This page might take
several seconds to load because of the many YouTube videos
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in it.
Unfortunately, Internet Explorer 11 will no longer play these videos. As far as I can tell, they play as intended in other Browsers.
However, if you have
Privacy Badger [PB] installed, they won't play in Google Chrome unless you
disable PB for this site.
[Having said that,
I have just discovered they will play in IE11 if you have
upgraded to Windows 10! It looks like the problem is with Windows 7 and earlier
versions of that operating system.]
If you are using IE 10, you might find some of the links I have used won't work
properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu); for IE11
select 'Compatibility View Settings' and add this site (anti-dialectics.co.uk). Microsoft's browser, Edge, automatically
renders these links compatible; Windows 10 does likewise.
However, if you are using Windows 10,
IE11 and Edge unfortunately appear to colour these links
somewhat erratically. They are meant to be mid-blue, but those two browsers
render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and red!
Firefox and Chrome reproduce them correctly.
Several browsers also appear
to underline
these links erratically. Many are underscored boldly in black, others more
lightly in blue! They are all meant to be the latter.
Finally, if you are viewing this
with Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have
used;
this browser often replaces them with an "º'.
There are no problems with Chrome, Edge, or Internet Explorer, as far as I can
determine.
As is the case with all my
work, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a scientific theory I fully accept --,
or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the
self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat
as I was when I first became a revolutionary over thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between
Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
It is worth pointing out that a good 50% of my case
against DM has been relegated to the
End Notes.
Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence and
argument is to
be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a
little more smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate more fully my
case against DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have
qualified my comments (often adding greater detail and substantiating evidence),
and I have even raised objections (some of which are obvious, many not -- and
some that will have occurred to the reader; indeed, several have actually been
raised by a handful of readers and/or critics; for instance, Brain Jones,
mentioned above) to my own arguments -- which I have then answered.
[I explain why I have adopted this tactic in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any
objections they might have will be missed, as will the extra evidence and
argument.
Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for over 25 years, I have heard all the
objections there are! Many of the more recent on-line debates are listed here.
Several readers have
complained about the number of links I have added to these Essays because they
say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly
lodge that complaint since they believe everything is interconnected, and
that must surely apply even to Essays that
attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those
who find such links do make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have linked to familiar
subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of
recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of
popular films, or certain words
that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
It should also be pointed out that
phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed
here,
here, and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially
here,
here,
and here).
In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the
argument (but this time aimed at absolute beginners!)
here.]
Finally, readers will find that in what
follows I repeatedly link to a specific section of a new Essay of mine (Why
Dialectical Materialism Can't Explain Change) -- namely, where I
quote literally dozens of passages from the DM-classics, and lesser DM-works, in
support of several allegations I advance. I have done this since experience has taught
me that the vast majority of DM-fans either haven't read these passages (or
if they have, they have clearly failed to appreciate their implications), and
as a result they reject out-of-hand the
ridiculous consequences implied by 'the
DM-theory of change'. So, in debate with them I find I have to remind them
continually of what their own classics tell them about their own theory!
[In this, I am, of course, following
a cue from Lenin
himself.] And even then, when
confronted with the relevant passages, in black and white, chapter and verse,
staring at them on the page or screen, they
still refuse to believe
their own eyes, and tend to react in a series of predictable ways -- to
which I have also responded,
here.
Hence, I have adopted the same tactic in
this Essay, and have included scores of reminders in the text below (and now
here). In which
case, apologies are owed in advance to neutral readers for this constant
and tedious, but necessary, repetition.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
A US comrade (Brian Jones) has
made a half-hearted attempt to
reply to a letter I sent to the
International Socialist Review concerning several of the issues raised
in this Essay. The original letter can be accessed
here, comrade Jones's response,
here, and my reply
to him,
here.
More recently, a UK comrade has also
tried to reply to some of my criticisms; the details can be found
here and
here.
More recently still, another US comrade has also attempted to
respond to some of the points made in this Essay. On that, see
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of July 2024, this
Essay is just under 214,000 words long;
three very much shorter summaries of some of its main points can be accessed
here.
The material below does
not
represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in
progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
The aim of Essay
Seven Part One is to argue that Engels's 'Three Laws of Dialectics' are
so vague and confused that it is impossible to determine whether or not they are
true -- or even if they make any sense at all.
While
many dialecticians claim that 'The Three Laws' express the core ideas of
classical DM, others regard them as far too crude and formulaic. The author of
TAR,
John Rees, on the other hand appears to adopt a middle course, slightly
downplaying their significance, while preferring to define DM in terms of
"mediated Totality" and change through "internal contradiction", etc. [p.5.]
Nevertheless, he also notes that:
"The 'three laws' are...useful reminders of forms
in which dialectical contradictions sometimes work themselves out.... The three
laws are not, even in Hegel, the only way in which dialectical
development can take place. They can't be understood without the broader
definition of the dialectic discussed above [pp.3-8]. They are not, as Marx and
Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult, empirical task of
tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key
whose only advantage is to turn up where no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998), pp.8-9.]
[DM = Dialectical Materialism; TAR =
The Algebra of Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]
[Alas, Rees forgot to point out
precisely where Marx
"insisted" on any of the above, or, indeed, anything remotely like it. Engels's 'insistence', on the
other hand, can be read
here.]
Be
this as it may, Essay
Two has shown that this isprecisely how these 'Laws' (and other dialectical precepts) have been
interpreted by dialecticians for well over a hundred years -- that is, as just such a
master key.
Indeed, in
an article in Socialist Review, Rees endorsed this 'Law' unreservedly, and, on the basis of just
oneexample -- the hardy perennial, water freezing or boiling
-- he was happy to assert that:
"[T]his is a feature of many different sorts of change, even in the
natural world. Water that rises in temperature by one degree at a time shows no
dramatic change until it reaches boiling point when it 'suddenly' becomes steam.
At that point its whole nature is transformed from being a liquid into a vapour. Lower the temperature of water by a single degree at a time and again there
is no dramatic change until it reaches freezing point, when it is transformed
from a liquid into a solid -- ice.
Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
From this
impoverished evidential base, Rees suddenly "leapt" to the following conclusion:
"This is why Marx described the dialectic as 'an
abomination to the bourgeoisie' and why Lenin said of this method that it 'alone
furnishes the key to "self-movement" of everything existing; it alone
furnishes the key to "leaps", to the "break in continuity"...to the destruction
of the old and the emergence of the new.'" [Ibid. Bold emphasis added. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, here we
have yet another example of
a priori dogmatism; that is, we are confronted with ideas that have been read
into nature and society based on little or no evidence. One minute, these
'Laws' aren't a master key, the next they are -- and then they are
peremptorily imposed on
"everything existing".
As we will soon
discover in what follows,
Rees ignored the countless cases where "qualitative" change isn't
even remotely "sudden", just as he ignored the many instances where this
'Law' just doesn't work. [Numerous examples of both have been presented in what follows.]
As
noted above, this Essay aims to show that these 'Laws' are far too
vague and confused for them even to be assessed for their truth or their falsehood. In
that case, they are absolutely no use helping us
understand the world or how to change it.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Nevertheless, Engels summarised his
three 'Laws' in the following way:
"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality, and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites;
The law of the negation of the negation." [Engels (1954),
p.62.]
Earlier, he had characterised them
a little more fully, adding a little extra detail:
"Dialectics as the science of universal
inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual
penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried
to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation --
spiral form of development." [Ibid.,
p.17.
I have criticised the "spiral form of development" aspect of Engels's 'Laws' in
Essay Ten Part One, here.]
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
Exactly how Engels knew
that it was impossible
to "alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or
motion" he annoyingly kept to himself. His certainty in this regard can't have
been based on the limited evidence available in his day, nor yet from the
meagre evidence he actually scraped together in support of it, plainly since there is no body of evidence that
could confirm that it is "impossible" to alter the "quality" of a body in the
way he says. That remark is also true with respect to the vastly increased body of
evidence we have available today, as we will see.
Indeed,
this is something Engels himself
acknowledged:
Perhaps Engels was simply being careless in his choice
of words in these private notebooks? Maybe so, but no subsequent dialectician
has even so much as noticed that it isn't possible to derive an "impossibility"
(or even a "necessity") from
a set of contingent facts, no matter how large that set is.
But, we already know the answer: Engels didn't derive this 'Law'
from a research tradition established in any of the sciences; he copied it from
that Christian Mystic, Hegel,
who similarly based it on a handful of
anecdotal and trite examples,
which, as we will see, he, too, seriously garbled.
To be sure, Engels went on to argue:
"This is so very correct that it does not follow
from the continual rising of the sun in the morning that it will rise again
tomorrow, and in fact we know now that a time will come when one morning the sun
will not rise. But the proof of necessity lies in human activity, in
experiment, in work: if I am able to make the
post hoc, it becomes identical with the propter hoc." [Ibid.,
pp.229-30. Italic emphases in the original.]
But, it isn't too clear how human intervention can create a
necessity where there was only a sequence of events before human beings
had intervened. Engels seems to think this is obvious when it isn't. In fact, as will
soon be revealed, it is possible to alter the qualitative state of a body
without
the addition of matter or motion. In which case, Engels's conclusions aren't just non-obvious, they are false -- that is, where any sense can
be made of them.
Of course, this is quite apart from the fact that this 'Law' is
supposed to work in the natural world independently of human intervention. If
so, it looks like Engels's appeal to human action in order to derive a necessity
here means
this 'Law' operates only
contingently in nature -- or maybe not at all. How is human intervention able to
guarantee the sunrise or movement of the continents? Add to that the additional fact that the
results of human practice aren't quite as straight-forward as Engels appears to
think; on that, see here.
This
conundrum is rendered all the more puzzling
when we recall that for Engels matter itself is an
abstraction. [Cf.,
Engels
(1954), p.255: "Matter as such is a pure creation of
thought and an abstraction...."]. In that case, it seemsthat energy must be and 'abstraction', too. If so, it isn't easy to see how anything can
be altered qualitatively by the addition or subtraction of an 'abstraction'.
However, in AD
Engels's characterisation of this 'Law' is slightly more 'tempered':
"This is precisely
the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite
nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where
boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which -- under normal pressure
-- the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently
quantity is transformed into quality." [Engels
(1976), p.56.
I have used the online version here, but quoted the page numbers from the Foreign Languages
edition. Bold emphases added.]
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Ibid.,
pp.82-83. Bold emphases added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with
this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at
0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphases added.]
"...laws [have been] foisted
on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them." [Engels
(1954),
p.62.]
He also added the following thought:
"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]
But, Engels's
hasty
deduction of a necessary law (i.e., one that uses the word "impossible")
from only a handful of cases -- largely drawn from a few areas of nineteenth
century chemistry, buttressed by a limited number of quirky,
anecdotal examples derived from everyday
life or the popular science of his day -- is a neat trick
that DM-fans and theists alone seem capable of performing.
Even if Engels had access to
evidence several orders of magnitude greater than we have today, that would
still fail to justify his use of "impossible".
His earlier words are worth re-quoting, therefore:
"The empiricism of observation alone can never
adequately prove necessity." [Engels (1954),
p.229.]
Less partisan observers might be forgiven for
concluding that Engels either did not know what the word "foisted" meant, or he
hoped no one would notice when he had indulged in a little of it himself.
Despite this, some might object that Engels actually had an answer to the above
objections (which is in fact a get-out clause he borrowed from
Hegel, too):
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.'
In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory. The form of universality is the form of completeness,
hence of the infinite. We know that chlorine and hydrogen, within certain limits
of temperature and pressure and under the influence of light, combine with an
explosion to form hydrochloric acid gas, and as soon as we know this, we know
also that this takes place everywhere and at all times where the
above conditions are present....The form of universality in nature is law,
and no one talks of the eternal character of the laws of nature than the natural
scientists.... All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the
infinite, and hence the essentially absolute.... [This] can only take place in an infinite
asymptotic progress."
[Engels (1954),
pp.234-35. Italic emphases in the original.
Paragraphs merged.]
However, the scientists of Engels's day
-- from whose work he
was here generalising -- were Christians,
as was Hegel himself. In that case, one would expect them all to talk this way.
But, their conclusions (about these alleged "laws") manifestly do not
follow from the evidence that even theyhad gathered, any more than the existence of
their 'God' does. As we will
see in a later Essay, in their attempt to explain the content of their work to
non-specialists,
scientists often indulge in amateur metaphysics, but
this should no more influence us than their political opinions do. Even more
pertinent, perhaps: since
scientists are constantly
changing their minds over
the nature (and even the validity) of these 'eternal' laws, only the
terminally naive would think to base their philosophy,
or their politics, on
such shifting sands.
"How is it possible to translate the word
'infinite' as
'law-governed process'? Now Engels tries to equate the two, but an
'always' and 'at all times' are not an 'infinite'.
"In a later
Essay, we will see that this view of scientific law is a carry-over from ancient
animistic beliefs about nature, and so it is no surprise to see this idea
re-surface here in such
Hermetically-compromised
company." [On this, see
here
and
here;
the first is Swartz (2009), the second Swartz (2003).]
Nevertheless,
there are countless processes in nature
and society that
'disobey' this 'Law', so it can't be a law in any recognisable sense of that word (but see
here). And, even where it
seems to
work, it does so only because Engels left several key terms vague and
equivocal -- in which state they remain to this day. [I will be returning
to this point several more times as this Essay unfolds, giving clear examples.]
Of course,
it could be argued that there are many scientific laws that face similar
problems with respect to isolated or anomalous exceptions. That objection has
been neutralised
here.
[In what follows, I am not denying sudden
change, merely arguing that not all "changes of state" are sudden. So, in this respect
at least, this 'Law' is defective.]
Engels's First 'Law' is supposed to work
discontinuously (i.e., "nodally"), which supposedly allows nature and society to develop
by making "leaps" (a term which DM-fans like to use even while
leaving it studiously vague, too!).
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphases alone added.]
And
here is Engels -- copying Hegel, once more:
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphases added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C
from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
Here, too, is Plekhanov:
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: this has
now been corrected!)]
Finally, this is what Lenin had to say:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality....
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"The identity
of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' --
although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly
important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition
(discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite
tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including
mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world
in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their
real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the
'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically
observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease
and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites
(the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal
relation).
"In the first
conception of motion, self-movement, its
driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the
shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the
second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the
source of 'self'-movement.
"The first
conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of
everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid.,
pp.357-58. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
Unfortunately for these
a priori dogmatists, many
things in nature change qualitatively without passing through any such "nodal"
points -- and not even so much
as a tiny "leap".
These include
the following: melting or solidifying
metals, resin, rock, sulphur, tar
and
asphalt,
toffee, sugar, chocolate, wax, butter, cheese, and
amorphous
solids, such as glasses, gels, and
plastics (polymers).01 As these
materials and substances are heated or
cooled they gradually change (from liquid to solid, or vice versa). There isn't even a
"nodal point" with respect to balding heads! Individuals do not
suddenly become bald.01a
In fact, it is difficult to think of
many state of matter transformations (from solid to liquid -- or vice versa) that
exhibit these "nodal points" of transition -- and that includes the transition from ice
to water (and arguably also the condensation of steam). Even the albumen of
fried or boiled eggs changes slowly (but non-"nodally") from clear to opaque white
while they are being cooked.1
Those
who think the above comments are seriously mistaken
should consult Note One, as well as
this and
this, and then
perhaps think again.
For anyone who doubts the above, there are scores of
videos on YouTube that show metal, plastic,
chocolate,
glass,
and other solids melting slowly -- for example, the following:
Video One: Melting Plastic Spoons
Video Two: Glass Blowing
Video Three: Forging Iron
Video Four: Melting Chocolate
[I
recommend readers mute or turn
the volume right down on Video Three!]
Videos of
volcano eruptions show rock solidifying slowly. A lava stream will gradually
slow down as the molten rock cools and slowly grinds to a halt. Here, for
instance, is footage from
a volcano
in Iceland that began to erupt in March 2021:
Video
Five: Yet Another Refutation Of Engels?
Readers will
no doubt notice that the lava in the above video doesn't suddenly change from
liquid to solid, but does so gradually.
Indeed, this
property (i.e., a slow change of state) allows chocolate, gels and plastics to be shaped,
glass to be blown
and
metals forged.
Naturally, all this depends on how the duration of a
"nodal" point
is defined. Unfortunately, DM-fans have to this day failed to specify the length
of a single "node", nor have
they even so much as mentioned their duration. Indeed, discussions on the
Internet have shown that this objection wrong-foots most DM-fans, so they either ignore it
or call it "pedantry!".
Because of this, dialecticians feel they are free to indulge in bouts of sloppy, subjective, off-the-cuff, a prioriSuperscience
-- in which amateur pastime they all appear to be experts. Hardly one of them
ever fails to come up with
their own
favourite, or idiosyncratic examples, tested, of course, only in the
'laboratory of the mind', and which remain studiously non-peer reviewed.
That is
partly why I have called this aspect of DM, Mickey Mouse
Science.
[Since the above was written, I have discovered that
the above isn't
strictly true. The very first book I have encountered (in over 30 years of
trawling through the wastelands of DM-literature) that at least tries to deal
with this 'difficulty' is Kuusinen (1961) -- a work I first read in 2007. My
response to Kuusinen's attempt to defend Engels can be found here.
I have also responded to several objections to my comments about the length of a
'dialectical' "node" in my other Essay, Engels
And Mickey Mouse Science. Readers are directed there for more details.]
When
faced with the above, DM-fans often point to the precise melting points of
various substances as proof that there are indeed "nodal" points in nature. However,
they all ignore amorphous
solids (such as glasses, gels, and plastics),
which have nosharp melting point, about which we read:
"Amorphous solids do
not have a sharp melting point; they are softened in a range of temperature."
[Quoted from
here; accessed 03/05/2015. Bold emphasis added.]
"Amorphous polymers have a random molecular structure that does not have a
sharp melting point. Instead, amorphous material softens gradually as
temperature rises." [Quoted from
here; accessed 13/12/2018. Bold emphasis added. The rest of this
comprehensive review merits careful study.]
"Amorphous
solids tend to soften slowly over a wide temperature range rather than having a
well-defined melting point like a crystalline solid." [Quoted from
here; accessed 08/04/2015. Bold emphasis added; spelling
altered to conform with UK
English. See also
here.]
And since:
"Almost any substance can solidify in
amorphous form if the liquid phase is cooled rapidly enough...", [Ibid.]
that must
mean "almost any substance" lacks a
melting point if handled in the above manner. This in turn implies that there are
countless non-'nodal' (non-"leap"-like) changes in 'quality' in nature.001a
[See also
this
Encyclopedia Britannica article on Amorphous Solids. Notice once
again: I amnot arguing that
there are no sudden changes in nature and society, only that not everything
changes in this way, refuting this 'law'.]
Do DM-theorists even so much as mention,
let alone consider, these
glaring counter-examples?
Are you
serious!?
[I
have said much more about amorphous solids, especially glasses,
below.]
Another example
recently offered up in support of this 'law' is
Steven Jay Gould's
theory of "Punctuated Equilibria". Unfortunately,
amateur dialectical
palaeontologists have failed to notice that the alleged "nodal" points here
last tens of thousands of years! That is a pretty unimpressive
"leap" -- it is more like a painfully slow crawl. Indeed,
a snail on downers would be
remarkably sprightly in comparison!
[However,
this
DM-joker thinks both that (i) A 'nodal' change is 'instantaneous', and (ii) An 'instant' can last thousands of years!]
Moreover, since no individual organism actually
changes into a new species, there is no obvious object or body here which alters in quality
as quantitative variations accumulate. This contradicts Engels once more:
"Hence
it is impossible to alter the quality of abody without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
added.]
So, we seem to have
neither an Hegelian, nor
yet an
Aristotelian,
"substance" (or Engelsian "body") in which such "qualities" could inhere, and hence
motivate the right sort of change. Worse still, it isn't easy to see what the supposed quantities are supposed to
be here, either.
It could be objected that these "quantities" are quite clearly
the countless minor variations that accumulate over many generations in populations of organisms, which lead at some point
to a qualitative "leap", a species-change. But, many small variations are qualitative
already, and many of them occur in different organisms not
cumulatively in any one of them. [Examples of this phenomenon are given in the
next but one paragraph.] Moreover, novel qualitative changes introduced by
mutation don't arise slowly and then make a DM-"leap" after they have been
accumulated, since they appear suddenly. In other words, there is no slow
gradual change here, hence no "interruption in gradualness",
either -- since there is no
obvious gradualness to be "interrupted" --, leading to a mutational "leap". Mutations
themselves are
sudden and already qualitative.
Recall what Lenin said:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness." [Lenin
(1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
Mutations don't gradually happen.
So,
here at least we appear to have changes in quality caused by no
obvious or straight-forward changes in quantity!
In any case, even if the above comments are rejected for some
reason (or, far more likely, and as experience debating with DM-fans has taught
me, rejected for no reason -- or simply ignored!), the following
questions remain:
(a) What precisely is being
slowly and quantitatively accumulated, here? And,
(b) In what are all these
quantitative changes taking place or inhering?
No one supposes that if, for example, several
hundred thousand
Canada Geese all change colour slightly (for instance, if they all
become marginally pinker), that all these separate changes additively combine somehow into one
big qualitative change -- i.e., resulting in the emergence of a single very deep pink bird! Or, that
if,
say, several thousand
Red Deer all individually
manage to run a little faster that
every one of these extra cm/sec increments in each individual animal's speed
will combine to add an extra km/sec toone incredibly nippy herbivore!
Natural selection, so we are told, will
impact on populations
of organisms
that produce less (surviving) offspring, so that certain characteristics are
eliminated -- others preserved --,
which
then proliferate in populations of the descendants of those who reproduce the most, or which survive
the most. But, speciation is
the result of much more complex processes than mere additive increase (even if
we knew what was being 'added' here, or to which 'body' it was being
added, according dialecticians). [On this, see, for example, Coyne and Orr (2004).]
We
also encounter comments like this:
"Underpinning this conception of human beings as both part of the natural world
-- beings who were wholly physical in nature -- and yet different in crucial
ways from other parts of nature, was a theory of dialectics
adapted from Hegel in which, amongst other things, quantitative change (such as
the evolution of the brain) could turn into qualitative change (such as
consciousness)."
[Rob Hoveman, quoted from
here; accessed 05/05/2018. Bold emphasis added.]
But
no single human brain experiences this quantitative accumulation; no single organism
undergoes this progression in brain size; no single proto-human develops in this way.
So, precisely what is "the body" that Engels talks about that has been changed in quantity so that
a new 'quality' emerges in that body as a result? A least with respect to water we have the
same body of liquid being boiled! At least we have the same elastic band being
snapped, or the same head losing hair. But, all we have here are populations of
proto-humans with a range of individuals who have slightly larger brains (one
supposes), every single one of which dies without a furtherincreasein their own brain size, with the next generation having slightly bigger brains (one
supposes, once more). Again, as this process unfolds there is no one proto-human
being whose brain gradually increases -- from the small brain comparable with
that of our ape-like ancestor to the large brain of
Cro-Magnon 'Man' -- until 'consciousness' finally 'popped into
existence'.
Yet
again, we encounter a less than half-formed DM-'theory' passed off as if it were
cutting edge science, with little or no evidence, or even argument, offered in support. The problem
with this is that the above 'argument' appeared in an article that was meant to
promote Marxism as a scientific theory; but, imposing half-baked ideas on
human development (ideas dreamt up by Hegel) only succeeds in undermining
HM as a science.
[I
take up this sorry tale and further expose its patent absurdities in Essay
Thirteen Part Three, Sections Seven and
Eight.]
On the other hand, if
a species is to be regarded as an object in its own right -- perhaps stretched out in time,
as some taxonomists actually picture them1a --, then that 'object' will
only
seem to alter as 'changes' accumulate. That is because, if a species is
defined in this way (as a temporally-extended 'object', a bit like the
manifolds
embedded the
4-space
of Relativity
Theory), then it
can't actually change in any
straight-forward sense.
Admittedly, that depends on how we define the 'object'/'body' in
question and how we depict change. It is no surprise, therefore, to find both of these
notions have been left impressively vague by comrades who quote this particular example in
support of the First 'Law' (which is clearly part of the reason they
think they can get away with citing it). [For example,
here.]
Hence, if a
certain species is characterised in
this way (as a sort of four-dimensional 'sausage' -- i.e., as a
manifold in 4-space), then, even if the First 'Law' actually applied to it, this
particular 'species' won't have changed as a result of its 'internal
contradictions', or, indeed, as a result of anything else, for that matter. That
is because these manifolds don't change;
four-dimensional objects do not 'exist'
in time to change -- time is one of their 'in-built' dimensions,
as it were. On the contrary, 'time' exists in them; they
neither perdure
nor endurein time. Since everything temporally true of each of these manifolds is
true of the whole of it 'all at once' (so to speak -- because it is a single,
four-dimensional 'object'/'body'), it can't gain or lose
properties or "qualities" --, unless, of course, we insist on embedding it in a
fifth-dimension
and (confusingly) call this new context "Time". But then, of course,
this five-dimensional 'object' wouldn't change, either, and for the same reason.
[There is more on this in Essay Eleven
Part One.]
Without this 'extra-dimension', any predicates
true of this four-dimensional manifold will stay true of it for good, for there
is no past, present or future as far as this 'object' is concerned. In that case, 'change' would
amount to no more than 'our' subjective mis-perception of a
'succession' of
orthogonalhyper-plane 'slices' through this manifold
that we just happen to 'experience', or 'decide to focus upon'.
[This forms part of the so-called "Block
view of time". On this, see the PDF article
here.
Incidentally, I take no stance on this view of time in this Essay; I will do so, however, in a
later post.]
As should now seem obvious, dialecticians can
only afford to view the universe in this way if they are prepared to abandon
their belief in change -- or, if they are willing to consign change merely to our 'subjective'
apprehension of 'reality'.
Alternatively, if a species isn't
to be defined in this way (i.e., as a four-dimensional sort of 'object'), then because no singleorganism actually evolves, change to a species can't be the result of its 'internal
contradictions', once more -- since, on this view, a species is merely a sort of collection,
not an 'object' or 'body'.
Moreover, in
populations, individual organisms change neither by "contradicting" one
another nor their environment, howsoever the word "contradiction" is understood. There are no 'internal
contradictions' in such populations here to cause change -- or, if there are,
dialecticians have yet to identify them. Indeed, no single thing actually changes in
an evolutionary sense, only whole populations, and they
manifestly do so non-dialectically.
Of course, it could be objected that organisms do in fact 'contradict' one
another when, for example, they compete for scarce resources, etc. Contradictions
thus apply to the
'struggle' for survival among
conspecifics.
Or so it might be argued...
But, even
if that were a correct way of picturing 'dialectical contradictions', there
still don't appear to be any that are internal
to a particular organism
which motivates evolutionary change in that organism.
And, that isn't just because evolution works
on populations, not individuals. It is because changes to organisms are both
internally-, and externally-induced. As we will
see,
mutations,
of course, can be internally-generated (as copying 'errors', etc.), but
many are not; they are externally-motivated by radiation, or by viral or chemical agents. Indeed, some organisms even share
mutations (for example,
bacteria). What kind of 'contradiction' is that?
In addition, populations of organisms change
in response to environmental pressure (which, so we are told, 'selects out'
unfavourable variations). This is clearly an external constraint.
Again, as we will also find
out, depicting any of these as 'contradictions' -- howsoever they are caused --
is radically confused. [This topic has been discussed in
much more detail in Essay
Eight Parts One,
Two, and
Three.]
[On
this subject in general, see Ridley (2004); on the 'external'
and 'internal' causes of speciation, see Coyne and Orr (2004).]
Notwithstanding this, it isn't easy to
see how conspecific competition could be 'contradictory'. Not
only do many animals and plants cooperate
(on this see
Kropotkin
(1939), and Ryan (2002)), those that do compete
with
heterospecifics don't in general struggle against members of their own species.
So, for example, if a herd of deer is running away from a predator, and the
fastest individuals escape and survive, no one imagines that they do this by
struggling with those that didn't or couldn't run as quickly -- for example, by deliberately hindering or tripping fellow
conspecifics. Of course, there are many examples of organisms that do compete
conspecifically, but there are just as many (perhaps more) that don't. So, if
this 'Law' applies here, it does so only fitfully. Once more, calling this sort of competition a
"contradiction" is a
serious error.
Why that is so will soon become apparent.
According to the
Dialectical Classics, objects and
processes change because of (a) A "struggle" between "dialectical opposites",
and (b) Those "opposites" change into "one another". But,
competing conspecifics or heterospecifics manifestly do not change into
one another as a result of this alleged 'contradiction' or even this
'struggle'. A well-fed lion does not, for example, change into a escaping
antelope, which it would have to do if the dialectical classics are to be
believed (i.e., when they tell us that objects and processes change into that with
which they 'struggle').
Any who are tempted to question the above inferences are invited to read the
dozens of passages I have quoted from the
DM-classics and other DM-theorists that tell us that this is what such
opposites in fact do. [Follow the above link.]
[I have posted several videos and pictures
that illustrate heterospecific cooperation in Note 1b.]1b
Moreover, but worse, even if we could identify these 'contradictions', they
can't be 'dialectical'. That is because such contradictions are supposed to be
the result of the dynamic relation between dialectically-united "opposites". In
order to count as such "opposites" they have to imply one another,
such that one can't exist without the other (like the proletariat implies
the capitalist class and both can't exist without each other, so we are told).
But
which animal implies the existence of its predator, or vice versa? If all
predators died out, would that instantly wipe out every deer, for example (just
as the proletariat would cease to exist if there were no capitalists)? Can deer
only exist if there are other animals that chase after and then eat them? Do
conspecifics also imply one another? But they must if they 'contradict' one
another (and we naively believe what we read in the DM-classics). So, does, say, duck1
only exist if there is a duck2
that 'implies it into existence'? If the first duck dies does the second automatically
kick the bucket? One might well wonder what the very last
Dodo on earth
was thinking as it defied 'dialectical law' and happily lived out its last few
days/weeks/months all on its lonesome, not beingimplied into existenceby a single conspecific.
Apparently, that flightless bird was killed off by a combination of human and
rat predation. If there were a 'dialectical contradiction' anywhere in this
zoological drama, then those humans hunters and those rats must also have
ceased to exist as the last Dodo popped its clogs, since they were then no more
being 'implied into existence' by a single existent Dodo they could hunt.
None of this makes an ounce of sense,
even in DM-terms!
In that case, not only is Gould's theory not an example of this 'Law' at
work,
not even Darwin's is!
It is worth noting the
response of one comrade,
who offered what amounts to a subjectivist
counter-argument, along the following lines:
"She [i.e., Rosa L] also does not understand that
thousands of years are actually very short periods of time, geologically
speaking."
Which fact isn't, of course, something
that evolution itself understands, possessing neither a memory nor a working
knowledge of Geology. Hence, the processes involved clearly don't know when
something is short or long, nor do they know when to speed up just to make sure
they 'obey' this 'Law'. [The point of those rather odd remarks will become clear
presently.]
As should seem plain, a comparison like this with all of
geological time depends on a subjective
view of events, an opinion that we as observers of the whole process form of the course of evolution
and the development of the Earth. The processes themselves have no appreciation
of the time periods involved. In that case,
to describe these "nodal" points as either "long" or "short" would be
to do so from
our perspective. However, from the 'perspective' of the organisms involved,
tens of thousands of years wouldn't be a short time. In that case, for amateur
dialectical palaeontologists to describe these "nodal" episodes as
either
"long" or "short" would be no less subjective.
It could be argued that a ten-, or twenty-thousand year period
is short when compared with the hundreds of millions of years that
organisms have been evolving; so the above response isn't even remotely
subjective.
Of course, the point is worth making
again: nature
itself can't
take this view -- since, plainly, it isn't conscious! Human observers certainly make
comparisons of this sort, and as such these comparisons aren't
observer-independent -- hence, they aren't objective. [Of course, that depends on how
the word "objective"
is itself understood.] Lenin defined "objective" in terms of "independence" of human cognition:
"To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed
to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not
dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute
truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
Again, exception could be taken to this
in that the above remarks (of Lenin's) don't imply these comparisons aren't objective. That is
because these
time periods exist independently of human observers.
But, once more: comparisons don't exist in nature.
Without conscious beings to do the comparing they would never be drawn. So,
while the processes concerned certainly exist without human observers to record
them, that isn't true of the comparisons themselves. [Which
is the reason for those earlier, rather
odd comments.]
Moreover, the phenomena themselves don't dictate
to us that we should compare the rapid speciation of a certain organism with the
whole of geological time, no more than we would allow similar comparisons
to be made with anything else. So, for example, it certainly won't do for someone
sat in a restaurant,
say, who has been waiting several hours for their food to arrive
to be told that in comparison to the amount of time since the
Pre-Cambrian they have in fact been served rather quickly.
Such comparisons aren't forced on us by
nature, and that is why we can't just use them anyway we please, as
the light-hearted comment in the previous paragraph
sought to bring out. If we insist on drawing lines somewhere, it will require
some sort of justification. As far as I am aware, no such justification has been
offered
by a single dialectician.
Anyway, why should we compare the speciation
underway in one population with all of geological time? If we
have to make comparisons, a more relevant one would seem be
one drawn against the length of time that
that species
has been in existence, which may only be of the order of tens of thousands of years,
anyway. In that case, if we have to draw comparisons, the time period Gould envisaged
for a new bout of speciation would be relatively long (or, rather, it will not
always be relatively short), compared to the time period that the said species has
existed, making this "nodal" point quite
protracted, and
hence not really "nodal" at all.
There is
nothing in nature itself that tells us we have to slice things up
one way rather than another (although it might be possible to give some sort of a
rationale for one specific choice over an alternative, as was done, for
instance, in the previous paragraph). While development may or may not be
punctuated, geological time itself hasn't been punctuated for us, with objective periods
highlighted for our convenience. Certainly geologists have divided up the
past
into the familiar
geological
ages, but that in itself doesn't force any particular choice on
us when it comes to comparing the development of a certain species with the whole of
earth's history.
And we
should certainly resist slicing up the past just to make life easy for
dialecticians.
Naturally, they can parse nature as they see fit,
but then that would merely highlight the subjectivism that we already know is
inherent in this 'upside-down' version of Hegelian Idealism. Of course, if
they were to do this, that would be no different from forcing their theory on
the facts, something they effect
to disavow, as Cornforth pointed out:
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
In that case, and once more, the comparison of any of these alleged
"nodes" with all of geological time would be no less subjective, no less an attempt to make everything fit into a favoured theory.
Of course, all this sits rather awkwardly with
what Engels himself said about these 'leaps':
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us
is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure
relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the
transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive
change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with
this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change
suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr
Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made
use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the
change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure
changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the
liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely
quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the
condition of the water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
It is hard to see how a 'qualitative'
change that took place in a geological time period lasting maybe ten thousand
years could conceivably be described as "sudden" -- Engels's choice of word, not mine. Again, how would
describing such a
change as "sudden", when it takes place in a time period that long, be different from
imposing a certain theory on the facts?
Alternatively, if it is claimed that this
'dialectical' re-description isn't
subjective, then dialecticians need to inform us of the objective criteria upon
which this piece of convenient, self-serving temporal parsing has been based -- and
then show how nature could possibly have agreed to implement these post hoc
(after the event) criteria, and why it
failed to signpost them more clearly for our convenience.
It
would be interesting to see this subjective re-description applied to several
of the other examples DM-theorists regularly wheel out to 'illustrate' this 'Law'. To
that end, consider a man who went bald
over the space of, say, ten years. Because this time interval is short
compared to
all of
geological time, we
could
count this
as a 'rapid' change, with a short "nodal" point. But,is
that sensible?
On the
other hand, and more reasonably, we would surely compare this example of follicular
deterioration with that man's
life up to that point. In that case, let us
assume this individual was, say, thirty when he finally became
follically-challenged, with
the first signs appearing when he was
perhaps twenty.
Given these background details, his subsequent hairless condition can now be
seen as the result of
slow
change and the alleged "nodal" point would have to be adjusted accordingly
to conform with this new
and more
reasonable perspective. Indeed, it would clearly be a rather lengthy "nodal"
point --, in which case, describing it as "nodal" would be about as accurate as describing a
tortoise as "fleet of foot", and
Kier Starmer as "honest,
straight-forward and true".
[However, as is pointed out
below, there
is in fact no "nodal" point in this case; there is no point at which someone who is not
bald becomes bald if they lose just one more hair. Naturally, a person's hair
could
fall out overnight, in which case, we would have a much clearer "nodal" point; but in the majority cases
baldness is progressive and chronic, not acute. But, even if someone were to
lose all their hair that quickly, this still wouldn't be a 'dialectical' change,
and that is because in this case there would have been no "break in
gradualness", required by
the DM classics. Not losing one's hair up to a certain point in time, then
losing it all at once isn't a "break in gradualness".]
Consider another example: what if a certain body of water
were heated up very rapidly (for example, because the heat source was immense --
say, from a nuclear explosion), and it went from water to steam in just a few
seconds. Here, the "nodal" point involved would clearly be very short. Compare
that
with the same body of water heated up very slowly (perhaps as a result of
long-term global warming), so that it evaporated gradually over the space of
several centuries, for the same input of energy. Clearly,
there would be no
"nodal" point at all in that case -- because, in this instance the water would never actually boil,
even though it would still evaporate.
Indeed, evaporation takes place all the time, right round the world as the
oceans re-cycle water into the atmosphere, very
undialectically. Even
if there were a "nodal" point here, it would be protracted, not short.
Calling it "nodal" would therefore do violence to this word, once again.
And
it is no use referring to the rapid breaking of inter-atomic bonds
(when water molecules change into steam)
as examples of "nodal" points, since they don't gradually break and then suddenly break,
which is what they would have to do if this were to take place in accord with
Engels's First 'Law'
-- that is, if the DM classics are to be believed. There is no 'break in
gradualness' in this case.
Here is Lenin again:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality....
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
Notice that Lenin points out that the "leap" and the "interruption of gradualness" are
what distinguish 'dialectical' from non-dialectical change. When inter-molecular
bonds break, they don't gradually break and then suddenly snap. So, there is no
"interruption of gradualness" here, which means this isn't an example of
'dialectical' change -- if Lenin is to be believed.
In that case, the duration of "nodal" points
themselves seem to change from short to long, and back again (or, they
disappear entirely), depending on the context (or the example under
consideration -- or, indeed, on the DM-fan telling the tale), and they appear to
do this without the intervention of a single 'internal contradiction', or
the input/removal of any matter/energy.
However, subjectivist conclusions (like the one
that opened
this
Sub-section) are
of little use even to dialecticians, for if we are now meant to refer to the
entire geological period in order to classify such "nodal" changes
as nodal, then the massive 'qualitative' transition from single-celled
organisms to present day flora and fauna manifestly took place over a "nodal" point lasting several billion years.
Given
that comparison, the phrase "nodal point" must surely lose whatever
connection it might once seem to have had with reality -- since it looks as if it can mean anything to anybody.
Someone might still complain that the above several-billion-year-long "nodal" point isn't a single point at all. There are
in fact tens of thousands of small "nodal" points dotted along its entire length, all illustrating dialectical change.
But, who
says? Where are the objective criteria that decide where a "nodal" point
begins and ends? Or, that help identify them, or
allow them to be
counted? Or, that tell us which periods we are supposed to be compared with which?
Or, even what-the-dickens a "nodal" point
is to begin with!
So far, not
only have DM-fans not thought to define
(or even so much as looselycharacterise) these all-important "nodal" points,
they have signally failed to say how we should count them, distinguish
them, compare them or even ascertain their length.
To that end, DM-theorists
might decide to get their act together and specify a minimum time
interval during which a phase or state of matter transition must take place for it to be counted as
"nodal". In relation to boiling water, say, they could decide that if the
transition from water to steam (or vice versa) takes place in an interval
lasting less than or equal to k seconds/minutes (for some
Real Number, k),
then it is deemed to be "nodal", not otherwise. Thus, by dint of
just such a stipulation their 'Law' could be made to work (at least in this
respect, in this instance). But, there is
nothing in nature that forces any of this on us -- the reverse is, if anything,
the case. Phase/state of matter changes, and changes in general, take different
lengths of time.
Moreover, under
differing circumstances even these intervals can alter, too.
Unfortunately, as noted above, if the "nodal" aspect of Engels's 'Law'
is re-defined in this way, that 'Law' would only become 'valid' because
of yet another
imposition on nature, which would make
it both eminently 'subjective' and conventionally dogmatic.
However, given the
strife-riven and
sectarian
nature of dialectical politics, any attempt to define a DM-"node" could lead to
yet more factions. Thus, we are sure to see emerge the rightist "Nanosecond
Tendency", sworn enemies of the "Picosecond Left Opposition", who will both
take up arms with the 'eclectic' wing at the "It-depends-on-circumstances"
'clique' from the centrist "Femtosecond League".
In low grade Mickey Mouse Science
like this, it looks like it is sufficient to throw a few loose and ill-defined
phrases at the page, or air them in a YouTube video, and then fool oneself into thinking that this constitutes genuine scientific,
or even apodictic philosophical, knowledge.
This
probably helps explain why there isn't (to my knowledge) even so much as one single PhD thesis (in
any
of the sciences) devoted to this aspect of DM, and which attempts to tighten-up
the loose phraseology of any of its 'Laws', or that establishes the truth of
any of them with the sort of detailed, thorough-going, rigorously checked evidence one finds in the genuine sciences. Of course, there are any number of books
and articles produced by DM-fans (which are almost without exception
mind-numbingly repetitive, and which re-cycle
the same 'arguments', and regurgitate the same handful of examples, year in, year out)
that offer a few hastily cobbled-together ideas on this topic, supported by a
smattering of highly selective, anecdotal or secondary 'evidence'. Almost invariably
this 'evidence' fills a few paragraphs, or, at best, a few pages. Compare that with the scores of pages of detailed evidence
and argument that grace the pages of genuine scientific research papers and monographs
-- I have given several examples
of such, here.
Woods and
Grant (1995/2007) is an excellent example of this genre. Even though
their display of 'evidence' is more extensive than is the norm in the
DM-literature, it, too, remains highly selective, and slanted so that it only
cites what seems to fit this 'Law' --, rather than this 'Law' having been being derived from all the available evidence.
The level of detail they give nowhere reaches the standard one sees in the
genuine sciences --, or indeed, the level of detail and precision one tends to
see in Marxist economics, for example (as noted
elsewhere in this Essay). Moreover, they consider none of the
obvious objections raised in this Essay.
In their case, Cornforth's words once
again seem rather apt:
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphasis added.]
As now seems clear,
none of these forays into sophomoric 'dialectical' science
would satisfy the requirements of even a first year undergraduate paper in
Chemistry, Physics or Biology. Can you imagine saying that about any
branch of the genuine sciences? Or even the essays submitted by any
randomly-selected A-grade science student?
And, as
pointed out above, even
if Gould's alleged "nodal" points were as
subjectively short as they are said to be, during each one of them no individual
organism actually undergoes
speciation, since speciation applies to populations,
or possibly even to 'gene
pools', not individuals.
So, in this case, the alleged passing over of
"quantity into quality" attaches to no identifiable object in nature; hence the
First 'Law' doesn't apply, even
here:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e.
without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
alone added.]
"Change of form of motion is always a process
that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite
quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a
corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion,
electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality
mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to
convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.,
pp.63-64. Bold emphasis added.]
Naturally,
this sloppy
approach
to science allows dialecticians to imagine that Gould's hypothesis can be used to
'illustrate' their 'theory', but with no 'objective' criteria
or data to support
that assumption. This, once again, shows that DM has been imposed on
nature. Or, to be more precise, in this particular case, it has been foisted on Gould.
Finally, it is worth noting that Gould's theory
was partly developed to help resolve a serious difficulty that Darwin's theory
had
itself faced from the beginning: the (apparent) fact that there are countless 'gaps' in the
fossil record.
[On this,
see Schwartz (1999);
cf., also
this and
this. In fact, since Schwartz's new theory of
origins is pointedly non-gradualist, it ought to appeal to DM-fans more than
Darwin's!]
Now,
without adopting a position on this (since it is outside my area of expertise),
it is important to remember that Gould and Eldredge's theory is still just a theory.
It might not pan out;
most theories don't. [This allegation will be defended in
Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published; until then, see
here.] In which case, DM-fans would be wise
not to pin all their hopes on it.
There is an excellent article on this
topic,
here, which stresses the relatively rapid changes that
Gould and Eldredge's theory postulates, but it also underlines the fact that
these changes are still gradual, not saltational (i.e., they are
non-"nodal"):
"Punctuated equilibrium is therefore mistakenly
thought to oppose the concept of
gradualism,
when it is actually more appropriately understood as a form of
gradualism...." [Quoted from
here.]
Others might be tempted to appeal to
what could be called the 'statistical defence', and claim that the insistence that
Engels's 'Law' be applied to individual objects (or organisms) in evolution is yet another
example of 'formal thinking'. However, and on the contrary, Engels's Laws apply to averaged
(etc.) data sets.
Or, so it could be maintained...
Quite apart from the fact that this
objection flies in the face of what Engels himself actually said (repeated below), unless we can specify what it is
-- what body is it -- that bears
the qualities that actually undergo change, this 'Law' can gain no grip, for, in that case,
there would be no "quality" of anything specific that would change because of the increase in some
other
unspecified "quantity".
The only way round this 'difficulty', it seems,
would be
to attribute a "quality" to some sort of 'collective individual', or the
entire population/gene
pool in question. But, as noted above, even there, change is smooth, and
non-"nodal", and largely externally-motivated. In that case, this option is of no use to dialecticians.
[On this see, Coyne and Orr (2004).]
Moreover,
since statistical values nowhere appear in nature (that is, the
world itself does not contain, nor does it calculate,
the mean,
standard deviation,
cumulative frequency, or
Poisson distribution of anything whatsoever), this response is
entirely
subjective, too.
To be sure, we use statistical concepts
all the time to help us understand nature, but that doesn't mean such measures
are 'objective' --, any more than there exist feet, miles, kilometres, the
Prime Meridian,
the Equator, or the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy in nature, and which are hence 'objective'.
Of
course, this rather desperate response (i.e., the aforementioned 'statistical
defence') sits rather badly with Engels's words:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of
a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned....
Change of form of motion is always a
process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one
loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other
gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical
motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and
quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible
to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body."
[Engels (1954),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Definite quantity" does not look at all
statistical!
But,
as with everything else connected with this terminally vague 'theory', it is
impossible to decide if even that is correct.
Although, we will see later that Engels
was wrong about this, it is possible to "convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body."
That is because energy is changed from one form to
another inside the bodies of animals and plants. Of course, that depends
on what Engels meant by "a single body",but, as usual,he left that concept totally unclear, too.1c
The
difficulties the First 'Law' faces don't end there, either.
When heated, objects and bodies change in quality from cold to
warm and then to hot with no "nodal" point separating these particular
"qualitative" stages -- hot water is significantly
"qualitatively" different from cold water. [This is even more the case when water is
superheated under pressure.] The same happens in reverse when they cool.
Moving bodies similarly speed up from slow to fast (and vice versa)
without any "nodal" punctuation marks affecting this qualitative transition.
Bodies with a high relative velocity are "qualitatively" different from those
with a low relative velocity -- any who doubt this should stand in front of a
stationary bus, and then in front of one moving at top speed. [Only joking!
Don't do it!] In like manner,
the change from one colour to the next in the normal colour spectrum is
continuous, with no "nodal" points evident anywhere at all; this is also the case
with the colour changes that bodies experience when they are heated until they
are red-, or white-hot. Sounds, too, change smoothly from soft to loud, and in pitch
from low to high, and then back again in a "node"-free environment. In fact, with
respect to wave-governed phenomena in general, change seems to be continuous
rather than discrete, which means that since the majority of objects
in nature move in such a manner, most things in reality seem to disobey this
aspect of Engels's rather unimpressive 'Law' -- at least, at the macroscopic level. Hence,
here we have countless changes in "quality"
that are non-"nodal".
To be sure, somewave-like changes are said to occur
discontinuously (indeed, the word "node" is used precisely here by Physicists),
but that isn't the result
of continuous background changes. For example, quantum phenomena are
notoriously discontinuous; such changes aren't preceded by
continual, or even gradual, quantitative increases, as this 'Law' demands:
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: they have
now corrected it!)]
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
The argument
above is plainly this:
(i)
Quantitative increase or decrease in matter or energy results in gradual change.
Hence,
(ii) At a certain point, further
increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a "leap", a sudden "qualitative"
change.
But, sub-atomic, quantum changes occur
suddenly with no "gradual" build-up. For example, electrons in an atom
don't "gradually" absorb energy and then "leap" to an new orbital. A 'quantum
leap' is exactly that, a sudden change caused by a discrete addition of a unit
of energy. This isn't like poring a liquid into a container, more like dropping a ball into
it. The same can be said when inter-atomic or inter-molecular forces break down. They
don't slowly or
gradually break and then suddenly break; there is no change in "gradualness",
even here.
"Changes of energy, such as
the transition of an electron from one orbit to another around the nucleus of an
atom, is done in discrete quanta. Quanta are not divisible. The term quantum
leap refers to the abrupt movement from one discrete energy level to another,
with no smooth transition. There is no 'inbetween'. The quantization, or 'jumpiness' of action as depicted in
quantum physics differs sharply from classical physics which represented motion
as smooth, continuous change. Quantization limits the energy to be transferred
to photons and resolves the
UV catastrophe problem." [Quoted from
here; accessed 15/12/2015. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected. Paragraphs merged.]
Hence, discontinuous quantum, sub-atomic
and inter-molecular phenomena, can't be
recruited to
fit, or illustrate, this 'Law'.
[Several more comments on the
alleged
application of this 'Law' to microscopic and/or quantum phenomena will be
added at a later date.]
Some might argue that in relation to
the above there are, indeed, sudden changes. For example, at some point a
speeding car will be deemed to be travelling fast (for instance, when it exceeds
local speed limits, or is in excess of, say, 50 mph). However, this response
would actually punch a gaping hole in this 'law', for it will be a human
observer who decides in each case that a car is travelling fast, or
that a lump of metal is hot, or a sound loud.
There
are several problems with that
(proffered) reply:
(a) It is a
human observer that undergoes
the supposed nodal-change, here,
not the objects in question. There is no objective point at which a car
is travelling fast, or a sound is loud. So, in this case, a qualitative change will
have taken place in that observer, not the object in
question. While the car will have had energy added to it, it hasn't changed
in the required manner, the
observer has done that -- but that observer has had no energy added to her.
(b) It is
even less clear what a 'quality' is supposed to be in such instances. Are there
objective laws in nature that decide when a lump of iron is hot and when it is
not? Is that lump objectively hot at, say, 99oC,
but not objectively hot at 98oC?
As we will see below, given the DM-definition of 'quality' there is in fact no
DM-'quality' in such cases. In relation to hotness, there is no point at
which a lump of metal "is what it is and not something else", and which is
also something substantially new, as the
definition requires.
[It
could be objected that a human observer will have had energy added to her, the
light energy that enters her eyes. I have dealt with objection extensively
here,
here and
here; sceptical
readers are directed there for more details.]
Dialecticians often apply this "nodal"
aspect of the First 'Law' to Capitalism in a bid to illustrate by analogy the revolutionary change from
one Mode of Production to another (especially that between capitalism and
socialism), as quantity supposedly builds into quality,
which then, at
some point, initiates a sudden revolutionary 'leap'. An excellent example of
this approach can be found
here, a more recent one here,
Rees (2008),
another
here -- yet another here:
"The point is that revolutionary crisis in society
is an example of the Hegelian 'transition from quantity to quality' -- or, if
one prefers to avoid Hegelian terminology, a 'phase transition' (borrowed from
thermodynamics), 'catastrophe' (borrowed from 'catastrophe
theory') or 'tipping point' [borrowed from right-winger,
Malcolm Gladwell --
RL]. The phrase 'transition from quantity to quality' has the disadvantage of
Hegelianism. But it has the helpful aspect of drawing attention precisely to the
fact that crisis emerges out of prior, gradual processes, which are perfectly
identifiable while they are going on, even if they may happen not to be noticed
until the outbreak of crisis." [Mike Mcnair, quoted from
here; accessed
22/09/2023. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Link added.]
[See also Molyneux (2012), pp.49-50, and Yurkovets (1984), pp.102-05.]
Once more,
what exactly is the 'dialectical'-body that is supposed to be involved in
such circumstances? What matter or energy has been added to what? No good
looking to DM-fans for an answer to these awkward questions since they
never even ask them, content merely to repeat, mind-numbingly, the mantras they
have uncritically imported into Marxism.
Anyway, how do we know that social
changes like these aren't like
the gradual solid-to-liquid phase, or state of matter transformation that metals,
glasses, gels, and plastics undergo? How do we know these social changes aren't gradual,
too? Since Capitalism clearly isn't a liquid,
but a solid (or a collection) of sorts, the transition to socialism should go rather
smoothly, if we really must insist on appealing to this analogy. [On that, see
here.]
Interpreted that way, the First
'Law' is of no
use to revolutionaries since it clearly suggests that they aren't needed,
and that Capitalism can be reformed away smoothly -- a bit like the way
metal, say, can slowly melt, or the way that heads can slowly turn bald as they
lose hair. If that can happen, and if dialectical revolutionaries aren't needed, their
obsolete theory
isn't
either.2
Some DM-fans
argue that the change of money into capital, or the change of a money-owner into
a capitalist, is an example of this 'Law' at work, and they point to Marx's use
of it in Das Kapital:
"The guilds of the middle ages therefore tried to prevent
by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist, by
limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master within a
very small maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a
capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production
greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is
shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his 'Logic'), that
merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative
changes." [Marx (1976),
p.423. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
I have dealt
with the above example in this Essay, here.
[I hasten to add that
I don't think
capitalism can be reformed away, but must be overthrown by a proletarian
revolution; however, the analogy
drawn against Engels's First 'Law' suggests the opposite, as we have seen.]
This 'Law' is in difficulties in other respects,
too. Clearly, not
every change in quantity "passes over" into a change in quality. Why
not? [Don't expect an answer from DM-fans, dear reader!]
Perhaps even
worse, there is an obvious way of
reading the "vice versa"codicil attached
to this law which suggests quality should "pass over" into quantity!
"The first law of the transformation of quantity into quality and
vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Bold emphasis
added.]
"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else.
It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from
quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is
reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as
quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place."
[Ibid.,
p.253. Bold emphasis
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Engels
made the same point, this time in published work:
"In proof of this law we might have cited
hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus,
for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of
relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of
labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in
which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change
alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to
use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into
quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of
a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to
use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of
its separate forces." [Engels
(1972), p.160. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Engels is quite clear: just as quantity
passes over in quality, the reverse also takes place -- quality passes over into
quantity!
Trotsky concurred:
"Logic involves unchanging
qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities. Dialectics is
constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the reverse." [Trotsky
(1986), p.87.]
However, I haven't been able to find other DM-theorists who interpret this 'Law'
in this way (i.e., "reciprocally", as Engels calls it), so perhaps I am the only
one who has ever noticed this 'loophole' (in fact, it is more like a fissure the
size of the Grand Canyon) in Engels's 'Law'. One
will look in vain for any attempt to address this fatal defect in the highly clichéd
and repetitive writings churned out by DM-fans (on whose pages the quantity of
their words definitely does not
pass over into improved quality) -- or even for some sort of vague recognition that such difficulties
exist. Not even Trotsky thought it was necessary for him to explain how this
'law' can possibly work backwards.
But, the "reciprocal" action of this 'Law' is hard to understand
for other reasons.
Is Engels really saying that a "qualitative" change in matter passes over into
"quantity", i.e., that, say, the change from liquid water to steam adds
matter or energy to the process? Or that bald heads make their owners lose
hair? If not, it isn't easy to see what this "reciprocal" aspect of
this 'Law' implies.
It could be argued that when steam condenses, or when ice melts,
latent heat
is released. So, a change in quality produces energy, just as Engels says.
However, quite apart from the fact that there is no change in quality here
(since the substance involved remains H2O
throughout), the reverse rule, if applied across the board, descends into
absurdity. For example, if a bald man loses his baldness, does this create new
matter or energy? Of course, the change itself is the result of new hair
growing, but that is an application of this 'Law' in forward gear, as it were --
i.e., the gradual addition of new hair will change one supposed quality
(baldness) into another (hirsuteness). But, there is no way of making sense of the idea
that the change in quality here, of itself, creates new hair, which it
would have to do if this 'Law' is to work 'backwards'.
[I consider another example of
this 'law' supposedly working in 'reverse gear', here.]
[Word of warning: When confronted with
many of the counter-examples listed below DM-fans generally respond by pointing out
that Engels's' 'Law' only applies to developing bodies and systems, which
rules them out. I have dealt with that attempted rebuttal
here and
here.]
As we delve deeper
into the murky depths of this 'Law', serious problems
continue to float to the surface. For
example, the same number of molecules at
the same energy level can exhibit widely differing properties/qualities
depending on circumstances. Think of how the same amount of water can act
as a lubricant, or have the opposite effect, say, on wet clothes;
the same amount of sand can help some things slide, but prevent others
from doing so;
the same amount of poison given over a short space of time will kill, but given over a longer period (in small doses) it could benefit the recipient --
Strychnine comes to
mind here.
To be sure, the effect of quantitative
stability of this sort
(supervenient
on qualitative change) is also sensitive to time constraints and the levels of concentration of the substances involved, but this extremely
vague First 'Law' says nothing about such factors. And, try as hard
as one might, it isn't easy
to see how these unquestionably material
aspects of nature (i.e., levels of concentration and duration) can be accommodated to the Ideal
Dialectical Universe Engels
uncritically appropriated from Hegel (upside down or 'the right way up').
But, what sort of scientific 'Law'
ignores details such as these? In fact, if a Mickey Mouse 'Law' like this were
written up and submitted to the peer review system of a reputable
scientific journal, the derision its authors would face would be the least of
their problems. Their reputations would be permanently tarnished. And that would be so even if it had been
presented in an
undergraduate science paper!
However, other recalcitrant examples
rapidly spring to mind: if the same colour is stared at for several minutes it
can undergo a smooth qualitative change into another colour (several optical illusions
are based on this phenomenon). Something similar happens with many
two-dimensional patterns and shapes (for example the
Necker Cube and other
optical illusions); these undergo considerable qualitative change when no
obvious quantitative differences are involved. So, there appear to be numerous
examples where quantity and quality aren't connected in the way
that DM-theorists suppose. [Pictures illustrating these phenomena have been
posted to Note 3.]3
In case someone
is tempted
to
argue that these aren't 'real' objects, but 'mental' entities, it is worth
recalling what Engels had to say:
"Dialectics,
however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and
development of nature, human society andthought." [Engels
(1976) p.180.
Bold emphasis added.]
The above Necker cube changes are at least objects of thought, and
so should be subject to this 'Law', if Engels is to be believed.
In fact, there are so many
exceptions to this
'Law' it might be wise to demote it and consign it to a more appropriate
category, perhaps classifying it among the trite rules of thumb that sometimes
seem to work -- a bit
like "An apple a day keeps the doctor away", or even, "A watched kettle
never boils".
Indeed, given the
additional fact that this
'Law' has no discernible mathematical content it is rather surprising it
was called a "law" to begin with. That isn't to say that Engels and others have
tried to apply this 'law' to mathematical objects -- as if they
develop! --; I have responded to unwise moves like that,
here.
[Recall, I have replied to several seemingly obvious objections to
the above points in the End Notes; links were posted several paragraphs
back, repeated below.]
[Word of warning,
again: When confronted with counter-examples like those mentioned below DM-fans generally respond by pointing out that Engels's 'Law'
only applies to developing bodies and systems, hence they argue that
'Isomers objection', for instance, is misguided. I have dealt with that reply
here and
here. Among other things, I
point out that
Engels himself appeals to Isomers to illustrate his 'Law' --
e.g., Engels (1954),
p.67
--, so DM-fans can hardly complain when his own examples are used
against him.]
Nevertheless, the situation is even worse
than the above 'difficulties' might suggest; there are countless examples in nature where significant
qualitative change can result from no obvious quantitative difference. These
include the qualitative dissimilarities that exist between different chemical
compounds
for the same quantity of matter/energy involved.
For instance,
Isomers present a particularly good example of this phenomenon;
and that is especially the case with respect to
molecules that have so-called "chiral" centres (i.e., centres of asymmetry).
In such cases, the spatialordering of the constituent atoms, not
their quantity, affects the overall quality of the resulting molecule -- which,
as we can see, Engels said couldn't happen:
"[Q]ualitative changes can onlyoccur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
In this
instance,
with isomers, a change in molecular orientation
-- a change in geometry, not quantity -- alters quality.
Consider one example of many: (R)-Carvone (spearmint) and
(S)-Carvone (caraway); these molecules are composed of the same number of atoms (and,
indeed, of the very same elements),
with the same bond energies, but they are nevertheless
qualitatively distinct because of the different spatial arrangement of the atoms
involved. The same is true of some of the
Fullerenes. Change in geometry
here once again results inachange of quality.
This non-dialectical aspect of matter is especially true of
the so-called "Enantiomers" (i.e., symmetrical molecules that are mirror images
of each other). These include compounds like
(R)-2-clorobutane and (S)-2-chlorobutane, and the so-called
L- and D-molecules, which
rotate the plane of
polarised light
to the left (laevo) or to the right (dextro), respectively --
such as, L-, and D-Tartaric
Acid. What might at first
sight appear to be small energy-neutral
differences such as these have profound biochemical implications; a protein
with D-amino acids
(instead of L-) won't work in
most living cells since the overwhelming majority of organisms metabolise L-organic molecules. These compounds not only have the same number of
atoms in each molecule, there are no apparent energy differences between them. Even so, they have easily distinguishable physical qualities.
Once
more: change in quality is here based on identical quantity.4
Recall, too, that the above are no less
material changes than any Engels himself considered; so no genuine
materialist should be embarrassed by them. It isn't as if I'm proposing
non-materialist causes here!
In response, it could be
argued that Engels
had already anticipated the above objection:
"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that
the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because
they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser
quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.
But what is the position in regard to change of
form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or
vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the
same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion...; anyone can be
virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of
motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of
which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat),
while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality
(mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore,
quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been
found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single
isolated body." [Ibid.,
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
In this way, he is able to argue that
any change in the relation between bodies always amounts to a change in
energy. But, it depends on the nature of the field in which these bodies are embedded.
[On that, see below.]
Engels's profound lack of mathematical knowledge
clearly let him down -- again.
Independently of this, Engels also confused the expenditure
of energy with energy added to a system. The difference between the two
is easy to see. Imagine someone pushing a heavy packing case along a level
floor. In order to overcome friction energy will have to be expended. But that energy hasn't been put into the packing case (as
it were) -- if the case ends up stationary. However, if the same case is pushed up a hill, Physicists tell us that
recoverable energy has been put into the case in the form of
Potential Energy.
Now,
as far as can be ascertained in the examples of interest to dialecticians (but
again, they aren't at all clear about any of this), it is the latter form of
energy (but not necessarily always Potential Energy) that is relevant to this
'Law', not the former. The first doesn't really change the quality of
any bodies concerned; the second does. [Although, of course, in the limit, the
first can. Enough friction will often melt a body or set it on fire, for
example. I will consider that option presently.]
If so, the
above counter-examples (e.g., involving Enantiomers) still applies, for the energy expended in
order to change one isomer into another is generally of the first sort, not the
second.
To be sure,
some of the energy in the packing case example will appear as heat (perhaps also
as sound), and will warm the above case slightly. But
this energy won't be stored there as chemically
recoverable (i.e., structural, or new bond) energy.
Despite this,
there could be a few die-hard dialecticians
who might try to argue
that any expenditure of energy is relevant to this 'Law'. That would be
an unfortunate move since it would trivialise it, for in that case it
would amount to the belief that any change at all (no matter how remote),
since it involves the expenditure of some form of energy somewhere (but
not necessarily energy put 'into' the bodies concerned), is the cause of
qualitative change to other bodies somewhere else. That would make a mockery of Engels's claim that only energy
added to the bodies concerned is relevant to this 'Law'.
"Change of form of motion is always a process
that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite
quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a
corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion,
electricity, chemical decomposition)." [Ibid.
Bold emphasis added.]
Several
examples of that sort of change are given
below. The problems this creates
for DM are discussed at length in two later sub-sections,
here and
here, where
attempts to delineate the
thermodynamic boundaries of the local energy budget involved
-- which
would have to be specified in order to prevent remote objects/energy expenditure
being allowed to cause proximate change -- and what exactly constitutes the
addition of matter or energy -- were all
shown to fail. [Readers are referred to those later sections for more details.]
Some have
cp0mplaiend that Isomers can't count as counter-examples to the 'Law' since
there is no development involved between molecules. But, as noted above, Engels himself
included
Isomers as an example of this 'Law', even though there is no "development",
so it can hardly be objected when they are used against him.
"In these series we encounter the Hegelian law in yet
another form. The lower members permit only of a single mutual arrangement of
the atoms. If, however, the number of atoms united into a molecule attains a
size definitely fixed for each series, the grouping of the atoms in the molecule
can take place in more than one way; so that two or more isomeric substances
can be formed, having equal numbers of C, H, and 0 atoms in the molecule
but nevertheless qualitatively distinct from one another. We can even
calculate how many such isomers are possible for each member of the series.
Thus, in the paraffin series, for C4H10
there are two, for C6H12
there are three; among the higher members the number of possible isomers
mounts very rapidly. Hence once again it is the quantitative number of atoms
in the molecule that determines the possibility and, in so far as it has been
proved, also the actual existence of such qualitatively distinct isomers."
[Engels (1954),
p.67. Bold emphases
added.]
Even though there is there is no
"development" here, Engels notes that there are qualitative differences
between such already present molecules. If so, they can't have been produced from
one another. He says they are "qualitatively distinct" from each other
as they
now stand. Hence, not only are they "qualitatively distinct" from any they
might have
been developed from, they are "qualitatively distinct" from those they haven't,
and can't have been, developed from.
Again, if Engels is allowed to refer to
examples where there is no "development", or point to qualitative differences that
don't depend on development, to illustrate his 'Law', dialecticians can't legitimately complain if
similar examples are used to refute it.
Anyway, it is clear that Engels
failed to appreciate how this radically compromised his claim
that:
"It is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned."
[Ibid.,
p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
Once more: here we
have a change in geometry "passing over" into a qualitative change, refuting this
'Law'.
Nevertheless, it could
still be
maintained that Engels is quite clear: he has focused on qualitative change to the
same body. So, the above alleged counter-examples are all irrelevant, since what is being
compared here
are qualitative differences between different bodies.
Or, so it could be argued...
But,
that is just a variation of the 'development objection' we
met earlier, and suffers from all its weaknesses.
Furthermore, Engels's version of this 'Law' also leaves it entirely obscure what
the "addition" of matter and/or energy amounts to, and what even counts as
'the same body'. As we will see in a
later sub-section it is important to be
clear about this, otherwise it turns out that it is possible to show there are
endless
counter-examples waiting in the wings that also refute this 'Law'. [Again,
readers are referred to the aforementioned sub-section for more details.]
Finally, Engels seems to think it is always clear what
constitutes a single body:
"Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually
correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.]
However, nature isn't quite so accommodating. In fact, when we
look at the material world, and refuse to impose an a priori scheme like
this on it, we see the picture isn't as clear cut as Engels would
have us believe. Indeed, as we will soon discover, it is easy "to convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body."
[The reader is again directed to
here and
here for more
details. And we have already seen
there a problems defining a species as a single body.]
Even more embarrassing for this 'Law' are
Tautomers. One standard Organic Chemistry textbook defines them as follows:
"Tautomers are isomers differing only in
the position of hydrogen atoms and electrons. Otherwise the carbon skeleton is
the same." [Clayden, et al (2001), p.205.]
"In the case of
dimedone, the enol must
be formed by a transfer of a proton from the central CH2
group of the
keto
form to one of the
OH groups.
Notice that there is no change in pH -- a proton is lost
from carbon and gained on oxygen. The reaction is known as enolization as it is
the conversion of a
carbonyl
compound into an
enol. It is a strange reaction in which little happens. The product is almost
always the same as the starting material since the only change is the transfer
of one proton and the shift of the double bond." [Ibid., pp.524-25.
Paragraphs merged; links added.]
Another source adds that tautomerism
involves:
"[I]somerism in which the
isomers change into one another with great ease so that they ordinarily exist
together in equilibrium." [Quoted from
here.]
And, Wikipedia characterises
Tautomers in the following way:
"Tautomers
are
organic compounds
that
are interconvertible by a
chemical reaction
called
tautomerization. As most commonly encountered, this reaction results in
the formal migration of a hydrogen atom or
proton, accompanied by a
switch of a
single bond
and adjacent
double bond. In solutions
where tautomerization is possible, a
chemical equilibrium
of
the tautomers will be reached. The exact ratio of the tautomers depends on
several factors, including temperature,
solvent, and
pH.
The concept of tautomers that are interconvertible by tautomerizations is called
tautomerism. Tautomerism is a special case of
structural isomerism
and
can play an important role in non-canonical
base pairing
in
DNA
and especially
RNA
molecules.
"Prototropic tautomerism refers to the relocation
of a proton, as in the above examples, and may be considered a subset of
acid-base behaviour. Prototropic tautomers are sets of isomeric protonation states with the
same
empirical formula
and
total
charge.
"Annular tautomerism is a type of prototropic
tautomerism where a proton can occupy two or more positions of a heterocyclic
system. For example, 1H- and 3H-imidazole;
1H-, 2H- and 4H-
1,2,4-triazole; 1H- and 2H-
isoindole.
"Ring-chain tautomerism occurs when the movement of
the proton is accompanied by a change from an open structure to a ring, such as
the
aldehyde
and
pyran
forms of
glucose.
"Valence tautomerism is distinct from prototropic
tautomerism, and involves processes with rapid reorganisation of bonding
electrons. An example of this type of tautomerism can be found in
bullvalene. Another
example is open and closed forms of certain
heterocycles, such as
azide
--
tetrazole. Valence
tautomerism requires a change in molecular geometry and should not be confused
with canonical
resonance structures
or
mesomers." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 05/10/2008 (the article has been altered somewhat since then). Spelling
modified to conform with
UK English. Several links added.]
Even though many of these reactions require
catalysts
(which add no energy or matter to the original compounds), in each case the
product is a 'qualitatively' different substance, refuting the First 'Law'. This is a
particularly 'difficult' series of counter-examples (i.e., 'difficult' for
DM-supporters) because it does involve the
"development", the transformation of one substance into another. In
this case, the "same body" (a molecule)
changes while no matter or energy has been added to it, merely re-distributed in
that body.
Of course, it could be argued that the above
Wikipedia source acknowledges
the fact
that there is a change in matter or energy between the resonating isomers -- for
example, when it says:
"Tautomers
are organic compounds that
are interconvertible by a chemical reaction called tautomerization. As most commonly encountered, this reaction results in
the formal migration of a hydrogen atom or proton, accompanied by a
switch of a single bond and adjacent double bond." [Wikipedia. Link
above. Bold
added.]
But,
no energy or matter has been added to the molecule in question; as
already noted, it has simply been re-distributed within the molecule itself, as Clayden, et al pointed out:
"Tautomers are isomers differing only in the position of
hydrogen atoms and electrons. Otherwise the carbon skeleton is the same."
[Clayden, et al, op cit.]
Resonance
(aka "mesomerism") is even more controversial, but no less fatal to this 'Law':4a0
"Though resonance is often introduced in such a
diagrammatic form in elementary chemistry, it actually has a deeper significance
in the mathematical formalism of
valence bond theory (VB).
When a molecule can't be represented by the standard tools of valence bond
theory (promotion,
hybridisation,
orbital
overlap,
sigma and
pi bond
formation) because no single
structure predicted by VB can account for all the properties of the molecule,
one invokes the concept of resonance.
"Valence bond theory gives us a model for
benzene
where
each carbon atom makes two sigma bonds with its neighbouring carbon atoms and
one with a hydrogen atom. But since carbon is
tetravalent, it has the ability to
form one more bond. In VB it can form this extra bond with either of the
neighbouring carbon atoms, giving rise to the familiar
Kekulé ring structure.
But this can't account for all carbon-carbon bond lengths being equal in
benzene. A solution is to write the actual
wavefunction
of the molecule as a linear
superposition
of the two possible Kekulé structures (or rather the wavefunctions
representing these structures), creating a wavefunction that is neither of its
components but rather a superposition of them, just as in the
vector analogy
above (which is formally equivalent to this situation).
"In benzene both Kekulé structures have equal weight, but
this need not be the case. In general, the superposition is written with
undetermined constant coefficients, which are then variationally optimized to
find the lowest possible energy for the given set of basis wavefunctions. This
is taken to be the best approximation that can be made to the real structure,
though a better one may be made with addition of more structures.
"In
molecular orbital [MO --
RL] theory,
the main alternative to VB, resonance often (but not always) translates to a
delocalization of electrons
in
pi orbitals (which are a separate concept from pi bonds in VB). For example,
in benzene, the MO model gives us 6 pi electrons completely delocalised over all
6 carbon atoms, thus contributing something like half-bonds. This MO
interpretation has inspired the picture of the benzene ring as a hexagon with a
circle inside. Often when describing benzene the VB picture and the MO picture
are intermixed, talking both about localized sigma 'bonds' (strictly a concept
from VB) and 'delocalized' pi electrons (strictly a concept from MO)." [Quoted
from here.
Accessed 05/10/2008; the article has since been substantially
re-written.]
Figure One: Examples Of Resonance
In view of the fact that these are distinct qualitative
variations on a common theme, created by no new energy or matter added to the
'body' in question, it seems,
therefore, that this hapless First 'Law' has been refuted yet again.
[Another
word of warning: When confronted with examples
like those listed below, DM-fans generally respond by pointing out that Engels's' Law
only applies to developing bodies and systems, which supposedly rules these
alleged counter-examples out. Once more, I have dealt with that objection
here and
here. Anyway, several of the cases
considered below are in fact examples of "development".]
"In thermodynamics, the triple
point of
a substance is the
temperature and pressure
at which three phases (for example, gas,
liquid, and solid) of that substance coexist in thermodynamic equilibrium.
For example, the triple point of mercury
occurs at a temperature of −38.8344°C and a pressure of 0.2
mPa." [Quoted from
here.]
Once
again, here we have a change in quality (or one such between different qualities) with no addition of energy or matter,
at this point.
(B) Age Hardening
Consider, too, a process called "Age
Hardening" (or "Precipitation
Hardening") in metallurgy, a
process discovered by
Alfred Wilm.
When, for example, an alloy of Aluminium (e.g.,
Duraluminium)
is "quenched"
and then left at room temperature it will harden considerably over time when
left to itself. Once again, we
have here a change in "quality" with no matter or energy added to, or subtracted
from,
the alloy, refuting Engels. To be sure, this process can be controlled if the alloy in
question is maintained at a high temperature, but it still happens if it is left
at room temperature, as Wilm discovered.
If
two or more forces are aligned differently,
the qualitative results will invariably vary even when the overall
magnitude of each force is held constant.
Consider an
example: let forces F1 and
F2 be situated in parallel (but not along the same
line of action),
diametrically opposed to one another. Here, these two forces can exercise a
turning effect on a suitably placed intermediary body. Now, arrange the same two forces in like manner so that they are still
parallel, but act diametrically along the same line (i.e., these
two force vectors have opposite senses). In this new configuration, as seems clear, they will now have no turning effect on the same body.
Here we have a change in quality with no
change in quantity, once more. Since there are many ways to align forces (as there are with
other vectors,
such as velocities and accelerations, etc.), there are countless
counter-examples to this rather pathetic First 'Law', here alone.4a
Some might argue that moving a force in the
manner envisaged requires energy, so these instances aren't in fact
energy neutral. However, just like the example of the
organic molecules quoted by
Engels -- or, indeed, elements referenced in connection with the Periodic Table --, the arrangements listed
elsewhere this Essay could exist side by side. A qualitative difference
then would be obvious, but there would be no quantitative discrepancy between
them.
In addition, as
also noted earlier,
even where there is "development", the expenditure of energy itself depends on the
nature of the force field in which these forces are embedded -- i.e., whether or not the field
in question is "conservative".
[On
conservative forces, see
here
and
here.]
In a conservative field, the work done in moving a force in a
circuit is zero, but certain (non-circuitous)
line integrals
in such fields can also be zero, if they are chosen carefully. So, a force could still 'develop' in this way in an energy neutral
environment.
In either case, we would have a qualitative
difference (and based on development) for no extra quantitative input of matter/energy. Naturally, once again, this 'Law'
could be tightened to exclude these and other awkward counter-examples, but then
it would cease to be a law, and would simply become a narrow,
specially-tailored, subjectively-applied convention (or stipulation) -- and,
incidentally, one that will thus have been imposed on
nature.
It could be objected that moving a force in a circuit, even in a conservative
field, would merely take it back to where it began, which isn't what was
required by the examples given earlier this Essay. There, forces were moved
somewhere different. But, that is to misunderstand the notion of a circuit. The
point is that in a conservative field, movement of a body from A to B
(where A and B could be widely separated, and non-coincidental) is
independent of the path taken.
Perhaps more significantly, this 'Law' takes
no account of qualitative changes that result from (energetically-neutral)
ordering relations in nature and society (several examples of which we have
already met). Here, identical physical
structures and processes can be ordered differently to create significant
qualitative changes. One example of this is the different ordering principles found in
music, where an alteration to a sequence of the same notes in a chord or
in a melody can have a major qualitative impact on harmony, with no quantitative
change anywhere in sight. So, the same seven notes (i.e., tones and semi-tones)
arranged in different
modes (Ionian, Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian,
Aolean and Locrian) sound totally different to the human ear. Of course, there
are other ways of altering the quality of music in an energetically neutral
environment over and above this (such as timing and attack).
Another example
along the same lines concerns the ordering principles found in language, where
significant qualitative changes can result from the re-arrangement of the same parts of
speech. For instance, the same number of letters jumbled up can either
make sense or not, as the case may be -- as in, say, "dialectics" and
"csdileati" (that is "dialectics" scrambled). Which of these two
'words makes more sense I
will leave the reader to decide.
Perhaps more radically, the same
set of words can
mean something qualitatively new if sequenced differently, as in, say: "The cat
is on the mat" and "The mat is on the cat". Or, even worse: "It
is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first
chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's
Logic", compared
with "It
is impossible completely to understand Hegel's Logic, and especially its first
chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Marx's
Capital." Here, there is considerable qualitative difference with no
quantitative change at all.
[What are the odds that Engels would have tried to alter his First 'Law' to
accommodate that awkward fact?]
There are many other examples of this phenomenon, but a few more
should suffice for the purposes of this Essay: a successful strike (one that
is, say, planned first then actioned second) could turn into its
opposite (if it is actioned first and planned second). Now even
though the total energy input here might very well be ordered differently in
each case, the overall energy budget of the system (howsoever that is
characterised) needn't be any different. So, the addition of no extra matter or
energy here can turn successful action into disaster if the order of events is
reversed. Of course, we can all imagine situations where this particular example
could involve different energy budgets, but that isn't necessarily the case, which is all that is required.
There are literally thousands of everyday
examples of qualitative changes such as these where there are no obvious associated quantitative
differences,
so many in fact that Engels's First 'Law' begins to look even more pathetic as
a result. Who, for example, would put food on the table and then a plate on top
of it? A change in the order here would constitute a qualitatively different
(and more normal) act: plate first, food second. Which of us would jump out of
an aeroplane first and put their parachute on second, or cross a road first, look
second? And is there a sane person on the planet who goes to the toilet first
and gets out of bed second? Moreover,
only an idiot would pour 500 ml of water
slowly into 1000 ml of concentrated
Sulphuric Acid, whereas, someone who knew
what they were doing would readily do the reverse. But, all of these have
profound qualitative differences if performed in the wrong order (for the same
energy budget).5
How could Engels have missed
examples like these? Is dialectical myopia so crippling that it prevents
dialecticians using their common sense?
(E)
Context
Pushing these ideas further: context, too, can
affect quality in a quantitatively neutral environment. So, a dead body
in a living room has a different qualitative significance compared to that same
body in the morgue (for the same energy input). A million pounds in my bank
account has a different qualitative feel compared to the same money in yours.
"Ceci n'est pas une pipe"
presents
qualitatively different connotations if appended to a picture of a pipe, compared to its being
attached to a picture of, say, a cigarette. Indeed, "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" itself can change qualitatively
from false to true depending on how it is interpreted. So, as an
expression of what the painting by
Magritte is about (i.e., a pipe) it is false.
But, despite this, it is also literally true, since manifestly a picture
of a pipe isn't a pipe! Change in quality here, but no change in quantity. And
the one interpretation could easily develop into the other with no new
matter or energy introduced.
Figure Two: Gallic Refutation?
Several more examples of contextualised
qualitative change (supervenient on an energy-neutral background)
rapidly come to mind:
think of the way that the 'same' action can assume different qualities if the
circumstances are filled in. For instance, suppose a driver puts her hand out of the window; depending on
the background, that same physical act could be one or more of the
following: a right turn signal, a
friendly gesture to a friend, an effort to cool down, an attempt to throw away or catch something, an aimless act, a coded message, an act of bravado,
an attempt to pay at a toll booth or drive-in fast food outlet, and so on.
As we all know, there
are countless examples of this sort of situation (for each energy-neutral local environment)
where bodily movements can take on qualitatively different aspects if the
surrounding circumstances are filled in.
Other counter-examples include
the following: The wrong signatures on two different localised cheques could
invalidate both. Swap the signatures around and they would become valid. The same number (a large 20, say) printed on a
batch of £20 (or $20) notes would be qualitatively different from the same number (now
acting as the
serial number) printed on every one of these notes, which would invalidate them
all since they
would then all have the same serial number. A gold necklace in your pocket might
lead to your arrest. The same one in my pocket might win me a reward (and vice versa).
Once again,
doubtless the reader can think of
her own examples of such 'dialectically-challenged' facts.6
[Some
readers might lose patience with the triteness of
counter-examples like these, but the same individuals seem infinitely forgiving
of the countless trite examples that litter almost every single DM-book and
-article -- for example, balding heads, boiling/freezing water, snapping rubber
bands, etc., etc.]
(F) Qualitative Change Caused By Other
Qualitative Changes
Furthermore,
qualitative change can be induced by other
qualitative changes, contrary to what Engels asserted:
"...[Q]ualitative changes can
only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or
motion...."[Engels (1954), p.63.
Bold emphasis added.]
For example, in a 1:1
mixture of paint, one litre of brown can be made by mixing two half litres each of red and green,
but the same qualitative effect can be achieved by using less or more of both
(say, 2 litres of each), but in the same ratio. Here a change in the quantity of mixed paints has no
effect on the qualitative properties of the mixture that results (i.e., its colour), while
the qualities that are mixed will havethat effect. In this
case, two qualities (two colours) will have changed into a new quality (a new
colour) when mixed. Not only do the same amounts (and proportions) of red and
green paint exist before and after mixing, for any fixed amount of each, the two former qualities
will have merged
into a single quality. So, here we have qualitative change produced by qualitative change.
Even better, this is an example of development.
Of course, it could be argued that the
mixture contains more paint than it did before (which means that there actually has been a
quantitative increase), but that isn't
so. In general, prior to mixing there were n litres of each colour (and
2n
litres of both) preserving the 1:1 ratio. And, after mixing the same quantity of paint still exists,
namely n litres of each (and 2n litres of both), still preserving the
1:1 proportion. The qualitative
change in colour has nothing to do with the quantities involved, but everything
to do with the mixing of the two previous qualities in the same ratio.
To be sure, if the ratio
of the mixed paints are changed, a different qualitative outcome would also
emerge, but as noted above, even that won't happen "nodally", and so it seems to be of little
relevance to the First 'Law'. Recall what Lenin said:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin
(1961), p.123. Bold emphases alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
So, even if quantity were relevant here,
since there is no "interruption of gradualness", no "nodal line", this still
wouldn't be a 'dialectical change', whatever else it is.
In which
case, if the ratio is kept the same, we would have here a
change in quality initiated by qualitative change only, and not by any increase in
quantity.6a
As noted above, this example also applies to the
development of this 'body of matter'. So, we started with 2n litres of paint
and we finished with 2n litres, but at the end we also had a new quality (a new
colour) emerge, created by no overall increase in matter. And, the same will be true if these
mixtures are increased indefinitely by the continuous addition of paint (in the
same ratio -- say, by pouring both colours into a huge vat at the same rate from two
pipes -- both of which are fed from two tanks, with the entire ensemble (comprised
of the vat, pipes, paint, tanks, room, etc.) located in
one area of a factory or warehouse). In that case, the "same Engelsian object"
would be this entire ensemble -- i.e., this particular room/area
(etc.) in the factory or warehouse (and all it contains), to
which no new energy or matter has been 'added' -- plainly because that "body"
already included/took account of the paint and all that room's contents.
Furthermore, what applies to colour also applies to other qualities, too --
for example, heat (where the mixing of two 2n litres of hot and cold water
creates a warm mixture also of 2n litres).
Indeed, mixing
2n litres of two, n litre batches of different molten metals (exhibiting
severally different qualities) can lead to a qualitatively new
alloy -- for
example, brass
or pewter.
This also applies to any mixing of 2n units (or, indeed, other amounts
in the same or different ratios) of many different
varieties of matter that can be mixed (in solid, liquid or gaseous forms). Indeed, something similar can be achieved with the mixing of chemicals
in general (again, whether they exist as solids, liquids, or gases) capable of being mixed.
This also applies to the mixing of light, sounds, smells, and
tastes.
Indeed, the vast majority of chemical reactions can be characterised this way.7
Matter in general is therefore
reassuringly
non-dialectical.
Any who
object to the above examples need only reflect on the fact that they don't represent a
challenge to materialism (since they are all manifestly
material
changes), they merely throw into doubt Engels's (or, rather, Hegel's) rather pathetic 'Law'.
In which case, only someone more intent on defending Engels
and imposing DM on nature than
they are in understanding it will find reason to cavil at this point.
Another, and perhaps more significant instance of qualitative change, where
there is no implied change in quantity, includes the "Big Bang"
(assuming it actually happened). We are told this led to the formation of a whole
universe of qualitative changes with no overall increase in energy or matterin the
universe. So, here we have a massive change in quality (with Galaxies and
planets, and all the rest, emerging out of the original debris) with no overall
change in the quantity of energy in the universe.
As should
seem plain, that constitutes the
ultimate counter-example to this rather pathetic 'Law': the development of
everything refutes it!
On the other hand, if the
above 'Big Bang'
counterexample is
rejected
-- and an infinite universe is postulated in its place -- since there can be no increase in energy
in such a universe, any qualitative change in the whole of nature will
still occur with no
increase in the universal quantity of energy.
Either way, DM once again crashes to the ground in flames.
As we
are about to find out, it
isn't easy to shoehorn remote changes into this ill-fitting dialectical
straight-jacket.
So,
for example, the largest cut diamond on earth (in a safe, say, in New York) could change
into the second largest if another, bigger diamond is cut in, say, Amsterdam.
Here we would have a change in quality produced by no change in quantity to the
object in question, the diamond in New York. The same considerations also
apply to other remote changes. For instance, the biggest star in a
galaxy could become the second biggest if another star ten thousand
light years distant (but in the same galaxy) grows in size (perhaps over
millions of years) through accretion of matter. So, in both cases, there would
be a qualitative change to the first object with no relevant matter or energy
added to or subtracted from that object.
There are countless examples of remote change like this.
A
cheque drawn, say, in Paris will become instantaneously worthless
(qualitative change) if the issuing bank in Tokyo goes bust -- meaning that no
quantitative change will have happened to the original cheque -- no
matter or energy having been added to, or subtracted from, it.
The President of a given country visiting, say, the
UN Headquarters in Manhattan, can cease to be President if, while she is
away she is deposed at home. This is a significant change in 'quality', even
though no relevant matter/energy has been
added to, or subtracted from, this individual. Some might claim (rather
desperately) that this is a contrived example,
but the actual examples listed below show such remote changes aren't
contrived.
A Silver Medallist in,
say, the Olympic Games, can become the Gold Medal winner in a certain event (qualitative
change) if the former Gold medallist is disqualified because of drug-taking
or cheating -- meaning that no relevant quantitative change will have occurred to that Silver
Medallist. [In case anyone thinks this is another contrived example,
here is just one example of many.]
Here is what
I have just added to Essay Five on this (slightly edited):
The following
example isn't forced, either; it concerns a story (aired by the BBC) concerning the 3000 metre
steeplechase final at the 2014 European Games:
"France's Mahiedine Mekhissi-Benabbad has been stripped of
his 3,000m steeplechase gold medal at the European Championships for taking his
shirt off on the home straight. Mekhissi-Benabbad put his top in his mouth after
pulling clear of the field. Initially he appeared to be shown a yellow card by
an official but was subsequently disqualified. Frenchman Yoann Kowal now wins
gold, Poland's Krystian Zalewski gets silver and Spain's Angel Mullera wins
bronze." [Quoted from
here.
Accessed 15/08/2014. Paragraphs merged.]
As a result of this, Yoann Kowal was moved from second to first,
Krystian Zalewski from third to second, and Angel Mullera from fourth to
third....
The above
story isn't a one-off, either. It happens quite frequently in sport these days
(when those who cheat by taking performance enhancing drugs are found out). Here is a recent example:
"Russia's Natalya Antyukh has been stripped of 400m hurdles
gold from London 2012 on the basis of historical data from a Moscow testing
laboratory. Antyukh, now 41, is already serving a four-year ban
after being named in a World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) investigation into
cheating by Russia. American Lashinda Demus will be promoted to gold
in her place. All three gold medals won on the track by Russian athletes at
London 2012 have now been rescinded on doping grounds.
Mariya Savinova and Yuliya
Zaripova, the initial winners of 800m and 3000m steeplechase gold, have been
disqualified.
Ivan Ukhov's high jump title and Tatyana Lysenko's hammer victory in the
field have also been wiped from the record books....
"Antyukh has struck a defiant tone on social media. Her last
Instagram post on 18 August is a photo of her showing off her silver and bronze
medals from the 2004 Olympics. Those medals remain unaffected by the latest AIU
decision. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) can now promote Jamaica's
Kaliese Spencer to the bronze medal position after Antyukh did not appeal
against her punishment, with Czech Republic's Zuzjana Hejnova in line for an
upgrade to silver." [Quoted from
here; accessed
08/10/2023. Links in the original; several paragraphs merged. Bold emphases
added.]
The above
are yet more examples of remote change in quality induced by no relevant
change in quantity.
But, we
needn't rely on examples drawn from athletics. Back in May 2017,
James Comey,
Director of the FBI,
was fired by President Trump while he (Comey) was away in California. So,
Comey underwent a pretty significant qualitative (and remote) change (he ceased
being 'top cop') even though there was no relevant matter or energy added
to him.
Something similar happened to Rex Tillerson, Trump's ex-Secretary of State,
who found out on TV that he had been fired by Trump, on Twitter. Again,
this is an example of remote change in quality (the loss by an individual of a very powerful political Office
of State) with no relevant matter or energy added to him.
More-or-less the same can be said about Mark Esper, Trump's ex-Secretary of
Defence, who was also remotely fired, on Twitter, in November 2020.
This is yet
another change in quality with no relevant matter or energy added.
It
might be objected that the above argument is defective: When these individuals
saw or heard the news that they had been fired, light or sound energy was added
to them. Maybe so, but their seeing or hearing the news wasn't what fired them
or changed their status. Trump's remote action did that, and they were fired
whether or not they heard or saw the news. Hence, when Trump fired them they
all underwent an instantaneous, remote, political, legal qualitative change -- before
they had even discovered their fate -- but with no relevant matter or energy added
to them.
Consider another example: The
oldest known vertebrate fossil on earth could become the second oldest if
another even older one is discovered.
We
needn't labour the point; as noted above, there are countless examples of remote
qualitative change like this,
so many, in fact, that this Essay could easily be doubled in length if I were to
itemise
a significant number of them.
[Notice,
too, that many of the examples aired in the last few paragraphs concern 'developmental' change.]
(H) Context And Ordering Relations, Again
Two identical "Keep off the Grass" signs can mean
something different (qualitative change) if one of them is posted on a garden lawn and
the other is
positioned near a stand of Marijuana plants, at the same height above sea level
(thus, with no difference in energy).
Should anyone object to that example, we need only alter it slightly: imagine
another "Keep off the Grass" sign, but now in front of, but a few yards/metres
away from a huge picture of a lawn. This large background picture is
then removed and replaced by a huge picture of a Marijuana stand, again a few
yards/metres away from the "Keep off the Grass" sign. The sign itself will have
had no matter or energy added to it, but it will have altered in
'quality' -- it will also have "developed".
Some
might still object that the object here is in fact the "Keep
off the Grass"
sign and the background picture, since it is that picture which gives the
sign its meaning. If so, there will have been an addition of matter to
this sign as each background picture was changed.
In that case, all we need do
is alter the example once again:
imagine another "Keep off the Grass" sign in front of, but a few yards/metres away
from two huge pictures of a lawn and a Marijuana stand, one of which picture is
in front of the other. Imagine one of these background pictures is moved so that
it is now behind the other picture. Imagine also that this move is powered by a
battery operated device. The sign itself will have had no matter or energy added
to it, neither will the entire ensemble -- that is, the sign, the two
large pictures and the battery-operated mechanical moving device will
have had no matter or energy added to them, since this ensemble is self-sufficient in
energy -- but the entire set of objects will have altered in quality as these two large
pictures were swapped.
[The
objection that this, too, is a highly contrived example has been rebutted in the next
sub-section.]
A circle
will look like an ellipse
(qualitative change) if viewed from certain angles, for no change in, or
addition of, matter/energy to that shape.
The same three
mathematical (or physical) points can undergo a qualitative change if, say, from
being arranged linearly they are then re-arranged as the corners of a triangle
-- with no energy added to these points. Here, there would be a qualitative change with no quantitative change,
once again.
There is, of course, a potentially infinite number of examples of this
sort of change imaginable for 2-, or 3-dimensional shapes, for n points (be
they mathematical or physical -- so this isn't necessarily an abstract
set of counter-instances).8
[Any who object to the above might like to
explain how energy/matter has been 'added' to such points.]
Of course, the counter-examples
aired in this Essay could
involve genuine energy differences, that is undeniable -- but it isn't always necessarily
the case.
It would depend on how the 'local system' has been defined. Once again, this terminally vague
First 'Law' omits all mention of such 'trifling' details. Indeed, this
impressive and consistent level of DM-vagueness allows any
number of wild speculations to be advanced for or against this 'Law' -- as
we have already seen, and are about to see. It isn't easy to
think of a genuine scientific law that is quite so
theoretically, systematically and semantically-challenged, or one that is so accommodating
as the First 'Law'.
[On the difficulties of specifying the energetic boundaries of
any given system, see Lange (2002), especially pp.111-65.]
Hence, if we
define the local system as all the energy (chemical, potential, kinetic, etc.)
within a volume interval equal to that which contains the objects and processes
concerned, there would be no discernible energy difference in any of the examples
so far listed. To be sure, no
system in nature is hermetically sealed against all outside influences in this
way, but even slight energy leakage (in or out) at the boundary of such spatial regions will have no significant effect on the potentially huge
qualitative differences one could imagine in such cases.
In what follows, I don't intend to enter into too much technical
detail, but dialecticians have yet to specify whether the
systems (or the "same body"/"bodies") to which this 'Law' applies
are
thermodynamically open or
closed.
Engels lived when many of the core principles of thermodynamics were still being
developed, so it isn't fair to accuse him of serious neglect in this regard.
The same can't be said about subsequent
DM-theorists, those who helped spread this theory after the
Classical Laws of
Thermodynamics had been thrashed out. That isn't to deny Engels had much to say about the work
being done in this area by the scientists of his day, only that he and
subsequent DM-theorists signally
failed to delineate:
(i) The thermodynamic boundaries of the "bodies" he
spoke about;
Naturally, the
above attempt to tighten-up
the vague DM-'definition' of the First 'Law' (i.e., insisting on a clear
delineation of the thermodynamic and physical boundaries of the bodies/systems
involved) will lay it open to
all manner of extra, or novel, counter-examples.
Consider the
(hackneyed) boiling
water example:
If the relevant energy locale is
widened too much, no energy will have been
added to that system (i.e, the water, the kettle or pan, and the stove or
cooker and its energy source). In that case, we would have a qualitative change with no
quantitative increase in the energy locale so widely defined. Such a possibility
would definitely emerge if, say, the local region where the said boiling occurred is
defined as the entire country within which it takes place (or the entire
planet, and so on). So, with respect to such more widely defined systems no energy will have been added
to that system, just transferred from one part (the gas/electricity supplier) to another
(the heated water, etc.).
Engels
actually allowed for this (not perhaps realising it
drives a coach and horses through his non-definition of 'same body'):
"But what is the position in regard to change of form of
motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or
vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same?
Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion as with
Heine's vices;
anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of
form of motion is always a process that takes place
between at least two bodies,
of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat),
while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality
(mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore,
quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been
found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single
isolated body." [Engels (1954),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
If
this 'Law' allows for energy to pass "between at least two bodies", then the system as a whole
(of which they are a part) will have had no energy added to it, but it
will have changed qualitatively, nevertheless. In that case it is worth asking: is the 'body' in question the entire system
containing these two or more 'bodies'? Or is it just one of them? If
the latter -- which means we will have drawn a "fixed, rigid"
thermodynamic boundary here --, then that would clearly violate this other DM-principle:
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay';
for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.]
For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time
be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. [Engels (1976),
p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Bold emphasis added.]
[I won't pull on that rather 'awkward' thread right
now;
the reader is re-directed here for more
details.]
In
the above case -- where the system might be an entire country or planet,
say --, any
energy leakage at the
periphery would be far too remote from the boiling of water in a kitchen somewhere
inside that system to affect that kettle. For example, any energy leakage at the boundary between the
earth and outer space will have no effect on a kettle boiled in, say,
Oswaldtwistle, England.
Moreover, other
instances that involve more rapid energy
exchanges (i.e., possible leakage in or out from remote sources of radiation -- for
instance, exploding stars)
wouldn't affect the
actual boiling of a kettle of water here on earth,
which would be irrelevant, too. Indeed, as things now stand, no dialectician has
thought to argue that when water boils, remote, minute energy inputs from distant stars (etc.)
have a significant, or even a relevant, effect, despite their commitment to DM-Holism and universal
interconnection.
Anyway,
an
energy locale could be defined in terms of a suitable light cone,
ruling-out all external energy inputs or leakages. [On that, see below.]
Now, it takes very little dialectics to see
that if the energy locale is defined widely enough, no (relevant) matter or energy will be
added to any complete system that exhibits a phase or state of matter
change in one or more of its parts. In that case, dialecticians (as a matter of
some urgency!) need to devise a new, non-question-begging definition of:
(a) The
permitted energy locale relevant to the First 'Law'; and,
(b) What counts as one body as opposed to a collection of
bodies.
Of course, even
a kettle is a collection of bodies -- most are an amalgam of a spout, a handle, a water container, a lid,
an electrical element, etc., etc. "Non-question-begging" is meant in this sense: the boundaries of a
given energy locale would need to be
drawn so as to avoid the accusation that this 'Law' only works because of yet
more ad hoc word-juggling --,
or, that it only works because of several convenient stipulations (i.e., 'persuasive definitions')
applied in a piecemeal manner, or subjectively imposed. Unfortunately for DM-fans, there
don't appear to be any objective criteria
to which they can appeal to prevent their 'Law' sinking into just such a
subjectivist black hole.
However,
there are at least two considerations why that
thankless task might prove to be even more challenging than the above remarks seem to suggest:
(1) Since
dialecticians believe that all things are interconnected, there appears to be no
way that they can objectively isolate one part of the universe from the rest so
that they could then assert truthfully that that sub-system is a sealed
unit, with no energy leakage (in or out).
If so, there is no way they can define
a single phase or state of matter transformation that would rule out the above attempt to widen
the relevant energy locale to all of reality, scuppering their
First 'Law'. In that case, no phase or state of matter transformations at all, anywhere
in the entire universe, would have resulted from an overall
increase in matter or energy, since the whole of the
universe would (obviously!) experience no change in energy as a result. Once
again: such
changes would simply have arisen
from a localised re-distribution of matter/energy inside the
universe. Engels's own reference to an increase in
matter or energy would now have to be withdrawn (or re-defined) in terms of
locallyre-distributed 'packets' of energy or matter, otherwise no increase could take place in such
circumstances. [We saw Engels arrive at that conclusion
earlier. Anyway, this
is just a generalisation of a much more limited point made in the next
Sub-section.]
For example, consider object/process, A,
which receives energy or matter from object/process, B, along
lines suggested by
Engels. If the energy locale
is defined as {A, B}, and if the "same body/process" is also
defined as {A, B}, then no energy will have been added to {A,
B}, but merely re-distributed inside{A, B}. In which case, there will have been a change in
"quality" in or to {A, B} with no new energy or matter added to {A, B}, contradicting Engels:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Emphasis
added.]
On the other hand, consider again object/process, A, which
receives energy or matter from object/process, C,now interpreted as
the rest of the Universe. If the energy locale is defined as {A,
Universe} or, {A, C} -- or, in fact, just {C} --, and if the "same body/process" is also defined as
{A,
Universe} or, {A, C} -- or, just {C} again --, then, plainly, no energy will have been added to
{A, Universe} -- or just {C} -- merely re-distributed internally, once more.
[Henceforth,
I will drop reference to "just {C}", for obvious reasons!]
However, as we are about to
find out,
given DM-'interconnectedness', there is no way
to prevent {A, B} from inflating into {A, Universe}.
[Oddly enough
a similar fate awaits the 'DM-theory-of-knowledge'. On that, see
here.]
(2) The second reason why the aforementioned task
seems impossible to carry out (in DM-terms) is connected with any attempt made to
tighten or shore-up the boundaries of the systems involved. If the latter are
made too restrictive, no change can take place. In that case, either no energy
could be fed into the system -- meaning that (i) no qualitative change will result (according to Engels),
or, (ii) any qualitative change that does occur won't have been created by
new energy fed into the system -- since, in that case, it would be a sealed unit!
For example, consider again object/process,
A: if the energy locale is defined as {A}, and if the "same
body/process" is also defined as {A}, then, plainly, no energy will have been
added, since, plainly, {A} is now a sealed unit! [Which is what Engels
himself pointed out.]
On
the other hand, if the system is made less restrictive, there is no way to avoid
the inflation (mentioned a few paragraphs back, and again below) from occurring
-- i.e., that which in this case would lead from {A} to {A,
Universe}.
Before these knotty problems are addressed more fully, it
might prove useful to consider an obvious objection:
Proffered DM-Answer [DM-1]:
The horns of this
artificial dilemma
could easily be made less
problematic if the boundary to each energy locale (relevant to any phase
or state of
matter
transition) were defined quite naturally
as the immediate surroundings of that change and that energy input. Clearly, this would mean that any energy
that had been fed into a system (which involved, say, the boiling of a pan of water) would be
confined to the immediate causes of this specific change in quality (etc.), and
they would naturally be those that took place inside the space
(loosely) defined by that local boundary.
[Again, on the difficulties of defining
an energy 'locality', see Lange (2002),
pp.1-25, 94-110. Incidentally, Lange's proposed solution is itself defective for
reasons I won't enter into in this Essay.]
Or, so a response might go...
But, in
that case, plainly, no energy could be fed into any system so described
in DM-1.
If we fix our attention on the immediate surroundings in order to
locate or isolate the proximate cause of the above change in quality (aimed at
short-circuiting objections (1) and (2), above), that would
simply force us to look for the source of that
change in slightly more remote events (for example, to those taking place in the power station, or
the gas plant,
which supplied the energy).
On the
other hand, if we don't do that, and seal this system off, then
Engels's requirement that energy be fed into the system, now defined as the
immediate surroundings of the said change that initiated it, won't have been fulfilled. Again, if
that system is a sealed unit, no such outside inputs will be allowed!
That is plainly because:
Z1:
No energy or matter can't be added to, or
removed from, a body/system if it is sealed unit.
Plainly,
energy doesn't come from nowhere; it has to be input from somewhere.
However, if energy is input into any such system, then the local energy boundary
must be re-defined to include the source of that energy (the power station, or gas
plant, etc.). Again, if we don't do that, then the change in quality
witnessed won't have been caused by an input of energy, meaning that the whole
system won't have changed qualitatively as a result of that very input of energy, since none had been fed in!
Z1
again.
[Several obvious objections
to the above argument will be
considered presently.]
We could now try to seal this new and wider
energy locale in
a similar manner to that attempted above. That done all we
would have once more is a transfer of energy from one part of that sealed unit to
another -- in this case, from the power station to the kettle of water, say. But, and again,
if that were so, there would be a change of quality to that
system as a whole -- i.e., the power station, the location of the kettle, and the
kettle itself -- with no new energy added to that system as a whole, since, as now seems obvious, this wider system itself includes
the energy source!
To
repeat: all that will have happened here is that energy will have been
transferred from one part of the system to another, hence none added to that
system.
Consider, once more,
object/process, A, which receives energy or matter from object/process, B.
If the energy locale is again defined as {A, B}, and if the "same
body/process" is also defined as {A, B}, then no energy will have
been added to {A, B}, merely re-distributed internally. Alternatively, if
we widen the local energy boundary to include the energy source,--
call the latter, "S", -- then we will now have {A, B, S}
as our new body/system.
The reader
will no doubt see where this is going,
for the next question forces itself upon us:Is this wider system, {A, B, S}, itself
a sealed unit?
If it is we will have
Z1 again:
Z1: No energy or matter can't be added to, or
removed from, a body/system if it is sealed unit.
As seems
equally plain, the matter/energy produced and processed by a gas or electricity plant had to come from
somewhere. So, in order to comply with Engels's requirement that
energy be added to a given system to initiate qualitative change, we
would have to look outside{A, B, S} for such an input.
In that case, we would now have
to move this already widened boundary to include the field [F] from which the
gas was extracted, or the coal/gas/water/wind systems that generated the
electricity -- yielding {A, B, S,
F}, and so on. Is
this a sealed unit? If it is, then Z1 applies once more. But, in that eventuality, and
to comply with Engels's 'Law',
we would now have to widen this still further to include the organisms that lived
millions of years ago that produced the gas/coal/oil, or the astronomical, geological
or atmospheric processes that produced the water/wind. How then could we prevent
this inflating uncontrollably to include the entire universe,as indicated
earlier?
In that case,
as noted above, {A, B,
S, F} would soon inflate into {A, Universe}!
Hence, Engels's First 'Law' seems to require
inclusion of the entire universe if it is to work. ['Truth is the Whole'?] Not even the
hackneyed DM-boiling-pan-of-water can be isolated from the rest of reality
-- indeed, as
DM-classicists themselves tell us:
"When we consider and reflect
upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual
activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations
and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what,
where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes
away....
"We see, therefore, at first
the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the
background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the
things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but
intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is
not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into
being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy
culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great
merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual,
is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change,
transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal
connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development."
[Engels (1892),
pp.405-08. Bold emphasis added.]
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics is the science of
universal interconnections…." [Ibid.,
p.17.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics
of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others....
[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
[Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97;
221-22.
Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
"Dialectics
requires an all-round consideration of relationships in
their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.... A tumbler is assuredly
both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two
properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an
infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the
world. A tumbler is a heavy object which can be used as a missile; it can
serve as a paper weight, a receptacle for a captive butterfly, or a valuable
object with an artistic engraving or design, and this has nothing at all to do
with whether or not it can be used for drinking, is made of glass, is
cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth.... Formal logic, which is as
far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower
forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring,
and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined
at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic
definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing
more. Dialectical logic demands
that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of
an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and
'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely,
but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.
Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in
development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is
not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too,
is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and
connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of
an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of
truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly,
dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the
late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin
(1921), pp.90-93. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged. Quotation marks altered to
conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of
phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but
as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected
with, dependent on, and determined by, each other. The dialectical method
therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by
itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena…. The dialectical method
therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the
standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the
standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into
being and going out of being….
Speaking of the materialist
views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all
is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the principles of
dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961),
p.347.]"
[Stalin
(1976a), pp.837-38, 845. Bold emphases
added; paragraphs merged. I have quoted from the online edition of Lenin's
Philosophical Notebooks here.]
[Several
other passages that say the same sort of thing have been quoted
here.]
If all things are interconnected, then not even a
pan of water
is an isolated or sealed unit. It took human beings, energy and countless
different material/energy
inputs to make that pan, as well as a human being to buy it and use it to boil water. It also
takes human beings to procure that
water, clean, sterilise and distribute it. Furthermore, it took a series of natural processes to create that water, and so on.
If we seal any of these off from the rest of the universe, there would be no pan to
begin with, and no one to turn on the gas, connect the gas supply,
prospect for gas; no ancient organisms to die and produce that gas, no water, etc., etc.,
etc.
Moreover, if the above DM-classicists are to be believed, all these objects and processes are still interconnected. As we will see in Essay Eleven
Part One, if we
insist that everything is inter-linked, there is no way to prevent an
absurd inflation to {A, Universe} from taking place, so that even a humble
pan (just like
Lenin's tumbler, above) will now be interconnected
with events remote in space and time -- even including those that no longer exist! If
this Wholist, DM-thesis is correct, all these objects and events are now connected with that
pan,
just as that it is now connected with them in return. Otherwise, why
assert that everything is inter-connected, as opposed to merely being
connected? And, if that is so, it isn't possible to seal even a pan
of water off
from the rest of the universe.
In that
case, there are no isolatable
or sealed units in the DM-universe,
and hence there are no energy inputs -- since that energy will already
be part of the system to which they all belong --i.e., {A, Universe}.
Of course, there is an easy way to neutralise this entire set of
annoying objections: abandon the theory of universal interconnection. In
that case, it might be possible to save the First 'Law' by ditching that other core DM-thesis. On the other hand, if
universal interconnection is to be preserved, then the above inflation is unavoidable. As
soon as the energy boundary is widened to take in the whole universe -- in order
to maintain
the idea that everything is interconnected --
no phase or state of matter
transformation at all would result from an overall increase in matter or energy
to that wider system -- since, plainly, the whole of the material universe would have experienced no
change in total energy or matter in that regard, merely its re-distribution.
Now, it could be objected that it is perfectly clear what
Engels was trying to say. He meant that if energy or matter is fed into an
object or process, at some point it will undergo a qualitative change. The last
few paragraphs have merely complicated a simple and easy to understand description of a familiar
series of events --, such as that of boiling a pan of water.
However, it is worth recalling that
the progressive widening depicted above was initiated in response to a suggested
attempt to define the immediate surroundings of the object or process
undergoing the said qualitative change -- i.e., DM-1. And, that was introduced in order
to be a little clearer about which objects and processes are being referenced --, and that in turn
was required in order to (a) Rule out the awkward counter-examples
listed above. and earlier, and (b) Comply with the DM-thesis that all things are
interconnected. It
is also
worth adding that, (c) Any relevant energy boundary needs to be drawn tightly to stop leakage
at the margins, and hence forestall a cosmic energy inflation,
also
outlined
earlier.
But, if the "immediate surroundings" are defined more tightly to exclude the
input of energy needed to effect the said change in quality, then obviously
no such change will take place (Z1 again!),
which means the doctrine of universal
interconnection will have to be abandoned. On the other hand, if there is a qualitative
change inside that boundary, it can't have resulted from an input of
energy!
Alternatively,
if the boundary to a local system (the "immediate surroundings") is relaxedsufficiently enough to allow
some energy in, and that input itself is included in the immediate surroundings --
yielding {A, B, S, F}, in order to rule out several of the
aforementioned annoying counter-examples --,
that would undermine Engels's requirement that energy must be addedto the system, since that 'added energy' has already been included in theimmediate surroundings,
and so can't have been added!
It could be objected that
the above moves are unfair,
if not ridiculous. As soon as Engels's requirement that energy is added has been
observed, the law will work perfectly well. All that the present critic has done
is rule it out as not having been added!
I
will resist making an easy counter-jibe that anyone who complains along those
lines doesn't "understand 'anti-dialectics'", nor will I go for an easy cop-out
and play a
Nixon card (claiming that
'anti-dialectics' also "grasps" the contradictions in DM, but only in order to
help in the latter's speedy demise). Dialecticians would certainly be hoisted
by
their own petard if their unfair and self-serving argumentative tactics were
now used
against them.
[This is
just a long-winded way of saying that DM-theorists are the last people on the
planet to complain legitimately about such "unfair" moves. Sceptical readers are
referred to the next
Sub-section for a few concrete examples
of this DM-quandary.]
The
reason the above 'unfair' critical moves were aired was to underline the fact that
howsoever we try to repackage the First 'Law' it can't be made to work unless we ditch other core DM-theses.
Of course, if any DM-fans who have read this far think otherwise, they are welcome
to say (clearly) -- and for the first time in 150 years -- what the hell Engels was
banging on about!
So, this
is the quandary facing DM-fans -- and we have found that whichever option they
chose, it can't be made consistent with Engels's terminally vague description of
this First 'Law', nor with other
core DM-theses:
[A] On the one hand, if the boundary
taking in the
immediate surroundings of one of these 'dialectical changes' is drawn too tightly, no energy can be fed into
that system and nothing will change qualitatively in the required manner.
[B] On the other
hand, if energy is
allowed in, that would throw open the doors to the above inflation.
Once more: howsoever we try to
re-define any such local system, the First 'Law' suffers
a mortal wound.
This isn't just a
DM-failing. As we will discover, it is also the fate of all other metaphysical
theories (considered in several other Essays posted at this site, summarised
here). When it comes to
filling in the
details, not only does material reality invariably erect insurmountable obstacles
to such theories -- or, rather, to such theoretical impertinences --,
the language based on, and derived from, humanity's long-term interaction with that reality (i.e.,
ordinary language)
actually prevents such theories from making the slightest sense.
[That
argument was set out in detail in Essay
Twelve Part One.]
As a
last desperate attempt to breath life back into this dying 'Law', someone might try
to argue that the above constraints would be disastrous for science,
too. That isn't so; scientific laws are surrounded by countless ceteris
paribus clauses, and so don't pretend to be metaphysical. Moreover, no
scientist would come out with such woolly vagueness concerning the supposed relation
between "quantity and quality":
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Emphasis
added.]
Since
this topic has been dealt with extensively in Essays Eleven
Part One
and Twelve Part One, the
reader is directed there for more details.
Lest the reader be tempted to argue that
there is no pressing need for dialecticians to consider things in such pedantic detail --
their 'Law' is fine as it is --, it is worth pointing out that if scientists
themselves attempted to advance their discipline in such a slap-dash, 'dialectical' manner, few would remain
in their jobs for long, and even fewer would have advanced human knowledge
much beyond the invention of the wheel. If
science is to progress, its practitioners have to analyse their research areas
and question the language they use in even morepedantic detail than has been
attempted so far in this Essay.
[Concerning the 'pedantic' detail they do in fact take into account, see
here; on 'pedantry' itself, see
here.]
Anyone who has studied or practiced
genuine science will already know this, anyway.
[In a future re-write of this Essay, I will add just such detail
to reveal to those who know little of modern theory the extent of the 'pedantic'
detail those who theorise about science actually enter into these days. In the meantime, sceptical
readers are encouraged to visit
this
site for scores of examples. (Philosophy of Science is in fact one of
the few areas of Philosophy that won't be rubbished at this site, even if a critical stance will always be adopted
toward it.) I have now added some of the aforementioned material to this
Sub-section.]
Finally, it might be thought that the above considerations clearly ignore the fact
that we can rule out such vanishingly small, remote effects as
irrelevant. I have
dealt with that objection in Essay Eleven
Part Two.
The above considerations highlight another
serious ambiguity in Engels account of this
embattled 'Law':
"...[T]he transformation of
quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express
this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual
case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or
subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the
body concerned." [Engels
(1954), p.63.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
As noted earlier, Engels is entirely unclear what
constitutes the "addition" of matter and/or energy to a "body"
-- which considerations partly underlie the counter-objections aired in a previous
Sub-section. In relation to the mixing
of coloured paint, for example, it would seem that those objections take it as
read that one litre of red has been added to one litre of green. But if we
word this differently, even that would become false. Imagine the following
scenario: we have a two-litre can holding one litre of red and one litre of
green separated in the middle by a collapsible barrier (which remains inside the
container where the mixing occurs). Let us assume that the barrier is collapsed so that the red and
green paint begin to mix (we could even have a battery operated mixing device internal
to this container so that no energy is 'added' to the entire ensemble,
comprising the
container, the paint,
the mixing device and the barrier). In this scenario, the object/body in question
would be the
container, along with its contents. At the end of the mixing process we would still have the same
object (i.e., the tin can with exactly the same quantity of paint, the original
collapsed divider, energy source and mixer), only now exhibiting a new quality, the colour brown.
Put this way, we would have a change in
quality to the same object/body (the tin of paint and its contents) with no new matter added
to that object/body, contradicting Engels.
Now, it could be argued that the above examples are
highly contrived, and so can't be considered 'natural' processes. But, these aren't
supernatural processes -- they all take place in this universe --
and yet they still contradict Engels, who said this sort of thing was
"impossible":
"It is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned."
[Engels
(1954),
p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
If a series of events
can be described clearly (and which don't violate any scientific laws), then
this must be possible, not "impossible".
Anyway, even if the above
were a viable objection, there are countless processes in nature and society that
undergo similarly non-dialectical 'development'.
"The beetle's explosive power is derived primarily
from the mixture of two chemical compounds -- hydroquinone
and
hydrogen peroxide -- that are
stored in separate reservoirs in the abdomen. The chemicals then pass through a
valve before meeting in a special chamber, along with an enzyme that catalyzes
the reaction. This creates gases that rapidly expand and give off heat. Beetles
can open and close valves to this reaction chamber rapidly, fast enough to
produce up to up to
500 explosive bursts in a second. These insects can also aim the chemical
sprays at prey, using their rear ends like a noxious water pistol." [Quoted from
here; accessed
29/06/2024. Paragraphs merged. Two links added.]
If the original object/body is the said beetle, then
we have here a change in quality -- i.e., this otherwise quiescent and
placid animal turns into a noxious insect -- with no change in matter or overall energy. Sure, matter is subsequently lost
(to that animal), but
before that happens the beetle has already changed,
otherwise the subsequent loss of matter wouldn't
have taken place!
Even more annoying, the above change is part of that beetle's
'development', so this example isn't susceptible to the sort of challenge we met
earlier.
Or, consider another example -- and one that is
perhaps more familiar to most dialecticians than the Bombardier Beetle -- the Widget in certain cans of beer:
"A can of beer is pressurised by adding
liquid nitrogen, which
vaporises and expands in volume after the can is sealed, forcing gas and beer
into the widget's hollow interior through a tiny hole -- the less beer the
better for subsequent head quality. In addition, some nitrogen dissolves in the
beer which also contains dissolved
carbon dioxide.
The presence of dissolved nitrogen allows smaller bubbles
to be formed with consequent greater creaminess of the subsequent head. This is
because the smaller bubbles need a higher internal pressure to balance the
greater
surface tension, which is
inversely proportional to
the radius of the bubbles. Achieving this higher pressure is not possible just
with dissolved carbon dioxide because of the greater solubility of this gas
compared to nitrogen would create an unacceptably large head.
"When the can is opened, the pressure in the can quickly
drops, causing the pressurised gas and beer inside the widget to jet out from
the hole. This agitation on the surrounding beer causes a chain reaction of
bubble formation throughout the beer. The result, when the can is then poured
out, is a surging mixture in the glass of very small gas bubbles and liquid.
This is the case with certain types of draught beer such
as draught stouts. In the case of these draught beers, which before dispensing
also contain a mixture of dissolved nitrogen and carbon dioxide, the agitation
is caused by forcing the beer under pressure through small holes in a restrictor
in the tap. The surging mixture gradually settles to produce a very creamy
head." [Quoted from
here;
several paragraphs merged. Links in the original.]
Once again, we have a change in quality with no
change in quantity to the can and its contents.
It could be argued that there is in fact a difference
in matter and/or energy in this can, namely the removal of the ring pull and the
escape of gases near the
opening. That is undeniable, but is it significant? What causes the change in
quality is the Widget, not the ring pull. This can be seen by the fact that in
cans where there is no Widget, the above doesn't happen.
However, someone could still object that the above
differences in matter/energy are relevant to the subsequent change in quality;
after all, they set in motion those changes.
[This is yet another particular example of the general
point we met in the previous
Sub-section: if DM-fans want to interconnect this and other cans with
further processes in the vicinity, then
there is no way to prevent the absurd inflation described earlier (link
below).]
There are several problems with the above attempted pro-DM-rebuttal:
First, as we saw
earlier, there is no
question-begging way to define the thermodynamic or energy locale of such 'DM-changes'.
Secondly, it is questionable that the removal of a ring pull, and the loss of
small quantities of vapour amounts to the addition/removal of matter or energy
from the beer-Widget ensemble itself. This, naturally, raises issues also
touched on earlier.
What exactly is the DM-"object"
in this case? Until we are told, this attempted pro-DM-rebuttal can't itself succeed. Even after
we have been told what the DM-"object" is here, that will just beg the question (again, as noted
earlier), for it
would then be plain that any new demarcation lines will have been drawn in order to
save this 'Law', making it entirely subjective -- and, incidentally, it would
have been imposed on the facts.
Finally, after the ring pull has been removed, and the small quantity of
vapour has escaped, the ring-pull discarded, the remaining beer-Widget ensemble will undergo a qualitative change
for no new matter or energy input into that system, violating the First
'Law'. Anyone who objects to the 'line' being drawn just there (i.e.,
cordoning-off this system at the Widget-beer boundary just after the ring pull
has been removed) will need to advance objective criteria for it to be
re-drawn somewhere else.
On the other hand, if that boundary is re-drawn to include the
discarded ring pull and
any escaped vapour, then, once more, no new energy or matter will have been
added to that system (i.e., the beer-Widget-ring-pull-vapour ensemble),
even though it will have undergone a qualitative change.
Anyway, the aforementioned ring-pull could be removed
by a battery-operated device stored inside the can, controlled by an internal timer
(or both could be inside a box holding the can itself),
meaning that the resulting change in quality will have been occasioned by no new
energy added to the can-beer-widget-battery-device system (or more specifically
to the
box-can-beer-widget-battery-device system). And, of course, there
are plenty of such systems already in use. For example, electronic alarm clocks
run on internal batteries. When they change in 'quality' from ticking to
ringing, no new matter/energy has been added to the clock-battery system. The same is true of most battery operated devices,
or any system with its own internal energy source -- and that includes motor
vehicles, aeroplanes, rockets, ships, lap-top computers, mobile/cell phones, pacemakers,
battery operated drills, etc., etc.
In every such case, they regularly undergo qualitative change (and some of these can
be quite dramatic) even though no energy or matter has been added to them.
Consider a car travelling along a level road. In order to change in 'quality'
and
turn left, no new energy will be added to that car. Of course, it could be
argued that friction between the road surface and the car will effect that
change, which involves the input of external energy. But, if all things are
interconnected, then the car-road
ensemble itself will experience no new energy input to it. Alternatively, if we draw
the boundary between the car and the road in order to try to save this theory, then
all those earlier unanswered questions
will force themselves on us once more. If we were to agree with DM-theorists
that everything is interconnected then the car can't be isolated from the road
or any forces between that road and that car's wheels. In which case, there
will be no
increase in energy in this new "whole" (i.e., the car-road complex), merely a transfer from one part of
it to
another. On the other hand, if we insist on isolating these two, then not all things are
interconnected. Either we save the First 'Law' by abandoning 'universal
interconnection', or we abandon the First' Law' to save 'universal
interconnection'.
This is one 'either/or' DM-fans can't glibly explain away -- or ignore.
Of course,
that defence can't even be contemplated with respect to battery operated devices.
No new matter or energy is added to a battery operated alarm clock when the
alarm goes off, for example.
It is always possible for DM-fans to try
to advance their overused "relatively-speaking"
defence at this point -- as might happen by the use of a "relatively true",
"relatively stable", or "relatively interconnected" response to the above --, in order to argue that while objects
and processes in nature are interconnected they are also "relatively
isolated" from one another, and so can be regarded as single units
(this perhaps forming part of an
initial abstract analysis of the world and how it changes).
Well, we certainly wouldn't allow defenders of the capitalist system to argue that
wages are "relatively fair", nor would we even so much as countenance
an
argument offered by a Nazi who claimed that Hitler was "relatively nice to the Jews",
and the same is true with regard to the "relatively-speaking" defence
that might be used here used by
a DM-apologist.
That is quite apart
from the fact that even if a "relatively speaking" clause were allowed here,
that would in no way affect what happens in the real world, which doesn't depend
on how we might or might not attempt to parse it. Whether or not a car is
"relatively" isolated from the aforementioned road, the road-car ensemble has no
energy fed into it.
It is also rather
absurd -- if not desperate -- for anyone to try to claim that a road is
"relatively" isolated from any car that is travelling along it!
Be this as it may, Engels had already rejected any attempt to
isolate objects along the above lines:
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay';
for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.]
For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time
be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. [Engels (1976),
p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Bold emphasis added.]
"The great basic thought that the world is
not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but a complex
of processes…." [Engels
(1888), p.609. Italic emphases in the original.]
Which means
that any attempt to isolate, say, a car from the road it is travelling along
would render that attempt -- shock! horror! -- 'metaphysical'.
It could be countered that Engels also argued as follows:
"When we
consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of mankind or our own
intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of
relations and reactions in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but
everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away. This primitive,
naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by
Heraclitus:
everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is
constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.
"But this
conception, correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of
appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details of which this
picture is made up, and so long as we do not understand these, we have not a
clear idea of the whole picture. In order to understand these details we must
detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one
separately, its nature, special causes, effects, etc. This is, primarily,
the task of natural science and historical research: branches of science which
the Greeks of classical times on very good grounds, relegated to a subordinate
position, because they had first of all to collect the material. The beginnings
of the exact natural sciences were first worked out by the Greeks of the
Alexandrian period, and later on, in the Middle Ages, by the Arabs. Real natural
science dates from the second half of the fifteenth century, and thence onward
it has advanced with constantly increasing rapidity. The analysis of nature
into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and
objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organic bodies
in their manifold forms -- these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic
strides in our knowledge of nature that have been made during the last four
hundred years." [Engels (1976),
pp.24-25. Bold emphases added.]
Indeed, while Engels did say this, he immediately added
the following:
"But this
method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects
and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole;
of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constants, not as essentially
variables, in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at
things was transferred by
Bacon
and
Locke from natural science to philosophy,
it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the preceding
centuries." [Ibid.,
p.25. Bold and links emphases added.]
And soon after that we
meet a passage already quoted:
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.]
For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time
be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. [Ibid.,
p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Bold emphasis added.]
So, only if DM-fans want to abandon this "great basic thought", and revert to
thinking "metaphysically", will they try to isolate objects in this way.
Independently of this -- and irrespective of what DM-theorists think they
must assume at the first
stage of any analysis --, it is worth underling the following point once again: unless
dialecticians are committed to the idea that what they
know or must assume can actually affect processes in the real world, so that what
they know,
or can assume, makes it true that pans of water, for instance, aren't in fact
connected with anything (or are 'relatively disconnected' from them), this
spurious defence can't work. Even if it might seem to some DM-fans that a pan of
water is
'relatively isolated' -- or, even if they have to assume it in order to make a
start in any analysis of the phenomena -- in the real world, if DM-interconnectivity is
a valid theory (and
it isn't just an easy and
convenient way for DM-fans to imagine they sound profound), pans of water are interconnected with
their surroundings, and with the forces that brought them into existence, as are
the power systems we use to heat them (etc.).
On that basis, whether we like it or
not, whether we know it or not, if DM is true, pans of water and power systems
(and much else besides) are interconnected in this way. Our level of
knowledge, the extent of our ignorance, or even the subjective requirements of
analysis, have
no bearing on what actually happens in the real world. So, the "relatively-speaking" defence is, at best, a stalling tactic, and the above
anti-DM points
still stand.
[However, I have discussed this topic at length, and
in depth, in Essay Eleven Parts
One and
Two, so the
reader is directed there for more details. Incidentally, my acceptance of local
inter-connectivity in no way contradicts my demolition of 'universal
interconnection' in Essay Eleven.]
It is worth adding at this point that the nature of
state of
matter transitions isn't being questioned in this Essay -- only whether
all of them are sudden
or 'nodal'.
The picture nature presents us with in
connection with phase and state of matter changes are highly complex,
which is one of the reasons why Engels's 'Laws' can't possibly capture its
intricacy,
regardless of their other fatal defects.
Indeed, as we
have also seen above, either the 'nodal' aspect of the First 'Law' is defective, or it
only works in some cases, not others, in which case, it can't be a law.
In fact, Physicists tell us that what they
call "second-order" Phase Transitions can proceed smoothly. As
one online source informs us:
"Second-orderphase transitions, on the other hand, proceed smoothly. The old phase transforms
itself into the new phase in a continuous manner."
[See also
here
-- where we will find that "first order" phase change isn't straight-forward, either.]
Moreover, under certain
conditions
it is possible to by-pass phase transformations altogether. [More on that later.]
In addition, it is important to distinguish between states of
matter and phases (a distinction DM-fans in general appear to
ignore):
"Phases are sometimes confused with
states of matter, but
there are significant differences. States of matter refers to the differences
between gases, liquids, solids, etc. If there are two regions in a chemical
system that are in different states of matter, then they must be different
phases. However, the reverse is not true -- a system can have multiple phases
which are in equilibrium with each other and also in the same state of matter.
For example,
diamond
and
graphite
are both solids but they are different phases, even though their composition may
be identical. A system with oil and water at room temperature will be two
different phases of differing composition, but both will be the liquid state of
matter." [Quoted from
here.]
On another page we
read the following:
"States of matter are sometimes confused withphases. This is likely due to the fact that in many
example systems, the familiar phase transitions are also transformations of the
state of matter. In the example of water, the phases of ice, liquid water, and
water vapour are commonly recognized. The common phase transitions observed in a
one component system containing only water are
melting/solidification
(liquid/solid),
evaporation/condensation
(liquid/gas) and
sublimation/deposition(solid/gas).
"Transitions between different states of matter
of the same chemical component are necessarily a phase transformation, but not
all phase transformations involve a change in the state of matter. For example,
there are 14 different forms of ice, all of which are the solid state of matter.
When one form of ice transforms into another, the crystal structure, density,
and a number of physical properties change, but it remains a solid." [Quoted
from
here.
Bold emphasis added. This article has been substantially altered since it was
first accessed. Parts of the original can be found
here,
others
here.]
Here
is a slightly clearer explanation of the difference:
"Basic physics simply tells us about the primary states of matter, namely;
solid, liquid, gas, and plasma. In many occasions, the term 'phase' is also used
similarly as the word 'state.' However, the phases of matter and states of
matter are two different things as they are used in different contexts. Phases
of matter can be described depending on either the region of space to which
there are uniform physical properties or the types of molecular movements
observed at dissimilar temperatures.
"As mentioned, there are four basic states; solid, liquid, gas, and then plasma.
In some resources there are even more. The solid state of matter has its
molecules tightly vibrating onto each other that they seem to be in a fixed
state. Because of this, solid matter is described as rigid and takes a specific
form or shape. For the liquid state of matter, the molecules are looser as
compared to the molecules of solid matter. The molecules are just far enough
apart that they slide against each other. This is the reason why liquids,
although not having a definite shape, still take the form of its holding
container. And so they have a specific volume. Gaseous matter has more loose
molecules that are freely spread apart from each other. That's why their volume
and shape are not that specific. The newer state -- plasma, is said to be
situated only at the core and outer galactic atmospheres of the stars.
"The phase of matter with respect to molecular motion, temperature or heat plays
an integral role. For example, an ice cube (in its solid state) undergoes a
phase change/transition as it melts and becomes liquid water. The molecules of
the ice cube were heated enough to the point where their bonded position has
been overcome thereby making it looser. Hence, it is now in its liquid phase.
When more heat is present to evaporate the water, then it goes into its gaseous
state as its molecules move more liberally.
"The phase of matter can also be its region of space in a physical system. Let's
say there is a sealed plastic container with ice and water inside. This is a
simple physical
system wherein three phases are present: the cubes belong to one phase,
water is the second phase, and then water vapour settling on top of liquid water
is the third phase. The same is true with water and oil. These two substances
have different degrees of solubility specifically broken further into the
hydrophobic (non-polar) substance and the
hydrophilic
(polar) substance. Water is the polar substance that will immediately separate
itself from oil (a non-polar substance). Both liquids have weak solubilities
against each other placing them in different phases.
"Summary:
"1. 'States of matter' is a more specific and precise term than 'phases of
matter.'
"2. State of matter is the state of a particular compound in a physical system
whereas phase is a set of states within such a system.
"3. Phases of matter can refer to the types of molecular motion.
"4. Phases of matter can refer to a certain region in space." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 10/10/2016. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Some links removed, some added. Spelling
modified to agree with UK English.]
From
the above it is plain that there can be phase changes while the supposed
"quality" (e.g., solidity) remains the same! It isn't easy to see how that fact can be made consistent with the
First 'Law'.
Another Wikipedia
article points out the following:
"In general, two different states of a system are
in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties
while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in
the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt
changes." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added. Again, this page has also been altered since it was first
accessed.]
This Harvard University source says more-or-less the same:
"In the physical sciences, a phase is a set
of states of a macroscopic physical system that have relatively uniform chemical
composition and physical properties. A straightforward way to describe phase is
'a state of matter which is chemically uniform, physically distinct, and (often)
mechanically separable.' Ice cubes floating on water are a clear example of two
phases of water at equilibrium. In general, two different states of a system are
in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties
while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in
the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt
changes. There are, however, exceptions to this statement, such as the
liquid-gas critical point. Moreover, a phase diagram is a type of graph used to
show the equilibrium conditions between the thermodynamically-distinct phases.
Common components of a phase diagram are lines of equilibrium or phase
boundaries, which refer to the lines that demarcate where phase transitions
occur. A triple point is, in a pressure-temperature phase diagram, the unique
intersection of the lines of equilibrium between three states of matter, usually
solid, liquid, and gas." [Quoted from
here; accessed 10/10/2016. Bold emphasis added. Spelling modified to accord
with UK English. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
So,
it is plain that some "qualitative" changes are non-"nodal",
since
"two states are in the same phase if they can be transformed into one
another without any abrupt changes."
[Emphasis added.]
Indeed, the situation is even more complicated still:
"In the
diagram, the phase boundary between liquid and gas does not continue
indefinitely. Instead, it terminates at a point on the phase diagram called the
critical point. At
temperatures and pressure above the critical point, the physical property
differences that differentiate the liquid phase from the gas phase become less
defined. This reflects the fact that, at extremely high temperatures and
pressures, the liquid and gaseous phases become indistinguishable. In water,
the critical point occurs at around 647K
(374°C or 705°F) and
22.064
MPa." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added.]
"In
physical chemistry,
thermodynamics,
chemistry
and
condensed matter physics,
a critical point, also called a critical state, specifies the
conditions (temperature, pressure) at which the liquid
state
of the matter
ceases to exist. As a liquid is heated, its density decreases while the pressure
and density of the vapour being formed increases. The liquid and vapour
densities become closer and closer to each other until the critical temperature
is reached where the two densities are equal and the liquid-gas line or phase
boundary disappears. Additionally, as the equilibrium between liquid and gas
approaches the critical point,
heat of vaporization
approaches zero, becoming zero at and beyond the critical point. More generally,
the critical point is the point of termination of a
phase equilibrium
curve, which separates two distinct phases. At this point, the phases are no
longer distinguishable." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added. Spelling modified to conform with UK English.]
Again, the second of the above Wikipedia pages has
been altered since it was originally consulted.
However, what the latter had to say is confirmed by
this comment from a specialist site:
"At T6
the two phases cannot be distinguished any more. This point in the p-T-diagram
is called the critical point. The distinction between gas and liquid
cannot be made any more. From the critical point on we call both phases
together the liquid phase in contrast to the solid phase." [Quoted
from
here; accessed 23/02/2015. Bold emphases alone added.]
That can
only mean qualitative differences between the
liquid and gaseous phases of water are energy-neutral beyond this "critical point",
contradicting Engels.
And,
here is what a standard Physical Chemistry textbook had to say:
"[W]e must distinguish the
thermodynamic
description of a phase transition and the rate at which the
transition occurs. A transition that is predicted from thermodynamics to be
spontaneous may occur too slowly to be significant in practice. For instance, at
normal temperatures and pressures the
molar
Gibbs energy
of graphite is lower than that of diamond, so there is a
thermodynamic tendency for diamond to change into graphite. However, for this
transformation to take place, the C[arbon] atoms must change their locations,
which is an immeasurably slow process in a solid except at high temperatures."
[Atkins and de Paula (2006), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
In that case, nature (i.e., the real material world,
not the Ideal world Hegel and Engels dreamt up) is far more complex than
Engels's Mickey Mouse 'Law' would have
us believe. Once more, not every change is "nodal".
Indeed, scientists in the USA recently reported they had
discovered a new state of matter, which, while being solid, appears to behave
like a liquid (so, here we would have a change of quality with no change in quantity):
"In the 15 January 2004 issue of the journal
Nature, two physicists from Penn State University will announce their
discovery of a new phase of matter, a 'supersolid' form of
helium-4
with the extraordinary frictionless-flow properties of a superfluid. 'We
discovered that solid helium-4 appears to behave like a superfluid when it is so
cold that the laws of quantum mechanics govern its behaviour,' says
Moses
H. W. Chan, Evan Pugh Professor of Physics at Penn State. 'We apparently
have observed, for the first time, a solid material with the characteristics of
a superfluid.'
"'The possible discovery of a new phase of
matter, a supersolid, is exciting and, if confirmed, would be a significant
advance,' comments John Beamish, professor of physics at the University of
Alberta and the author of a review of Chan's discovery published in the 'News
and Views' section of Nature. 'If the behaviour is confirmed, there are
enough questions to be answered about the nature and properties of supersolid
helium to keep
both experimentalists and theorists busy for a long time.'...
"'Something very unusual occurred when the
temperature dropped to one-tenth of a degree above
absolute
zero,' Chan says. 'The oscillation rate suddenly became slightly more rapid,
as if some of the helium had disappeared.' However, Chan and Kim were able to
confirm that the helium atoms had not leaked out of the experimental capsule
because its rate of oscillation returned to normal after they warmed the capsule
above one-tenth of a degree above absolute zero. So they concluded that the
solid helium-4 probably had acquired the properties of a superfluid when the
conditions were more extreme....
"If Chan's experiment is replicated, it would
confirm that all three states of matter can enter into the "super" state, known
as a
Bose-Einstein condensation, in which all the particles have condensed into
the same quantum-mechanical state. The existence of superfluid and 'supervapor'
had previously been proven, but theorists had continued to debate about whether
a supersolid was even possible. 'One of the most intriguing predictions of the
theory of quantum mechanics is the possibility of superfluid behaviour in a
solid-phase material, and now we may have observed this behaviour for the first
time,' Chan says." [Science
Daily, 15/01/2004. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site; spelling changed to agree with UK English. Added
February, 2015: It should be pointed out that further work has thrown some of
the above conclusions into considerable doubt;
work is
continuing
to prove the existence of supersolids -- on that, see below.]
The
above was published in 2004, and was subjected to some criticism, but later
work seems to have confirmed the results; here is the New Scientist from
2010:
"New
evidence that weird quantum supersolid exists
"By Kate McAlpine
"The first
supersolid -- a ghostly, quantum form of matter in which a solid
flows, frictionless, through itself -- was reportedly made in 2004.
But a debate has raged ever since over whether the researchers
involved had simply misinterpreted their results. Now two new
studies suggest that genuine supersolids have been made after all.
"According to quantum theory,
supersolidity should kick in at very low temperatures. In a solid,
atoms are bound together in a regular lattice, keeping their
structure rigid under normal circumstances. But if you cool some
solids close to absolute zero, they should become frictionless,
flowing supersolids, while retaining their lattice structure. In the
original experiment,
Eunseong Kim -- now of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science
and Technology in Daejeon, South Korea -- and
Moses Chan of Pennsylvania State
University in University Park cooled and pressurised liquid helium
until the atoms were forced into a crystal lattice. They then made a cylinder filled
with this solid helium spin one way and then the other, over and
over again. As they cooled it, the cylinder switched direction more
frequently. The researchers concluded that some of the helium was
standing completely still, reducing the mass that was rotating along
with the cylinder and allowing it to switch more quickly. They
assumed that this was because some of the helium had
become frictionless due to supersolidity....
"Earlier this year, however, this
interpretation was challenged by
John Reppy of Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. He
suggested that the reason the cylinder switched more quickly at
lower temperature was because the helium had become a wobbly 'quantum
plastic', a previously unknown phase of matter that is distinct
from a supersolid. The increased elasticity of this new material
allowed the cylinder to more easily reverse its rotation, he said.
"To test whether Reppy was right,
Kim spun the larger apparatus in which the cylinder sits: the
apparatus spun in just one direction, while the cylinder spun one
way, then the other, as it had before. He reasoned that elasticity
should affect only how quickly the cylinder switched direction, not
its actual spinning rate. Therefore if Reppy was right, and the
solid helium was a quantum plastic, adding a constant underlying
rotation should not change the results. His team found, however, that it
did. Unlike in the original experiment, the direction switches did
not get faster with a falling temperature. The best way to explain
this, says Kim, is if the helium is indeed supersolid. That’s
because, in a supersolid, the constant rotation should cause
vortices to form, rather as in a liquid, disturbing the material’s
quantum properties, and reducing the supersolidity....
"In a tantalising coincidence,
Yaroslav Lutsyshyn of the Polytechnic University of Catalonia in
Barcelona, Spain, and his colleagues have just found
further evidence of supersolidity. Theory suggests that
supersolid helium flows because holes form in the crystal lattice.
Lutsyshyn's team experimented with how likely these holes were to
form under different pressures; and it turned out that the pressure
under which holes formed most easily matched that at which Kim and
Chan identified the largest proportion of supersolid helium in their
system.
"'It's like rabbit ears sticking
out of the grass,' says Lutsyshyn of his team's results. He also
holds that the experiment by Kim's team is strong evidence -- but
not full proof -- that the solid helium contains a supersolid. Reppy, however, remains
unconvinced that Kim's most recent work rules out quantum plasticity
as the cause of the apparent supersolid effects. He disputes Kim's
assumption that the extra energy added by rotating the whole
apparatus would not affect the rate at which a quantum plastic
switches. 'I'm now fairly certain that the large supersolid signals
that they were seeing are manifestations of the elastic properties,'
he says." [Quoted from
here; accessed 10/10/2016. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs
merged.]
The change
described in that article is sudden (whoever claimed that some
changes weren't?); while that particular aspect of the First 'Law' has been
partially confirmed
in this instance, the
main part (where Engels said it was impossible to alter the quality of an
object/process without the addition or subtraction of matter or energy) has
been refuted by the possible discovery of such
superfluids/supervapors, and now by these
supersolids;
moreover, the substance
in question remained Helium either side of this change.
It
needs to be added that conclusive proof of the existence of supersolids has yet
to be found.
Update, May 2018: The Science Alert website had this to say:
"Physicist Say
They've Created
an 'Impossible'
New Form of
Matter:
Supersolids
"The most
compelling
evidence yet
that supersolids
exist.
"Fiona MacDonald
3 MAR 2017
"Our world just
got a little
stranger, with
physicists
claiming they've
successfully
created a brand
new 'impossible'
form of matter
in the lab --
supersolids,
which have
properties of
both liquids and
solids at the
same time.
Scientists have
predicted that
this exotic
state of matter
could exist for
more than 50
years, but no
one had been
able to
demonstrate that
it's actually
possible. Now,
two independent
teams of
physicists have
used different
techniques to
achieve the same
odd result --
what they claim
are the first
examples of
supersolid
matter. There's
sure to be
controversy over
whether these
new experiments
unequivocally
demonstrate a
supersolid state
-- especially
after a similar
claim in 2004
went on to be
debunked -- but
this is the most
compelling
evidence yet
that supersolids
could actually
exist.
"For those who
aren't familiar
with just how
bizarre that is,
a 'supersolid'
is a strange
state of matter
that has the
crystalline
structure of a
solid, while
flowing like a
liquid
--something
that's pretty
contradictory
when it comes to
traditional
physics.
Usually, matter
exists in just
four simple
states: solid,
liquid, gas, and
plasma. These
states arise
depending on
conditions such
as temperature
and pressure,
and are defined
by the
arrangements of
particles within
the matter.
What's weird
about the
supersolid state
of matter is
that the
particles are
arranged in a
rigid, solid
structure, but
then it can also
flow without
viscosity -- or
'stickiness' --
which is a key
characteristic
of a
superfluid.
"'It is
counterintuitive
to have a
material which
combines
superfluidity
and solidity,'
said lead
researcher of
one of the teams
behind the
discovery,
Wolfgang
Ketterle from
MIT. If your
coffee was
superfluid and
you stirred it,
it would
continue to spin
around forever.'
Supersolids were
first predicted
by Russian
physicists back
in 1969, who
hypothesised
that a helium-4
isotope could
display solid
and liquid
properties
simultaneously,
under certain
conditions. For
a long time,
researchers
generally
assumed that it
would be
impossible to
create such a
structure -- but
that didn't stop
some from
trying.
"A breakthrough
came in 2004,
when
Pennsylvania
State University
researchers
cooled helium to
less than
one-tenth of a
degree above
absolute zero
(around -273
degrees Celsius)
and stumbled
upon what might
have been a
supersolid
state. As
Bec Crew
reported for us
last year,
the team wasn't
confident enough
to say they'd
actually made a
supersolid,
seeing as they
couldn't rule
out the
possibility that
a thin layer of
liquid had snuck
inside the
container and
skewed their
results. Several
experiments in
the decade that
followed
further debunked the
idea that a
supersolid had
been made, by
showing that
helium-4 has a
type of 'quantum
plasticisity'
(sic) under
certain
situations,
which isn't
caused by
supersolidity.
"Most of the
science
community pretty
much decided
that the 2004
sample wasn't an
example of a
real supersolid,
and for the past
few years the
field has been
pretty quiet on
the subject.
But then in
November,
not one, but two
independent
teams both
declared in
pre-print papers
that they'd done
it -- they'd
managed to
create
supersolids in
the lab. The
researchers are
from MIT in
Cambridge,
Massachusetts,
and ETH Zurich
in Switzerland,
and although
they both had
different
processes, the
team had both
used a strange
type of gas
known as a
Bose-Einstein
condensate to
create their
supersolids.
Bose-Einstein
condensates are
a
fifth state of
matter that
appear at
ultra-cold
temperatures,
where atoms
behave like
waves.
"They have
unique
properties of
their own, but
what's good
about using a
Bose-Einstein
condensate to
create a
supersolid is
that it's
already a
superfluid, so
it's halfway
there. The team
took these
ultra-cold gases
and used
slightly
different
techniques to
coax them into a
quantum phase of
matter with a
rigid structure
like a solid,
but the ability
to flow like a
superfluid. At
the time, the
two teams
published their
results on the
pre-print server
arXiv.org. And
now they've both
been
peer-reviewed
and published
in Nature (here
and
here), offering
the most
substantial
evidence to date
that supersolids
are real.
"The Swiss
researchers were
able to achieve
this by taking a
small amount of
rubidium gas and
putting it in a
vacuum chamber,
where they
cooled it to a
few billionths
of a kelvin
about absolute
zero, causing
them to form a
Bose-Einstein
condensate. The
team then put
this condensate
in device with
two optical
resonance
chambers, each
consisting of
two tiny
opposing
mirrors.
Using lasers,
the particles
eventually
adopted a
regular,
crystal-like
structure,
indicative of a
solid. But the
condensate also
retained its
superfluid
properties --
they were able
to flow without
any energy
input, which
isn't possible
in a normal
solid.
"'We were able
to produce this
special state in
the lab thanks
to a
sophisticated
setup that
allowed us to
make the two
resonance
chambers
identical for
the atoms,' one
of the ETH
Zurich team,
Tilman
Esslinger,
told Phys.org.
The MIT team
took a different
approach -- they
used a
combination of
laser and
evaporative
cooling methods
to turn sodium
atoms into a
Bose-Einstein
Condensate. They
then used lasers
to also
manipulate it
into a
crystalline
solid
arrangement by
creating density
variations in
the atoms.
Although the
process was
different, the
end result was
the same as the
Swiss team's --
solid matter
that flowed like
a superfluid.
The fact that
the results has
been verified by
two teams at the
same time makes
it even more
compelling that
these
supersolids are
the real deal.
"'It's certainly
the first case
where you can
unambiguously
look at a system
and say this is
both a
superfluid and a
solid,' Sarang
Gopalakrishnan from
the City
University of
New York, who
wasn't involved
in the research,
told Science
News back in
November. It's
likely there
will now be a
new round of
independent
testing and
verifying, to
make sure that
what has been
produced can
really be called
a supersolid.
There's the
argument that
because the team
used
Bose-Einstein
Condensates
rather than
helium-4 to
create the state
of matter, it
could be seen as
'cheating'. But
it's definitely
our most
compelling
evidence to date
that supersolids
exist. So what
does a potential
new state of
matter for the
rest of us?
Right now, not
much. The fact
that these
materials can
only exist at
extremely low
temperatures in
ultrahigh-vacuum
conditions means
they're not very
useful at the
moment.
"But a further
understanding of
the strange
state of matter
could lead to
improvements in
superconductors
-- incredibly
useful materials
that conduct
electricity
without
resistance.
'With our cold
atoms, we are
mapping out what
is possible in
nature,'
said Ketterle.
'Now that we
have
experimentally
proven that the
theories
predicting
supersolids are
correct, we hope
to inspire
further
research,
possibly with
unanticipated
results.'
Although the
fact that two
teams have both
made this claim
at the same time
might sound
competitive, the
reality is that
both research
groups welcome
the validation
and feedback
from each other.
'The
simultaneous
realisation by
two groups shows
how big the
interest is in
this new form of
matter,'
Ketterle added."
[Quoted from
here;
accessed
27/05/2018.
Quotation marks
altered to
conform with the
conventions
adopted at this
site; many
paragraphs
merged. Minor
typos corrected.
Links in the
original, bold
emphasis added.]
Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed
that "the particles eventually adopted a regular, crystal-like structure,
indicative of a solid. But the condensate also retained its superfluid
properties -- they were able to flow without any energy input, which
isn't possible in a normal solid", contradicting Engels. [Bold added.]
Update, April 2020: We now read the
following:
"Physicists prove the existence of a
supersolid state of matter
"A supersolid is a state of matter that can
be described in simplified terms as being solid and liquid at the same time.
In recent years, extensive efforts have been devoted to the detection of this
exotic quantum matter. A research team led by Tilman Pfau and Tim Langen at the
5th Institute of Physics of the University of Stuttgart has succeeded in proving
experimentally that the long-sought supersolid state of matter exists. In our
everyday lives, we are familiar with matter existing in three different states:
solid, liquid, or gas. However, if matter is cooled down to extremely low
temperatures, quantum effects can also enable other states of matter. This
includes superfluids, which are characterized by a frictionless flow of atoms.
"Moreover, in the quantum world, particles
can exist in superpositions of being unpredictably and randomly in two different
locations. It had long been conjectured that even superpositions of states of
matter are possible. According to these ideas, known states of matter, such as
solid or fluid, can thus be superimposed to form new states of matter with new
properties. A supersolid is exactly such a superposition state, and features
both the crystalline structure of a solid and the frictionless flow of a
superfluid. In such a state every atom is unpredictably and randomly
either part of the solid or of the superfluid.
"In the experiments in Stuttgart, the
supersolid is generated from
dysprosium
atoms that behave like tiny magnets. These atoms are cooled down to near
absolute zero (-273°Celsius). At this point, two types of interaction between
atoms become important: if two atoms come very close together, they collide like
billiard balls. At the same time, they can attract or repel each other over
larger distances due to the magnetic interaction. To generate a supersolid, the
researchers adjusted the relationship between these two forces such that a
crystalline lattice structure and superfluidity are created simultaneously. 'We
were able to observe the periodicity of the crystal directly with a microscope,
and tested the quantum mechanical superposition through interference
experiments' explain Mingyang Guo and Fabian Böttcher, postdoc and doctoral
student at the experiment.
"Detection by
means of sound waves
"The definitive proof that the matter created
in the experiment is indeed a supersolid is based on the observation of two
kinds of sound waves that travel through the supersolid at different speeds.
Such sound waves propagate differently in different materials -- in air, for
example, sound waves travel much slower than in water. This 'normal' sound wave
is also present in the supersolid. However, because the supersolid is at the
same time solid and fluid, a characteristic second form of sound wave can be
observed, in which the crystal and the superfluid move against each other. This
results in sound waves that travel at very low speeds, which the researchers in
Stuttgart were able to observe for the first time in their experiment.
"In recent years, several observations of a
supersolid have been reported, but it later turned out that only one form of
sound wave was present. 'Using our experiment with ultracold dysprosium atoms,
we have now succeeded for the first time in observing simultaneously all
defining properties of a supersolid state' Tilman Pfau summarizes. The
experiments in Stuttgart now open up the possibility to study the exotic
properties of this new state of matter in unprecedented detail." [Quoted from
here; accessed 02/04/2020. Several paragraphs merged. Some bold emphases and
link added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
Update, June 2021: Science Daily has this to say:
"Scrambled
supersolids: Soft form of a solid discovered
"Supersolids
are fluid and solid at the same time.
Physicists have for the first time
investigated what happens when such a state is brought out of balance. They
discovered a soft form of a solid of high interest for science. Researchers
report that they were also able to reverse the process and restore
supersolidity.
"Last year, more than fifty years
after initial theoretical proposals, researchers in Pisa, Stuttgart and
Innsbruck independently succeeded for the first time in creating so-called
supersolids using ultracold quantum gases of highly magnetic lanthanide atoms.
This state of matter is, in a sense, solid and liquid at the same time.
'Due to quantum effects, a very cold gas of atoms can spontaneously develop both
a crystalline order of a solid crystal and particle flow like a superfluid
quantum liquid, i.e. a fluid able to flow without any friction' explains
Francesca Ferlaino from the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information
of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Department of Experimental Physics
at the University of Innsbruck. 'Much simplified, a dipolar supersolid can be
imagined as a chain of quantum droplets which communicate with each other via a
superfluid background bath,' says Thierry Giamarchi, theoretical physicist from
the University of Geneva....
"In Nature Physics, the researchers now
report how such a supersolid state reacts if the superfluid bath between the
droplets is drained by control of the external magnetic field. 'We were able to
show that without the bath the droplets quickly lose knowledge about each other
and start to behave like small independent quantum systems -- they dephase. The
supersolid turns into a normal solid,' says Maximilian Sohmen from Francecsa
Ferlaino's team. 'This "solid", however, is still soft, it can wobble and
support many collective excitations, called phonons,' adds Philipp Ilzhöfer from
the Innsbruck team. 'This makes this state a very interesting but complex
subject of study with strong connections to solid-state physics and other
fields.'
"Maybe surprisingly, the Innsbruck physicists were
also able to reverse this dephasing process: When they replenished the
background bath, the droplets renewed their communication by particle tunnelling
and re-established supersolidity." [Quoted from
here; accessed 15/06/2021. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Some bold emphases added. Italics in
the original.]
Phase
changes occur with no addition of matter or energy, according to the above.
Update, July 2024: Earlier this year,
Chemistry World
reported that there is increasing evidence supersolids do in fact exist.
Be
this as it may, it is entirely unclear whether the term "quality" -- as
that term is
used by dialecticians -- means the same as "state
of matter" or even, "phase",
especially as it appears in such surroundings.
Either way, the substances involved, whether or not they are in different phases or states,
almost always remain the same substance. So, in that sense, if "quality" is defined in terms of
the nature of such substances (in conformity with what Hegel and
Aristotle
had to say about them
-- on that, see here), it is
clear that even though these might be phase/state of matter changes, they can't count as qualitative changes
of the right sort, since they remain the same throughout.
Howsoever
slowly or quickly aluminium melts or solidifies, for example, it remains
aluminium. The same is the case when Nitrogen or Oxygen are frozen into
liquid or even sold form, they remain Nitrogen and Oxygen throughout.
Now, has a single DM-supporter ever given any thought to that
awkward fact? Or even acknowledged it?
Moreover, as noted above, until we are told the exact length of a dialectical
"node", the First 'Law' can't be considered anything other than a vague
(even 'subjective') rule-of-thumb -- at best. If
"nodal" points each turn out to be several minutes long, for
instance, then many of the examples
to which dialecticians refer would cease to be "nodal". On the other hand, if they last, say,
only a
few nanoseconds, none of these examples would survive as such.
Nevertheless, the bemused reader
will scour the
DM-literature till the cows next evolve, and to no avail for any hint of clarity or precision in this
regard. Indeed, DM has been so amateurishly and carelessly cobbled-together that
these considerations
won't even have occurred to the vast majority of DM-fans. And, even now
(should they read this), the latter won't even register. They will either ignore
them or simply hand-wave them aside as pedantic irrelevances -- so
sloppy and atrophied have their thought processes become. [On 'pedantry', see
here.]
We
can be thankful that scientists aren't so slap-dash. Can any of my readers imagine a Physicist
waving aside as irrelevant or pedantic questions being asked about the timing or duration of, say, a nuclear reaction? One
imagines that if ever the Olympics are organised by these cavalier dialecticians,
everyone would get Gold since precise timing and careful observation are both a 'pedantic irrelevance'.
In
that case, it is to be hoped that DM-fans are never given the opportunity to run an ambulance service -- and are allowed nowhere near a demolition
site.
[The above was written before I had read this. On
that, see Note 001a.]
But, worse is to come: as we saw
earlier, the aforementioned
reverse, "vice versa" codicil attached by Engels
to this 'Law' renders it totally useless -- if not completely crazy --, since it
suggests, for instance, that qualitative change can create quantitative
material change. Consider the following example of Trotsky's:
"A housewife knows that a
certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the
soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in
cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into
quality…." [Trotsky (1971),
p.106.]
Engels's vice versa
codicil suggests that a change in quality from "palatable" to "too salty"
is somehow able to produce an increase in the salt content of soup!
That isn't an unsympathetic
interpretation of this 'Law' on my part, for, as we have seen, Engels himself signed up to it:
"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else.
It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from
quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is
reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as
quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place."
[Engels (1954),
p.253. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
So did
George Novack:
"The
dialectical process of development does not end with the transformation of
quantity into quality…. The process continues in the opposite direction and
converts new quality into new quantity." [Novack (1971), p.92. Bold
emphasis added.]
Trotsky,
too:
"Logic involves unchanging
qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities. Dialectics is
constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the reverse." [Trotsky
(1986), p.87. Bold added.]
This suggests that changes in quality are
capable of
creating a quantitative change -- that is, that new matter or energy can be
produced
by a qualitative change! Is there any other sensible way of interpreting the
above?
If in forward gear, if the addition or
subtraction of new matter of itself creates qualitative change, then, in
reverse gear, qualitative change must of itself add or subtract new matter/energy!
Matter or energy must be created or destroyed by qualitative change!
Hence, in
this case, the vice versa codicil implies that a
qualitative change from, say, acceptable soup to unpalatable soup would in
effect produce
a quantitative pay-off: it must cause soup to have more salt in
it! Clearly this magic trick will be of interest to those who still (foolishly)
think that matter and energy can't be created or destroyed. There
seems to be no other way of reading the vice versa codicil -- except as just
such a 'metaphysical blank cheque'.
It could be objected that such a
qualitative change will have been produced by a quantitative increase in
salt. But, that is just the First 'Law'
applied in forward gear, as it were. If we apply that 'Law' in reverse, as
Engels says we can, then we can't appeal to a quantitative increase leading to a qualitative change,
but
must appeal to a qualitative development inducing a quantitative change -- that is,
that a change in taste is able to create salt out of thin air!
Be
this as it may, it is worth examining
Trotsky's
anecdote more closely in its own terms, since it will help expose the many
serious errors and confusions that afflict what few examples dialecticians have scraped
together to illustrate this ramshackle 'Law.'
"Every individual is a
dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A
housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that
added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman
guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of
quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on
the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and
birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the
first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes
that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox
are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All
this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic
and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather
expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense
the universe is permeated with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky
(1971),
pp.106-07.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
[We
have already found there is
a total lack of clarity in passages like this concerning the nature and extent of the 'dialectical body' to
which matter or energy has supposedly been added or from which it has been
subtracted.]
But, what exactly did Trotsky imagine the change of
'quantity' into
'quality' to be, here?
Does
an increase in the quantity of salt alter that salt's own
quality? Presumably not. Does the quantity of soup
even change? Perhaps only
marginally as salt is added. But even then the quantity of soup isn't what allegedly
changes the quality of the soup; that is supposed to have been the result
of the quantity of salt added.
In fact,
the quantity of the original soup hasn't actually changed, merely the quantity of the
salt/soup mixture; and neither has the quality of the salt altered (just its alleged
quantity, in the soup).
What appears to have happened (in this less than half-formed
'thought experiment') is this: the addition (to the soup) of too much salt is
supposed to have changed the taste of the resulting salt/soup mixture as perceived by the taster. Hence, at a certain ("nodal") point, a further
increase in the quantity of salt alters the quality (i.e., the taste) of the soup, so that its
acceptability has changed either side of that "leap".
But, once more, even here, the
increased quantity of salt has not passed over into any change in
itsown quality. What has occurred is that one quality (a palatable taste) has
morphed into another quality (an unpalatable taste) as a result of a
quantitative change made to one ingredient (salt) added to the salt/soup mixture. So, a
certain
quality of the soup has changed from being acceptable to being
unacceptable as a result of the increased quantity of salt that the mixture
now contains.
However, the relevant quality of the added salt remains the same no matter
how much is added. Salt is (largely)
Sodium Chloride, and it tastes salty whether it is delivered by the spoon, the bucket
or the train-load. In that case, neither the quantity nor the quality of the
salt has "passed over" into anything inthe salt itself.
There
doesn't therefore seem to be
anything in the opening part of this
story for that particular aspect of the salt to "pass over" into.
Consequently, the first half of this 'Law' (the 'increase in quantity' clause)
is either mis-stated or doesn't applyto the substance being
added, thesalt.
As
far as the second half is concerned (i.e., the alleged alteration in the quality either
of the salt or the soup), the postulated change relates to the taste of the
soup. But, manifestly, the soup remains salty no matter how much salt is
poured in, as we saw. What we seem to have here is this soup becomes
increasingly salty as more salt is added.
So, what qualitative change is meant to
have occurred? Again, it looks like the change relates to the acceptability of the
taste of the soup as perceived by the taster. Hence, at or slightly
beyond the alleged "nodal" point, the taste of the soup becomes
objectionable. But, this particular change is confined to the one doing the tasting,
not the soup.
Manifestly, it isn't
the soup that alters in this respect; soups do not taste themselves, or
perceive their own taste. Tasters experience tastes; tastes exist in
tasters, not soups. On one side of the "nodal" point the soup is objectively salty (i.e., it
contains dissolved salt); on the other side it is still objectively
salty, but with more salt in it. The difference is that on one side the taster
tolerated the taste and continued to like it, but on the other side the taste
became intolerable and the cook ceased to enjoy what she was sampling. This means that the soup
itself hasn't actually changed in this respect, merely the taster's
appreciation of it. The relevant change occurs in her not the soup.
It
now seems that a change in the quantity (of salt) doesn't
actually affect the soup –- except, perhaps, its volume (very slightly)
and its composition as a salt/soup mixture. No matter how much salt is dumped
into the soup it remains just that, a salt/soup mixture, only with higher
proportions of salt -– and that remains the case even at the limit where
the soup perhaps turns into sludge or a semi-solid lump, or whatever. A million tons of salt can't
change that.8a
Consequently, even with
respect to the relevant quality (i.e., soup as soup), the concoction doesn't change (or, at
least, not in a way that is relevant to Trotsky's purposes). Hence, a change in
the quantity of salt hasn't "passed over" into a change in the quality of the
soup (as soup), which means that the second part of this 'Law' (the
change in 'quality' part) seems to be defective, too.
If there is a qualitative change
anywhere at all that is relevant to the point Trotsky was trying to make, it seems to
occur in the third party, here -– that is, the taster. We are forced
to interpret his 'thought experiment' this way unless, of course, we are to suppose that tastes
actually reside 'objectively' in soups, as one of their alleged 'primary' qualities,
perhaps. If
that were so, qualities like this (that reside in soups, and not
solely in tasters) would have to be able to
alter 'objectively', evenwhen they aren't being tasted! But, this
example can't
imply that; no sane dialectician (one imagines!) believes that tastes reside in
the objects we eat. Hence, if this 'Law' is to work in this case, the qualitative
change must take place in the taster not the soup.8b
If so, qualitative change
in this case must have been
induced by a quantitative change in the taster, if this 'Law' is to apply
in this case. That is, the taster's 'qualitative' change (if it may be so described) must have been
caused by a quantitative change to her, if Engels's 'Law' is applicable. But, what quantitative
change has taken place in the taster that caused a
corresponding change in (her) quality, or in her changed perception of a
quality (taste)? Does she grow new nerve cells or an extra head? A new tongue or a
larger mouth? In fact, there are none -- or, none that
Trotsky mentioned, and certainly none that are at all obvious.
Plainly, it is a
quantitative change in the salt/soup mixture that resulted in the new quality as
perceived by that
taster. But, that specific quantitative change had no effect on any quality actually in the soup
(as previous paragraphs sought to show -- tastes don't reside in soups!). But, there now seem to be no
relevant quantitative
changes in the taster which could 'pass over' into a corresponding qualitative change in
her.
In that case, the most that can be made
of this half-baked example is that while quantitative change leads to no
qualitative change in some things (i.e., soups), it can prompt certain
qualitative changes in other things (i.e., tasters), even though the latter weren't caused by a quantitative
change in those things themselves, but by something altogether mysterious. That
is, we now have no idea what quantitative change occurred in the taster to
make her change in quality.
So, the second part of the 'Law' is
now doubly defective.
Of course, it could be objected that there is indeed a
quantitative change in the said taster, namely an increase in salt
particles hitting her tongue. But, this just pushes the problem one stage
further back, for unless we are to suppose that tastes reside in salt molecules
(or in Sodium and Chlorine
ions), the qualitative change we seek will still have
occurred in the taster, not in the chemicals in her mouth , But at just
means we are back
to where we were
a few paragraphs ago.
There seems to be no obvious quantitative change to the taster in any of
this. She
does not grow another tongue or gain more taste buds. It is undeniable that
there will have been an increase in salt molecules hitting her tongue,
and that these will have a causal effect on the change in taste as she perceives
it, but even
given that, no change in quantity to the taster herself will have taken
place.
Again, it could be objected that there is a
material or energetic change here; matter or energy will have been transferred to the
taster (or her central nervous system), which causes her to experience a qualitative change in her appreciation of
the soup.
In fact, what has happened is that the original salt has interacted with
the taster's tongue/nervous system upon being ingested. But, it is at precisely
that point that the
earlier problems associated with the salt/soup mixture now transfer to the
salt/nervous system ensemble. Since tastes don't exist in nerves any more than they exist in soups, we
are no further forward. And, as far as changes to any quantity in the
taster herself are concerned, that will depend on how we draw the boundary between inorganic salt molecules
and living cells. Since this 'difficulty' is considered in more detail below, no more will be
said about it here.
[This
is a continuation of the argument set out
in the previous section against Trotsky's attempt to illustrate Engels's First
'Law' by referring to a parable about a cook
adding salt to some soup.]
In any case, it seems rather odd to describe a change in taste
(or in the appreciation of taste) as
a qualitativechange to ataster, whatever it was that caused it. As the term "quality" is
understood by dialecticians, this can't in fact be a qualitative change
of the sort they require. Qualities, as they are characterised by
dialecticians --, or, rather, as they are by those that bother to say
what they mean by this word "quality" -- are those properties of bodies or processes
that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body or process into
something substantially new:
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of
quality, quantity
and
measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85. Paragraphs merged;
bold emphasis added.]
The Glossary at the
Marxist Internet Archive adds:
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something
else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect
of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby
becoming something else. Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'. In Hegel's
Logic,
Quality
is the first
division of
Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while
Quantity
is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage,
Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here.
Accessed August 2007. Some paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added. Paragraphs
merged.]
This is an Aristotelian notion.
If we apply
the above definition to the hackneyed example used by nearly every DM-fan --
water turning into steam or ice if it is heated/cooled --, this 'Law' can't
apply to it.
Here is why:
As a solid (ice), liquid, or a gas (i.e.,
as steam), water remains H2O
throughout. No new "kind of thing" has emerged. Consider other
examples: Iron is still iron as a solid or a liquid.
Oxygen is still oxygen in its liquid or gaseous state. The same can be said
about all substances that undergo state of matter changes (i.e., those that don't breakdown/disintegrate on
heating or cooling).
Recall:
"Quality is an aspect of something by
which it is what it is and not something else...". [Ibid.
Bold added.]
Furthermore,
all substances exist as solids, liquids, gases or plasmas, so that can't be what makes each of them "what it is
and not something else". What makes lead, for example, isn't whether is it
a solid or a liquid, it is lead because of its atomic
structure, and that remains the same whether it exist in a solid or a liquid
state. The same
goes for every element in the
Periodic Table.
Nevertheless, Cornforth gamely tries to tell us what a 'dialectical quality'
is:
"For instance, if a piece of
iron is painted black and instead we paint it red, that is merely an external
alteration..., but it is not a qualitative change in the sense we are here
defining. On the other hand, if the iron is heated to melting point, then this
is such a qualitative change. And it comes about precisely as a change in the
attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state
of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal
character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a
qualitative change." [Cornforth (1976), p.99.]
And yet, no new substance emerges as a result;
liquid iron, gold and aluminium are still iron, gold and aluminium. Worse still:
as we have seen, metals melt and solidify slowly, not nodally!
It is worth noting at this point how the
above DM-'definition' has transferred vagueness from "quality"
to "kind". We
aren't told what a 'dialectical kind' is! In what follows, I will however assume we
all know what such a kind is (even though we don't!). Of course, Cornforth
doesn't use the term "kind of thing" -- the second of the above definitions
use it
-- he uses "the nature of a thing" (p.98), and "a new thing" (p.103), which are
both no less vague.
Of course, it could be argued that liquid and solid states of matter are, as
the second definition says, "different kinds
of things". But, to describe something as a liquid isn't to
present a kind of thing, since liquids encompass many different "kinds of
things", as noted above. The same is true of gases and solids. So, a state of matter isn't a
"kind of thing", but a state possessed by kinds of things.
So, we speak about liquid iron, liquid mercury, gaseous oxygen, gaseous
nitrogen, a solid ingot of iron, etc., etc. And if a state changes,
in the overwhelming number of cases the "kind of thing" that that particular
substance is doesn't change. Admittedly, some substances do change into
'something new' when they are heated -- for
instance,
solid
Ammonium Chloride
sublimates into Ammonia gas and Hydrochloric Acid, but that
isn't typical. [In fact, DM-theorists would be on much firmer ground
appealing to this
sort of change than they
are with their
hackneyed water as a liquid, solid or gas
example.] Again, liquid mercury, for instance,
is still mercury, just as solid mercury is. Melted sugar is still sugar. The same
is true of
plastics, and every metal. Liquid chocolate is still chocolate. The elements aren't situated where they are in
the Periodic Table because they are solid, liquid or gas, but because of their
Atomic
Number. This shows that states of matter aren't "kinds of things";
if they were, solid mercury would no longer be mercury, and any cooling of
liquid mercury would move it to a new place in the Periodic Table!8b1
But, the
proffered DM-objection at the beginning of the previous paragraph (i.e., that
different states of matter are different "kinds of things") -- should it ever be
advanced by a dialectician -- only goes to show just how vague their
'definitions' of "quality" are. Indeed, it allows DM-fans to count different
states of matter as different "kind of things", even thoughthey don't
also regard shape, colour,
heat, or motion as different "kinds of things". Hence, for example, an
object in motion isn't counted as a different "kind of thing" from the same
object at rest (relative to some
inertial frame). A spherical ingot of iron, for instance, isn't regarded as different
"kind of thing" compared with a cylindrical ingot of iron. A red box isn't a
different "kind of thing" compared with a green box. Sure, gases, liquids and solids have different physical
properties, but so do moving and stationary bodies, and so do spherical and
cylindrical objects. And the same can be said about different coloured objects. It isn't easy to see why green
and red objects aren't different "kinds of things" when liquids and solids are
allowed to be. And, it is no use pointing to the "objective" nature of states of matter as
opposed to the "subjective" nature of colour, since shape and motion are just as
"objective".
[Anyway,
the "subjective" nature of colour will be questioned in
Essay Thirteen Part One --
as will the philosophical use of the terms
"subjective" and "objective".]
But,
what about this?
"And it comes about precisely as a
change in the attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal
molecular state of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state,
its internal character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it
undergoes a qualitative change." [Cornforth, op cit.]
Are
such "laws of motion" what make iron what it is and not another thing, so that
it is "no longer the same kind of thing"? As we have just seen, even if
Cornforth were right about these "laws of motion", that wouldn't re-classify iron and place it in
a new location in the Periodic Table. Plainly, it doesn't make iron a "new kind of
thing". Furthermore, we have
already seen that rapid changes experienced by sub-atomic, or
inter-molecular, forces (of the sort Cornforth envisages) can't be recruited to this 'Law', either.
Other than Cornforth,
Kuusinen is one of the few DM-theorists who
seems to make any note of this
'difficulty':
"The totality of essential features that make a
particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguishes it from others, is
called its quality.... It is...[a] concept that denotes the inseparable
distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a
phenomenon and without which it cease to be what it is." [Kuusinen (1961),
pp.83-84. Italic emphasis in the original.]
We
will have occasion to question whether there are any "essential features" or
"essential properties" in nature (these terms are sometimes associated with a 'technical term', "natural kind");
readers are re-directed to Essay Thirteen Part Two for more details. [That Essay
will be published sometime in 2025. Until then, see Note 8c. Since the above was written
I have added several relevant comments about "natural kinds" to Essay Eight
Part Two. Readers are
directed there for more details.]
Independently of this, it isn't at all clear that someone's liking
or not liking
soup defines them as a person -- or as a being "of a particular sort".
While scientists might choose to classify certain aspects of nature by placing
them in whatever categories they deem fit, as far as I am aware none has so
far identified two different sorts of human beings: (i) soup-likers for n
milligrams of salt per m litres of soup versus (ii) soup-dislikers for the same or
different n or m. And even if they were to do so, that would
merely save this part of DM by means of a re-definition, since it is reasonably
clear that these two different sorts of human beings don't actually exist --, or, at least, they didn't until I just invented them.
Once again, that would make this part of DM eminently subjective, too, since it would
imply that changes in quality were relative to a convenient choice ofdescription/re-description.
Once again, that would introduce an element of arbitrariness in relation to
something
dialecticians (at least) claim is a
scientific law. How would that be any different from "foisting" DM on
nature?
Moreover, as has also been noted, H2O
as ice, water or steam, is still H2O.
As a liquid or a gas,
Helium is
still Helium.
If so, these changes can't apply to any of the qualities covered by
the DM/Aristotelian/Hegelian principles quoted above. So, it now seems that these
hackneyed examples of
Q«Q
either undermine the meaning of a key
DM-concept on which this 'Law' had supposedly been based (i.e., "quality"),
vitiating its applicability in such cases; or they weren't examples of
this 'Law' to begin with!8b2
Update, 07/03/2014: I have just received a copy of
Burger, et al (1980), the existence of which I had been unaware until a
few weeks ago. One of the contributors to this book [i.e., Erwin Marquit
(Marquit (1980)] makes a valiant attempt to define "quality", "system"
and "boundary",
among other things.
Unfortunately, his attempt fails badly, too.
I will add some thoughts about this to a future re-write
of this Essay, as well as to Essay Eleven Part Two.
Given
this new twist, it now seems that quantitative change to material bodies (such
as salt/soup mixtures) actually cause changes to the human sensory system (albeit of a vague and perhaps non-quantitative -- or even non-qualitative
-- kind). They in turn bring
about some sort of qualitative change in the sensory perception of any
tasters involved. If so, the original 'Law' (applied in this
area) is woefully wide of the
mark; it should have been something like the following:
E1: A change in quantity merely causes a change in quantity
to the material bodies involved [that is no misprint!], but at a certain
point this causes qualitative alterations (but they might not be Hegelian, or even Aristotelian, qualities)
to the way some human beings perceive the world, even though these
individuals haven't
undergone a quantitative change themselves.
Put like this, it isn't at all clear that anyone would
conclude this (or anything like it) from cooking soup, as Trotsky
tried to suggest. And we can be pretty sure about that-- since not even Engels got close to this more
accurate version of his own 'Law'.
Nor did Trotsky!
It is scarcely
credible that non-dialectical cooks, workers, or anyone else, for that matter,
would advance much further -- or even this far -– based only on their own
experience.
Of
course, this can only mean that peasant cooks aren't "unconscious
dialecticians", and neither is anyone else outside the DM-fraternity --, and
that is probably because they aren't quite so easily
duped by the vague and barely coherent ramblings of Mystical Christians like Hegel.
[I resume my analysis of the other things Trotsky said
about foxes (etc.) below and in Essay Nine
Part One.]
Nevertheless, the above 'definitions' of "quantity" and "quality"
aren't without their own problems.
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of
quality, quantity
and
measure.
"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something
else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect
of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby
becoming something else.
"Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'.
"In Hegel's
Logic,
Quality is the first
division of
Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while
Quantity is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage,
Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here.]
First of all, it isn't too clear if there is a real distinction
between "quantity" and "quality" here if we rely merely on what Hegel
had to say:
"[A] house remains what it is, whether it be greater or
smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]
For Hegel, house size seems to be the "quantity" here, but
beyond a certain size, houses are no longer houses. Hence, a 'house' the size of
a grain of sand isn't a house. Neither is one the size of a galaxy. Isn't this a
"qualitative" change? So, size is also a "quality". Moreover, extremely dark
blue is no longer blue (since it is indistinguishable from black). Is this
another "qualitative" change? Or is it "quantitative"? In that case, there seems
to be no clear distinction here between what is a "quantitative" and what is
a "qualitative" change. And it is no use appealing to yet another
'get-out-of-a-dialectical-hole-free-card', saying that quantity has "passed over"
into quality in these instances, since this slide in fact affects the
definition of these two terms. If we have no clear idea what we are talking about, then
it isn't possible to say what has "passed over" into what.
Anyway, where is the alleged "development" in this case? Or, are we to
suppose with Hegel that the very same house has been slowly shrunk in size until it
gradually assumed the
size of a grain of sand?
It
could be objected that there could be no houses the size of a grain of sand, so
the above objection is spurious. Of course, that is the very point: if the size
of a house were reduced to that extent, it would cease to be a house, even if one such
has never yet been constructed. Beyond a certain size, what might look like a house
ceases to be of any use, and can't actually house anyone. A Dolls House isn't a
house.
Figure Three: Would Anyone Choose To
Live This?
Secondly, as we have seen, the phrases "something new" and
"ceasing to be what it is" are hopelessly vague, too. We aren't told what
constitutes novelty or what "ceasing to be" amounts to, either. Still less
are we informed what counts as a relevant form of novelty. For instance, consider a raft
of examples from earlier:
So,
for example, the largest cut diamond on earth (in a safe, say, in New York) could change
into the second largest if another, bigger diamond is cut in, say, Amsterdam.
Here we would have a change in quality produced by no change in quantity to the
object in question, the diamond in New York. The same considerations also
apply to other remote changes. For instance, the biggest star in a
galaxy could become the second biggest if another star ten thousand
light years distant (but in the same galaxy) grows in size (perhaps over
millions of years) through accretion of matter. So, in both cases, there would
be a qualitative change to the first object with no relevant matter or energy
added to or subtracted from that object.
There are countless examples of remote change like this.
A
cheque drawn, say, in Paris will become instantaneously worthless
(qualitative change) if the issuing bank in Tokyo goes bust -- meaning that no
quantitative change will have happened to the original cheque -- no
matter or energy having been added to, or subtracted from, it.
The President of a given country visiting, say, the
UN Headquarters in Manhattan, can cease to be President if, while she is
away she is deposed at home. This is a significant change in 'quality', even
though no relevant matter/energy has been
added to, or subtracted from, this individual. Some might claim (rather
desperately) that this is a contrived example,
but the actual examples listed below show such remote changes aren't
contrived.
A Silver Medallist in,
say, the Olympic Games, can become the Gold Medal winner in a certain event (qualitative
change) if the former Gold medallist is disqualified because of drug-taking
or cheating -- meaning that no relevant quantitative change will have occurred to that Silver
Medallist. [In case anyone thinks this is another contrived example,
here is just one example of many.]
Here is what
I have just added to Essay Five on this (slightly edited):
The following
example isn't forced, either; it concerns a story (aired by the BBC) concerning the 3000 metre
steeplechase final at the 2014 European Games:
"France's Mahiedine Mekhissi-Benabbad has been stripped of
his 3,000m steeplechase gold medal at the European Championships for taking his
shirt off on the home straight. Mekhissi-Benabbad put his top in his mouth after
pulling clear of the field. Initially he appeared to be shown a yellow card by
an official but was subsequently disqualified. Frenchman Yoann Kowal now wins
gold, Poland's Krystian Zalewski gets silver and Spain's Angel Mullera wins
bronze." [Quoted from
here.
Accessed 15/08/2014. Paragraphs merged.]
As a result of this, Yoann Kowal was moved from second to first,
Krystian Zalewski from third to second, and Angel Mullera from fourth to
third....
The above
story isn't a one-off, either. It happens quite frequently in sport these days
(when those who cheat by taking performance enhancing drugs are found out). Here is a recent example:
"Russia's Natalya Antyukh has been stripped of 400m hurdles
gold from London 2012 on the basis of historical data from a Moscow testing
laboratory. Antyukh, now 41, is already serving a four-year ban
after being named in a World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) investigation into
cheating by Russia. American Lashinda Demus will be promoted to gold
in her place. All three gold medals won on the track by Russian athletes at
London 2012 have now been rescinded on doping grounds.
Mariya Savinova and Yuliya
Zaripova, the initial winners of 800m and 3000m steeplechase gold, have been
disqualified.
Ivan Ukhov's high jump title and Tatyana Lysenko's hammer victory in the
field have also been wiped from the record books....
"Antyukh has struck a defiant tone on social media. Her last
Instagram post on 18 August is a photo of her showing off her silver and bronze
medals from the 2004 Olympics. Those medals remain unaffected by the latest AIU
decision. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) can now promote Jamaica's
Kaliese Spencer to the bronze medal position after Antyukh did not appeal
against her punishment, with Czech Republic's Zuzjana Hejnova in line for an
upgrade to silver." [Quoted from
here; accessed
08/10/2023. Links in the original; several paragraphs merged. Bold emphases
added.]
The above
are yet more examples of remote change in quality induced by no relevant
change in quantity.
But, we
needn't rely on examples drawn from athletics. Back in May 2017,
James Comey,
Director of the FBI,
was fired by President Trump while he (Comey) was away in California. So,
Comey underwent a pretty significant qualitative (and remote) change (he ceased
being 'top cop') even though there was no relevant matter or energy added
to him.
Something similar happened to Rex Tillerson, Trump's ex-Secretary of State,
who found out on TV that he had been fired by Trump, on Twitter. Again,
this is an example of remote change in quality (the loss by an individual of a very powerful political Office
of State) with no relevant matter or energy added to him.
More-or-less the same can be said about Mark Esper, Trump's ex-Secretary of
Defence, who was also remotely fired, on Twitter, in November 2020.
This is yet
another change in quality with no relevant matter or energy added.
It
might be objected that the above argument is defective: When these individuals
saw or heard the news that they had been fired, light or sound energy was added
to them. Maybe so, but their seeing or hearing the news wasn't what fired them
or changed their status. Trump's remote action did that, and they were fired
whether or not they heard or saw the news. Hence, when Trump fired them they
all underwent an instantaneous, remote, political, legal qualitative change -- before
they had even discovered their fate -- but with no relevant matter or energy added
to them.
Consider another example: The
oldest known vertebrate fossil on earth could become the second oldest if
another even older one is discovered.
We
needn't labour the point; as noted above, there are countless examples of remote
qualitative change like this,
so many, in fact, that this Essay could easily be doubled in length if I were to
itemise
a significant number of them.
[Notice,
too, that many of the examples aired in the last few paragraphs concern 'developmental' change.]
Are such
'remote changes' relevant or not? True to form, 'pedantic' details like those
above are passed-over in silence by DM-fans. But, this isMickey Mouse Science, after
all!
We
have also seen dialecticians -- including Hegel -- regard ice, water and steam as
"something new", when we now know they aren't. But, equivocations like
this 'allow'
them to apply this 'Law' when and where is suits them, just as it
'allows' them to reject or ignore counter-examples when and where that
suits them, too. Indeed, it is reasonably safe bet that several of the
counter-examples listed above (or elsewhere in this Essay) will have been
rejected out-of-hand by dialecticians on that basis alone. For instance, heating water from cold to very hot is a
"qualitative" non-"nodal" change by any standard,
and it also results in something
"new" -- if we leave that word in its current, DM-vague-condition.
And yet, if by "new" we mean something substantially new, then ice and steam
aren't "new".
Nevertheless, there are dialecticians who will airily brush these factors aside as irrelevant.
Either that, or they will simply pass them over in silence.
[An
excellent example of both tactics put to good use can be found
here. There are
plenty more here. Another recent
example can be found in the comments section below this
YouTube Video in
relation to several objections I posted.]
What is finally decided upon here will, of course, depend on how
we view the status of Aristotelian "essences" (or "essential properties").
Further discussion of that topic will take us too far from the main theme of
this Essay, so no more will be said about it here.8c
The confusion over exactly what constitutes a
'dialectical'-body is well illustrated by the following passage -- which is often quoted by Trotskyists,
who appear to do so without ever once noticing
the serious damage it inflicts Engels's 'Law' and Trotsky's reputation:
"Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian
dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and
tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it
in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into
quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with
Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in
passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are
not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual
inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense the universe is permeated
with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky
(1971),
pp.106-07.]
But,
what precisely is the 'body' here that has had matter or energy added to it so
that it becomes bigger, intimidating this imaginary fox (as "quantity passes
into quality")? Where is the development, too? Does anyone imagine that the wolf in this tall tale gradually
expands in size in front of the fox thereby convincing the fox
not to attack and try to eat it? Or are we to suppose there is a line of
animals, or even wolves, in front of this fox,
gradually increasing in size, say, from left to right? Perhaps the fox walks
along it, inspecting each animal or wolf as if he were the colonel-in-chief of this
'vertebrate regiment', until at a
certain point the fox encounters an animal of a certain size and is intimidated by
it? If so, plainly no matter or energy will have been added to anything in
this setup -- hence, the following words of Engels's can't apply to it:
"[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
Nor
has there been any 'development', here.
Even if we take Trotsky's words
literally or at face value:
"Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and
birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the
first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes
that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee...," [ibid.]
it
still difficult to see how Engels's 'Law' applies. Presumably, Trotsky had the
following scenario in mind: one day, the fox encounters a small animal, say, a
mouse, hunts it and eats it. Next day, it comes across a vole, with the same
outcome. Day three sees it chase a chicken, which it catches and eats. On day
four, it rounds a corner, encounters a wolf, takes fright and legs it. But, once
more, which body has had matter or energy gradually added to it so that
"quantity turns into quality" by means of some sort of "leap"?
Here again
is what the dialectical classics have to say about this 'Law', beginning with
Hegel:
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphases alone added.]
Here is Engels -- again
echoing Hegel:
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphases added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C
from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
Plekhanov:
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: this has
now been corrected!)]
Finally,
these are Lenin's comments:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality....
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"The identity
of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' --
although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly
important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition
(discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite
tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including
mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world
in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their
real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the
'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically
observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease
and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites
(the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal
relation).
"In the first
conception of motion, self-movement, its
driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the
shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the
second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the
source of 'self'-movement.
"The first
conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of
everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid.,
pp.357-58. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
The argument
here is reasonably plain:
(a)
Quantitative increase or decrease in matter or energy results in gradual change; hence,
(b) At a certain point,
a further increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a
"leap", a sudden "qualitative" change.
The
question now is: When did this wolf or these animals suddenly increase in size so that
they were capable of frightening the
fox? And, what new "quality" emerged in any of those animals?
But, wait: this new "quality"
must have emerged in the fox, so that the wolf or the other animals were now perceived by that fox as
intimidating -- when a moment or so earlier there were none of them in front of the
fox, and
no intimidation. It is isn't as if any of these animals gradually became more and
more intimidating until the latter passed a certain point and scared the life out of the fox. So, the change in
"quality" applies to the fox, not the animals confronting it. In that case,
although there had been new matter or energy added to the animals in the months
and years
before they
encountered the fox, that new matter or energy led to no new "quality" in
them. So, Engels's 'Law' can't apply to the wolf or the other animals in this specific
case.
In
the meantime, no new (relevant) matter or energy had been added to the fox,
either, even though it suddenly encountered an intimidator, and ran away.
["Relevant" since we aren't to imagine, it is to be hoped, that, as the fox grew
in size in the months and years leading up to this encounter, it gradually became more
frightened of other animals, until, at a 'nodal'-point, it ran away after crossing
paths with one such for the first time.]
So, precisely which new "quality"
emerged in the fox?
Are we to suppose that in the weeks and months leading up to this imaginary
incident the fox possessed a certain "quality" which then became its opposite
upon running into animal that frightened it? [It has to be the opposite "quality", since,
as we have been told by the DM-classics, all things turn into their
'opposites'.] So the old "quality" must be a tendency not to run
away from larger animals. It must have been that particular "quality" (or
something like it) if the new "quality" became its opposite:
i.e., if it became a tendency
to run away from larger animals, a tendency that was actualised when the
fox ran away from the one confronted it. But, that doesn't even seem right. Do foxes really have a tendency not to run
away from larger animals before they encounter them, which then turns into
its opposite, a tendency to run away? If so, in what way could this be
a tendency not to run away if foxes always do the opposite when they meet
larger animals? If ordinary plate glass, for example, has a tendency to break
when heavy objects are thrown at it, but it always does the opposite when
heavy objects are thrown at it, in what way was this a prior tendency to break,
in the first place? Same
with the fox. So, and once again, what new "quality" has emerged in
the fox?
Let
us suppose that DM-fans manage to come up with a "quality" of some sort
in this instance. If so, the next question would become: what new matter or energy
has been added to the fox -- in the moments preceding its encounter with the
scary animal, up to at the point where it
crossed that animal's path -- that caused this 'change' in "quality"? There
doesn't appear to be any. If so, it doesn't look like Engels's 'Law' applies to
the scary animal or the fox.
No good
leafing through the writings of Trotsky's epigones for help in resolving this
'difficulty'; they all seem to have swallowed this tall
tale whole and, as usual, uncritically. Indeed, they laud it in
adulatory terms.
Is
this yet another catastrophic failure of Engels's 'Law'...?
As if to cap
it all, here is a video of a
domestic cat chasing off a larger dog, which had been attacking a small boy:
Video Eight: Anti-Dialectical Cat?
[Warning: Graphic Footage.]
Of course, Trotsky didn't have access to
YouTube, but his epigones do. In that case, they will no doubt be interested to
see footage of rabbits chasing off larger
cats
and dogs,
and a whole host of other
non-dialectical
animal antics (such as another
domestic
cat chasing away a larger fox).
It would be tedious to list them all so
I will finish by adding
a link to a page with a series of pictures that show a lioness defending a
fox cub from the predatory attention of a much larger male lion.
It looks like the animal kingdom is
over-stocked with conscious anti-dialecticians!
Other
hackneyed examples that DM-theorists regularly roll out to 'illustrate' this
'Law' (boiling/freezing water, balding heads,
Mendeleyev's Table, the seemingly ambivalent fighting ability of Mamelukes --, and, of late,
Catastrophe and
Chaos
Theory) only
seem to work because of the way that the word "quality" has been
'defined' -- or, to be more honest, the way it hasn't been
clearly defined, are no
less defective.9
For example, in the case
of boiling water, the increase in quantity of one item (i.e., heat) is
said
to alter the quality of the second (i.e., water). As noted
above, "quality" was
characterised by Hegel in Aristotelian terms [i.e., as a certain
property that is
essential to a substance
or process without which it changes
into "something else" --, or, to use the jargon, "determinate being"
--; on
this, see Inwood (1992), pp.238-41]. And yet, by no stretch of the imagination is
liquidity an essential property of water. Once again, either side of the alleged
"qualitative" change, this substance remains H2O.
Boling or freezing doesn't change it into another substance;
water in its solid, liquid or gaseous form is still
H2O.
So, quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative
change of the required sort; no new Hegelian or Aristotelian "quality"
emerges. No "new
kind of thing" is formed as a
result.
However, it is worth
looking at this and other hackneyed examples in more detail.
Consider
water again: as it is heated, steam increasingly leaves the surface in a non-"nodal" fashion.
[The sudden breaking of inter-molecular, or even inter-atomic, bonds will be
considered presently.] The rate at which water vapour leaves the surface increases gradually as the temperature
rises. There is no sudden 'leap', in this case, with respect to water vapour. So, even here we have a smooth transition from liquid to gas.
Indeed, if a pan
of water is kept at 99oC
for long enough, all of the water will slowly evaporate as steam. In
fact, who doesn't know that water evaporates slowly at room temperature? Who has never dried
clothes on a line, crockery or cooking utensils on a drainer? Who on earth
doesn't know that some
rivers, ponds and lakes dry up in hot weather? Where is the "leap", in
such cases? Examples like these illustrate a well-known fact:
many, if not most, processes in nature run smoothly, and are non-"nodal".
Back to the
water: at 100oC
(at normal pressure and level of purity) events accelerate dramatically -- but even then they do so
non-"nodally". Some might find that assertion hard to believe,
but a few tenths of a degree below the critical point -- again, depending on the purity of the water,
surrounding conditions
and atmospheric pressure, as well as how the liquid is being heated
(etc.) --, bubbles begin to form more rapidly in the liquid. This process accelerates increasingly quickly as the
boiling point is approached. What we see, therefore, is a non-"nodal" change of phase/state
of matter,
even here. The phase or state of
matter
change in this case isn't sudden
-- like the snapping of a rubber band, or the breaking of glass. We don't see no bubbles
one second and then a microsecond later a frothing or seething mass, which we would do if this were
a "nodal" change.
Of
course, dialecticians might concede the
truth of the above contentions -- i.e., that before the liquid
reaches 100oC
water molecules leave the surface all the time --, even while they reject the
assertion that this isn't an example of "nodal" change. They might even add that
when a water molecule changes from its liquid to its gaseous state certain
chemical bonds are broken, and this is what happens suddenly, and hence
"nodally". But, even that isn't as
clear-cut as they seem to think. Certainly, when a bond is broken, that will be sudden, but there
is no "break in gradualness" (required
by this 'Law' -- on
that, see the passages I have quoted a few paragraphs
below), in this case. Bonds don't gradually break, and then suddenly
break. They just break. There are only "nodes" in this instance, with
no gradualness leading up to them.
So, this vague 'Law' doesn't even apply to the breaking of chemical
bonds!
Naturally, "nodal"-points could be re-defined
thermodynamically, in terms of latent heat (enthalpy
of vaporisation/condensation), etc. But, latent heat is involved
throughout the evaporating process, not just at 100oC.
What happens at the
boiling
point is that the vapour pressure of the liquid equals that of the
surrounding medium. In fact, it is possible to induce boiling (in many liquids,
and not just water) by lowering the surrounding pressure sufficiently enough. This can
also take place without any obvious addition or subtraction of any matter or energy
to or from the liquid concerned.
[Raising or lowering the
pressure in the surrounding medium isn't to add or subtract anything to or from the
actual liquid concerned. It might result in matter leaving the surface of
that liquid, but lowering pressure removes matter from the surrounding
atmosphere, not the liquid itself. The questions is: Is that what Engels meant by the
addition or subtraction of matter and energy? As with many other things connected with
this hopelessly vague 'Law', who can say?]
"What
about latent heat?", someone might interject:
"Heat absorbed or released as the result of a
phase change is called latent heat. There is no temperature change during a
phase change, thus there is no change in the kinetic energy of the particles in
the material. The energy released comes from the potential energy stored in the
bonds between the particles." [Quoted from
here; accessed
30/11/2020.]
Of course, the
idea that the temperature of water stays the same as it boils is an
abstraction. Unless every molecule of water is being heated at the same
rate, at the same time, the convection currents induced in the liquid will mean
that there are micro-differences in temperature throughout the said liquid. We have here what is called a "mixed-phase"
system as bubbles form in some places but not others. [On that, see below.]
As
suggested earlier, the
objections (that focus on the breaking of bonds
and on latent heat) appear to depend on the idea that latent heat
is only involved at the boiling point (or, at the phase/state of matter
transition). If so, that will have nothing to do with
the events in the lead up to that point (the alleged "gradualness" that is finally broken,
resulting in a "leap"), as this
'Law' requires:
"This is precisely
the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite
nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where
boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which -- under normal pressure
-- the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently
quantity is transformed into quality." [Engels
(1976), p.56. I have used the
online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages
edition. Bold emphasis added.]
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error.
Added June 2015: they have
now corrected it!)]
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations' ... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphases alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphasis added.]
So, once again, we see this shaky 'Law'
isn't illustrated by this over-used example, even if we were to throw in latent heat.
[I return to latent heat, below.]
Anyway,
the
volunteered DM-reply from earlier
itself depends on how a "nodal point" is defined.
As we have seen, since the length of a dialectical "node"
has also been left hopelessly vague, dialecticians
may only challenge the above assertions if they are prepared to define precisely
the length of a DM-"node".
Otherwise, my opinion is as good as theirs -- which is why I earlier
labelled this 'Law' subjective in the extreme.
Is there a
'DM-Standards Authority' to which we can appeal? Genuine scientists use
this system; that is,
of course, why their results can be
checked, and are even to be described as "objective". But, are there any standards at all in this DM-wing of
Mickey-Mouse Science?
The answer is pretty clear: there aren't.
There never have been
any.
On the other hand, if dialecticians take the
trouble to re-define the word "node"
just to accommodate these awkward non-dialectical facts (as noted earlier, in certain circumstances this tactic is
rightly called a "persuasive
definition"), it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish DM from stipulative
conventionalism.
However, it is worth noting that there isn't in fact a problem with that approach, since scientists do
it all the time. Unfortunately, though, this means that if DM-theorists were to
emulate them, they would
have to abandon their claim that DM is 'objective', and admit that their
'theory' is conventional, after all. [I will return to this specific topic in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
On
the other hand, if such phase/state-of-matter changes were to be defined
thermodynamically, then many of them would be far too abrupt. But, even that
isn't as clear-cut as might at first sight seem:
"The first-order phase transitions are those that involve
alatent heat. During such a transition, a system either
absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy. Because
energy can't be instantaneously transferred between the system and its
environment, first-order transitions are associated with 'mixed-phase regimes'
in which some parts of the system have completed the transition and others have
not. This phenomenon is familiar to anyone who has boiled a pot of water: the
water does not instantly turn into gas, but forms a turbulent mixture of water
and water vapour bubbles. Mixed-phase systems are difficult to study,
because their dynamics are violent and hard to control. However, many important
phase transitions fall in this category, including the solid/liquid/gas
transitions and
Bose-Einstein condensation.
"The second class of phase transitions are the 'continuous
phase transitions', also called
second-order phase transitions.
These have no associated latent heat. Examples of second-order phase transitions
are the ferromagnetic transition and the
superfluid transition.
Unfortunately, the above article has since been
changed somewhat since it was first consulted it; here is a later version:
"First-order phase transitions are those that involve a
latent heat. During such a transition, a system either
absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy. During
this process, the temperature of the system will stay constant as heat is added:
the system is in a 'mixed-phase regime' in which some parts of the system have
completed the transition and others have not. Familiar examples are the melting
of ice or the boiling of water (the water does not instantly turn into
vapour, but forms a
turbulent mixture of liquid water and vapour
bubbles). Imry and Wortis showed that quenched disorder can broaden a
first-order transition in that the transformation is completed over a finite
range of temperatures, but phenomena like supercooling and superheating survive
and hysteresis
is observed on thermal cycling.
"Second-order phase transitions are also called
continuous phase transitions. They are characterized by a divergent
susceptibility, an infinite correlation length, and a power-law decay of
correlations near criticality. Examples of second-order phase transitions are
the ferromagnetic transition, superconducting transition (for a
Type-I superconductor
the phase transition is
second-order at zero external field and for a
Type-II superconductor
the phase transition is
second-order for both normal state-mixed state and mixed state-superconducting
state transitions) and the
superfluid transition. In contrast to viscosity,
thermal expansion and heat capacity of amorphous materials show a relatively
sudden change at the glass transition temperature which enable quite exactly to
detect it using
differential scanning calorimetry measurements....
"Several transitions are known as the infinite-order
phase transitions. They are continuous but break no
symmetries.
The most famous example is the
Kosterlitz–Thouless transition
in the two-dimensional
XY model. Many
quantum phase transitions, e.g., in two-dimensional
electron gases, belong to this class." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis and one link added. Italic emphases in
the original. Spelling adapted to UK English; quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Another source had this to say:
"Discontinuous
phase transitions are characterised by a
discontinuous change in entropy at a fixed temperature. The change in entropy
corresponds to
latent heatL
=
TΔS.
Examples are solid-liquid and liquid-gas transitions at temperatures below the
critical temperature. Continuous
phase transitions
involve a continuous change in entropy, which means there is no latent heat.
Examples are liquid-gas transitions at temperatures above the critical
temperature, metal-superconductor transitions and many magnetic ordering
transitions." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis
alone added; paragraphs merged.]
A
third added:
"Since the entropy is
continuous at the phase transition, the latent heat is zero. The latent heat
is always zero for a second order phase transition." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]
A
fourth concurs:
"'Discontinuities' at continuous
phase changes (2
nd
order or higher): For continuous transitions, the entropy is continuous crossing
the phase boundary and so there is no latent heat." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]
[Both
of which agree with the earlier Wikipedia
article before it was revised.]
This is, of course, just another way of
making the same point made earlier: not all changes
are unambiguously "nodal".
Now, with respect to the length of "nodal" points,
Kuusinen had this to say (Kuusinen doesn't use the
word "node", but it is plain that his "leaps" are "nodes"):
"The transition of a thing, through the
accumulation of quantitative modifications, from one qualitative state to a
different, new state, is a leap in development. This leap is a break
in the gradualness of the quantitative change of a thing. It is the
transition to a new quality and signalises (sic) a sharp turn, a radical
change in development." [Kuusinen (1961), p.88. Italic emphasis in
the original; bold emphases added.]
This seems pretty clear: all "leaps" are "sharp" turns,
"radical" breaks in "gradualness". Kuusinen clearly defines
"nodes"/"leaps" exactly as Hegel and Engels had done. So,
how does he handle the
slow
qualitative changes
we met earlier?
"Leaps, transitions from one quality to another
are relatively rapid.... The leaps are rapid in comparison with the
preceding periods of gradual accumulation of quantitative modifications. This
rapidity varies, depending upon the nature of the object and the conditions in
which the leap occurs. Some substances pass at once from the solid to
the liquid state on reaching a certain critical temperature.... Other substances
-- plastics, resins, glass -- do not have an exact melting point. On heating,
the first soften and then pass into the liquid state. We might say that in their
case the qualitative change, i.e., the leap, occurs gradually. But it is still
relatively rapid." [Ibid., p.88. Italic emphasis in the original,
bold added. Paragraphs merged.]
This is all very confusing;
"leaps" are rapid except where they
aren't! That is about as scientifically useful as defining acids (a là Brønsted-Lowry)
as "substances which donate
hydrogen ions, except where they don't"! Would a genuine scientist be allowed
to get away with cop-outs/confusions like this? Would anyone take a Physicist seriously who
said that a
half-life, for instance, is the time taken for radioactive compounds to decay to half their
original mass, except where they don't?
However,
the above sits rather awkwardly with Engels's take on the
matter (no pun intended!):
"We have already seen earlier, when discussing
world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure
relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points
into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a
weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one
of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the aggregate states of
water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0oC
from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100oC
from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the
merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in
the condition of the water." [Engels
(1976), p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
Engels seems to know nothing of all those protracted "nodes" Kuusinen
dreamt up. Or, does "sudden"
now mean the same as "protracted" on Planet Dialectics? Is this yet another "unity
of opposites"? [See also here on this.]
Kuusinen tries 'handle' this 'difficulty' with the usual
"relatively-speaking"
'get-out-of-jail' clause tacked on at the end. But, the transition
from liquid water to steam (at 100oC)
is genuinely rapid no matter how quickly or slowly the water is heated in the
build-up to that point. By way of contrast, the melting of, say, plastic can be long and drawn out
(lasting weeks, if necessary) if the temperature rise is regulated accordingly.
And we
might well wonder: "Relative to what?" With what may we
'objectively' compare the time it takes for plastic objects to melt so that we
might truly say that their melting was either "relatively slow" or "relatively sudden"?
But,
what about the opposite? Many qualitative changes are very slow and protracted
even though the build-up is rapid. Which means that the "relatively-speaking"
get-out-clause doesn't apply. Consider the larval stage of
moths. The larva or grub will build a cocoon rapidly, but the radical
'qualitative' changes inside that cocoon (from larva to adult moth), in the
pupal stage, are
painfully slow (relative to the previous stage and the lifespan of most
moths and butterflies) -- ranging from a few weeks to many months. To be sure, when the
moth breaks out, that change will be rapid, but the unseen 'qualitative' changes that
have already happened were slow. By no
stretch of the imagination is this unseen development -- these radical qualitative changes
-- a
"leap", even "relatively-speaking".
And, the same comments apply to the development of reptiles,
birds, fish and other animals that grow inside egg sacks. Even a human baby
takes nine months to "leap" from the fertilised egg stage to being a fully-developed foetus before
it is born. As is well known, fertilisation and parturition are pretty rapid in comparison.
So, the "relative" clause isn't just vague, it fails to apply in any
meaningful sense across many such instances.
Even
the countless cell divisions that take place in an embryo's development are
non-"nodal". Cells don't "suddenly" divide. To be sure, some of the processes in cell division are
"sudden", but not all are. The division itself is slow.
Naturally, this depends
on how DM-fans define "sudden" and "nodal", but we have been
there already. They refuse to say.
All this
is, of course, independent of these
comments
concerning the
subjective implications of this "relatively-speaking" get-out clause.
In short, Kuusinen's amateurish,
if not disingenuous, attempt to specify the length
of dialectical "nodes"/"leaps" is no more impressive than the other things
he and his fellow Mickey
Mouse Dialectical Scientists have to say about this ramshackle 'theory'.
Another over-used example
dialecticians have enlisted to their cause is
Mendeleyev's Table.
"Finally, the Hegelian law is valid not only for
compound substances but also for the chemical elements themselves. We now know
that 'the chemical properties of the elements are a periodic function of their
atomic weights' (Roscoe-Schorlemmer,
Complete Text-Book of Chemistry, II, p. 823), and that, therefore,
their quality is determined by the quantity of their atomic weight. And the test
of this has been brilliantly carried out. Mendeleyev proved that various gaps
occur in the series of related elements arranged according to atomic weights
indicating that here new elements remain to be discovered. He described in
advance the general chemical properties of one of these unknown elements, which
he termed eka-aluminium, because it follows after aluminium in the series
beginning with the latter, and he predicted its approximate specific and atomic
weight as well as its atomic volume. A few years later,
Lecoq de Boisbaudran actually discovered this element, and Mendeleyev's
predictions fitted with only very slight discrepancies. Eka-aluminium was
realised in gallium (ibid., p.828). By means of the -- unconscious --
application of Hegel's law of the transformation of quantity into quality,
Mendeleyev achieved a scientific feat which it is not too bold to put on a par
with that of
Leverrier in calculating the orbit of the still unknown planet
Neptune." [Engels
(1954), pp.67-68. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Links added.]
[The
example of Neptune and Leverrier isn't in fact a happy one; on
that, see here.]
The claim is that scientists can
(or should) be regarded as 'unconscious
dialecticians' is a DM-induced fantasy. On the basis of this example of wishful thinking,
DM-theorists like to flatter themselves that their theory is scientific, which
is scant compensation for the fact the 99.9% of scientists consciously ignore it
--, that is, if they have ever even heard of it.
Indeed, as Erwin Marquit was forced to admit:
"In
the developed capitalist countries very little has been written on the physical
sciences by scientists and philosophers who consciously base their work on
dialectical-materialist methods of analysis." [Marquit (1980), p.77.]
Marquit offers two main reasons for this:
(i) The harassment and discrimination
dialecticians face from academic institutions; and,
(ii) The complete separation
of philosophy from science in the training of scientists.
Unfortunately, he failed to consider another far more likely option:
So no wonder genuine scientists won't touch it even with
someone else's barge pole.
[I have said more about this topic
here, and here.]
Concerning the Periodic Table, here are Woods and Grant:
"The
science of chemistry made great strides forward in the 19th century. A large
number of elements was discovered. But, rather like the confused situation which
exists in particle physics today, chaos reigned. Order was established by the
great Russian scientist Dimitri Ivanovich Mendeleyev who, in 1869, in
collaboration with the German chemist
Julius Meyer, worked out the periodic table of the elements, so-called
because it showed the periodic recurrence of similar chemical properties. The
existence of atomic weight was discovered in 1862 by
Cannizzaro. But Mendeleyev's genius consisted in the fact that he did not
approach the elements from a purely quantitative standpoint, that is, he did not
see the relation between the different atoms just in terms of weight. Had he
done so, he would never have made the breakthrough he did. From the purely
quantitative standpoint, for instance, the element
tellurium (atomic weight =
127.61) ought to have come after
iodine
(atomic weight = 126.91) in the periodic
table, yet Mendeleyev placed it before iodine, under
selenium, to which it is
more similar, and placed iodine under the related element,
bromine. Mendeleyev's
method was vindicated in the 20th century, when the investigation of
X-rays
proved that his arrangement was the correct one. The new
atomic
number
for tellurium was put at 52, while that of iodine is 53. The
whole of Mendeleyev's periodic table is based on the law of quantity and
quality, deducing qualitative differences in the elements from quantitative
differences in atomic weights. This was recognised by Engels at the time...."
[Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.50-51. Paragraphs merged; links added.]
In this particular case, the argument appears
to be that as elementary particles are added to certain atoms they change qualitatively
into other elements, which isn't, of course, how
Mendeleyev
saw things, nor is it how Engels interpreted his own 'Law'. That is because elementary particles were unknown in
their
day; indeed, the atomic theory of matter wasn't universally accepted until after the
work of
Jean Perrin,
forty or fifty years later still. Indeed, as the above quotations show, Engels interpreted this
example in terms of Atomic Weight, not Atomic Number.
[On this, see Nye (1972). On Mendeleyev, see
Gordin (2004), and on the Periodic Table in general, see Scerri (2007).]
Be
this as it may,
the elementary particles involved don't
themselves appear to change
(in the relevant sense --, that is, they don't change qualitatively),
but, even if they were to do that, the
atoms concerned don't. What happens is that as new particles are added
new atoms come into being with new qualities. So, the old qualities and the old
atoms simply disappear. So, this is as much a change of quantity, followed by
a disappearance of quality, as it is the emergence of a new quality.
Naturally, dialecticians will want to challenge the above and argue that that isn't what Engels's
Law implies in this case, maintaining perhaps that a
change in quantity does indeed lead to a change in quality, and that this is a
classic example, confirming this Law. It is only the deliberate
mis-description above that once again raises spurious objections.
Or, so a response might go...
But, even dialecticians will agree that not
just any old quantitative increase in elementary particles or energy will alter
the relevant qualities to produce the different elements in the Periodic Table. It takes
certain sorts of elementary particles to change one element into another, and
since these particles exhibit their own qualities -- and they effect the changes they
do because of those qualities --, it is clear that it takes
qualitative and structural-geometric change to induce development
of the elements in the Periodic Table. So,
if we ignore for the moment the 'disappearing quality' comment above, when
new qualities (not merely additional quantities) are added to atoms they
change in quality themselves. In which case, the
application of this 'Law' isn't as clear-cut as DM-fans would
have us believe, even in this supposedly classic example. Here, change in
quality leads to further change in quality.
This
point also applies to quantum 'leaps' -- for example, when an
electron jumps from one quantum state to another.
In that case, electrons don't
gradually change and then suddenly 'leap'; there are only 'leaps'. This
'Law' fails to apply even here!
[The relevant passages from the DM-classics and
other DM-sources have been quoted (again!) below.]
Readers who might be tempted to
argue that this as a
minor point, which can be safely ignored, should re-read what Lenin had to
say:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin
(1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
This
very point -- the interruption of
gradualness, ending in a "leap" -- is what distinguishes "the dialectical
transition from the undialectical transition". So, according to Lenin, this is a
core principle of dialectics, which can only be ignored by those who want to
undermine the distinction between dialectical and non-dialectical transitions.
The problem is that this means that the vast
majority of examples DM-theorists list, which they claim illustrate this 'Law'
-- ranging from water boiling to Mendeleyev's Table -- fail to illustrate it!
Of course, dialecticians might still want to insist
that a quantitative increase or decrease is what effects qualitative change in this
instance; but, again, there is nothing
in the phenomena themselves that forces that description on us. Hence,
this 'Law' is subjective, at best, when it is applied in this case; i.e., it
only appears to work if a favourable or a preferred
description is imposed on the facts. But, how is that different from
forcing a certain view on nature?
Furthermore, even dialecticians
will admit that it is only certain
qualities that effect the desired changes in this area, so the
re-description outlined in previous paragraphs is in fact consistent with a more honest qualitative re-appraisal of the phenomena in question. In that case, by clinging to
Engels's First 'Law' as stated, dialecticians are foisting onto
nature a view that isn't even in line with their own more honest appraisal of it!
Of course, Hegel had already appreciated this fact in his 'nodal
line of measure' -- it isn't just a mere increase in quantity that induces
change. As noted above, these changes are also qualitative in a different sense because of the
new
geometry (i.e., the new
orbital structure) of the resulting atoms, and it is this new geometry as
much as anything else which determines the novel properties of the resulting
change. Here quantity is only tangential. And Hegel knew nothing of quantum
change, or orbitals.
Moreover, as we saw earlier, there are many different
ways that change can be depicted in Physics and Chemistry (for example, in relation to
Isomers and the
ordering relations that occur both naturally and artificially in
nature and in relation to human interaction with it). Moreover, the energetics involved can be parsed in many different ways. In that case,
plainly, there is no single law that governs every chemical change
(except, perhaps,
Conservation of Energy), or,
indeed, all change in general (that, see
here). Indeed, in
relation to this,
one of the best examples used by DM-fans, we discover that even if we
accept the standard picture, it is as much geometry as it is quantity that
'determines' quality.
However, far more
problematic for DM-supporters is the observation that the
Periodic
Table doesn't actually conform to Engels's 'Law'! To see why, we need
only re-examine what Engels and others have actually said about this 'Law':
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: they have
now corrected it!)]
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. (Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!")]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphasis added.]
Again, the argument here is plainly this:
(i)
Quantitative increase or decrease in matter or energy results in gradual change.
Hence,
(ii) At a certain point, further
increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a "leap", a sudden "qualitative"
change.
But,
that doesn't happen in relation to the Periodic Table! Between each
element there is no gradual increase in protons and electrons leading to a
sudden change -- there are only sudden changes as they are added!
For example, as one proton and one electron are added to Hydrogen, it suddenly
changes into Helium. Hydrogen doesn't slowly alter and then suddenly "leap" and
become Helium. The same is true of every other element in the Table. In that
case, one of the 'best' examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' this 'Law' in
fact refutes it! There is no "interruption" in gradualness.
This is a more honest reading
from the extant data, is it not? And not a single foisting anywhere in sight!
These comments also apply to the other
examples drawn from Organic Chemistry -- quoted by Engels: cf., Engels (1954),
pp.161-63, and (1976), pp.65-68 (and Woods and Grant
(1995), whose ideas are further examined
in Note 4).
So, between each
of
the organic molecules (to which
DM-theorists refer)and the
next in line there is no gradual increase in atoms leading to a sudden change -- once again, there are only sudden changes as atoms are added!
For example, as one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen are added to
Butyric Acid,
it suddenly changes into
Valeric Acid.
Butyric Acid doesn't gradually alter and then suddenly "leap" and become
Valeric Acid. You can't just add one atom of Carbon, one of Hydrogen, and then
another of Hydrogen. They are added as a unit, as a job lot. The same is true of every other
molecule in other, similar organic series. In that case, another one of the 'best' examples
dialecticians use to 'illustrate' their 'Law' bites the dust! There is no "interruption" in gradualness, here,
either. Recall what Lenin said:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin
(1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
In
all these examples there is no continuity, only discontinuity. This
means that the most widely-, and over-used couple of examples drawn from the DM-box-of-tricks
(that supposedly illustrate this 'Law') fail to do so!
Furthermore, it seems rather odd to describe an increase in heat as an increase
in quantity when what happens is that the relevant water
molecules just move about faster if energy is fed into the system.
Of course, it
could be countered that that is precisely Engels's point; since energy can be
measured (perhaps here as an increase in temperature or maybe even in
Joules, etc.), then that increase in heat would be
an increase in quantity -- in this case perhaps the "quantity of motion"
(translated in terms of the increased velocity of water molecules, if that can
actually be measured). But, the original idea appeared in Hegel's work at a
time when heat was regarded as a fluid,
Caloric.
[For Hegel's view, see
here.] We now know that what really happens is that molecules just move
faster, after having interacted with still other faster moving molecules.
[That
is something Engels admits anyway; cf.,
Engels (1954),
pp.63-64.]
So, when he speaks
about an increase in
energy as a quantitative increase, he was either using a façon de parler,
or he hadn't quite abandoned the old idea that
heat is a substance. Of course, it might still be legitimate to describe this phenomenon
as an 'increase
in energy', but if so, it would only succeed in plunging this part of the First
'Law' into complete darkness, since the word
"energy" (if it, too, isn't just a
façon de parler)
isn't the name of an
identifiable substance that can be qualified in this way, either.
Erwin
Marquit (mentioned in an earlier sub-section) rightly makes much about the lack
of clarity concerning the nature
of energy in modern physical science -- cf., Marquit (1980), pp.80-83 --, but
his definition, which he claims to have found in
DN, isn't much to write home about,
either:
"Energy is a measure
of the capacity for change in the form of motion." [Ibid., p.83. Italic emphasis in
the original.]
In
fact, this isn't much different from the 'definition' offered by many scientists!10
One
standard text defines energy as follows:
"Energy is a measure that is associated with a state (or condition) of one or
more bodies." [Halliday, et al (1993), p.188.]
A
Dictionary of Physics had this to say:
"Energy: A measure of the ability of an object or a system to do work." [Harrison
(1999), p.58.]
This
is all rather odd; we are told elsewhere that matter is really a form of energy
(i.e., that they are basically 'the same thing") -- so, is everything really
made of, or "the same thing" as, "measure of a capacity for change
in the form of motion"? Everything is made of a "capacity"? Or an "ability"?
Is the material world just "the same thing" as a "capacity to do work"? Really?
"E = mc2.
It's the world's most famous equation, but what does it really mean? 'Energy
equals mass times the speed of light squared.' On the most basic level, the
equation says that energy and mass (matter) are interchangeable; they are
different forms of the same thing." [Quoted from
here; accessed
04-07-2024. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
But as Lenin
argued, the question remains: What then is it that moves? [We might add
"What then is this "capacity?"] However, Engels
and Marquit can't answer these questions without going round in circles: It is
matter that moves, and matter is energy which is a capacity to move. But, what
moves? Answer: It is matter that moves and matter is energy, which a capacity to move...
In
fact, Lenin appeared to reject Engels and Marquit's definition because it goes
round in circles, in the above manner:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the
question, does matter move? into the question, is energy material? Does the
transformation of energy take place outside my mind, independently of man and
mankind, or are these only ideas, symbols, conventional signs, and so forth? And
this question proved fatal to the 'energeticist' philosophy, that attempt to
disguise old epistemological errors by a 'new' terminology." [Lenin
(1972), p.324. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
But,
Lenin had no answer, either. He also failed to tell his readers what matter and
energy are! No wonder he and
Engels were forced to say that
matter is just an
abstraction!
That can only mean that energy is an abstraction, too!
It is at this point that we hit peak absurdity:
according to DM-theorists, the quality of bodies and processes is changed by the
addition or subtraction of an abstraction to an abstraction! The universe is not only made out of
an abstraction, it is changed by the addition or subtraction of yet more
abstractions!
Is it any wonder
that Lenin preferred Idealists to 'boring materialists'?
"Intelligent idealism is
closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead
of intelligent; (sic) metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of
stupid." [Lenin (1961),
p.274.]
As I
pointed out in Essay Three Part Two, this puts Lenin and other DM-fans
on the side
of the 'Gods',
not the materialists:
"When the
Gigantes
about
Pallene
chose to begin war against the immortals,
Herakles
fought on the side of the gods, and slaying many of the Sons of
Ge
[or Gaia, the 'Earth Goddess' -- RL]
he received the highest approbation. For
Zeus
gave the
name of
Olympian only to those gods who had fought by his side, in order that the
courageous, by being adorned by so honourable a title, might be distinguished by
this designation from the coward; and of those who were born of mortal women he
considered only
Dionysos
and
Herakles worthy of this name." [Diodorus
Siculus, Library of History 4.15.1.]
That
metaphor alludes to an
image painted by
Hesiod (in his
Theogony -- links at the end)
and later by Plato in his dialogue,
Sophist, which is one of his more profound surviving works. Indeed, the
Sophist and two of his other dialogues -- Theaetetus (Plato
(1997e)) and
Parmenides (Plato
(1997d)) -- are together the principle source of much of subsequent Idealism.
The following excerpt from the Sophist reports on a conversation between an
Eleatic
"Stranger" (who appears to be a follower of
Parmenides)
and a character called "Theaetetus":
"Stranger. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who
treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed
to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all,
that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of
not-being....
"...There
appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are
fighting with one another about the nature of essence.
"Theaetetus. How is that?
"Stranger.
Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to
earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and trees; of these they
lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or
handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if
any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him,
and will hear of nothing but body.
"Theaetetus. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they
are.
"Stranger.
And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from
above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of
certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists,
which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little
bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and
motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict
raging concerning these matters.
"Theaetetus. True.
"Stranger.
Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call
essence.
"Theaetetus. How shall we get it out of them?
"Stranger.
With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty,
for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or
rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag
everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?
"Theaetetus. What?
"Stranger.
Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us
imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in
accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth
having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is
acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but
seekers after truth." [Plato
(1997b), pp.267-68, 246a-246d. I have used the on-line version here.]
[As noted
earlier, this battle is described in
Hesiod's
Theogony (lines 675-715), available
here.]
From this it is quite clear that
Marxist Dialecticians are far closer to the 'Idealist Gods'
than they are to the
'Materialist Giants'!
"In order to talk to each other, we have to have words, and that's all right.
It's a good idea to try to see the difference, and it's a good idea to know when
we are teaching the tools of science, such as words, and when we are teaching
science itself. To make my point still clearer, I shall pick out a certain science book to
criticize unfavourably, which is unfair, because I am sure that with little
ingenuity, I can find equally unfavourable things to say about others. There is
a first grade science book which, in the first lesson of the first grade, begins
in an unfortunate manner to teach science, because it starts off an the wrong
idea of what science is. There is a picture of a dog -- a windable toy dog --
and a hand comes to the winder, and then the dog is able to move. Under the last
picture, it says 'What makes it move?' Later on, there is a picture of a real
dog and the question, 'What makes it move?' Then there is a picture of a
motorbike and the question, 'What makes it move?' and so on.
"I thought at first they were getting ready to tell what science was going to be
about -- physics, biology, chemistry -- but that wasn't it. The answer was in
the teacher's edition of the book: the answer I was trying to learn is that
'energy makes it move.' Now, energy is a very subtle concept. It is very, very difficult to get right.
What I meant is that it is not easy to understand energy well enough to use it
right, so that you can deduce something correctly using the energy idea -- it is
beyond the first grade. It would be equally well to say that 'God makes it
move,' or 'spirit makes it move,' or 'movability makes it move.' (In fact, one
could equally well say 'energy makes it stop.')
"Look at it this way: that's only the definition of energy; it should be
reversed. We might say when something can move that it has energy in it, but
not what makes it move is energy. This is a very subtle difference. It's the
same with this inertia proposition. Perhaps I can make the difference a little clearer this way: If you ask a child
what makes the toy dog move, you should think about what an ordinary human being
would answer. The answer is that you wound up the spring; it tries to unwind and
pushes the gear around. What a good way to begin a science course! Take apart the toy; see how it
works. See the cleverness of the gears; see the ratchets. Learn something about
the toy, the way the toy is put together, the ingenuity of people devising the
ratchets and other things. That's good. The question is fine. The answer is a
little unfortunate, because what they were trying to do is teach a definition
of what is energy. But nothing whatever is learned.
"Suppose a student would say, 'I don't think energy makes it move.' Where does
the discussion go from there? I finally figured out a way to test whether you have taught an idea or you have
only taught a definition. Test it this way: you say, 'Without using the new word which you have just
learned, try to rephrase what you have just learned in your own language.
Without using the word "energy," tell me what you know now about the dog's
motion.' You can't. So you learned nothing about science. That may be all
right. You may not want to learn something about science right away. You have to
learn definitions. But for the very first lesson, is that not possibly
destructive? I think for lesson number one, to learn a mystic formula for answering
questions is very bad. The book has some others: 'gravity makes it fall;' 'the
soles of your shoes wear out because of friction.' Shoe leather wears out
because it rubs against the sidewalk and the little notches and bumps on the
sidewalk grab pieces and pull them off. To simply say it is because of friction,
is sad, because it's not science." [Quoted from
here. Spelling modified to agree with UK
English; quotation marks
altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected; several
paragraphs merged. Some bold emphases
in the original, some added.]
It is instructive to note that when push comes to shove, even
great physicists have to appeal to
ordinary language
and common understanding to explain why anything actually happens.
[No pun
intended!]
Be
this as it may, another serious problem now rears its ugly head: using "quantity" to depict the
change in motion of molecules is dubious on other grounds. Certainly, we can speak of an
increase or decrease in the velocity of certain molecules, here, but there is no such thing as a quantity of
velocity that could sensibly be said to increase. Velocity isn't a substance, either, and
although we certainly use numbers to depict this
vector, we don't refer to anything
called the "quantity of velocity" (except again, perhaps as a
façon de parler).
Since velocity is a
vector, its magnitude is given by a
scalar,
but velocity itself is just that scalar operating in that
direction. To call the magnitude of a vector a "quantity" would be to confuse a
vector (or indeed a direction) with a substance, or even with a scalar.
And
this isn't just me being pedantic. As we saw above, this is in line
with Hegel's own definition of the word:
"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical
with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its
quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does
not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it
be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]
That
point is also underlined by the Glossary at the
Marxist
Internet Archive:
"Quantity is an aspect of somethingwhich may change (become more or less)
without the thing thereby becoming something else. Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'. In Hegel's
Logic,
Quality
is the first
division of
Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while
Quantity
is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage,
Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
Hence, if we strictly adhere to these definitions, there can be no "quantity" of
energy, because it isn't a "thing", or an "aspect" of a thing in
any meaningful sense of those words. In fact, as we have seen: we have
absolutely no
idea what energy is! I make it a point on the many discussion forums I use
and still frequent to ask Professors and Doctors of Physics what energy actually
is. Not one of them has been able to tell me.
Nevertheless,
even if it were appropriate to depict energy in the way Engels thought he could, neither the heat nor the faster
molecules change in quality themselves. Any amount of heat still stays as
heat; motion is still motion. This confirms the obvious fact that energy and heat aren't
"kinds of things", and hence that their increase or decrease isn't even quantitative,
since they can't therefore be "aspects" of something. If they were, then according
to this 'Law', an increase in energy at some point would "pass over" and it
would change into a "new kind of thing". Energy and heat would change
into...., what?
If so, the "quantitative" aspect of Engels's First 'Law' is
fundamentally defective, since,
if "quantity" has to be an aspect of certain "kinds of thing", and energy and
motion aren't "kinds of
things" themselves, they can't increase or decrease in quantity.
Of course,
that is a ridiculous conclusion, since
energy is largely quantized; but this just shows how defective Hegel and
Engels's 'definitions' of "quantity" have turned out to be.
Hence, on close examination -- much
closer than DM-fans have ever subjected this to -- the First 'Law' doesn't appear to apply
to such 'phenomena'!
In that case,
at best, it should now perhaps be re-written along the following lines:
M1: An increase in the
quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item,
while it can induce an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water),
which will in turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative
change itself -- but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it
isn't a quality
definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).
Or, even:
M2: An increase in what
isn't the
quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item,
while it can induce an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water), which will in
turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative change itself --
but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it isn't a quality
definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).
As we can now see: this isn't an impressive 'Law'.
In comparison, "A stitch in time saves nine" and "An apple a day keeps
the doctor away" are far more noteworthy!
Still
less is this hackneyed example (concerning water) a convincing 'illustration' of
the First 'Law'.
As far as balding heads
are concerned, it isn't easy to see how this other over-worked example illustrates the
First 'Law', either. That is because it is difficult to believe
that someone with, say, n hairs on their head is hirsute when the same
person with n-1 hairs is objectively bald -- even if at some point or other
(and not necessarily the same point) we all might
subjectively choose different words to depict them.
Now, if it could be shown that those with
preciselyn-1 hairs on their heads are always objectively bald, and that this is an essential defining quality of baldness,
or of bald people, or of bald heads (which is the Aristotelian/Hegelian sense
required by DM), so that a
change from n to n-1 hairs always results in baldness, and which rule is true for all hirsute human beings,
then the First 'Law' might have some life left in it in this one instance.
It would then be a dialectical 'Law' that applies only to the balding parts of
the universe, but nothing else. [Which is just longhand for saying it can't therefore
be a law.]
Anyway, is baldness really a "new kind of
thing"? With
respect to that condition human anatomists (and even hairdressers) have yet to define
hair loss in such
Aristotelian/Hegelian terms. Hence, and unfortunately for DM-fans, they have so far failed to categorise all
follically-challenged
individuals in this way, declaring that anyone with n-1 hairs is
essentially bald, whereas anyone with n hairs is still essentially non-coot.
Until they do, there are no "nodal" points here, just as there seem to be no
specifically (Aristotelian/Hegelian) "qualities" definitive of bald human beings
for dialecticians to latch onto. So, in this case, too, it is impossible
to see how an 'objective' example of this dialectical 'Law' applies --, merely a 'subjective' impression
of it,
and, indeed, one that has to rely on a quirky application of an already vague
Aristotelian/Hegelian
'definition' of "quality".
So, it seems that the change in "quality", if
one even occurs
here, takes place not in the one actually going bald, but in the one describing
them
that way. In
which case, with
respect to human balding, a change in
the quantity of hair on one person's head will merely change the quality of someone else'sopinion of the one going bald; and even that occurs subjectively and
(possibly even) non-"nodally", too. And the one judging that qualitative change
in the balding individual will themselves have undergone a qualitative change without any
quantitative change in or to them that could have brought that about!
There isn't much here on which to base a
dialectical 'Law', at least nothing that would fail to brand this part of DM
as 'fringe science', at best.
Not to be
deterred, DM-fan, Clifford Conner, hopes to persuade his readers that the following example of change in
"quality" also 'illustrates' this 'Law':
"Atomic bombs and nuclear reactions have given us
an unsurpassable illustration of this law, and Engels would surely have
appreciated this one, too. When the nuclear fuel is brought together, if there
is less than a certain exact amount, which is called the 'critical
mass', nothing will happen. But, if a little more fuel is added, and a
little more, and a little more, eventually the 'critical mass' will be reached
and the
nuclear chain reaction
will be initiated." [Conner (1992), p.29. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
But, has a new "kind of thing" emerged, here? In fact,
as we have repeatedly seen, no "new
kind of thing" has resulted from this particular process. All that has happened is that a
certain sort of reaction speeds up dramatically:
"Fission chain reactions occur because of
interactions between
neutrons and
fissileisotopes (such as 235U). The
chain reaction requires both the release of neutrons from fissile
isotopes undergoing
nuclear fission and the subsequent absorption of some of these neutrons in fissile
isotopes. When an atom undergoes nuclear fission, a few neutrons
(the exact number depends on several factors) are ejected from the
reaction. These free neutrons will then interact with the
surrounding medium, and if more fissile fuel is present, some may be
absorbed and cause more fissions. Thus, the cycle repeats to give a
reaction that is self-sustaining.
"Nuclear power plants
operate by precisely controlling the rate at which nuclear reactions
occur, and that control is maintained through the use of several
redundant layers of safety measures. Moreover, the materials in a
nuclear reactor core and the uranium enrichment level make a nuclear
explosion impossible, even if all safety measures failed. On the
other hand, nuclear weapons are specifically engineered to produce a
reaction that is so fast and intense it can't be controlled after
it has started. When properly designed, this uncontrolled reaction
can lead to an explosive energy release." [Wikipedia,
accessed 08/11/2011. For those who don't like Wikipedia, the
same is argued
here, at BBC Science.]
Figure Four: A Non-Dialectical Chain Reaction
As another source points out:
"Although two to three neutrons are
produced for every fission, not all of these neutrons are available
for continuing the fission reaction. If the conditions are such that
the neutrons are lost at a faster rate than they are formed by
fission, the chain reaction will not be self-sustaining. At the point where the chain
reaction can become self-sustaining, this is referred to as critical
mass.
"In an atomic bomb, a mass of fissile
material greater than the critical mass must be assembled
instantaneously and held together for about a millionth of a second
to permit the chain reaction to propagate before the bomb explodes. The amount of a fissionable
material's critical mass depends on several factors; the shape of
the material, its composition and density, and the level of purity.
"A sphere has the minimum possible
surface area for a given mass, and hence minimizes the leakage of
neutrons. By surrounding the fissionable material with a suitable
neutron 'reflector', the loss of neutrons can reduced and the
critical mass can be reduced.
By using a neutron reflector, only
about 11 pounds (5 kilograms) of nearly pure or weapon's grade
plutonium 239 or about 33 pounds (15 kilograms)
uranium
235 is needed to achieve critical mass." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 08/11/2011. Quotation marks altered to conform
with
the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
So, and again, no "new kind of thing"
emerges from this process
-- the "old kind of thing" merely speeds up. In that case, this can't be an example of
the First 'Law'.
"I was reminded of the transformation of quantity
into quality by an article I read...about resort beaches in New Jersey. Health
inspectors periodically check the ocean water for
faecal
coliform bacteria. They measure it in parts per millilitres of water. If it
is below 200 parts, they allow the beaches to remain open; above that number they
close them down. Some resort owners were caught throwing chlorine tablets into
the ocean just before the inspectors were due to arrive. It was a futile attempt, as it turned out, to
prevent a transformation of quantity into quality, but it was rather remarkable
to see capitalists sneaking around trying to 'unpollute' the environment."
[Conner (1992), p.29. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
But,
whatever it was that the aforementioned capitalists did or didn't do
isn't as remarkable as the sight of
DM-fans scratching around, desperately trying to impose their ramshackle
'theory' on the world. In this latest example of
Mickey Mouse Science, Conner
failed to tell his readers what the new "quality" is supposed to be
that he thinks has come into being in this case. Plainly, no new "kind of thing"
has emerged, once more. All we have are more bacteria in the water over and
above a figure set by the authorities. Either side of that figure, the water is still polluted, it is just that above 200
parts per millilitre the
authorities have decided that it becomes 'cost effective' to close the beach.
As
Karl Popper
noted, just like Freudians (and he could have added, just like Fundamentalist
Christians), Dialectical Marxists only look for conformation of
their 'theory' -- and even then they have to ignore what that theory
actually tells them!
"I found that those of my friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and
Adler,
were impressed by a number of points common to these theories, and especially by
their apparent explanatory power. These theories appear to be able to explain
practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred.
The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion
or revelation, open your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet
initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirmed instances
everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened
always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were
clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refuse to see it,
either because it was against their class interest, or because of their
repressions which were still 'un-analyzed' and crying aloud for treatment.
"The most characteristic element in this situation seemed to me the incessant
stream of confirmations, of observations which 'verified' the theories in
question; and this point was constantly emphasize by their adherents. A Marxist
could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for
his interpretation of history; not only in the news, but also in its
presentation -- which revealed the class bias of the paper -- and especially of
course what the paper did not say. The Freudian analysts emphasized that their
theories were constantly verified by their 'clinical observations.' As for
Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported
to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found
no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings,
although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he
could be so sure. 'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon
I could not help saying: 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has
become thousand-and-one-fold.'
"What I had in mind was that his previous observations may not have been much
sounder than this new one; that each in its turn had been interpreted in the
light of 'previous experience,' and at the same time counted as additional
confirmation. What, I asked myself, did it confirm? No more than that a case
could be interpreted in the light of a theory. But this meant very little, I
reflected, since every conceivable case could be interpreted in the light
Adler's theory, or equally of Freud's. I may illustrate this by two very
different examples of human behaviour: that of a man who pushes a child into the
water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his
life in an attempt to save the child. Each of these two cases can be explained
with equal ease in Freudian and Adlerian terms. According to Freud the first man
suffered from repression (say, of some component of his
Oedipus
complex), while the second man had achieved sublimation. According to Adler
the first man suffered from feelings of inferiority (producing perhaps the need
to prove to himself that he dared to commit some crime), and so did the second
man (whose need was to prove to himself that he dared to rescue the child). I
could not think of any human behaviour which could not be interpreted in terms
of either theory. It was precisely this fact -- that they always fitted, that
they were always confirmed -- which in the eyes of their admirers constituted
the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that
this apparent strength was in fact their weakness." [Popper (1974b),
pp.34-35. Spelling modified to
agree with UK English; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis and
link added.]
Of
course, Popper used these observations to attack Marx's Theory
of History, too, but as we will see in a later Essay, that move was as unwise as
it was misguided. Even so,
his comments certainly apply to the sort of Mickey Mouse Science
DM-apologists are peddling.
As I noted
earlier (slightly modified):
The phrases
"something new" and "ceasing to be what it is" are hopelessly vague, too. We
aren't told what constitutes novelty or what "ceasing to be" amounts to, either.
Still less are we informed what counts as a relevant form of novelty.... We
have also seen dialecticians -- including Hegel -- regard ice, water and steam as
"something new", when we now know they aren't. But, equivocations like
this 'allow'
them to apply this 'Law' when and where is suits them, just as it
'allows' them to reject or ignore counter-examples when and where that
suits them, too.
More
recently,
dialecticians have begun appealing to
Chaos and Catastrophe
Theory in their vain attempt to argue that Engels's nineteenth century 'Law' is
bang
up-to-date. The natural processes investigated in those areas of science at
some point undeniably change
rapidly. [Again, it is important to note that rapid change in nature and
society is neither
being denied nor asserted in this Essay. What is being challenged is the theory
that all change is "nodal", or rapid. Some changes are, many aren't. I
have found it necessary to repeat this point several times since critics who claim to
have read this Essay seem to think I am denying there are any rapid changes in
nature and society. I am not. Unlike DM-fans, I simply refuse to be
informed about this by a Christian Mystic, and ('foolishly') look to
scientists to educate us about the world and the varied rates of change we
encounter there.]
However, as we will see, the term "quality" is defined in DM-circles in terms
that
rule-out many of these catastrophic changes from even being categorised as 'dialectical'. That is because no
new DM-"qualities" emerge in such transitions.
For example, in the famous "three
body" problem, whatever the outcome, the planetary bodies involved are still
planets and they are still satellites; their orbits are still orbits. What new
DM-"quality" has "emerged"?
[Here is a
JavaScript simulation of this phenomenon. Indeed, the transitions in this example
also appear to be non-"nodal".
(Visitors can alter the parameters in the top left hand corner of the page.)]
Moreover, chaotic (turbulent)
flows, either side of the alleged "node", are still flows, and the liquids/gases
involved are still the liquids/gases. No new
Aristotelian/Hegelian "quality"
has "emerged" here, either.
To be sure, some chaotic systems certainly seem
to conform with this 'Law' -- but, that is because: (a) The phrase "nodal change"
has been left conveniently vague, and (b) Few dialecticians are prepared to ask
awkward (but rather obvious) questions about the precise nature of these DM-"qualities". [On that, see
here,
here and
here.]
However, there are scientific and/or mathematical models of
reality that explain chaotic systems (indeed, they do so with far greater clarity) --,
and they don't fall foul of the many counter-examples listed in this Essay
(that 'refute' this 'Law') -- namely, from the theorists whose popularisations
DM-theorists themselves learnt about these chaotic systems in the first place.
Hence, if we needed a theory of change
(in such cases), DM wouldn't be
it.
Once more, if the "same body" requirement is
indeed part of Engels's 'Law', then many of the examples DM-theorists themselves
use soon fall by the wayside. For example, the following (overworked) example (to which Engels
himself appealed) goes straight
out of the window:
"In conclusion we shall call one more witness for
the transformation of quantity into quality, namely --
Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were
bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes,
who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but
lacked discipline, as follows:
'Two Mamelukes
were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100
Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300
Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes,
and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500
Mamelukes.'" [Engels
(1976), p.163.]
But,
what is the "same body", here? At best, all we have in this
instance is
a changing collection of non-identical Mamelukes and French soldiers
(unless we are to suppose the same collections of Mamelukes and French soldiers
were used each time -- even after they had been defeated, or perhaps
wounded/killed). This is hardly the
"same body".
Does anyone think that Napoleon
(or even Engels!) actually carried out this experiment? At best, this was a 'thought experiment'. But,
that hasn't stopped DM-fans quoting it as if it were gospel-truth/well-established-science.
Unfortunately for them we
don't even have a single material body to consider, here, just a few
vague words by about different collections of warriors!
Plainly, there can be no 'development' here,
either -- since there is no evidence that this series of events ever took place!
--, so the objection directed against many of the
counter-examples mentioned in this Essay (i.e., that they are irrelevant since they
apply to systems or bodies that aren't developing) also fails. Which
DM-fan has ever objected to this example on the grounds that
(a) It doesn't apply to a body/system to which matter or energy has been added,
and (b) It involves a 'thought experiment' about a 'system' that isn't
actually developing?
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As far as
the other examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' this 'Law' are concerned:
there are few that even appear to work (even when the
above difficulties and equivocations have been ignored), and when added to
the others already considered in this Essay, that hardly justifies the title
"Law" being attached to this key component of Engels's theory.
By way of comparison,
had
Newton's
Second Law of motion, for instance, worked as fitfully as this 'Law' does (or it was
as vaguely-worded and was a mathematics-free-zone, too), physicists would
heartily laugh at anyone who described it as a law. If, say, the rate of change of momentum, even
under controlled conditions, were only occasionally proportional to the applied
force -- and even then, if this were the case only if key terms were either ignored,
remained ill-defined or were twisted out of
shape -- no one would have taken Newton seriously. And rightly so.
But, that's is Mickey Mouse
'Dialectical Science' for you...
The reason why I have
called DM Mickey Mouse
Science should now be quite plain. The examples usually presented by DM-fans to illustrate their
First 'Law' -- which lack clarity and are ill-defined -- are almost without exception
either
anecdotal
or entirely amateurish. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal
purporting to establish the veracity of a new law, or even support a novel
hypothesis, with the same level of
vagueness, imprecision, lack of detail and supporting mathematics -- failings
that were compounded by profound theoretical wooliness --, it would
be rejected out-of-hand at the first stage, its author's reputation forever
damaged. As even Maurice
Cornforth (an otherwise enthusiastic DM-supporter and
-proselytiser)
was forced to admit:
"But investigation of universal laws of dialectics remains an open field.
It is something that has been projected but not yet systematically done.
And the laws that have been written down, following Hegel,
still lack both the precision of formulation and the systematic derivation to be
expected of anything that can rank as science.
The laws of dialectics should be, as Engels claimed, 'as simple and clear as
noonday'. If they are not, and if their interconnection is not evident, that is
because not enough work has been done on their formulation. (A case in point is
the so‑called 'law of the negation of negation'.)" [Cornforth (1985), p.293;
quoted from here.
Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
The above
was written many years ago but the situation hasn't markedly changed in the
intervening years. So, this is still the case: "[T]he laws [of dialectics]
still lack both the precision of formulation and the systematic derivation to be
expected of anything that can rank as science."
Indeed, as I
have argued
elsewhere:
Anyone who has studied or practiced genuine science knows the
great care and attention to detail that has to be devoted by researchers, often
over many years or decades, if they
want to add to or alter even relatively minor areas of current knowledge, let
alone establish a new law. This was the case in Engels's day, just as it is the
case today. Moreover, the concepts employed by scientists have to be analytically sound. The use of primary data is essential (or it has at least to
be reviewed or referenced by the scientists involved); supporting evidence has to be
precise, detailed,
meticulously recorded, and subject not only to public scrutiny but also to peer review.
In contrast, the sort
of Mickey Mouse Science one finds in Creationist literature is rightly the
target of derision by scientists and Marxists alike. And yet, when it comes to
DM we find in Engels's writings (and those of subsequent dialecticians) little
other than Mickey Mouse Science. Engels supplied his readers with no original data, and what little
evidence he offered in support of his 'Laws' would have been rejected as
amateurish in the extreme if it had appeared in an undergraduate science paper,
let alone in a research document --, even in his day! DM-theorists
today almost invariably present their readers with a few paragraphs, or, at best, a few pages of
highly selective secondary and tertiary 'evidence' of the sort that Engels
paraded before his readers. It is salutary,
therefore, to compare Engels's approach to scientific proof with that of Darwin, whose classic work is a model of
clarity and original research. Darwin presented the scientific community with
extensive evidence and fresh data, which has been expanded upon greatly over the last 150 years.
All we find in DM-'science' is mind-numbing repetition and vaguely-worded
anecdotes.
Contrast,
DM-Mickey Mouse Science with the real thing; here, for example, is one report of
the accuracy achieved by the instruments aboard the recently launched
Gaia
satellite:
"'Gaia was not designed to take Hubble-like pictures; this
is not its operating mode at all. What it will eventually do is draw little
boxes around each of the stars you see in this picture and send just that
information to the ground.'
"The satellite
has been given an initial mission duration of five years to make its 3D map of
the sky.
"By repeatedly
viewing its targets, it should get to know the brightest stars' coordinates down
to an error of just seven
micro-arcseconds
-- an angle equivalent to a
euro coin on the Moon being observed from Earth." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 06/02/2014. Bold emphasis added.]
Even back in the
16th century, astronomers were concerned with accuracy and precision;
Tycho Brahe,
for instance, was able to observe the heavens with the naked eye down to an
accuracy of one arcminute (1/60th of a degree!). Once again, this is
typical of genuine science, which, unfortunately, starkly distinguishes it
from the 'science' we find in DM.
Genuine science is markedly different from Mickey Mouse 'Dialectical Science'.
Since many DM-supporters appear not to know the difference between their brand
of 'science' and the genuine article, here is an example of the latter:
"'Light-speed' neutrinos point to new physical reality
"Subatomic particles have broken the
universe's fundamental speed limit, or so it was reported last week.
The speed of light is the ultimate limit on travel in the universe,
and the basis for
Einstein's special theory of relativity, so if the
finding stands up to scrutiny, does it spell the end for physics as
we know it? The reality is less simplistic and far more interesting.
"'People were saying this means Einstein is
wrong,' says physicist Heinrich Päs of the Technical University of
Dortmund in Germany. 'But that's not really correct.' Instead, the result could be the first
evidence for a reality built out of extra dimensions. Future
historians of science may regard it not as the moment we abandoned
Einstein and broke physics, but rather as the point at which our
view of space vastly expanded, from three dimensions to four, or
more.
'This may be a physics revolution,' says
Thomas Weiler at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee,
who has devised theories built on extra dimensions. 'The famous
words 'paradigm shift' are used too often and tritely, but they
might be relevant.'
"The subatomic particles -- neutrinos -- seem
to have zipped faster than light from
CERN, near Geneva,
Switzerland, to the OPERA detector at the
Gran Sasso lab near L'Aquila, Italy. It's a conceptually simple
result: neutrinos making the 730-kilometre journey arrived 60
nanoseconds
earlier than they would have if they were travelling
at light speed. And it relies on three seemingly simple
measurements, says Dario Autiero of the Institute of Nuclear Physics
in Lyon, France, a member of the OPERA collaboration: the distance
between the labs, the time the neutrinos left
CERN,
and the time they arrived at Gran Sasso.
"But actually measuring those times and
distances to the accuracy needed to detect nanosecond differences is
no easy task. The OPERA collaboration spent three years chasing down
every source of error they could imagine...before Autiero made the
result public in a seminar at CERN on 23 September. Physicists grilled Autiero for an hour
after his talk to ensure the team had considered details like the
curvature of the Earth, the tidal effects of the moon and the
general relativistic effects of having two clocks at different
heights (gravity slows time so a clock closer to Earth's surface runs a tiny bit slower).
"They were impressed. 'I want to congratulate
you on this extremely beautiful experiment,' said Nobel laureate
Samuel Ting of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after
Autiero's talk. 'The experiment is very carefully done, and the
systematic error carefully checked.'
Most physicists still expect some sort of
experimental error to crop up and explain the anomaly, mainly
because it contravenes the incredibly successful
law of special relativity
which
holds that the speed of light is a constant that no object can
exceed. The theory also leads to the famous equation E =
mc2.
Hotly anticipated are results from other
neutrino detectors, including
T2K in Japan
and
MINOS at
Fermilab
in Illinois, which will run similar experiments and
confirm the results or rule them out (see 'Fermilab
stops hunting Higgs, starts neutrino quest')....
"Even if relativity is pushed
aside, Einstein has worked so well for so long that
he will never really go away. At worst, relativity will
turn out to work for most of the universe but not all,
just as Newton's mechanics work until things get
extremely large or small. 'The fact that Einstein has
worked for 106 years means he'll always be there, either
as the right answer or a low-energy effective theory,'
Weiler says." [Grossman (2011),
pp.7-9. Bold
emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.
(Also
see the report in
Socialist Review.) Subsequent experiments have
confirmed the result, but some scientists think
they have found a flaw.]
This is how genuine science is
practiced. Three years spent looking
for possible errors! Even today, scientists around the world are still
pouring over the data, examining it closely for mistakes in the experimental
details, or in the interpretation of the results. They certainly don't attack each other for having the temerity
to question Einstein. Nor do they
moan about "pedantry" when their work is peer reviewed; and they
definitely don't
retreat into a 'dialectical sulk' and refuse to engage with those who insist on
their work being checked and double-checked.
That is the
difference between science and dialectical quackery. And, it takes a little
more than a few references to balding heads, boiling/freezing water, melting points
and
the ambiguous fighting habits of the Mamelukes to confirm or confute apparent counter-examples to Einstein's theory.
Oddly enough,
hasty
references to the dogmatic ramblings of a Christian and Hermetic Mystic,
who lived 200 years ago, aren't sufficient, either.
Update, March 2012:
The above experiment has been repeated, which confirms that neutrinos don't travel faster than light:
"Neutrinos clocked at light-speed in new
Icarus test
"By Jason PalmerScience and technology reporter, BBC
News
"An
experiment to repeat a test of the speed of
subatomic particles known as neutrinos has
found that they do not travel faster than
light. Results announced in September
suggested that neutrinos can exceed light
speed, but were met with scepticism as that
would upend Einstein's theory of relativity.
A test run by a different group at the same
laboratory has now clocked them travelling
at precisely light speed. The
results
have been posted
online. The
results
in
September,
from the
Opera
group at
the Gran
Sasso
underground
laboratory
in
Italy,
shocked
the
world,
threatening
to upend
a
century
of
physics
as well
as
relativity
-- which
holds
the
speed of
light to
be the
Universe's
absolute
speed
limit.
Now the
Icarus
group,
based at
the same
laboratory,
has
weighed
in
again,
having
already
cast
some
doubt on
the
original
Opera
claim.
Shortly
after
that
claim,
Nobel
laureate
Sheldon
Glashow
co-authored
a
Physical
Review
Letters
paper that
modelled
how
faster-than-light
neutrinos
would
behave
as they
travelled. In
November,
the
Icarus
group
showed
in
a paper
posted
on the
online
server
Arxiv
that the
neutrinos
displayed
no such
behaviour.
However,
they
have now
supplemented
that
indirect
result
with a
test
just
like
that
carried
out by
the
Opera
team.
"Speedy
result
"The
Icarus
experiment
uses 600
tonnes
--
430,000
litres
-- of
liquid
argon to
detect
the
arrival
of
neutrons
sent
through
730km of
rock
from the
Cern
laboratory
in
Switzerland.
Since
their
November
result,
the
Icarus
team
have
adjusted
their
experiment
to do a
speed
measurement. What
was
missing
was
information
from
Cern
about
the
departure
time of
the
neutrinos,
which
the team
recently
received
to
complete
their
analysis.
The
result:
they
find
that the
neutrinos
do
travel
at the
same
speed as
light.
'We are
completely
compatible
with the
speed of
light
that we
learn at
school,'
said
Sandro
Centro,
co-spokesman
for the
Icarus
collaboration. Dr
Centro
said
that he
was not
surprised
by the
result.
'In fact
I was a
little
sceptical
since
the
beginning,'
he told
BBC
News.
'Now we
are 100%
sure
that the
speed of
light is
the
speed of
neutrinos.'
"Most
recently,
the
Opera
team
conceded
that
their
initial
result
may have
been
compromised
by
problems
with
their
equipment.
Rumours
have
circulated
since
the
Opera
result
was
first
announced
that the
team was
not
unified
in its
decision
to
announce
their
findings
so
quickly,
and Dr
Centro
suggested
that
researchers
outside
the team
were
also
suspicious. 'I
didn't
trust
the
result
right
from the
beginning
-- the
way it
was
produced,
the way
it was
managed,'
he said.
'I think
they
were a
little
bit in a
hurry to
publish
something
that was
astonishing,
and at
the end
of the
day it
was a
wrong
measurement.' Four
different
experiments
at
Italy's
Gran
Sasso
lab make
use of
the same
beam of
neutrinos
from
Cern.
Later
this
month,
they
will all
be
undertaking
independent
measurements
to
finally
put an
end to
speculation
about
neutrino
speeds.
The
Minos
experiment
in the
US and
the T2K
experiment
in Japan
may also
weigh in
on the
matter
in due
course
-- if
any
doubt is
left
about
the
neutrinos'
ability
to beat
the
universal
speed
limit."
[Quoted
from
here.
Quotation
marks
altered
to
conform
with the
conventions
adopted
at this
site.
Several
paragraphs
merged.]
Again, this is how genuine science
proceeds; controversial results have to be rigorously tested (often many times) before they are accepted
as fact
-- unlike Mickey Mouse DM-'Science'.
Consider another example: the following
is a brief description of the
precautions (highlighted in bold) taken by one scientist trying to ascertain a more
precise value for the
Gravitational Constant, G:
"Harold Parks's belongings were already leaving for France
when he realised gravity had given him the slip. 'The movers were in my
apartment taking my stuff away,' he says. He was in his lab at the research
institute
JILA in Boulder,
Colorado, making the final checks on an experiment that had taken up the past
two years of his life -- to precisely measure the strength of gravity. 'The
signal shouldn't have changed,' he recalls. 'But it did.' That was 10 years ago. Having relocated, for a while
Parks was tempted to give up on gravity. But the force exerts a mysterious pull
on those who measure it. After a sojourn at the high temple of metrology, the
International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) in Paris, France, Parks was back in Boulder, rebuilding and improving his
old experiment.... Meanwhile, Parks was beavering away in Boulder.
His and [his supervisor] Faller's experiment was a variant of an apparatus that
had been used to try to pin down big G before. It consisted of two free-hanging
pendulum bobs surrounded by four massive stacks of tungsten. Moving the tungsten
masses inwards...draws the bobs closer together by
an amount 1000 times smaller than the diameter of a human hair. Still, the shift
is large enough to be picked up by a laser interferometer.
"Not that it is easy to be sure the movements are
down to gravity alone. 'It's about thinking of all the things the world can do
to you to muck up your experiment,' says Parks. The pair set up the pendulums in
a vacuum to avoid the effects of temperature changes and air resistance slowing
the pendulums' movements. They also floated the tungsten stacks on a thin layer
of air to stop them vibrating unexpectedly. Even so, tiptoeing anywhere near the
experiment was a no-no: the additional mass of a person would weigh down one
side of the floor and nudge the apparatus ever so slightly. The problems didn't stop at the doors of the
lab. Next to, and towering over, the basement where the experiment was situated
was a high-rise block. As the sun crept across the sky during the day, it warmed
first one side of the tower and then the other, causing it to expand unevenly.
The effect was to imperceptibly tilt the tower and everything attached to it,
including Parks's lab, first one way and then the other.
"Even that cruel trick was nothing compared to what was
unmasked the day the fire alarm sounded. 'There had been regular spikes in data
taken during the day,' says Parks. 'They just went quiet.' It turned out that a
surge in current each time the elevator moved in the tower caused a slight
change in the magnetisation of the pendulum bobs, moving them ever so slightly
and skewing the results." [Webb
(2011), pp.45-47. Quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added;
several paragraphs merged.]
[Another recent example of
genuine, careful, meticulous
and original science can be accessed
here -- and even more
recent examples,
here and
here.]
Finally on
this topic, the following video is an excellent example of the detail scientists have
to enter into when a well accepted theory is challenged. This is a video of a
PhD candidate in Biological Anthropology challenging the criticisms levelled
against evolutionary theory by a 'Young
Earth Creationist' [YEC] [The latter are Christian Fundamentalists who believe
that the earth is 6000 to 10,000 years old and that the fable presented in The Book of Genesis
is literally true.] Earlier, I underlined the level of detail, the care and
attention to specifics that have to be devoted by researchers if they want to
challenge any area of science, or, indeed, defend science against the wild ideas
of religious bigots. Here, we see this PhD candidate subject the
superficially detailed evidence and argument that one YEC geneticist raised
against the seemingly modest claim that humans and chimpanzees share about 98%
of their genetic material to even more detailed, lengthy and
careful scrutiny in order to expose the bogus nature of YEC itself. [In fact,
most of the videos posted by this PhD candidate at her
YouTube site devote
the same care and attention to detail in relation to other areas of YEC and are
highly recommended as a result.] I have yet to see a single DM-supporter (in
book-, article-, or video-form) enter into even 1% of this detail or
devote a fraction of this care and attention to detail while defending or promoting their
theory, as this PhD candidate, or the other scientists mentioned above. Even
YEC-apologists enter into more detail and show greater care defending their
ideas than DM-fans! How embarrassing and revealing is that?
Video Nine: This Is What "Attention To Detail"
Means In Genuine Science
Do we see such
care and attention to detail in Engels's work on DM
-- or in
that of subsequent dialecticians?
Or, anything even remotely like it?
Are you joking?!
Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any endeavour to
establish either the truth of classical economics with an argumentative and evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as
we find in the musings of DM-fans; to say
nothing of the contempt they would show toward theoretical wooliness of
the sort they
regularly serve up to their readers. In
such circumstances, dialecticians who might otherwise be quick to cry "pedantry"
at several issues raised in this Essay and elsewhere at this site, would becomewell-focused 'pedants' themselves, nit-picking with the best of them at
any such attempt to defend classical economics or the capitalist system.
[In
fact,
the aforementioned 'dialectical pedants' already do this with my work. In one breath they complain about my alleged "pedantry", in the
next they home in on what they think are minor errors in detail or wording
in my Essays.
Here is just the latest example; concentrate, for example, on the comments
of one "Gilhyle"; here is another.
At the same time, they show almost limitless patience coupled with endless
understanding when it comes to
Engels, Lenin or Trotsky's writings about DM. Critics like me are pilloried for the
slightest of assumed mistakes; DM-fans are regularly issued with
get-out-of-jail-free cards.]10a
When we
compare this
amateurish approach to evidence, proof and clarity with the opposite
state of affairs apparent in, say,
HM, the contrast is stark indeed.
In economics,
history, current affairs, and politics Marxists display commendable attention to detail
alongside
admirable clarity, almost invariably adding page after page of (often novel)
facts, figures, tables, graphs, references and detailed analyses to
their books and articles -- much of which show signs of painstaking
research and
careful thought.
One only has to look at a handful of the excellent blogs run by Marxist economists
to see how meticulous they are in connection with HM -- for instance,
this one.
In addition, they devote adequate space
to analysing concepts like "ideology", "the falling rate of
profit", "mode of production" and "alienation"
-- indeed, sometimes even publishing entire articles and books
-- but hardly ever even so much as a single paragraph to "quality" or
"node", to say nothing of the missing detail noted earlier (for example,
here, and
here).
At this point we might
wonder where Engels's predilection for
Mickey Mouse Science came from. After all, he was familiar with the
careful and detailed work of contemporaneous scientists (like Darwin and
Helmholtz). Why then was he prepared
to assert that his 'Laws' were indeed laws on the basis of very little primary data
-- or, in some cases, none at all? For instance, how much data did
Engels provide in
support of his theory that motion was contradictory? In fact, he offered zero evidence, just a highly suspect
'thought
experiment'. [I have covered this topic in much more detail in Essay
Five. Readers are directed there for
more details.] In general the sad fact is that in support of his 'Laws'
Engels relied on sketchy, secondary or even tertiary (highly selective) evidence
--,
compounded by seriously compressed, vague and sloppy analyses. Compare that
with the level of supporting detail Marx added to Das Kapital.
We need look no further than Hegel
for an answer to the above question (i.e., where Engels's ideas came from). He
not only derived them from Hegel, he also copied the latter's cavalier attitude
toward the provision of supporting evidence. So,
that Christian Mystic, Hegel,
was the original Mickey Mouse Scientist, which makes Engels, perhaps, the
Sorcerer's Apprentice.
Figure Five: Researching For A 'PhD In
Dialectics'?
Here is
Hegel's 'detailed proof' of the First 'Law':
"The system of natural numbers already shows a nodal line of qualitative
moments which emerge in a merely external succession. It is on the one hand a
merely quantitative progress and regress, a perpetual adding or subtracting, so
that each number has the same arithmetical relation to the one before
it and after it, as these have to their predecessors and successors, and so on.
But the numbers so formed also have a specific relation to other
numbers preceding and following them, being either an integral multiple of one
of them or else a power or a root. In the musical scale which is built up on
quantitative differences, a quantum gives rise to an harmonious relation without
its own relation to those on either side of it in the scale differing from the
relation between these again and their predecessors and successors. While
successive notes seem to be at an ever-increasing distance from the keynote, or
numbers in succeeding each other arithmetically seem only to become other
numbers, the fact is that there suddenly emerges a return, a surprising
accord, of which no hint was given by the quality of what immediately preceded
it, but which appears as an actio in distans [action at distance --
RL], as a connection with
something far removed. There is a sudden interruption of the succession of
merely indifferent relations which do not alter the preceding specific reality
or do not even form any such, and although the succession is continued
quantitatively in the same manner, a specific relation breaks in per saltum
[leaps -- RL].
"Such qualitative nodes and leaps occur in chemical combinations when the
mixture proportions are progressively altered; at certain points in the scale of
mixtures, two substances form products exhibiting particular qualities. These
products are distinguished from one another not merely by a more or less, and
they are not already present, or only perhaps in a weaker degree, in the
proportions close to the nodal proportions, but are bound up with these nodes
themselves. For example, different oxides of nitrogen and nitric acids having
essentially different qualities are formed only when oxygen and nitrogen are
combined in certain specific proportions, and no such specific compounds are
formed by the intermediate proportions. Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are
formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by
colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the
proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific
substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific
compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses
characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not
merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the
solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary,
each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual
succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far
from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap
from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration.
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no
leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a
ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual
emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in
general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a
transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other
which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something
qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling,
does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually
solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all
at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing
undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state. In thinking about the gradualness of the coming-to-be of
something, it is ordinarily assumed that what comes to be is already sensibly or
actually in existence; it is not yet perceptible only because of its
smallness. Similarly with the gradual disappearance of something, the
non-being or other which takes its place is likewise assumed to be
really there, only not observable, and there, too, not in the
sense of being implicitly or ideally contained in the first something, but
really there, only not observable. In this way, the form of the in-itself,
the inner being of something before it actually exists, is transformed into a
smallness of an outer existence, and the essential difference, that of the
Notion, is converted into an external difference of mere magnitude. The attempt
to explain coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be on the basis of gradualness of the
alteration is tedious like any tautology; what comes to be or ceases to be is
assumed as already complete and in existence beforehand and the alteration is
turned into a mere change of an external difference, with the result that the
explanation is in fact a mere tautology. The intellectual difficulty attendant
on such an attempted explanation comes from the qualitative transition from
something into its other in general, and then into its opposite; but the
identity and the alteration are misrepresented as the indifferent,
external determinations of the quantitative sphere.
"In the moral sphere, in so far as it is considered under
the categories of being, there occurs the same transition from quantity into
quality and different qualities appear to be based in a difference of magnitude. It is through a more or less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness
is exceeded and something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus
right becomes wrong and virtue vice. Thus states, too, acquire through their
quantitative difference, other things being assumed equal, a distinct
qualitative character. With the expansion of the state and an increased number
of citizens, the laws and the constitution acquire a different significance. The
state has its own measure of magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere
change of size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same
constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its expansion."
[Hegel (1999),
pp.368-71, §§774-778.
Italic emphases in the original. Several paragraphs merged.]
"The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at
first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two
categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the
one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without
affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution,
immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers
change. Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no
consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase of diminution
of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of
cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or
ice. A quantitative change takes place, apparently without any further
significance: but there is something lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent
change of quantity acts as a kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The
antinomy of Measure which this implies was exemplified under more than one garb
among the Greeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap
of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair from the
horse's tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of quantity as an
indifferent and external character of being, we are disposed to answer these
questions in the negative. And yet, as we must admit, this indifferent increase
and diminution has its limit: a point is finally reached, where a single
additional grain makes a heap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we
continue plucking out single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story
of the peasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce
after ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable burden. It
would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic futility; they really
turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is of great importance in practical
life, especially in ethics. Thus in the matter of expenditure, there is a
certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but when the
Measure, imposed by the individual circumstances of the special case, is
exceeded on the one side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in
the above examples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt, and
a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into avarice or
prodigality. The same principles may be applied in politics, when the
constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of, no less than as
dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number of its inhabitants, and
other quantitative points of the same kind. If we look, e.g. at a state with a
territory of ten thousand square miles and a population of four millions we
should, without hesitation, admit that a few square miles of land or a few
thousand inhabitants more or less could exercise no essential influence on the
character of its constitution. But on the other hand, we must not forget that by
the continual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point
where, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration alone
necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the constitution. The
constitution of a little Swiss canton does not suit a great kingdom; and,
similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic was unsuitable when
transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany." [Hegel (1975),
pp.158-59.]
If only all scientific papers were as clear, rigorous, detailed and technically
competent as this!
If only Darwin had read Hegel!
Sarcasm to one side, non-partisan readers will no doubt be alarmed to learn that rank
amateurism like this isn't confined to Engels -- or even Woods and Grant. Hegel could
'amateur' and dissemble with the best of them.10a1
We
have already had occasion to note that even though Hegel asserts such changes
in 'quality' represent a break in gradualness, they don't actually do so:
"But we have seen that the alterations
of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a
becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of
something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it." [Ibid.]
But, in no
way does the transition from one number (it is assumed that this is what Hegel
meant by "magnitude") to the next represents an "interruption of gradualness'.
The number two doesn't slowly or gradually morph into the number three, and then at a certain point suddenly change
into it. There is no 'development' here either -- two doesn't develop into three. Hegel's other examples
fare no better: the chemical
compounds he mentioned don't gradually change into whatever he thought they changed into, they do so abruptly
(as we have already seen).
Hegel himself half recognised this, all the while still imagining that
there is gradual change here when there isn't!
"But we have seen that the alterations
of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other
which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something
qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling,
does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually
solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all
at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing
undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Ibid.]
After first
of all asserting
that such processes represent an "interruption of gradualness", he then admits
that water doesn't gradually turn into ice!
It
could be objected that is unfair to Hegel since it is plain that he spoke about an
interruption
of gradualness, here. But, a body of water doesn't suddenly and completely turn into ice (except in
the unusual circumstances mentioned by Hegel). Ice crystals slowly form in what is
called a "mixed-phase"
until all the water has frozen. [Readers are directed back to an
earlier discussion of this
phenomenon.]
Hegel had earlier argued:
"Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are
formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by
colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the
proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific
substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific
compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses
characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not
merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the
solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary,
each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual
succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far
from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap
from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration." [Ibid.]
He
points out that temperature, for example, increases gradually, but that slow
increase is then interrupted by a "nodal" change in the "quality" of the
said water
as it freezes abruptly. We have already seen that what makes water "what it is"
and not something else (which is how Hegel himself defines "quality") is the fact that it is H2O.
Its solid state does not define water. Countless things are solid, so that can't be what makes
this water 'what it is and not something else'. If solidity were the "quality"
here, we would have to say that a rock, a lump of metal or a car is frozen
water, because they are all solid, too.
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of
quality, quantity
and
measure.
Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85. Bold emphasis
added; paragraphs merged.]
Plainly, the
whole point of the above comment is that there must be a change in the "quality"
of water, and that "quality" doesn't change gradually, but abruptly. The
temperature might alter gradually, but not even that changes into
something new (slowly or abruptly).
[But, once more, we have been here already; readers are
directed back to the earlier
discussion of the changes water experiences when it is heated or cooled.]
As we
have seen, this 'Law' can
only be made to
seem to work in a
few selected cases if:
(i) We bend and twist the concepts involved totally out of shape;
(ii) We fail to define "quality", "node", "leap", "same body", "new kind of
thing", and "addition of matter or energy" with any clarity,
consistency -- or even at all!; and,
(iii) We ignore
Hegel's own (vague) 'definition' of "quality", which he also
ignored(!).
In
contrast, there are countless examples where this 'Law' doesn't apply, no matter
how we try to squeeze nature into such an ill-fitting, dialectical boot.10b
Exactly why Engels's First 'Law' was called a
law in the first place is therefore something of a Dialectical Mystery.
Unsurprisingly, the Second 'Law' of dialectics fares little better.
We saw above
that Engels depicted this 'Law' as follows:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites....
[M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when
carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954),
pp.17,
62.]
In
the following,
published work, he says more-or-less the same:
"Already in
Rousseau, therefore, we find not only
a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation."
[Engels (1976),
p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
Lenin added a few extra details:
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in
[a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only
the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into
its opposite?]….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of
all processesof the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous
development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of
opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone
furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing….
The unity…of opposites is
conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive
opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58. Emphases in the original.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site;
paragraphs merged.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
It is worth noting at the outset that:
(i)
Neither Engels nor Lenin offer any proof of this 'Law', which means this is yet
another imposition of a dogmatic theory on the facts. Subsequent DM-fans have
done likewise, also failing to provide proof. [See Essay
Two for more details.]
(ii)
The
doctrine that nature and all it contains is a UO, and that change is powered
by a 'contradictory' interaction between 'dialectical opposites', is found in all known mystical
religions and philosophies.
[There is more on
that in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here). Until
the latter is published, the reader is directed
here and
here for more
details.]
This
only serves to confirm (yet again) Marx's assertion:
"The
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of
mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than
the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant
material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make
the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The
individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness,
and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and
determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do
this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as
producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of
their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and
Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added.]
An
up-dated and greatly expanded version of the argument presented in this sub-section has now been
published as Essay Seven
Part Three. Readers are directed there for my more considered thoughts on
this topic (as well as my
replies to several objections), alongside further argument and evidence.
So, I recommend that readers should skip this sub-section,
move across to the above Essay,
and begin again later,
here.
Surprisingly, DM-theorists (like Lenin and Engels,
quoted above) are
decidedly unclear as to whether objects/processes change because
(1) There is
a contradictory relationship between their 'internal opposites'.
(2) They change
into these opposites -- or even because
(3) Change itself creates such
opposites.
[FL = Formal Logic; NON = Negation of the
Negation: UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Lenin's words merely illustrate this
confusion in an acute form; he speaks, for instance, of the "transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
We will see below the radical confusion such an idea would create, if it were rue.
Engels is equally unclear: "[M]utual penetration of polar
opposites and transformation into each other...." The same can be said of
Plekhanov:
"And so every phenomenon, by the
action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov
(1956),
p.77. Bold emphasis added.]
And, here is Mao:
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take
these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile,
transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are
in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in
objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile,
temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect
transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in
given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and
the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end,
all
processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all
processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of
one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b),
pp.340-42. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Once more, these
passages inform us that objects and
processes not only
change because:
(a) There is
a struggle going on between their 'internal opposites', and that
(b) They
develop into
these opposites (indeed,
according to Lenin, they change into all
of them!), and
(c)
They produce these opposites while they change
--, or,
they do so as a
result of that change.10b1
[In what follows, I will be ignoring the equivocation (noted
below) whereby dialecticians sometimes seem to mean by "internal opposite",
"spatially-internal opposite", and sometimes they appear to mean "conceptually-",
or "logically-internal opposite" --
the latter of which was certainly what Hegel appeared to mean by this phrase.]
As we are about to see, this idea -- that
there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites"
(etc.), which cause change because they "struggle" with one another
and then change into each other -- presents
DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along
the lines expressed in the DM-classics and in the writings of countless
DM-theorists (quoted above but at greater length
here,
where several objections that have been levelled against the argument presented
in this Essay have also been
neutralised).
In order to
see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of, or
possesses, two
"internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O*
and O**,
and it thus changes as a result.
[Henceforth, in order to save on complexity,
I will omit the phrase "or possesses".]
But, O* can't
itself change intoO**
since O**already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this
theory, O* couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with
which it could "struggle" in order to bring that
about.
[Once more, several obvious objections to
the above have been neutralised below. Incidentally, the same problems arise if these are viewed as
'external contradictions'. (However, as we will see in Essay Eight
Part One, 'external
contradictions'
attract a few serious difficulties of their own.)
I have avoided using "A" and "non-A"/"not-A",
here, in order to prevent certain options from being closed off too soon. Not
much hangs on this, anyway, which readers can confirm for themselves if they replace O*
and O** with "A" and/or "non-A"/"not-A" respectively throughout.
Concentrating on A alone won't help, anyway. If
A changes into non-A/not-A, A will have to exist at
the same time as non-A/not-A, or A and non-A/not-A couldn't 'struggle' with one
another in order for A to change into one or other of non-A/not-A.
Once more: if non-A/not-Aalready exist, A
can't change into either of them, since, plainly, they already exist!]
What is more, these 'opposites'
have to co-exist -- as Gollobin points out:
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually
exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate
each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects
of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws
in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process
as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the
mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and
opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection,
and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their
unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on
to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin
(1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a),
p.414. Bold emphases added.]
Mao made the same point:
"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can
exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for
its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a
concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no
death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no
'below'.... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without
tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there
would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie.
Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or
semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist
oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the
one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are
interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this
character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory
aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being
in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are
interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies
'how opposites can be and how they become identical'. How then can they be
identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the
first meaning of identity.
"But is it enough to say merely that each of the
contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is
identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity?
No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for
their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other.
That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a
thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its
opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by
means of revolutionthe proletariat, at one time the ruled, is
transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is
transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied
by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will
take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity
of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?" [Mao
(1961a), pp.338-39. Bold emphases alone added.
Minor typos corrected; missing words "and how they become",
found in the published version, added. I have informed the MIA of these errors.]
As, indeed, did Engels:
"And it is just as impossible have one side of a
contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in
one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891b), p.496. Bold
emphasis added.]
The online version renders this passage slightly differently:
"And one cannot have one side of this
contradiction without the other, any more than a man has a whole apple in his
hand after eating half." [Quoted from
here.]
In that case, these 'opposites' must co-exist.
Anyway, it is
hard to see how
O* could "struggle" with
O** if
O** didn't co-exist with
O*!
Moreover,
it is no use propelling O** into the future so that it is what
O*will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless
O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!
So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of
O* and
not-O*
(interpreting
O** now as not-O*),O* can't change into not-O*
since
not-O*
already exists.
[Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might
allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this
dialectical hole. I have considered some of them in Note 10b1a.10b1a]
Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as
not-O*
readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there
is an
added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O*
in existence to make it happen. In which case, the dialectical process
will simply grind to a halt unless a not-not-O*
pops into existence (out of thin air, it seems) to start things up again or to
keep things going. But, what could possibly engineer, or have engineered, that?
Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how
not-O* itself came about
in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
[Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising the serious problems
it creates
for his theory.]
Returning to the last point: where not-O*
itself came from. It seems it will have to have come fromO*
since
O* can only change because of its struggle with
not-O*,
which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a
'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems -- as
we have seen in Note10b1a, in relation to C,
S, and F -- Capitalism, Socialism and Feudalism.
[NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]
Maybe this is too
quick. In order to see if the above is rather hasty, it might be wise to push
this into the past to see if we can circumvent the above 'difficulties'. To that end, let us suppose
that
O* itself came from object/process X, and
that not-O*
came from object or process Y. However, according to the
DM-classics, X
itself can only change because it "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call
this "not-X". As a result of that "struggle", X changes into not-X. But, and once
again, not-X already exists, so X can't change into it! If
not-X didn't already exist, there would be nothing with which X
could "struggle", and hence change.
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Of course, this
leaves the origin of not-X itself unexplained! And yet, it can only have come into
existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, X!
However, as we have seen, X can't change into not-X, since not-X already
exists! Once more, if it didn't, X couldn't change since there would be nothing
there with which it could "struggle". In which case, both X and
not-X must have popped into existence from nowhere.
The same problems
afflict Y. Once more, according to the DM-classics, Y itself can
only change because of a "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call this "not-Y".
As a result, Y changes into that opposite, not-Y. But, and once again, not-Y
already exists, so Y can't change into it! If not-Y didn't
already exist, there would be nothing with which Y could "struggle", and
hence change.
Moreover, this
also leaves the origin of not-Y unexplained. Not-Y can only have come
into existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, Y!
But, Y can't change into not-Y, since not-Y already exists!
If it didn't, Y couldn't change. In which case, both Y and not-Y
must have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
It could be objected that
the above seems to place objects and/or processes
in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians have of
FL. Hence, on that
basis, it could be maintained that the argument presented in this Essay is completely misguided.
Fortunately, repairs are relatively easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two
changing
"internal/external opposites" O*
and O** -- the latter once again interpreted as not-O*
--,
andthus develops as a result.
The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing
'dialectical union' of
O* and not-O*,
and
O* develops into not-O*
as a result, then this can't happen. As we have already seen, it isn't possible for
O* to change into not-O*
if
not-O*
already exists, and that is
the case whether or not
O* and not-O*
are changeless or constantly changing objects and/or processes.
Of
course, it could be objected that not-O* develops into O*
while not-O* develops into
O*.
[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian
term-of-art: "sublation".
More on that presently.]
If
that were so, while this was happening,O*
and not-O* would no longer be
opposites of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite"
to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate
object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that
would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently
'subjective', once more. It would also threaten to undermine this 'Law' in other
ways, since, as we will see, each object/process has to have a unique
"opposite" (something Hegel and Lenin called its "other").
Ignoring this 'difficulty' for now --
and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O*
while not-O* 'developed' into
O*, and that such process were governed by the obscure
term "sublation" -- this still won't work (as we are
about to find out).
In order to see this, it might be a good idea to
develop this objection further. To that end, it
could be argued that
Engels had anticipated the above difficulties when he said:
"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is
taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as
it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old
idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless
metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a
grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed
and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are
normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat
and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such
ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has
arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process
of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces
grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its
turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again
the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold.
Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost
the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for
example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from
it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of
the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds,
which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each
fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels
(1976),
pp.172-73. Bold emphases
added.]
"But someone may
object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I
negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it
underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I
negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and
what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is
a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the
metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the
narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean
simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it
in any way one likes.
Long ago
Spinoza
said: Omnis determinatio est
negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation.
And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general
and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first
negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the
particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or
crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made
the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way
of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is
just the same with every kind of conception or idea....
"But it is clear
that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of
alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that
a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness
of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians
try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the
negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid.,
pp.180-81. Bold emphases
and link added.]
Engels's argument is that "dialectical negation" isn't the same as ordinary (or
even logical) negation in that it isn't simple destruction nor is it simple cancellation. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and
preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless,
as we have already seen, Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly
suspect in itself, just as we will also
see this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel
confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as,
indeed, did Engels).
Despite this,
it is worth asking: Does the above comment by Engels neutralise the objections presented earlier? Is the argument here guilty of the following?
"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put
forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of
the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]
To answer this question, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of
two changing "internal opposites"/"tendencies" O* and not-O*, and thus
develops as a result. Given this new scenario, O* would change/develop into a
"sublated"
intermediary --, but not intonot-O* --, incidentally,
contradicting the DM-worthies.
If we are to believe what they tell us, O* should, of course, change into not-O*,
not into some intermediary.
Putting this minor quibble to one side, too: Given this 'revised' view,
we may now suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter,
"Oi*"
(which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation'
which also 'preserves'/'sublates').
If
so, Oi*
must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-Oi*
in existence to make it develop any further!
[Recall that according to this 'theory', everything (and that must include
Oi*)
changes because of a 'struggle' with its 'opposite'.]
So, there must be a not-Oi*
in existence
to make Oi*
change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt Oi*
from this essential requirement on an ad hoc
basis (arguing, perhaps, that Oi*
changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that,
there would seem to be no good reason to accept the version of events expressed in
the
DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process in the entire universe changes because of the
"struggle" of
opposites (and Oi* is certainly a thing/process).
Furthermore, if we allow an exemption here, the whole point of the
exercise would be lost --, for if some things do, and some things do not change
according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which
changes were, and which were not subject to it.
[That would also mean that the Second 'Law' isn't a law, either -- which is what we found
was the case with
the First 'Law', too.]
This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively
applied exemption certificate (issued to Oi*)
would mean that nothing at all could change, for if everything in the universe
is in the process of change, then it is already a 'sublated' version of
whatever it used to be.
Ignoring this 'difficulty', too: Even ifOi*
were to change into not-Oi* (as we suppose it must, given
the doctrine laid down in the DM-classics), then all the problems we met earlier simply reappear, for
Oi*
would only be able to change if not-Oi*
already exists to make that happen! But, not-Oi*
can't already exist, for Oi*
hasn't changed into it yet!
On the other hand, even if we were to suppose not-Oi*
already exists, Oi*
couldn't change into it since not-Oi*
already exists!
Again, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of
O*,
which
produces not-O*,
isn't ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.
In that case, let us now suppose that
O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite, not-Os*.
But, if that is to happen, according to the
Dialectical Classics,
not-Os*
must already exist if
O* is to struggle with it and then change into it!
But, and once again, if that were so,
O* couldn't turn into not-Os*,
for it already exists! Alternatively, if not-Os*
didn't already exist, then O*
couldn't change since
O*
can only change if it "struggles" with what it changes into, i.e., not-Os*!
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall, once more.
It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the
point; in the real world things manifestly change. For instance, to use Mao's
example, peace changes into war, and
vice versa. Love can change into hate, and so on.
No one doubts this, but,
as we have seen, DM can't explain why it happens. For peace to change
into war, or vice versa, it would have to struggle with it. Has anyone
witnessed this odd event? Can abstractions like these actually struggle with one
another? And yet, both Mao and Lenin informed their readers of the following:
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
"The
universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is
that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the
other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of
opposites exists from beginning to end.
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the
unity of opposites as 'the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,
mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and
processes of nature (including mind and society)'. Are these ideas
correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects
present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life
of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not
contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"The
contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each
other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained
in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A
simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process
contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one
another.
"That is how all things in the objective world
and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion....
"War and peace, as everybody knows, transform
themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the
First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in
China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into
war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into
war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a
second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory
things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not
only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given
conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full
meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed
'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what
conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another'....
"Why is it that 'the human mind should take these
opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming
themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective
reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things
is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and
relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself
into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist
world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling
classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who
regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves
into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy
everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their
rule....
"All processes have a beginning and an end,
all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of
all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the
transformation of one process into another is absolute.
"There are two states of motion in all things,
that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the
struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When
the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative
and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of
being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative
change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise
to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change
ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity,
combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy,
equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the
appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand,
the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity,
combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy,
equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite
are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the
transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming
themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of
opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the
second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional,
temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute.
"When we said above that two opposite things can
coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because
there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to
say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can
transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions,
they can't constitute a contradiction, can't coexist in the same entity and
can't transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of
opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is
conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites
permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself
into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore
unconditional and absolute.
"The combination of conditional, relative
identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of
opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b),
pp.316, 337-38, 339-40, 342-43. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
If the above DM-classicists
were right, how could peace change into war unless it "struggles" with it?
It could be argued that the contradictory aspects (or
underlying processes/tendencies) of a given society, or societies -- which might give the
appearance of peace -- are what turn peace in to war; it is the mutual struggle of
these contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) that change the
one into the other.
In that case, let us call these underlying contradictory
aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) UA and UA*.
If the above were correct, it would be the
struggle between UA and UA* that changes Peace (P) into War (W).
But, if that is indeed so, the DM-classics were wrong; P and its opposite, W, do
not actually struggle with one another, even though they are
opposites, and even though they should do this (if the
DM-classics are to be
believed).
What changes P into W is a struggle between their
non-opposites,UA and UA*. And yet, if either UA or
UA* changes
P into W, then
one or both of them must be the opposite(s) of P, and if they are
the opposite(s) of P they should
change into P! Either that, or the DM-classics were wide of the mark.
On the other hand, if UA and UA* are indeed
opposites of one another, they should change into each other. But, they can't do
that since they both already exist!
Once again,we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
It could be argued that if we consider a more concrete example,
we might be able to understand what the DM-classics meant when they claimed that
things change into their opposites.
[In what follows, I examine 'concrete cases' that have been put
to me in discussion by those who doubt that the general criticisms above are
successful. Apologies are owed in advance for the somewhat repetitive
nature of this material, but those who raised these examples thought they could
circumvent the above criticisms by introducing them. In every case,
they only imagined this by ignoring one or more of the core DM-theses advanced
in
the classics: (1) Everything changes because of a
'struggle' with its 'dialectical opposite', (2) Everything changes in to that
'opposite', and (3) Change produces that opposite. In that case, the following
material is aimed at showing that if we accept what the DM-classics have to say,
the aforementioned general criticisms do in fact apply in each particular case. Hence the
need for repetition.]
Consider "John"
again: While it might be the
case that John is a boy, in a few years time it will be the case that John
is a man (all things being equal). Now, the fact that other individuals are already
men doesn't
stop John changing into a man (his opposite). So, John can change into his
opposite even though that opposite already exists. Hence, the above
objections fail.
Or, so it could be maintained.
And yet, as we have seen, this theory tells us that all things/processes change because
they "struggle" with their 'opposites', and that they "struggle" with what they
will become (i.e., that 'opposite').
First, are we to assume that John has to struggle with his
opposite if he is to change? If so, he must struggle with all the
individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself
(assuming that every other man is his opposite).
Alternatively, are we to suppose that John must struggle with what he
himself is to become, his
individual opposite -- i.e., himself as a man --, even
before he exists as a man?
If not, then the above response is beside the point; John can only
change if he struggles with his opposite, but that opposite does not yet exist.
Plainly, if his opposite doesn't yet exist, he can't struggle with it, and
hence can't change. We hit the same problem.
Moreover, in view of the fact
that John must turn into his opposite, doesn't that mean he has to turn
into these other men, too, if all men are his opposite? Or, does he turn into just one of them? But, it seems he must
do one or the other if the
DM-Classics are to be believed.
Anyway, according to the DM-worthies, John can only
change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now.
If so, are we
really supposed to
believe that "John-as-a-man" is struggling with "John-as-a-boy"
in the here-and-now?
Or, that the abstraction,
manhood, is struggling with that other abstraction, boyhood?
Some might be tempted to reply
(indeed, one comrade did so rely in debate with me over this) that that is precisely what
adolescence is, and yet, if that were the case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would
have to be locked in struggle in the here-and-now. Of course, adolescence
can't struggle with anything, since it, too, is an abstraction. And a struggle
in John's mind over what he is to become can't make him develop into a man,
either! It should hardly need pointing out that a struggle in the mind can't
change a boy into a man. This isn't to deny that such struggles take place, it
is merely to point out that thinking doesn't make something so -- if it did,
beggars would ride.
Nevertheless, John-as-a-man doesn't yet exist, so John-as-a-man can't struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if
John-as-a-man does exist alongside John-as-boy, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful
self, then John-as-boy can't change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already
exists!
To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is
allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that 'opposite' can't now
exist otherwise John wouldn't need to become him! But, and once again, if that
opposite doesn't exist,
John
can't change, for there would be nothing with which he could struggle.
Looking at this a little more concretely: In ten or fifteen years time, John
won't become just any
man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that
John becomes "ManJ".
But, once more, ManJ must exist now
or John can't change into him (if
the
DM-classics are to be believed) -- for John can only become a man if he
is now locked in struggle with what he is to become, his own opposite, ManJ!
Once more: if that is so, John can't
become ManJ since ManJ
already exists!
It could be objected that the DM-classics are arguing that an
object in change takes on an opposite property or quality, expressed as the
negation of the predicate term that once applied to it. So, in abstract terms,
if
A is F (where "A" is perhaps the name of a person, such as John,
or that of some object or process, and "F" is some property or quality he/it
possesses) -- then the A that is F becomes the A that is not-F.
[Or, rather: it used to be the case that "A is F"; now
it is the
case that "A is not-F".] This is
surely possible, indeed, actual; it happens all the time. Moreover, A being F doesn't
prevent it becoming not-F on the grounds that Falready exists, or
even because not-Falready exists (since, plainly, not-Fdoesn't
yet exist). So, dialectical change is not only possible, it is actual.
This is just a generalisation of the point made above about John
becoming a man, and is susceptible to the same sort of rebuttal: if not-F
doesn't already exist, then A can't struggle with it, and hence can't
change.
It could be argued that not-Fdoes exist, so this
struggle can take place. Hence, A can both struggle with not-F
and become not-F. More concretely, tendencies in John that maintain
him as a boy (F) are locked in a struggle with those that are changing
him into a man/not-a-boy (not-F).
But, are we really supposed to believe that John
changes into a tendency (for that is what not-F is, according to this
objection)?
[I have examined the 'opposite tendencies defence' in more detail,
here.]
Independently of that, it is difficult to believe that
anyone who has read the
DM-classics could imagine that this new interpretation
finds any support in what they have to say. For example, if it is indeed the
case that the A that is
F turns into the A is not-F -- or if A's being F
develops into A's being not-F -- then, according to those
classics, they must struggle with one another. But, how can this happen if it is admitted
that the A is not-F doesn't yet exist?
It could be countered that what is important here is that F
applied to A turns into its opposite, not-F. Now, many not-Fs
will typically already exist. For example, John might be alive one day (i.e.,
A is F), but the next he could be dead/not alive (i.e., A is
not-F). But, many others were dead, or weren't alive, the day before, when John was
alive. But, that doesn't stop him from becoming not alive (not-F), contrary to
the repeated assertions above. The fact that some things are not-F
doesn't prevent other things from becoming not-F, too.
Again, this is just a re-packaged version of the point made above
about John becoming a man. In this case, when he dies John doesn't just become any old
corpse, he becomes John's corpse. If that is so, and the
DM-classics are to be
believed, then that can only happen if John struggles with his opposite, i.e.,
with his own corpse! Do we all really have to fight our own future dead bodies
in order to die?
It could be objected that this could happen if F struggles
with not-F. Life and death/not-life are dialectically opposed to one
another, as Engels pointed out. So, the forces that keep John, for example,
alive are opposed to those that are killing him, and which will kill him one day.
But, if that is so, and the DM-classics
were correct, then these dialectical opposites would turn into one another. Is it really the case then
that the forces that keep John alive will turn into those that are killing him,
and vice versa? Will
anabolic processes become
catabolic
processes, and catabolic processes become anabolic? In fact, these
processes don't even struggle with
one another! [Follow the links below for more details.] But, they should do so if we
were to believe
everything we read in those dusty old DM-classics.
[Since I have devoted several sections of this Essay to this very
point, the reader is
re-directedthere for
more details.]
Furthermore, and returning to the whatever A refers to, mentioned above:
A
doesn't just change into any old not-F, it changes into a particular
not-F. Let us call the particular not-F that A changes into
"FA".
Once more, according to the dialectical classics, every object/process changes
because (1) It struggles with its opposite and (2) It changes into that
opposite. [I have to keep repeating these points since DM-fans conveniently
forget them.] If so, A can only change by struggling with FA;
but FA
already exists, so A can't change into it. If FA
didn't already exist, A couldn't struggle with it in order to
change.
No matter how many bends we try to negotiate with this rusty banger of a
theory, it still ends up wrapped around the same
old non-dialectical tree trunk.
Consider another concrete example: wood being fashioned into a
table. Once more, according to the
dialectical classics all objects and
processes change because of a 'struggle' of opposites, and they also change
into those opposites.
So, according to this 'theory', the wood that is used to make a table has to
'struggle' with what it turns into; that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with
the table it turns into!
In that case, the table must already exist, or it couldn't 'struggle' with the
wood from which it is to be made.
But, if the table already exists, then the wood can't be changed into it.
Indeed, why bother making a table that already exists?
On the other hand, if the table doesn't already exist, then the wood can't
'struggle' with its own opposite; that is, it can't 'struggle' with the table it
has yet to become!
Either way, this sort of change can't happen, according to this 'theory'.
And, it is little use introducing human agency here, for if a
carpenter is required to make a table, then he/she has to 'struggle' with the
wood to make it into that table -- since we are told that every object and
process in nature is governed by this 'Law'. But, according to the
Dialectical Classics, objects and processes 'struggle' with their dialectical
'opposites', and they turn into those opposites. If so, wood must turn
into the carpenter, not the table! And the carpenter must change into wood!
[These, of course, are simply more concrete versions of the
general argument
outlined earlier. For an answer to the objection that objects and processes change
in stages, see Note 10b2 (link above).]
Consider another hackneyed DM-example: water turning into steam at
100oC (under normal
conditions). Are we really supposed to believe what the
DM-classics tell
us, that the 'opposite' that
water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? But, that must be
the case if the DM-classics are correct.
Hence, while you might think it is the
heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really
happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water
turn into steam!
In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!
It might prove useful to make this example a little more concrete. To that end, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it
this liquid is heated.
In order to
identify it, call it, "W1",
and the steam molecule it turns into, "S1".
But, if the
DM-classics are correct, W1
can only turn into S1
by 'struggling' with it. In that case, S1must already exist, otherwise W1
couldn't struggle with it and hence change! But, how can W1
turn into S1
if S1
already exists?
In fact, according to the DM-classics, opposites turn
into each other; if so, S1
must change into W1
at the same time that W1
is turning into S1!
So, while you are boiling a kettle --
according to this 'Super-scientific theory' -- steam must be condensing back into the water you are boiling, and it must
be doing so at the same rate it is turning into steam!
One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles
ever manage to boil dry.
Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and, as
we have seen, to
any and all supposed examples of 'dialectical'-change).
It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns
into is a gas (i.e., steam/water vapour); so the dialectical classicists are correct.
However, if we take the DM-classics at their word, this gas must
'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change into it.
But, plainly, this gas doesn't yet exist,
or the water would already have changed into it! In
which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were correct --, since the gas it
is supposed to change into isn't there yet for it to struggle with.
Plainly, it is
the heat we add that causes the change not the gas!
It could be maintained that what happens is that the heat energy
input into the system makes water boil. Indeed, but then, if heat makes
water boil, that water must struggle with this heat, and then change into it,
just as heat must change into water! If not, the DM-classics were wrong, and dialecticians are left
with no theory of change.
[Follow the above link for an explanation why Hegel and Lenin both
adopted this particular theory of change.]
Finally, it could be pointed out that
Lenin actually argued as
follows:
"The identity of opposites (it would be more
correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the
terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense
both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,
mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,'
in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them
as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two
basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of
development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as
repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a
unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation)." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered
to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.]
As
one critic of my argument put things (this is in fact one of the few detailed
and carefully argued responses to my objections I have encountered in the last
sixteen years on the Internet):
"This is a complete misreading of the law of
unity and interpenetration of opposites. To borrow Rosa's symobology (sic), a
contradiction means in essence that an entity A contains internally
contradictory tendencies O* and O** which cause A to turn into not-A. The
struggle within A is between O* and O**, the internal tendency for it to stay
the same (O*) and the internal forces acting on it to change (O**). The whole
essence of dialectics is that O* and O** can not exist within a stable
equilibrium. Rosa quotes Lenin saying quite clearly that we are not dealing with
O* turning into O**, but with the working-out of 'internally contradictory
tendencies' within A.
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations
of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites.
This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the
internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity;
it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which
preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we
can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within
the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its
transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**).
"Now, Rosa's going to object that dialectics
pictures entities that 'struggle with' what they are going to become, which
presupposes that these entities already exist. But this is because she fails to
distinguish between the realized entities A and not-A, and the internal
tendencies O* and O**. When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with
one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which
contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency
O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in
capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the
working class O** over the control of the means of production. The working out
of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for socialism....
"Again, Lenin talks about these tendencies
in phenomena and processes that elude your grasp. The above is precisely what I
have been illustrating with the difference between A (the entity) and O*/O**
(its contradictory tendencies) that you have not understood.
"Things do not change into their contradictions, which is what your
mock-refutation entails, they change into their opposites. That is, A does not
change into O**, but into not-A. O* does not change into O** but into not-O*."
[Bold added.]
Readers will look long and hard and to no avail to find where I
say that things "change into their contradictions", but into their
contradictories, in this case into not-A (which is what the
DM-classics
themselves tell us). Just as they will look long and hard for a singe quotation
from the DM-classics (certainly this critic offered none) that supports this
revisionist reading of the theory. The above critic will also need to tell us why not-A
isn't the 'contradictory' of A.
It could be objected that the above critic did refer us to
this quotation from Lenin:
"The identity of opposites (it would be more
correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the
terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense
both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,
mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society)." [Lenin
(1961),
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
However, when asked (several times), the above critic
refused to comment on this quotation from Lenin:
"Dialectics
is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and
how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under
what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,
-- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin
(1961),
p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]
According to the above, the opposite tendencies
within A -- that is,"the internal tendency for it to stay the same (O*)"
and "the internal forces acting on it to change (O**)" must change into
one another. But, how can they do that if each of them already exists? No
wonder this critic ignored Lenin's words. [However, see below.]
But, what about this part of the argument?
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations
of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites.
This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the
internal tendencies O* and O**. Not-A does not yet exist as a realized entity;
it does not need to. The struggle is the internal struggle between O* (which
preserves A) and O** (which causes its transformation into not-A). In essence we
can say that O** is the seed of the unrealized entity not-A which exists within
the realized entity A, and A struggles (in the form of O*) against its
transformation into not-A (through the operation of O**)."
Unfortunately, this ignores the philosophical
background to Hegel's theory (which Lenin accepted, even if he had to put it
"back on its feet"). That background is outlined
here.
It could be argued that this critic has answered the point
made by Lenin (that opposites are transformed into one another):
"Now, Rosa may point out that some presentations
of dialectics may say that things 'struggle with and become' their opposites.
This is looking at the outside -- the change from A to not-A, because of the
internal tendencies O* and O**."
And yet this fails to explain why
O* and O* do
not change into one another. Despite being pressed on this many times, this critic
refused to respond. Moreover, this isn't to look "at the outside" (whatever
that means!). The DM-classics are quite clear, this applies to "everything
existing" and it is an "absolute":
"The law of the interpenetration of
opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into
each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17,
62.]
"Dialectics, so-called objective
dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics,
dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites
which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual
conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into
higher forms, determines the life of nature." [Ibid.,
p.211.]
"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all
differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into
one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of
thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast
lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges
the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in
the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole
method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course,
for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories
retain their validity." [Ibid.,
pp.212-13.]
"And so
every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its
existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
p.77.]
"[Among the
elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory
tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not
only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination,
quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"In brief,
dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This
embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The
splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the
essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the
principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing…. The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22,
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming
change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is
that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another,
not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular
only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite
right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite."
[Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this
particular quotation coming from p.285.]
"Dialectics
is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and
how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under
what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,
-- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid.,
p.109.]
"Of course, the fundamental proposition of
Marxian dialectics is that all boundaries in nature and society are conventional
and mobile, that there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under
certain conditions be transformed into its opposite." [Lenin (1916). Quoted
from
here.]
"Why is it
that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because
that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or
identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living,
conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every
contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking
of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is
real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of
opposites into one another....
"All
processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into
their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability
manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao
(1961b),
pp.340-42.
In all of the above, bold emphases alone added; quotation marks have been altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[The above
passages are from the classics; we have seen that
'lesser'
DM-works also say the same thing. However, this critic is a fellow Trotskyist, and so
might not be prepared to accept what Mao had to say. But, as we can see, Mao was
merely echoing Lenin.]
It could be argued that some of the above passages merely say that
everything changes into its opposite; they don't say that they change into one
another. But, if everything changes into its opposite, and that opposite is also
part of everything, then it too must change into its opposite; that is, O*
must change into O**, andO** must change into O*.
But, what of the argument itself? Are "tendencies"
causal agents? Aren't they (i.e., both the tendencies and the changes) rather the result of other causes? For example, do we
say that the "tendency" for glass to break is what makes it break, or do we
appeal to inter-molecular forces within glass, and an external shock?
But, can't
we call these inner forces "tendencies", too? Are there such inner "tendencies"
in glass? If there are, what in turn are their causes? Or, are they uncaused? In
fact, if we just appeal to "tendencies" to explain things, noting will
be explained.
"Why did that glass window break?" "It just has a tendency to do so." "Why is it
raining?" "It simply has a tendency to do so." "Why did those cops
attack the strikers?" "They have a tendency to defend the bosses." So, an appeal to
"tendencies" is no explanation at all.
Or rather, if we insist on regarding an appeal to
"tendencies" as an explanation, that is because we also view the word as a
shorthand for other causes (known or unknown) at work in the system. Consider
the "tendency" of the rate of profit
to fall. Is that uncaused? But, no Marxist will argue it is. Indeed,
Marxists point to
several contributory causal factors that combine to make the rate of profit
tend to fall over time. Would any of us have been satisfied if Marx had simply said
there a "tendency" for the rate of profit to fall, and made no attempt to
explain its cause/causes? I suspect not.
Hence, "tendencies" aren't causes; they are
the result of one or more causes themselves. So, this critic is mistaken, an
internal "tendency" can't "preserve A", nor can the opposite "tendency",
O**, cause a "transformation into not-A", since these "tendencies" are
derivative, not causative. Indeed, as the DM-classics inform us, the cause of
these "tendencies" is the "unity and interpenetration of opposites", the
"contradiction" and the "struggle" that results from this.
As Gollobin points out (quoting Engels):
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually
exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate
each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects
of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws
in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process
as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the
mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and
opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection,
and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their
unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on
to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin
(1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a),
p.414. Bold emphases added.]
So, as Lenin also noted, these 'internal
opposites' not only struggle, they turn into one another:
"Dialectics
is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and
how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under
what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,
-- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Lenin
(1961),
p.109. Bold emphasis alone added.]
But, that can't happen, and for reasons explored
above.
Well, perhaps it is the struggle between
these "opposite tendencies" that causes A to change? Here is my critic
again:
"When A exists, both O* and O** exist, and struggle with
one another. These may be united within a physical object such as a seed, which
contains structures that form its O* to keep it a seed, and yet has a tendency
O** to transform into its opposite, a seedling. Or they may be united in
capitalist society, such as the capitalist class O* which struggles with the
working class O** over the control of the means of production. The
working out of this contradiction is nothing less than the struggle for
socialism...."
But, the
DM-classics are quite clear: when these
opposites struggle, they change into one another, as noted above several times. [And it is no use this critic blithely asserting that this is to be found
only in "some presentations" of the theory. It is found throughout the
DM-classics and other DM-texts,
as we have seen.] So, O* must change into O**, and vice versa.
Otherwise, O* and O** would be changeless. If they
themselves have causal powers, or are causal powers, then
they, too, must also be objects (structures?), relations, or processes of some sort. In which case, they must
also change. On the other hand, if they don't have causal powers, or they
aren't causal powers, then, of course, they can't cause
change themselves. And, we can see this critic also assumes this to be so,
since he has stopped calling O* and O** "tendencies"; they have
become the "capitalist class" and the "working class", respectively. And, these
surely change one another, and thereby change themselves. They are the most
important cause, or one of the most important causes, of change in Capitalism.
Indeed, this critic admits they do
change:
"That is, A does not change into
O**, but
into not-A. O*
does not change into O** but into not-O*."
And yet, if we ignore the impromptu 'theory' this critic has
pulled out of thin air and focus on the account presented in the DM-classics,
that can only happen if O* struggles with not-O*,
and then turns into it,
which puts us exactly where we were several paragraphs back.
In which case,
this critic is mistaken and my refutation still stands.
[Readers are encouraged to read my lengthier reply to this
critic,
here. Several more objections have been neutralised
here -- even more
here. I
will return again to
consider the tendencies within capitalism that this objector thinks cause it to change or
remain the same.]
This, of course, doesn't deny that change occurs, only that
DM can account for it.
Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.
Howsoever we try to re-package this 'Law' we end up with
the same insuperable
problems, which can't simply be
Nixoned away.
[As far as social change is concerned, see
here,
here and here.]
However, as we have seen, this 'theory' is just an elaboration of the following example of a prioriSuperscience
concocted by the Mystery MeisterHimself:
"Neither
in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there
anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever
exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of
things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being
and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly
at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its
relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is
always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very
moving principle of the world." [Hegel (1975),p.174. Bold emphases added.]
As this quotation indicates, and as the next few sections of this
Essay and Essay Eight Part
Three will demonstrate, Hegel
made a quasi-'logical' attempt to 'derive' such 'opposites' from his criticism
of the LOI, but his reasoning was
defective from beginning to end -- and
demonstrably so. The bottom line
is that, far from
specifying that each object was paired with its unique dialectical "other", Hegel
inadvertently conceded that objects and processes were confronted on all sides by countless
"others", fatally damaging his theory of change.
Leaving
Putting such technicalities to one side, and ignoring
for the moment the question of how Hegel, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov knew
this 'Law' was true of everything in the entire universe, for all of time (this topic was examined in more detail in
Essay Two)
-- when
it is based only on a ham-fisted, Idealist 'thought experiment' -- it is worth pointing out that
many things clearly have
no internally-interconnected opposites. For example,
electrons, which, while they
appear to have several external opposites (even though it isn't too clear what
the opposite of an electron is -- is it a
positron or
is it a proton?
--, it is clear that electrons don't seem to turn into either of them), they
appear to have no internal
opposites as far as can be ascertained. In that case, they must be changeless
beings -- or, if they do change, it can't be a result of their "internal
contradictions".10c
Admittedly, electrons had only just been discovered
in Lenin's day, but that makes his dogmatism even more puzzling --
especially when it is recalled that it was Lenin who insisted that all knowledge is
provisional and relative.
The relevancy of the criticisms
advanced in this sub-section depend on what dialecticians mean by "internal opposite".
Readers should bear this in mind as they read on.
As noted in an earlier Essay, DM-theorists sometimes appear to mean
by "internal", "spatially-internal", at other times they appear to mean "logically-internal".
They also
regularly slide between a logical and a spatial understanding
of "internal", not noticing either the difference or the effect this has on
DM in general. [There is more on this
here.]
Even though the spatial sense of "internal"
(see the previous paragraph)
seems reasonably clear, an actual example might help clarify the difference between
these two senses of that word: all the lines of
longitude
on a map are logically-internal to the
Prime Meridian in Greenwich,
UK. Their geographical location and numerical value depend on that
Meridian and are defined by it. Any change to the latter automatically alters each of the former.
Remove the Prime Meridian and they disappear with it. Slide the Prime Meridian
fifty miles east or west, and they all move with it. The nature and existence
of each associated meridian thus depend on the Prime Meridian. Although each meridian line is also geographically related to the Prime Meridian,
they aren't spatially internal to it, they are
logically internal to it -- where "internal" in this case means "implied by".
[Of course, this doesn't mean that if
someone deletes the Prime Meridian from a digital map, for example, that all the
other lines of longitude will automatically vanish. That would make this a
causal link. It means that if at some time in the future a new system is
developed which supersedes the system of longitude we now have, all the meridian lines will
vanish to be replaced by new lines, or with whatever is entailed by this new
system.
Alternatively, if the definition of the Prime Meridian is itself
changed, that will automatically affect every other line; their nature and
existence depends on the nature and existence of the Prime Meridian. Naturally,
if the Prime Meridian is actually removed from the definition of the
system, then, say, the meridian line 030º
(west) will cease to make sense since there would no longer be a Prime Meridian
for it to be 30º
west of!]
Even so, the relation between the Prime
Meridians and each meridian isn't a 'dialectical UO'. For example, they don't
'struggle' with
and then change into one another:
"The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute…." [Lenin (1961), p.358.
Bold emphasis added.]
There is no mystery to this; there is nothing
'logical' in reality, "beneath the surface of appearances", that underpins or
'determines' the logical relation between these lines. They depend on
decisions made centuries ago,
on human choice and stipulation.
So, "internal" is being used in this case
metaphorically, and is a carry-over from the theories developed by the philosophers
mentioned below.
The following is one explanation of the term "internal relation" that I
think is almost right:
"There are relations which could not fail to
obtain since they are given with or (partly) constitutive of the terms (objects
or relata), such as white's being lighter than black." [Glock (1996), p.189.]
[Some definitions characterise "internal
relations" in terms of "essential properties", but, as we will see in Essays
Four Part Two and Thirteen Part Two, there are good reasons to reject all such
definitions. I will say much more about this topic there, too.]
In like manner (one supposes), objects and
processes that are said to be 'dialectical opposites' are not only meant to imply
one another, they
inter-define each other. Plainly this is the logical sense of
"internal". The classic example given by DM-theorists is the relationship
between the capitalist class and the proletariat; there would or could be none of the
former without the latter, nor vice versa. They exist or
cease to exist together, just as they inter-define one another. Or so we have been
led to believe.
[I have said much more about this, and why the link
between the capitalist class and the proletariat isn'teven logical,
and hence isn't dialectical, in Essay Eight
Part Two.]
On the other
hand, "spatially-internal" applies to objects and processes
that are merely located
inside another object or process. No logical connection is necessarily
implied. So, although both your appendix and your brain are both located inside your
body, there doesn't appear to be any logical connection between them. If there
were, you couldn't ever have your appendix removed without your brain ceasing to
exist.
Here is an egregious example of this sort of confusion:
"Another of these three principles is 'Unity of opposites'. You know, every
person has virtues as well as vices. Just as there is no person who has only
virtues and no vices, there is also no one with vices only and no virtues.
Neither is possible. When we call someone very good or someone else very bad,
what do we mean ? Here 'good' and 'bad' are used in the relative sense. That is,
the person in whom good traits have a preponderance over the bad ones is called
good. Again, if a person has some good traits but these are outweighed by bad
ones he is called bad.
There may be a question as to why such differences exist between one person and
another. This is because, how one's characteristic features would shape out
depends mainly upon the contradiction within one's own self. It is well known
that a contradiction or conflict between instinct and conscience works within
every man.
One should know that no one is born with any instincts or conscience, neither
are these unchangeable or eternal. In the process of contradiction and conflict,
the person in whom instinct succeeds in defeating conscience becomes a mere
slave of base instincts. Naturally,
the aspect of vices gets predominance in such a person, not the good qualities.
We call such a person bad. Conversely, in a person whose conscience is very
sharp and active, whose conscience can control his base instincts, the aspect of
good qualities gets more and more developed. And we call him good. That is, a
man becomes wayward if his base instincts win whereas his life takes a turn for
the better and he earns reputation as a good man if his conscience wins. It does
not, however, follow from this that no bad or base instincts can creep into a
good man, or that conscience can never work in a bad man." [Shibdas Ghosh,
quoted from
here; accessed 09/07/2021. Bold added.]
If we ignore the primitive psychology and physiology
apparent in the above passage, it is clear that comrade Ghosh has confused what
was supposed to be a logical-, with a spatial-relation. For Ghosh,
the fact that these characteristics, or whatever gives rise to them, are located
inside a given individual means that the pairs of 'opposites' he mentions
constitute a UO.
But, there is no way that the existence of whatever gives rise to a given
'virtue' implies that its 'opposite' vice must exist, too, or that the one can't
exist without the other (like the proletariat and the capitalist class have
to co-exist, so we are told) -- which must be the case if the
DM-classics are to be believed.
Unfortunately, sloppy thought like this is par for the
course in DM-circles.
Consider another example: even though
dialecticians appear to think there is 'dialectical' relation between electrons
and protons (or is it positrons?) -- which for them constitutes a classic DM-UO --, it is far from
clear how this could be logical-, as opposed to
it merely being a spatial-, or even a causal-, relation. That is because electrons can exist without protons, and vice versa.
Nor do they inter-define one another, which they would have to do if they formed
a DM-UO. And do they really struggle with and then turn into one another?
This confusing use of "internal" dates back at
least to
Leibniz
and Kant.
Kant called this type of link "analytic"; in
Leibniz it was merely "necessary". For the latter, each substance (or 'monad')
'contained' its own "complete idea" -- i.e., a 'list' of predicates that were true of it,
assigned by 'God'. So everything true of that substance, everything that has
happened, is happening, or will ever happen to it has been encoded internally (in a
'spatial' sense), so they are all necessarily true of it (in a 'logical' sense),
if we but knew it. We might not be able to discern or even ascertain the
necessary connections that exist here, but that doesn't mean they aren't there
or aren't necessary. Collectively, these predicates uniquely define a given
monad. They all reflect one another and are therefore all inter-related -- but
not by any 'external factors'. All their interconnections are spatially-, and
logically-internal, programmed by 'god' -- they are all "windowless monads"
(which means that nothing, not even light, can get in!). So, the 'logical' and the 'spatial'
connotations of "internal" were united in Leibniz's theory. Kant
ditched the
overt metaphysics apparent here by concentrating on the conceptual
connections we are supposedly capable of apprehending -- even if he later attempted to milk
some metaphysics from them!
However, as with most things in Traditional Thought, the seeds of this confusion
stretch back to the metaphysical fog generated by Ancient Greek Philosophers, an
internally-generated mist that engulfed the spurious 'problem' concerning the link between
a 'substance' and its 'accidents' (expressed in its contingent properties), often re-appearing in diverse theories about
the link between subject and predicate terms in indicative sentences (covered in
detail in Essay Three Part One). This family of confused ideas was later
imported into Mediaeval, and then post-Renaissance thought, where one concept was
said to be internally related to another if the definition and existence of one
automatically implied the existence and nature of the other, or, indeed, of the rest.10c1
Here is
Leibniz -- where
"contained" appears to carry both spatial and logical connotations:
"A notion that determines a certain
individual Adam must contain absolutely all his predicates, and it is
this complete notion that determines general considerations to the
individual.... So: I hold that every true proposition is
either immediate or mediate. An immediate proposition is one that is true by
itself, i.e., a proposition whose predicate is explicitly contained in its
subject; I call truths of this sort 'identical'. All other propositions are
mediate; a true proposition is mediate when its predicate is included virtually
in its subject, in such a way that analysis of the subject, or of both predicate
and subject, can ultimately reduce the proposition to an identical truth. That's
what Aristotle and the scholastics mean when they say 'the predicate is in the
subject'." [Leibniz to Arnauld, 1686, quoted from
here. See also
here.
Paragraphs merged.]
"The nature of an individual
substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is
sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of
the subject to which this notion is attributed." [Leibniz, quoted from
here.]
[The
above is an obvious echo of the medieval, Identity Theory of Predication
-- once again, considered in more detail in Essay Three
Part
One.]
Christia Mercer brings out this confusion admirably well (although she doesn't call
it a confusion!):
"To help us in the next part of our story,
let's remind ourselves briefly of two related senses of 'essence,' which were
widely accepted in the seventeenth century and are relevant here. First, an
essence is what is given in the definition of the thing and what can be grasped
by the intellect; second, it constitutes the nature of an individual and that
from which its properties flow. It is striking that
Micraelius asserts in his Lexicon Philosophicum that the 'properties
emanate from the essence of the thing.' Scherzer, for example, defines an
essence as 'what is first conceived in a thing, without which the thing
is not able to be; it is what is fundamental and the cause of other things
which are in it.' We need to keep a firm grip on the difference between an
essence as something conceived and as something contained in an individual
created thing from which the properties of the thing (somehow) flow or emanate."
[Mercer (2001), p.227. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added. Link added.]
From the above we can see the logical sense of
"internal" ("an essence as something conceived") being run together with the
spatial sense (an essence as something "contained in an individual", from which "flow" its
properties, or 'accidents').
Here, too, is Kant (where "internal" -- or
rather, "contained" -- and "outside" are now both logical and
metaphorical, but not spatial):
"In all judgments in which the relation of a
subject to the predicate is thought (if I consider only affirmative judgments,
since the application to negative ones is easy), this relation is possible in
two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as
something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies
entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection
with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second
synthetic." [Kant
(1998), p.130. Bold emphasis alone added. (This link might not work if you
are using
Internet Explorer!)]
To use a highly clichéd example, bachelor was said to imply
unmarried man, and vice versa -- each is 'contained' the
conception of the other.10c2
So, the equivocation mentioned above -- whereby DM-fans
slide effortlessly between
these two different
senses of "internal" -- clearly dates back to Leibniz and Kant (and
ultimately to Aristotle),
who created this confusion by their ill-considered choice of words like "contained". Hence, it was
only a matter of time before the spatial connotation came to the fore and
replaced the logical connotation of "internal". This took place in Hegel's
system (that is, if it is possible to decide what, if anything, he was banging
on about; on this, see Inwood (1992), pp.142-44, 197-99). Or, rather, to be more
accurate: for Hegel there appears to be no difference between these two senses of
"internal". This cavalier attitude has clearly been passed down without
modification to Hegel's progeny among DM-fans.
Despite
this, there remains a clear distinction between something that is logically-, and
something that is spatially-internal. Clearly, the spatial sense of
"internal" -- as that connotation found its way into in Dialectical
Marxism, whereby two objects or 'concepts' were
said to be complementary parts of a UO simply because they were inside
something else, or were part of a system
(while perhaps also appearing to be 'opposites') -- doesn't of itself make
them 'dialectical opposites'. Or, at least, it wouldn't unless (obviously!)
there were also some sort of logical connection between them --
whereby the existence of each 'opposite' implies the other's existence, just
like the existence of the proletariat is said to imply the existence of the
bourgeoisie, and vice versa.
Much of the sloppy thought that passes for
'dialectics' in this area is a direct result of this equivocation. DM-fans
have appropriated the spatial sense of this term, assuming without proof
that any objects and processes involved are also
'dialectical opposites' just because they are located inside a third
body, process or system -- or even where there is some sort of causal connection between them. This helps account for their
profligate use of 'contradiction', examples of which they see literally everywhere (on that, see here.) [We will
have occasion to meet this again below when we
examine Engels's ideas about life and death, where both of these connotations become
hopelessly entangled.]
Rarely, if ever, do DM-fans (and this includes
the classicists, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Mao), rarely if ever do
they try to showhow the
existence of one of these alleged 'opposites' implies the existence of the other
-- or derive one from the other, as the proletariat can be derived from the
capitalist class (so we are told).
In fact, in the vast majority of examples, if not in relation to every single
one (outwith the
link between the two aforementioned classes), it turns out that there is
no such connection -- so it is
no big surprise that they draw a veil over this topic when pressed, or they change the
subject.
Now, much of the material
in the next few sub-sections depends on interpreting "internal opposites" in
one way -- i.e., spatially -- since that is how DM-theorists largely
understand this term. Even so, the other alternative (i.e.,
reading "internal opposite" logically) will also be
considered where it seems applicable or appropriate.
Readers will need to keep this in mind as
we proceed.
[Any
confusion caused by this is the fault of the sloppy thought that passes for 'dialectics', not the present author! Concerning the serious difficulties this equivocation creates for DM-theorists, see
here. There is,
however, a
DM-critic
of this site who also wanted to view these "opposites" spatially
-- for example, when he speaks about considering the dialectical process
externally (i.e., "at the
outside"). Follow the previous link for more details.]
Furthermore, it is plain that this
particular equivocation
also arose because of an inappropriate organicist metaphor
that dialecticians have likewise borrowed from Hegel. Clearly, the various organs and other
parts of an animal or plant are spatially-internal to it --, and some of them might even be logically-internal
to a given organism, too (even though their organs/parts aren't logically-internal, or
logically-related, to each other; as noted above, for example, we would
refuse to call an amoeba "an amoeba" if it lacked a nucleus), although I prefer to call
this a "grammatical connection". However, when we move
beyond biology this metaphor loses all of its seeming plausibility, where the
above equivocation (between the spatial-, and the logical-meaning of "internal") creates serious problems
for fans of the dialectic -- indeed,
as we
are about to find out.
Despite the above fatal flaws, it is difficult to
believe Lenin and other DM-theorists were serious in claiming that everything is
a UO -- which is, incidentally, a dogma in support of which they have so far
neglected to provide any proof, having based it solely on a throw-away line Hegel borrowed from
Spinoza
(also left unproven, just assumed to be the case), that "every determination is also a negation". I
have said much more
about that yet to be substantiated dogma in Essay Three
Part One.
It is also impossible to make any sense of this assertion of Lenin's (also
awaiting proof):
"[Among
the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory
tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of
everydetermination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other [into its opposite?]…." [Lenin (1961),
p.221. Emphases in the original.]
Are we really supposed to believe that, say, a
domestic cat is a UO? But, what is the (spatial) opposite of a cat? A dog? A tulip? A tin
of beans? A bag of
Catnip?
[Below, I
will examine several possible candidates that might count as one or more of
these 'spatially internal opposites' inside a cat.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
However, in the logical sense of
this term, the 'opposite' here might loosely be labelled, 'non-cat'. And yet, if non-cat were the opposite of
cat, it would mean that if everything changes into its opposite --
according to the
DM-classics --, cats should change into everything that they are not,
after struggling with them. That is, each cat must struggle with and then
change into one or more of the following 'non-cats': a
can of beer, an oak tree, a
pebble beach, a pair of cuff
links, a set of duelling pistols, the
Taj Mahal, the Great Wall of China, a dog basket, a rift valley, a petrol station,
the
Great Barrier Reef, a carburettor, an atom of Phosphorus, President Biden, a
shower of meteorites, the
Whirlpool Galaxy..., to name just a
few of the non-cats there are in the universe.
[There are
two obvious responses
to the above: (i) The examples listed aren't 'dialectical opposites' of cats, and (ii)
For every object or process there is a
unique opposite, and this includes cats -- or, rather, it includes processes inside cats that cause them to change
(note a reappearance of the spatial sense of "internal", here). Those two
responses have been neutralised in Essay Seven
Part Three.]
On the other hand, if we interpret "internal"
spatially once more, then,
according to Lenin, cats must contain all these things if they are indeed
UOs --, just as they must also be a unity of cat and
non-cat, in the logical sense of "internal"--, especially if these opposite 'struggle'
with one another.
That is, if
each cat 'struggles' with one or more of its 'spatially internal opposites'.
Moreover, if we combine both senses of "internal" -- which would seem to imply
that each cat struggles with the non-cats inside each of them, and that is what causes a cat to change. Is, therefore, each unassuming domestic
moggie a repository of all its myriad opposites, and do these opposites
contain their own sets of opposites, ad infinitem, like glorified Russian Dolls?
Well, it seems they must if, according to Lenin, "everydetermination,
quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every other…."
[Emphases in the original.]
If change
is the result of an 'internal' struggle between opposites (declared above to be an
"absolute" by Lenin, as well as a law that governs
everything in the entire universe), and if everything changes
into everything else ("every other" -- Lenin's words, not mine!), or at least into its 'opposite', then cats must
(at some point) both contain and
change into a whole host of things, which must in turn contain and change into
yet more.10d
It is little use complaining that these are
ridiculous conclusions; if everything changes into its 'opposite' (or, indeed,
into
every single one
of them, according to Lenin ("every other")), then all of these must
follow. Any who still object should rather pick a fight with dialecticians like
Lenin --
not me -- for concocting such a crazy 'theory' of change.
[The obvious objection that this discussion
ignores 'mediated essences' is fielded in Note 10e. 'Internal tendencies'
are examined in detail in Essay Seven
Part Three.]10e
Figure Six: Yet Another Dialectical Catastrophe?
So,
if cats change, as surely they do, then,
according to the DM-classics, they must both struggle with and change into their opposites. But, where are these 'opposite cats'
with which they are supposed to be struggling? And, how
do they feature in and cause the changes they allegedly bring about in the original
animal? On the other hand, if they don't do this, does this mean
that these feline parts of nature aren't
subject to dialectical law? Is this why cats have
at least
nine lives?
It could be
argued that this Essay ignores the essential connection between
dialectical opposites, so that not just anything can be the opposite of something
else. This is brought out well in Marx's criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right:
"It is remarkable that Hegel, who reduces this
absurdity of mediation to its abstract logical, and hence pure and irreducible,
expression, calls it at the same time the speculative mystery of logic, the
rational relationship, the rational syllogism. Actual extremes can't be
mediated with each other precisely because they are actual extremes. But neither
are they in need of mediation, because they are opposed in essence. They
have nothing in common with one another; they neither need nor complement one
another. The one does not carry in its womb the yearning, the need, the
anticipation of the other. (When Hegel treats universality and singularity, the
abstract moments of the syllogism, as actual opposites, this is precisely the
fundamental dualism of his logic. Anything further regarding this belongs in the
critique of Hegelian logic.)
"This appears to be in opposition to the principle: Les extrêmes
se touchent. [Extremes meet -- RL] The North and South Poles attract each other; the female and
male sexes also attract each other, and only through the union of their extreme
differences does man result.
"On the other hand, each extreme is its other
extreme. Abstract spiritualism is abstract materialism; abstract materialism is
the abstract spiritualism of matter.
"In regard to the former, both North and South
Poles are poles; their essence is identical. In the same way both female and
male gender are of one species, one nature, i.e., human nature. North and South
Poles are opposed determinations of one essence, the variation of one essence
brought to its highest degree of development. They are the differentiated
essence. They are what they are only as differentiated determinations; that is,
each is this differentiated determination of the one same essence.
Truly in real extremes would be Pole and non-Pole, human and non-human gender.
Difference here is one of existence, whereas there [i.e., in the case of Pole
and non-Pole, etc.,] difference is one of essence, i.e., the difference between
two essences. In regard to the second [i.e. where each extreme is its other
extreme], the chief characteristic lies in the fact that a concept (existence,
etc.) is taken abstractly, and that it does not have significance as independent
but rather as an abstraction from another, and only as this abstraction. Thus,
for example, spirit is only the abstraction from matter. It is evident that
precisely because this form is to be the content of the concept, its real
essence is rather the abstract opposite, i.e., the object from which it
abstracts taken in its abstraction -- in this case, abstract materialism." [Marx
and Engels (1975b),
MECW Volume Three, pp.88-89. I have used the on-line translation here,
which differs markedly from the published version. Bold emphases added.]
However, as we will see in a later Essay,
Aristotelian Essentialism like this (albeit expressed in and by obscure Hegelian
jargon) is impossible to defend. [On that, see Note 8c, above.]
Independently of this, it is quite clear that Marx has fallen
into error, here (and he did so in a manner
similar to Hegel), since he failed to examine a wide enough range of
examples, all the while mis-describing several he did consider. Take
the Poles of a magnet: in what sense is a magnet an 'essence'? Marx doesn't say.
Hegel didn't say, either. Of course, both men wrote before scientists decided that
magnetic
fields are an expression of the
vector alignment of electrons, and which in many cases can be switched on
and off at will, so there is in fact no 'essence' here at all.
Moreover, the 'essence' that supposedly applies to males and females
isn't too clear, either (and it remains so even if we ignore for the time being
hermaphrodites,
chimerism,
genetic
mosaicism, and
asexual reproduction). In fact, evolution has taught us that Aristotle was
wrong, there are no 'essences' in biology (as
hybridisation, among other things, attests). Like Hegel, Marx was clearly
led astray by his reliance on now out-dated science a serious defect compounded
by acceptance of far too much Traditional Philosophy, a condition further aggravated by
a reliance on too many
of Hegel's
Hermetic vagaries.
[Later
in this Essay I will consider in more detail the problems the existence of
Hermaphrodites poses for Engels's Second 'Law'.]
Marx also failed to consider other examples (many of these are
discussed in the main body of this Essay). What, for example is the opposite of
a liquid? Is it a solid or a gas -- or, is it a
plasma?
Indeed, what is the opposite of a cat? If it has none, it can't change (that is, if we are to believe the
Dialectical
Classics). Indeed, what is
the 'essence' of a cat? Is it the variety, the species, the genus,
the family, the order, the class...? Of course, cats can change in many
different ways; does this mean that cats have many 'dialectical opposites' --
one for each such change --, and hence many
'essences'? It seems they must. Of course, what applies to cats applies to other
organisms. And, dialectical headaches like these not only multiply,
they intensify when we direct our attention to the plant kingdom. What, for
example, is the opposite of grass? Or, a Larch
tree? Or, if we throw the net wider, what is the opposite of a
Euglena, or
even a Covid-19
virus?
If we now move to the inorganic world, non-living objects
don't seem to have 'essences', either. What, for instance, is the 'essence' of any of
the following: plastic buttons, railway sidings, used tea bags, TV aerials, leather chairs,
Kellogg's
Cornflakes, rift
valleys, mountains whose height above sea level lies between 1500 metres and 2000 metres, silver cuff links, fluff, dandruff,
knotweed, motorway signs, grass pollen,
acidic volcanic eruptions, broken threads of green cotton, ice erosion,
continental drift, empty space, crisp packets, luminous paint, fly droppings,
spiders webs, and sentences that just tail off...? If none of
these has an 'essence', then they can't have 'dialectical opposites', either,
and so can't change. But they do.
Recall, a 'dialectical opposite' isn't just anything; it
isn't conjured into existence by the simple expedient of prefixing a given word with the negative particle (as in "cat"
and "non-cat"). Such 'opposites' not only have to share the same 'essence', they have to
imply one another -- such that one can't exist without the other, like the
proletariat and the capitalist class (or so we are told). So, for example, what other
unique object/process is implied by a box of cornflakes, or a used tea bag, such that
they can't exist without each other?
And, as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Two, not even elements
and chemical compounds have 'essences'. [On that, see Note 8c, above.]
Bemused readers will search long and hard (and to no avail) in
the highly repetitive 'dialectical literature' for any help in answering these
and similar questions. But, what else can be expected of
Mickey Mouse 'Dialectical' Science?
Engels did at least try to
address a few of the fatal
flaws in his theory. He argued that we must learn from nature what the actual
properties of objects and processes are in each case, and hence, presumably,
what they can legitimately change into. [Admittedly, he made this point in
relation to the First and Third of his 'Laws' (the change of 'Quantity into
Quality' and the 'Negation of the Negation', respectively), but there is no reason to suppose he would have denied this of
his Second 'Law' (the 'Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites').] In addition, he pointed out that 'dialectical negation'
isn't annihilation. [Engels (1954),
pp.62-63 and (1976),
p.181. [The second of these two passages has been quoted
here.]
However,
as we saw briefly in the previous Sub-section, nature and society are annoyingly ambiguous in relation to
what we can learn from them. For example, lumps of iron ore can turn, or be turned into,
a host of
different things with or without the input of human labour, etc. These include
the following:
cars, car parts, rolling stock, aeroplane components, ships, submarines,
magnets, surgical equipment, surgical appliances, cutlery, kitchen utensils, scaffolding,
pipes, chains,
bollards, barriers, cranes, plant machinery,
pumps, tubes, engines (diesel, petrol and electric), ornaments, jewellery, steel girders,
guns, spears, swords, axes, machetes, tanks, shells, bullets, bombs, rockets,
missiles, sheet metal, tools,
instruments, wire, springs, furniture, doors, locks, keys, gates, grates,
manhole covers, lifts, escalators, anchors, railings, railroad tracks, bridges, wheels,
ball bearings, zips,
bars, handcuffs, iron filings, rivets, nails, screws, staples, steel wool, helmets,
armour, artwork, and dietary supplements --, alongside other assorted naturally occurring
and
artificial substances, such as,
haemoglobin,
cytochrome
nitrogenase,
hematite,
magnetite,
taconite,
ferrofluids, countless ferrous and ferric compounds (including
rust, Ferrous and
Ferric Sulphides,
Fools Gold,
etc., etc.) --, to name just a few.
Are
we really supposed to believe that all of these reside inside
each lump of iron -- if we appeal to the 'spatial interpretation' of "internal opposites",
here? They would surely have to do so if "internal opposite" des
indeed mean "spatially
internal". Alternatively, are each of the above examples 'logically' connected with
some iron ore that has just been mined
(as
an single Hegelian unique "other"
-- or an entire range of them)
so that the ore can turn into, or be turned into, one or more of the items
listed above?
Are we really meant to suppose there are 'inner tendencies' quietly humming away in each
block of iron ore just waiting for the chance to turn into a pair of handcuffs,
a tea pot, or a manhole cover?
On the other hand, if we adopt the 'logical view' of "internal opposites"
once more,
how can all of the above be logically-related to iron ore as its unique
"other"? If not,
what exactly is the point
of this 'Law' if iron can change, or be changed, into any of the above
objects/compounds? If each one isn't the
unique "other" of iron
ore, and yet iron ore can be turned into any of them, doesn't that fact alone
suggest that iron
ore possesses no unique 'other', and hence,
according to
Hegel and Lenin, it can't change?
Alternatively,
if we now combine the 'spatial view' with the 'logical interpretation' of "internal
opposites", the following question now confronts us: If these items don't in fact exist
inside
each lump of iron (the 'spatial view') -- or, even if they don't confront each other as antagonistic external or 'logical'
opposites -- how is it possible for human labour and natural forces to turn iron
ore into one or more of the above objects/substances while obeying 'dialectical Law'? Does human
labour work with or against these 'dialectical Laws'? If a lump of iron doesn't (logically or spatially)
'contain' or 'imply', say, a carving knife, how is it possible for human beings to change
iron ore into carving knives, dialectically? Or, are
there changes in nature and society that aren't governed by such 'laws'?
Are the
Iron 'Laws' dialectics not applicable to iron itself?
Exactly which opposites are
('logically'/physically) united in, or with, any specific lump of iron ore?
Furthermore, and perhaps worse, if,
according to the DM-classics, objects and process change because they
struggle with and then turn into their opposites -- that is, they turn into that
with which they have struggled --, then a lump of iron ore must both struggle
with and turn into the frying pan it is to become, and the latter must similarly
turn onto iron ore! But how can the ore turn into a frying pan if that pan is
already there? If it weren't already there, how could the iron ore struggle with
it and hence change?
And
when was the last time you saw a frying pan turn back into iron ore after
struggling with it?
Of course, if none of the above are the case
(which they aren't!), then we can surely ignore the DM-classics which tell us
that such miracles must happen every day.
It could be objected that the above
considerations are ridiculous and completely misconstrue the nature of this
'Law'. No one supposes
that cats or nuggets of iron ore contain their opposites. Indeed, this is how
Woods and Grant explained things:
"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the
'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion;
north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and
anti-matter; male and female in biology, odd and even in mathematics; even the
concept of 'left and right handedness in relation to the spin of subatomic
particles.... There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and
negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract." [Woods and Grant (1995),
p.65.]11
But, if nature works
(at least) in pairs,
what is the paired opposite of a cat that causes it to change?
If cats have no opposites as such, then these feline-oppositional parts of nature (at least)
don't
exist, or don't interact, in 'dialectical pairs'. And, whatever applies to cats must surely apply to countless other
objects and processes that change, too. What then are the external and/or internal opposites of things like the
following: Giraffes, Snowy Owls, Mountain Gorillas, Daffodils, Oak trees,
Chinese Puzzles, broom
handles, craters on the Moon, waste paper, copies of Anti-Dühring,
any
ten grains of sand in the Gobi Desert, the four
thousand-and-first moth to hatch in
Cook County, Illinois, USA, in May 2012 -- or
the question mark at the end of this sentence (on your screen, not mine)? All of these are subject to
change, but not, it seems, as a result of any obvious oppositional pairing, tension
or 'struggle' with anything unique to each.
Is a question mark, for example, really locked in a life-and-death struggle
with other punctuation marks? Or, even with its
Hegelian 'other'? But, what is
the 'other'
of a "?"? Or an "!"? Or even a "-"?
What should we
say about things like broom handles and copies
of Trotsky'sIDM? Do they change because of the 'dialectical' tension
created by their own inner (or outer) 'logical' opposites? But, what could they possibly be? Is the
opposite of IDM, Mein Kampf, or Stalin's Problems of Leninism?
Could it even be these Essays?
In view of the fact
that the
Dialectical
Classics tell us
that such opposites "turn into one another", does this mean that IDM will
change into one of my
Essays? Well, perhaps TAR will, since my work was originally aimed
specifically at that book. In which case, had this work not been
undertaken, would TAR and IDM have been eternally changeless books?
[IDM = In Defense of
Marxism (i.e., Trotsky (1971)); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998)); RIRE = Reason In Revolt
(i.e., Woods and Grant (1995/2007)).]
Hence,
the above passage from RIRE is no help at all resolving this problem.
It could be objected that in the case
of cats (and, indeed, some of the other objects listed above), the opposites concerned are plainly "male" and "female".
But, even if that were so, these are manifestly not "internal opposites", and neither are
they "internally related" to each other -- they are causally,
historically and biologically related. Sexual
diversity isn't a logical feature of reality -- if it were, there would
be no hermaphrodites or
asexual
organisms. So, change in this case can't be the result of any 'internal contradictions' between male and female organisms.
Many female organisms could very well still exist (and thrive if they reproduced
parthenogenetically)
even if every male organism was wiped from the face of the earth. This shows
that the link between males and females isn't logical. The one doesn't
imply the other such that they have to co-exist, as is the case with the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie (or so we are told).
[On
Parthenogenesis, see Prasad (2012).]
As is well-known, parthenogenetic reproduction proceeds without the
intervention of the male; it is found in the following right-wing
and shamelessly reactionary
species: water fleas, aphids, honey bees, lizards, salamanders, nematode worms, turkeys,
several species of
spider (this links to a PDF), and some
varieties of fish. Apparently, it can also be
artificially induced in both fish and amphibians. Indeed, we read this from the BBC (in an article entitled "Lesbian
Lizards"):
"Every individual in this whip-tailed lizard
population is female -- genetically the same female. Every time they lay eggs, a
clutch of new female clones is born. The lizards live in the deserts of Arizona
and New Mexico, and must be perfectly adapted to their surroundings. As a
result, they don't want their good genes diluted by the involvement of males.
The females have opted to hang on to their favourable genes and have driven the
males to extinction. But the ghost of the male haunts their life nevertheless.
Near laying, all the virgins need the stimulation which a male would provide to
make them ovulate. With none around, the role is played by a female. In every
sense she apes being a male. Driven by a surge of the male hormone
testosterone,
she temporarily forsakes her true gender -- and goes through the motions of
copulating." [The associated film can be viewed
here.
Accessed 21/11/2011. Link added.]
As
well as this:
"Researchers have bred a
new species of all-female lizard, mimicking a process
that has happened naturally in the past but has never
been directly observed. 'It's recreating the
events that lead to new species,' said cell biologist
Peter Baumann of the Stowers Institute for Medical
Research, whose new species is described May 3 in the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
'It relates to the question of how these unisexual
species arise in the first place.'
"Female-only species that
reproduce by cloning themselves -- a process called
parthenogenesis, in which embryos develop without
fertilization -- were once considered dead-end
evolutionary flukes. But in the last decade,
unisexuality has been
found in more than 80 groups
of fish, amphibian and reptiles. It might not be such a
dead end after all. Best-known among all
unisexual species are Aspidoscelis, the
whiptail lizards of southwestern North America, of which
7 of 12 species are unisexual. Genetic studies suggest
their unisexuality emerged from historical unions of two
sexually-reproducing lizards belonging to
closely-related species, the hybrid offspring of which
possessed mutations needed for parthenogenesis.
"In two of the unisexual
whiptails, that seems to have been enough; they
immediately went all-female. In the other five, it took
another round of traditional sexual mating. Those
species are so-called triploids, bearing two sets of
chromosomes from the original mother species and one
from the father. But for all the evidence
of these historical hybridizations, it's been remarkably
difficult to observe in the present. When new hybrid
whiptails have been found in nature, they've invariably
proved sterile. The same goes for laboratory efforts,
including
one that lasted for 29 years
and involved 230 lizards from nine species. Researchers
were left with a conundrum: Though adding chromosomes is
clearly possible, it's a disaster whenever seen.
"'There are recognized
species for which that hybridization event occurred
100,000 years ago,' said Baumann. 'But there are also
hybrids that have arisen in the last five years. If you
go to New Mexico and look around, you can find them.
They've also arisen in the lab, but they're sterile.' There was, however, one
historical hint of hybrid success. In 1967, a captive
A. exsanguis female, triploid and
parthenogetic, successfully mated with a male A.
inornata. One female offspring laid eggs. They
weren't cared for, but Baumann and colleagues suspected
that they might have developed.
"In the new study they
revisited that experiment, again mating A. exsanguis
with A. inornata. This time, it conclusively
worked. Six eggs were recovered and incubated, producing
four hybrid females. All went on to clone themselves.
Those offspring are now into their fourth generation,
fully healthy and representing 'a proof of principle'
for how new parthenogenetic lizards could evolve in
nature.
"Baumann's team hasn't
yet decided what to name their new species, which as of
March numbered 68 females with more eggs on the way.
More pressing than a name is continued study. 'What is
the fundamental difference between these lizards and
every hybrid that's been examined in the last 40 years?'
he said. It's a question with
multiple implications. Baumann's expertise is in cell
division; comparing sexual cell division, known as
meosis, in the new species with other, infertile lizards
could reveal as-yet-unappreciated mechanisms. 'By
comparing and contrasting meiosis in different species,
I've gained an appreciation for how little we know about
meiosis in any organism,' he said.
"If this laboratory
hybridization proves analogous to naturally-occurring
moments of hybridization, it could support the notion
that unisexuality is not an evolutionary dead end.
Baumann's lizards have effectively just received an
influx of genetic mutations, providing variety
unavailable to self-cloners. He wonders if some lizard
lineages might actually alternate between sexual and
unisexual reproduction, depending on the pressures of
each era.
Is it really the case
that, once a species is unisexual, it's set in stone,
and it will be that way until it dies out?' he said. 'Or
is it there a chance that material in unisexual lineages
could find its way back?'" [Quoted from
here; written May 2011, accessed 21/11/2011. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Looks like lizards, too, can outwit (or be coaxed into
outwitting) this rather whimpish 'Law'.
Indeed, as can some
species of shark:
"An international team of
scientists
surprised the
world by reporting that female hammerhead sharks can
reproduce without males through parthenogenesis, or
'virgin birth'. It was previously believed that sharks
reproduced only sexually. Researchers from Ireland
and the United States performed genetic tests on a baby
hammerhead born in an Omaha, Nebraska aquarium in 2001.
The three occupants of the tank were all females who
were captured as babies and had never been introduced to
a male in captivity, which is what prompted the
curiosity. The genetic tests proved that there was no
'DNA of male origin' in the baby hammerhead.
"Female sharks are able
to
store sperm for months, if not
years, so
there was some suspicion that the mother had mated prior
to be taken into captivity, but the repeated DNA tests
apparently ruled out this possibility. While useful at times,
reproduction through parthenogenesis carries risks for
the species, as it reduces the genetic diversity of
offspring and makes them more prone to being wiped out
by disease. Given this new data, scientists speculate
that parthenogenesis occurs in sharks only rarely --
when male mates are hard to find.
"The new discovery poses
a dilemma: mammals are now the only major vertebrate
group where parthenogenesis has not been observed. Are
they (we) incapable, or have scientists just not
looked?" [Quoted from
here; written May 2007, accessed 21/11/2011. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Some links added. Several paragraphs merged.]
Countless other organisms reproduce
asexually,
showing admirable contempt not just for the
UO, but also for the
NON.
Update, 12/09/2012:
Since the above was written other animals appear to have taken a sharp turn to the right, for now we read this from
the BBC:
"Virgin
births discovered in wild snakes
"By Jeremy Coles,
BBC Nature
"Virgin
births have been reported in wild
vertebrates for the first time.
Researchers
in the US caught pregnant females from two
snake species and genetically analysed the
litters. That proved the
North American pit-vipers reproduced
without a male, a phenomenon called
facultative parthenogenesis
that has
previously been found only in captive
species. Scientists say the findings could
change our understanding of animal
reproduction and vertebrate evolution. It was
thought to be extremely rare for a normally
sexual species to reproduce asexually.... First identified in
domestic chickens, such 'virgin births' have
been reported in recent years in a few
snake, shark, lizard and bird species.
Crucially though, all such virgin births
have occurred in captivity, to females kept
away from males.
"Virgin
births in vertebrates in general have been
viewed as 'evolutionary novelties', said
Warren Booth, from the University of Tulsa,
Oklahoma, US. Professor Booth is lead author
of a paper published in the Royal Society's
Biological Letters
that challenges this label. He and his
collaborators investigated virgin births in
wild populations of two geographically
separated and long-studied species of snake.
They captured pregnant
copperhead
and
cottonmouth
female pit-vipers from the
field, where males were present. The snakes
gave birth, allowing the scientists to study
the physical and genetic characteristics of
the litters. Of the 22 copperheads, the
scientists found one female that must have
had a virgin birth. Another single virgin
birth occurred within the 37 cottonmouth
litters.
"'I think the
frequency is what really shocked us,' said
Prof Booth. 'That's between 2.5 and 5% of
litters produced in these populations may be
resulting from parthenogenesis. That's quite
remarkable for something that has been
considered an evolutionary novelty,' he
said.... A virgin
birth, or parthenogenesis, is when an egg
grows and develops without being fertilised
by sperm. It results in offspring that only
have their mother's genetic material; no
fatherly contribution is required. This is
not uncommon in invertebrates such as
aphids, bees and ants.
"It also
happens in a few all-female species of
lizard; geckos and whiptails for example.
But here it occurs across a generation; all
female reproduce asexually via a process
called
obligate parthenogenesis. But asexual
reproduction by a normally sexual vertebrate
species is still rare, having been reported
in less than 0.1% of species. It was only
in the mid 1990s that virgin births began to
be documented in captive snakes, followed by
a captive giant lizard in 2006 and a captive
shark in 2007. To date this now includes
around 10 species of snakes including a
couple of boas, and a python, four species
of shark, and several
monitor lizards, including the
endangered
Komodo dragon. Recently the
zebra finch
and
Chinese painted quail were added to the
list. All were kept in isolation in
unnatural conditions and away from any
males. So to find asexual reproduction in
two species of snake in the wild on their
first attempt was 'astounding', according to
Prof Booth and his collaborators. Virgin
births should no longer be viewed as 'some
rare curiosity outside the mainstream of
evolution,' he said....
"It remains
unclear whether the female snakes actively
select to reproduce this way, or whether the
virgin births are triggered by some other
factor, such as a virus or bacterial
infection. 'Any answer is pure speculation
at this point,' says Prof Booth. In
captivity, two sharks, and three snakes,
have been shown to have had multiple virgin
births, producing more than one litter via
facultative parthenogenesis. As yet, it also
remains unclear whether the offspring of
these wild virgin births can themselves go
on to have normal, or virgin births of their
own. In captive snakes studied so far,
offspring have so far not been proved
viable, that is capable of surviving and
reproducing.
"However,
earlier
this
year
Prof
Booth
and
colleagues
reported
that a
checkered
gartersnake
that has
had
consecutive
virgin
births,
appears
to have
produced
viable
male
offspring.
Parthenogenically
born
copperheads
and
cottonmouths
are also
currently
being
raised
and 'in
the next
two to
three
years we
will
know if
they are
indeed
viable,'
said
Prof
Booth.
'If
they
cannot
survive
and
reproduce,
then
this is
a
reproductive
dead-end.
However,
if they
are
healthy
and can
reproduce,
that
opens an
entirely
new
avenue
for
research,'
he said.
"Being
able to
switch
from
sexual
to
asexual
reproduction
could be
advantageous;
in the
absence
of males
a female
could
still
give
birth
and
start a
new,
albeit
inbred,
population.
Her
genes
could
still be
passed
on via
her
fertile
male
offspring.
Scientists
believe
that
facultative
parthenogenesis
is more
common
in some
lineages
such as
reptiles
and
sharks.
However
it is
unlikely
that
similar
virgin
births
will be
found
among
placental
mammals,
which
include
all the
mammals
aside
from the
platypus
and
echidnas.
That is
because
mammals
require
a
process
called
genomic
imprinting
to
reproduce,
where a
set of
genes
from one
parent
dominates
over the
other.
The
interaction
between
the two
sets of
parental
genes is
required
for
embryos
to
develop
normally."
[Quoted
from
here.
Accessed
12/09/2012.
Quotations
marks
altered
to
conform
with the
conventions
adopted
at this
site.
Minor
typos
corrected;
links
added.
Several
paragraphs
merged.]
Consider, too,
the
Japanese Knotweed. In the UK, every plant of this noxious weed is female -- but that hasn't
stopped its rapid spread:
"Every Japanese Knotweed plant in Britain
is female and reproduces through its
rhizomes
or
fragments of its own vegetation.
Strimming
it is the worst thing you can do: it
creates millions of tiny pieces, each of which can sprout into a new plant. In
Kenidjack [in Cornwall -- RL], the weed quickly spread down the valley: when
local residents hacked it from their
gardens, tiny fragments
fell into the stream and seeded along the bank. For the past three years, local
landowners, the county council, the
National Trust and other agencies have
worked together on an incredibly pain-staking and expensive clearance programme:
cutting the knotweed by hand, carefully disposing of the waste and injecting
each individual stump with specialist weedkiller. This summer, the valley has
been returned to a native normality, with bluebells and bracken." [Guardian
G2 Supplement, 14/08/2009,
p.11. Links added.]
What are the 'interpenetrated opposites'
at work here?
Which plant
(or part of a plant) is the 'negation', and which the NON?
As
seems likely, this
weed has been issued with a DM-exemption certificate in order to reproduce in the
UK.
Update, 02/06/2015: It looks like
certain species of swordfish in the USA have joined
this reactionary stampede rightwards; here again is the BBC -- all this
non-dialectics must be an "abomination" to DM-fans:
"Virgin-Born' Swordfish
are a first in the wild
"By Jonathan Webb Science
reporter BBC News. June 1st 2015
"Seven sawfish in
Florida have become the first virgin-born animals ever found in the wild from a
sexually reproducing species. The discovery suggests that such births may be a
natural response to dwindling numbers, rather than a freak occurrence largely
seen in captivity. It was made by ecologists studying genetic diversity in a
critically endangered species of ray. They say that births of this kind may be
more common than previously thought. The findings appear
in the journal Current Biology....
"There are many species, particularly
invertebrates, that naturally reproduce alone; some types of whiptail lizard,
meanwhile, are bizarrely all-female. But for an animal that normally reproduces
by mating, a virgin birth is an oddity. And yet a number of captive animals have
produced virgin births. This
roster of surprise arrivals
includes sharks, snakes,
Komodo dragons and turkeys -- all species that normally use sexual reproduction.
And in 2012 a US research group reported two pregnant pit vipers, caught in the
wild, each gestating baby snakes (inside eggs) that
appeared
to be fatherless.
"But the
smalltooth sawfish, a strange-looking beast that grows up to four metres
long, is the first sexually reproducing species whose virgin-born babies have
been found roaming free and healthy in their native habitat. Andrew Fields, a
PhD student at Stony Brook University in New York and the study's first author,
said the find was entirely unexpected. It came during a survey of the sawfish
population in the estuaries of southwest Florida. 'We were conducting routine
DNA fingerprinting of the sawfish found in this area in order to see if
relatives were often reproducing with relatives due to their small population
size,' Mr Fields said. 'What the DNA fingerprints told us was altogether more
surprising: female sawfish are sometimes reproducing without even mating.'
"Of the 190 individual
sawfish that Mr Fields and his colleagues surveyed, seven had DNA that indicated
they only had one parent. Specifically, these seven historic fish had identical
copies of at least 14 of the 16 genes that the scientists looked at; if they had
arisen from normal sexual reproduction, the team calculated that the chance of
the animals being 'homozygous'
for all those genes was less than one-in-100 billion.
"So they concluded that the
seven sawfish -- all of them female, five of them sisters -- were produced by
'parthenogenesis': a process by which an unfertilised egg develops into an
embryo. Researchers believe this takes place in vertebrates when the egg absorbs
an identical sister cell. Because the resulting offspring have much less genetic
diversity than normal sexual offspring, their chances of survival are usually
thought to be very low. But the seven fish in Mr Fields' study were up to one
year old, normal in size and apparently getting on fine.
"'Occasional parthenogenesis
may be much more routine in wild animal populations than we ever thought,' said
Dr Kevin Feldheim of the Field Museum of Chicago, a co-author of the study. The
researchers suggest it might be a last-ditch evolutionary strategy that takes
hold when a population goes through an extremely lean patch -- such as that
presently faced by the smalltooth sawfish, whose numbers have plummeted to less
than 5% of what they were a century ago. But for this to make sense, the
'parthenogens' themselves would have to be fertile, so that they could help the
species to bounce back. It is too early to know whether that is the case for the
seven sawfish.
"Dr David Jacoby is a behavioural ecologist and
marine biologist at the
ZSL
Institute of Zoology. He told the BBC
that the Florida findings were 'interesting and groundbreaking', particularly
with regard to the question of whether virgin births are a natural adaptation.
'We kind of associate parthenogenesis with invertebrates: corals or crustaceans
or things...like that. There are instances of this happening in vertebrates
-- birds and reptiles, and some shark species -- but it's all been in captivity.
The fact that this has not only been inferred in the wild, but also in a species
that is seeing critically low levels of population -- it definitely raises the
question as to whether this is a strategy which has evolved.'
"But Dr Jacoby cautioned, as
did the researchers themselves, that although this remarkable ability might slow
the demise of the sawfish, it is unlikely to halt it altogether. 'It doesn't
seem as though this type of adaptation is going to be a way of restoring
population levels,' he said. 'It's not a get-out clause.' They might have
produced a natural miracle, but the sawfish of the Florida estuaries still need
human help to avoid extinction." [Quoted from
here; accessed 02/06/2015. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged; some links
added.]
Even odder is the fish Poecillia formosa
-- the South
American Amazon Molly:
"The Amazon molly, a small fish from the rivers
of Central and South America, is one of the few species that appears to have rid
itself of the need to reproduce sexually. The fish are all female, and
scientists had thought that they produced young without ever mixing their genes
with those from a male partner. But it turns out the fish were fooling us all
along. German biologists have shown that eggs produced by female Amazon mollies
occasionally take up small fragments of genetic material from sperm produced by
males from closely related species.
"The researchers do not yet know exactly how the
fish 'capture' these foreign genes, but their finding resolves a long-standing
puzzle surrounding the Amazon molly. Evolutionary biologists argue that species
which eschew sex should become extinct in less than 100,000 generations. Without
the genetic reshuffling brought about by sexual reproduction, harmful mutations
should simply accumulate over time, eventually causing the species to die out. The Amazon molly apparently gave up conventional
sexual reproduction more than 500,000 generations ago, yet it is still going
strong. 'In some of the rivers of Mexico it's taking over,' says Manfred Schartl
of the University of Würzburg, who led the team that made the discovery. Schartl
believes that some of the small foreign genetic fragments taken up by Amazon
molly eggs must contain healthy genes that can counter the effects of damaging
mutations.
"The researchers made their discovery by breeding
Amazon mollies in tanks which also contained male black mollies. The black molly
is an ornamental variety of a closely related species which lives alongside the
Amazon molly in its natural habitat. In a tiny proportion of the resulting
broods, the fish were speckled with black, instead of showing the Amazon molly's
usual uniform silver-grey coloration. The researchers looked at cells from these
speckled fish and counted their chromosomes. In addition to the Amazon molly's
usual complement of chromosomes, the cells contained fragments of black molly
chromosome (Nature, volume 373, p.68).
"Schartl and his team have shown that these
fragments contain the gene responsible for the black molly's characteristic dark
colour. They have also found that around 5 per cent of wild Amazon mollies carry
similar 'microchromosomes', presumably taken up from sperm produced by related
species. This may explain how the Amazon molly has avoided extinction.
Amazon molly eggs have ample opportunity to take
up genes from foreign sperm because they are triggered to develop by the
presence of sperm from related species. But some all-female species, including
several salamanders, produce young in the absence of sperm, so the same
mechanism can't work for them." [New
Scientist, 14/01/1995. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
The situation is
in fact even odder:
"The South American Amazon Molly...is a
particularly fascinating fish. Most generations of this species consist of
asexually reproducing female clones. Amazon Mollies produce fully viable clone
eggs; however sperm are required to trigger the developmental process. Thus, an
Amazon Molly will mate with either of the related species Atlantic Molly (Poecillia
mexicana) or Sailfin Molly (Poecillia latipinna). Usually this mating
only serves to trigger the cloning process; however, and occasionally (and the
necessary conditions are still not well understood) the mating does result in
cross-fertilisation between the species. Surprisingly, the offspring of these
pairings are not hybrids of the two species, but develop into female, asexually
reproducing Amazon Mollies...." [Crozier (2008), p.465. Italic
emphasis in the
original.]
With the
worst will in the world, it isn't easy to see how such strange organisms can be
incorporated in the 'dialectical universe'.
Mercifully,
there are far too many non-dialectical creatures on this planet to consider here.
Independently of the above, is it really the case that males and females always conflict/'struggle'? Anyone
who has, for example, seen
Leopard Slugs mating might be forgiven for thinking that these fortunate
creatures have had a dialectical exemption certificate encoded in their DNA. They
manifestly do not 'conflict'!
That is to say nothing
about gay sex,
either.
One might well wonder how Woods and Grant propose to
account for homosexuality, not just among human beings, but
right across the animal kingdom, along DM-lines. Indeed, how might
DM-theorists in general account for it? Where is the 'Unity of Opposites', here?
Might this not explain the fact that large sections of the
Marxist left
were openly homophobic until relatively recently. The old
Militant Tendency (of which Woods and Grant were leading figures)
was apathetic, if not overtly hostile toward gay rights. In some communist countries
this is still the case. For example, the
Cuban regime was openly homophobic until the 1980s and 1990s. Homosexuality
was only
decriminalised in China in 1997, and removed from the list of mental
illnesses in 2002. Gays still face discrimination
in Vietnam. The Soviet Union originally decriminalised homosexuality after
the 1917 revolution,
which was reversed in the 1930s. The situation didn't change much
until the 1970s; it was only legalised when the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991. Since then, gay rights have come under sustained attack in Russia
in the last few years (which hostility was only slightly attenuated
because of international pressure threatening a boycott of the
Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, and the
World Cup in 2018) -- but, plainly, that has nothing to do with communism.
'Just so' stories to one side, not only is
it difficult for Darwinism to account for homosexuality, Dialectical Marxists
face no less serious problems explaining it in terms consistent with DM.
To say nothing of transgender issues...
And
what are to say about stories like the following from the BBC?
"Fur seals have been
caught engaging in an extreme form of sexual behaviour. Specifically, trying to
have sex with penguins.
"Things are heating up in cold climes of the
sub-Antarctic. On a remote, and mostly desolate island, seals have been caught
engaging in an extreme form of sexual behaviour. Specifically, they have been
trying to have sex with penguins. More than one fur seal has been caught in the
act, on more than one occasion. And it's all been captured on film, with details
published in the journal
Polar Biology. The sexual behaviour of the fur
seals hasn't come as a complete shock to the scientists that recorded it.
"In 2006, they saw, for the first time,
a fur
seal attempting to copulate with a king penguin, on
Marion Island, a sub-Antarctic island that is home to both species.
They published details of that incident, and
speculated that the sex act at the time may have been the behaviour of a
frustrated, sexually inexperienced seal. Or an aggressive, predatory act. Or a
playful one that turned sexual. But the new incidents, published in the study
'Multiple occurrences of king penguin (Aptenodytes patagonicus) sexual
harassment by Antarctic fur seals (Arctocephalus gazella)', still
surprised the researchers.
"'Honestly I did not expect
that follow up sightings of a similar nature to that 2006 one would ever be made
again, and certainly not on multiple occasions,' said Nico de Bruyn, of the
Mammal Research Institute at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. Scientists routinely monitor
wildlife on the island, and look out for rare and unusual behaviour. On three
separate occasions, a research team led by William A. Haddad and de Bruyn
spotted young male seals sexually coercing what appeared to be healthy penguins
of unknown gender.
"Two
incidents occurred on
Goodhope Bay,
and one on Funk beach. The incident in 2006 occurred on a different beach again,
called Trypot. 'This
really made us sit up and take notice,' said de Bruyn, of the new sightings. All
four known sexual incidents followed a common pattern. Each time a seal chased,
captured and mounted the penguin. The seal then attempted copulation several
times, lasting about five minutes each, with periods of rest in between. Male
and female penguins mate via an opening called a cloaca, and the seals are
thought to have actually penetrated the penguins in some of the acts, which were
caught on film by Haddad. In three of the four recorded incidents the seal let
the penguin go. But on one of the more recent occasions, the seal killed and ate
the penguin after trying to mate with it. Fur seals often catch and eat penguins
on the island.
"The
incidents are the only time
pinnipeds,
the group that includes seals, fur seals and sea-lions, have been known to have
sex with an animal from a different biological class, in this case a mammal
trying to have sex with a bird. The scientists can only speculate about why the
seals are behaving this way. But the new observations suggest that having sex
with penguins may be becoming a learned behaviour among seals on the island. 'Seals have capacity for learning -- we know this from their foraging behaviour
for example,' explained de Bruyn. 'So male seals may see each other coercing
penguins, then attempt it themselves. That might explain why the number of
incidents appears to be increasing.... But
'if this is learned behaviour, we really can’t think of what the reward may be
for these young males,' he adds. 'Other than perhaps learning that these birds
are an easier target to practice their copulatory skills.'
"The
seals were not yet old or large enough to defend harems of female seals,
explained de Bruyn.
'Perhaps it is a release of sexual frustration, given the hormonal surges
during seal breeding season. It is very unlikely to be failed mate recognition
-- i.e. the misidentification of the penguin as a female seal. All in all it's
difficult to say really,' he admits." [Quoted from
here; accessed 19/11/2014.
Spelling adjusted to agree with UK English.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some
links added. (The video from the original article has been omitted.) Several
paragraphs merged.]
And,
who
hasn't seen cows trying to mount other cows?
Here's a
video of a bull trying to hump a motorcycle! [YouTube is full of such oddities.] Who
hasn't seen
dogs trying to hump table legs, human legs, other objects, or even other
animals? [Here's
another video, this time of a dog humping a pillow.] Is a randy dog the 'dialectical
opposite' of a table leg? Or is it a pillow?
[There are
dozens of videos on YouTube showing dogs humping all manner of objects as
well as other
animals, too.]
Maybe 'the
dialectic' has by-passed the above animals, permitting the copulation of a mammal with a bird, or a
dog with a
fluffy toy (I had to resist the temptation to call it a "stuffed toy"). Maybe 'Being' has a wicked sense of
humour and has planted these sad cases in nature to test the faith of DM-fans,
rather like
the way that some Christians think 'God' (or 'Satan') placed certain fossils in the ground
to test their
faith, too.
Of course, the
following research would have to be ruled out in
advance by all decent, 'God'-, ..., er, ..., 'Being'-fearing DM-fans, since it is a
clear violation of 'dialectical law', which supposedly governs everything
including sexual reproduction:
"'Three
people, one baby' public consultation begins
"By James
Gallagher, Health and
science reporter, BBC News
"A public
consultation has been launched to discuss
the ethics of using three people to create
one baby. The technique could be used to
prevent debilitating and
fatal
'mitochondrial' diseases, which are
passed down only from mother to child.
However, the resulting baby would contain
genetic information from three people -- two
parents and a donor woman. Ministers could
change the law to make the technique legal
after the results of the consultation are
known.
About one in
200 children are born with faulty
mitochondria -- the tiny power stations
which provide energy to every cell in the
body. Most show little or no symptoms, but
in the severest cases the cells of the body
are starved of energy. It can lead to muscle
weakness, blindness, heart failure and in
some cases can be fatal. Mitochondria are
passed on from the mother's egg to the child
-- the father does not pass on mitochondria
through his sperm. The idea to prevent this
is to add a healthy woman's mitochondria
into the mix. Two main techniques have been
shown to work in the laboratory, by using a
donor embryo or a donor egg.
"How do
you make a baby from three people?
"1) Two embryos are fertilised with sperm
creating an embryo from the intended parents and another from the donors. 2) The
pronuclei,
which contain genetic information, are removed from both embryos but only the
parents' is kept 3) A healthy embryo is created by adding the parents' pronuclei
to the donor embryo, which is finally implanted into the womb.
"However,
mitochondria contain their own genes in
their own set of DNA. It means any babies
produced would contain genetic material from
three people. The vast majority would come
from the mother and father, but also
mitochondrial DNA from the donor woman. This
would be a permanent form of genetic
modification, which would be passed down
through the generations. It is
one of
the
ethical
considerations
which
will be
discussed
as part
of the
Human
Fertilisation
and
Embryology
Authority's
consultation.
The
chair of
the
organisation,
Prof
Lisa
Jardine,
said:
'It is
genetic
modification
of the
egg --
that is
uncharted
territory.
Once we
have
genetic
modification
we have
to be
sure we
are damn
happy.'
She said
it was a
question
of
'balancing
the
desire
to help
families
have
healthy
children
with the
possible
impact
on the
children
themselves
and
wider
society'....
"However,
treatments in
IVF clinics will be years away even if
the public and ministers decide the
techniques should go ahead. There are still
questions around safety which need to be
addressed. One of the pioneers of the
methods,
Prof Mary Herbert
from Newcastle
University, said: 'We are now undertaking
experiments to test the safety and efficacy
of the new techniques. This work may take
three to five years to complete.'" [Quoted
from
here. Some links added; several
paragraphs merged. Quotation
marks modified to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Bold
emphases in the original. Accessed
17/08/2012.]
Update, March 2013: And what about this latest reactionary bulletin from the BBC (about
a topic also covered in the Appendix):
"The UK could move a step closer to allowing the
creation of babies from two women and a man later. The Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority is to advise ministers and report on a public consultation
and the latest advances in the field. The three-person IVF technique could be
used to prevent debilitating and fatal 'mitochondrial' diseases. But some groups
have raised ethical and safety concerns about creating babies with DNA from
three people. The babies would have DNA from two parents and a tiny amount from
a third person....
Scientists have devised techniques that allow
them to take the genetic information from the mother and place it into the egg
of a donor with healthy mitochondria. It is like taking two fried eggs and
switching the yolks. However, this would create a baby with genetic information
from three people, as mitochondria have their own genes in their own DNA. The
implications are not just for the couple and the child. If the therapy was
performed it would have ramifications through the generations as scientists
would be altering human genetic inheritance." [Quoted from
here.
Paragraphs merged. Accessed 20/03/2013.]
Which are the UOs here?
More importantly, how is it possible for genetic engineers to by-pass
iron DM-laws so easily?
And, in
late February 2014, we read that three-parent babies are
expected to be born in the UK in the next year or so:
"Britain sets out plans for first '3-parent' IVF
babies
"(Reuters) -- Britain proposed new regulations on
Thursday that would make it the first country in the world to offer
'three-parent' fertility treatments to families who want to avoid passing on
incurable diseases to their children. The move was praised by doctors and but feared by critics, who say the
technique will lead to the creation of genetically modified designer babies. The
technique is known as three-parent in vitro fertilization (IVF) because the
offspring would have genes from a mother, a father and from a female donor. The
British plans come as medical advisers in the United States began a series of
public hearings this week to consider whether there is scientific justification
for allowing human trials of the technique.
"The treatment, only at the research stage in laboratories in Britain and the
United States, would for the first time involve implanting genetically modified
embryos into women. The process involves intervening in the fertilization
process to remove faulty mitochondrial DNA, which can cause inherited conditions
such as fatal heart problems, liver failure, brain disorders, blindness and
muscular dystrophy. It
is designed to help families with mitochondrial diseases -- incurable conditions
passed down the maternal line that affect around one in 6,500 children
worldwide. Mitochondria act as tiny energy-generating batteries inside cells....
"Announcing draft plans to allow the technique and launching a public
consultation on them, Britain's chief medical officer Sally Davies said the
proposed move would give women who carry severe mitochondrial disease the chance
to have children without passing on devastating genetic disorders. 'It would
also keep the UK in the forefront of scientific development in this area,' she
said in a statement.
But David King of the campaign group
Human Genetics Alert
accused the government of 'jumping the gun' in laying out new laws before the
treatments had been thoroughly investigated.
"'If passed, this will be the first time any government has legalized
inheritable human genome modification, something that is banned in all other
European countries,' he said in a statement. 'Such a decision of major
historical significance requires a much more extensive public debate.' Although some critics of mitochondrial transfer say it is akin to creating
designer babies, replacing faulty mitochondria with healthy ones would not be
genetic engineering in the usual understanding of the term. It would not make a
child smarter, sportier, more attractive, or otherwise different from what his
genome and environment would produce in the normal way.
"Britain said the proposed new rules would be subject to public scrutiny and
parliament's approval. Many scientists, campaigners and medical experts welcomed
the government's decision. Jeremy Farrar, director of the
Wellcome
Trust
international medical charity, urged the government to 'move swiftly
so that parliament could debate the regulations at the earliest opportunity and
families affected by these devastating disorders can begin to benefit'. Peter Braude, a professor of obstetrics and gynaecology at King's College
London, welcomed the move, saying: 'It is true that genetic alteration of
disease risk is an important step for society and should not taken lightly.'
"'However the proposed changes to the regulations ensure it will be limited to
informed couples, who understand from sad personal experience the significant
effects of their disease, and are best placed to balance the risks of the
technology with the possibility of having children without mitochondrial
disease,' he added.
Scientists are researching several three-parent IVF techniques. One being
developed at Britain's Newcastle University, known as pronuclear transfer, swaps
DNA between two fertilized human eggs. Another, called
maternal
spindle transfer, swaps material between the mother's egg and a donor egg
before fertilization.
"A
British ethics panel review of the potential treatments in 2012 decided they
were ethical and should go ahead as long as research shows they are likely to be
safe and effective. Because Britain is in the vanguard of this research, ethical
concerns, political decisions and scientific advances are closely watched around
the world.
Britain's public consultation on the draft regulations began on Thursday and
was scheduled to run until May 21, 2014." [Quoted from
here; accessed 28/02/2014, updated
here,
03/06/2014. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English.
Several paragraphs merged. Links added.]
"The world's first three-parent baby has been born. Scientists revealed the
birth of a baby boy, now five months old, using DNA from three parents.
Fertility experts hailed the breakthrough as 'great news and a huge deal' for
the future of reproduction. But they expressed concern that it was only achieved
because US scientists crossed the border to Mexico to take advantage of lax
regulation. And critics last night accused the scientists of taking 'outrageous'
and 'unethical' steps in order to achieve the world first. The child was born to
a couple from Jordan, who had been trying to start a family for almost 20 years.
"His mother carries genes for Leigh
Syndrome, a fatal disorder that affects the developing nervous system, and
caused the deaths of their first two children. The
baby was conceived from an egg containing nuclear DNA from his mother and
father, and mitochondrial DNA from a "second" mother - an unknown female donor.
The aim was to replace defective mitochondrial DNA and prevent the disease being
passed on through the maternal line. British researchers expressed excitement
about the breakthrough, saying it would 'accelerate' advances in the field and
'tame the more zealous critics'.
"The controversial technique -- which allows
parents with rare genetic mutations to have healthy babies, is only legal in
this country [the UK -- RL], and this followed fierce parliamentary debate. The
breakthrough, which came about using an approach called spindle nuclear transfer
was revealed in New Scientist magazine. Scientists from the New Hope Fertility
Center in New York City removed the nucleus from one of the mother's eggs and
inserted it into a donor egg that had had its own nucleus removed. The resulting
egg -- with nuclear DNA from the mother and mitochondrial DNA from a donor --
was then fertilised with her husband's sperm. The team, led by Dr John Zhang
used this approach to create five embryos, one of which developed normally, and
was implanted, resulting in the birth nine months later.
"The method has not been approved in the US,
so Dr Zhang went to Mexico instead, where he said 'there are no rules'.
Defending his decision, he said: 'To save lives is the ethical thing to do'.
Other scientists working in the field welcomed the news -- but expressed concern
that it had occurred in a country which lacks stringent regulation. Dr Dusko
Ilic, a reader in stem cell science at King's College London, said: 'This is
great news and a huge deal -- it's revolutionary.' He described the child's
birth as an 'ice-breaker' which was likely to be swiftly followed. 'The baby is
reportedly healthy. Hopefully, this will tame the more zealous critics,
accelerate the field, and we will witness soon a birth of the first
mitochondrial donation baby in the UK.'" [Quoted from
here. Links added; several paragraphs merged. Accessed
10/10/2016.]
[I have posted several more instances of
thoroughly reactionary, anti-dialectical science to
Appendix A -- specifically in relation to the above story,
here.]
Notice, there is no mention of this
brazen violation of Engels's Second 'Law' by any of the scientists involved in
the above investigations (perhaps part of what should be a legitimate objection to this
line of research, if they were 'unconscious dialecticians'), and I have
yet to see a single article or blog written by a DM-fan anathematising this
research -- or, indeed, a single DM-fan objecting to gay sex, or 'dry-humping'
dogs, on the same grounds. But, what price the
UO if it is so easily by-passed,
violated or snubbed by
reactionary scientists, and anti-dialectical right-wing animals such as these?
Without doubt, modern medicine is quite
remarkable -- indeed, a few snips of the surgeon's scissors and Bob's your
aunty. And yet (but this should hardly need pointing out) males don't change into females (nor
vice versa), unaided and of their own accord, which is what the
DM-classics tell us must happen
to
all such opposites. Worse still, they should do so by struggling with the
opposite that they become; that is, they should struggle with the oppositely
sexed individual they turn into (if the DM-classics are to be believed)!
Moreover, while it is true that cats are able to reproduce because of well known
goings-on between males and females of the
species, cats themselves
don't change because of the relationship between the opposite sexes of
the cat family. If they
did, then a lone cat on a desert island would surely be capable of living forever
(or, at least, of not changing).
In that case,
as long as this eternal and serially miserable, chaste moggie kept clear of members of the opposite sex, it
would be able to look forward to
becoming a sort of feline Super-Methuselah.
Returning to an earlier theme,
if cats don't change as a
result of the machinations of their external and/or 'logical' opposites, but
because of their 'internal contradictions' -- or even as a result of their 'internal, opposite tendencies'
-- then factorsinternal to cats must surely be responsible for their
development (if, as noted above, we interpret the word "internal" spatially --
since we seem to have got nowhere interpreting it 'logically'). Should we now
look inside cats for these illusive opposites? If so, do these opposites appear
at the level of this
furry animal's internal organs, or should we look elsewhere?
But what is the opposite of, say, a cat's liver? Does it have one? If not, is it
an
everlasting liver? It must be if it has no 'opposite'. On the other hand, if it does have an 'opposite', will a cat's liver one
day turn into a cat's 'non-liver'? -- A
fossil
trilobite, say, or the
Dog Star,
maybe? These are all 'cat non-livers'. But,
as we have seen
in Essay Seven Part Three, this can't
happen unless these 'opposites' struggle with and then turn into
each other. Has anyone witnessed a cat's liver slugging it out with a cat's
non-liver?
In order to discover what the 'internal contradictions'
or 'opposing
tendencies'
are in this case, perhaps we should delve even deeper into
the inner recesses of these rather awkward, feline aspects of 'Being'?
[I will omit reference to
'opposing tendencies' from now so that unnecessary pedantic detail is reduced as
much as possible; readers can assume they are also intended in what follows.]
If a cat's liver has no opposite, then
perhaps its liver cells do? But once more, what is the opposite of a
cat's liver cell? A kidney cell? A blood cell? An onion cell?
As we
ferret deeper into the nether regions of inner
moggie space, perhaps these
elusive opposites will appear at the molecular or atomic level? Some
dialecticians seem to think so, but they can only argue this way by ignoring their own claim that all of
nature works in pairs, and we have
just seen that was a dead end.
To that end,
we have yet to be told which 'opposite' the River
Amazon is twinned with, let alone what the
Oort Cloud's dialectical alter ego --
its "other" -- could possibly be.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that
'internal opposites' actually involve the relations that exist between sub-atomic,
or inter-atomic forces and processes at work inside cats, lumps of iron, and
much else besides.12
But, if each
thing (and not just each part of a thing), and each system or process in the
Totality, is a UO (as we have been assured they are by the
DM-Luminaries), then
cats and iron bars (and not just electrons,
π-mesons,
and positrons) must have their own internal and/or spatially external opposites -- that is, if they
are to change.
So,
for a cat to become a 'non-cat' -- which is, presumably, the 'internal' (or even 'spatially external'?) opposite it is supposed to turn into --, it must be in dialectical tension with that opposite
in the here-and-now if that opposite is to help bring about such a change. [We
saw this in a more abstract
form,
here.] If not, then
we can only wonder what dialecticians imagine the forces are (and from whence
they originate) that cause cats, or lumps of iron, to change into whatever their opposites are
imagined to be.
Even
if it were argued that molecular, inter-atomic or sub-atomic
forces actually cause the development of cats, they would still in general have to change because of
their paired macro-level opposites (whose identities still remain a
mystery). It isn't as if each cat is struggling against all the
protons, electrons and
quarks that
exist beneath its fur. Nor
are we to suppose that
cats
are constantly conflicting with their own internal organs, or with their fur and whiskers. If they
were, then according to
DM-lore,
cats would have to turn into their internal organs, fur or whiskers, and the
latter would have to turn into cats!
Furthermore, even if sub-atomic particles were locked
in some sort of 'quantum struggle' with one another (or with their 'opposites',
whatever they turn out to be), the
changes they induce in the average 'dialectical moggie'
must find expression in macro-phenomena at some point, or cats wouldn't change.
But what on earth could these
macro-phenomena be?
Moreover,
even if change were to be located
ultimately at the quantum level, then the following question naturally arises: What are all those sub-atomic particles changing
into? Many are
highly stable. But, even supposing they
weren't --
and we naively believed what the DM-classics have to say -- whatever they
change into must exist right now if it is to cause them to change into it, or
they couldn't struggle with them and hence change. And
yet, if these opposites already exist, the original particles can't change into
them. The very best that could happen here is that these 'opposite particles'
must replace the
originals (which then magically disappear!). In that case, given this
'disappearing' view of nature,
things don't
actually change, they just vanish, while other (seemingly identical)
objects and processes take their place -- and they do so undialectically since
their opposites will have simply vanished, and there would now be nothing
with which they could struggle. Hence, these particles won't have changed into
their opposites.
With no more 'opposites' with which they could struggle, they plainly couldn't be subject
to further change.
The
entire process would grind to a halt.
So, what specific changes are supposed to happen at the
sub-atomic level? Do protons struggle with electrons, or with positrons? In
either case, if the DM-classics were correct, protons would have to change into
electrons or positrons, and each of the latter would have to change into
protons. If that were the case, much of
High Energy Physics
(i.e., Particle Physics) will need to be ditched, and the brave DM-fan who
came up this novel, 'innovative theory', would walk off with a guaranteed Nobel Prize.
Or, does this inner struggle involve machinations at
a higher level, between atoms and molecules? If so, similar questions impose
themselves upon us: do these molecules/atoms struggle with and then change into
one another? But they can't do that since the atoms/molecules
with which they struggle already exist! If they didn't already exist, no struggle could take
place. Are we really supposed to believe that atoms of, say, Carbon struggle
with and then change into atoms of, say, Potassium? Or that sugar molecules struggle
with and then change into
ATP, and vice versa? If so, then much of modern
Chemistry will need to be binned, too, and the brave DM-fan mentioned earlier would
walk off with a second gong.
If we
now ask what the 'inner tendencies' are that cause live cats to change into dead
cats, it isn't easy to come up with a viable candidate. Some might point to catabolic and anabolic processes as
just such an example of these 'inner
tendencies', but they aren't actually tendencies, they are manifestly causal.
[We have already seen that tendencies
aren't causes.]
But, let us assume these processes (anabolism and catabolism) are
viable candidates in this case; even then this theory still falls flat. As
was noted in another Essay:
Will
anabolic processes become
catabolic
processes, and catabolic processes become anabolic processes? In fact, these
processes don't even struggle with
one another! [Follow the links below for more details.] But, they should if we
were to believe
everything we read in those dusty old DM-classics.
[I have devoted several sections of the present Essay to this very
point, so the reader is
re-directedhere for
more details.]
Since these processes don't change into one another (which
we have been told
should happen to all such opposites), it isn't easy to see how DM can account
for changing cats, let alone anything else!
Moreover, if the forces that cause cats to
change are solely internal to cats, then as far as these furry mammals
are concerned they must be hermetically
sealed-off from the rest of nature (as must everything else -– this dialectical
difficulty is examined in more detail in Essays Eight Part
One and Eleven
Parts One and
Two), otherwise change
wouldn't be internal to cats.
If, on the other hand, the causes of
feline change are external to cats, then 'internal contradictions' can't be
responsible for changing them into
'non-cats', and we are back where we started.
Furthermore, if we now ignore this 'either-or', and
claim that cats change because of 'internal' and 'external'
contradictions, then we would be faced with the prospect of cats changing into
their internal and external
opposites, if the
DM-classics are to be believed. But, and once
again, if these
opposites already exist (which they must, or they couldn't engage in
struggle and cause change), then cats can't change into them!
[Incidentally, the same difficulties apply to sub-atomic particles: if
the forces that cause change are solely internal
to such particles, then as far as their mutability is concerned, they, too, must be
hermetically sealed-off from the outside world, otherwise change wouldn't be internal to them. If, on the other hand, the causes of
their change were external, then 'internal contradictions' can't be
responsible for changing them into a 'non-whatever...'. Alternatively, once more, if the opposites of
such particles cause them to change into those opposites, then they needn't
bother changing, for those opposites already exist. On the other hand, if those
opposites didn't already exist, what could possibly make them change?
There would be nothing with which they could 'struggle'. Finally if external
and internal factors cause these particles to develop, then they must change
into those factors, if the
DM-classics are to be believed. But, they
can't do that since those factors already exist! Readers might have noticed that we
keep hitting the same non-dialectical brick wall.]
In the macro-world, the idea that change is
the sole result of 'internal contradictions' would appear to mean that when, say, a cat
is run over it actually self-destructs, and the car that hit it
had nothing to do with flattening that cat. One might well wonder why nature produced such
catastrophically suicidal beasts. [Is this perhaps
an example of 'natural de-selection'?]
This seems to be the implication of the sort of things
dialecticians say:
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing…. The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged. There are several more quotations like
this,
here.]
Of course, it could be argued (along
Leibnizian
lines) that had the cat been internally strong enough it would have survived its
unequal tussle with that car. So, the real cause of this cat's radically changed shape is
indeed to be found inside that animal. [Leibniz's argument is outlined
here. As we will see in
Essay Eight Part One, some
DM-theorists do indeed argue along such lines.]
There
is something to be said for this argument -- but, fortunately, not much.
Whatever forces that cause a cat's shape to alter when it is run over are clearly not
the
structural or mechanical forces that maintained its anatomical
integrity from day-to-day; something must have upset its structural stability in
order to modify its shape. Cats don't spontaneously flatten themselves. Few
of us would be happy to be told by a Leibnizian drunk driver that it isn't his fault that
the family pet is spread half-way across the road, because the cat itself is the
cause of its radically altered anatomy. In such cases, we clearly have an example of
interacting causes for the sad demise of the family pet, none of which can be put down solely
to events internal to that unfortunate animal. Of course, dialecticians don't
deny this, but as Essay Eight Part One will show, their 'theory' can't account
for, or even cope with, such complexities.
Someone could object that
DM can account for catastrophic reconfigurations of cats like this. A
combination of internal and external forces is the cause of their novel shape.
But, not even that will work, for if a cat is to change into a flat cat, then
according to the
DM-worthies (where we
were told that all objects
and processes "inevitably" turn into the
opposites with which they have struggled), the flat cat must already
exist in order to turn a non-flat cat into a flat cat. So the driver
-- given
this new turn of events -- didn't flatten the cat, the an already existent flat cat did that!
In which case, it remains a mystery what the
'opposite' of a cat actually
is (i.e., what a
'dialectical cat' must turn into after struggling with that mysterious 'opposite-of-a-cat'), which is part of the UO that brings about such
dramatic topological
feline re-configurations --, again, if the
DM-worthies are to be believed.
Despite this, and whatever their commitment to this 'Law'
finally turns out to be, one
supposes(!) that no dialectician still in command of her/his senses would
excuse, say, a policeman for inflicting on her/him actual bodily harm on the
basis that LeibnizianNature unwisely failed to incorporate into the heads of militants
the ability to withstand
Billy Clubs.
Once
again, dialectics would be refuted
in practice; gashed heads on picket lines aren't the result of "self-development".
Alternatively,
once more, if the causes of feline,
or even cranial, mutability
are both internal and
external to one or both,
then change can't be the sole result of 'internal contradictions', and things
wouldn't in
fact be
"self-developing", as Lenin maintained.
"And if strict monogamy is to be regarded as
the acme of all virtue, then the palm must be given to the
tapeworm, which possesses a complete male and female sexual apparatus in
every one of its 50 to 200
proglottids or segments of the body, and passes the whole of its life in
cohabiting with itself in every one of these segments." [Engels
(1891b), p.469. Links added.]
Are
tapeworms -- are hermaphrodites -- an expression of some sort of cosmic,
ruling-class
plot against DM?
Consider the
African Bat
Bug.
The New Scientist had the following to say about this strange insect:
"If you thought human sexual relationships were
tricky, be thankful you're not an African bat bug. They show what could be the
most extreme case of transsexualism yet discovered. Male bat bugs sport female
genitalia, and some females have genitalia that mimic the male's version of the
female bits -- as well as their own redundant vagina. Bat bugs, and their relatives the bed bugs, are
renowned among entomologists for their gruesome and bizarre method of
reproduction. Males never use the vagina, instead piercing the female's abdomen
and inseminating directly into the blood, where the sperm then swim to the
ovaries. It is this 'traumatic insemination', as it is termed, which is at the
root of the extreme levels of gender bending in the African bat bug, says Klaus
Reinhardt of the University of Sheffield, UK.
"Female bat bugs have evolved a countermeasure to
the stabbing of the male's penis -- structures on their abdomens known as
paragenitals. These are a defence mechanism that limits the damage by guiding
the male's sharp penis into a spongy structure full of immune cells. When Reinhardt's team studied bat bugs in a cave
on Mount Elgon, Kenya...they found that the males also had defence genitals. What's more,
they had scarring on their abdomens similar to that of the females following
copulation. In other words, males had been using their penises to stab other
males.
"If that isn't strange enough, when the team
looked at 43 preserved female bat bugs, they found that 84% had male versions of
the defence genitals. Females with this male version of female genitals had less
scarring due to penetration than the other females. 'This is what we think might have happened,'
says Reinhardt. 'Males started getting nobbled (sic) by other males, so they
evolved the female defensive genitals. As this reduced the amount of penis
damage they were getting, females evolved the male version of the female
genitals.'
"While theoretical models have predicted that
females should evolve different morphologies to escape male attention, this is
the first time it has been seen in genitalia, Reinhardt says. 'It's a
spectacular example of evolution through sexual conflict.'" [New
Scientist, 195, 2622, 22/09/2007, p.11. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
In fact, the Second 'Law', with its UOs, seems to be
coming under sustained attack from all sides of the animal and plant kingdoms. Consider the sea slug:
"Striking that happy balance between giving and
receiving in a relationship can be fraught with difficulty. But not, it seems,
for hermaphrodite sea slugs. These gentle soft-bodied animals, blessed with both
male and female genitalia, solve the battle of the sexes by engaging in 'sperm
trading'. They donate sperm only on the condition that
they receive it, so thwarting the male desire to fertilise and run. During sex,
each slug inserts its penis into the other and one transfers a small package of
sperm. The transfer of further sperm will only proceed if the other partner
reciprocates by transferring a package of its sperm.
"That hermaphrodite sex worked this way was
suggested 20 years ago but this is the first time it has been demonstrated. Nico
Michiels and colleagues at the University of Tübingen, Germany, sealed off the
sperm ducts of Chelidonura hirundinina sea slugs so that they could
insert the penis but not transfer sperm. In 57 staged sexual encounters, sea slugs paired
with a 'cheating' partner, unable to transfer sperm, were more likely to abandon
sex than animals paired with a 'fair trader' (Current Biology, 15,
p.792). 'I expect that sperm trading is widespread in
hermaphrodites,' says Michiels. 'These sea slugs have found a way to optimise
sperm transfer so that both partners benefit.'" [New
Scientist, 2521, 15/10/2005. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original.
Several paragraphs merged.]
There seems to be a unity of non-opposites going on here.
Other species of sea slug are even more mendaciously
anti-dialectical:
"Every cloud has a silver lining. There's even an
upside to being repeatedly stabbed -- at least if you're an hermaphroditic sea
slug. A species of sea slug known as
Siphopteron quadrispinosum
is a
simultaneous hermaphrodite: each
animal has male and female sexual organs, and it can use both at once. An animal acting as a male first uses a
syringe-like organ to stab its partner and inject prostate fluid into its body.
The 'male' then inserts its penis into the partner's genital opening; the penis
has spines that anchor it in place, but harm the other slug. Because mating is so traumatic for the
'female', the slugs prefer to act male, and often resist mating altogether.
But curiously, they still mate as females much more often than is necessary
simply to ensure that their eggs are fertilised, says Rolanda Lange
of the University of
Tübingen in Germany. Lange and colleagues captured groups of sea
slugs and gave different groups more or fewer opportunities to mate. The slugs
produced the most eggs when they acted as females at a medium rate.
"In theory, slugs should act as females just
often enough to maintain a store of sperm, and no more. But the slugs mated as
females much more often than that. Yet they produced the same proportion of
fertilised eggs regardless of how many mating opportunities they had. This
indicates that even the slugs that mated the least had gathered more than enough
sperm for their reproductive needs. All of this suggests the traumatic mating has
some benefit that goes beyond reproduction -- an advantage that offsets the
bodily harm. We don't know what that might be, says Mike
Siva-Jothy
of the University of
Sheffield, UK. But the injections of prostate fluid might include nutrients that
benefit the stabbed slug.
"Male insects and spiders often proffer food as a
bribe to persuade females to mate. 'Male' sea slugs might be doing the same
thing. 'Males are giving with one hand and taking with the other,' Siva-Jothy
says." [New
Scientist, 01/09/2012, p.14. Quotations marks altered to conform to the
conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original, bold
emphasis added. Several paragraphs merged.]
These non-opposites seem to swap places almost at will.
And don't
eventhink about the fire ant:
"It is often said that males and females are
different species. For the little fire ant, that seems to be literally true. The ant Wasmannia auropunctata, which is
native to Central and South America but has spread into the US and beyond, has
opted for a unique stand-off in the battle of the sexes. Both queens and males
reproduce by making genetically identical copies of themselves -- so males and
females seem to have entirely separate gene pools. The only time they reproduce conventionally is
to produce workers, says Denis Fournier from the Free University of
Brussels...in Belgium, a member of the team that discovered the phenomenon (Nature,
435, p.1230). But workers are sterile and never pass on their genes. This is the first reported case in the animal
kingdom of males reproducing exclusively by cloning, although male honeybees do
it occasionally.
But it is too early to assume male and female
gene pools are entirely separate, cautions Andrew Bourke from the Institute of
Zoology in London. Males may occasionally reproduce by mating with a queen to
top up the gene pool. Fournier's study analysed DNA from 199 queens, 41 males
and 264 workers collected in New Caledonia in the south Pacific, and French
Guiana. Only a much larger study could rule out gene pool mixing, he says." [New
Scientist, 2506, 02/07/2005.
Paragraphs merged.]
Moreover, such dialectically-benighted creatures aren't confined to the
non-vertebrate world; evolution has thrown up the mangrove Killifish:
"Something fishy is happening in the mangrove
forests of the western Atlantic. A fish is living in the trees. The mangrove killifish (Kryptolebias
marmoratus) is a tiny fish that lives in ephemeral pools of water around the
roots of mangroves. When these dry up the 100-milligram fish can survive for
months in moist spots on land. Being stranded high and dry makes it hard to find
a mate, but fortunately the killifish doesn't need a partner to reproduce. It is
the only known hermaphrodite vertebrate that is self-fertilising.
Now biologists wading through muddy mangrove swamps in
Belize and Florida have discovered another exceptional adaptation. Near dried-up
pools, they found hundreds of killifish lined up end to end, like peas in a pod,
inside the tracks carved out by insects in rotting logs. 'They really don't meet
standard behavioural criteria for fish,' says Scott Taylor of the Brevard County
Environmentally Endangered Lands Program in Florida, who reports the findings in
an upcoming issue of
The American Naturalist....
"The rotting logs may help explain how killifish
occupy such a large range, stretching from southern Brazil to central Florida.
Self-fertilisation makes it easy for individuals to colonise new places, and
dead logs are good rafts for getting around, says John Avise, an evolutionary
biologist at the University of California at Irvine. 'They might be washed
ashore in a rotting log and start a new population.'" [New
Scientist, 196, 2626, 20/10/2007, p.20. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Even worse
news: it now seems that scientists can further
'negate' this shaky DM-'Law', as it applies to an already
'dialectically-confused' semi-hermaphrodite
worm:
"The sexual preferences of microscopic worms have
been manipulated in the laboratory so that they are attracted to the same sex,
offering new evidence that sexuality may be hard-wired in the brain.
By activating a single gene in the brains of
hermaphrodite
nematode worms, scientists have induced them to attempt to mate
with other hermaphrodites, instead of being attracted exclusively to males....
"While nematode worms are extremely simple
organisms, and details of their behaviour are difficult to apply to people with
any accuracy, the researchers said that the existence of a biological pathway to
same-sex attraction offered a possible insight into human sexuality. Erik Jorgensen, Professor of Biology at the
University of Utah, who led the study, said: 'Our conclusions are narrow in that
they are about worms and how attraction behaviours are derived from the same
brain circuit.'... 'We can't say what this means for human sexual
orientation, but it raises the possibility that sexual preference is wired in
the brain. Humans are subject to evolutionary forces just like worms. It seems
possible that if sexual orientation is genetically wired in worms, it would be
in people too. Humans have free will, so the picture is more complicated in
people.'
"Nematode worms, of the species Caenorhabditis
elegans, are one millimetre long and live in soil, where they feed on
bacteria. The overwhelming majority -- more than 99.9 per cent -- are
hermaphrodites, which produce both sperm and eggs and generally fertilise
themselves before laying eggs. About 0.05 per cent of nematodes are male,
however, and these worms must seek out hermaphrodites to reproduce.
Hermaphrodites will mate with an available male rather than fertilise
themselves, and though they produce sperm they will not impregnate other
hermaphrodites as they lack the required copulatory structure.
"There are no true females and hermaphrodites
were treated as female for the purposes of the study. C. elegans shares
many of its genes with human beings and other animals, and is a standard
organism used for early laboratory studies of genetics. 'A hermaphrodite makes both eggs and sperm,'
Professor Jorgensen said. 'She doesn't need to mate [with a male] to have
progeny. Most of the time, the hermaphrodites do not mate. But if they mate,
instead of having 200 progeny, they can have 1,200 progeny.' As the worms have no eyes -- hermaphrodites have
only 959 cells and males 1,031 cells -- they detect one another's sex using
scent cues. In the study, published in the journal
Current Biology, the scientists activated a gene called fem-3 in
hermaphrodites. This gene makes the nematode body develop as male, with neurons
that appear only in male brains and copulatory structures such as tails. In the experiment, fem-3 was activated only in
the brain, so the worms developed male nerve cells but not other male body
characteristics. Despite this, they behaved like males, attempting to seek out
and fertilise other hermaphrodites.
"'They look like girls, but act and think like
boys,' said Jamie White, who conducted the key experiments. 'The [same-sex
attraction] behaviour is part of the nervous system.' Professor Jorgensen said: 'The conclusion is
that sexual attraction is wired into brain circuits common to both sexes of
worms, and is not caused solely by extra nerve cells added to the male or female
brain. The reason males and females behave differently is that the same nerve
cells have been rewired to alter sexual preference.' In a second phase of the study, the scientists
manipulated different kinds of nerve cell in the male brain to determine which
were responsible for switching on male attraction to hermaphrodites. They found
that, although switching off one of the eight sensory neurons impaired
attraction in adults, young males developed normally if just one such nerve cell
was intact.
This finding suggests that there is considerable
redundancy built into the sexual development of males. Dr White said: 'It must
be that the behaviour is very important.'" [The
Times, 26/10/2007. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged. On the complex mating habits of
nematode worms, which are the
most abundant animal life-form on the planet (indeed, four out of every five
animals on earth is a nematode), see
here.]
Also
spare
a thought, now, for other 'dialectically-confused' organisms -- i.e., for those
that exhibit
Pseudohermaphroditism:
"Pseudohermaphroditism
is a clinical term for the condition in which an organism is
born with primary sex characteristics of one sex but develops the
secondary sex characteristics that are different from what would be expected
on the basis of the
gonadal tissue (ovary
or
testis). It can be contrasted with the term
true hermaphroditism, which described a condition where testicular and
ovarian tissue were present in the same individual. This language has fallen out
of favour due to misconceptions and pejorative connotations associated with the
terms, and also a shift to nomenclature based on genetics. The term male
pseudohermaphrodite was used when a testis is present, and the term
female pseudohermaphrodite was used when an ovary is present." [Quoted from
here; accessed 30/08/2017. Links and italic emphases
in the original. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Paragraphs merged.]
Worse
still what are we to say about
Gynandromorphism, where organisms exhibit both male and female
characteristics? Is nature so reactionary that it is ganging up on DM? It
certainly looks like it.
It is
to be hoped that the dialectical deity (aka 'Being') visits these highly
confused insects one day to give them more than just friendly couple
counselling.
It could be
argued that no law is without exceptions, and that
applies to Engels's Second and Third laws, too -- that doesn't stop them from
being laws. [One rather brave defender of Engels
did
indeed advance this objection in response to an article of mine.] In reply,
it is worth pointing out that DM is unlike any normal science; its 'laws'
are a priori, dogmatic,
and weren't derived from a scientific study of nature, but from Hegel's 'Logic' and
Traditional Philosophy. Hence, these 'laws' can have no exceptions -- rather like the rules of
Pure Mathematics can have none. That was the point of
Hegel's response
to Empiricist attacks on Rationalist theories of causation, for example. In a rational
universe there are no 'accidents', no genuine contingencies, they just seem that
way because we lack the complete picture -- or, indeed, have failed to
'understand' dialectics. A 'dialectical view' of nature will reveal to us the
necessary connections between every event, between causes and their effects.
That was the point of the following comments advanced by Lenin:
"This aspect of dialectics…usually receives
inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective
world)." [Lenin (1961),
p.357.
Emphasis in the original.]
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming
change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is
that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another,
not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular
only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite
right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite."
[Lenin
(1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this
particular quotation is found on p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"But
the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing
which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the
first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and
altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus
essentially contained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold
fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the
presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition;
also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the
absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the
examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961),
p.225, quoting Hegel (1999),
pp.833-34, §1795.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
Lenin
wrote in the margin:
"This
is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961),
p.225.]
A 'law of cognition',
coupled with the above remarks about "absolute truth and necessity", put
DM on a par with the laws of
mathematics, not the empirical sciences. Since I have already
covered
this ground elsewhere, I will say no more about it here.
Be
this as it may,
it now appears that scientists can by-pass these rather shaky DM-'Laws' almost at will:
"With a surprisingly simple genetic tweak,
scientists have transformed
nematode worms into hermaphrodites. They
report in the journal Science that lowering the activity of just two
genetic pathways produces the change. Evolution from a species consisting of males and females into one consisting of
only males and hermaphrodites happens naturally in many nematodes. A
team of US researchers says their experiment explains how this might take place. They
say it also provides a simple model helping scientists to work out the mechanism
of evolutionary change. The
researchers chose to study the evolution of female worms into hermaphrodites
because it was a 'striking change' that occurred relatively recently.
"Ronald Ellis, a biologist from the University of Medicine and Dentistry[,] New
Jersey..., who led the research, said that most big evolutionary changes
within species happened too long ago to study at the genetic level. 'But
this dramatic change happened fairly recently and in a group of animals that we
know a lot about...[,] that's why we're studying it to find out how complex traits
are created,' he told BBC News. Dr
Ellis said it was exciting to discover that, by lowering the activity of just
two genetic pathways he and his team were able to 'take what should have been a
female animal and turn it into a cell fertile hermaphrodite'. The
two genes the researchers 'tweaked' were one involved in making sperm and
another involved in activating them. 'These were small changes to the activity of genetic pathways that already
existed,' said Dr Ellis. 'So
the pieces were already in place, they just had to be altered so they worked in
a slightly new way.' He
said the finding was surprising because it was such a simple change that
produced a trait that was so dramatic....
"The
scientists use nematode worms as simple models to show how evolution works at a
genetic level. 'We
understand how evolution tweaks simple traits, like a giraffe's neck [getting]
longer and longer over time,' he said. 'But
most of the most important changes -- the creation of the eye, the development
of feathers in birds, wings in insects -- involved the creation of novel traits. The
better we understand this, the better we can understand the kinds of changes
that created humans from our ancestors.' Dr
David Lunt, an evolutionary biologist from the University of Hull, UK, who was
not involved in this study told BBC News that said this was an 'excellent
experiment'.
'Scientists study the evolution of sexual systems because it allows us to see
all the forces of evolution at once,' he explained. 'We
have very few model systems anywhere near as powerful as this one.'" [BBC
News, 15/11/2009. Emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Some might think hermaphrodites are perfect examples of the "unity of
opposites", but that can't
be so otherwise their male organs would turn into the female sex organs (and vice
versa) after "struggling" with them, if the
Dialectical
Classics are to be believed. Oddly enough, none of the above scientists
report observing this 'struggle', or anything remotely like it.
The above 'problems' aren't confined to
changes involving water molecules, worms, bugs or assorted furry mammals;
they re-surface in different forms with respect to the structures
and processes found in 'Materialist Dialectics'.
(a)All change is the
result of a struggle between a unique pair of 'dialectical opposites',
whereby each member of that pair is the "other of the other", and each implies
the existence and nature of the other (like the proletariat supposedly implies
the bourgeoisie, and vice versa);
(b) These opposites must co-exist
if they are capable of struggling with one another;
(c) Everything changes into
its opposite -- that is, everything turns into that with which it has
'struggled'; and,
(d) Struggle is an "absolute".
We
have already seen that this creates several rather nasty dialectical headaches
for DM-fans.
As we are about to find out, they will rapidly
develop in a bad case of Dialectical Migraine.
[I have
covered this specific topic more fully
here.]
HM tells us that the
capitalist world may only be transformed into a socialist world through struggle.
So, according to points (a)-(d) above, if
Capitalism is to change into socialism,
its opposite, Socialism must now exist somewhere for that to happen!
As far as
revolutionaries are concerned, that conclusion alone means that not only is DM
of no use to them, it is worse than useless.
But, is there any
truth to this latest and rather surprising allegation?
In order to see that
there is indeed more than enough it might be a
good idea to examine the connection between the Capitalist Relations of Production [CRAP], and Socialist
Relations of Production [SORP] --, but, more pointedly, the
link between the Forces and Relations of Production [FP and RP, respectively],
where it is patently obvious that neither of these change into the other
(their 'other', their 'opposite').
We have already had
occasion to quote the DM-classics, and 'lesser' DM-texts to the effect that they
hold to (a)-(d) above, but here is Marx himself extending this idea to the
FP and the
RP:
"In the social
production
of their life, men enter into definite
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will,
relations of production
which correspond to a definite
stage of development of their material
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation,
on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond
definite forms of social consciousness.
The
mode
of production
of material life conditions the social,
political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their being, but,
on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a
certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society
come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or -- what is
but a legal expression for the same thing -- with the
property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of
development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters.
"Then begins an
epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the
entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In
considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the
material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be
determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political,
religious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an
individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of
such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary,
this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material
life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the
relations of production." [Marx
(1968b), pp.181-82. Bold emphases added. Links in the original;
several paragraphs merged.]
[I shall return to the above
quotation, and this specific topic,
presently.]
For the purposes of argument, let us assume that SORP
doesn't actually exist anywhere on earth right now. However, given what
the
DM-classics have to say,
if CRAP is to change into SORP, SORP must already exist
in the here-and-now for CRAP to change into it, by struggling with it!
Any
who question the above conclusion should re-read points
(a)-(d), above, and then perhaps think again.
If CRAP changes into SORP, then they must struggle with one another, but they
can't do that unless SORP already exists.
For those
comrades who think there are places on earth where SORP does
exist, then all that needs pointing out is that there was a time when they
didn't exist. In that case, they should just project the argument developed in
this section back to that time in history, and the point will become clear to
them. SORP will have had to exist before it existed if it were capable of
changing CRAP into SORP!
But, if SORP already exists,
it can't have come from CRAP (its 'opposite') since CRAP can only change into
SORP because of a struggle with its own opposite-- namely, SORP! -- which
doesn't yet exist since CRAP hasn't changed into it yet. That is, unless we are to suppose SORP actually exists before it exists!
The same comments apply to "potential
SORP" -- or even to some sort of "tendency to produce SORP", be this a
'sublated' tendency, or indeed a 'sublated' actuality, it matters not.
In order to see this, let us call "potential SORP",
"PSORP", and a 'sublated' "tendency to
produce SORP", "TSORP".
To repeat: according to the DM-classics
(not me!),
if PSORP is to change into SORP, it has to (i) struggle with its opposite, and
(ii) change into that opposite, that is, it has to struggle with whatever it
changes into -- or, (iii) certain tendencies within CRAP must change it from 'within'.
But, we have already seen that these
options are a dead-end. So, PSORP has to both struggle with and
change into SORP. But, that means that SORP must already exist, otherwise
PSORP will have nothing with which it can struggle. And, if that is so, PSORP
can't change into it since it is already there!
The same comments
apply to any potential, or tendency, in CRAP to produce SORP. Again, let us call the
tendency in CRAP to produce SORP, "TSORP"; if TSORP is to change into
SORP, SORP must already exist, otherwise no struggle can take place between
them.
But, let us suppose there is both a
tendency in Capitalism to produce SORP and a tendency
to oppose it.
Let us call these, "TCRAP" and "TCRAP*", respectively.
Once again, if these
are 'dialectical opposites' (always assuming they aren't the only changeless
'objects', structures or processes in the entire universe), they can only change by struggling with one
another, and then change into one another -- that is,
if the DM-classics are
to be believed.
However, they can't
change into one another since they already exist!
Yet again, we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Anyway, are we
really supposed to believe that the tendencies in capitalism to produce
socialism, and the tendencies that oppose it must change into one another
-- for example, that, say, the working class (and/or the economic forces that
drive workers into struggle) must change into the Capitalist Class/Police/Courts
(and/or the forces that oppose workers' struggles, or which impel/enable the bosses to
attack workers), and Capitalist
Class/Police/Courts (and/or the forces that oppose workers' struggles, or which
impel/enable the bosses to attack workers) must change into the working class
(and/or the economic forces that drive workers into struggle)?
But, that is what the Dialectical-Classics assure us must always happen.
You guessed it: the same
non-dialectical brick wall blocks our path.
Let us now assume
that it is TCRAP that changes CRAP into SORP; that is, there is a tendency
in Capitalism that causes CRAP to change -- we can call this the falling rate of
profit, the proletariat, or whatever causal agent we decide is the most
important factor here. But, if that is so, TCRAP must
struggle with and change into CRAP, not SORP! That is because, once
more, the
DM-Worthies tell us that everything in the entire universe changes into that
with which it struggles, its 'opposite'. It is reasonably clear that TCRAP,
whatever it is, must exist
in this universe if it is to effect such changes.
In that case, the
only alternative is that SORP must have popped into existence from nowhere --,
or it must have always existed --, if DM-theorists are correct.
It
could be objected that it is the class war that will change society in the above
manner -- but more specifically the struggle between the proletariat and the
capitalist class. Maybe so, but if the DM-classics are to be believed then these
two classes much change into one another! The working class would become the
capitalist class!
But, the opposite of the proletariat isn't just any old
ruling-class, it is the
capitalist class -- the bourgeoisie. This class is
the unique "other" of the proletariat with whom they are
'internally' linked. Hence, the former must change into the latter, and vice
versa, if the theory expounded in the DM-classics is correct. Workers struggle with capitalists, and so, according to this
theory, they must change into them,thus making socialism impossible.
The existence of a ruling class doesn't imply the proletariat, and many forms of
ruling class can exist without the proletariat, but the bourgeoisie can't exist
without the proletariat (or so
we have been told) -- as, indeed, Mao himself pointed out:
"The fact is that no contradictory
aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the
condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of
a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life,
there would be no death; without death, there would be no life.... Without
the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there
would be no bourgeoisie."
[Mao (1961b),
p.338. Bold emphasis added.]
Attentive
readers will no doubt notice that Mao tells us that the dialectical "opposite"
of the proletariat isn't just any ruling-class, it is "the bourgeoisie". In
which case, the proletariat must change into "the bourgeoisie", and they must change into the
proletariat -- again, if the DM-classics are to be believed.
Is this
what revolutionaries are fighting for? For the proletariat to become the
bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie to become the proletariat?
If
so, the new,
parasitic boss-class (i.e., this new class comprised entirely of ex-proles
who have just turned into the bourgeoisie) would now constitute
the vast bulk of the population!
Conversely, there would be a
massive reduction in the size of the working class -- compounded by a massive increase in
the new bourgeoisie -- scarcity would become the norm, surely with so few workers. Such a society would last
about as long as a
Mayfly.
Once more, this isn't to deny change, nor is it to suggest that the present author doesn't want to see the back of
CRAP
and the establishment of SORP; but if DM were correct, that will not only never
happen, it couldn't happen.
To be sure, in the real world very
material workers struggle against equally material Capitalists (and/or their
lackeys), but neither of these turn into one another, and they can't help change CRAP
into SORP, either, since neither of these classes is the opposite of CRAP or SORP, nor vice
versa.
[On the 'contradictions' Marx which speaks about in Das Kapital, see
here.
On 'real material contradictions',
here.]
Returning to Marx's comment quoted
earlier, the above
problems apply to the social and material relations constitutive of each and
every Mode of Production -- if we naively accept as gospel truth what the
DM-classics had to say. We find Dialectical Marxists often asserting things
like the following:
"Throughout the mature Marx's economic works the idea that a contradiction
between forces and relations of production underlies the dynamic of the
capitalist mode of production is present. More generally, such a contradiction
accounts for history existing as a succession of modes of production, since it
leads to the necessary collapse of one mode and its supersession by another....
The power
of the contradiction between relations and forces to act as the motor of history
is also stated in the same place: 'at a certain stage of their development, the
material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing
relations of production...within which they have been at work hitherto'; and
'from forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into
their fetters', thereby initiating social revolution." [Harris
(1985), p.178, quoting
Marx (1968), pp.181-82. Bold
emphasis added.]
There are, of course, countless
DM-theorists who say the same sort of thing; I have quoted several of them
here.
If this is indeed a
'dialectical contradiction', then the Forces and Relations of Production [FP and
RP, respectively] must be 'dialectical opposites', too. If that is the case, FP
and RP must (a) Struggle with each another, and they must (b) Change into one
another. Is it really the case that relations of ownership,
exploitation and control will struggle with and then change into labour power,
factories, motorways, airports..., and vice versa?
If so, no one seems to
have noticed this remarkable interaction and subsequent transformation.
If it is further complained that in many of
the above examples human intervention must be taken into account, for,
plainly,
it is human labour that changes many of the processes that
already occur, or which might occur, naturally into the artificial products
mentioned earlier. Because of this, a
different set of principles
must apply since
human activity will have interfered with the normal operation of the 'natural
opposite' of things like iron ore, for example.
Or, so it might be
argued.
I have dealt with the above 'objection' in another Essay.
Here is my counter-argument
(the reader is invited replace the word "wood" with their favourite naturally
occurring material, like, say, the aforementioned iron ore, and "table" with
whatever that metal might be made into):
Consider another concrete example with which I have been
confronted: wood being fashioned into a
table. Once more,
according to the dialectical classics
every object and process changes because of a 'struggle' between opposites, and
it also changes
into its opposite.
So, according to this 'theory', the wood that is used to make a table has to
'struggle' with what it turns into; that is, this wood has to 'struggle' with
the table it is made into!
In that case, the table must already exist, or it couldn't 'struggle' with the
wood from which it is to be made.
But, if the table already exists, then the wood can't be changed into it, since
the table is already there!
Indeed, why bother making
a table that already exists?
On the other hand, if the table doesn't already exist, then this wood
couldn't
'struggle' with it, its own opposite; that is, it couldn't 'struggle' with the table it
has yet to become!
Either way, change like this can't happen, according to this 'theory'.
And, it is little use introducing human agency here, for if a
carpenter is required to turn wood into a table, then he/she has to 'struggle' with that
wood to make it into that table -- since we are told that every object and
process in nature and society is governed by this 'Law'. But, once again, according to the
Dialectical Classics, objects and processes 'struggle' with their dialectical
'opposites', and they turn into those opposites. If so, the wood in
question must turn
into the carpenter, not the table! And the carpenter must change into wood!
Nor is it
any use complaining that the above conclusions are ridiculous -- since they
follow directly from what we read in the DM-classics.
[I have dealt with this
particular objection more fully
here.]
Nor is it any use DM-fans introducing intermediary
stages in the making of a table, or, indeed, in connection with any other
changes that occur in nature and society.
I have dealt with intermediary stages in the life of
cats, here and
here.
I now propose to do the same with the intermediary
stages in the making of a table.
Let us
assume, therefore, that table, T, goes through n successive stages
in its construction: T(1), T(2),
T(3)..., T(k)..., T(n-3), T(n-2), T(n-1), until at
the last stage, T(n), it is finally complete. For simplicity's sake, I
will assume that stage, T(1), involves all the items required to make a
given table (e.g., wood, screws, tools, glue, nails, etc.). Initially, I will
also omit all reference to the human labour required to make this table; that
extra complicating factor will be re-introduced later. Finally, the above stages
can be set as close together as DM-fans deem necessary (if they but thought
about such 'pettifogging' details!) -- for example, each stage is, say, a
nanosecond apart. In addition, these stages can be credited with whatever
'dialectical properties'/'relations' they require or are deemed fit and
appropriate -- such as: (a) no stage is static, but is dynamically
interconnected with its 'unique dialectical opposite', and (b) each stage is
inter-related to the rest of the DM-'Totality' (howsoever
that is conceived). Finally, I will assume that each of the above stages is
the 'dialectical opposite' of the next stage in line.
(i) A 'struggle
between opposites' -- that is, T(1) must 'struggle' with T(2); and,
(ii) T(1)
must also change into that
with which it has 'struggled'; it must change into its 'opposite'.
Hence, T(1) must
both 'struggle' with and change into T(2).
But, T(1)
can't change into T(2) since
T(2)
already exists! If it didn't exist, T(1) couldn't 'struggle' with it.
Furthermore, if
T(2) is itself to change, it must also 'struggle' with whatever it changes
into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with and change into, T(3). But,
T(2) can't change into T(3) since T(3) already exists! If it
didn't, there would be nothing to make T(2) change, nothing with which it
could 'struggle'.
By n applications of the above argument -- if this 'theory' is to be believed -- all the stages
in a table's construction must
co-exist. In which case, no table would ever need to be made --, since, as
we have just seen, the final stage, T(n), must already exist. That
must be so otherwise stage T(n-1) would have nothing with which it could
'struggle', and hence change. But, once again, that means T(n-1) can't
change into T(n)since it already exists!
The same
applies to stages T(n-1) and T(n-2), they must also co-exist
otherwise T(n-2) would have nothing with which to 'struggle'. Well we
needn't labour the point: all the stages in the making of a table must
co-exist if this theory is to be believed.
Why then
bother making tables? In this weird and wonderful 'dialectical universe',
every single table is already there (alongside all the stages required to make
them)! And what applies
to tables applies to anything and everything that changes or which can be made.
All their stages
must co-exist. In that case, absolutely nothing need ever be made, since
they all already exist!
The DM-'theory' of change thus stands as a neat
refutation of the labour theory of value!
No labour is needed to make a single commodity; they
all already exist!
At this point, the Introduction of human labour into
the mix is no use. In fact, it is even worse -- since it has decidedly weird
consequences.
Assume carpenter, C, is involved in making
table, T. Let us further assume that this process begins at stage
T(1), and that C
and T(1) are 'dialectical opposites'. Since the DM-classics tell us that
all change is the result of the interaction of such 'opposites' we have
to assume this -- or conclude that carpenters can't make tables!
[Also, if a human being is involved in the
making of a table, we will need to assume the time gaps between successive
stages are longer than a nanosecond -- they will more likely vary from few
seconds to a few hours (in the latter case, maybe, allowing glue to set, etc.).]
But, if C is to change
T(1) into T(2), she
will have to 'struggle' with it -- that is, if we once again decide to believe
what the
DM-classics tell us about change. But, those classics also inform us that
every object and process in the entire universe changes into that with which it
has 'struggled'. If so, C must change into T(1) --she must
change into the first stage in the making of a table --, and
T(1) must change into C!
Has anyone every noticed this? That a collection of wood, screws, tools,
glue, nails, etc., has ever changed into a carpenter?
Once again,
it is little use DM-apologists complaining that this is ridiculous -- since
it is a direct consequence of their own theory.
Moving on:
what are we to say about substances that didn't exist (as far as we know) before human
beings made them? Once more, has
humanity made things that are above and beyond dialectical 'Law'?
Again, if each of these plastics does indeed have a "unique" opposite (which
they must have or they couldn't change
-- if the
DM-classics are to be believed), how is it that human labour is
capable of
manufacturing or bringing into existence each of these (as-yet-un-named -- and before
we evolved --, non-existent) opposites
at the same time as making each new form of plastic? If we ignore the ancient
use of rubber and various shellacs, polystyrene was the very first plastic
invented (in 1839 by a German apothecary,
Eduard
Simon). Unless we assume this plastic was eternally changeless, this
invention must have also brought into existence its unique 'other', its
'dialectical opposite'. But how was that achieved? Or, was the extra creation
of this 'unique opposite' engineered by default, a side-effect, as it were, of making
the original material? Did the 'unique opposite' of, say, PVC come into
existence as a by-product when that material was first invented? Do these
'unique opposites' pop into existence by emerging from some sort of 'metaphysical antechamber'
the moment these materials are invented or manufactured on planet earth? If not, how are
such plastics ever going to change if there are no opposites with which they can
even begin to struggle?
[Incidentally, it is no use appealing to the inter-atomic, or
sub-atomic forces here as the cause of change in the above substances, since
that would leave the unique "other" of, say, PVC out of the picture. And,
as we
have seen, PVC must have a unique "other" if it is to change -- at
least, according to the
DM-classics. Anyway, do these inter-atomic, or sub-atomic forces change into one
another? Do protons, for example, struggle with and then change into electrons?
(Or, is it
positrons?) If so, a Nobel Prize awaits the first DM-fan who successfully publishes on this.]
Furthermore, if human labour
is able to turn plastics into all manner of products (such
as bottles, shopping and food bags, cutlery, food containers, trays, guttering, drainpipes, insulation, toys,
model soldiers, car
parts, pens, chairs, suitcases, lenses, telescopes, handsets, keyboards, DVDs, cell phone casings, chess pieces,
clothes pegs, combs, brushes, etc.,
etc.), do they not
therefore have countless artificial (or is it natural?) 'opposites' themselves --
namely the things we turn them into?
[Do
they really have as
many 'opposites' as the things into which we can change these plastics? Recall, the
DM-classics
tell us that these 'opposites' are what every object or process both
struggles with and changes into.]
So, it is
worth asking: Were all of the
artificial 'opposites' mentioned above (and below) created the moment the original substances were
first invented? All of them? At present,
PVC can be made into the following: Plastic bottles,
refuse bags and shopping bags, bin liners, food containers, guttering, drainpipes,
insulation, toys, car parts, pens, keyboards, DVDs, cell phone casings, chess
pieces, tools, sheeting, etc., etc.
Did every single one of the latter come into existence when PVC was first
invented? But, that must be the case, since, according to the dialectical
classics, every object in the universe has an 'opposite', which it sooner or
later turns into after struggling with it. So, if PVC can be changed into the
above commodities, they must all be the
'opposites' the DM-classicists spoke about. Hence, if PVC is to change into any
or all of them (by
struggling with each), they too must have come into existence when PVC was first
produced, otherwise they couldn't struggle with it, and PVC would be
changeless. The DM-classics inform us that these opposites
co-exist with
whatever they are the opposites of. [How could it be otherwise if objects and
processes are to struggle with their opposites? They surely can't struggle all
by themselves.] In that case, when PVC was first invented (1838),
these opposites must also have been invented (by default) at the same time
-- otherwise PVC would be changeless, having no opposites with which it
could struggle. If so, where were all the hundreds of millions of ('default') PVC products
that have been made over the last century or so originally stored? Again, did they exist in
some sort of abstract 'dialectical'/'metaphysical' antechamber?
If not,
how can we believe a single thing the DM-classics have to say about change?
However, there is an other awkward implication of this theory (which we have met
already -- in connection with those
wooden tables).
Plainly, the changes mentioned in the last but one paragraph happen
because human beings work on plastics like PVC to create the sort of products
listed earlier. But,
according to the DM-classics, objects and processes are changed as a result
of a struggle with their opposites, which they then change into. So, if human
beings are the cause of change in and to PVC, they must also be the opposite of
the PVC they were working on. And if objects change into that with which they
struggle, PVC must change into these workers! Has
anyone met one of these peculiar shape-shifting human beings?
Again: if not, is there any point
our paying attention to what the DM-classics have to say about change?
On the other hand, and
once again, if these 'opposites' only popped into existence when the above plastics
were changed into them (meaning that human labour
can't have created these 'opposites' in the act of making the original
plastic substance/artefact), how is it possible for those
non-existent 'opposites' to 'contradict', or struggle with, the unchanged
plastic so that it could be changed into
them?
Even worse: if the 'opposite' of, say, PVC
is what causes it to change, how does human labour feature anywhere
in the action? What is the point of
building factories and studying
polymer chemistry,
for example, if
(according to the DM-classics) the 'opposite' of PVC
is what changes
lumps of PVC into plastic buckets or storage containers, all by itself? When human beings work on PVC to change
it into
all of the many things that they can and do change it into (using complex techniques and expensive machinery),
are they merely onlookers -- not part of the action, as it were --, just viewing things that
would have happened anyway, naturally?
[This
appears to be the DM-equivalent of
Occasionalism.]
Once again, it
is little use DM-fans complaining that the above remarks are ridiculous since
the conclusions I have drawn are a direct consequence of
what we find in the
DM-classics. Dialecticians may only advance this objection if
they are prepared to ignore their own classics! [I have dealt more fully
with this objection, alongside several others,
here.]
Or, have the capitalists discovered a
new way of
by-passing
this dialectical 'Law'? Are all polymer scientists, therefore, reactionaries?
We are also told that exchange value [EV]
represents "congealed labour
time" [LT]. That is, of course, a serious problem since use value [UV] is
supposed to 'contradict' EV -- but, UV and EV don't seem to "struggle" much
either, with one another or with anything else. But, according to the
Dialectical
Classicists, UV must both struggle with
and change into EV if they 'contradict' one another. Has anyone
ever witnessed this 'abstract wrestling match'?
Here is Scott Meikle (who
might have):
"All the contradictions of capitalist
commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and
exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the
commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....
"The simple form of value itself contains
the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value....
[Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two
inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at
the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the
first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards
of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen
can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The
relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other
commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the
other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't
simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't,
therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value.
These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'
"This polar opposition within the simple form is
an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the
individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between
use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore
represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation
between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only
as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an
exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple
form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the
commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]
Despite this, how does Meikle tackle the problem of
change? Indeed, how does he introduce opposition?
"The poles of an opposition are not just united.
They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within
that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of
labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that
contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and
exchange-value within it." [Ibid., p.26.]
Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted,
it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, this is just another
brute fact and not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe.
[I have developed this argument in much more detail in Essay Eight
Part
Two.]
Unfortunately, there are so many metaphors in the above passage it isn't easy to
make much sense of it. Anyway, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has
reified the products of social relations (UV and EV),
and in this reified state they have become the actual agents, with human beings (or,
perhaps, commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the
word "repel" here? Do they really repel each other (like magnets, or
electrical charges)? Or, do we do this 'repelling' because of the way we manufacture use values and
then exchange them?
[I am
using the word "patient" here in its older sense; that is, it relates to that
which is acted upon, not that which acts.]
And
do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one another? Does
UV struggle with and then change into EV -- as the
DM-classics assure us
they must?
Independently of this,
it is worth asking: How can the forms that underpin UV and EV (equivalent and relative form) provide an analogue of
the forces Meikle requires? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other
bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial conditions first -- the most important of which is
that they should at least
have the decency to exist. But, as we are about to see, these two forms can't
co-exist. So, other than conceptually, how then can they possibly repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other
objects and processes to repel -- anything?
This is what Marx had to say:
"The relative
form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent
and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are
mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression.
They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into
relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in
linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the
contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else
than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of
the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other
commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore,
the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an
equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent
cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not
the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the
material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are
worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1
coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation,
in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that
the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity
cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both
forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive."
[Marx (1996),
pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of
commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The
differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away
these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can
exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are
reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly
falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from
it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to
go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid.,
p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at
the same time? On the other hand, if they both do co-exist, so that
they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "exclude" the other?
In fact, Marx says that
"A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in
the same expression of value, both forms." So, they can't co-exist, after all.[Again, I have said much more about this in Essay Eight
Part
Two.]
Other than conceptually, how then can they repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other
objects and processes to repel -- anything?
That is, of course, the unyielding rock upon which we have
seen all such Idealist speculations founder.
It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thought
about the simple commodity form. But, even there, they can't co-exist,
for if they could, they wouldn't "mutually exclude" one another! On
the other hand, if they do genuinely "exclude" one another, we can't even think
of them acting on one another, for if we were so to think of them both at once,
we
would, of necessity, be misconceiving them.
Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling
match taking place in our heads,
such that, when we think of the one it elbows out of the way (out of
existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we could declare equivalent form
the winner over relative form by two falls to a submission (UK
rules)?
Figure Seven: Equivalent Form Slam Dunks
Relative Form
In A Skull Near You
It could be objected that the fact that something is a relative
form excludes it from being an equivalent form. This is where the opposition
arises; the one is the opposite of the other.
But, "opposite" isn't the same as "oppositional", as I have
shown here.
Of
course, in Marxist economics, part of the alleged 'contradiction' between labour
and capital, does Labour Power [LP] and Capital [C] "struggle" with
one another? As we have already noted, very
material workers most certainly struggle against their equally material bosses, but how is it
possible forLP to struggle against C?
Someone might object that this seriously misrepresents DM; it is the inherent dialectical
contradiction between capital and labour (or that between the relevant
classes) that foments struggle.
Perhaps so, but until we are told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, that
response itself is devoid of sense (since it contains a meaningless phrase:
"dialectical contradiction"). [There is more on that in Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three. As far as social change in general is concerned, see
here,
here and here.]
Once
more, this isn't to deny change, merely to underline the fact that DM can't account for it.
Again, is it really the case that everything turns
into its 'opposite', and that it does so by "struggling" with its 'opposite',
its "other", as
Hegel, Engels, Lenin, Mao and Plekhanov
argued?
To be sure,
certain states of matter do change into what might conventionally be called their "opposites" (e.g.,
a hot object might change and become cold; something above might later be below,
or on the right then on the left, and so on), but even there, these opposites
don't cause these changes, they don't struggle with one another! And this certainly
isn't true of everything. Do men, for instance, turn into
women, fathers into sons (or is it daughters?), brothers into sisters, left-, into right-hands,
the working class into the capitalist class, medieval serfs into aristocrats, forces of production into relations of production,
use values into exchange values, negative numbers/electrical charges into positive numbers/electrical charges, electrons into
protons (or even positrons),
and matter into 'anti-matter'? If not, what is the point of saying that
everything changes into its opposite? And why claim that objects and processes have internal, or
even external, opposites if in most cases they feature nowhere in the action --,
and if
many things just do not turn into them?12a
Furthermore, if
Lenin were correct
--
when he said that "every
determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every
other…"
(Lenin
(1961),
p.221;
emphases in the original)
-- it would mean that everything (and every property) must
change into every other property!
But, if that were so, heat, for example,
would change into, say, colour, hardness and generosity (and vice versa);
liquidity would become brittleness, circularity and
inquisitiveness (and vice versa); gentleness would turn into speed,
opacity and bitterness (and vice versa); triangularity would develop into arrogance, honesty and duplicity (and
vice versa), and so on.
Is there a single person on
the planet not suffering from dialectics who believes any of this?
Once
again, if these bizarre changes don't happen (as they plainly do not!), and if
such things aren't actually implied by these
terminally vague 'Laws' -- or, more specifically, they aren't implied by what Lenin said
above --, what is the point of DM-theorists
repeatedly asserting that this is precisely what everything does?
Of
course, it could be objected that the above
comments were recorded in notebooks, so we shouldn't interpret them too
literally, or regard them as an definitive expression of Lenin's more considered thoughts.
But, has a single dialectician ever pointed this out about these words whenever
they quote them? Hardly.
Anyway, as we have seen: since
Hegel's unique 'other'
protocol is itself defective, this is in fact a consequence of the Second 'Law'
-- i.e., that
"every
determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every
other…". That was the point of the
earlier observation about dialecticians vacillating between the theory that
UOscause
change and the idea that objects and processes change into their opposites --
sometimes veering over to the doctrine that change also produces these
opposites. The first
of these alternatives is examined in Essay Eight
Part One, but if the second alternative
were the case, we would surely witness some bizarre
transformations in nature and society as men changed into women, cats into dogs,
banks into charities and the working class into the capitalist class -- and
then back again!
However, as has been argued in detail
in Essay Seven Part Three,
if change merely creates these opposites then, plainly, that can't have
been a result of a "struggle" between two co-existing opposites --
since at least one of them wouldn't yet exist! Hence, with respect to objects
in the latter category, change would create them, not them it.
This completely scuppers the DM-account of
change for it is now clear that there
is nothing in the DM-universe that could cause the many and
varied changes we see all around us in nature and society.
In
which case, and once again: if and when change occurs, dialectics -- the much
vaunted 'theory of change' -- can't explain it.
Indeed, if DM were true, change would be
impossible.
Turning
now to specifics, Engels
also asserted the following:
"For everyday purposes we know and can say, e.g., whether an
animal is alive or not. But, upon closer inquiry, we find that this is, in many
cases, a very complex question, as the jurists know very well. They have
cudgelled their brains in vain to discover a rational limit beyond which the
killing of the child in its mother's womb is murder. It is just as impossible to
determine absolutely the moment of death, for physiology proves that death is
not an instantaneous momentary phenomenon, but a very protracted process.
"In like manner, every organic being is every moment the same
and not the same, every moment it assimilates matter supplied from without, and
gets rid of other matter; every moment some cells of its body die and others
build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time the matter of its body is
completely renewed, and is replaced by other atoms of matter, so that every
organic being is always itself, and yet something other than itself." [Engels
(1976), pp.26-27. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
"[L]ife consists precisely and primarily in this
-- that
a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is
therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes
themselves, and which constantly asserts and resolves itself; and as soon as the
contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to and end, and death steps in." [Ibid.,
p.153.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Abstract identity
(a = a; and negatively, a cannot be
simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in
organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its
life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself, by absorption
and excretion of substances, by respiration, by cell formation and death of
cells, by the process of circulation taking place, in short, by a sum of
incessant molecular changes which make up life and the sum-total of whose
results is evident to our eyes in the phases of life -- embryonic life,
youth, sexual maturity, process of reproduction, old age, death. The further
physiology develops, the more important for it become these incessant,
infinitely small changes, and hence the more important for it also the
consideration of difference within identity, and the old abstract
standpoint of formal identity, that an organic being is to be treated as
something simply identical with itself, as something constant, becomes out of
date." [Engels
(1954), p.214. Bold emphases alone added.]
Plekhanov concurred:
"But upon closer
investigation it turns out that life itself bears in itself the germ of
death, and that in general any phenomenon is contradictory, in
the sense that it develops out of itself the elements which, sooner or later,
will put an end to its existence and will transform it into its own opposite.
Everything flows, everything changes; and there is no force capable of holding
back this constant flux, or arresting this eternal movement. There is no force
capable of resisting the dialectics of phenomena." [Plekhanov (1974),
p.539. Bold emphasis alone added.]
But, what is the 'contradiction'
supposed to be here? Is it:
(i) Living cells contain dead matter,
they are a union of life and death;
(ii) Life is a
constant struggle to avoid death;
(iii) Life can only sustain itself by a constant
struggle with dead matter; or is it,
(iv) A
reference to the contrast,
or conflict, that is supposed to exist between these two processes -- life and death --, which
constitutes the
dynamism we see in living things?
And, what on
earth is the:
(v)
"Something else" that, according to Engels, each living thing
is supposed to be, or become?
As far as (i) is concerned, the contrast between
living and dead matter seems to depend on the obsolete idea that there is an
intrinsic difference between living and non-living molecules (or chemical
processes) -- i.e., that there is some sort of 'vital force' at work
here. While it is unclear whether or not Engels
believed this (in fact, in several places it seems he rejects this idea --, e.g.,
Engels (1954), p.282), it is reasonably clear that subsequent dialecticians
have repudiated it. So, it is reasonable to conclude that option (i) can't be what underlies the
'contradiction'
in this case.
With respect to (ii), while it is undeniable
that most living things constantly strive to stay alive, it is
still unclear what the alleged
UO is supposed to be
in this instance. If a living cell is indeed a UO, the
scene of a bitter struggle between life and death -- in the sense that each cell
contains within itself both life and death, slugging it out, as it were
--, what physical form is taken by these mysterious, 'lethal' processes? It isn't
as if we could easily identify any likely or viable candidates here (no pun
intended) -- as we can with, say,
magnetic
or electrical phenomena. There, the presence of apparently opposite poles
or charges is specifiable and measurable. Here (with respect to
life), there aren't any easily identifiable opposing forces, processes
or sets of objects.
And yet, if dialecticians
were
correct, and everything were a UO, each living cell would (it seems) contain
death within itself (as an 'internal' opposite), and not just have it confronting
that cell externally. But,
what material form does 'death' take? Are we to imagine that a black,
shrouded figure, sickle in hand, inhabits every living cell?
Figure Eight: Are These The Two Main Antagonists
Slugging
It
Out In Each
'Dialectical Cell'?
If not, how is
'death' to be conceived of in this case? Indeed, what form does 'life' itself take?
An
incarnation of the
Archangel Gabriel? Or,
maybe,
Louis Pasteur?
On the other hand, if this particular UO is
comprised of a set of
opposing processes (or, indeed, if it is to be regarded as a special
type of interaction between certain
forces), as options (iii) and (iv) would seem to suggest (picturing living systems
constantly battling against disintegration, the latter perhaps manifested by
catabolism, the former by anabolism),
then we are surely on firmer ground.
But, why would anyone
want to call such a set-up a UO? What exactly are the opposites that are
struggling here? It isn't to be imagined (one hopes!) that inside each vibrant cell there is another
older (or even decaying) cell waiting to emerge, nor yet one that is
constantly fighting
the embattled host cell, stabbing it 'inside the back', as it were.
Nor is it credible to suppose that
catabolism and anabolism (or catabolic and anabolic
processes) are locked in
permanent struggle with each other. Indeed, it isn't easy to see catabolism as
directly 'contradictory' even to anabolism (howsoever the word "contradiction"
is understood). These processes don't oppose
one another by preventing the other working, or by immediately picking apart what
the other has produced. They just work in different ways, often in separate
or distinct parts of the cell. Nor are they 'internally-related' -- they do not
imply one another, as the proletariat and the bourgeoisie allegedly do. The two
processes had to be discovered; no one hit upon the two processes, catabolism and anabolism,
merely by
thinking about their 'concept(s)', as was the case with those two
'dialectically-connected' classes, as they should have been if they
constituted a genuine 'dialectical contradiction'. If they are genuinely connected
in this way, DM-fans have
once again neglected to provide the proof.
Perhaps more significantly, they certainly don't turn into one another
-- as we have been led to believe they shouldby the
Dialectical
Classics. Nor does the output of one process always turn into the input of the
other. For example, the
Krebs
metabolic cycle produces water and carbon dioxide from carbohydrates, fats
and proteins. But, no cycle in animal cells does the reverse. Sure, these
products are broken-down/metabolised, but not in a 'reverse Krebs cycle'.
Indeed,
photosynthesis isn't its opposite, either.
The overwhelming majority of animals don't and can't photosynthesise -- and
of the minority that do, the majority of them do so only by
utilising plant cells
symbiotically,
or by sequestering plant
chloroplasts).
So,
anabolic and catabolic processes don't
typically
confront one another in normal cells, opposing whatever the other does. To
characterise such a set-up as 'contradictory' would be about as intelligent as, say,
arguing that a group of men digging-up a road somewhere was 'contradicting'
("opposing" or "struggling against") another group repairing
a house a few hundred yards down the way. Or, that, say, the manufacture of
aeroplanes 'contradicts' the scrapping of aluminium chairs!
And, even if it were accurate to
describe catabolism as undoing the results of anabolism, that still
wouldn't amount to either of them 'contradicting'
one another. Undoing is not 'contradicting' -- if it were, then doing
would be a tautology!
Of course, if someone were to insist that
despite the above, such processes are contradictory, they would owe the rest of us an
explanation of the literal nature of the contradiction allegedly involved, here. In that
case, it would be pertinent to ask how one process could possibly be
"gainsaying" the other.12b
But,
even if this were rejected
for some reason, DM still wouldn't be out of the non-dialectical frying pan. While it
could be maintained that in this instance we do have 'opposites' that are internal to
cells, we don't as yet have opposites internal to anabolic or
catabolic processes themselves. So, if either of these two cause the other to change, that
would clearly be another example of an externally-motivated
transformation (that is, they would be acting on each other externally, not internally as
required by the theory). Moreover, as noted above, anabolism would have to turn into catabolism, and
vice versa -- that is, if the
Dialectical Classics
are to be believed.
According to
Lenin all change is internally-motivated, and everything develops of itself:
"Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Lenin (1921),
p.90.]
Anabolic processes certainly
involve objects (i.e., molecules), but if they undergo development, that
can't
be the result of an interaction (or 'struggle') with catabolic processes (which would
constitute an
external influence, once more). On the other hand, if they do alter each other
(but how?), then Lenin's "demand" and "requirement" would have to be
ditched.
Nevertheless, here, as elsewhere,
the words dialecticians actually use look decidedly figurative -- except, in
this case, it isn't easy to
see what the trope could possibly be
here.
And yet, if these words are figurative, that would be all to the good; it would at least
allow the interpretation of the 'contradictions' referred to by this 'Law' to be
viewed, say, poetically. No one minds if
poets
contradict themselves (cf.,
Walt Whitman),
or one another.
Even
if the word "struggle" were substituted for "contradict", the situation wouldn't noticeably
improve. Since literal
struggles can only take place between agents, that would mean that this
aspect of DM could work only if biochemical reactions, in vivo,
were
personified, or if they were under the control of an agent of some sort. In
that case, this use of the word "struggle" would clearly be figurative,
too.
However, it could be argued that the above considerations are highly
abstract, and are therefore irrelevant (although it
isn't easy to see how
a cat, or even anabolism and catabolism, are abstract). Hence, it could be objected
that DM actually concerns real material
contradictions, confirmed in practice, not abstractions like these.13
But, how could
either the presence or the operation of 'real material
contradictions' be confirmed in order to make sure they
are genuine? Fortunately, John Rees explained how this might be done (but, alas, only in relation to concepts drawn from
HM):
"[O]nce we are sure that our
concept of 'capital' is a true reflection of the actual existing capital –- then
we can also be sure that any further categories that emerge as a result of
contradictions which we find in our concepts will necessarily be matched by
contradictions in the real capitalist world." [Rees (1998), p.110.]
However,
Rees also added the following caveat:
"This…is only a safe
assumption on the basis of constant empirical verification…." [Ibid., p.110.]
The
idea appears to be that any contradictions that remain (in a theory that has
itself been thoroughly checked against reality at every stage) must "of
necessity" be a genuine reflection of actual objects and processes in nature and
society (or, for Rees, perhaps only in society). This safeguard is necessary to
rid 'materialist dialectics' of idealist, Hegelian 'excesses', as well as prevent any of its theories from being, or becoming, defective (in that
defective theories are 'self-contradictory'; more on that in
Essay Eleven Part
One). [Rees (1998), pp.52-53, 108-18.]
As
George Novack
also points out:
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
[The demand
for evidence must be distinguished from anything redolent of
Positivism
or
Empiricism -- on that, see Note 15a.]
Nevertheless, as far as DM-contradictions
are concerned, it isn't at all clear how verification is supposed to work --
even when it is executed exactly as intended. Presumably, on this basis,
'incorrect' contradictions will be rejected or eliminated because: (a) They are
self-contradictions, (b) They have been falsified by experience, or (c)
They couldn't be confirmed by appropriate methods.
But, with respect to any
of the contradictions that theorists might want to retain (so that they are regarded as
correct 'reflections' of reality), how could anyone be sure that future
contingencies won't arise -- in the shape of further evidence -- that would
require their rejection? [On that,
see
below.] In view of Lenin's declaration that all knowledge is
incomplete, it seems they can't.
Despite this, option (a) can't be correct, otherwise we should have to reject Engels's analysis of motion,
which pictures it as self-contradictory. Along with it would go many other
'dialectical contradictions'. [On that, see Essays
Five and Eleven
Part One.]
In connection with option (b), what evidence could possibly refute
a contradiction? How is it possible for a contradiction to be falsified
by experience? Presumably, that would occur if propositions that supposedly relate to experience contradicted
something that was already contradictory to begin with. But, what sort of
monstrosity would that be?
Consider again Engels's depiction of the
contradictory nature of living cells:
"We saw above that life consists
precisely and primarily in this –- that a living thing is at each moment itself
and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present
in things and processes themselves, and which constantly asserts and resolves
itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to and end,
and death steps in." [Engels (1976),
p.153.]
"Abstract identity (a
= a; and negatively, a can't be simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is
likewise inapplicable in organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at
every moment of its life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from
itself, by absorption and excretion of substances…, in short, by a sum of
incessant molecular changes which make up life….
"Life and death.
Already no physiology is held to be scientific if it does not consider death as
an essential element of life (note, Hegel, Enzyklopädie, I, pp.152-53),
the negation of life itself, so that life is always thought of in
relation to its necessary result, death, which is always contained in it in
germ. The dialectical conception of life is nothing more than this…. Living
means dying." [Engels (1954),
pp.214,
295.]
[The
serious problems connected with Hegel and
Engels's egregious misunderstanding of the
LOI will be tackled in Essays
Six, Eight Part
Three and Twelve (summary
here).]
This
latest difficulty Engels's 'theory' faces can perhaps be brought out by the following argument:
L3: Experimental evidence
also shows that C1
is not alive.
L4: L2 falsifies L1.
L5: L3 falsifies L1.
L6: However, the conjunction
of L2 and L3 verifies L1.
L7: Therefore, L1 has been
falsified and verified.
[It
is worth noting that the above 'argument'
isn't valid, and has only been reproduced here to try to make sense of what Rees
and Engels could possibly have meant.]
From this it is quite clear that
the confirmation and refutation of a 'dialectical contradiction' are all of a piece.
So, it is still unclear how they can be verified by experience or experimentsthat
also refute them.
It could be pointed out that
in this case
DL shows its
superiority over 'formal thinking' concerning the point of death, when a cell or
organism is still alive, but just about to die, since dialectics is the logic of
change. And yet, this response itself looks rather hollow now that we know that if DL were
true, change
would be impossible.
Finally, it could be argued that
observation might confirm that a cell is alive and not-alive all at once --
i.e., it could be claimed that dialectical contradictions can in fact be observed.
That response will be tackled below.
However,
as noted above, if reality itself
were contradictory, the 'verification' of a contradiction would also
constitute its automatic 'falsification', and vice versa. So, it seems
that option (b) above is unavailable as far as the investigation of
'dialectical contradictions' is concerned. This must mean that Rees's requirement that
contradictions be tested against experience is in effect an empty gesture, since, with
respect to DM-'contradictions', if reality were contradictory, it would both
refute and confirm their
presence.
In which case, DM-theorists would have no reason whatsoever to reject a
single
contradiction implied or projected by their theory. On the other hand, they would
at the same time have eminently
good reason for rejecting all of them -- at least to prevent their theory
from becoming defective. [More on that outcome in Essay Eleven
Part One.]
The
quandary now facing dialecticians we might call the "Dialecticians' Dilemma"
[DD].
The DD arises from the uncontroversial observation that if reality were
fundamentally contradictory then a true theory should, and would, reflect this supposed
state of affairs. [Why that is so is explained
here.]
As
Engels himself pointed out:
"That is what comes of accepting 'consciousness',
'thought', quite naturalistically, as something given, something opposed from
the outset to being, to nature. If that were so, it must seem extremely strange
that consciousness and nature, thinking and being, the laws of thought and the
laws of nature, should correspond so closely. But if the further question is
raised what thought and consciousness really are and where they come from, it
becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself
is a product of nature, which has developed in and along with its environment;
hence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last
analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of nature's
interconnections but are in correspondence with them." [Engels (1976),
p.44. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Bold emphasis added.]
[Nevertheless, one might well wonder how, if everything is, or contains, a
contradiction, the "products of the human brain" and "the rest of nature" don't
end up contradicting one another. Are the "products of the human brain" not part
of this world? If everything is contradictory, it would seem that that
the "products of the human brain" must be exempted if we insist on denying they contradict
"the rest of nature".]
The
above comment was quoted approvingly by Lenin:
"If we find that the laws of thought correspond
with the laws of nature, says Engels, this becomes quite conceivable when we
take into account that reason and consciousness are 'products of the human brain
and that man himself is a product of nature.' Of course, 'the products of the
human brain, being in the last analysis also products of nature, do not
contradict the rest of nature's interconnections but are in correspondence with
them'. There is no doubt that there exists a natural, objective interconnection
between the phenomena of the world. Engels constantly speaks of the 'laws of
nature,' of the 'necessities of nature', without considering it necessary to
explain the generally known propositions of materialism." [Lenin (1972),
p.179. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Bold emphasis added.]
However, and this is the problem, in order to
reflect nature correctly any such theory
must contain contradictions itself or it wouldn't be an accurate reflection of
it. But, if the development of science is predicated either on the
removal of contradictions from any given theory, or on the replacement of an
older theory with a newer, less contradictory version, as DM-theorists contend (on
this see Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published), then science couldn't
advance toward a 'truer' and fuller account of reality. That is because
a scientific theory so modified would reflect the world less accurately, having had all (or most) of
its
contradictions removed.
[Of
course, if the advancement of science isn't dependent on the removal of
all or most contradictions, then scientists would face intractable difficulties
of their own -- for example: How to tell a defective theory (i.e., one that is
shot through with contradictions) from a non-defective theory (that isn't).
Fortunately, to date, scientists have adopted
neither of these
ill-advised dialectical options, and have remained stubbornly loyal to the
protocols of FL, IF, and ordinary language.]
Conversely, if a true theory aims to reflect
more accurately the contradictions DM-theorists believe exist in nature (which it must do if reality is
indeed
contradictory) then, in order to be consistent with this protocol, scientists
shouldn'tattempt to remove contradictions from-- or try to resolve them
in, or between -- theories. Clearly, on that score, science wouldn't be able
to advance, since there would be no
reason to replace a contradictory theory with a less contradictory one, and
every reason no to do so (since a theory that contained few -- or no -- contradictions
would reflect nature less well than one that possessed more contradictions). Indeed,
if DM were correct, scientific theories should become more contradictory
-- not less -- as scientists seek to reflect what is supposed to be 'contradictory'
reality more accurately. This means, of course, that science as a whole
would become more
defective over time!
On the other hand, if science advances
because of the elimination of contradictions then a fully true theory should
have had all (or most) of its contradictions
removed!
In the limit, oddly enough, science
would then reflect the fact that
reality contains no contradictions!
[It is worth noting here that critics
of DM have already arrived at that anti-dialectical conclusion, and they managed
to dosowithout an ounce of DL to slow them down.]
So, on the
one hand:
(A) According to DM, scientific theories
should be replaced by those that more faithfully reflect the fundamentally
contradictory nature of reality -- despite the fact that scientists will have removed every
(or nearly every) contradiction in order reach that point!
But, on
the other hand:
(B) If scientists failed to remove
contradictions (or, if they refused to replace an older theory with a newer,
less contradictory alternative), so that each theory reflected the contradictory nature of reality more accurately,
they would then have no good reason to reject any particular theory no matter how
contradictory it might be, and science would grind to a halt.
In whichever
direction this rusty old DM-banger is
steered, the 'dialectical' view
of scientific progress hits a very material brick wall
in the shape of the DD each time.
Once more,
it could be objected that dialecticians don't believe that scientific theories
should have all or most of their contradictions removed if science is to
advance, merely those that hold up progress.
However, dialecticians have so far failed to distinguish those contradictions
which are merely the artefacts of a defective theory
from those that supposedly reflect the 'objective' state of the world. But, how
is it possible to distinguish the latter from the former? How is it
possible to decide whether a contradiction in a theory is an accurate reflection of reality,
or whether it is a consequence of a faulty theory?
An appeal to
practice here would be no help, either, since that takes place in the phenomenal world,
at the level of experience, which is itself riddled with DM-contradictions!
In that case, it isn't easy to see how practice could possibly help confirm (or refute) a theory
if its deliverances are themselves part of the same contradictory reality being
investigated.13a00
[We
saw above that, given DM, confirmation
and refutation are all of a piece, anyway. And,
as we will see in Essay Ten Part One,
practice is
no friend of dialectics, either. In my wander across the wastelands of DM, I have
encountered only one serious attempt to tackle some aspects of this problem -- Spirkin (1983). I have
dealt with his 'solution' in Note 13a00 (link above).]
It
might prove helpful if we considered a concrete example: DM-theorists in general agree
that the wave-particle duality of light confirms the theory that nature is fundamentally
contradictory, or 'dialectical'. In this case, light is supposed to be a
UO of wave and particle.
Precisely how they are a unity (i.e., how it could be true that matter at
this level is
fundamentally particulate and fundamentally non-particulate all at once)
is of course left completely obscure. Moreover, exactly how this phenomenon helps account for the material world
we see around us is no less mysterious.
Even though all dialecticians refer to this
'contradiction', not one of them has ever actually explained how and why it is a
contradiction, still less how and
why it is a 'dialectical contradiction' (even if we knew
what one of those were!). Does
the particulate nature of light imply it is also a wave (in the way that the
proletariat is said to imply the bourgeoisie)? If so, we have yet to see the
proof. If it did imply this then it needn't have been discovered by scientists;
they could have derived it from the concept itself (as they do from the
concepts: capitalist and proletarian). Furthermore, do wave and particle struggle with
each other
and then turn into one another? But,
they must do both if the
DM-classicists are to be believed? But, they can't do either of these since light
is said the be a wave and a particle at the same time. In order to turn
onto each other, light would have to be a particle first and then later a wave
(or vice versa). In addition: in order to struggle among themselves these
two states would have to co-exist separately. Neither is
possible if light is meant to be both at once.
Furthermore, consider these two propositions:
Q1: Light is a wave.
Q2: Light is a particle.
Now, Q1 would contradict Q2
only if the following were the case:
Q3: No wave can be a particle.
Q4: Light must be one or the other, wave
or
particle.
[Q4
is required or Q1 and Q2 would merely form an inconsistent, not a contradictory,
set.]
But,
is Q3 true? Surely not, for if physicists are correct,
light
is both!
It
could be objected that the above conclusion
begs the question
since it refuses to call this state of affairs a contradiction. However, there are plenty of examples of waves in
nature and society that are particulate; e.g., sound waves, water waves and
Mexican
waves. So, Q3 is in fact false!
Moreover, Q4 could be
false, too. Light could turn out to be something about which we don't yet have a word or a concept. That, of course, would make Q1
and Q2 merely inconsistent. Do 'dialectical logicians' know what to do with
'dialectical inconsistencies'?13a0
But, even if
in some as-yet-unspecified-way this
phenomenon were a
contradiction, it does nothing to explain change
(not even in the sub-atomic world) -- unless we are supposed to accept the idea that the fact that light is a particle
is what
changes it into a wave, and vice versa. And yet, if that were so,
if one of these states has to turn into the other, then, as noted above,
it can't be the
case that light is both wave and particle at the same time!
So, what
is the point of this 'contradiction'?
What role does it play either in DM or in Physics?
At best, it seems merely
ornamental.
[When
confronted with this objection in private correspondence, one rather desperate
DM-fan
claimed that these were 'illustrative' contradictions (even
though they do no 'dialectical' work inside the atom or outside it). This can only mean that dialecticians
now resemble Fundamentalist Christians even more than one might otherwise have thought.
Many of the latter think that, say, the
three-dimensionality of space 'illustrates' the truth of the Trinity, God having
scattered this
and other clues (like 'metaphysical confetti') all across 'Reality' for us to discover.
(Don't
believe me? Then check
this out.)
In a similar way, but in relation to dialectics, perhaps 'Being Itself' has sent
this 'wave duality' conundrum our way to inform DM-fans they are
traversing the
straight-and-narrow path that leads
to 'Dialectical Salvation' -- by their holding this 'illustrative' but totally useless
truth about the
duality of wave and particle to their bosoms!
But what exactly does it "illustrate"? The fact that this contradiction does no work?
Or, the fact that waves and particles of light are locked in a pointless 'non-struggle'?
(Incidentally, none of the above should be taken to mean that I doubt the
duality of such phenomena; I am merely pointing out the rather obvious fact that
it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction', whatever else it is. Indeed,
scientists
now claim
to have photographed this phenomenon. Maybe they have, maybe they haven't,
but no one has yet reported seeing a
'struggle' going on down there, surprising though that might seem!)]
Now, if we put to one side the 'solution' to
this 'conundrum' offered by, say,
Superstring Theory
[now,
M-theory], there are
in fact more than a handful of Physicists --
with, it seems, a more robust commitment to
scientific realism
than the average dialectician appears capable of mustering -- who believe that this 'paradox' can
be resolved within a realist theory of nature. [Evidence for this can be found
here and
here. Also see Wick (1995) and Becker
(2018).]
Whether or
not they are right needn't detain us since DM-theorists (if consistent)
ought to advise these impetuous, wrong-headed Scientific Realists to stop trying to solve
this conundrum. That is because DM has already provided them with a
handy, a priori solution: nature is
fundamentally contradictory. End of story! In which case, there is no solution
-- so
none need be sought. This
paradoxical, 'dialectical' state of affairs should simply be "grasped", or "Nixoned",
by the DM-faithful. No further questions asked.
However, in this case, it is
now possible to see how
practice can't help. If experiments are conducted, which show
that light is both a particle and a wave, then DM-theorists would have no reason
to question this supposedly contradictory conclusion, nor try to resolve this 'difficulty'.
In that case, practice alone
can't distinguish between these
two views (the realist and the 'dialectical'), even though only one of them will seriously hold up progress. Moreover, since we know that practically any theory can be made
to conform with
observation -- if enough adjustments are made elsewhere -- this criterion (i.e.,
practice) is doubly
defective.
[That allegation will be
substantiated at length in Essays Ten
Part One and Thirteen Part Two,
to be published in 2025.]
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
Nevertheless, those not committed
to such an obtuse and short-sighted view of the world would have good reason
to question it; and that might, for all anyone knows, assist in the advancement of science.
Not so with
DM-fans, whose advice could permanently impede scientific progress.13a
Once more, in advance of any
such test, if
they are consistent, DM-theorists should advise scientists not to bother trying
to refute their interpretation
of QM, or resolve the paradox upon which it [QM] is supposedly based, since there is no point doing
so in view of a theory they have,
which sees nature as fundamentally contradictory.
Unfortunately, if physicists took that advice, science wouldn't and couldn't advance to a
'superior view of nature' (if one exists) by eliminating this alleged
contradiction. At best, this dogmatic DM-approach to the search for knowledge
would close down every available option, forcing scientists to adopt a view of
reality that might be incorrect, and, given what we already know about the
history of Physics, probably isn't correct.13b
Fortunately, there is little
evidence that Physicists have paid any attention of this regressive aspect of dialectics,
always assuming any of them have ever heard of it.
Nevertheless, only those who disagree with
Lenin about the incomplete nature of science (or, alternatively, those who have
an insecure grasp of the History of Physics) would risk concluding that
contemporary science has already attained a final and complete picture of reality, at least in
this particular area. If that is so, Physics could only advance by resolving this
alleged paradox -- thus eliminating one of the best examples in the DM-Grimoire,
which allegedly shows nature is
fundamentally contradictory.
Of course, only those who
might want to
foist
their ideas on nature would object at this point.
On
the other hand, if DM-theorists' advice to scientists is that they should in
general try to replace a contradictory theory with a less logically-challenged
version, they will have to abandon the idea
that nature is fundamentally contradictory -- at least here. Such a
response is all the more pressing in view of the fact that some scientists think they have
already solved this problem -- David Bohm, for example,
being one of the most important.14
But, this is just the DD once again:
i.e., the theory that nature is 'contradictory', coupled with the claim that science can
only advance by removing contradictions, can't, it seems, distinguish between
contradictions that hold up the progress of science (and which are therefore
artefacts of a defective or incomplete theory) from those that reveal the supposedly 'contradictory' nature
of reality.
Although some (like
Spirkin) have
acknowledged the problem, it remains unresolved to this day.
The various ways there might be for
DM-theorists to extricate themselves from the hole they have dug for themselves will be examined in a later
Essay, and shown to fail.
Dialecticians are therefore advised to stop
digging.
In addition, it is unclear how option
(c) above is itself supposed to work. How
is it possible for anyone even to try to verify a
DM-contradiction? For example, does humanity possess technology sensitive enough
to observe, or register, time intervals of the order of, say, 10-10,000
seconds, so that Engels's claims about motion can be checked? What then about
intervals of 10-100,000
seconds? And yet, observation of motion would have to be made with respect to
time intervals of that order of magnitude (and far, far better, too) in order to confirm
whether this phenomenon remains contradictory at this level of accuracy, at least. But, where
do we stop?
Naturally, some might want to appeal to
Planck time
intervals (of the order of 5 x 10-44
seconds) to provide a natural place to halt, but that would be no help at all. A
single one of these Planck 'instants' is, so we are told, 1026times shorter than the shortest time interval so far measured -- an
alto-second (or 10-18seconds). In that case, there is little prospect that these far shorter
intervals will ever be measured. And since Planck intervals are theoretical entities, the
chances are that this limit, too, will be revised one day (in line no doubt with Lenin's claim that
no knowledge is ever final).
Anyway, the answer to this particular
'difficulty' is irrelevant. That is
because, no matter how brief or ephemeral the time frame involved, no measurement could
conceivably test whether a moving object is in two places at once, only
whether it is in two places in the same finite temporal interval. [More on that in
Essay Five.]14a
Update, 29/06/2021:
A
brief search of YouTube will reveal countless (genuine!) physicists who all seem
to have a different take on this alleged truth about sub-atomic 'particles' --
that they are both particle and wave --, perhaps illustrating the fact that if you put ten
physicists in a room,
you'll soon be faced with fifteen different interpretations
of QM and the TOR. Some still believe that, for example, the electron is a particle, but the
vast majority of physicists claim it is merely an "excitation" in the
Electromagnetic Field. Here is Nobel Laureate,
Steven
Weinberg:
"[P]articles are bundles of the energy, or quanta,
of various sorts of fields. A field like an electric or magnetic field is a sort
of stress in space.... The equations of a field theory like the
Standard Model deal not with particles but with fields; the particles appear
as manifestations of those fields." [Weinberg (1993), p.25. Bold emphasis
and link added.]
[QM = Quantum Mechanics; TOR =
Theory of Relativity.]
"The only way to have a consistent relativistic
theory is to treat all the particles of nature as the quanta of fields,
like photons. Electrons and positrons are to be treated as the quanta of the
electron-positron field, whose 'classical' field equation, the
analogue of
Maxwell's equations for the EM [Electromagnetic -- RL] field, turns out to
be the
Dirac equation [this links to a PDF -- RL], which started life as a
relativistic version of the single-particle
Schrödinger equation.… This approach now
gives a unified picture, known as
quantum field theory, of all of nature." [Mills (1994), p.386. Italic
emphases in the original; bold emphases and links added. Spelling adjusted to
agree with Uk English.]
Finally,
here is another Nobel Laureate,
Frank
Wilczek:
"In quantum field theory, the primary elements of
reality are not individual particles, but underlying fields. Thus, e.g.,
all electrons are but excitations of an underlying field, naturally called
the electron field, which fills all space and time. This formulation explains
why all electrons everywhere and for all time have exactly the same properties,
including, of course, the same mass. If one constructs all matter from
excitations of a few fields, as we do in the modern Standard Model, the
challenge of mass takes a new and profoundly simpler form. At worst, we will
have to specify a few numerical parameters -- one for each fundamental field --
to account for mass in general." [Wilczek (1999), p.11. Bold emphases added.]
The
following interchange is just one example of the aforementioned difference of
opinion among physicists. This was prompted by physicist, Art Hobson's paper,
'There Are No Particles Only Fields', published in the American Journal of
Physics (2013):
"Quantum foundations are still unsettled, with mixed
effects on science and society. By now it should be possible to obtain consensus
on at least one issue: Are the fundamental constituents fields or particles?As this paper shows, experiment and
theory imply that unbounded fields, not bounded particles, are
fundamental. This is especially clear for relativistic systems, implying
that it's also true of nonrelativistic systems. Particles are epiphenomena
arising from fields. Thus, the
Schrödinger field is a space-filling physical field whose value at any
spatial point is the probability amplitude for an interaction to occur at that
point. The field for an electron is the electron; each electron extends
over both slits in the two-slit experiment and spreads over the entire pattern;
and quantum physics is about interactions of microscopic systems with the
macroscopic world rather than just about
measurements. It's important to clarify this issue because
textbooks still teach a particles- and
measurement-oriented interpretation that contributes to
bewilderment among students and pseudoscience among the public. This article
reviews classical and
quantum fields, the two-slit experiment, rigorous
theorems showing particles are inconsistent with relativistic
quantum theory, and several phenomena showing particles are
incompatible with
quantum field theories." [Quoted from
here; link added.]
The above
paper prompted the following exchange (between Robert Sciamanda and Hobson):
"There
Are No Particles And There Are No Fields
"Art
Hobson (1) has done an admirable job of analyzing the particle versus field
question and bringing it up to date. He lucidly traces the history of this
discussion and shows how Quantum Field Theory (QFT) introduces quanta as
countable excitations and interactions of fields. He finds no support for a
particle concept in QFT, even in some extended sense. Hobson forcefully argues
the conclusion that 'There are no particles, there are only fields.' By
extending some of Hobson's ideas, I arrive at the conclusion that in addition to
there being no particles, there are not even fields! The fields of QFT are
operators. The system state is an abstract vector in
Hilbert or
Fock space,
not described by a field but instead by a
'bra'
or 'ket' vector; simply a label. The field operators describe interactions
by which the system evolves in Fock space. In this view, the QFT construct is a
most useful calculational model, but does little or nothing to identify a model
for the ontological reality (particle, field, wave, or whatever) of the entity
being described.
"Perhaps
there is no useful conceptual model to describe ultimate reality in human terms
-- and perhaps there is no need for one. (1) A. Hobson, 'There are no particles,
there are only fields,' Am. J. Phys. 81, 211–223 (2013). (Robert J. Sciamanda
Department of Physics, Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro,
Pennsylvania...)."
"I thank
R. J. Sciamanda for the nice comments, but must disagree with his views about
realism. It is an important topic, because too many physicists, disheartened by
the apparent conundrums of standard quantum physics, are giving up on science's
endeavour to describe the real world. There is no reason to regard quantum
fields as less real than rocks. Indeed, rocks are made of them. Are electrons
and photons not real? If they are, then quantum fields are real because
electrons and photons are field quanta. To discuss this issue, it is sufficient
to look only at the non-relativistic limit of the quantized Dirac equation,
namely the Schrödinger equation. Here, the issue comes down to the reality of
the Schrödinger field (the 'wavefunction'). Is it only a calculational tool
having nothing to do with reality? I think not. In the double-slit experiment,
for example, a real electron comes through one or the other or both slits. As
argued in my paper, this electron is an extended wave in a quantum field, as
described by the Schrodinger equation.
"The
conundrums of wave-particle duality, quantum randomness, macroscopic
superpositions, non-locality, measurement, and collapse of the state function
are not a sign that quantum physics fails to describe the real world. None are
true paradoxes. All have consistent explanations in terms of the
counter-intuitive behaviour of field quanta. Reality does not fade from
existence once one reaches some small distance scale, whether it be a millimetre
or an angstrom
or the distances probed at the LHC [Large Hadron Collider -- RL]. (Art Hobson
Department of Physics University of Arkansas Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701)."
[Both quoted from
here. (This links to a PDF.) Spelling modified to agree with UK English;
quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Links added.]
[Hobson's
article appeared as
Hobson (2013). (This links to a PDF.)]
As we will
see later, maverick physicist,
David Bohm
has a totally different interpretation
of QM, and, for him, particles were real. Moreover, if
String Theory (now
called by some, M-Theory) is to be believed, if there are any 'particles', they are
actually tiny vibrating 'strings' (i.e., they are wavelike), made of 'we don't
know what...'/'energy'.
Part of the
fundamental difference in opinion here centres around the question whether
physicists should endeavour to understand the nature of the physical universe or
just try to 'calculate and predict'. The tension between these two
opposing views of Physics was brought out with admirable clarity by
scientist/philosopher,
Tim Maudlin,
in the following video interview:
Video Ten: The Problem With
Quantum Theory
(Ignore The Annoying Swimmer In
The Background!)
[See also
Becker (2018). On this in general, see Strassler (2024), and
this video interview
with the author.]
However, the
problem this poses for DM is now quite stark: if there are no particles, only
fields, then questions whether electrons and photons are both wave and particle
will fall by the wayside, of no more relevance to science than questions about
the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin.
The
theoretical and practical headaches this leaves for physicists are no less daunting, since the physical nature
of each 'field' remains completely obscure. [I will say no more about that
topic in this Essay -- but see Essay Eleven
Part One on
this.]
Resuming the argument
left over
from an earlier section -- but, more specifically, with respect to the
alleged contradiction outlined in L1, above (i.e., "Cell
C1
is both alive and not alive") -- how would it be possible to confirm the
supposed fact that a cell is alive and dead at the same time? Certainly, just
looking at cells won't help. Nor is it much use referring to the vagueness
of the alleged 'boundary-line between life and death'. That is because Engels
himself regarded living cells as a unity of living and dead processes
(or, at least, of 'opposing tendencies')
while such cells were still alive;this is the imagined
contradiction that needs to be confirmed somehow.
"For everyday purposes we know and can say, e.g., whether an
animal is alive or not. But, upon closer inquiry, we find that this is, in many
cases, a very complex question, as the jurists know very well. They have
cudgelled their brains in vain to discover a rational limit beyond which the
killing of the child in its mother's womb is murder. It is just as impossible to
determine absolutely the moment of death, for physiology proves that death is
not an instantaneous momentary phenomenon, but a very protracted process.
"In like manner, every organic being is every moment the same
and not the same, every moment it assimilates matter supplied from without, and
gets rid of other matter; every moment some cells of its body die and others
build themselves anew; in a longer or shorter time the matter of its body is
completely renewed, and is replaced by other atoms of matter, so that every
organic being is always itself, and yet something other than itself." [Engels
(1976), pp.26-27. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
"[L]ife consists precisely and primarily in this
-- that
a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is
therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes
themselves, and which constantly asserts and resolves itself; and as soon as the
contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to and end, and death steps in." [Ibid.,
p.153.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Abstract identity
(a = a; and negatively, a cannot be
simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in
organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its
life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself, by absorption
and excretion of substances, by respiration, by cell formation and death of
cells, by the process of circulation taking place, in short, by a sum of
incessant molecular changes which make up life and the sum-total of whose
results is evident to our eyes in the phases of life -- embryonic life,
youth, sexual maturity, process of reproduction, old age, death. The further
physiology develops, the more important for it become these incessant,
infinitely small changes, and hence the more important for it also the
consideration of difference within identity, and the old abstract
standpoint of formal identity, that an organic being is to be treated as
something simply identical with itself, as something constant, becomes out of
date." [Engels
(1954), p.214. Bold emphases alone added.]
At this
point, it is worth reminding ourselves that some form of confirmation is
required here in order to prevent this theory being branded dogmatic, a priori and hence Idealist. This isn't something that the
present author demands, it is a precondition that
DM-theorists themselves insist upon:
"All
three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought:
the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being;
the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of
his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures
as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake
lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of
thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and
often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be
arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the
product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954),
p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]
"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator
from painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]
"Dialectics and materialism are the basic
elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all
that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master
key. Dialectics can't be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts,
from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), p.233.
Bold emphasis added]
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added]
"This…is only a safe
assumption on the basis of constant empirical verification…." [Rees (1998), p.110.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay
claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint
which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they
are…without disguises and without fantasy….
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added.]
"Engels emphasises that it would be
entirely wrong to crudely read the dialectic into nature. The dialectic has
to be discovered in nature and evolving out of nature....
"Of course, that does not mean we
should impose some a priori dialectical construct upon nature. The
dialectic, as Engels explains time and again, has to be painstakingly
discovered in nature....
"Engels did not make the laws of
nature dialectical. He tried, on the contrary, to draw out the most
general dialectical laws from nature. Not force artificial,
preconceived, inappropriate notions onto nature." [Jack Conrad,Weekly
Worker, 30/08/2007. Bold emphases added.]
Once
more: how is it possible to confirm that cells are indeed as dialecticians
say they are?
Perhaps a consideration of the
nature and application of
vague predicates (such as "...is alive", or "...is
dead") might help, here --, at least, as far as this supposed 'contradiction' is concerned?
Unfortunately, such a detour is unlikely
to help. That can be seen if we consider another less fraught but no less vague distinction: the imprecise boundary between
night and day. In relation to that transition, few DM-theorists would want to argue
(it is to be hoped!) that daylight is itself a contradictory combination of night and
day at any specific point on earth not near the boundary of the Sun's westward moving
shadow on the face of the Earth. Hence, at mid-day in high summer, on the
Tropic of Cancer in blazing sunlight,
say, only a complete fool would want to argue that because the boundary between
night and day is vague, and because day eventually turns into night, bright
daylight is a contradictory combination of night and day (or of darkness and
light). Even if it were possible to find a few maverick, hard-core,
granite-skulled
DM-fans who were prepared to argue along those lines, even fewer would agree
with them -- except they might both agree and disagree just to wind them
up.
Less supercilious critics
might ask such mad
dog dialecticians for the
empirical evidence that backs up the odd idea that light itself (in the
form of bright mid-day tropical sunshine) is a
UO of light and darkness (or,
perhaps of
night and day) 'dialectically' slugging it out, as it were. Indeed,
they might also want to know what work this idea could possibly do in DM-terms,
even if it were true. Are we to suppose that light 'struggles'
with its opposite, darkness, at mid-day? Presumably not, since darkness is just
the absence of light! Must we argue that darkness
makes light change into darkness, and vice versa (which is what the
DM-classicists
tell us the 'struggle' between all such 'opposites' achieves)? If they are prepared to argue
along such lines, this innovative hypothesis will no doubt force
scientists to re-write their theory of light, for up to now they had recklessly
assumed that light was created by
the way sub-atomic particles
behave, and that this was itself the consequence of a transformation of one form of matter
or energy into
another. They had certainly given no thought to the possibility that it was
brought about by the action of a privation
-- the lack of
light -- on light itself, which 'struggle' leads to nightfall!
As I
am such the reader already knows, in the real world nightfall
has more to do with the rotation of the Earth, and nothing at all to do with a
battle between photons and the absence of photons!
In
that case, it seems that this 'dialectical union' of light and dark does no work
at all, even if we were foolish enough to accept that idea.
So, there are circumstances where even
'potentially vague' predicates have
clear applications -- or they can be paraphrased so that they mimic those that
do.
In order to test Engels's claims about living things, we would need a way of
deciding
whether a certain cell wasa UOwhile it was still
unambiguously alive. That is why it was argued (above) that even a
consideration of
the applicability of vague predicates is of little use to dialecticians. No matter how vague the
predicate, it would still be impossible to verify Engels's claim that a cell was
alive and dead at the same time (or that it was dialectical mix of the two --
or, indeed, a combination of two 'opposite tendencies' (anyway, how does one confirm a
tendency?)) while
it was still clearly and unambiguously alive.
At
the boundary between life and death humans don't possess
senses -- or, indeed, scientific equipment -- sensitive enough to verify Engels's a priori,
dogmatic claims about life and death, even though it is far from clear
whether anyone has the faintest clue how to go about doing that if we had.
Of
course, it would always be open to a DM-supporter to point out that a living
cell is constantly exchanging dead matter -- or matter that isn't 'alive' -- with its environment, or that certain
parts of the cell aren't actually alive while the rest it is.
Nevertheless, exactly how that would validate the claim that a cell is alive and dead all at once (or that it is a
dialectic union of 'opposite tendencies') is far from clear.
At best, they would simply confirm that living things contain dead
matter. But, it would no more show that when a cell is alive it is also dead (or
a dialectic union of 'opposite tendencies') than
would an analogous claim demonstrate that people are clothed and naked at the
same time (or that they possess hidden 'tendencies to dress and undress')
because they all have nothing on underneath their clothes, and were
thus 'contradictory UOs' for all that.
On the other hand, if anyone were
foolish enough to claim this, they would have to suppose further that one of
these opposites (being naked, say) was locked in some sort of 'struggle' with
the other (with being clothed) -- or, rather, the aforementioned
'tendencies' were
locked together in a brawl of some description --, which 'explains' why we put
clothes on, or take them off, at various times of the day!
In that case, if this 'theory' is to be believed, it isn't we
who 'struggle' to take our clothes off, but our nakedness that makes us do it!
Again, it could be objected that
this trivialises DM. The issue
here is quite clearly the following: living things are changing all the time; they are a dialecticalunity of living and dead matter, or of analogous processes and tendencies. Cells constantly absorb dead matter from
their environment and turn it into living matter. Dialecticians certainlydo
not maintain that an organism (or a cell) is wholly alive and
completely dead all at once, as the above remarks foolishly suggest. Cells are a dialectical
union of two contradictory processes, or tendencies, which slowly change or age the
host organism, perhaps
even killing it.
Or,
so it could be argued.
Nevertheless, such a response won't do. The discussion here has centred on the controversial idea that DM-'contradictions' can
be verified or falsified in some way, not that they can be re-jigged
theoretically (or 'sanitised') every time this theory encounters an 'problem'. [That
particular escape route -- i.e., attempting to re-write DM with some
'innovative' word-juggling whenever it faces serious difficulties -- will be
blocked in a later Essay.]
So, the introduction of yet more jargon
here doesn't help, nor does it amount to confirmation by any stretch of
the imagination. It does, however, increase suspicion that
this is all that dialecticians have to offer by way of 'substantiation'
for their
theory: yet more jargonised expressions. And, if that is so, the
self-imposed requirement that
dialectics be confirmed (somehow) by checking it against realityturns
out to be an empty gesture.
It could be countered that the above
quotations clearly show
that dialecticians are also interested in generalisation. DM-theorists try
to deduce general laws applicable to nature from nature, which is
all that Engels was doing here. Since this is also the way that scientists work
how can it be a problem?
The nature of science and what scientist actually do will be
examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two, but in advance of that it is worth directing the
reader's attention to
this section of Essay Eleven Part One, where the topic was dealt with in
more detail.
However, to return to more pressing matters: how is even this
generalisation about the nature of life to be confirmed? In view of the fact
that scientists plainly don'tmake generalisations and then fail to test them, how might we test
Engels's claims about life and death?
Clearly, it isn't
possible to verify this particular DM-theory -- i.e., that cells are a
dialectical union of two 'contradictory' processes or tendencies.
[Any who
disagree might like to let me know how
it might be done without prejudicing any such attempt with the use if yet
more unexplained DM-jargon. In the meantime, much of the next two
subsections are devoted to showing how and why the confirmation of this part of
Engels's theory is actually impossible.]
This aspect
of 'dialectics' is
no less dogmatic and a
priorithan anything else we find in
DM. Certainly, no one doubts that living
things absorb non-living matter from their surroundings, but how this validates the
claim that they are a dialectical unity of life and death (or there are
'dialectically-united tendencies'
in one direction or the other) remains
obscure. Still less does it support the claim that life is somehow 'contradictory',
or that it is a union of 'contradictory' processes and/or tendencies --
when we have yet to be told with any clarity
what a 'dialectical contradiction'
actually is!
It might
help if we examined this
topic more closely. Perhaps the intended 'contradiction'
here is meant to be
something like the following:
C1a: Cell C1
is a (dialectical) combination of living and dead matter, or of contradictory
processes and
tendencies.
[To avoid repetition, I
will omit the phrase "contradictory processes and tendencies" from now on; it should be
understood in every subsequent use of the word "processes" and its
cognates in this sub-section.]
But, once again, in what way is a combination
of living and dead matter, or processes, a contradiction? If it were,
then surely any collection of alleged opposites would be contradictory, too.
Thus, presumably, the human body would be contradictory simply because it comes
equipped with a left and a right hand -– meaning, perhaps, that those who have
lost a limb in an accident weren't quite as contradictory as their less orthopaedically-challenged friends
are. And, if a surgeon removes a kidney in an operation, should we say she
has "resolved a contradiction"? Indeed, in like manner one could argue that
we contradict ourselves every time we look in a mirror, turn around, walk
backwards, or shake hands. Apart from sounding enigmatic, what is the point of
such talk? Other than representing an appeal to yet another linguistic trick (i.e.,
combining a word with its supposed opposite -- as in the following schematic sentence, "C1
is both A and non-A", or "C1
is both A and B", where A and B are opposites), there
seems to be little to
recommend this
way of talking.
[Any
who object that no dialectician talks this way should check out
Dialectics For Kids --
especially
here
-- which
is widely linked to on the Internet, and then perhaps think again. I have listed
several other examples of the use of language like this by DM-fans throughout
Essay Eight Part Two.]
For
example, your
left hand doesn't 'struggle' with your right, nor do you 'struggle' with your
image in a mirror. When you walk backwards, there is no 'struggle' underway
with the non-existent state of you walking forwards that turns into
either its opposite. If that were the case, every time you walked
forward, the non-existent state of 'you walking backward' would soon turn you
around! Of course, these aren't even dialectical opposites! Your left
hand doesn't imply you have a right hand; the one can exist without the other -- unlike,
say, the capitalist class and the proletariat. You can exist without an image in
a mirror -- indeed, human beings managed to do that for many tens of thousands
of years before mirrors were
even thought of. In DM-terms, none of this makes any sense.
[Indeed, quite the opposite (no pun intended)
-- as we will see
in Essay Eight Parts One,
Two and
Three.]
Naturally, dialecticians might want to cling onto this
odd way of describing
'opposites' (and
the site mentioned above certainly does that, but without once explaining why such
things are contradictions -- however, on that site, see
here), but if empirical evidence is meant to decide on such issues (as Engels,
Novack, Cornforth, TAR,
RIRE and many others
maintain), convenient verbal artifices like this will hardly do. Otherwise
why bother saying that DM requires verification to avoid being labelled
"Idealist" if it can only be 'confirmed' by yet more word-juggling?
If such an approach were generalised, scientists would only need to invent a few
verbal tricks of their own and count that as adequate verification of any given theory or hypothesis. They
would certainly save time and
money, which they now unwisely waste on all those useless
observations and experiments!
[Again,
some might conclude that the above emphasis on
verification and confirmation proves that the present author is a "positivist", or
even an "empiricist". On that, see Note 15a.]
Once more it could be objected that this
completely misses the point: left and right hands may be opposites, but they are
not dialectically united opposites in change, and the same applies to mirror images and walking forwards. The parts of
a cell are united in this way, as contradictory processes.
Be this as it may,
it would still
fail to show
that this 'unity' amounted to a contradiction -– nor would it demonstrate
that this aspect of DM had been verified, that it is verifiable, or that
it is even capable of being confirmed in any way at all -- of course, other than
by the use of yet more obscure jargon lifted straight from The Idealists' Phrasebook.
Anyway, the
alleged contradiction between living and dead matter only arises
inside the cell. This 'contradiction' isn't thought to exist
between just any old aggregate of living and dead matter. For a
dialectical unity to hold, here, the two types of matter (or forces/tendencies) must enter
into some sort of close proximity with one another -- an organic union, perhaps?
In addition, some form of "mediation" has to exist between them --
either that, or they must be connected by an "internal relation" of some
description. In
that case, it would seem that dead matter must enter the cell and link up or interact with
living matter in a process of some kind -- but, alas, in an as-yet-to-be-explained
manner.
We have
already seen how DM-theorists run together two different meanings of "internal"
-- a spatial-, and a logical-sense. Here we see it surface once more, where it
is clear that its spatial-meaning is being confused with its logical-meaning.
Or, rather, it is simply being assumed that if certain objects or
processes are spatially related they must automatically be logically related. So
far no DM-theorist has actually tried to show that these 'dialectical' processes
inside any given cell are inter-related like the proletariat and the capitalist
classes are; that they both inter-define and imply one another, such that one
can't exist without the other. This is just assumed on the basis of a spatial
relation.
Hence, it isn't at all clear how a non-living body of matter can in
any way form a UO with
living matter. At no point do they imply one another, and the former can
certainly exist without the latter. For example, (i) Non-living matter surely existed in
splendid isolation for hundreds of millions of years after
the
formation of the Earth right up to the moment when
life evolved, and (ii) In the rest of the universe where there is no life,
non-living matter has existed for billions of years.
This means that the vast bulk of non-living matter in the universe exists where
there is no life. On the other hand, if there were a 'dialectical connection'
between the two forms of matter (but are there really two forms of
matter?), then one couldn't exist without the other -- indeed, non-living matter would
imply the existence of living matter (and vice versa), meaning that life would spring up everywhere in the
universe, spontaneously. We wouldn't be able to move for life forms since it
would exist everywhere there is non-living matter. For example, there would have to be a life
form, or body of life forms, the size of Mount Everest close to that mountain,
to say nothing of what sort of life form we could expect near the Sahara Desert,
or inside
The Mantle and Core of the Earth, if dead matter were related to living
matter like the proletariat is supposed to be related to the capitalist class.
Putting this fatal objection to one side for now, what stops us from saying
that when non-living matter enters the cell it becomes living matter? Clearly, in
that case, there would no longer be anything for a DM-'contradiction' to latch
onto, since there would only be one type of matter, or process, inside the cell: the living
sort.
Naturally, DM-theorists
might want to challenge that response -– but they may only do so by advancing an
opposite stipulation to the effect that dead matter remains
dead even when it enters the cell in order to rebut the contrary stipulation
above. This counter-stipulation would
then allow DM-fans to continue claiming that
the dead matter in question becomes part of a 'dialectical union', or process in
conjunction with living matter,
when inside the cell (even though there is no obvious way these two forms of
matter could enter into such a union, as we have just seen).
Now, it is worth emphasising that this DM-counter-move could only ever be
based on a stipulation. That is because the
inspection of cellular processes -- no matter how detailed or fine-grained
it might be, no matter what level of magnification was brought to bear on it --
would fail tell us which of these two alternatives was
correct. It isn't possible to see that dead matter remains dead (or
becomes alive) inside a cell -- even if it were possible to say what the difference is between
'alive' and 'dead' matter --, any more than it is possible to see
when night becomes day. Nor is it possible to confirm either option in any other way that
wasn't itself based on yet another set of stipulations. To be sure, the
examination of living cells reveals all sorts of activity going on -– but
observation alone can't decide which
aspects of this activity are of the 'living sort' and which are not, or which are the
'struggling' processes that DM-theorists require, and which are not. That is, of course,
why
scientists
still face serious problems trying to define life itself. [Are
prions, for
instance, alive? They are certainly active inside cells.]
It
could be objected at this point that this is in fact consistent with the DM-view
of life; DM-theorists point out that there are no fixed and permanent boundary
lines in nature and society, so no wonder it is difficult to define life:
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the
same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to
its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the
contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence,
§119.
Bold emphasis added. The serious problems this dogmatic and a priori
diktat creates for Hegel, which he nowhere tries to justify, are detailed
here.]
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or
does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else.
Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in
a rigid antithesis one to the other.
"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is
that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable
fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful
adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the
metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a
number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular
object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it
becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In
the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them;
in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of
that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood
for the trees." [Engels
(1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"For a stage in the outlook
on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all
opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical
method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no
hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which
bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises
also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is
the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage.
Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical
categories retain their validity." [Engels
(1954), pp.212-13.
Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"…[the] basis of philosophical materialism
and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical
materialism. The recognition of immutable elements…and so forth, is not
materialism, but metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialism….
Dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every
scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists
on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving
matter from one state into another." [Lenin (1972),
p.312.
Bold emphasis added.]
[I
have said much more about this rather odd theory in Essay Nine
Part One, so
readers are directed there for more details. I also return to this again, below.]
However, the insistence that there being no "absolute boundaries" here only
throws into doubt the claim that the link between these two forms of matter, or
between life and death, is 'dialectical'. It isn't easy to see how there could
be such a relation if it is unclear at what point whether something is live
or dead, just as it would be difficult to see how there could be such a relation
between workers and capitalists if at some point it was unclear who was a worker
and who was a capitalist. And, of course, there is a marked difference between
worker and capitalist, just as there is between night and day, but what is the
difference between dead and living matter? We have already seen that the old
idea that there is a 'life-force' (an élan vital)
at work here that allows us to tell the difference between living and dead
matter is as obsolete as the
Crystalline Spheres of Ptolemaic Astronomy.
Of
course, this underlines the point made above that if there is no "absolute
boundary" here then observation can't tell us when non-living matter becomes
living matter, hence any declaration that at some point a collection of matter is
alive or dead will have to be based on stipulation.
It
might be objected that it is
possible to confirm that when non-living matter enters a cell it remains in the same
state for a while until it is metabolised by that cell. Hence, the above
contentions are misguided, at best.
However, what we actually see and what
we might want to say are two different things. To illustrate this, let us
track, say, a single
Glucose molecule,
G1,
as it passes across a given membrane into a cell. Naturally, in order to do this we
will have to assume god-like powers of perception, discrimination, and observation, but, ignoring that formidable obstacle for the present, we might want to say that while on the
outside, G1
is non-living, and -- in view of the objection just noted -- we might also want
to maintain that it is still non-living soon after it enters the cell. Once
inside, G1
will naturally mingle with other molecules that form part of the metabolic
processes of the cell in question.
For the sake of clarity, let us call
the set of molecules that form part of the metabolic processes of the cell in question, "M",
all the while allowing for that collection to change
over time. But, are any of molecules belonging to M actually
alive themselves? If we are to derive a contradiction here we need to be
able to say that a sub-set of M is alive in order to maintain
that both living and non-living molecules co-exist, side by side, as part of a
'contradictory' process, P. Otherwise, once more, there would
be no way to identify both halves of the alleged 'contradiction', and
hence no way to validate this part of Engels's theory.
But, would we be able
to see (or would we be able to confirm inany other way) that
some of the elements of
M are alive, whatever we finally decide to say? In order for us to
verify (as opposed to simply assume, or stipulate,
again) that a 'contradiction' exists here, we would have to register an instrumental
or sensory
impression of some sort that confirmed that certain molecules belonging
to M are indeed alive at the same time that G1,
its latest recruit,
isn't. Or, that there are analogous processes at work in this cell. But, to what could we appeal, here? Unless we are to suppose that there
is something special about living molecules, or processes, which makes them look alive
--
or which makes their 'vivacious qualities' detectable -- or, indeed, we assume they
are under the control of
a "vital force" of some sort (which could also be observed or confirmed in some way), any subsequent declaration
that these molecules (or processes) are alive could only ever be based on yet another stipulation.
Of course, the above analysis looks rather
reductionist, and no dialectician would want to argue that molecules
taken singly actually contradict one another in this way -- in the sense that
while one or more of them is alive, another molecule nearby isn't --, even if collections of them are
still to be regarded as UOs
in their own right. Although, it is also worth reminding ourselves that DM-theorists certainly talk about
sub-atomic particles doing just this! Indeed,
Hegel himself spoke of acids and
bases as contradictory pairs (i.e., when he declared that one was the
"other" of the other), and they
could hardly do that if their individual molecular structures, or, indeed, individual
molecules failed to do this.
[Yes, I know that in Hegel's day molecules were unknown! But, contemporary
DM-fans certainly know about molecules.]
Even so, dialecticians might want to add, as
indeed they do, that life "emerges" at certain levels of molecular organisation
or complexity, as
'quantity turns into
quality' (etc.).15
Hence, it is only at such higher, integrated structural levels that these contradictions
arise or become apparent. This means that the
above criticisms are badly off target.
Or, so it could be maintained, once more.
However, to reiterate, this dispute arose because it
was assumed that it is possible to see, verify, or confirm (in some
way or other, by an appeal to something empirical) the existence of
DM-'contradictions', which would justify describing them as "real, material
contradictions". That is itself required, it was claimed, in order to
prevent DM sliding back
into the Idealist swamp from which it had emerged. Short of doing that, DM
would be no different from Hegelian Idealism, in this respect at least.
In the present case, the
'contradiction' was supposed to be the following: that
inside a cell living matter exists alongside matter that isn't
alive,
caught up in some sort of 'dialectical' relation, process, union or tension.
[I
have already considered
the only other viable option available in this case: that there exist opposite forces inside
living cells -- i.e., those instantiated by anabolic and catabolic processes.]
Difficulties then arose over ascertaining
what sense could be made of the claim that there was
a dialectical 'contradiction' here, as well as over the question whether this 'dialectical'
relation could be confirmed by
observation, or by some other empirical means, as
DM-theorists
themselves
demand of their own theory.
It
now turns out that this particular thesis can only be verified by an appeal to
yet another rather shaky DM-'Law', not by
an appeal to anything empirical.
If so, it seems that the existence of DM-'contradictions' can only be confirmed by
reference to
Q«Q
–- but not by 'comparison with reality' --, as we had been led all along to
believe.
[Q«Q
= The Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality, and vice versa.]
As we saw
earlier,
Q«Q
is either a conventionalised, vaguely-stated 'Law' (more accurately, it is
at best a trite rule of thumb which fails more times that it works,
i.e., where any clear sense can be made of it), or
it is yet another
example of metaphysical confusion.
It certainly can't bear the weight that this
latest counter-argument places upon it. But, even if it could, we still
await the empirical confirmation of Engels's claims about living cells; once again, an appeal to
yet more theory is no help at all:
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
It could be objected that
the above argument fails to comprehend the dialectical process underlying
the development of knowledge, the interplay between the abstract and the concrete. But, even if
that were relevant, reliable -- or even comprehensible --, in
what way could it help anyone understand how it is possible to verify or
confirm this 'dialectical' process by observation, or by any other means?
Clearly, the above difficulties (concerning empirical confirmation) afflict
dialectical processes just as much as they confront alive/dead 'dialectical'
molecules.15a
[DM-epistemology (including the alleged relation between the 'abstract' and the
'concrete') was examined in more detail in Essays Two,
and Three Parts
One,
Two and Three. The oft-repeated appeal to
practice was destructively analysed in Essay Ten
Part One.]
Or, are we to suppose that DM-theorists can
somehow non-empirically 'intuit' processes of this sort (in nature and
society)? Must we concede that they have a 'special way' of confirming these DM-Super-Truths,
using an avenue of knowledge concerning which the rest of don't have access, the
precise nature of which they can't actually
explain to anyone -- not even one another? If so, how are they different from good old-fashioned,
open and honest mystics?
Inside or outside the cell, then, we seem to
be unable to confirm the presence of these 'contradictions';
certainly not by observation, or even by experiments that are themselves
observation-based (or, indeed, any that are free from ad hoc
stipulation), and which aren't just "thought experiments",
themselves.
Incidentally, to return to an earlier
difficulty, not even a god-like observer could see or confirm in any way whether certain molecules (or processes) are alive or dead -- at any
chosen level of complexity, magnification or detail -- without recourse to a stipulation to
either effect. In that case, short of just such a convention,not even an 'Ideal Observer' could verify the
presence of these 'contradictions'.
That being so, the
claim 'contradictions'
exist in nature and society can't have been derived from
experience -- hence it can't have been obtained by a 'process of abstraction' -- it can only have been
foisted on
reality as just another a priori, metaphysical
dogma.
Now, even though John Rees and others repeatedly refer
their
readers to the necessary empirical checks that must be made in order to verify
the presence of DM-'contradictions', what we actually find in their place
in TAR (and in other DM-texts, such as DN, AD, DMH, FPM, PN, IDM and RIRE) are a
handful of superficial, conceptual,faux-investigations into
things like motion, change, identity, living and dead matter, matter in general
(which
we
are told is an "abstraction", anyway!), and the 'nature of reality'
-- with little or no empirical evidence offered to back them up (i.e., evidence that hasn't itself been slanted by
the imposition and use of yet more
DM-stipulations and Hegel-jargon).
[These allegations were thoroughly substantiated in Essay
Two, as well as earlier in this Essay.]
[DN = Dialectics of
Nature; AD = Anti-Dühring; DMH = The Development Of The
Monist View Of History; FPM
= Fundamental Problems Of Marxism; TAR = The Algebra of Revolution; PN = Philosophical Notebooks; IDM = In Defence of Marxism;
RIRE = Reason In Revolt.]
None of this
at all surprising, either; empirical
verification of even one of these 'contradictions' is impossible -- even in theory -–, as
was demonstrated earlier.
[Graham Priest's
claims to the contrary will be examined in a later Essay -- although, it is
quite plain that his 'contradictions' aren't even 'dialectical contradictions',
merely
rather confused or quirky ways of speaking. On that, see Slater (2002, 2004, 2007b, 2007c).]
Of course, I
am sure DM-theorists sincerely believe
that there is a 'contradiction' between living and dead matter (or, there are
'contradictory tendencies' at work in living cells), the processes
underlying life and death
-- or, indeed, that there are 'contradictions' in nature and society,
and that there are 'dialectical mechanisms' at work all over the place --, but until they inform us
which particular set of observations or experiments (not themselves
dependent on further stipulations) confirm these acts of faith,
they can't consistently maintain that their ideas have been "continually checked
against reality andverified by experience". In fact, they have yet to
provide even so much as onevague description how the existence of a single 'contradiction' can in
fact be confirmed in nature and society by any means whatsoever.
In fact, and worse: we have yet to be told
with any clarity what a "dialectical
contradiction" actually is!
Admittedly, the above objections leave
unchallenged the naive belief that DM-'contradictions' had originally been discovered
empirically,
were even prompted by observation, or, indeed, that they have ever been
based on physical evidence of any sort. In fact, as is well known, this idea was
borrowed from Hegel,
and from earlier Idealists and Mystics, who also failed to provide any
observational evidence in support of the odd things they regularly dream up.
Subsequent observations
aimed at 'verifying' these 'contradictions' would be otiose, anyway -– that is, if DM-theoristsever even bothered to perform any such tests. John Rees certainly mentions
none of the experiments he performed in this regard, neither do Woods and Grant -- the same can
be said of Hegel, Engels, Dietzgen, Plekhanov, Lenin, Mao, Trotsky, Stalin...
Dialecticians
in general haven't gone down in history as great experimental scientists.
Experiments would be
pointless anyway; as we have just seen; that is because it isn't possible to see (or to experience)
'contradictions' in nature without a decision already having been made to
label them that way (the latter
choice itself based on an explicit, or implicit, Idealist convention borrowed from
thinkers who were themselves card-carrying members of an ancient, mystical,
apriorist, philosophical tradition). This helps explain why so littleevidence
(as opposed to repeated assertion)
confronts the reader when the consult in DM-texts, and why there is none at all that substantiates the
doctrine that 'contradictions' exist right throughout the universe,
everywhere and all the time.
Any who
doubt this should compare the average DM text (even those that sincerely
try to prove there is a 'dialectic in nature', such as RIRE, or Gollobin
(1986)) with a bona
fide scientific or technical paper that has been published in any
randomly selected copy of, say, Nature.
The difference between
Mickey Mouse Dialectical 'Science' and genuine science will
immediately become apparent to the unbiased reader.
In the place of hard evidence, what we
invariably find in its place in DM-texts are the same hackneyed examples dredged up year-in year-out. These include the following hardy perennials: boiling or freezing water, cells that are alive and dead, grains of barley that 'negate'
themselves, magnets that are
UOs, Mamelukes' ambiguous fighting
prowess when
matched against French soldiers, Mendeleyev's
Table, the sentence "John is a man", homilies about parts and wholes (e.g., "The whole is greater than the sum of
the parts", etc.), characters from Molière who discover they have been speaking prose
all their lives, laughably
weak
and misguided attempts to depict the principles of FL,
"Yay, Yay", and "Nay, Nay",
anything more than this "cometh of evil", wave/particle 'duality', 'emergent'
properties popping into existence all over the place, etc., etc.
Even then, we are never given a scientific report about any of these phenomena; all
we find in DM-texts are a few brief, amateurish and impressionistic sentences
(or, at most, a handful of paragraphs) devoted to each
example. Even at
its best (again, in, say, Woods and Grant (1995/2007), or Gollobin (1986)), all we
find are a few chapters of secondary or tertiary evidence, specially-selected
and heavily slanted in the required
direction. No contrary evidence, or argument, is even so much as mentioned.
In
contrast -- and in relation to, say,
politics, history, economics or current affairs --, Marxists provide countless pages
of primary and secondary data and analysis (much of it original), which they
refine and update
regularly. [Michael
Roberts's blog being an excellent example of such.] But, when it comes to
dialectics, all we are presented with is watery-thin 'evidence' and even thinner
reasoning. Small wonder then that
to its Marxist opponents, like myself, this area of theory is
regarded as
risibly insubstantial, and is
hence treated with the contempt it deserves.
Incidentally, Lenin let it slip that evidence is irrelevant in
this regard, anyway:
"This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov)
usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the
sum-total of examples ['for example, a seed,' 'for
example, primitive communism.' The same is true of Engels. But it is 'in the
interests of popularisation...'] and not as a
law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin
(1961),
p.357.
Emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
A 'Law of Cognition' follows from a priori reasoning,
not
from the facts. C L R James and Herbert Marcuse both concurred:
"Hegel defines the principle of
Contradiction as follows:
'Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as
it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.'
[Hegel (1999),
p.439, §956.]
"The first thing to note is that
Hegel makes little attempt to prove this. A few lines later he says:
'With regard to the assertion that
contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this
statement.'
"We here meet one of the most important
principles of the dialectical logic, and one that has been consistently
misunderstood, vilified or lied about. Dialectic for Hegel was a strictly
scientific method. He might speak of inevitable laws, but he insists from the
beginning that the proof of dialectic as scientific method is that the laws
prove their correspondence with reality. Marx's dialectic is of the same
character. Thus he excluded what later became The Critique of Political
Economy from Capital because it took for granted what only the
detailed argument and logical development of Capital could prove. Still
more specifically, in his famous letter to Kugelmann on the theory of value, he
ridiculed the idea of having to 'prove' the labour theory of value. If the
labour theory of value proved to be the means whereby the real relations of
bourgeois society could be demonstrated in their movement, where they came from,
what they were, and where they were going, that was the proof of the theory.
Neither Hegel nor Marx understood any other scientific proof.
"To ask for some proof of the laws,
as Burnham implied, or to prove them 'wrong' as Sidney Hook tried to do, this
is to misconceive dialectical logic entirely. Hegel complicated the question
by his search for a completely closed system embracing all aspects of the
universe; this no Marxist ever did (sic!). The frantic shrieks that Marx's dialectic is
some sort of religion or teleological construction, proving inevitably the
victory of socialism, spring usually from men who are frantically defending the
inevitability of bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution." [James
(1947), quoted from
here. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"The doctrine of Essence seeks to
liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that
appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of
dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the
apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Minor typo corrected.
Bold emphasis added.]
To be sure, Lenin
prefaced this particular quotation in the following way:
"The correctness of this aspect of the content of
dialectics must be tested by the history
of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov) usually receives
inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of
examples ['for example, a seed,' 'for example,
primitive communism.' The same is true of Engels. But it is 'in the interests of
popularisation...'] and not as a law of
cognition (and as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin (1961),
p.357.
Italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
But, it is plain from what he went on to say that he meant this
to be taken as
an a priori truth. From that, it seems that 'dialectics' is meant to be imposed on the history of science,
too,
just like it has been imposed on nature
and society. Otherwise, why say this?
"...the identity of opposites is taken as the
sum-total of examples ['for example, a seed,' 'for
example, primitive communism.' The same is true of Engels. But it is 'in the
interests of popularisation....'] and not as a
law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world)." [Ibid.]
We can see this from the 'examples' Lenin himself gives of
the 'identity of opposites':
"In mathematics: + and —. Differential and
integral.
In mechanics: action and reaction.
In physics: positive and negative electricity.
In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.
In social science: the class struggle." [Ibid,
p.357.]
Lenin made no attempt to show how the evidence supports
assertions like these, and that is because, alongside Hegel, he took this to be a 'law of
cognition'. Which is why he could also assert:
"Such
must also be the method of exposition (i.e., study) of dialectics in general
(for with Marx the dialectics of bourgeois society is only a particular case of
dialectics). To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc.,
with anyproposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a
man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel's
genius recognised): the individual is the universal....
Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are
identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the
universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the
individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every
universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every
universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every
individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual
is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals
(things, phenomena, processes) etc. Herealready
we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of
objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the
necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido
is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a
number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the
appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.
"Thus
in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a 'nucleus' ('cell') the
germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that
dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. And natural science
shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in any simple
instance) objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the
individual into the universal, of the contingent into the necessary,
transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics
is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This
is the 'aspect' of the matter (it is not 'an aspect' but the essence of
the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no
attention." [Ibid.,
pp.359-60. Emphases in the original.]
Lenin is quite plain
here: dialectics primarily follows from an
analysis of language and thought, not from the facts, which is why it is a
"law of cognition", and a "property of all human knowledge". Lenin
can't possibly have examined "all human knowledge" (or even a tiny fraction of
it), and yet he was quite happy to assert that dialectics was one of its properties.
This he could only do by means of an a priori, Idealist imposition:
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Which is,
of course, why Lenin's argument
starts from Hegel's a priori
'linguistic analysis', and he felt he could impose the results on the history of
science, too --
not the other way round:
"And natural science shows us (and here again it
must be demonstrated in any simple instance) objective nature with the
same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the universal, of
the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal
connection of opposites. Dialectics is the theory of
knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the 'aspect' of the matter (it is
not 'an aspect' but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not
to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention." [Lenin (1961),
p.360. Italic emphasis in the original;
bold emphasis added.]
Hence, the history of science is
merely to be used to illustrate
dialectical principles arrived at by other means, which in turn explains why DM-theorists
since Engel's day have been happy to foist their theory on the facts. It is also why
Lenin felt confident enough to assert that:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all
processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous
development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of
opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone
furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…." [Ibid.,
pp.357-58. Bold emphasis
alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site; paragraphs merged.]
Hence, DM is the master "key"; Hegel's a priori
'linguistic analysis' 'allows' each DM-adept to derive universal, omni-temporal
truths -- valid for all of space and time -- from thought alone:
"[This] alone
furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…." [Ibid.
Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
This a priori, rationalist approach to
knowledge is underlined by, for example, Herbert
Marcuse; commenting on Hegel, he had this to say:
"The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate
knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the scientific common
sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of knowledge is not the given
fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude
to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge deals with appearances in order to
get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has an essence, that is, things really
are not what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something more
to be done than merely rove from one quality to another and merely to advance
from one qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in
things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The
knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth.
The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential
from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse
(1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Minor typo corrected. Bold emphases added.]15a1
Marcuse nowhere criticises Hegel for this Idealist approach to knowledge; quite
the reverse, in fact, he endorses it. His a priori
approach to Philosophy elsewhere
only serves to confirm that allegation (on this, see Essay Thirteen
Part Three).
Be this as it may, another DM-fan -- David DeGrood -- partially
quoted the above passage with approval:
"To take each and every quality displayed by an
object or even at face value would necessarily mean that neither a scientific
nor a philosophic account could be given of it.
"[Added in a footnote:] As Herbert Marcuse
explains: 'The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship
of "observable facts"....' Such an anti-positivist, anti-phenomenalist, Hegelian
conception of essence has been continuously relied upon by Marxist philosophers
ever since. The doctrine of essence is a fundamental one. A [quotation] from Mao
Tse-Tung [is a] striking confirmation of this: 'When we look at a thing, we must
examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the
threshold, and once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the
thing; this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.'
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1966),
p.213." [DeGrood (1976),
p.73. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
Neither DeGrood nor Marcuse (and, it must be said, Hegel) bothered to prove
(or even provide so much as a weak argument in support of this
ancient idea) that
'essence' is anything other than a pure invention, a figment of the overheated
metaphysical mind -- or, indeed, the idea that anything in the universe actually has an 'essence'.
As noted in the
opening paragraphs of this
Essay,
the invention of words like "essence" -- creations of the Ancient Greek fantasy
--,
was the result of a verbal trick that now 'allows' dialecticians to ignore the deliverances of
their senses, and hence impose their a priori theories on nature and
society.
At least in the above book,
DeGrood failed to say what he thought of Engel's declaration that DM shouldn't be
imposed on nature (his words are quoted again below) -- probably because he
(DeGrood) spends much of it doing just that, appealing to the
following Idealist excuse to cover his rear:
"'The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate
knowledge from the worship of "observable facts"....' Such an anti-positivist,
anti-phenomenalist, Hegelian conception of essence has been continuously relied
upon by Marxist philosophers ever since." [Ibid.]
It
could be objected that this is to misrepresent the above argument. What Hegel,
DeGrood and Marcuse are arguing is that science and philosophy can't just
examine surface appearances, but must seek to find underlying patterns,
general laws, which reveal the essential, as opposed to the accidental surface
phenomena of 'reality'.
Suffice it to say here that the above
volunteered response fails to tell us how dialecticians are able to 'see' what
the rest of us can't -- i.e., spot all these mythical 'essences'. Do they possess a 'third
eye'? Are they especially gifted? How is this unexplained 'ability' (i.e.,
the capacity to 'see' what the rest of humanity can't), how is it any different from
imposing dialectics on nature?
As I
also noted in Essay Two:
This
is rather odd. One minute we are being told that the "laws" of the dialectic
must "correspond with reality", and that this is the only "proof" Marx and Hegel
"understood". The next we are being told that to ask for a proof is
"misconceived".
Anyway, as we have also seen, James is mistaken when he tells us that no Marxist has
ever searched for a "completely closed system embracing all aspects of the
universe". Engels, for one, disagreed:
"And
so, what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general -- and for this
reason extremely far-reaching and important -- law of development of nature,
history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and
plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy --
a law which even Herr Dühring, in spite of all his stubborn resistance, has
unwittingly and in his own way to follow.... Dialectics, however, is nothing
more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature,
human society and thought." [Engels (1976),
pp.179-80.
Bold emphases added.]
As,
indeed, do many of the other DM-theorists cited or quoted throughout
this
Essay. Perhaps James thought that Engels was no Marxist.
Nevertheless, even though the examples
of 'contradictions' to which dialecticians refer are also viewed as instances
of genuine DM-principles at work in nature and society, they are in fact mistakenly identified as such.
Why is that?
Without exception,
these alleged 'contradictions' are
anything butcontradictions. They all invariably turn out to be little more than badly described, paradoxical, quirky,
or
'oppositional situations', or they are just plain contraries. Even
then, little or no evidence is presented to substantiate the hyper-bold extrapolations
DM-theorists regularly advance from even this impoverished evidential
base to all of nature, for all of time. In place of convincing
evidence, all we are offered are sketchy, half-baked analyses, often based on a
handful
superficial "thought experiments" (which are badly
formulated, anyway) with some homespun,
sub-Aristotelian Logic,
courtesy of Hegel, thrown in for good
measure.
Our intelligence is then insulted with the claim that this Dialectical Morass is
thevery epitome of the scientific method!
[Again, these serious allegations
have been
thoroughly substantiated in the Essays posted
at this site.]
So, there seems to be no way of interpreting living cells
as 'dialectical' UOs in anything other than a poetic or figurative sense -- as a
sort of throwback to the
Romantic era in Biology
-- but otherwise of little
relevance to modern science, never mind revolutionary socialism. Again, this shouldn't
really surprise anyone given
the fact that these ideas were imported into Marxism from
Ancient Hermetic and
Mystical Christian Theology -- belief
systems we knowhad a profound influence on the aforementioned
Romantics and Natürphilosophers
of Hegel's day, and thus on Hegel himself.
[On this see Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).]
This
part of dialectics, therefore, clearly depends on an ancient tradition that grew
out of Greek and Christian Mysticism, not modern science. It is
little wonder then that it can't be confirmed in any way whatsoever -- or, that
it has
failed us for so long.
As
now seems plain, no literal, internal
or 'dialectical opposites' are apparent in any of the examples to which DM-fans
appeal. This means that
DM-UOs are, at best,
figurative. The question is: Are such 'dialectical figures of speech' of any use
to DM-theorists, especially those eager to parade the scientific credentials of
their theory? Indeed, are they of any
real
assistance to revolutionaries in their endeavour to understand
Capitalism, to say nothing of how it may be overthrown?
Well,
once again, given that (a) Dialectics has
dominated revolutionary thought for over a hundred and fifty years, and (b)
During that time Dialectical Marxism has enjoyed long-termlack
of success, the only reasonable response to the above questions must
be in the negative. If practice is a test of truth, dialectics stands
condemned out of its own contradictory mouth. In that case, this 'theory' is of no
use to revolutionaries either in their attempt to understand Capitalism or any desire
they might have to assist in its overthrow.
Independently of the above, even if we now were to accept that DM-concept are figurative (intentionally-so,
or not), they aren't even good metaphors.
For
example, as we have already seen, neither workers nor the working class contain capitalists (their alleged
internal 'opposites') literally or metaphorically; the same is
probably true vice versa. And, even though Capitalism contains both
workers and capitalists, as entire classes they don't seem to change into
one another, literally or figuratively.15a2
We have already seen that these two
classes don't even imply one another! In that case, both senses of
"internal" (i.e., its
spatial and the logical connotations) fail to apply to the relationship between
workers and capitalists.
More-or-less the same can be said of the forces and relations of production, and,
indeed,
of the alleged 'contradiction' between use and exchange value. Do factories,
power lines and transport systems literally 'struggle' against mill owners,
bankers, or bourgeois politicians? Do they even appear to do so figuratively?
Does the hypothetical use value of, say, a sugar spoon 'struggle' against its
monetary (or exchange) value? Does the actual use of an escalator in a shopping
mall 'struggle' against…, well, what? Do any of these objects collectively or
severally have the wit, wisdom or willingness to 'struggle' against anything at all?
Does
a single one turn into the other,
as we
have been told they must?
[Certainly, the class war causes capitalism to change and develop, but
not by 'contradicting' anything, for the reasons given above and in Essays Five and Eight
Parts One,
Two, and
Three, as well as the additional reasons summarised below.]
Neither
is this to deny or even minimise the
irrationalities and gross injustices we see in Capitalism, nor deflect from the horrors we witness every day, but since
agent-orientated verbs like "contradict", "struggle", "oppose" (etc.) are
clearly out of place in the study of inanimate matter (save we use them
figuratively, again -- but we have just seen that these metaphors are particularly
ill-suited to that end, anyway) and social
change, these comments should strike those with a reasonably secure grasp of the
vernacular as entirely uncontroversial.
Nor is this to claim that
HM can't
account for such things either; indeed it can, but it needs no help
from Hermetic
Mysticism to that end. In fact, the reverse is the case: dialectics
has only succeeded in mystifying HM and
obstructing revolutionary socialism.
However, the fact that these assertions will sound
controversial only to dialecticians suggests thatlinguistic naivetymight very well be their only
defence here.
As far as option (v) above is concerned -- the "something else"
that each living thing is supposed to be, or to become, according
to Engels (i.e., whatever it was he imagined living things were
supposed to change into) --, no obvious candidates come to mind.
Engels was perhaps appealing to the alleged fact that the
LOI doesn't apply to
living matter, and hence that living things are constantly changing into "what they
are not" -- so at any moment a living thing is "A and not
A"
--
"itself and something else" (etc.).
Indeed, here is how
August Thalheimer seemed to understand this point:
"The most general and the most inclusive
fundamental law of dialectics from which all others are deduced is the law of
permeation of opposites. This law has a two-fold meaning: first, that all
things, all processes, all concepts merge in the last analysis into an absolute
unity, or, in other words, that there are no opposites, no differences which
can't ultimately be comprehended into a unity. Second, and just as
unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different
and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as
the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single
thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and
its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of
infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest
contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of
infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human
mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited
differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present
in reality....
"...[I]t is more difficult
with such opposites as true and false and still more difficult with the concepts
of being and non-being, which are the most general of all, the most inclusive,
and, at the same time the poorest in content. The average person will say: how
can one unite such absolute opposites as being and non-being? Either a thing is
or it is not. There can be no bridge or common ground between them. In the
treatment of Heraclitus I have already shown how the concepts of being and
non-being actually permeate each other in everything that changes, how they are
contained in changing things at the same time and in the same way; for a thing
which is developing is something and at the same time it is not that something.
For example: a child which is developing into a man is a child and at the same
time not a child (sic). So far as it is becoming a man it ceases to be a child.
But it is not yet a man, because it has not yet developed into a man. The
concept of becoming contains the concepts of being and non-being. In this
concept they permeate each other...." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.161, 165-66. Bold
emphases added.]
[Other DM-theorists say the
more-or-less same sort of
thing -- often by simply quoting or paraphrasing, Engels.]
But, as we saw earlier,
this can only mean that whatever livings things "are not" must already
be present in or near to whatever "they are" if (a) This pairing is to count as a
UO,
(b) If all living things are to change into what they "are not", and
if (c) They do so by struggling with each other,
as per the DM-classics.
In this instance, one suspects that Engels
and Thalheimer have
simply confused a logical principle with an empirical fact or physical process:
since anything that changes must change into "what it is not" (as a mater of
discursive logic, although there are exceptions even to that rule)15b -- either in whole
or in part -- these two clearly thought that this general (I would say
grammatical) point applies to all living things (or, indeed, to anything
whatsoever) as it changes.15c
Of course,
referring to what a cell or an organism changes into as "what it is not"
is preferential word-juggling, for it is equally legitimate to argue that a cell or an
organism changes into what it is, not into what it is not,
especially in view of
the fact that change is built into our concept of living things. Anyone who
didn't know that living things change would simply reveal they had a defective concept of living
organisms. Hence, while
cells and organisms are changing all the time, their identity remains the same,
for it is the same cell or organism that undergoes the said change, not some other
cell or some other organism. So,
if we speak about cell, C, or organism, O, part of what we mean here
is that these living things change in certain ways (or they would be dead and we
wouldn't call them either living or an organism!), but
neither C nor O changes into "what it is not" (i.e., neither
develops into not-C
or not-O -- that is neither change into 'not-a-cell' or 'not-an-organism').
Our concepts of growth and development imply that when these
living things change they both remain C and O while they do it.
And
even when these organisms die, we possess an equally sophisticated vocabulary
that enables us to cope with and speak about such an eventuality, too. We certainly
don't need to appeal to the obscure jargon Hegel
invented to talk about change, life, growth and death. So, we say that in the
case of C, for example, that it has died. We don't say that not-C
is dead, but C is dead. We don't even say that C is now not-C.
Again, to take a less 'abstract' example: when, say, Socrates is dead, we don't
say "Not-Socrates is dead" but "Socrates is dead"; we don't even say "Socrates
is now not-Socrates", nor yet "Socrates is not-Socrates". Even DM-fans
still refer to Socrates. Not one single one of themrefers to not-Socrates.
Have any of them ever spoken about not-Marx, not-Engels, or not-Lenin?
So, in practice, once more, dialecticians inadvertently reveal that they don't even accept
their own theory!
Now, this
returns the discussion to a reconsideration of a handful of problems
noted earlier (i.e., about the
confused way that DM-theorists picture change -- in particular, with respect to domestic cats). These hapless animals, it seems, must
undergo some sort of dialectical change into what they "are not" (or
they would remain the same, clearly -- at least, as Engels's theory seems to picture things).
But this is just the verbal trick
DM-theorists put to no good use, having inherited more than their fair share of
dubious 'reasoning' from
Hegel.
However, as with other examples of
metaphysical word-juggling that litter
Traditional Philosophy this one
has a tendency to strike back, especially against those who use it uncritically.
In this case, living things are clearly not cars,
not calculators, not mountains, not Quasars, not sewage
systems, not volcanoes, not books on
DM -- meaning, of course, that
all of these (and more) are "what living things are not". In
that case,
Engels's formulation that living things are constantly changing into "what they
are not" implies that all living things are constantly changing into cars,
calculators, mountains, Quasars, sewage systems, volcanoes and books on DM (and
much else besides). The fact that living things don't do this (to
anyone's knowledge) suggests that cats, for instance, don't actually change into "what they are not", or anything remotely like
it. Here, material reality (coupled with our use of the vernacular) once again stands in the way of another
example of dialectical
word-juggling.
And,
it is no use complaining that this makes a mockery of Engels's words, since his
confusion of a logical principle with empirically determinable facts invites ridicule. Moreover, dialecticians have no way of
neutralising the above objection --, or, rather none that leaves this piece of quirky Hegelian
word-magic
intact. If it is logically true that everything changes into "what it is not",
and what an object "is not" is everything that it logically is not,
then it must change into everything in the universe that it logically is not.
Hegel tried to block these
fatal implications of his 'logic' by
appealing to a unique dialectically-united "other" with which objects and
processes are pared, so that when they change, they do so in a determinate
manner into this unique "other". But,
as we have seen,
Hegel holed his own theory well below the waterline, for it was obvious to him
(as it is to the rest of humanity!) that objects and processes can change in
many different ways (more on that
here). In that case, there can't
be a unique "other" for them to change into.
Hence,
objects and processes don't change as a result of logical principles magicked into existence
because
of Hegel's tenuous grasp even of AFL.
[AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic.]
On the other hand, if Engels's formulation
doesn't mean this (i.e., if on the contrary it means that things don't change into what they "are not"), what
then does it mean? While this brief remark of his might look
profound, it is now clear that no sense can be made of it.
It could be objected
once again that the above comments are heavily biased against Engels and DM, not because
his/their claims are either confused or defective, but because of the
continuous refusal by Ms Lichtenstein to interpret him in a sympathetic, or even
plausible, way.
Well,
quite apart from the fact that dialecticians aren't known for their sympathetic/plausible reading
of their opponents' writings (a quick leaf through Lenin's Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism will readily confirm that accusation, as
should a five minute 'debate' with a dialectical clone on an
internet discussion
board), the
above criticism actually takes Engels words both seriously and literally. When
that is done, it is easy to see that no sense can be made of them. Anyone
who still thinks the reverse is the case is invited to e-mail me with their best
shot!
However, whatever sense,
if any, can be made of Engels's enigmatic prose, it is quite clear that dialecticians have totally misconstrued the LOI. As will be argued in
detail in Essays Six and Eight Parts
Two and
Three,
in relation to that 'law', if a living organism changes, then anything identical to it will
change equally quickly. That, of course, makes identity no enemy of change.
But, if we absolutely must view nature
metaphorically,
poetically, or even mystically
-- as DM-theorists seem determined to do, given their acceptance of a set of
obscure
Hermetic
nostrums they imported from Hegel (upside down or the 'right way
up') -- that might now allow space for an equally batty idea, namely, that nature isn't
actually driven by 'contradictions', but is in fact powered by
'dialectical tautologies'.
As a result of the present author's own incautious (but
temporary, and,
I might add, wholly insincere)
dalliance with Metaphysical Superscience/Poetry,
compounded by no little word-juggling and home-spun 'logic' of their own, the above observation
may readily be confirmed by the way that:
(a) Every single
object that we know of changes
identically quickly as it itself does.
(b) Each and every one of them alters into something which has
changed just as much as each one itself has done. And,
(c) The "something"
that each changes into is identical to the thing it has just changed into.
Now,
since this 'thesis' is apparently
tautologious -- or it is at least 'dialectically'/poetically so (i.e., given
this strain of loopy 'logic', where we
are allowed to make stuff up as we go along, or as the fancy takes us) -- it
might be appropriate to call this novel form of word-juggling: Materialist Dialectricks.
Anyway, the words I have used can easily be 're-defined' on 'sound' and
'consistent' 'dialectical' lines so that the above 'theory' becomes "tautologious" --
of course, with "tautologious" understood in a special and permanently
unexplained sense, rather like the way that "contradiction" has its
own special and permanently unexplained, DM-'sort-of-sense'. Indeed, we could insist that just as "contradict" means
"conflict", "tautologious" means "harmonious" (or,
"in harmony with"), and
dig our heels in, DM-style, 'Nixoning'
away any and all quibbles on the grounds that critics just do not
"understand" Materialist Dialectricks.
Once again, this (temporary and wholly insincere) a priori
'theory' of mine has the advantage of being consistent with
every conceivable observation -- unlike dialectics with its dubious
DM-'contradictions'. Whether things stay the same, or change (fast or slow, it
matters not), they do so no faster than they themselves manage to do it, and they all change into things
that are identical with whatever they have just changed into. That, naturally, makes this tautologically-poetic
'theory' of mine far more 'scientific' than DM.
I have absolutely no doubt that Marxism will
be no less unsuccessful if we were foolish enough to adopt Materialist Dialectricks.
As
noted above, those still unconvinced by (unintended) 'innovative logic' like this clearly
don't "understand"
Materialist Dialectricks, but that is probably because they suffer from too much lack of
tenderness
for the world. Moreover, anyone impatient with crazy 'logic' like this
should turn an even more sceptical eye on the same sort of lunacy found in
the DM-literature -- which is intended.
Engels
aired several rather odd mathematical ideas in
AD
and DN, whichturn out to be so
questionable that some of his most ardent fans have called them "unhelpful".
For example, Helena Sheehan claims that Engels's
use of
"inappropriate Hegelian terminology" lies behind some of his less defensible
musings [Cf., Sheehan (1993), p.41], even though she is highly sympathetic to
his ideas in general. [Ibid., pp.25-48.] The authors of The Dialectical Biologist
also describe several of Engels's ideas as "quaint". [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.279.]
Two other commentators (Paul McGarr and Philip
Gasper) similarly distanced themselves from certain unspecified failings
in Engels's work. [Cf.,
McGarr (1994),
p.155 -- McGarr even labels several of Engels's examples, "trite" --, and
Gasper (1998),
p.144 -- who says some of them aren't "very convincing".] This is
despite the fact that both of these comrades appear quite willing to accept
many of Engels's decidedly odd 'scientific' ideas at face value, subjecting them to very little critical
scrutiny --, or, to be more honest, none at all.
But, who is
to decide which of Engels's examples (which seek to illustrate the
"laws of dialectics") are "inappropriate" and "unhelpful" (here quoting TAR's own
words; cf., p.75), and which aren't?
[However,
this article might help some readers
decide.]
[TAR = The Algebra of
Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]
So, here are
just a few of Engels's more 'interesting'
ideas:
"[I]t is a contradiction that the root of A should be the power of A…[as it is] that a negative magnitude should be the
square of anything…. The square root of minus one is therefore not only a
contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction…. [Again, there is the]
contradiction that in certain circumstances straight lines and curves may be
identical…that lines that intersect…can nevertheless be shown to be parallel…."
[Engels (1976),
pp.153-54.]
Again, which of the above remarks are "unhelpful", "inappropriate", or just
plain confused? Indeed, every single one of them is difficult to harmonise with a
materialist theory of any description, let alone Engels's dogmatic,
a priori version.
If mathematical entities like the above are
'contradictory' (as Engels declares them to be), then they should change. But, which of
them
is changing? And what are they changing into? With what are they
struggling. The DM-classics tell us
that everything struggles with its 'opposite' and changes into that with which it has
struggled, that 'opposite'. If so, what, for instance, is π changing into and with what is it
struggling? If it isn't struggling with anything, then is it changeless?
Consider one
of Engels's examples: "[I]t is a contradiction that the root of A should be the
power of A". If so, are any roots of A and any powers of A locked in some sort of struggle? What then are
they
changing into? If
they are contradictory,
why have they remained the same state for countless centuries, and will remain so
forever, as far as we know? Indices won't one day turn into
Matrices, nor
will
Affine Transformations change into
Hermite Polynomials.
Negative
integers don't turn into positives. Admittedly, we can multiply two negative integers to yield
a positive, but no one supposes that the original numbers have changed,
otherwise no one would be able to use them again. When -2 is multiplied by -1 to
obtain 2, both of these numerals -- "-2" and "-1" -- are still
there on the
page/screen, unchanged. They certainly don't 'develop' through 'internal
contradiction', either. What, for example, is the 'internal contradiction' in
-2? Is it -4/2, or 8/-4, or -8/-1 x -1/4...?
Or,
are we to suppose that when -2 'changes' into 2 (if it is multiplied by
-1) that
-2 and 2 (or is it -2 and -1?) must have been locked
in some sort of 'struggle'? Well, it seems they must if they are 'opposites' and we were to
accept what the
Dialectical classicists
tell us -- that just such a 'struggle' must turn the one into the other, and
that they turn into that with which they have struggled. But, what then of
-1? What role does it play in this quasi-Platonic melodrama? It is certainly not
the 'opposite' of either 2 or -2, and yet it seems capable of 'changing'
(but it is really mapping) each into the other --, or, indeed,
mapping any number onto its 'opposite'. To be sure, if we multiply -2 severally,
and serially, by
the entire set of negative integers we will obtain the set of positive even
integers. Does this mean that -2 has an infinite number of 'opposites' with
which it must 'struggle and then change into'? But, that contravenes
a key Hegelian
stipulation --
that each and every object/process has its own unique opposite, its "other".
More to the point, where are the real
'material forces' these 'contradictions' supposedly represent? And, where is the
"careful empirical work" that substantiates
bold claims such as these, evidence that DM-theorists, TAR's author and Engels
himself insist
must always be called for? [TAR, pp.108-12. On this, see
Essay Two.]
One
might wonder, too, what has actually changed. Try this out for yourself:
reach for a sheet of paper and write down "-2x -1 = 2" (or type it into Word or
some other programme), then ask yourself "Has either -2 or -1 changed?"
Unless you are visually challenged, you will see "-2" and "-1"
still on the page or screen unscathed by the 'historic struggle' in which they
have both participated. If you remain unconvinced, may I suggest you keep
repeating this simple experiment until Engels's words no longer hold you in a
vice-like grip,
howsoever long that takes.
On the other hand, if they aren't
struggling with each other and are changeless, what is the point of calling
them contradictory?
Moreover, Engels's claims make little sense
even in
their own terms. For example, the iterative rule uk
= (-a)k [where "k" and
"a" are integers] alternately maps k onto the set of
negative and positive integers, for odd or even k. But, where is the "development" in this
process? Where
is the 'struggle'? In fact,
and to
rain heavily on this parade, when a = 0, the result of the iteration is always the same
-– i.e., zero. Is this an example of change that produces no change? Is this
yet another 'contradiction'? Or, is this part of mathematics reactionary?
Engels also uses the rather strange term
"absurd contradiction" -- "The square root of minus one is therefore not only a
contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction" -- without explaining the
difference between an "absurd contradiction" and an ordinary 'contradiction',
or even a 'dialectical contradiction'. [We have already had good reason to
reject Spirkin's rather weak attempt in
this direction.]
This is especially puzzling since many of the
'contradictions' Engels regards as scientifically or mathematically important look no less absurd.
Furthermore, with respect to his comments about "the
square root of minus one", what is so contradictory about
Complex
Numbers? What are they developing into? Against what are they locked
in "struggle"?
Is,
for example, the expression a + bithe
contradictory of -a + bi, a – bi, -a – bi,
1/(a + bi), 1/(a - bi),
1/(-a - bi), or 1/(-a + bi)? If the answer is that it is any particular one
of these, then why isn't a + bi changing into "any particular one
of these", as we
were assured is
the inevitable fate of all such 'contradictory' opposites?
Perhaps each complex number
is the contradictory only of its
complex conjugate
(in that case, a + bi
would supposedly 'contradict' a – bi)? That is because the product of these two yields a
Real Number, namely
a2
+ b2 But, why does
this
make them contradictory? Once more: these two conjugates don't turn into one another.
In fact, they don't change at all!
And yet,
[1/(a + bi)] x (a + bi) = 1; so why
aren't these
'contradictory' of one another? But, what development is there even here?
Moreover, after any randomly
chosen conjugate pair has been multiplied out and the answer written down, there are countless
trillion copies of the very same symbols awaiting similar multiplication,
queuing up in 'abstract space', each of which will yield identically the same
results with no detectable development over the many millions of years the
human race will be doing such things (if humanity survives that long!).
Or, to put the same point more concretely: anyone can write out and then
multiply -- in impeccably physical ink, on boringly material paper -- "(1 +
i)" and "(1 - i)", until the cows next evolve,
the result won't change: (1 + i)(1 - i) = 2. Once more, if the planet and/or
humanity lasts long enough, this calculation will yield the same result in one
hundred million years time, still on paper, still written in very material ink.
Hence, this is just as much a 'concrete', as it is an 'abstract', example.
Of course, if from the
start you believe everything is 'contradictory', mathematical objects and
processes will naturally be classified accordingly, even when every indication
is that they aren't the least bit 'dialectical' -- having failed to notice
perhaps that numbers don't 'struggle'
amongst themselves (and neither do variables, lines, planes or
manifolds),
nor do they mirror any identifiably material processes or developments in the real world.16
Anyway,
how is that different from
imposing DM on the subject matter, something dialecticians insist
they don't do?
Of course, Engels focussed part of his comments on "the
square root of minus one", but this must have been a mistake, since minus one
has two square roots:
i and -i [since i2
= -1, and (-i)2 =
-1], which fact alone rather ruins Engels's point -- unless, of course,
we now introduce into mathematics the idea that some numbers 'dialectically dither'
-- or have a 'split personality' --, as it were.
Furthermore, it is far from clear what Engels would have said about the
potentially infinite number of the
roots of unity in Complex Number theory. For
instance, the equation zn
= 1has n
roots (where
z is a Complex Number and n = 1, 2, 3, ... ).
In
addition, Engels's comment
about lines and curves is no less misguided. Once again, if lines and planes are
contradictory, what are they 'struggling' with? And what are they 'developing' into?
The fact that some things have
a dual
aspect (if that is indeed the case with lines and curves!), that in no way
makes them contradictory. If it did, then we would have to say that the number
seven, for instance, is potentially 'infinitely contradictory' because, while it
is the sum of countless odd, even and negative integers, it is also one of the
square roots of forty-nine, it is equal to the rational number 147/21, in addition
to being the result of the application of countless other functions to arbitrary sets of
integers and
other mathematical expressions, such as 49x6/7x6,
for
x
¹
0.
And yet, despite its
infinitely 'contradictory' nature, 7 never actually changes. Are all the "material forces"
in nature that 7 supposedly 'reflects' in eternal equilibrium? Or, has this number been knobbled by
the CIA?
Even in dialectical terms, none of
this makes any sense.
Moreover, it
isn't at all clear why Engels regarded the following as contradictory: "the root
of A" is also "the power of A". Of course, that might be the case if roots and powers
could struggle with one another
and then turned into each other as a result. But, who in their left mind would want to
give that any credence?
On a similar basis, it
could just as well be argued that because 10 is a square root of 100, and
102
= 100, and10 = 100½,
andlog10102
= 2, andlog10010
= ½, that the log function is deeply contradictory in that it 'contradicts' the
relevant powers and roots of 10 and 100, for example, which 'contradict' one another into the
bargain. But, even given the recklessly profligate nature of
DL, is it possible
for four items to contradict each other all at once? If it is, should we not
now abandon the idea that all concepts, objects and processes are
UOs (each with its own
unique
Hegelian 'other') in
favour of the more generous notion that they consist of countless UOs --
dialectically adjusting the word "opposite" to accommodate this 'new
development' in the concepts involved -- now that we can see that each concept,
object or process has a potentially infinite number of 'opposites'? But,
tinkering with the meaning of the word "opposite" just to cater for this rapidly
burgeoning theory would be no less of a conventionalist cop-out
than it would be anywhere else.
[As far as Engels's
view of the nature of mathematics is concerned, it
seems to oscillate wildly between naïve Abstractionism and confused Platonism.
Examples of both, and more, can be found in Engels (1976): naïve
Abstractionism, pp.47-50; naïve Platonism, pp.62-63; confused Platonism, p.154;
inconsistent Platonism,
pp.171-72.]
As is argued in detail in Essays
Two, Three Parts
One and
Two, and Twelve (summary
here),
Abstractionism is itself a form of Linguistic Idealism, founded
on a syntactically inept
misinterpretation of general terms as the Proper Names of
Abstract
Particulars, conjuring the latter into existence by the magical 'power' of
simply naming them (or, to be more accurate, conjuring them into existence by the
simple expedient of nominalising/particularising predicate
expressions, so that they cease to be predicative, and become the aforementioned
Proper Names of 'Abstract Particulars').
[I have
explained the above moves in extensive detail in Essay Three
Part One.]
On
any interpretation, these linguistic dodges rely on, and even lend spurious support to,
the
ancient, quasi-religious dogma that the underlying nature and structure of
reality is abstract -- and further that it is
'Rational', 'Mind'-like or the product of 'Mind'. That
helps account for the confused
Platonism we find in Engels's writings, noted above.
Finally, Engels's
ideas on the nature of zero are decidedly weird. His comments suggest he fetishised this
number, attributing to it what appear to be magical powers:
"...[Z]ero is richer in content than any other
number. Hence, it is part of the nature of zero itself that it finds this
application [i.e., that it equals zero] and that it alone can be applied in this
way. Zero annihilates every other number with which it is multiplied...."
[Engels (1954),
p.261.]
But, does
this mean that if someone were to use,
say, the following symbols, "0 x
12", the number 12 would be "annihilated", never to be used by
anyone else ever again? Or, are we to suppose that the numeral "12" will
itself disappear from the page in a
puff of
smoke? If not, what precisely is the force of the word "annihilate" here?
[Comrades who are
(mysteriously) impressed with Engels's
mathematical competence should consult van Heijenoort (1948)
-- in order to have that
intellectually debilitating condition
fixed.]
It is worth recalling that
many of Engels's comments on this topic didn't appear in an obscure or
minor work, nor were they scribbled hastily on the back of a cigarette packet.
They were published in a widely recognized DM-classic that has inspired generations of DM-fans.
Indeed,
Engels rather oddly claims to have "read" it to Marx.
[That
would have
taken days. In fact, it is
easy to show
that it
did take days! Can you imagine it! One wonders how often the ageing Marx
must have nodded off, not fully realising the nature of what it was that some
of his 'followers' would
later claim he accepted!
Unlike Engels, Marx was an excellent mathematician.
Does anyone really
think he would have allowed Engels to publish mathematical gobbledygook
like this
had he read it, or had he been wide awake when it was supposedly "read" to him?
This is in fact indirect evidence that Engels didn't read this book to
Marx.]
Certainly, Lenin and Trotsky didn't find these rather peculiar
ideas at all "unhelpful", or "quaint" -- or, if they did,
they remained diplomatically quiet about them.17
On the other hand, if we are now supposed to ignore these
Engelsian 'foibles' -– in the way that scientists today disregard, say,
Newton's alchemical
and theological ramblings -–, then why pay any regard to the other, equally strange claims
Engels advanced? Why should we now accept Engels's assertion that ice "contradicts"
liquid water, that life is "contradictory", or that grains of barley are "negated" to form
mature plants?
And, how exactly does
ice 'contradict' water? Does it oppose it? Do they co-exist, locked in struggle? Does one of them force the other to
do its bidding as
the temperature changes? Does something higher emerge as "new content
arises from old conditions", if ice is melted and refrozen thousands of times?
[Engels (1976), pp.154-82.] Water has been freezing and thawing for billions of
years. Has it morphed into something 'higher'? Is it ever going to become H3O,
or something else
as a result?
It could be
argued that that is a spurious counter-example to the
NON; as Cornforth points out:
"In many processes the working out of their
contradictions results in a directed or forward movement, in which the process
moves forward from stage to stage, each stage being an advance to something new,
not a falling back to some stage already past. Other processes, however, are not characterised
by such a forward movement. For instance, water when cooled or heated
undergoes a qualitative change, passes into a new state (ice or steam), but the
movement is without direction and can't be called either progressive or
retrogressive.... If some processes have direction and others
have not, this depends solely on the particular character of the processes
themselves and of the conditions under which they happen." [Cornforth (1976),
pp.108-09. Paragraphs merged.]
We will have occasion to look at Cornforth's
bizarre account of change in
Essay Eight Part One,
where it will soon become apparent that he (along with other DM-theorists) isn't
at all clear precisely what constitutes a process, an object,or even
a system -- let alone what it means to assert that any of these 'develop'.
Anyway,
according to Cornforth, the non-development of water isn't a counter-example, after all.
Nevertheless, we are left entirely in the dark as to why some processes
'develop' when others do not.
But, what about a
genuine development? For example, the 'negation' of Feudalism to form
Capitalism, and the 'negation' of Capitalism in turn to form Socialism?
Cornforth doesn't count this as non-progressive; indeed, it is a clear example of development
via the NON:
"[C]apitalist private property arises only on the
ruin and expropriation of the pre-capitalist individual producers.... But when
capitalist private property is itself negated -- when 'the expropriators are
expropriated' -- then the individual property of the producers is restored once
more, but in a new form, on a higher level.... When capitalism arose, the only way
forward was through this negation of the negation.... The principle of the negation of the negation is
thus an expression of the simple truth that one can't put the clock back and
reconstitute the past. One can only move forward into the future through the
working out of all the contradictions contained within the given stage of
development and though the negations consequent on them." [Ibid., pp.118-19.
Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphasis added, paragraphs merged.]
Cornforth wasn't alive to see it, but one wonders what he would have
made of the events in the former USSR and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991
(and now, perhaps, in China, and possibly even in Cuba). If history can't 'go back', only forward
(i.e., process move "forward from stage to stage, each stage being an advance to
something new, not a falling back to some stage already past"), then the sort of
free market capitalism that has swept through these countries (when not one
single
worker lifted a finger to defend 'their' state) must represent a higher stage
of property relations -- the negation of the negation of the negation, perhaps? Either
that, or the NON has run out of steam and no longer works -- perhaps it never did.
Of course,
if the above remarks are rejected
(for whatever reason), then the only response possible is
that, contrary to what Cornforth says, DM-theorists don't in fact learn from
history -- they impose their abstract schemas on it:
"If some processes have direction and others
have not, this depends solely on the particular character of the processes
themselves and of the conditions under which they happen." [Ibid.,
pp.108-09.]
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of
things on nothing but the actual investigation of them.... It does not invent a
'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit
into it." [Ibid., p.15.]
Moreover, those who, like me, regard such regimes as
State Capitalist should avoid crowing too vociferously at the refutation
that history has visited upon
Stalinism. If, for example, the 1917 revolution has been reversed (in 1921,
1929, 1989, 1991, or whenever), then the NON must have made a serious error, and
should perhaps be dumped on the trash-heap of history (alongside the
crystalline
spheres,
the humoral theory
of disease,
Phlogiston and
Caloric), as a bogus 'scientific' concept.
Hence, it is worth asking of those who tell us that
the NON applies only to things that "develop": Why saddle DM with such a crazy
set of examples (e.g., "ice contradicts water", and mathematical roots 'contradict' powers)
if they play no part in understanding the world and how to change it?
Another
question that often arises in relation to these 'Laws'
is: Who first introduced variables into mathematics? Engels claimed that Descartes's
was the first to do this:
"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes'
variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics,
and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels
(1954), p.258.]
Despite what Engels
sais, variables had been in use in FL long before they were
employed in Algebra. [Cf., Kneale and Kneale (1962), pp.23-297.] And, of course,
variables were used by
Muslin algebraists (this links to a PDF) long before Descartes was even
though of. The
word "Algebra"
itself rather gives the game away!
In
fact, variable were in use much earlier still. This is what Professor Nidditch had to say
about Aristotle's use of variables:
"One has to give Aristotle
great credit for being fully conscious of this [i.e., of the need for a general
account of inference -- RL] and for seeing that the way to general laws is by
the use of variables, that is letters which are signs for every and any
thing whatever in a certain range of things: a range of qualities, substances,
relations, numbers or of any other sort or form of existence.... If one keeps in mind that
the Greeks were very uncertain about and very far from letting variables take
the place of numbers or number words in algebra, which is why they made little
headway in that branch of mathematics...then there will be less danger of
Aristotle's invention of variables for use in Syllogistic being overlooked or
undervalued. Because of this idea of his, logic was sent off from the very start
on the right lines." [Nidditch (1998), pp.8-9. Italic emphasis in the
original; paragraphs merged.]
[Although it isn't suggested here that Aristotle thought to use variables in
mathematics.]
Of course, that
fact alone completely undermines the idea that traditional FL can't cope with change,
that it uses only "fixed concepts and categories". Moreover, as will
be pointed out in Essay
Four, variables are as widely used in MFL as they are in Mathematics, in which
case, MFL is even more 'change-friendly', as it were, than traditional AFL ever
was. [On this, see Essay Four
Part One, and
here,
where several objections to the above have been neutralised.]
[A word of
caution needs to be introduced at this point: in view of the
comments made here concerning
Frege's criticism of variables, the use of the word "variable" should be treated with
no little caution. Indeed, as
we will see, there are no 'variable magnitudes'. However, throughout this Essay (and this site) I have in
general used "variable" in its traditional sense; the complications
discussed at the above link, if introduced into the argument, would certainly make these Essays more precise, but needlessly
recondite for no real theoretical (or even rhetorical) gain.]
Dialectics
Meets The Calculus -- And Comes Unstuck
However, what Engelsactually
said is worth examining once again, in its own right:
"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes'
variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics,
and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels
(1954),
p.258.]
Two points need
to be made about this passage, and, in general, about
Engels and Marx's ideas concerning the foundations of the Calculus.
(1) The claim that Descartes's invention of
"variable magnitudes" introduced "motion" into Mathematics is as
confused as it is
inaccurate. A more balanced account from a Marxist perspective can be found in
Hadden (1994). As Hadden points out, variables began to be used by
mathematicians in the late Middle Ages as a result of the development of ideas
connected with the nature of
what were taken to be commensurable values of commodities. For example,
Nicholas Oresme had anticipated much of Descartes's analytic Geometry in the
Fourteenth Century, and had already begun to use algebraic ideas to study motion. [On this, see
Boyer (1959), pp.60-95, Boyer (1968), pp.288-95, Edwards (1979), pp.81-93, and
Katz (1993), pp.292-99. Some of the original papers can be found in Clagett
(1959).]
Also worthy of note
-- indeed, as pointed out earlier -- is the fact that Muslim mathematicians had
invented the use of algebraic variables long before Descartes. Engels must have been aware of this.
Nevertheless, Engels's point stands or falls on its own merits,
irrespective of who actually introduced variables into Mathematics, or
even when and why it happened.
However, as Frege noted, the idea that variables in mathematics
refer to 'varying magnitudes' is confused in the extreme. [Frege (1904). Since
it is at present impossible to find anything on-line about this, and, as far as
I am aware, there is precious little
in the 'Frege literature' devoted to it, either, his
main arguments have been summarised in Note 17a.]17a
(2) Unfortunately, the publication of Marx's Mathematical
Manuscripts[Marx (1983)] has revealed the sad spectacle of a
scintillating intellect
vainly trying to shoehorn an interpretation of the
Calculus into a
dialectical boot it won't fit.
Correction 20/06/2014: In fact, up until
recently, I had only read a few chapters of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts,
having unwisely taken the word of his commentators that it was a work of
'dialectics' (in the traditional Engels-Plekhanov-Lenin sense of that word).
However, I have now
checked these manuscripts in detail, page-by-page, line-by-line, and can find only one
example that is unambiguously 'dialectical' (in the above sense).
Here it is:
"The whole difficulty
in understanding the differential operation (as in the negation of the negation
generally) lies precisely in seeing how it differs from such a simple
procedure and therefore leads to real results." [Marx
(1983), p.3.] [Italic emphasis in the original.]
That's it! That is the extent of the
'dialectics' (in the above sense of the word) in these manuscripts! And even
then this indirect reference to 'dialectics' (in the above sense of that word)
is equivocal, at best. Anyway, Marx certainly does nothing with it.
Hegel is mentioned only once in the entire book (that is, if we ignore
the many references to him made by the editors and other commentators in the
same volume), and then only in passing -- in fact, as many times as Kant and Fichte (p.119).
"Contradiction", as far as I can see, makes only one appearance:
"This leap from
ordinary algebra, and besides by means of ordinary algebra, into
the algebra of variables is assumed as au fait accompli, it is not
proved and is prima facie in contradiction to all the laws of
conventional algebra, where y = f(x), y1
= f(x+h) could never have this meaning." [Ibid.,
p.117.Italic emphases in the
original.]
However, it is
clear that this isn't a 'dialectical' use of that word (again, with that word understood in the above manner).
These algebraic expressions do not 'struggle' with, and then turn into, one
another (as the
DM-classics assure they must always do).
Although, there is this passage:
"And here it may be
remarked that the process of the original algebraic derivation is again turned
into its opposite." [Ibid.,
p.56.]
If readers check, they will also see that Marx isn't arguing 'dialectically'
here (with that word understood in the above manner, once more). Again, there is, for
example, no 'struggle' going on between 'dialectical opposites', here,
as we were told must be the case. Marx is simply making
a point about the algebraic manipulations he had just completed and those he is about to
complete.
Hence, the comment I made above -- i.e., "Unfortunately, the publication of Marx's
Mathematical
Manuscripts [Marx (1983)] has revealed the sad spectacle of a
scintillating intellect
vainly trying to shoehorn an interpretation of the
Calculus into a
dialectical boot it won't fit" -- is entirely misguided. This isn't
in fact a
work of 'dialectics' (again, in the above sense of that word).
Anyway,
as
the editors of these manuscripts themselves admit, Marx's analysis of the
Calculus was based on textbooks that were badly out-of-date even
in his own day. Marx was clearly unaware of the important work done in
Analysis
by Cauchy,
and the definitive results obtained by
Weierstrass and
Riemann
–- work that was in fact available in his lifetime (the former having been
completed in the 1820s, the latter in the 1850s and 1860s) -- or, if he was, he
made no use of it.17b
Several of the authors
published in the Appendix to
this work
did, however, make some attempt to explicate and defend Marx's ideas, as well as outline a few
criticisms of their own of subsequent developments in
Analysis. As these
theorists correctly point out, mathematicians working after Weierstrass found
that the development of his results required a much clearer understanding of the
nature of Real Numbers, continuity and the 'logic of infinity' than were
available
at the time. Unfortunately,
early
Logicist theories in this area foundered when
contradictions were
uncovered in Frege'sGrundgesetze. Subsequently,
Hilbert's entire
foundational
program was dealt a severe (but, as it turns out, entirely spurious) blow by
Gödel's Theorem.18
Nevertheless, these authors pointedly failed to show how dialectics could possibly help, or
could possibly have
helped, in any way at all;
indeed, it is quite obvious from the considerations aired below that the
opposite is in fact the case.
Despite this, several other points arise from
the comments the above
authors -- i.e.,
Yanovskaya, Kol'man, and Smith
-- make about Marx's unpublished writings on the Calculus.
(3) Smith,
one of the aforementioned commentators, admits that Marx's analysis
is technically limited; for example, it only relates to certain varieties of
analytic functions
(Smith (1983), pp.265-66). Moreover, Marx's method of proof relies
on binomial and other expansions; however, when it is
applied to more complex analytic functions -- such as f(x)= (1 - x - x3)-2/3
--, it faces the sort of problems that afflicted
Euler's
work, for example: it can't cope with infinite expansions, nor can it take account of
those that don't converge. Hence, Marx would have found it impossible to
explain why trigonometric functions can't be differentiated
if angles are measured in degrees rather than
radians. There, the derivative
depends on
small angle approximations
converging on a
limit for small values, and this only happens if angles are measured in
radians. Since Marx paid no heed to convergence, and had no way of deriving
general results upon which this branch of the calculus depends, there is no way
these functions can be differentiated using his method -- even if, per
impossible, his comments about simple algebraic functions had been 100%
correct!
[On this, and how these and other 'difficulties'
were tackled between, say, 1680 and 1870, see Kitcher (1984), pp.229-71, and
Lavine (1994). For a
college entry-level discussion of some of the mathematics involved in small
angle approximations (measured in radians), see, for
example, Berry et al (2004), pp.157-65, 210-15, and Heard et al
(2005), pp.69-83.]
Moreover, there other categories of ordinary derivatives that weren't considered by Marx
-- for example: dT/dx (the rate of change of temperature with respect to
position, where no 'motion' is implied by the variables employed); dA/dt or
dV/dt (the rate of change of area or volume with respect to time). What sort of
'motion' could these possibly involve? Can an area or a volume be in two
places at once, in one of these and not in it at the same time? What about
dr/dt
-- the rate of change of a
position vector
with respect to time? In this particular case, it is even more difficult to see how a
changing vector can be given a 'dialectical' make-over.
Can a magnitude
and a direction occupy two places at once, in one of these and not in it
at the same time --
especially if vectors
themselves define locations?
Furthermorehigher-order derivatives
were ignored by Marx, and it isn't at all clear how these can be reconciled with a
'dialectical' account of change. Are we to suppose that, for instance, d2y/dx2
-- i.e., d(dy/dx)/dx -- expresses how the first derivative itself changes,
or how the variables themselves undergo more complex sorts of 'motion' -- or
what? What then about dny/dxn?
[To say nothing of (dy/dx)n.]
And what about several of the more complex
(but still rather simple) ways that ordinary derivatives
can inter-relate? For example, what sort of 'dialectical spin' can be put on
the following?
If y = f(u), and u =
g(x), then dy/dx = (dy/du).(du/dx).
If y = uv, and u = f(x),
v =
g(x), then dy/dx = (u.dv/dx) + (v.du/dx).
If y = u/v, and u = f(x),
v = g(x), then
dy/dx = [(v.du/dx) - (u.dv/dx)]/v2.
Are we to suppose that the 'movement' of all these variables is
equal, inter-coordinated -- or even comparable?
[Marx did try to examine some of the
above, but as I will show in a
later re-write of this Essay, his endeavours in this direction fail rather badly.]
[Update, September 2012: I have just been sent a PDF of a
new
translation of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts, which not only
contains fresh material (along with new interpretive essays), it confirms once
again that Marx was no amateur mathematician, but was very well versed in
Analysis from the pre-Cauchy
era. I haven't yet had time to digest this material in any detail, but an
initial inspection reveals that one or two comments posted in this Essay are now
slightly inaccurate, and will need to be revised -- particularly those above
about Higher Derivatives. However, having said that, this new material confirms
the conclusion reached in this section that Marx confused the movement of
variables with movement in reality, and that what he says about
variables (or, rather, how he refers to them, and what use he makes of them)
is untenable. As noted below, this
vitiates any attempt to introduce 'dialectics' into mathematics, rendering
Marx's re-configuration of the Calculus as just so much wasted effort, by an
undoubted genius -- certainly on a par with all the time Newton wasted on
Alchemy, Kabbalism, and Biblical Numerology.]
On top of this, Marx totally ignored partial derivatives.
Perhaps that was because it would have involved him in having to consider
variables 'changing' in three or more directions at once!
Finally, although Engels mentioned it, there seems to have been no consideration
whatsoever given to the
whole of the
Integral Calculus.
It is impossible, anyway, to see how the
latter could be accommodated within a 'dialectical' framework -- and with that
out would go much of Modern Mathematics and Science. [On the origin of modern
theories of integration, see Hawkins (1980).]
It
could be argued that the Integral Calculus is a sort of 'reverse'
Differentiation. But that isn't so. Quite apart from their different proof
structures (integration involves a summation of areas approaching a limit -- not
much 'motion' involved in this --, differentiation involves the slope of a
secant approaching a limit), there are functions that can't be
differentiated which can be
integrated, and vice versa. And must we assume that variables are able to
move 'backwards'? It seems they must if the differential calculus involves the
'movement' of variables, as Marx seems to have thought.
(4) Independently of the above, Marx's approach is seriously flawed
in its own terms.
That is because it requires a variable, x (taking values in the domain of a function,
f(x)), to
'change' into x1,
and that this be represented as part of the factorisation of f(x) -- i.e.,
g(x)(x1
– x), where g(x) and (x1
– x) are both factors of f(x).
Now, in order to avoid well-known problems
(notoriously exposed by
Bishop
Berkeley in
The Analyst) that had plagued earlier attempts to make the foundations
of the Calculus rigorous, Marx set the
value of x1 such that
x1 = x
(or, rather, he allowed it to "move" back!). This manoeuvre was 'justified' (but,
note(!),
not by Marx, by his commentators) with an appeal to suitably vague, and
yet-to-be-explained, 'dialectical principles' (which will
be examined presently), the upshot of which is that unless the meanings of "="
and "–" have themselves changed, the factor, (x1
– x), must equal zero! But, that just leaves the Calculus in the same state it
had been in the 18th
century, with all the problems that had bedevilled it since
Newton and Leibniz's
day.
[Several commentators have tried to blow away
the chaff surrounding Marx's argument, leaving behind the 'rational core', so to
speak. Their arguments will also be examined in a later re-write of this Essay.]
Hence, despite the obvious genius he
displayed in other areas, Marx's ideas on the Calculus are, sadly, completely worthless.
In fact, there is little evidence anyone has
made a serious use of his ideas -- including
mathematicians working in the former USSR, where lip-service had at least
to
paid to them (for career, and/or neck-saving, reasons). Sure, Marx's ideas
in this area were extensively studied in 'communist' countries and elsewhere [Dauben (2003)], but there is no evidence
they were put to any use. And, as far as can be ascertained, no one since
has bothered to
develop Marx's ideas into a rigorous system, or ironed-out its fatal
defects. [However, on more recent attempts to rehabilitate Marx's
re-interpretation of these symbols, see below.]
(5) Even if the above
criticisms are misguided in some way,
and Engels's point about variables introducing dialectics into Mathematics
were correct, andMarx'sanalysis were flawless, their
ideas on this branch of mathematics would
still be of no use. That is because it is a fatal error to redirect
attention away from motion itself onto the symbols depicting it in an attempt to explain how the Calculus
handles movement and change in nature. Marx committed just such an error when he
confused the alleged 'motion' of variables and 'quantities' with motion itself in the real
world. [It has to be said that Newton and Leibniz were guilty of this, too.] This can be seen by
the subsequent use of the aforementioned 'dialectical reasoning' to justify the
'change' of x into x1
(by his commentators, noted above). Those symbols don't 'struggle' with anything
(which they would have to do in order to change or move,
if we were to believe the DM-classics), so whatever else this is it isn't an
example of 'dialectical change'. In that case, incantations using the word
"dialectical" are of no more use here than "Abracadabra" would be.
In this regard, Aristotle's general comment
on the rationale underlying Plato's
Theory of Forms
is apposite: in any attempt to solve a problem it isn't a good idea to begin by doubling it. In this particular
case, whatever difficulties there are over understanding the mathematics of
motion, they aren't helped by reduplicating the very same problems in the motion of symbols!
Clearly, the latter would then need explaining, too.
But, how can symbols
move? Do they dash about the page? Do they mutate before our eyes? Of course,
they are supposed to 'take on new values', but beyond this obscure metaphor,
what does that mean?
Are they magnetic? Do they attract these values in other ways? Do they adopt them, impersonate them..., fight them?
But, what else can "take on" mean? [Of course, as Wittgenstein pointed, the
solution here is to see the meaning of these symbols as an expression of the rules we
use to make sense of motion. (More on that later.) Again, on variables, see
here.]
To be sure, a clear account of the rate of change of, say,
position with respect to time might not be easy to formulate, but the
introduction of the rate of change of symbols with respect to time is
doubly confused. [Wouldn't this need second-order symbols..., and so on?]
In
fact, any attempt to depict motion by the behaviour of symbols -– in this
case variables in supposed 'motion' -– would constitute yet another example
of Linguistic Idealism
[LIE]. On that basis, the 'dialectical
motion' of variables (i.e., linguistic expressions) -- as if they
were capable of 'reflecting' change in reality --, would plainly have been conflated
with real change in nature and society. Hence, instead of seeing mathematical variables as a
means to an end (i.e., as an expression of the rules we use to make sense of motion),
they become an end in themselves:their 'motion' has now replaced the very thing they had been introduced all along to
explain!
Inferences drawn with respect to
variables (so conceived) are then misconstrued as if they were now a legitimate
component in a scientific analysis of real motion in the
material world. Hence, from a consideration of 'moving' variables we somehow
obtain super-dialectical truths about motion in nature, valid for all of space
and time!
Which, as we have seen, is precisely the trap
that ensnared Marx.
There have been several
other attempts to defend Marx's account of the Calculus; cf., Blunden (1983),
Carchedi (2008), Struik (1948),
Kennedy (1977) -- republished as Kennedy (2006) --, and Gerdes (1983).
[These works will be considered here at a
later date.]
Suffice it to say that
every single one of the above commentators confuses real motion with 'moving variables'
-- among other things --, and hence their conclusions are susceptible not
only to the above comments, but also to
Frege's criticism of the use
of variables in mathematics.19
But, what about Engels's other "unhelpful" idea that parrots and domesticated
animals actually understand what is said to them?
"Comparison
with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in
the labour process is the only correct one. The little that even the most
highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require
articulate speech. In a state of nature, no animal feels handicapped by its
inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it
has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have
developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily understand any
language within their range of concept (sic)…. Anyone who has had much to do
with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many
cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect…. Let no one
object that the parrot does not understand what it says…. [W]ithin the limits of
its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a
parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning…; tease
it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as
correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits."
[Engels (1876), pp.356-57.]
Here is an extract from
Essay Thirteen
Part Three dealing with this passage (slightly edited):
Contrary to
what Engels asserts, we shouldn't want to concede that animals understand our
use of language (or, indeed, that they grasp the import of swear words, for
instance) simply
because parrots, for example, can make certain sounds -- or, just because some
humans are a tad too sentimental and believe that their pet dog can "understand
every word they say". If understanding were attributable to animals solely
on the basis of vocalisation, then we might have to admit that, for example, the
ability most of us have of repeating foreign words upon hearing them means that
we too understand the language from whence they came, when quite often we don't.
For example, although I can read both Hebrew and Greek, I actually
understand very few words of either language.
But, even
when we repeat foreign words we don't understand we would still
be viewing them from our standpoint as sophisticated users of our own
language, which means that the dice have already been heavily loaded (so to speak) in our
favour. Because of this, we often make an educated guess concerning the meaning
of any new (foreign) words we might encounter, based on knowledge of our own
language. Moreover, we do this against a background of shared behaviour and a common
culture that links us -- directly or indirectly, closely or remotely -- with all
other human beings. The same can't be said of parrots,
dogs and horses.
We should, I think, only want to count
someone (or something) as having understood what is said if it possessed a sufficiently detailed verbal and behavioural repertoire,
at the very least. If, for example, such a 'proto-linguist' couldn't form
new sentences from their 'vocabulary', if they were incapable of forming the
negation of any of their sentences (for example replying "No, it isn't raining"
when told it is raining), or couldn't cope with word-order change, if they
were unable to refer to anything proximate to, or remote from, their
immediate surroundings, if they couldn't identify or specify any of the
implications of what they had said, or of what was said to them, if they were
incapable of reasoning (hypothetically) both with truths and
falsehoods (in the latter case, for example, with an "If that's true, I'm a
monkey's uncle!"), failed to appreciate stories or fiction, if they couldn't
respond to humour, or engage in self-criticism, if they were regularly perplexed
by new sentences they had never encountered before (even those that contained
'words' drawn from their own repertoire), if they couldn't follow or give instructions, and so on, then I
think most of us would have serious doubts about their
capacity to understand the target language.
On the other hand, had Engels said the
following to one of his parrots: "Swearing isn't allowed here because it
represents the language of oppression" (to paraphrase Trotsky) -- and the
parrot had stopped swearing as a result, or, maybe, had deliberately sworn even
more as a result! -- we might
be a little more
impressed with his claims.
Despite this, Engels's ideas don't seem to
hang together even on their own terms. If language and understanding
are the products of social development (augmented by co-operative
labour), then they most certainly do not hang together. Indeed, Engels even says:
"Comparison with animals
proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the labour
process is the only correct one.... First labour, after it and then with
it speech -- these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of
which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man...."
[Engels (1876),
pp.356-57. Paragraphs merged.]
If so,at a minimum, how could an
animal comprehend our speech without also having gone through the same social
development and engaged in the same sort of collective labour with human beings?
It could be argued that animals have,
and still do work alongside human beings. Think of the phrase "work
horse", or the use to which dogs are put in guarding, sledging, hunting and
the herding of sheep, to say nothing of the work done by oxen, donkeys, camels
and pigeons, to name but a few. However, without wishing to minimise the use human beings have
made of animal labour (etc.), this hardly counts as collective labour (any more than the
use of some wood in a building counts as collective labour contributed by
a tree); it more closely resembles the use of living tools. The
differences between human and animal labour don't need to be itemised to see that
this line-of-defence won't work. Which Marxist wants to argue that an ox, for
example, shows any desire to communicate, or that a donkey or a pigeon shows any
sign it wants to verbalise its aims and intentions? But, if their efforts counted as
collective labour, we should be prepared to argue that these animals do
indeed show signs of a "need to communicate".
Moreover, Engels appears to think (somewhat
inconsistently) that mere proximity to human
beings is sufficient to engender (in certain animals) the "need to communicate".
If this were so, then manifestly an ability to use language can't have been the result of
collective labour. Surely, in humans (on Engels's own admission) the
"need to communicate" arose out of collective labour, not from mere
association. By way of contrast, in the passage above, Engels seems to think that this "need to
communicate" is a free-floating force when it comes to animal behaviour,
which can somehow be divorced from its connection with cooperative human labour,
and hence is capable of crossing the species boundary.
This explains
why he also appears to believe that mere association with human beings is
able to create
such a "need" in these animals, too. To be sure, the behaviour of domestic animals is
different from the behaviour of animals belonging to the same (or similar) species in
the wild, but if mere
proximity to human beings could account for language, then we should expect
cats, cows, donkeys, camels, oxen, sheep, goats, rats, mice, gerbils, fleas,
lice and bacteria to be able to
communicate with us, or with one another (to say nothing of viruses).
[Added in a footnote:
To be sure, an application Engels's first
'Law' might succeed in ruling out several of the organisms listed in the main body of this Essay -- for example, it might exclude the final four or five.
(But, parrots in fact have smaller, less developed brains than rats or sheep.)
[Brain size can't be the determining factor here, nor can the length of time
these animals have been in human company. As should seem obvious, cats and cows
have bigger brains than parrots, and have lived far closer to human beings for far longer
(as have rats and mice).
[It
could be argued that infants don't engage in collective labour but they still
learn to speak, so why can't parrots and
other animals? But, as pointed out in the main body of this Essay, if mere
proximity to human beings could account for language, then we should expect
cats, cows, sheep, rats, mice, gerbils, fleas, bacteria and lice to be able to
communicate with us.
Clearly, being a human being is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
an individual to learn language; having certain physical capacities and
behavioural traits -- among other things, these include a
CNS, the capacity to
mimic, curiosity, and a propensity to respond as other humans do to social and
inter-personal cues and stimuli (skills and propensities which animals lack),
etc. -- are also necessary.
When these are present, a sufficient condition
for an infant to learn a language is for it to be raised and socialised in a speech community
that is based on collective labour. Parrots, dogs, and the other
organisms listed above plainly lack these necessary concomitants; moreover, they
can't engage in communal life. They may 'tag along', but that is all they
can do. This isn't so with human babies.]
Conversely, if animals were able to talk or understand us then language
can't be a
social phenomenon, nor would it be the result of co-operative labour.
It seems, therefore, that [far too many Marxists] have ignored this glaring
inconsistency in Engels's account.
However, in wanting to deny that there is a
significant gulf between humans and our closest relatives among the Apes, or
Ape-like ancestors, Engels
[was] clearly laying a foundation for [his] own theory of descent --
i.e., a theory based on the idea that a change in quantity leads to
a change in quality (and vice versa).
In order for this
'Law' to work, DM-theorists would have to argue that the important differences
between human beings and certain animals is merely quantitative -- even if it is finally
expressed qualitatively via this 'Law'. On this view, the gap between ancient humanoids and apes (or our common ancestors), say, would be somewhat analogous to that between two closely
related elements in the
Periodic Table
(except, of course, with respect to evolutionary descent, the situation is far more complex). So, given
this analogy, when one chemical element supposedly acquires a few more
elementary particles, "qualitatively" new properties automatically arise in the
elements so formed. The latter could then be said to "emerge" from the former as
the increased complexity exceeds a certain "nodal
point".
[However, as we saw
earlier, this 'Law'
doesn't even apply to the elements in the Periodic Table, which removes one
of the best and most over-used 'illustrations' of this 'Law' that DM-fans' have
in their box of tricks.]
Indeed, a belief in the continuity of nature
seems to require a similar commitment to the idea that there is some sort of
'dialectical connection' between, say, our ape-like ancestor (or proto-human, or
humanoid, group, before the development of language, etc.) and modern human
beings (after
language had been acquired).
The idea appears to be that even though apes are biologically close to us, the
gradual increase in our ancestors' social and physical evolution in the end led to the
development of the profound
qualitative differences between humans and the aforementioned ancestors, culminating
in the 'emergence' of 'consciousness' and language, etc. Hence, Engels's claim
that certain animals are capable of understanding language looks as if it lends
support to the belief that some sort of continuity exists between modern humans
and our ape-like past, mediated by subsequent material and social
progress.
This seems to be the
only conceivable reason why Engels alluded to
parrots, dogs and horses in this way.
The only problem is that he left out
the Apes!
Plainly,
Engels chose the wrong animals to illustrate his point (if this was
his point). As should seem
obvious, no sane biologist would
want to argue that we are biologically closer to parrots, dogs and horses than we are to
the Apes.
Even worse, the latter aren't
widely known for their verbal skills (unlike parrots); in fact, they are
quite
incapable of vocalising
words. And yet, if the view outlined above were
correct, we should find Apes vastly exceeding the 'linguistic' production of parrots.
Hence, the "qualitative change" that is supposed to have "emerged" as a result
of increased "quantitative" evolutionary development must, it seems, have taken an unplanned "qualitative" detour
via birds, horses and dogs, outflanking our nearest relatives the Apes! Clearly,
this means that "quantity" doesn't in fact "pass over" into
"quality", but skips it sometimes, or shimmies past it. Either that, or it indicates that parrots and
other birds
(the Hill Myna, for example), as well as dogs and horses, somehow managed to defy this
dialectical 'Law' --, or, indeed, (if we absolutely insist on clinging to
this part of DM come what may), that these
species are evolutionarily closer to us than the Apes!
Comrades are oddly
silent on this issue. They are, however, free to
"grasp" what
little comfort they can from it.
Is this another example of
Engels's extraordinary scientificprescience -- or an indication that on some things his ideas were
just a
little dotty?
In his
review of
TAR, Alex Callinicos
wondered why John Rees hadn't discussed these and similar ideas in his book.
[Callinicos (1998), pp.99-100.] In view of the above, I think it is reasonably
clear why that material was omitted: it represents a low
point in the thinking of an otherwise great revolutionary, which is best
swept
tactfully under the rug.
Despite this, it is quite clear that the "nodal" aspect of the First 'Law' is
incompatible with the Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites [UIO].
[Or, is this at least
so in relation to the link
DM-theorists have attempted to establish between the UIO and their criticism of the LEM?]
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; FL = Formal
Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Here are Hegel, Engels and Lenin:
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the
same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to
its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the
contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence,
§119.
Bold emphasis added. The serious problems this dogmatic and a priori
diktat creates for Hegel, which he nowhere tries to justify, are detailed
here.]
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or
does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else.
Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in
a rigid antithesis one to the other.
"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is
that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable
fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful
adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the
metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a
number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular
object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it
becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In
the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them;
in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of
that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood
for the trees." [Engels
(1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"For a stage in the outlook
on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all
opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical
method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no
hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which
bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises
also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is
the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage.
Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical
categories retain their validity." [Engels
(1954), pp.212-13.
Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"…[the] basis of philosophical materialism
and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical
materialism. The recognition of immutable elements…and so forth, is not
materialism, but metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, materialism….
Dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every
scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists
on the absence of absolute boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving
matter from one state into another." [Lenin (1972),
p.312.
Bold emphasis added.]
In order to see how and why these two 'Laws' clash, consider
the following:
Object/process, P, which is just about
to undergo a qualitative change (a "leap") from, say, state, PA,
to state, PB.
For there to be a "nodal" change here it would have to be the case that:
A1:
P is in
state, PA,
one instant/moment,
T1, and in state, PB,
an instant/moment later, T2.
[A1 would
have to be true howsoever these "instants"/"moments" are
understood, and howsoever long they are deemed to be.
There is no other way of making sense of the abrupt nature of "nodal" change. If
anyone knows of another way to interpret these 'nodes'
please enlighten me. In order to spare the reader, I will
simply refer to these
"instants"/"moments" and
"objects"/"processes" as "instants" and "objects",
respectively, from now on.]
But, if that is so, then any state description of P
would have to obey the LEM, for it must be the case that:
A2:P was in state, PA,
at T1, but not in state, PB,
at T1,
and P was in state, PB,
at T2but not in state, PA,
at
T2.
That is, it would notbe true to say that P was in
both states atT1,
just as it would notbe true to say that P was in
both states atT2.
In that case, these two states wouldn't interpenetrate one another
(in the sense that they both co-exist, or that they both apply to Pat the same time), which would mean that the LEM does apply to this process at T1
and T2.
That
is:
A3: P is in state, PA,
at T1,
and
in state, PB,
at T2.
So
that:
A4: At
any given moment P is either in state, PA,
or
in it is in state, PB,
but not both at the same time.
On the other hand, let us assume that these two states
do in fact interpenetrate
each other (in the sense that they both co-exist, or that they both apply to P at the
same time such that the "either-or" of the LEM doesn'tapply here).
That is:
A5:
P
is in state, PA,
and
in it is in state, PB,
at the same time -- both T1andT2.
Hence,
if P is in both states at T1andT2, then the transition from
PA to PB
would be smooth and not "nodal", after all.
[The object in question might in the
above case be undergoing what is
called a
"mixed-phase"
transition. However, when I say that the LEM does or does not apply to a
given process what I mean is that it does or does not apply to a description
of that process. I omitted that caveat from the above to reduce the complexity
of the analysis.]
The same,
but now in
more ordinary terms:
Consider a crystal of ice. If it is heated and undergoes "nodal" change, melting
to produce liquid water, then it can't be the case that it is both
liquid and solid at the same time. It must be either solid or
liquid, not both.
But,
if there is no "either/or" anywhere in the universe, then it can't be the case
that this former crystal is either solid or liquid -- it must be
both!
On
the other hand, if it isn't both, and is either solid or liquid,
then there is an "either/or" in the universe, after all -- namely
here. This means that Hegel, Engels, and countless other dialecticians, are wrong.
This dilemma is independent of the length of time a "node" is
held to last (that is, if we are ever told!). It is also worth noting
that this inconsistency applies at the very point where dialecticians tell us
DL
is superior to FL --, that is, at the point of change.
So, once more, we see that
not only can DL not explain change,
at least two of Engels's three 'Laws' are inconsistent with each other (when
applied to objects that undergo change).
Hence, if
objects undergoing change are indeed a unity of opposites (so that there is no
"either/or" at work, here), then there can be no 'nodal' change
(otherwise an "either/or" would apply here).
Alternatively,
if there is 'nodal' change, then such objects must be in one state, not two,
at a given time -- which means there is an "either/or", after all!
Any who find the next dozen or so paragraphs
somewhat annoying are encouraged to shelve their exasperation until
they reach
here, where I hope to assuage their
ire by making my argument far less annoying and much clearer.
The
Third 'Law', 'Negation of the Negation'
[NON], fares little better than the first two 'Laws'. Indeed, since the NON is an
elaboration of the previous 'Law', it suffers from all the latter's weaknesses.
[Readers are referred to
Section C, and
here, for
more details.]
As with other
DM-theses, the NON is based on a confusion of logico-linguistic categories with
objects and processes in the world, an ancient error Engels imported from
Hegel. In fact, Hegel borrowed this idea from Kant. [On this, see
Redding (2007). There is
more on
this
below -- and in Essays Eight
Part Two,
Twelve Part Five and Fourteen Part One (summaries of the latter two can be found
here and
here).]
Nevertheless, what few examples
DM-theorists have scraped-together over the last hundred years or so that
are supposed to illustrate this 'Law' fail to work even in the way
they were clearly intended. For example, concerning grains of barley Engels
argues that:
"[T]he grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place there
appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain…. It grows,
flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as
soon as these have ripened, the stalk dies, is in its turn negated…." [Engels
(1976),
pp.172-73.]
However, Engels failed to notice that
many
plants don't cease to exist (and so can't have been 'negated') when they
produce seeds. Do apples trees wither and die when, or soon after, they produce their first crop of
apples? Do fig trees crumple to dust each time they produce a batch of figs? Is it really
necessary to re-plant an entire vineyard each year? Engels seems to have
generalised from the example of one plant species that produces an annual crop and
then dies to a thesis supposedly valid throughout nature, for all of
time.
Consider,
too, the animal kingdom: Do all
animals drop dead when they produce their off-spring? Some do, but most don't.
Do all human children
become orphans the moment they are born?
If not,
it is reasonably clear that much of the living world totally ignores this
obscure 'Law'.
That is quite apart from the fact that most
plants, and some animals, reproduce asexually; precious little 'negating' going
on there. [More on this below.]
Leaving aside for now the confusion noted
earlier -- i.e., whether plants (or,
indeed, anything) change(s) because of (a) a struggle between "internal opposites",
or whether
(b) they change into those opposites; that is, whether they change into
that with which they have struggled --, if each grain is indeed a
UO (i.e., a union of
grain and 'non-grain' -- or a union of the plant it is and the plant
it becomes -- where 'non-grain' is the plant that the grain becomes and where the
latter is
itself the negation of the grain, and so on),
the grain itself must also contain the plant, not potentially, but actually.
[That particular observation is itself dependent on the dialectical equivocation
highlighted earlier.] If this weren't so, the grain wouldn't itself be a union of these opposites -- and
hence there would be nothing to cause it to change, nothing with which it
could 'struggle', and nothing for it to change
into.
[Objections to this way of reading Engels will be neutralised presently.]
However, this 'plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism must for the same
reason also contain its own opposite -- yet another plant (i.e., a
'plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism, if, according to
Engels and Lenin, the 'plant inside
the grain' is itself a UO). If it is, then it, too, must
contain its own opposite, yet another grain (i.e., a
'grain-inside-the-plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism --
and so on, forever. If they didn't then they couldn't change, since we
were
also told that all change is the result of these 'internal
contradictions'.
This
objection can't be neutralised by arguing that the opposite of the
'plant-inside-the-gain' is in fact the grain itself, for if that were the
case, the 'plant-inside-the-grain' would turn onto that grain, if all things turn
into their opposites, as
the DM-classics tell us they must. For the 'plant-inside-the-gain' to develop into a plant
it has to be in some sort of 'internal struggle' with its own opposite, that is,
it has to struggle with what it has to yet to become (i.e., a plant!), which in
turn has to be internal to that 'plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism.
Furthermore, this 'plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain'
sort of organism isn't itself changeless. Hence, if it is to change into its opposite
(which opposite I have here surmised to be a
'grain-inside-plant-inside-the-plant-inside-the-grain' sort of organism -- but,
that is just my guess), that opposite must already exist for it to change into,
or this would be a change with no 'dialectical opposite' inducing it. It would, in that
eventuality, have nothing with which it could 'struggle'. The rest follows as
before.
Again, this must indeed be so if everything is a UO, as Hegel,
Engels, Lenin
and Mao said they were. In
that case, Engels's version of the NON (at least as far as barley is concerned) seems to imply
the actual existence of an infinite set of organic plant-and-seed 'boxes
within boxes', as it were, which is about as believable as the picture of
reality
painted
by 18th century
preformationist/ovist
biologists. That is because it would mean that every grain
that ever there was must contain, and must be contained by, every subsequent
plant that ever there grew (or will grow), with each of these organic mega-Russian Doll-type organisms complete with its own
grains and plants within grains and plants within grains and…, etc., to infinity.
Of course, dialecticians (most
probably those
of the
Low Church
tendency) who accept Engels's seed example as Gospel Truth will reject the above
analysis. According to them, the UO here is precisely what we see as, and
is understood to be, a barley seed alongside all its law-governed inner processes
and 'tendencies' -- including its dialectical interactions with the environment.
The latter components are what change each seed into a plant, unfolding the aforementioned
'negation', which doesn't destroy
the grain as such, but "sublates" the original negation, or, indeed,
the seed from which the new plant emerges.
It could then be argued that none of this
means that the original seed contains the
subsequent plant, as the above paragraphs rather foolishly suppose. Whatever
opposites this natural process requires, so that a new plant grows from seed, can be ascertained from its
actual development.
Or, so a response might proceed.
[It
is worth pointing out that the above 'get-out-of-a-dialectical-hole-free-card' was withdrawn from circulation
here.]
But, what exactly are these "opposites",
anyway? And
why do the
Dialectical Classics say that things change into their
opposites because of an 'internal struggle' between those very opposites --, which, plainly, must co-exist for
that to happen?
"The law
of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites
and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954),
pp.17,
62.]
"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two
poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as
they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually
interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are
conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but
as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the
universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded
when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and
effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will
be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels
(1976),
p.27. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line
of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation."
[Ibid.,
p.179. Bold emphases alone added.]
"[Among
the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory
tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of
everydetermination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other [into its opposite?]…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58. Emphases in the original.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which
condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed
into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956),
p.77.
Bold emphases alone added.]
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only
do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given
conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full
meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed
'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what
conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...'.
"Why is it
that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because
that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or
identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living,
conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every
contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking
of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is
real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of
opposites into one another....
"All
processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into
their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability
manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao
(1961b),
pp.340-42.
Bold emphases added.]
"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can
exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for
its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a
concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no
death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no
'below';... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without
tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there
would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie.
Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or
semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist
oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the
one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are
interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this
character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory
aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being
in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are
interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies
'how opposites can be and how they become identical'. How then can they be
identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the
first meaning of identity.
"But is it enough to say merely that each of the
contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is
identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity?
No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for
their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other.
That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a
thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its
opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by
means of revolutionthe proletariat, at one time the ruled, is
transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is
transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied
by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will
take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity
of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?" [Ibid.,
pp.338-39.
Bold emphases alone added. Minor typos corrected; missing words "and how they
become", found in the published version, added. I have informed the MIA of these
errors.]
[Dozens more
quotations, all arguing along the same lines, have been published
here.]
This can only mean that barley grains
contain
the barely plants they subsequently develop into -- so they are like
Russian dolls, after all. There doesn't seem to be any other way of reading this 'Law', at
least as it is
depicted by the DM-classicists mentioned above. That is because there don't appear to be any
'external' opposites that make a seed change into its 'opposite'. Do seeds fight
among themselves or slug it out with water molecules, or anything else that
happens to be in the
soil? If they do, then they would turn into water molecules, or whatever else
they struggled with --
if we are to believe the DM-Classics, which tell us that
objects and processes turn into that with which they struggle. Hence,
these 'dialectical opposites' must be internal to each seed.
However, even if we ignore that
serious difficulty for the present,
what NON-sense can be made of the claim that a plant is the
negation of a seed? That rather odd idea seems to depend on the ancient
idea that all words,
including the negative particle, are names -- in this case, the negative
particle in language in fact names a special sort of 'dialectical process'.
As noted above, this idea can be traced back into the mists of time, but in its modern form it surfaces in Kant's
claim that there are such things as "real negations". [On that, see
here,
here, here
-- but more specifically,
here.]
Be this as it may, it
is far from easy to follow the 'dialectical-reasoning', here. Perhaps it goes
something like this:
B1: If we have a negative particle in language,
which corresponds with something in reality, then it must name or refer to that something.
So, since negativity appears in language, it must reflect real negativity in nature.
[Minus the Hegelian gobbledygook, I have yet to see anything more sophisticated than this in
the DM-literature.
Lenin's feeble attempt in this regard will be examined in Essay Thirteen
Part One. Among Hegel and Kant
commentators, the argument is little more sophisticated -- that
is, if we strip away the obscure jargon they inflict on their readers. I will be
examining what they have to say in Essay Eight Part Two.]
But,
if the above were so, it would become rather
difficult to rectify an incorrect
naming or identification (something that is easy to do in the vernacular). If and when misidentification happens in
every day life, we have reasonably straightforward ways of correcting ourselves
and others. If we
mistake, say, George H W Bush for his son George W Bush, it is easy to put that right; we simply use a
definite description and a nominal qualifier (perhaps), such as: "I mean the
former
President of the USA, George Bush senior" -- or we point and use a
demonstrative, such as, "I mean him over there!"
[Exactly why all words
aren't names was
explained in Essay Three Part
One.]
More importantly,
negation in language typically attaches to
propositions (or clauses; however, see
here),
and if the latter were names, too -- in that a proposition supposedly names 'the
true',
or 'a fact', or whatever --, then it would seem that any named thing could be
negated. This certainly accounts for the
nominalisation of the verb "negate" in Hegelian and DM-circles, where the word
slides effortlessly between its the nominal- and verb- forms. One minute it is the
name of 'negativity' (or perhaps it is the name of a subsequently "sublated" 'opposite'), next
it is a process that creates novelty. Of course, it is this terminological slide
that helps create the problem. But, negation is something wedo in
language, and we do it to, or with, specific expressions. Treating it as the name
of something in the material world could only therefore amount to the
fetishisation of the negative particle. [More on this, too, in Essay Twelve (summary
here); the
approach I will adopt there is summarised
here.]
Well, even if this 'syntactical slide' represented a
sound piece of Stone Age Logic, negation would still only apply to words,
clauses and sentences, not things. If negation
does in fact apply to changing or developing objects and processes in the world, DM-theorists have yet to provide
us with the proof. [Further ruminations along these lines are explored
here. More details
will be given in Essays Twelve and Four Part Two.]
Following Hegel and Kant, Engels just assumed
that 'things'/processes could be negated; his only 'proof' seems to have been
the fact that it is possible to negate sentences and clauses. To be sure, in the
Kantian and the Hegelian systems it made some sort of crazy sense to suppose
'things'/processes could be negated. After
all, in Hegel's 'mental universe' the line between reality and language, or thought
and things, had become even thinner than George W Bush's excuse for invading Iraq.
However, as far as a materialist
theory is concerned no physical meaning can be given to this odd idea. On a similar basis, one might just as well
think that conjunctions can attach to objects in reality just because we can speak about
cats and dogs (or, if we attached this connective to processes (such as "riding
and
swimming")) -- which 'manufactured fact' would supposedly then 'allow' us to claim that reality contains
'objects' called
"cats-and-dogs" (or "riding-and-swimming"), into which an alleged
natural process of "conjunction" could change them.
This linguistic trick could then be justified by an appeal to the Fourth 'Law' of dialectics, the 'Conjunction
of the Conjunction' -- in a similar way to how we might suppose, DM-style, that reality contains
"negated-seeds". Or even, that nature contains objects called "and"s (to which our
word "and" refers), or that things are
glued together and thus develop by the "power of andivity".
Of course, the motivation for thinking that reality contains
negation (and that it doesn't contain conjunctions) had its own highly
dubious
'logical' origin. As noted above, it was derived from:
(i) Kant's theory that there are
such things as "real
negations";
(iii) The odd idea that
the LOI stated negatively
implies the LOC
and,
(iv) Hegel's
belief that the 'logical' processing of certain ideas (connected with Spinoza's
unsupported claim that 'every determination is also a negation') had profound
implications for the entire universe, for all of time.
Items (ii)-(iv)
have been
neutralised here
(a summary of which can be found
here); (ii) is
also extensively criticised in Essay Three
Part One. Finally,
(i) has been partially tackled below, but more
fully in Essay Eight
Part Two.
[See also my
comments on this over at Wikipedia.]
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of
Non-contradiction.]
Even so,
this 'secondary' argument (that the world must contain negativity if we
allegedly have a word for it) fails, too, for as we have seen, if this were a
sound argument, then reality should also contain adverbs, prepositions and expletives, alongside sundry other odd
'linguistic' items.
We saw in Essay Three
Part One (and
will see again in more detail in Essay Twelve (summary
here)), that the
idea that inferences like this (i.e., the derivation of
fundamental theses, valid for all of space and time, from language alone) is a dodge that Ancient
Philosophers and assorted Mystics invented in order to
account for the supposed link between the 'Word of God', the Logos, and 'His' creation. This ideological
and theological thought-form was then
employed in order to help rationalise and 'legitimate' State Power, since, in that case,
both the natural world and the State were supposed
to
reflect the invisible 'divine', or logical, order of reality.
Moreover, if the structure of language in
fact allowed
us to infer a priori truths about reality from linguistic expressions
(like "not") then we might just as well openly accept the Ideal nature of the world
around us, and be
done with it -- indeed, as George Novack pointed out:
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
In that case, the materialist
flip Hegel's system is supposed to have had inflicted upon it, transforming it into 'Materialist Dialectics',
must have been through the full 360 degrees, and not the
advertised 180.19a
But,
let us suppose that the above is misguided in some way; the question
still remains, what are the 'dialectical opposites' (or 'opposite tendencies')
that are supposed to be inside a grain of barley that cause it to
turn into a plant -- if we interpret the phrase "internal opposite"
spatially, and not
logically as Hegel intended? We have already seen (here,
here and
here) that there are no
viable candidates. Engels certainly didn't tell us, nor have subsequent
DM-theorists.
In
which case, the above considerations aren't 'totally misguided' -- or, at
least, not until DM-fans come clean and answer the question at the top of this
sub-section with far more clarity than they have hitherto managed to
produce.
Engels argued that as things stand
the development of grain into barley is a natural process; hence the plant that
subsequently grows from each seed is its 'natural' negation. But, many
other things can 'naturally' happen to seeds. For example, they can be eaten or burnt
to provide energy. They can also rot, ferment, dry-out and be
thrown at weddings. In fact, since anything that happens in nature must
be natural (it surely isn't supernatural), all such processes must,
it seems, be governed by these and other DM-'Laws' (that is, if they are
genuine
laws).
It won't do, either, to argue that the "natural"
development of objects and process is whatever would happen to them if they were
'left alone' to develop naturally as a result of the operation of their
"internal contradictions". That is because nothing in the DM-universe is
ever 'left alone' -- everything is part of a supposedly interconnected DM-Totality.
Whatever happens in nature must have been 'mediated' to do so by some
DM-'Law' or other, if DM-theorists are to be believed.
It could be argued
in response that if seeds are left to develop according their own "internal
contradictions", the NON will assert itself naturally,
just as Engels imagined. In that case, the
above examples (of seeds being crushed, or eaten, etc.) aren't relevant to the
operation of this 'Law'.
However, quite apart from the fact that the
phrase "internal contradiction" is itself as clear as mud (and has yet to be
explicated with any clarity -- or at all -- by a single DM-theorist, as we saw
above, and
as Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three show), dialecticians
themselves appeal to "external contradictions" to account for change since,
without them, their theory would imply that everything in nature is either
self-moving, or is hermetically sealed-off from the rest of the universe. [On
that, see Essay Eight Part One,
again.]
Anyway, several of the above examples involve
'internal change': rotting and fermenting, for instance. Moreover, when grain is
in an animal's stomach that animal's internal regime will take over, and the grain
will 'naturally' develop into animal tissue or provide it with energy. In fact, 'internal' to a wedding
celebration the 'contradictions' inherent in the bourgeois institution of
marriage will surely prompt someone to throw grain at the hapless couple. All
quite 'natural'.
So, exactly where the 'natural' boundaries of
this 'Law' are to be found is somewhat unclear. [Indeed, as we have also seen in
this Essay, the
thermodynamic
boundaries of this 'Law' weren't delineated by Engels.] Once more, this isn't
surprising; dialecticians in general haven't given the fine detail
of their own theory much thought, as the Essays published at this
site reveal.
Clearly, the advancement of science and
technology often confronts older theories with unexpected problems and
anomalies. So, Engels wasn't to know that one day a company called
Monsanto would
turn up and develop its
so-called "Terminator
Gene". This is a gene that can, by all accounts, stop certain plants from
producing seeds, which 'technological advance' also seems capable of halting the
NON in its tracks, forcing farmers to buy all their grain from -- surprise,
surprise! -- Monsanto.20
[This genetic programme has now been renamed, "Genetic Use Restriction Technology"
[GURT]. Incidentally, the Wikipedia page linked to in Note 20 has been
changed, but it can be accessed in the History section.]
According to some reports, this technology has itself been
terminated.
This
piece of good news suggests that popular opposition has clearly saved the day for
the NON, at least in this respect.
Is, therefore, the NON so weak and ineffectual that a large corporation can
countermand its inevitability? Or, is the NON still at work somewhere in all
this, 'negating' the rights of Third World farmers behind their backs, as it
were, so that they will no longer be able to produce their own planting seed --, if, that
is, Monsanto change their minds, ignore public pressure, and go ahead with the
production of this
gene? Are Monsanto potential negators of the NON? Or have they learnt how to
control it?
In that case, shouldn't we rename
Monsanto "NONsanto", as a result?
Meanwhile,
this 'Law' can now go back to turning seeds into plants, and plants
into seeds. As RationalWiki pointed out:
"Monsanto has
patented
Genetic Use Restriction Technology, branded 'terminator technology' by
environmental groups. This exists in two flavours:
"(1) 'Variety GURT' or V-GURT (which received
the lion's share of publicity) -- it is a process which makes the second
generation seed of GM crops sterile. This means that GM traits cannot spread in
the environment and has a few other potential benefits, such as preventing
sprouting in warm and wet conditions, but also, that seed from the harvest
cannot be saved for the next year. It would also represent a method of enforcing
the legal agreement signed by all customers of Monsanto's GM seeds, which states
that farmers are not allowed to replant saved seed.
"(2) 'Trait GURT' or T-GURT -- it involves
inhibiting the genetically engineered traits in a plant unless an activator
compound is applied. This would mean that farmers can save seed, but to benefit
from GM traits, they must spray their fields each year with the activator bought
from the seed company.
"Effectively, GURT is a form of 'plant
DRM.' If introduced, the issues posed by these GM seeds would not be new.
Plants grown from traditional hybrid seed, used since the 1920s, do not produce
true copies in the second generation and have to be bought from seed growers
each year; otherwise, there is a sharp reduction in yield. In the end, due to
public backlash, neither variant of the terminator technology was
commercialized, Monsanto has promised to never use terminator seeds, and there
are no 'terminator seeds' on sale anywhere in the world. Despite this, both
organic and GM crops still have patents." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 14/05/2018. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links in the
original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
Nevertheless, there remain a few NON-threatening clouds on the dialectical
horizon: this
Wikipedia
article and the above RationalWiki piece inform us that Monsanto have
"promised never to use" such technology, and "have no plans to commercialise"
the Terminator Gene. For those who know what the phrase "no plans" really means,
or how much we can trust the promises of large corporations, it is pretty clear
that the NON is operating on borrowed time, at least as far as seeds are
concerned.
Indeed, as of
May 2008, the signs are that the Terminator Gene may be on the rise again.
[The same could be said in
early 2014.]
In fact, similar 'non-natural' human interventions in nature might in the future further
undermine the alleged universality of this
increasingly pathetic-looking DM-'Law'.
However, as noted above, there is now a variant of GURT -- T-GURT:
"A second type of GURT modifies a crop in
such a way that the genetic enhancement engineered into the crop does not
function until the crop plant is treated with a chemical that is sold by the
biotechnology company. Farmers can save seeds for use each year. However, they
do not get to use the enhanced trait in the crop unless they purchase the
activator compound. The technology is restricted at the trait level, hence the
term T-GURT." [Wikipedia.]
It
seems that
this "activator" compound can switch the NON back on! It is
reassuring to know that 'Being' has inserted an on-off switch in this 'Law', even as it struggled with
'Nothing' to generate 'Becoming'.
It is
almost as if there were a coordinated plot building against the NON since we now learn from the New Scientist
that researchers have discovered a physical state half-way between life and
death, a state of 'suspended animation', as it were. If so, NON-believers must
surely feel slightly NON-plussed -- unless, of course, we allow for the 'fractional negation' of life as a
special dispensation extended once more by 'Being' in order to preserve the morale of beleaguered DM-fans. [Trivedi (2006).]
Now, since the above process is supposedly reversible,
an individual who might formerly have been regarded as dead, may be brought back
to life. That must mean that scientists themselves can 'negate' the NON almost
at will. Should we, therefore, regard such life-saving
work as reactionary, or conclude that the NON itself has been refuted?
Or, perhaps better: that this 'Law'
is now, and always was, "NON-sense on stilts".
Moreover, and more recently, the same journal tells us that
geneticists have succeeded in 'reversing' evolution:
"You have
probably heard of evolution in action -- but how about evolution in reverse? Many of the
genes in our bodies have descended from ancient genes that have mutated and
changed their function. Petr Tvrdik and Mario Capecchi of the University of
Utah, Salt Lake City, have now managed to demonstrate this in mice by recreating
an ancient gene from two of its modern descendants.
"Half a
billion years ago, the size of our ancestor's [sic] genome quadrupled. With four
copies of every gene knocking about, genes either had to make themselves useful,
or be swiftly dumped. The quadrupling meant that 13
Hox genes, which
control the development of body shape, became 52. The ones that didn't mutate to
do something useful were lost, so today mammals have 39 Hox genes. Tvrdik and
Capecchi focused on two that were originally duplicates but have evolved to
perform different functions. Hoxa1 controls brain stem development in the
early embryo, while Hoxb1 directs nerve growth in an area of the brain
that controls facial expression.
"The two
genes make the same protein, but in different places in the brain, and at
different times. In other words, it is the regulatory region of the gene that
differs between Hoxa1 and Hoxb1, not the protein-coding region. To
reconstruct the ancestral Hox1 gene, Tvrdik and Capecchi attached the
regulatory sequence from Hoxb1 -- which turns the gene on later in foetal
development -- to the Hoxa1 gene. That way, one gene did the job of two.
Mice with the new Hox1 gene, but with their Hoxa1 and Hoxb1
genes knocked out, developed normally....
'We
constructed a gene that is fairly similar to the ancestral Hox1 gene
present in the vertebrate lineage half a billion years ago,' says Tvrdik." [New
Scientist,
12/08/2006, p.11. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted
at this site. Several paragraphs merged. Link added.]
Is this not, perhaps, a
clear example of the NON-NON?
So, it looks like Lenin was right: the partial nature of
knowledge means that no scientific principle is immune from revision, or forever
safe from being consigned to the theoretical knackers yard
-- especially by those with no
respect for the NON. In that case, the NON should now be moth-balled -- alongside,
say, the humoral theory of disease, the crystalline spheres, the idea that
women can give birth to live rabbits,
and that some children have naturally golden teeth
-- as yet another example of the whacky beliefs
human beings once used to accept.
[On the belief that women can give birth to live rabbits, see Pickover (2000); or look
here.
On the 'Golden Tooth' saga, see Grant (2007), pp.13-14, and
here.]
But, we needn't wait until Monsanto
finally change their minds and produce their grain NON-starter; anyone who buys fruit these days knows about
seedless grapes. In
fact, most fruit today doesn't come from seed; it is produced by propagation,
from grafts and cuttings.21
For
example, there are many varieties of seedless fruit; these include: navel
oranges, clementines, seedless watermelon, persimmon, seedless cucumber, and
Bartlett pears. Some seedless fruits are propagated naturally by vegetative reproduction
(e.g., bananas and pineapples). [On this, see
here,
here and
here.]
Indeed, many seedless fruits come from
triploid
plants (i.e., cells that don't possess the normal
diploid
paired sets of chromosomes) -- for instance, bananas. Have we here yet another
example of organisms in nature which aren't UOs?
Even though Woods and Grant swore blind that everything
in nature exists as paired opposites,
these Reactionary Chromosomes have
clearly sold out.
"Polyploidy"
(as this condition is generally known) occurs in animals, too; e.g., in
goldfish, salamanders and lizards. But, it is also very common in ferns and most flowering
plants. The wheat that goes into bread is hexaploid (i.e., it has six sets of chromosomes).
Furthermore, the following organisms are:
(a) Triploid: bananas and apples;
(b)
Tetraploid: durum or macaroni
wheat, maize, cotton, potato, cabbage, leek, tobacco, peanut, Pelargonium;
(d) Octaploid: strawberry,
dahlia, pansies, and sugar cane. Polyploidal animals are often sterile,
though, and have to reproduce by parthenogenesis (another
paradigmatically non-dialectical
process in nature,
as we saw earlier); on
that, see also,
here and
here.
In
addition, sterile offspring/hybrids also seem to be no less contemptuous of the
NON. The mule and the hinny are classic examples of this; the mule results
from crossing a male donkey with a female horse; the hinny from a female donkey
with a male horse. Other organisms that exhibit polyploidy are
in fact sterile. Hence, the product of the union of a horse and a donkey (a
mule/hinny) doesn't itself produce sterile offspring, just no
offspring at all. In that case, it looks like the NON has hit another brick wall. [On this, see
here
and here.]
Even more problematic for the NON is the
Liger. This
large cat
is a hybrid cross between a male Lion and a female Tiger. Male Ligers are
sterile while females are fertile. The NON must have gotten its wires crossed.
Similar comments apply to
Tigons (or
Tiglon), a
hybrid between a female Lion and a male Liger. As with Ligers, male Tigons are sterile
whereas females are fertile. Wikipedia adds:
"At the
Alipore Zoo in
India, a tigoness named Rudhrani, born in 1971, was successfully mated to a
male
Asiatic lion named Debabrata. The rare, second generation hybrid was called
a litigon.
Rudhrani produced seven litigons in her lifetime. Some of these reached
impressive sizes -- a litigon named Cubanacan weighed at least 363 kilograms
(800 lb), stood 1.32 metres (4.3 ft) at the shoulder, and was 3.5 metres (11 ft)
in total length.
"Reports also exist of the similar
titigon..., resulting from the cross between a female tigon and a male tiger.
Titigons resemble
golden
tigers, but with less contrast in their markings. A tigoness born in 1978,
named Noelle, shared an enclosure in the Shambala Preserve with a male
Siberian tiger called Anton, [because of] the keepers' belief that she was
sterile. In 1983 Noelle produced a titigon named Nathaniel. As Nathaniel was
three-quarters tiger, he had darker stripes than Noelle and vocalized more like
a tiger, rather than with the mix of sounds used by his mother. Being only about
quarter-lion, Nathaniel did not grow a mane. Nathaniel died of
cancer at the
age of eight or nine years old. Noelle also developed a severe cancer, that
killed her not long after she was diagnosed." [Quoted from
here; accessed
27/02/2021.
Here is film of Liger cubs, and
here
is footage of the first Liliger, the offspring of a Lion and a Liger.
Links in the original.]
Video Eleven: Is This 'The
Liger That Ate The NON'?
[There are
in fact far too many examples of hybrids to list in this Essay; on that, see
here.
And,
here we read about the recent hybridisation of Polar and Grizzly Bears.
Apparently, the males are sterile, but the females aren't, again.]
There
appear to be countless exceptions to Engels's Third
'Law' among plants and animals alike, so many that it is in danger of becoming terminally
sterile itself.
This is, of course, to leave out of account all mention of
symbiosis (mutualism), an eminently
non-'contradictory' way for many organisms to underline the radically
non-dialectical nature of life. Far from 'struggling' with one another, such
affable organisms go out of their way to assist each other. [On the important
influence symbiosis has had on evolution, see Ryan (2002).]
Now, I (jokingly) used the term "dialectical tautology"
elsewhere in this Essay -- so, if we
absolutely have to impose dubious metaphors on nature, these
friendly organisms should rightly have this one foisted on them.
In which case, evolution has produced countless organisms that refute at least
two of Engels's 'Laws' in one fell swoop.
Just as it is to leave out of account the origin of
mitochondria,
widely believed to have been the result of an
endocytosis
billions of years ago, when certain bacteria were absorbed by
prokaryote
cells to form the harmonious cellular union we see today. Yet another amazing
'dialectical tautology'?
[In January 2007, the BBC reported on a research program
into hybrid embryos
that are 99% human, 1% animal (i.e., non-human). A recent article in Socialist Worker
also recorded this reactionary, anti-dialectical move by scientists -- cf.,
Parrington (2007).]
"Some researchers are also convinced that hybridisation has been a major driving
force in animal evolution (see below),
and that the process is ongoing. 'It is really common,' says
James Mallet, an
evolutionary biologist at University College London. 'Ten per cent of all
animals regularly hybridise with other species.' This is especially true in
rapidly evolving lineages with lots of recently diverged species -- including
our own. There is evidence that early modern humans hybridised with our extinct
relatives, such as
Homo erectus
and the
Neanderthals (Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B, vol. 363,
p 2813).
"Hybridisation isn't the only force undermining the multicellular tree: it is
becoming increasingly apparent that HGT plays an unexpectedly big role in
animals too. As ever more multicellular
genomes are
sequenced, ever more incongruous bits of
DNA are turning
up. Last year, for example, a team at the University of Texas at Arlington found
a peculiar chunk of DNA in the genomes of eight animals -- the mouse, rat,
bushbaby,
little brown bat,
tenrec,
opossum,
anole
lizard and
African clawed frog -- but not in 25 others, including humans, elephants,
chickens and fish. This patchy distribution suggests that the sequence must have
entered each genome independently by horizontal transfer (Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 105,
p 17023).
"Other cases of HGT in multicellular organisms are coming in thick and fast. HGT
has been documented in insects, fish and plants, and a few years ago a piece of
snake DNA was found in cows. The most likely agents of this genetic shuffling
are viruses, which constantly cut and paste DNA from one genome into another,
often across great
taxonomic
distances. In fact, by some reckonings, 40 to 50 per cent of the human genome
consists of DNA imported horizontally by viruses, some of which has taken on
vital biological functions (New
Scientist, 27 August 2008, p 38). The same
is probably true of the genomes of other big animals. 'The number of horizontal
transfers in animals is not as high as in microbes, but it can be evolutionarily
significant,' says
Bapteste.
"Nobody is arguing -- yet -- that the tree [of life] concept has outlived its
usefulness in animals and plants. While vertical descent is no longer the only
game in town, it is still the best way of explaining how multicellular organisms
are related to one another -- a tree of 51 per cent, maybe. In that respect,
Darwin's vision has triumphed: he knew nothing of micro-organisms and built his
theory on the plants and animals he could see around him....
"It
could be time to ditch the old idea that hybrids are
sterile individuals that can't possibly have played a role in shaping the
history of life on Earth. Hybridisation is a significant force in animal
evolution, according to retired marine biologist
Donald Williamson, formerly of the University of Liverpool, UK. His
conclusion comes from a lifetime studying marine animals such as
starfish,
sea urchins
and
molluscs,
many of which lead a strange double life, starting out as larvae and
metamorphosing
into adult forms.
"The
conventional explanation for metamorphosis is that it evolved gradually, with
the juvenile form becoming specialised for feeding and the adult for mating,
until they barely resembled each other. Williamson thinks otherwise. He points
out that marine larvae have five basic forms and can be organised into a family
tree based on shared characteristics. Yet this tree bears no relationship to the
family tree of adults: near-identical larvae often give rise to adults from
different lineages, while some closely related adults have utterly unrelated
larvae. It's
as if each species was randomly assigned one of the larval forms -- which is
exactly what Williamson argues happened. He believes metamorphosis arose
repeatedly during evolution by the random fusion of two separate species, with
one of the partners assuming the role of the larva and the other that of the
adult.
"If
that sounds unlikely, Williamson points out that many marine species breed by
casting their eggs and sperm into the sea and hoping for the best, giving ample
opportunity for cross-species hybridisation. Normally nothing comes of this, he
says, but 'once in a million years it works: the sperm of one species fertilises
another and two species become one'. The most likely way for this biological
mash-up to function is if the resulting
chimera
expresses its two genomes sequentially, producing a two-stage life
history with metamorphosis in the middle.
"This explains many anomalies in marine biology, says Williamson. His star
witness is the starfish
Luidia sarsi,
which starts life as a small larva with a tiny starfish inside. As the larva
grows, the starfish migrates to the outside and when the larva settles on the
seabed, they separate. This is perfectly normal for starfish, but in Luidia
something remarkable then happens. Instead of degenerating, the larva swims off
and lives for several months as an independent animal. 'I can't see how one
animal with one genome could do that,' says Williamson. 'I think the larval
genome and the adult genome are different.'
"The
idea that microbes regularly swap portions of genetic code with individuals from
another species doesn't seem so far-fetched (see main story). But could the same
process also have shaped the evolution of multicellular animals? In 1985,
biologist
Michael
Syvanen of the University of California, Davis, predicted that it did (Journal
of Theoretical Biology, vol. 112, p.333). Back then there was no way to test
that claim, but there is now. Syvanen
recently compared 2000 genes that are common to humans, frogs,
sea squirts,
sea urchins, fruit flies and
nematodes.
In theory, he should have been able to use the gene sequences to construct an
evolutionary tree showing the relationships between the six animals.
"He
failed. The problem was that different genes told contradictory evolutionary
stories. This was especially true of sea-squirt genes.
Conventionally, sea squirts -- also known as tunicates -- are lumped together
with frogs, humans and other vertebrates in the
phylumChordata,
but the genes were sending mixed signals. Some genes did indeed cluster within
the chordates, but others indicated that tunicates should be placed with sea
urchins, which aren't chordates. 'Roughly 50 per cent of its genes have one
evolutionary history and 50 per cent another,' Syvanen says. The
most likely explanation for this, he argues, is that tunicates are chimeras,
created by the fusion of an early chordate and an ancestor of the sea urchins
around 600 million years ago." [Lawton
(2009), pp.36-39. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original. Some links added.
Several paragraphs merged.]
In
that case, cooperation, symbiosis, merging and unification
appear to be important natural processes, about which forces Darwin and Hegel
were seemingly unaware. Is this not yet more proof of the 'tautological'
(as opposed to the 'contradictory') nature of reality?
It looks, therefore, like the NON is losing its iron grip and
is slowly 'vanishing from reality', somewhat like an abstract version of the
Cheshire Cat. A suitably ironic non-'nodal' end to this error-strewn 'Law', one
feels.
The question now seems to be: how come the NON is
so weak and feeble that it is so easily cancelled, by-passed, or countermanded? Countless processes in nature
appear to be non-NON-events of this sort, as
human beings alongside a wide variety of organisms have so easily upset the 'natural DM-order of things'.
And what are we to say about
genetic engineering
in general? Is this an interference in the operation of the NON, an infringement
of the 'dialectical law' that all change is 'internally-generated'? Or, is it
nevertheless a
natural process in view of the fact that none of the scientists (or even
the capitalists) involved are supernatural beings (so we have been led to believe), but are
manifestly physical objects themselves?
The
following conclusion, therefore, seems inescapable: if all the above are natural
processes, then it can truly be said that no grain is an island, and
anything that happens to
grain anywhere inside the universe must surely be 'natural'.
Hence, even if barley is dropped in the
sea, crushed by a falling tree, genetically modified, or hit by American
'friendly fire', all these (and many more besides) are natural events and must,
one presumes, be governed by one or more of these DM-'Laws'. If so, there doesn't seem to be a single
thing that could constitute, or which could act as, the 'natural
negation' of a grain of barley.
So, does it even have one?
On
the contrary, it seems that given the supposed
universal dominion of the 'Laws' of dialectics (which DM-fans tell us are the most
"general" laws there are), there must be countless
'natural negations' of anything and
everything:
"And
so, what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general -- and for this
reason extremely far-reaching and important -- law of development of nature,
history, and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and
plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy --
a law which even Herr Dühring, in spite of all his stubborn resistance, has
unwittingly and in his own way to follow.... Dialectics, however, is nothing
more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature,
human society and thought." [Engels (1976),
pp.179-80.
Bold emphases added.]
So it now seems that anything and everything
could be the natural, or even 'dialectical', 'opposite'
of grain -- especially, if according to Lenin "every
determination, quality, feature, side, property [changes] into every
other…." If that is so, and if we apply this hyper-generous and open-ended 'Law' to
Capitalism, it should be possible for the latter, too, to change into a grain of barley, and
vice versa. It is little use saying that this sort of change has never
been observed, since, according to the above, anything could be the opposite of
grain, or even of Capitalism. Like the proverbial
Black
Swan, we just have to wait long enough and it is bound to show up.
In that case, since barley is
"not-Capitalism", and Capitalism can only change into what it "is not",
recklessly profligate 'dialectical logic' like this suggests that revolutionaries should,
as a matter of some urgency, consider re-configuring their aims and objectives. Instead of the struggle for socialism, they should
perhaps struggle for…, well, er..., sowing. This further suggests that our
slogans will need some revising, too --, perhaps to the following: "Capitalism digs its
own garden", "You have nothing to lose but your daisy chains", "There is a tractor haunting Europe"
-- or, maybe even "From each according to his ability to each
according to his seed"?
We
might even consider updating our slogans to the following: "No war for soil!",
"Whose fields? Our fields!", "This is what domestication looks like!" -- or
perhaps even "Biden, Trump, CIA, how many fields did you plough today!"
Now, any who object to the above
(admittedly!) off-the-wall comments should rather direct their indignation at this Third 'Law' and
its
DM-Apologists,
not
at this piss-taker.
Either that, or they should say clearly for the first time ever what NON-sense there is to this
easily countermanded 'Law'.21a
Nevertheless, and despite the above, as far as the descendants of barley
plants are
concerned, little development seems to take place; barley remains barley for
countless generations -- unless change is externally induced (on that, see below).
And, no matter how many times water freezes or ice melts, it still fails to develop, via
the NON, into anything
new.
More interesting, however, is the fact that
based on such long-term lack of change --, and if appeal is made to the NON
(as the DM-paradigm for social development) --, it would seem that Marxists
ought to
become staunch conservatives, since, in the majority of cases, the NON has proved to be impressively conservative.
So,
the NON, applied to barley (and, it looks like, everything else in the living world)
implies near universal biological stasis (unless, once
again, change is introduced
from the outside). In that case, anyone foolish enough to use this 'Law' as a metaphor for social change,
ifthey are consistent, should be committed to the idea that society must
develop peaceably, naturally, slowly -- possibly cyclically -- with no overall
change at the end (unless, again, that is induced from the outside).
However, since organisms develop as a result of mutations
(mostly in response to violent, externally-induced interruptions to the
'natural' order of growth and reproduction), this process can't, it seems, be
reconciled with the above NON-inspired, internally-generated 'theory' of change (or,
rather, lack
of it).
If, on the other hand, this superior,
'externalist' model of development (through mutation) is adopted -- wherein the facts of nature are
allowed to speak to us for a change, and speciation is recognised as a largely externally-motivated
phenomenon --,
then the revolution, if and when it does occur, should result from the intervention of
Aliens, or other NON-humans, acting as external causes -- if, that is, we
insist on using the NON as a metaphor for revolutionary change.
[I
hasten to add that this isn't my view, but then I reject 'dialectics'.]
In
that case, it looks like the 'internal contradictions' of Capitalism might not be
enough to bring about its downfall; governed by the NON, they are far too conservative, if
Engels's analogy drawn against barley seedsis the guiding
model.
Some might object to the above on the grounds that it confuses
classical materialist dialectics with
Second International Marxism, where the NON was understood deterministically. Since history is governed by the actions of human beings, this leaves
room for human decision, choice and intervention.
Or, so this objection might
proceed.
However, given the 'law'-like nature of the
NON, its effects seem to be no more easy to escape (or even by-pass) than those of the law of gravity. Of
course, DM-theorists get around this by arguing that 'freedom' somehow
mysteriously 'emerges'
from 'necessity', as the First 'Law' (i.e., Q↔Q) kicks in at some level of complexity.21b
But, that 'Law' is far too weak to lend any support to this 'semi-miraculous'
defence. Indeed, as we have seen,
it can't even account for baldness or melting butter!
Be
this as it may, this topic will be
examine in detail in Essay Three Part
Five. There, we will see that unless dialecticians come up with new
evidence and argument the NON (whether or not it is interpreted along the
lines set out by Second International
ideologues) is eminently 'deterministic', eminently NON-Marxist.
In
response, it could be argued that
some mutations are
internally-generated.
Maybe so, but these are errors of replication and can in no way be seen as
negations (they are more like random spelling mistakes). Indeed, these 'copying
errors' can't have been created by "internal
contradictions", since, if the
Dialectical
Holy Books are to be believed, such changes can only occur if a DNA sequence
struggles with the sequence it is to become, its "opposite". This will require
that "opposite" to exist before it exists! [That argument is developed and
defended in depth here.]
Moreover, the random nature of these internal
copying errors is difficult to square with a law-governed process of any sort. Not only are
most mutations highly lethal (whether they are internally-, or
externally-induced), they aren't the least bit directional.
Hence, at any particular point in its history a certain mutation might be of no use to an
organism, or population (in terms
of natural selection); at another, it could be a species-saver. There doesn't,
therefore, appear to be much here that can be squeezed even into this
'dialectical NON-boot'.22
In addition,
it isn't easy to see how this
NON-theory is
applicable to other natural life-cycles. What, for instance, are we to make of the
development of
moths and butterflies?
Engels clearly thought that their development illustrated his 'laws':
"With most insects, this process follows the same lines as
in the case of the grain of barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the
egg by a negation of the egg, pass through certain transformations until they
reach sexual maturity, pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the
pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs."
[Engels (1976),
p.173.]
But, moths and butterflies go through the following
four developmental stages:
Adult → Egg → Pupa → Chrysalis → Adult
Which
stage is the negation of which
here? And which is
the NON? And
what about organisms that reproduce by splitting, such as
amoebae and
bacteria?
In any such spit, which half is the negation and which the
NON?23
And,
what about such things as the
periodic extinction of life on earth (by
meteorites or other
catastrophic causes)? When a comet or meteorite slams into the Earth,
which is the negation and which the NON? And where is the development here? Do
meteorites develop into anything new after they crash into the Earth? Is the resulting crater creative?
Furthermore, when a planet orbits a star, is there even a tiny sliver of space
for the NON to gain a slender toe-hold? The said planet might continue in its orbit for hundreds of thousands of years
with little significant change (in its mass, speed, or inclination to the
ecliptic,
etc.). Again, where is the development? Where even is the 'contradiction', here?
[Responses to these objections (on the lines that the NON
in fact only applies to 'development') will considered in Essay
Eight Part One. The idea that
contradictory forces keep planets, for example, in orbit has been batted out of
the non-dialectical park in Essay Eight Part Two,
here and
here.]
Again, it could be argued that this seriously misconstrues the
NON; but we have already seen that
events and processes, which dialecticians regard as eminently developmental, do
not in fact develop; indeed, they go backwards.
So,
until DM-theorists actually tell us what is and what isn't 'genuinely
developmental' (and what is or isn't in fact a correct example of the
NON at work), the above objections will stand as counter-instances with as much
right to be such as the (very few) instances to which dialecticians themselves
appeal to illustrate their 'Law'. If these counter-examples are defective, then
the few that DM-fans regularly use are equally so.
What
this shows is that this 'Law' isn't just the
scrag-end of a abysmally weak theory, but also that ,as an account of the natural world
(and much else besides), it is a definite NON-starter.24
Conclusion:
The Same Old Tune --
Just Different Words
Finally, as noted in
Essay Two, with respect to each of
these
'Laws', DM-theorists seem quite
happy to derive Superscientific
'truths' about all of nature for all of time from a handful of
obscure words and ill-considered examples. Except, these Supertruths
are based on seriously garbled, less than half-formed ideas, misconceived
anecdotes and botched
'thought experiments'.
In that case, they are of no use in helping us understand the world and how to
change it.
01.Update, February 2021: A few years ago I obtained a copy of Levy (1939), which is
in places presents a sophisticated defence of its author's interpretation of DM (in Chapter X). This follows on
from his earlier book, Levy (1938a), and his article, Levy (1935). Indeed,
his work in general contains
what is perhaps one of the most intelligent attempts to defend the 'dialectical outlook'
(applied to the physical sciences) that I have so far encountered. However, Levy was
himself severely criticised by the DM-thought-police. On that, see Palme Dutt (1938a,
1938b), and Levy (1938b).
[I will add
several comments on Levy's work at a later date.]
Recently, an
American comrade has criticised claims made in this Essay about metals and other substances melting slowly. Readers can access
his comments, and my reply, here.
Another comrade raised similar concerns. What he had to say, and my
response, can be accessed
here.
Several
years ago a UK
comrade also
raised a few legitimate points about glass, arguing (at first) that it is a
liquid, not a solid. In which case, he claimed that the claims made in the main body of this Essay
-- that this
particular 'phase
transition' is slow, not rapid -- were incorrect.
However, scientists aren't quite so sure about glass. Here is what one online source tells us about
it:
"It is sometimes
said that glass in very old churches is thicker at the bottom than at the top
because glass is a liquid, and so over several centuries it has flowed towards
the bottom. This is not true. In Mediaeval times panes of glass were often
made by the Crown glass process. A lump of molten glass was rolled, blown,
expanded, flattened and finally spun into a disc before being cut into panes. The sheets were thicker towards the edge of the disc and were usually installed
with the heavier side at the bottom. Other techniques of forming glass panes
have been used but it is only the relatively recent float glass processes which
have produced good quality flat sheets of glass. To answer the
question 'Is glass liquid or solid?' we have to understand its thermodynamic and
material properties....
Some
people claim that glass is actually a supercooled liquid because there is no
first order phase transition
as it cools. In fact, there is a
second order transition
between the supercooled liquid state and the
glass state, so a distinction can still be drawn. The transition is not as
dramatic as the phase change that takes you from liquid to crystalline solids.
There is no discontinuous change of density and no latent heat of fusion. The
transition can be detected as a marked change in the thermal expansivity and
heat capacity of the material....
[The author of
this article now goes into considerable detail, which I won't quote -- RL]
"There is no
clear answer to the question 'Is glass solid or liquid?'. In terms of molecular
dynamics and thermodynamics it is possible to justify various different views
that it is a highly viscous liquid, an amorphous solid, or simply that glass is
another state of matter which is neither liquid nor solid. The difference is
semantic. In terms of its material properties we can do little better.
There is no clear definition of the distinction between solids and highly
viscous liquids. All such phases or states of matter are idealisations of real
material properties. Nevertheless, from a more common sense point of view,
glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday
experience. The use of the term 'supercooled liquid' to describe glass
still persists, but is considered by many to be an unfortunate misnomer that
should be avoided. In any case, claims that glass panes in old windows have
deformed due to glass flow have never been substantiated. Examples of Roman
glassware and calculations based on measurements of glass visco-properties
indicate that these claims can't be true. The observed features are more
easily explained as a result of the imperfect methods used to make glass window
panes before the float glass process was invented...." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphasis alone added. Accessed 10/11/2008. Quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some links also added;
several paragraphs merged.]
"Glass is an amorphous form
of matter. You may have heard different explanations about
whether glass should be classified as a solid or as a
liquid. Here is a look at the modern answer to this question
and the explanation behind it.
"Is
Glass a Liquid?
"Consider the characteristics
of liquids and solids. Liquids have a definite volume, but
they take the shape of their container. A solid has a
fixed shape as well as fixed volume. So, for glass to be a
liquid it would need to be able to change its shape or flow.
Does glass flow? No, it does not! Probably the idea that glass
is a liquid came from observing old window glass, which is
thicker at the bottom than at the top. This gives the
appearance that gravity may have caused the glass to slowly
flow.
"However, glass does not
flow over time! Older glass has variations in thickness
because of the way that it was made. Glass that was blown
will lack uniformity because the air bubble used to thin out
the glass does not expand evenly through the initial glass
ball. Glass that was spun when hot also lacks uniform
thickness because the initial glass ball is not a perfect
sphere and does not rotate with perfect precision. Glass the
was poured when molten is thicker at one end and thinner at
the other because the glass started to cool during the
pouring process. It makes sense that the thicker glass would
either form at the bottom of a plate or would be oriented
this way, in order to make the glass as stable as possible.
"Modern glass is produced in
such a way that has even thickness. When you look at modern
glass windows, you never see the glass become thicker at the
bottom. It is possible to measure any change in the
thickness of the glass using laser techniques; such changes
have not been observed.... Although
glass does not flow like a liquid, it
never attains a crystalline structure
that many people associate with a solid.
However, you know of many solids that
are not crystalline! Examples include a
block of wood, a piece of coal and a
brick. Most glass consists of silicon
dioxide, which actually does form a
crystal under the right conditions. You
know this crystal as quartz.
"Physics Definition of Glass
"In
physics, a glass is defined to be any
solid that is formed by rapid melt
quenching. Therefore, glass is a
solid by definition.
"Why Would Glass Be a Liquid?
"Glass
lacks a first order phase transition,
which means it does not have a volume,
entropy and enthalpy throughout the
glass transition range. This sets glass
apart from typical solids, such that it
resembles a liquid in this respect.
The atomic structure of glass is similar
to that of a supercooled liquid. Glass
behaves as a solid when it is cooled
below its glass transition temperature.
In both glass and crystal the
translational and rotational motion is
fixed. A vibrational degree of freedom
remains." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 07/09/2012. Bold
emphases added. Several paragraphs
merged.]
In
that case, according to criteria we
ordinarily apply to
other substances, glass is a solid, and when heated it loses its 'solid'
properties gradually and non-"nodally".
This is confirmed by the Wikipedia article on Glass:
"Glass in
the common sense refers to a
hard,
brittle,
transparent
amorphous solid, such as
that used for windows, many bottles, or eyewear, including, but not limited to,
soda-lime glass,
borosilicate glass,
acrylic glass,
sugar glass,
isinglass (Muscovy-glass),
or
aluminium oxynitride.... In the scientific sense the term glass is often extended to all
amorphous solids (and
melts that easily form amorphous solids), including
plastics,
resins, or other
silica-free amorphous solids.... Glass
is generally classed as an amorphous solid rather than a liquid. Glass
displays all the mechanical properties of a solid. The notion that glass flows
to an appreciable extent over extended periods of time is not supported by
empirical research or theoretical analysis. From a more commonsense point of
view, glass should be considered a solid since it is rigid according to everyday
experience." [Quoted from
here. Bold
emphasis alone added. Accessed 10/11/2008. Several paragraphs merged. This Wikipedia page has changed
considerably since it was first accessed, although none of the above substantive
points seem to have been removed. Paragraphs merged.]
Compare the above with the following
New York Times article:
"'It surprises most people that we still don't
understand this,' said David R. Reichman, a professor of chemistry at Columbia,
who takes yet another approach to the glass problem. 'We don't understand why
glass should be a solid and how it forms.'... Scientists are slowly accumulating more clues. A
few years ago, experiments and computer simulations revealed something
unexpected: as molten glass cools, the molecules do not slow down uniformly.
Some areas jam rigid first while in other regions the molecules continue to
skitter around in a liquid-like fashion. More strangely, the fast-moving regions
look no different from the slow-moving ones.... For scientists, glass is not just the glass of
windows and jars, made of silica, sodium carbonate and calcium oxide. Rather, a
glass is any solid in which the molecules are jumbled randomly. Many plastics
like polycarbonate are glasses, as are many ceramics....
"In freezing to a conventional solid, a liquid
undergoes a so-called phase transition; the molecules line up next to and on top
of one another in a simple, neat crystal pattern. When a liquid solidifies into
a glass, this organized stacking is nowhere to be found. Instead, the molecules
just move slower and slower and slower, until they are effectively not moving at
all, trapped in a strange state between liquid and solid.
The glass transition differs from a usual phase
transition in several other key ways. Energy, what is called
latent heat,
is released when water molecules line up into ice. There is no latent heat in
the formation of glass. The glass transition does not occur at a single,
well-defined temperature; the slower the cooling, the lower the transition
temperature. Even the definition of glass is arbitrary -- basically a rate of
flow so slow that it is too boring and time-consuming to watch. The final
structure of the glass also depends on how slowly it has been cooled." [New
York Times, 29/07/2008. Accessed 10/11/2008. Bold emphases added. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several
paragraphs merged.]
"Glass is an amorphous solid. A material is
amorphous when it has no long-range order, that is, when there is no regularity
in the arrangement of its molecular constituents on a scale larger than a few
times the size of these groups. [...] A solid is a rigid material; it does not
flow when it is subjected to moderate forces [...]." [Doremus (1994), p.1.] Glass includes all materials which are
structurally similar to a liquid. However, under ambient temperature they react
to the impact of force with elastic deformation and therefore have to be
considered as solids." [Pfaender (1996), p.17.]
"Amorphous substances, like crystalline solids, are usually characterized by
certain areas of short-range order. [...] A long-range order,
as in crystals, does not exist in amorphous substances. The designations
'amorphous' and 'noncrystalline' describe the same fact. [...] Glasses are noncrystalline or amorphous substances. Nevertheless, the term
vitreous state is restricted to (i) solids obtained from melts, or (ii) solids
produced by other methods and obtained in a compact form or as thin coherent
films [...].
"Glasses have numerous properties in common with crystalline solids, such as
hardness and elasticity of shape [...]. The term 'amorphous solid state' has a
more comprehensive meaning broader than that of the 'vitreous state'. All
glasses are amorphous, but not all amorphous substances are glasses." [Feltz
(1993), pp.7-8. Italic emphases in the original.] As kinetically frozen forms of liquid, glasses
are characterized by a complete lack of long-range crystalline order and are the
most structurally disordered types of solid known." [Jeanloz and Williams
(1991), p.659.
Several paragraphs merged.]
Several more quotations along the same lines can be found if readers click on the above
link (where a simple test to decide whether or not a substance is solid or
liquid has been outlined in the Appendix at the end of that article). [However, I have only been able to
check two of the above four references, Doremus (1994) and Pfaender (1996).]
And, here is what we find in an article from Science
Daily:
"Scientists fully understand the
process of water turning to ice. As the temperature cools, the
movement of the water molecules slows. At 32oF, the molecules
form crystal lattices, solidifying into ice. In contrast, the
molecules of glasses do not crystallize. The movement of the
glass molecules slows as temperature cools, but they never lock
into crystal patterns. Instead, they jumble up and gradually
become glassier, or more viscous. No one understands exactly
why." [Science
Daily, 13/08/2007. Bold emphasis added.]
In
addition, here is what a recent New Scientist article had to say:
"Forget the hoary myths peddled by tour
guides at old European churches and cathedrals. Medieval window panes are
sometimes thicker at the bottom not because of the slow flow of glass over
centuries, but because of the uneven way molten glass was originally rolled into
sheets in the Middle Ages. Glass is not a slow-moving liquid. It is a solid,
albeit an odd one. It is called an amorphous solid because it lacks the ordered
molecular structure of true solids, and yet its irregular structure is too rigid
for it to qualify as a liquid. In fact, it would take a billion years for
just a few of the atoms in a pane of glass to shift at all. But not everything about glass is quite so
clear. How it achieves the switch from liquid to amorphous solid, for one thing,
has remained stubbornly opaque. When most materials go through this transition
between liquid and solid states, their molecules instantly rearrange. In a
liquid the molecules are moving around freely, then snap! -- they are more or
less locked into a tightly knit pattern. But the transition from the
glassblower's red-hot liquid to the transparent solids we drink from and peer
through doesn't work like that. Instead of a sudden change, the movement of
molecules gradually slows as the temperature drops, retaining all the structural
disorder of a liquid but acquiring the distinctive physical properties of a
solid." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 05/04/2020. Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
So, I wasn't wrong to call glass a solid, or
claim that the
phase change here is slow, or "gradual", and not at all "nodal".
Concerning the so-called "Glass Transition", Wikipedia said the
following:
"The liquid-glass transition (or glass
transition for short) is the reversible transition in
amorphous
materials (or in amorphous regions within
semicrystalline
materials) from a hard and relatively brittle state into a molten or
rubber-like state. An amorphous solid that exhibits a glass
transition is called a
glass.
Supercooling
a
viscous liquid
into the glass state is called
vitrification,
from the Latin vitreum, 'glass' via French vitrifier. Despite the massive change in the physical
properties of a material through its glass transition, the
transition is not itself a
phase transition
of any kind.... The glass transition of a liquid to a
solid-like state may occur with either cooling or compression. The transition
comprises a smooth increase in the viscosity of a material by as much as 17
orders of magnitude
without any pronounced change in material structure." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 05/11/2011. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
Another source
discusses several other examples of amorphous materials:
"Amorphous materials are ubiquitous in
natural and engineered systems.
Granularfault gouge
in earthquakes faults, thin film lubricants, and bulk metallic glasses are
seemingly disparate systems which are similar in that they possess an amorphous
structure. Colloids, emulsions, window glass, dense polymers, and even
biological tissues are other examples. Other examples of amorphous materials
include colloids and emulsions, foams, glass-forming molecular liquids, traffic
jams...." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 05/11/2011.
See also
here, as well as the comments in
the main body of this Essay about amorphous solids. Paragraphs
merged.]
So, and once again, not all state of
matter/phase changes are "nodal". The same points can be made with respect to
other so-called "amorphous
solids":
"Melting Point: A crystalline solid
has a sharp melting point, i.e., it changes into liquid state at a definite
temperature. On the contrary an amorphous solid does not have a sharp melting
point. For example, when glass is heated, it softens and then starts flowing
without undergoing any abrupt or sharp change from solid to liquid state...."
[Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]
"In an amorphous solid, the local environment, including both the distances to
neighbouring units and the numbers of neighbours, varies throughout the
material. Different amounts of thermal energy are needed to overcome these
different interactions.
Consequently, amorphous solids tend to soften slowly over a wide temperature
range rather than having a well-defined melting point like a crystalline solid."
[Quoted from here; accessed
16/09/2024. Spelling altered to UK English. Bold emphasis added.]
Admittedly,
much of this was unknown in Engels's day,
but he surely can't have been unaware of the fact that glass melts slowly. Why then did he
insist on "foisting" his 'Law' on the facts?
Finally,
here is a recent science video on the subject:
Video Thirteen: Glass Isn't A
Liquid
It could be objected (indeed,
it has been objected,
here) that Engels is quite specific; the First 'Law' links the addition or
subtraction of matter or energy to changes in quality in the natural world, not in relation to social development:
"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by
saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual
case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).
All
qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical
composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is
almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of
a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without
quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's
mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious." [Engels
(1954), p.63. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
Maybe
so, but a few pages later he added this remark:
"In biology, as in the history of human
society, the same law holds good at every step, but we prefer to dwell here
on examples from the exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately
measurable and traceable." [Ibid.,
p.68. Bold emphasis added.]
Here, Engels links "the same law" with social change. He then
says the following:
"But to have formulated for the first time in its
universally valid form a general law of development of nature, society, and
thought, will always remain an act of historic importance." [Ibid.,
p.68. Bold emphasis added.]
Hence, the "same law" applies universally to the
"development
of nature, society, and thought".
Not much wiggle room there, one feels.
Some might now object that Engels doesn't
specifically apply this Law -- in its 'addition of matter and motion' form
-- to
social change, and no wonder; the latter sort of change can't be reduced to
such crude formulations.
Or, so it could be maintained...
But, if that were so, it can't be the "same
law", nor could it be completely general. Notice that in the same section of
DN, Engels refers us back to the
'matter and motion' formulation of this 'Law':
"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by
saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual
case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).
All
qualitative differences in nature rest on differences of chemical
composition or on different quantities or forms of motion (energy) or, as is
almost always the case, on both. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of
a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without
quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In this form, therefore, Hegel's
mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious." [Ibid.,
p.63. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
And, he then says:
"In biology, as in the history of human
society, the same law holds good at every step, but we prefer to dwell here
on examples from the exact sciences, since here the quantities are accurately
measurable and traceable." [Ibid.,
p.68. Bold emphasis added.]
So, and once more, Engels specifically
tells us that this is the "same law" that applies "in nature"
and "human society"; hence the 'matter and motion' protocols must apply
to social change, too.
It could be objected that these comments appear
in notebooks, so the precise formulation shouldn't be relied upon too
much.
However, when we read
AD, a published
work, we see Engels himself connecting this 'Law' to social change:
"In proof of this law we might have cited
hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus,
for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of
relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of
labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in
which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change
alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to
use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into
quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a
number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to
use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of
its separate forces." [Engels
(1972), p.160. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Here, Engels applies this 'Law' to social change, and
he does so in its 'addition of matter and motion' form, too. He specifically refers
to the:
"[C]o-operation of a number of people, the fusion
of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase, a 'new
power', which is essentially different from the sum of its separate forces." [Ibid.]
And human beings are, plainly, made of matter; many have been
known to move.
He then adds:
"In
conclusion we shall call one more witness for the transformation of quantity
into quality, namely -- Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French
cavalry, who were bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were
undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but lacked
discipline, as follows:
'Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a
match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300
Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably
defeated 1,500 Mamelukes.'
"Just as with Marx a definite, though varying,
minimum sum of exchange-values was necessary to make possible its transformation
into capital, so with Napoleon a detachment of cavalry had to be of a definite
minimum number in order to make it possible for the force of discipline,
embodied in closed order and planned utilisation, to manifest itself and rise
superior even to greater numbers of irregular cavalry, in spite of the
latter being better mounted, more dexterous horsemen and fighters, and at least
as brave as the former. But what does this prove as against Herr Dühring? Was
not Napoleon miserably vanquished in his conflict with Europe? Did he not suffer
defeat after defeat? And why? Solely in consequence of having introduced the
confused, hazy Hegelian notion into cavalry tactics!" [Ibid.,
pp.163-64. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Here, Engels again tells
us this 'Law' operates in the same way, and that an increase in the number of
disciplined soldiers involved (which is manifestly an increase in quantity
of matter -- they aren't immaterial!) changes their quality. So, no
wonder he called this a "general law", which "same law" applies to the
"development
of nature, society and thought".
It could be objected that this is
ridiculous, since Engels knew that complex social changes can't be reduced in
such a crude manner to 'matter and motion'. But, as we will see throughout this
Essay, Engels is radically confused about such things, so the above isn't
a safe conclusion to draw. This is quite apart from the fact that we have yet to
see the proof that such a reduction can't be made. DM-fans constantly assert this for a fact,
but they never quite seem to get around to proving that such a reduction is impossible. Short of
doing that, DM-fans have
plainly imposed that particular belief on nature and society, despite the
fact that that is something they say they
never do.
[Incidentally, the above comment doesn't
make any concessions to reductionism, it merely questions, once again,
DM-supporters' consistency.]
Hence, all the above objections fail.
01a.
It could be argued that balding is a classic example of the operation of
this law since it is like another classic
sorites
conundrum, the 'paradox
of the heap'. With a balding head we actually do have a gradual process as one hair is lost each time,
which means that at
some point the individual concerned suddenly becomes bald.
I have analysed and then neutralised that argument here
(where what I argue also applies to heaps).
1.
"Not so!" I hear some readers exclaim. But,
as we will see, the nature
of these "nodal points" has been left completely vague by
dialecticians. Until they clarify what they mean by that phrase, not even theywill know whether
or not the claims made in the main body of this Essay are correct.
"Have you ever left a plastic bucket or some
other plastic object outside during the winter, and found that it cracks or
breaks more easily than it would in the summer time? What you experienced was
the phenomenon known as the glass transition. This transition is
something that only happens to polymers, and is one of the things that make
polymers unique. The glass transition is pretty much what it sounds like. There
is a certain temperature (different for each polymer) called the glass
transition temperature, or Tg for short. When the polymer is cooled
below this temperature, it becomes hard and brittle, like glass. Some polymers
are used above their glass transition temperatures, and some are used below.
Hard plastics like polystyrene
and poly(methyl methacrylate),
are used below their glass transition temperatures; that is in their glassy
state. Their Tg's (sic) are well above room temperature, both at
around 100oC. Rubber
elastomers
like
polyisoprene
and
polyisobutylene,
are used above their Tg's (sic), that is, in the rubbery state,
where they are soft and flexible....
"Amorphous and Crystalline
Polymers
"We have to make something clear at this point.
The glass transition is not the same thing as melting. Melting is a transition
which occurs in crystalline polymers.
Melting happens when the polymer chains fall out of their crystal structures,
and become a disordered liquid. The glass transition is a transition which
happens to amorphous polymers; that is, polymers whose chains are not
arranged in ordered crystals, but are just strewn around in any old fashion,
even though they are in the solid state.
"But even crystalline
polymers will have a some amorphous portion. This portion usually makes up
40-70% of the polymer sample. This is why the same sample of a polymer can have
both a glass transition temperature and a melting temperature. But you
should know that the amorphous portion undergoes the glass transition only,
and the crystalline portion undergoes melting only....
"The Glass Transition vs.
Melting
"It's tempting to think of
the glass transition as a kind of melting of the polymer. But this is an
inaccurate way of looking at things. There are a lot of important differences
between the glass transition and melting. Like I said earlier, melting is
something that happens to a crystalline polymer, while the glass transition
happens only to polymers in the amorphous state. A given polymer will often have
both amorphous and crystalline domains within it, so the same sample can often
show a melting point and a Tg. But the chains that melt are not
the chains that undergo the glass transition.
There is another big
difference between melting and the glass transition. When you heat a crystalline
polymer at a constant rate, the temperature will increase at a constant rate.
The heat amount of heat required to raise the temperature of one gram of the
polymer one degree Celsius is called the
heat
capacity.
"Now the temperature will
continue to increase until the polymer reaches its melting point. When this
happens, the temperature will hold steady for awhile, even though you're adding
heat to the polymer. It will hold steady until the polymer has completely
melted. Then the temperature of the polymer will begin to increase once again.
The temperature rising stops because melting requires energy. All the energy you
add to a crystalline polymer at its melting point goes into melting, and none of
it goes into raising the temperature. This heat is called the
latent heat
of melting. (The word latent means hidden.)
"Now once the polymer has
melted, the temperature begins to rise again, but now it rises at a slower rate.
The molten polymer has a higher heat capacity than the solid crystalline
polymer, so it can absorb more heat with a smaller increase in temperature. So, two things happen when a
crystalline polymer melts: It absorbs a certain amount of heat, the latent heat
of melting, and it undergoes a change in its heat capacity. Any change brought
about by heat, whether it is melting or freezing, or boiling or condensation,
which has a change in heat capacity, and a latent heat involved, is called a
first order transition.
"But when you heat an
amorphous polymer to its Tg, something different happens. First you heat
it, and the temperature goes up. It goes up at a rate determined by the
polymer's heat capacity, just like before. Only something funny happens when you
reach the Tg. The temperature doesn't stop rising. There is no latent
heat of glass transition. The temperature keeps going up.
"But the temperature doesn't
go up at the same rate above the Tg as below it. The polymer does undergo
an increase in its heat capacity when it undergoes the glass transition. Because
the glass transition involves change in heat capacity, but it doesn't involve a
latent heat, this transition is called a second order transition."
[Quoted from
here;
accessed 15/12/2015. Emphases in the original. Some links added; several
paragraphs merged. See also
here, and
here.]
This
underlines (yet again!) just how out-of-date Engels's 'Laws' are. Nature is far
more complex than dialecticians would have us believe, especially since they are
promoting a theory that was dreamt up over 2400 years ago by Heraclitus,
'modernised' by the confused musings of a Christian Mystic (Hegel)
200 years ago.
[Once more:
it is no part of my argument that there are no sudden changes in
nature, only that not all are.]
1a.
For
example, Ghiselin (1975), and Hull (1976, 1988). [On this, see
here.]
1b.
Concerning cooperation
among animals, here is an amazing
video of a Hippopotamus rescuing a wildebeest from the jaws of a crocodile:
Video Fourteen: Hippo Refutes Hegel?
[Unfortunately, the original video
is no longer available so I have posted a related clip.]
Where is the 'contradiction' here?
Some might think that the hippo 'contradicted' the
crocodile, but if you watch
carefully, the former says nothing at all to the latter, and the hippo doesn't turn into the
crocodile, either -- nor vice versa -- even though the
DM-classics tell us that all such contradictory opposites should turn into
each. [Follow that link for dozens of quotes from the DM-classics that say this,
and even more from subsequent dialecticians that say the same.]
Furthermore, any who think that
altruistic
or cooperative behaviour in animals and plants can be explained along neo-Darwinian
lines, perhaps as a consequence of the 'Theory
of Inclusive Fitness', would do well to read Stove (1994a, 1994b) -- the latter has just been re-issued as Stove (2006) --, as well as
Franklin (1997), which is a response to Blackburn (1994) --, and then perhaps think
again. [I have discussed this topic in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
[For those unfamiliar with
David Stove,
it is worth pointing out that up until his death in 1994 he was an avowed atheist.
He had been a communist in his youth and he believed that Darwin's
theory was the best explanation we yet have for the origin of the species, even
though he also argued that it wasn't itself without serious
flaws,
especially in relation to human evolution. Later in life he morphed
into a
right-wing conservative
bigot who
held a range of truly offensive views, especially
about race and the status of women. However, that should no more stop us taking
note
of his well-argued criticisms of neo-Darwinism
than dialecticians allow Hegel's right-wing, mystical theories prevent them from
studying his
'Logic'.]
Update, August 2011: The National
Geographic Wild Channel has just aired a documentary about a lioness
protecting a newborn Wildebeest from
an attack by Hyenas. Precious little 'contradicting' going on in this encounter,
either. Here is
a brief trailer of that film:
Video Fifteen: Spot The 'Contradiction'
And,
here a video of another lioness adopting an
Oryx
calf (apparently it was one of several that year):
Video Sixteen: Better Luck This Time...
Update, April 2013: The BBC
news website posted
a video of a female goat that has adopted two (sheep) lambs. Not much
'contradicting' noticeable here, either. And
RT,
the Russian, English language channel, has posted the following anti-Hegelian
film (my words, not theirs!), about a tiger that made friends with a goat:
Video Seventeen: Hold The Press!
-- Tiger Viciously 'Contradicts' Goat
And, here is a brief report
(and picture) from The Guardian:
"Kimon, an eight-year-old pet female long-tailed
monkey, treats a kitten as her baby in Bintan Island, Indonesia." [Quoted from
here.]
Figure Ten: Neither Of These
Crazy, Mixed-Up Animals
Has Read Hegel...,
Or, Indeed, Engels
Finally,
here is another 'video oddity':
Video Eighteen: And Neither Have These
And, of course, there is
also
a link I
posted earlier that will take the reader to a page
with a series of pictures that show a
lioness defending a fox cub from the predatory attention of a much larger male
lion.
As I have repeatedly said:
Nature is far too complex to squeeze
into this ill-fitting 'dialectical-boot'.
1c. A few
years ago, a US comrade (Brian Jones)
attempted to respond to a few of the points made about the vagaries
surrounding the 'dialectical' use of terms like "node" and "leap", along these lines:
"But since the precise dimensions of the 'nodes,' or threshold -- a millisecond
or a geological age -- cannot be prescribed, she claims that the 'law' is
worthlessly vague. Yet similar events can occur on vastly different scales.
Geologists regularly refer to the 'collision' of tectonic plates. These are
quite different from, say, our automobile collisions. Surely, since tectonic
plates move mere millimeters a year, and automobiles move at many miles per
hour, Lichtenstein must find it ludicrous to call both 'collisions,' even though
the term describes something important that they have in common." [Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Here
is how I replied:
However, the use of
"collision" in mathematics, the physical sciences and geophysics is
quite well-defined.
When one tectonic plate hits another, their continued collision can last
for hundreds of millions of years, but the actual collision (point of
contact) isn't a protracted affair. It doesn't take millions of years for two
rock faces to begin to touch each other. In fact, to depict the process itself,
geophysicists will use the present continuous tense, employing "colliding".
Dialecticians don't have a similar
present continuous tense they can employ (unless, of course, they appeal to
"leaping", or "node-ing").
So, the actual use of
"collision" in this case is the same as its use in descriptions of road crashes; the word connotes
suddenness. And, so does "node" and its
corollary "leap". Comrade Jones needn't take my word for it, both Hegel and Engels
were quite explicit:
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis
added.]
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83.I have used the
online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages
edition. Bold emphasis added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
As, indeed, was Lenin:
"The
'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality....
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps. [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Lenin added in the margin here:
'Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!']
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity
(identity) of Being and not-Being. [Lenin (1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
"The first
conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of
everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid.,
p.358. Bold emphases alone added.
In each case quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
From this it is
clear that for Hegel, Engels and Lenin, "nodes"/"leaps" are sudden.
Indeed, Engels, applies this term right across the sciences, and Lenin credits
it with universal significance. In
which case, comrade Jones is out-of-line with these dialecticians (and, indeed,
with many other DM-theorists).
Hence, a collision is
a collision no matter whether it is sudden or protracted (so a clear definition is
inappropriate), but a "node" has to be sudden, as the above quotations show.
But
how "sudden"?
We have yet to be told -- just as I predicted.
Independently of the
above, while they certainly are important, collisions aren't a fundamental
feature of this part of geology, something that distinguishes plate tectonics
from whatever went before.
Contrast this with the
"leaps" and "nodes" of DM; here again is what Lenin had to say:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Lenin (1961),
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
So, according to Lenin
(but not comrade Jones, it seems), "leaps"/"nodes" are central to DM; they
help distinguish dialectical from non-dialectical change. But, "collision"
doesn't distinguish one scientific theory from any other. Comrade Jones's
counter-argument is, therefore, entirely spurious.
Once more:
can you imagine a scientist leaving it unclear what she meant by a key
concept in her theory -- and one that distinguishes it from all the rest
--,
but who then criticises you for having the cheek to ask her to be clear or more
precise?
I can't. Perhaps
comrade Jones can?
2.
Another example of "nodal revolutionism"
-- i.e., the idea that this 'Law' applies to the revolutionary transition from
one Mode of Production to another -- can be found in Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.61-63, but this idea is widespread throughout the genre, as anyone
familiar with dialectics will already know. See also, Kuusinen (1961), p.89.
3.One benighted DM-fan tried to argue
that the increase in quantity here in fact relates to
time (alas, the site where this was argued has now been closed!), forgetting that unless time is energy,
that response itself refutes Engels's 'Law'. This is quite apart from the rather bizarre idea that
time is a quantity that can be added to anything!
Other examples of the same phenomena can be
found at countless sites on the Internet devoted to optical illusions;
here,
for instance.
Indeed, the very same material object can change qualitatively if
its context and/or background is altered, so that no material change to that object
will have occurred, but it will still have qualitatively changed.
The black figures
below are all the same size, but they look qualitatively different (and this could form
part of a moving image on a level surface, so the figures below could look bigger as they moved
into this shape -- or 'developed' --, and thus alter qualitatively with no input of energy):
Figure Twelve: Are These Yet More
Spectres Haunting DM?
[This example was obtained from
here. See also
Essay Five, here.]
However, since
the above was written scores of videos of optical illusions have been posted on
YouTube and other websites. So, Figure Twelve has now been brought to life by the "Ames
Room" optical illusion, where we can see just such motion and apparent
change in size; here is one such video:
Video Nineteen: The Ames
Room
Of course, some energy might be expended
in the above example, but that isn't necessarily so. [On that, see
here.] Moreover, Engels was quite specific;
energy has to be added to a system or body; in this case
that plainly isn't so. [On that, see
here.] The
illusion is created in the observer who has had no energy added to her, and none
of the energy expended by the moving figures alters their "quality", either.
It
could be argued that energy has been added to the observer. But that
energy can't have created her subjective impression of changing size in the
moving figures since the same observer watching people move about in an ordinary
room won't have that effect on her (or them) for the same energy input. So this
energy input can't be what created the above illusion or this subjective change
in 'quality' -- i.e., an apparent change in size. It is this specially-designed
room and the observer's subjective take on what they see that creates this illusion.
"In chemistry two
stereoisomers
are said to be enantiomers if one
can be superimposed on the mirror image of the other, and vice versa. A
simple analogy would be that your left and right shoes are enantiomers of each
other. Two
molecules
that are made up of the exact same
atoms, having exactly the same neighbours, and differing only in their
spatial orientation are said to be stereoisomers. A test for enantiomers can be
stated thus: Do the molecules possess mirror planes of symmetry? That is, is
it possible to find a plane that cuts through the molecule such that the two
halves are mirror images of each other? It has to bisect all of the
chiral centres. An enantiomer of an
optically active isomer rotates plane
polarized light
in an equal but opposite direction of the original isomer. A
solution of equal parts of an optically active isomer and its enantiomer is
known as a
racemic solution and has a net rotation of plane polarized light of zero. A
more in-depth explanation of this is in the footnotes for optical isomerism....
"Research is expanding quite rapidly into the
field of chiral chemistry because, for the most part, only one enantiomer is active
in a biological system. Most biological reactions are enzymatic and the
enzymes
can only attach to one of the enantiomers. (The left-shoe stretcher
will only fit in the left shoe, not in the right shoe -- enzymes and their
targets must fit together.) This is usually not a problem because mother nature
only tends to make the one that you need, but if you are introducing a synthetic
chemical care must be taken. For example, one enantiomer of
thalidomide cures morning sickness, the other causes birth defects.
There are exceptions where both enantiomers are
biologically active. One example is (+)-carvone and (-)-carvone; one smells like
spearmint and the other like caraway." [Quoted from
here.
This page was originally accessed
31/03/2005; it has since been changed.
The original article is
available
here. Several paragraphs merged.]
In addition, it is also worth consulting the
following articles:
[For those
who don't trust Wikipedia, see Nelson and
Coz (2005), andClayden, et al (2001).]
Cameron (1995) claims that Engels had
in fact anticipated this objection in
DN; for example, here:
"All qualitative differences in nature rest on
differences of chemical composition or on different quantities or forms of
motion (energy) or, as is almost always the case, on both. Hence it is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. In
this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite
rational but even rather obvious.
It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the
various
allotropic
and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on
various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser quantities
of motion communicated to the bodies. But what is the position in regard to change of form of
motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or
vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same?
Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion as with
Heine's vices;
anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of
form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies,
of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat),
while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality
(mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore,
quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been
found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single
isolated body." [Engels (1954),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs
merged.]
Cameron
then argues as follows:
"However, do all qualitative changes arise from the
'addition or subtraction of matter or motion'? Engels points to another factor
that is sometimes involved: 'by means of a change of position and of connection
with neighbouring molecules it ["the molecule" -- Cameron's insertion] can
change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation'....
Engels then is arguing that qualitative change can come about by means of
'change of position' or as he put it in another passage, 'various groupings of
the molecules'...." [Cameron (1995), pp.66-67. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the convention adopted at this site; bold emphasis added.]
However, as Cameron goes on to point out, Engels also said the
following:
"For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
added.]
In which case, Engels was either thoroughly confused or he
thought that a simple change of position amounted to a "quantitative" change,
contradicting this earlier claim:
"[Q]ualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Italic emphasis
in the original.]
Even so, the counter-examples considered
in the main body of this Essay -- i.e., those involving stereoisomers -- don't just concern mere "changes of position", but
involve the symmetrical re-arrangement of constituent atoms. The point of referring to
such
isomers in this Essay is that they are exact copies of one another, unlike those
involved in allotropy. Indeed, that is why allotropes were ignored.
Now, despite the fact that Engels refers to isomers in DN (see
below), it is doubtful whether he had heard of stereoisomers (even though they
were
first
isolated by
Louis
Pasteur; indeed structural chemistry didn't come into its own until the
1860s -- on that, see Brock (1992), pp.257-69).
Nevertheless,
and despite the above, it could be
objected that Engels had covered this particular base with the additional comment that "qualitative" change
could occur:
"...by means of a change of position and of connection
with neighbouring molecules it can
change the body into an allotrope or a different state of aggregation."
[Engels (1954),
p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
In response, once more, it is worth pointing out that this makes
a mockery of his claim that such changes can only come about through
the addition/subtraction of matter and/or motion, and that it is "impossible" to alter a body
"qualitatively" in any other way:
"Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Ibid.,
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
This
means that should any appeal be made to the first of the above quotations
in order to
argue that Engels had anticipated stereoisomers, they will also have to drop
Engels's "only" and "impossible" caveats in the second
passage. In that case, why call this
'Law' a law
if it admits of no clear boundaries or is so easily contradicted by its most
important advocate? Would we call
Newton's Third Law a 'law' if it turned out that it was typically
possible for an action to fail to have an equal and opposite reaction?
This is quite apart from the fact that Engels is
actually denying that such ordering relations are a separate factor in
"qualitative" change:
"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that the
various
allotropic
and aggregational states of bodies, because they depend on
various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser
quantities of motion communicated to the bodies." [Ibid.,
p.63. Bold
emphasis added.]
Here, Engels is plainly attempting to reduce aggregational change
to his principle requirement -- i.e., that "qualitative" change can "only" come about
through the addition/subtraction of matter and/or energy. Hence, far from anticipating
stereoisomerism as a factor in "qualitative" change, Engels is here
ruling it out as just such a factor! He is in effect saying that the
re-arrangement of atoms amounts to an addition of matter
and/or energy, and that this isn't thereby an extra or separate cause of such
change, which he had to take into account in addition to matter and motion.
This reading of Engels at least has the merit of rescuing him
from the accusation that he was a complete simpleton, who, on the very same page
(and in successive paragraphs) declared that (a) "Qualitative" change can
"only" come about through the addition/subtraction of matter and/or energy, and that (b) It
is
"impossible" to alter a "quality" in any other way, even though (c)
There
is
in fact another way to alter such "qualities"!
Perhaps we can put his rather loose wording
here down to the fact
that these remarks appeared in what were after all unpublished notebooks.
However, as we will soon see (for
example, here), Engels is decidedly unclear
what he meant by the "addition" of matter and/or motion/energy. And that isn't all; he is
no less vague about what he meant by "quality", "development",
"body" and "process", too! Even though
he was no simpleton, Engels was definitely a sloppy thinker. And this
can't be put
down to the fact that we are here considering notebook entries, for he was no
less sloppy in published work on philosophy and science -- for instance, in
AD. Moreover, in view
of the fact that subsequent dialecticians seem happy merely to parrot
Engels's ideas -- plainly having
devoted little or no thought to them --, it is reasonably clear that they have signally failed to
warrant any description other than "simpleton"
themselves (at least with respect to DM),
because of that.
Some might
object here that these examples
don't involve the development of single processes; they
relate to
parallel processes and co-existent objects/molecules. In that case, they aren't
valid
counterexamples to the First 'Law'.
However, Engels and other
DM-fans are more than happy to appeal
to various co-existent organic molecules and elements in the
Periodic Table to
illustrate the First 'Law' (on that, see here),
which were produced by parallel
chemical reactions. In that case, if they can appeal to examples like this to
support their 'Law', they can hardly complain when examples of the very same sort
are used against them.
It could now be
countered
that the elements in the Periodic Table were all produced from one another,
or at least from other simpler atoms, in what is now known as
Stellar Nucleosynthesis, so there is development in this case. In response,
it is worth noting that (i) This was unknown in Engels's day (so, he was
using examples where there was no development as he saw things), and (ii) This isn't true of
Hydrogen itself -- it didn't develop from simpler atoms, and (iii) Despite
what we are constantly told by DM-fans, this hopelessly vague 'Law'
doesn't even apply to the Periodic Table!
For example, Woods
and Grant list several molecules drawn from Organic Chemistry
(but they merely lifted this material en block from Engels). Here, the
qualitative differences between the organic compounds listed are independent of
whether or not they have been derived from one another. They patently
exist side-by-side:
"Chemistry involves changes of both a
quantitative and qualitative character, both changes of degree and of state.
This can clearly be seen in the change of state from gas to liquid or solid,
which is usually related to variations of temperature and pressure. In Anti
Dühring, Engels gives a series of examples of how, in chemistry, the simple
quantitative addition of elements creates qualitatively different bodies. Since
Engels' time the naming system used in chemistry has been changed. However, the
change of quantity into quality is accurately expressed in the following
example:
and so on to C30H60O2, melissic acid, which melts only at 80o
and has no boiling point at all, because it does not evaporate without
disintegrating.'" [Woods
and Grant (1995), p.52, quoting Engels (1976),
p.163.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
This
is all quite apart from the fact that it isn't easy to see how
the elements we find in nature arose by the mere addition of elementary
particles. Many were produced by
fusion;
in that case, the objection noted in the sub-section mentioned in the previous
paragraphapplies to one of DM's most
overworked examples: Mendeleyev's Table. Of course, we could always try to
redefine "fusion" to mean "development", but that would save this 'Law' by yet
another terminological dodge, thus
imposing it on nature.
Once more, if the "same body" requirement is
indeed part of Engels's 'Law', then many of the examples DM-theorists themselves
use soon fall by the wayside. For example, the following (overworked) example (to which Engels
himself appealed) goes straight
out of the window:
"In conclusion we shall call one more witness for
the transformation of quantity into quality, namely --
Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were
bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes,
who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but
lacked discipline, as follows:
'Two Mamelukes
were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100
Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300
Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes,
and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500
Mamelukes.'" [Engels
(1976), p.163.]
But,
what is the "same body", here? At best, all we have in this
instance is
a changing collection of non-identical Mamelukes and French soldiers
(unless we are to suppose the same collections of Mamelukes and French soldiers
were used each time -- even after they had been defeated, or perhaps
wounded/killed). This is hardly the
"same body".
Does anyone think that Napoleon
(or even Engels!) actually carried out this experiment? At best, this was a 'thought experiment'. But,
that hasn't stopped DM-fans quoting it as if it were gospel-truth/well-established-science.
Unfortunately for them we
don't even have a single material body to consider, here, just a few
vague words by about different collections of warriors!
Plainly, there can be no 'development' here,
either -- since there is no evidence that this series of events ever took place!
--, so the objection directed against many of the
counter-examples mentioned in this Essay (i.e., that they are irrelevant since they
apply to systems or bodies that aren't developing) also fails. Which
DM-fan has ever objected to this example on the grounds that
(a) It doesn't apply to a body/system to which matter or energy has been added,
and (b) It involves a 'thought experiment' about a 'system' that isn't
actually developing?
Furthermore, as noted above, the
organic chemical examples will
also have to be ditched, for the differences Engels noted between the various
molecules he listed don't depend on them being made from precisely the same
atoms, or in the same laboratory, or even at the same time.
This, too, will have to go:
"And now let the reader admire the higher and
nobler style, by virtue of which Herr Dühring attributes to Marx the opposite of
what he really said. Marx says: The fact that a sum of values can be transformed
into capital only when it has reached a certain size, varying according to the
circumstances, but in each case definite minimum size -- this fact is a
proof of the correctness of the Hegelian law. Herr Dühring makes him say:
Because, according to the Hegelian law, quantity changes into quality,
'therefore'
'an advance, when it reaches a certain size, becomes capital'.
That is to say, the very opposite." [Engels
(1976), p.159.]
It is quite
clear that the "same body" isn't implied in this
case, either.
But, even if it were, Marx's argument (as reported by
Engels) is defective. Values (it is assumed that these are
"exchange values") don't become Capital by mere
quantitative increment. It requires the presence of a Capitalist Mode of Production
(and thus a change in the Relations of Production), or adifferent use of
that money, for this to
be so. The capitalists concerned have to do something with these
exchange values. So, the mere increase of exchange values doesn't automatically
"pass over" into a qualitative change and become Capital. These values have to be
invested (or put to some other specific productive use), and that too isn't automatic (in certain circumstances, they could be
consumed). So, what we have here is a change in quality passing over into
another change in quality!Quantity has nothing to do with it. The
same quantity of money could be used as Capital or fail to be so used.
It requires a change in its quality (its use, or its social context) to
effect such a development.
"[T]he International Monetary
Fund has pointed out that there is something like $76 trillion being held by
financial firms, such as private equity in different forms, waiting to be
invested. There is...something like $28 trillion that is held in the bank of New
York Mellon alone. The amount of money that cannot be profitably invested keeps
going up.... It is a crazy situation when such enormous sums of money are being
held and not being invested -- a situation that has lasted almost a decade. In other words, there is a
very large proportion of surplus value that is not going into investment. And
money that is not invested is not capital: it is not being used to generate more
surplus value." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 22/01/2016. Paragraphs merged.]
Notice, "money that is not invested is not
capital...."
"The guilds of the middle ages therefore tried to prevent
by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist, by
limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master within a
very small maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a
capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production
greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is
shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his 'Logic'), that
merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative
changes." [Marx (1976),
p.423. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
Over the last twenty-five years or so, in my
wander across the wastelands of the Dialectical Dustbowl, I have yet to encounter a single dialectician
who has pointed out that this application of Hegel's 'Law' by Marx contains a
serious error!
So desperate have DM-fans become (in their endeavour to find
support for their failed theory in what Marx wrote), every single one of them
seems to have forgotten,
or disregarded, basic principles of
HM!
Hence, £x/$y (or their equivalent)
owned by a Medieval Lord in, say, Eleventh Century France, couldn't of its own become Capital
no matter how large this pot of money became (but see below), whereas £w/$z in Nineteenth
Century Manchester, even though that sum might be less than the £x/$y
held by the aforementioned Lord (allowing for inflation, etc.), would be Capital
if employed in
certain ways. It isn't
the quantity that is important here but the Mode of Production and the use to
which the money is put, that are.
Also worth
asking is the following question: How does this money actually "develop"? In what way can it
"develop"? Sure, money can be saved or accumulated, but how does a £1/$1 coin
"develop" if its owner saves or accumulates more of the same? Even if we redefine
"save" and "accumulate" to mean "develop" (protecting this 'law' by yet another
terminological dodge, thus imposing it on the facts), not all money will
"develop" in this way. What if the money was stolen or had been expropriated
from,
or even by, another non-capitalist? What if it had been obtained (all at
once) by selling land, slaves, works of art, political or other favours, etc?
Where is the "development" in such cases?
Notes and coins don't change, or become bigger, if they are accumulated. Money
in the bank doesn't "develop" either. Or are we to imagine that in the vaults,
or stored on disk somewhere, notes and coins grow and reproduce, or that all
those digital 'ones' and 'zeros' on that disk become more 'one'-, and
'zero'-like?
But, this money could still operate or serve as Capital, howsoever it had
been acquired, or where it had been stored, depending on
its use and the Mode of Production in which this takes place.
Of course, this isn't to
deny that there were Capitalists (or nascent Capitalists) in pre-Capitalist
Europe; but whatever money they had, its nature as Capital wasn't determined
by its quantity, no matter how large it became, but by the use to which it was put. This is also true
of
the period of transition between Feudalism and Capitalism (before the Capitalist Mode of
Production was apparent or dominant); again, it is the use to which money is put that decides whether or not
it is
Capital, not its quantity.
Why did Marx make such a simple error? Was he
perhaps still in
his 'coquetting' phase? Well, we
already know that by the time he came
to write Das Kapital, he was in that phase of his
intellectual development -- mainly because he (not me), he says
he was. That is, he was already beginning to put Hegel's ideas in what is the equivalent of 'scare
quotes', which is what critics (like me) would do with them these days
as a matter of course. This is the only
way we can rescue Marx from being accused of committing a
sophomoric errorover his own theory!
Compare the above with Marx's more considered
thoughts (where there is no hint of "coquetting"):
"Capital
consists of raw materials, instruments of labour, and means of subsistence of
all kinds, which are utilised in order to produce new raw materials, new
instruments of labour, and new means of subsistence. All these component parts
of capital are creations of labour, products of labour, accumulated labour.
Accumulated labour which serves as a means of new production is capital.
"So say the
economists.
"What is a
Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the
other.
"A Negro is a
Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton-spinning machine
is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain
relations. Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold in
itself is money, or sugar the price of sugar....
"Capital, also, is a social relation of production.
It is a bourgeois
production relation, a production relation of bourgeois society....
"How, then, does any amount of
commodities, of exchange values, become capital?
"By maintaining and multiplying
itself as an independent social power, that is as the power of a
portion of society, by means of its exchangefor direct, living labour
power. The existence of a class which possess nothing but the ability to
labour is a necessary prerequisite of capital.
"It is only the dominion of
accumulated, past, materialized labour over direct, living labour that turns
accumulated labour into capital.
"Capital does not
consist in accumulated labour serving living labour as a means for new
production. It consists in living labour serving accumulated labour as a
means of maintaining and multiplying the exchange value of the latter.
" [Marx
(1968a), pp.79-81. Italic emphases in the original; bold added. The on-line
version is slightly different to the published version I have used.]
We
also have this remark (unpublished by Marx) from Volume Three of Das
Kapital:
"Capital is not a thing,
but rather a
definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical
formation of society...." [Marx
(1998), p.801. Bold added.]
But
more importantly, this from Volume One:
"The change of value that occurs in the case of money intended to be
converted into capital, cannot take place in the money itself, since in its
function of means of purchase and of payment, it does no more than realise the
price of the commodity it buys or pays for; and, as hard cash, it is value
petrified, never varying. Just as little can it originate in the second act of
circulation, the re-sale of the commodity, which does no more than transform the
article from its bodily form back again into its money-form. The change must,
therefore, take place in the commodity bought by the first act, M-C, but not in
its value, for equivalents are exchanged, and the commodity is paid for at its
full value. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the change
originates in the use-value, as such, of the commodity, i.e., in its
consumption. In order to be able to extract value from the consumption of a
commodity, our friend, Moneybags, must be so lucky as to find, within the sphere
of circulation, in the market, a commodity, whose use-value possesses the
peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption,
therefore, is itself an embodiment of labour, and, consequently, a creation of
value. The possessor of money does find on the market such a special commodity
in capacity for labour or labour-power. [M = Money; C = Commodity -- RL.]
"By labour-power or capacity for labour is to be understood the aggregate of
those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he
exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description.
"But in order that our owner of money may be able to find labour-power offered
for sale as a commodity, various conditions must first be fulfilled. The
exchange of commodities of itself implies no other relations of dependence than
those which result from its own nature. On this assumption, labour-power can
appear upon the market as a commodity, only if, and so far as, its possessor,
the individual whose labour-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a
commodity. In order that he may be able to do this, he must have it at his
disposal, must be the untrammelled owner of his capacity for labour, i.e., of
his person. He and the owner of money meet in the market, and deal with each
other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference alone, that one is
buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law. The
continuance of this relation demands that the owner of the labour-power should
sell it only for a definite period, for if he were to sell it rump and stump,
once for all, he would be selling himself, converting himself from a free man
into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity. He must constantly
look upon his labour-power as his own property, his own commodity, and this he
can only do by placing it at the disposal of the buyer temporarily, for a
definite period of time. By this means alone can he avoid renouncing his rights
of ownership over it.
"The second essential condition to the owner of money finding labour-power in
the market as a commodity is this -- that the labourer instead of being in the
position to sell commodities in which his labour is incorporated, must be
obliged to offer for sale as a commodity that very labour-power, which
exists only in his living self.
"In order that a man may be able to sell commodities other than labour-power, he
must of course have the means of production, as raw material, implements, &c. No
boots can be made without leather. He requires also the means of subsistence.
Nobody -- not even 'a musician of the future' -- can live upon future products,
or upon use-values in an unfinished state; and ever since the first moment of
his appearance on the world's stage, man always has been, and must still be a
consumer, both before and while he is producing. In a society where all products
assume the form of commodities, these commodities must be sold after they have
been produced, it is only after their sale that they can serve in satisfying the
requirements of their producer. The time necessary for their sale is superadded
to that necessary for their production.
"For the conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner of money
must meet in the market with the free labourer, free in the double sense, that
as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that
on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything
necessary for the realisation of his labour-power." [Marx
(1996), pp.177-79. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site; bold emphases added.]
In
which case, the mere accumulation of money, according to Marx himself, can't be or become capital if
(i) "definite
social production relations" are absent, (ii) labour isn't 'free' and
(iii) labour-power isn't also a commodity.
Once again,
quantity has nothing to do with it.
[I have debated this alleged use of
Hegel's 'law' at length over at RevLeft; the argument can be accessed
here (beginning with a challenge from a critic in post #202, and then
stretching across the next few pages. (This link no longer works!) Recent debates over the some point
have been linked to,
here. An even more recent 'debate', from 2019/20, can be accessed
here.]
This 'mistake'
also re-surfaced in correspondence between Marx and Engels:
"Have read Hofmann. For all its faults, the latest chemical theory does
represent a great advance on the old atomistic theory. The molecule as the
smallest part of matter capable of independent existence is a perfectly
rational category, a 'nodal point', as Hegel calls it, in the infinite
progression of subdivisions, which does not terminate it, but marks a
qualitative change. The atom -- formerly represented as the limit of divisibility
-- is now but a state, although Monsieur Hofmann himself is forever
relapsing into the old idea that indivisible atoms really exist. For the rest,
the advances in chemistry that this book records are truly enormous, and
Schorlemmer says that this revolution is still going on day by day, so that new
upheavals can be expected daily." [Engels to Marx, 16/06/1867, in Marx and Engels (1975a),
p.175.]
"You are quite right about Hofmann. Incidentally, you will see from the
conclusion to my Chapter III [later, this was Chapter XI -- RL], where I outline the transformation of the master
of a trade into a capitalist -- as a result of purely quantitative
changes -- that in the text there I quote Hegel's discovery of the
law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change into a qualitative one
as being attested by history and natural science alike." [See
Capital, Chapter XI.]...."
[Marx to Engels 22/06/1867, ibid.,
p.177.]
We will be returning to these letters later.
However, for present purposes it is sufficient to point out that it is far from easy to
excuse Marx's serious error here -- except we interpret him along lines suggested
in Essay Nine Part
One (where I have entered into this entire topic more extensively;
readers are directed there for more details). And, as we can see by examining the quotation from
AD
below, Engels
dropped a similar clanger.
"Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian
dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and
tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it
in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into
quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with
Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in
passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are
not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual
inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense the universe is permeated
with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky
(1971),
pp.106-07.]
In what way does this fox, or
even the wolf, "develop"? And what
matter has been added to the fox or the wolf? [We have
already had occasion to note
that there is
no little confusion in passages like this over the nature of the 'dialectical'-body
in question to
which matter and/or energy has supposedly been added. See also
here.]
More-or-less the same can be said about this
passage:
"In proof of this law we might have cited
hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus,
for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of
relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of
labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in
which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change alters
the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to use the
expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into quality and
vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of a number of people,
the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to use Marx's phrase,
a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of its separate
forces." [Engels
(1976),
p.160. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
The reader
will search long and hard and to no avail through Das Kapital for
Marx's plural references to this 'Law' -- saving the one mention
(in over 2000 pages(!)), noted above --
and even then, Marx admitted that he was merely "coquetting"
with Hegelian jargon in his masterpiece; so that reference itself can't be taken too seriously.
[Again, there is more on this in Essay Nine
Part One.]
And
no wonder. The examples to which Engels superficially alludes can't be forced
into this 'dialectical straightjacket' no matter how hard we try.
The "quantity" of the items he mentions manifestly do not affect their "quality";
as we saw above, it takes a radical change in social relations to do
that. Or, does Engels seriously think that a mere increase in machinery turns it into
something else, something qualitatively new?
Once more,
we ask: what is the "same body" here? All we seem to have
is more of something-or-other -- more machines, more workers, greater
division of labour. What we don't have is more energy or matter fed into the "same
body", for there isn't one. Never mind ordinary "bodies", what
precisely is the 'dialectical body' in this case? A collection of machines, or
group of human beings?
If so, there is no single body here just a collection that simply seems to get bigger
or more numerous.
But, what
about this comment?
"As for example the fact that the co-operation of
a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to
use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of
its separate forces." [Ibid.]
Unfortunately, this is all rather vague,
too. Does this "fusion" build
gradually, leading up to a break, a "leap"? Are individuals added one at a time,
until at some point 'we' acquire this "new power"? Marx characterised this as a
"leap" in itself with no break in "gradualness", but all we have here is a "fusion
of many forces into one". So, this is all "leap" with no "gradualness"!
In that case,
whatever
else this is, it can't be an example of Hegel or Engels's 'Law'.
Again, this is independent of any clear indication from Engels (or even
from Marx)
exactly which 'dialectical' body is involved here, and in what way it is
involved.
There
is, however, one example of just such a "new force" outlined in
DB:
"The fact is that the parts
have properties that are characteristic of them only as they are parts of
wholes; the properties come into existence in the interactions that makes the
whole. A person can't fly by flapping her arms simultaneously. But people do
fly, as a consequence of the social organisation that has created airplanes,
pilots and fuel. It is not that society flies, however, but individuals in
society, who have acquired a property they do not have outside society. The
limitations of individual physical beings are negated by social interactions.
The whole, thus, is not simply the object of interaction of the parts but is the
subject of action of the parts." [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.273.]
Here is how
I have dealt with this
rather odd example in Essay Eleven
Part Two (slightly edited):
The general idea here appears to
be that novel properties "emerge" (out of nowhere, it seems; they certainly
can't
be reduced to the microstructure of each part, or even of each whole --
according to Rees (1998), pp.5-8, and other dialecticians we will meet in Essay
Three Part Three), because of the new relationships that parts enter into when
they become incorporated into wholes -- coupled with the new natures
('essences'?) they acquire as a result.
The above passage
appears to be claiming that:
(a) When human beings act as individuals (or, is it in less developed social
wholes?) they lack certain properties --, in this case, the power of flight.
Nevertheless: (b) As a result of their social organization, human beings
apparently gain new 'properties' collectively, in this case, again, the power of
flight -- even though as
individuals they still can't fly. The conclusion then seems to be that: (c)
Because of economic and social development (etc.) people acquire characteristics
that they wouldn't have possessed otherwise --, which appears to indicate that when they are
appropriately socially-organised, human beings become "more" than they would have
been without it.
But, once again, in what sense are human beings
"more" than they were before
flight became possible? Manifestly, they still can't fly. They don't
sprout wings, develop engines or grow sophisticated landing gear.
The only way that human beings would be "more" than they used to be would
appear
to be as a group. Hence, it could be maintained that as a group humanity
now has a property that it once lacked -- flight. Of course, human beings as
a group, or as individuals, still can't
fly; clearly, it is the machines they build that do this!
So,
humanity itself still lacks this 'property'.
Whatever meaning can be given to the "more" that human beings supposedly become,
it can't have resulted from the part/whole relation.
That is because immediately before or after flight finally became possible no
new wholes or parts actually came into existence -- nor did these new parts and
allegedly novel wholes become newly related, either.
If it is argued in response that humans can
now do something they couldn't do before (namely, fly through space),
even this isn't entirely correct. Since we now know that the earth rotates on
its axis as it orbits the Sun humanity has in fact been travelling through space for hundreds of
thousands of years. Which means we have been flying for many hundreds of
thousands of years!
Again, it could be maintained that it is only
since the invention of
dirigibles,
balloons and aeroplanes that human beings can do things
at will that in earlier generations they couldn't: i.e., leave the surface of the earth whenever they wanted,
and move about
the planet, sometimes at great speeds, flying to destinations that would have been
unimaginable, say, 500 years ago.
But,
not even this is correct. Human beings have been hurtling off cliffs and tall
buildings for thousands of years. To be sure, the vast majority don't live to
tell the tale, but for a few seconds they manifestly possess the property of
flight (in the sense described above).
Once more,
it could be replied that it is only in aeroplanes (etc.) that they can
leave the surface of the earth at will. Nevertheless, it still seems that
it isn't humanity that has this novel property, but these new artefacts which
have.
Moreover, the properties of these machines are reducible to their parts.
Try taking off without engines made of heat resistant materials;
a chocolate jet engine won't get you very far--
nor will wings made of
butter or cheese.
So, in this case, human beings just hitch a ride, as it were.
If
so, precisely whatis the new property
humanity is supposed to have gained? The ability to hitch new sorts of rides?
Or, the capacity to form queues at check-in desks?
Whatever meaning can be given to the "more" that human beings supposedly become,
it can't have resulted from the part/whole relation.
That is because immediately before or after flight finally became possible no
new wholes or parts actually came into existence -- nor did these new parts and
allegedly novel wholes become newly related, either....
When
powered flight was finally achieved by the
Wright
Brothers in December 1903 (or, earlier, by means of the
steam/hot
air
powered machines or balloons of the 1800s -- or even by means of the gliders
and kites mentioned
above), the question is: which novel parts or wholes
emerged as a result? To be sure,
there was a new 'whole' comprising the Kitty Hawk (the name of the
Wright Brothers' flying machine) and its pilot, but it isn't easy to see how the entire
nature of Orville Wright, say, was determined by this new Orville/Kitty Hawk 'whole', or that
the entire nature of the Kitty Hawk was determined by its 'internal relation'
to Orville.
Moreover, when the
first
commercial flights began a few years later, what new wholes or parts
came into existence then? To be sure, new capitalist ventures were set up, but which
is whole and which is part even here?Was this 'capitalist-venture-whole' the workers and the bosses, or the buildings and the legal
documents -- or maybe the lawyers who drafted the contracts, the energy fed in from the outside
that powered the lighting or the heating systems, the
roof on the office building, the waste paper
basket in the corner of the room, the
air circulating in and through the building, the natural 'forces' holding
everything together...?
And, are any of these items
also parts? Or,
are the parts the
passengers, the freight, the paint on the aeroplane's fuselage, the rubber
molecules in its tyres, the fuel in its tanks, the countless billions of dead
sea creatures that went into forming that fuel millions of years ago...?
[I
then proceed to examine the vague DM-idea of "part" and "whole" in
Note 11.]
As I said, this is all rather vague; but,
as we have seen several times, this is just par for the course in
this area of Mickey Mouse
'Dialectical' Science.
Finally, dialecticians like to use this
'Law' to argue that as one rises in the orders of existence (say, from the molecular
to higher levels) this change in 'quantity' passes over into a
qualitative difference. But, what change in what
quantity is there in this case?
We saw an example of this in Engels's letter:
"Have read Hofmann. For all its faults, the latest chemical theory does
represent a great advance on the old atomistic theory. The molecule as the
smallest part of matter capable of independent existence is a perfectly
rational category, a 'nodal point', as Hegel calls it, in the infinite
progression of subdivisions, which does not terminate it, but marks a
qualitative change. The atom -- formerly represented as the limit of divisibility
-- is now but a state, although Monsieur Hofmann himself is forever
relapsing into the old idea that indivisible atoms really exist. For the rest,
the advances in chemistry that this book records are truly enormous, and
Schorlemmer
says that this revolution is still going on day by day, so that new
upheavals can be expected daily." [Engels to Marx, 16/06/1867, in Marx and Engels (1975a),
p.175. Italic emphasis in the original. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[The above was in response to a letter from Marx (already
quoted).]
Alex
Callinicos seems to agree:
"The transformation of
quantity into quality does by contrast seem genuinely universal in so far as it
highlights two crucial features of the world -- first the phenomenon of
emergence and stratification -- the existence of qualitatively different levels
of physical being each governed by specific laws, including the human species,
with its peculiar capacities and distinctive history, and second, qualitative
transformations from one state of being to another." [Callinicos (2006), p.212.]
[There is
more on these 'levels', in Note 7,
below.]
But, there is no way that this can be
made consistent the
'more energy/matter input into the "same body"' part of the theory.
Precisely what
energy or matter is fed in here? And, where is the "development"?
We will meet this appeal to 'levels' in Essay Three Part Five,
where it will be used to undermine the DM-claim that these 'Laws' aren't thoroughly deterministic.
Hence, and once again, if Engels and other DM-fans are allowed to appeal to
various objects, processes and collections that can in no way be described as the "same body" (or, indeed,
be said to have had matter and energy fed into them),
as well as to bodies/systems that don't "develop", they
can hardly complain if several counter-examples along the same lines are used
against them.
4a0.
Resonance was
a concept introduced into Organic Chemistry in 1930 by
Linus
Pauling, further developed by
George Wheland in order to
help resolve
serious problems over the structural formula of
Benzene
that had been
proposed by
August Kekulé. However, for many years
-- between, say, 1940 and 1970 -- Soviet scientists refused to accept this
"bourgeois", "Machist", "Idealist" concept, preferring
an interactive
model suggested by
Butlerov.
Although, UK
Marxist,
J B S
Haldane, described resonance as a perfect example of 'dialectics' -- which
illustrates once
again how this theory can be used to 'justify' anything a theorist cares to
choose and its opposite!
[More on
this in Essay Nine Part
Two -- Haldane is quoted in Graham (1971, 1987) and van Brakel (2004).]
An excellent
summary of this dispute can be found in Graham (1971), pp.297-323 (updated in
Graham (1987), pp.294-319) -- which also contains a useful summary of resonance
-- and van
Brakel (2004), pp.27-34. See also Pauling (1960), and Wheland (1955), the latter of which contains a translation of the
criticisms of this concept advanced by two soviet scientists (i.e., Tatevskii and
Shakhparanov), along with Wheland's reply: pp.613-15.
4a.This is, of course, quite apart from the points made earlier
about energy added to
a system as opposed to energy expended when changing a system, yet another
important detail DM-theorists pass over in total silence.
5.Here are two more examples to add to
those listed in the main body of this Essay
(concerning the
radically altered qualities apparent in certain events, objects and processes,
but for no necessary
overall difference in the energy input):
(a) The ordering sequence of the same bases in
DNA molecules has a radically different affect on
the genome.
(b) The same instructions in the wrong order
could cause serious problems: e.g., "Take the antidote and throw away the poison", compared with "Take the poison and throw
away the antidote"; or, "Ask
questions first, shoot second", compared with "Shoot first, ask questions
second", etc.
These considerations would then allow the
following example to work: "Read Reason in Revolt first, criticise it
second", compared with "Criticise Reason in Revolt first, read it
second". The total localised energy budget here could be the same in
each case(if say
the aforementioned criticism advanced were "What a confused book!"),
but the qualitative difference is plain to see.
The reader should no doubt now be able to
provide
her own (potentially endless list of) examples drawn from everyday life (or from
the sciences) whereby altering the order of events initiates significant qualitative
changes for no overall, localised difference in energy. [That line-of-thought has been
continued here. The objection that this 'Law' only applies to developing
bodies/systems (ruling out these and other counter-examples) has been neutralised
here and
here.]
6.It could be objected that dialecticians
might be able to appeal to the part/whole relation in answer to many of the
impertinent objections to the First 'Law' aired in this Essay. Maybe so, maybe
not. [Anyway, DM-Holism is
destructively analysed in Essay Eleven Parts
One
and Two.] However, the
First 'Law'
explicitly states that there can be no qualitative change without a
quantitative increase/decrease bringing it about:
"For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
In
that case, if the part/whole relation were also capable of effecting the
above changes, that
would suggest this 'Law' is not
only defective, it is inconsistent with other DM-principles. Of course,
if qualitative change can arise by other means, then the First 'Law' isn't a
law,
to begin with.
[Again, the objection that this 'Law' only applies to developing
bodies/systems (ruling out these and other counter-examples) has been neutralised
here and
here.]
6a.Someone could still object to this that there hasbeen
an increase in matter, here. If one litre of red is added to one litre of green,
say, this causes a qualitative change in colour, as Engels argued. So,
there is plainly an increase in matter.
And yet, there is no increase in matter, since we
started with two litres and ended with two litres. [This is in fact a concrete instance of the general objection
levelled earlier; the
same can be said of the other examples listed below.]
7.As weshall see,
the radically confused way that both of these words (i.e., "quantity" and
"quality") are bandied about in DM-circles allows virtually anything to be
introduced in
as an example of an 'increase or decrease in quantity' causing a 'change in quality'. For
example, in RIRE, comrades Woods and Grant
include different levels of reality as different quantities, or
maybe even different qualities -- to be perfectly honest, it isn't too clear which is which in their
argument:
"Newton's dynamics were quite
sufficient to explain large-scale phenomena but broke down for systems of atomic
dimensions. Indeed, classical mechanics are still valid for most operations
which do not involve very high speeds or processes which take place at the
subatomic level. Quantum mechanics...represented a qualitative leap in
science.... But for a long time it met with a stubborn resistance, precisely
because its results clashed head-on with the traditional mode of thinking and
the laws of formal logic." [Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.53-54.]
We will have occasion to comment on Woods and
Grant's 'innovative' approach to
FL in Essay Four (here
and
here), where several of their more egregious
errors will be exposed for what they are (for example,
here).
Suffice it to say that in this case, too, they failed miserably to substantiate this criticism
of 'formal thinking'.
Indeed, readers are invited to check the original where they will find that the
above two
comrades advanced these claims while offering no evidence in support of
their wild allegations. This
tactic is in fact typical of their approach to FL
(in fact, this approach has been adopted
by the
overwhelming majority of
dialecticians who similarly advance all manner of accusations about FL which
they also fail to substantiate); these two have added dozens of unsubstantiated
claims about FL to their
ill-advised book. They would, of course, be the first to complain if the enemies
of Marxism invented analogous fantasies and levelled them against
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky.
Be
this as it may, the fact that there is a "qualitative" difference between
Classical and Quantum Mechanics can't be attributed to anything obviously quantitative. Or, at least,
if that were the case,
Woods and Grant were remarkably secretive about it. The 'quantity' of magnification,
perhaps? But what matter or energy has been added to any of the objects or
processes involved
when they are magnified?
Notice, too, that such levels are
compared
with one another, even though they don't develop into each other. Indeed,
what would it be for microscopic particles to develop into macroscopic objects?
Do electrons expand, fermions fatten and
bosons bloat?
In that case, an earlier
objection directed against several of the counter-examples listed in this
Essay (i.e., that they aren't relevant because the First 'Law' only applies to
objects and processes in "development") can no longer be sustained.
DM-theorists use the above 'difference in levels' all the time -- for example,
when arguing in favour of their own form
of determinism, or in relation to the emergence of life, 'mind' and 'consciousness'
(i.e., from increased size or complexity in matter, or even a greater number of
neurons, etc.), linking them
with the First 'Law'.
We met one example earlier:
"Underpinning this conception of human beings as both part of the natural world
-- beings who were wholly physical in nature -- and yet different in crucial
ways from other parts of nature, was a theory of dialectics
adapted from Hegel in which, amongst other things, quantitative change (such as
the evolution of the brain) could turn into qualitative change (such as
consciousness)."
[Rob Hoveman, quoted from
here; accessed 05/05/2018. Bold emphasis added.]
[These ideas will be examined in more detail in Essay
Three Parts Three and Five, and Essay Thirteen
Part Three.] So, and once more,
DM-fans can't legitimately complain if counter-examples cited in this Essay aren't all
"developmental", either.
Here is more of the same:
"At a certain point, the concatenation of
circumstances causes a qualitative leap whereby inorganic matter gives rise
to organic matter. The difference between inorganic and organic matter is
only relative. Modern science is well on the way to discovering exactly how the
latter arises from the former. Life itself consists of atoms organised in a
certain way. We are all a collection of atoms but not 'merely' a collection of
atoms. In the astonishingly complex arrangement of our genes, we have an
infinite number of possibilities. The task of allowing each individual to
develop these possibilities to the fullest extent is the real task of
socialism....
"The enormous complexity of the human brain is
one of the reasons why idealists have attempted to surround the phenomenon of
mind with a mystical aura. Knowledge of the details of individual neurons, axons
and synapses, is not sufficient to explain the phenomenon of thought and
emotion. However, there is nothing mystical about it. In the language of
complexity theory, both mind and life are emergent phenomena. In the
language of dialectics, the leap from quantity to quality means that the
whole possesses qualities which can't be deduced from the sum of the parts or
reduced to it. None of the neurons is itself conscious. Yet the sum total of
neurons and their connections are. Neural networks are non-linear dynamical
systems. It is the complex activity and interactions between the neurons which
produce the phenomenon we call consciousness." [Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.55-56. Bold emphases added.
Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
We find Engels appealing to this type of change,
too:
"If we imagine any non-living body cut up into
smaller and smaller portions, at first no qualitative change occurs. But this
has a limit: if we succeed, as by evaporation, in obtaining the separate
molecules in the free state, then it is true that we can usually divide these
still further, yet only with a complete change of quality. The molecule is
decomposed into its separate atoms, which have quite different properties from
those of the molecule. In the case of molecules composed of various chemical
elements, atoms or molecules of these elements themselves make their appearance
in the place of the compound molecule; in the case of molecules of elements, the
free atoms appear, which exert quite distinct qualitative effects: the free
atoms of nascent oxygen are easily able to effect what the atoms of atmospheric
oxygen, bound together in the molecule, can never achieve.
"But the molecule is also qualitatively
different from the mass of the body to which it belongs. It can carry out
movements independently of this mass and while the latter remains apparently at
rest, e.g. heat oscillations; by means of a change of position and of connection
with neighbouring molecules it can change the body into an allotrope or a
different state of aggregation.
"Thus we see that the purely quantitative
operation of division has a limit at which it becomes transformed into a
qualitative difference: the mass consists solely of molecules, but it is
something essentially different from the molecule, just as the latter is
different from the atom. It is this difference that is the basis for the
separation of mechanics, as the science of heavenly and terrestrial masses, from
physics, as the mechanics of the molecule, and from chemistry, as the physics of
the atom." [Engels
(1954), p.64. Bold emphases added.]
Naturally, "in the imagination", no energy or matter can be added to, or
subtracted from, the above 'bodies'.
It
could be argued in reply that if the 'procedures' Engels mentions are actually carried out
(and if they aren't just imagined -- even though Engels specifically talks about the
imagination), the same results would emerge. Nevertheless, what Engels is in
fact appealing to here isn't an increase or
decrease in energy/matter, but a series of divisions of the same body of
matter. Hence, at the end of any such division we would have the same amount of matter/energy with
which we began, only arranged differently.
Recall that in
an earlier sub-section it was
argued that the terminal vagueness of this 'Law' means that it is impossible for
DM-fans to rule certain counter-examples out unless the local energy boundary is
well-defined -- i.e., if it is treated as a sealed unit. But, as soon as that
has been done, serious problems reassert
themselves. In the end, we discovered there was no way of
preventing a catastrophic inflation taking place, resulting in the entire
universe becoming the sealed unit in question! Since the latter undergoes no
overall energy difference for any qualitative change, Engels's 'Law' can't be
made to work howsoever we try to repackage it.
8.Of course, many (but not all) of these
factors involve what might be called "internal relations". That notion will be
examined in more
detail in Essays Four Part Two and Eleven
Part Two.
Suffice it to say that we only have DM-theorists' word for it that such
'relations' actually exist. That is plainly because there is no evidence -- nor
is there anything that could conceivably count as evidence
-- supporting this ancient Idealist dogma. Or, to put this point differently: the only 'evidence'
for their existence are the bogus 'ideas' dialecticians have uncritically
borrowed from Hegel and other Idealists and Mystics.
Plainly,
that shows these 'relations'
have been "foisted" on nature, not read from it, which is hardly surprising since a commitment to 'internal
relations' is one of the defining characteristics
of
Idealism. [On that, see Mulligan (1995), and
Hylton (1990).]
It seems that this 'Law', which is already
under suspicion for having been read into nature, can only be defended by
yet more of the same. That tactic is about as impressive as those adopted by
Christian Fundamentalists who, in the face of the existence of natural
dysteleology (disorder and lack of design) and 'evil', appeal to the Bible to
defend the (superior) moral status of 'God' -- but who then point to the alleged
"order in nature" and 'His' implied "goodness' to prove 'He' exists and is
benevolent!
The sight of
supposedly materialist 'dialecticians' tugging on these Ideal bootlaces
("internal relations") to lift their ailing 'theory' out of
the mire is no less unedifying.
8a.It could be objected that in the soup's transition from a liquid to a sludge, then to a semi-solid and
next perhaps
into a full-blown solid as more salt is dumped
in the soup, we would have a clear example of change of quantity into quality.
But even here, this change will be gradual and non-"nodal".
Moreover,
solid soups are still
soups, it seems, so no change in that specific "quality" takes
place here, either.
Figure Thirteen: Trotsky In The Soup?
Again, the vague
DM-'understanding' of "quality"
at work here makes it impossible to decide what is and what isn't a correct
application of this 'Law'!
8b.Even if tastes are a to be regarded as relational
properties, or even a qualitative reaction of
our sensory system
--, so that it is in fact the response of the taster (or her senses) to the chemicals in the
soup that constitutes or results in the taste it perceived as having --, the
experience of taste is manifestly
registered in and by the taster, not the soup. And it is there, in the
taster, that the supposed change in 'quality' takes place, not in the soup
itself.
But, as it
turns out, dialecticians can't afford to call relational
properties like these 'qualities', either; while
that might
save this example from the waste bin of history, it would trash this 'Law' in
other places.
Hence, if the relational
properties of bodies were to be counted as part of an object's 'qualities',
many things would change qualitatively with no increase or decrease in matter
or energy. Several examples have
already been cited,
but here are a few more for readers to ponder:
(A)NN is watches her friend,
MM, walk away from her. As MM recedes into the distance MM
seems to grow smaller in size. At some point MM disappears. [This would also
happen if NN walked away while MM remained stationary, for
instance.] Here we have a change in quality (size) prompted by no increase in quantity.
It is
to no avail appealing to the quantity of metres that separate the two, for
Engels was quite specific:
"...[T]he transformation of
quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express
this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual
case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or
subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of
the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases added.]
"Matter or motion"
added to or subtracted from a body
are the relevant factors here -- not separation distance. And, of course, it is MM who moves
in this case -- but nothing at all has been added to her, even
though her apparent size (perceived by NN) changes in 'quality'.
Still less use would it be appealing to Engels's reference to
"motion" in this instance, since he was also clear that he meant the addition of "energy".
To be sure, it could be argued that it takes energy to make MM move. Maybe so, but
unless MM moves to a different height above or below NN, no energy will have been
addedtoher (as noted
earlier).
And, motion itself can't change the apparent size of either party to this
example; we can see that if MM covers the same distance as she did before,
but this time merely circles around NN, or NN accompanies
MM into the distance
Even
so, no energy has been added to
NN -- the stationary viewer --, in whom
these changes in 'quality' were perceived, or in whom they take place. No one supposes (it is to be hoped(!)) that even if
MM
were to walk up a hill, thereby adding potential energy to her body, or if she
speeded up (adding kinetic energy) she would actually
shrink
and not just looksmaller to NN as a result! Furthermore,
and once again, if NN accompanies
MM up this hill, neither would grow smaller -- as perceived by either of them.
Moreover, if MM turns round, NN, who is sat on that bench and
hasn't moved, will also appear to shrink, as perceived by MM. But what energy/motion has been added
to NN?
(B) Consider another example:
three animals are lined up in a row,
a mouse, a pony, and an elephant. In relation to the mouse, the pony is big, but
in relation to the elephant it is small (but,
note, these observations only apply if we are tempted to relax definition of "quality" in the above manner). So, here we have change in quality with no matter
or energy added or
subtracted. There are countless examples of this sort -- with respect to
the relations that hold between any object, or set of objects, and the rest of
the local (or remote) universe -- here alone.
Someone could object that the mouse-pony-elephant
example really involves the perception by an observer, and so this
isn't
a genuine counter-example, after all.
That can't be correct for it is surely the case, independently of any and all
observers, that a pony is bigger than a mouse while it is also smaller than an
elephant. Anyway, we have already seen that Engels informed us that this 'Law' applies
to thought, too:
"Dialectics,
however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and
development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels
(1976), p.180. Bold emphasis added.]
Hence, if, as a result of inspecting (or
even thinking about) this line-up, someone judges the second animal larger than the
first, and the first smaller than the third, that
will be covered by Engels's 'Law'.
Moreover, even if the above objection
were valid, the qualitative change in perception of the alleged observer wasn't
the caused of any change in quantity in that individual.
So, this is a genuine counter-example, after all.
[And, of course, Trotsky's example of
the fox
revolves around the alleged perception of the wolf by the fox.]
Still others could
object that these animals
don't "develop" into one another; maybe so, but
that response has already been dealt with,
here and
here. But, if we argue
that the change in "quality" occurred in the perceiver, then there was
development in her -- she changed from someone who judged the pony bigger
one moment, then smaller a few seconds later.
It is also worth recalling that the
above example has only been introduced as a warning to DM-fans of
the implications for their theory if they
decide to water-down their
characterisation of "quality" by introducing the relational properties
of bodies -- always assuming, of course, that they ever manage to be
clear
even about this aspect of their 'theory'!
Finally, when confronted with this particular
counter-example, some dialecticians object that it is a ridiculous argument. Indeed it is,
but it is a direct consequence of relaxing the definition of "quality"
in the above manner. Again, I have responded to such critics
at length
here, and
here.
8b1.
Incidentally, this doesn't
represent a concession on my part to the idea that there are such things as
"natural kinds". On that, see Note 8c, below.
8b2.
There is an
excellent analysis of quality in Hacker (2007), pp.29-56; see also Hacker
(1979). I hasten to add that while there is much in the latter with which I
agree, there is also much with which I do not. [Hacker adopts a far too Aristotelian
approach to this topic, but I will say more about that in another Essay.]
Even so, beleaguered
DM-fans might find Hacker's work of some use in helping them clarify their own
ideas in this area.
Be this as it may,
Yurkovets (1984), pp.100-05 contains one of the best
attempts to explain the DM-'understanding' of "quality" I have come across in my
thirty year trudge across this dusty
dialectical desert. Having said that, it is the best of the worst. I will examine what he has to say in a later re-write of
this Essay. Nevertheless, how odd that it took an STD like Yurkovets to try to
clarify this DM-concept, especially when we have repeatedly been told by TDs
that the STD-take on this theory is "wooden and lifeless",
little more than the "cynical and self-serving creed of a new and brutal ruling
class." [Rees (1998), p.196. On this in general, see Essay Nine
Part Two and Appendix B
to that Essay.]
It
could be argued that the present author argued against the identification of
water as H2O
in Essay Eight
Part Two, but here it is asserted that water is H2O.
Which is it to be?
In
this Essay, I am of course dealing with what DM-theorists believe, and
they certainly think water is H2O. I am using that belief to put pressure on Engels's First 'Law'. What
I do or do not believe about water is (in this context) hardly relevant.
8c.
I will be arguing against Essentialism (or, perhaps better: arguing
in favour of the view that Essentialism comprises a
non-sensical and
incoherent family of theories) in Essay Thirteen Part Two. In the meantime, the reader is directed to the following: Dupré (1993), Hallett (1984, 1988, 1991), Ramsey (2000), Van
Brakel (2000), VandeWall (2007). Until that Essay is published, readers are
invited to examine what I have said about this in Essay Eight
Part Two.
Of course, if
Essentialism
is a non-starter, as I hope to show, then that would be another body blow to Engels's
First 'Law'.
9.The boiling water example is one
of the most overworked clichés in the dialectical box of tricks. Hardly a
single DM-fan fails to mention it, so mantra-like has this theory become.
10.It seems this is why Physicists find they have to define
energy as a
"capacity" to do work. On that, see
here,
here and
here
(the latter of which tells us energy is an "abstraction"!). Indeed,
as Marc Lange notes, energy no more
'exists' than does the average family -- it isn't a "kind of stuff". [Lange (2002), pp.111-64.]
If so, what in earth is matter made of?
10a.Admittedly, there are a few scientists who accept these three 'Laws' (for instance, Levins and Lewontin) --
but more particularly those from previous generations of the Communist
Party
(e.g.,
Bernal,
Haldane
and Levy, etc.) -- many of whom appear to have done so to remain alive (on that,
see Essay Four
Part One).
However, is clear they would have treated with dismissive contempt any
paper submitted by a PhD candidate (or even an undergraduate) that relied on evidence as
weak and feeble as the 'evidence'
regularly palmed off on readers of books and articles on DM written by
dialecticians.
[Incidentally, the same comments apply
to Nobel Laureate
Jacques
Monod, who also seemed to be fond of these 'Laws' -- Monod (1972).]
Indeed, the unwise acceptance of the impoverished 'data' set that supposedly supports DM is
comparable to a similar the acceptance of 'evidence' in
favour of, say, the scientific accuracy of the Book of Genesis by
Creation
'Scientists'.
In both cases, faith
and partisanship have clearly 'affected'
the judgement of the individuals involved. This can be seen,
for instance, in relation to the
Lysenko
'affair'. Even though Bernal was widely considered to be one of the best
scientific minds of his generation (and perhaps of the 20th
century), and Haldane was one of the leading biologists of his day,
both bought into the ideas of that
charlatan for rather sordid political reasons.
[On Bernal and Lysenko, see
Brown (2005). On Haldane and Lysenko, see this
Science and Society article from 1940. On Lysenko, see
Joravsky (1970),
Graham (1987), Lecourt (1977),
Medvedev (1969), and Soyfer (1994). See also
this article by Robert Young. For a different assessment,
see Lewontin and Levins (1976). Some of the original documents can be
accessed
here.
My more detailed comments can be found
here.]
10a1.
Defenders of
Hegel have for too many years tried to convince sceptics of his sophisticated
scientific knowledge (rather like they try to do the same with Engels). Perhaps
the most detailed (and sordid) example of this sycophantic character defect is Burbidge (1996). Burbidge
manages to show that Hegel was a well-informed amateur chemist (although he
failed to mention Hegel's Alchemical and Hermetic mind-set, an important
omission that seriously undermines Burbidge's credibility). However, even as he
tries manfully to rehabilitate Hegel he struggles heroically to make,
for example, Hegel (2004) pp.232-72, §§326-336
(which is a section called 'The Chemical Process')
comprehensible. That particular section begins as follows:
"In individuality developed into totality, the
moments themselves are determined as individual totalities, as whole particular
bodies which, at the same time, are in relation only as different toward each
other. This relation, as the identity of non-identical, independent bodies, is
contradiction, and hence is essentially process, the function of which, in
conformity with the Notion, is the positing of the differential as identical,
the enlivening and dissociation of it." [Hegel (2004), pp.232-33, §326.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
I
am sure readers will agree that this is so much clearer than anything
Dalton,
for instance, came out with!
Nevertheless, one wonders
what the point is of the entire
exercise given the fact that Hegel succeeded in mystifying and rendering obscure
processes that have since been made perfectly clear by contemporary chemists without an ounce of
Hermetic
Philosophy to slow them down. Other than mystics themselves, does anyone
familiar with contemporary science try to defend the odd ideas ancient and early
modern alchemists came out with? Why then try to defend this Christian and
Hermetic Mystic?
[The answer to that question can
be found in 'Idealism: A Victorian
Horror-Story, Parts I and II', in Stove (1991), pp.83-177. (However, in relation
to Stove's work, readers should take note of the caveats I have posted
here.)]
Be this as it may, when it comes to scientific
'proof', Hegel's own commitment to Mickey
Mouse Science isn't now in any doubt.
[On Hegel's Alchemical, Hermetic and Kabbalistic
influences and leanings, see Magee (2008).]
10b.
Hegel certainly didn't think this 'Law' was as universally applicable as DM-theorists
now seem to believe it is. On this, see Levine (1984), pp.111-26. In fact, Trotsky himself
admitted as much:
"Hegel himself undoubtedly did not give the law
of the transition of quantity into quality the paramount importance which it
fully deserves." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88-89.]
10b1.
The material below has now been re-written and greatly expanded,
here,
here,
here
and
here. Readers are directed there since what follows is now badly
out-of-date. Begin again here.
When confronted with these revelations--
and, to most DM-fans these passages are indeed a complete revelation since few of
them seem to have read the DM-classics with due care or given them much
thought --, dialecticians with whom I have 'debated' this topic have tended to respond
in one or more of the following ways:
(2) They argue that these quotations aren't
representative, or they have been "taken out of context".
(3) They claim that the
author in question mis-spoke, or made an error.
(4) They argue that my demolition of this core
DM-principle is merely "semantic", or that it is a classic example of "pedantry".
That
response is neutralised
here. But, independently
of that, it is worth pointing out that the argument that Hegel used to motivate
and establish this 'theory' of change was itself based on 'semantic' principles -- on that, see
here, and
here. So, if this doctrine was
originally based on 'semantics', DM-fans can hardly complain if 'semantics' is
used in its demolition.
(5) They suggest we should use
our "common sense" when applying this 'Law', and thus reject the
absurd conclusions I have highlighted.
[Here is a recent example of the above tactic, and here is my
reply.]
(6) They point out that it is inappropriate to use
FL-symbols when attempting to understand/interpret this theory, since that
simply puts objects and processes
in 'fixed categories'. [An example of this reply can be found
here, on page 2.]
[FL = Formal Logic.]
(7) They endeavour to repair this
theory on-the-hoof, as it were, substituting their own
preferred, but hastily concoctedsubstitute theory -- all of which
attempted repairs suffer from other serious 'difficulties' which they also fail to spot, 'difficulties' about which
Hegel and the DM-classicists were well aware. Indeed, Hegel's theory was
specifically designed to avoid these
'problems'.
(8) They argue that (a) This 'Law'
deals solely with, or pertains exclusively to, opposing "tendencies", or that (b)
It only applies in
specific circumstances.
(9) But, mostly, they simply ignore this
'problem', or they deflect it onto me, and ask: "Who does Ms Lichtenstein think
she is questioning this great Philosopher (Hegel), or these great
revolutionaries?" [An excellent example of the latter approach can be found
here -- check out the emotive responses of 'Loz'. But there are many more
like this.]
I will now deal with each of these in turn --
beginning with (2): Below is a list of
representative passages -- lifted from the writings of the Dialectical
Classicists (and lesser DM-clones) -- which shows that the quotations given in the main body of this Essay are indeed
representative, and that DM-theorists (i.e., those who accept the classics)
do in fact, or should in fact, believe that (a) Everything changes into
its 'opposite', that (b) Everything does so by 'struggling' with its 'opposite',
and that (c) This 'struggle' results in the production of that 'opposite' -- beginning with Hegel who sets the theoretical
stage for us. [Another recent set of objections has been rebutted
here.]
[In what follows, quotation marks have been altered
to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site, and bold emphases alone have been added; other emphases
are in the original. (In fact, the following quotations have been augmented with
several more that say the same sort of thing,
here.)]
"If, for instance, the
Sophists
claimed to be teachers,
Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist
Protagoras to confess that
all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues,
Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast
terms of understanding. Thus in the
Parmenides
he deduces the many from
the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was,
more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored
it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the
Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective
piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really
serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely
as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.
"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the
action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence
is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that
Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of
consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be
viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead
of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is
exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as
implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural
being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975),
pp.117-18.
Links added.]
"Everything
is opposite.
Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in
the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the
understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and
opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of
correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are.
Thus, in inorganic nature, the
acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in
other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence
the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize
what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the
world." [Ibid.,
p.174.]
"The law of the interpenetration of
opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into
each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17,
62.]
"Dialectics, so-called objective
dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics,
dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites
which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual
conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into
higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion.
Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the
case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become
oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of
chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the
cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein
material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution
demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side,
and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between
heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little
applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and
'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side,
adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been
inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active,
positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity."
[Ibid.,
p.211.]
"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all
differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into
one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of
thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast
lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges
the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in
the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole
method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course,
for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories
retain their validity." [Ibid.,
pp.212-13.]
"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two
poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as
they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually
interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are
conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but
as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the
universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded
when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and
effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will
be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels
(1976),
p.27.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line
of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation."
[Ibid.,
p.179.]
"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the
resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one
no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed
into the other, etc." [Engels (1891a),
p.414.]
"And so
every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its
existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
p.77.]
"[Among the
elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory
tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not
only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination,
quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….
"In brief,
dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This
embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The
splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the
essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the
principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing…. The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22,
357-58.
Paragraphs merged.]
"Hegel
brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world,
nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed
more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the
alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of
their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in
the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely
this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual
dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a
certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others."
[Lenin (1961),pp.196-97.]
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming
change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is
that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another,
not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular
only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite
right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite."
[Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this
particular quotation coming from p.285.]
"Dialectics
is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and
how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under
what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,
-- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid.,
p.109.]
"Development
is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume
XIII, p.301.]
"Of course, the fundamental proposition of
Marxian dialectics is that all boundaries in nature and society are conventional
and mobile, that there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under
certain conditions be transformed into its opposite." [Lenin (1916). Quoted
from
here.]
"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego,
to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at
the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and
overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who
believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of
opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical
method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the
dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature
as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the
development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions
in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature....
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that
internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature,
for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future,
something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between
these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is
dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and
that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of
development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative
changes into qualitative changes." [Stalin
(1976b), pp.836, 840.]
"[The sides of] dialectical contradictions do not
dissolve one another, do not neutralise one another, while oppositely directed
forces do not prevail over one another but turn into one another, and this
transition of every phenomenon, every process into its opposite also constitutes
the essence of all forms of movement of matter, a general law of its existence."
[Boris Gessen and Ivan Podvolotskii, quoted in Weston (2008), p.435. These two
characters were
Deborinites
writing in the 1920s.]
"Why is it
that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because
that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or
identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living,
conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every
contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking
of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is
real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of
opposites into one another....
"All
processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into
their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability
manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao
(1961b),
pp.340-42.]
"The law of
contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the
basic law of materialist dialectics....
"As opposed to the
metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds
that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it
internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the
development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary
self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and
interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development
of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within
the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence
its motion and development....
"The universality or
absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that
contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the
other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of
opposites exists from beginning to end...." [Ibid.,
pp.311-18.]
"Second, and just as
unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different
and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as
the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single
thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and
its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of
infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest
contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of
infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human
mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited
differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present
in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]
"So far we have discussed the most general and
most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of
opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main
proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the
law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the
process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with
examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the
first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of
this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as
in
Lao-tse and
his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in
Heraclitus.
Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.
"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well
as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that
things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All
fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or
development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and
absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that
all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.
"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere
proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something
about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It
states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place
through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.
"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other
words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is
represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation
of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the
law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid.,
pp.170-71.]
"The second conception [i.e., the second
conception Lenin mentioned -- RL], not remaining on the surface of phenomena,
expresses the essence of movement as the unity of opposites.... This conception
seeks the causes of development not outside the process but in its very midst;
it seeks mainly to disclose the source of 'self-movement' of the process. To
understand a process means to disclose its contradictory aspects, to establish
their mutual relationship, to follow up the movement of its contradictions
through all its stages. This view gives the key to the 'leaps' which
characterises the evolutionary series; it explains the changing of a process
into its opposite, the annihilation of the 'old' and the emergence of the
'new'." [Shirokov (1937), pp.135-36.]
"The second
dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of
opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality
-– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere
to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in
unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically
expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….
"[F]rom the standpoint
of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change
which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31,
32.]
"The negative
electrical pole…can't exist without the simultaneous presence of the
positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore
found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944),
pp.35-36.]
"This dialectical
activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and
relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in
all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that
surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that
everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather
changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of
the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to
surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its
opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), pp.94-95; quoting Hegel
(1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used at this
site.]
"Formal logic,
which is based on abstract, or simple, identity (A equals A), is too
one-sided to explain this negation of one state of matter and its transformation
into its opposite, in this case the lifeless into the living, because it
excludes from its premises real difference and contradiction, which is the
extreme development of difference. But the unity of opposites (A equals
non-A), which makes contradiction explicit and intelligible, can explain this
transition, which actually occurred on earth. The emergence of life from the
nonliving in turn substantiates the objective basis in nature of this law of
concrete contradiction, a cornerstone of dialectical logic." [Novack (1978),
p.239.]
"Contradiction is an
essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself.
It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The
dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and
interpenetration of opposites….
"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change
into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and
the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history
of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a
bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike.
And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped,
embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious
minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical
reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely
decisive role....
"This universal
phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all
motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a
contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies
and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"Contradictions
are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not
only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move
simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative
but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their
opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into
positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not
destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a
neutral charge.
"This is an extension of the law of the unity
and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of
nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...."
[Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.43-47,
63-71.]
"Dialectics teaches one to look beyond the
immediate, to penetrate beyond the appearance of stability and calm, and to see
the seething contradictions and ceaseless movement that lies beneath the
surface. We are imbued with the idea of constant change, and that sooner or
later everything changes into its opposite. The capitalist system, together
with its values, morality, politics and what sometimes passes for philosophy, is
not something eternal, which has no beginning and no end. In fact, it is a very
recent phenomenon with a turbulent past, a shaky present, and no future at all.
This, of course, is something the system's defenders find impossible to
contemplate. So much the worse for them!" [Authors' Preface to the second
Spanish Edition of Reason in Revolt (i.e., Woods and Grant (1995); quoted
from
here.]
"Ted Grant was an incorrigible optimist all his
life. Marxists are optimistic by their very nature because of two things: the
philosophy of dialectical materialism, and our faith in the working class and
the socialist future of humanity. Most people look only at the surface of the
events that shape their lives and determine their destiny. Dialectics teaches
one to look beyond the immediate, to penetrate beyond the appearance of
stability and calm, and to see the seething contradictions and ceaseless
movement that lies beneath the surface. The idea of constant change, in which
sooner or later everything changes into its opposite enables a Marxist to rise
above the immediate situation and to see the broader picture." [Authors'
Preface to the second English Edition of Reason in Revolt; quoted from
here.]
"This struggle is not
external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it
arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The
opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are
inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they
operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the
process as a whole….
"Movement and change
result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal
contradictions….
"Contradiction is a
universal feature of all processes….
"The importance of the
[developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its
supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All
development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a
necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66,
72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually
exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate
each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of
opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in
mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as
such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual
action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of
these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely,
their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in
their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side
alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986),
p.115; quoting
Engels
(1891), p.414.]
"The
unity of opposites and contradiction.... The
scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond
its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions.
The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a
dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually
incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong
to each other.
"It is even more important to remember this point
when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process
of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one
can't find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change,
old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a
dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their
struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they
form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity
for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the
unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and
transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity
of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a
relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite
objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its
constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of
thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They
are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....
"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a
whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally
ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility,
contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next
stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common
basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not
correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites,
which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of
contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal
inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph.
They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development
produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new
ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a
network of contradictions." [Spirkin
(1983), pp.143-46.]
"The statement that the struggle of opposites is
decisive in development in no way belittles the importance of their unity. The
unity of opposites is a requisite of struggle, because there is struggle only
where opposite sides exist in one object or phenomenon....
"And so, objects and phenomena have
opposite aspects -- they represent the unity of opposites. Opposites not merely
exist side by side, but are in a state of constant contradiction, a struggle is
going on between them. The struggle of opposites is the inner content, the
source of development of reality." [Afanasyev (1968), pp.95-97.]
"'The contradiction,
however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a
contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In
brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity
of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'
"The world in which
we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat,
light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative,
boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right,
above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.
"The fact that two
poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded
in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two
contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a
reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.
"Motion, space and
time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have
explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time.
It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in
it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes
motion possible.' (Hegel)
"To understand
something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal
contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual,
and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites,
--
cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely
links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.
"Lenin explains this
self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows
how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they
are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind
should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional,
mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'"
[Rob Sewell, quoted from
here.]
"But, change itself also constitutes a
unity of opposites. In the most general way, a system undergoing change is
becoming something that it was not and is cessing to be what it was. In one form
or another a change represents the transformation of an object into
its dialectical opposite, a process referred to as dialectical negation...."
[Marquit (1982), pp.69-70.]
"Qualitative change is one of the basic concepts
of dialectics. And so-called qualitative change refers precisely to the
transformation of the character of a thing into the opposite and its change
into another thing. To deny this is to deny the whole of dialectics." [Wang
Jo-Shui, p.3, quoted from
here. (This
links to a PDF.)]
"Apart from the more or less broad division of
contradictions into antagonistic and non-antagonistic, it is possible to
emphasize specifically contradictions which are the basic source of development
of an object (this is contradiction in its essence), contradictions connected
with the transition of an object from a given state into its opposite state...."
[I. Narski, Soviet Philosophical Encyclopedia (1963), p.1; quoted from
here.
(This links to a PDF.)]
Even Left Communists, it seems, have been seduced
by this Hermetic Creed:
"It is assumed that the dialectical character of
historical materialism is best described when it is referred to as the theory of
development. However, the process of evolution was also known to the natural
science of the 19th century. Scientists were well acquainted with the growth of
the cell into a complex organism, the evolution of animal species as expressed
in the origin of species, and the theory of the evolution of the physical world
known as the law of entropy. But their method of reasoning was undialectical.
They believed their concepts were concrete objects and considered their
identities and opposites as absolutes. Consequently, the evolution of the
universe as well as the continued progress of knowledge brought out
contradictions in the theory of knowledge of which many examples have been
quoted by Engels in his 'Anti-Dühring.' Understanding in general and science in
particular segregate and systematise into definite concepts and laws what in the
real world of phenomena occurs in continuous flux and transition. By means of
names, through which language separates and defines the sequel of events, all
occurrences falling into a particular group are considered similar and
unchangeable. As abstract concepts they differ sharply, but in reality they
converge and fuse. The colours blue and green are distinct from each other but
in the intermediary nuances no one can say definitely where one colour ends and
the other begins. It cannot be stated at which point during its life cycle a
flower begins or ceases to be a flower. That in practical life good and evil are
not absolute opposites and that the greatest justice may become the greatest
injustice is acknowledged everyday, just as juridical freedom may be
transformed into its opposite. Dialectical thinking corresponds to reality
inasmuch as it takes into consideration that the finite cannot explain the
infinite, nor the static the dynamic world; that every concept has to develop
into new concepts, or even into its opposite. Metaphysical thinking, on the
other hand, leads to dogmatic assertions and contradictions because it views
conceptions as fixed entities. Metaphysical, that is undialectical, thinking
considers concepts formulated by thought as independent concepts that make up
the reality of the world. Natural science proper does not suffer much from this
shortcoming. It surmounts difficulties and contradictions in practice insofar as
the very process of development compels it to continually revise its
formulations and concepts, to amplify them by breaking them up in greater
detail, to further modify its formulations to account for the new changes and to
find new formulas for additions and corrections, thereby bringing the picture
ever closer to the original model, the phenomenal world. The lack in dialectic
reasoning becomes disturbing only when the naturalist passes from his special
field of knowledge towards general philosophy and theory, as is the case with
bourgeois materialism." [Anton Pannekoek, Materialism And Historical
Materialism, 1942. Quoted from
here. Spelling modified to conform with UK English.]
And we also see this idea on-line:
"Logic since Aristotle (384-322 BCE) had been
based on the so-called formal logic of A = A, a thing is always equal to itself.
With the advances in science just after the French Revolution Hegel was able to
propound a new logic, which based itself on movement. This can be summed up with
the idea that A = -A, everything will eventually change into its opposite.
Light and dark, life and death, up and down, all phenomena are in movement
and eventually change into their opposite. Even the most durable elements
break down into nothing over time." [Quoted from
here.]
Of course, this is an ancient idea, and even
appears in Chinese Philosophy:
"The Yin Yang principle is 'the' preeminent
ancient Chinese secret offering explanation to everything that exists, changes
or moves. Its origin comes from observing the very essence of the Universe --
from darkness there is light. Yin Yang embodies duality or an opposite nature
with Yin tending toward passive, dark, feminine, downward seeking and Yang
tending toward active, light, masculine, upward seeking.
"Because we can see dark and we can see light they appear separate yet they are
connected. Everything in life has this same connective quality. However, notice
your tendency to identify Yin and Yang as separate and to judge which one you
relate to or prefer over the other. This same human tendency prevents us from
accessing the power of the principle. So to access the power of Yin Yang we must
embrace both Yin and Yang and observe without judgment.
"There is also a cyclical nature to Yin Yang. Everything changes into its
opposite in an ongoing cycle of reversal. Health changes to sickness and
sickness changes into health. The more you embrace Yin Yang and see your life as
one continuous flow; your experiences in life will naturally reverse or begin to
flow more easily." [China
Daily, 25/02/2011.]
Other open and honest mystics hold to the
same belief:
"'This is why no one could ever defeat me. There
was no way to defeat me because I was never victorious. There was not a single
person on this earth who could defeat me. Nobody could defeat me because I had
already accepted the defeat on my own. I never tried to win. But you are saying
that you want to win, and you don’t want to be defeated by anyone. Then you are
bound to be defeated because victory and defeat are two sides of the same coin.'
"What Krishna is saying is that one who sees
this…. And remember one thing about this seeing: it is an existential
experience. It is our everyday experience, but it is a wonder how we go on
missing it, how we protect ourselves from seeing it. It seems we are playing a
big trick on ourselves, otherwise it would be astonishing for such a living
truth of life to escape our notice.
"We experience it every day. Everything
changes into its opposite. If you go more deeply into a friendship, it
starts turning into enmity. But what is the trick, that we go on avoiding seeing
it? The trick is that when the friendship starts turning into enmity, we don’t
see it like that. We say that the friend is turning into an enemy." [Bhagwan
Shree Rajneesh, quoted from
here.]
It wouldn't be difficult to double or treble the number of quotations
(from Dialectical Marxists and open and honest mystics, like the Bhagwan) that say more-or-less the same thing, as anyone who has access to as
many books and articles on dialectics -- or, who knows how to use Google
-- as I have can easily confirm.
From the above, it is quite clear that the vast
majority of classical (and even more recent) dialecticians do indeed believe
that (a) All change is the result of a "struggle" of "opposites", (b) All
objects/processes/concepts change into these "opposites", and that they
also (c) Produce these "opposites" when they
change, as was argued in the main body of this Essay.
Now, when asked in what way these passages have been
"taken out of context", the 'reply' I invariably receive from my
'dialectical critics' is..., total silence. To that end, if any of my
current readers think I have taken any of the above "out of context", they should e-mail me,
and if what they tell me is correct, I will apologise profusely and rectify that error.
As far as (1)
is concerned, if the
DM-worthiesdidn't mean what they said then
latter-day DM-fans (who advance this excuse) will, it seems, have to ignore
their own classics! [Less irrational readers will note that many of the above
dialecticians quote one another word-for-word, so they at least thought their sources
meant what they said.]
More-or-less the same can be said about excuse (3); if these worthies miss-spoke, or
were wrong, then contemporary DM-fans would be well advised to ignore these
error-strewn classics, since they all say the same thing!
Of course, anyone foolish enough to adopt this
sound piece of advice will have to endure the same
amount and volume of abuse that I have
received from those misguided enough to ignore it.
Excuse (5) is a
little different. Clearly we should use our common sense when interpreting
anything, but this complaint is a little rich coming from those who tell us, or who endorse, the
following comment about 'commonsense':
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental
reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and
apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is
"yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For
him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be
itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another;
cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.
"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to
us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only
sound commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own
four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide
world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and
necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the
nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a
limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in
insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets
the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets
the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their
motion. It can't see the woods for the trees." [Engels
(1892), p.406. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Especially those who now turn round and expect 'commonsense'
to bale them out. In fact, Engels tells us that 'commonsense' is all but useless
in such contexts (i.e., in relation to change, etc.). How 'commonsense' can help the beleaguered dialectician
here is therefore
somewhat unclear.
Indeed, the application of ordinary common sense shows
this 'Law' would make change impossible.
[I explain the difference between
"common sense" and "commonsense",
here.]
Even so, Lenin and Mao were quite clear, this
'Law' is both universal and absolute:
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing…. The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all
processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all
processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of
one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b),
pp.340-42.]
"The universality or
absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that
contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the
other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of
opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid.,
p.318.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold
emphases added.]
Not much wiggle room here, one feels!
As far as (6) is concerned I in
fact have used very little, if any, FL in this part of the Essay. And, as far as
symbols are concerned, we need look no further than Mao's own use of them:
"But this situation is not static; the principal and the non-principal
aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature
of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage
in the development of a contradiction, A
is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or
in another process the roles are reversed -- a change determined by the
extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle
against the other in the course of the development of a thing." [Mao
(1961b), p.333.
Bold emphases added.]
Any who still complain about the use of symbols should
examine
their use by
DM-theorists themselves -- and, indeed,
by
Hegel.
So, the use of abbreviative letters in this Essay (and they are no more than this -- they
are certainly not variables drawn from
FL!) is decidedly
uncontroversial and plainly doesn't imply the use of 'fixed categories', as
Mao himself notes.
The
DM-classics inform us that cats, for example, change because of a
'struggle of opposites', and that they change into those 'opposites'
(since we are told everything in
the entire universe changes this way).
Consider a live cat and its 'dialectical opposite'. According to
the DM-classicists thatlive cat must at some
point 'struggle' with and then change into that 'opposite'. Again, at some
point, that live cat also changes from a live cat into a dead cat. So, this dead
cat must be the 'opposite' of the live cat. In that case, if the
dialectical
classics are to be believed, a dialectical
cat must 'struggle' with the dead cat it is one day to become; hence, it can only
die by struggling with itself as a dead cat!
Alternatively, that live cat can't change into the aforementioned dead cat since
that dead cat
already exists! If it didn't already exist, the live cat couldn't 'struggle'
with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', the above live cat
can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that
already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM, the 'world view of the proletariat', implies that cats are immortal!
On the other hand, it also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the
dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Has anyone witnessed this universal phenomenon?
Perhaps we don't 'understand' dialectics...
Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in
the life and death of a cat, whether or not these are 'sublated'
intermediaries.
Let us assume, therefore, that this live cat goes through an indefinite number
of successive stages: cat stage one, cat stage two, cat stage three..., cat
stage any large number you care to name, cat stage one bigger than that, until at
cat stage one bigger still it finally
pops its clogs.
But, according to the dialectical classics, cat stage one can only change into
cat stage two
because of a 'struggle of opposites', and cat stage one must also change into that
with which it has struggled; hence, cat stage one must inevitably
change into cat stage two.
So, cat stage one must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage two.
If so, the same problems arise, for cat stage one can't change into cat stage
two since
cat stage two
already exists. If it didn't, cat stage one couldn't 'struggle' with it!
Moreover, ifcat stage two is itself also to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes
into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with, and change into, cat stage
three. But,
cat stage two can't change into cat stage three since cat stage three already exists! If it
didn't, there would be nothing to makecat stage two change, nothing with which it
could struggle.
By an indefinite number of applications of the above argument -- and according to this 'theory' -- all the stages of a cat's life must
co-exist. In which case, no cat can change, let alone die! And what applies
to cats, applies to anything and everything that changes. All their stages
must co-exist, too.
It is a mystery, therefore, how there is any room left in the
dialectical universe for anything to move, let alone change!
With such absurd implications, is it any wonder that workers
in their hundreds of millions ignore Dialectical Marxism?
The reader will no doubt appreciate that very little has changed
(no pun intended), except perhaps the argument isn't quite as clear or as
concise as it used to be. Hence, very little hangs on the use of abbreviative
symbols.
[FL = Formal Logic; LOI = Law of Identity;
LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]
Now, it seems that very few DM-fans have given much thought to their
own 'theory' of change, so when its absurd consequences are pointed out to them
they first of all react with horror, and then some of them attempt to apply
their own hastily constructed and impromptu repairs. [An excellent example of
this tactic can be found
here, on page 2.] But, these repairs, carried out 'on-the-hoof', fail to
address the core problems that Hegel's theory was supposed to have solved --
which is why DM-theorists like Lenin were keen to import it into Marxism. Before
I examine how Lenin thought he had done this, it might be a good idea to fill in
some of the background.
So, in response to (7)
above it is worth recalling that Hegel invented this way
of characterising change by appropriating and then adapting Kant's
response to
Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation. Hume had argued that
there is no logical or conceptual connection between cause and effect. This
struck right at the heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume
and the
Empiricists were radically mistaken. Kant had already attempted to answer Hume, but his solution
banished causation into the
Noumenon,
about which we can know nothing. That approach was totally unacceptable to
Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect. He found
it in (1) Spinoza's claim that every determination is also a negation (which,
by the way, neither
theorist even so much as attempted to justify -- more about that in Essay
Twelve), and in (2) His argument that the
LOI "stated negatively" implies
the LOC (which it doesn't).
Based on this, Hegel was 'able' to argue that for any concept A,
"determinate
negation" implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A.
This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built
into it, as
A
transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This provided him with the
logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it
doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A,
which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational
consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that
for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it),
not-A,its 'internal' and hence unique 'opposite'. Hegel had to
derive this consequence since
everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A
could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't have introduced this limiting factor,
this unique "other".
From this, the "unity of opposites" was born. So, the link between cause and
effect was now given by this 'logical' unity, and causation and change were the result of the interaction
between these logically-linked "opposites".
Plainly, this
paired,
unique opposite,
not-A, was essential to Hegel's theory, otherwise, he could provide no
explanation why A should be followed by a unique not-A as opposed
to just any old not-A -- say,
B, or, indeed, something else, C, for
example.
So, since B
and C (and an indefinite number of other objects and
processes) are all manifestly not-A, Hegel had to find some way of eliminating
these, and all the rest, as candidates for the development of A, otherwise he
would have had no effective answer to Hume.
[Hume, of course,
wouldn't have denied that A
changed into "what it is not", into not-A, he would merely have
pointed out that this
can't provide the conceptual link that rationalists require unless all the
other (potentially infinite) not-As could be ruled out in some way. He
concluded that it is only a habit of the mind that prompts us to expect A
to change into what we have always, or have in general experienced before. There is no
logical link, however, between A and what it changes into since there is no contradiction in supposing A to
change into B or C, or, indeed, something else. (In saying this the
reader shouldn't conclude that I agree with Hume, or that Hume's reply
is successful.)]
Hence, Hegel introduced
this unique "other" with which each object and process was conceptually linked -- a unique
"other" that was 'internally' connected with A --, something he claimed could be derived by 'determinate
negation' from A. [How he in fact derived this "other" will be examined in Essay Twelve Part
Five, but a DM-'explanation' -- and criticism of it -- can be found in Essay
Eight Part Three.]
This special not-A
was now the unique
"other" of A. Without it
Hegel's reply to Hume falls flat.
Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Marxist
dialecticians) bought into this spurious 'logic' (several of them possibly unaware of the
above 'rationale'), and attempted to give it a 'materialist make-over'. And that
is why this Hegelian theory (albeit "put back on its feet")
is integral to classical DM; it supplied Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the
rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.
[There are in fact far better ways than this to neutralise Hume's criticisms, and
those of more recent Humeans, and which do not thereby make change impossible. More details will be given in Essay Three Part
Five. Until then, the reader is directed toward Hacker (2007), and Essay
Thirteen Part Three.]
Here is Lenin's acknowledgement and endorsement of this principle:
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming
change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is
that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another,
not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular
only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite
right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite."
[Lenin
(1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this
particular quotation coming from p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"But
the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing
which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the
first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and
altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus
essentially contained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold
fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the
presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition;
also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the
absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the
examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961),
p.225, quoting Hegel (1999),
pp.833-34, §1795. Emphases in
the original.]
Lenin
wrote in the margin:
"This
is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961),
p.225.]
To
which he added:
"Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians
and Humists [Humeans -- RL] more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than
of Hegel." [Ibid.,
p.179.]
This shows that Lenin
understood this to be a reply to Hume, and that it was central to comprehending
dialectics.
"Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a
universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of
itself. Taken
quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first
immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal
appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being
is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the
first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in
the other, but the other is essentially not the empty
negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather
is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore
determined as the mediated -- contains in general the determination of the first
within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even
in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of
the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in
rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to
convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far
as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic
consists of such.
"Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to
begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simple
determination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is
present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and
the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a
proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its
predicate; for example, the finite is infinite,
one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate
form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgment
it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form
of the positive judgment, is incapable of holding within its grasp
speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the
negative judgment, would at least have to be added as well. In the
judgment the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent
subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this
negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their
positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in
them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a
proposition.
"The
second determination, the negative or mediated, is at the same
time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first
instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a relation
or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the
positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the
other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case
it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the
other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it
includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction,
the posited dialectic of itself. Because the
first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and consequently is also only
implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in
it the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is
itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it
the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship,
judgment, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at
once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is
solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For
the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and
at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the
contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception,
into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in
juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without
reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for
its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the
thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking
does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in
saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract
negation." [Hegel (1999),
pp.833-35, §§1795-1798. Bold
emphases alone added. I have used the on-line version here, correcting a few
minor typos.]
The most relevant and important part of which is this:
"It is therefore the other, but not the
other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an
other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the
other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it
includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction,
the posited dialectic of itself." [Ibid.
Bold emphases alone added.]
This "reflection", as Hegel elsewhere calls it, of the "other in
its own self", a unique "other", provides the logical link
his theory required. Any other "other" would be "indifferent", and not
the logical
reflection he sought. It is from this that 'dialectical contradictions' arise, as Hegel
notes. Hence, Lenin was
absolutely right, this "other" is essential for "understanding"
DM -- except he forgot to mention that dialectics is in fact rendered incomprehensible and
unworkable as a result!
Hegel underlined this point (but perhaps less obscurely) in the
'Shorter Logic':
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the
same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to
its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the
contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence,
§119.
Bold emphasis added.]
[The problems these odd ideas create for Hegel are outlined
here.]
Hence, any attempt to (1) Eliminate the idea that change results from
a 'struggle of opposites', or (2) Deny that objects and processes change into these 'opposites', or
even (3) Reject the idea that
these 'opposites' are internally-related as one "other" to another
specific "other", will
leave DM-fans with no answer to Hume, and thus with no viable theory of change.
[For Hegel's other comments on Hume, see Hegel (1995b),
pp.369-75.]
In which case,
Hegel's theory
(coupled with the part-whole dialectic) wasat least a theory of causation,
change
and of the supposed logical development of history, so the above
dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into
DM. It allowed them to argue that, among other things, history isn't accidental
-- i.e., it isn't just 'one thing after another' -- it has a logic to it. Hence,
Hegel's
'logical' theory enabled them to argue, for example, that capitalism must
give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to
nothing else. Hume's criticisms -- or, rather, more recent versions of them (which,
combined with contemporary versions of
Adam Smith's
economic theory (Smith was of course a friend collaborator of Hume's)
in
essence feature in much of modern economic theory and philosophy, and thus
in contemporary criticisms of Marx's economics and politics) -- are a direct threat to this
idea. If these critics are right, we can't predict what the class struggle will
produce. Or, rather, if Hume is right, the course of history is contingent, not
necessary, not "rational" -- and there is no 'inner
logic' to capitalism.
As far as
I can tell, other than Lenin, very few dialecticians have discussed (or have even
noticed!) this aspect of their theory. The only authors
that I am aware of who take this into consideration are Ruben (1979), Lawler (1982), and Fisk (1973, 1979). I will examine Fisk's arguments, which
are the most sophisticated I have seen to date (on this topic), in other Essays published at this
site. Lawler's analysis is the subject of Essay Eight
Part Three. However, since writing this I
have also come across several of Charles Bettelheim's
comments
that suggest he, too, understood this point.
Incidentally,
this puts paid to the idea that there can be such things as 'external
contradictions' (a notion beloved of STDs and MISTs). If there were any, they couldn't be 'logically'
connected as 'one-other-linked-with-another-unique-other' required by Hegel's
theory. For Hegel, upside down or the 'right way up', this would fragment
the rational order of reality, introducing contingency where once there had been
logico-conceptual or necessary development. Hence, any DM-fan reckless enough to introduce
'external contradictions' into their system would in effect be 're-Hume-ing'
Hegel, not putting him 'back on his feet'! In which case, it is no surprise to find that
'external contradictions' were unknown to Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov.
[I have analysed several other fatal defects in the idea that there can be
'external' and/or 'internal contradictions' (in nature and society) in Essay
Eleven Part Two, here
and here.]
The problem is that even though Hegel's theory sort of works
-- if one is both an Idealistand p*ss-poor logician
(more on this in Essay Twelve Part Five) --, it can't work in
HM, for the reasons
outlined in this Essay -- since, if this theory were true, change would be impossible!
So, if, for instance, the relations of production and the forces of production,
the proletariat and the capitalist class, are linked as 'contradictory
opposites' in the way that Hegel supposed (upside down or 'the right way up') --
which they will have to be so linked, or Hume's criticisms and more modern versions of them
will have their place --, then the forces of production must change into the relations of
production, and the proletariat must change into the capitalist class -- and
vice versa!
But, the opposite of the proletariat isn't just any old
ruling-class, it is the
capitalist class. This is the unique "other" of the proletariat
with whom they are 'internally' linked. Hence, the former must change into the latter, and vice
versa, if this theory were correct. Workers struggle with capitalists, and so, according to this
theory, they must change into them,thus making socialism impossible.
Anyway, did
the peasant class in the Middle Ages change into the ruling-class of their day?
Did the slaves in Ancient Rome change into the Aristocracy? Or even vice versa?
But, they should have done so if DM were correct.
The first half of response (8)
was answered in the
main body of
this Essay. The idea behind the second half seems to be the following point,
made by Mao:
"All
contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single
entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also
transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the
identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they
happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they
are identical, transforming themselves into one another'.
"Why
is it that 'the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but
as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'?
Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the
unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is
living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given
conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite.
Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist world outlook of
materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling classes of the past
and present and the metaphysicians in their service who regard opposites not as
living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves into one another, but as
dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy everywhere to delude the masses
of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their rule. The task of Communists is
to expose the fallacies of the reactionaries and metaphysicians, to propagate
the dialectics inherent in things, and so accelerate the transformation of
things and achieve the goal of revolution.
"In
speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring
to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of
opposites into one another." [Mao (1961b),
p.340. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Lenin seems to have agreed:
"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action)
of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative." [Lenin
(1961),
p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
[There are passages from Engels which appear to say the same sort
of thing.]
Hence, it could be
argued that the criticisms aired here seem to trade on the idea that
dialectical contradictions are abstractions of some sort, or that they operate
unconditionally, everywhere and at all times. As the above quotations show, the
unity and identity of opposites apply to real, material processes, which have to
be identified first (they can't just be invented, like the examples on show in
this Essay), and they have to be studied dialectically so that the real contradictions they
contain can be understood in all their complexity and in their inter-relationships with other
processes. Moreover, these contradictions operate conditionally and relatively. In which case, the criticisms
in this Essay are misguided in the
extreme.
However, Lenin and Mao went on to point out the following:
"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action)
of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of
mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute." [Lenin (1961),
p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
"Why can an egg but not a stone be transformed
into a chicken? Why is there identity between war and peace and none between war
and a stone? Why can human beings give birth only to human beings and not to
anything else? The sole reason is that the identity of opposites exists only
in necessary given conditions. Without these necessary given conditions there
can be no identity whatsoever....
"Why
is it that in Russia in 1917 the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution was
directly linked with the proletarian socialist October Revolution, while in
France the bourgeois revolution was not directly linked with a socialist
revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871 ended in failure? Why is it, on the
other hand, that the nomadic system of Mongolia and Central Asia has been
directly linked with socialism? Why is it that the Chinese revolution can avoid
a capitalist future and be directly linked with socialism without taking the old
historical road of the Western countries, without passing through a period of
bourgeois dictatorship? The sole reason is the concrete conditions of the time.
When certain necessary conditions are present, certain contradictions arise
in the process of development of things and, moreover, the opposites contained
in them are interdependent and become transformed into one another; otherwise
none of this would be possible.
"Such
is the problem of identity. What then is struggle? And what is the relation
between identity and struggle?
"Lenin
said:
'The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action)
of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of
mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute.'
"What
does this passage mean?
"All
processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into
their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability
manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute."
[Mao (1961b),
pp.341-42. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks also added to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
So, the struggle and the transformation into opposites is
absolute, but the identity of opposites is conditional and relative. According
to Mao it seems that the identity of opposites supplies some sort of constancy,
whereas the struggle of opposites initiates change. [But, Mao isn't at all clear,
so this might be to misrepresent him.]
However, my interpretation is partially supported by the very
next thing Mao said:
"There
are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest and that of
conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle between the two
contradictory elements contained in a thing. When the thing is in the first
state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative and not qualitative change
and consequently presents the outward appearance of being at rest. When the
thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first
state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution
of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the
appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity, combination,
harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity,
attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in
the state of quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity,
that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony, balance,
stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and
the change of each into its opposite are all the appearances of things in the
state of qualitative change, the transformation of one process into another.
Things are constantly transforming themselves from the first into the second
state of motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the
contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we say that the
unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and relative, while the struggle of
mutually exclusive opposites is absolute.
"When
we said above that two opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can
transform themselves into each other because there is identity between them,
we were speaking of conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two
contradictory things can be united and can transform themselves into each other,
but in the absence of these conditions, they can't constitute a contradiction,
can't coexist in the same entity and can't transform themselves into one
another. It is because the identity of opposites obtains only in given
conditions that we have said identity is conditional and relative. We may add
that the struggle between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end
and makes one process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and
that struggle is therefore unconditional and absolute.
"The
combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute
struggle constitutes the movement of opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b),
pp.342-43. Bold emphases added.]
Much of the difficulty interpreting Mao (and other dialecticians)
lies in the fact that they all like to talk in riddles, perhaps on the
assumption that enigmatic language will fool the unwary into mistaking it for
profundity. [As we will see in Essay Nine
Part Two, there were, and still
are, ideological
reasons for this rhetorical flourish.]
Hence, in addition to the confusing passages above, we also find
the following:
"We
Chinese often say, 'Things that oppose each other also complement each other.'
[The original gives the source of this remark -- RL.] That is, things opposed to
each other have identity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to
metaphysics. 'Oppose each other' refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle
of two contradictory aspects. 'Complement each other' means that in given
conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet
struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no identity.
"In
identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, and in
individuality there is generality. To quote Lenin, '...there is an absolute in
the relative.'" [Mao (1961b),
p.343. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
Mao is here quoting Lenin:
"The distinction between subjectivism
(scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in
(objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is
itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute
within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only
relative and excludes the absolute." [Lenin (1961),
p.358. Italic emphases in the original.]
And good luck to anyone trying to make sense of that!
Be this as it may, let us assume that
this criticism is
valid,
and that all such change is relative and conditional -- the result will be no
different. Consider, therefore the following modified argument:
Let us suppose that
object/process A is comprised of two
"internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O*
and O**,
and that it changes only under conditions C as a result.
But, even under these conditions, O*
can't
itself change intoO**
since O**already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this
theory, O* couldn't change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that
about.
[Of course, the other complications considered in the main body
of this Essay now only need to have the clause "which change only under conditions C" added
to make them work, too -- but, I'll refrain from doing that, otherwise this Essay will
become even more unwieldy. That unpleasant task is left to the reader.]
The same sort of adjustment will also take care of this part of the
above objection:
"The unity and identity of opposites apply to real, material
processes, which have to be identified first (they can't just be invented, like
the examples on show in this essay), and they have to be studied dialectically, so that the real contradictions they
contain can be understood in all their complexity and in their inter-relationships with
other processes."
In that case:
Let us suppose that
real, concrete, material object/process A (proven to be such by a
thorough dialectical, and all-round analysis) is comprised of two
"internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O*
and O**,
and that it changes only under conditions C as a result.
But, even under these conditions, O*
can't
itself change intoO**
since O**already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this
theory, O* couldn't change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that
about.
Once more, the same dialectically-depressing denouement emerges
at the end.
Again, this doesn't deny change, only that DM can account for it.
Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.
Hence, howsoever we try to re-package this 'Law' we end up
hitting the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Let it go comrades, your defective
theory of change can't be made to work
whatever repairs are hastily inflicted upon it.
10b1a.
There
are several possible escape routes that the beleaguered DM-fan might want to
take:
(1)
O* 'changes', not into not-O*,
but into not-O1*,
meaning that: (a) There are now two not-O*s
where once there was only one -- not-O1*
andnot-O*
-- unless, of course, one of these not-O*s
just vanishes into thin air (see below), or (b) O* will have changed,
not into its opposite, but into something that isn't its opposite,
and with which it hasn't struggled --
according to the DM-classics, O*
should struggle with not-O*
-- its opposite -- not with not-O1*,
which isn't its opposite.
Or:
(2)(a) O* doesn't actually change,
and/or (b) it
simply disappears.
Plainly,
O* can't change into
what already exists -- that is,
O*can't change into its opposite, not-O*,
without there being two of the latter (see option (1), above). But, even then, one of these
won't be not-O*,
just a copy of it.
In that case, once more:
O* either disappears, or
O* does not change at all -- or, it changes into something
else.
Or:
(3) Not-O*
itself disappears in order to allow a new (but now copy of) not-O*
to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so,
questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O*
could possibly cause
O* to
change if it has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones
the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict the new not-O*
that confronted the old. If the new not-O*
exists in order to allow O* to change, then
we are back where we were a few paragraphs back in the main body of this Essay.
Or:
(4) O* and not-O*
change into one another. But, as we will soon see, this options presents
DM-theorists with even more serious difficulties, since it implies, for example, that
capitalism must change into socialism, and socialism must change into
capitalism!
But, worse: it isn't easy to see how this could happen if both of
these already exist.
Anyway, as should seem obvious -- and among the other things already
mentioned --, alternative (2) plainly means that
O* does not in fact change into not-O*, it is just
replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O*
remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- i.e.,
into
O* --, according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will
only work if matter
and/or energy can either be destroyed or created from nothing!
In addition, option (4) has O* and not-O*
changing into one another, meaning that (i) there is no net change, or, that (ii)
O* and not-O*
have just replaced one another. So, if we label, for instance, Capitalism, "C"
and socialism, "S", then these two must co-exist if they are to "struggle"
with one another (as Mao pointed out earlier), the net result being that in the
end S and C still co-exist, only they will have now swapped places! Of
course, if S already exists, C won't need to change into it, and
socialists needn't fight for it!
For example, in
relation to option (4) above, S
must
already exist, or there can't be any struggle, but where did S come from? From C? And yet it can't
have done that, since for C to change and produce S, S must
already exist (or there would be no struggle)! And, where did C itself come from? Of course, C
came from F (Feudalism), but that in turn means that C and F
must co-exist, too, so C can't have come from F (since, as we have
seen, they must
co-exist if one is to cause the other to change)! Hence, this 'theory' implies that either (i) C, S and F must all co-exist,
or (ii) All three sprang into existence from nowhere.
Of course, C,
S and F are all abstractions, and so can't possibly struggle with
one another, but the same problems emerge if we concentrate on things that can
and do struggle. Let W1
be any randomly-selected worker, or section of workers, in struggle, and let C1
be those capitalists, or sections of the capitalist class and their bully-boys,
with which he/she/they struggle -- the 'dialectical opposite' of W1.
But,
according to the DM-classics, W1
must change into C1
and vice versa. But, this can't happen since both of these already exist;
so, at best, all they can do is replace one another. Do we see this anywhere on
the planet in connection with the class
struggle?
Recall, if this theory is true, this must happen countless thousand
times a year as the capitalist class (or sections of it) struggles with workers
(or sections of them)! If this theory is
correct, this must happen every time bosses
struggle with workers: they must change into one another!
The same difficulties
arise if we project this into the future and consider the final struggle to
overthrow capitalism (if and when that takes place). In that case, let W2
be that section of the workers' movement in actual struggle, and let C2
be those capitalists (and/or those elements that fight their battles for them)
with which they are struggling. According to the DM-classics, W2
must change into C2,
and vice versa. Again, this can't happen since both of these already
exist; so at best, all they can do is replace one another.
Are we really
all struggling just to become capitalists?
It
could be objected that the working class does indeed become its opposite, it
becomes the ruling class. I have replied to that objection,
here.
The
DM-classics inform us that cats, for example, change because of a
'struggle of opposites', and that each changes its 'opposite'
(since we are told everything in
the entire universe changes this way).
Consider live cat, C, and its 'dialectical opposite', C*.
According to the DM-classicists, C must at some
point 'struggle' with and then change into C*. Again, at some point, C
also changes from a live cat into a dead cat. So, this dead cat must be the
'opposite' of the live cat; that is, C* must be that dead cat. In
that case, if the
dialectical classics are to be believed, a dialectical
cat must 'struggle' with the dead cat it is one day to become. Hence, it can only
die by struggling with itself as a dead cat!
Alternatively, live cat C can't change into dead cat C* since dead cat C*
already exists! If C* didn't already exist, C couldn't 'struggle'
with it and so couldn't change. Hence, according to this 'theory', C
can't actually die, for to do so it would have to change into something that
already exists, and that is impossible, even for a cat.
So, DM, the alleged 'world view of the proletariat', implies that cats are immortal!
On the other hand, DM also implies that cats are constantly scrapping with the
dead cats that that they will one day turn into.
Has anyone witnessed this universal phenomenon?
Perhaps we don't 'understand' dialectics...
Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in
the life and death of cat C, whether or not these are 'sublated'
intermediaries.
Let us assume, therefore, that cat, C, goes through n successive stages C(1), C(2),
C(3)..., C(i)..., C(n-1), C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally
pops its clogs.
[These
stages can even be seen as 'dialectically' interlinked, or even as 'moments' in the
ongoing process of change experienced by this cat. I consider the alternative
model that "opposite tendencies" in
this cat are what cause it to change, and then die,
here.]
However,
according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2)
because of a 'struggle between opposites' (since we are told that all
change occurs this way), andC(1) must also change into that
with which it has struggled.
So, C(1) must 'struggle' with and change into, C(2).
However, the insurmountable problems we have already met several times now
re-surface, for C(1) can't change into C(2) since
C(2)
already exists. If
C(2)
didn't already exist, C(1) couldn't 'struggle' with it and hence change!
Furthermore, if C(2)
is itself to change, it must struggle with whatever it changes into -- that is, it must 'struggle' with and change into, C(3),
its 'opposite'. But,
C(2) can't change into C(3) since C(3) already exists! If it
didn't, there would be nothing to make C(2) change, nothing with which it
could struggle.
By n applications of the above argument -- if this 'theory' is to be believed -- all the stages of a cat's life must
co-exist if it is to change. In which case, no cat could change, let alone die!
And what applies
to cats, applies to anything and everything in the entire universe that changes. All their stages
must co-exist, too, if we are to believe what we read in the DM-classics.
With such absurd implications, is it any wonder that workers
in their hundreds of millions ignore Dialectical Marxism? Is it any wonder
that Dialectical Marxism has been such an abject and long-term failure?
10c1. This long and sorry tale is
traced for us in, for example, Copleston (2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2003g).
See also,
Beaney (2014).
At some point in the future I will
post a up-dated
version of one of my undergraduate essays on this topic, which shows how and why
this ancient idea gained traction among early modern Rationalist Philosophers.
This topic is also connected with several of the things I have to say about ancient
theological ideas concerning the nature of 'God', and how they were connected
with the 17th
century 'scientific revolution', in Essay Eleven
Part Two.
10c2. However, it is far from clear what
Kant
meant by this 'containment' metaphor, or why he chose to use it. He indicates later on in the same passage
that this has something to do with merely thinking about the concepts involved:
"Analytic judgments (affirmative ones) are
thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity,
but those in which this connection is thought without identity are to be called
synthetic judgments. One could also call the former judgments of clarification
and the latter judgments of amplification, since through the predicate the
former do not add anything to the concept of the subject, but only break it up
by means of analysis into its component concepts, which were already thought in
it (though confusedly); while the latter, on the contrary, add to the concept of
the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all, and could not have
been extracted from it through any analysis; e.g., if I say: 'All bodies are
extended,' then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go outside
the concept that I combine with the word 'body' in order to find that extension
is connected with it, but rather I need only to analyze that concept, i.e.,
become conscious of the manifold that I always think in it, in order to
encounter this predicate therein; it is therefore an analytic judgment. On the
contrary, if I say: 'All bodies are heavy,' then the predicate is something
entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in
general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment.
"Now from this it is clear: 1) that through
analytic judgments our cognition is not amplified at all, but rather the
concept, which I already have, is set out, and made intelligible to me; 2) that
in synthetic judgments I must have in addition to the concept of the subject
something else (X) on which the understanding depends in cognizing a predicate
that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it." [Kant
(1998), pp.130-31. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Kant expresses himself slightly differently in the
Introduction to the B edition, pp.141-42.]
[Again, the
above is an obvious echo of the medieval, Identity Theory of Predication,
considered in more detail in Essay Three
Part
One.]
That isn't much clearer, and was subjected to searching criticism by the
late W V O Quine (in
Quine (1951), which was arguably the most influential -- but not
necessarily the most important -- philosophical paper
published in the second half of the 20th
century). Quine's criticisms were effectively rebutted by
Grice and Strawson (1956). [Both of these link to PDFs.] These papers (and
many others on this topic) were reprinted in Sumner and Woods (1969). I will say
no more about the continuing controversy over Kant's distinction since it will take me too far from the
main theme of both this Essay and this site. [See also the so-called 'Paradox
of Analysis'.]
10d.Of course, in certain circumstances it is possible to
defend Lenin by interpreting the word "struggle"
non-literally.
Indeed, this is precisely what Kuusinen, for example, does. Commenting on Lenin's claim that
development is a "struggle' of opposites", he says:
"It stands to reason that this proposition must
not be understood too simply. The struggle of opposites in the direct, literal
sense of the word occurs chiefly in human society. It is by no means always
possible to speak of struggle in its literal sense as regards the organic world.
And as regards inorganic nature the term is to be understood still less
literally. That is why Lenin put the term in quotation marks." [Kuusinen (1961),
p.94. Bold emphasis added.]
But, this sits rather awkwardly with
the many
occasions in
Lenin's writings and those of other DM-theorists where the
word "struggle" appears without those protective quotation marks
(and which Lenin also calls an "absolute"). Here are
just a few of them:
"The unity…of opposites is
conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive
opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin
(1961),
p.358. Bold emphasis added.]
"Such apparently are the elements of dialectics.
One could perhaps present these elements in greater detail as follows:.... (6)
the struggle, respectively unfolding, of these
opposites, contradictory strivings, etc." [ibid.,
p.221. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The basis of all things is therefore
the law of change, the law of constant motion. Two philosophers
particularly (the ancient Heraclitus and the modern Hegel…) formulated this law
of change, but they did not stop there. They also set up the question of the
manner in which the process operates. The answer they discovered was that
changes are produced by constant internal contradictions, internal struggle.
Thus, Heraclitus declared: 'Conflict is the mother of all happenings,' while
Hegel said: 'Contradiction is the power that moves things.' [Bukharin (1925),
pp.72-74.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The interdependence of the contradictory aspects
present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine
the life of all things and push their development forward."
[Mao (1961b),
pp.316-17. Bold emphasis added.]
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature,
for they all have their negative and positive sides...; and that the
struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new,
between that which is dying away and that which is being born..., constitutes
the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the
transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes...." [Stalin
(1976b),
pp.835-46. Bold emphasis added.]
"The general conclusion [is] that whenever
a process of development takes place, with the transformation in it of
quantitative changes into qualitative changes, there is always present in
it the struggle of opposites –- of opposite tendencies, opposite forces within
the things and processes concerned….
"The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from
the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not
independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts
or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the
basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole…." [Cornforth
(1976), pp.86, 90. Bold emphases added.]
"The essence of the
dialectical contradiction may be defined as an interrelationship and
interconnection between opposites in which they mutually assert and deny each
other (sic), and the struggle between them serves as the motive force, the
source of development. This is why the law in question is known as the law
of the unity and struggle of opposites.
[Konstantinov,
et al (1974), pp.144. Bold emphasis added.]
"Contradiction also expresses
this feature of the relation of opposition, i.e., the mutual exclusion and
mutual presupposing of its formative aspects. It can therefore be briefly
defined as the unity of opposites which mutually exclude one another and are in
struggle. The law of dialectics the demonstrates the driving force of
contradictions is formulated as the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.
"According to this law, contradictions are the inner impetus of development, the source of the
self-movement and change of things. If things were a constant identity in
themselves, and lacked differences and contradictions, they would be absolutely
immutable.... Contradiction is a dynamic relation of opposites.... The
determining element in contradiction is therefore the struggle of opposites." [Kharin
(1981), p.125. Bold emphases
added.]
"The development of the most
diverse objects and phenomena shows that opposite aspects can't exist
peacefully side by side; the contradictory, mutually exclusive character of
opposites necessarily causes a struggle between them. The old and the
new, the emergent and the obsolete must come into contradiction, must clash.
It is contradiction, the struggle of opposites that comprises the main source
of development of matter and consciousness....
"...The struggle of
opposites is the inner content, the source of the development of reality.
"Such is the essence of the
dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites." [Afanasyev (1968),
pp. 95, 97-98. Bold emphases added.]
Hence, it is quite clear that
dialecticianshave in general understood this word
literally, and, as a result, have applied it universally.
But, even if Kuusinen were right, and the word "struggle" was
meant to be taken non-literally (when applied to the inorganic world), what possible sense
can be attached to it? How do electrons 'struggle' with protons non-literally?
How do the North and South poles of a magnet 'struggle' metaphorically?
Kuusinen failed to say, and, as we will find out in Essay Eight
Parts One and
Two, no sense can be
attached to this idea howsoever it is interpreted.
Anyway, if this word applies only to animate matter, then the
problems we saw, for instance, with
cats
simply reassert themselves.
11. Woods and Grant list several examples of
internal and external opposites -- not really distinguishing between the two --, perhaps basing this
prize example of sloppy thought on principles they learnt from far too brief an
exposure to FL, but rather too much to DL.
[FL = Formal Logic; DL=
Dialectical Logic.]
Since
RIRE is now being quoted all over the Internet as the book to read
on DM, a few words seem appropriate. To that end, the reader should consult my
comments on this book in Essay Four (links in Note 7, above), and those written by a
supporter of this site, "LevD",
here. [To assist the reader, the latter has now been re-posted
here.]
[Several more comments relating to Woods and
Grant will be published here at a later date.]
Those
tempted to agree with Woods and Grant should spare a thought for the
Australian
Jewel Beetle, or rather the male of the species, which seem to have
developed a lusty obsession with empty beer bottles:
"Beetles Die During Sex With Beer Bottles
"Jennifer Viegas
"Besotted beetles are dying while trying to get
it on with discarded brown beer bottles, according to research conducted by
Darryl Gwynne, a University of Toronto Mississauga professor. It's a case of mistaken attraction,
because the beer bottles happen to possess all of the features that drive male
Australian
jewel beetles wild.
They're big and orangey brown in color, with a slightly dimpled surface near the
bottom (designed to prevent the bottle from slipping out of one's grasp) that
reflects light in much the same way as female wing covers. Gwynne made these
observations with colleague David Rentz.
"As a result, the beer bottles are irresistible
to the male insects, which will die trying to mate with them in the hot
Australian sun.... Gwynne and Rentz were conducting fieldwork in
western Australia when they noticed something unusual along the side of the
road.
"He explained, 'We were walking along a dirt road
with the usual scattering of beer cans and bottles when we saw about six bottles
with beetles on top or crawling up the side. It was clear the beetles were
trying to mate with the bottles.' The bottles –- stubbies as they are known in
Australia, Canada and a few other countries –- resemble a 'super female' jewel
beetle. Male beetles are so captivated by the bottles that they will gird their
loins and go through the expected motions, refusing to leave until they fry to
death, are consumed by hungry ants, or are physically removed by researchers.
"The male beetles are very particular about the
bottles. Beer cans or wine bottles do nothing for them. It's all about the
shape, colour and texture and has nothing to do with booze. As the researchers
wrote in their findings, 'Not only do western Australians never dispose of a
beer bottle with beer still in it, but many of the bottles had sand and detritus
accumulated over many months.'...
"Gwynne points out that the research supports a
theory of sexual selection: that males of certain species, in their eagerness to
mate, are often the ones making mating mistakes." [Quoted from the
Discovery Science News
page; 03/10/2011. Quotations marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site; spelling changed to UK English. Several paragraphs merged. Link in the original; some links
removed. Spelling adjusted to agree with UK English.]
Has evolution, therefore, provided a novel
'dialectical opposite' for these randy insects? But, why, we might wonder, has this development
in the forward march of the
NON
only taken place
in Australia? Are European and American beer bottles not attractive
enough?
12. These claims will be analysed more fully
when Note 11, above, has been
completed.
12a.
Some might think
that, for example, positive numbers do in fact change into negative numbers, and
vice versa, but that would be a serious error. Mathematicians and others can play around with the
number 4 all day long, hitting it with whatever function or operation they please, it
will stubbornly stay super-glued as 4. Sure, one can multiply 4
by -1 to derive the output -4,
but 4 hasn't actually changed into -4, otherwise no one would be able to use
4
ever again (it having changed). Not even the numeral on the page has altered:
look here it is, in red: 4x -1 = -4. Did you see
4 change? Has it changed? Keep
checking. Who knows? DM-theorists might be right...
And,
it is worth noting that whatever it is that numbers like 4 can be mapped onto,
that will be achieved by the application of well-defined functions; these
changes aren't the
result of an 'internal struggle' going on in 4 -- nor between, say
4 and -1 -- or even one that is taking place in
the head/'mind' of whoever does this mapping. [Does anyone
really think that in 'the mind' or brain of such individuals the number four is battling it out ("struggling") with its 'internal
opposite', forcing that individual to come up with an answer?] Neither is it the case that
the 'opposite' of 4 actually changes 4 into whatever it is that results from any such operation
(as the
DM-classics tell us it must); -4
has no affect on 4, nor does it change 4 into -4. -4 is an inert number,
totally incapable of fighting its own battles, let alone bullying other numbers
into doing its bidding.
Indeed, it is a moot point what the 'opposite' of
4 is.
[Recall, if this 'theory' is to work,
that 'opposite' must be its unique
'other'.] Is it -4? Or, 1/4? Or, -1/4? Maybe it is
0-4i (if we extend into the
complex plane)?
Perhaps it is -1, since -1 maps 4 onto -4? That is because, as we
saw: according to the DM-Classicists (link in the previous paragraph), it
is the
'opposite' of an object or process that effects the changes to, or those that
take place in, that object
or process. In which case, -1 must be the opposite of 4! [That is:
four, not four factorial.]
But, what if a
'reactionary mathematician' multiplies
4 by -2, to obtain -8? Is
-8 now 'the opposite' of 4? Or, is its opposite -2?
Moreover, zero can be mapped onto
any given number by adding it to zero; for example: 0 + 123456 = 123456.
Again, any number will do here:
0 + n = n. If so, does this mean that every member of the potentially infinite set
of integers is 'theuniqueopposite' of zero?
Furthermore, any number can be mapped onto zero in the following way: 0 x n =
0.
Does this mean that zero is 'theuniqueopposite' of every number?
And since it is thereby 'changed' into itself, is zero its own opposite -- in view of the
fact that the DM-classicists tell us that not only does an object/process
struggle with, it changes into, its opposite -- i.e., it changes into that
with which it has struggled? Hence, if the opposite of 4 were -4, then 4 x -4 = -16 would in fact be
incorrect. The 'dialectical' answer should be 4 x -4 = -4, as 4 changes into its
supposed opposite, into that with which it has just 'struggled'. Alternatively, if 4 x -4 = -16
were correct (as indeed it is!) then the DM-opposite of 4 must be -16, and
4 would have
to 'struggle' with -16 in order to change into -16! In that case, we would have this
dialectical gem: 4 x -16 = -16! [That is: sixteen, not sixteen
factorial.]
As should now seem obvious, howsoever
hard we try to get to grips with this
Dialectical Mess, no
sense can be made of it.
[There
is more on this topic later in this Essay --
here as well as here.]
12b.
It is worth recalling at this point that a literal
contradiction would involve just such a gainsaying.
Naturally, if dialecticians understand the
word "contradiction" in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense, all well and good.
But, what is this 'new' sense? We have yet to be told with any clarity or
consistency. The various 'attempts'
that have been made by DM-theorists to tell us what this 'new' sense is, or what
it might
possibly be, have been examined in detail in Essays
Four,
Five, Eight Parts One,
Two, Three, and Eleven
Part One. The
reader is directed there for more details.
13. Once more, the confused nature of DM-'contradictions'
is examined in extensive detail in Essays
Four,
Five, Eight Parts One,
Two, Three,
and Eleven Part One.
13a00. Here is
Spirkin, who makes a valiant attempt to tackle one aspect of this
'problem' (i.e., the difference between 'dialectical' contradictions' and
self-contradictory theories):
"Contradictions may be found
in nature, society and human thinking literally at every step. The whole history
of human culture, of scientific knowledge involves a struggle between new
knowledge and hypotheses and obsolete propositions, the clash of different and
sometimes completely opposed opinions. The struggle of ideas is one of the vital
guarantees against the mummification of thought. Great discoveries always evoke
animated discussion and argument and this is where the truth is born. Life is an
unceasing struggle -- a process of development, in which the winner usually
achieves progress in the development of knowledge if for no other reason than
the necessity to fight, made ever more urgent by the efforts of the opposing
side. This stimulates the thought and intellectual abilities of both sides, thus
encouraging general intellectual progress.
"The stating of
contradictions in science is enormously important for the development of
knowledge. One should not fear contradictions, for every contradiction
contains the embryo of discovery. Creative thinking not only states
antinomies
but is seeking to resolve them. Dialectical contradiction in thought is not
self-contradiction, not a muddling of concepts, but the interaction of opposed
positions, points of view, opinions, concepts. Unlike muddled thinking,
dialectical contradictions represent consciously perceived contradictions.
Unconscious contradictions in thought are a sign of stupidity or of incorrect
reasoning, which are corrected either by the thinker himself or by others.
Nor can a theory which is internally contradictory be of any scientific
importance. It has to be perfected and become internally uncontradictory.
Otherwise dialectics would become a justification for total lack of principle
and teach an ability to say one thing today and the opposite tomorrow. When
caught in a confusion of opposed conclusions, reason feels extremely
uncomfortable. Far from hindering us, the recommendations of formal logic,
including the rules that protect us against elementary contradictions, against
irresponsible jumping from one assertion to another without any objective
grounds, help us to discover and express, consciously point out the actual
contradictions and variability of things. By dialectics we mean not a person's
contradicting himself, although even this may happen unconsciously in the course
of research, when mental associations run riot around some idea; what we mean
is the contradiction in an object and the reflection of this contradiction in
thought, where it is consciously registered and resolved. As science
progresses the number of possible contradictions, paradoxes and antinomies does
not decrease but actually multiplies. Great flights of creative thought and
discoveries have been and will be made possible precisely through resolving
these contradictions. Contradictions taken to the point of antinomy usually turn
out to be landmarks in scientific progress, the points where thought breaks
through into what was previously unknown.
"At the first stage in the
process of cognition, when the object is perceived in its initial wholeness and
sensuous concreteness, the contradictory unity of opposites cannot be revealed.
The knower must therefore begin from mental analysis of the initial unity,
breaking it down into its components. Cognition of the aspects of a
contradiction in their separateness and even opposition presupposes the
synthesis of previously divided opposites. As a result, the one-sidedness of the
initial analytical approach to the object, when all its aspects were studied as
isolated phenomena, is overcome.
"Antinomies, which have an
objective basis, are a specific form of the existence of dialectical
contradictions in knowledge. The content that they reflect is ultimately an
element of the structure of the developing objective contradiction. Cognitive
antinomies serve as a form of theoretical reproduction of contradictions in
scientific theories, whose development takes place through the uncovering and
resolving of the contradictions discovered in previous theories or levels of
research. The most effective way of resolving antinomies that arise in
theoretical thought is to go beyond their limits, to discover the underlying
basis, to find how one opposite turns into the other and reveal the intermediate
links.
"The philosophical and
methodological importance of being able to identify and resolve contradictions
is constantly growing in connection with the increasing diversity of people's
social relationships, the progress of science and the increasing complexity of
the system of concepts in thought. The educative value of an understanding of
the principle of contradiction is that it becomes the core of a person's
attitude to the world as a world full of contradictions demanding to be
known and resolved. Intellectual thought in science, art or politics must
start by assuming that the world is contradictory. Otherwise they can only
stagnate." [Spirkin
(1983), pp.148-50. Bold emphases and link added.]
However, the above passage seems -- rather ironically -- somewhat contradictory
itself. One
minute we are being told that "[d]ialectical
contradiction in thought isn't self-contradiction", the nextthat"a theory which is internally
contradictory [is of no] scientific importance". But,
we have
already seen that DM can't fail to be self-contradictory, in which case, if
the latter quote is to be believed, it
can't be of "scientific importance". That is because:
"[W]hat we mean is the
contradiction in an object and the reflection of this contradiction in thought,
where it is consciously registered." [Ibid.]
But, we are also informed that a
contradictory theory:
"[H]as to be perfected and
become internally uncontradictory. Otherwise dialectics would become a
justification for total lack of principle and teach an ability to say one thing
today and the opposite tomorrow." [Ibid.]
In
other words, 'dialectical thinking' registers these 'contradictions'
"consciously", and real contradictions --
'dialectical contradictions' -- are "reflected...in thought". Well
this just means that such "thought" can't fail to be self-contradictory, too! Otherwise it wouldn't be an
accurate reflection of those 'objective contradictions'. It isn't easy to see how it
could be otherwise. Spirkin just passes over this fatal defect without comment.
Muddled thinking in action, perhaps?
[I have
given a clear example of a self-contradictory DM-theory in Essay Eleven Part
One, here.]
Be this as it may, Spirkin continues:
"Dialectical contradiction in
thought is not self-contradiction, not a muddling of concepts, but the
interaction of opposed positions, points of view, opinions, concepts. Unlike
muddled thinking, dialectical contradictions represent consciously perceived
contradictions. Unconscious contradictions in thought are a sign of stupidity or
of incorrect reasoning, which are corrected either by the thinker himself or by
others." [Ibid.]
Spirkin clearly thinks that non-dialectical contradictions are the product of
"muddled thinking", a sign of "stupidity" or "incorrect reasoning". Of course,
this might be so in some circumstances (and we have just seen that Spirkin was
probably guilty of this himself), but it can't in general be true, otherwise
Indirect Proof (or "Proof by Contradiction") in mathematics, for example,
would be illegitimate. So would Reductio ad Absurdum
[RAA] in FL and Philosophy. Indeed, in that case, demonstrating that another's thought is
self-contradictory (using modified IF -- as I have attempted
to do with respect to several DM-theories in some of the Essays at this site, for example,
here)
would either be impossible or pointless.
Furthermore, one might well wonder how science could progress if the following were
the case:
"As science progresses the
number of possible contradictions, paradoxes and antinomies does not decrease
but actually multiplies." [Ibid.]
Especially since we
were also told:
"Nor can a theory which is
internally contradictory be of any scientific importance. It has to be perfected
and become internally uncontradictory." [Ibid.]
If that were so, if each theory has to be
made a contradiction-free zone, then it is difficult to see how contradictions
(etc.) could "multiply". Could this be another 'dialectical contradiction' that has
itself been produced by yet more muddled thinking? Of course, Spirkin offers his
readers no evidence that this is what happens as science progresses, that
contradictions (etc.) "multiply".
Spirkin also
failed to confront the core dilemma of the DD:
the awkward consequence that if the social and natural world are
contradictory, science must reflect this supposed fact in its theories. And if
that is so, scientific knowledge must become increasingly
self-contradictory as it slowly approaches the ever elusive 'absolute truth
about reality'. On the other hand, if science is progressively less and
less self-contradictory, that must mean it is either failing to reflect
'contradictory' reality faithfully, or nature and society aren't
contradictory, after all!
Finally, Spirkin had this to say:
"It [a theory -- RL] has to
be perfected and become internally uncontradictory. Otherwise dialectics would
become a justification for total lack of principle and teach an ability to say
one thing today and the opposite tomorrow." [Ibid.]
However,
as we have also seen, that
is precisely what the Stalinists and the Maoists ended up doing: using DM as"justification for total lack of
principle", saying one thing one day, the opposite the next,
and on a regular basis.
In which case, Spirkin is no help at all
in resolving the DD. Quite the
opposite, in fact. [Irony intended.]
13a0.
Some might be tempted to respond that this is just another example of Ms
Lichtenstein's pedantry:
the difference between an inconsistency, a contrary and a contradiction is merely semantic.
But, that isn't so. In fact, this particular objection could only be advanced by someone ignorant
even of AFL, let alone MFL.
S1 and S2
can't both be true, but both could be (and are) false.
[They are also called
contraries, which is just another name for two such inconsistencies.]
So,
S1 is false when S3, below, is true:
S3: Some swan is not white.
[Colloquially, S3 would be "Some swans aren't white". I have employed the
stilted version normally used in logic. I won't try and justify
it.]
And, S2 is false when S4, below, is true:
S4: Some swan is white.
[Colloquially, S4 would be "Some swans are white". Again, I have
employed the version used in logic.]
S3 and S4 are called
sub-contraries; that is, they can both be true (in fact they are), but
they can't both be false (in a non-empty universe).
However, S1 and S3 are contradictories
-- they can't both be true
and they can't both be false -- they have opposite truth-values. The same
goes for S2 and S4.
S1: All swans are white.
S3: Some swan is not white.
S2: No swan is white.
S4: Some swan is white.
Now, if we confuse contradictions
with contraries/inconsistencies
that would allow the following inference:
S5: S1 and S3 must have opposite truth values.
[But, S1
and S2 also can't both be true and can't both be false; they, too, must
have opposite truth values.]
[Without this distinction, we would have to
abandon the condition that S1
and S2
can both be false, i.e., if we insist on confusing contradictories with
contraries/inconsistencies.]
S6: "No swan is white" -- this is S2 and is obviously
false.
S7: So, "All swans are white"
-- this is S1 which can't now also be false. [S1 and S2 can't both be false by S5.]
S8: A black swan has just been observed in Western
Australia, which, if correct, would make "Some swan is not white" (S3) true and
thus "All swans are white" (S1), false.
S9: But, S1 can't be false (a repeat
of
S7).
S10: Hence, there must be an error in
S8: whatever those explorers observed in Western Australia, it can't have been a
swan, or it wasn't really black.
However, if we now confuse contraries/inconsistencies with
contradictories, the following would be possible:
S11: S1 and S2 can't both be true, but
they can both be false. In addition, S1 and S3 can't both be true but they can both be
false, too -- and the same applies to S3 and S4.
[We would now have to abandon the
condition that, taken pairwise, S1 and S3, and S2 and S4, must have opposite truth values
--
if we insist on confusing contraries/inconsistencies with contradictions.
Incidentally, this means we also have to abandon the sub-contrary relation
between S3 and S4. These two can both now be false together.]
S12: "No swan is white" (S2) is obviously true
if uttered by a native Western Australian several centuries ago, for example.
S13: Hence, "All swans are white" (S1)
can't be
true (by S11).
S14: A white swan has been observed in Western
Europe (by a native Australian traveller), which, if correct, would make "Some
swan is white" (S4) true.
S15: But, "Some swan is white" (S4) and
"No swan is white" (S2) can't both be true, but they can both be false (by S11).
S16: Since we know S2 is true, S4 must be false.
S17: Hence, whatever this traveller saw,
it can't
have been a swan or it wasn't really white.
On the other hand, if we insist on maintaining the distinction
between
contraries/inconsistencies and contradictories, the following inference goes through straight away:
S18: All swans are white.
S19: A black swan has been observed in Western
Australia, which, if correct, would make "Some swan is not white" (S3) true and
thus "All swans are white" (S1), false.
S20: Hence, "All swans are white" (S1) is false.
The above inference is valid since it is now possible for both
S1 and S2 to be false, which wasn't the case with respect to S5-S10.
Sure, some 'semantics' is involved in all this (in the sense that
we have to be precise about what we mean), but we can see the inferential
confusion that would result when details like this are ignored -- even in this simple case.
Anyway, even if this distinction is blurred
(which is something DM-fans almost invariably manage to do), we would still need a new term
to distinguish those propositions that have to have opposite truth-values from
those that are merely contraries or sub-contraries, and hence don't.
13a. And sure enough, there
are scientists
who question the results -- and not just the interpretation -- of the famous
"two slit" experiment, which is supposed to show that a photon (or an electron) is
both a particle and a wave.
Harvard Physicist,
Shahriar
Afshar's notorious experimental supposedly refutes the 'orthodox'
Copenhagen Interpretation of
QM; this was reported in the New Scientist in July 2004. [Chown (2004a); see
also Chown (2004b). On this, see also
here,
here and
here.
The New Scientist article
also links to several authoritative critiques of Afshar's work.] If Afshar is
correct, photons, for example, are particles and waves at the same
time, and aren't just in "complementary"
states.
However, if this idea is accepted by
DM-fans, they will have to revise or abandon their criticisms of the LOI, since
here we have a particle identical to a wave at the same time
(which would plainly implicate two uses of this dread 'law').
[QM =
Quantum Mechanics; LOI = Law of Identity.]
Whatever the
outcome proves to be, this reveals how scientific knowledge is actually
negotiated and developed; but more specifically how challenges to orthodoxy are
handled by other scientists. [More on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Unlike DM-fans, what scientists
don't do is refuse to consider alternatives. Plainly, if they were to do that,
most would
still think the earth was flat.
In the article posted
here, University of
Washington Physicist
John Cramer explains why he thinks Afshar's experiment does
indeed refute the Bohr-Heisenberg (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum
phenomena, and he offers his own "Transactional" account, which he says doesn't imply a
paradox. [His paper can be accessed
here.]
Readers can follow Afshar's own blog to monitor developments
themselves; DM-fans might even try to tell Afshar's critics to give up now, since
they are
flogging a dead
hypothesis,
which fact they themselves would accept on a priori grounds if they 'understood'
dialectics. [The original paper can be downloaded as a PDF from
here.]
In early 2007, the New Scientist had this to say about Afshar's work:
"It rocked quantum theory when it was first
proposed in 2004, unleashing a dam-burst of vitriol in the physics community.
Now the controversial experiment that questions our understanding of the
wave-and-particle nature of light has finally been published, forcing some of
its initial opponents to take it seriously." [Chown (2007), p.19.]
Now, it could be argued that this shows that the contradictory
nature of photons has actually been observed in this experiment -- in that it
purports to show that particles exhibit interference patterns --, but it is too early to conclude this. One thing
we know for sure, indeed, as noted above, DM-fans have an a priori solution to
this 'problem', and should therefore advise the Physics community to stop trying to pick
holes in Afshar's results.
Nevertheless, the history of Physics suggests that it is only a
matter of time before someone finds a widely accepted realist account of the
nature of quantum phenomena, which doesn't rely on paradox and 'contradiction'
for it to 'work'. Indeed, this is precisely what
Professor of Physics, the late
Philip
Russell Wallace,
argues in Wallace (1996).
In fact,
Richard
Feynman went as far as to assert the following:
"I want to emphasize that light comes in this
form -- particles. It is very important to know that light behaves like
particles, especially for those of you who have gone to school, where you were
probably told something about light behaving like waves. I'm telling you the way
it does behave -- like particles.... This state of confusion was called the
'wave-particle duality' of light, and it was jokingly said by someone that light
was waves on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; it was particles on Tuesdays,
Thursdays, and Saturdays, and on Sundays, we think about it! It is the purpose
of these lectures to tell you how this puzzle was finally 'resolved'." [Feynman
(1985), p.15, 23. Emphasis in the original; quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
For other alternative
explanations of "quantum complementarity" -- once more, each and every
one of which DM-fans must rule out
on a priori grounds --, see Wick (1995). [See also,
here.]
Update, January 2016: Recent commentary on Afshar's experiment can be
accessed
here.
[There are more details about this
topic in Note 14, below.]
Update, July 2021: It looks like Quantum Field Theory [QFT] is
incompatible with the view that electrons etc., are even particles, as we
found out earlier.
I have just
discovered a Bohmian interpretation of Afshar's experiment. Here is an abstract
of the paper in question:
"This work is about Bohmian mechanics, a non-relativistic quantum
theory about the motion of particles and their trajectories, named after its
inventor
David Bohm (Bohm,1952). This mechanics resolves all paradoxes associated
with the measurement problem in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. It accounts
for quantum randomness, absolute uncertainty, the meaning of the wave function
of a system, collapse of the wave function, and familiar (macroscopic) reality.
We review the purpose for which Bohmian trajectories were invented: to serve as
the foundation of quantum mechanics, i.e., to explain quantum mechanics in terms
of a theory that is free of paradoxes and allows an understanding that is as
clear as that of classical mechanics. To achieve this we analyse an optical
interferometry experiment devised and carried out 2005 by Shahriar Afshar
(Afshar,2005). The radical claim of Afshar implies in his own words the
'observation of physical reality in the classical sense' for both 'which path
(particle-like)' and 'interference (wave-like)' properties of photons in the
same experimental setup through the violation of the
Englert-Greenberger duality relation (Englert,1996) that according to
Englert can be regarded as quantifying of the 'principle of complementarity'."
[Quoted from here;
accessed 26/07/2021. Links added. The paper itself can be accessed
here (as a
PDF). Bohn, of course, was a Marxist.]
13b.
Since the vast majority of scientific
theories are now on the scrap heap (on that, see the entire first section of
Essay Ten Part
One, as well as Essay Eleven
Part One), the probability is rather high that any
randomly selected theory will join them there one day. [More on this in Essay
Thirteen Part Two (when it is published).]
In fact, other aspects of
the 'orthodox' interpretation of QM certainly worried scientists in the USSR a few generations
ago -- they regarded it as thoroughly
Idealist, a product of anti-Marxist forces at work in
Weimar Germany. [See
Graham (1971), pp.69-110, and Forman (1971). For similar DM-opposition in China, see Hu
(2005).]
However, it is
undeniable that there are theoretical consequences
of some interpretations of QM that seem to imply the existence of
instantaneous non-local interactions, suggesting that some processes in nature are interconnected
(at least with respect to certain specific quantum states). [On this, see
here.]
There are however
Internet sites where the standard view is seriously questioned: for example,
Caroline Thompson's Physics site (which is
unfortunately no longer accessible).
Sadly, I received notice in March 2006 that Caroline had died
of cancer. Her website seems to be unavailable now.
Update, December 2009: Caroline's site is now back on-line,
here.
Update,
June 2018: It looks like Caroline's page is now no longer available! Anyone
interested in her work will now have to do a Google search to find the
remaining fragments.
Update August 2011: Caroline's Wikipedia entry (old
link above) has been deleted for reasons that smack of censorship. I have lodged
an
appeal. I won't be holding my breath about the result.
Even so, quantum
entanglement is still largely theoretical; it possesses only limited and highly
controversial evidential support (mainly based on the work of
Alain Aspect).
In fact, the experimental substantiation on offer for entanglement is all the more
alarmingly meagre when it is set against the universal interconnections that
dialecticians require -–
i.e., those stretching across vast expanses of space and time, rather than those
that reach across to the other side of a Physics lab, or perhaps those confined to
relatively small regions of this planet.
Indeed, non-local, long-distance interconnections
are in principle impossible to test, let alone verify.
[However,
Wikipedia now reports that the speed of quantum entanglement has been
calculated at 10,000 times the speed of light (but still not infinite)! No wonder Einstein was
sceptical! On that, see
here.]
In fact,
Caroline Thompson
managed to find errors in the Aspect's original paper, which, if correct,
undermines the entire project.
[On this, see
here and
here (the latter has now been deleted!), although Caroline's most important papers (except,
perhaps, this
one) don't
seem to be available any more.
Correction, they now appear
here.
(This link now appears to be dead!) One of her more important papers is now
accessible
here (this links to a PDF). An abstract of one of her papers can be accessed
here.]
Update, June 2018: Five of Caroline's papers have now been permanently
deposited
here by the University of Wales.
Christopher
Norris is admirably clear on this topic:
"…[O]ne
can take a singlet-state pair of particles whose combined angular momentum is
zero and then project them on divergent paths towards two detectors…. [I]f a
measurement is carried out on particle A and produces the value 'spin-up = +½'
for a given parameter, then any measurement conducted simultaneously on particle
B will produce the inverse value 'spin-up = -½'….
"Where
the paradox shows up is with the further requirement…that any results thus
produced with respect to either particle will depend upon the kind of
measurement carried out, i.e., the setting of the spin-detector and hence the
particular outcome in this or that case. Moreover, that result will decide the
outcome of any measurement which might be performed simultaneously on the
other particle…this must always be the case for…[particle pairs] that have a
common source or which have interacted at some previous stage.
"But
then, what precisely is meant by the terms 'simultaneous' and 'previous'…? For
it follows from orthodox QM that these events must transpire in a space-time
framework that permits violations of special relativity, or which allows for
superluminal (faster than light) interaction between particles at any distance
from each other. In which case there can be no appeal to Einstein's principle
for establishing simultaneity relative to the speed of light, the latter taken
as an absolute limit on causal propagations of whatever sort…. [T]here is
clearly a marked tension (if not perhaps a downright inescapable conflict)
between the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics and Einsteinian
relativity theory. Moreover, any talk of 'previous' states or events -– such as
the particles' orientation when separated at source or the spin-values that
might have been measured at some 'earlier' stage in their trajectory -– is
likewise rendered highly problematic. That is to say, it takes for granted the
impossibility that those events could somehow be affected -– or those
measurements somehow retroactively determined -– by whatever occurs at a 'later'
stage in the system's space-time evolution." [Norris (2000), pp.7-8.]
Admittedly, while Norris
goes on to outline in considerable detail the factors involved, he clearly
failed to notice that his 'solution' to this particular 'paradox' actually undermines his
avowed commitment to
Scientific Realism.
If paradoxes like this can be clarified by
an analysis of the meaning of words like "simultaneous" and "previous" --
as they feature in competing theories -- then any supposed 'solution' must be
convention-sensitive, and hence non-'objective' -– i.e., in the
Metaphysical-Realist
sense of that term, which is what Norris requires.
In
relation to this, as Whitaker makes clear [Whitaker (1996)], it is rather ironic that
instantaneous interconnections such as these were actually propounded by the
anti-realist camp in Physics (as part of the orthodox "Copenhagen
Interpretation" of QM), whereas their denial has been championed by the
Realists, some of whom advocated an appeal to several as
yet undiscovered "hidden variables" to resolve the problem -- which brings us to
the work of
David Bohm.
About
Bohm's work, and in relation to the aims of this Essay, US Marxist, Phil Gasper, commented as
follows:
"The
Physicists David Bohm and
B J Hiley
interpret 'the quantum interconnectedness of
distant systems' in terms that Marx and Engels would have relished…." [Gasper
(1998), p.155.]
Well, perhaps Engels
might have "relished" them, but even he would have balked at
Bohm's descent into Idealism and open Mysticism in his later work (see, for example, Bohm (1994))
-- a trajectory already implicit in the
Organicist
picture of nature
he promoted in
his earlier writings. [Cf., Bohm (1995).] In fact, Engels would have been
horrified to learn of Bohm's subsequent advocacy of characters like
Uri Geller!
[Cf., Gratzer (2000), p.105. See also
Richard Feynman's
comments on Bohm and
Geller,
here. (More details
here.)]
However, given the
quasi-mystical view of the universe Bohm advocated, and since he was an avid Dialectical Marxist,
his subsequent trajectory isn't at all surprising. As will be argued in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries
here and
here), DM
in fact represents a return to an earlier magical, if not
enchanted view of nature. In which case,
spoon bending
should have sounded
eminently reasonable to Bohm!
Martin Gardner, in
what was for him an
unusually fair review of this unorthodox scientific theory, had
this to say of Bohm's ideas:
"Bohm's
quantum potential binds the entire universe together into what he liked to call
a seamless 'unbroken wholeness'. Every particle in the universe is connected by
the quantum potential to every other particle. He likened the cosmos to a
hologram in which each point on the film carries information about the entire
picture. Bohm's GWT [guided-wave theory], far more sophisticated than
de
Broglie's crude version, is a 'holistic' vision in which all parts of the
universe are joined to every other part. 'Interconnectedness' was one of Bohm's
favourite words. He saw the universe as resembling the unity of a living
organism, a kind of pantheism not unlike
Spinoza's -– a pantheism Einstein
himself favoured.
"Although
Bohm's GWT is identical with standard QM in its predictions, its way of talking
about quantum phenomena is entirely different. The randomness of the Copenhagen
interpretation…is replaced by a strict determinism. There are no quantum jumps,
no superpositions, no collapsing wave functions.... The universe is real, 'out
there,' independent of you and me. Human consciousness is not essential, as
von
Neumann, Eugene Wigner, and others supposed, to collapse wave functions."
[Gardner (2000), pp.78-79. Spelling modified to agree with UK English;
quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Of course,
all this might
seem conducive to a 'DM-picture of reality', but Gardner went on to point out the
following:
"In
Bohm's revolutionary theory…particles are as real as golf balls. At all times
they have precise, unfuzzy properties such as position and momentum, and precise
paths through space-time. The particles are never waves. Associated with
each is an invisible undetectable wave in a field which Bohm called the 'quantum
potential'. Its waves are real waves, not probability waves. They guide the
particle's motion…the way radar information guides a ship. This quantum field,
like the fields of gravity and electromagnetism, permeates all of space-time,
but unlike those fields, its intensity doesn't diminish with distance. Also
unlike other fields, it exerts no force on particles. Essentially it is a wave
of undecaying information.
"It
is the ad hoc nature of this undetectable pilot wave that reminds so many
of the old stagnant aether of the nineteenth century…. As J.C.
Polkinghorne…said: 'In the opinion of many Bohm had jumped out of the
indeterminate frying pan into a crackling nonlocal fire….'
"But
how does the pilot wave manage to guide the paths of a particle? This is one of
the darkest mysteries of GWT. It is able to push particles around without at the
same time exerting any force on them. If it did, photons would have their
energies altered. But this doesn't happen…. Somehow each photon must pick up
information from its pilot wave without having its energy modified. This may be
spooky, but no spookier…than the probability waves in orthodox QM…." [Gardner
(2000), pp.75-77. Bold emphases added.]
Naturally,
any DM-supporters tempted
to adopt Bohm's theory will have to abandon the idea that
sub-atomic particles confirm, or conform with, the fundamentally contradictory nature of reality,
since Bohm's theory denies
that they have a dual wave/particle nature. Their
behaviour he explains as the result of a particle and a separate guiding wave.
This is something that
Woods and Grant oddly failed to notice in their advocacy of Bohm's "dialectical
method". [Woods and Grant (1995),
p.58.]
However, as pointed out in Essay
Eleven Part One, scientists are
forever changing their minds. A recent report in the New Scientist now
casts doubt on the mathematics that was used to derive
Bell's
Theorem (a key component in the rejection of 'hidden variable' theory, and
which is central to current ideas about 'entanglement'), and how this is all part of a
growing feeling among Physicists that their fundamental theories of nature are ripe for
change:
"Listen to
Joy Christian
at the University of
Oxford and you may wonder if these grandiose quantum conclusions are really
necessary at all. He claims that physicists' supposed proofs of the
impossibility of more 'realistic' theories rest on false assumptions and so
don't prove much at all. 'Contrary to the received wisdom,' he
says, 'quantum theory doesn't rule out the possibility of a deeper theory, even
one that might be fully deterministic.' Christian's conclusion follows from a
relatively simple calculation using alternative mathematics,
described in a paper now
under review at the journal Physical Review Letters....
"Quantum theory also asserts that particles have
no particular spin before they are observed. Instead, the spin is an indefinite
superposition, pointing up and down simultaneously. Only when you measure the
spin, do you 'force' it into the up or down state. Do this to an entangled photon and its
counterpart responds instantly, even if they are light years apart. If you
measure one photon and find its spin pointing 'up', you'll find that the other
has spin 'down'. Consequently, quantum theory appears to dictate that what
happens in one part of the universe can have instantaneous 'non-local' effects
in another part, which seems to threaten the basic assumptions of Einstein's
special theory of relativity....
"Bell assumed the hidden variables in his
argument would be familiar numbers, akin to the value of a velocity or a mass.
Such numbers obey the ordinary rules of algebra, including a law that says that
the order of multiplication doesn't matter -- so that, for example, 2 × 5 equals
5 × 2. This property of multiplication is called commutation. The idea that
hidden variables are commuting numbers might seem so basic as to be beyond
question, but Christian argues it is important to question this point because
mathematicians know that different kinds of variables needn't obey commutative
algebra. Take rotations in space, for example. They differ fundamentally from
ordinary numbers in one important respect: the order of rotations matters.... Rotations do not commute.
"So why is all this important? Christian argues
that the existence of this other algebra reveals a weakness at the core of
Bell's proof: the only hidden variables Bell considered were ordinary numbers.
But ordinary numbers are not the be all and end all. 'Why should theorists be
obliged to remain unimaginative and consider only commuting numbers in their
theories?' Christian says.... He claims that Bell's argument no longer leads
to its impressive conclusion if you allow that hidden variables can have other
algebraic properties. Following the logic through, Christian shows that a local,
realistic model can actually reproduce everything that quantum theory can.
Christian concludes that Bell's theorem is simply not equipped to say whether or
not hidden variables are a possible explanation for non-local quantum
effects....
"The debate seems likely to continue for some
time while researchers puzzle over details. However it turns out, Christian's
work reflects a growing willingness among physicists to question whether quantum
theory is really the ultimate foundation for theoretical physics. Even those who
doubt Christian's conclusion suggest that there's a long way to go to (sic) before we
truly understand quantum mechanics. 'I have no problem thinking that quantum
theory is incomplete,' says
Nicolas Gisin
of the University of Geneva.
"Twenty years ago, it was heretical even to raise
such an idea, but physicists are now questioning quantum theory for a range of
reasons.
Lee Smolin
of the Perimeter Institute in Waterloo, Canada, for one,
doubts that physicists can really make headway building a true theory of quantum
gravity and space-time before making some serious revisions to quantum theory
itself. The inability of theorists to extend quantum theory to the entire
universe, he suggests, may imply that it only works for parts of the universe,
as an approximation of some deeper reality.... So after decades of physicists bending their
minds over the weirdness of the quantum world, it is just possible that its
uncertainties and paradoxes may give way to something a little less weird and
more definite. Suddenly it's more acceptable to challenge the dogma and to look
for a more fundamental, simpler story." [Buchanan
(2007), pp.37-39. Several
paragraphs merged.]
Here is
theoretical Physicist,
Sabine Hossenfelder, explaining why many of the foundations of
The
Standard Model are not quite a secure as many imagine them to be:
Video Twenty: Particle
Physicists'
Empty Promises
Video Twenty-One: Physics Isn't
Pretty
See also
Hossenfelder (2018).
Of course,
if these new lines of research resolve the 'paradox' of the wave/particle
duality of certain 'quantum objects', dialecticians should consider picketing
the research labs and lecture halls that might be used to promote this reactionary turn of events, for if the
above theorists are right, their work will undermine the relevance of one of the best examples
in the DM-box-of-tricks (wave-particle duality), which supposedly confirms the idea that nature is fundamentally contradictory.
Anyway, as we saw earlier, dialecticians have an a priori solution here and,
on that basis alone, they should advise scientists to save time, effort
and money and scrap any such futile line-of-research.
Recently, quantum entanglement has been used (in the work of
Michael
Persinger) to account for odd results obtained in research carried out into
telepathy. I am reluctant to quote the comments posted on Internet discussion
boards, but this one seems too good to resist. In relation to Persisnger's
results one character had this to say:
"I know what to make of it. It is the same as
those folks who try to posit quantum consciousness theories. QM is one of the
final 'gaps' in which to cram your
woo.
"1. Select your wacky hypothesis about macro-scale reality.
"2. Find a quantum effect that behaves in a similar manner but has absolutely
nothing to do with your hypothesis, which cannot manifest on macro scales any
more than I can quantum tunnel through a bank vault.
"3. Appeal to said quantum effect as a scientific explanation for your wacky
hypothesis." [Quoted from
here.]
I think
more-or-less the same can be said about the 'support' QM supposedly lends to DM
-- it is on par with the 'support' it gives to
Daoism and
Zen
Buddhism.
[In 'support', see Capra (1997, 1999, 2003). For the contrary
view, see
Victor
Stenger's response in Stenger (1995).]
In relation to this controversial quantum phenomenon, the New
Scientist had this to say recently:
"Two entangled particles share a single quantum
state: they behave as one and cannot be described individually. Measuring one
instantaneously affects the other, no matter how far apart they become, an
oddity that prompted Einstein to describe entanglement as 'spooky action at a
distance'. However, for this to happen the particles must
have interacted in some way when they came into existence, which may mean
only a small fraction of the particles in the universe are entangled at any
given time." [New Scientist223, 2980, 02/08/2014, p.8.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold
emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]
So,
even if this aspect of QM were true (and, per
impossible, if it were capable of being verified), it would be inimical to DM,
anyway, and that is because, as the above says, only a tiny fraction of the particles in nature would be interconnected.
[It should be pointed out that the above article
also aired a new
mathematical theory that questioned this conclusion; but it, too, would be
impossible to verify.]
15.After
having divided nature into three levels: (a) Atomic/Sub-atomic, (b) Chemical/Biochemical and (c)
Individual Human/Social life (suitably inter-linked), Woods and Grant then argued as follows:
"In the last analysis, all human existence and activity is
based on the laws of motion of atoms.... And yet, when we pass from a) to c) we
make a series of qualitative leaps and must operate with different laws at
different 'levels'…." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.60; from here:
Complex Organisms.]
In
fact, this is part of their main argument against reductionism, but it plainly
depends on the highly dubious First 'Law' again. As we have seen, this 'Law'
can't even stand up straight on
its own two legs, regardless of how weak this extra theoretical 'Zimmer Frame'
of support (i.e., from "all human activity") turns out to
be -- for here we have a qualitative change caused by a mere change of level,
which Engels said was "impossible". [On that, see Note 7.]
Figure Fourteen: Badly Needed Support
For 'Materialist Dialectics'?
15a.
Those who
look with suspicion on such demands for empirical proof
might be tempted to conclude that this makes the present author
an 'Empiricist',
or even a 'Positivist'.
That supposition is itself is rather odd since the DM-theorists under review here
(i.e., Engels, Woods and Grant, Trotsky, Rees, etc.) all state very clearly that dialectics
must grow from the facts
and not be imposed on them. But, if facts aren't empirical, or haven't been
empirically ascertained or obtained, it isn't easy to see why they should be called "facts" in the
first place.
Such comrades also need to
recall the many
demands on empirical
proof made by Marx and Engels throughout their life. Just to take two
examples at random, from The German Ideology and Engels's
DN:
"The premises from which we begin are not
arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be
made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the
material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already
existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be
verified in a purely empirical way....
"The fact is, therefore, that definite
individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these
definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each
separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and
speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with
production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out
of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may
appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e.
as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite
material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will....
"In direct contrast to German philosophy which
descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to
say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as
narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the
flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real
life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and
echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also,
necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically
verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics,
all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no
longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no
development; but men, developing their material production and their material
intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the
products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but
consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is
consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which
conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and
consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
"This method of approach is not devoid of
premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a
moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but
in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under
definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described,
history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists
(themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as
with the idealists." [Marx
and Engels
(1970), pp.42-48. Bold emphases added.]
"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment." [Engels
(1954),p.47. Bold emphases alone
added.]
If I'm an Empiricist,
or a Positivist, then so were Marx and Engels.
However, I'm not an
Empiricist
(in fact I hold all philosophical theories in contempt as an expression
of ruling-class
ideology (on this, see Essay Twelve
Part One -- as well as here)).
Furthermore, I don't appeal to verification as a general method, nor as a criterion of meaning
--
or even as a
criterion of
anything whatsoever. I am merely holding dialecticians to their own word, that their theory be confirmablein
some way.
Naturally, they are at liberty to deny that facts can, or should be sought -- or
even adduced in support of DM -- but in that case they should openly admit their Idealism, and be
done with it.
"A consistent materialism
can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphases added.]
"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it. [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]
"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment.
"Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the
dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin
Hegelians of the older and younger line." [Ibid.,
p.47. Bold emphases alone
added.]
Indeed, as Engels argued with respect to Dühring's
theory:
"What
he is dealing with are therefore principles, formal tenets derived
from thought and not from the external world, which are to be applied
to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to
conform.... Herr Dühring's contrary conception is idealistic, makes things
stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas, out
of schemata, schemes or categories existing somewhere before the world, from
eternity -- just like a Hegel." [Engels (1976),
p.43. Bold emphasis alone added.]
It
could also be objected that there are many objects and processes studied in the
sciences that can't be observed, the existence of which no one doubts. If so, why pick
on DM?
Any tempted to think along these lines
is encouraged to
re-read the following:
"All
three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought:
the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being;
the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of
his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures
as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake
lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of
thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and
often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be
arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the
product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954),
p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]
"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator
from painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]
"Dialectics and materialism are the basic
elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all
that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master
key. Dialectics can't be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts,
from their nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973), p.233.
Bold emphasis added]
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added]
"This…is only a safe
assumption on the basis of constant empirical verification…." [Rees (1998), p.110.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay
claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint
which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they
are…without disguises and without fantasy….
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added.]
"Engels emphasises that it would be
entirely wrong to crudely read the dialectic into nature. The dialectic has
to be discovered in nature and evolving out of nature....
"Of course, that does not mean we
should impose some a priori dialectical construct upon nature. The
dialectic, as Engels explains time and again, has to be painstakingly
discovered in nature....
"Engels did not make the laws of
nature dialectical. He tried, on the contrary, to draw out the most
general dialectical laws from nature. Not force artificial,
preconceived, inappropriate notions onto nature." [Jack Conrad,
Weekly
Worker, 30/08/2007. Bold emphases added.]
So,
and once more, this isn't my requirement, but a demand
DM-theorists place on themselves. What non-DM-scientists do or do not do is
irrelevant. DM-theorists have set the bar at this height; it is
up to them to live up to it.
In that case, it is
appropriate to ask of
DM-supporters what their evidence is -- not what their stipulations,
"demands" or "insistencies" are -- what their evidence
is that there
is a dialectical unity of life and death inside a cell, or that life is
somehow a 'contradiction', a 'dialectical' union of 'contradictory'
processes and 'tendencies'.
Exactlyhow Lenin managed to do this
was
also explained in detail in Essay Three
Part One.
15a2.
Of course, it could be pointed out that the proletariat and the capitalist class
are internally connected; that is, one can't exist without the other, one
implies the existence of the other. That theory has now been thrown into
considerable doubt in Essay Eight
Part Two.
However, even
if that were so, it is still the case that
the proletariat doesn't turn into the capitalist class, contrary to what the
DM-classics tell us they
should.
15b.
This
argument has been
developed in much greater detail
here.
15c. I am, of course, employing
the word "grammatical" as
Wittgenstein would have used it. [Unfortunately, there is as yet no satisfactory
study of this aspect of his work anywhere in the burgeoning Wittgenstein literature.
On this see Glock (1996), pp.150-55, and Savickey (1999). I have said more about this in Essays Twelve
Part One and Thirteen Part Three.]
16.
Of course, this doesn't mean that mathematics isn't the product of social development. Quite the opposite in fact.
Nor is it to suggest that mathematics can't be used to help us understand the
world -- or, indeed, change it.
Nevertheless, dialecticians will in general want to reject the claim advanced at
this site,
that mathematical concepts aren't
abstractions, nor are they based on abstraction -- and while we are at
it, add to that the additional fact that the
process of abstraction
actually
undermines
belief in the social nature of language and mathematics. However, DM-theorists regularly
reassert their belief that mathematical objects have been 'abstracted' from real processes (etc.) in
the material world.
For example,
RIRE devotes a whole
chapter to this idea; Woods and Grant (1995), pp.349-68. However, as usual, they
omit the proof that mathematics is based on abstraction, clearly thinking it an
obvious truth which needs no supporting evidence or argument. Even so, they
seem quite happy to impose this doctrine on the subject matter, nonetheless.
This topic will
be discussed in more detail in
a later Essay. Suffice it to
say here that since no mathematical object even remotely resembles a
single material object or process (nor could they) -- and whatever it is that
material bodies do or do not share with one another, it most certainly isn't
a mathematical concept or object --,
they can't have been derived by abstraction from
them, nor can any such 'abstraction' be imposed on the world as part of some law of 'cognition'.
Clearly, mathematical points have no shape,
circumference, diameter or radius -- and they aren't even circular or have a
centre! They aren't containers, either, so no other point can 'occupy' them.
Otherwise they'd be volume intervals, not points.
We sometimes say lines are 'made of points',
but that can't be so or they'd fall apart rather quickly (and they would be
rather bumpy, like a string of pearls), since there is no 'mathematical' force
to hold those points together. Lines are also perfectly strong and rigid, they
neither age nor begin to fray at the edges -- and yet they can be easily
cut/intersected by other lines and planes, as well as bent into any shape we
please by a suitable
homeomorphism. But even then the original line is still there in
'mathematical space', 'unbent', so that someone else can use it as many times as
they like and for whatever mathematical purpose they choose, as can any number
of other mathematicians, and they can all do it at the same time, countless
times. They don't even need to form a queue.
Lines are supposed to intersect other lines
at a 'common point', too, but if neither line is made of points, they can't have
'common points', can they? How then do they intersect?
And if planes aren't made of points, either
-- otherwise we could ask the same questions as those above about lines --, how
can a line intersect a plane at a 'common point'? Furthermore, planes can't be
made of lines (or they'd be like an array of really thin knitting needles with
nothing to 'hold them together'), and if that is so, planes can't intersect at a
'common line', either.
Furthermore, there are no 'perfect circles',
since there are no mathematical circles to begin with. If there were, we
might well ask where they exist, and what their size or thickness is -- or even
what they are made of. Are they solid, or do they have a really big hole in the
middle, like a rarefied polo mint with an extremely thin non-minty rim?
The same goes for rectangles, squares, cubes,
cones, ellipses, spheres,
ellipsoids,
paraboloids…
As Philip, the original answerer, rightly
says, we mathematicians deal with 'objects' that not only do not exist, they can't exist,
and not just in real life -- but, anywhere. They soon exhibit
contradictory properties when we think otherwise or we confuse them with
physical objects. But are they even 'non-physical' objects, or, indeed,
'objects' of any sort? If they were 'non-physical', how could they be perfectly
rigid, for example? Is a line comprised of 'non-physical' points? And how does that hold
together? What exactly are 'non-physical points', anyway? They too have no
shape, circumference, or centre. They aren't containers, either, otherwise
they'd be 'non-physical volume intervals'! And, if that is so, no other
'non-physical point' can occupy them, too.
Much of traditional analytic and differential
geometry, as well as topology, will need to be re-written if we are to free them
of such crude ideas, and, indeed, avoid such awkward questions.
The traditional approach to mathematical
'objects' and 'processes' thus confuses mathematics with physical science -- and
physicists return the compliment with interest by treating the universe as a
mathematical object in its own right. Hence we have all those 'worm
holes', 'parallel' universes, 'branched' time zones, 'warped spacetime', 'branes'
-- and, of course, the 'paradoxes' of 'time travel'. No wonder physicists face
insuperable problems explaining 'force', 'energy', 'space' and 'time' -- not to
mention all those particles that seem to be wave and particle all in one go, can
be in two places at once and seem able to 'pop into existence' whenever they
feel the urge.
And these problems don't stop there; the
'paradoxes' of number theory (and, indeed, set theory) also arise from viewing even
these as if they were physical objects of some sort.
Of course, this means that there are no
viable versions of
mathematical Platonism, which theory positively invites awkward questions
and 'difficulties' such as the above.
And the
same goes for 'bargain basement' Platonism -- i.e., 'mathematical
realism'. [Quoted from
here, slightly edited. Links added.]
In
which case, none of the 'properties' we associate with mathematical objects can
be obtained by abstraction from physical objects, lines, points, planes or
surfaces. The latter share no properties at all with the former, so they can't
have been derived from them by a 'process of abstraction'. Imposing
concepts derived from the material world on mathematical objects and structures
only succeeds in distorting them.
[On this see Shanker (1987);
see also, Ernest
(1998), Marion (1993, 1998) and Slater (1998). Mathematics is clearly a social
practice, a complex, interwoven
system of rules that we
use for manipulating symbols, many of which gain their meaning from their
application in every day life, engineering, technology and the sciences.]
On the failure of earlier (and later)
theorists to derive number concepts by abstraction, see Frege (1953).
[Frege's
own abstractionism is in fact a special,
Logicist
variant that bears no relation to earlier,
philosophical
forms of abstractionism. On that, see Wright (1983), and Chapters 18 to 20 of Schirn (1998).]
Abstractionism in general was taken apart in Essay Three Parts
One and
Two. Also, see Note 18, below.
17.
Engels's ruminations on the Calculus will be discussed
below.
Readers should also refer to
Jean Van
Heijenoort's discussion of Engels's mathematical fantasies. Heijenoort was at
one point a
leading member of the
Fourth International and helped provide security for Trotsky in his final
years. [On this see Heijenoort (1978) and Feferman (1993).] Heijenoort was also an expert logician,
and as such he wasn't overly impressed with this aspect of Engels's thought. Cf.,
Heijenoort (1948), which is now available
here.
Frege (1904) was in fact an attempt to criticise
contemporaneous theories of functions. However, in order to do that,
he first had to consider several ideas held by fellow mathematicians about the nature of 'variables'.
He begins by noting that variation must take place
in time, which fact
alone removes the variable (as the latter was understood in his day) from pure
mathematics, whose theorems are independent of time.
Furthermore, he asked us to consider precisely what it
is that varies:
"The answer one immediately gets is: a magnitude. Let us
look for an example. We may call a rod a magnitude in respect of its being long.
[I think Frege meant the length of a rod is a magnitude -- RL.] Any variation in the rod as regards its length, such as may result, e.g., from
heating it, occurs in time; and neither rods nor lengths are objects of pure
Analysis." [Frege (1904), p.107.]
But,
what of the real world? Has mathematics nothing to say about change that takes
place in nature and society? Is mathematics of no practical use? In order to answer these
questions, Frege points out an obvious fact: numbers are employed by
scientists to account for change. But, an annoying problem arises at this point: when
theorists speak of "variable magnitudes" they never refer to "variable numbers",
for numbers can't vary. [Frege means that no matter what happens, the number
three, say, remains the number three, and doesn't change into the
number four, for example. We must be careful though to distinguish numbers from numerals!]
However, someone might object and maintain that there are indeed
"variable numbers". We certainly speak of a certain number which is the length of a rod,
and since that rod can vary in length, that number can vary too. [Indeed, Marx
and DM-theorists are fond of talking this way, as we will see.] So, by using the
expression "the number that gives the length of this rod" it seems we
can
designate variable numbers.
Frege
responds:
"Let us compare this example with the following
one. 'When I say "the King of this realm" I am designating a man. Ten years ago
the King of this realm was an old man; at present the King of this realm is a
young man. So by using this expression I have designated a man who was an old
man and is now a young man." [Ibid., p.108.]
In which
case, by parity of reasoning, we
might be tempted to think that the expression "The King
of this realm" designates a 'variable man'.
However, unless time is mentioned,
the expression "The King of this realm" doesn't in fact
designate a specific man, and hence it fails to designate a man at all.
That is because the expression "The King of this realm" could refer to a
different man depending on the time specified. In that case, "The King of this
realm in 1900" designates a different individual
from "The King of this realm in 1820" (assuming, of course, that there was
in fact a man on the throne that year). If so, we plainly have a different subject
in each case; we are talking about two different individuals. In like
manner, the expression "The number that gives the length of this rod" doesn't designate a number at all unless some date or time is indicated.
If the time is mentioned, then the number, say, 1000, may indeed be that which
was intended. But, 1000 itself is invariable. At a later time we would use a
different expression (for the length) which would then designate a different
number, say, 1001. Here we clearly have a new subject of predication; we are
talking about two different numbers designating two different lengths at two
distinct times -- not one number that has altered. It isn't as if 1000 has grown
into 1001; 1001 has merely replaced 1000 as the new length.
[Again, dialecticians talk as if numbers can change, but they disguise this by
talking about variable expressions or magnitudes.]
We can see
this is the case for if the original rod is replaced with a longer one we
wouldn't say that the first rod was grown longer. That is because we would now have a different subject of predication each
time -- that is, we would be saying something about two different rods,
just as when we had two different numbers, 1000 and 1001.
On the other hand, if the same rod
grows in length (if it is heated, say),
we would have the same subject of predication. In this case, the same rod would now be longer.
But, it is worth asking: Specifically what remains the same when a number
(that refers to a length) is
supposed to have varied. The answer is obvious: nothing remains the same! We
don't have the same number -- since, as noted above, the length here is
given by two different numbers! We don't in fact speak about the numbers we use for the size
of rods in the same way that we measure rods, and that is because numbers
aren't physical objects like rods,
which can vary over time. It would make little sense to say that we had measured
the number 1000 and found it had grown to 1001. There is nothing common here
-- there
is no such thing as the 'same but
changing' number -- of which we could
predicate this supposed variation, as we can with rods. In that case, there can be no
"variable numbers" as there can be
variable rods.
But, what about the letters we use to designate 'variable
numbers', such as "x", "y" or "z"? Frege responds as follows:
"This way of speaking is certainly employed; but these
letters are not proper names of 'variable numbers' in the way that '2' and '3'
are proper names of constant numbers; for the numbers '2' and '3' differ [from
each other -- RL] in a
specified way, but what is the difference in the variables that are said to be
designated by 'x' and 'y'? We can't say. We can't specify what properties x
has and what different properties y has.... Since we can't conceive of each
variable as an individual, we can't attach any proper names to variables."
[Ibid., p.109.]
So,
if these letters aren't proper names, they can't designate
anything, let alone a "variable number".
May
we not talk about "indefinite numbers"? But, this way of speaking is rather odd.
Do we speak about "indefinite men"? Sure, we may not be definite about which man
or woman we are speaking about, but the individuals concerned can't themselves be indefinite. There is no such thing as an indefinite
man (or woman).
Someone might retort: "But, surely, the number
n is indefinite;
that is why we have to use a letter, not a numeral, to designate it." And yet,
when we speak of "the number n", it is always in a certain context -- for instance: "If the number
n is even,
then cosnπ = 1". The whole sentence has a sense, but not any of the detached parts.
For example, it is impossible to answer the question "Is the number n odd or
even"? without such a context, any more than we can answer the question "Does
cosnπ = 1?" If we could answer it, then n would now be the proper name of a
specific
number, in which case n wouldn't be indefinite, after all.
So, we shouldn't say that "n" designates an "indefinite number"
but that it "indicates numbers indefinitely".
Some may want to say that "a variable assumes a certain value",
but this is a completely obscure way of speaking. How does an indefinite number
set about "assuming" a value? That is, how does it set about "assuming" a certain number (for that is what a
value is, a number)? Does an indefinite man go about "assuming" a definite man?
"In other connexions (sic), indeed, we say that an
object assumes a property; [but] here the number must play both parts; as an
object it is called a variable or a variable magnitude, and as a property it is
called a value. That is why people prefer the word 'magnitude' to the word
'number'; they have to deceive themselves about the fact that the variable
magnitude and the value it is said to assume are essentially the same thing, that in this case we
have not got an object assuming different properties in succession, and
that therefore there can be no question of a variation." [Ibid., p.111. Italic
emphasis in the original.]
So, those who speak of numbers as "variable magnitudes" do so
because it allows them to treat numbers as both objects and
properties at the same time, as the subject of predication and as the predication itself.
Unfortunately, Frege in
the end allowed for the use of "variable magnitude"
outside of pure mathematics, but to my mind he did so inconsistently, for it
seems to me that his arguments apply to any use of this term.
Be
this as it may, that minor concession (of Frege's) is of little use to
dialecticians, for their 'solution' to the problems of the Calculus must apply to
"variable numbers" (and not just "variable magnitudes") -- that is, it must relate to
mathematical theory so that it is indeed a solution, and doesn't just relate to the incidental measurement of bodies. Certainly, Marx
thought he was contributing to "pure" mathematics. In
that case, Frege's criticisms apply to his 'solution', too.
[My summary
of Frege's argument ends here.]
-----------------------------
Now,
we met this syntactical segue (treating predicate expressions as Proper Names) in Essay Three
Part One. Traditional
Theorists (and that includes dialecticians) confuse predicates with Proper Names
all the time
-- since that is the only way they can make their theories even seem to work. Because
objects change over time they acquire new properties, so the predicates we use to depict
them are time sensitive,
whereas their Proper Names
aren't. [On this, see
Geach (1968), pp.22-46.
This links to the 3rd
edition, hence the page numbers are in fact different:
pp.49-72.]
So, even though Karl Marx, for instance, didn't have the name "Karl"
the very moment he was born, we still say
that Karl Marx was born on the 5th of May, 1818. And, he is still called "Karl Marx" even though he has
been dead for well over 135 years.] If a theorist regards numbers as both
objects and properties -- that is, should a theorist hold that there is no
logical difference between Proper Names and predicate expressions --,
then it is hardly surprising that they conclude that numbers are themselves variable.
This is
where dialectical dissembling rears its ugly head. The above
syntactical segue -- which elides the logical difference between Proper Names
and predicate expressions -- allows dialecticians to imagine that magnitudes (expressed as
numbers) can actually change. Numbers are treated as both subjects and
predicates, this conceptual slide is 'justified' by the utterance of a
by-now-familiar 'dialectical' mantra, which is somehow supposed to work like
fairy dust and work magic when rational argument has run dry. This also
helps explain why dialecticians (like Engels, and alas Marx, too) soon descend
into linguistic confusion and claim to be able to see 'contradictions' all over
the place
in algebra -- and not just in nature and society --, which spurious conundrum they then attempt to
'resolve' by the use of yet more Hegelian jargon. Instead of asking
whether (i) The language they employ makes any sense, (ii) They have confused
Proper Names (or even objects themselves) with predicates (or properties), or
(iii) They are treating
mathematical objects as if they were physical objects, they end up
constructing an entire mythology out of a series of verbal mix-ups.
In that case, if there can be no "variable numbers"
--, or, indeed,
"variable
magnitudes" --, then the idea that DM can help us understand the Calculus falls
even before it reaches the first hurdle.
[This, of course, explains why Marx struggled against the grain
of language as he tried to make dialectics apply to the Calculus, and why
his epigones since then have similarly laboured in vain. (However, I have had to
revise this comment in the light of subsequent research -- surprising as this
might seem, Marx didn't try to apply 'dialectics' to the calculus. On
that see here.)]
It is
no surprise then to recall that Engels traced these moves back to
Descartes, a Traditional Thinker of the first water. But, as we have seen,
Descartes didn't in fact "introduce...variable magnitudes" into mathematics,
since mathematics doesn't use "variable magnitudes", and never has. Sure, in
their "prose", some mathematicians might talk as if this is what
they actually do, but, as Frege has shown, in their actual practice they
don't in
fact do this.
[Incidentally, this
use of the word
"prose" was taken from Wittgenstein; on this see Shanker (1987), pp.161-219.
It refers to the language mathematicians use when they attempt popularise, or
even try to make sense of
their own work, but which language forms no part of their proofs; it represents a
spurious accretion in which amateur metaphysics often looms large. In
that case, "prose" is rather like the hand-waving moves of stage magicians -- or,
indeed, those of incense wielding priests.]
17b. Although, Carchedi
appears to be unaware of this! [Carchedi (2008), p.422, note 8.]
18. Cf., Yanovskaya (1983), Kol'man (1983), and
Smith (1983).
Nevertheless, Fregean Logicism has made an
impressive come-back of late; cf., MacBride (2003), Noonan (2001) and Wright (1983).
An excellent account of the general background to this can be found in Giaquinto
(2004). See also chapters 13 to 17 of Schirn (1998). More details can be found
here.
Despite this, there is a note of caution in
Burgess (2005). See also Bostock (2009).
Why Gödel's result is described here as "philosophically irrelevant" is examined
briefly here. However, on this topic,
see Floyd (2000, 2011,
2012, and forthcoming 1, forthcoming
2),
Marion (1998), Shanker (1987, 1988a, 1988b), and Rodych (1997, 1999a, 1999b,
2000, 2002,
2018).
19. Since writing this I have discovered
much more material on the Internet relating to Marx's comments on the Calculus
(and particularly to
Non-standard Analysis and 'infinitesimals',
developed by
Abraham Robinson). I will add some of my own comments on this when
I obtain hard copies of this material.
Kennedy's article can be accessed (as a PDF),
here. This has now been published, along with
other relevant material, as Kennedy (2006). From that particular essay, it is
quite clear that Kennedy has made the same errors as other commentators -- that is, he too transfers attention away from motion in reality onto to the 'movement' of variables.
Moreover, he failed to notice several glaring errors in
Marx's own argument.
[More details will be posted here at a later date.]
The
Internet site maintained by the organisation to which Woods and Grant belong has
an article they say is reputed to have helped rehabilitate Marx's
analysis of the Calculus. However, that article (which is in Spanish) hasn't yet
been translated into English, so I can't comment on it. On that, see
here. I hesitate to use on-line translators since they all fail to render
texts written in a different language completely faithfully. In which case, any
criticisms I might have of this Spanish version might not actually be valid,
based as it would be on a not-to-be-trusted rendition.
19a.
It could be
argued that we use the negative particle quite uncontroversially to speak of
events and processes in the world. For example, we say things like: "What you
have just done negates everything you have ever stood for", or "Alkalis negate
the action of acids". Indeed, certain alleged
synonyms
of "negate"
could also be quoted in support. There is nothing wrong with using the word
"negate" and its cognates in such a way, but this use of that word is different
from the use of typographically similar words in logic. The latter use of the
word has
truth-functional implications; the use of "negate" in sentences like "What
you have just done negates everything you have ever stood for" doesn't. That
use is more akin to "undoes" or even "undermines".
'Dialectics'
only gets off the ground by confusing these to uses of "negate".
However, with regard to the latter point, several comments made
in another Essay about certain
dictionary definitions of the word
"contradiction" are apposite here:
To be sure, one online dictionary says the
following sort of
thing:
"contradiction, n 1:
opposition between two conflicting forces or ideas..."
However, it is worth recalling that
dictionaries are repositories of usage, and, except perhaps in relation to
standardised spelling, are neither normative nor
prescriptive. This particular dictionary has clearly recorded the Dialectical
Marxist/Hegelian use of this word. That doesn't imply it means anything when used this way.
It also defines the word "Nirvana"
--,
but which materialist wants to admit that that word actually means anything
(that is, apart from its emotional import)? [On the meaning of "meaning",
see Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Indeed, they 'define' many things
with which dialecticians would disagree.
For
example:
"God: A being conceived as
the perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, the
principal object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions.
"The force, effect, or a
manifestation or aspect of this being.
"A being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a
people, especially a male deity thought to control some part of nature or
reality.
"An image of a supernatural being; an idol.
"One that is worshiped, idealized, or followed: Money was their god...."
"negation n 1: a negative
statement; a statement that is a refusal or denial of some other statement 2:
the speech act of negating 3: (logic) a proposition that is true if and only if
another proposition is false."
No mention here of "sublation" or the
NON,
but does that force dialecticians into accepting this 'definition'? Of course
not; they pick and choose when it suits them.
Consider, too, the definition of "wage":
"1. Payment
for labour or services to a worker, especially remuneration on an hourly, daily,
or weekly basis or by the piece.
"2. wages
Economics The portion of the national product that represents the aggregate
paid for all contributing labour and services as distinguished from the portion
retained by management or reinvested in capital goods.
"3.
A fitting
return; a recompense." [Quoted from
here;
spelling altered to conform with UK English.]
"An amount of money
paid to a worker for a specified quantity of
work, usually expressed
on an hourly basis." [Quoted from
here;
spelling altered to conform with UK
English.]
Are there any Marxists on the planet who would accept this
definition of what wages really are? Hence, as noted above, dictionaries
record ideology as much as they record use or meaning.
With respect to "contradiction",
the writers of the first dictionary have plainly taken note of the animistic use of
this word employed by DM-fans.
And, asEssay Eight
Part Two
shows, since no literal sense can be made of the equation of
forces and contradictions, dialecticians shouldn't believe all they read in dictionaries (or Thesauruses).
[In fact, The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary
doesn't
mention opposing forces in its definition of "contradiction".]
Now,
it is a philosophical question whether or not certain words are genuine synonyms of "negate", the answer to which certainly can't be taken for granted.
Unfortunately, I have yet to find a single argument in the scores of DM-texts
I have consulted which
makes the case for equating "negation" with words like "annihilate", "cancel" or
"nullify" in the way that dialecticians clearly require (i.e., as a 'dialectical' concept).
In fact, they simply assert the connection dogmatically, foisting DM not just on nature, but now
on language!
[The equation of "negate" with "cancel" was
also shown to be
untenable, here.]
As far as "nullify"
is concerned, in the above example (i.e., "What you have just done negates
everything you have ever stood for"), that word can't be
taken literally, for in that case it would imply backwards causation!
Now,
if "nullify" and "negate" are taken to mean "undo"
(as suggested above), then we are surely on firmer
ground for certain actions or commands clearly undo, or aim to undo others and
can be spoken of loosely as their negation. For example "I declare this bridge
open" and "I declare this bridge closed", or "Open the door!" and "Close the
door!" are pragmatic contradictories in this sense -- i.e., they can't both
be performed at the same time, and in the same way on the same abject/process,
although it is possible to abstain from both by verbalisations just saying or doing nothing. If these were genuine contradictions, then they
couldn't both be performed at the same time and it would be impossible to
abstain from both at the same time. Clearly, that isn't the case here, since we can
abstain from obeying commands expressed in the above way.
In fact, and developing the above point, if we are precise
about this, the pragmatic contradictory of "Open
the door!" (or, "Bring it about that the door is open!") isn't "Close the door"
but "Do not bring it about that the door is open!" (or "Don't open the door!").
"Close the door!" is merely the pragmatic contrary of "Open the
door!", since "Close the door!" is the equivalent of "Bring it about that the door is not open!"
That is
because both "Open the door!" and "Close the door!" can both
be countermanded by
"Leave the door alone!", whereas "Do not bring it about that the door is open!"
can't.
But, dialecticians should take no comfort from this, for such
uses of "negation" and "contradiction" are hardly 'dialectical'.
Neither of these actions or objects "struggle" with one another, nor do they turn into
each other
(which they would do if these were 'dialectical', and the
Dialectical
Classics were to be believed). To be sure,
an open door can be turned into a closed door, but a closed door doesn't cause
an open door to close -- nor does it do so as a result of an 'internal struggle of
opposites'. Admittedly, the action of closing a door can bring about such a
change, but the action of closing a door doesn't contradict an open door, it
merely undoes its opening. If anyone were to suppose that the action of closing
a door contradicted an open door, they would also have to suppose that that action
itself can turn into a closed door! That is because, as the DM-classicists
assure us, dialectical contradictories turn into one another, or they somehow cause
'dialectical opposites' to do so. Moreover, these two states don't imply one
another, such that one can't exist without the other, as is supposedly the case
with the proletariat and the capitalist class. An open door can surely exist
without it ever being closed, and vice versa.
Since this particular issue overlaps with my discussion of
contradictory forces, the reader
is referred there for further details.
Kant introduced into Philosophy the
concept of "real opposition" and "real negation", an idea that was also present
in embryo in Aristotle:
"Two things are opposed to each other if one
thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold:
it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is
to say, without contradiction." [Kant (1763), p.211. Emphasis in the original.]
However, as we have seen in Essay Eight
Part Three, the
idea that these 'cancel' one another is itself completely misguided. The other points
Kant makes have been critically examined in Essay Eight
Part Two.
21.
On this, see
here
and
here. Several more rather odd NON-counter-examples
have been listed in Note 23, as well as the
Appendix.
21a. To be sure, this
off-the-wall reasoning is ridiculous in the extreme, but it can only be neutralised by
the adoption of rational
principles that are foreign to DL (i.e., those found in FL and
IL).
21b.This response is offered in, for example,
Molyneux (1995). In addition, Woods and Grant argue that the classical
'problem' concerning the origin of 'order' out of 'chaos' is solved by Engels First 'Law' --
which apparently also resolves the conundrum over the link between 'freedom'
and 'necessity':
"The answer to the problem is supplied by the law
of the transformation of quantity into quality. Out of the apparently random
movement of a large number of molecules, there arises a regularity and a pattern
which can be expressed as a scientific law. Out of chaos arises order. This
dialectical relation between freedom and necessity, between chaos and order,
between randomness and determinacy was a closed book to the science of the 19th
century, which regarded the laws governing random phenomena (statistics) to be
entirely separate and apart from the precise equations of classical
mechanics....
"All that exists evidently does so of necessity.
But not everything can exist. Potential existence is not yet actual existence.
In The Science of Logic, Hegel carefully traces the process whereby
something passes from a state of being merely possible to the point where
possibility becomes probability, and the latter becomes inevitable ('necessity').
In view of the colossal confusion that has arisen in modern science around the
issue of "probability," a study of Hegel's thorough and profound
treatment of this subject is highly instructive.
"Possibility and actuality denote the dialectical
development of the real world and the various stages in the emergence and
development of objects. A thing which exists in potential contains within itself
the objective tendency of development, or at least the absence of conditions
which would preclude its coming into being. However, there is a difference
between abstract possibility and real potential, and the two things are
frequently confused. Abstract or formal possibility merely expresses the absence
of any conditions that might exclude a particular phenomenon, but it does not
assume the presence of conditions which would make its appearance inevitable....
"In order for potential to become actual, a
particular concatenation of circumstances is required. Moreover, this is not a
simple, linear process, but a dialectical one, in which an accumulation of small
quantitative changes eventually produces a qualitative leap. Real, as opposed to
abstract, possibility implies the presence of all the necessary factors out of
which the potential will lose its character of provisionality, and become
actual. And, as Hegel explains, it will remain actual only for as long as these
conditions exist, and no longer. This is true whether we are referring to the
life of an individual, a given socioeconomic form, a scientific theory, or any
natural phenomenon. The point at which a change becomes inevitable can be
determined by the method invented by Hegel and known as the 'nodal line of
measurement.' If we regard any process as a line, it will be seen that there are
specific points ('nodal points') on the line of development, where the
process experiences a sudden acceleration, or qualitative leap....
"The impossibility of establishing a 'final
cause' has led some people to abandon the idea of cause altogether.
Everything is considered to be random and accidental. In the 20th
century this position has been adopted, at least in theory, by a large number of
scientists on the basis of an incorrect interpretation of the results of quantum
physics, particularly the philosophical positions of
Heisenberg. Hegel answered
these arguments in advance, when he explained the dialectical relation between
accident and necessity.
"Hegel explains that there is no such thing as
causality in the sense of an isolated cause and effect. Every effect has a
counter-effect, and every action has a counter-action. The idea of an isolated
cause and effect is an abstraction taken from classical Newtonian physics, which
Hegel was highly critical of, although it enjoyed tremendous prestige at that
time. Here again, Hegel was in advance of his time. Instead of the
action-reaction of mechanics, he advanced the notion of Reciprocity, of
universal interaction. Everything influences everything else, and is in turn,
influenced and determined by everything. Hegel thus re-introduced the concept of
accident which had been rigorously banned from science by the mechanist
philosophy of Newton and
Laplace.
"At first sight, we seem to be lost in a vast
number of accidents. But this confusion is only apparent. The accidental
phenomena which constantly flash in and out of existence, like the waves on the
face of an ocean, express a deeper process, which is not accidental but
necessary. At a decisive point, this necessity reveals itself through accident.
This idea of the dialectical unity of necessity and accident may seem strange,
but it is strikingly confirmed by a whole series of observations from the most
varied fields of science and society. The mechanism of natural selection in the
theory of evolution is the best-known example. But there are many others. In the
last few years, there have been many discoveries in the field of chaos and
complexity theory which precisely detail how 'order arises out of chaos,'
which is exactly what Hegel worked out one and a half centuries earlier....
"Dialectical determinism has nothing in common
with the mechanical approach, still less with fatalism. In the same way that
there are laws which govern inorganic and organic matter, so there are laws that
govern the evolution of human society. The patterns which can be observed
through history are not at all fortuitous. Marx and Engels explained that the
transition from one social system to another is determined by the development of
the productive forces, in the last analysis. When a given socioeconomic system
is no longer able to develop the productive forces, it enters into crisis,
preparing the ground for a revolutionary overturn.
"This is not at all to deny the role of the
individual in history. As we have already said, men and women make their own
history. However, it would be foolish to imagine that human beings are 'free
agents' who can determine their future purely on the basis of their own
will. They have to base themselves on conditions which have been created
independent of their will -- economic, social, political, religious, and
cultural. In this sense, the idea of free-will is nonsense....
"Is it possible to attain freedom? If what is
meant by a 'free' action is one that is not caused or determined, we must say
quite frankly that such an action has never existed, and never will exist.
Such imaginary 'freedom' is pure metaphysics. Hegel explained (sic) that real freedom
is the recognition of necessity. To the degree that men and women understand the
laws that govern nature and society, they will be in a position to master these
laws and turn them to their own advantage. The real material basis upon which
humankind can become free has been established by the development of industry,
science and technique. In a rational system of society -- one in which the means
of production are harmoniously planned and consciously controlled -- we will
really be able to speak about free human development. In the words of Engels,
this is 'mankind's leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.'"
[Woods and Grant (1995), pp.126-40.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold
emphasis added; italic emphases in the original. Links added.]
It is worth noting here that the sole authority for this
slide from 'necessity' to 'freedom' is..., Hegel. Nothing in science
justifies this verbal sleight-of-hand. It is also worth pointing out that the highlighted sections of
the above passage reveal yet again how quick DM-fans are to impose their ideas on nature.
How could Woods and Grant possibly know any
it for a fact -- that is, other than uncritically relying on Hegel's
say-so?
These
ideas, alongside and other dialectical/Idealist fantasies, will be neutralised
in Essay Three Part Five, when it is published. In the meantime, readers are
directed here and
here for more
details.
22.
On
this, see Note 1b, above.
Anyway, are we really supposed to believe that
internally-arranged 'opposites' produce such mutations? If so, and if all things
are created by the interaction between 'dialectical opposites', which promptly turn into
each other --
as the DM-classics tell us
they must -- then a non-mutated gene must
already exist side by side with the mutant version, or that mutation won't
happen! In which case, this mutant gene can't
have been produced by that mutation! It already exists, otherwise there would
be nothing with which the non-mutant gene could 'struggle' in order to produce
it!
As we
have seen several times
already, the
radically-confused nature of the DM-'theory' of change implies either that (1)
Nothing novel can come into existence, or (2)
UOs are incapable of producing novelty
and
change:
(a)
If such opposites cause change by struggling with one another then both must
co-exist in order for that to happen. If, therefore, change involves an object
or process developing into its opposite, then that opposite must already exist. But, if it
already exists,
no
novelty can arise.
(b) On the
other hand, if that opposite doesn't already exist, it can play
no part in the action and nothing would change.
23. Consider, too, the
thoroughly reactionary life form Myxomycota(The Slime Mould), which belongs neither to the plant nor the animal kingdom
but to the
Protoctista.
Its life-cycle involves the
following: a giant
amoebal stage, followed by a slug-like existence, which morphs into a
fungal-like fruiting body, which then releases spores.
Now
it might be that this organism is so primitive that it doesn't "understand dialectics", and hasn't quite figured out which of these four stages is the 'negation', and which
is the NON, let alone what 'sublates' what -- especially since the first phase of
its life-cycle
involves a union, a 'dialectical tautology', if you will!
"The Dictyosteliomycota are also known as the
social amoebae. Their life cycle is considered among the most bizarre among
microorganisms. It begins with free-living amoeboid cells (not to be confused
with the Amoebae); there is no true
plasmodium. As long as there is enough food
(usually bacteria) the amoebae thrive. However, when food runs out, the amoebae
send out chemical signals to surrounding amoebae. Next, they stream toward a
central point and form a sluglike multicellular
pseudoplasmodium, which can then
migrate like a single organism. When conditions are right, the pseudoplasmodium
stops migrating and forms a multicellular fruiting body. Some of the cells
become spores that disseminate, while the rest form stalk cells whose only
function is to raise the spores up into the air to be more easily caught in air
currents." [Quoted from
here.]
Video Twenty-Two:
The Slime Mould --
A Rather
Fitting Negation Of The NON
24.
In relation to the Third 'Law', if we recall the problems that
tautomerism created for the First
'Law', we might well ask: As these isomers flip back and forth every
microsecond, billions of times a day, which tautomer is the 'negation' and which is the NON?
How many more counter-examples do we need to
reference before this
'Law' turns into its own opposite: a NON-law?
Notwithstanding this, it would be unwise to underestimate the ingenuity of
adamantine-skulled dialecticians in their desire to shoe-horn these and other non-dialectical oddities
into their theory, come what may.
If you,
dear reader, have any doubts about that, check
out
this site (where the author of the material there is an open and honest mystic,
for a change).
Alana
Saarinen loves playing golf and the piano,
listening to music and hanging out with
friends. In those respects, she's like many
teenagers around the world. Except she's
not, because every cell in Alana's body
isn't like mine and yours -- Alana is one of
a few people in the world who have DNA from
three people.
"A lot of
people say I have facial features from my
mum, my eyes look like my dad…. I have some
traits from them and my personality is the
same too," says Alana. "I also have DNA from
a third lady. But I wouldn't consider her a
third parent, I just have some of her
mitochondria."
Mitochondria
are often called the cell's factories. They
are the bits that create the energy all of
our cells need to work, and keep the body
functioning. But they also contain a little
bit of DNA. Alana Saarinen is one of only 30
to 50 people in the world who have some
mitochondria, and therefore a bit of DNA,
from a third person. She was conceived
through a pioneering infertility treatment
in the USA which was later banned. But soon
there could be more people like Alana, with
three genetic parents, because the UK is
looking to legalise a new, similar technique
which would use a donor's mitochondria to
try to eliminate debilitating genetic
diseases. It is called mitochondrial
replacement and if Parliament votes to let
this happen, the UK would become the only
country in the world to allow children with
three people's DNA to be born.
The structure of a
cell
Nucleus: Where the majority of our
DNA is held - this determines how we look
and our personality
Mitochondria: Often described as
the cell's factories, these create the
energy to make the cell function
Cytoplasm: The jelly like substance
that contains the nucleus and mitochondria
Alana was
born through an infertility treatment called
cytoplasmic transfer. Her mum, Sharon
Saarinen, had been trying to have a baby for
10 years through numerous IVF procedures. "I
felt worthless. I felt guilty that I
couldn't give my husband a child. When you
want a biological child but you can't have
one, you're distraught. You can't sleep,
it's 24-7, constantly on your mind," she
says. Cytoplasmic
transfer was pioneered in the late 1990s by
a clinical embryologist Dr Jacques Cohen and
his team at the St Barnabus Institute in New
Jersey, US. "We felt that there was a chance
that there was some element, some structure
in the cytoplasm that didn't function
optimally. One of the major candidates that
could have been involved here are structures
called mitochondria," he says.
Cohen
transferred a bit of a donor woman's
cytoplasm, containing mitochondria, to
Sharon Saarinen's egg. It was then
fertilised with her husband's sperm. As a
little bit of mitochondria was transferred,
some DNA from the donor was in the embryo.
Seventeen babies were born at Cohen's
clinic, as a result of cytoplasmic transfer,
who could have had DNA from three people.
But there was concern about some of the
babies. There
was one
early
miscarriage,
considering
there
were
twelve
pregnancies
that is
an
expected
number,"
says
Cohen.
He and
his team
believed
that
miscarriage
occurred
because
the
foetus
was
missing
an X
chromosome.
"Then
there
was
another
twin
pregnancy,
where
one [of
the
twins]
was
considered
entirely
normal
and the
other
had a
missing
X
chromosome.
"So
that's
two out
of the
small
group of
foetuses
that was
obtained
from
this
procedure.
This did
worry us
and we
reported
that in
the
literature
and in
our
ethical
and
review
board
that
oversees
these
procedures,"
he says.
At the
time of
birth,
the
other
babies
were all
fine. A
year or
two
later,
another
of the
children
was
found to
have
"early
signs of
pervasive
early
developmental
disorder
which is
a range
of
cognitive
diseases
which
also
includes
autism."
Cohen
told me.
He says
it's
difficult
to know
if the
abnormalities
happened
by
chance
or
because
of the
procedure.
Other
clinics
copied
the
technique
and
Cohen
estimates
that
around
30 to 50
children
worldwide
were
born who
could
have DNA
from
three
people
as a
result.
But in
2002 the
American
regulator,
the FDA
(Food
and Drug
Administration)
asked
clinics
to stop
doing
cytoplasmic
transfer
due to
safety
and
ethical
concerns.
All of
them
did. "There
was a
reaction
from
scientists,
ethicists,
the
public
at
large, I
think
most of
it was
supportive,
some of
it was
critical
-- I
think
this is
normal,
every
time an
experiment
is done
in
medicine
there is
a
reaction
-- what
are the
risks
here?"
says
Cohen.
At the
time,
some
were
concerned
because
they
felt
this was
germ
line
genetic
modification.
What
"germ
line"
means is
that a
child
like
Alana
would
pass her
unusual
genetic
code
down to
her
children.
And
their
children,
would
pass it
to their
children
and so
on.
Because
we
inherit
our
mitochondria
only
from our
mothers,
only
female
children
would
pass
their
unusual
genetic
code on.
Crossing
the germ
line as
it is
known
has
never
been
done
before
so very
little
is known
about
what the
outcome
could
be. Due
to a
lack of
funding,
Cohen
says, it
hasn't
been
possible
to find
out
about
how any
of the
children
like
Alana
who were
born
from
cytoplasmic
transfer
are
doing.
But the
St
Barnabus
Institute
is now
starting
a follow
up study
to check
their
progress.
Sharon
Saarinen
says her
daughter
Alana is
a
healthy,
typical
teenager
"I
couldn't
ask for
a better
child.
She is
an
intelligent,
beautiful
girl
inside
and out,
she
loves
math and
science…she
does
really
well in
school.
She
helps me
around
the
house…when
she's
not
texting!
She has
always
been
healthy.
Never
anything
more
than a
basic
cold, or
a flu
every
now and
then. No
health
problems
at all."
The
health
of the
children,
like
Alana,
born
from
cytoplasmic
transfer
is under
scrutiny
now
because
of the
UK's
decision
to
consider
legalising
mitochondrial
replacement,
where
the
mitochondria
of a
donor
woman
will be
used to
create a
child.
It would
not be
available
for
people
with
fertility
problems
but for
those
who
carry
diseases
of the
mitochondria
and
would
otherwise
pass
down
these
genetic
abnormalities
to their
children.
Exactly
how it
is done
still
needs to
be
determined
as there
are two
ways of
doing
the
procedure,
depending
on when
the eggs
are
fertilised.
Eggs
from a
mother
with
unhealthy
mitochondria
and a
donor
with
healthy
mitochondria
are
collected The
nucleus,
containing
the
majority
of the
genetic
material,
is
removed
from
both
eggs.
The
donor
nucleus
is
destroyed The
mother's
nucleus
is
inserted
into the
donor
egg --
it now
has
healthy
mitochondria.
The egg
is then
fertilised
by the
father's
sperm.
Both the
mother's
and
donor's
eggs are
fertilised
with the
father's
sperm to
create
two
embryos The
pronuclei,
the
nuclei
during
the
process
of
fertilisation,
contain
the
majority
of the
genetic
material.
They are
removed
from
both
embryos.
The
donor's
is
destroyed A
healthy
embryo
is
created
by
putting
the
parents'
pronuclei
into the
donor
embryo.
"Mitochondrial
diseases
tend to
involve
tissues
or
organs
which
are
heavily
dependent
on
energy,"
says
Prof
Doug
Turnbull
from The
University
of
Newcastle.
He has
treated
people
with
mitochondrial
disease
for
decades
and is
one of
those
who has
developed
these
new
techniques
to try
to cure
these
debilitating
diseases.
"The
conditions
can
therefore
involve
the
heart,
the
brain or
sometimes
the
skeletal
muscle,"
he says.
"People
can have
very bad
heart
problems
which
can
cause
the
heart to
fail
eventually,
they can
be very
weak and
require
respirators
or be in
a
wheelchair.
With the
brain,
they can
get
epilepsy,
strokes
and
eventually
severe
dementia."
Turnbull
estimates
that
around 1
in
3000-5000
people
in the
UK have
a
mitochondrial
disease.
"We can
treat
the
symptoms.
We can
improve
the
quality
and
length
of
peoples'
lives
but we
can't
cure
them."
The
mitochondria
carry
some
DNA,
around
13
"important
genes"
says
Turnbull.
That
compares
to the
"23,000
important
genes"
in the
nucleus
where
most of
our DNA
is held.
This is
the DNA
that
determines
our
traits
and
personality.
"We're
not
trying
to
create
some
characteristic
that
makes
this
person a
stronger
person
or
[someone
who]
will
have
blonde
hair.
We're
trying
to
prevent
disease
and I
think
that is
the only
justification
for
doing
this,"
he says.
Sharon
Bernardi,
from
Sunderland
in the
North of
England,
is
someone
who
mitochondrial
replacement
could
have
helped.
"I have
babies
in three
different
cemeteries,"
she told
us in
her
sitting
room,
surrounded
by
photographs
of all
her
children.
"That is
not the
way you
plan
your
life
when
you're
trying
to have
a
family.
I have
lovely
photos
and
lovely
memories
but
obviously
that's
all I
have got
now."
The
doctors
didn't
know why
Bernardi's
babies
kept
passing
away
only
hours
after
they
were
born. So
that's
why she
kept
trying,
hoping
she
would
have a
healthy
child.
With her
fourth
child,
Edward,
at first
everything
seemed
different.
He was
healthy
until he
was
about
four and
a half.
But it
was then
that he
was
diagnosed
with
Leigh's
disease,
a type
of
mitochondrial
disease,
and his
health
deteriorated
throughout
the
years. "From
the age
of 20
Edward
[found]
getting
around
more
difficult.
He
started
to get
new
symptoms
--
spasms.
He'd
start
screaming...four,
five,
six
hours at
a time.
His
muscles
used to
tense
up, his
hands,
his
face. It
was like
dystonic
spasms
-- a
really
bad
spasm.
[For]
eight
hours
he'd be
in pain,
screaming.
His face
would
twist up
and his
hands
would
get
really
stiff.
It was
hard to
see."
Edward
Bernardi
passed
away
three
years
ago,
when he
was 21.
"My life
was
totally
for
Edward.
Even now
sometimes
if I
have
gone to
sleep, I
still
wake up,
and
think,
'It's
very
quiet.'
I have
to slip
back
into
reality
and
think,
'Don't
be
silly,
Edward's
not
there.
He's not
in his
room'.
Without
a
heartbeat
I would
have
gone for
this
[mitochondrial
replacement].
I hope
this is
a new
option.
I hope
people
take it
seriously
and it's
approved.
I don't
want my
son to
have
just
died for
nothing.
I want
him to
have
made a
difference.
His life
was
robbed
at 21.
We're
trying
to stop
this.
People
have to
understand
this is
a life
disease.
We're
trying
not to
pass it
on to
children
and make
it
better
for
future
families." But some
people
believe
this
technique
could
set us
on a
slippery
slope
towards
genetically
modified
humans.
"These
regulations
would
authorise
the
crossing
of a
rubicon
for the
first
time. It
would
authorise
germ
line
therapy...to
alter
the
genes of
an
individual.
This
is
something
defined
by the
EU
Charter
of
Fundamental
Rights
as
effectively
constituting
eugenics,"
says
British
MP Fiona
Bruce
who
chairs
the All
Party
Parliamentary
Pro-Life
Group.
"We will
have
approved
a
technique
and what
that
technique
could be
used for
in the
future
who
knows.
We're
opening
a
Pandora's
box."
The
regulator
in the
UK, the
HFEA or
Human
Fertilisation
and
Embryology
Authority,
has held
three
independent
reviews
to
scrutinise
the
safety
of this
technique.
The
conclusions
were
that
mitochondrial
replacement
is "not
unsafe".
That
means
"it
would be
reasonable,
with
some
additional
experiments,
to take
it into
clinical
practice
if all
circumstances
are
fulfilled"
says
Peter
Braude,
emeritus
professor
of
obstetrics
and
gynaecology
at Kings
College
London.
He sat
on all
three
HFEA
scientific
reviews.
"In any
move
from
science
to
clinical
practice
there is
a leap
of faith
-- it
has to
be
done,"
he says.
He adds
that
many of
the
concerns
being
raised
now
about
this are
the same
as the
ones
cited in
the
early
days of
IVF. The
UK has
for
decades
been a
leader
in
assisted
reproduction
science
and is
where
the
world's
first
test
tube
baby,
Louise
Brown,
was born
in 1978.
"The
headlines
then
were
'playing
God' and
'genetically
modified
humans',"
says
Braude.
"There
have
been few
episodes
I'm
aware of
in the
history
of
assisted
reproduction
that
have had
to be
stopped
because
of
hazard.
It's all
gone
pretty
swimmingly
as far
as I'm
aware."
Braude
says
that
mitochondrial
replacement
has gone
through
much
more
scrutiny
than
previous,
now well
established,
assisted
reproduction
techniques
did,
such as
IVF.
"Whereas
the
original
techniques
were
used
with
only
[experiments
from]
mice,
rabbits,
lab
animals...the
big
difference
here is
we also
have
issue of
human
embryos
and this
work has
been
tested
in
macaque
monkeys
in
primates.
All
those
were
very
useful,
reassuring...hence
why we
came to
the
conclusion
that
this is
not
unsafe."
The
experiments
done on
macaque
monkeys
were
done in
Oregon,
US and
the
monkeys
are now
five
years
old and
seem to
be
healthy.
Braude
also
points
out that
having a
third
person's
DNA in
your
system
is
"nothing
particularly
new....
Think
about
bone
marrow
transplants,
let's
say
unfortunately
you have
leukaemia
and you
have to
have
your
bone
marrow
radiated
for the
cancer
to be
killed
and then
it is
replaced
by bone
marrow
from
someone
else --
say me.
Effectively
from
that
time
onwards,
you will
have
circulating
in your
body DNA
from me.
You
won't be
related
to me,
you may
be
grateful
to me,
but you
will
have DNA
from a
third
person
circulating
in your
body."
What is
different,
say
critics,
about
mitochondrial
replacement,
is that
DNA from
the
donor
will be
passed
down
future
generations.
Dr Ted
Morrow,
an
evolutionary
biologist
from the
University
of
Sussex,
and
colleagues
have
carried
out
mitochondrial
replacement
experiments
on other
animals.
He
raised
safety
concerns
about
mitochondrial
replacement
to the
scientific
reviews. "For
mice,
there
were
changes
in
cognitive
ability...to
learn
and do
things
using
their
brain.
In fruit
flies
and seed
beetles
there
were
changes
in male
fertility,
changes
in
ageing,
a range
of
different
traits
were
effected
in
various
experiments,"
he says.
The
HFEA's
scientific
reviews
dismissed
Morrow's
findings
as not
relevant
to
humans
because
they
were
done on
inbred
animals.
Morrow
stands
by his
research
and says
the
scientific
panels
should
not have
dismissed
his
findings
so
quickly.
It is
Morrow's
evidence
that
critics
such as
Fiona
Bruce
cite
when
saying
this
technique
is not
safe
enough.
She has
called a
debate
in the
House of
Commons
today to
discuss
mitochondrial
replacement.
She does
not
believe
there
has been
enough
debate
about
what the
UK is
proposing
to do.
"The
technique
itself
could
allow
the
child to
inherit
untried
untested
medical
complications,"
she
says.
Morrow
says
that all
the
coverage
of his
research
has been
"a
rather
odd
experience.
In the
press
it's
sometimes
portrayed
that the
scientists
think
this,
and the
pro-life
group
this.
I'm a
scientist
but I'm
not a
pro-lifer.
I think
this is
a
genuine
safety
concern
--
that's
it."
Alana
and
Sharon
Saarinen
have
been
watching
the
debate
in the
UK with
interest. "I wish
I could
meet
her, the
donor,
to tell
her I am
so
grateful
for what
she did
for us.
How can
you
thank
someone
for
giving
you a
life?
That's
impossible,"
says
Sharon.
Alana
agrees
with her
mum. "I
think it
would be
nice to
thank
her. But
I
wouldn't
want to
have a
relationship
or
connection
with
her. The
DNA I
have of
her is
just so
small.
"I know
she
might
have
another
person's
mitochondria,
[but]
look
what a
great
person
she
turned
out to
be, and
healthy.
Just
because
she'll
pass it
on to
her
children
it won't
bother
me in
the
least. I
know it
was the
right
thing to
do. I
have the
living
proof
every
day to
see how
great it
turned
out."
[Quoted
from
here;
accessed
19/11/2014.
Several
paragraphs
merged.
Photos
omitted.
Links
and bold
emphases
added.
Several
paragraphs
merged.]
In
the above, which is the 'unique dialectical opposite' of what? And which is the
NON?
In the
absence of an answer to the above questions, will DM-fans join with the reactionary 'moralists' (highlighted
in bold) and oppose these developments, since they seem to violate 'dialectical
law'?
[May I
suggest that readers
don't hold their breath waiting for an intelligent response to the above
questions from the DM-fraternity?]
Update, 20/07/2021:
Here is a recently published scientific paper about this technique.
[2] Update, February 2015:
-- 'Reactionary' Science Given The Go-Ahead.
We
saw earlier that scientists
were planning to engineer genetically a foetus from three parents ('heretically' confounding
both the UO and the
NON); here is the
latest about this from the BBC:
UK approves three-person babies
By James Gallagher Health editor, BBC News
website 24/02/2015
The UK has now become the first country to
approve laws to allow the creation of babies from three people. The modified
version of IVF has passed its final legislative obstacle after being approved by
the House of Lords. The fertility regulator will now decide how to license the
procedure to prevent babies inheriting deadly genetic diseases. The first baby
could be born as early as 2016. A large majority of MPs in the House of Commons
approved "three-person babies" earlier this month. The House of Lords tonight
rejected an attempt to block the plan by a majority of 232....
Mitochondria are the tiny compartments inside
nearly every cell of the body that convert food into useable energy. But genetic
defects in the mitochondria mean the body has insufficient energy to keep the
heart beating or the brain functioning. The structure are passed down only from
the mother and have their own DNA, although it does not alter traits including
appearance or personality. The technique developed in Newcastle, uses a modified
version of IVF to combine the healthy mitochondria of a donor woman with DNA of
the two parents. It results in babies with 0.1% of their DNA from the second
woman and is a permanent change that would echo down through the generations.
Timeline
March to August -- The UK fertility regulator
will develop and then publish their licensing rules for assessing applications
to perform three-person IVF
Early Summer -- The team in Newcastle publish
the final safety experiments demanded by the regulator
29 October -- Regulations come into force
24 November -- Clinics can apply to the
regulator for a license
By the end of 2015 -- the first attempt could
take place....
In the debate, health minister Lord Howe said
there was an opportunity to offer "real hope" to families. He stated the UK was
leading the world and that three safety reviews by experts suggested it would be
safe. Lord Howe told the House: "Families can see that the technology is there
to help them and are keen to take it up, they have noted the conclusions of the
expert panel. It would be cruel and perverse in my opinion, to deny them that
opportunity for any longer that absolutely necessary." Lord Deben, the former government minister
John Gummer, countered that there were "real doubts about safety". He also
voiced concerns about whether the creation of such babies would be legal. "It is
quite clear that there is considerable disagreement, let me put it simply like
that, about whether this action is legal under European law."
Baroness Scotland of Asthal, a former Labour
attorney general, also questioned the legality asking: "Why the haste? Everyone
agrees we have to get this right. If we're going to do something which everyone
agrees is novel. different and important internationally we really have to be
confident that we are on solid ground. If we are not we give a disservice." Fertility doctor, Lord Winston, told the
House there were comparisons with the early days of IVF which was "also a set in
the dark". He added: "I don't believe my Lords, in spite of what we have heard
this evening, that this technology threatens the fabric of society in the
slightest bit."...
Sally Cheshire, the chairwoman of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [HFEA -- RL], said :"Britain is the first
country in the world to permit this treatment, and it is a testament to the
scientific expertise and well-respected regulatory regime that exists across the
UK that Parliament has felt able to approve it. The HFEA now have to develop a
robust licensing process, which takes into account on a case by case basis the
technical and ethical complexities of such treatments to ensure that any
children born have the best chance of a healthy life. The HFEA has a long
tradition of dealing with medical and scientific breakthroughs, ensuring that
IVF techniques, pioneered in the UK and now practised across the world, can be
used safely and effectively in fertility treatment."
Prof Alison Murdoch, who was instrumental in
developing the technique at Newcastle University, said: "For 10 years we have
publically discussed mitochondrial donation to explain how it could help
patients whose families are blighted by the consequences of mitochondrial
abnormalities. Whilst acknowledging the views of those who have a fundamental
abjection to our work, Parliament has determined that we should continue. We
hope that opponents will accept its democratic decision. The science will be
reviewed and, if accepted, we hope to be able to submit a treatment application
to the HFEA when regulatory policies have been determined."...
James Lawford Davies, a lawyer from Lawford
Davies Denoon which specialises in the life sciences, told the BBC: "All of the
legal arguments made in opposition to the regulations are hopeless. The
regulations do not breach the Clinical Trials Directive which applies only to
medicinal products. The regulations do not breach the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms which prohibit 'eugenic practices' as this is intended to
prevent practices such as forced sterilisation and reproductive cloning, not
treatments intended to prevent the transmission of disease."
The Catholic and Anglican Churches in England
said the idea was not safe or ethical, not least because it involved the
destruction of embryos. Other groups, including Human Genetics Alert, say the
move would open the door to further genetic modification of children in the
future -- so-called designer babies, genetically modified for beauty,
intelligence or to be free of disease. Estimates suggest 150 couples would be
suitable to have babies through the technique each year. If the measure
goes ahead. the first "three-person" baby could be born next year. [Taken from
here.
Accessed 31/12/2015. Several paragraphs merged. Minor typo
corrected.]
DM-fans
might like to contact the above Bishops and theologians with the
glad tidings that -- thanks to Hegel and his 'Logic' -- the NON in fact rules out such
genetic impertinences, saving them the trouble of having to refer to an obscure book written by
Christian Mystic (for example, The Bible) for guidance..., er..., oh wait...!
As we have seen, the
first three-parent baby has now been born.
Update, 20/07/2021: Another "three person baby" has now been born. This
is the very first time this technique has been used to help cure infertility
(this comes from April 2019):
Fertility doctors in Greece and
Spain say they have produced a baby from three people in order to overcome a
woman's infertility. The baby boy was born weighing 2.9kg (6lbs) on Tuesday. The
mother and child are said to be in good health. The doctors say they are "making
medical history" which could help infertile couples around the world. But some
experts in the UK say the procedure raises ethical questions and should not have
taken place. The experimental form of IVF uses an egg from the mother, sperm
from the father, and another egg from a donor woman. It was developed to
help families affected by deadly mitochondrial diseases which are passed down
from mother to baby. It has been tried in only one such case -- a family from
Jordan -- and that provoked much controversy....
This is all about mitochondria --
they are the tiny compartments inside nearly every cell of the body that convert
food into useable energy. They are defective in mitochondrial diseases so
combining the mother's DNA with a donor's mitochondria could prevent disease.
But there is also speculation mitochondria may have a role in a successful
pregnancy too. That claim has not been tested. The patient was a 32-year-old
woman in Greece who had endured four unsuccessful cycles of IVF. She is now a
mother, but her son has a tiny amount of his genetic makeup from the donor woman
as mitochondria have their own DNA.
Dr Panagiotis Psathas, president of
the Institute of Life in Athens, said: "A woman's inalienable right to become a
mother with her own genetic material became a reality. "We are very proud to
announce an international innovation in assisted reproduction, and we are now in
a position to make it possible for women with multiple IVF failures or rare
mitochondrial genetic diseases to have a healthy child."
The Greek team were working
with the Spanish centre Embryotools, which has announced that 24
other women are taking part in the trial and
eight embryos are ready to be implanted. In February 2018, the doctors in
Newcastle who pioneered the technology were given permission to create the UK's
first three-person babies. The fertility regulator approved two attempts,
both in families with rare mitochondrial diseases.
Some doctors in the UK argued the
two applications -- fertility and disease prevention -- are morally very
different. Tim Child, from the University of Oxford and the medical director of
The Fertility Partnership, said: "I'm concerned that there's no proven need for
the patient to have her genetic material removed from her eggs and transferred
into the eggs of a donor. The risks of the technique aren't entirely known,
though may be considered acceptable if being used to treat mitochondrial
disease, but not in this situation. The patient may have conceived even if a
further standard IVF cycle had been used."
Dr Beth Thompson, from the Wellcome
Trust, said: "UK regulation was based on strong public engagement and scientific
evidence and allows the risks and benefits to be carefully weighed up. We're
proud to be supporting the first UK study into the use of mitochondria donation
techniques in a well regulated environment, but we're concerned about studies
taken place without similar levels of oversight." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 20/07/2021. Links in the original; several paragraphs merged. Bold
emphases added.]
The next
three updates contain yet more reactionary science news from the BBC.
By
Michelle Roberts, Health editor, BBC News online 07/12/2015
UK
scientists say they have reached a milestone in the fight against malaria by
creating a genetically modified mosquito that is infertile. The plan is to wipe
out the insects that spread malaria to people by bites, Nature Biotechnology
reports. Two copies of the mutant gene render the malaria-carrying female insect
completely barren. But one copy is enough for a mosquito mum or dad to pass it
on to the offspring. This should perpetually spread the infertility gene
throughout the population so the species dwindles or dies out. However, the
Imperial College London team say more safety tests are needed, meaning it will
be a decade before the mutant mosquitoes can be released into the wild....
The
mutant mosquito can still carry and transmit malaria to people via bites. But
their genetic make-up means they should bread with and replace other
malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Any offspring with one copy of the gene would carry
on passing the trait to future generations, while and female offspring that
inherits both copies would be unable to reproduce.
In this way, the host of the
malaria parasite should eventually become extinct. In the Imperial team's
experiments with
Anopheles gambiae -- a breed of mosquito that is rife in sub-Saharan
Africa where the bulk of human malaria deaths currently occur -- the mutant
mosquitoes were kept with wild-type ones so they could mate. The gene for
infertility was transmitted to more than 90% of both male and female mosquitoes'
offspring across five generations, thanks to technology called
gene drive,
say the researchers Dr Tony Nolan and Prof Andrea Crisanti. Normally, one copy
of a
recessive gene has a 50% chance of being passed down from parents to their
offspring. Gene drive -- a
DNA cutting and
pasting machine that can manipulate
genetic
code as it is passed from parent to offspring -- boosts this inheritance
rate....
Some
experts fear that wiping out mosquitoes may upset the natural balance of the
environment. But Prof Tony Nolan said their method should not make a big dent in
the overall mosquito population -- just the ones that transmit malaria. "There
are roughly 3,400 different species of mosquitoes worldwide and, while
Anopheles gambiae is an important carrier of malaria, it is only one of
around 800 species of mosquito in Africa, so suppressing it in certain areas
should not significantly impact the local ecosystem."
Prof
David Conway, and expert in malaria at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, said the work held promise: "The key achievement here is that a novel
genetic drive mechanism can force these modifications to be passed on, using a
trick that would not occur in nature." But he said more work was needed to check
that the mosquitoes don't evolve resistance to the genetic modification. [Quoted
from
here;
accessed 15/01/2016. Several paragraphs merged. Links and bold emphases added.]
DM-fans might like to join forces with the above "experts" who"fear that wiping out mosquitoes may
upset the natural balance of the environment....", except, they should tell them that the NON will come to the rescue of these
obnoxious insects, 'sublating' the species indefinitely.
Update 2,
January 2016: Fractofusus isn't a plant or an animal, but it
reproduces like a plant:
Sex life of ancient Fractofusus organism
revealed
By
Rebecca Morelle, Science Correspondent, BBC News, 03/08/2015
One of the earliest
complex organisms had a surprisingly complicated sex life, scientists say. Until
now, little was known about the biology of
Fractofusus, which lived in the ocean 565 million years ago. But new
research has revealed a dual mode of reproduction. In one method, the organism
sprouted young from its body in much the same way that a spider plant or
strawberry plant multiplies. In another, it produced seeds or tiny buds into the
water column. This allowed the ancient life-form to produce clones that could
colonise a new patch of seabed. The study
is published in the journal Nature.
Fractofusus -- originally called "the Spindle" until it was formally
described in 2007 -- appeared in the
Ediacaran age. It is among the earliest-known, complicated organisms,
emerging from an ocean of simple multi-cellular microbes. It grew to up to 40cm
long and had a flat, oval shape, made up of a series of little branches
stretching across the sea floor.
"It
has a very distinct body plan that is totally unique," said Dr Emily Mitchell,
the paper's lead author, from the University of Cambridge. "There is nothing
like Fractofusus around today, which makes trying to understand anything
about it really, really difficult." She added: "We knew very little, apart from
the fact it lived in the deep sea, it has a relatively large surface area -- so
it got its nutrients from the water column. We literally had no idea how it
reproduced prior to this study." An analysis of fossil beds in Newfoundland,
Canada, enabled the team to shed light on the organism's sex life. Dr Mitchell
said that while the two modes of reproduction might sound unusual, many plants
reproduced this way. She added that Fractofusus should not be classified
as a plant.
"It
certainly wasn't a plant because it couldn't photosynthesise -- there was no
light (that deep in the ocean). Nor was it an animal, she said. "Fractofusus
doesn't exhibit any of the features you associate with animals. It belonged to a
now-extinct
eukaryotic group known as
rangeomorphs. But how rangeomorphs relate to animals and the origin of
animals is incredibly difficult to work out."
While
the debate continues over where it sits on the tree of life, an unusual mode of
sex clearly worked for Fractofusus. But in terms of evolution, the
organism was less of a success. It died out about 450 million years ago --
and nothing like it has ever appeared again. [Quoted from
here; accessed 15/01/2015.
Some links added. Several paragraphs merged; bold emphases alone added.]
It
almost looks as if evolution has produced this metaphorical 'anti-DM raspberry'. Like the
Hydra,
this creature has two ways of reproducing -- one of which poses a serious
challenge to those who think nature works with paired opposites. Nor is it
easy to make this organism consistent with the NON. At least Fractofusus
had the decency to die out long before Heraclitus and Hegel inflicted their
baleful ideas on humanity.
Update 3,
January 2016:
Will gene therapy be banned after the revolution -- if only to save the blushes
of DM-fans?
'Suicide' gene therapy kills prostate cancer
cells
BBC
Health, 12/12/2015
A new
gene therapy technique is able to modify
prostate cancer cells so that a patient's body attacks and kills them, US
scientists have discovered. The technique causes the tumour cells in the body to
self-destruct, giving it the name 'suicide gene therapy'. Their research found a
20% improvement in survival in patients with prostate cancer five years after
treatment. A cancer expert said more research was needed to judge its
effectiveness. Prostate cancer is the most common cancer in men in the UK with
more than 41,000 diagnosed each year.
The
study, led by researchers from Houston Methodist Hospital in Texas, appears to
show that this 'suicide gene therapy', when combined with radiotherapy, could be
a promising treatment for prostate cancer in the future. The technique involves
the cancer cells being genetically modified so that they signal a patient's
immune system to attack them. Usually, the body does not recognise cancer cells
as the enemy because they have evolved from normal healthy cells. Unlike an
infection, which the body reacts against, the immune system does not react to
kill off the offending cancer cells. Using a virus to carry the gene therapy
into the tumour cells, the result is that the cells self-destruct, alerting the
patient's immune system that it is time to launch a massive attack....
In two
groups of 62 patients, one group received the gene therapy twice and the other
group -- who all had more aggressive cancer -- received the treatment three
times. Both groups also received radiotherapy. Survival rates after five years
were 97% and 94%. Although there was no control group in this study, the
researchers said the results showed a 5 to 20% improvement on previous
studies of prostate cancer treatment. And cancer biopsy tests performed two
years after the trial were found to be negative in 83% and 79% of the patients
in the two groups. Dr
Brian Butler, from Houston Methodist Hospital in Texas, said it could change the
way that cancer is treated. "We may be able to inject the agent straight into
the tumour and let the body kill the cancer cells. Once the immune system has
knowledge of the bad tumour cells, if they pop up again, the body will know to
kill them."...
Kevin
Harrington, professor of biological cancer therapies at The Institute of Cancer
Research, London, said the results were "very interesting" but more research was
needed. "We would need a randomised trial to tell if this treatment is better
than radiotherapy alone. The viruses used in this study cannot reproduce. Next
generation viral therapies for cancer can selectively replicate in cancer cells,
something that can kill the cancer cell directly, and also help spread the virus
to neighbouring cancer cells. It would be interesting to see this approach used
with viruses that could reproduce to see if it makes for a more effective
treatment." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 15/01/2016. Link and bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
It is
difficult, anyway, to squeeze cancer (or, indeed, any disease) into the
theoretical body of 'upside down Hegelianism' [i.e., DM]; but a
self-destructing cancer cell artificially engineered by those with an open
contempt for the NON? That would be like an active revolutionary socialist being
crowned Queen of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
So, how does
a "self-destructing cell" fit in with the NON?
Let me know if you have an answer to
that head scratcher.
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