year.
E5: The
Prime Meridian
moves with the rotation of
the earth.
E6: Multiplying –2 by –3 moves it from the set of
Negative Integers
to the set of Positive Integers (= 6), even while all three remain
in the set of
Real Numbers.
E7: The disqualification of Leaping Lena in the
3.30 at
Belmont moved
Mugwump into first place.
E8: The back of the
Necker Cube
moves to the
front (and vice versa) depending on how you view it.
E9: The result of the strike ballot moved the
question of tactics to the top of the agenda.
E10: The chairperson moved to strike the
objection from the record.
The above senses of "move" cannot easily be reconciled with
Lenin's ideas about matter and motion.
[Many more examples like this
were given in Essay
Five. See also Note 13, below.]
To be sure, some might want to dismiss one or more of the above
examples (and, indeed, those in Essay Five) by refining Lenin's 'definition' of matter,
or even of motion -- in tandem with the use of a several other (ad hoc) dodges, perhaps.
Alternatively, still others might point out that these examples employ the word
"move" in different senses to the one intended by Lenin. But, even if
that were so, it still wouldn't mean Lenin's construal was the correct way --
or, indeed, the only way -- to use this word. Clearly, what Lenin actually
meant by "motion" (that is, if he did mean anything by it!)
must be ascertained before a decision can be made either way. However, Lenin's
intentions aren't at all easy to fathom; in fact, it is difficult to make head or tail of
much that Lenin's has to say
in this area, or even throughout MEC, as will be demonstrated in the main body of this Essay
and Essay
Thirteen Part One.
If further exception is still taken to the counter-examples given above
(which, incidentally illustrate perfectly ordinary uses of the word "move" and its
cognates), then that would amount to finding fault with ordinary language,
not with the present author or even with the examples given. And we
have
already seen the
serious problems
that
that would entail for anyone foolish enough to do that.
Indeed, these examples represent a much wider
and representative selection of
the use
of "move" than is generally the case in the scribblings of Idealists and
metaphysicians (and that includes Lenin). As seems clear, they show how ordinary human beings regularly
employ this word (and others related to it)
in their interface with the world and with one another, in ways undreamt of in
and by
Traditional Thought.
Whatever else Lenin might have imagined he
meant by his use of the words "motion"/"move", it is clear that ordinary speakers do not
employ them this way, and neither do scientists. The use of this word by everyday materialists -- i.e.,
workers --
is
surely a better and more reliable guide to its overall connotations than is that of
inconsistent materialists
and closet Idealists -- i.e., dialecticians. If Lenin's employment of
this word diverges from its materially-grounded use in everyday life, then so much the
worse for him and anyone who agrees with him.
However, it could be countered that it is perfectly clear what
Lenin intended; he was
alluding to the physical or literal meaning of the word "move" -- i.e.,
connected with locomotion and "change of place", studied by the physical sciences and
applied mathematics.
Hence, the above anti-DM considerations are
irrelevant.
Or
so it could be claimed...
In
response, it is worth noting that the alleged physical sense of "move"
(interpreted as "change of place") isn't without its own problems. Since
that was discussed in detail in
Essay Five, the
reader is referred there for further details.
Moreover, we have already seen Lenin speak about the movement of thought:
"Let us imagine a consistent idealist
who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take
'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical
idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that
the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas,
sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject
and regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his
ideas come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' --
and that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of
thinking. And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the
solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view. The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
Lenin
here speaks about "the movement of ideas" and the "motion of...thoughts, ideas,
sensations". He can't have meant "change of place" by this use of "move"/"motion"!
So, if Lenin is allowed to employ a
(slightly) wider use of "motion" (and/or its cognates), DM-fans can hardly complain
when that tactic is adopted by those who don't accept DM.
Independently of this,
it is easy to show that Lenin is entirely unclear what he meant by "move" (and/or its
cognates), just as he was unclear about "matter" -- on that, see
here and
Note One.
Finally, since many of the above examples relate to events that take place,
or might take place,
outside the mind, they clearly relate to material movement, as defined by
Lenin. If they are unacceptable, then the problem
lies with Lenin's characterisation of matter and motion, not with these examples.
M12: The occurrence of literal motion without matter can never be thought of as true.
Which appears to imply, or be implied by, the following:
M13: Literal motion without
matter can never take place.
The
use of that word is deliberate because M12 could be true while M13 is false (which means that M13 can't follow from M12).
On the other hand, M13 could follow from M12 if an extra
Idealist (perhaps even suppressed) premiss were added, namely:
M12a: Thought determines the
nature of reality.
Since it is central to my case against DM that its theorists
(covertly) accept M12a (on that, see Essays Two
and Thirteen
Part One), then, at least for them, M13 would follow from M12
(via M12a).
[The
reverse implication, too, is problematic, for M13 could be true and M12 false.
However, that invalid inference is less relevant to the aims of this Essay and
will be ignored.]
13.Another example of the indirect
connection of motion with matter is the following:
E11: The shadow moved across the surface of
water.
Even though something material would have to move for the shadow
itself to move, the latter's motion is clearly non-material, and depends on the
absence of matter (i.e., light).
Other examples include the following:
E12: The surface of the water moved in the
breeze.
E13: The hole in the crowd moved from right to
left.
Surfaces are rather puzzling; no one seems to be sure
whether they are material or not. [Cf., Stroll (1988).] Few doubt they can move.
The same goes for shapes, holes, corners, boundaries and edges [Cf., Casati and
Varzi (1995, 1999,
2023), and Varzi (1997,
2023)], all of which can move (indeed, some
do; e.g., Mexican
Waves).
The same applies to reflections and shadows. [On reflections and shadows, see Sorensen (2003,
2008). On shapes, see Bennett (2012).]
Hence, not only is motion without matter conceivable, it is
actual, as many of the above show.
[This forms part of Note 17.
However, I
have covered this topic in much greater detail
here.]
Marx's belief in the social nature of language, and the
fundamental role it plays in communication (not representation), is confirmed by the following
passages:
"The production of ideas, of conceptions, of
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and
the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving,
thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct
efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as
expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics,
etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. --
real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its
furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious
existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all
ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical
life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical
life-process. [Marx
and Engels (1970),
p.47. Bold emphasis added.]
"Only now, after having
considered four moments, four aspects of the primary historical relationships,
do we find that man also possesses 'consciousness,' but, even so, not inherent,
not 'pure' consciousness. From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the
curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the
form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as
old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for
other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well;
language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of
intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me:
the animal does not enter into 'relations' with anything, it does not enter into
any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist
as a relation.Consciousness is, therefore, from the very
beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.
Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the
immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with
other persons and things outside the individual who is growing
self-conscious.... On the other hand, man's consciousness of the necessity of
associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the
consciousness that he is living in society at all...." [Ibid., pp.50-51. Bold emphases added.]
"One of the most difficult tasks confronting
philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as
philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to
make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical
language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The
problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned
into the problem of descending from language to life.
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an
independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations
of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive,
systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and
philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence
of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a
consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The
philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The object before us, to begin with,
material production.
"Individuals producing in Society -- hence
socially determined individual production -- is, of course, the point of
departure. The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom
Smith and
Ricardo
begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century
Robinsonades, which in no way express merely a reaction against
over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural
historians imagine. As little as
Rousseau's contrat social, which brings naturally independent,
autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract, rests on such
naturalism. This is the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the
Robinsonades, great and small. It is, rather, the anticipation of 'civil
society', in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides
towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition, the
individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier
historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human
conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of
the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century
individual -- the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of
society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the
sixteenth century -- appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the
past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the
Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising
historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new
epoch to this day.
Steuart avoided this simple-mindedness because as an aristocrat and in
antithesis to the eighteenth century, he had in some respects a more historical
footing.
"The more deeply we go back into history, the
more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as
dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the
family and in the family expanded into the clan [Stamm]; then later in
the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions
of the clan. Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various
forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards
his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this
standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the
hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations. The
human being is in the most literal sense a
Zwon politikon not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which
can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an
isolated individual outside society -- a rare exception which may well occur
when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically
present is cast by accident into the wilderness -- is as much of an absurdity as
is the development of language without individuals living together and
talking to each other. There is no point in dwelling on this any longer. The
point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle, which had sense and reason
for the eighteenth-century characters, had not been earnestly pulled back into
the centre of the most modern economics by
Bastiat,
Carey,
Proudhon
etc. Of course it is a convenience for Proudhon et al. to be able
to give a historico-philosophic account of the source of an economic relation,
of whose historic origins he is ignorant, by inventing the myth that Adam or
Prometheus
stumbled on the idea ready-made, and then it was adopted, etc. Nothing is more
dry and boring than the fantasies of a
locus communis." [Marx
(1973), pp.83-85. Bold emphasis added.]
"The main point here is this:
In all these forms -- in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of
the economic order, and where the economic aim is hence the production of use
values, i.e., the reproduction of the individual within the specific
relation to the commune in which he is its basis -- there is to be found: (1)
Appropriation not through labour, but presupposed to labour; appropriation of
the natural conditions of labour, of the earth as the original
instrument of labour as well as its workshop and repository of raw materials.
The individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being
his; [relates] to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the
latter realizes itself; the chief objective condition of labour does not itself
appear as a product of labour, but is already there as nature;
on one side the living individual, on the other the earth, as the objective
condition of his reproduction; (2) but this relation to land and soil,
to the earth, as the property of the labouring individual -- who thus appears
from the outset not merely as labouring individual, in this abstraction, but who
has an objective mode of existence in his ownership of the land, an
existence presupposed to his activity, and not merely as a result of
it, a presupposition of his activity just like his skin, his sense organs, which
of course he also reproduces and develops etc. in the life process, but which
are nevertheless presuppositions of this process of his reproduction -- is
instantly mediated by the naturally arisen, spontaneous, more or less
historically developed and modified presence of the individual as member of
a commune -- his naturally arisen presence as member of a tribe etc. An
isolated individual could no more have property in land and soil than he could
speak. He could, of course, live off it as substance, as do the animals. The
relation to the earth as property is always mediated through the occupation of
the land and soil, peacefully or violently, by the tribe, the commune, in some
more or less naturally arisen or already historically developed form. The
individual can never appear here in the dot-like isolation...in which he appears
as mere free worker." [Ibid.,
p.485. Bold emphasis added.]
[This
anticipates Wittgenstein, except, he would have questioned this particular use of
"consciousness".]
Here, too, is Engels:
"Much more important is the direct, demonstrable
influence of the development of the hand on the rest of the organism. It has
already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously
impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from
non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the
development of the hand, with labour, and widened man's horizon at every new
advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in
natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily
helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of
mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this
joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the
point where they had something to say to each other.... First labour, after it and then with it
speech -- these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of
which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all
its similarity is far larger and more perfect...." [Engels (1876),
pp.356-57. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
[I defend a particular interpretation of this
general idea in Essay Thirteen Part
Three.]
This
isn't to suggest that Marx and Wittgenstein would have seen eye-to-eye (quite
the reverse, in fact), or that Marx was a proto-Wittgenstein -- far from
it. However, as I have argued
here and
here, anyone who concludes the
contrary faces serious difficulties over interpretation, at the very least.
Having said that, there are clear indications that
Wittgenstein adopted his 'anthropological' approach to language as a result of
long conversations with
Piero Sraffa,
a
noted Marxist, and
because of his clear sympathies with the left. [More details
can be found here.]
So, far from Marx being a proto-Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein is, in
some (limited)respects, a latter-day Marx. In fact, in many ways, Wittgenstein
stands to Marx as
Feuerbach did to Hegel. [I hope to defend that particular analogy in a later
Essay.However, see
here.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
17a.
The comments at this point in the main body of this Essay do not, of course,
imply that these conventions are set in stone. Many have changed over the
millennia
while some
plainly have not and cannot. [I have covered some of the latter
considerations in
Essay Five.]
18a.
It could be
objected that Voloshinov's work is a clear exception to these sweeping
allegations. That
objection has been neutralised in Essay Thirteen
Part Three, Sections (4)-(6).
"The prevailing conception of meaning, is, importantly,
representational, or, as it has sometimes been put, 'descriptivist'. Those
who adhere to it would not deny, of course, that we do any number of things with
words other than describing, asserting, stating, or
otherwise representing things as being one way or another. Nonetheless, they
would insist (and presuppose in their theories and arguments) that the
representational function of language is somehow primary and fundamental to it,
and that there is in every (philosophically interesting) case a representational
('semantic') element to speech and thought -- an indicative core, as
Davidson
puts it (1979/2001, p.121) -- that may, and should, theoretically be separated
from the rest of what is involved in speaking or thinking....
"The prevailing assumption is that our words, and hence
their meanings, ought first and foremost to enable us to form representations of
things and the ways they stand -- to 'capture the world', as
Horwich
tellingly puts it (2005, p.v) -- and only as such may be usable
for doing things other than, or beyond, representing. This is taken to be true
not just of words such as 'Gödel', 'cat', 'water' and 'red', but also of
philosophically troublesome words such as 'know', 'think', 'believe', 'see',
'seems', 'looks', 'good', 'reason', 'will', 'world', 'part', 'cause', 'free',
'voluntary', 'intention', 'soul, 'mind', 'pain', 'meaning', and so on.... What
makes these words fit for this function, it is further presupposed, is their
power to 'refer to' or 'denote' or 'pick out' some particular relation that
sometimes holds between knowers and facts, or propositions...." [Baz (2012),
pp.17-19. Bold emphases alone added; referencing conventions
altered to conform with those adopted at this site.]
[While I agree with much of what Baz says in the above work, in some
cases I think he pushes his ideas a little too far, and certainly
beyond anything Wittgenstein himself would have envisaged. Not that that is decisive in
itself; but, in so far as Baz is trying to defend Wittgenstein, that
observation is
nevertheless apposite.]
[Added
on Edit: The above site is now all but defunct, so I have republished
that summary in Essay Three Part Two,
here. Material
that used to be here has now been moved to
the main body of the Essay.]
"Man is born free; and everywhere he is in
chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater
slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it
legitimate? That question I think I can answer." [Rousseau
(1952), p.3.]
Dialecticians, it seems, have
also accepted
Bourgeois Individualist theories of meaning,
which have loosely been grafted onto
a social theory of
language and 'consciousness'. As Meredith Williams commented on
Vygotsky's ideas
(a theorist whose work is highly influential among DM-fans):
"Vygotsky attempts to combine a social theory of
cognition development with an individualistic account of word-meaning.... [But]
the social theory of development can only succeed if it is combined with a
social theory of meaning." [Williams (1999b), p.275.]
Alas, Williams could in fact be talking about
any randomly-selected
Dialectical
Marxist who has written on this subject.
[I examine
several of the most important of the latter in Essay Thirteen
Part Three, sections (4)-(6).]
21.
In fact,
disappointingly few
Marxists have commented on language in any detail
or to any depth. Those that have at least made moves in that direction
unfortunately also
tend to undermine, denigrate or depreciate ordinary language. Either that or
they make all the usual mistakes, implying that they, too, accept the idea that language is primarily
representational.
[The above allegations will be substantiated in Essays Twelve Part Seven and Thirteen Part
Three. They were also covered in Essays Three
Part Two,
and Four Part One.]
Independently of this it is important to note that
Conventionalism is
itself
highly complex and comprised of a set of widely differing strands.
Having said that, what unites modern and classical versions of that approach to
language is a
determination to invent or derive a priori theories about the nature of
both discourse and science, which is in turn based on certain interpretations of
the supposed meanings of certain
words. Such theories won't be defended in this Essay -- or anywhere else for
that matter. [Nor will these somewhat controversial claims.]
Despite
this, there are grammatical features of
language (which Conventionalists mistakenly misconstrue as (empirical) facts about language
and the world (etc.)) that underpin the
anthropological approach to discourse that has been adopted at this site --
that is, as a
"form of representation" not as a philosophical theory'
Those features are also compatible with the claim that language is conventional
(in a suitably qualified sense).
[There is more on that below, the rest
of Essay Twelve and Essay Thirteen Parts Two and
Three.]
Unfortunately, there are
also few comprehensive -- let alone convincing -- Marxist analyses of
Science, despite the fact that revolutionaries in general have a such high
regard for that entire discipline.
However, Robinson (2003) contains one of the best
(currently) available Marxist accounts of science (see also his
unpublished essays, which have been
posted at this site).
Also see Miller (1987).
While Science itself has advanced dramatically since Engels's day,
accounts of it written by Dialectical Marxists have largely stood still, and
that is especially true of the last
fifty or sixty years. DM-theorists have obviously been more intent on
rehashing tired old ideas lifted from the 'dialectical classics' than they
have been with keeping
abreast of current developments in the History and Philosophy of Science (which
has itself undergone something of a revolution since
Kuhn (1962) was
published. [This links to a PDF of the Second Edition.]
Two
of the more recent attempts to squeeze scientific knowledge into a dialectical
boot it won't fit are
RIRE and
Mason (2012) -- which are in effect
just padded-out and 'beefed-up versions' of Baghavan (1987) and shorter (but
much less
hagiographical) versions of Gollobin (1986). Indeed, all four read like
notorious
Creationist
attempts to make The Book of Genesis
seem consistent with modern science. Another recent example in that direction is
Malek (2011). [Malek is a retired scientist and, despite his rather odd devotion to DM, some of
his comments about
the Idealist implications of modern science are well observed.]
[Readers should check out the desperate debating
tactics adopted in defence of DM over at the
Soviet Empire Forum and the
Guardian Science blogs recently where a comrade who writes and argues
like Malek operates under the pseudonyms
"Future World" and "Futurehuman", respectively. It should be
noted, however, that the latter of these individuals has denied he is identical with the former!
Incidentally, I am not 'outing' ("doxing") a fellow comrade here; Malek has openly acknowledged
he is 'Futurehuman' in The Guardian comment section.]
To compound the problem, there have been even fewer
attempts to understand the History of Science from an overtly revolutionary
perspective. Phil Gasper's review back in the 1990s only serves to underline this
easily confirmed fact. [Gasper
(1998).] However, much of what Gasper has to say is itself excellent
and well worth reading
for its own sake.
Classical Marxist histories of science are by now
badly dated. Even when new they tended to adopt an a priori and somewhat
'Whiggish' approach to
the subject, dominated by the constant repetition of familiar DM-clichés.
Regrettably, that observation also applies to
Boris Hessen's classic study of
the social dimension of Newton's work [Hessen (1971)
-- this links to a PDF]. Despite its obvious
strengths, and in spite of the fact that Hessen was working under intolerable
pressure at the time, this work of his is far too insubstantial to count as a
substantial contribution
either to history or to theory. No doubt had the author lived he would have developed,
justified and
substantiated many of his more controversial ideas. Unfortunately, however, in the intervening years little extra
evidence or argument has emerged in support of his main thesis. As if to compound matters, Hessen's
study is
fatally
compromised by his reliance on far too many of Engels erroneous ideas
in this area. [Cf., Graham (1985); and Clark (1970).]
Bernal's classic work is more closely tied to the actual
development of science, but even here the author is ideologically biased toward
Stalinism.
On this, see Bernal (1939, 1969). [Cf., also Ravetz (1981),
and Swann and Aprahamian (1999).
On Bernal's life and his Stalinist bias, see Brown (2005).]
Excellent (left wing) historical work includes the following: Farrington (1939, 1974a,
1947b,
2000), the
classic analyses in
Caudwell
(1949, 1977),
Zilsel (2000)
and
Needham (1951a, 1951b, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1979), and, of course,
Needham (1954-2004).
A recent minor classic, however, is Conner (2005), which I cannot praise
too highly.
Other works written from a Marxist
perspective (but
surprisingly ignored by Gasper) are rather more successful, though. Among these are
Freudenthal (1986) and Swetz (1987). [Cf., also Høyrup (1994).] Also omitted:
are: Albury and Schwartz (1982), Easlea (1973, 1980), J. Jacob (1988), M. Jacob
(1976, 1988, 2000, 2006a, 2006b), Krige (1980), and Mason (1962). Of course,
several of the latter were published after Gasper's article was
written!
However, by far
and away the best work in this area is Hadden (1988, 1994),
which developed ideas originally aired in
Borkenau (1987), Grossmann (1987) and Sohn-Rethel (1978) -- alas, also omitted from
Gasper's review. Hadden's book
should, however, be studied in conjunction with Kaye (1998).
Also, since writing much of the above, I have had the pleasure of
reading Lerner (1992). Lerner is clearly a Marxist or has been heavily
influenced by Marxism. Whatever one thinks of his
criticism of the BBT,
his analysis of science, as far as it goes, is excellent.
[BBT = Big Bang Theory; RIRE = Reason In
Revolt; i.e., Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]
A 'Marxist' book that readers should
read with caution, though, is
Gillott and
Kumar (1995). Its authors are in fact ideologues of the old UK-RCP -- the remnants of which, over
at Spiked, now pass
themselves off as supporters of unfettered free market capitalism and shills for
Big Capital! The reason for claiming that can be found,
for example,
here,
here,
here and
here. [The last link is now dead since the host site had been subjected
to numerous hack attacks of a rather
suspicious nature (that link is also now dead!) -- plainly because
it is one of the best resources
on the Internet that exposes the
GM industry.]
As
noted above, recent addition to the literature is
Mason (2012),
which is devoted to criticising some of the core ideas aired in RIRE, from a
'dialectical' angle. Parts of this book are excellent, but much of it is highly repetitive and, where it
discusses DM, recklessly naive. On that, see
here.
Incidentally, Gasper's account is itself
compromised as much by his uncritical acceptance of DM as it is by its extreme
philosophicalbrevity --, which is puzzling given his
professional expertise
in this area. For example, while he rejects "social constructivism", he does
so on the basis of a few rather dismissive, all-too-brief remarks, neglecting to
substantiate what he asserts with argument or evidence. In marked contrast, Gasper seems quite happy to
accept what Engels and Lenin (etc.) had to say about science with scarcely a
blink, when what they wrote was supported by evidence, analysis and
argument that is considerably
thinner and weaker than anything that can be found in the work of even the most feeble-minded and
superficial of social
constructivists.
Another book widely respected
and referenced among revolutionaries
is Helena Sheehan's badly mis-titled work: Marxism and the Philosophy of Science
[Sheehan (1993)]. It is mis-titled for the simple reason that readers will search long and
hard (and to no avail) for anything even remotely resembling the Philosophy of
Science -- or even a Marxist perspective on that discipline! What they will find instead, however, is an excellent but no
less depressing and detailed account of what
various DM-apologists imagined was/wasn't the relation between Marxism and
science, among many other seemingly irrelevant topics. Unfortunately, the vast majority of those
tedious, obsolete ideas, disputes and opinions now only possess
curiosity value, of sole interest to antiquarians and die-hard DM-fans, but few
others. Even in their heyday, those moribund arguments, quarrels and
theories were seldom less than dogmatic, motivated more often than not by
sectarian in-fighting and point-scoring than
they were by a genuine search
for the truth. Alas, that frame-or-mind
still dominates much of Dialectical
Marxism.
In spite of
this, it turns out that Sheehan's book is (inadvertently) valuable in other
respects since it exposes the monumentalwaste of timeand energy
DM-fans have devoted to a 'theory' which few have managed to advance much beyond
Engels's amateurish first attempt and Lenin's descent into Subjective Idealism
(exposed in Essay Thirteen Part One).
To that end it contains
page-after-page of incriminating evidence that reveals the
extent to which this 'theory' has helped
cripple and even ruin Marxist theory
in this area as
some of our very best minds have attempted to grapple with the incomprehensible
gobbledygook Hegel inflicted on humanity, which wasn't, I
take it, part of Sheehan's original intention.
These rather depressing conclusions
have been further amplified by the following studies
of the 'unfortunate' relationship between Stalinised Marxism and post-1920
science (typified by the work of
Lysenko): Birstein
(2001), Graham (1971, 1987, 1993), Joravsky (1961, 1970), Kojevnikov (2004), Krementsov (1997),
Lecourt (1977)
[this links to a PDF],
Medvedev (1969),
Soyfer (1994), and Vucinich (1980, 2001).
For a different perspective, see Lewontin and Levins (1976). [I have said much more
about this dark period in the development and degeneration of Soviet Science in Essay Four
Part One.]
In passing, it is worth noting
that Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin's two books
on science -- i.e., Levins and Lewontin (1985) and Lewontin and
Levins (2007) -- are excellent, but only where they steer clear of
'dialectics'.
There are countless books
and articles that focus on Marxism and science written by
Stalinists but few are worthy of mention. Interested readers are referred to the
sources listed above, as well as to Helena Sheehan's work for more
details. However, the following three books by the same author are worthy of note: Omelyanovsky (1974, 1978, 1979).
Other sources I have found useful
over the years are: Gregory (1977), Little (1986), Railton
(1991), Thomas (1976), Wartofsky (1968, 1979) and Young (1990). Special mention,
however, should once again be made of Caudwell (1949,
1977), whose brilliant insights are only slightly ruined by the author's vain attempt to
defend DM. I have in fact developed several of his ideas at this site.
Nevertheless, easily the best general book on the
Philosophy of Science
written from a Marxist perspective is Miller (1987) -- mention of which was also
omitted from Gasper's article. [But, not from Gasper (1990).] Another important
Marxist author is Richard Boyd; cf., Boyd (1989, 1991, 1993, 1996).
John Dupré's
work has also been composed from a quasi-Marxist angle -- i.e., Dupré
(1993, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2012), and Barnes and Dupré (2008).
22.The
author ofTAR,
John Rees, clearly rejects Conventionalism, but
unfortunately he failed to explain why (cf., Rees (1998), p.297). In
MEC, Lenin
made a characteristically weak gesture at refuting a handful of conventionalist interpretations of
science that were current in his day, but, as noted in Essay Thirteen
Part One, to
call what he had to say in this area a joke would be to praise them a little too
highly.
Lenin almost invariably confronted each and every opinion he disliked with
a neurotic repetition of the following mantra:
"[T]he concept of matter…epistemologically
implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human
mind and reflected by it." [Lenin (1972), p.312.
A list of over forty passages in MEC
like the above has been posted
here.]
As things
turned out, Lenin's timing was rather unfortunate, for a few lines
later he posed this question:
"Do electrons, ether and so on exist
as objective realities outside the human mind or not…? [S]cientists…answer
[this] in the
affirmative." [Ibid.,
p.312.]
But, what was so objective about the
Ether
that failed to prevent its subsequent fall from scientific grace?
Clearly, the
problem with what can only be described as 'revisionary realism' that Lenin
promoted in MEC is that it
is regularly left with having to explain how such 'objective entities' suddenly vanish from the universe and
thereby become
'non-objective'. Even worse is having to explain precisely what scientists were talking about before these
'ontological deletions'
took place. [I will say more about that in Essay Thirteen Parts
One and Two.]
Nevertheless, in defence of Lenin it is worth pointing out that
there still are scientists who still believe that the Ether exists in some form
or other. On that,
readers might like to consult
this website (and follow the links there). See also Essay Eleven
Part One, where the
opinions of several leading scientists on this mysterious 'entity' (including
the views of Einstein himself) have been quoted or referenced.
Despite this, DM-theorists can take little comfort from the inability of
prominent Physicists to make their minds up over such a basic issue. That is
because it is quite clear that the changing concept of the Ether can't be
attributed to the
development of greater and greater abstractions --, i.e., those that have
been applied to, or derived from, nature. If that had ever been the case,
the Ether would hardly keep disappearing from Physics and then re-appearing
again later with completely different physical and mathematical
properties. In fact, Einstein himself conceived of the Ether as little more than a
mathematical construct. [Cf., Kostro (2000).]
There is no way that that view of the Ether can be equated with Aristotle's, Newton's
or even
Maxwell's.
Nevertheless,
some might think that another of Lenin's
comments might help clarify matters:
"[D]ialectical materialism insists on the
approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of
matter and its properties…." [Ibid., p.312.]
The
idea here seems to be that 'objectivity' isn't undermined by
the passing away of obsolescent theories that postulate the existence of soon-to-be-eliminated, but still
supposedly, 'objective' entities. That is because since these
older theories were less near the truth than those that eventually
superseded them, but which don't postulate the existence of these formerly 'objective'
objects and processes.
But, that can't be correct;
it doesn't even look
correct.
Let us suppose that theory, T,
for instance, postulates the existence of
entity, or process, E, and that DM-theorists accept T as "objectively, but
partially or even relatively true". Suppose further that scientists later reject
Talong
withE. It can't now be argued that the content of T was
"objective" or even "partially" true, since it was neither. If E
doesn't exist (and never did), any claims made about 'it' are
now devoid of sense.
[In fact, such claims
will be neither
(empirically) true nor false -- for
reasons examined in more detail in the main body of this Essay, but more fully
in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Now, in
relation to the
example under consideration here: if there is no Ether, Physicists won't have taken one step
'closer' to the 'truth' by postulating its existence. On the other hand, if the
Ether does exist, Physics must have gone backwards when it was rejected.
It
could be objected that questions regarding the non-existence of the Ether (or
Phlogiston
and
Caloric)
are neither here nor there. What really matters is that researchers are able to
advance scientific knowledge by developing certain techniques (conceptual,
experimental, mathematical and/or methodological) as a result of
assuming such entities do exist. Hence, given this (modified) account, even
wildly incorrect theories can help
science progress.
No
doubt they can, but what has this got to do with 'objectivity'? If the Ether,
Caloric and Phlogiston don't exist, and never did, the supposition that they do
takes science away from the 'truth', away from 'objectivity'. Spin-off benefits (howsoever
impressive) have nothing to do with 'objectivity' -- which, according to Lenin,
relates to the 'mind independence' of objects and processes in reality:
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
'Objectivity', as Lenin conceived of it, has nothing to do with improved technique. Belief in God, for example,
helped numerous great scientists construct classical Physics, but no one
supposes that collateral advances like this mean that belief in God was 'closer
to the truth', or 'objective', just because of that. [On this, for example, see
Dillenberger (1988), and Hooykaas (1973).]
If the 'objective' status' of the
entities and processes that scientists study, or claim to have discovered, turn out to be irrelevant --
and only (adventitious) spin-off techniques are what really matter --
then the status of those techniques themselves can't fail to attract suspicion.
Dialecticians often use the word "spiral" to describe the faltering progress of
knowledge -- as science supposedly "spirals" in on the truth --, but, as the
above shows, if that were correct, a better word would surely be
"screwy". [There is more on this in Essays Ten
Part One
and Thirteen Part Two.]
However, it is worth pointing out that Conventionalism doesn't face problems
like these (even if other 'difficulties' stand in its way), whereas all forms of
Metaphysical Realism do.
[Many more obsolete 'objective'
objects and processes
have been itemised
here.]
This isn't a
very convincing "spiral".
Admittedly, the evidence for the 'existence' of many of the above was
at one time considered compelling, but as
Philosopher of Science, P K Stanford, notes:
"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to
Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence
available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong
support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern
would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early
corpuscularian chemistry to
Stahl's
phlogiston theory
to
Lavoisier's
oxygen
chemistry to
Daltonian
atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various
versions of
preformationism
to
epigenetic
theories of embryology; from the
caloric theory
of heat to later and ultimately contemporary
thermodynamic
theories; from
effluvial theories of electricity
and magnetism to theories of
the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from
humoral
imbalance
to
miasmatic
to
contagion
and ultimately germ theories of disease;
from 18th Century
corpuscular theories of light
to 19th
Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from
Hippocrates's
pangenesis
to
Darwin's blending theory of inheritance
(and his own
'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to
Wiesmann's germ-plasm
theory and
Mendelian
and contemporary molecular genetics; from
Cuvier's
theory of functionally
integrated and necessarily static biological species or
Lamarck's
autogenesis to
Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of
theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more
unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry
offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are
alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even
when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]
[See also: Stanford (2000,
2003, 2006a,
2006b,
2009,
2011,
2015, 2018,
2023), Chang (2003), Cordero (2011), Laudan (1981,
1984),
Lyons (2002, 2003, 2006), and Vickers (2013). (Several of these link to PDFs.)
My referencing these works doesn't imply I agree with everything they contain.]
Even
Woods and Grant acknowledge this (but who mysteriously fail to apply it to DM):
"[T]here are few things in science that are
not called into question sooner or later." [Introduction to the e-book edition
of
Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]
It is
often argued that the above objects and processes weren't part of "mature"
science, and are in stark contrast to the "mature" theories extant today. Anyone
who thinks along those lines should read Baggott (2013), Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006), and then
perhaps think again. [This topic will be
discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two; see also
here.]
24.It
could be argued that this isn't so. Someone could hold a sentence true even
before they understood it. For example, some may implicitly accept the
views of an authority on a given subject; others might accept the word of a holy man/woman. [Martin
(1987), for instance, pushed that line.]
Consider,
therefore, these examples (which were deliberately made incomprehensible to
underline this point):
L1:
Professor NN said, "The admurial current in this sample of Blongit has a value of
15.542 buhrs/spec when subjected to a Moggle Field of 1.896 galols/klm7.6134."
L2: St.
MM uttered these immortal words: "Orle Geerlty Jurthir Shcmood gleebers a minnert whal replificatoe."
Well, is either
of these true? Would anyone accept them as such before they understood the odd
words they contain? If they were to do that, the next couple of questions would be: "What precisely
are you holding true here? To what are you committing yourself if you haven't a clue what these
sentences say?"
Someone
could respond: "St. MM wouldn't lie. I believe every word she says."
Putting to one side how anyone could possibly know whether or not this 'holy'
woman had ever lied if everything she says were so readily believed by the
faithful independently of any attempt to validate the 'gems' she came out with -- never mind the
profound gullibility it reveals --, this sort of credulity is manifestly
centred on the person concerned not the 'content' of the words she
utters.
It could be objected that the
above examples are highly contentious, and are therefore irrelevant. Maybe so,
but until such an objector produces a sentence that he/she doesn't understand
that he/she would hold true if uttered by a figure of
authority (religious or otherwise) -- while explaining preciselywhat was being held true, even
though they had no idea what they were committing themselves to --, they will
have to do.
Someone might reply by offering the following as just such an example:
"[W]e worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding the
Persons; nor dividing the Essence. For there is one Person of the Father;
another of the Son; and another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the
Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one; the Glory equal, the
Majesty coeternal. Such as the Father is; such is the Son; and such is the Holy
Ghost. The Father uncreated; the Son uncreated; and the Holy Ghost uncreated.
The Father unlimited; the Son unlimited; and the Holy Ghost unlimited. The
Father eternal; the Son eternal; and the Holy Ghost eternal. And yet they are
not three eternals; but one eternal. As also there are not three uncreated; nor
three infinites, but one uncreated; and one infinite. So likewise the Father is
Almighty; the Son Almighty; and the Holy Ghost Almighty. And yet they are not
three Almighties; but one Almighty. So the Father is God; the Son is God; and
the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods; but one God. So likewise
the Father is Lord; the Son Lord; and the Holy Ghost Lord. And yet not three
Lords; but one Lord. For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity; to
acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord; So are we forbidden by
the catholic religion; to say, There are three Gods, or three Lords. The Father
is made of none; neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone;
not made, nor created; but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the
Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten; but proceeding. So there is one
Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three
Holy Ghosts. And in this Trinity none is before, or after another; none is
greater, or less than another. But the whole three Persons are coeternal, and
coequal. So that in all things, as aforesaid; the Unity in Trinity, and the
Trinity in Unity, is to be worshipped. He therefore that will be saved, let him
thus think of the Trinity." [The Athanasian Creed, quoted from
here.]
Here
we have a set of indicative-looking sentences that absolutely no one
understands, but which many millions hold true, contrary to what was
asserted earlier.
The
first point worth making in response would be to remind the objector that the
original point had been as follows:
It
could be argued that this isn't so. Someone could hold a sentence true even
before they understood it.
In relation
to the above Creed, that isn't so. Believers claim this dogma is true
before they understand it and they hold it true even though they never
succeed in understanding it. By way of contrast, metaphysicians claim to
understand the 'propositions' they concoct.
Secondly, serious questions would arise concerning what exactly is being
held true, here. Consider this puzzling sentence:
"So the Father is God; the Son is God; and
the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods; but one God."
If
there are three persons who are all 'God' how can there only be one 'God', not
three 'Gods'? How can that be true?
Silence must ensue -- or, we would be told that it is just a "mystery".
Thirdly, it is quite clear that the above use of "true" bears no relation to its
use in connection with empirical propositions, or even in connection with
metaphysical 'propositions'. It is a religious use of that word and hence bears
as much a connection to the ordinary use of "true" as the religious use of
"father" bears to the ordinary word, "father". Is 'God' really
a father? Does 'He' have a body, does 'He' have a head, does 'He' eat food,
breath, go to the toilet? Is 'He' married? Does 'He' even have sex organs? If
not, in what way is 'He' a father? Or even male? On the other hand, if
'He' does,
in what way is 'He' 'God' and not a creature like the rest of us? Again, all this is
a 'mystery', apparently.
Fourth, as also noted above, this expression of faith
is centred on the institution of the Church and/or the religious tradition to
which a given believer belongs, not the 'content' of the words
that had been strung together -- since their 'content' is a 'mystery'. So, holding The
Athanasian Creed 'true' is tantamount to saying "I have faith in the Church and
it's all a mystery...". Hence, this is an expression of faith not of
knowledge.
Finally,
this Essay is centred on scientific knowledge and whether or not DM is an
incomprehensible metaphysical theory. Any appeal to what the god-botherers among
us accept or reject would therefore only succeed in underlining the accuracy of
this remark:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis
added.]
25.It is here that we
can see just how the 'representational-' or 'referential-theory' appears to gain
some grip: if nature contains a secret code of sorts (perhaps written in a
mathematical (or 'Ideal') form --, or which exists in some way that is
structurally/physically causal (maybe existing as an aspect (or module) of/in the 'architectonic of our
cognitive processes')
-- then, if it is also assumed that nature is "rational", human
beings would then be rational only if they were 'in
tune' with that 'external rationality'. If so, then any sentences that state truths about reality would gain the sense they have by 'reflecting',
expressing, representing or incorporating that 'code' -- i.e., 'reflecting', expressing,
representing or
incorporating this "external rationality" -- in a
like-represents-like sort of fashion ("as above so below"
-- as ancient Hermeticists expressed this idea).
That is why 'correspondence' theories seem so plausible to many.
If language had no 'secret code' -- or, rather, if language had no 'deep
structure', which was only capable of being accessed by a tiny minority -- correspondence theories
would make little sense. The 'logical structure' of the world and the logical
structure of language (or even 'the Mind' and its 'architectonic' -- these days
labelled its 'modularity') somehowmiraculously match/mirrorone another. [ I have covered this in more detail in Interlude Two, above.]
Naturally, this raises serious questions about the origin of this hidden 'code'
(or this 'deep structure'), what gives it
the 'sense' it has (it has to have one or it wouldn't be a language or
even a code), and why it can't be misinterpreted or
subjected to alternative readings.
And yet, if it is indeed a
code, it will have to have
been transposed from some language or other, using a translation manual
-- otherwise it wouldn't be a code, it would be a 'code', a term we don't yet
understand. This of course means that it islanguage that explains codes, not the
other way round.
Some might
point to codes that have already written into nature --, for example, the
Genetic Code.
But, that code isn't like the codes human beings have written, invented or developed. As we have
just seen, codes
depend on the prior existence of a language, into and out of which they
can be translated using an agreed upon (normative) translation manual. Clearly, we
can only attribute such a feature to nature if we are prepared to
anthropomorphise it.
[In fact, the game is up whenever 'reality' is described as
"rational" -- clearly implying its origin in, or its creation by, some 'mind' or other.]
Hence, whatever else it is that geneticists are referring to when
they speak about "codes", they can't be
talking about those that human beings invent, nor anything like them. In which case,
once more, they must be referring to 'codes', not codes. Either that, or they
are using the word "code" as a technical term -- which only
succeeds in misleading the incautious. [There is more on this in Bennett and Hacker (2021), pp.177f, and
Bennett et al (2007), pp.146-56.]
As
should seem obvious, we can't hope to solve 'puzzles about
reality' like this by postulating intelligent causes, howsoever they are
re-packaged. As David Hume pointed out, if human intelligence is to be accounted for by an
'exterior intelligence' or 'rationality' -- of whatever sort or provenance --, an
infinite regress must ensue. That sceptical argument, of course, isn't weakened in the slightest if the word "God" is replaced by
"law" -- or even if "rationally-based-and-evidentially-supported-objective-theory"
were substituted for one or both. On this, see
Hume (1963).
Some, like
Daniel Dennett, have tried to argue along neo-Darwinian lines that human
intelligence can be modelled along such lines, that is, as a creation of a
combination of the interplay between random mutation/variation and natural
selection. I have said much more about this in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.
See also Bennett and Hacker (2021), pp.470-91, and Bennett et al
(2007), pp.146-56.
[There is more on this in
the main body of this Essay (here), and
will be in Part Four (to be published in 2024). See also, Essay
Three Part Two.]
26.This was discussed more fully in Essay Three
Part Two and was also addressed
in detail in Essay Thirteen Part
Three.
26a.
A representative example of this approach can be found in Devitt and Sterelny (1999), but there are
countless others. [No pun intended. I will say more about this topic in Essay Thirteen Parts Two and
Three.]
27. This topic will be tackled in Parts Two and
Three of this Essay, and again in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.
29.Naturally, this puts much weight on the word
"understanding", but anyone who has a problem with that word is
already way beyond
my help.
My
argument also appears to ignore the possibility that humans could first
appropriate non-linguistic 'truths', rather like non-human animals that react to their
surroundings. Humans than learn from this and, after having acquired language,
proceed to comprehend the world about them, the entire process of course taking many thousands of years.
Or so it might be argued...
The
wishful thinking -- or, indeed, thescience fiction -- that
underlies any such
'possibility' will be considered later.
[On this, see
Baker and Hacker (2005a), pp.357-85, and Baker and Hacker (2005b), pp.305-56.
See also here,
as well as
Note 31.]
The analysis presented in the main body of this Essay
largely restricted attention to indicative sentences and empirical propositions.
That isn't meant to depreciate or
indirectly denigrate other forms of
discourse (i.e., questions, commands,
fictional, poetic and ethical language,
optatives,
and so on), nor is it to ignore the importance of figurative speech and
prosody.
The
discussion here has been deliberately restricted for two reasons:
(1)
Metaphysical theories purport to be focused around
industrial strength,Super-Factual propositions. However, as I have tried to
show, such theories are based on a systematic failure to distinguish between
different types of indicative sentence -- that is, between 'pseudo-empirical'
and empirical propositions themselves, between those that ape the
indicative mood but collapse into non-sense and incoherence upon examination,
and those that don't.
(2) Empirical propositions are, of course,
intimately connected with the possibility of expressing scientific
knowledge.
[In addition,
and for the sake of simplicity, the distinction between
type
and token empirical propositions has been ignored. Naturally, in a
comprehensive account of the linguistic phenomena under review these issues, and
many others besides, will have to be addressed -- for all that that would
be inappropriate in an Essay of
the present sort, or in connection with the rather narrow aims of this site.]
Since
the other issues mentioned above aren't
related to the topics under discussion here, and as important as they are in
themselves, an analysis of their mode of signification has been omitted.
Moreover, the idea that these Essays are fixated on single
sentences -- a clichéd criticism of Analytic Philosophy often advanced by
dialecticians -- is no less misguided. Single sentences are analysed here merely to
focus attention on problems associated with specific DM-theses,
difficulties that
dialecticians universally fail to notice --, and, indeed, on those that have been
imported from Traditional Thought. Where relevant, wider
contextual issues have, of course, been taken into account (for example, in this
Essay in relation to what Lenin had to say about
matter and motion).
[On this, see also Note 31
(link above).]
However,
DM-fans need to face the fact that if they can't handle single sentences,
they stand no chance with
larger bodies of text.
Having said that, 'Contextualism' (i.e., the idea that
words, or indeed sentences, gain their meaning from their context of use) has
been criticised at length in
Essay Thirteen Part Three.
In addition, Metaphysical Holism (of the sort that dialecticians
have also unwisely bought into) has also
been destructively analysed in Essay Eleven Parts
One and
Two, as well as
here.
29a. It might be
wondered how anyone who understands an empirical proposition -- like, say, M6 --
would know it was true, as opposed to notknowing it was false.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
As pointed out in the main body of this Essay:
...if the sense of a proposition weren't
independent of its actual truth-value, then, plainly, the mere fact that
a proposition had been understood would entail it was true, or, as the case may
be, it would entail
that it was
false! Naturally, if either
alternative
were correct, linguistic or psychological factors would determine the
truth-status of
empirical propositions and science would become little more than a branch of
hermeneutics.
Of course, it isn't easy to think our way
into such an odd (and plainly) defective
account of empirical propositions, which is why sentences like M1a were
considered first, in relation to which it is easier to see how and why the
'comprehension' of metaphysical claims go hand-in-hand with knowing which of
their supposed
truth-values actually hold.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
For theorists like Engels and Lenin who
accept the theory that "Motion is the mode of
the existence of matter", the 'comprehension' of M1a automatically implies it is true.
However, if that were also the case with plain and simple empirical propositions, then the
comprehension of M6 would automatically imply it was true, too. In that case, the alleged
truth, and thus the comprehension, of M6 would follow from some other
proposition, or propositions, which would, of course, mean that anyone who
didn't know these other 'truths' wouldn't be able to comprehend M6, which is
absurd.
It could be argued that it is easy to see what
truths would have to be known first if M6 is to be understood -- namely that Tony Blair
is a man (and/or) that he exists, as well as the fact that The Algebra of Revolution is a
book (or is indeed something that can be owned).
This topic is partly what motivated Wittgenstein to
argue as follows in the Tractatus:
"Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why
they cannot be composite. If the world had no substance, then whether a
proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. In
that case, we could not paint any picture of the world, true or false."
[Wittgenstein (1972), p.11, 2.021-2.0212.]
Now, I don't want to enter into a
discussion about what Wittgenstein did or didn't mean by "substance", only
point out that he later replaced the logical objects and formal concepts of
The Tractatus
with "logical grammar", "agreement in judgements" and a shared "form of life". [Wittgenstein (2009),
p.94e, §§241-42.] In other words, he
regarded the rules we use in the formation of propositions like M6 as a sort of
non-propositional bedrock, which meant that the sense of such propositions
don't depend on the truth of another proposition, or set of propositions. [How
that works will
be explained later. On the above passage from the Tractatus, however, see
White (1974, 2006).]
The point is that if someone didn't in
general know
these things, they wouldn't be
able to enter into this specific use of language (fully or
partially). But, this isn't factual knowledge, it is the
possession of a set of (behavioural) skills. I will say much more about that in Essay Thirteen
Part Three. [See also
Note 31.]
30.
One of the leading alternative
accounts of language
on offer these days -- the so-called "Nativist" theory of
Chomsky,
Fodor,
Bickerton and
Pinker,
among others -- will be discussed in more detail
in Essay Thirteen Part Three. [Until
then, the reader is referred to Baker and Hacker (1984), Behme (2014a, 2014b), Cowie (1997, 2002,
2008),
Everett (2008, 2012), Sampson (2005) and the review
posted
here.]
Also worth consulting are the following essays
written by Sampson,
here, and
here. [The
reader is, however, warned that Sampson is a right-wing Tory who holds objectionable, racist views
(and much else besides). Despite this, Sampson is, in my view, right about Nativism
(a doctrine that, oddly enough, also
underpins other right-wing ideas). See also,
here.] {The last two links are now dead!}
Furthermore, as we will
see later, only if a proposition were part of a body of propositions
would it have a sense, to begin with, and hence would it be possible to ascertain its truth-value. Empirical propositions don't face the
world as isolated units, nor do they function like arrows that pin truths to
targets single-handedly (to vary the image). They function more like nets
catching fish (to vary it once more). However, these nets are such because of
the form of
representation, or parts of several such forms, as the case may be,
employed by users to that end.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
This might
seem to make a mockery of the argument presented in the main body of this Essay:
that to understand the sense of a proposition like M6 is ipso facto to
know what would make it true or what would make it false. That argument seems to
suggest such propositions face the world as atomic units, so to speak,
not
part of a body of propositions, as alleged above.
I will deal
with that objection in the section dealing with
Wittgenstein's comments on "criteria and
symptoms". In the meantime,
Quine's arresting metaphor will perhaps make
things a little clearer:
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from
the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of
atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which
impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total
science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A
conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the
interior of the field. Truth values have to be re-distributed over some of our
statements. Re-evaluation of some statements entail re-evaluation of others,
because of their logical interconnections.... But the total field is so
underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much
latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any
single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any
particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through
considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole. If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the
empirical content of an individual statement -- especially if it is a statement
at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field." [Quine
(1951), pp.42–43. This links to a PDF. Spelling
modified to agree with UK
English; paragraphs merged.]
[I
distance myself from the ideas presented in much of the rest of the above paper -- on
that see, for example,
Grice and Strawson (1956) (this links to a PDF), and Glock (2003) -- as well
as the claim that
"it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement",
since, as we have seen, it is easy so to do. However,
the above comments, suitably re-cast, neatly overlap with Wittgenstein's approach
(in this area).
On that, see Glock (2003) again, and Hacker (1996), pp.189-227.]
Hence, the actual truth of propositions like M6 depends on a whole web of
background practices and beliefs (this is what Quine later came to call "The Web of
Belief" -- on that, see
Quine and Ullian (1978)
-- this links to a PDF). Held in place, this means
that while it might seem that empirical propositions face conformation or
confutation on their own, their conformation and confutation also depend on this background.
[Readers are directed to Note 36, Note 40a,
and the section below on Scientific Knowledge,
for more details.]
In this regard, it is
also important to distinguish between the
sense of a proposition and its truth-value. While the truth-value
of M6, for example, will depend on the truth of several other propositions
(i.e., indicative sentences expressing the existence of whatever makes M6 true
or M6 false, or which record the facts of the matter), its
sense won't.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
[I
deal with this topic at greater length in the next sub-section, but it will help if readers keep the
above caveats in mind as they proceed.]
32.This
doesn't
mean that there exists (somewhere -- perhaps 'in each head') a body of precise rules governing human
language. What it does in fact mean will be addressed Essay Thirteen
Part Three.
Rules, of course, are no more capable
of being true or false than
imperatives or
interrogatives are. They are dependent on wider social practices and hence, as such, are historically-, and socially-conditioned.
Given
that view, social change is
reflected in language by, among other things, concomitant alterations to the conventionalised,
rule-governed use of words. Naturally, this situates language, and thus thought, in material conditions
(i.e., in real social interactions that arise from underlying Relations of Production,
etc.), not in a hidden, 'mental' realm (supposedly located in each brain), or in a
socially-isolated and atomised
arena subject only to each individual's mysterious (and
uncheckable) powers of 'abstraction' and 'representation'.
[There is more on this in Essays Three
Part Two
and Thirteen
Part Three. On this in general, see Robinson (2003a), and Hanna and Harrison (2004).
Unfortunately, the latter work has been spoiled somewhat by an adoption
of Kripke and
Evans's'causal theory' of names. It should therefore be read in
conjunction with Baker and Hacker (2005a), pp.113-28, 227-49. (Kripke and Evans's theories
can be found in Kripke (1980) and Evans (1973, 1982). I'll address some of their ideas in Essay Thirteen Part Two.)]
On the basis of the "anthropological
approach", briefly
outlined in this Essay, thought is more naturally grounded in discourse, material
practice, social interaction and communication, but only derivatively
linked to the capacity human beings have of representing things to
themselves by means of language (etc.) -- i.e., with the latter typically
carried out in a public area, in print or by
means of the spoken word, for example. So, given the view adopted here, these 'representations' are all
publicly accessible and hence are inter-subjectively checkable; they aren't to be found 'in the head'. [Exactly why
that is so is explored at length in Essays Three
Part Two and Thirteen
Part Three.]
In this way,
therefore, there is no need for anyone to advance a vague, DM-style reference to the
'dialectical' unity between 'thought' and practice, since, given the approach adopted
here, 'thought' is constituted both by social practice and by our use of language, all three
being inter-twined.
'Thought'
thus requires no further 'philosophical' elaboration. It is, therefore, what our everyday use of words about it
says it is, not what Idealist Philosophers or inconsistent materialists (i.e.,
dialecticians) tell us it must be.
Extensive critical examination of the perennial confusions (such
as those inspired by the above Paradigm) -- found in Psychology, Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Mind
-- can be
accessed in the following: Anscombe (2000),
Baker and Hacker (1984, 2005a, 2005b), Bennett and Hacker (2008, 2021), Bennett et
al (2007), Budd (1989), Button, et al (1995), Coulter (1983, 1989,
1993, 1997), Coulter and Sharrock (2007), Erneling (1993), Fischer (2011a, 2011b), Goldberg (1968, 1991), Goldstein (1999), Greenspan
and Shanker (2004), Hacker (1987, 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1996, 1997, 2000a, 2000b,
2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2007a,
2010,
2012, 2013a, 2013b,
2013c, 2013d), Hark (1990, 1995), Hilmy (1987), Hutto (1995), Hyman (1989,
1991), Johnston (1993), Kenny (1973, 1975, 1984a, 1984b, 1992, 2003, 2006), Malcolm (1968, 1977a,
1977b, 1980, 1986b), Racine and Slaney (2013), Ryle (1949a
(this links to a PDF of the 2009 edition), 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 1971d, 1971e, 1982), Schroeder (2001a), Schulte (1993), Shanker
(1986b, 1987b, 1987c, 1987d, 1988, 1995, 1997, 1998), Stern (1995), Suter
(1989), Williams (1999), and Wittgenstein (1958, 1969, 1980b, 1980c,
1981, 1982, 1989, 1992, 1993, 2009).
Furthermore, because we use words rather like
(but not exactly like) we use tools, language has played a key role in human
social evolution. This observation is important because language is partly constitutive of our
'consciousness'.
[The latter word is in 'scare' quotes because in such contexts it
is often employed as a metaphysical term-of-art
redolent of Cartesianism. On that, see Hacker (2007a), (2012),
and (2013a).]
This Essay,
therefore, begins where Engels's theory (of the development of human
'consciousness' through cooperative labour and the use of tools (etc.)) left
off.
[Again, this topic will be covered in more detail in Essay
Thirteen
Part Three.]
33.Unfortunately, the nature
of science and scientific language remained largely unexplored in Wittgenstein's
work. This failing has been compounded by the same neglect from many of those who work in the
Wittgensteinian tradition (in Analytic Philosophy), who haven't significantly
developed or extended his method into this area since his death. Strange though
this might seem, that comment
also applies to Thomas Kuhn's work, and that of
Norwood Russell Hanson.]
[Added
on Edit, December 2023: That picture has now changed a little since the
above words were first written, a topic that will be covered in more detail in
Essay Thirteen Part Two, which I aim to publish sometime in 2025.]
The
crucial point here is that Wittgenstein's method isn't confined to issues connected with ordinary language (as many
erroneously suppose) -- it applies to anything we should want to call a language,
or a practice (the former understood in a non-essentialist sense, of course -- since it
is
we who decide, not some underlying 'essence of language' or 'thought'
that does this for us).
Hence, his method encompasses scientific, technical and formal languages (and
practices). Admittedly,
an extension of his method into wider uses of language would require a
detailed analysis of each of them in use, in conjunction with the practices out
of which they have arisen. Since that is way beyond the scope of this Essay and
this site,
such an analysis won't be attempted here, but several important
related issues will be discussed in Essay Thirteen Parts Two and
Three, as well as the rest of Essay
Twelve, when they are finally published (a summary of the latter can be accessed
here).
However, with respect to the analysis of figurative and
analogical language,
the picture isn't much better. For example, despite the subsequent but
nonetheless relatively minor advances
that were made (mostly in the High Middle Ages), our understanding of the logic of analogy has
largely remained
where Aristotle left it 2400 years ago.
Naturally,
this means
we don't as yet have a clear idea how such specialised
uses of language actually relate to our wider understanding of the world, or, indeed, ourselves
in general.
In which case, much of what has been written about the scientific use of
metaphor and analogy is of limited value. [And recent work on metaphor, which
has wandered off down a Cognitive Science cul-de-sac, following the
work of
George Lakoff and others, has only made a bad situation worse.] This doesn't mean that
specialist areas of discourse (like these) are illegitimate, only that we don't yet understand how they
work. And this lack of understanding is connected with the way that most theorists
casually and uncritically employ figurative language to state what they think are
literal truths about the world, or, indeed, about language itself. In other words, they use metaphor and
analogy to hide their ignorance, often from themselves.
Unfortunately, this means that
the above theorists
are held captive by a "misleading picture" (to paraphrase
Wittgenstein),
which distort the way they make sense even of their own theories. [On
this, see Fischer (2011a, 2011b), and Egan (2011).] In turn, as noted earlier,
this predicament isn't unconnected with the traditional idea that language is first and
foremost a
means of
representation.
That 'assumption' (based as it is on ancient metaphors, as we will see as the
rest of Essay Twelve unfolds) seriously compromises their thought from the beginning,
therefore.
That topic will
receive further consideration in the next two Parts of this Essay, where an attempt will be made to
connect the move toward a representational view of language (which began in the
'West' in Ancient Greece) with the development of early class society, and hence
it will connect this development to contemporaneous ruling-class priorities,
interests and ideologies, and thus with
the invention of Theology and Metaphysics, which were aimed at rationalising all
such moves.
Alas, when scientists and amateur philosophers try to translate technical
aspects of scientific theory into ordinary language, their attempts are invariably
sprinkled with
inappropriate (and often unacknowledged) metaphors, 'scare' quote encased words and
inappropriate analogies. These are then often spruced-up with half-baked
metaphysical theories, replete with specially-invented jargon and tailor-made
neologisms. [Recent examples of this
genre include Greene (1999, 2004), Smolin (2000), and Penrose (1989, 1995, 2004)
--
but most 'popularisations' of science are equally guilty (and that comment
applies to many such videos on YouTube, for instance -- as most of my comments
there seek to expose).]
Oddly enough, some scientists are perhaps beginning to
recognise this 'problem' is connected with their use of language -- although, it is plain from what follows that the great physicist,
Niels Bohr, was
already arguing along similar lines in the 1920s and 1930s. Here. for example, is
the late
David Peat, writing in the New Scientist:
"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as
Lee Smolin's
The Trouble with Physics and
Peter Woit's
Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that
string
theory, the brightest hope for
formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation,
has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s,
when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists
believed they would soon, to use
Stephen
Hawking's words, 'know the mind of
God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.
"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final
step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist
Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is
wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics
concerns what we can say about nature.' At first sight that seems strange.
What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about
solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's
path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we
choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the
nature of the result.
"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of
1925, when the young
Werner
Heisenberg worked out the basic
equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate
consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with
total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would
always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values. Heisenberg needed an explanation for
this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is
used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon
of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position,
then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making
this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the
electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the
position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg
argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic
properties.
"However, when Heisenberg showed his
results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr
argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is
like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These
are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level.
The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a
particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature
replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts. This is where language comes in.
While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the
equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the
blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the
language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality --
assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we
are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'.
Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.
"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists
discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly
reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist
Michael Green
a few years after he and
John
Schwartz
published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory
mainstream. Green remarked that when
Einstein
was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the
philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space
and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply
in philosophy.
"In contrast, Green felt, string
theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same
deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were
for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in
the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.
The American quantum theorist David Bohm
embraced Bohr's views on language,
believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages
we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of
Newtonian physics. When we say
'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns),
which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects
that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields.
But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably
hindered.
"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects
are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a
process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary
role....
Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But
what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter.
In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places
on how we can think about the world...." [Peat
(2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases
and several links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Except, ordinary language isn't the least bit "Newtonian", and the
'problem' isn't with language as such, but with the belief that it functions most
'naturally' (or even primarily) representationally.
[Concerning metaphor in general -- and as it features in science
--, cf., White (1996), Benjamin, et al
(1987), and Guttenplan (2005). Cf., also Baake (2002) and Brown (2003). On
analogical reasoning, see White (2010) -- however, readers should make note of
this caveat
concerning the latter work.]
34.Of course, no one
in their left mind would argue that the
comprehension of an empirical proposition would automatically guarantee its truth.
However, as we have seen, the metaphysical basis of traditional theories of
meaning -- and that of many modern variants along the same lines -- relies on an appeal to 'necessary
truths' of some sort. Either that, or others refer to
theories expressed in a
metalanguage,
and even to dispositional or 'emergent' states of the 'mind'/brain, all
of which presuppose, or imply, stronger (or maybe, in some cases, even weaker) versions of
the same set of ideas. Since
factors like these are what supposedly lend to language the sense it has (or
which explain the meaning of words), this approach is
implicit in traditional (and contemporary) theories of language: i.e., that, at some point,
meaning is not only inseparable from truth, it depends on it.
Unfortunately for such theorists, these
'truths' also seem to
'follow' from the alleged meaning of certain words. Sometimes the latter are
called "analytic", sometimes "tautologies" or even "truisms".
Alternatively, they are characterised as 'self-evident', 'true' but solely in virtue of
a stipulation or definition of some sort, or they are said to depend on a rather
vague set of 'intuitions'.
[On this, see Baz (2012).]
Ironically, instead of meaning being dependent on truth (as the above
theories sought to imply), it now turns out that they themselves are dependent on
a distortion of language, and hence on alteredmeaning, at
some level, just as Marx indicated:
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
Here lies much of the spurious plausibility of
LIE.
For further elaboration on this theme, see the later Parts of Essay Twelve
(when they are published), Essay
Three Part One,
and Note 90. On the weaknesses of
dispositional accounts of language
(this links to a PDF) -- or, at
least, how such theories supposedly connect with our capacity to follow rules --, see Kripke (1982), and
Kusch (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006). See also Bloor (1997). [It
is worth pointing out that these authors mistakenly portray Wittgenstein as some
sort of 'meaning sceptic', which he certainly wasn't. He would simply have
pointed out that the word "meaning" has a use (in fact
many).
On this, see Essay Thirteen
Part Three, and
Malcolm (1986a). On Bloor's work, see Note 35. See
also Hanna and Harrison (2004), Chapter Eight.]
35.These comments
should in fact be uncontroversial since they follow from a
consistent acceptance of the social nature of
language. Unfortunately, however, because certain "ruling ideas" have sunk
so deeply into our movement they will
(in fact) seem controversial to
most DM-fans.
In Essay Thirteen Part
Three I will endeavour to show how conventions
(constituted by social practice) are capable of underpinning the sense of empirical
propositions without compromising the social nature of language.
A recent study by David Bloor [Bloor (1997)] has succeeded in
extending this approach considerably. Unfortunately, Bloor's book is a mixture
of illuminating insight and profound philosophical error, further compounded by
no little confusion. Worse
still, Bloor badly misinterprets the nature of Wittgenstein's method, branding
it a form of LIE. This
is a serious error. Wittgenstein was at pains to distance himself from all
philosophical theories, depicting his method rather as a way of dissolving
philosophical 'problems', arguing that they were in fact pseudo-problems and that philosophical theories in general are simply "houses of cards".
[I have summarised some of his remarks in this direction,
here.]
[On the question of Wittgenstein and Idealism, cf., Dilman (2002), Hutto (1996),
and Malcolm (1995c). However, Dilman (2002) should be read with some care
because of the incautious way the author tries to explain some of Wittgenstein's
ideas. (On this topic in general, see Part Four of this Essay.)]
Bloor's approach is seriously flawed in other ways, too. That is partly because
of the extreme voluntarism that appears to underlie his interpretation of
rule-following, carefully disguised as a social interpretation of that very practice.
It is also partly because of the philosophical method Bloor employs. According
to him, rule-followers just make decisions on how to proceed each time they
apply a rule, even if they are acting socially, as part of a group.
Misleadingly, Bloor appeals to a rhetorical point Wittgenstein advanced in the
Philosophical Investigations:
"'But how can a rule show me what I have to do at
this point? After all, whatever I do can, on some interpretation, be made
compatible with a rule.'"
However, Bloor failed to note that in
the same paragraph(!) Wittgenstein rejected this view of rules:
"No, that's not what one should say. But rather
this: every interpretation hangs in the air together with what it interprets and
cannot give it any support." [Wittgenstein
(2009), §198, p.86e.]
Wittgenstein
then goes on to say:
"So is whatever I do compatible with the rule?"
-- Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule -- say a sign-post -- got
to do with my actions? What sort of connection obtains here? -- Well, this one,
for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and
now I do so react to it. But with this you have pointed out only a causal
connexion; only explained how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post;
not what this following-the-sign really consists in. Not so; I have further
indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there is an
established usage, a custom." [Ibid. Paragraphs merged.]
So, far from endorsing the view that whatever is decided upon can
be made to accord with some rule or other (on some interpretation), Wittgenstein
is here directing our attention to the social nature of rule-following, and how
what we do is a result of our socialisation. This isn't to give a causal, but a
normative, explanation.
However, the only constraints on rule-following
Bloor seems to allow are causal in character, but given the way he depicts this
entire question -- which is naturalistically --, conformity with a rule
could in fact take any form whatsoever. In that case, the whole enterprise just
collapses into the sort of extreme individualismand voluntarism
his account was
designed to counteract. Indeed, the notion of social constraint, or social norms, falls
apart when extreme voluntarism like this is countenanced. [On that, see
Malcolm (1986a).]
Bloor's otherwise excellent analysis is also partly undermined
by his failure to take seriously the distinction Wittgenstein drew between a
grammatical and an empirical investigation, as much as it is by his insistence
on constructing a philosophical theory of rule-following. If
Wittgenstein's work succeeded in achieving nothing else, it showed that
philosophical theories are based on, and thus result in, confusion because they
are motivated by, and arise out of, a misuse or a distortion of language. And
that is why Bloor himself had to alter the meaning of ordinary words like
"decision", "rule" and "follow" to make
his theory 'work'.
More illuminating recent accounts of
rule-following can be found in Floyd (1991), Meredith Williams (1999), and especially Robinson (2003b).
However, Williams's account is itself slightly spoilt by
her neglect of what Wittgenstein regarded as the only legitimate method
in Philosophy: as argued above, a grammatical investigation of our use of language.
Unfortunately, there is as yet no definitive account of this method, but an
excellent summary can be found in Savickey (1999). See also, Suter (1989).
However, there are encouraging signs that Wittgensteinian commentators are at
last beginning to tackle this topic with the sensitivity and attention
to detail it merits. Recent examples of this trend can be found in Crary and Read (2000)
and in the work of
Juliet Floyd,
Meredith Williams,
Rupert Read,
Cora Diamond
and
James Conant, among others. Another recent publication well worth consulting is
Forster (2004) -- see also Hutto (2003), Kenny (1998),
Fischer (2011a, 2011b), Kuusela (2005, 2006, 2008), and O'Neill (2001). [Again,
my citing these works doesn't imply I agree with everything they contain.]
As noted
earlier, Bloor totally ignores Wittgenstein's explicitly stated
intention, that his work was primarily an investigation into the "logical grammar
of language" (which means that it was based on an appraisal of how we
actually use language, how we arrive at some form of agreement
(which point is often ignored by critics), how discourse features both in our social
and our individual lives,
all of which were set against the background of
our shared "form of life".
[However, this doesn't mean that Philosophy must now become a
sub-branch of Linguistics. I will say more about that elsewhere; in the meantime, the reader
should consult Kindi (1998).]
To be sure, there is nothing in this Essay to suggest that we
must accept something just because Wittgenstein said it; nor is it being denied
that some of his ideas are difficult to understand. However, to implicate his
work with that of 'naturalistic' sociologists -- as Bloor himself does --
amounts to a gross
misrepresentation of his method, whatever else one makes of it.
36. Of course, that isn't the only consideration that recommends the adoption of this
approach to language. Alternatives soon decay into incoherence, as we have seen. That, on its
own, should be enough.
Incidentally, this latest point brings
out the grain of truth in Lenin's comments about 'the tumbler', which we met in
Essay Ten Part One. The meaning we
give to a term (in our collective, practical application of it) delineates the scope of its
generality, the totality of what we take to be its legitimate instances
--, even if this totality has indistinct boundaries, or none at all, and even if
this changes over time. That is perhaps the only way the DM-"Totality" can be given some sort of sense
(in this respect) -- that is, if it is interpreted anthropologically.
And that
is all to the good, too, since, as we have seen, no sense
can be attached to this term
(in the way that DM-fans try to use it).
Again, it needs emphasising that the comments in this Essay don't mean that scientific truth must be relativised to a
"conceptual scheme"
(etc.). [On that, see Sharrock and Read (2002).]
In order
for truths (or, indeed, falsehoods) to be stated, confirmed or refuted,
they should first
make sense; they must be capable of being understood by those who use
them, or who read/hear them. With respect to empirical propositions, this means that whatever
constitutes their sense must be anterior to whatever determines their truth-values. If the sense
of an empirical proposition is constituted by its truthconditions,
not its actual or presumed truth-value, communication between language users (at
this level, with respect to empirical propositions, indicative sentences, or sentence
fragments/clauses, at least) becomes possible. Given this view, the comprehension of an empirical
proposition involves grasping the conditions under which it would be true or
would be false -- independently of knowing which of these is actually the
case. Understanding such propositions doesn't, therefore, require
knowing whether they are true, or
knowing whether they are false, just what would make
them true -- and thus, ipso facto, what would make them false.
[These two options are both connected to the content
of a given proposition. On that, see here.]
In that case, lack of knowledge
of the actual truth or the actual falsehood of any sentence in question
wouldn't prevent its comprehension, and thus it wouldn't prevent communication. Hence, it is possible
(but not necessary) for interlocutors to engage in conversation before they know whether the sentences they use
are true or whether they
are false; indeed, they might never find out which of these alternatives is in
fact the case. For
example, it is currently possible to discuss whether or not there is life on Mars
(using sentences like, say, V1, but more concisely, V2) before anyone
knows if there is any life there, just as it is possible to hypothesise about the whereabouts of
Shergar even
though we might never find out the truth about his disappearance, and so on.
[That would be impossible given the referential and representational view of
language.]
V1:
Formations similar to
Stromatolites, which are formed by microbe colonies on Earth, show there is
life on Mars. [Partially quoted from
here.]
V2:
There is life on Mars.
V3*:
There is schmife on Schmars.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
Scientists can discuss, and therefore understand, V2, even before they know
whether it is true (or know whether it is false). Admittedly, V1 and V2 are far
more complex than M6, but that doesn't affect the point being made: that
scientists have to understand these two before they can ascertain their
semantic status -- or they wouldn't know what to look for or what to
investigate. Compare them with V3. [The use of an asterisk indicates a
non-standard sentence -- to put it mildly!]
If this weren't the case, communication would break down. Imagine
trying to grasp what someone said if, in order to do so, you had to know in
advance that what
they said was true, and what its actual truth consisted in. [Here, of course, I am referring to grasping the
sense of a sentence, not an attempt to
ascertain
speakers' meaning.]
Of course,
failure to do the first of the above would make the second
impossible.
It could be argued that
if someone lacked knowledge of certain word (maybe they had never heard them
before, or they were specialist/technical terms), then communication would be
threatened (as, for example, we see in V3), which means that the above analysis
is misguided.
But,
that objection rests
on another confusion. Trivially, lack of knowledge of (certain aspects of) language does indeed cripple
communication, but facility with language isn't like learning ordinary empirical facts.
Learning the meaning of new words is an extension to comprehension, not
knowledge -- unless, of course, we mean by "knowledge", "knowing how" not
"knowing that" (on that distinction, see
here). It is this extension to understanding that
then enables the individual concerned to
access knowledge -- or, come to know something. While
it might look like it is merely a fact that a word means this or that -- so, for instance,
it might seem to be a fact that in English "vixen" means "female fox" --,
the meaning of a word isn't based on that supposed linguistic fact but on the use to which it has
been, is still being, and should be put. The import of the rules we have for the use of
words is, ipso facto, part of what enables learners to continue to
employ them correctly -- which use has to mesh with words they already comprehend,
as well as with practices into which they have already been inducted, or with which they are
becoming familiar -- if words are to
mean anything to them. So, learning new words doesn't amount to learning new facts,
but to an acquisition of, or an extension to, a certain skill.
If it were a mere fact
that the following were true:
F1:
"Vixen" means "female fox,"
it could be false. But,
as we have seen, F1 can't be false
without the subject of that sentence changing. In that case, F1 would
then be about the meaning of a typographically
similar inscription -- that is, it would concern the meaning of a different word. Either that, or it would
represent a simple rejection of this rule. [On that, see Note 60.]
As we have
also seen, this
approach to meaning and sense re-locates this skill and facility with language in the
public domain, as opposed to situating either or both in an
individualised. private region of someone's brain, which relocation is precisely
what one would expect of a social account of language.
"Meaning does not reside
in the word or in the soul of the speaker or in the soul of the listener.
Meaning is the effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced
via the material of a particular sound complex."
[Voloshinov (1973), p.102. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Unfortunately,
although Voloshinov emphasised the social nature of language and communication
(as opposed to its alleged individualised and representational role, at least as
far as meaning is concerned), he turned out to be an unreliable recruit (as we
found out in Essay Thirteen
Part Three).
On the
non-cognitive skills upon which language mastery is based, cf., Robinson (2003b). See also
Glock (2004); but, once more, this should be read in the light of Bloor (1997), and Kusch
(2002, 2006). See also much of Hanna and Harrison (2004).]
Such rules thus enable
greater facility in language and hence permit wider and more effective
communication.
Using
Wittgenstein's terminology, among other things the meaning of words and the
sense of propositions in general depend on "logical grammar"
-- the manner of their construction (or in the case of words, their use) -- and the role
they play in our lives. [An
example of this will be given below. In
the case of empirical propositions, this also includes the
conditions noted in the main body of this
Essay. However, readers should also take note the remarks posted
here.]
[It is worth underlining
the reason for an addition of the phrase "in general", used above. Without that, this would imply that language
does indeed have an 'essence'.]
When coupled with the
criteria we have for the application of certain words, these constitute
what we (through inter-social agreement in action) count as the truth conditions for
the proposition in question, if those words are so used in the said proposition.
[On criteria, see here.]
This might seem to make
truth itself dependent on human choice/behaviour, when it is surely dependent on the way
the world happens to be. Unfortunately, this once again confuses the truth-value
of an empirical proposition with its
truth conditions. The truth-values of empirical propositions are
indeed sensitive to the way the world happens to be, but that isn't the case
with their truth conditions.
[On
that, see here and here.]
[Admittedly, the phrase
"the way the world happens to be" is itself rather vague; it will be sharpened
considerably later on in this Essay. Its use here shouldn't, however, be
confused with its employment in the
CRT.]
Because
the aforementioned criteria are socially-conditioned, empirical
sense is dependent both on practice and on the material relations
humans have with one another and the world. Since truth-values are determinable by
reference to reality, scientific knowledge (expressed in and by empirical
propositions, not natural laws (which are themselves forms of representation or
rules)) is ultimately dependent on the
world --, even while such knowledge isn't independent of, or insensitive to, wider social factors. It is, after all,
human beings who have to decide under what conditions a proposition is
or isn't to be counted as true, and because we are
social beings such decisions can't be divorced from wider social and historical
factors. But, of course, the final arbiter here (in relation to empirical
propositions) are the facts of the
matter.
[Further discussion of
this topic would take us too far into Wittgenstein's philosophy of
language. For a brief account of some of the central issues concerned, see Glock (1996),
pp.98-101, 124-29, 150-55, and 315-19. A much more detailed list of relevant references can be found
in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
However, it is worth
adding that most of
Wittgenstein's commentators appear to have ignored the connection between the
social nature of language and his method. Even those who at least
make any gestures in that direction generally fail to develop them in anything like a satisfactory manner; they certainly fail openly to acknowledge the central role social and historical factors play in Wittgenstein's work
(except, perhaps, to render it lip-service). The problem with much of the writing in
this genre is that even where such factors are taken into account, they
are invariably given an a-historical twist. This unfortunately makes it
entirely mysterious how language is connected with human beings and their
historical development, as
opposed to cardboard cut-outs-of-human-beings who have no history or who
don't live in class-divided societies -- almost as if they have been beamed in, en
masse, from another planet. So, given the way that this
topic is addressed in much of the literature it is almost as if human practice
(and all that that entails)
descended from the skies.
[A notable exception
to that generalisation is
Robinson (2003). See also his
essays.]
For instance, Meredith Williams's otherwise excellent
work is seriously undermined by her open and explicit rejection of
HM. [Williams (1999b), pp.280-81.]
Another recent example along similar lines is O'Neill (2001). However, that major
gripe won't be explored any further here; it would, anyway, require the
setting up of detailed interconnections with, and within, HM, a topic that is largely
ignored at this site.
[HM = Historical Materialism.]
36a.
The difference between non-sense as
such and
incoherent non-sense will also be explained.
38.For example, if someone were to
report the following:
D1: NN asserted that Rrr Gggr is ttyhh,
we
wouldn't know what to make of it (saving, of course, rather odd, unusual or special surrounding circumstances --
for example, if D1 were a code of some sort). However, if the following 'explanation' were now
offered:
D2: What NN meant by "Rrr Gggr is
ttyhh" is
"Gptyur is rtyeue",
we would still be unable to make
any sense of it. The prefixes "NN asserted
that…" and "NN meant…" (or even "What I meant...") can't
of itself turn babble into meaningful language any more than
"MM paid...for..." can turn a bucket of cat droppings into money:
39.
Issues connected with
trying to make sense
of the rather odd things people sometimes come out with are examined in more detail in several articles in
Crary and Read (2000) -- for example, Cerbone (2000). Cf., also
Conant (1991),
Diamond (1991), Lippitt and Hutto (1998) and Robinson (2003).
39a. In what follows, an implicit use
will be made of the LEM (as a rule of language, not as an a priori
'truth'). Dialecticians, of course, take exception to the
universal application of this 'law', especially in relation to change. However, we have already seen that
few, if any, of them
manage to get this 'law' right, even while they themselves have to appeal to it,
or even use it,
repeatedly (albeit this is often implicitly in order) to make their
theories even seem to work. For example, I can think of no
sane or sober DM-fan
who would argue that the sentence, "Karl Marx is the author of Das
Kapital Volume One" is neither true
nor false -- nor yet that it is true and false -- it is one or the
other. They all choose one of these options, that it is indeed true.
[LEM = Law of
Excluded Middle.]
So,
to take another example, with respect to the theory, "Motion is the mode of the existence of matter",
as far as DM-theorists see things, the only
two options available are (i) true or (ii) false. Dialecticians opt for the former
and reject
the latter.
Hence, in answer to the question: "Is motion the mode of the existence of mater or
not?", not one of themwill then quote Hegel:
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence,
§119.
Bold emphasis added.]
Or
even Engels:
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or
does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else.
Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in
a rigid antithesis one to the other.
"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is
that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable
fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful
adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the
metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a
number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular
object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it
becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In
the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them;
in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of
that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood
for the trees." [Engels
(1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"For a stage in the outlook
on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all
opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical
method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no
hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which
bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises
also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is
the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage.
Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical
categories retain their validity." [Engels
(1954), pp.212-13.
Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Indeed, it is perfectly clear why they wouldn't quote the above in answer to
that question: if they were to do that
they would then have to admit openly that an acceptance of P4 (below) commits them to
just such a "fixed and rigid", "hard and fast" line -- motion is either a
mode of the existence of matter or it isn't -- but not both -- it is
the former.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Just
as it is perfectly clear why they have to adhere -- surreptitiously -- to this
"fixed and rigid", "hard and fast" line: nothing determinate about the world could be proposed (i.e., "be
put forward for consideration") without accept a valid use of the LEM -- again, as a
rule of language, not a
Super-Truth about
'reality', or even a 'law' about language, logic
and the world.
If and when
this 'law' is applied to
change, DM-theorists often assert that it breaks
down. But that claim is what actually breaks down, as P5 clearly
demonstrates:
P5:
The LEM either breaks down when applied to motion and change or it
doesn't.
DM-theorists opt once more for the first half of P5: that the LEM breaks down when
it is
used in connection with motion and change, thus applying yet another hard-and-fast line, in defiance of their
own criticism of such rigid distinctions!
So,
DM-qualms -- should they be aired in relation to that earlier use of the LEM --
would be, at best, irrelevant; at worst, self-refuting.
[The
reader is directed
to
these
more detailed comments about the LEM and for a consideration of the serious problems associated with
the usual DM-criticisms of this 'law'. The word "law" is in 'scare quotes'
here since the
LEM isn't a law but a rule of language (however else it might be
interpreted by some logicians).]
40.This is the
requirement of bi-polarity mentioned in the Preface
to this Essay, which protocol constitutes one of the fundamental insights of
Wittgenstein's
Tractatus
[Wittgenstein (1972)]. On this see White (1974, 2006), Moyal-Sharrock (2007),
pp.33-51, and Palmer (1988, 1996, 2011).
40a. There is more on
that in
Essay Three Part Four. This is the same bottomless hole Lenin dropped himself into, in
MEC. On that, see
Essay Thirteen Part
One. Indeed, this is just one of the fatal weakness of
Representationalism.
However,
some might wonder about
the status of patent
truths, such as "Water is wet", or
"Fire burns". In such cases, truth and meaning seem to go hand-in-hand, so
that, for example, knowing what the word "water" means is ipso facto
to know it is wet.
That isn't quite right.
The truth of sentences like these plainly wasn't originally established by the
simple expedient of inspecting the
words they contained. Their actual truth had to be determined at some point
by some sort of confirmation or interface with the world -- or, in some cases,
this will have been the result of a stipulation of some sort (based on the same). Of course, mundane
truths like these have now been "put in the archives" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein),
so to speak, and no one in their right or left mind
would think to question them. But, their actual truth depends on their being confirmable,
or on their having been confirmed at some point by reference to the world, not as a
sole result of linguistic
or conceptual analysis, or by the operation of thought alone. For example,
a child won't learn that water is wet merely by inspecting the
words or concepts involved; nor will he/she learn it by simply thinking
about water. At some point, that child will have to experience the wetness of
water and be taught to describe it using this word and associated terms (i.e.,
they would have to be told that this
is what "wet" means -- that can, of course, take place directly or indirectly).
Naturally, having learnt when to use this particular word, a child might take on trust or
accept by hearsay that other liquids are wet, too. But, no one learns such things by
simple contemplation, and on that alone.
[On testimony, see Kusch (2002). For a
different view, see Lackey (2008).]
[Compare this with
Wittgenstein's remarks on
The Standard Metre -- Wittgenstein (2009), §40,
p.29e. On that, see Baker and Hacker (2005a), pp.189-99, Diamond (2001), Jacquette (2010),
Malcolm (1995b), and Pollock (2004); a copy of the latter can be accessed
here (this
links to a PDF).]
Others might wonder about
the status of propositions which are unquestionably empirical, but which nonetheless express
certainties (of the sort that exercised, say,
George Moore) -- such as our 'knowledge' of our own names, the content of
our memories, the fact that we (or most of us) have two hands, or that we all
have parents (even if in some cases we might not know who they are), etc. However, as is the case with the previous examples, the truth
of none of
these was ascertained by thought alone. [On this, see
Wittgenstein (1974b). See also Michael Williams (1999), Moyal-Sharrock (2007), and Moyal-Sharrock
(2013), pp.362-78.]
This isn't to suggest
that we can't infer from an already accepted truth, or set of truths, another empirical truth,
or truths. Indeed,
scientists do this all the time. But, even here, exceptional
circumstances to one side, no scientist would accept propositions like "Copper
conducts electricity" as true or even unquestionably
true until they had been confirmed in some way, at some point, by someone, or
some team of researchers, howsoever long ago that might be.
Some might
object that this can't be correct. For example, if a language-user didn't know
that water was wet, we would be reluctant to credit them with understanding
these words.
In response, it is
worth directing the reader's attention to a distinction
Wittgenstein drew between
what he called
criteria and symptoms. [This links to a PDF.] Because of that
distinction, what might
at first sight appear to be an empirical
proposition -- or, indeed, what had once been regarded as an empirical proposition --, could in fact assume a radically different
role or logical status.
Symptoms are
those facts which we regard as lending support to, or which tend to confirm the truth of, say, an hypothesis
or tentative statement, whereas a criterion supplies conclusive proof, or helps
provide such proof, of its
truth -- or, indeed, of the proper application of an expression, such as "water" (with or without the use of other relevant criteria); or criteria help determine whether
a given sentence or claim can even count as
true, or whether an object has been, or can be, classified correctly.
Hence,
a plane figure possessing three straight intersecting edges would be
a criterion for something to count as a triangle (or for calling it one), whereas a pavement being wet would
merely be a symptom that supported a claim, or which lent credence to the supposition, that it had been raining
in the vicinity. On the other
hand,
wetness would now be one of the criteria that could/would be employed in
order to decide if a certain liquid was water (but it wouldn't be the only
criterion,
of course). However, the absence of wetness on its own would provide conclusive proof that
the liquid in question wasn't water. So, for example, liquid Mercury
doesn't feel wet to human skin, just cold. However, other obvious properties of Mercury
would clearly distinguish it from water well before it was allowed anywhere near
unprotected skin.
[Naturally,
that depends on how "wet" is itself to be defined. If it is taken to mean that a
certain liquid contains water, then the above criterion would more closely
resemble a colloquial tautology. It should go without saying, however, that the everyday meaning of "wet"
must be distinguished from the scientific term, "wetting".]
Furthermore, what had once been regarded as
a symptom could later become a criterion. For example, the observation that
acids turned certain substances red was once regarded by medieval dyers
and painters as an interesting fact about acids. That
quirk was originally viewed, therefore,
as a symptom. Later, this peculiar fact about acids was employed by
Robert Boyleas a way of detecting, or of deciding upon, the presence of acids. It thus became a
criterion --
later used universally in connection with, for instance,
Litmus Paper.
Of course, we use
other pH-Indicators
these days, but that just means this criterion has (or these criteria
have) now become more
varied and complex. The distinction itself still remains valid -- indeed, as
Peter Hacker notes:
"It is
true that we can, in certain cases, transform an empirical proposition into a
rule or norm of representation by resolving to hold it rigid.... It was an
empirical discovery that
acids are proton donors, but this proposition was
transformed into a rule: a scientist no longer calls something 'an acid' unless
it is a proton donor, and if it is a proton donor, then it is to be called 'an
acid', even if it has no effect on litmus paper. The proposition that acids are
proton donors...has been 'withdrawn from being checked by experience but now
serves as a paradigm for judging experience'. [This is a quotation from
Wittgenstein (1978), p.325 -- RL.] Though unassailable, so-called necessary
truths are not immutable; we can, other things being equal, change them if we so
please.... But if we change them, we also change the meanings of their
constituent expressions...". [Hacker
(1996), p.215. Link added.]
None of this
affects the ideas being aired in this Essay since criteria are also rules.
That is, we appeal to various criteria (as rules) to decide if a substance is water, or if another is an
alkali, etc. Indeed, they comprise a form/norm of representation.
Each one is "So to speak an empirical proposition hardened into a rule."
[Wittgenstein (1978), p.325.]
[On this, see Glock (1996), pp.93-97. More details can be found in
Albritton (1959), Canfield (1981), pp.31-148, Harrison (1979), pp.49-58, Harrison (1999), Hacker (1993a),
pp.243-66, Hanfling (2002), pp.38-50, Loomis (2010), McDowell (1982), Wright
(1993) and Hertzberg (2022) -- the latter of which corrects several errors
committed by earlier interpreters of Wittgenstein.]
This helps answer
objection (1), from earlier. Owning a book can
be rather vague and surrounding details may sometimes be rather involved. In which case, M6 could be deemed true under a host of
varying
conditions (i.e., the criteria could be both varied and complex, just as they can
differ between cultures and historical periods -- or, indeed, between diverse
social groups and communities). For example, at present in the UK (and all other
'advanced economies' it seems), Blair would be deemed to own the
said book, if: (i) He bought it himself, (ii) It was bought for him as a present, (iii) It
was a gift from the publisher, the author or someone else, (iv) He won it in a raffle, or
some other competition, or (v) He inherited it, and so on. If at least one of (i)-(v) (etc.) were the case,
Blair would be credited as the owner of the said book. How he came to own it -- providing it had been
'legally obtained' -- is therefore irrelevant in this respect.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
[As should seem obvious
owning a book isn't the same as having that book in one's possession,
either permanently or temporarily.
One can own a book and not have it in one's possession -- for example, if has been
loaned, confiscated, lost, stolen or destroyed (etc.) --, and one can have a book
in one's possession without owning it -- for instance, if it has been borrowed,
stolen, found, planted, or if it is being held for safe-keeping (etc.). Of
course, all of these options have been complicated somewhat by the arrival of
e-books.]
Let us now generalise
this and suppose that there
is or might be a set of situations/circumstances the obtaining or the
happening of which allow us to count (or which allow
some other group or culture to count) an individual (in this case, Blair) as owning a given book (that
is, if they possess such a concept -- as noted above, these criteria can change over time
and between cultures)
--
say: S1,
S2, S3,...,
Sn.
Let us
call
this set, "S".
[Where S1,
S2, S3,...,
Sn stand
for situations or circumstances like those mentioned above, and here relate to
such sentences about Blair. These alternatives could, of course, be expressed propositionally**, or
left as verb or noun phrases -- but the latter will be held to be the
case, or held not to be the case, if they apply in relation to indicative
sentences like M6b or M6c.]
Hence, M6 would be true
if at least one element of S were itself the case -- i.e., if some
sentence, "Wi",
expressing at least one element, "Si",
were true -- false otherwise -- and where Wi
in this instance is M6b. So, if no element of S were the case,
Wi would now
be M6c. [But, see also here.]
Of course, this
puts pressure of what might count as a "situation", but that would
only serve either to lengthen or shorten the list, not eliminate it.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
M6b: At
least one element of S must the case with respect to Tony Blair.
M6c. No
element of S must the case with respect to Tony Blair.
In
that case, M6 and M6a would still be contradictories, since M6 would be true if
at least one of S obtained, and M6a
would be true if none did. [It is worth recalling that the quantifiers "At least
one..." and "None..."
are
contradictory functors.] Also worth pointing out is that sentences like M6b
and M6c express rules, so none of the above remarks contradict what was said
earlier -- i.e., that the sense of an empirical proposition doesn't
depend on the truth of any other. [Again, on this see White (1974).]
[**Incidentally,
I return later to consider cases
where rules can be expressed propositionally, or, indeed, with the use of
indicative sentences in general.]
It could be objected that M6 and M6a could both be false (in
which case they couldn't be contradictories). That would happen if, for instance, (a) The book in question had never been written
and we assume no one else is, has, or ever will write a book with that title, or (b) Tony Blair
has never
existed and we assume no one else is, has been, or ever will be called by that
name.
If either were the case,
M6 and M6a would both lack a truth value, and on that basis would cease to be propositions.
On the other hand, if (a) were the case, then
some might consider M6 false and M6a true -- but see my response to (vii), below.
However, in such circumstances, we would say something like this: "This
character 'Tony Blair' doesn't own a copy of
'The
Algebra of Revolution'
since no book with that title has ever been written or published or written and
no one with that name has ever existed, as far as we know!"
However,
as will be argued below, M6 and M6a would both fail to be propositions.
Under such
circumstances we would probably say something like this: "These two
propositions can't be contradictories until it had been shown that there has
been someone called 'Tony Blair' and that there has also been a book
written (and possibly published) with the said title."
Further consideration of this
particular alternative would bring us to the
second objection, which was that the claim that
someone owns something is itself rather vague. For example, if it were unclear what
(vi) The
Algebra of Revolution is or (vii) What owning something actually amounted to. [Of
course, there are other possibilities here, but my answer will take care of them
all.]
If (vii) were the case, then M6 and M6a would cease
to be propositions, let alone empirical (since it would then be unclear what
was being proposed or put forward for consideration -- that response also
applies to the above
objection), and so they couldn't
contradict one another -- except, perhaps, in a figurative or fictional
sense. However, just as soon as these ambiguities (and any others
that have yet to be, or which could possibly be, suggested) had been cleared up (by whatever means), then M6
and M6a would once again become contradictories. On the other hand, if they can't be cleared up (either in
practice orin principle), then the concept of ownership might itself be
thrown into question, which would mean that M6 and M6a would cease to be propositions,
once more -- since, once again, it would be unclear what was being proposed,
and I would have to come up with
some new examples, maybe these two:
If anyone wants to question whether these two
are contradictories, I
can only wish them "Good luck!"; any such brave individuals should email me with
their best shot.
Finally, if (vi)
were the case, we would be back where we were earlier: M6 might be deemed false and M6a true (but my answer to
Option
(vii) could apply here, too).
It could be argued that the above
approach falls foul of the redundancy
objection, which goes something like the following, in this instance:
M6 is true if at least one (i.e., some) of S
obtain[s], but it is also true if one of S obtains along with some other
unrelated truth, say, T1.
For example, let us assume that
S1
is the following:
S1: Blair's legal purchase of the book and its current appearance
on one of his shelves.
[This, of course, makes
S1
a compound situation.]
As pointed out above, S1 could also be expressed in
propositional form, as, say, P1.
P1
would now be:
S2: Blair
legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves.
T1,
for example, might be the following:
S3: Paris is the capital of France.
That would
make the account presented in this Essay far too generous, for M6 would
then be
true if:
S4: Blair
legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves and Paris
is the capital of France.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
Or, so it might be claimed.
This is mistaken. The above 'difficulty' might be a problem for
logicians
(something that can be left to them to sort out), but it certainly isn't a
problem for ordinary language. It is difficult to imagine anyone in command on
their senses accepting the truth of M6 on the basis of S4
being the case.
[Of course, because T1
has itself been expressed in propositional form (cf., S3), we would be faced with an infinite regress here if some
attempt were made
to specify the situations that made it true -- that is, if any randomly-selected truth
could also be tacked on to T1, as well.]
It is important to note that the way the above has been presented
seems to base this account on the
nominalisation of indicative sentences -- so that "Blair legally purchased
the book and it is now sat on his shelves" has been turned into the compound
noun/verb phrase "Blair's legal purchase of the said book and its current
appearance on his shelves". That niggling detail will be tackled in Essay Ten Part Two. For
present purposes all that needs to be said is that the obtaining of the following:
"Blair's legal purchase of the said book and its current appearance on his
shelves"
can also be expressed by an indicative sentence, namely "Blair
legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves"
-- i.e., S2/P1.
S2: Blair
legally purchased a copy of the said book and it now sits on one of his shelves.
Such
considerations might make this account
look as if it were identical to the
Redundancy and/or Deflationary Theory of Truth. It might, except I am not
propounding any sort of theory, here, since my account can't possibly cater for every
eventuality.
It is a defeasibleForm
of Representation. Moreover, the
elucidatory rules I summarised above
might
prove to be unworkable in some cases, and would need to be revised.
As should
seem plain, I haven't dealt with every conceivable possibility/objection, but
then this isn't meant to be an academic exercise. A definitive treatment of just
this one topic (i.e., the content of this Note!) would require an
entire book devoted to it -- or, indeed, an entire PhD thesis.
However,
if anyone reading this has an objection they would like me to consider, or they
think my explanations above are far from clear, email me.
Finally, this account has nothing to do with the
CRT, either. That
topic will
also be tackled in Essay Ten Part Two.
40b. A 'Super-Truth'
is a sentence that superficially resembles an ordinary scientific truth
(such as "Copper conducts electricity"), but is in
fact nothing at all like any such ordinary truth. Super-Truths transcend anything the sciences could
possibly deliver, confirm
or confute. M8 and M9 from earlier are particularly good examples of this. Their alleged truth
depends solely on meaning, not on the way the world happens to be. They
tell us how the world, any world, must be.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
No amount of evidence can confirm or confute
these two; indeed, evidence is irrelevant to both. On this, see Note 41.
41.Quite the reverse, in fact; in this case, an Ideal sort of reality (or part
of it) becomes in effect the projection of such a 'thought' or proposition.
Hence, far from the proposition in question being a reflection of nature (as was
supposed to be the case), 'reality' becomes a construct created by 'thought'.
That is achieved by telling us what
the world must be like. The
logical properties of such 'thoughts', or 'propositions', determine the 'logical form'
of this (now) 'Ideal Reality',
not the other way round. This amounts, therefore, to yet
another inversion: 'thought' determines the fundamental nature of this 'Ideal
World', which is, of
course, why all such
theories collapse into, or imply, Idealism.
In Part Four of Essay Twelve, this
logical inversion (which parallels one such brought to our attention
earlier)
will be used to support the claim that the flip DM-fans say they have
inflicted on Hegel's system (in order to obtain 'Materialist Dialectics', as
'the dialectic' is put back 'the right way up') hasn't in fact taken place,
no matter what dialecticians might otherwise think or assert. Indeed, the projection from
thought, or from language, to the world lies behind something that will later be
called the "Reverse Reflection Theory" [RRT],
which implies that the world is
in fact thought-, or language-like -- since, on this view, key linguistic
features of that
theory have been
reified,
or alienated (i.e., they have become divorced from their roots in material
practice and discourse), and then
dogmatically projected onto nature. Forms of discourse thus delineate the form of the world.
This
traditional approach to 'philosophical knowledge' populates the Universe (or,
rather, it populates the part of it that supposedly underlies 'appearances') with
countless "Abstractions" and "Essences", which are little
more
than shadows cast on the world by distorted language. [This, of
course, endorses, extends and amplifies
a point made by Marx.]
As we can now see, this
means that these deformed aspects of discourse have been readinto
nature on the back of centuries of Traditional Thought (which dialecticians have
only extended into revolutionary theory) -- not derived from it.
Had they been derived from the world, the indicative sentences so
produced would be capable of being negated; but,
as we will see, they can't.
[The
significance of that seemingly irrelevant fact will also be explored. See also. Note 43a.]
An important strand in this logico-linguistic 'conjuring trick'
was exposed in Essays Two and Three
Part One,
where contingent features of
Indo-European Grammar (i.e., the subject-predicate form,
coupled with a specialised use of the verb "to be", as a copula) were read into
the world as fundamental logical features of 'Being', supposedly capable of revealing
all these supposed "Essences",
via the mysterious process of 'abstraction'. [On that, see Kahn (2003).]
[More on this below, and in Parts Five and
Six of this Essay, where we will see how Hegel further transmogrified this innocent-looking verb into an
all-embracing cosmic process -- "Becoming" --, powered by the
'contradictions' he was able to magic into existence as a spin-off of an egregious
and ham-fisted 'analysis' of
the LOI. (A
summary of these 'moves' can be accessed
here.)]
43.It could be argued
that Lenin was simply
ruling out the possibility of motion without matter. End of story! Move on...
There
are in fact several possibilities here: Lenin could be have been rejecting (a)
Immobile matter, (b) The movement of non-matter, or, (c) The separability of
matter and motion -- or, indeed, (d) all three.
(c)
has been dealt with in Note 43a.
However, if Lenin was ruling out either
or both of (a) and (b) he surely can't have done so
without thinking the forbidden words, "motion without matter", what they impliedor their content when situated in a sentential context. In that case, he must have
entertained the possible truth of at least one sentence that expressed this state of
affairs -- i.e., motion without matter -- while claiming no one
could do what he had just done, since it was "unthinkable"!
In short, he had to have some
understanding of what he was ruling out.
Otherwise, he would simply have been
using empty phrases.
43a. Once more, it
could be objected that it is perfectly clear what Lenin was rejecting: the
immobility of matter. However, as we have just seen, in order to do that,
Lenin would have to think the "unthinkable" by thinking about the
content of the offending sentences expressing that possibility. So, if it is possible to think
about the immobility of matter (even if only in order to reject it
out-of-hand, which he could only do if he knew what it was he was ruling out), the
immobility of matter can't be
"unthinkable" -- or, rather, the content of any sentence used to
assert its immobility couldn't even be entertained, even though it has just be
entertained in order to do just that. If it is indeed "unthinkable", not even Lenin could think it
or entertain it.
He can't have it both ways.
Of course, the use of
the word "thinkable" is
somewhat vague and ambiguous (in such
contexts). Consider one particular example: It is possible to 'think about'
four-edged triangles in the sense that one
intones, or entertains, those words, but since there is no such thing as
a four-edged triangle, it isn't possible to think about them! There is no
"them"!
Suppose someone asserts the following:
T1: Four edged triangles are unthinkable.
Whoever asserts T1 will have to know what
they were ruling out;
for instance:
T2: This plain one-dimensional
manifold has four intersecting
straight edges and is a triangle.
T3: A triangle is a
polygon
with three vertices
formed from the intersection of three lines or line segments.
In
this case, since nothing could count
as a four-edged triangle, ruling out this combination of words amounts to the rejection of
the use of the word "triangle" to describe what we would otherwise call a
quadrilateral, or perhaps a reminder to a novice that "triangle" is the
wrong word to use here. In that case, ruling out T2 amounts to the endorsement of a
linguistic rule that instructs us how to classify three-edged polygons, as triangles
--
exemplified in T3.
Now, if someone like Lenin wanted to treat T1 as a fundamental
truth about reality, as opposed to an indirect expression of a rule (e.g.,
T3), then he would have to know what state of affairs he was ruling out, which
would in turn mean that he would have to be able to think the content of T2, for
example, even if only to rule it out straightaway. But, if he can't do that, he would have
no idea what he was trying to rule in, either.
As we
will find out later, this 'quandary' takes
us to the heart of the 'problem', for we will see that such sentences (be they metaphysical
or even mathematical), have no
negations, even though what might look like their negations use a negative particle. This is in fact what makes M1a (and T1) problematic.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
T1: Four edged triangles are unthinkable.
So, the real problem isn't whether M1a
or T1 are or aren't 'thinkable', but the fact that they violate rules we
already have for the use of certain words. In short, as Wittgenstein noted,
metaphysics is based on confusion like this -- the misconstrual of linguistic
rules as if they expressed fundamental truths about reality. [On this, also see Note 44 and Note 43c.]
"As
for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold space to be
something merely relative, as time is; that I hold it to be an order of
coexistences, as time is an order of successions." [Alexander (1956), pp.25-26.
A different and more recent edition to the one I have used in this Essay can be accessed
here. (This links to a PDF.)]
[See also Vailati (1997), pp.109-37, and
Earman (1989). (This links to a PDF.)]
43c. The argument presented in the main body of this
Essay might appear to mean that no one could deny, for example, that an ordinary triangle
has four edges.
Z1: A triangle has four edges.
Z2: It is not the case that a triangle has four
edges.
If Z1 were to define a triangle then (if the argument in
the main body is to be believed), Z2 must have changed the subject and so can't
be about triangles, but must be about 'triangles'. That being the case,
Z2 can't be the negation of Z1, and so can't be used to reject Z1. But children
are often told that triangles do not have four edges, they have three. The same
goes for many other mathematical statements and denials --, for example, "Four is not
an odd number", "A hexagon does not have five edges", "π is not a rational
number".
As will be argued later on in this Essay,
mathematical propositions aren't to be compared with empirical propositions,
they are in fact rules for the use of certain symbols (or in some cases, words).
So, the negation of a mathematical proposition is in fact the rejection of a
rule.
But, Z1 isn't about
triangles to begin with.
It is in fact proposing a new rule for the use of a typographically identical
word, 'triangle'. This means that Z2 amounts to a rejection of that rule.
Mutatis
mutandis, the same goes for sentences like "Four is not an odd number", and
"A hexagon does not have five edges".
"π is not a rational number" is, however, different.
It was a mathematical
discovery that what later came to be called Real Numbers -- like
√2
and π -- weren't Rational. In that case, when it was determined that π wasn't a
rational number, that amounted to a change in the rules governing the use of
that symbol.
[Yes, I am aware that the Reals include the
Integers, the Rationals and the Natural Numbers; the only point I am making
above is that numbers like
√2
and π (and many others!) forced mathematicians to expand the concept
of Number by introducing Real Numbers.]
44.We
tend to receive, or 'hear', such propositions as if they were empirical (or,
rather, in relation to Metaphysics, as if they are Super-Empirical), as though
they are informing us of profound truths about, or which express principles that underpin,
reality (albeit, in this case, where such Super-Facts were held to be far more profound than mundane, everyday facts
--, or even scientific facts). This is indeed why many
of us slip so easily into a metaphysical or dogmatic mind-set.
Traditional
philosophical theories are supposed to express fundamental 'truths' about an unseen, hidden world that
lies behind, or which is anterior to, empirical-reality or 'appearances'. These
'Cosmic Verities' are 'Super-True'
because they reflect this secret world (and one that is 'more real' than the
physical universe), -- which means these 'Truths' can't be false.
That is certainly how they have always been received, at least by Traditional
Thinkers and any who attend to, learn from, or have been influenced by, them.
Hence,
if and when we internalise the Traditional View of 'Reality', or allow it to influence us, we
pretend to ourselves that we can grasp the presumed sense of the indicative
sentences that express these 'Cosmic
Verities', and hence that we (somehow) know the conditions under which they would be true (or,
as the case may be, would be false). After all, that is how we have been socialised to receive
ordinary empirical propositions, which these 'Super-Truths' superficially resemble. Sentences that masquerade as empirical
propositions are received in like manner. If 'true', their 'truth' seems to follow from
the meaning of the words they contain or the concepts they express -- or, the
opposite if they are
'false'. We can see that that is so since we tend to accept their 'truth' (or otherwise) --
or at least we suspend judgement -- before we have examined any
evidence;. All we have to do is read some words, and the 'truth' of these
'Super Verities' seems to follow (or the opposite if they are 'false'). At a minimum, thought alone,
or language alone, is all the 'evidence' we appear to need, or require, in such
cases.
But, as soon as we
reflect on them (in the manner illustrated in this Essay, and at this site) we
soon see they can't be viewed the traditional way, since one or other of their
semantic options (i.e., truth or falsehood) has been closed-down --, which, as we have
also seen,
has the knock-on effect of shutting both down.
And
it is this that lies behind the
genuine
puzzlement, if not consternation, dialecticians feel (or express) when
they are told -- as they have been at this site (and by yours truly, in debate
on-line, or in person) -- that no one
"understands" their theory: not Engels, not Plekhanov, not Lenin, not Mao, not Trotsky...
Since the supposed truth of DM-claims depends on the
putative meaning of the words/concepts by means of which they are expressed, no wonder
DM-fans assent to their veracity as soon as they have 'understood'
them and are
genuinely nonplussed (or, in many cases, angered) when they are told that they
themselves don't, and can't, understand their own theory.
In such
cases, however, it is little use
DM-fans trying to provide more evidence in order to convince doubters since the presumed truth of their theories is independent of the evidence
-- and that
helps explain why they almost invariably respond as follows: "Well, you
just don't understand
dialectics". That, of course, gives the game away since it shows that even
DM-fans (implicitly) realise that their theory is based on the
comprehension of the language they have used, not on the evidence.
[And we have
already seen that what DM-fans have
already offered as supporting 'evidence' -- if such it may be called --, is more
accurately to be described as Mickey Mouse evidence.]
DM-theorists are so used
to accept their 'laws' in the above manner -- as, indeed, tradition has taught them
to receive and then process such a prioriSuper-Truths
(i.e., as a legitimate part of 'genuine philosophy')
--, that it seems perverse, if not offensive, to claim that they
themselves do not comprehend their content. But, since DM-theories have no content -- merely a jargonised, ersatz
sort of 'content' -- there is nothing there for them, or anyone, to understand.
So, telling them that they don't understand their own theory isn't to malign
them, but to make a logical point about DM itself.
[We saw this here,
in relation to
the
idiosyncratic, dialectical use of the word "change", for instance,
and here over their criticisms of
the LOI,
here in their ideas about motion,
here and
here over 'the process of
abstraction', etc., etc. And we have witnessed it,
too,
in this Essay in connection with Lenin's
declarations about motion and matter.]
This isn't, of course,
unconnected with the continual slide into incoherence of every single DM-thesis.
[On this, see also Note 45.]
45.
As we will soon
see, this pretence -- or, rather, charade -- often involves those who claim to 'understand'
DM in spinning increasingly
baroque
'elucidations', composed of little other than complex webs of jargon, stitched
together in a vain attempt to 'explain' or elaborate on the last batch of jargon
-- an excellent recent example of which can be found
here.
This process results in the creation of increasingly
reconditesuper-webs of self-referential
jargon with nothing to ground it in ordinary language or
everyday life -- Hegel's Logic, of course, being
the paradigm example of this (with Heidegger's work on the sub's bench).
Such attempts at 'clarification'
are, alas, no more illuminating than the tales spun by Christian
Theologians/Mystics when they
try to 'explain', for instance, the
Incarnation of Christ -- except, they are at least open
and honest about the fact that that doctrine is
an unfathomable "mystery". Not so our very own Dialectical Mystics
with their 'theory'.
Francis Bacon summed-up this mind-set admirably well (although he
confined his criticism to the tangled web of 'verbal spaghetti' weaved by Medieval Schoolmen, i.e., the
Scholastics,
but it is just as applicable to those who try to 'explain' Hegel -- upside down
or 'the 'right way up'):
"This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the Schoolmen: who
having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety of
reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly
Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of
monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of nature or time,
did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out
unto those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is
the contemplation of the creatures of God, works according to the stuff, and
is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider works his web,
then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for
the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit." [Bacon
(2001),
pp.25-26. Bold emphasis added; Stuart/Elizabethan English replaced by modern English.]
"44. Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men's
minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from
the perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the
theatre. For we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received or
imagined, as so many plays brought out and performed, creating fictitious and
theatrical worlds...." [Novum Organum, quoted from
here.]
45a.
Someone might object
that "not true" doesn't necessarily imply "false" (nor vice versa),
since the proposition in question could lack a truth-value (or it could even have a
third truth-value, "neither true nor false" -- or, worse, "both true
and false"). But, those alternatives, if they were viable to begin
with, would simply make us
reconsider what we should count as a proposition, or, indeed, as an empirical proposition
-- or, they might even prompt a re-classification of any indicative
sentence that was so semantically-challenged as, perhaps, non-factual. If
a proposition purports to be about the facts, the only two truth-values
available are true and false, otherwise it would be entirely unclear what was
being proposed or put forward for consideration, to begin with.
This,
of course, introduces controversial issues in the Theory of Meaning, the Philosophy of
Language and the Philosophy of Logic raised, for example, by the late
Michael Dummett
and the late Donald
Davidson (among others). It
also introduces 'problems' raised by
Graham
Priest. [On the latter, see
here.]
So,
someone might further object that to declare an empirical proposition "not
false" plainly doesn't mean it is true. For example, consider an empirical,
scientific proposition, V2:
V2:
There is life on Mars.
We
have currently no idea if V2 is false, so if someone were to assert:
V4: "V2 isn't false",
that wouldn't automatically imply it is true!
Or, so it might be argued...
Well, that confuses a logical-, with an epistemological-point
-- which is something the late
Michael Dummett tended to do -- a muddle further compounded by his conflation
of meaning with sense, when he linked the meaning of a proposition
with its "assertibility conditions" (on that, see Ellenbogen (2003),
pp.25-58).
While
we might not (currently) know whether or not V2 is false, we also don't know it is true. We are in no
position to assert either of these: that V2 is false or that V2 is true. But,
that doesn't affect the logical point that we can specify ahead of
time (plausible) conditions that would make V2 true or that would make V2
false, if they obtained or failed to obtain, as the case may be. We would have no idea how to go about even investigating the
semantic status of V2 if that weren't the case. [And that doesn't imply that
nature can't surprise us from time to time, only that we can now specify
in advance what would make V2 true and what would make V2 false -- i.e., in line
with what we currently know about nature.]
In
which case, V4 is really this:
V4a:
"We don't know if V2 isn't false",
and
that does imply the following:
V4b:
"We don't know if V2 is true".
[I will deal with Donald
Davidson's ideas in a later re-write of this Essay.]
However, at this site, an empirical proposition is taken to have a true-false
polarity (and that is because of the requirement that they are capable of being understood first
before their truth or their falsehood has been, or even could be, ascertained). [Again, I have said more about
this in Note 53and
here.]
It could be objected that the propositions advanced in this
Essay -- such as, "Metaphysical propositions are non-sensical" -- are self-refuting,
too, since they aren't empirical and yet they are also supposed to be true. If
so, they can't be false, either, hence they must be non-sensical
themselves -- that is,
if we are to believe what this Essay has argued.
This objection is based on the idea that there are only two
uses of the indicative mood: fact-stating and philosophical thesis-mongering.
The conclusion seems to be that I am either stating facts -- which could be
false --, or I am advancing a supposedly true philosophical theory of my own
about language, etc. If that were the case, what I have to say would
be
no less non-sensical. Hence, I would only have succeeded in refuting myself!
But, there
are other uses of the indicative mood, one of which features in the formulation
of scientific theories, that in general, don't state facts but express rules
scientists use to make sense of the world (at this site these are also called forms of
representation; more about that presently). And rules aren't the sort of
thing that can be true or false, only useful or useless, effective or
ineffective, practical or impractical, followed or broken, etc.
So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is
proportional to the applied force, he isn't stating a fact -- otherwise it could be
false. But if that were so, its falsehood would change the meaning of "force".
In that eventuality, what he had to say would be about something other than "force", as Newton
understood the term, in the
Second Law.
There he was proposing, or establishing, a rule that could be used
to study acceleration, among other things.
[Of
course, he
might not have seen things this way, but that doesn't affect the point being
made. Recall
the comments made at the top of this page:
This Essay "tackles issues that have sailed right
over the heads of some of the greatest minds in history...."
I will say more about why such 'Laws' are in effect rules in Essay Thirteen Part
Two. (Incidentally, this approach to scientific 'Laws' helps account for the odd
fact that they all
appear to "tell lies about nature". On that, see
Cartwright (1983).
{This links to a PDF.} Why that is so will also be explained in the aforementioned Essay.)]
At this site
I use several sentences (in the indicative mood) in the same way -- as interpretative, or
elucidatory,
rules --, except, in this case, I do so in order to show that philosophical theories
themselves are both non-sensical and incoherent.
At this
point, someone might
now refer to Wittgenstein's notorious comment:
"6.54: My propositions [Sätze -- sentences, RL]
serve as elucidations in the following way: Anyone who understands me eventually
recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when he has used them -- as
steps -- to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder
after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright."
[Wittgenstein (1972), p.151. Paragraphs merged.]
They
might
then claim (as, indeed, many have) that he only succeeded in refuting himself.
As I explained earlier, in
place of "nonsense" I prefer "non-sense",
and that is clearly what Wittgenstein also intended; that is, he was referring
to 'propositions' (sentences) which are incapable of expressing a
sense (Sinn). [The Tractatus
(i.e., Wittgenstein (1972)) pointedly
contrasts Unsinnig (non-sense) with Sinnloss (senseless) sentences.]
So, Wittgenstein's own Unsinnig sentences [Sätze] express rules
("elucidations") in what appear to be propositional (or sentential) form.
That is, they use the
indicative mood, by-and-large. He employed these elucidations in an endeavour make clear how
it is that some of our sentences are capable of expressing a sense (Sinn), how
others fail to express a sense (Sinnloss), and how some can't express a sense (Unsinnig). When that has been
achieved -- or when we grasp what
Wittgenstein was trying to say by these means -- we no longer need these rules and can "throw them away".
Once more, rules can't express a sense (they are Unsinnig); they aren't capable of being true or false, they can only be useful or useless,
practical or impractical, obeyed or disobeyed --, but that doesn't prevent us from understanding them
and the role they occupy (which
we plainly do once we realise they aren't like empirical propositions, or even
metaphysical pseudo-propositions --, they are, in this case,
elucidations), and this we do when we see, or come to appreciate, they aren't
incoherent non-sense. In that case, Wittgenstein was outlining, or proposing, a
set of interpretative rules that were aimed at rendering his analysis of language
clear.
Again, when Newton, for example,
tells us that the rate of change
of momentum is proportional to the impressed force he is (indirectly) informing us how he
intends to use certain words and how he proposes to make sense of nature by
means of them. His 'laws' elucidate his physics, and as such are rules.
[Again, I will say much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
But, why
"throw them away"? Well, consider someone who is trying to teach a novice how to
play chess, how the pieces move, how they can capture other pieces, etc., etc.
In so doing they will explain the rules of chess, often employing the
indicative mood: "The Queen moves like this, and this... the Rook like
this...". Of course, these rules can
also be expressed in the imperative mood, too -- for instance: "Move your Rook like this...",
or "The King has to move this way..." --, but that isn't absolutely essential. In addition, the rules
of the game can be taught by
practical demonstration -- by simply playing! Novices can even learn
just by watching others play, asking a few questions.
The rules of chess are also Unsinnig; they can't be true or
false. They aren't descriptive (they don't express facts); they are prescriptive
(they express rules). If they were descriptive they could be false. In that
case, for example, some other rule -- such as,
"The Bishop doesn't move diagonally, it moves in a zig-zag fashion" --
might then 'true'. But, "The Bishop doesn't move diagonally, it moves in a zig-zag
fashion" isn't an alternative rule for the Bishop in chess, since the way that
that piece moves
defines what the word "Bishop" means in that game. The rules of chess elucidate how that word
is used and how that piece has to behave. If a 'Bishop' were to move (legitimately) in
any other way, it would be part of an different game, not chess!
Some might
argue that a rule in chess such as, "The Bishop moves like this..." is
in fact true. So, the above comments are themselves false. But, if that were the case, "The Bishop moves like this..." would
then be descriptive, not prescriptive, making it an assertion,
which could be true or could be false. But, anyone who now claimed that such
rules weredescriptive (and, in this case, were also true) would have no answer to someone
else who retorted "Well,
I'll move this piece any way I like!". Other than an appeal to tradition, to how the
game has always been played in the past, they could make no effective response. So, in order to
proscribe the antics of such maverick chess players, "The Bishop moves like
this...", and sentences like it, would have to be viewed prescriptively, and thus
as rules, not descriptions. Rules are enforced, and are enforceable, because they are
prescriptive. It would make no sense to enforce a description -- unless it
were turned into a rule, and hence into a prescription.
Of course, "The Bishop moves like this..." is a correct (or true)
description of, or assertion about, a rule in chess, in the sense that anyone who used it would be
speaking truly about the rules themselves; but, the prescriptive nature of this
or any other rule doesn't depend on such truthful reports, but on the application of that rule, a
rule which
defines how certain pieces must move. They delineate what are and what
aren't legitimate moves in the game.
Once we have grasped these rules we can in effect "throw them away" (unless, of
course, we have to explain them to someone else, or appeal to them to settle a
dispute, etc.). So, how many times do players have to say to themselves once
they
have mastered the rules of chess: "The Rook moves like this, the Pawns like
that..."?
Every single Wittgenstein commentator has missed these simple points and
they then struggle to comprehend the Tractatus!
Now, I'm not suggesting Wittgenstein was crystal clear about
this (he wasn't a systematic philosopher at any point in his life, and
pointedly ignored criticism, both constructive and destructive), but it seems to me to be the only way to make the Tractatus
comprehensible, so that it doesn't self-destruct or morph into something
completely different (perhaps as a result of the rather extreme interpretations
suggested by,
for example, the 'New
Wittgensteinians'). [On that, see Crary and Read (2000), and Read and Lavery (2011).]
But, even if it could be shown that Wittgenstein
didn't hold this view, it certainly represents my view and my attempt to repair the
Tractatus.
46.Although
this supposed truth, or this supposed falsehood, is a 'gift'
bestowed on such
Super-Truths or Super-Falsehoods by those who, of course, appear to comprehend the alleged
meanings of the words they use, or have read, to that end. As we have seen, these 'truths' flow
solely from what certain words seem to mean.
But, many of the words employed by Traditional Theorists
in fact belong to a rather select, specialised vocabulary, or they are
simply technical terms. In many cases, they
are interminably obscure expressions which are 'definable' only in terms of yet more
specialised jargon, which never seems to 'touch the ground', as it were. And, as we will see in Essay Thirteen
Part Three, as well as below and in other Essays,
they can't be expressed in ordinary terms, in ordinary language.
[Readers
are directed to Chomsky's
words in connection with topics like this.]
For
Lenin, of course, the truth of M1a isn't like that of M2 or M3; he just says
that motion without matter is "unthinkable". He didn't even attempt
to supply evidence in support of that contention (and precious little supporting
argument either!). On the contrary we have already seen that
that idea (or its content) certainly is thinkable
(i.e., something like S1).
So, the 'truth' of M1a is
all talk and no walk.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M2: Two is a number.
M3: Two is greater than one.
S1: Matter
itself is motionless.
Of course,
that is because, for previous generations of Philosophers and Scientists who
accepted the theory expressed in S1, the word "matter" (in English, or any other
language that possessed such a word) had a different meaning. But that is part
of the point being made here. Change what Lenin, or any other theorist, meant by
"matter" and any sentences that used this word in such radically different ways
couldn't contradict one another. So, sentences like P4 and P4a below, for
instance, might look like they are contradictories, but since they
represent a change of subject/meaning, they aren't. They are contentless, empty
strings of words when they are interpreted as Super-Truths about
'fundamental features of reality', and not as (idiosyncratic) rules for the use
of words like "motion" and "matter".
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
P4a: Motion isn't the mode of the existence of
matter.
47. This
'ceremony' has typically been 'performed in the head' or 'the mind' of whomever is behind the invention of
each metaphysical fantasy. Often it is also accompanied by a 'thought experiment'
of some sort (several 'classic' thought experiments are outlined
here), which is partly why the 'underlying essences' beloved of Traditional
Theorists aresurprisingly easy to find -- but only by those with
more leisure time on their hands than is good for any human being, or, of
course, only for those who are capable of mentally stripping a concept down to its 'abstract' core,
inventing an entire phrasebookof impenetrable jargon along the
way.
DM-fans also
try to tell us that these 'easily accessed abstractions' "reflect" the world,
but more
fully and accurately after they have been tested in practice. However, as we have
seen several times in this Essay (and in Essays Three Parts
One and
Two, and Thirteen
Part Three), not only does this
approach seriously compromise their (avowed) commitment the social nature of
both language and knowledge, these 'abstractions' do not, and cannot, 'reflect' anything whatsoever
in nature and society, or, indeed, anything supposedly 'lying behind appearances'.
On the contrary, they are put to use imposing a certain structure on
'reality'. In this way the world comes to reflect an artificial 'reality',
one constructed by means of the philosophical language
invented for this very purpose, not the other way round. Yet another
inversion!
And that is, of course, why
metaphysicians and dialecticians are quite happy to impose their ideas on the world,
for their world is, and has always been, Ideal -- as Hegel himself pointed
out:
"Every philosophy is
essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the
question then is only how far this principle is carried out." [Hegel
(1999),
pp.154-55; §316.]
48.With respect to dialecticians, since their 'thought experiments' have largely
been lifted from Hegel work and other mystics, they are based on the former's
defective
'logic' and Idealist fantasies.
49.
"Persuasive definition" is a
term introduced into Philosophy by
C L Stevenson
in order to characterise attempts (made by certain thinkers) to re-define
controversial words in a way that manipulates, manoeuvres and this persuades the reader
into accepting a particular moral principle or doctrine disguised in terms of
what looks like a neutral definition. This
is achieved by re-defining
key words in ways that have 'acceptable' or 'useful' connotations favoured
by the definers themselves. This can also involve replacing descriptive with emotive language aimed at swaying the reader
in one particular direction. However, at this
site, this term won't be employed in the way Stevenson himself intended; it will be used purely
descriptively in relation to metaphysical, not moral, theories aimed at
predisposing a target audience toward accepting a particular 'view of reality'. In relation to
several
examples considered in these Essays we
are presented with what are already biased definitions
intended to persuade the reader to swallow the entire DM-enchilada.
So, we have already encountered three persuasive definitions in
this Essay:
(i) Where Engels and Lenin tell us (with no proof, and without even an
attempt at offering the reader the thinnest of supporting arguments!) that motion is the "mode
of the existence of matter";
(ii) Where Lenin attempted to re-define
"matter" in epistemological terms (we witnessed this in extensive detail in
Essay Thirteen Part One); and,
(iii) Where Hegel and Engels tried to re-define "metaphysics".
In other Essays we have seen DM-theorists redefine
the following: "contradiction", "opposite", "negation", "logic", "motion",
"place", "identity", "change", "internal", "quality", "commonsense",
"appearance", "truth", etc., etc., in like manner.
[Several more were examples of this
'tactic' were given in
Essay Two; another can be found in Essay
Eight Part Two.]
50.The same can be said about the odd idea DM-fans have
inherited from Hegel concerning identity and change -- some
things can be identical while not being the same, or how they can be
either equal and identical or equal
and not identical, and so on. Or, even how they can change while remaining the
same! [These topics are covered in
detail in
Essays
Five and Six.]
50a. In Essay Nine
Part One
we saw that the claim that certain words contained or implied their own opposites
originated in Hegel's work and that of other mystics. We also saw that this
idea fetishises
language, transforming
words into agents and their users into patients.
["Patient"
here doesn't refer
to those who need to see their doctor! It refers to anything that is acted upon
and which isn't therefore an actor or agent in its own right -- i.e., in the linguistic
sense outlined
here.]
I have said more about the provenance of this
'view of reality'
in Note 61 and Note 64.
51.As we will
see in Parts Two and Three of this Essay, that is precisely what motivated
Ancient Greek Philosophers to make linguistic moves like these, and it is also what has encouraged Traditional Philosophers to do
likewise ever since. [The background to these claims has been summarised
here.]
52.
In this
particular argument, I have blurred
the distinction we should normally want to draw between the meaning of a word and
the sense of a proposition. A more pedantic
deployment of that distinction wouldn't
alter the conclusions reached in the main body of this Essay, it would merely stretch the patience of
the reader.
[This topic
has been examined at much greater length in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Nevertheless, the principles governing the sense of an indicative
sentence depend on the use (and hence the meaning) of words like "true" and
"false". The claim in the main body of this Essay is that it is a radical misuse
of such words that lends to certain metaphysical theories their seeming 'necessity'.
Of course, unless we are very careful, if we speak about the meaning of an indicative
sentence (as opposed to its sense), we have already begun
to blur the distinction between words and sentences. That muddle caused widespread
and long-lasting confusion in Traditional Philosophy (and it still does, even among those who should know
better). However, providing we are careful
not to blur the distinction between words and sentences, there is no harm in
speaking of the meaning of such sentences.
There is another danger associated with
ignoring this
distinction that is important to guard against, too: if and when we speak about the meaning of a sentence, we risk falling into the trap that vitiated much of
Voloshinov's work (and that of his many DM-admirers). I have covered this
topic issue in detail
In Essay Thirteen Part Three,
Sections (4)-(6).
53.The following is a continuation of the comments posted
earlier (and will be understood more fully by those who have read them):
Throughout this site I have taken the word "false" to mean "not true" and the
word "true" to mean "not false" (at least in the
sentential contexts under examination
in this Essay).
Or, to be more precise, I have taken "false", when used to
characterise the semantic status of an empirical proposition, to imply the
following in relation to the said proposition: "Operate on this
empirical proposition with 'not' (or some other equivalently negative particle/phrase/inflection) to yield a truth".
That is because the indicative sentence in question, before it was operated on in this manner, must have been false
if it yields a truth when so operated on. I have also taken "true", when used to
characterise the semantic status of an empirical proposition, to imply the
following in relation to the said proposition: "Operate on this
empirical proposition with 'not' (or some other equivalently negative particle/phrase/inflection) to yield a
falsehood". That is because the indicative sentence, in question before it was operated on in this manner must have been false
if it yields a truth when so operated on. [I owe this formulation to
Peter Geach.]
Of course, in some contexts the above will involve a rather more complex use of
negative particles, or their equivalent.
Unfortunately, that characterisation is (obviously) circular, and so it depends on
already understanding the key words ("false" and "true") as they are used
in the vernacular. So, that characterisation merely explains the logical relation between
these two terms, not what they mean.
This supposition doesn't need defending,
either, since it is based on a reasonable
interpretation of the ordinary use of these expressions. Hence,
I am ignoring the alleged 'third semantic possibility' -- i.e., that "not true" or
"not false" imply "neither true nor false" when applied to
empirical propositions.
Elsewhere, I hope to say a little more about why this approach has been adopted
at this site --
alongside a few comments about another (fourth) 'semantic possibility', "both true
and false".
Also,
I am ignoring other, wider uses of these words, since they don't
feature in the sort of contexts examined here -- for example, the appearance of
"true" or "false" in phrases like "true friend", "false lead", "true colour",
"false beard", "false smile", "false laugh", etc. In Part Five of this Essay, I will return to
this topic, since it is connected with yet another serious blunder Hegel
committed.
If the above connections are rejected, then for an empirical proposition to be
true it would have to satisfy other conditions over and above merely not being false, and vice versa. In
certain specialist formal systems this might prove to be
an acceptable extension to -- or, indeed, alteration of -- the meaning of "true"
and "false" (and perhaps also of the meaning of "proposition"
and "negation") -- although the difficulties and problems such modifications introduce don't appear to be worth the candle!
However, such profligacy in ordinary language would make communication
impossible. By implication, this also would have a knock-on effect for scientific
discourse, which would in turn make science impossible.
For example, in the latter eventuality (ambiguity and rhetorical
import to one side, and if it were maintained that truth and falsehood
aren't mutually
exclusive (or aren't always mutually exclusive) in the above manner), then, if a theory, T, predicted that event, E, would take place
at time, t1, which prediction was itself subsequently verified
-- event, E, at t1
having been observed and recorded successfully --,
investigation would then have to be continued beyond that point to show that, although
the earlier observation had established the truth of the prediction, it hadn't
shown that itwasn't
false! But, what could possibly do that that the original
experiment/observation had
failed to accomplish? Similarly, for the converse eventuality: if T
predicts that E would take place at t1, which prediction was itself subsequently
falsified successfully -- event, E, at t1
having failed to occur --,
investigation would then have to be continued beyond that point to show that, although
the earlier failure to observe E had established the falsehood of the prediction, it
hadn't shown that it wasn't true! Again, what could possibly do that
that the original experiment/observation had
failed to achieve?
[In this, I am not committing the fallacy of
affirming the consequent, since I am not arguing that T is true
based on the truth of the prediction, merely that the prediction of E will have been
verified/falsified observationally, or in some other relevant and legitimate way;
and, on the basis of that, asking what further could be done to resolve this
manufactured 'difficulty'. I have also kept the above example very basic so that
the point I am making is much easier to appreciate.]
Of course, in some
areas of Physics it could be argued that
sentences are used that have 'indeterminate' truth-values (i.e., those that are
neither true nor false -- for example, in relation to so-called "Quantum Logic").
The question here, therefore, isn't whether
such propositions do or do not have indeterminate truth-values, but whether they
are (empirical) propositions to begin with. If they don't propose
anything (factually) determinate (if what is being offered up for consideration is unclear),
they can't be (factual) propositions, whatever else they
might be.
[On "Quantum Logic", however, see
Harrison (1983, 1985).]
Furthermore, in ordinary discourse (rhetoric to one side, again),
if someone speaks the truth we assume that what is said isn't false,
which we couldn't, or wouldn't, do if the truth of what was said didn't automatically imply that it was
also
not false.
In addition, and as indicated above, it isn't possible to
separate the use of the words "true" and "false" from the role of negation in ordinary language
-- which, of course,
operates in complex ways itself.
[Cf., Horn (1989/2001) for a detailed study.]
Another problem that has dogged much of previous thought in this
area is the
idea that negation is linked with falsehood, or 'privation'
(i.e., with a lack of something). But, negated propositions should neither be regarded as false
nor seen as expressing 'privations'. The sentence "The
Thames is not longer than the Mississippi" is true despite being the negation of "The
Thames is longer than the Mississippi". Moreover,
the sentence "Tony Blair is not dead" is the equivalent of "Tony Blair is alive"
(if we regard "dead" as synonymous with "not alive"), but "Tony Blair is not
dead" isn't expressing the lack
of anything (deadness?); indeed it is expressing the exact opposite -- the presence
of life!
[We will be looking at "Nothing" (and its supposed connection with 'lack of Being') in Part Five of
this Essay, but in the meantime, see
here.]
Nor should assertion be confused with truth. If someone asserts
that the Thames is longer than the Mississippi, that doesn't make it true.
Moreover, denial isn't the same as negation, nor is assertion the opposite of
negation. I
can assert that the Thames is not longer than the Mississippi just as I can assert the
opposite, that the Thames is longer than the Mississippi. If assertion were the opposite of negation, these
two would be the same,
which they aren't. [And I can deny both, too.] Assertion and denial are what we
do with sentences regardless of whether they are true or whether they are false,
negated or not. This can be seen from the fact that all known (natural) languages have
negative particles, but not one has a symbol for
assertion or denial. Admittedly we can use the negative particle to deny
something but we can also use it to assert something, so denial and negation
aren't the same. Hence, "The Potomac isn't longer than the Nile" is as much a
denial that the Potomac is longer than the Nile as it is an assertion that it
isn't.
Of
course, assertion and denial are often accompanied, or indicated, by
prosody, the use of gestures, facial expressions or even the context of an utterance, which make them what they are (i.e.,
they indicate or signal that what is said or implied is an
assertion or is a denial, among other things -- although these additional
considerations affect what is called speaker's meaning not word meaning;
on that, see
here).
But that is clearly a separate issue. I won't
enter into this topic in any more detail here since that will take us too far into
the murky depths of Philosophical Logic,
Sociolinguistics, and
Psycholinguistics. [On this, see Horn (1989/2001) and
Wansing
(2001). (This links to a PDF.)]
[I have
also
relied on unpublished lectures given by
the late
Professor Geach,
in 1977-78. If I can obtain permission from his literary executors, I will post
my detailed notes (at this site) at some later
date.]
"A
proposition is essentially that which is true or false...; and an apparent
proposition is nonsensical if you cannot give a coherent account of the
conditions under which it would be true or false. In this
way, the central question becomes: 'What is it for a proposition to be true or
false...?' But to be true or false...is to be answerable to something that sets
the standard for rightness and wrongness. The world is introduced here [by
Wittgenstein] simply as the sum total of that which sets the standard for
rightness and wrongness.... We thereby implicitly draw 'the limits of language',
in the sense that if someone puts forward an apparent proposition, where it can
be shown that they can give no coherent account of the way in which their
putative proposition stands in such a relation to the world as thus conceived,
then they have transgressed the limits of language and they have failed to give
any meaning to their apparent proposition." [White (2006), p.23. Paragraphs
merged.]
[Incidentally, the above book is
easily the best (currently available) introduction to the Tractatus. I distance myself,
however, from White's confusion of "sense" and "meaning" in
the above, and his use of
"relation" in connection with the presumed link between a proposition and the
world. I also think that White has failed to distinguish different sorts of
nonsense (or, non-sense, as I have characterised that neologism at this
site).]
Naturally, this puts much
weight on a clear account being given of
propositions,
just as it should depend on a defence of the use of that expression (as opposed to the
use of "sentence", à la
Quine or
Davidson, etc. -- or even "statement", à la
Oxford
Logic -- in its place); these knotty issues will be tackled elsewhere.
In the meantime, anyone
who objects to the use of "proposition" can substitute for it "indicative
sentence" (bearing in mind the fact that not all indicative
sentences are empirical), or perhaps even "statement" -- however, in
relation to "statement": same caveat. Moreover, many indicative sentences aren't
actually stated (i.e., asserted) -- "statement" thus falls
foul of what Professor Geach has called "the Frege point". On that, see
Geach (1972b, 1972c).
Quineans will object, too -- but, since they aren't likely to have much truck
with DM -- for the purposes of this Essay, they can object all they like.
On
this, see Wittgenstein (1974a), p.124, and, for example, Hacker (1996), p.288, n.65 and
p.318, n.13. Also see Baker and Hacker (1984), pp.168-205, and Glock (2003),
pp.102-36 (especially pp.118-36). See also, White (1971).
[Again, readers
shouldn't assume that I agree with everything that the above have to say.]
55.There is an excellent account of Wittgenstein's reasons for saying this in Baker
and Hacker (1988), pp.263-347.
This doesn't place a restriction
on what we are capable of discovering in nature, it merely sets limits to what
we can sensibly say about what we have found, or can find there, given the language we now
have. Of course, what we can sensibly, or even meaningfully, say will alter as language develops
(in
line with social change). In addition, it reminds us of the limited extent to which we can
distort
language before it ceases to say anything at all comprehensible.
[It is worth pointing out that in this work, I have ignored
the distinction philosophers have recently drawn between so-called
de dicto
and de re necessity, since it raises issues that are connected with
other topics discussed
later (concerning
LIE and the RRT). Hence, I
will postpone further comment until then.]
55a.
Unless, of course, we were
to regard a definition, or the linguistic expression of a rule, as a 'logical
truth'.
If we concentrate on a less stilted version of
M21, we still obtain the same result:
M2: Two is a number.
M21e: Two isn't a number.
We can see that M2 and
M21e fail to contradict one another, since the use of the word "two" has once
more changed between sentences. In addition,
these earlier comments about trivial cases might also apply to M21e, M21c and M21f.
M21c: The number two is a number and the number two is
not a number.
M21f:
Two is a number and two isn't a number
Incidentally, these facts alone refute Abstractionism -- the idea that both
numbers and our number system were 'discovered' by a process of 'abstraction'. I will leave that comment in its
present enigmatic form for now (but a moment's thought should make it clear why
it is correct).
[On this, however,
see Essay Three Parts One and
Two, and Frege (1953).]
However, if, as was pointed out above (i.e., in
Note 53), the use of negation in
ordinary language is analogous, or is closely similar, to that of a logical operator that maps truths onto falsehoods and falsehoods onto truths, then the
negation of a true proposition will ipso facto produce a false one, and
vice versa. If, however, it isn't possible for a sentence to be true, or
it isn't possible for it to be false (if, for instance, it is 'necessarily' the
one or the other, or the sentence itself is
non-sensical), then this use of the negative particle can't operate in such
a straightforward way. Hence, if the putative negation of a 'necessarily true'
or 'necessarily false' proposition causes it to disintegrate into incoherence (a
result we have witnessed many times in these Essays with respect to DM-theories),
it would appear to confirm the allegation advanced either that (i) the original sentence hadn't actually been negated (despite a negative
particle having been used), or (2) it wasn't an empirical proposition,
to begin with. Or, of course, (iii) both.
Admittedly,
the word "incoherence" (used above) is rather vague itself. But, it is possible
to form some idea of what it means in present
circumstances by considering a response Lenin might have made to someone
who attempted to negate the following sentence:
N2: Motion without matter is unthinkable,
by means of
this:
N3a: Motion without matter is not unthinkable.
Or, even:
N3b: Motion without matter is thinkable.
The only response Lenin could have made to the above would surely have been to argue that
the erstwhile negator of N2 had failed to understand the use of certain words.
And that response itself would be based on a prior acceptance of P4:
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Either that, or Lenin would have had to admit that he himself
just could not
understand this new set of words (i.e., N3a or N3b), and neither could anyone else
--,
since he had declared them, or their content, "unthinkable".
Now, this is all we need in the present context to understand the
use of the term "incoherent" (and its cognates).
Further
discussion of this topic would take us too far into Wittgenstein's Philosophy of
Language and Mathematics. There is a useful summary of the latter in Glock (1996), pp.63-66, 150-55, 258-64,
315-19. [See also Note 45a and Note 54
above.]
There is
also now an excellent
outline of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics
online --
Rodych (2018). However, Rodych interprets Wittgenstein as a
Formalist of some sort, which isn't supported by the weight of evidence. A more
balanced account can be found in Shanker (1987a). See also Marion (1993, 1998),
Floyd (2021) and Schroeder (2023). Other references to
Wittgenstein's distinctive view of mathematics were given in
Essay Four. [See also
here.]
On the inapplicability of
the words "true" and "false" to mathematical propositions
(i.e., without change of meaning), see
Baker and Hacker (1988),
pp.34-64, 263-347.
56a.
Employing
perhaps a more familiar but simpler example: if someone were to say "The strike has been called
off", and someone else denied it, "The strike hasn't been called off", the
second sentence would only be taken to be the negation of the first if the same
strike were being referred to in both cases. Or, to take another, if someone
said "I put my wages in the bank today", and her interlocutor
responded, "No you
didn't; you spent all day fishing", the first wouldn't be taken to contradict
the second if it were then ascertained that the original
speaker had buried her wages in the river bank while fishing.
57a.
I am
well aware that those who have been influenced by, for example,
Imre Lakatos
[Lakatos (1976)], might object to this bald statement, but the kind of
experiments considered in Lakatos (1976) plainly aren't like those
conducted by scientists in the lab or out in the
field. So, not even the most rabid
Lakatosian
would dream of checking M2 by observation or measurement! And the same comment
probably applies to Mad
Dog
Quineans,
too.
M2: Two is a number.
Some
might object that M2 is utterly banal, and not at all the sort of thing Lakatos
or Quine had in mind. Maybe not, but then that might be part of the problem.
58.Incidentally, this relatively simple observation provides a further clue as to how the 'problems'
connected with the supposedly 'contradictory nature of motion' might be resolved.
Unfortunately, that particular topic won't be explored any further in this Essay. [On that,
however, see
here.]
59.That contentious claim will be
substantiated in Parts Two and Three of this Essay.
60.Of course, such a rejection wouldn't come without a price. I will endeavour to
say more about that in Essay Thirteen
Part Two.
Even
so, it could be objected that the following isn't the case:
M2 can't be false. Its 'falsehood' would amount to a
change of meaning, not of fact. Hence, M2 may only be accepted or rejected
as the expression of a rule of language, or, indeed, of mathematical language.
That is
because it is clearly
afact that the English word for Two
is "Two". So, M2 would be false if the following new fact were the case:
E1: The English word for the integer between One
and Three is now "Schmoo".
In which
case, the following would now be true:
E2a/M2b: Two isn't a number.
So, E2/M2 would become false because of this new fact about
English.
Or, so it could be argued...
E2/M2: Two is a number.
But, this revision amounts to the adoption of
a new rule.
Hence, counting in English would proceed as follows: "One, Schmoo, Three,
Four,..." and the supposedly 'new fact' (i.e., E1) would be parasitic on
that new
rule. E1 would then amount to the following:
E3: We no longer use "Two" as a number word in
English,
which would, of course, express, or reflect, the termination, demise
or cancellation of the old rule.
It could be objected that it would still be a fact that
English had a new name for the integer between One and Three.
Indeed, but this
fact would depend on the adoption of this new rule. This novel fact about
English isn't what would make E2/M2 false -- because it can't be false
since it is the expression of a rule.
Despite this, it could be argued that the following would no longer be
true:
E2/M2: Two is a number,
just as this wouldn't, either:
E4: Krue is a number.
Maybe so, but it would be a fact about English that in such
circumstances the word "Two" was no longer used in the old way, but it
still isn't the case that what we now call Two (i.e., the number which when
added to Three yields Five, etc.) isn't a number. Recall M2/E2 isn't:
E5: "Two" is a number word in English.
[This would indeed be made false by a terminological revision
of the sort rehearsed above.]
But:
E2/M2: Two is a number.
And that rule is still applicable no matter what
we might later wish to call Two. Hence, the new fact about English would be E6:
E6: "Two" is no longer a number word in English.
Whatever the new word for Two happens to be, it will have to do
what "Two" now does or, plainly, it won't be able to take its place in our number system. Otherwise,
that would amount to changing the entire system, along with the meaning we currently
attach to "number", and possibly even "add", "subtract" "multiply" and
"divide", to name but a few! For something to count as a number
(no pun intended!), it would
have to slot into our number system in a rule-governed manner. It wasn't a discovery
that "two" appeared in our system of numbers -- like, say, the discovery of
new moons
of Jupiter or a previously unknown species. Users of the English language (or whatever preceded it) didn't wake
up one day to find to their surprise "two" (or whatever
preceded that inscription in Latin or Arabic, etc.) following "one" where
the day before there hadn't been anything. Howsoever it was that our number
system originally arose, "two" (or whatever preceded it) was either stipulated
to follow "one", or it had already been established as part of a normative practice.
That
being the case, the above 'revision' would amount to a trivial, terminological
change, as, indeed, was maintained in the main body of this Essay.
So, a
trivial change like this can't affect the status of E2/M2. What we now
call "Two" remains a number whatever we might later wish to call it -- and so long as it is
subject to the same rules, etc.
Of
course, this doesn't mean that our understanding of numbers hasn't changed or
hasn't developed over the centuries. Mathematicians have a much clearer and
broader concept of number than they had, say,
two hundred years ago. [On this, see Grattan-Guinness (1997), Ifrah (2000), and
Potter (2000).] That shouldn't be taken to mean the present author agrees with
every such development (especially in relation to some of the 'numbers' aired in
this video!), but this
isn't the place to enter into that knotty 'problem'.
61.This
is also the case with the so-called 'Laws' and 'Thoughts' of
'God' --, the verbal expression of which are themselves the result of an analogous fetishisation of alienated
forms of human self-expression and self-perception (if we follow
Feuerbach, here). Misconstrued rules like these, which underpin
theories developed in Traditional Philosophy, carry with them a similar
social or psychological force and no little 'charm'. Metaphysical ideas also purport to give a 'God-like' view of reality,
since they
originate from a similar source: socially-alienated patterns of thought. They seem to command acceptance in
like manner. Social norms, which constitute and underpin our very capacity to think,
communicate and reason, spill over into these fetishised areas and lend to them
an almost irresistible authority -- i.e., an alienated form of social sanction akin, indeed, to the 'Voice of God'.
And in this lies their 'charm'. They appeal to those who think the material
world isn't sufficient to itself and that another, hidden, world of 'immaterial
beings', 'concepts' or 'objects' is required to give this world its substance or
point -- a train of thought also connected with a search for 'the meaning of
life'.
[This is
also part of the reason for the rampant
Platonism, for
example, in mathematics.]
Hence, when we look into this
bottomless pool of metaphysical
pseudo-knowledge, all that stares back up at us are the reified, mystified and misidentified social norms
invented or concocted by alienated human beings -- just as Feuerbach suggested
(even though he only did so in connection with religious belief).
The above, of course, represents the beginning of an attempt to push
Feuerbach's analysis
much further, and in a
Durkheimian direction (extending
his insight by making it fully social, instead of it having to conform
with an
individualistic
orientation we find in Feuerbach's work), something that will
be explored more fully in later Parts of this Essay, and in more detail in Essay
Fourteen Part Two. There, this approach will be linked to the
fetishisation of language introduced into Philosophy by Ancient Greek theorists
(later perfected by Hegel, among others), which moves were a reflection of the
alienated thought-forms developed by assorted ruling-class hacks and
Traditional Philosophers. Also explored
will be the manner in which this has seeped into Marxist thought,
and which has therefore helped cripple it theoretically. [Cf., Durkheim (2001).]
[That topic
will also be connected with ideas floated in Stove (1991), pp.83-177, which is
one of the most coherent and powerful condemnations I have ever read of
world-views like the above. Having said that, I hesitate to reference this
author's work because of his objectionable and reactionary political views. I
distance myself, therefore, from many of his remarks he makes, especially those
found on p.96 (of the above book). On that, see also
here.]
This claim
about the fetishisation of linguistic rules (in Traditional Thought) is
partially based on the work of David
Bloor (but he doesn't quite put it like this, as far as I am aware), where
distorted social norms like these indeed function like the 'Voice of God', and,
because of which, words and concepts actually seem to dictate to uswhat we
should make of them. That happens, for instance, when theorists alienate the linguistic
products of social interaction and project them onto the world. The
result of which is that Nature
now looks as if were made in our image, pictured as 'Rational' and 'Law-governed'.
[This frame-of-mind re-surfaces in DM with all those 'contradictions' and
'real negations',
etc.] The theories that emerge as a result "weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (to quote
Marx) as they become reified and ossified into Super-Scientific Truths about nature and
society.
[On this see Bloor (1978, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1991, 1992, 1997), and
Guy Robinson's
Essays, published at this site.]
In relation
to the principal claims made here (and other than Guy Robison; see above), few
of Wittgenstein's many commentators seem to be aware of the full implications of
this aspect of his work. That is possibly because this facet of his method is
most forcefully represented in his early work [Wittgenstein (1972, 1979a), and
Waismann, (1979)] and in the writings of his so-called "middle period"
[Wittgenstein (1974a, 1975, 1979b, 1980a).] Not only are these still not
widely (or fully) understood, many commentators erroneously believe he
repudiated much of what they contain.
[Although, the signs are that this way of reading Wittgenstein is increasingly
out of favour, certainly more so than when the above words were first written in
1998. There is an excellent recent collection of essays, which suggests that the
general picture is at last changing -- Crary and Read (2000). (That comment shouldn't be taken
to mean that I fully concur with everything implied by this new direction in Wittgenstein
Studies. For example, see my comments here.)]
Among the
notable exceptions to this generalisation are the following: Baker (1988,
2004a), Carruthers (1989, 1990), Maury (1977) and White (1974, 2006, and
forthcoming); although, it needs pointing out that White has argued
against the approach adopted by the 'New Wittgensteinians'
(forcefully, for instance, in White (2006, 2011)). It shouldn't be assumed,
either,
that the other authors listed above in this paragraph are sympathetic to the views expressed
by the ''New Wittgensteinians', either!
There
are also many short articles in Glock (1996), which present excellent, clear summaries of Wittgenstein's main ideas. On the continuity
of Wittgenstein's work, see Hilmy (1987).
Once again, there is as yet no definitive study of these
key areas of Wittgenstein's early work --
although Roger
White's long awaited book [White (forthcoming), if it is ever published!]
should rectify the situation somewhat.
[See also, Robinson (2003), and Robinson's Essays (link given earlier).]
62.That is, of course, part of what it means to say that meaning and use are
connected. The socially-sanctioned and -governed use of number words is our main (if
not our only) guide to their meaning. Individual words don't gain their meaning as isolated
units, like atoms, but holistically as part of such practices. [On this aspect of
Wittgenstein's work, and the many confused ideas that have been foisted on him, see
Hallett (1967). See also Baz (2012), although I distance myself from this
author's 'contextualism' and his comments about Frege and Geach.]
However, this is one place where
Wittgenstein's work differs from traditional
Conventionalism.
Philosophers working in the
Logical
Positivist wing of the latter 'tradition' tended to argue that it was the meaning
of certain terms that enabled specific conventions to be established from them -- or
which
permitted the stating of certain truths -- which approach was clearly atomistic
and arose out of their own avowed Empiricism.
In contrast, Wittgenstein argued that meaning is
constituted by convention (that is, it grows out of social practices, so this
approach is anti-individualist); that is, it is the many and varied uses of words
that express
conventions that have already been adopted (in practice), and propositions which were,
and still are taken by many to be 'necessary truths', are in fact a confused/garbled expression
of conventions already established in and by social practice.
The former approach would have words gain their meaning piecemeal,
in advance of the conventions/practices in which they are subsequently
embedded, while the latter holds that meaning takes shape in, and as a result of,
social practice. The sentences so formable are themselves sensitive to earlier
linguistic and social
interactions within which these conventions and practices are rooted. [On this, see
Note 64.]
The
profound difference between Wittgenstein's method and the approach adopted by
other Conventionalists -- alongside the important consequences this has for
Philosophy -- is brought out in Baker (1988) and Shanker (1987a), pp.274-353.
See also Glock (1996), pp.129-39, 226-28, 343-44, and Glock (2004). However,
these works should be read in conjunction with Bloor (1997), Robinson (2003),
pp.158-71, and Williams (1999a). Two other important studies are Kusch (2002, 2006).
A minor modern classic in this area is David Lewis's
Convention. [Lewis (1969)
-- this links to a PDF.] That work demonstrates in detail how and why conventions don't
need to be based on conscious, planned decisions (or stipulations), as many
suppose. They are dependent on wider social phenomena. Nevertheless, Lewis's
work is seriously compromised by his reliance on game theory,
and hence on bourgeois individualism (i.e., on the
notion that human beings typically confront one another as socialatoms).
If we restrict ourselves to the level of physical description, that is
patently true (but uninformative); indeed, it is about as useful an account of human
interaction as claiming that chess, for example, is simply the
inter-relationship between bits of wood, a board, a clock and a set of fingers.
[On this, also see von Savigny (1988).]
Quite
apart from this, the conventions already expressed in ordinary language show
that human beings don't regard themselves as social atoms. [That contentious claim will be
defended in Part Seven of this Essay.]
Incidentally, Blackburn (1984), pp.118-42, contains a
sharp but misplaced critique of Lewis. Blackburn, unfortunately, allows himself
to become a little distracted from the central issue and ends up chasing to
ground a Gricean hare in the mistaken belief that it is a
Lewisean
rabbit.
Blackburn's own brand of individualism is the subject of an effective critique
in Bloor (1997). On this topic in general, see Williams (1999a), and Kusch
(2006).
[Blackburn's
real quarry can be found burrowing away in Grice (1989). However, on Grice, see
Baz (2012).]
One of the most
common criticisms of Wittgenstein's
work is that even though he tells us he isn't advancing a philosophical theory,
he is manifestly doing just that -- is refuted in and by Kuusela (2006,
2008). See also Iliescu (2000), and Baz (2012).
63.Otherwise an infinite regress
would be initiated for obvious reasons. Some claim that an infinite regress is no big
deal (for example, Gaskin (2008)). To be sure, if humans were semi-divine beings, it would be no big deal.
Alas we aren't, and so it is.
[I will say
more about the above topic in
Part Seven of this Essay.]
64.
That is
because,
instead of social factors (i.e., the complex, historically-conditioned
relationships between human agents) governing meaning, meaning would in fact be governed
by factors internal to the each individual language-user
-- their brain or their 'mind'. That approach has been the dominant trend in
much of
post-Cartesian
Philosophy, which isn't, of course, un-connected with the hegemony of
Bourgeois
Individualism.
On that
view,
'inner representations' dictateto each user, individualistically, what
their words or 'concepts' mean.
Instead of meaning arising from the
interaction between human agents it would result from the interaction between
an individual's inner 'representations' (often these are portrayed as the inner
psychological or neurological correlates of words), or some such, making them the agents of meaning and
human beings their puppets. Again, this isn't unconnected with the
alienation of the individual from the social, a theme beloved of bourgeois ideology:
individual first, society second. Either that or "there is no such thing as
society" (Margaret
Thatcher).
If this were the case,
there would and could be no shared meanings of words between users. If each language-user
determined the meaning of the words they used -- or, rather, if those meanings
had been determined for them
by the above psychological/neurological factors --, there would be no basis for
communication.
Or, indeed, if, as some Marxists (such as
Voloshinov) believe, meaning were 'occasion-sensitive' -- communication
would also be
impossible.[There
is much more on
that in
Essay Thirteen Part Three, Sections
(4)-(6).]
But,
as far as the above Marxists are concerned -- so that they can at least gesture
at preserving a commitment to the social nature of language --, the communal
life of human beings now has to be alienated, or inverted, and projected back
onto the words they use (or onto
the
'representations' of those words in each 'atomised' head, reappearing now as
the social life among signs, or, indeed, as the social life enjoyed by those
'inner correlates', those 'representations), thus fetishising them.
Indeed, that is what happened
to all those "signs" in
Voloshinov's theory.
Once more, they become the agents, each language user the patient --
a puppet of the words that somehow now control them.
This explains,
of course, the original motivation underlying the fetishisation of language and
'consciousness' that runs throughout Metaphysics -- and, as we have seen,
throughout Dialectical Marxism, too.
[Again, there is more on this In Essays
Three
Part Two
and Thirteen
Part Three.]
65.Once more, this topic will be
addressed in greater detail Essays Thirteen
Part Three and Fourteen Part Two.
65a. These patterns
(expressed as linguistic functions) were briefly outlined in Essay Three
Part One. See also Note 70.
65b.
Incidentally,
and once again, the best account of this topic is to be found in Robinson
(2003).
66.This is connected with
an idea
expressed in Wittgenstein's work -- that is, that that language forms a Satzsysteme (a system of
sentences), whereas Mathematics forms a Beweissysteme (a system of
concepts). These terms are explained in detail in Shanker (1987a). That distinction began to appear in
Wittgenstein's "middle period"; see, for example, Waismann (1979), pp.63-67, 87-90. It then featured throughout the rest of his work
in various different
guises.
66a.
Plainly, this doesn't mean that new terms can't be introduced into
mathematics. If and when that takes place, novel words and concepts have to relate in some way to those
already
in use -- or, indeed, to practices/techniques that have already been established -- otherwise no one would understand them. [An
example of this process was given
here.]
67.This was covered
in Essay Three Part Two (here
and
here), where it was shown that the mysterious 'process of abstraction' would
prevent inter-communication, and that includes any such between
mathematicians.
The
opposite approach
is, of course, what motivates, or tends to motivate, the
Platonic
or neo-Platonic view of mathematical
objects -- i.e., a 'halfway house perspective' that views mathematical structures as 'abstract' or
'objective', but which doesn't in generalaccept
Plato's Ontology of Forms. Often that approach merges imperceptibly with contemporary
versions
of
Mathematical Realism.
[On this see, for example, Maddy (1992), and Hale
(1986). For an opposing view, see Burgess and Rosen (1997). In general, see
Brown (2008), Colyvan (2012), and Shapiro (2000); in particular, see Balaguer (1998).]
The reader should note that each of these works adopts a different approach to
one aired at this site -- and, indeed, to each other. They do, however, illustrate how sophisticated
this area of Analytic Philosophy has become of late, and just how
out-of-touch. obsolete and degenerate 'DM-analyses' of mathematics are.
[See also the works listed
here, as well as Benacerraf
and Putnam (1964, 1983), and Jacquette (2002). On
Wittgenstein's distinctive approach to mathematics, which has largely been
adopted at
this site, see
here.]
68.On this see
Note 55a, when it has been updated.
Note the different use of "true" here, in relation to mathematics and
other formal systems, where it is synonymous with "provable within the
calculus", or even, "used in a specific way within
a
practice". In that sense, one could say rather loosely that everyday mathematical
propositions like M2 are "true", since, when they are applied as rules, they
enable counting and calculation -- i.e., they work. But, I for one
prefer not to use that word in this area, since it only creates misunderstanding
and increases confusion. In connection with mathematics and other formal systems, I generally put the word "truth"
in 'scare quotes' -- unless I am referring to ideas held by others.
69a. The term "isolation" is being used
here to mean "cut off, abstracted, from social practice". That is, it is meant
to relate to what allegedly goes on 'in the head' when individuals are said to
'abstract' numbers magically into existence, on their own, from their own experience. Only
then, so the story goes, are they able to engage in calculating and counting.
The general idea behind this has been destructively criticised in Essay Three Parts
One and
Two.
Meaning is also a
complex term; on that, see
below.
70.As noted above, while we might teach
mathematics to young children by manipulating objects familiar to them, we establish the
'truth' of mathematical propositions by proof, not by comparing them with
reality. [Which mathematician will attempt to prove, say,
The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra by comparing it with anything in her, or
anyone else's, experience?] Nor do we base any of this on a process of 'abstraction', or
on 'objects' that supposedly exist in an invisible 'Platonic
Universe'. And how would an appeal to abstract objects help us account for the
necessity we attribute to the relation between mathematical objects or structures?
If material objects and structures can't account for necessity, how will a
retreat into the abstract manage to do what they can't? [On this, see Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Of course, by now these proofs have been
"put in the archives" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein), so it is no longer necessary to
re-prove or reproduce them (except when teaching students, etc.), or so we no longer need to
rehearse them each time we do arithmetic, etc., but that doesn't make them
in any way redundant.
An example
taken from Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations illustrates the radical difference between
number words and other terms we use (which, incidentally, also exposes one of
the core confusions motivated by
Semiotics -- that 'all words are signs', or operate as
"signifiers" of the "signified"; on that see Essay Thirteen
Part Three).
Wittgenstein encourages us to consider
an example where a customer enters a grocery
store and asks the assistant for five red apples. The assistant
doesn't first go off in search of red things, nor yet collections of
five things. Manifestly, they will go and find apples first, or even red apples, and then count them.
This forms part of the
Fregean idea that number
words attach to concepts, not objects. Or, as Wittgenstein might have said,
number words express operations carried out on objects of a certain sort,
qualified by a
count noun -- like "three apples" or "five pears" (although, as far as I am
aware, Wittgenstein didn't use the phrase "count noun"; he did use a roughly equivalent term, "substantive",
though).
Hence, the
assistant
will count apples: one apple, two apples..., and so on, as the concept
expression "ξ is an apple" is successively instantiated or
applied -- sometimes expressed demonstratively (typically to children) as: "That
is an apple, and this is another...". Of course, that isn't to suggest these are
the words that this fictional assistant will actually use, or indeed that she/he will use any words at all, but they, or
words like them, will have been used in her/his childhood training, at some
point. No one is just taught to count 'objects', but to count objects of a certain sort,
or objects identified demonstratively, governed by the use of concept expressions
(like "ξ is an apple"), or count nouns (i.e., "napples").
Novices who can
proceed along lines they have been trained are thus said to have grasped the use of number
words (and,
indeed, of concept expressions and/or count nouns). Subsequently, this linguistic skill
becomes automatic, which is indeed part of what we mean by "knowing how to count",
or even how to serve in a grocery store! [On
this, see Robinson (2003b). The use of Greek symbols, like those employed above, is explained
here.]
[This isn't to suggest,
either,
that knowing (implicitly) how to apply number words is sufficient for us to be
able to credit an individual with a minimal grasp of the concept of number. As
is well known (at least since Frege (1953) -- and as is implied by the above
remarks), this requirement needs supplementing with what is called a "criterion
of identity" (that is, the individual concerned must be able to specify
whether or not, in this case, there are the same number of apples (or,
indeed, red apples) each time. And in order to do that successfully, they must be proficient with the
practical, not just verbal,
application of "same apple".
That is, they must know what counts as the same (sort of) apple. Cf., Wittgenstein (2009), §1,
pp.5e-6e.
See also,
Geach (1968), pp.39-40
--
this in fact links to the 3rd
(1980) edition, so the page numbers are different:
pp.63-64), Lowe (1989) and
Noonan (2022). For some of
the complexities involved in this area, see Epstein (2012).]
Now, the
whole point of that analysis is to show that (i) not all words are names,
and (ii) not all words function in the same way -- and, eo ipso,
that (iii) words can't be "signifiers" of the "signified" -- otherwise, the order in which
the above grocer looked for the items required by this customer would be
indifferent, and he/she could or would look for five things first, red things next,
apples last.
In
addition, it is also aimed at demonstrating
that we all know this to be so (i.e., in our practice -- in, say, our
automatic reaction to requests like the one the shop assistant faced
--,
but not necessarily in our deliberations about such things, where we
often go astray). And, that is
why (whatever philosophical theory we hold, whatever ideology we assent to) not one of us
would dream of looking for something named by "five" first, or even "red",
and then "apples" last. On the other hand, if all words were names, we would typically
do this.
That
alone shows Wittgenstein wasn't fixated on ordinary German (or even ordinary
English). No human being who has ever walked the planet would dream of
looking for something 'named' by "five" first, or even "red", and then "apples" last (always assuming they lived in a society with the requisite
social organisation and vocabulary,
etc.), whatever their language, social circumstances or ideological
commitments happened to be.
Now,that
is what Wittgenstein meant by "logical grammar": logical features expressed in
language, reflected in our practices that illustrate how we all
react in social circumstances (or otherwise),
no matter what ideology or theory we
subscribe to, and no matter in what century we happen to live. Indeed, they are so much part of our second nature, so much
part of what we do without thinking, that we fail to spot their significance --,
which is, of course, why they went unremarked upon for millennia (until Frege and
Wittgenstein pointed them out).
[This also illustrates
that Wittgenstein was interested in "big logical differences", rather than the
minutiae that concerned much that passed off as
OLP, especially as
it was practiced in Oxford in the 1950s and 1960s. (I owe this point to
Peter
Geach.) {On that, see Baker (2004b).} This also shows that numbers can't be 'abstracted' into existence,
either. I will leave that gnomic comment in that rather vague and enigmatic
condition for now and return to it in a
future re-write of Essay Three Part One. On this in general, see
Frege (1953).
Cf., also Beaney (1996), Dummett (1991), Kenny (1995), Noonan (2001), Weiner
(2004). See also
Zalta
(2021).]
This
specific topic isn't covered
at all well in the Wittgenstein literature (indeed, most commentators seem to
miss the point of the above parable);
however, see Baker and Hacker (2005b), pp.43-91, and Baker and Hacker (2005a),
pp.1-28. But, and once more, the best
article on this is still Robinson (2003b).
However, on
this topic, Hallett refers
his readers to Peter Geach's lecture notes:
"...[N]otice that the order of the operations in the grocer's shop is
determinate: it would be hopeless for the grocer to...look around for red things
until he found some that were also apples, and it would be still more hopeless
for him to recite the numerals up to five in his language first of all -- this
would be a completely idle performance. Frege said that a number attaches to a
concept.... What Frege of course meant was that a number is a number of a kind
of things -- a kind of things expressed by a general term; and that until you
have fixed upon the kind of thing that you are counting, you can't count, you
can't attach a number." [Hallett (1977), pp.74-75.]
71.Having said that, it is possible to use mathematical (and other 'necessarily true')
propositions in alternative ways, some of which could be, and are, empirical, some not.
For a brief summary, see Hacker (1996), pp.212-16. A more thorough account of
this phenomenon can
be found in Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.34-64, 263-347.
72.Recall that the words in M2 don't acquire their meaning in this way, hence the
use of the word "seem".
M2: Two is a number.
73.This can be seen
in many of the things
dialecticians say about the concepts (or words) they use -- for example:
"The identity of thinking and being, to use
Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and
does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which
it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a
fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because
reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it
only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon
manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in
this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt
(12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels
(1975b), pp.457-58. Bold emphasis added.]
"Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of
the animal, nor its image even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the
unimaged simple representation. We think in names." [Hegel
(1971), p.220, §462.]
Indeed, Marx made the following point quite explicitly:
it is philosophers who invent
abstract names for things:
"The ordinary man does not think he is saying
anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when
the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says
something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the
real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'…. It goes without saying that the speculative
philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally
known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as
determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the
real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of
reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes
from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity
of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
In the speculative way of speaking, this
operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an
inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension
constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels
(1975a), pp.74-75. Italicemphases in the original; bold emphasis added.
Paragraphs merged.]
So, Marx
clearly contrasted the process of abstraction -- and the creation of the names
of abstract objects thus created -- with the way that ordinary human
beings talk and think.
For such theorists, all words are names (the names of 'concepts',
or the names of 'things', or of 'the object'), which therefore function as linguistic atoms. Sure, they then try to
tell us that all such 'concepts' are inter-linked, but as we saw in Essay Three
Part Two, this
broken, 'Philosophical Humpty
Dumpty'
can't be put back together
again. 'Philosophical Atoms' like this can't
be re-connected.
[There is much more on this in Essay Thirteen
Part Three, Sections (4)-(6), where we will see
theorists like Voloshinov argue along such traditional, and by-now-familiar, lines.]
It could be argued that
Dialecticians do in fact appeal to evidence to support claims like M1a.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
For example,
speaking about change (which includes motion), John Molyneux argued as follows:
"At the heart of
dialectics is the proposition that everything changes. 'Everything' here
refers to everything in the universe itself to the tiniest particle. For a start
everything is in motion, the most basic form of change, but also everything is
also developing, altering, evolving, coming into being and passing out of being.
As Bob Dylan once put it, 'Who isn't busy being born, is busy dying.'
This fundamental
principle of dialectics is entirely in accord with, and confirmed by all the
findings of modern science from
Copernicus, through
Kepler,
Newton,
Darwin
and
Einstein
to
quantum
mechanics
and
big
bang theory. In other words it is
a well established fact." [Molyneux (2012), pp.40-41. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links and bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged. Of course,
Molyneux isn't alone in advancing such hyper-bold claims; scores of
passages, taken from the writings of
DM-classicists and more recent DM-theorists who say more-or-less the same, were
quoted in
Essay Two.]
As we have seen, this
isn't even remotely true. There are in fact trillions of unchanging objects in every
gram of matter, and there are countless trillions that don't "come into
being and pass out of being", let alone "evolve". Protons, electrons and
photons, as far as we know, are changeless. [On that, see
here.]
But,
even if what Molyneux had to say were
valid, its 'truth' was asserted long before any such evidence became available, having originally been promulgated by
Heraclitus, who
based his universally-valid claim about motion and change on what he thought was true about stepping
into a river! So, as with other DM-'laws', this idea was back then
imposed on world and has since continued to foisted on
nature by DM-fans. Evidence has never been central to its supposed veracity. The appeal to
evidence (and not even all of it!) is little more than a recently
clutched fig-leaf.
It could also be objected that dialecticians
wouldn't respond along lines suggested in the main body of this Essay -- i.e., that this
is about the meaning of certain terms. They would in fact argue that Lenin's words reflect
objective reality. So, M1a, for example, is about the world, not language.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
But, we have already seen
that Lenin's words (and their supposed content) make no sense, so they can't be a reflection of anything
other than his own confused thought.
Now, the only way to
defuse that impertinent response would involve dialecticians explaining what
Lenin's words in fact meant (of course, without actually using or thinking the words "motion
without matter", or their content, while doing it!), so that what he
said could
even begin to reflect
something other than contingent features of Lenin's (or Engels's own) confused
musings. Clearly, that would involve a clarification of the language
he (they) chose to use.
In which
case, the allegations advanced in the main body of this Essay aren't wide of the
mark. Quite the reverse, in fact -- they hit
bullseye every time.
So, this
is about
the use of language.
[See also, Note 74a below.]
74.In fact, as we have seen (especially in Essay Seven
Part One),
evidence is at best onlyeverused illustratively by DM-apologists.
The sublimely amateurish approach to evidence displayed by DM-theorists was
labelled Mickey Mouse Science in that Essay (specifically
here) -- and
for good reason, too.
74a.Following on from Note 73: I have just received a copy of
Houlgate (2006), which tries to defend Hegel's use of
language. Houlgate first quotes him as follows:
"It is in
names that we think." [Hegel (1971), quoted in Houlgate (2006), p.75; this
author
uses his own translation.]
However, the online
(Miller) version renders this passage as:
"Given the name lion, we need neither the actual
vision of the animal, nor its image even: the name alone, if we understand it,
is the unimaged simple representation. We think in names." [Hegel
(1971), p.220, §462.]
That
isn't a good start since it clearly reflects the traditional view of language
that has been criticised here
(i.e., the idea that all words are names and that thinking is an inner,
private act of intellection, or 'cognition'). Hegel was
a
bourgeois
theorist; so it is no big surprise he reasoned along those lines.
Gilbert Ryle
explains why this theory can't work (although he targets more recent
Philosophers):
"Frege,
like
Russell,
had inherited (directly, perhaps, from
Mill) the
traditional belief that to ask What does the expression 'E' mean? is to ask, To
what does 'E' stand in the relation in which 'Fido' stands to Fido? The
significance of any expression is the thing, process, person or entity of which
the expression is the proper name. This, to us, grotesque theory derives partly,
presumably, from the comfortable fact that proper names are visible or audible
things and are ordinarily attached in an indirect but familiar way to visible,
audible and tangible things like dogs, rivers, babies, battles and
constellations. This is then adopted as the model after which to describe the
significance of expressions which are not proper names, and the habit is formed
of treating the verb 'to signify' and the phrase 'to have a meaning' as
analogous relation-stating expressions. 'What that expression means' is then
construed as the description of some extra-linguistic correlate to the
expression, like the dog that answers to the name 'Fido.'...
"Now a very little reflection should satisfy us that the assimilation to proper
names of expressions that are not proper names breaks down from the start.
(Indeed the whole point of classing some expressions as proper names is to
distinguish them from the others.) No one ever asks What is the meaning of
'Robinson Crusoe'? much less Who is the meaning of 'Robinson Crusoe'? No one
ever confesses that he cannot understand or has misunderstood the name 'Charles
Dickens' or asks for it to be translated, defined, paraphrased or elucidated. We
do not expect dictionaries to tell us who is called by what names. We do not say
that the river Mississippi is so and so ex vi termini [by definition, or
by implication -- RL]. A man may be described as 'the person called "Robin
Hood",' but not as 'the meaning of "Robin Hood".' It would be absurd to say 'the
meaning of "Robin Hood" met the meaning of "Friar Tuck".' Indeed, to put it
generally, it is always nonsense to say of any thing, process or entity 'that is
a meaning.' Indeed, in certain contexts we are inclined not to call proper names
'words' at all. We do not complain that the dictionary omits a lot of English
words just because it omits the names of people, rivers, mountains and novels,
and if someone boasts of knowing two dozen words of Russian and gives the names
of that number of Russian towns, newspapers, films and generals, we think that
he is cheating. Does 'Nijni
Novgorod is in Russia' contain three, four or five English words?
"There are indeed some important parallels between our ways of using proper
names in sentences and our ways of using some, but not many sorts of other
expressions. 'Who knocked?' can be answered as well by 'Mr. Smith' as by 'the
landlord'; and in 'the noise was made by Fido,' 'the noise was made by the
neighbour's retriever' and 'the noise was made by him' the proper name, the
substantival phrase ['Mr Smith', or 'Fido' -- RL] and the pronoun play similar
grammatical roles. But this no more shows that substantival phrases and pronouns
are crypto-proper names than they show that proper names are crypto-pronouns or
crypto-substantival phrases.
"Two exceptions to the 'Fido'-Fido principle were conceded by its devotees.
(1) Frege saw that the phrases 'the
evening star' and 'the morning star' do not have the same sense (Sinn),
even if they happen to apply to or denote (bedeuten) the same planet. An
astronomical ignoramus might understand the two phrases while wondering whether
they are mentions of two planets or of only one. The phrase 'the first American
pope' does not apply to anyone, but a person who says so shows thereby that he
understands the expression. This concession seems to have been thought to be
only a tiresome though necessary amendment to the 'Fido'-Fido principle. In fact
it demolishes it altogether. For it shows that even in the case of that
relatively small class of isolable expressions, other than proper names, which
are suited to function as the nominatives of certain seeded subject-predicate
sentences, knowing what the expressions mean does not entail having met any
appropriate Fidos or even knowing that any such Fidos exist. The things
('entities'), if any, to which such expressions apply are not and are not parts
of what the expressions mean, any more than a nail is or is part of how a hammer
is used.
"(2) The
traditional doctrine of terms had required (confusedly enough) the analysis
of proposition-expressing sentences into two, or with heart searchings, three or
more 'terms'; and these terms were (erroneously) supposed all to be correlated
with entities in the 'Fido'-Fido way. But sentences are not just lists like
'Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,' or even like 'Socrates, mortality.' For they tell
truths or falsehoods, which lists do not do. A sentence must include some
expressions which are not terms, i.e. 'syncategorematic
words' like 'is,' 'if,' 'not,' 'and,' 'all,' 'some,' 'a,' and so on. Such words
are not meaningless, though they are not names, as all
categorematic words were (erroneously) supposed to be. They are required for
the construction of sentences. (Sometimes special grammatical constructions
enable us to dispense with syncategorematic words.) Syncategorematic words were
accordingly seen to be in a certain way auxiliary, somewhat like rivets which
have no jobs unless there are girders to be riveted. I have not finished saying
anything if I merely utter the word 'if' or 'is.' They are syntactically
incomplete unless properly collocated with suitable expressions of other sorts.
In contrast with them it was erroneously assumed that categorematic words are
non-auxiliary or are syntactically complete without collocations with other
syncategorematic or categorematic expressions, as though I have finished saying
something when I say 'Fido,' 'he,' 'the first American pope' or 'jocular.'..." [Ryle
(1949b), pp.226-28. (This links to a PDF.) Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the
original; links added.]
[I
have discussed this topic at length in Essay Three
Part One. I distance myself,
however, from Ryle's declaration that Proper Names have no meaning, or, indeed,
that they might not even be words. On the one hand, Ryle was normally very
careful when it came to the complexities built into our use of language; on the
other he seems to have treated "meaning" (at least here) as a rather simple
term, when it isn't. In this I think
Ryle was likewise misled by the very fallacy under discussion, the 'Fido-Fido
Fallacy', in that he appears to regard "meaning" as having only one role to play
-- that of naming something! Nor is a dictionary an
arbiter of meaning, either! Having said that, his sharp criticism of the fallacy
is fully in line with the view presented at this site.]
DM-theorists have uncritically
followed Hegel in this regard,
so it should surprise no one that
they have been
accused (by me) of adopting
a theory of language that is no better than those concocted by
Locke and
Descartes, and hence that their
theory is thoroughly bourgeois,
too. This approach to language and thought is atomistic, and
patently misguided. When was the last time you 'thought' in names?
"We next went to the School of
Languages, where three Professors sat in Consultation upon improving that of
their own country. The first Project was to shorten
Discourse by cutting Polysyllables into one, and leaving out Verbs and
Participles, because in reality all things imaginable are but Nouns.
"The other, was a Scheme for entirely
abolishing all Words whatsoever; and this was urged as a great Advantage in
Point of Health as well as Brevity. For it is plain, that every Word we speak is
in some Degree a Diminution of our Lungs by Corrosion, and consequently
contributes to the shortening of our Lives. An Expedient was therefore offered,
that since Words are only Names for Things, it would be more convenient for all
Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the particular
Business they are to discourse on. And this Invention would certainly have taken
Place, to the great Ease as well as Health of the Subject, if the Women in
conjunction with the Vulgar and Illiterate had not threatened to raise a
Rebellion, unless they might be allowed the Liberty to speak with their Tongues,
after the manner of their Ancestors; such constant irreconcilable Enemies to
Science are the common People. However, many of the most Learned and Wise adhere
to the New Scheme of expressing themselves by Things, which hath only this
Inconvenience attending it, that if a Man's Business be very great, and of
various kinds, he must be obliged in Proportion to carry a greater bundle of
Things upon his Back, unless he can afford one or two strong Servants to attend
him. I have often beheld two of those Sages almost sinking under the Weight of
their Packs, like Pedlars among us; who, when they met in the Streets, would lay
down their Loads, open their Sacks, and hold Conversation for an Hour together;
then put up their Implements, help each other to resume their Burthens (sic),
and take their Leave.
"But for short Conversations a Man may
carry Implements in his Pockets and under his Arms, enough to supply him, and in
his House he cannot be at a loss: Therefore the Room where Company meet who
practise this Art, is full of all Things ready at Hand, requisite to furnish
Matter for this kind of artificial Converse." [Gulliver's Travels, The
Voyage to Balnibari,
Chapter 5.
Paragraphs merged. Original capitalisation left in place.]
Holding up objects, instead of using words, would make conversation and
communication impossible -- unless this were part of some code or
puzzle of some sort -- both of which depend on language and on
the fact that not all words are names.
[On this, see
also Baker and
Hacker (2005a), pp.1-28, 227-49.]
We have
already seen
that Hegel's reference to the implicit speculative nature of the German language is about as
genuine as a video showing
Rembrandt
using his Smartphone
to post a list of his favourite DVDs on
Facebook.
Nevertheless, Houlgate
argues that Hegel was actually using ordinary
German words in his Logic, not a specialised vocabulary. He did so in order to reveal its inherently
'speculative' nature (i.e., in effect, that it was really a secret code, a code
that was clear only
to a very small minority --, in fact, a minority of one, Hegel!). So,
while English readers might think that Hegel's argument is obscure, tortuous and
opaque because of his use of language, apparently that isn't the case for those who can read him in the original
German, according to Houlgate:
"At this
point, those who know Hegel's work only through English translation may be
forgiven a distinctly sceptical smile. Hegel uses ordinary vocabulary?
Can that be true? Do Germans really go around talking about 'determinateness' (Bestimmtheit)
and 'being in and for itself' (Anundfürsichsein)? Well perhaps not
precisely in the way Hegel does, but they do use related expressions in everyday
speech. Ask a German if he or she thinks national reunification was good thing
and you may hear in response 'bestimmt' ('definitely'), or 'an für
sich, schon' ('in principle, sure')." [Houlgate (2006), pp.76-77. Italics in
the original.]
This flies in the face of the fact that German speakers
--,
like, say,
Schopenhauer
--, find it almost impossible to work out what Hegel was
banging on about in his day:
"If I were
to say that the so-called philosophy of this fellow Hegel is a colossal piece of
mystification which will yet provide posterity with an inexhaustible theme for
laughter at our times, that it is a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental
powers, stifling all real thinking, and, by the most outrageous misuse of
language, putting in its place the hollowest, most senseless, thoughtless, and,
as is confirmed by its success, most stupefying verbiage, I should be quite
right.
Further,
if I were to say that this summus philosophus [...] scribbled nonsense quite
unlike any mortal before him, so that whoever could read his most eulogized
work, the so-called Phenomenology of the Mind, without feeling as if he
were in a madhouse, would qualify as an inmate for
Bedlam, I should be no less
right.... At first
Fichte
and
Schelling
shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the
man who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point of
talent -- I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel." [Schopenhauer, quoted
from
here. Links added; paragraphs merged.]
"But the
height of audacity in serving up pure nonsense, in stringing together senseless
and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously been known only in
madhouses, was finally reached in Hegel, and became the instrument of the most
barefaced general mystification that has ever taken place, with a result which
will appear fabulous to posterity, and will remain as a monument to German
stupidity." [Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation,
Volume
2, p.22.]
"Fichte is the father of the sham philosophy, of the disingenuous method which,
through ambiguity in the use of words, incomprehensible language, and sophistry,
seeks to deceive, and tries, moreover, to make a deep impression by assuming an
air of importance in a word, the philosophy which seeks to bamboozle and humbug
those who desire to learn. After this method had been applied by Schelling, it
reached its height, as everyone knows, in Hegel, in whose hands it developed
into pure charlatanism.... In Germany it was possible to proclaim as the greatest philosopher of all ages
Hegel, a repulsive, mindless charlatan, an unparalleled scribbler of
nonsense....
If indeed I now chose to call to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions
have abused such wide and empty abstractions, I should have to fear that both
the reader and I myself would be ill; for the most nauseous tediousness hangs
over the empty word-juggling of this loathsome
philophaster.... It may be said in passing that one can see how important the choice of
expressions in philosophy is from the fact that that inept expression condemned
above, and the misunderstanding which arose from it, became the foundation of
the whole Hegelian pseudo-philosophy, which has occupied the German public for
twenty-five years." [Ibid., quoted from
here. Link added; paragraphs merged.]
So, if Schopenhauer, a sophisticated German
speaker if ever there was one, found that the
language of this verbose Waffle-Meister was full of "senseless
and extravagant mazes of words, such as
had previously been known only in madhouses" and "empty abstractions", that it was "incomprehensible", "inept", and amounted to
"empty word juggling", what price ordinary Germans?
This confirms much of what has been alleged here:
metaphysicians like Hegel take ordinary words and use them in
radically non-standard ways, nominalising verbs -- for example, the verb "to be"
transmogrified into "Being"; "is identical with" reified into "Identity";
the use of the negative particle morphed into "Difference"/"Negativity" -- , and
which transforms general words (common nouns)
into the Proper Names of
abstract particulars.
And,
of course, Schopenhauer's negative opinion was shared by Marx
(even if he wasn't quite as harsh -- partially quoted above):
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an
independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations
of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive,
systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and
philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence
of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a
consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
"The mystery of critical presentation…is the
mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction…. If from real apples, pears,
strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine
that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity
existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple,
etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring
that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the
almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the
apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence,
perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and
then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real
fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the
substance' -– 'Fruit'….
"Having reduced the different real fruits to
the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must,
in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way
back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse,
ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to
produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to
produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive
at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the
abstraction….
"The main interest for the speculative
philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary
fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds
and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in
the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances
of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for
they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of
the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind….
When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the
mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the
contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into
sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of
'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the
mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the
Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses,
for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond.
Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their
natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which
gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute
Fruit'.
"The ordinary man does not think he is saying
anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when
the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says
something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the
real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'…. It goes without saying that the speculative
philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally
known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as
determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the
real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of
reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes
from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity
of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
In the speculative way of speaking, this
operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an
inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension
constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels
(1975a), pp.72-75. Italic emphases in the original; several paragraphs
merged.]
Any reader tempted to respond that this can't
so,
since Hegel was a great philosopher, should consult Exhibit AFor The Prosecution
below (in fact, the English alphabet doesn't contain enough capital letters to label even a tiny fraction of the
incriminating evidence Hegel very helpfully scattered throughout his Logic,
let alone his other works):
"Being
is the indeterminate immediate; it is free from determinateness in
relation to essence and also from any which it can possess within
itself. This reflectionless being is being as it is
immediately in its own self alone.
"Because it is indeterminate being, it
lacks all quality; but in itself, the character of indeterminateness
attaches to it only in contrast to what is determinate or qualitative.
But determinate being stands in contrast to being in general, so that
the very indeterminateness of the latter constitutes its quality. It will
therefore be shown that the first being is in itself determinate, and
therefore, secondly, that it passes over into determinate being
-- is determinate being -- but that this latter as finite being
sublates itself and passes over into the infinite relation of being to its own
self, that is, thirdly, into being-for-self.
"Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy
it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it
has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not
be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which
could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an
other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to
be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure
intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is
equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact
nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.
"Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of
all determination and content -- undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as
intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether
something or nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing
has, therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished and thus nothing is
(exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and
thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being.
Nothing is, therefore, the same determination,
or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure
being.
"Pure Being and
pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither
being nor nothing, but that being -- does not pass over but has passed over --
into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not
undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same,
that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and
inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its
opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate
vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both
are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved
itself."
[Hegel
(1999), pp.82-83. Italic emphases in the original.]
This is the sort of "Blaahdee Rraahbeesh" (paraphrasing
Tony Cliff)
that intelligent people like Houlgate uncritically swallow -- and, what is worse,
try
to convince the rest of us that it is in fact ordinary German, and that it makes some
sort of sense!
Insults aside, has anyone ever heard a single ordinary German
speaker (not the worse for drink, drugs, brain disease, or
Hermetic Mysticism) misuse German
in that way
(i.e., in the original language of the above quotation)?
[In
Parts Five and Six of Essay Twelve, this passage, and many more like it, will be
dumped back in the
Neoplatonic and Hermetic Swamp
from which it slithered two centuries ago.]
74a1.
Of course,
as noted in Essay Thirteen Part Three, the word "meaning" is itself rather complex. On
that, see Note 74b.
74b.We can
illustrate what has gone wrong using Wittgenstein's own example:
"If a sign is possible, then it is also
capable of signifying.... (The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing
is that there is no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical
because we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not because of
the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.) Thus the reason why 'Socrates is identical'
says nothing is that we have not given any adjectival meaning to the word
'identical'. For when it appears as a sign for identity, it symbolizes in an
entirely different way -- the signifying relation is a different one --
therefore the symbols also are entirely different in the two cases: the two
symbols have only the sign in common, and that is an accident." [Wittgenstein
(1972), §§5.473-5.47333, pp.95-97. Italic emphasis in the
original; paragraphs merged.]
In this
context, we can conclude one of two things: (i) The word "identical" used in the
following sentence has no meaning (since we
haven't given it any in such a context), or, (ii) Because
of the usual meaning of "identical", no sense can be made of W1.
W1: Socrates is identical.
It could be objected that W1 is malformed
-- but that is, in fact, part of the problem!
In that case consider
the following example:
W2: Motion is soluble from matter.
Once more, either (i) These words have no meaning in this context, or
(ii) Because of their usual meaning, no sense can be made of W2.
Again, it
could be argued that W2 isn't at all like M9. No one would think of uttering W2,
certainly not part of a philosophical theory.
In that case,
compare M9 with the following:
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
W3: God is inseparable from love.
W4: Heat is inseparable from love.
W5: Beauty is inseparable from truth.
W3 and W5
(or their equivalents) certainly have been asserted by philosophers.
Confronted with these
examples, decisions would have to be made about whether we understand what
look like ordinary words used in such contexts, or whether we grasp the unusual
use to which they were being put, which is what creates the problem. Same with M9.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
Again, it could be objected that W3-W5 aren't at all like M9, which is a
scientific proposition. The others aren't.
However, as we have seen, propositions like M9 (i.e., M1a and P4) fall apart upon
examination. Even so, the incoherence of M1a, for example, is less easy to
see than it is in relation to W1, but it is no less true that they are incoherent.
W1: Socrates is identical.
As Glock
notes:
"Wittgenstein's ambitious claim is that it is
constitutive of metaphysical theories and questions that their employment of
terms is at odds with their explanations and that they use deviant rules along
with the ordinary ones. As a result, traditional philosophers cannot coherently
explain the meaning of their questions and theories. They are confronted with a
trilemma: either their novel uses of terms remain unexplained
(unintelligibility), or...[they use] incompatible rules (inconsistency), or
their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary use --
including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts in terms
of which the philosophical problems were phrased." [Glock (1996), pp.261-62.]
The point underlying the last remark --
i.e., "their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary
use -- including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts
in terms of which the philosophical problems were phrased" is explained much
more fully in a passage quoted earlier (albeit in connection with the Philosophy
of Mind, but what it has to say is applicable more generally):
"As
to the widespread disparagement of attempts to
resolve philosophical problems by way of
appeals to 'what we would ordinarily
say', we would proffer the following comment. It often appears that those who
engage in such disparaging nonetheless themselves often do what they
programmatically disparage, for it seems to us at least arguable that many of
the central philosophical questions are in fact, and despite protestations to
the contrary, being argued about in terms of appeals (albeit often inept) to
'what we would ordinarily say...'. That the main issues of contemporary
philosophy of mind are essentially about language (in the sense that they
arise from and struggle with confusions over the meanings of ordinary words) is
a position which, we insist, can still reasonably be proposed and defended. We
shall claim here that most, if not all, of the conundrums, controversies and
challenges of the philosophy of mind in the late twentieth century consist in a
collectively assertive, although bewildered, attitude toward such ordinary
linguistic terms as 'mind' itself, 'consciousness', 'thought', 'belief',
'intention' and so on, and that the problems which are posed are ones which
characteristically are of the form which ask what we should say if
confronted with certain facts, as described....
"We have absolutely nothing
against the coining of new, technical uses [of words], as we have said. Rather,
the issue is that many of those who insist upon speaking of machines' 'thinking'
and 'understanding' do not intend in the least to be coining new, restrictively
technical, uses for these terms. It is not, for example, that they have decided
to call a new kind of machine an 'understanding machine', where the word
'understanding' now means something different from what we ordinarily mean by
that word. On the contrary, the philosophical cachet derives entirely from their
insisting that they are using the words 'thinking' and 'understanding' in the
same sense that we ordinarily use them. The aim is quite
characteristically to provoke, challenge and confront the rest of us. Their
objective is to contradict something that the rest of us believe. What the 'rest
of us' believe is simply this: thinking and understanding is something
distinctive to human beings..., and that these capacities set us apart from the
merely mechanical.... The argument that a machine can think or understand,
therefore, is of interest precisely because it features a use of the words
'think' and 'understand' which is intendedly the same as the ordinary use.
Otherwise, the sense of challenge and, consequently, of interest would
evaporate.... If engineers were to make 'understand' and 'think' into technical
terms, ones with special, technical meanings different and distinct from
those we ordinarily take them to have, then, of course, their claims to have
built machines which think or understand would have no bearing whatsoever upon
our inclination ordinarily to say that, in the ordinary sense, machines do not
think or understand." [Button, et al (1995), pp.12, 20-21. Italic
emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
In connection with the last remark (made by Glock), if
it applies to Lenin, that would mean he isn't in fact talking about
motion, but about 'motion', and we are no further forward (no pun intended) -- just
like W1 isn't about
identity, but about 'identity'. [The other two possibilities have already been
considered.] There is more on this in Note 75, below.
Finally, it is worth recalling that for
Lenin M9 isn't expressing ordinary inseparability, like, say, "He is
inseparable from his Teddy Bear", or "She is inseparable from her partner". More
on that later, too.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
Despite this,
in response
to the claims advanced in this Essay about Metaphysics -- that it is incoherent non-sense,
since it arise out of, and is based on, a radical misuse of language unconnected with wider social
practices --, some have argued that if
meaning is given by use, then metaphysicians certainly use words to
formulate their theories. If so, that should guarantee their language has meaning.
Furthermore,
Traditional Philosophy is part of a social practice, as is any
intellectual pursuit. Philosophers have been
debating among themselves now for well over two thousand years. They share ideas,
methods,
and terminology, and they set standards for one another's work (especially these
days in connection with peer reviewed books and articles). If so, their theses and their
language can't be meaningless. After all, "The game is played", to
paraphrase Wittgenstein.
In reply, it is worth pointing out that nowhere in
this Essay have philosophical theories been described as meaningless, just
non-sensical. Moreover, as I argue in
Essay Thirteen Part Three, use doesn't
guarantee that just any inscription will have a meaning:
Just because
I have used "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" to make the point that it is meaningless that doesn't imply that "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" means
"BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT is meaningless". If it did then clearly "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ
TTT" would mean "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT is meaningless", which in turn
would mean that "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" isn't meaningless after
all! In which case, "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" would imply that BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT
is meaningless and BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT isn't meaningless!
Nor does it mean that just because I
intended to show that "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" is meaningless
that it is meaningless just because that was so intended by me. It was
meaningless before I used it, and after. If we exclude the possibility that this string of
letters is some sort of code, or is intended to be a code (on this, see below), intentions
can't turn babble into sense, nor
the other way round. But, that fact didn't prevent the present author from using "BBB XXX
ZZZ QQQ TTT" to point out that it was indeed meaningless. Neither does it
prevent anyone else understanding the present author's (speakers') meaning to
that end, even
though whatever was, or could be said by using "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ TTT" is linguistically
meaningless, for all that.
[It
is important to note that in the aforementioned Essay I was, at that point,
temporarily ignoring the distinction between meaning and
sense.]
So,
the mere use of a string of letters (or sounds) doesn't
imply they have, or it has, a meaning.
It
could be objected that the string of letters used above (i.e., "BBB XXX ZZZ QQQ
TTT") is neither a word nor a sentence, and so it isn't relevant to the matter
in hand. Philosophical language isn't constructed out of
random letters or symbols.
Maybe not, but this still fails to show that philosophical words
doin fact have a meaning. Of course, it all depends on what one means by
"meaning". I added the following list of that word's possible connotations to
Essay Thirteen Part Three:
(1) Personal Significance: as in
"His Teddy Bear means a lot to him."
(2) Evaluative Import: as in "May Day
means different things to different classes."
(3) Point or Purpose: as in "Life has
no meaning."
(4) Linguistic Meaning, or
Synonymy: as
in "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", "'Chien' means 'dog'",
"Comment vous appelez-vous?" means "What's your name?", or
"Recidivist" means someone who has resumed their criminal career.
(5) Aim or Intention: as in "They mean
to win this strike."
(6) Implication: as in "Winning
this dispute means that management won't try another wage cut again in a hurry."
(7) Indicate, Point to, or Presage:
as in "Those clouds mean rain", "Those spots mean you have measles", or
"That expression means she's angry".
(8) Reference: as in "I mean him over
there", or "'The current president of the USA' means somebody different at
most
once every
eight years."
(9) Artistic or Literary Import:
as in "The meaning of this novel is to highlight the steep decline in political integrity."
(10) Conversational Focus: as in "I
mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% offer in the first place?"
(11) Expression of
Sincerity or
Determination: as in "I mean it, I do want to go on the
march!", or "The demonstrators really mean to stop this war."
(12) Content of a Message, or the
Import of a Sign: as in "It means the strike starts on Monday", or "It
means you have to queue here."
(13) Interpretation: as in "You
will need to read the author's novels if you want to give new meaning to her
latest play", or "That gesture means those pickets think you are a
scab."
(14) Import or Significance:
as in "Part of the meaning of this play is to change our view of drama",
or "The real meaning of this agreement is that the bosses have at last learnt their
lesson."
(15) Speaker's Meaning: as in "When
you trod on her foot and she said 'Well done!' she in fact meant the exact
opposite".
(16) Communicative Meaning: as in "You
get my meaning", or "My last letter should tell you what I meant", or "We have
just broken the code, hence the last message meant this...."
(17) Explanation: as in "When
the comrade said the strike isn't over what she meant was that we can still
win!", or "What is the meaning of this? Explain yourself!"
(18) Translation, or a Request for
Translation -- as in "What does 'Il pleut' mean in German?"
This isn't to suggest that these are the only meanings of "meaning", or that
several of the examples listed don't overlap. [For example, items (4) and (17)
intersect, as do (5) and (11), and (9) and (14), as well as (4) and (18).]
[A very useful summary of these and other
senses of "meaning" can be found in Audi (1999), pp.545-50 (which
entry was
written by
Brian Loar).]
It
isn't being denied that DM-jargon possesses some sort of meaning for its acolytes,
perhaps in
terms of Options
(1) and (2), but it hasn't any in
terms of Options (4) and (8). Moreover, when an
attempt is made to explain the meaning of philosophical jargon, all we end up
with is yet more jargon. That is also the case with DM.
In which case, not much more can be done with this
part of the
above objection (i.e., that if a word or an inscription has a use then it has
a meaning) until we are clear which of the above connotations of "meaning"
were
intended.
I also argued in Essay Thirteen
Part Three
as follows (in
relation to my claim that contextualism would imply that incidental noises
would have a meaning, slightly edited):
It could be objected to the points made in
the main body of the Essay about coughs and other incidental noises, that a cough
or a child's cry aren't
linguistic expressions, hence they are inapt counter-examples.
However, if meaning were indeed
occasion-sensitive (as opposed to it being a feature of the public use of words
drawn from a finite vocabulary, etc.), then any sound or sign could count as a
linguistic move. If, say, someone coughed and they meant (speaker's meaning)
on that occasion: "Look out, the boss is coming!", then it seems, according
to this theory that that noise would mean (linguistically) the same as:
"Look out, the boss is coming!". In which case, for [those who argue along these
lines, that context determines meaning], it looks as if a cough would be just as
much a linguistic act as uttering the words: "Look out, the boss is coming!".
Indeed, if that were so, the sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!"
would be
dispensable, and we could all use a cough from now on whenever we wanted to warn of
the boss's approach --, or, indeed, to report on that possibility in this Essay.
So, when I wrote:
If, say, someone coughed and
they meant (speaker's meaning) on that occasion: "Look out, the boss is
coming!", then it seems that (according to [this theory]) this noise would mean
(linguistically) the same as the words: "Look out, the boss is coming!".
I could just as well from now on write:
If, say, someone coughed and they meant
(speaker's meaning) on that occasion: "COUGH!", then it seems that (according to
[this theory]) this noise would mean (linguistically) the same as the word:
"COUGH!"
Which everyone committed to this theory would
understand, since the sentence ""Look out, the boss is coming!" would, for
them, mean the same as a cough, or even "cough".
In that case, the ridiculous nature of the above should
now speak, or cough, for itself.
Again, it could be objected that this response only succeeds in undermining the
argument advanced in
this Essay (which was that the meaning of words and the sense of sentences
aren't in general dependent on contexts of utterance), for if the meaning of, say,
a cough is now admitted to be occasion-sensitive, then meaning in general must be
occasion-sensitive, contrary to what had been claimed.
That
objection is misguided. Given the theory under
consideration, and the example used above,
we would now have nothing into which we could 'translate' the said cough, since the original sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!" is
dispensable (it having been replaced, along with its meaning, by a
cough). If so, either (i) coughs would become meaningless by default -- they would not now be
translatable because the sentence they replaced, and which could be used to
translate them, has dropped from the language --, or (ii) if
coughs retained some sort of a meaning, it would then be equivalent to the now
unusable (or, from-now-on-and-forever-to-be-unused) sentence "Look out, the boss is
coming!" -- once again, it having passed from the language. Either way, coughs would thus have taken on
the role of the now defunct type sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!".
As should seem clear, coughs would thus
become occasion-insensitive, since they would now have this
meaning: "Look out, the boss is coming!", and no other. The whole point of the exercise
would be lost and occasion-sensitivity will have been transformed into its alter-ego: occasion-insensitivity!
[Of course, this would create problems for
those who cough because they have a tickle in the throat, or are suffering from
a chest complaint. Might they come to be described as serial boss-approach-warners? And
what are we to say of the patients in tuberculosis wards? Are they all warning
one another of the same or different bosses?]
On the other hand, (iii) even assuming that the
sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!" doesn't slip from the language in the
manner suggested above (or in some other way), the point at issue here would
still be that whatever handle we have on occasion-sensitive acts of communication,
it must rely on linguistic expressions that aren't themselves constrained by
occasion-sensitivity.
So, the point made in the main body of this
Essay wasn't that
nothing is occasion-sensitive, but that not everything could possibly
be occasion-sensitive.
If the translation into language of coughs and
other assorted random noises -- so that they could be taken to mean things like "Look out,
the boss is coming!" -- were itself dependent on nothing but occasion-sensitive
materials (including the sentence "Look out, the boss is coming!"), we
would be involved in trying to comprehend something (the cough) in terms of
something else (its supposed sentential equivalent) that would itself be in need
of an unravelling process all of its own. Down such a road, I fear, lies another
infinite regress, in which impenetrable thicket all meaning would soon become lost.
Again, it could be objected that this still
fails to address the main issue: coughs (etc.) are non-linguistic acts;
hence, they aren't at all what [this theory] was adverting to.
The point about using examples such as coughs
and cries (etc.) is that [this theory] can't in the end distinguish between the
occasion-sensitivity of such sounds (etc.) and genuine linguistic acts, which
[it]
says are also constrained in this way (i.e., in that they, too, are subject to
the constraints of occasion-sensitivity). If the meaning of both is occasion-sensitive
(whereas the view advanced in this Essay is that only the meaning of the former
is so constrained, when used in the manner suggested), then
[those who hold this theory] still [need] other criteria to tell them apart. If a cough could mean
(speaker's meaning) the same as "Look out, the boss is coming!" (and who can doubt that?),
and any other randomly chosen sentence (such as "My gerbil is dead!") could
also mean "Look out, the boss is coming!" (as it seems it could, given
[this theory]; that is, if the person using "My gerbil is dead!" actually
meant it, or intended it, as a coded message/warning, "Look out, the boss is coming!"), then the
distinction between linguistic expressions and mere sounds would be
lost, and the points raised in the main body of this Essay would stand.
Despite this, it might be felt that since
coughs and itinerant noises aren't part of a standardised vocabulary, they can't
be interpreted on the lines outlined above. But, if a linguistic expression
can be used to mean anything whatsoever (even something wildly divergent
from the norm -- or to use [one theorists'] words: it could be "different in every
aspect") then standardised vocabularies must surely drop out as irrelevant. For
example, if the word "cough" (not the actual noise, or action, but the
word itself) could mean, say, "My armadillo is sick", then any connection it
once might have had with its own dictionary entry (or its established meaning) would be lost (as
would those of the other four words used: "my", "armadillo", "is" and "sick").
In that case, the links that the word "cough" had with its standard meaning
would be severed, too. And, if that is the case, an actual cough could
then mean the same as "My armadillo is sick", or any other word or set of words
in the dictionary or the language, which could in turn mean anything themselves, including
coughs.
It might now be objected that an actual
cough isn't a word, so it can't perform the roles assigned to it
in the above paragraphs.
But, if anything can mean anything, we must
surely lose touch with the meaning of the word "word" itself. On this view, the
word "word" could in fact mean: "This expression actually means
itinerant noises like coughs"
if it were so 'intended' by deviant linguists (or if I so intend it
here). If Occasionalism were true, this possibility can't be ruled out.
Occasionalism permits any word to mean anything if it is so intended, or if the
circumstances suggest it. And that includes words and phrases
like "meaning", "sentence", "word", "cough", "and so on"..., and so on.
Be
this as it may, as the examples of philosophical language surveyed in these
Essays show -- and as this
confirms -- little or no sense can be made of the words philosophers use. That being
the case, metaphysical meaning is probably covered by Options
(1) and (2) above, too. If, however,
any attempt is made to explain the meaning of the words philosophers and/or DM-fans employ (i.e., along the lines of
Option (4), for instance), then, as has been pointed out
many times, such attempts invariably rely on yet more impenetrable
jargon to 'explain' the last batch of obscure terminology --, or, indeed, the last
batch of misused ordinary words.
Hence, the circle of meaningless
jargon, or misused words, can't be broken into at any point.
As
far as the phrase "The game is played" is concerned, Wittgenstein certainly didn't mean that just anything could count as a language game.
But even if he did so intend, readers will be hard pressed to find any reference to
"language games" in these Essays (of course, saving isolated mentions like this). Again, as I
argued in
Essay Thirteen Part Three:
Wittgenstein introduced this metaphor to assist him compare and contrast the many uses
there are of language, as well as to help him draw an analogy between
language and rule-governed social behaviour. It wasn't meant to suggest that
the use of language is merely a game, or that it is simply there for amusement or
recreation, and is thus of little import. Nor yet that we play games when we use language, or
even that our 'view of reality' is 'relative' to such games. [The last few
words have been put 'scare quotes' partly because Wittgenstein himself would
have questioned their employment in such contexts.]
So, for example, when confronted by those who
use the negative particle in an odd way, he didn't say "Ok, well the game is played,
after all!", he
said this:
"There can be no debate about whether these
or other rules are the right ones for the word 'not'.... For without these
rules, the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has
another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just as well change the word
too." [Wittgenstein (2009),
§549, footnote, p.155e.]
It
could be objected that Ms Lichtenstein's rejection of the usefulness of the
language game metaphor in this regard doesn't mean that she
is right. Independent reasons are required to show that if the 'Game of
Metaphysics' is played, the words its adepts use are still meaningless.
[That issue will be tackled in Part Three of Essay
Twelve, when it is published.]
In advance of that, the reader is directed back to
a point
Glock made earlier.
Of course, if metaphysicians want to play such pointless games, which have no
more significance than the nonsense rhymes of
Edward
Lear, that is up to them. But, as the History of Philosophy has shown,
they would have been far better occupied watching someone else watch paint
dry.
Indeed, as far as Traditional Philosophy is concerned (if we except Theology and
other forms of Mysticism), a more useless and unproductive human endeavour would
be difficult to find. Again, as Peter Hacker noted (quoted earlier):
"For two and a half millennia some of the best minds in
European culture have wrestled with the problems of philosophy. If one were to
ask what knowledge has been achieved throughout these twenty-five centuries,
what theories have been established (on the model of well-confirmed theories in
the natural sciences), what laws have been discovered (on the model of the laws
of physics and chemistry), or where one can find the corpus of philosophical
propositions known to be true, silence must surely ensue. For there is no body of
philosophical knowledge. There are no well-established philosophical theories or
laws. And there are no philosophical handbooks on the model of handbooks of
dynamics or of biochemistry. To be sure, it is tempting for contemporary
philosophers, convinced they are hot on the trail of the truths and theories
which so long evaded the grasp of their forefathers, to claim that philosophy
has only just struggled out of its early stage into maturity.... We can at long
last expect a flood of new, startling and satisfying results -- tomorrow.
"One can blow the Last Trumpet once, not once a
century. In the seventeenth century Descartes thought he had discovered the
definitive method for attaining philosophical truths; in the eighteenth century
Kant believed that he had set metaphysics upon the true path of a science; in
the nineteenth century Hegel convinced himself that he had brought the history
of thought to its culmination; and Russell, early in the twentieth century,
claimed that he had at last found the correct scientific method in philosophy,
which would assure the subject the kind of steady progress that is attained by
the natural sciences. One may well harbour doubts about further millenarian
promises." [Hacker (2001c), pp.322-23.]
[The claim that Metaphysics has
played a useful role in the progress and development of
Science will be tackled in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
75.If rules for the use of ordinary
words (which are themselves a complex expression of social practices) help
constitute their meaning, then it would seem that a misuse of language must either
(a) Empty
them of all meaning or, (b) Endow them with a novel/different meaning (indeed, as
Glock and
others
quoted here pointed out). In the first instance,
this will render any sentence containing that word incapable of having a
sense
(i.e., incapable of being empirically true or empirically false), as opposed
it not having a sense simply as
amatter of fact.
Admittedly,
it isn't easy to specify the precise boundaries of the above distinctions, which is no big surprise. Human beings in their
ordinary discourse don't usually utter what they take to be factual sentences
but which are incapable of having a
sense, although they might sometimes utter those that contingently lack one.
[Slips of the tongue,
Spoonerisms
and
Malapropisms come to mind, here.]
A
factual sentence that as a matter of fact lacked a sense would, for
example, be one
that contained terms that contingently lacked a denotation, and were thus
contingently incapable of being understood. For example:
D1: Woodruff Durfendorfer bought The Happy
Sailor.
Now,
the name "Woodruff Durfendorfer" might not cause too many problems for those who
take it as the name of, or for, a man (even if they don't know
who he is), but D1 would lack a sense
(that is, it would be impossible to say if it was true or if it was false) until the
denotation of "The Happy Sailor" had been established. As soon as it
had been
settled that this is the name of a boat, a pub, or a book, for instance, it would gain a sense
and would thus be capable of being understood.
The distinction between a
name for and a name of a man/woman
perhaps needs explaining. [In what follows, to save me having to keep saying
this, when I use the word "name" in this specific context, what I mean is "Proper Name".] There are certain names that we automatically take to
be names for human beings (which will, naturally, vary from culture to culture,
era to era), and there are names that we instantly recognize can't function in
this way. Concentrating on given names, first: "Fido" can't be a name for
a man/woman (plainly, in English-speaking countries, it is typically a name for a
dog), nor can "Tiddles" (which is typically a name for a cat), whereas, "Peter" or "Susan" are the sort of names
we use for human beings. But, a name could be a name for a man/woman
while
not in fact being used to name any particular individual. So, "Jesus Christ" is
the name for a man, but it is a pretty safe bet no one is (now) actually called by that name; same with
"Adolf Hitler", "Heinrich Himmler", "Pol Pot", or even "Joseph
Stalin" (although it is possible that certain Stalinophiles might change
their names to "Joseph Stalin", or name their children after him). So,
if I am right, the last five
aren't currently the names of anyone. But, even if I am wrong, we can
think of situations in which no one would at that time actually be called by these names or,
indeed,
other names one could imagine, which is all we need for this distinction to
hold. For instance, it is a safe bet that no one at present is called "Vlad the Impaler"
(even though this was perhaps also a title). [I am, of course,
ignoring here the use of pseudonyms on the Internet or in role-playing, for example.]
So, a name of
a man/woman is a name that is actually used to name someone, whereas a name
for a man/woman is a name that individuals in a certain culture could use to name an individual, even if it isn't
currently in use.
Similarly, we have names for, and names of, rivers, mountains, horses, cars,
ships, planets, stars, wars, theorems, and oceans, to mention just a few. No one would take "E-type
Jaguar", the name of a classic sports car, for instance, as the name of,
or the name for, a man or woman -- not even pop stars would use it as
the name of one of their offspring -- or the name of, or the
name for, a mountain. It is clearly the name for a car, not a human
being, a mountain or a river. Same, mutatis
mutandis, with "Dogger
Bank", "Sargasso
Sea" and "Atacama
Desert".
On the other
hand, sentences that are incapable of possessing a sense and are incapable of
being understood --, or which are incoherent --, would, for instance, (i) Contain terms
whose employment abrogated certain
syntactic rules
(like those we saw in Essay Three Part One,
here,
here, and
here), or (ii)
Whose combination violated other, more general logico-grammatical conventions. [Here the word
"grammatical" is being used
both in its Wittgensteinian and in its normal sense.] Alternatively,
(iii) They could represent the linguistic expression of a rule that has been misconstrued
as
an empirical proposition.
Again, not much can be done with W1. The same is true of M1a (which
falls foul of (iii)), but it
takes a little more prodding before its bogus status becomes obvious.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Of course, as a matter of fact, words may be employed
in any way we like. Nevertheless, we may not make of the words we already have
what we please without creating confusion, or without altering their meaning. For example,
although this is highly unlikely, the word "identical" (in W1) might one day come to
mean what we now mean by "dead". [This is, of course, just a variation of the trivial
case we met earlier.] No one would count
it a significant discovery about the 'real meaning' of "identical" if it came to
mean what we now mean by "dead".
Even
so, it is relatively easy to confirm (a fact about life that should be as
obvious as it is familiar to most speakers, anyway) that
confusions occur when a speaker tries to use the vernacular in any
way they like. Trivial cases aside (e.g., coded messages, experimental
literature, poetry, jokes, making a grammatical or linguistic point (as here), or
as entertainment, etc.), any such individual
would soon fail to understand even their own words, to say nothing of the
puzzlement, confusion or consternation they would induce in their listeners. Again, W1 is a
good example. There, "identical" can't mean what we ordinarily take it to mean
(since it is part of a
compound
transitive verb phrase, which requires an object).
On the
other hand, if it is 'meant' to be taken with its usual meaning, no sense can be made of
it.
W1: Socrates is identical.
As
already noted, in such cases, the sentences involved might (a)
Contingently lack a sense or (b) They might be incapable of being assigned a
sense (given the language we now have), and thus be rendered incoherent as a
result. [But that would, of
course, depend
on each case in hand.] In the
latter eventuality (i.e., Option (b)), for example, if a novel application a word actually abrogated
the rules we already have for the formation and use of empirical propositions
(outlined at the beginning of this
Essay),
then any sentence in which that word occurred -- if that sentence were still intended to be taken empirically,
stating some fact or other --, would become
incoherently non-sensical. That is, it would be incapable of being
given an empirical sense given the meaning that the word "empirical"
(or even "fact") already has.
This illustrates how and why certain sentences can be (c)
both non-sensical and comprehensible (e.g., rules), while others can be (d)
non-sensical and
incoherent/incomprehensible. Metaphysical and DM-propositions fall into the
latter category. That can be seen from the discussion of the bogus nature of M1a
throughout this Essay, as well as other DM-theories analysed in other Essays
published at this site. For example, we witnessed the mess Engels got
himself into when he failed to consider the obvious questions he should have
asked about Zeno and Hegel's 'analysis' of motion, just as we have seen the
same fate befall Trotsky and his
comments about the
LOI.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
[Anyone who takes exception to the use of the word "empirical" can substitute
for it "fact-stating" or "factual"; not much will change. (On that, see Essay
Three Part Four, when it is published.) Anyway,
Marx and Engels employed this word
many times in the way if has been used here.]
Naturally, there is nothing to prevent language users from
discovering or inventing new ways of forming sentences (etc.), or expressing
themselves, but novel developments like these will
be typically socially-, not individually-, motivated. [That assertion is, of course,
controversial, and will be addressed more fully in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
However,
should the connection that now exists between an empirical proposition and its
negation be modified, the meaning of the word "empirical" (or even that of
"negation") can't fail to change, too. But that would only be the case in this
novel context; the wider use of such words like this won't be affected. Compare
that with how certain words have recently
changed, without affecting their wider use. Think of words like "sick", "woke",
or "text". At worst they will simply be rendered ambiguous, and will
need to be distinguished from the current use of what appear to be
typographically similar terms, even if only for clarity's sake. In that eventuality, we might have to
invent new words to serve in their place, so that we were then able to say what we
used to be able to say using such terms with their older meanings.
A recent
example of such a
change concerns the use of "refute",
which now seems to mean the same as "reject" or "repudiate".
Anyone now using "refute" (with its old meaning) will very likely be
misunderstood. We either have to accept the fact that "refute" now has two different meanings
or we will have to use a paraphrase to make ourselves clear (such as "prove, by
the use of counter-argument or disconfirming evidence that what someone has said or written is incorrect or false"). Another,
but less serious change, is the recent
confusion one finds on the Internet whereby younger users tend confuse
"then" with "than". (That might, of course, be a
spin-off from 'texting',
just as much as it might be the result of
homophony.)
In relation to this, even the 'prestigious', right-wing UK newspaper (ironically
"conservative", with both a capital and small "c") has succumbed to this trend.
Writing about the 3-0 defeat inflicted on Manchester United by their arch
rivals, Manchester City, in March 2014, one of their chief sports writers had
this to say:
"There was a barbed observation from one
Manchester United supporter at
half-time suggesting that the only reason referee Michael Oliver spared Marouane
Fellaini a red card for elbowing Pablo Zabaleta was that keeping him on the
pitch was actually more advantageous to
Manchester City then [sic] sending him off." [Mark Ogden, quoted from
here; accessed 27/03/2014.]
Another example is the almost ubiquitous use of "of" in place of "have" --
as in: "He should of..." instead of
"He should have...". Yet another, is the very widespread misuse of
"nothing" -- as in "I ain't done nothing", or "I don't
know nothing about nobody" (a line I heard delivered on a US TV cop show a
few years back).
[On this, and
other similar quirks, see Fry and Kirton (2012). On linguistic innovation, see
Deutscher (2006).]
But,
linguistic change like this is trivial: it amounts to little more than terminological
novelty, or it is just plain old fashioned confusion.
This isn't
to deny that it is possible for individuals to innovate linguistically, just
that, as social beings, we may do so only because of the linguistic and social space
that already exists for us even to attempt to do so. The social media and
the Internet have only increased the rate at which this is happening (with
"clicktivism", "haterade" and "otherize" among many
of the new words recently
added to the latest edition of the Oxford English Dictionary). If and when
users
innovate, but their innovations fail to 'catch on', any new words, or uses of
words, they might have introduced will merely form part of their own
idiolect. For
instance, back in 2005, when
the UK-press was working itself up into a lather over
the re-election of
Oona King,
I coined the term "Oonanism" on a discussion board to capture the state of
self-induced
ecstasy they, and the 'respectable
left', seemed to have developed over this MP. Needless to say, it didn't catch on.
[Although, a Google search will show that this word has been used many
times since, but one suspects it has simply been confused with "Onanism".]
Other
terms which do appear to have
caught on (again, largely because of the Internet and social media) are the
following: "Affluenza", "Brocialist", "Bromance", "Chillax", "Mansplain", "Selfie",
"Screenager", "Twitterati", "Intersectionality",
"Blogosphere", "blog", "vlog", and "Bling", etc. And,
of course,
many words have changed their meaning, or have become new words themselves
in the above manner. [On this, see, for example,
here.]
Nevertheless, back in the first century BC, no one would have been able to innovate
using words like "cell phone", "television" or "DVD player". That explains why,
if we found
ancient inscriptions that mentioned Plato's DVD collection and Archimedes cell
phone records, we would either
dismiss them as forgeries, fail to make sense of them --,
or, if a large enough number of such awkward facts turned up, we might begin to reconsider some of our fundamental
beliefs
about the past.
A similar conceptual revolution was initiated in
Palaeontology, Earth Science and Biology when enough fossils (and other
assorted anomalies) turned up or were discovered a couple of centuries ago. Scientists and
assorted opinion-formers had to revise more than a few fundamental ideas about the
earth, science and the Bible. [On this see, Bowler
(2003), Gillispie (1996), Greene (1996), Laudan (1990), and Rudwick (1985, 2007,
2010).]
75a0.
Several more of the same type were quoted
earlier.
Of course,
this greatly oversimplifies the nature and complexity of Traditional
Metaphysics. It would be hard, if not impossible, to condense much of it into
pithy one-liners like these. However, having said that, the vast bulk of
Traditional Thought does consist of theses (sub-theses, corollaries and
sub-corollaries), which each theorist spends much time and energy trying to
derive or substantiate (the latter of which can sometimes spread over hundreds
of pages, or across many different works). But, as noted in the main body, this
is just a convoluted charade, since all that this (largely wasted) effort
amounts to is the production of yet more obscure jargon aimed at 'substantiating',
or elaborating upon, the last batch of similar jargon. This
entire set of words, theses and sub-theses forms a self-referential body, which
nevertheless still amounts to
an extended attempt to
derive Supertruths from language alone.
The
"below the surface" metaphor is no less misleading. No one supposes
(it is to be hoped!) that if we
scratched away at the surface of objects, we would
eventually be able to locate their "essences", or they would at least
be capable of being observed. Or even that if we had senses vastly superior to those we now possess, we
would be able to see, or even sense, somehow (with or without the aid of
instruments) the 'abstractions' of Traditional Thought, or even the aforementioned "essences". Indeed, as Leibniz noted,
if we were to shrink down to the size of atoms and were somehow inserted into
someone's head, we would still be unable
to see, or sense, 'thoughts', or the 'formal properties' of bodies, nor yet the
'necessities' metaphysicians assure us are 'really' there, but which are forever mocking our
feeble attempts to perceive them.
So, what does
this metaphor actually mean? After 2400 years it is still far from clear.
However,
in response,
DM-theorists often point to the following passage from Volume Three of DasKapital:
"Vulgar economy actually does no more than
interpret, systematise and defend in doctrinaire fashion the conceptions of the
agents of bourgeois production who are entrapped in bourgeois production
relations. It should not astonish us, then, that vulgar economy feels
particularly at home in the estranged outward appearances of economic relations
in which these prima facie absurd and perfect contradictions appear and
that these relations seem the more self-evident the more their internal
relationships are concealed from it, although they are understandable to the
popular mind. But all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance
and the essence of things directly coincided." [Marx
(1981), p.956; Marx (1998), p.804. Bold emphasis alone added.]
(1)
First of all Marx was arguing with "vulgar economists", here -- those
who fail to examine the economy beyond superficialities, neglecting the relations
between the elements of production and exchange, as well as their historical
development, etc., etc. [Marx's criticism of other
economists won't be challenged here (or
anywhere else for that matter!).]
But, in what way do
such 'realities' lie 'under
the surface', or even behind and below "outward appearances"? And, didn't Marx refer to "all science", not just one
branch or part of it?
Well, whatever the answer
to those questions turns out to be, all that Marx did in response to his own question was to re-orientate his
analysis so that it included broader social and historical factors, those which were
in fact capable of being recognised by
theorists that weren't ideologically biased by an adherence to
privatised/individualistic theories of language,
a belief in atomistically active economic units/individuals or their support for class society --
and had they bothered to
check. In other words, Marx
was proposing the use of a different/novel grammar -- or, if readers prefer, he
was advocating a
different theoretical framework -- in order to analyse the
economy scientifically. This is nothing new. Every major innovation in science
is a result of the same (as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Two). In that respect, therefore, it
isn't goingdeeper that matters here, but going broader, going social,
going historical that counts -- exactly the approach
promoted at this site.
[On this, see
Lee Smolin's admission in Smolin (2006). To those who think the above approach
threatens 'objectivity', all I can say is: suspend judgement until
later. This topic will also
be addressed in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
(2) Second, as a general
description of science, Marx's remark is far too sketchy and vagueto be of
much use. That isn't to criticise
Marx, since he wasn't attempting to write a treatise on the nature of science. It is all
too easy, therefore, to read too much into this passage.
(3) Finally,
even if we take it at its face value, the above passage makes little sense (more on that presently).
In
that case, it is of little help in any attempt to understand this metaphor (i.e., that 'essences' lie somehow 'below the surface', or 'behind appearances') --, except
we interpret it along the lines suggested in (1) above. If essence is given by
grammar (as
Wittgenstein argued -- that is, the way we actually use language tells us what we
count as essential, and what we regard as essential is expressed by a
specific
use of language) -- that orientation will provide a way of comprehending
this figure of speech that doesn't slide back it back into the Idealist quagmire
that has held it fast for centuries.
If it is interpreted
that way, it now becomes clear that Marx meant that we should locate the "essence" scientists
speak about (that is, if they do!) by examining more carefully the
language they use -- what Wittgenstein called "depth
grammar":
"In
the use of words, one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'"
[Wittgenstein (2009), p.176e, §664.]
This
is a theme he carried over from The Tractatus:
"Everyday
language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It
is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language
is. Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because
the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body,
but for entirely different purposes....
It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical
form of proposition need not be its real one". [Wittgenstein
(1972), 4.002-4.0031, pp.36-37. This links to a PDF. Paragraphs merged.]
[Wittgenstein was here referring to Bertrand Russell's
Theory of Descriptions. On that, see Ryle (1932) -- neatly summarised
here -- and Baker (2001). I am
not claiming that Marx himself meant that his words should be viewed this way
(which would at the very least be anachronistic!), but
that it isa way of re-configuring this metaphor so that we don't saddle Marx with an
obscure,
half-baked, Idealist theory of science.]
Nevertheless, this
metaphor is clearly connected to the ancient idea that
nature "hides herself", a doctrine invented, as far as we know, by that
deeply confused ruling-class mystic,
Heraclitus:
"Nature loves to conceal herself." [Quoted from
here.]
Although Kirk and Raven render this passage
rather stiltedly, as follows:
"The real constitution is accustomed to hide
itself." [Kirk and Raven (1999), p.192.]
This idea has dominated traditional
thinking ever since, as this on-line source points out:
"Heraclitus, along with
Parmenides, is probably the most
significant philosopher of ancient Greece until
Socrates
and
Plato; in fact,
Heraclitus's philosophy is perhaps even more fundamental in the formation of the
European mind than any other thinker in European history, including Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle. Why? Heraclitus, like Parmenides, postulated a model of
nature and the universe which created the foundation for all other speculation
on physics and metaphysics. The ideas that the universe is in constant change
and that there is an underlying order or reason to this change -- the
Logos -- form the
essential foundation of the European world view. Every time you walk into a
science, economics, or political science course, to some extent everything you
do in that class originates with Heraclitus's speculations on change and the
Logos....
"In reading
these passages, you should be able to piece together the central
components of Heraclitus's thought. What, precisely, is the Logos? Can it be
comprehended or defined by human beings? What does it mean to claim that the
Logos consists of all the paired opposites in the universe? What is the
nature of the Logos as the composite of all paired opposites? How does the Logos
explain change? Finally, how would you compare Heraclitus's Logos to its later
incarnations: in the
Divided Line in Plato, in foundational and early
Christianity? How would you relate Heraclitus's cryptic statements to those of
Lao Tzu?"
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
[On this in general, see Eamonn (1994) -- although, as Eamonn points out,
materialistically-orientated scientists from the Seventeenth Century
onward sought to overthrow this ancient view of nature. By way of contrast, it is equally apparent that the tradition
that derives from Hegelian Natürphilosophie both reacted to, and resisted, this modernising
trend. (More on that in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here), and in
later Parts of Essay Twelve.) Cf., the detailed account in
Daston and Galison (2007), which traces the changes that took place (only
relatively recently) in the meaning of the word "objective", replacing the earlier phrase, "true to nature".]
Hence, it is quite clear that the usual way of
(mis)reading this metaphor is based on an ancient doctrine that there is a hidden (or, as we
might now say, there is an a priori)
structure to reality, accessible to thought alone.
This is also connected with the 'appearance/reality'
distinction, as
William
Blake observed:
"If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would
appear to man as it is, infinite." [Quoted from
here.]
"The best approach to understanding what is meant
by 'metaphysics' is by way of the concepts of appearance and reality. It is a
commonplace that the way things seem to be is often not the way they are, that
the way things apparently are is often not the way they really
are. The sun apparently moves across the sky -- but not really. The moon
seems larger when it is near the horizon -- but its size never really
changes. We might say that one is engaged in 'metaphysics' if one is attempting
to get behind all appearances and to describe things as they really are." [Van
Inwagen (1998), p.11. Bold emphasis alone added.]
We
have already seen dialecticians have bought into this view, following Hegel's lead:
"1. [T]he objectivity of consideration (not examples, not
divergencies (sic), but the Thing-in-itself). 2. the entire totality of
the manifold relations of this thing to others. 3. the development of
this thing, (phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life. 4. the
internally contradictory tendencies (and sides)
in this thing. 5. the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum and unity of
opposites. 6. the struggle, respectively unfolding, of these opposites,
contradictory strivings, etc. 7. the union of analysis and synthesis -- the
break-down of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts.
8. the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but
general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with
every other. 9. not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions
of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into
its opposite?]. 10. the endless process of the discovery of new
sides, relations, etc. 11. the endless process of the deepening of man's
knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to
essence and from less profound to more profound essence. 12. from
co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal
dependence to another, deeper, more general form. 13. the repetition at a higher
stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and 14. the apparent
return to the old (negation of the negation). 15. the struggle of content with
form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the
content. 16. the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa....
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites.
This embodies the essence of dialectics...." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22.
Bold emphases alone added. Formatting modified to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"This aspect of dialectics…usually
receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum
total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and
as a law of the objective world)." [Ibid.,
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"To begin with what is the simplest,
most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like]
John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized):
the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other
kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc.
Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity,
of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and
the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we
disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence
from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we
can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the
elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all
human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.359-60.
Bold emphases alone added.]
"The doctrine of Essence seeks to
liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that
appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of
dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the
apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Minor typo corrected.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Hegel defines the principle of
Contradiction as follows:
'Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as
it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.'
[Hegel (1999),
p.439, §956.]
"The first thing to note is that
Hegel makes little attempt to prove this. A few lines later he says:
'With regard to the assertion that
contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this
statement.'
"We here meet one of the most important
principles of the dialectical logic, and one that has been consistently
misunderstood, vilified or lied about. Dialectic for Hegel was a strictly
scientific method. He might speak of inevitable laws, but he insists from the
beginning that the proof of dialectic as scientific method is that the laws
prove their correspondence with reality. Marx's dialectic is of the same
character. Thus he excluded what later became The Critique of Political
Economy from Capital because it took for granted what only the
detailed argument and logical development of Capital could prove. Still
more specifically, in his famous letter to Kugelmann on the theory of value, he
ridiculed the idea of having to 'prove' the labour theory of value. If the
labour theory of value proved to be the means whereby the real relations of
bourgeois society could be demonstrated in their movement, where they came from,
what they were, and where they were going, that was the proof of the theory.
Neither Hegel nor Marx understood any other scientific proof.
"To ask for some proof of the laws,
as Burnham implied, or to prove them 'wrong' as Sidney Hook tried to do, this
is to misconceive dialectical logic entirely. Hegel complicated the question
by his search for a completely closed system embracing all aspects of the
universe; this no Marxist ever did (sic!). The frantic shrieks that Marx's dialectic is
some sort of religion or teleological construction, proving inevitably the
victory of socialism, spring usually from men who are frantically defending the
inevitability of bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution." [James
(1947), quoted from
here. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"To take each and every quality
displayed by an object or even at face value would necessarily mean that neither
a scientific nor a philosophic account could be given of it.
"[Added in a footnote:] As Herbert Marcuse explains: 'The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of "observable facts"....'
Such an
anti-positivist, anti-phenomenalist, Hegelian conception of essence has been
continuously relied upon by Marxist philosophers ever since. The doctrine of
essence is a fundamental one. A [quotation] from Mao Tse-Tung [is a] striking
confirmation of this: 'When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and
treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the
threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and
scientific method of analysis.'
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1966),
p.213." [DeGrood (1976),
p.73. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The important thing about a
Marxist understanding of the distinction between the appearance of things and
their essence is twofold: 1) by delving beneath the mass of surface
phenomena, it is possible to see the essential relations governing historical
change -– thus beneath the appearance of a free and fair market transaction it
is possible to see the exploitative relations of class society, but, 2) this
does not mean that surface appearances can simply be dismissed as ephemeral
events of no consequence. In revealing the essential relations in society, it
is also possible to explain more fully than before why they appear in a
form different to their real nature. To explain, for instance, why it is
that the exploitative class relations at the point of production appear as the
exchange of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay' in the polished surface of
the labour market....
"There is a deeper
reality, but it must be able to account for the contradiction between it and the
way it appears." [Rees (1998), pp.187-88. Bold emphases added. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
If some are tempted to search back through the archives to find the
hundreds of
container-loads of missing evidence that Lenin (or, indeed, the rest) had
"carefully" marshalled in support of these hyper-bold claims, a consideration of the next passage will at
least relieve them of that onerous task. Here, at last, Lenin is
disarmingly honest about where he had obtained these dogmatic generalisations:
"Hegel brilliantly
divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature)
in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more
popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the
alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97.
Italic
emphases in the original. First bold
emphasis only, added.]
Again, Lenin
is quite open and honest about the source of his ideas in these private
notebooks: dialectics derives its 'evidential' support -- not from a
"patient empirical examination of the facts" -- but from studying Hegel! As far as
evidence goes, that's it!That's all there is! The search for evidence
begins and ends with dialecticians leafing through Hegel's Logic.
That is the extent of the 'evidence' Lenin offered in support of his assertions
about "all notions" without exception, about "all phenomena and processes in
nature", and about nature's "eternal development", its "essence", etc., etc. Lenin
isn't alone; other DM-theorists are no less secretive about the
dearth of supporting evidence.
This
means that the aspiring metaphysician (and now, avid DM-fan) must employ language and
'thought' to go where our senses can't take us - 'beneath appearances' to the
heart of 'Being'. To that end they
must rely on some sort of mystical 'vision', the 'light of reason', a 'law of
cognition' (helpfully discovered for us by dialecticians without the use of a single consulting couch, brain scan or
psychometric test) -- or just good old-fashioned 'intuition'
-- augmented by no little 'word magic' and opaque jargon. Naturally, that
situates
this entire discipline right in the middle of Idealist
Valhalla.
I have
quoted the following passage several times already, but it is worth yet another
airing:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Returning to the van Inwagen quote, is it really
Metaphysics that tells us that the Sun isn't the same size as the Moon? If it
were, we would have no need of
science. Of course, as van Inwagen notes, the salient point here is that it is the
attempt to get behind "all appearances" that is metaphysical, not
just any particular optical illusion -- or even our attempt to understand it.
[Does anyone
think that the Sun and the Moon in
4-space
have any size at all? If they were so to think, that would make the
size of the Moon dependent on a measuring
system (or, indeed, on the 'Ideal
Observer'), and thus on -- Shock! Horror! -- 'appearances', once more. In
fact, even the 'Ideal
Observer' has to rely on 'appearances'! A clue is in the word "observer". On this, see Essay Thirteen
Part
One.]
Anyway,
the question is: From a handful of perceptual oddities like this is it really sound advice to question
all appearances?
Fortunately, materialists
needn't venture down that rather well
trodden path.
[Again, why that is so was discussed
at length in
Essay Three Part
Two; hence no more will be said about it here. Readers are directed there
for more details. Clearly this also raises complex issues
connected with the nature
of scientific knowledge, which will be tackled in Essay Thirteen Part
Two.]
So, the best spin that can be put on Marx's use of
this metaphor (if we want to absolve him of mysticism or of indulging in
Idealist Metaphysics) is to read it naturalistically. That is, if bourgeois
economists view the world superficially and ideologically then no wonder they misses essential features of the economy. And by "essential features"
I mean no more than those that are necessary in order to understand it
correctly, using the concepts and "forms
of representation" drawn from
HM. Now, since those concepts are based on, and are consonant with, ordinary language and
common understanding,
and arise out of the study of the evolution and social development of our species (alongside its many and
varied
class divisions and changing relations of production, etc., etc.),
this connects all of this with
our materially-based, historically-conditioned "form of life". Finally,
since "essence is expressed by grammar" (as Wittgenstein suggested),
s long-overdue
re-orientation like this will allow Marx to be defended from misguided
interpretations and accusations by
looking that the language he actually used, not the language some might wish he
had used.
Once
again, I'm not suggesting that Marx
would have put
things this way, or even that he would have agreed with it (but that is
certainly
possible); however it is the way I view this metaphor, and for the
above reasons. It is a metaphor, after all, so it has no literal meaning
of itself and has to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with
Marx's other idea, remarks and
commitments.
75b.
Some might object that this is true of science, too --,
i.e., that
scientific practice is
both individualistic and
gnomic. However, I doubt many Marxists will want to go down that escape route! On the contrary, science is and always has been a
collective
endeavour. [Cf., Bernal (1939, 1969); Conner (2005).]
While this might appear to be a somewhat
controversial claim, that is only so with some non-Marxists, and they were told to
sling their hooks
ages ago.
It could now be argued that science has always
relied on Metaphysics. Again, that idea will be laid to rest in Essay
Thirteen Part Two.
It could be objected that the vast majority of us have to be informed of
scientific truths; if so, that
fact can't also be
used against metaphysical or dialectical theories.
However, this is what was asserted in the main
body of this Essay:
[I]deas like these were never based
on -- nor were they even
derived from -- ordinary practice and everyday language,
otherwise the rest of us wouldn't need to be informed of them.
So, to
repeat: science has grown out of materially-grounded practice and
collective labour, unlike Metaphysics. That is why hundreds of millions
of human beings can be educated in the sciences (the same can't be said of
Metaphysics). Furthermore, much of science (outside of theoretical physics,
perhaps) can be expressed in ordinary
language (at some level), even if somewhat less concisely.
While it is undeniable that many scientific
facts aren't in any way obvious and that we have to be informed of them,
unlike metaphysical theories their truth doesn't follow from thought alone.
Once more, it could be countered that much of
Physics, for example, openly depends on a series of 'thought
experiments'. That is also undeniable, but those aspects of Physics are either confirmable by
observation and/or experiment, or they remain merely theoretical and hypothetical. No one
(other than closet -- or even overt -- Platonists) would accept a 'thought experiment' as
true if there no way to test it, or have it confirmed in some way; nor would they be inclined to accept a theory
if the only support it enjoyed was derived from a 'thought experiment'.
Metaphysical theories
on the other hand are worded so that they
remain forever unconfirmable in the above way.
Of
course, as Galileo showed, thought experiments might make us look at familiar
facts and see them in a new light, but they would already be widely accepted facts.
That is indeed what made his thought experiments so powerful and convincing,
which isn't
the case with Metaphysics. [On Galileo's thought experiments, see
Palmieri (2017). (This
link takes the reader to a page where the article can be downloaded as a PDF.)]
"It is more important to have beauty in one's equations
than to have them fit experiment...." [From
here.]
And others have voiced similar opinions, but then
they often also say things like this:
"God used beautiful mathematics in creating the world."
[Dirac,
same source.]
Which, naturally, gives away their Platonism
and Idealism.
[Further discussion of this topic will be resumed
in Essay Thirteen Part Two. On the distinction between science and
philosophy, see
Hacker (2007b). On how physics has been led astray by a search for 'beauty',
see Hossenfelder (2018).]
75c.Why this is so with respect to DM-fans is explored in Essay Nine
Part Two;
and why
this happens to most educated individuals was explained over 150 years ago by
Marx himself:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance,
in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are
contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of
the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an
'eternal law.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from
here. Bold
emphases added.]
Now, anyone inclined to doubt this claim
(i.e., that metaphysical theories and Idealist forms-of-thought are readily accepted, or
are studied with no little enthusiasm, by highly educated people) can't have studied
Traditional Philosophy at
College or
University. The inordinate respect shown toward the vast majority of metaphysical
obscurantists and bumblers history has inflicted on humanity is
as damning as it is universal.
And that observation applies
equally well not only to the almost obsequious respect DM-fans show toward
this alien-class thought-form, but also to their passionate and resolute defence of this
ridiculously easy way to gain 'knowledge'.
[The
Wikipedia
Kojève,
Lukács
and Žižek
links appear not to be working; the accents are what seem to be causing
mayhem. In that case, click on
the following:
Kojève,
Lukács
and Žižek.]
[HCD = High Church
Dialectician; that term is explained
here.]
Again, anyone who doubts this, should check out the
following (mercifully brief) examples of HCD-gobbledygook:
"Indeed dialectical
critical realism may be seen under the aspect of Foucauldian
strategic reversal -- of the unholy trinity of
Parmenidean/Platonic/Aristotelean
(sic) provenance; of the
Cartesian-Lockean-Humean-Kantian
paradigm, of
foundationalisms (in practice, fideistic foundationalisms)
and irrationalisms (in practice, capricious exercises of the
will-to-power or some other ideologically and/or
psycho-somatically buried source) new and old alike; of the
primordial failing of western philosophy, ontological
monovalence, and its close ally, the epistemic fallacy with
its ontic dual; of the analytic problematic laid down by
Plato, which Hegel served only to replicate in his actualist
monovalent analytic reinstatement in transfigurative
reconciling dialectical connection, while in his hubristic
claims for absolute idealism he inaugurated the
Comtean,
Kierkegaardian
and
Nietzschean
eclipses of reason,
replicating the fundaments of positivism through its
transmutation route to the superidealism of a
Baudrillard."
[Roy Bhaskar, quoted from
here.
Links added.
In fact, I could have quoted almost any paragraph from
Bhaskar (1993).
That book must surely win Gold in this event.]
"The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to
structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony
in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and
rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of
structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes
structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into
the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of
hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the
rearticulation of power." [(Zap! Pow! Take that ruling-class!) Judith Butler, quoted from
here.]
And then we
have the following from a
book aimed at clarifying -- plainly with no hint of irony! -- Roy
Bhaskar's nest of tangled dialectical spaghetti (aka, "Critical
Realism"):
"We have now considered how Bhaskar
launches his dialecticisation of critical realism and his 'critical realisation'
of dialectics. In terms of the MELD schema, these are essentially 2E moves based
on negativity. Dialecticising critical realism by integrating absence and being,
and 'critically realising' dialectic to produce a materialist conception of
diffraction, both concern real determinate non-being in the world. In the
process, however, both moves point beyond negativity to a third level of
analysis, that of totality. Thus to think of the spatio-temporal causality of
human being (sic)...is to think of the presence of the past in the present and
the future, and of the relationship between identity and its outside. Similarly,
to think of materialist diffraction of dialectic is to think...of how
fragmentation and fracturing are ultimately the relata of a structured,
contradictory whole.... 2E negativity in its various forms entails 3L totality,
so in terms of the MELD schema, we move from 1M perduring non-identity to 2E
real negativity, and on to 3L open totality...before moving...to 4D agency."
[Norrie (2010), p.86.]
Anyone interested can find page-after-page of obscure dogmatic apriorism,
expressed in 'academic gobbledygook', 'supported' and 'explained' by yet more of the
same, throughout the rest of Norrie's book.
What the above odd
abbreviations mean can be found in the opening pages of Hartwig (2007), which is
itself a book that plumbs even greater depths of obscurity in an earnest endeavour to confuse
further those already reeling from having ploughed through Norrie
(2010). Incidentally,
both of these works were published by Routledge. So, Bhaskarean 'dialectic', coupled with these brave attempts to make his thoughts
even more opaque,
isn't an "abomination" for at least this publishing wing of the
bourgeoisie. [Hartwig's book is available
here as a downloadable PDF.] Clearly,
those in charge at Routledge have concluded that if the revolution depends on
philosophical goulashof this stodginess and consistency, their class has little to fear.
Plainly, this BhaskareanSpectre isn't haunting Europe; it is far too busy haunting Academic Marxism.
As Lenin
argued:
"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases
is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing"
Childishness.]
I
have added to Essay Two
a series of
impressively obscure passages that Žižek thought it wise to inflict on his unfortunate readers, taken from his recent
attempt to redefine the word "unintelligible", Less Than Nothing
-- i.e., Žižek (2012),
pp.364-67. (This
links to a PDF.) He has now added to the confusion with this towering monument
to obfuscation,
Žižek (2015).
If comrades who dote on this material
end up having any qualms about it, they are often centred around their own aprioristic, idiosyncratic and similarly jargon-bound
criticisms, or on their own alternative a priori theories -- or,
indeed, around those of some other preferred
Philosophical-, or HCD-Guru.
An excellent example of this malaise can be found
here,
the
Homepage of my old friend
Ben Watson.
[Check out, too, the Dogmafest
here.] Wall-to-wall gobbledygook. Indeed,
readers can generate their own impressive, left-sounding verbiage/garbage by visiting
this site, repeatedly.
And, here are several more impressive examples of the same:
[Here
is a recent example where I am taken to task for even suggesting that we
should reject such ruling-class rubbish. (Unfortunately, that link no
longer appears to be working!) More of the same can be found if you follow
several of the links posted here.
Much of the above material has been taken from Essay NinePart Two,
where readers will find several more examples of impressive-looking HCD
gobbledygook.]
Not even once do these comrades ask
this question: Is there adequate (or even
any!) empirical evidence supporting these
ideas? Have they been derived from
the collective experience of the class, or
even the party? Are they based on
ordinary language?
Do they reflect anything other than the ivory tower experience, thoughts,
and 'practice' of assorted HCD-'intellectuals' and de-classé professional
revolutionaries?
In fact, these questions will be
enough, on their own, to
elicit derisionfrom
DM-fans (especially those drawn from the aforementioned HCD-Tendency), since it is now an
automatic assumption
(nay, axiom) that not only is 'genuine' Philosophy necessarily obscure, it is way superior to
the sort of 'working class'
("workerist"!) banalities, which require 'proof' (for goodness sake!),
promoted at this site. And that will be an important part of the reason why
this approach will continue to be dismissed out-of-hand as 'superficial' (again, mostly
by HCDs). You see, Ms Lichtenstein doesn't play the game, she refuses to indulge in 'proper', 'philosophical' theorising;
shock horror(!) nor does Ms Lichtenstein engage with
the philosophical theories of
other Marxist academics... What a
charlatan!
Guilty as charged, and proud of it: I reject this
entire tradition as self-important ruling-class hot air.
How impertinent of me!
Is there no level
to which I won't sink!
As Marx noted: the ideas of the ruling-class
always rule -- and they rule
partly because theorists, like those mentioned above, have turned their backs on radical thought. Indeed, they have
simply bent over
in their eagerness to accommodate ruling-class apriorism.
As
will soon become apparent, for all their claims to be radical, when it
comes to Philosophy
DM-theorists are
surprisinglyconservative -- and universally incapableof
seeing this even after it has been pointed out to them!
[An
excellent example of this phenomenon, and one that has
been highly influential
on how DM-theorists receive and then respond to such criticism, has been posted
here.]
At a
rhetorical level, this philosophical conservatism is camouflaged behind what at first sight
appears to be a series of disarmingly modest denials --,
which are then promptly flouted.
The
quotations listed below (and in
Note 1) show that DM-theorists are keen to
deny that their system is wholly, or even partly,
a priori, or that it has been dogmatically imposed on
the world, not read from it. However, the way that dialecticians themselves
phrase their theories contradicts these seemingly modest-looking claims,
revealing that the opposite
is in fact the case.
This
inadvertent dialectical inversion -- whereby what DM-theorists say
about what they do is the reverse of what they actually do
with what they say -- neatly mirrors the distortion to which Traditional
Philosophy has subjected ordinary language over the last two millennia (outlined in Essay
Three Parts
One and
Two, and in Essay Twelve Part
One), a point underlined by Marx himself:
"The
philosophers have only to dissolve their
language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to
recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to
realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their
own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
However, unlike
dialecticians, Traditional Metaphysicians were quite open and honest about what
they were doing; indeed, they brazenly imposed their a priori theories on
reality and hung the consequences.
But,
because dialecticians have a novel (but nonetheless defective) view of both
Metaphysics and FL (on that, see
here and
here), they are oblivious of the
fact that they are just as eager as Traditional Theorists have always been to
impose their ideas on the world, and equally blind to the fact that in so-doing
they are aping the
alienated thought-forms of their class enemy, whose society they seek to abolish.
Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked beforethey were even loaded; with such weapons, is it any wonder that DM-theorists
fire nothing but philosophical blanks?
[FL = Formal Logic.]
It should now be abundantly clear why I
said that.
"I've returned from travel-speaking, where I spend most of my life, and found
a collection of messages extending the discussion about 'theory' and
'philosophy,' a debate that I find rather curious. A few reactions -- though I
concede, from the start, that I may simply not understand what is going on.
"As far as I do think I understand it, the debate was initiated by the charge
that I, Mike, and maybe others don't have 'theories' and therefore fail to give
any explanation of why things are proceeding as they do. We must turn to
'theory' and 'philosophy' and 'theoretical constructs' and the like to remedy
this deficiency in our efforts to understand and address what is happening in
the world. I won't speak for Mike. My response so far has pretty much been to
reiterate something I wrote 35 years ago, long before 'postmodernism' had
erupted in the literary intellectual culture: 'if there is a body of theory,
well tested and verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign affairs or the
resolution of domestic or international conflict, its existence has been kept a
well-guarded secret,' despite much 'pseudo-scientific posturing.'
"To my knowledge, the statement was accurate 35 years ago, and remains so;
furthermore, it extends to the study of human affairs generally, and applies in
spades to what has been produced since that time. What has changed in the
interim, to my knowledge, is a huge explosion of self- and mutual-admiration
among those who propound what they call 'theory' and 'philosophy,' but little
that I can detect beyond pseudo-scientific posturing. That little is, as I
wrote, sometimes quite interesting, but lacks consequences for the real world
problems that occupy my time and energies....
"The proponents of
'theory' and 'philosophy' have a very easy task if they
want to make their case. Simply make known to me what was and remains a 'secret'
to me: I'll be happy to look. I've asked many times before, and still await an
answer, which should be easy to provide: simply give some examples of 'a body of
theory, well tested and verified, that applies to' the kinds of problems and
issues that Mike, I, and many others (in fact, most of the world's population, I
think, outside of narrow and remarkably self-contained intellectual circles) are
or should be concerned with: the problems and issues we speak and write about,
for example, and others like them. To put it differently, show that the
principles of the 'theory' or 'philosophy' that we are told to study and apply
lead by valid argument to conclusions that we and others had not already reached
on other (and better) grounds; these 'others' include people lacking formal
education, who typically seem to have no problem reaching these conclusions
through mutual interactions that avoid the 'theoretical' obscurities entirely,
or often on their own.
"Again, those are simple requests. I've made them before, and remain in my
state of ignorance. I also draw certain conclusions from the fact.
"As for the
'deconstruction' that is carried out (also mentioned in the debate), I can't
comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. But if this is just another
sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear:
just restate the results to me in plain words that I can understand, and show
why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long
before and have continued to do since without three-syllable words,
incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely
meaningless, etc. That will cure my deficiencies -- of course, if they are
curable; maybe they aren't, a possibility to which I'll return.
"These are very easy requests to
fulfil, if there is any basis to the claims
put forth with such fervour and indignation. But instead of trying to provide an
answer to this simple requests (sic), the response is cries of anger: to raise these
questions shows 'elitism,' 'anti-intellectualism,' and other crimes -- though
apparently it is not 'elitist' to stay within the self- and mutual-admiration
societies of intellectuals who talk only to one another and (to my knowledge)
don't enter into the kind of world in which I'd prefer to live. As for that
world, I can reel off my speaking and writing schedule to illustrate what I
mean, though I presume that most people in this discussion know, or can easily
find out; and somehow I never find the 'theoreticians' there, nor do I go to
their conferences and parties. In short, we seem to inhabit quite different
worlds, and I find it hard to see why mine is 'elitist,' not theirs. The
opposite seems to be transparently the case, though I won't amplify.
"To add another
facet, I am absolutely deluged with requests to speak and can't possibly accept
a fraction of the invitations I'd like to, so I suggest other people. But oddly,
I never suggest those who propound 'theories' and 'philosophy,' nor do I come
across them, or for that matter rarely even their names, in my own (fairly
extensive) experience with popular and activist groups and organizations,
general community, college, church, union, etc., audiences here and abroad,
third world women, refugees, etc.; I can easily give examples. Why, I wonder.
"The whole
debate, then, is an odd one. On one side, angry charges and denunciations, on
the other, the request for some evidence and argument to support them, to which
the response is more angry charges -- but, strikingly, no evidence or argument.
Again, one is led to ask why.
"It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I just lack
the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that have been
unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals and their followers.
I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been for years, when similar
charges have been made -- but without any answer to my questions. Again, they
are simple and should be easy to answer, if there is an answer: if I'm missing
something, then show me what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if
it's all beyond my comprehension, which is possible, then I'm just a lost cause,
and will be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and
keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be interested in
them and seem to understand them (which I'm perfectly happy to do, having no
interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the intellectual culture that engage in
these things, but apparently little else).
"Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left with
the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm certainly willing to
grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll have to remain suspicious, for
what seem good reasons. There are lots of things I don't understand -- say, the
latest debates over whether neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last
theorem was (apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have
learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to explain it
to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so, without particular
difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to learn more so that I will
come to understand it. Now
Derrida,
Lacan,
Lyotard,
Kristeva, etc. -- even
Foucault,
whom I knew and liked, and who was somewhat different from the rest -- write
things that I also don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says
they do understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to
proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities: (a) some
new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some sudden genetic
mutation, which has created a form of 'theory' that is beyond quantum theory,
topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b)...I won't spell it out.
"Again, I've lived for 50 years in these worlds, have done a fair amount of
work of my own in fields called 'philosophy' and 'science,' as well as
intellectual history, and have a fair amount of personal acquaintance with the
intellectual culture in the sciences, humanities, social sciences, and the arts.
That has left me with my own conclusions about intellectual life, which I won't
spell out. But for others, I would simply suggest that you ask those who tell
you about the wonders of 'theory' and 'philosophy' to justify their claims --
to do what people in physics, math, biology, linguistics, and other fields are
happy to do when someone asks them, seriously, what are the principles of their
theories, on what evidence are they based, what do they explain that wasn't
already obvious, etc. These are fair requests for anyone to make. If they can't
be met, then I'd suggest recourse to
Hume's
advice in similar circumstances:
to
the flames.
"Specific comment. Phetland asked who I'm referring to when I speak of
'Paris
school' and 'postmodernist cults': the above is a sample.
"He then asks, reasonably, why I am
'dismissive' of it. Take, say, Derrida...one of the grand old men. I thought I ought to at least be
able to understand his
Grammatology, so tried to read it. I could
make out some of it, for example, the critical analysis of classical texts that
I knew very well and had written about years before. I found the scholarship
appalling, based on pathetic misreading; and the argument, such as it was,
failed to come close to the kinds of standards I've been familiar with since
virtually childhood. Well, maybe I missed something: could be, but suspicions
remain, as noted. Again, sorry to make unsupported comments, but I was asked,
and therefore am answering.
"Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me) I've
met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in print, and
spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on real issues, and using
language that was perfectly comprehensible -- he speaking French, me English);
Lacan (who I met several times and considered an amusing and perfectly
self-conscious charlatan, though his earlier work, pre-cult, was sensible and
I've discussed it in print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly during the period
when she was a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of them I haven't met, because
I am very remote from these circles, by choice, preferring quite different
and far broader ones -- the kinds where I give talks, have interviews, take
part in activities, write dozens of long letters every week, etc. I've dipped
into what they write out of curiosity, but not very far, for reasons already
mentioned: what I find is extremely pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it
is simply illiterate, based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know
well (sometimes, that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual
lack of elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though
dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain
gibberish. When I proceed as I do in other areas where I do not understand, I
run into the problems mentioned in connection with (1) and (2) above. So that's
who I'm referring to, and why I don't proceed very far. I can list a lot more
names if it's not obvious.
"For those interested in a literary depiction that reflects pretty much the
same perceptions (but from the inside), I'd suggest
David Lodge. Pretty much on
target, as far as I can judge.
"Phetland also found it
'particularly puzzling' that I am so 'curtly
dismissive' of these intellectual circles while I spend a lot of time 'exposing
the posturing and obfuscation of the New York Times.' So 'why not
give these guys the same treatment.' Fair question. There are also simple
answers. What appears in the work I do address (NYT, journals of opinion, much
of scholarship, etc.) is simply written in intelligible prose and has a great
impact on the world, establishing the doctrinal framework within which thought
and expression are supposed to be contained, and largely are, in successful
doctrinal systems such as ours. That has a huge impact on what happens to
suffering people throughout the world, the ones who concern me, as distinct from
those who live in the world that Lodge depicts (accurately, I think). So this
work should be dealt with seriously, at least if one cares about ordinary people
and their problems. The work to which Phetland refers has none of these
characteristics, as far as I'm aware. It certainly has none of the impact, since
it is addressed only to other intellectuals in the same circles. Furthermore,
there is no effort that I am aware of to make it intelligible to the great mass
of the population (say, to the people I'm constantly speaking to, meeting with,
and writing letters to, and have in mind when I write, and who seem to
understand what I say without any particular difficulty, though they generally
seem to have the same cognitive disability I do when facing the Postmodern
cults). And I'm also aware of no effort to show how it applies to anything in
the world in the sense I mentioned earlier: grounding conclusions that weren't
already obvious. Since I don't happen to be much interested in the ways that
intellectuals inflate their reputations, gain privilege and prestige, and
disengage themselves from actual participation in popular struggle, I don't
spend any time on it.
"Phetland suggests starting with Foucault -- who, as I've written repeatedly,
is somewhat apart from the others, for two reasons: I find at least some of what
he writes intelligible, though generally not very interesting; second, he was
not personally disengaged and did not restrict himself to interactions with
others within the same highly privileged elite circles. Phetland then does
exactly what I requested: he gives some illustrations of why he thinks
Foucault's work is important. That's exactly the right way to proceed, and I
think it helps understand why I take such a 'dismissive' attitude towards all of
this -- in fact, pay no attention to it.
"What Phetland describes, accurately I'm sure, seems to me unimportant,
because everyone always knew it -- apart from details of social and
intellectual history, and about these, I'd suggest caution: some of these are
areas I happen to have worked on fairly extensively myself, and I know that
Foucault's scholarship is just not trustworthy here, so I don't trust it,
without independent investigation, in areas that I don't know -- this comes up
a bit in the discussion from 1972 that is in print. I think there is much better
scholarship on the 17th and 18th century, and I keep to that, and my own
research. But let's put aside the other historical work, and turn to the
'theoretical constructs' and the explanations: that there has been 'a great
change from harsh mechanisms of repression to more subtle mechanisms by which
people 'come to do' what the powerful want, even enthusiastically. That's true
enough, in fact, utter truism. If that's a 'theory,' then all the criticisms of
me are wrong: I have a 'theory' too, since I've been saying exactly that for
years, and also giving the reasons and historical background, but without
describing it as a theory (because it merits no such term), and without obfuscatory rhetoric (because it's so simple-minded), and without claiming that
it is new (because it's a truism). It's been fully recognized for a long time
that as the power to control and coerce has declined, it's more necessary to
resort to what practitioners in the PR industry early in this century -- who
understood all of this well -- called 'controlling the public mind.' The
reasons, as observed by Hume in the 18th century, are that 'the implicit
submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of
their rulers' relies ultimately on control of opinion and attitudes. Why these
truisms should suddenly become 'a theory' or 'philosophy,' others will have to
explain; Hume would have laughed.
"Some of Foucault's particular examples (say, about 18th century techniques of
punishment) look interesting, and worth investigating as to their accuracy. But
the 'theory' is merely an extremely complex and inflated restatement of what
many others have put very simply, and without any pretence that anything deep is
involved. There's nothing in what Phetland describes that I haven't been writing
about myself for 35 years, also giving plenty of documentation to show that it
was always obvious, and indeed hardly departs from truism. What's interesting
about these trivialities is not the principle, which is transparent, but the
demonstration of how it works itself out in specific detail to cases that are
important to people: like intervention and aggression, exploitation and terror,
'free market' scams, and so on. That I don't find in Foucault, though I find
plenty of it by people who seem to be able to write sentences I can understand
and who aren't placed in the intellectual firmament as 'theoreticians.'
"To make myself clear, Phetland is doing exactly the right thing: presenting
what he sees as 'important insights and theoretical constructs' that he finds in
Foucault. My problem is that the 'insights' seem to me familiar and there are no
'theoretical constructs,' except in that simple and familiar ideas have been
dressed up in complicated and pretentious rhetoric. Phetland asks whether I
think this is 'wrong, useless, or posturing.' No. The historical parts look
interesting sometimes, though they have to be treated with caution and
independent verification is even more worth undertaking than it usually is. The
parts that restate what has long been obvious and put in much simpler terms are
not 'useless,' but indeed useful, which is why I and others have always made the
very same points. As to 'posturing,' a lot of it is that, in my opinion, though
I don't particularly blame Foucault for it: it's such a deeply rooted part of
the corrupt intellectual culture of Paris that he fell into it pretty naturally,
though to his credit, he distanced himself from it. As for the 'corruption' of
this culture particularly since World War II, that's another topic, which I've
discussed elsewhere and won't go into here. Frankly, I don't see why people in
this forum should be much interested, just as I am not. There are more important
things to do, in my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite
intellectuals engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow
and (to me, at least) pretty uninteresting circles. That's a broad brush, and
I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without proving them: but
I've been asked, and have answered the only specific point that I find raised.
When asked about my general opinion, I can only give it, or if something more
specific is posed, address that. I'm not going to undertake an essay on topics
that don't interest me.
"Unless someone can answer the simple questions that immediately arise in the
mind of any reasonable person when claims about 'theory' and 'philosophy' are
raised, I'll keep to work that seems to me sensible and enlightening, and to
people who are interested in understanding and changing the world.
"JohnB made the point that
'plain language is not enough when the frame of
reference is not available to the listener'; correct and important. But the
right reaction is not to resort to obscure and needlessly complex verbiage and
posturing about non-existent 'theories.' Rather, it is to ask the listener to
question the frame of reference that he/she is accepting, and to suggest
alternatives that might be considered, all in plain language. I've never found
that a problem when I speak to people lacking much or sometimes any formal
education, though it's true that it tends to become harder as you move up the
educational ladder, so that indoctrination is much deeper, and the
self-selection for obedience that is a good part of elite education has taken
its toll. JohnB says that outside of circles like this forum, 'to the rest of
the country, he's incomprehensible' ('he' being me). That's absolutely counter
to my rather ample experience, with all sorts of audiences. Rather, my
experience is what I just described. The incomprehensibility roughly corresponds
to the educational level. Take, say, talk radio. I'm on a fair amount, and it's
usually pretty easy to guess from accents, etc., what kind of audience it is.
I've repeatedly found that when the audience is mostly poor and less educated, I
can skip lots of the background and 'frame of reference' issues because it's
already obvious and taken for granted by everyone, and can proceed to matters
that occupy all of us. With more educated audiences, that's much harder; it's
necessary to disentangle lots of ideological constructions.
"It's certainly true that lots of people can't read the books I write. That's
not because the ideas or language are complicated -- we have no problems in
informal discussion on exactly the same points, and even in the same words. The
reasons are different, maybe partly the fault of my writing style, partly the
result of the need (which I feel, at least) to present pretty heavy
documentation, which makes it tough reading. For these reasons, a number of
people have taken pretty much the same material, often the very same words, and
put them in pamphlet form and the like. No one seems to have much problem --
though again, reviewers in the Times Literary Supplement or
professional academic journals don't have a clue as to what it's about, quite
commonly; sometimes it's pretty comical.
"A final point, something I've written about elsewhere (e.g., in a discussion
in Z papers, and the last chapter of Year 501). There has been a
striking change in the behaviour of the intellectual class in recent years. The
left intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been teaching in working class
schools, writing books like 'mathematics for the millions' (which made
mathematics intelligible to millions of people), participating in and speaking
for popular organizations, etc., are now largely disengaged from such
activities, and although quick to tell us that they are far more radical than
thou, are not to be found, it seems, when there is such an obvious and growing
need and even explicit request for the work they could do out there in the world
of people with live problems and concerns. That's not a small problem. This
country, right now, is in a very strange and ominous state. People are
frightened, angry, disillusioned, sceptical, confused. That's an organizer's
dream, as I once heard Mike say. It's also fertile ground for demagogues and
fanatics, who can (and in fact already do) rally substantial popular support
with messages that are not unfamiliar from their predecessors in somewhat
similar circumstances. We know where it has led in the past; it could again.
There's a huge gap that once was at least partially filled by left intellectuals
willing to engage with the general public and their problems. It has ominous
implications, in my opinion.
"End of Reply, and (to be frank) of my personal interest in the matter, unless
the obvious questions are answered." [Quoted from
here. Spelling
modified to UK English, formatting and quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic
emphases in the original; links added.]
Those thoughts express my sentiments entirely.
Here
is
Richard Seymour's recent attempt to defend academic obscurantism:
"Writing is an artifice in its essence; it is an art of
embodiment, giving physical form to being. 'Putting it into words' means giving
form to existence, and there is no omnipotent father, Big Other, or whomever, to
guarantee that superiority of one form over another.
"The metaphysic of writing that is implied by 'plain style'
zealots, however, is that wherein writing is a ‘window on reality’, with the
subject neatly extruded -- and that is, lamentably, how many people are taught
to write.
Nancy Welsh (sic) in her very fine book on writing, Getting Restless,
is scathing about the advice given to students to suppress their own role in the
writing of knowledge -- 'this isn't about you, don't talk about yourself'.
"On the left, this has to do with a half-digested puritanism, and
a degree of 'workerist' (patronisingly anti-working class) anti-intellectualism.
There's almost a sense of shame at the intrinsic excess of writing, at the fact
that it is never reducible to communication, that it always produces effects
other than knowledge-effects. Words are aesthetic objects, erotic objects, and
that produces a certain phobia in parts of the left. And, I suspect, there's a
degree of aggression toward the reader among leftists who write in this 'plain'
style, a desire to bore and bully readers as much as possible -- I've suffered
for my vulgar exhortation, now it's your turn.
"This approach is giving us the worst of both worlds. People, to
the extent that they go along with the idea that they can take themselves out of
their writing, become bad writers, and bullshitters. They become bad writers
because writing becomes yet another means of repression, rather than
sublimation; it also becomes a guilt function, since having turned it into a
joyless process, people can't understand why they're so bad at writing. They
become bullshitters to the extent that they present a version of reality as if
from a god's-eye-view, as if told by a non-desiring, Buddha-like being.
"Radical politics must be, if nothing else, radically
de-naturalising. It must stress the art in living, the extent to which we
produce and design the world we live in, even if not under circumstances and not
with materials of our choosing." [Richard Seymour, quoted from
here. Accessed 13/07/2017. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Link and italic emphasis added.]
Unfortunately, fine-sounding words like these (as well as those written by
theorists who have influenced Seymour's own drift into HCD-obscurantism -- many
of whom were
listed above) will sail right over the heads of those whom Richard seeks
to champion: workers.
WTF does this mean?
"They [i.e., 'people' who are 'bullshitters']
become bad writers because writing becomes yet another means of repression,
rather than sublimation." [Ibid.]
"Repression"? How? And who exactly is being "repressed" by "bad writing"?
Snowflakes?
Having said that, in his videos on YouTube, Richard is almost invariably a model
of clarity -- except where he tries to sell his viewers some a priori
psychology (i.e., Lacanian Freudianism). For example, his videos
here
and here
are admirably clear.
Since Richard uses plain and simple English in these videos, who exactly is he 'repressing'? Who,
for instance, was he "boring and bullying"? And precisely what has
he
to feel "guilty" about?
One
of the few pieces of good advice in The New Testament is the following:
"And if the bugle gives an indistinct sound,
who will get ready for battle?" [I
Corinthians 14:8.]
If
there ever is a major political shift and Richard has to communicate with workers,
en masse, he will find he has to adopt a 'plain style' or fail to
communicate with them. The question is: will they
listen to a parvenu,
to someone who has progressively withdrawn from the struggle, someone they don't
know and hence don't trust, who writes obscure sentences and paragraphs
about even greater obscurities (an excellent recent example of which can be
accessed
here, or even
here -- which is a rather dyspeptic review of
Angela
Nagle's recent book,
Kill All Normies)?
At such times, an "indistinct sound" could
easily spell
disaster. Lenin's words, quoted earlier, seem all the more apposite, therefore:
"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases
is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing"
Childishness. Bold emphases added.]
Until
then, of course, Richard is perfectly at liberty to indulge his own flowery
style (not that he needs my permission or acquiescence), adrift in a stagnant
backwater of the class war, secure in his own irrelevance. Which, as noted
above, is a pity since
his videos on YouTube are always scripted in 'plain style' and are
invariably of a very high quality -- those two facts not being unconnected, of
course.
Chomsky's words come to mind, again:
"A final point, something I've written about elsewhere (e.g., in a discussion
in Z papers, and the last chapter of Year 501). There has been a
striking change in the behaviour of the intellectual class in recent years. The
left intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been teaching in working class
schools, writing books like 'mathematics for the millions' (which made
mathematics intelligible to millions of people), participating in and speaking
for popular organizations, etc., are now largely disengaged from such
activities, and although quick to tell us that they are far more radical than
thou, are not to be found, it seems, when there is such an obvious and growing
need and even explicit request for the work they could do out there in the world
of people with live problems and concerns. That's not a small problem. This
country, right now, is in a very strange and ominous state. People are
frightened, angry, disillusioned, sceptical, confused. That's an organizer's
dream, as I once heard Mike say. It's also fertile ground for demagogues and
fanatics, who can (and in fact already do) rally substantial popular support
with messages that are not unfamiliar from their predecessors in somewhat
similar circumstances. We know where it has led in the past; it could again.
There's a huge gap that once was at least partially filled by left intellectuals
willing to engage with the general public and their problems. It has ominous
implications, in my opinion."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
Of
course, Richard has a career to pursue, where academic gobbledygook is
de rigueur, but that is no reason to make a virtue out of obscurantism.
Here
are the words of the late Louis Proyect on Richard's recent turn
in that direction:
"At one time Richard Seymour was someone who had a penetrating class analysis.
However, in recent years he writes less and less on his blog based on historical
materialism and much more in the Lacanian psychoanalytic vein. I don't know how
much interest there is in the
Lacanian
stuff given his
Alexa
rating of 850,507 worldwide. He has set himself up on
Patreon
where for $3 per month and up you can get the a-list Seymour. With articles like
'Make cry-bullying kill itself', I am not sure if $3 per month is worth it.
"Over on Lenin's Tomb,
you can also find the same kind of article. For example, there is one titled 'On
Fetish', which sounds like the kind of paper delivered at the yearly
American Language Association conference:
'This estrangement of the visual order, this conversion of attention into
alienated labour, is what Beller calls the 'cinematic mode of production'. True
to the paranoid, psychotic structure of the theory, he can do no other than
offer us a cinematic image by way of explanation. We are in The Matrix, the
life-energy we put into the world converted into energy to run the image-world,
"imprisoned in a malevolent bathosphere, intuiting our situation only through
glitches in the programme."'
"Good grief.
"Most of this stuff has little interest for me but recently Seymour posted a
link on Facebook to a May 19th article titled 'Is
Fascism on the Rise' that shows how much damage this kind of psychoanalytic
Social Text
malarkey can do when the matter at hand requires a sober class analysis rather
than the sort of prose that
Alan Sokal
parodied. I hadn’t noticed the article when it first showed up but thought it
was worth some commentary since Seymour has become one of
antifa's PR
men.
"These are the opening paragraphs:
'It was the Martinican poet and anticolonial fighter,
Aime
Cesaire, who tried to point out to Europeans that what they called Nazism,
they had been practicing with a free conscience in the colonial world for
decades. And that this relationship was not incidental.
'In fact, the conscience of the European was never free.
Octave
Mannoni, the French psychoanalyst who famously psychoanalysed the colonial
situation, once suggested that there was a surprising pervasiveness of the
colonised, in the dreams of Europeans who had never left the continent and never
seen such a person. Today, one wonders if provincial, sedentary English men and
women dream of the Muslim.'
"Okay, spend a minute studying these paragraphs and try to figure out what is
wrong.
"Is the minute up? I hope that you would have noticed that the word 'Europeans'
is not rooted in a class analysis. Which class was practicing something like
Nazism on the colonized peoples? When your unit of analysis is the nation or the
continent, that goes out the window. It was the capitalist class, not the French
workers, who were oppressing and exploiting Algerians.
"'Today, one wonders if provincial, sedentary English men and women dream of the
Muslim.' What sort of nonsense is this? Who could he possibly be writing about?
Colonel
Blimp? This is a reductionist attempt to characterize an entire people,
something that would never appear in a serious Marxist analysis. It evokes an
op-ed piece in the NY Times, where someone like
Thomas
Friedman would pontificate on the 'Europeans' versus the 'Asians'. What a
sad decline from the sharp analysis he used to deploy....
"Explaining how conditions today can produce a new Adolph Hitler, Seymour is not
exactly lucid. He writes:
'Yes, economic crisis is important, but it has to be metabolised by the state
somehow. A crisis of capitalism, has to be a crisis of its political
institutions and of its ideological claims. That crisis must manifest itself in
a deadlock of political leadership of the ruling class. If, typically, one of
its sectors leads (say, the City of London) and imposes its imperatives as being
for the good of all, that leadership will come into question.'
"Does anybody understand what it means for an economic crisis to be metabolized
by the state? I don’t have a clue. To metabolize means to convert food into
energy in a living organism. I gave up trying to understand what this might have
to do with the Trump White House except maybe that his addiction to red meat and
Coca-Cola might be producing baleful psychological effects that will condemn us
all to concentration camps.
"But is Seymour right that the fascism of today won't look anything like the
Nazis?
'But the fascism of the future doesn't have to be traditional. Nor does it have
to respect the sequences observed in the interwar years, or reanimate old
cultures. It could even adopt a patina of edgy cool, as with the alt-right: we
should never underestimate the erotic glamour of fascism and its appeal to the
death-drive.'
"The erotic glamour of fascism? The appeal to the death-drive? Lacan is now in
the driver’s seat, not Marx. Not being versed in Freudian psychoanalysis, I have
no idea what this means. I guess I am a Marxist mouldy fig. I believe that
people join fascist movements because they support a total war on the left and
the creation of an absolutist state that will govern in their interests, at
least based on the demagogy of the fascist leader. And primarily this meant
solving the economic crisis. To the middle-class, Hitler promised eliminating
the Jews who were ruining it. To the workers, it was job security and social
benefits. To the bourgeoisie, it was a promise to put an end to working-class
power.
"While Seymour's article barely mentions the USA, it does join with the leftist
consensus in early 2017 that Trump was capable of imposing a fascist
dictatorship: 'The attempt by Bannon and Miller to force a rupture in the
American state was premature and voluntaristic. A more competent germinal
fascism would take its time, patiently exploiting the fascist potential within
the liberal state, to incubate and nurture the fascist monster of the future.'
"I
generally bristle at the word 'rupture' since it smacks so much of the academic
leftist prose that refuses to use a simple Anglo-Saxon word like 'break' or
'split'. What kind of split was
Bannon
trying to force? You'd think that Seymour regarded him as a latter-day
Kurt
von Schleicher who was a close adviser to
Paul
von Hindenberg. In 1930 he helped to topple the Social Democratic
government, the first step in a series that would lead to Hitler becoming the
German Chancellor. It was Schleicher who whispered in von Hindenberg's ear about
the need to make Hitler Der Fuhrer.
"Does anybody in their right mind think that this was what Bannon was about? To
whisper in Trump's ear about the need to arrest the leaders of the Democratic
Party and to pare down the Republican Party to the narrow base that continues to
back Trump? What then? Arrest the editors of the NY Times, Washington Post,
MSNBC and CNN and put them in prison where they would be tortured or killed?
What about the universities? Round up
George Ciccariello-Maher,
Jodi Dean
and even
Paul Krugman? That is what fascism would look like, after all."
[Quoted from
here; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Links added.]
While
Proyect is a little unfair to Seymour (for example Richard isn't advocating the
use of "European", he is merely summarising Octave Mannoni's ideas
-- albeit somewhat uncritically --, and Seymour's use of
"metabolised" is a perfectly acceptable metaphor, even if Proyect
failed to understand its use), it is clear that Seymour
isn't the first to have had his thought seriously clouded by French 'Philosophy'
and 'Psychoanalysis' -- nor will he be the last. But then he isn't the
first to have had his thought seriously compromised by Hegel, either -- and that
includes Louis Proyecthimself (who booted me off Marxmail for having
the temerity to question DM!).
It could be objected that Ms
Lichtenstein [RL] is being inconsistent -- while happy to accuse others of uncritically
accepting the obscure thought-forms of Traditional
Philosophy, RL seems quite content to accept Wittgenstein's work without so much as a quibble.
In fact, I have already responded to that allegation,
here and
here.
However, there is a world of difference between
(i) Accepting the a priori theories and speculations of Traditional Philosophers and
(ii) Employing a method (not a set of Superscientific Ideas) that exposes, and thus helps terminate, this
bogus ruling-class thought-form.
Well, there is at least to us genuine materialists.
Others have argued that those who criticise
Philosophy have to adopt (albeit implicitly) an alternative Philosophy.
Apparently, that is because it isn't possible to avoid philosophising and
hence it is impossible not to
adopt a philosophical stance of some sort.
Or, so the argument often proceeds...
However, this is no more convincing than arguing that doctors, for example, have to
be ill in order to be able to tackle disease. Or, that in order
to fight racism one has to be a racist!
Moreover, we have yet to see the proof that it is
"impossible not to philosophise". [On this, also see Note 88, below.]
"It is very difficult to sustain much
ongoing political work for any length of time without a coherent alternative
worldview to the dominant ideology which we encounter every day in the media (at
work, at school, at college, etc.). A significant role in an alternative
worldview is played by questions of philosophy.
"[Added in a footnote: To attempt an exact
definition of philosophy at this point would be a difficult and lengthy
distraction. But what I mean by it in this book is, roughly, 'general' or
'abstract' thinking about human beings and their relations between society and
nature.]" [Molyneux (2012), p.5. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis
and link added.]
"If from real apples, pears,
strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine
that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity
existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple,
etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring
that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the
almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the
apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence,
perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and
then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real
fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the
substance' -– 'Fruit'….
"Having reduced the different real fruits to
the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must,
in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way
back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse,
ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to
produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to
produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive
at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the
abstraction….
"The main interest for the speculative
philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary
fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds
and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in
the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances
of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for
they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of
the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind….
When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the
mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the
contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into
sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of
'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the
mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the
Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses,
for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond.
Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their
natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which
gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute
Fruit'.
"The ordinary man does not think he is saying
anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when
the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says
something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the
real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….
"It goes without saying that the speculative
philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally
known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as
determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the
real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of
reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes
from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity
of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
"In the speculative way of speaking, this
operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an
inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension
constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels
(1975a), pp.72-75. Italic emphases in the original.]
"The
philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world,
and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"With the theoretical equipment inherited from
Hegel it is, of course, not possible even to understand the empirical, material
attitude of these people. Owing to the fact that
Feuerbach showed the religious world as an illusion of the earthly world --
a world which in his writing appears merely as a phrase -- German
theory too was confronted with the question which he left unanswered: how did it
come about that people 'got' these illusions 'into their heads'? Even for the
German theoreticians this question paved the way to the materialistic view of
the world, a view which is not without premises, but which empirically
observes the actual material premises as such and for that reason is, for the
first time, actually a critical view of the world. This path was
already indicated in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher -- in the
Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie and Zur Judenfrage.
But since at that time this was done in philosophical phraseology, the
traditionally occurring philosophical expressions such as 'human essence',
'species', etc., gave the German theoreticians the desired reason for
misunderstanding the real trend of thought and believing that here again it was
a question merely of giving a new turn to their worn-out theoretical garment --
just as
Dr.
Arnold Ruge, the
Dottore
Graziano
of German philosophy, imagined that he could continue as
before to wave his clumsy arms about and display his pedantic-farcical mask.
One has to 'leave philosophy aside' (Wigand, p.187, cf., Hess,
Die letzten Philosophen, p.8), one has to leap out of it and devote
oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, for which there exists
also an enormous amount of literary material, unknown, of course, to the
philosophers. When, after that, one again encounters people like
Krummacher
or 'Stirner',
one finds that one has long ago left them 'behind' and below.
Philosophy and
the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as
onanism
and
sexual love. Saint Sancho, who in spite of his absence of thought -- which
was noted by us patiently and by him emphatically -- remains within the world of
pure thoughts, can, of course, save himself from it only by means of a moral
postulate, the postulate of 'thoughtlessness' (p.196 of 'the book'). He
is a bourgeois who saves himself in the face of commerce by the banqueroute
cochenne [swinish bankruptcy -- RL] whereby, of course, he becomes not a
proletarian, but an impecunious, bankrupt bourgeois. He does not become a man
of the world, but a bankrupt philosopher without thoughts." [Marx
and Engels (1976), p.236. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added. I have quoted
the whole passage so that readers can see this is not out of context.]
"The philosophers have only interpreted the
world, in various ways; the point is to change it." [Theses
on Feuerbach.]
"It can be seen how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism,
activity and passivity, lose their antithetical character, and hence their
existence as such antitheses, only in the social condition; it can be seen how
the resolution of the theoretical antitheses themselves is possible
only in a practical way, only through the practical energy of man,
and how their resolution is for that reason by no means only a problem of
knowledge, but a real problem of life, a problem which philosophy
was unable to solve precisely because it treated it as a purely theoretical
problem." [Marx (1975b), p.354. Italic emphases in the original;
bold added.]
Hence, according to Marx,
"philosophy is nothing but religion rendered into thought" -- in other words, it
is a far more
abstract source of consolation. It must, therefore, be "left aside"; one
has to "leap out of it and devote oneself
like an ordinary man to the study of actuality", and that is because Philosophy stands in the
same relation to the "study of the actual world" as onanism does to sexual love.
Furthermore, Philosophy is based on "distorted language of the actual world",
empty abstractions and invented concepts. No wonder then that Marx
contrasts a desire to change the world with this empty and pointless
ruling-class discipline, Philosophy.
In fact, after the mid-1840s,
there are no positive, and very few even neutral comments about Philosophy in Marx's work.
[It could be objected that Marx made positive
comments about dialectics all through his life, in published and unpublished
work. I have dealt with that response in Essay Nine
Part One.]
Indeed, as is well known, Marx published a book in 1847 called
The Poverty of Philosophy; hardly a ringing endorsement of that
pointless discipline! Here are a few relevant passages from it:
"If we had M. Proudhon's intrepidity in the matter of Hegelianism we should say:
it is distinguished in itself from itself. What does this mean? Impersonal
reason, having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an
object to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose
itself, is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and
composing itself -- position, opposition, composition. Or, to speak Greek -- we
have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For those who do not know the Hegelian
language: affirmation, negation and negation of the negation. That is what
language means. It is certainly not Hebrew (with due apologies to M. Proudhon);
but it is the language of this pure reason, separate from the individual.
Instead of the ordinary individual with his ordinary manner of speaking and
thinking we have nothing but this ordinary manner purely and simply -- without
the individual.
"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction -- for we have here
an abstraction, and not an analysis -- presents itself as a logical category? Is
it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the
individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is
composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a
body; that, if you leave out of account the limits of this body; you soon have
nothing but a space -- that if, finally, you leave out of the account the
dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity,
the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged
accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in
the final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical category. Thus the
metaphysicians who, in making these abstractions, think they are making
analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine
themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their
core -- these metaphysicians in turn are right in saying that things here below
are embroideries of which the logical categories constitute the canvas. This is
what distinguishes the philosopher from the Christian. The Christian, in spite
of logic, has only one incarnation of the Logos; with the philosopher
there is no end to incarnations. If all that exists, all that lives on land, and
under water can be reduced by abstraction to a logical category -- if the whole
real world can be drowned thus in a world of abstractions, in the world of
logical categories -- who need be astonished at it?
"All that exists, all that lives on land and under water, exists and lives only
by some kind of movement. Thus, the movement of history produces social
relations; industrial movement gives us industrial products, etc. Just as by dint of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical
category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic
distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition
-- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement. If one finds
in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has found in
the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only
explains all things, but also implies the movement of things....
"Up to now we have expounded only the dialectics of Hegel. We shall see later
how M. Proudhon has succeeded in reducing it to the meanest proportions. Thus,
for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is
happening in his own mind. Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the
history of philosophy, of his own philosophy. There is no longer a 'history
according to the order in time,' there is only 'the sequence of ideas in the
understanding.' He thinks he is constructing the world by the movement of
thought, whereas he is merely reconstructing systematically and classifying by
the absolute method of thoughts which are in the minds of all." [Marx
(1976), pp.162-65. Italic emphases in the original. Minor typos and a
few major errors corrected. (I have informed the editors at the Marxist Internet
Archive about them!) Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Some paragraphs merged.]
Not much
positivity obvious in there, one feels!
Like all too many others who claim to be
Marxists, Molyneux blithely ignores the above very clear statements from Marx -- not from me, or
Karl Korsch,
or anyone else -- fromMarx.
[Over the next few months I will add
several more passages to the
Appendix
that illustrate what Marx thought about Philosophy.]
Moreover, nowhere does Marx tell
his readers that socialists need a world-view (either to keep their spirits up,
provide them with an alternative world-view to counter the dominant world-views they meet every
day, or for any other reason --
quite the opposite,
in fact, he tells them to abandon philosophy). As we have seen
elsewhere in this Essay, since Ancient Greek times the dominant
world-view in the 'West' has been based on the belief that there is a hidden,
'abstract' world, anterior to the senses that is more real than the material
world we see around us. [There were also analogous developments in the 'East'.] Hence, according to this
archaic tradition, it is the philosopher's job to concoct arcane theories about this invisible world,
all of which were to be derived from 'thought' -- or words -- alone, dogmatically imposed on
'reality'.
Later in Molyneux's book (as well as in his other writings on dialectics),
he simply offers his readers
more of the same. So, far from providing us with an alternative world-view, he
simply serves up a set of his own a priori, dogmatic theories(which are really
an echo of the ideas Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Trotsky also
imposed on the world), that turn out
to mirror the
dominant ruling-class forms-of-thought mentioned above.
Marx predicted these ideas w
always rule, and we can
now see why he was right, even in relation to his erstwhile followers.
What Molyneux and the others mentioned above offer their readers is a pale
reflection of this ancient world-view, only now given a left-wing
veneer!
[Exactly
why DM-theorists do this is explored in detail in Essay
Nine Part Two.]
The next few
pages of his book offer a clearer view of what Molyneux
means by "philosophy" :
"In the course of discussion with a friend or
workmate they retort 'But there's one thing you've forgotten: you can't change
human nature,' or 'But there's always going to be rich and poor, always has
been, always will be!' In a debate in the movement someone says 'The real
problem is the Tories; we must all unite to get rid of them and get in Labour.
Then things will be better.' On a university sociology course the professor
says, 'Of course, Marx believed that communism was inevitable, but as social
scientists we have to reject such dogmatic views,' or 'Marxism reduces
everything to economics and class, but sociology nowadays is more complex and
sophisticated than that.' All of these statements have an immediate plausibility
-- they seem to appeal to 'common sense'. This is because they rest on a
worldview, a philosophy, systematically developed, perfected one might say, by
our rulers, the capitalist class and its philosophical ideologues, over
centuries and disseminated through innumerable channels to every corner of
society. To answer them requires an equally developed and coherent philosophy
from our side. Fortunately, such a philosophy exists -- Marxism!" [Molyneux
(2012), pp.5-6. Bold emphasis added.]
Now, it isn't too clear how beating the Tories and voting Labour,
or how the idea that Marx reduced everything to class and economics, or even how he
believed that communism was inevitable, are part of 'common sense'. It is even
less easy to see how the ruling-class (or, indeed, their ideologues) have been
perfecting these particular ideas for centuries. But, even if all of
these issues were crystal clear, and Molyneux was correct that they
encapsulate 'common sense', it is still far from obvious why we need a world-view to
counter them individually or even collectively. Surely, they can all be challenged by
an appeal to the facts: Did Marx think communism was inevitable or did he not?
Answer: "'No' and here are the reasons and the quotes...". Did he reduce everything to economics and class,
or did he not? Answer: "'No', and here are the reasons and the quotes...." Is the Labour Party capable
of 'making things better' or is it not? Similar response.... The other issues mentioned can surely be neutralised in much
the same way: is it a historical or scientific fact whether or
not human nature is fixed? Is it a historical or scientific
fact whether or not poverty is inevitable?
That isn't,
of course, to claim that right-wingers will accept replies like these and change
their minds. Far from it. Anyone who has tried to engage with one of those also
knows they are allergic to facts and deaf to counter-arguments. Over the
last seven years I have been arguing with well over two hundred such
individuals on Quora (and that figure is no exaggeration, either!), and can
count on the fingers of a severely mutilated hand the number that have responded
in a non-negative way. In the comment section under
this answer on Quora
alone, I have 'debated' such issues with over fifty right-wingers, and every
single one exhibited the above traits, and many more besides (including
abuse -- rather like the response I often also face from DM-fans -- compounded
by a few threats of violence). But, arguing with right-wingers isn't the same as
discussing revolutionary with fellow comrades or interested 'contacts'. And
does anyone seriously think that those who refuse to listen to the facts or pay
heed to careful scientific arguments will be persuaded by a swift dose of
dialectics?
Why then do we need a
world-view? Couldn't we make do with a scientific theory? Why do we
even need a
philosophical theory? Exactly what has an 'abstract' system -- which is how Molyneux
depicts Philosophy -- got to offer those who are pondering political or
scientific questions like the ones he mentioned? Precisely which 'abstractions',
which 'essences', will help
persuade someone drawn into the periphery of the movement or who joins for the first time that the Labour Party will always
fail workers, for instance? Or, that Marx didn't think communism was inevitable?
Marxists
will certainly appeal to ideas drawn from HM, but not from DM, as I have
argued in Essay Nine Part One (slightly modified):
[It
is worth pointing out that the material below depends heavily on the
evidence and argument presented in other Essays at this site,
which have demonstrated time and again that DM
makes not one ounce of sense, that its core ideas soon fall apart when
examined closely, and, indeed, that they are far too vague and confused to
be assessed even for their truth or falsehood. On this, see
Essays Three Part One to Eight
Part Three. That isn't the case with HM.]
It could be objected that
the distinction drawn between DM and HM at this
site is completely spurious;
hence, the controversial claims made in this Essay are completely misguided,
if not downright mendacious.
However, as will be argued in Essay Fourteen
Part Two, HM
contains ideas that are non-sensical only when they are translated into
DM-jargon. The eminent good sense made by HM -- even as that theory is understood by workers when they encounter
it (often this is in times of struggle) -- testifies to this fact.
[HM = Historical
Materialism; DM = Dialectical Materialism; LOI = Law of Identity.]
The clear distinction
that exists between these two
theories isn't just a wild idea advanced at this site; it can be seen clearly in the
day-to-day practice of revolutionaries themselves. No Marxist of any intelligence would use
slogans drawn exclusively from DM to communicate with workers; indeed,
few militants would even attempt
to agitate strikers, for example, with the conundrums found in DM. On a picket
line the alleged contradictory nature of motion or the limitations of the LOI
don't often crop up. How frequently does the link between part and whole loom large in the
fight against the Nazis? How many times do revolutionary socialists have to
explain the distinction, or even the link, between 'quantity and quality' in the
fight against, say, austerity?
Consider, for example, the following slogans:
"The Law of Identity is true only within certain limits and the opposition
to sanctions on Venezuela!" Or "Change in quantity leads to change in
quality and the
defence of pensions!"
[Excellent examples of the
utter uselessness of the
above 'law' can
be found here and
here.]
Or: "The whole
is greater than the sum of the parts and the
campaign to keep hospital HH open!" Or even, "Being is
identical with but at the same time different from Nothing, the contradiction resolved by
Becoming, and the fight against
the
DFLA!"
[DFLA = Democratic Football
Lads Alliance, a UK neo-fascist street gang, now effectively defunct (i.e., in
2024).]
Slogans like these would be employed by militants of
uncommon stupidity and legendary
ineffectiveness.
In contrast, active revolutionaries employ ideas
drawn exclusively from HM -- as that theory applies
concretely to the current
state of the class war --if they want to communicate with workers. The vast majority of
revolutionary papers, for example, use ordinary language coupled with concepts drawn from HM
to agitate and propagandise; rarely do they employ DM-phraseology. [A handful examples
of the latter have been considered
here.]
As Ian Birchall informs us:
"[Red]
Saunders thinks that the IS [the forerunner of the UK-SWP -- RL] attracted
the best of the 1968 generation through its politics -- 'Neither Washington nor
Moscow' -- but also through the accessibility of its publications, it used
ordinary language rather than the jargon of other far-left groups." [Birchall
(2011), p.422.]
Only
deeply sectarian rags of exemplary unpopularity and
impressive lack of impact use ideas and terminology lifted from DM to try to
educate or propagandise the working class. Newsline (the daily paper of the old
WRP) was notorious in this regard; but like the Dinosaurs it resembled, it is no more. [The
NON, it seems, took
appropriate
revenge.]
[NON = Negation of the
Negation.]
It could be objected that no one would
actually use
slogans drawn from certain areas of HM to communicate with or agitate workers. That
doesn't mean HM is of no use, so the same must be true of DM. For example, who
shouts slogans about "Base and Superstructure", or "Relative Surplus Value" on paper sales?
Who tries to propagandise workers with facts about the role of the peasantry in the
decline of feudalism? Once more, this means the distinction
drawn in this Essay is entirely bogus.
While it is true that no one
shouts slogans about the relation between "Base and Superstructure" on paper
sales, or prints strike leaflets reminding militants of the role of the peasantry
in the decline of feudalism, they nevertheless still use slogans (often
popularised versions) drawn exclusively from
HM, or which connect with HM as it relates concretely to current events in the class war.
Nearly every article, leaflet or slogan is informed by ideas drawn from HM.
In stark contrast, again,none at all are
drawn from DM.
To be sure, revolutionary papers
in general casually employ a handful of jargonised expressions drawn from DM (in
the vast majority cases, this is confined to the use of the word "contradiction")
in some of their articles, but this forms only a
very minor part of their output -- even though few, if any, comrades will use such
terms in slogans on street sales, on demonstrations or in discussions on the picket
line.
Anyway, as will be shown in
Part Two of this Essay, the use
of DM-terminology like this is merely a nod in the direction of tradition and
orthodoxy.
Indeed, we are forced to conclude this since no sense can made of such jargon -- as we
have seen, for instance,
here,
here,
here and
here. Hence, the employment of DM-terminology
simply amounts to a declaration, or an admission, of 'orthodoxy' on the part of the individual or group using
it -- an 'in-group'/'out-group'
marker, as is argued here.
DM-jargon does no real work (other than
negative) in such
circumstances, unlike concepts drawn from
HM.
[Claims to the contrary have been neutralised
here,
here and
here.]
So, just like Marx in Das Kapital,
revolutionary papers
merely "coquette"
with Hegelian jargon -- and even then, only "here and there".
Hence, at least at the level of practice
-- where the party interfaces with the working class and the material
world --,
DM is totallyuseless.
[As we will see
here, there is no
evidence that DM, or any of its jargon,was usedeven by the Bolsheviks in October 1917,
or, indeed, for several years
after.]
Consequently, tested in practice -- or, rather,
tested by beingleft out of practice -- the status of DM
is plain for all to see: At best, it is a hindrance; at worst, it would totally isolate
revolutionaries and make them look ridiculous.
This shows that the distinction drawn at this
site between
DM and HM isn't spurious in the least.
When they communicate with
workers,militants draw this distinction all the time.
Nevertheless, it could be argued in response
that this attempt to separate HM and DM would fragment and compartmentalise our
knowledge of nature and society. Such an approach to knowledge would possess
clear, Idealist implications,
suggesting that human beings
are
unique by implying that mind is independent of matter. If mind is dependent on matter
(howsoever that link is conceived) there must be laws that span across both
of them. And this
is partly where DM comes in.
Or, so it could be argued...
But, that
isn't so. As noted above, DM is far too vague and confused for it to function in
that way. It is incapable of
accounting for anything, social or natural (as the Essays at this site
demonstrate -- indeed, as we have seen, if DM were true,
change would be impossible). Hence, even if there were natural laws
that governed these two spheres (and I will pass no comment on that possibility
here), and an inventory were drawn up of all the viable alternative theories
capable of accounting for the above hypothesised connection, DM wouldn't even make the bottom of the
reserve list of likely candidates. It is far too vague and confused.
In response, it could be argued that
the above counter-argument is totally unacceptable since it ignores the fact that some of the best
class fighters in history have not only put dialectics into practice, they have woven it
into the fabric of each and every classic, and post-classic, Marxist text. Indeed, without
dialectics there would
be no Marxist theory. Indeed, HM would be like "a clock without a spring":
"While polemicising against
opponents who consider themselves -- without sufficient reason -- above all as
proponents of 'theory,' the article deliberately did not elevate the problem to
a theoretical height. It was absolutely necessary to explain why the American
'radical' intellectuals accept Marxism without the dialectic (a clock without
a spring)." [Trotsky
(1971), p.56. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.]
I
have dealt with that objection in Part Two,
here, so
readers are directed there for more details.
The other
claim (concerning matter and 'mind') was tackled in extensive detail in
Essay Thirteen Part Three.
So, if any
theory is required (to counter the ideas Molyneux mentions), it is HM, not DM.
And HM is a scientific, not a philosophical, theory.
If the above
is ignored and anyone interested in Marxism is plied with dialectics, the
following outcome is far more likely: they will be put off by the barrage of
'abstractions' thrown at them in answer to the above sort of questions,
especially 'abstractions' that turn out to be far more
obscure than those questions themselves.
But,
even if it turns out that we do need
a few 'abstractions', why can't those drawn from HM serve just as well, or even better? This is all the more especially so since the abstractions drawn from dialectics
fall apart alarmingly quickly, and which, if
'true', would make change impossible.
The problem is that Molyneux's 'definition' of Philosophy is
woefully inadequate (I suspect he hasn't given it much thought -- or, if he has,
he should have given it a lot more), since it blurs the distinction we
should normally want to draw between (i) Ordinary matters of fact, (ii) Scientific
questions, theories and truths, (iii) More general, abstract areas of study (such as Mathematics,
Logic, and Theoretical Physics), and (iv) Empty philosophical speculation. While
it is plain that we need the first three, Molyneux has yet to show we need the fourth.
Another pressing question requires an answer: Why were Molyneux's examples taken
from social, political and historical contexts? Surely, in order to illustrate
the invaluable nature of DM, one would have thought he would have also chosen a few
from hardcore DM? So, in order to fight capitalism, why do we need to know
why water boils, why the Mamelukes can't quite match Napoleon's infantry, why
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, or why Being is different from
Nothing, the contradiction resolved in Becoming? The answer is quite plain, not
only is DM useless even here, we don't need to know the answer to any of these
other questions (even if anyone actually understands the last one) in our fight against the
system.
Molyneux then proceeds to argue that the more involved an
individual becomes in the leadership of the movement, the more "questions of
philosophy become important" (p.6). That is undeniable, but that has, alas,
proved to be
detrimental to those involved --
as we have seen in
Essay Nine Parts One and
Two. There, it was pointed out that:
[U]nlike
HM, DM can't form a theoretical foundation for the "world-view of the
proletariat", and, therefore, that it has had to be imposed on what few workers
Dialectical Marxism has managed to attract to its ranks over the last 150 years. What is
more, this imposition runs 'against the grain' (so to speak) of workers' materialist good sense. Hence, it will be argued that DM is the
ideology of substitutionist elements within Marxism. Moreover, since it is
also possible to show that 'dialectics' is a total mystery -- even to DM-theorists(!)
--,
it can'tprovide revolutionary socialistswith a scientific, or philosophical,
foundation either for their politics or their practice.
In which case, DM not only doesn't, it can't 'reflect the experience of the party
or the class. [Quoted from
here, slightly edited.]
In addition
it was also argued that:
[D]ialectics (in either its DM-, or its
'Materialist Dialectics' [MD-], form) [occupies], or has [occupied], [a central
role] in addressing and
satisfying the contingent psychological needs of prominent Dialectical Marxists. In addition,
[it was shown] how and why Hegel's influence has assisted in the corruption of
our movement from top to bottom (aggravating, but not causing, sectarian
in-fighting, fostering splits and expulsions that often arise
as a result), revealing, too, why DM has had such a deleterious and
narcoleptic effect on
militant minds. These untoward consequences will be linked to the class origin and
current class position of
leading revolutionaries -- those who have helped shape our
movement's core ideas.
It [was]
also...shown how and why the above
comrades are particularly susceptible to ideas that have been peddled by
ruling-class theorists for thousands of years -- specifically, the doctrine that
there is a 'hidden world', a world of
'abstractions' and 'essences', anterior to 'appearances' that is
more real than the material universe we
see around us (in the sense that these 'abstractions' are somehow
capable of rendering objects and processes in nature concrete, an ancient idea that
implies nature is insufficient to itself, and needs 'Ideas', or
'Concepts', to make it 'Real'), which 'hidden world' can be
accessed by thought alone.
In short, it
[was] shown that this theory has played
a key role in making Dialectical Marxism synonymous with political and theoretical impotency --, which, naturally, helps explain
our movement's long-term lack of success.
[Notice the use of the indefinite article here
-- i.e., in "a key role".
I am not blaming all our woes on this theory! Doubters should read
this warning on the
opening page of this site, in the right
hand column.] [Quoted from
here, heavily edited.]
Hence, if, as Molyneux avows,
practice is to be our guide, it emphatically suggests we
should ditch this ruling-class thought-form, since it has served
us rather badly, if not disastrously, for over a hundred years.
Molyneux then argues that since religion is the most widespread form of
philosophy, revolutionaries need to be philosophically aware, or trained to some
extent, in order to counter it (pp.6-7). But, it is plain that Molyneux has here
run-together Theology (and possibly even
Philosophical Theology) with religious belief. The latter manifestly
isn't a philosophy, but an affectation and response to alienation, as Marx pointed
out. Sure, it may give rise to certain philosophical ideas or questions
(i.e., those expressed in Theology), but that still doesn't make it a philosophy.
Even so, anyone who thinks they can counter the arguments of
sophisticated theologians with the fourth-rate philosophy found in textbooks on
dialectics will be sadly disappointed -- especially given the fact that
dialectics is itself a version of
Mystical Christian Hermeticism (both upside down and 'the right way up'). In which
case, if we needed a philosophy to counter Theology and/or religious
affectation, DM is the very last
thing we should turn to!
Anyway,
it is possible to counter Theology reasonably
successfully without the use of philosophical theory. [I have done just
that,
here. (That link is now dead, but a more recent, much briefer version of my
argument can be accessed
here.)]
Molyneux also argues that activists need a solid theoretical
grounding in the historical development of religion, as well as a secure understanding
of the politics and social forces underlying religious movements
(p.7). But, once more, he has confused History, Religious Studies, the Sociology
of Religion,
and Political Theory with Philosophy per se. All of these (except the last, Philosophy) are, or can
easily become, part of HM. Why we need an extra input from Philosophy is
still far from clear.
Finally, Molyneux also points out that Philosophy is essential
for those who hope to understand the complex tactical aspects of intervention in
the class struggle (p.7). Once again, this is part of HM. DM is useless in
this regard. Who shouts slogans about quantity turning into quality on a
demonstration? Who points out that truth is the whole at an anti-war meeting? Who
even so much as mentions the alleged fact that the nature of the part is
determined by its relation to the whole, and vice versa, when countering
the arguments of trade union bureaucrats? Who in their left mind points out that being is identical
with, but at the same time different from, nothing, the contradiction resolved in
becoming, on a paper sale? Or even in an argument with reformists?
Only those the worse for drink or drugs -- or, who have
perhaps slipped out of their straight-jackets --, that's who!
So, the 'Marxist case' (or, indeed,
any case!) for Philosophy has
yet to be
made.
But even
if Marxists needed a philosophy of some sort, we surely can do better than
offer this fourth ratealternative. What an insult it is to the
workers' movement promoting DM as our/their philosophy. Haven't workers
suffered enough under capitalism? Why twist the knife?
[Anyone who thinks otherwise should
email me with their best shot.]
Update July 2017:
I have just read Andrew Collier's book on Marxism (i.e., Collier (2004)); there
he attempts to minimise or explain away Marx's anti-philosophical remarks and
unambiguous repudiation of that bogus discipline. He then tries to argue that not
only does Marxism itself need a philosophy, but that Marx himself possessed one,
too (pp.117-30).
Collier begins in the following way:
"Marx
was, by training, a philosopher. He studied philosophy at university, and
obtained a doctorate for a thesis on ancient Greek philosophy. He writes like a
philosopher; the attention to the analysis of concepts and their precise use,
the logical structure of his arguments, all show the methods and skills of a
philosopher to a high degree. His reputation today is probably higher among
philosophers than in any other academic discipline, and deservedly so: in his
manner of argument, he is a philosopher, and one of the greatest." [Collier
(2004), p.117.]
While Collier gives no examples of the
"logical structure" of Marx's writings, or his "attention to the analysis of
concepts", it is reasonably clear that in his early writings Marx was indeed a
(dogmatic) philosopher of some sort, albeit in the Hegelian and Feuerbachian
traditions. Even so, it is far from clear that Marx's reputation among
professional philosophers is as Collier alleges -- at least, if we confine our
attention to Analytic Philosophers, which is still perhaps the dominant
tradition. What Collier says may still be true among 'Continental Philosophers',
however. Be this as it may, if we examine Marx's later work, it is even less
clear that Marx was a philosopher of any sort -- as Collier himself
admits:
"Yet from 1845 on, the subject matter of his
writing is not, for the most part, philosophy, but social science and political
commentary. Much of what he says in 1845 gives the impression of consciously
turning his back on philosophy." [Ibid., p.117.]
Collier then quotes Marx's comment that we
should "leave
philosophy aside", adding this thought:
"There have always been some Marxists -- and,
at times, Engels comes close to being one of them -- who have proclaimed that
with Marx, philosophy comes to an end, and is replaced by something else."
[Ibid., p.117.]
Of
course, the argument developed at this site isn't that Philosophy
comes to an end with Marx; it is in fact that it never had a beginning, except as a
vehicle for highly abstract forms of ruling-class ideology and the promotion of "the ideas of the
ruling-class". As Marx himself points out:
"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. Bold
emphases added.]
A passage Collier doesn't quote even once --, and it isn't hard to see why.
It torpedoes his entire argument.
So,
what does Collier offer in response? He argues first of all that Marx supported
the aims of
The
Enlightenment, that it was possible for human reason to understand the world
and then help change it:
"When
in his early works he first talks about an end for philosophy, he is mainly
thinking of the project of emancipation by reason, and he does not mean that
philosophy should be superseded by science and laid aside; he means that what
philosophy has projected theoretically -- human emancipation based on reason --
should be realised in practice." [Collier (2004), pp.118-19.]
So,
rather like the 'followers' of the 'Prince of Peace' -- Jesus Christ, who told
his disciples to love their enemies and do good to those who hate them
-- who then try to tell us that he really didn't mean this, but that we
should torture, shoot, stab and bomb them, Collier also tries to tell us that
when Marx tells us that Philosophy is really a different form of religion -- and
hence an expression of human alienation, equally to be condemned -- and that we
should leave Philosophy and devote ourselves to the study of the actual world
(i.e., that we should in fact replace Philosophy with science!), he really
meant we shouldn't do this!
"One has to 'leave philosophy aside'..., one has to leap out of it and devote
oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality...." [Marx
and Engels (1976), p.236.]
Collier then adds this additional thought:
"When
he talks about philosophy in The German Ideology, however, he is thinking
of philosophy as speculation, and saying that this is no way to find out how the
world works." [Collier (2004), p.118. Italic emphasis in the original.]
That
is, of course, Collier's interpretation for which he offers no textual evidence,
and which, incidentally, flies in the face of what Marx actually wrote about
philosophy post 1844. But, let us suppose Collier is right, what exactly
will be left of this discipline if it has had its 'speculative' heart removed?
Collier doesn't say.
What
he does say is that Marx's later work did in fact have philosophical
content (p.118). However, it turns out that this 'philosophical content' is
confined to questions relating to methodology in the social sciences -- specifically,
questions about 'abstraction'. In support, Collier (partially) quotes the
following passage from the Grundrisse (which I have quoted in full):
"It seems correct to begin with the real and the
concrete…with e.g. the population…. However, on closer examination this proves
false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes
of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not
familiar with the elements on which they rest…. Thus, if I were to begin with
the population, this would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and I would
then, by further determination, move toward ever more simple concepts, from the
imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the
simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until
I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic
conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and
relations…. The latter is obviously scientifically the correct method. The
concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations,
hence the unity of the diverse." [Marx (1973),
pp.100-01.
I have analysed this passage in detail,
here.]
Why
Collier counts this as a philosophical question he leaves a total
mystery. Certainly Marx never describes it that way, nor does he even offer a hint
in that direction. In fact, Marx says that this is "scientifically
the correct method". It seems Collier is an expert at ignoring what Marx
actually says!
Collier then moves off in a more traditional direction and attempts to recruit
Marx's comments about 'the dialectic method' to the cause of confirming his
continuing interest in philosophy -- although he also appears to deny 'the
dialectic' operates throughout nature (p.125). Unfortunately, however, Collier
interprets and applies this 'method' by appealing to Fichtean Triplicity,
of "thesis-antithesis-synthesis", which is a serious error. [On that, see
here.]
Collier also quotes a few passages from Das Kapital where Marx uses
allegedly Hegelian terms like "contradiction" and "negation"; since I have dealt
with that topic at length in Essay Nine Part One --
here and
here -- readers are
directed there for more details. Collier then veers off on a tangent and tries
to saddle Marx with a 'materialist ontology' (pp.125-28), in support of which
he once again offers no textual evidence.
That is it! That is the extent of the 'proof' that Marx hadn't -- contrary to
what he himself declared -- left Philosophy.
Finally, there is a world of difference between
the amateurish, disconnected and
tentative musings (about time, existence, ethics, or the
'meaning of life', etc.) that ordinary humans sometimes engage in
(perhaps down the pub after a few too many jars?) and the
systematic theory-building of Traditional Philosophy.
[The word "amateurish" isn't
being used here in a derogatory or prejudicial sense. It merely serves to contrast the
thoughts of ProfessionalDogma-Meisters (of the sort
Chomsky mentioned), who indulge
in systematic philosophising and who are fully employed in the
production of 'High Theory', with the impromptu, disorganised
ruminations of avowed non-professionals.]
But, Chomsky made this point far better than I could.
[Link above.]
76.All this helps account for the close,
almost incestuous relationship between Traditional Philosophy and
Abstractionism. Without that bogus 'thought-form', Metaphysics (in Ancient
Greece) would have been stillborn, as the late Professor Havelock demonstrated (quoted earlier). [There
is more on this in Essay Three Parts
One and
Two -- and will be in Part Two of Essay
Twelve, when it is published.]
77.We saw this was so with respect to
Hegel,
here.
These days, in certain quarters, this
process is disarmingly called "designating"; new word, same import. The idea seems to be that if, for example, predicates
actually failed to "designate" something (be this a set, property, or "Universal",
in this or in some 'possible world') they would be empty phrases -- 'mere words' (as
Roscelin
would have put it) -- and would therefore be devoid of content. [On this, see
Ryle (1949b).
(This links to a PDF.)]
Clearly, that view of predication
confuses the descriptive or attributive role
occupied by predication with the referential role played by Proper Names and other singular terms. [There
is more on
this in Essay Three
Part One and Ryle (1949b), link above.]
Someone might object that the above is misleading since Philosophers don't just
assume there are essences, they have constructed several arguments
substantiating the theory that there are. That topic and those 'arguments' will be examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
78.Once more, this contentious claim will be substantiated in the next two Parts of
this Essay (summarised
here).
In
Chomsky's case, this latest allegation
might seem obviously wrong. That isn't so. On this, see Essay
Thirteen Part Three.
79.For centuries, theorists have
ignored, depreciated or down-played the vernacular and the communal labour and life on which it is
based. [Evidence in support of that contention will be given in Part
Seven of this Essay. In the meantime, the reader is referred to Conner (2005),
Eamon (1994), Eco (1997) and Meiksins Wood (1988).]
However, for practically the first time in human history
-- i.e., from approximately 1903 (starting with the revolt of
George Moore
and Bertrand
Russell
against Idealism) and up until the mid-1970s --, this 'time-honoured' trend in
ruling-class theory was partially and temporarily halted, thenreversed.
[On this, see Hacker (1996).]
Of course, if we regard it as a sheer coincidence that
during this
period the working class entered the stage of history for the first time as an
international force to be
reckoned with, and if the fact that these moves against Metaphysics were
prosecuted in the direction of ordinary language (and openly promoted by socialist, Marxist and left-leaning
Philosophers -- in Wittgenstein's case, see
here) were also
glossed over, then these developments would
indeed have no
explanation.
[Of course,
the above move had been pre-figured, if not signalled, by
Marx himself at a
time when the working class was just beginning to flex its muscles, and he was
beginning to analyse that fact.]
Nevertheless, the move away from OLP began in the
1970s, with the international downturn in working class militancy, and, oddly
enough, with the
beginning of the
Neo-liberal,
Monetarist,
and
Conservative assault on their living-standards, organisation
and culture -- the
first wave of which was pioneered (again, not uncoincidentally) by
philosophers, linguists, ideologues and economic theorists working in the USA,
the heart of the beast. [On the background to these political, social and
economic developments, see Neale (2004).]
Plainly, this doesn't constitute cast iron proof of the above claims; but in the context of these
Essays, and the political points that will be made in Part Seven, it is nonetheless highly significant.
Dialecticians, who claim that all things are inter-connected, have,
remarkably, failed to notice these reasonably clear links.
[On this, see
here,
which is a much longer and more comprehensive version of Uschanov (2002), although the author puts no political spin on this phenomenon.]
81.This isone aspect of what it means to argue that language is a social
phenomenon. [This will also be examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
[On the accusation that Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians do in
fact advance philosophical theories, see
here.]
Moreover, these comments are also related to
Wittgenstein's analysis of rules
in
his "middle" and "later period". On this, see the references given in
Essay Thirteen Part Three.
Also see Note 36, above.
Concerning the limitations of the analogy sometimes drawn between money and
language, see Jones (1991).
[That publication was originally meant to be the
first of three parts, but the author has informed me that the other two will not
now be published. That is a pity since
the last two parts were intended be an analysis of Marx's view of language, perhaps
the only one currently available. Update: Since that comment
was first written there have been a several developments in that direction. One
of note is Lecercle (2006), which is almost totally useless in this
respect. More-or-less the same can be said about Voloshinov (1973) and
Voloshinov's many subsequent commentators. These contentious remarks will be
substantiated in
Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
In this regard, as noted earlier, Marx had clearly anticipated Wittgenstein:
"The object before us, to begin with,
material production.
"Individuals producing in Society -- hence
socially determined individual production -- is, of course, the point of
departure. The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom
Smith
and
Ricardo
begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century
Robinsonades, which in no way express merely a reaction against
over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural
historians imagine. As little as
Rousseau's contrat social, which brings naturally independent,
autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract, rests on such
naturalism. This is the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the
Robinsonades, great and small. It is, rather, the anticipation of 'civil
society', in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides
towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition, the
individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier
historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human
conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of
the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century
individual -- the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of
society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the
sixteenth century -- appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the
past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the
Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising
historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new
epoch to this day.
Steuart
avoided this simple-mindedness because as an aristocrat and in
antithesis to the eighteenth century, he had in some respects a more historical
footing.
"The more deeply we go back into history, the
more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as
dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the
family and in the family expanded into the clan [Stamm]; then later in
the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions
of the clan. Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various
forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards
his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this
standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the
hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations. The
human being is in the most literal sense a
Zwon politikon
not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which
can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an
isolated individual outside society -- a rare exception which may well occur
when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically
present is cast by accident into the wilderness -- is as much of an absurdity as
is the development of language without individuals living together and
talking to each other. There is no point in dwelling on this any longer. The
point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle, which had sense and reason
for the eighteenth-century characters, had not been earnestly pulled back into
the centre of the most modern economics by
Bastiat,
Carey,
Proudhon
etc. Of course it is a convenience for Proudhon et al. to be able
to give a historico-philosophic account of the source of an economic relation,
of whose historic origins he is ignorant, by inventing the myth that Adam or
Prometheus
stumbled on the idea ready-made, and then it was adopted, etc. Nothing is more
dry and boring than the fantasies of a
locus communis. [Marx
(1973), pp.83-85. Bold emphasis and links added.]
Many fellow Marxists who have read the
above still
fail to notice its
full significance. Is this yet another serious case of selective blindness?
[On other similarities between Marx and Wittgenstein, see Kitching and Pleasants (2002) -- see
also
here and
here. I
have covered this topic in much more detail,
here.]
83.If correct, that would make words the
linguistic equivalent of intelligent ideas or even agents in their own right, a topic that was examined
earlier, but in more detail in Essay Three
Part Two.
85.This reversal -- as a result of which each human being is now viewed as a socially-atomised
and
individualised abstractor, further compounded by
the fetishisation of the products of social interaction (i.e., language) -- was
originally motivated by a set of clearly identifiable ideological aims and objectives
set by centuries of ruling-class theorists. Small wonder then that this view of language
and thought (i.e., that it is based on the mythical process of 'abstraction') has
underpinned Traditional Thought for over 2500 years.
[This entire issue will explored
in more detail in later Parts of this Essay, and in Essay Thirteen
Part Three. Abstractionism was
critically analysed in Essay Three Parts
One and
Two.]
86.
But even the attempt to
specify the meaning of words in such a piecemeal manner wouldn't justify the traditional inference
that has been drawn solely
from
language to
the truth of scientific or metaphysical theories, valid throughoutall of reality, for
all of time.
It is worth adding at this point that there is no suggestion here that
rules must be explicit; in fact, many can't be. [Why that is so will
be explained in a future re-write of this Essay. Until then, see Note 88.] In general, these rules
originate in, and grow out of, material practices,
something which is plainly absent in this case. [On that, see Robinson (2003b) and Kusch (2002, 2006).]
87.However, this is just another way of saying that language is a social
phenomenon, and that the linguistic rules human beings have developed over many
centuries aren't answerable to nature. Indeed, how could nature
determine what our words mean? And that is so whether or not this supposed influence
(by 'nature') is
thought to be expressed genetically or is
motivated in some other way; for example, whether or not our grammatical or
'ontological' prejudices "carve nature at the joints", as Plato surmised.
[Phaedrus
265e; i.e., Plato (1997b), p.542.]
Again, on this, see
Note 90.
88.This observation captures one aspect of the claim Wittgenstein made, that meaning
in language can't be given in
language by means of empirical propositions.
This might
be an odd thing to say, especially when it seems we can assert things like
"'Vixen' means 'female fox'". However, as noted above, that isn't an
empirical proposition, but the expression of a rule.
Once
more, this view of language underpins the usual complaint made against
Wittgenstein (and, indeed, Essays like those published at this site), which is that
his ideas also depend on some 'theory' or other. The reason for assuming this is plain enough: those who accept the traditional view of language
see representation as its only legitimate function, which must mean Wittgenstein's use of
language was in some way representational, too.
But,
Wittgenstein's method exposes this as a misleading picture of the way
language actually works, since representationalism completely undermines
the role discourse plays in communication. In that case,
for this and other reasons explored across all Parts of Essay Twelve, there can be no legitimate
theories in Philosophy. [On this see
Kuusela (2006, 2008) and Iliescu (2000). See also, Fischer (2011a, 2011b).]
Now, responses like this
often pass over the heads of those who have sold their radical souls to
ruling-class forms-of-thought. Indeed, they often argue that it is inconsistent
to criticise Traditional Philosophy along these lines, or
attempt to end this bogus thought-form, since
any endeavour
in that direction must itself be philosophical
-- or so they allege.
Well, that makes about as
much sense as claiming that socialists who want to end Capitalism must also be
Capitalists, or that in order to fight a virus one must first of all catch it!
He who drives a fat ox must be fat, too, I suppose. [On this, see Note 75c,
above.]
88a. It could be objected that liquidity
is an inseparable property of water (and so M23a is always false). That
is true in the sense that liquidity is an inseparable property of liquid
water (which is an 'analytic truth' (i.e., it is a linguistic rule), not an empirical fact,
otherwise it could be false -- and if that were so, we wouldn't be
referring to water!), but, since ice and steam are also water (i.e.,
H2O), M23 is either a
contingent truth about water (as H2O),
or it is now a criterion of what
counts as water, even if it isn't the only one.
M23: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
water.
M23a: Liquidity isn't an inseparable property of
water.
M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.
[M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.]
Of course, one could always modify M23 so
that it became something like the following:
M23b: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
(pure) water between 0ºC and 100ºC, at normal pressure.
But, as noted above, that would turn M23b into a criterion for
something to count as water, and hence into yet another rule!
However, if anyone still objects to this
particular example,
substitute the following for M23, M23a, and M24, etc.:
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M9a: Motion isn't inseparable from matter.
L2: Carbon is inseparable from Oxygen.
L3: Carbon isn't inseparable from Oxygen.
That having been done, not much will
change -- i.e., with respect to the argument presented in this section of the Essay.
89.That
was, of course, the point of
calling motion "The mode of the existence of matter" (on that, see
Note 89a, below).
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
From P4 alone it is
clear that the
connection between motion and matter is meant to be conceptual.
Since "modes" can't be experienced, that could hardly be
otherwise. As
Lenin might have said, P4 is a "law of cognition".
89a. Had this been
based on evidence, Lenin would have said something like the following: "Motion without
matter has never been observed, but it is impossible to say if it can't
exist in any other way...", or something to that effect. But, Lenin and Engels went much,
much further:
"In
full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it,
Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring
(read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....'
'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin
(1914), p.8. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Motion
is the mode of existence of matter.Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable
as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and
indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes)
expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same.
Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred. When motion is
transferred from one body to another, it may be regarded, in so far as it
transfers itself, is active, as the cause of motion, in so far as the latter is
transferred, is passive. We call this active motion force, and the
passive, the manifestation of force. Hence it is as clear as daylight
that a force is as great as its manifestation, because in fact the same
motion takes place in both.
"A motionless state of matter is therefore one of
the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]
90.That doesdoesn't imply the present author accepts the CTT, or any version of the 'picture theory of
representation' -- but Lenin seems to have done so.
On this
basis, empirical propositions are said to "picture" certain states of affairs in
the world (so that if what they say obtains they are true, and if what they say
doesn't, they are false), but that is
a grammatical point about how we use certain expressions (which is itself
contingent on how we have developed as a species; it isn't not a 'necessary truth about representation' as
such). In which case, this is just another "form of representation", not a philosophical theory about reality
-- or even concerning 'the
nature of the proposition'. Social practices ground this rule, not a priori
'truths', 'valid in all possible worlds'.
Of course, we could always say that it is thought that
connects a sentence to the world, but that would simply push the problem one
stage further back.
If a
'thought' "T" -- or some other 'act of cognition' -- were required to connect an
empirical proposition, "E", to the a specific feature of the world,
"F", then an explanation would be required for what connects
T to E, and then what links either or both to F, and
nothing else. Clearly, an answer to that couldn't appeal to a linguistic characterisation of
F (call that, "P"), or it would become circular.
It takes very little thought now to see this is yet another dead end, since
without P we wouldn't know
precisely whatT or E were in fact related to 'in reality'. So, if
this theory were true, 'thought' would take precedence over 'reality', the exact
opposite result to whatever it was that DM-theorists had hoped for, but hardly surprising given
its origin in mystical Hegelianism. In
addition, questions would then focus on the supposed link between F and P,
which would soon spiral off into yet another infinite regress.
[Expressed
differently, this was in fact one of the main themes of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus. The CTT flounders on this rock, too, which means that,
contrary to widely held views, the Tractatus doesn't contain, or express, any version
of the CTT, nor one remotely like it. Wittgenstein's concern there was to examine,
and then specify, the logical principles underlying our capacity to
represent the world. (There will be more on this in Essays Three
Part Four and Ten Part Two. Until then, the reader is directed to White (2006)
for more details.)]
Nevertheless, sentences are material objects
(or processes) in their
own right. They exist as marks on the page or as sound patterns in the air,
etc. In that case, it is difficult to see what could correctly connect just this
set of molecules (constituting a written expression
of a particular thought, or, if spoken, a molecular disturbance in the air) with
another set of molecules or neural processes from which its 'mental' analogue is supposed
to have 'emerged'. Since the word "correctly" introduces
normativity into the equation, it isn't easy
to see what could possibly do this that wasn't itself the result of another
damaging
concession to anthropomorphism --, duplicating in the brain an analogue of the
social practices that already underpin the normative use of language in everyday
life.
If such a
connection is to have the required normative force -- necessary
in order to judge a particular use
of language to be
correct -- then that would appear to commit us to the odd idea that social
practices must in fact take place inside the head or 'the mind'. Failing that,
it might even seem to commit us to the theory that 'thoughts' enjoy a communal life of their own inside each skull. In
other words, this would be tantamount to regarding words as social agents
that provide for themselves their own 'correct' meaning and determine their own 'correct' application,
thus dictatingtoushow we are to employthem. As has been pointed out several times
already, this would not only fetishise words, it would dehumanises us.
[That topic was explored
in Essay Three
Part Two; it has also been discussed more fully in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Some might
object to all this emphasis on linguistic 'correctness' on the ground that it smacks of
elitism of even small "c" conservatism. Any who do so object should never be given a job in the
proof-reading department of a revolutionary paper, or a socialist publishing
house. where ordinary (and correct) use is required in order to communicate
with 99% of the population.
Independently of that the above 'elitist' jibe isn't so -- at least, not unless we are prepared to call Lenin and Trotsky
"elitists". Here is Lenin
arguing that it is important to be clear about the meaning of key words:
"'Sense-perception
is the reality existing outside us'!! This is just the
fundamental absurdity, the fundamental muddle and falsity of Machism, from which
flows all the rest of the balderdash of this philosophy and for which
Mach
and
Avenarius
have been embraced by those arrant reactionaries and preachers of
priestlore, the immanentists. However much V.
Bazarov
wriggled, however cunning and diplomatic he was in evading ticklish points, in
the end he gave himself away and betrayed his true Machian character! To say
that 'sense-perception is the reality existing outside us' is to return to
Humism,or even Berkeleianism, concealing itself in the fog of
'co-ordination.' This is either an idealist lie or the subterfuge of the
agnostic, Comrade Bazarov, for sense-perception is not the reality
existing outside us, it is only the image of that reality. Are you
trying to make capital of the ambiguous Russian word sovpadat? Are you
trying to lead the unsophisticated reader to believe that sovpadat here
means 'to be identical,' and not 'to correspond'? That means basing one's
falsification of Engels à la Mach on a perversion of the meaning of a
quotation, and nothing more.
"Take the
German original and you will find there the words stimmen mit, which
means to correspond with, 'to voice with' -- the latter translation is literal,
for Stimme means voice. The words 'stimmen mit' cannot mean
'to coincide' in the sense of 'to be identical.' And even for the
reader who does not know German but who reads Engels with the least bit of
attention, it is perfectly clear, it cannot be otherwise than clear, that Engels
throughout his whole argument treats the expression 'sense-perception' as the
image (Abbild) of the reality existing outside us, and that therefore
the word 'coincide' can be used in Russian exclusively in the sense of
'correspondence,' 'concurrence,' etc. To attribute to Engels the thought that
'sense-perception is the reality existing outside us' is such a pearl
of Machian distortion, such a flagrant attempt to palm off agnosticism and
idealism as materialism, that one must admit that Bazarov has broken all
records!
"One asks, how
can sane people in sound mind and judgment assert that 'sense-perception [within
what limits is not important] is the reality existing outside us'? The earth is
a reality existing outside us. It cannot 'coincide' (in the sense of being
identical) with our sense-perception, or be in indissoluble co-ordination with
it, or be a 'complex of elements' in another connection identical with
sensation; for the earth existed at a time when there were no men, no
sense-organs, no matter organised in that superior form in which its property of
sensation is in any way clearly perceptible.
"That is just
the point, that the tortuous theories of 'co-ordination,' 'introjection,' and
the newly-discovered world elements which we analysed in Chapter I serve to
cover up this idealist absurdity. Bazarov's formulation, so inadvertently and
incautiously thrown off by him, is excellent in that it patently reveals that
crying absurdity, which otherwise it would have been necessary to excavate from
the piles of erudite, pseudo-scientific, professorial rigmarole."
[Lenin
(1972), pp.124-26. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphases and links added.]
"Tryfor once to think over the words you use to compile your phrases,
comrades!" [Lenin, 'Intellectualist Warriors Against Domination by the
Intelligentsia', Nashe Ekho, No.5, March 30, 1907. Quoted from
here.Bold emphasis alone added..]
Unsurprisingly,
Trotsky concurred:
"It is
necessary to call things by their right names." [Trotsky
(1971), p.56.]
Apparently, even
the bourgeois press gets it. Here is the soft left, reformist UK paper, The Daily Mirror,
which knows the importance
of using the right words (in this case, appearing in an article about the difference
between "migrant" and "refugee"):
"Using the right words for the right things is very
important. It's how we manage to communicate across languages and borders, via
keyboards and tweets and picture captions. Using the wrong words means you
stop communicating -- it means that at best you begin to mislead, and at worst
you lie. For example, Newton's law of gravity states that the force of
attraction between two bodies is directly proportional to the products of their
mass. In other words, apples fall downwards because the earth is bigger than an
apple. Imagine if just one of those words meant the opposite of what we think it
does. We couldn't send a lander to Mars because we wouldn't know where it was,
jet engines would make no sense so there'd be no package holidays, and we'd all
think dancing on the ceiling like
Lionel
Richie was an option. If you don't get the words right, you get
everything else wrong." [The
Daily Mirror, 02/09/2015. Paragraphs merged. Bold
emphases and link added.]
It could
now be argued that this gets things completely the wrong way
round -- material reality precedes thought; so whatever connects certain
aspects of reality, such as F (from
earlier) to T (also from earlier)
--
or even to P (ditto) -- must be objective already. The
failure to acknowledge this basic fact means that the above comments are
misguided.
The issues raised by
that rejoinder are connected with the RRT, which
will be examined in detail in Part Four of this Essay.
In advance of that, it is worth pointing out that Essays at
this site have been at pains to distinguish an anthropological
account of language (which is promoted in these Essays) from theories of language that descend into,
are based on, or which imply some form of LIE. Indeed, it has been argued that
theories of language that run contrary to the approach adopted at this
site readily
collapse into LIE, since, at some point, they depend on a fetishisation
of language (as noted above). By so doing, they invert the products of
social interaction, turning
them into the real relations between things, or into those things themselves.
Furthermore,
attempts to construct (associated) theories of knowledge face a similar
fate; the 'truth' of any of the claims that emerge will follow
solely from the supposed meaning of the words they contain, not from
the way the world happens to
be. That is because the expressions used won't have been derived from a material
interaction with the world (in collective labour, etc.), but from a series of
arcane
abstractions divorced from it -- as well as from the beliefs and ideological
priorities of theorists who are determined to keep them that way.
Now, this Essay and others seek to undermine the traditional view
by showing that an
anthropological account of language reveals how empirical propositions -- whose
truth-values don't depend solely on the meanings of words,
but on the way the world happens to be (and whose truthconditions are constituted by rules of grammar
that are themselves based on social practices, on an interaction
with the world and with other human beings) -- gain the sense they have.
It is also
argued that it would be a serious error to
claim that something called "the Mind" (somehow) creates such truths -- which is, of
course, the underlying rationale of all forms of Idealism -- and which, it seems, is also the
view of those who
indulge in "subjective
dialectics". [There is much more on this in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
"Dialectics, so-called objective
dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics
(dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through
opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual
conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into
higher forms, determines the life of nature."
[Engels (1954), p.211, quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
Nevertheless, while it is human
beings who form/utter empirical propositions, it is the world that distributes
truth-values among them. Hence, it is what we humans say that
is
capable of being true or false, and even though the meanings of the words
we use haven't themselves been established under conditions of our own choosing (to
paraphrase Marx),
it is human beings who nevertheless established those they do employ (in
their practices, and by their interaction with each other and with the world
--, but not in general
as a result of individual or collective deliberation). This hasn't been done by the
(non-human)
universe -- and that is because, of course, nature itself isn't an agent and has no social history.
In response, it could be argued that human beings are part
of nature. In that case, the above comments are clearly misguided.
The
first of the above two sentences
is undeniably correct; but nature as such isn't an agent, and
that is all we need to keep in mind for present purposes.
Indeed, if we were to suppose that certain aspects of the natural world
determined the conditions under which we held empirical propositions true
perhaps as a result of the influence of an as yet unknown 'causal-', or 'dialectical-law') -- i.e., if we
naturalise epistemology and/or semantics -- then, in those
circumstances, inferences could be made from the meaning of words to the
truth-values of the propositions in which they occurred. That is because, in
such circumstances, the sense of a proposition wouldn't be independent of
its truth-value.
[Those who actually
reason along the above lines (in favour of just such a 'naturalisation') tend to
focus on
sentences -- i.e., on the vocalisation or the inscription of such
sentences --, and won't have anything to
do with propositions. On this, see Glock (2003),
pp.102-36 (especially, pp.118-36). See also, White
(1971).]
To see this (at least in
in relation to DM-proponents), let us suppose there is a naive theory
that postulates the existence of a (dialectical?) Law, L1,
which specifies that given a certain state or process in the world, S1,
observer, O1,
would be constrained to form a true proposition, P1,
even if at present we don't know what this 'Law' is, or, indeed, never actually
find out what it is.
[And by "state/process in the world", we can include all the relevant neural,
psychological, 'emergent' or 'dialectical' concomitants applicable in this
instance, as required.]
Clearly, falsehoods can't
be produced in this way since, if a sentence is false, what it says doesn't obtain. In that case, such a non-obtaining fact
couldn't exercise a
causal influence on anything at all, and if that is so, only true propositions
(like P1)
would be causally induced in this way by such a process.
[In which case, we need
a more sophisticated account of the dialectical/causal factors involved. On
that see below.]
The
above argument doesn't rule out 'negative causation', but it isn't easy to see how
it would, or could, work in this case. [Examples of
'negative causation' were given
here. See also here.]
So, while it might be false to say,
for example, "There is a cat on the mat", if there
is no cat on the mat, the absence of that cat on that mat won't have caused what was
actually said to be
false, even though what was said would be false because there was no cat
on the mat. ["Because", here clearly relates to the reasons why what was
said was indeed false, not the alleged cause of that falsehood. On the
difference between "because" and "cause", see Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Plainly, there would be nothing cat-like
on the mat to cause this sentence to be
uttered. A total lack of feline members of the animal kingdom,
where that cat should have been, wouldn't motivate or evince an utterance of the falsehood "There
is a cat on
the mat" -- unless, of course, this were some sort of secret code, uttered
perhaps between spies. On the other hand, it might motivate or evince its (true)
contradictory "The cat isn't on the mat" -- or, more likely, "There is
no cat on that mat" (in contradiction to "There is a cat on that mat", where the
mat in question is identified by a pointing gesture or is made perfectly clear
in some other way). Nevertheless, a specific cat being on a specific mat
can't have caused the utterance of the falsehood "The cat is on the mat"
(jokes and playfulness to one side) --
since it wasn't there to cause anything!
[In more complicated circumstances, the causal antecedents and
surroundings of the utterance "There is a cat on the mat", when there wasn't one
on the mat,
will be far more involved than the mere fact that the said moggie was absent.
(Several examples of this are given below.)
This would merely complicate the picture, not materially alter it. An absent
cat, on its own, can't be part of some unknown causal law that prompts,
or could prompt, the utterance of the falsehood "There is a cat on the mat", any more
than it would prompt "Paris is in China".]
It might be countered that the absence of the said cat could cause,
motivate,
or prompt the utterance of the truth "There isn't a cat on the mat"
(or, "There is no cat on the mat!"). However, not even that is plausible
(except, perhaps, in special circumstances -- such as it being uttered during a
search for the said cat, maybe as a way of eliminating one or
more of its
possible locations, or even to reassure someone who is perhaps hallucinating cats
everywhere), since a cat-free-mat could evince any number of utterances,
such as "This place needs hoovering!", "The dog has run off again!", "I see your
father has been over today and left that awful mat in the hall!", "Is this
a non-slip mat?", "Yes, the mat is still
covering that ink stain", "Oh dear, the mat salesman clearly saw you coming!", "Where are my shoes? They
were on the mat a minute ago!", and so on, ad nauseam.
[It
isn't to the point, either, to argue that not all of the above
examples are in the indicative mood, since the whole point is to show that a
cat-free-mat can evince a whole range of responses, some (possibly) predictable
from the surrounding circumstances, some not, making an appeal to a
causal or 'dialectical' law here seem seriously misguided itself in the circumstances.]
Additionally, the
naiveversion
outlined above might find it hard to account
for propositions that change from true to false, and back again, regularly, or
rapidly --
such as "Today is Monday", "It's raining", or "The lights are green" -- or even, "There
is a cat on the mat" (if the said animal couldn't make its mind up where to sit,
and soon ran off). It might
also struggle with truths about the past, such as "Julius
Caesar was assassinated on the
Ides of
March". What sort of causal/dialectical law could account for
utterances like these?
Or even, "Julius Caesar lived to a ripe old age"?
Hence, in
such circumstances, and given the naive version outlined above, only true sentences would be causally constrained in this way, by existent
states of affairs. If so, knowing what a proposition meantwould be all that one would
require in order to know it was true -- that it had been produced in the mind by
one of these (actual) states of affairs. The truth of an indicative sentence would be all of a piece with
its meaning, and we could
dispense with the need for supporting evidence.
In
this way, it should perhaps be clear why even an (allegedly) scientific law-governed account of
meaning in language (which adopted the naive version outlined above)
would collapse into LIE.
Someone could object that a false belief (as opposed to an
absent state of affairs) might cause the production of P1,
short-circuiting the above argument. However, as we will see in Essay Three Part
Four, this theory can't even account for false beliefs, so that isn't a
viable objection. Anyway, that objection will be defused below.
However, if we complicate matters, and move away from the
naive version, not much changes.
To that end,
consider a set of circumstances, "C",
that is indefinitely large, which might prompt, or
occasion, the utterance of any given indicative sentence.
As we have seen, both
"There is a cat on the mat" and "There
isn't a cat on the mat"
could be occasioned by a seemingly irrelevant set of circumstances or
alternative motivations (call that
set,
"CC").
For instance, it could be:
(i)
part of a joke;
(ii) a puzzle;
(iii) an
attempt to
confuse; or,
(iv) an
intention to distract.
It could even be occasioned by:
(v)
someone practising English;
(vi)
someone communicating a coded message; or it could form part of,
(vii)
a play;
(viii) the reconstruction of a crime scene; or it could even be the result
of,
(ix) an
inference: "If you're right, and the cat is outside chasing birds, then the
cat isn't on the mat"...,
The possibilities are
seemingly endless.
If so, the prospects of
finding a law that would cover all of these (when we don't even know which
circumstances are or aren't elements of CC,
or what sentences would, or could, be evinced by a cat-free, or even a cat-occupied mat,
and are never likely to find out) do not look at all promising.
Indeed, the likelihood that there is just such a law (whether or not we know
what it is) is vanishingly small. What law could possibly cause, or allow
anyone to predict that you would utter these sentences (upon seeing either
an empty mat or a cat-occupied mat) "Where's the dog?", "The mat is in
the way again!", "I thought you said you had sold that threadbare mat!", "That
reminds me, we need cat food", "I though you said you'd keep that stray cat out
of the kitchen!", "Did you take the cat to the vet's?","The cat has
pinched the dog's mat again!", "Where's that darned cat? I saw it on the mat a
few minutes ago", "Quick take a picture. The cat has fallen asleep and it looks
so cute!", "Looks like the pepper spray worked!", "Did you remember
to pick up the
Cats Versus Dogs DVD?", "That reminds me, is Mat still at school? Or has
he come home yet?", or...?
Of course, it is possible for the above conclusions to be
disputed on more substantive grounds. One of these might involve the idea that there
could be material principles at work here, which we do not yet understand, or about which we
are now completely ignorant, and about which we might forever remain ignorant, that constitute a
'causal-',
or 'dialectical-law' that governs what we say, and when we say it. Perhaps a combination of
'dialectically'-, or 'historically-conditioned-' causes could create in our
brains (or could allow our minds to respond to) the neurological conditions that
prompt the uttering of any given sentence. This could even be part of our
evolutionary heritage, one that enables our brains to be flexible and hence
capable of reacting in an open-ended manner to anything we might encounter.
Clearly, that set of possibilities
wouldn't be affected
by our subjective understanding or knowledge -- or even our lack of subjective
understanding or knowledge -- of these supposed casual laws. Speakers of a
language needn't, therefore, be aware of all (or any) of the causes underlying
the utterance of specific sentences, which means that the above inference from meaning to truth
is invalid.
Unfortunately, that reply substitutes speculation for
hard science.
However, in response, it is worth pointing out that that reply ignores the point made
above. That is, how such a law -- even if we don't currently know what it is, and
might never know --, how such a law can explain, or be used to predict, the
countless responses a cat either on, or not on, a mat might evince. [This point
also applies to a set of laws that might be postulated to be operative here, too.]
In addition,
the formulation of any such 'dialectical-law' would itself be the result of a
yet another fetishisation
of the products of the social relations among human beings. [On this, see the
next two Parts of this Essay.] Hence, their re-employment here to try to argue
that the products of social relations in fact actually depend on them
(that is, arguing that the linguistic products of social interaction and convention depend on such 'laws'), not the other way
round, wouldn't just be circular, it would undermine the capacity language
has for allowing us to
say anything at all (true or false). [Why that is so is explained below.]
Secondly, as noted above, this response
still fails to account for falsehood.
If there were some 'dialectical-' (or even 'non-dialectical-') law, or laws, that conditioned
language in this way -- even if we were forever ignorant of it, or them -- it/they could only produce truths,
hence all the
earlier points still stand.
Naturally, it could be argued in response that DM postulates an
array of social, economic, political and historical factors that are
dialectically responsible for the production of a range of ideological
concepts, so it isn't the case that dialectical-laws would only ever produce
truths. However, that specific topic will be dealt with at length in Essay Three Part Four;
the reader is referred back to that discussion for a more detailed rebuttal
(when it is
finally published).
Independently, and in advance of that, the above response would represent an unwise move,
anyway, based as it is on the mistaken view that by means of empirical
propositions we can
specify what the conditions are that lend to language the sense it has. This
approach would be tantamount to the imposition of a certain structure on
reality -- i.e., a transcendental condition on the possibility of
language --, something DM-theorists, at least, pretend to disavow.
It
could be objected that the above comments were confined to true or false reports
of the immediate surroundings or circumstances of an utterance -- sometimes
called
"occasion" and "observation" sentences. As such it ignores true and false
utterances in general. In which case, it has failed to consider true or false
propositions/sentences like: "New Orleans is larger than Los Angeles", "US
GDP rose by 1.6% in 2016", "Cats are herbivores", "Steve
Bannon was fired on the 18th of August 2017", "Flu is caused by
Orthomyxoviruses",
or "Concentrated
Sodium
Hydroxide is good for the complexion".
That
is a valid objection, and will be considered in detail in Essay Three Part Four,
and partly below.
To those who
feel that the above responses undermine materialist explanations of 'the mind',
its properties or its 'output', it is worth pointing out that an anthropological account
of the origin of language is thoroughly materialist. It grounds discourse
in social interaction, just as it views language as a product of the interplay
between human beings in cooperative labour, communal life and as they interact with the
material world (of everyday experience). The postulation of the
existence of yet undiscovered (and what amount to anthropomorphic) 'laws'
to account for language would be completely circular (for reasons
outlined above and explored in more detail in Part Seven of this Essay).
In addition,
supporters of Lenin's account of matter, who might object to the anthropological
account promoted at this site, will need to be far clearer about what they
themselves mean by "matter", "law" and "cause" before their objections merit serious
consideration. As we will see in Essay Thirteen
Parts One and
Three, on this score at least,
their ideas aren't in the game. Nor are they even on the sub's bench.
More importantly, however, the claim (advanced at this site) that the sense
of a proposition is independent of its actual truth-value is just one way of
making the point that language is a social, not a natural, product. That observation
isn't dependent on speakers of the language being
aware of the truths that supposedly underpin the sense of a proposition, as the
counter-argument volunteered above would seem to suggest. The approach adopted
here maintains that the sense of a proposition can't depend on any truths
-- or even falsehoods -- let alone upon
those about which we might be unaware.
Once more: Let us suppose there is a Law, L2,
about which we as yet know nothing, that specified that given a certain state in
the world, S2,
observer O2
would be constrained to form a true proposition P2.
Again, falsehoods can't be produced in this way since, if a sentence is false
then what it says doesn't obtain, and what doesn't obtain can't exercise a
causal influence on anything (saving, of course, complex examples of negative
causation). Hence, only true propositions like P2
will be evinced by such a process.
Now, the fact that we can
and do make false claims about nature and society is sufficient to refute this view of language
and 'Law'.
So, either way, whether
or not we know what any such 'Law' actually is, since only true
observation sentences would be so conditioned, knowing what a
proposition meant would be all that would be required to declare it true --
that is, that it had been produced 'in the mind' by an existent state of
affairs. Truth would now follow from meaning, and we could dispense with the
need for supporting evidence, once more. Moreover, if the truth of a proposition
followed from meaning, all the problems outlined in this Essay would kick-in, and that would
undermine the capacity language had of allowing us to say anything at all (true
or false), as noted earlier.
It
could be objected that the above response attributes a far too simplistic set of
ideas to those who might disagree with the approach adopted at this site. True
and false beliefs are formed in rather complex ways, and it is difficult to
think of anyone who would argue that true beliefs are caused by actually
existing states of affairs, at least not as supposed in this Essay.
In that case, let us now suppose there exists a complex set of laws
and physical or psychological processes, C, that prompt an individual, NN, to think, formulate, consider,
ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon, say, sentence/proposition, P3.
Even then,NN will need to understand P3
before he/she knows whether it is true or whether it is false. Hence,
whatever promptsNN to think, formulate, consider, ponder, utter,
write, or otherwise ruminate upon P3
will still have to be independent of its sense. That is because the mere
formulation of P3
won't determine the conditions under which it is true. P3's
sense is related NN's understanding what would make P3
true or would makeP3
false. It is unrelated to what actually makes it true or
actually makes it false. Whatever it was that prompted NN to think,
formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon P3
wouldn't be what makes it true, or wouldn't be what makes it false, either. In both instances,
it is the world that tells NN whether P3
is true or whether it is false. If that weren't so, events and processes internal to NN would determine the
truth or the falsehood of P3,
not the external world. In that case, even if there were a complex set of
laws and/or physical or psychological processes that prompted NN to think,
formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon P3,
that wouldn't affect the relevant points made in this Essay.
In
addition, we have seen that there are good reasons to
question naturalistic accounts of meaning like this -- i.e., those that are dependent on
dispositional facts about human brains. The reader is therefore referred back to
that discussion.
This topic
is addressed more fully in Essay Three Part Four (see below) and Essay Thirteen
Part Three -- where we will see
there are more cogent reasons to question whether there could be a complex set
of laws and/or physical or psychological processes that prompt NN to
think, formulate, consider, ponder, utter, write, or otherwise ruminate upon P3.
Finally, it could be countered that a scientific theory that explains how human
understanding works will one day show how misguided the above comments are.
Quite apart from the fact that this is another appeal to science fiction,
I have responded to that specific point in Essay Thirteen Part Three --
particularly in
Section Five of that Essay.
[See also Note 93. On this topic in general,
however, see Shanker (1998), Kripke (1982), and Kusch (2002, 2006).]
However, here is how I have tackled the problem of
falsehood in Essay Three Part Four (yet to be published -- slightly edited):
Traditional attempts to account for falsehood faltered partly because of their
links with earlier versions of the CTT in Plato and Aristotle's work. The latter held that a true
proposition must correspond to a fact/process/state of affairs in reality;
otherwise it would be false. The CTT will be examined in more detail later (in
Essay Ten Part Two, when it is published), but for present purposes it is
sufficient to point out that traditional versions of the CTT made it impossible
to explain what exactly it was about false propositions that made them false. If
a true proposition corresponds with a fact, then presumably a false one should
fail to correspond with it. But, there might not always be such a fact for a
false proposition to fail to correspond with. Indeed, if there wasn't, a false
proposition could hardly fail to do that since it isn't possible to fail to
correspond with something that doesn't
exist. In that case, paradoxically, in such circumstances it wouldn't be false. However, obvious flaws
like this consistently failed to stop determined souls from inventing convoluted and
baroque philosophical theories to explain away such glaring flaws. Often this
amounted to explaining falsehood as some defect of the imagination, blaming it
on "imaginary conceptions", but that only succeeded in undermining the CTT even
further, as we are about to see.
is
false, there is no fact in the world that E1 fails to match in the required
manner. There is no fact anywhere in reality -- such as, "Tony Blair isn't three
feet tall" -- to which E1 fails to correspond. Nor is there a non-existent fact
(a 'false fact', as some have called them -- almost as if there could be 'false
truths'!) , namely, "Tony Blair is three feet tall", to which it does correspond. Of
course, it is a fact that Blair isn't three feet tall (just as it is a fact that
he is not three feet one inch tall, or three feet two inches tall..., along with countless other facts
that could be specified
about his height), but there is no identifiable part of reality answering to
this fact (or, indeed, the countless other facts) to which E1 also fails to correspond.EN1
Admittedly, it could be argued that E1 fails to correspond with the true
proposition that records Blair's correct height (say, "Tony Blair is six feet
tall -- assuming for the purposes of this Essay that that is his correct height
at a certain specific time of the day), and in this lies its falsehood. But, E1 also fails to
correspond with all of the potentially infinite number of false propositions
that also record his incorrect height. In that case, E1 fails to
correspond with the following:
E2: Tony Blair is n feet tall, for any n other than 3.
And, plainly, E2 isn't a fact, either! There is no part of reality that it
represents. Hence, if the falsehood of E1 results from its failure to correspond
with the true proposition that records Blair's correct height (i.e., "Tony Blair
is six feet tall at 12 pm on the 30th October 2007"), it must also arise from its failure to match each instance
of E2, for any value of n other than 3. So, the falsehood of E1 isn't uniquely
specified by its failure to match the true proposition that records Blair's
correct height, which means we are no further forward.
E1: Tony Blair is three feet tall.
Not only that, E1 also fails to correspond with one or more of the following:
E3: George W Bush is a draft dodger,
E3a: George W Bush isn't a draft dodger,
and with a potentially infinite number of other sentences about everything and
everyone. So, the falsehood of E1 isn't to be established by its failure to
match the true proposition that records George W's correct military record
(whichever of the two it is), nor with countless other truths. Hence, we are
even more in the dark.
Again, it could be argued that the falsehood of E1 results from its failure to
correspond with whatever height Blair actually has, recorded by the following
sentence:
E4: Tony Blair is 6 feet tall.
Since E4 does record an identifiable part of the material world, and E1
fails to match it, E1 is false.
Or so it could be claimed...
Admittedly, E1 fails to correspond with E4, but E4 is a proposition, not an
extra-linguistic feature of reality. Hence, we still don't have a 'part of
reality' that E1 fails to match.
It
could be argued that the above response is specious, since it is plain that what
is meant is that E1 fails to match what E4 expresses.
The problem here is that it is impossible to pick out specific items in the
world that propositions like E1 match or fail to match. That is because E1 also
fails to match (even if it is consistent with) the following aspect of reality
expressed by yet another proposition:
E5: Tony Blair weighs less than a Blue Whale.
E5
is also true, but the failure of E1 to correspond with it can't be what makes E1
false. And if that is so, it isn't easy to say what relevance the truth of E4
plays that the truth of E5 does not.
As
we have seen, the link between true and
false propositions is partly connected with (i) what it means for a linguistic
expression to be a proposition in the first place, and (ii) with the use of
negation in ordinary language. As it turns out, E1 is false because it is
consistent with the negation of E4 (i.e., E4a), which we are assuming is true,
and because both belong to a system of propositions that are connected with the
practice of measuring (among other practices), and that have logical (or
'grammatical'/rule-governed, or even pragmatic) connections with each other.
Unfortunately, such an account of falsehood isn't available to DM-theorists
because of their unwise acceptance of Hegel's excessive 'tenderness towards'
contradictions.
E4: Tony Blair is 6 feet tall.
E4a: Tony Blair isn't 6 feet tall.
However, details of previous attempts to solve this insoluble 'problem'
needn't detain us.
However, according to John Rees:
"[A]ll science generalizes and abstracts from 'empirically verifiable facts.'
Indeed, the very concept of 'fact' is itself an abstraction, because no one has
ever eaten, tasted, smelt, seen or heard a 'fact,' which is a mental
generalization that distinguishes actually existing phenomena from imaginary
conceptions." [Rees (1998), p.131.]
It
is only natural now to ask: With what do "imaginary conceptions"
correspond or fail to correspond? Strangely enough, if these odd entities really
are imaginary they should 'correspond' with nothing at all (except perhaps by
sheer coincidence/accident). If so, why are abstractions (such as facts) needed if anyone is
able to distinguish fantasy from "actually existing phenomena"? Do we really
need an abstraction to tell us whether the tooth fairy is imaginary or not?
Of
course, Rees was clearly aiming his remarks at ideological constructions. But,
an appeal to ideology -- or even 'false consciousness' -- would be of little
help in distinguishing truth from error. That is because ideological claims are
partially false themselves; hence any attempt to explain falsehood this way
would plainly be circular. It is of little assistance to be informed that
"imaginary conceptions" are created by a false view of reality, when an
explanation of falsehood was required to begin with.
Furthermore, an appeal to the 'one-sided' or 'partial' aspects of a proposition
or a theory -- as a way of explaining why they are false -- won't work,
either. And that isn't just because some 'one-sided' beliefs are true -- the
following for example:
E6: From some angles, coins look elliptical.
E7: A Moebius strip has only one side.
E8: Most music CD's play on only one side.
E9: "I may be completely prejudiced, but Nazis are dangerous racists."
E10: "From earth, the universe looks pretty big."
E11: "No two ways about it: the emancipation of the working class is an act of
the working class."
[Naturally, the truth of E6, E7 and E8 depend on the present author interpreting
the term "one-sided" literally, for once.]
It is
also because the alleged limitations of a claim are never sufficient to make it
false. Plainly, that is because a proposition is judged true or false in accord
with extra-linguistic factors, not linguistic or psychological infelicities.
Admittedly, unless a proposition were well-formed it would be incapable of being
true or false -- but then, if it weren't well-formed, it wouldn't be a proposition to begin with.EN2
Perhaps we should locate falsehood in the erroneous way the imagination (or the
"understanding" -- which is a 'faculty' that was helpfully identified for us by Hegel,
but without a
single fact to support his 'bold conjecture') puts certain ideas or concepts
together? Of course, that (traditional) answer to the 'problem' of falsehood
doesn't merit our respect simply because of its longevity; indeed, it is
to be rejected because it, too, locates error in the supposed shortcomings of the individual
concerned, not in a failure to accord with extra-linguistic factors. If a
thought is well-formed (i.e., if it is expressed as a proposition), then a decision about its
veracity must surely be reality-induced, not imagination-dependent. That is,
indeed, why many falsehoods can and do become true (as we can see in connection
with E12, below): because things change.EN3
Falsehoods couldn't do this if they were dependent on obscure 'internal' factors
of some sort (even if we knew what they were!).
E12:The traffic light is now green.
E12 will be true, then false, then...
Incidentally, that is also why the 'deficiency theory' of falsehood -- as it
might be called -- is often aired in Idealist circles. If truth is the 'whole',
then any claim that falls short of this must surely be 'partial' -- or
'one-sided'. Error could then be located in a mind that judged rashly or
prematurely. That, of course, confuses why someone might say something
with why it might be false.
Unfortunately, the obverse of this is the idea that no matter how ludicrous, no
proposition could be absolutely false (and for similar reasons). Small wonder
then that this approach found it difficult to cope with falsehood. On this view
no proposition is ever really false, it is just, "relative",
"one-sided", "partial" or 'underdeveloped'
(or whatever).
Anyway, whatever they might say,
in practice few dialecticians accept the idea that there are no completely false
theories or propositions, even if they might sometimes tell their audience the
opposite. Here, for instance, is Cornforth:
"Just as truths are for the
most part only approximate and contain the possibility of being converted into
untruths, so are many errors found not to be absolute falsehoods but to contain
a germ of truth.... We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression...."
[Cornforth (1963), pp.138-39. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]
Despite what Cornforth says, it would be
impossible to find a "germ of truth" in
any of the following:
(1) Ten litres of concentrated
Nitric
Acid applied directly to unprotected human skin dramatically improves the
complexion if left there for several hours.
(2) "Jews, Slavs, Romanies, Arabs, Asians and Africans
all belong to 'inferior,
sub-human races'."
(3) "Capitalism is a genuine expression of
eternally unchanging human nature, which is both acquisitive and selfish."
(4) "All women are completely happy with their oppression
and are keen to be reminded of it on a daily basis."
(5) "Imperialism is 100% progressive
everywhere, at all times, and always will be."
(6) "The
Ku Klux Klan and the
alt-right are exemplary leaders in the
fight for Black
Liberation and full equality for Muslims."
(7) In 2002, Iraq manufactured and stored more
WMD than any other country in the
entire history of the
planet.
(8) The earth is supported by a colossal tortoise,
on top of a huge locust, on top of a giant crab, on top of a...
(11) Karl Marx was a flagrant plagiarist from Mars who copied all his best ideas
from George W Bush.
(12) "Anyone who wanders about aimlessly for
several hours crossing and re-crossing a
busy main road during the day while blindfolded will live a long and happy life."
(14) The world was created about 6000 years
ago from a bowl of custard by the
Flying Spaghetti Monster.
I suspect that anyone who questioned the
truth of, say, (1) would be
hard pressed to find a single revolutionary who agreed with (2).
Naturally, that makes the negation of (2) absolutely true (for all revolutionaries).
On
the other hand, if they reject as completely false one or both of those sentences --
i.e., (1) and/or (2) -- as they should, they would thereby
have confirmed the point at issue: if either one of these sentences is completely false,
then there is at least one sentence (namely (1) or (2)) that is completely
false.
QED.
And, just in case the above remarks attract the
attention of a handful of brass-necked, hardcore Hegel Honchos, who might
want to claim one or more of the above are 'partially true', 'partially false', they should
perhaps consider the following:
H1: There are absolutely no partial truths,
and there never have been.
Now, is that 'partially'
true?
Again, given the account being criticised at this site, the truth-value of a
concept, judgement or proposition has been de-coupled from any consideration of
the facts (which have now been reduced to the status of "mental
generalisations") and made to depend on 'coherence' with other 'truths', 'judgements',
'abstractions', "mental generalisations", or even 'the Whole' -- perhaps even
upon the deliverances of an 'Ideal Observer' in the 'ideal limit', to put it in terms
Engels and Lenin would have recognised:
"The identity of thinking and being, to use
Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and
does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which
it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a
fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because
reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it
only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon
manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in
this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt
(12/03/1895), in Marx and
Engels (1975b), pp.457-58, and Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
"'Fundamentally, we can know
only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.234-35.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
"Thought proceeding from the
concrete to the abstract -- provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get
away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter,
the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all
scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more
deeply, truly and completely." [Lenin (1961),
p.171. Emphases in the
original.]
"Knowledge
is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate,
not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the
formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws,
etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally,
approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing nature.... Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as
a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality,' he can only
eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a
scientific picture of the world...." [Ibid.,
p.182. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Cognition is the
eternal, endless approximation
of thought to the object." [Lenin (1961),
p.195.
Bold emphasis added.]
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and
a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties and qualities or
facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of
'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world." [Lenin
(1921),
pp.92-93.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Ibid., p.90. Bold emphases
alone added.]
"Dialectical materialism
insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the
structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute
boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into
another." [Lenin (1972),
p.312.]
"'Hereonce again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between
the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its
reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is
a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is
for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of
generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as
not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much un limited as
limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition..., its
vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not
sovereign and it is limited in its individual expression and in its realisation
at each particular moment....'
"'Truth
and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have
absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and
as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first
elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar
opposites. As soon as we apply the
antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been
referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact
scientific modes of expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely
valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles
of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error
and error truth'.... Here follows the example of
Boyle's law
(the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The 'grain of
truth' contained in this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The
law, it appears, is a truth 'only approximately'.
"Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give,
absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step
in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but
the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now
expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge." [Ibid.,
pp.150-51, quoting Engels (1976),
pp.108-09, 114.
The on-line and published translations are slightly different. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and
link added.]
Other DM-fans agree (and that largely because they all think 'surface
appearance' is 'contradicted' by underlying 'essence', by 'abstractions'):
"A 'concrete' truth is a logical system of
abstractions multilaterally reflecting the real concrete. One truth is more
concrete than another to the extent to which it reflects more essential traits
of the investigated object. Concrete truth like absolute truth,
can only be reached asymptotically ad infinitum." [Wald (1975), p.35.
Quotation marks altered to conform with conventions adopted at this site.
Italic emphases in the original.]
"The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth.
The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential
from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse
(1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected.]
"Prior
to this formalisation, the experience of the divided world finds its logic in
the Platonic dialectic. Here, the terms 'Being,' 'Non-being,' 'Movement,' 'the One
and the Many,' 'Identity,' and 'Contradiction' are methodically kept open,
ambiguous, not fully defined. They have an open horizon, an entire universe of
meaning which is gradually structured in the process of communication itself,
but which is never closed. The propositions are submitted, developed, and tested
in a dialogue, in which the partner is led to question the normally unquestioned
universe of experience and speech, and to enter a new dimension of discourse --
otherwise he is free and the discourse is addressed to his freedom. He is
supposed to go beyond that which is given to him -- as the speaker, in his
proposition, goes beyond the initial setting of the terms. These terms have many
meanings because the conditions to which they refer have many sides,
implications, and effects which cannot be insulated and stabilised. Their
logical development responds to the process of reality, or Sache selbst
['thing itself' -- RL]. The laws of thought are laws of reality, or rather
become the laws of reality if thought understands the truth of immediate
experience as the appearance of another truth, which is that of the true Forms
of reality -- of the Ideas. Thus there is contradiction rather than
correspondence between dialectical thought and the given reality; the true
judgment judges this reality not in its own terms, but in terms which envisage
its subversion. And in this subversion, reality comes into its own truth.
"In
the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of
dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But
this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which
states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of
their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are;
consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to
that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As
such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence --
potentiality....
"This
contradictory, two-dimensional style of thought is the inner form not only of
dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grips with reality.
The propositions which define reality affirm as true something that is not
(immediately) the case; thus they contradict that which is the case, and they
deny its truth. The affirmative judgment contains a negation which disappears in
the propositional form (S is p). For example, 'virtue is knowledge';
'justice is that state in which everyone performs the function for which his
nature is best suited'; 'the perfectly real is the perfectly knowable'; 'verum
est id, quod est' ['the true is that which is' -- RL]; 'man is free'; 'the
State is the reality of Reason.'
"If
these propositions are to be true, then the copula 'is' states an 'ought,' a
desideratum. It judges conditions in which virtue is not knowledge, in
which men do not perform the function for which their nature best suits them, in
which they are not free, etc. Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is
not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the
proposition involves a
process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is.
The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not
state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it
could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with
inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the
eyes of God, by nature, etc....
"Under the rule of formal
logic, the notion of the conflict between essence and appearance is expendable
if not meaningless; the material content is neutralised....
"Existing as the living contradiction between essence and appearance, the
objects of thought are of that 'inner negativity' which is the specific quality
of their concept. The dialectical definition defines the movement of things
from that which they are not to that which they are. The development of
contradictory elements, which determines the structure of its object, also
determines the structure of dialectical thought. The object of dialectical logic
is neither the abstract, general form of objectivity, nor the abstract, general
form of thought -- nor the data of immediate experience. Dialectical logic
undoes the abstractions of formal logic and of transcendental philosophy, but it
also denies the concreteness of immediate experience. To the extent to which
this experience comes to rest with the things as they appear and happen to be,
it is a limited and even false experience. It attains its truth if it has
freed itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind
the facts -- that is, if it understands its world as a historical
universe, in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice
of man. This practice (intellectual and material) is the reality in the data of
experience; it is also the reality which dialectical logic comprehends."
[Marcuse (1968),
pp.110-17. Italic
emphasis in the original; bold emphases added. Spelling adjusted to conform to
UK English. I have used the on-line text here, and have corrected any
typographical errors I managed to spot.]
"To take each and every quality
displayed by an object or even at face value would necessarily mean that neither
a scientific nor a philosophic account could be given of it.
"[Added in a footnote:] As Herbert Marcuse explains: 'The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of "observable facts"....'
Such an
anti-positivist, anti-phenomenalist, Hegelian conception of essence has been
continuously relied upon by Marxist philosophers ever since. The doctrine of
essence is a fundamental one. A [quotation] from Mao Tse-Tung [is a] striking
confirmation of this: 'When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and
treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the
threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and
scientific method of analysis.'
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1966),
p.213." [DeGrood (1976),
p.73. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.
Bold emphasis added.]
Anyway, as we shall see, this view of
falsehood in fact undermines the CTT. Naturally, this makes DM theorists'
adherence to both theories (i.e., the CTT and the COT) problematic, to say the
least.
For all that, even given the truth of this part of DM, it would still be
impossible to say which combination of concepts or ideas are or aren't
illegitimate without a reference to the syntactic preconditions a linguistic
expression must fulfil in order for it to count as a proposition (or judgement),
in the first place. And that would clearly make this attempt to explain of falsehood susceptible to the difficulties noted above --
that is, if a
sentence isn't well-formed it can't be a proposition and hence it would be incapable of
being true or false.
Moreover, traditional approaches to this 'problem' actually got things
completely the wrong way round. An emphasis on concepts, ideas or abstractions
as vehicles of truth (partial or otherwise) depends on a atomistic theory of
language, since it holds that concepts, ideas or abstractions can be true on
their own. For Idealists, at least, such an account didn't sit well with
the Holism they promoted elsewhere. But, as any competent user of the language
already knows, we neither connect together first -- nor compare with the world
second -- isolated ideas, concepts, or sentence fragments. As Socrates pointed
out, our assent to any truth often depends on our being reminded of the obvious.
In the present case, this is something that was in front of us all along: when
making empirical claims we typically use sentences whose main verb is in the
indicative mood. If anything is a fact, that is.
In
connection with their theories of falsehood traditional philosophers completely ignored this
platitude. This allowed them to forget that while the mere possibilities of
truth and falsehood (as 'properties' of 'judgements', if you will) were
consequent on the formation of certain kinds of indicative sentences, their
truth-values were dependent on the facts (etc.) -- that is, on the way the world
happens to be. Falsehood doesn't result from the comparison of concepts, ideas
or mental generalisations with anything -- plainly, it isn't possible to compare
a concept or idea with anything in reality. That is of course because there are
no concepts or ideas in the world 'outside' of the mind for them to be so
compared, nor are there concept-like 'things' in nature. It is rather odd that
materialists like Engels and Lenin seemed to forget this very material fact.
Unfortunately, the problems facing this approach to knowledge don't stop there.
If truth and falsehood are to be explicated by means of a theory aimed at
relating true sentences to the facts, so that the truth predicate ("ξ is
true") ends up being
misinterpreted as a relational expression (i.e., one that implies or expresses a
'correspondence relation' between propositions and obscure items in 'reality'),
then it is hardly surprising that it becomes impossible to specify what falsehoods could possibly
relate to. On this view, there would be nothing for them to so correspond; one
half of the alleged relation would be missing for each false proposition. Small
wonder then that a problem like this arose out of yet another distortion of
language, one that twisted the predicative use of truth into its relational
misuse.
Philosophers disposed to this way of theorising toyed with the idea that
falsehoods perhaps referred to "false facts", or to "non-existent facts", but
they had no clear idea what (or where) any of these were located. Indeed, a false fact would
make about as much sense as a counterfeit authentic coin, an imitation
genuine Ming vase --, or even a reliable dodgy dossier. And, it would be
little use anyone supposing that falsehoods correspond with the absence of
whatever it was that would have made their contradictories true had they
existed, since they would still correspond with nothing at all, except these 'absent
facts'. And, absent facts are just as much of a liability as "imaginary
conceptions" ever were.EN4
At
this point, we are no nearer understanding what it is that makes truths true or
falsehoods false according to DM-epistemology – and that is quite independent of whether
all the earlier worries about the abstract and the concrete were themselves
justified, or not.
Extra Notes
EN1. Of
course, this just shows how complex our use of the word "fact" is.
Even though it is a fact that Tony Blair isn't three feet tall, nothing in reality answers
to it, whereas something does answer to the fact that he has two hands.
Admittedly, there are propositions about Blair that are inconsistent with E1:
E1: Tony Blair is three feet tall.
But, the CTT (as it is traditionally expressed) mentions nothing of these. And
even if it did, it would be of little help: logical relationships between
propositions might help us to decide which were inconsistent with which but
they can't tell us which are true and which are false (although they might
inform us which must be true if others are true/false). Indeed, two or more
inconsistent propositions could all be false. For example, "Blair is five feet
tall" is inconsistent with "Blair is four feet tall"; both are inconsistent with
E1, and all are false.
EN2. This doesn't
represent a concession to the CTT since no theoretical claims are being
advanced here. It simply amounts to an observation about how we (typically) use the words "true"
and "false".
EN3.
For example, although it is false (at the time
of writing) that Theresa May is an ex-Prime Minister of the UK, mercifully one
day it won't be. Now, that couldn't happen if falsehood were a mere 'failing'
that was sensitive to the 'internal operations of the mind' (the 'process of
cognition', etc.), the 'development of concepts', or, even if it were a
consequence of 'partial'/'one-sided knowledge' (etc.).
EN4. However, if
the CTT were true, it would suggest that if facts were indeed identifiable items
in the world that made true sentences true (in contemporary jargon: if they were
"truth-makers"), 'absent facts' should make falsehoods false. This we
may call the 'Correspondence Theory of Falsehood'. However -- and this is no
accident --, the linguistic expression of such 'absent facts' turn out to
be the negations of the true propositions that contradicted those very same
falsehoods. So it looks like the notions of truth, falsehood and contradiction
can't be prised apart, after all. In which case, we needn't appeal to
correspondence relations to explain truth or falsehood: a proposition isn't
false because it 'corresponds', or fails to 'correspond', with something in
reality, but, at a minimum, because it is the contradictory of a true
proposition. Of course, this account, which bypasses metaphysical correspondence
relations, isn't available to those who cast doubt on the LOC (as a rule of
language, not a 'Super-Scientific Truth' that isn't always true!).
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction.]
Naturally, the above is scarcely an adequate account of truth and/or
falsehood, but it does conform more closely to how we ordinarily understand and
use these terms. Anyway, given the philosophical stance adopted at this site,
not only do we have no need of a theory of truth and falsehood, none could be
given -- so no attempt will be made to construct one. I will endeavour to
explain more fully why that is so
in Essays Ten Part Two (not yet published) and Twelve Part One.
91.This idea is elaborated on in Suter
(1989), passim, and in Glock (1996), pp.261-62, 293-96. See also
Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.34-64, 263-347, and
Peterman (1992). However, the best
recent work on this is Fischer (2011a, 2011b).
92.Again, that claim will be dealt with elsewhere.
"Empirical,
contingent
truths have always struck
philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that
none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained….
Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute
contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in
explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature
of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere,
e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in
quantum mechanics
today. One feature that
explains philosophers' fascination with
truths of Reason
is that they seem, in a
deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is
to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of
things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be
otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical
discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by
Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential
relations of
Simple Natures; mathematical truths are
apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by
a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting
pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build
upon them mythological structures.
"We think of necessary
propositions as being
true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We
conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even
about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about
universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as
the
truth-functions or (in Frege's
case) the
truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as
describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics.
So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence
investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a
process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the
empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and
mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a
supra-empirical domain (a 'third
realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of
mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein
(1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however
these authors record this erroneously as p.139 -- RL] or the 'mineralogy of
numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g.,
Pascal,
admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal.
Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were
confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again,
these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41 -- RL]. Logic seems to
investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a
description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a
reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is
correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….
"In our eagerness to ensure
the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality
and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are
no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude
being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green
merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems
to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on
axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by
means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are
necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent
'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see
clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that
the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness
or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell
(1937), p.xv (this links to a PDF); again these authors record this erroneously as p.v;
although in the edition to which I have linked, it is p.xliii -- RL], then the
mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical
that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary
propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities
which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products
of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of
physical theorising, such as
Planck's constant."
[Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original
have been altered to conform with those adopted at this site. Italic
emphases in the original; links added.]
This shows that even if we could make
sense of 'necessarily' true empirical propositions, they would fail to provide
theorists with the epistemological bedrock they seek, for the necessity such
propositions supposedly reflect would depend on a brute matter of fact --
that is, they would depend on the fact that the items supposedly
linked are
nevertheless only contingently connected.
Appeals made to
'intuition', 'self-evidence', 'a priori truth', 'apodictic certainty',
'unthinkability', 'laws of cognition' and the like, would be to no avail,
either. That is because these terms merely
express (or are based on) yet more brute facts about how we as human beings are supposed
to think, by anyone using such phrases (as if they made a significant difference), and thus on how we contingently use language
-- artificially boosted by a
liberal sprinkling of
modal terms. As
Wittgenstein
pointed out, expressions like these are in effect simply one set ofsigns confronting
another set of signs, and as such they can't supply the necessity metaphysicians seek.
Or, at least, they can't unless we are prepared to anthropomorphise these signs,
attributing to them what is only legitimately attributable to human beings.
Alternatively, if we are prepared to credit words like this with autonomy, with powers of their
own, so
that they seem to possess an authority akin to the 'Voice
of God' (as noted earlier). But, that would be to fetishise them, once more. [On this, see
Baz (2012).]
And it is little use, either, appealing to natural 'necessities',
for even if
there were any such, we would plainly have no other access to them except by means of our
capacity so to depict them.
They can't dictate to us what we are to make of them, for
they aren't intelligent agents (or agents of any sort), and hence hold no power over us. It is we who make
such decisions (in our practices, not generally in our deliberations), which means that
if or when we do so decide, we
would once again be dealing with yet more signs confronting still other
signs
-- i.e., yet more brute facts about the alleged relation between certain words.
Thus, an attempt to squeeze a few drops metaphysical juice out of these
desiccated lemons itself depends on resolve to use words idiosyncratically -- the meanings of which (if they have any) are themselves dependent other social
contingencies (i.e., yet more brute facts about how we are supposed to use
language).
As should have been clear (to those who sought to base their own
preferred metaphysical theories on this or that principle -- i.e., on what are
supposed to be
fundamental 'laws of thought' that command our assent by sheer 'force of logic', or even as a
result of
the operation of "speculative reason" (upside down or 'the right way up'), the unexamined assumption
lying behind this view of language is that words themselves are capable of
providing the necessary 'glue' that is imagined to exist between
objects and processes in nature, or even in 'the mind'. That
approach to knowledge is in turn based on the implausible notion that the human
'mind' resides at the very centre of the metaphysical universe, where, as a
result of some sort of ontological quirk, what we humans say or think, at
some level, possesses universal, cosmic and necessary significance,
and so,
unaided, our 'minds' are capable of penetrating the very heart of "Being" in order to unmask its
ultimate 'secrets'. This overall idea even assumes, without proof, that there are such
'secrets out there' for someone to find, in the first place.
In fact, this approach to 'knowledge' was founded
originally on a magical view of language
and 'reality'. That is, it was based on the idea that Super-Truths can be extracted
from words alone (or their alleged meanings) by the mere operation of thought, which doctrine
was predicated on the
belief
that reality is 'rational', and is either 'Mind', or the 'product of Mind'. [The
ideologically-motivated reasoning behind this entire 'world-view' will
be exposed in the next three Parts of this Essay -- summary
here.]
[On this, see Kingsley (1996), Lloyd (1979),
Malinowski (1954)
-- this links to a PDF --, Skorupski (1976), Tambia (1968),
and Vickers (1984b).]
Anyone still tempted to think along such (traditional) lines need only reflect on the fact that they, too,
will have confused linguistic-, and social-conventions with the 'Voice of God', mentioned
earlier.
This means, of course, that Traditional Philosophy still awaits its
very own Copernican Revolution. It has yet to dawn on those who, even now, are seduced
by this archaic and mystical approach to Super-Science that human beings
don't lie at the centre of the 'meaning' universe,
and that our words and thoughts alone are no more a guide to the nature of "Being-as-Such"
(etc.) than is the rustling of leaves or crashing of waves.
[That
shouldn't be taken to imply some form of skepticism or lend weight to any
claim that human beings can't access truths about nature and society; it is
merely aimed at undermining Traditional Philosophy along with its
incoherent and non-sensical theories -- not genuine science.]
This predicament (if such it may be called) isn't, of course, a consequence of
human cognitive limitations; there is no
such thing as "Being-as-Such" for anyone to study, or about
which truths may be uncovered, any more than there is a pot of gold at
the end of the rainbow. Or, rather, to suppose otherwise makes no sense.
Coming to see this was the point of recommending a second, but
more comprehensive and profound, Copernican Revolution. [On that, see
Dilman (2002). The reader should, however, take note of
this caveat concerning Dilman's book.]
It is this that will finally expose the
philosophical ideologies promoted by the
various ruling-classes and their "prize fighters" (which humanity has had to endure throughout history).
The latter not only regard this world as their 'world', they also behave as if their view
of it were indeed sat right at the
centre of the meaning universe,
around which all other ideas are meant to revolve.
So, dialecticians of the world relent; you have nothing to lose but your
class-compromised, anthropomorphic and fetishised view of 'Being'!
93a.
This isn't to
place a limit on the nature or extent of our search for knowledge but to remind
us that, as yet, no possibility has been presented for
consideration.
After all, would we be prepared to accept a similar
complaint (as even remotely sensible), that an illegitimate,
a priori limit had been put on the search for knowledge when
informed that
the following sentence is incoherently non-sensical:
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