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Apart from Essay Three
Part Two
this has been one of the most difficult to write. That is partly because so
little has been published by dialecticians themselves over the last 200 years that
offers readers any help at all understanding what
they mean by "the Totality" (or "the Whole"),
as will soon become apparent to anyone who is tempted to think otherwise
-- and, of course, who bothers to read this Essay!
In fact, tackling
this particular topic is what one imagines swimming through syrup would be
like -- but even then one would at least have something to struggle against. With
respect to "the Totality" (and "the Whole") there is precious little.
Admittedly, there a handful of dialecticians who vaguely gestured
at explaining
what "the Totality" is supposed to be, but beyond the usual highly
compressed and practically useless minimum amount of information (quoted
extensively below), the bemused reader faces
what is in effect a blank page, for all the good it does. This
theoretical desert has been made worse by what turns out to be well over a
century of prevarication and deflection (by dialecticians themselves) with
respect to this supposedly core concept.
The reason often given for this is that it should
be pretty
obvious to one and all what "the Totality" is, but as we are about to find out, that isn't even
remotely the case.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise up front
that
Holist
theories of human social and
economic development won't be considered in what follows (unless, of course,
such ideas impact negatively on
revolutionary politics or they involve the use of obscure Hegelian jargon), since that would introduce issues
integral to Historical Materialism
[HM], a theory I largely ignore in these Essays (for reasons outlined
here).
In that case, both Parts of Essay Eleven are
largely but not exclusively devoted to criticism of 'dialectical' theories
applied to the natural world.
Unfortunately, some parts of this Essay are a
little repetitive. I have endeavoured to rectify this relatively minor fault and
will continue to do so in future re-writes. Having said that
it is worth adding that books and articles
devoted to Dialectical
Materialism [DM]are themselveshighly repetitive,
so any criticism of this theory/method can hardly avoid a little of it, too.
Independently of
that, long
experience has taught me that unless the same point is made several times over (perhaps from
different angles), it fails to register in far too many dialectical heads (for reasons
explored in Essay Nine
Part Two).
In what follows, I have hyphenated my use of the
word "interconnection" (and related terms) for reasons that should become
clear as this Essay unfolds.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As is the case with all my
work, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on HM -- a scientific theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on
revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first
became a revolutionary over thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between
DM and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
Several readers have complained about the number of
links I have added to these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult
to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they
believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply even to
Essays that attempt to debunk that
very idea (i.e., this one!). However, to those who find such links do make these Essays
difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have linked to familiar
subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of
recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of
popular films, or certain words
that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
It is also worth pointing out that a good 25% of my case
against DM (in this Essay) has been relegated to the
End Notes.
That has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more
smoothly. This means that if readers want fully to appreciate my case against
DM, they should consult that additional material. In many cases, in those Notes,
I have qualified my argument, often adding greater detail and additional
supporting evidence. Indeed, I have even raised objections to my own remarks
(some of which might seem obvious, but many aren't -- and some might even have
occurred to the reader), to which I have then responded. I explain why I have
adopted this approach in
Essay One.
If readers skip this material, then my replies to
any objections they might have will be missed, as will this extra evidence and
argument, alongside those qualifications. Since I have been
debating this theory with dialecticians for well over thirty years, I've heard all the
objections there are!
[I have also linked to many of the older on-line debates here.]
Finally, phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.), employed throughout this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or, indeed, "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise, the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until recently, this dogmatic approach to knowledge has almost
exclusively been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the prevailing system
for the elite.**
However, that issue will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed here,
here and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how the above applies to DM has been explained in several other Essays
published at this site (especially here,
here
and here). In addition
to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised my argument (but
written withabsolute beginners in mind),
here.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of April 2024, this
Essay is just over 219,500 words long -- a significant percentage of which
consists of lengthy and extensive quotes from the DM-classics and the writings of
subsequent DM-theorists. In addition, a large section of approximately 40,000 words
from this Essay's old Appendix A has now been
moved to a new location, which I am currently
re-formatting, re-editing and re-writing.
A much shorter summary of some of this
Essay's main ideas can be
accessed
here.
The material
below does not represent my final view of any of the issues
raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
Anyone using these links should remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you
will need to press the "Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links
here won't work!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
Parts One and Two of this Essay
will attempt to find out what DM-theorists mean by:
(1) The "Totality";
(2)
'Universal Inter-connection'; and,
(3) The obscure, but oft repeated, one-liner: "The
whole is greater than the sum of the parts; the parts make the whole and the
whole makes the parts" -- i.e., DM-'Wholism'.
The first two will be
covered here, in Part One; the third will be tackled in
Part Two.
Imagine for a moment, if you will,
Hamlet without its main character, the
Prince, or at least without a single description of 'him', such as whether
'he' is indeed a Prince, is male, female, trans, non-binary..., or if 'he' is
even a human being. In
such circumstances questions would rightly be asked about what role this 'character' could possibly
occupy in a play supposedly about 'him',
just as serious doubts might be raised about
the competence (or even the sanity) of its author,
William Shakespeare.
Fortunately, we needn't indulge in such
flights-of-fancy.
Imagine now, if youcan, a
theory (or 'method') that its supporters tell us is (among other things):
(5) A general account of everything in
existence, how it develops and changes;
(6) A revolutionary 'method' aimed at helping change society;
(7) An explanation of how
everything is inter-connected in something
called the "Totality";
And finally that,
(8) The "Totality" is a fundamental concept, to
such an extent that nothing can be fully understood without
reference to it.
Consider, too, the following additional fact: every
single one of that theory's advocates studiously avoids -- or even refuses -- to say what
the "Totality" actually is, or what its supposed
"inter-connections" are deemed to be, or, indeed, how they knowso little
(and, indeed, say so little) about this obscure 'system', 'object' or
'process'...
Wonder no more! For that theory is
DM, those supporters are Dialectical Marxists, and they are serial
prevaricators and world champion
deflectors.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist,
depending on the context.]
If you still harbour doubts, I invite you, dear
reader, to search
through their
writings -- and for my sins I have had to do just that for the last
thirty-five years! Even if you are the slightest bit interested, you will
find precious little to help you decide what
DM is in fact about, for its most fervent and devoted proponents have yet to tell
anyone (least of all one another) what the mysterious "Totality" actually is!
In which case, this isn't so much Hamlet without the
Prince, it is Hamlet without the..., er..., well..., er..., um...,
er..., er...
Indeed, over the last thirty-five years I have made
a point of asking many of the DM-fans I know or have met (personally or on the
Internet) what they think the "Totality" actually is. Of those who bothered to reply, most were puzzled (if not
slightly annoyed) that Ieven thought to ask such an impertinent
question, something they imagined had a very clear, obvious and unambiguous answer.
So, some tended to respond with, "Nature, the World, what else?", but refused to say any more
-- perhaps because, as we
are about to find out, there is no more that could be said. Others gestured toward the heavens
with an airy, "All that!" -- rather like
parents
who try to explain to small children where 'God' is supposed to hang out
(perhaps with an accompanying remark to the effect that, "He's up there, in heaven"),
wafting their hands vaguely skywards. Still others confessed they didn't know
what the "Totality" was, but declared that
they still believed in it, rather like children with hand-waving parents.
Dialecticians of, shall we say, a more scientificframe-of-mind referred me to the 'Big Bang',
perhaps forgetting that the latter is a key part of a theory of origins.
It tells us little about "everything" and its supposed inter-connections, as we will also soon
discover.
At this point, readers possessed of a more kindly or
empathetic disposition might be tempted to respond:
"This can't be! Surely someone has specified clearly what the DM-'Totality'
actually is. After all, they have had at least 150 years to come up with
something!"
Admittedly, a handful of DM-theorists have put
forward a few
very brief and rather vague
ideas about this mysterious 'entity', but beyond the barest
of details they have either sat on their hands or nervously looked the other way.
I suspect these guys could prevaricate for their country.
Indeed, DM-fans are remarkably coy about the precise
nature of their "Totality", and it isn't hard to see why: There
isn't one.
Or, to be more accurate: there is in fact no way of
sensibly referring to
whatever it is they think they want to refer to as the "Totality".
It should come as no surprise, therefore, to
discover that
this 'entity' -- the "Totality" -- was
first dreamt up by card-carrying
Mystics, and to this day this concept still remains locked in their
vice-like grip.
Just as theologians (and ordinary believers) find it
impossible to say who or what 'God' is, it has proved no less difficult for
DM-fans to say what the "Totality" is.
That isn't so much
because of what those two words might appear to mean, it is because both are in fact
devoid of
any clear meaning, and for surprisingly similar reasons.01a
Even for believers, 'God' is unlike anything you
or I or anyone could possibly experience, conceive or sensibly put into words.
Anyone tempted to think otherwise has simply latched onto an inferior sort of 'deity' in whose 'name' it
wouldn't be worth persecuting a single
'infidel' or 'heretic'.
Naturally, this means the faithful have
found it impossible to speak about 'God' without employing a set of inappropriate
metaphors,
misleading analogies and obscure
euphemisms. For many centuries theologians appealed to a wide variety of what can only be
described as verbal dodges and linguistic tricks in a vain attempt to make
'God'-talk vaguely comprehensible. Unfortunately, even though many of the terms
they have press-ganged into service are well enough
understood in everyday life (such as "father" and "son"), the intentional target of all this
theologising and analogising isn't. Precisely what is being
analogised? The response
from believers? Yet more gobbledygook -- or, and far more often, just deafening silence.
It's all a "mystery", you see...
In fact, it turns out to be quite impossible to
answer questions like these
without demoting 'God', and to such an extent that 'He' would now sink to the same level
as 'His' alleged creation. So, if you have to compare 'God' to one of 'His' creatures
in order to 'understand' 'His' nature (using analogy, metaphor and other tropes,
alongside words like "father", "person" or "architect"), it soon becomes
impossible to distinguished 'Him' from them, except, perhaps, in terms
of 'His' supposed magnitude. On the other hand, if 'He' is then sharply distinguished
from 'His' creation (so that no terms really, or literally, apply to 'Him') then nothing at all
can be said about 'God'. But, just as soon as any words are pressed into service
in order to characterise this mysterious 'Being', 'He'
is automatically embroiled in yet another ignominious
ontological
demotion.
If the gap between the 'Divine' and the mundane
is infinite, any attempt to bridge it must border on 'blasphemy', since it will either identify 'The Creation' with the
'Creator', or it will reduce the 'divine' to the profane. On the other
hand, if the gap is infinite, that will make 'God' absolutely incomprehensible,
not only rendering the word itself meaningless, but all talk about 'Him'
entirely vacuous.
Both approaches having failed, 'god-botherers' often fall
back on a time-honoured
via
negativa, beloved of Christian Mystics. For them, 'God' is notthis, notthat, not...
As that lapsed, right-wing
atheist, the late
Anthony Flew, once observed, in this way 'God'
winds up suffering "death
by a
thousand qualifications". In the end, 'He' ends up no different from
Nothing.01
But, if we know nothing whatsoever about 'God'
(unless we demote 'Him' in the above manner), and if 'He' is indeed indistinguishable from 'Nothing', how is the
use of the word "God" any different from, say, "Slithy
Tove"? Other than appealing to a rather questionable tradition
--, whereby the word "God" has been attached to all manner of things (ranging
from money to natural powers and forces, from Roman Emperors to..., yes...,
even
Eric Clapton) --, what can Believers point
to in order to explain the meaning of this word to those who only see
before them on the page or screen three perfectly ordinary letters ("G", "o", and "d")
knitted together into an inky sort of triplet, "God"?
Figure One: Is Clapton 'God'?
Figure Two: Some Think This Album
Says,
"Maybe!"
In like manner, to what can the DM-faithful
appeal in order to help non-believers comprehend their own invisible and equally incomprehensible 'Being'?
As we are about find out, this 'inverted' DM-Deity
-- the "Totality" -- likewise faces death by a thousand
'dialectical' qualifications.
Or, to be more honest, a thousand dialectical-prevarications...
At this point, less patient members of the
DM-fraternity (who have made it this far) might be tempted to respond with the
following seemingly obvious retort, the "It's everything!"
gambit --, as in, "Damn it, it's perfectly clear what
that the Totality is; it's everything!"
Unfortunately, that knee-jerk rejoinder is little
help since it
immediately prompts the following response: "And what does that include?"
As we are about to discover, there is no way of
answering that question in any way that fails to sink DM
one millimetre per
second slower than it has already sunk Theism.
For instance, does "everything"
include:
(a) All that exists
now?
(b) All that previously existed?
(c) All that will one day exist?
(d) All
that could exist?
(e) All that might have existed?
(f) Everything that has been discovered?
(g) Everything that hasn't (yet) been discovered?
(h) Everything that has been found, then lost (like
Phlogiston)?
(i) Everything that has been lost then found, then lost again (like
Democritus's and
Dalton's indivisible atoms)?
For example, in relation to Item (k), above, scientists
could one day unearth
some of those fabulous creatures. Any who harbour doubts might like to ponder
the discovery of the following remarkable beasts: the
Coelacanth,glypheoid lobsters,
jurodid beetles. Or, of course, they
could
watch
this video, which is about the truly
horrendous-looking and scarcely believable animals that have so
far been discovered lurking in the deep waters off our coasts (viewer
discretion is advised!); or maybe even
this video which takes an even wider look at the peculiar and
similarly unbelievable animals and plants that inhabit our planet.
At this point, the patience of one or two readers
might have stretched way past breaking point. If so, they are encouraged to
maintain their composure a little longer since the reason for asking the above rather odd questions will soon become
clear. In fact, several more, increasingly problematic but mercifully far less
annoying questions will soon emerge that promise to make those aired above seem rathertrivial in
comparison.
Some might now direct our attention to the TOR,
which, on some interpretations, seems to imply that the universe is
finite and
unbounded. "This is the Totality, our finite and
unbounded universe!", they might
insist.
Now, I don't wish to question the validity of the TOR, but since we don't yet
know for certain whether that mathematical aspect of this theory -- i.e.,
the supposed fact that
the universe is indeed finite and unbounded -- actually applies to our
world, it can hardly help
in any (convincing, let alone successful) attempt to understand what the "Totality" is.
As physicist,
Paul Davies,
once observed: "Cynics often say that there is speculation, speculation
squared, and cosmology."
Anyway, as we will
also soon discover, the TOR itself is no friend of DM.
To cap it all, there have been,
and there still are, DM-theorists who reject current theory -- i.e., much of the TOR,
as well as the alleged fact that the universe is finite -- and who therefore also
question whether it is either bounded or unbounded.
They also cast doubt on the 'Big Bang' itself. [On that, see Note 27.]
As I hope to show, even if clear answers to such perplexing questions
were forthcoming from the DM-fraternity, our problems would only just be
beginning, for as
Russell's Paradox has taught us, unless we define "everything" with due care
(and, it is worth adding, completely arbitrarily), we will end up with a
"Totality" that contains things it doesn't contain!
[A recent criticism of what has come to be known as "universally
unrestricted quantification" can be found
in Hellman (2006).]
At this point, it is worth noting that we are
beginning to face the same sort of problems in connection with the "Totality"
that we have seen confront Theologians for many centuries in connection with 'God', and who (in response) also
found they had to invent obscure metaphors, vague analogies and opaque jargon in
order to 'explain' 'His' nature.
[Readers are encouraged to keep that thought (and
the next) in mind as this
Essay unfolds.]
One suspects that down this road lies our very
own 'dialectical' via negativa as DM-theorists tell us, time and again,
"No, the Totality does not include this, or that, or
this, or...; nor does it mean this, or that, or...".
Be this as it may, even if DM-theorists
ever do manage to define the "Totality" (either carefully or satisfactorily), it would
clearly be a creature of
convention, and, just like "God", a human invention.
No wonder then that DM-fans fall silent when they
are asked to fill in the yawning gaps in their 'knowledge' of this 'God'-substitute, the "Totality".
[Below, I return to consider the vacuous "'It's
Everything!' Gambit" (henceforth, IEG) in much more detail.]
The short answer to that question is, "Not a lot."
The long
answer is, "Well..., er..., not a lot, squared."
Well, what do they say? Engels, as usual, writes much but manages to
say little (of any real help):
"When we consider and reflect
upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual
activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations
and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what,
where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes
away.... We see, therefore, at first
the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the
background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the
things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but
intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by
Heraclitus: everything is and is
not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into
being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy
culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great
merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual,
is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change,
transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal
connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development."
[Engels (1892),
pp.405-08. Some paragraphs
merged. Bold emphases added.]
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis
added.]
So, no clearer then...
[As should seem obvious, each of the above passages
offer their readers what is in effect just a variant on the
IEG, from
earlier.]
Perhaps 'The Great Teacher', Stalin, had the answer?
"Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of
phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but
as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected
with, dependent on, and determined by, each other. The dialectical method
therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by
itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena…. The dialectical method
therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the
standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the
standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into
being and going out of being…. Speaking of the materialist
views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all
is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the rudiments of
dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961), p.347.]"
[Stalin (1941), pp.837-38, 845. I have used a different edition of Lenin's
Philosophical Notebooks here. Several paragraphs merged.
Bold emphases added.]
Plainly not...
What about Bukharin?
"I am now writing on paper
with a pen. I thus impart pressures to the table; the table presses on the
earth, calling forth a number of further changes. I move my hand, vibrate as I
breathe, and these motions pass on in slight impulses ending Lord knows where.
The fact that these may be but small changes does not change the essential
nature of the matter. All things in the universe are connected with an
indissoluble bond…." [Bukharin (1925),
p.66.
Bold emphasis added.]
We needn't labour the point.1
There is little to nothing in the DM-classics that is of any real help in
trying to understand what dialecticians are referring to when they talk about
the "Totality", never mind 'universal inter-connection'.
[I have quoted several more DM-theorists to the above effect
here
and in Appendix B.]
A few years ago,
Martin Jay published an excellent book
entitled, Marxism And Totality. The
Adventures Of A Concept From Lukács To Habermas [i.e., Jay (1984)], but,
in over
500 pages, he studiously refused to saywhat his book was
actually about!
Admittedly, in Chapter One, Jay very
helpfully
summarised several classical and early modern
Holist
theories of nature and society, but they were themselves no less vague, imprecise
and as devoid of supporting evidence as the above passages are.
Maybe because he found little material to speak of in the DM-classics (or, indeed, in the
writings of contemporary 'systematic'
and other
academic dialecticians) to help him
explain this obscure concept, Jay ducked several important questions. Such as
whether Ancient Greek and Early Modern theories of 'the Whole'
are the same
as, or are different from, one another, or, indeed, are the same as, or are
different from, the DM-"Totality" itself. Are all these "Totalities"
the same? Or different?
After all, how would it even be possible to
decide?
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
For instance, how would it be possible to determine
whether Hegel's 'Whole' is the same as, or is different from,
Plato's?
Or,
Plotinus's?
Or,
Aristotle's? Or, any of the many "Wholes" that
litter most
of the world's philosophical and mystical belief systems? Given the additional fact that Hegel went out of his way to undermine the
universal validity of the
LOI, how could they be the same?
Here, for example, is
Alan Watts
informing his audience about The Totality Of All Being -- but, is his 'It' the same as Plato's
'It'? Or even Hegel's?
Video One: Is Alan Watts A DM-Ally?
Or A DM-Embarrassment?
After listening to what Watts had to say are you, dear reader, any the wiser?
Email
me if you think you are..., but don't forget to include a detailed, jargon-free explanation
-- and one supported by sufficient evidence.
Admittedly, the above mystics all use
typographically similar-looking words (e.g., one or more of the following: "Being", "The
Whole", "The Totality", "One", etc., or their equivalent
in their own language), but if the use of similar-looking words was enough to equate whatever they
supposedly depicted, we would surely be justified in concluding that, for example, Plato's "Forms"
were identical to those complicated, pre-printed sheets of paper you have to
complete in order to apply for a job, obtain a driving licence or sign up for a
credit card. Plainly, the use of typographically similar-looking words isn't
sufficient to identify the many 'Wholes' that Traditional Thinkers have
invented
over the last two-and-a-half thousand years. After all, is every 'god' the same?
Does anyone possess an
Identikit picture
of the "Totality", one that might help identify this mysterious 'object', perhaps
in a
line-up
of likely candidates? Has anyone seen its likeness etched in the
sand, shaped in the
clouds or carved on the surface of
Mars (in the way that some claim to
have discerned images of
Jesus or
The Virgin Mary on a
slice of toast or even a grape)?
Indeed, precisely what is the
criterion of identity for mystical, or even 'dialectical', "Totalities"?
Worse still, we don't have anything that could even
be labelled as a partialdescription of a single "Totality", ancient or modern, to assist us in
our quest. Can you, dear reader, imagine trying to decide whether or not two
individuals -- say, Woodruff Durfendorfer and Arthur Farfenickle -- were the same
or were different if you were given no clear
description to work with, no pictures to guide you, no DNA to rely on, no
relatives, friends or acquaintances to ask? But, even then you would at least have something to
go on: the knowledge that these
two were
at least supposed to be human
beings. Concerning the many "Wholes" and "Totalities" that assorted
philosophers and mystics
have concocted, we don't even have that much to go on. We
have no idea what kind of 'entity' we are dealing with here, the existence and
identity of which we
are being asked
to contemplate. We literally have nothing to work with.
No good doing a Google search or consulting Wikipedia.
Of course, as noted above, this puzzle hasn't been helped by the fact that
none of the ancient 'thinkers' who concocted these ideas were at all specific about
the nature and extent of the "Whole" they had just dreamt up. Neither
were the aforementioned mystics,
and for obvious
reasons.
After all, a crystal clear mysticwould lose
his or her licence to
mystify.
Nevertheless, in relation to the entire set of
"Wholists" (ancient
or modern), post-Hegelian Dialectical Mystics are easily the vaguest,
most equivocal and evasive. Prevarication and obfuscation taken way beyond the call of duty.
The rest of
Martin
Jay's book is devoted to expounding what contemporary dialecticians have or haven't thought about history,
society and the economy as possible examples of what can only be
described as
'sub-totalities' (but even that might be to read too much into what he was
trying to say!). However, as far as can be ascertained (and except for the
opening chapter) the "Totality" itself
is conspicuous by its absence from the entire work! That omission is, of course, quite remarkable in itself.
Indeed, it is decidedly odd, just as odd as it would have been had Darwin
neglected to mention natural selection, or had omitted all talk of species,
past, present and future, from
On The Origin
Of Species.
That isn't to pick a fight with Jay, since his book is
an excellent guide in its own way -- a sort of Dialectician's Alice, as it were. To be sure, if anyone wants to know
what Dialectical Marxists think about social wholes (albeit,
'described' in what looks
for all the world like an obscure, quasi-human, perhaps even Martian dialect), this is the place to look.
[HCD = High Church
Dialectician; that term is explained
here.]
Even card-carrying HCDs seem unwilling, or unable, to tell
an expectant world what the "Totality" actually is. Here, for instance,
isAlan Norrie (attempting to translate
into English the obscure Venusian
patois that litters the late
Roy Bhaskar's writings on this and other
topics):
"Totality, then, is the place
where different things are seen in their connection and are viewed as a whole."
[Norrie (2010), p.87. I return to Norrie's book in Essay Nine
Part
Two.]
Well, that clears things up, and no mistake!
"Totality" is the "place" where all the 'dialectical' action transpires, it
seems. That suggests, for Norrie (and maybe Bhaskar) that the "Totality" is a methodological
device, which, for all we know (or, rather, for all Norrie and Bhaskar
apparently know)
might be no more 'real' than the
Crystalline Spheres of medieval
astronomy. Or no more real than the
Tooth Fairy, which is another
'methodological device' to which the hand-waving parents
we
met earlier sometimes appeal in order to 'explain' why children's
teeth sometimes vanish from under their pillows to be replaced by a few coins.
[I return to Bhaskar's work briefly,
below,
and again in Essays Eight
Part Three and Nine
Part Two, but more extensively in Essay
Thirteen
Part Three.]
Update September 2023: Here is
Helena Sheehan's
attempt at clarification:
"Totality is an ongoing process, not a static or
finished thing. The verb totalizing, rather than the noun totality, better
captures its open-ended, always striving, process. It is an activity rather than
an object. It is an orientation toward the whole, not a finalized conception
of the whole. It is a way of thinking that endeavours always to understand
each phenomenon within the pulsing whole and the complex nexus of its
interactions." [Sheehan (2023), quoted from
here, accessed 26/09/2023. Spelling modified to UK English; bold
emphases added.]
So, for Sheehan, it looks like "Totality" is a
methodological concept, an orientation toward "the whole". But that is of
little help since she says virtually nothing about what this "whole" is supposed
to be! The term itself appears twenty-seven times in Sheehan's article, but by
the end the bemused reader will scratch her head and wonder what the hell
Sheehan is referring to -- except later in the same article the "whole" seems to
be equated with "nature". So, at best, this rather weak attempt to
address the topic (in an article whose title promised so much 'Totality: Decades
of debate and the return of nature', from someone who is otherwise a first-rate
theorist) turns out to be no more than a vague nod in the direction of
the IEG!
Nor are we told what this "nexus of interactions"
is, a key part of the overall theory other theorists have also left in limbo,
as we will
soon discover.
[I have said a little more about Sheehan's article,
below.]
So, it seems Dialectical Marxism is still missing its
Prince of Denmark.
The audience is becoming restless.
That is because Dialectical Marxists promised so
much -- a "method oriented toward" or even a 'theory about' "the
whole"/"everything", but we have yet to be told what this "whole"/"everything"
is!
Thisproject began back in July 1998 and was
originally intended to be an
extended
review of, and response to, John Rees's book, The Algebra Of Revolution
[Rees (1998a), or TAR], but it rapidly grew into something much more
comprehensive. Rees's book, for all its faults -- and all its strengths
--, has proven to be widely influential in one of the most
geographically-extensive, unorthodox Trotskyist Tendencies on the planet, the
IST/UK-SWP.
In that case, it is well placed to spread yet more dialectical confusion.
[Several years after the above words were first written Rees
resigned from the UK-SWP and now helps run Counterfire,
which means his ideas are no longer
viewed
by the IST as 'ideologically sound'. Comrades who at one time lauded this book now
either do the opposite, or they simply ignore it!
An ironic fate for any book on dialectics to have to face.]
Anyway, since Rees is one of the more recent
DM-authors to situate the "Totality" at the heart of his ideas
in this area,
his book appears to be a reasonably good place to start.
Unfortunately, as we are about to find out, it doesn't
matter where we begin, the 'descriptions' of this mysterious entity
(advanced by DM-fans drawn from all wings of Dialectical Marxism) turn out to be
thinner than a
flatworm on a crash diet!
Figure Three: Flatworms --
Remarkably Substantial In Comparison
Hence, it is no surprise to discover that, even though Rees clearly believes the "Totality" is a
core DM-concept [Rees (1998a), pp.5-8], apart from a
few rather vague gestures at defining or even explaining the term, he never really tells us what
'it' is!
Hard to believe? Well, one of
the few 'attempts' Rees makes at informing us what his book is actually about is the following:
"Totality refers to the
insistence that the various seemingly separate elements of which the world is
composed are in fact related to each other." [Rees (1998a), p.5.]
There seems to be something wrong with that
'definition' since it tells us that the "Totality" is actually an
"insistence"!
Can this be what "everything" is,
an
"insistence"?
Is this what the 'Big Bang' ushered forth? An ever-expanding "insistence"?
Admittedly, if the above rather odd 'definition' were to
be interpreted muchless unsympathetically, it would appear to
suggest that Rees intends the
word "Totality" to be
understood methodologically (rather like Alan Norrie from
earlier
and Helena Sheehan,
below)
But, even supposing that was his intention, exactly how the "Totality" can be
used this way is far from clear, especially if we still have no idea what the "Totality" actually is!
Furthermore, the above 'definition' seems to imply that the
idea that nature forms a 'unified whole'
is
either:
(i) A useful fiction;
(ii)A regulative idea (i.e., it
functions as an
interpretative device dialecticians like Rees use in order to assist them understand/explain nature and society,
all the better to help change the latter); or,
(iii) A statement of theoretical intent -- a sort of 'dialectical promissory
note' that indicates what Rees aims to do with the concept. In which case, as
the rest of this Essay will reveal, we are still waiting...
Nor are we told what the "relations"
Rees mentions actually are, even though they're supposed to inter-connect objects and processes right across the "Totality"
(or they're supposed to express the sort of inter-connections of interest
to DM-theorists).
In fact, we still remain in the dark
whether or not every object and process is inter-linked with every other
object and process,
or only with some, let alone in what way they
are inter-related.
[There is much more on these issues, below.]
Unfortunately, there are few other clues
in Rees's book
that
help the bemused reader understand the nature of this supposedly keyDM-'concept', 'object',
'process'
or 'methodological device'. One of the few extra
clues on offer appears in another brief passage where Rees
attempts
to link the "Totality" with "universal inter-connectedness"
itself, which is also something other
DM-theorists attempt to do (on that, see
here and
here):
"Lenin's worry is that
previous explanations of dialectics have simply shown that reality forms a
totality and that things which are assumed to be opposites are in reality
connected with one another. But they have not stressed that realityis a
contradictory totality or that it is the mutually antagonistic relationship
between the parts of the totality which are the motor force of its change and
development.... [The] natural and
social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a result
of…internal contradictions…. [N]ature is an interconnected system that developed
for millions of years before humans." [Ibid., pp.186, 285-86. Bold
emphasis alone added. Paragraphs merged.]2
This all-too-brief description of the "Totality"
suggests it is much more than a mere "insistence".
This appears to equate the "Totality" with
all of nature -- indeed, with all of "reality" --, but, as we
will soon discover, those terms themselves are far too vague to be of much
usetoanyone (other than a child with arm-waving parents). In
fact, Rees is here offering us his own version of the
IEG ploy,
discussed in more detail
below.
Worse still, what Rees has to say doesn't really distinguish DM from,
for instance,
Mystical Hermeticism:
"Another parallel between
Hermeticismand Hegel is the doctrine of internal
relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to
use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything
in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This
principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called
Emerald Tabletof
Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines
'As above, so below.'
This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis
for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences
between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is
the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is
reflected.... The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies."
[Magee (2008),p.13. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. More on this topichere. Paragraphs merged.]
However, Rees has an answer to the above claim that
mystics also have their own theories of, or ideas about, the "Totality":
"Totality alone is not,
however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of
society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own
mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation and a very practical
view of the temporal hierarchy that goes with it. 'The Taoist tradition in China
shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole being maintained by
the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.'... [Rees is here quoting Levins
and Lewontin (1985), p.275.] What unites all these
explanations is that they see the totality as static.... What they lack is any
notion of a totality as a process of change. And even where such systems grant
the possibility of instability and change, it is considered merely as a prelude
to a restored equilibrium.... Change, development,
instability, on the other hand, are the very conditions for which a dialectical
approach is designed to account." [Rees (1998a), p.6. Paragraphs merged.]
However, there are countless mystical systems that
view the world in almost exactly the same way as DM-theorists -- that is, as an
unstable, developing and changing Whole, which exists in states of permanent or
semi-permanent change/stasis, suffused by countless 'unities of opposites'. For
example, here is how the
Kybalion
(reputably the third most important book of
Hermetic
Philosophy) expressed this idea:
"'CHAPTER X POLARITYEverything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites;
like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different
in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be
reconciled.' -- The
Kybalion.
"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle
-- the
Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two
sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees
between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind
of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always
recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it
by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and
isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is
half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to
every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the
difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a
matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,'
and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in
degree'; and that the 'universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a
recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations
of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the
real nature of anything....
"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests;
everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.
"The great Third Hermetic Principle
-- the Principle
of Vibration -- embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the
Universe -- that nothing is at rest -- that everything moves, vibrates, and circles.
This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers
who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of
by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century
physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific
discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this
centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.
"The Hermetic Teachings are that
not only is
everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences'
between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to
the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL,
in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of
intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the
teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the
physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be
at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole
of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter.
Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes
of vibration.
"Modern Science has proven that all that we call
Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more
advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists
who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion.
Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in
matter and energy.
"In the first place, science
teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from
temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same
things -- it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and
vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle
to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes.
The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move
around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the
particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and
movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of
Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration.
The
atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc.,
which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and
which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all
forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of
Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first passage can be
accessed
here; the second,
here.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"For everything must
be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise."
[Copenhaver (1995), p.32. Bold emphasis added.]
The on-line version renders this passage
slightly differently:
"For all things must
consist out of antithesis and contrariety; and this can otherwise not be."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
Moreover, the Hermetic 'God' isn't external to the
universe, but is 'immanent', or 'internal' to it (hence 'He'/'She'/'It' also
changes), which is, of course, where
Hegel himself obtained the idea.
Here is Alan Watts, again:
"Buddhist enlightenment consists simply in
knowing the secret of the unity of opposites -- the unity of the inner and outer
worlds.... The principle is that all dualities and
opposites are not disjoined but polar; they do not encounter and confront one
another from afar; they exfoliate from a common centre. Ordinary thinking
conceals polarity and relativity because it employs terms, the terminals
or ends, the poles, neglecting what lies between them. The difference of front
and back, to be and not to be, hides their unity and mutuality." [Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases and link added.
Paragraphs merged.]
We also learn the following about the Hindu view of
'god':
"The three major gods of
Hinduism are
Brahma
(the creator; paradoxically of minor importance in actual practice -- possibly,
since his work is completed),
Vishnu (the preserver), and
Shiva
(the destroyer), each with a wife, to symbolize the androgyny of ultimate
reality. By theologians and educated Hindus in general, these gods and their
innumerable manifestations are viewed as pointing toward one transcendent
reality beyond existence and non-existence, the impersonal world-spirit
Brahman, the absolute unity of all opposites.... Hindus envision the cosmic process as the growth
of one mighty organism, the self-actualization of divinity which contains within
itself all opposites." [Quoted from
here.
(This links to a PDF.)
Bold emphases and links added. Paragraphs merged.]
As well as this, concerning
Sufist ideas on the subject:
"Sufism
is usually associated with Islam. It has developed
Bhakti
to a high point with erotic imagery symbolising
the unity of opposites.
The subtle anatomy and microcosm-macrocosm model also found in
Tantra
and
Taoism
is used by it, dressed in its own
symbols. Certain orders use ecstatic music and/or dance which reminds one of the Tantric
celebration of
the senses. Sometimes, the union of opposites is seen as a kind of gnosis. This
is similar to
Jnani Yoga." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphases
and links added.]
Furthermore, as noted above, Hegel was
also a
Hermetic Philosopher, a died-in-the-wool
Mystical Wholist, who believed in
change through contradiction (which fact, oddly enough, Rees seems to have
forgotten). [On that, see
here and
Note 4, below.]
Incidentally, it is worth adding that even
fascist mystics have embraced this ancient metaphysic:
"The cosmos operates through polarities, and
the interaction of these polarities causes change and evolution." [White
Order of Thule, quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added. However, you might need to take a lengthy shower
if you
decide to follow that link!]
Which is ironic in view of the fact that
Jewish
Mysticism also acknowledged the same basic theory!
Finally, there is this revealing comment:
"The ancient Egyptians believed that
a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A similar premise, that the
interaction between yin (the female principle) and yang (the male principle)
underlies the workings of the universe, is at the heart of much Chinese
thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy from the fourth century
B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many Chinese who are not
Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the Chinese. Peoples all
over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, have come to the conclusion
that the cosmos is a combining of opposites...."[Maybury-Lewis
(1992), pp.125-26. Bold emphases added.]
It wouldn't be difficult to extend indefinitely this list
of believers in some sort of 'unity of opposites' controlling the world until it became
clear
that practically every Mystic who has ever walked the earth thought (or thinks)
'dialectically' and believed in a 'contradictory', changing "Totality".
[A longer list of examples like those above, drawn
from mystical systems right across the planet, can be found
here
and
here. Many more
will be listed in Essay Fourteen Part One (when it is published).]
Er..., what was that again about "the ideas of the ruling
class..."?
Oh yes, this:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas,i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from
here. Bold
emphases added.]
So, "Totality" and change through
contradiction are just as much at home in Mystical Hermeticism (and other
similar systems) as they are in DM -- which is hardly surprising given the fact
that the latter developed out of the former. Once again,
Hegel was a
card-carrying Hermeticist.
Be this as it may, in an article about Engels, Rees
added the following remarks:
"Here the key
is to see all the different aspects of society and nature as interconnected.
They are not separate, discrete processes which develop in isolation from each
other. Mainstream sociological and scientific thought 'has bequeathed us the
habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, detached from the
general context'. Much of our schooling today still follows this pattern -- the
development of the arts is separated from that of the sciences, and 'technical'
subjects are separated from languages, history and geography. Our newspapers and
TV news programmes divide the world up in the same artificial way -- poverty
levels and stock exchange news, wars and company profit figures, strikes and
government policy, suicide statistics and the unemployment rate are all reported
in their own little compartments as if they are only distantly related, if at
all. A dialectical analysis tries to re-establish the real connections between
these elements, 'to show internal connections'. It tries, in the jargon of
dialectics, to see the world as 'a totality', 'a unity'.
"To see society
and nature as an interconnected totality which is in a process of constant
change still leaves one vital question unanswered. What makes this whole process
develop? Why does it change? There are any number of religious and
philosophical theories which try to answer this question by insisting that the
motor of change lies outside the historical process -- with god, or in the
unchanging pattern of human nature or in the eternal features of the human soul.
Marx and Engels rejected these approaches as mystical and, literally,
supernatural. They insisted that the processes which drove the development of
nature and society forward must be internal contradictions, not
supersensible entities like god, the soul or, as Hegel had argued, the general
essence of human consciousness existing somewhere in the ether beyond the
consciousness of actual living human beings." [Rees
(1994), p.62. Italic
emphases in the original.]
We have already seen that no sense can be
made of these 'contradictions' -- i.e., those that supposedly exist in nature and society (on
that, see
here,
here,
here and
here).
Independently of that, the social
aspects of the "Totality" are part of HM, discussion of which will largely
be omitted from this Essay. Since I don't deny that HM relies on factors
governing and inter-linking the whole of human history, there is nothing much
for me to question in this regard.3
[HM = Historical
Materialism.]
But, what about this passage (quoted earlier)?
"What unites all these
explanations is that they see the totality as static.... What they lack is any
notion of a totality as a process of change. And even where such systems grant
the possibility of instability and change, it is considered merely as a prelude
to a restored equilibrium.... Change, development,
instability, on the other hand, are the very conditions for which a dialectical
approach is designed to account." [Rees (1998a), p.6. Paragraphs merged.]
But that isn't the case with several of the above
mystics, for whom the material world will forever remain unstable, with no
sense that there will ever be a "restored equilibrium".
Also worth pointing out is the fact that in a future communist society (run along
lines suggested by Marx) there will be anequilibrium of sorts, because
class division will be a thing of the past. Here are Marx and Engels in The
Communist Manifesto:
"[T]he first step in the revolution by the working
class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the
battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest,
by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of
production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the
ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as
possible....
"When, in the course of development, class
distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the
hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its
political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the
organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during
its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to
organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the
ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of
production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the
conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and
will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old
bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an
association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free
development of all." [Marx
and Engels (1968b), pp.52-53); several paragraphs merged. Bold
emphasis added.]
At which point, presumably, human society will cease
to be a 'contradictory' sub-"Totality".
[Unless, of course, we accept the
existence of post-revolutionary "antagonistic" vs "non-antagonistic"
'contradictions', beloved of STDs and MISTs. On that, see Essay Nine
Part Two.]
Be this as it may, one important aspect of Rees's
use of this (yet-to-be-explained) term, "Totality", is the relationship that he and other
dialecticians
claim exists between parts and wholes:
"In a dialectical system, the
entire nature of the part is determined by its relationship with the other parts
and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts….
In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of
the parts but also that the parts become more than they are individually by
being part of the whole…." [Ibid., p.5.]4
The problem with this is that it still fails
to tell us what the "Totality" is, or what it involves.
Nor is it clear what these
"parts" are, too!
[On that, see the next subsection, as well as
Part Two.]
As far as can be ascertained, that is
virtually all Rees had to say in
TAR
and elsewhere about this supposedly important concept.5
Update September 3rd 2023:
In an article that is about to be published, Helena
Sheehan has this to say about
"Totality":
"How is it that classical Marxist authors were able
to address such a stunning array of issues? In the call for a recent conference
on Frederick Engels, organizers suggested possible themes in exploring the
legacy of Engels, suggesting class, gender, nature, science, religion,
colonialism, capitalism, and socialism. Many more could have been added. The
same could be said of Karl Marx, V. I. Lenin, Nikolai Bukharin, and many more
authors. What made it possible for them to encompass such a wide range of
themes? Of course, many people discuss many things, but do they encompass them
in a coherent perspective? Quite often, they do not. There is a difference
between scatty and systemic thinking, between eclecticism and synthesis, between
pluralism and holism, between a ragbag of assorted notions and a coherent and
comprehensive worldview. It is systemic thinking, synthesis, totality that
characterized the approach of the above theorists and continues to set apart the
best of what has come to be called Marxism.
"Totality is an ongoing process, not a static or
finished thing. The verb totalizing, rather than the noun totality, better
captures its open-ended, always striving, process. It is an activity rather than
an object. It is an orientation toward the whole, not a finalized conception of
the whole. It is a way of thinking that endeavours always to understand
each phenomenon within the pulsing whole and the complex nexus of its
interactions. There is a long history of controversy surrounding the concept
of totality both within Marxism and in the wider intellectual culture
surrounding it. My own version of that history that I propose to sketch here is
at odds with the version many other Marxists would put forward." [Sheehan
(2023), quoted from
here. Bold emphases added; several
paragraphs merged. Spelling modified to agree with UK English]
Sheehan's comments suggest she views "Totality" in
more-or-less the same way as Rees; that is, she understands this term
methodologically -- or, at least, she does so as a way of interpreting "the
whole". But this brief characterisation looks suspiciously circular, or it does
so until we are told what "the whole" is that doesn't rely on understanding what
"Totality" itself means!
However, the above article has yet to be published
in full on-line, so it would be grossly unfair to comment any further. I will
return to consider what Sheehan has to say in more detail when the entire
article is finally available. Having said that,
later in
this Essay I have dealt with other attempts to interpret
"Totality" in this way. [Update: Sheehan's article has now been
published
in full; readers are therefore directed to
my other (brief) remarks about it,
here.]
Clearly, this creates serious problems from the start. The 'uninitiated' have no
clear idea what Rees, Norrie, Sheehan and other DM-theorists areactually referring to,
or even talking about! And,
as
we have seen, anyone who might (sincerely) want to find out more about this
mysterious "Totality" will search long and hard,
and to no
avail, through the entire DM-literature for further
details.
Naturally, this means thatDM-theorists
themselves have no idea what they areactually talking about,
either!6
Anyway, if,
according to Rees, "The part
makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts", it turns out that it is in fact be impossible for
anyone to determine exactly what this mysterious "whole" amounted to before they were
clear about the nature of every single part of it.
Indeed,
Engels himself said as much (in unpublished preparatory material for his
book,
Anti-Dühring):
"Systematics impossible after
Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole,
but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Bold
emphasis alone added.]
It is a pity, therefore, that Engels didn't
keep the above comments in mind when he, too, began to speculate and fill his work with
"figments" of his own (or rather, Hegel's) imagination.
[Many of those
"figments" and "irrational fancies" were exposed for that they are in Essays Seven
Part One
and Eight
Part Three.]
Plainly, if Engels is right and the above clichéd saying about
parts and wholes (i.e., "The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the
parts") is correct, it would indeed be impossible to determine the nature of
any
of the parts before the nature of the whole had been ascertained and comprehended.
In turn, that means it would be impossible for anyone
to grasp a single rudimentary fact about part or whole, since no one
would know
anything about either (part or whole) before they knew everything about both.
[I
discuss this self-defeating aspect of DM in much greater detail in
Part
Two, where I have also responded to several obvious, and a few
not so obvious, objections.]
As is well-known, this was just one of the
many 'epistemological black holes' into which Hegelian Idealism dropped itself,
along with the theories of those gullible enough to give credence to anything
that confused mystic inflicted on his readers.7
And yet, whatever
steps subsequent Hegelians finally took (or might still take) in order to haul
themselves out of this
bottomless pit of obscurity and confusion -- and whether or not they succeed --, they don't appear to be available to DM-theorists. That is because
they tell all who will listen that their theory must be based on evidence,
not
conceptual manipulation or linguistic chicanery -- indeed, as
George Novack reminds us:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added. This echoes what Engels also had to
say, reproduced
below.
Other DM-theorists have also been quoted to that effect,
here.]
But, what sort of
evidence can DM-fans point to that hasn'talready been compromised in
the above manner? Clearly, any and all evidence relates to, includes
or is comprised of, such 'parts'. That is, any such evidence incorporates or
gives expression to supposed facts
that are also part of the 'Whole'
-- they aren't external to, or independent of, 'it'. In that case,if this theory (about parts and wholes) is to be believed,
the nature of each of these 'parts' -- i.e., the nature of the facts that constitute this
supposed evidential base --
can't itself be ascertained or comprehended until the 'Whole' has been, nor vice versa.
In short, the meaning and significance of every
aspect of
this 'evidence' would be unclear until the nature of the 'Whole' has been
ascertained. But, that can't happen, either, since the nature of the 'Whole' itself remains obscure,
at least until the nature of
each part -- or each fact -- had already been comprehended, and so on ad infinitem.
There seems to be no way to break into
this Idealist circle: the status of all such evidence can't be known,
ascertained or comprehended until the 'Whole' has been, and the nature of the
'Whole' can't be understood unless every scrap of
determinate physical evidence has been comprehended, in order to do just that!8
At this point, an appeal to 'approximate' or
'relative' truth would be no help, either. That is because the nature and status
even of
'approximate' or 'relative' truth can't be ascertained until the nature of the 'Whole' had been,
if the
above neat slogan is to be believed. Nor would an appeal
to a series of 'developing approximations' that are supposedly converging on the
'Whole Truth', or, indeed, which are edging ever closer to some form of
'decreasingly relative truth'. According to this theory, unless the entire truth
about everything was already known no one would be in any position to know that
'relative truths' were themselves even relative or even
approximations. Indeed,
unless the entire truth about everything was already known, no one would be in
any position to know whether or not there was
even such a thing as 'The
Whole Truth', to begin with!
Furthermore, before humanity possessed a clear idea
of what could count
as 'Absolute Truth' --, or, indeed, 'The Whole Truth' --, no one would be in any position to declare that 'relative' truth had approximated to
that Ideal
by so much or so little. An
approximation only makes sense if we know with what it is that it
approximates, but for us to know that we would have to know what
constitutes 'Absolute Truth'! And that in turn is impossible since humanity won't know
anything about anything before it had reached that epistemological summit, the Final
State. But, according to DM-theorists,
humanity
will never reach that end point. [Why that is so will be revealed
presently.]
Again, as Engels pointed out:
"[T]he knowledge of this
system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597.
Boldemphasis alone added.]
In that case, the obscure nature of each DM-part undermines
knowledge of the
DM-'Whole', just as the shadowy nature of the DM-'Whole' undermines
knowledge of each DM-part, the exact opposite of what the
neat slogan sought to tell us.
Which is yet another ironic 'dialectical
inversion' for readers to ponder.
That might help explain why Rees was so
cagey about the "Totality" and why his 'definition' amounted to little more than a
throw-away line, a half-hearted gesture, almost an afterthought. Indeed, there is nothing that could have been said
about this nebulous concept, or its murky parts, that would be consonant
with a believable form of materialism. Or, for that matter, which didn't
automatically undermine DM itself, as we
have just seen.9
Once again, that shouldn't surprise us given the
mystical origin of all such talk.
While it now seems
clear that nothing could be said about the "Totality" or its parts before
everything was known about both, it is also worth pointing out that
if dialecticians were correct, it wouldn't even be possible tobegin to say
anything truthful about anything, since,
ex hypothesi, nothing would be known about the parts (and hence
about the Whole)
until the end of an
infinite epistemological
journey:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.234-35. Bold emphasis
alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
"The reproaches you make
against the law of value apply to all concepts, regarded from the
standpoint of reality. The identity of thought and being, to express myself in
Hegelian fashion, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. But although a concept has the essential nature of a concept
and cannot therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from
which it must first be abstracted, it is still something more than a fiction,
unless you are going to declare all the results of thought fictions because
reality has to go a long way round before it corresponds to them, and even
then only corresponds to them with asymptotic approximation." [Engels to
Conrad Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphasis added. I have used the on-line version here, which
differs slightly from the published text.]
"Systematics impossible after
Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole,
but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic
emphases in the original.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world…. [I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93. Bold emphases
alone added. Paragraphs merged.]
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In
social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away
is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in
accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and
further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.
The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so
is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the
course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the
subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and
we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which
depart from concrete history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[I have quoted several other DM-theorists to the
same effect,
here. At this point, a knee-jerk appeal to practice
would be to no avail, and for reasons set out in Essay Ten
Part One.]
According to the above, humanity will never
achieve this Blessed End State.
That is, of course, one of the least appreciated consequences of
trying to 'invert' Hegelian Idealism:
material reality may only be 'comprehended' by beginning
at the end!
Hence, not even the
Owl of Minerva
would be identifiable until Epistemological Judgement Day had dawned, by
which time who would be left to care whether or not it flew?
In the absence
of anythingthat
even
remotely resembles a superficial characterisation (let alone a definition)
of this obscure DM-'object' -- the "Totality" -- we are forced to press the sort
of questions that
DM-theorists consistently ignore, or from which they prefer to deflect:
(1) What exactly is the DM-"Totality"?
(2) What does 'it' contain'? And,
(3) What is the nature and extent of 'its'
inter-connections?
I propose to examine two
possible approaches/answers to Question (1). The first introduces what I shall call the
"Ontological Definition" of the "Totality" (because it involves a consideration
of what might comprise a plausible contents list); the second I propose to call the "Epistemological
Definition" (since its aim will be to link this mysterious 'entity'/'object'/'process' with the
current extent of
human knowledge, experience and practice).
[However, my use of the
word "definition" (above) is slightly misleading. That is because the material below in no way
constitutes a definition! In my defence, I can only pass the buck to
DM-theorists themselves, whose job this should have been, not mine!]
In response to the foregoing it could be
objected that it is perfectly clear that the "Totality" includes
everything in
the Universe --, or, at least, everything in existence. [This is the
IEG, re-stated from earlier.]
In fact, many leading physicists believe we exist in
just such a
"multiverse":
"Multiverse
theory suggests that our universe, which consists of billions and billions of
planets, stars and galaxies and extends out tens of billions of light-years, may
not be the only universe in existence. There could be another universe that is
completely different from ours with its own natural laws. Even more
maddeningly, there may not be just one, but an infinite number of such
universes, all of which differ from one another and harbour millions of
celestial bodies and even intelligent life forms, just like our own universe....
"Multiverse theory assumes that our universe is
only a small member of an enormous multitude of universes. The idea of the
multiverse arose from a now widely popular theory -- the
inflation theory. It was developed in
1980 and filled in some information gaps where the
Big Bang theory was lacking. Although
the Big Bang theory offers a valid explanation for the origin of the universe,
it has three significant problems. First of all, it doesn't explain the
flat geometry of our universe. In
addition, it also doesn't account for the
monopole problem and the
horizon problem associated with our
universe. In other words, the Big Bang theory fails to explain why there is so
much homogeneity in the universe's structure....
"The multiverse theory is a hotly debated topic in
the scientific world. Some believe that it is merely a fascinating proposition
straight out of science fiction, while others support the legitimacy of the
multiverse idea. Scientists are trying to find evidence of the existence of
multiple universes by observing distortions in electromagnetic radiation left
over from an early stage of the universe. Certain special types of black
holes can also provide clues to the existence of the multiverse.
The idea of multiple universes is so astounding that it has been hypothesized
not only in cosmology and astronomy, but also in philosophy, music, literature,
science fiction, and even religion. Because of the universality of this
idea, these 'other' universes are called by different names, including parallel
universes, alternate universes, parallel realities, quantum realities,
alternative realities, and more." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 24/08/22. Several paragraphs merged; all but
two links added. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases
added.]
[On this, see Hossenfelder (2022), Chapter Five, 'Do
Copies Of Us Exist?'. See also
below for evidence that other universes
might actually exist.]
The following video summarises several of the
theories physicists have come up with in this area:
Video Two: "What Would Other
Universes Look Like?"
However, the next video questions the theory that there are multiverses, but it does so by
inadvertently torpedoing Quantum Mechanics [QM]:
Video Three: All Multiverse
Theories Are 'Unscientific'
In the above,
theoretical physicist,
Dr Sabine Hossenfelder, argues that
multiverses are intrinsically unobservable and hence can form no part of
science. [Of course, that doesn't itself imply they don't exist only that this
topic is no business of science.] And yet, that is also the case with many other states, events and processes that
are part of established science and which can't, even in theory, be
observed
-- such as 'Quantum
Superposition'. That state can't be observed without
collapsing the wave function involved, thus
losing that very quantum state. This isn't to deny there is such a quantum
state (nor that there is much indirect evidence such states exist), merely to point out that
Dr Hossenfelder's criterion would imply QM isn't a
science (at least
as it is currently understood)!
So, are multiverses part of the "Totality"
or not? If they are, are they observable? Or is our current understanding of QM
-- or even the nature of science itself -- radically misconceived?
Maybe both are, maybe not, but the problem with
a
knee-jerk "IEG. End. Of. Story!" response is that it is not only hoplessly vague
itself, it isfar too generous.
The
'Polo Mint' Totality: A Whole
With A Gaping Hole In The Middle
If the
"Totality" is supposed to include everything that exists,
several awkward questions
immediately
force themselves on us.
For instance: Does the "Totality"
comprise:
(i) All
that exists in the present?
(ii) All
that used to exist in the past?
Or,
(iii) Both?
Since DM-theorists are looking for a historical explanation of the development of class
society (etc.), and because they think everything in nature and society is
inter-connected, it seems they must at least accept Option (iii), and so count
whatever exists, or has existed, in the past
and the present as part of the "Totality".
But, if (as appears to be the case) the past is no more, how can it be
part of anything, let alone the "Totality"? In what sense can something
that doesn't exist be a part of anything?10
On the other hand, if the "Totality" does include
the past, that will mean 'it' contains countless objects and processes that don't actually exist
-- unless, of course, we are prepared to believe that things in the past do in
fact still
exist, somewhere.
[On that possibility and its connection with the
TOR, see Video Six.]
However, if objects and processes in the past don'tactually exist, but are still deemed to be part of the "Totality", then
it looks like 'it' must contain some things that can (at best)'exist'
only as ideas about the past -- that is, presumably those that 'exist' in
the thoughts of anyone living in the present. And if that is so, it would appear to
mean that the "Totality" is part material, part
Ideal.
Any alternative to that (which holds that only
currently existing objects and processes are part of the "Whole") would
clearly imply that the
vast bulk of the visible universe can't be part of the "Totality", in view of
the fact that most of the stars we see at night, for example, no longer exist!
Even if the above inferences are misguided
in some way, and it turns out that everything in the "Totality" is
inter-connected, another inconvenient question immediately imposes itself on us: How is it possible for
ideas
of the past
--
or, how is it even possible for the actual past itself --
to be inter-linked with everything
that currently exists? Indeed, if the "Totality" includes objects and processes
that 'exist'
only as ideas about them (since they no longer actually exist), what were they
inter-connected with
before any ideas about them had even been formed -- i.e.,
before sentient life evolved?
As seems reasonably clear, while the past might be connected
with the present (we will let awkward questions about that possibility slide for now),
the past itself surely can't be inter-connected with the present. That is, the present can't be
back-connected with the past (which it would have to be for the past and the
present to be inter-connected, not just connected). On the other hand,
if past and present are inter-connected, that would surely imply some form of
'backward causation'. Alternatively again, if they aren't inter-connected,
and the "Totality" itself contains
onlyinter-connected objects and processes, then that would mean the past can't be part of the
"Totality", after all!11
In that case, until
DM-fans inform us otherwise, the above connections will be interpreted
causally. Hence, for object, event or process, A, to be
"connected" to object, event or process,
B, there must be some sort of cause or causal link (actual or potential) running fromAtoB -- but
not necessarily fromBtoA. However, for such objects, events or processes to be inter-connected,
there must be some sort of cause or causal chain (actual or potential) fromA toB as well as fromBtoA
[It should also be noted that the word "cause" is
here being interpreted very broadly, to include all that DM-theorists
themselves might understand by that term, should we ever be told with any
clarity what that is!]
For example, to state the obvious, while a lightning strike might
be the cause of a forest fire, the forest fire isn't the cause of the lightning
strike. Plainly,this example illustrates a connection between two events,
not their inter-connection.
An excellent example of an inter-connection would be a
feed-back loop; but even then
the various components in such a loop would typically co-exist. Thus, if there is a feedback loop
between A and B, it would seem that in the vast majority of cases both A and B
would both co-exist in some form or other -- even if the latter turns out to be an ephemeral or intermittent
co-existence -- or they must both exist/endure in the same temporal zone (howsoever
that is
conceived). They won't exist decades or centuries apart, for instance!
In this sense, therefore, the question is: How can past and present
be inter-connected if we don't allow for 'backward causation'?
Furthermore, but more worryingly, any ideas we
now form, or which we might now entertain, about the past
plainly correspond with nothing at all, since the past doesn't exist
for anything to correspond with 'it'/'them' -- except, perhaps, with yet more ideas
about 'it'/'them'. Hence, so conceived, the "Totality" wouldn't even be objectively Ideal
-- at least, not with respect to the past --, never mind whether or not 'it' is
a material, or a physical, 'entity' 'Itself'.
If that interpretation of the DM-"Totality" is
correct, one half of the supposed
'correspondence relation' between our ideas of the past and the past itself
wouldn't exist, or rather, wouldn't hold. That in turn would appear to
mean there could be no 'objective'
relationship between our ideas of the past and the past itself --, certainly not
one of correspondence.
In order to avoid intractable problems like these
we might be tempted to restrict the "Totality" to things that exist only
in the present; that is, we end up limiting the "Totality" to objects and processes that
only enjoy contemporaneous
material existence, wherever they happen to be located in the universe.
Of course, given the validity of
Special Relativity, awkward questions about
simultaneity will need to be swept under the rug if that option
were adopted by DM-theorists and then applied across the board to all of nature.
Independently of that, the above suggestion (that we
restrict the "Totality" to things that exist only in the present) generates
several problems of its own. For example, the "Totality" would contain no
historically significant events (or, perhaps worse still, it would contain no historical events at all!), without which nothing that
happens in the present would have taken place. Depicted this way, the "Totality"
must surely become explanatorily useless, since an appeal would now have
to be made to (Ideal) 'objects and processes' outside the "Totality" to
account for those inside!
Indeed, if the "Totality"
were to be limited in this way, it would become
precariously ephemeral.
That is because the present is of extremely limited duration (that is, if it has
any duration!). Nevertheless, just such an extremely slender "Totality" would seem to be implied by this option,
whether or not it is correct.
Is the DM-Totality, therefore, a Whole with a
huge hole in it? Is there little or no substance to it at all?
At this point, some readers might be forgiven their
growing impatience for it would seem that the present author is
putting words in the mouths of Dialectical Marxists, perhaps in an endeavour to run
rings around them (no pun intended!).
Unfortunately, speculation
like this has been forced on us because of the extremely limited information
about this topic in the DM-literature, even if some credit (but not much!) is
given to the few dialecticians who bother to mention the "Totality" (or its
equivalent); or, indeed, those
who actually manage to say something (anything!) substantive about 'it'. [On that, see
especially Appendix B,
as well as
here.]
This
glaring omission represents an information black hole at the heart of
Dialectical Marxism, the nature and
extent of which is further aggravated by
the reluctance of dialecticians even to address this problem.
Others might be tempted to conclude that the above is
further evidence of the present author's obvious bias and nit-picking pedantry.
Of course, everything is now crystal clear!
This is all my fault.
How dare I have the cheek to ask such awkward questions! When will I learn!? When
will I stop holding DM-fans to their own 'high ideals'? When will I stop reminding
them that they never tire of telling the world that if their theory is to avoid
being labelled a form of Idealism, it should be supported by evidence,
and that the concepts used should all be entirely
perspicuous?
Here,
for example,
are the words of just a few DM-theorists who at least gave lip-service to
that protocol:
"Finally, for me there could be no
question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of
discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels
(1976), p.13. Bold emphasis added.]
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"We all agree that in every field of
science, in natural and historical science, one must proceed from the given
facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms of
motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science too the
interconnections are not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in
them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.
"Just as little can it be a question of
maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by
the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line. Hence, with the fall of
the idealist point of departure, the system built upon it, in particular
Hegelian natural philosophy, also falls. It must however be recalled that
the natural scientists' polemic against Hegel, in so far as they at all
correctly understood him, was directed solely against these two points: viz.,
the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of
the system." [Ibid.,
p.47. Bold emphases alone added.
Unfortunately, this passage no longer appears at the Marxist Internet Archive!]
"In this way, however, the whole dogmatic content of the Hegelian system is
declared to be absolute truth, in contradiction to his dialectical method, which
dissolves all dogmatism...." [Engels
(1888), p.589. Bold emphasis added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), p.597. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"The dialectic does not liberate the
investigator from
painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of
the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere
of knowledge, like an ever-ready master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on
facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development…."
[Trotsky
(1973), p.233.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The dialectic is not a magic master key for all
questions. It does not replace concrete scientific analysis. But it directs
this analysis along the correct road, securing it against sterile wanderings in
the desert of subjectivism and scholasticism." [Trotsky
(1971), p.68.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Idealism and metaphysics are the
easiest things in the world, because people can talk as much nonsense as they
like without basing it on objective reality or having it tested against reality.
Materialism and dialectics, on the other hand, need effort. They must be based
on and tested by objective reality. Unless one makes the effort, one is liable
to slip into idealism and metaphysics." [Mao, quoted from
here. Bold emphasis added.]
"The criticism to which the idealism of
the
Deborin
school has been subjected in Soviet philosophical circles in recent years has
aroused great interest among us. Deborin's idealism has exerted a very bad
influence in the Chinese Communist Party, and it cannot be said that the
dogmatist thinking in our Party is unrelated to the approach of that school.
Our present study of philosophy should therefore have the eradication of
dogmatist thinking as its main objective." [Mao
(1961b) p.311. Bold emphasis and link added.]
"A consistent materialism cannot
proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason,
intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source.
Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon
evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in
practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
"The
basic conceptions of dialectical materialism have in the first place been taken
from nature,
not arbitrarily imposed upon it...."
[Novack, quoted from
here. Bold emphasis added.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
"Materialism is not a dogmatic system. It is
rather a way of interpreting, conceiving of and explaining every question."
[Ibid., p.17. Bold emphasis added;]
"Separating knowledge from
practice, many philosophers have also maintained that knowledge is built up by a
process of 'pure thought'. The senses, they say, are unreliable, and cannot be
the source of knowledge, to gain which we should...rely on the intellect
alone.... What we know about the
material world is derived form the exercise of our senses. Any supposed
knowledge which goes beyond that is not knowledge but fantasy, and any supposed
objective reality inaccessible to the sense is not real but imaginary. [Can this
dogma be 'derived from the senses'? -- RL.]
"It may be objected that
these are dogmatic statements, but there is no dogma here. On the contrary, once
we get away from this fundamental materialist position we get away from
verifiable knowledge and into the realms of pure speculation. One we allow
ourselves to start inventing 'realities' which cannot in any way be detected by
the instrumentality of the senses, we are away into the clouds.... [Can this too
be 'derived from the senses'? -- RL.]
"Hence we should steadily
reject all 'principles' and dogmas which claim to be known independent of
experience, independent of the exercise of the senses, whether by some inner
light or by virtue of some authority. [Such as the alleged contradictory nature
of motion,
which can't be verified by
the senses? -- RL.] We should not trust those who seek to impose their views
because they claim to possess some special intellectual gift, or to have been
initiated into some mystery, or to be empowered with some special authority.
We should be sceptical, and accept nothing from
anyone which cannot be explained and justified in terms of practice and sense
experience." [Cornforth (1963), pp.156-57. Quotation marks altered to
conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added; some paragraphs
merged.]
"Precisely because Marx's dialectic is a
materialist one, however, it does not start from intuition, preconceptions or
mystifying schemes, but from a full assimilation of scientific data. The
method of investigation must differ from the method of exposition. Empirical
facts have to be gathered first, the given state of knowledge has to be fully
grasped. Only when this is achieved can a dialectical reorganization of the
material be undertaken in order to understand the given totality. If this is
successful, the result is a 'reproduction' in man's thought of this material
totality: the capitalist mode of production." [Mandel
(1976), p19. Bold emphasis added. (This links to a PDF.)]
"This law of dialectical process is like
the others in that it cannot be arbitrarily 'foisted' on Nature or history. It
cannot be used as a substitute for empirical facts, or used to 'predict' things
without a concrete study of the facts in question…. Dialectics is not magic. It provides no
mysterious formulas with occult properties, by means of which most marvellous
and unexpected results can be arrived at. [Dialectical laws] are...merely the
most general, universally found characteristics of process, and as such
they give us a method for investigating processes concretely in various
particular fields. But they can in no way eliminate the need for this detailed
investigation which falls within the province of one or other of the special
sciences." [Guest (1939), pp.49-50, 74. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
"The central idea in Dialectical
Materialism is that of transformation. The problem is at the same time: How do
transformation occur and how can we make transformations occur? The approach
to this problem lies not in a philosophical analysis and definition of
transformation, but in an examination of all observable facts in the universe as
they are known to us from various sources, scientific and historical.... Dialectical Materialism is not a not
a formula to be applied blindly either in the natural or human world. The
facts must first be known and the field of application delimited before it is
possible to say whether such and such a phenomenon exhibits a dialectical
movement or is part of a larger process exhibiting such a movement." [Bernal
(1935), pp.90, 109. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
"Great care has to be taken not to
impose any abstract thought interpretations upon the external world. Its
independent properties must be allowed to build up in the mind and not have some
premature abstract thought imposed on these, concealed and unknown
properties.... Training
and using our senses properly means to avoid imposing thought images on the
external world." [Gerry Healy, quoted in North (1991), pp.89-90. Bold
emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]
Finally, the
on-line editors of Tony Cliff's article, 'Deflected Permanent Revolution', added
the following remarks:
"Marx wrote: 'Philosophers have
explained the world.
The point however is to change it.' Marxists are often accused by our
opponents of being dogmatic and doctrinaire theorists. Nothing could be further
from the truth. If the point is to change the world then socialist theory
must always be changed and updated in the light of experience. This is what
Trotsky did and this is what Tony Cliff set out to do in this re-examination of
Trotsky's theory." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphases added. This comment does not appear in the pamphlet
version of this article. What
Marx actually said
was this: "The philosophers have only interpreted the
world, in various ways; the point is to change it."]
[I have quoted several other DM-fans who say
more-or-less the same,
here.]
Unfortunately for DM-fans, the above accusation
(about the present author's alleged 'pedantry'), if it were ever to be aired, would only serve to confirm an earlier
allegation: that when pressed on this topic
DM-fans soon become evasive, and then deflect onto me. It would also
concede the fact that
not even DM-fans know what their "Totality" is or contains, or, indeed, with what any of its
'parts' are inter-connected! Or even what any of these
inter-connections actually are!
As we dive ever deeper into these murky
dialectical depths it seems the "Totality" is increasingly beginning
to resemble what theologians have to say about 'God'...
How odd!
Anyone would think the 'father of modern-day
dialectics' was a Christian!
However, if the past
now exists only as an idea (or better still, now 'exists' only
conceptually, expressedperhapsin orby our use of differentially tensed verbs and the like, or maybe only exists in our 'thoughts about it'),
and if 'it' is still to be
included in 'the Whole', then the vast bulk of the "Totality" must be Ideal. That
is because, of course, the past is far longer than the
present. It is also because it seems (to some philosophers, at least) that the present has
no durationat all. As
Augustine pointed out, if the present had any duration, it would have its own
temporal parts, a 'before' and an 'after', a 'later' and an 'earlier'.
Naturally, that would imply the present was in fact part past and part future,
itself.
[I
hasten to add that I
reject the above metaphysical argument (i.e., the
one presented by Augustine), but I can see no way that DM-fans will be able to
counter it. However. my reason for rejecting it will take us too far afield, so I will
have to let that topic slide for now.]
These
seemingly paradoxical results might end up providing yet more grist to the DM-mill
since they appear to advertise the 'contradictory' nature of 'reality'. But, apart from
saddling this metaphysical 'problem' with an
even more obscure term
(i.e.,
calling it a 'dialectical contradiction'),
how would this help anyone understand time or the
nature of the present
any better?
Several other rather surprising results now follow
from the above observation --, as well as from the CTT, a theory of truth widely accepted in DM-circles.
[More on that in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two, when they
are published.]
If propositions about the past are true just in case they
correspond with events in the past, then that would actually make it impossible todeclare
them true. That is because, as noted earlier, there is nothing with which they could correspond
other than yet more ideas --, or, in practice, with the content of yet more
indicative sentences -- about the past,
since the past is no more.
Undeniably, we may draw true or false
conclusions about the past based on evidence now before us, but such evidence (of
necessity) only exists, directly or indirectly, in the present.
Furthermore, whatever it was
such evidence once related to (in this sense) no longer exists so it is difficult to
see how such non-existents could form part of a correspondence relation
with anything at all, at least, not in any obvious sense. Or,
as seems equally plain, not without another damaging concession to Idealism.
In response, it could be countered that
the past is an objective feature of reality. If so, it would seem the above conclusions
are completely misguided.
Or so it could be argued...
Unfortunately, the meaning of the term "objective"
is, at best, hopelessly vague, at worst, terminally obscure. [That was demonstrated in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
Nevertheless, whatever that word appears tomean,
it is of little help, anyway. That is because it would still be unclear how anything (such
as the past) could be "objective" if it doesn't exist.
'Objectivity' --
according to Lenin,
at least -- has something to do with existence independent of the human mind,
and yet we appear to have something here (the past) that doesn'texist
except we form ideas about it.
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
In which case, plainly, the past (so conceived) isn't independent of
the mind, or "of man". That being so, it can't be "objective" (always
assuming, of course, that Lenin is to be believed).
Again,
it could be objected that
our beliefs about the past are true just in case they correspond with past
individuals,
objects and
events, whose existence might in turn be confirmed by
an appeal to evidence in the form of documents, artefacts and assorted remains,
etc.
However, quite apart from the circularity of
the above rejoinder, this doesn't alter the fact that the past no longer
exists, nor
does it affect the conclusion that the confirmation of propositions about the past requires
the use of contemporaneous objects and events. That is, it necessitates the
use of evidence situated in the present, the employment of which is
typically augmented by
the use of differentially tensed verbs. Once more, that is because such evidence (in the shape of the aforementioned documents, artefacts and assorted remains)
clearly exists in the present. Without the use of a working time
machine, we don't have access to a body of evidence from the past that is still located
there, in the
past!
Truths about the present are quite unlike those
about the past, whatever we finally conclude about the
nature of any supporting evidence pertaining to one or both. That can be
seen by the way we form sentences relevant to each; as noted above, we use sentences with
differentially
tensed verbs. That is partly where the rebuttal reported
earlier
itself went astray; it failed to explain -- as similar attempts must always fail
to explain without the
use of suitably tensed verbs -- precisely with what
contemporaneous
propositions about the past are supposed to correspond if 'one half' of
that (hypothetical) relationdoesn't actually exist.12
Admittedly, such 'difficulties' don't just plague the
CTT
(if and when
that theory is applied to past events). The CTT
collapses into some form of Idealism whatever time period is chosen for it,
or to whatever time frame it is applied (as will be
demonstrated in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two, when they are published).
Philosophical 'problems' like this (concerning past, present
and future)
invariably arise because of inappropriate interpretations imposed on phrases like "The past", "The
present" and "The future".12a
It has thus seemed to some that if such expressions resemble, or seem to
function
like, Proper Names (or, indeed, they appear to be referential, or it is
thought they can be
used referentially),
then there must be 'something' to which they correspond,
or which they designate or name, which 'something' must therefore exist...,
er..., somewhere...
A 'philosophical search' is then hastily launched in order to locate these pseudo-entities
-- 'The Past' and/or 'The Future' -- conjured into existence by yet another crude
misuse of language.13
Plainly, if the past exists, we have to use the present tense to
refer to it -- as has just been done in the previous few paragraphs. Again, if
we were to interpret those verbs in a similarly crude manner, it would seem to
suggest the
past isno
longer in the past, but in the present! In turn, that would imply the past has in
fact been misnamed or mis-characterised.14
The depiction of the past in this way is clearly
inappropriate, for it would appear to mean its existence was an
empirical question, an activesearch for which would be
appropriate since it would resemble a hunt for, say,
Bigfoot, only far more
challenging.
If
something exists, then, in theory, we should at least be able to
identify and locate it, even if that can't actually be done at present (no pun
intended), or even if this were only possible remotely, 'at a distance', as it were.
Unless we accept the possibility of time travel (a fantasy that is itself based
on confusions like this -- more on that below and in a later Essay, until then,
see Dummett (1993b)), this isn't a viable option.
Clearly, these terminological 'difficulties' have arisen
out of an inappropriate and
misleading analogy drawn between space and time.
For some, this connection appears to suggest that just as objects in space can be located
somewhere (for example, using an ordered Cartesian triple, <x1,
y1,
z1>), those in
spacetime can be located both somewhere and somewhen (using an ordered quadruple, <x1,
y1,
z1,
t1>).
But, the word "time" now assumes an entirely new meaning, since these
theoretical moves
depend on the aforementioned analogy drawn between location in time
and location in space -- or, at least, because these two 'concepts' have now been
put on the same level.
Indeed, as we have just seen, this is done by the simple expedient of adding a fourth
variable to the Cartesian
co-ordinate system.15
Clearly, this now suggests that just as we can move about in space we should
also be able to move about in time, and hence that such moves can in some way be equated,
or even combined in something called "spacetime".
Clearly, analogies like this appear to validate the
following inference: since objects located in space can (typically) co-exist,
that must also be the case with objects located in time. This further motivates the idea that since some future-tense indicative
sentences appear to be true now, they must correspondwith, or
must refer to, events which have yet to occur. It is then but a short step to
the conclusion that future events must now exist in a shadowy form
in, well..., er..., 'The Future'.
Unfortunately, that, too, appears to situate such 'future events'
in the present! Similarly with those in 'The Past'.
[Notice: the present tense has had to be used to make
the above points.]
Naturally, this would mean that all events -- past,
present and future -- co-exist (present tense, again)! All this
'deep metaphysics' conjured into existence by means of a few simple tricks with coordinate systems,
verbs, prepositions and nouns; an entire ontology conjured
into existence by the simple expedient of adding another variable to an ordered
triple -- creating a theory that, as we will see,
no one really understands!
In order to side-step awkward
questions like these we might be tempted into arguing that the "Totality"
includes everything that exists, a-temporally.
Unfortunately, that suggestion is little help since it is unclear what a-temporal
existence could possibly mean -- except, perhaps, that phrase might apply to a 'Deity'
of some sort, and, incidentally, one that couldn't actually do anything.17a
That would, of course, link the DM-"Totality" even
more closely with those
earlier ruminations about 'God'.
Independently of all that, can we say anything more
about all those 'universal inter-connections'?
Here are the thoughts of a
fully paid-up member of the
HCD-Fraternity outlining an argument in
favour of linking inter-connection with "Totality" (in what
is a relatively, and uncharacteristically, clear passage from this theorist):
"This [i.e., a
'transcendental' deduction for totality -- RL] seems relatively easy for social
life. Consider once more our paradigmatic book...in the library.... There is an
obvious sense in which the book, if recently published, existentially
presupposes all, or at least many, of the others, and the spatio-temporal
traditions which nurtured it.... That is to say it would have been impossible
without the others. Or consider the text itself. It is an internally related
totality. As are the elements of a language, or the ebb and flow of a
conversation, the sequential 'habitus' of a routine, the systematic
interdependencies of the global monetary system, a play, a sculpture, or an
experimental project oriented to the demediation of nature. Or consider simply a
musical tune, melody, beat or rhythm. Or reflect on the semantic structure of a
sentence, bound in a complex of paradigmatic and
syntagmatic relations (and
metaphoric and
metonymic presuppositions). Or on its physical structure -- for
instance, the location of the spaces and punctuation marks within it. Not to
treat such entities as totalities is to violate norms of descriptive and
hermeneutic adequacy." [Bhaskar (1993),
pp.123-24.
Links added.]
But, how are
the things this author mentions inter-linked? While they might turn out to
be causally or 'conceptually' related, their inter-connection would still
be far from clear. For example, Bhaskar says the following about books:
"Consider once more our paradigmatic book...in the
library.... There is an obvious sense in which the book, if recently published,
existentially presupposes all, or at least many, of the others, and the
spatio-temporal traditions which nurtured it...." [Ibid.]
While
Bhaskar's own work might be related to others on which it depends (i.e., those to
which he might have referred or which he studied in order to write the book in
question), and to the publishing industry upon which all books depend, how does any of that inter-connect
that book with, say, ancient Chinese pottery, Bronze Age Norwegian
jewellery or first century Greek hair styles? Are they not part of Bhaskar's "Totality"?
Are these items, and countless others, inter-connected? How do we decide which are
(and which aren't) legitimate,
inter-linked items in
Bhaskar's "Totality"? We are given no clues. And Bhaskar doesn't even begin to ask questions
about possible or actual inter-connections between the present and the past
(like those that were posed earlier in this Essay,
here
and here,
for instance).
Anyway, what about "totalities"
outwith the social sphere, in nature? Bhaskar is far less clear and
much less
confident about the answer to that question. The smokescreen of obscure jargon he
now throws up is a
dead give-away:
"First, it might be entered
that unless there were internal, and specifically dialectical contradictions...,
there would be no internal (radically negating) tendencies to change either for
individual things or for their types (including natural kinds) or, more
drastically, for the world as a whole, so that the emergence of, for example,
science would have been impossible. If my first argument turns on the
transcendental necessity of ontological change, my second turns on that of the
transcendental necessity for taxonomy in science. Thus it could be argued that
unless some explanatory significant things had properties which were
existentially essential to them, that is, such that they were not just
necessarily connected, but internally related, to them, scientific
classification, which depends on the possibility of real (as distinct from
merely nominal) definitions, would be impossible. Internal relationality, and
so the conceptual possibility of the analytic
a posteriori, is bound to the
Leibnizian level of the identification of natural kinds, as natural necessity is
tied to the demonstration of explanatory adequacy in the dialectic of
explanatory and taxonomic knowledge in science.... For if classification is
justified only on the basis of superficial resemblance rather than real identity
of structure, then there is no rationale for the stratification of science. This
depends upon grasping suitably groomed structurata (sic) as tokens of real
structures, whose intransitive existence and transfactual efficacy is a
condition not only of science, but also of life." [Ibid.,
p.124.
Link added.]
There are
many things in the above passage with which one might want to take issue (for
example, 'internal relations', 'transcendental deductions' and 'natural kinds'; they will
all be
critically evaluated elsewhere at this site), just
as there are others that have already been challenged in this and other Essays
(such as the
precise nature of 'dialectical contradictions' and 'natural
necessity').
Despite this,the above
passage still fails tell us what the DM-"Totality" actually is --
other than that it is (maybe) a regulative device aimed at maintaining the
morale of scientists (for instance, enabling them to construct taxonomies, for goodness
sake!). Or perhaps even for attracting the attention of those who dote on academicgobbledygook like this?
Once again,
Bhaskar failed to ask the sort of questions posed at this site -- for example,
about the physical nature of these connections and
inter-connections, or even whether the past and the future are part of this
"Totality".
Bhaskar is
also (and understandably) silent about the mystical and theological origin
of these obscure
'concepts'. That might
help explain why he
finally unravelled as an open and honest mystic later
in life. Alas, he too has now gone off to join the Big-Negation-In-The-Sky, so we will never know the answer to
that one.
Since DM-fans remain steadfastly
silent about the nature and content of the "Totality", let
alone their inter-connections, maybe they require some assistance, someone to construct a membership list
for them?
The present author is happy to help out and step
into the breach...
To that end, if we knew
exactly what we are supposed to be talking about, the nature of
the
elusive "Totality" might become a little clearer -- or at least a
little less unclear. Indeed, construction of just such a roll call can only help
in our
quest to be clear about some of the implications of the wider theory
-- i.e., DM itself --,
especially if a concerted effort were made to consider every conceivable possibility.
[That is my excuse for what is about to
follow over the next score or more paragraphs! Readers are encouraged to keep
that in mind throughout the rest of this section of the Essay.]
So, it is worth posing questions that
DM-fans fail, or even refuse to ask. For example: Does the "Totality" include
every material object, or only material objects? If the latter is
the case, it would seem that the "Totality", or its content list, must exclude
non-material 'objects' -- for instance (maybe), 'abstractions', like courage, generosity, justice and equality?
[As we saw
in
Essays
Two and Three Parts
One and
Two, DM-theorists have yet to
tell us
exactly with what (in this universe)
the 'abstractions' they all speak about actually correspond!
If they don't correspond with anything, it is difficult to see how they can
'reflect' anything either, and hence how they can form part of a materialist
theory, to begin with -- let alone be part of the "Totality". In
Essay Twelve Part Four we will see John Rees, for example, unsuccessfully
attempt to account for an abstraction like
friendship. But at least he tried, which is more than can be said
about every other
DM-fan I have encountered over the last thirty-five years.]
If any of the above 'abstractions' are to be excluded, it might be
prudent to throw these
spurious creations of
Ancient Greek Grammar (i.e., all those 'abstractions') overboard.
And yet, doing that would almost certainly sink the 'dialectical theory of
knowledge', which relies heavily on the mythical 'process of abstraction'. It would seem,
therefore, that the only viable alternative available to dialecticians on this score is
for them to conclude that the
DM-"Totality"
must contain abstractions of some sort or description, the precise nature of which are, alas,
no less obscure than
the "Totality" 'Itself'!
Fitting bed-fellows, then.
But, dear
reader, don't
presume to ask where
such
abstractions live, reside or are to be found. In 'heaven', with 'God'? In your head?
Inside objects and processes themselves? Spread out over the set of all things to
which they supposedly apply, like some sort of metaphysical shroud?
Puzzled onlookers (some of whom might be tempted to
ignore the above advice) should contact their local DM-Soothsayers,
who, in response to impertinent questions like these will once again wave their
arms vaguely heavenward, if you are
lucky -- or, and what is far more likely, accuse you of not 'understanding' dialectics,
which happy band (as we discovered in Essay Nine
Part One) includes dialecticians
themselves
-- if you
aren't.
And, of course, if
you're a child, you'll believe
everything you are told.
"It is the old story. First of all one makes sensuous things into abstractions
and then one wants to know them through the senses, to see time and smell space.
The empiricist becomes so steeped in the habit of empirical experience, that he
believes that he is still in the field of sensuous experience when he is
operating with abstractions.... The two forms of existence of matter are
naturally nothing without matter, empty concepts, abstractions which exist only
in our minds. But, of course, we are supposed not to know what matter and motion
are! Of course not, for matter as such and motion as such have not yet been seen
or otherwise experienced by anyone, only the various existing material things
and forms of motions.
Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is
abstracted and motion as such nothing but the totality of all sensuously
perceptible forms of motion; words like matter and motion are nothing but
abbreviations in which we comprehend many different sensuous perceptible
things according to their common properties. Hence matter and motion can
be known in no other way than by investigation of the separate material
things and forms of motion, and by knowing these, we also pro tanto
know matter and motion as such.... This is just like the difficulty
mentioned by Hegel; we can eat cherries and plums, but not fruit,
because no one has so far eaten fruit as such." [Engels (1954),
pp.235-36. Bold emphasis
and link added. Italic emphasis in the original.]
"N.B. Matter as such is a pure creation of thought and an abstraction. We
leave out of account the qualitative differences of things in lumping them
together as corporeally existing things under the concept matter. Hence
matter as such, as distinct from definite existing pieces of matter, is not
anything sensuously existing." [Ibid.,
p.255. Bold emphasis added.]
These are
rather odd things for an avowed materialist to have to say. If matter is
an abstraction, how can "definite existing pieces of matter" fail to be
abstract, too? Actual examples of an 'abstraction' can't fail to be abstract,
surely?
Nevertheless, none of this should surprise us since arch-Idealist, Hegel, was
also of this opinion (according to
Lenin):
"If
abstraction is made from every determination and Form of a Something,
indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure abstract. (--
Matter cannot be seen or felt, etc. -- what is seen or felt is a determinate
Matter, that is, a unity of Matter and Form)." [Lenin
(1961), pp.144-45. Bold
emphasis alone added. The original passage from Hegel has been reposted in
Note 57 of Essay Thirteen Part
One.]
It is
instructive, therefore, to see a card-carrying Idealist like Hegel agree with
such
avowed materialists, that matter is just an "abstraction"!
[Incidentally, I have subjected Engels's argument (about eating fruit) to
destructive criticism in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
In which case, being told that the "Totality" contains
or is comprised only of material objects is no help at all, since that
would mean it contains, or is comprised only of, abstractions!
Maybe
that is why Lenin argued as follows:
"Logical concepts are subjective so long as they
remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the same time they express the
Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract,
both
phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human
concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a
whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source." [Lenin
(1961), p.208. Bold emphasis alone
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
Except, if
nature is completely material, it can only be abstract -- since,
according to the above DM-classicists, matter is an abstraction. That
would make the "Totality" an 'Ideal object', which, once more, shouldn't surprise us
given its origin in Ancient Greek, Hermetic and Christian Mysticism.
[My use of the word "theoretical" here doesn't
mean I question the existence of any of the
scientific 'entities' just mentioned, only that many are defined parts of complex and (so we are told)
well-founded bodies of theory. In that case, the nature of each is integral
to the theory to which it belongs. Any significant change to a given theory (which regularly
happens in science,
as we are about to discover) can't fail to
have a knock-on effect on the defined nature of the said 'objects' and 'processes', too. That is
all that is meant by the word "theoretical" in such a context -- and
in this Essay --, unless stated otherwise. I will say much more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
But, what about the properties of
objects that depend either on their disposition or on their relation to other bodies,
such as size, velocity, weight, and hardness? Do these make the Mega Inventory?
If so, shouldn't we
also rope in the apparent properties of matter, such as solidity,
liquidity, colour, smell, taste, and sound? And yet, according to some, these
properties and qualities depend solely
on their being perceived by sentient beings, which would mean that they aren't
'objective' --
at least,
not according to Lenin
(re-quoted below)
--, even though they appear to exercise some sort of causal influence on
other material bodies independently of our perception of them. Is this sufficient reason to strike them from the Cosmic
Registry, the fact that
they might not have existed countless millions of years ago when there
was no one around to perceive them? Is that good enough reason to add them to,
or even delete them from,
the Cosmic Membership List (henceforth, CML)?
What then should we conclude about genuine
oddities, such as corners, surfaces and shapes? These rather strange
'entities' seem
to disappear at the micro-level, and several even depend on the point of view of
the observer. In that case, can they really be part of an 'objective' "Totality"?18
Worse still, what are we to say about 'items'/'prospective
members' whose natures are even more puzzling or obscure? For example, what
should we make of mathematical fictions like the average worker, the mean square
velocity of (a body of) gas molecules (which forms part of the
Kinetic
Theory of Gases), the probability of an event,
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient,
the Centre of Mass of the Solar System, or
the moment of a force?
Despite the fact that these are human constructs, some of them also appear to
exercise a significant causal influence on
material objects, events and processes. In which case, are they 'objective', 'subjective', both or
neither?
Concerning
Centres of Mass (or "Barycentres"), this is
what we read at
NASA's website:
"We say that planets orbit stars, but that's not the
whole truth. Planets and stars actually orbit around their common centre of
mass. This common centre of mass is called the barycentre.... Every object has
a centre of mass. It is the exact centre of all the material an object is made
of. An object's centre of mass is the point at which it can be balanced.
Sometimes the centre of mass is directly in the centre of an object. For
example, you can easily find the centre of mass of a ruler. Try holding your
finger under the middle of a ruler in a few different spots. You'll find a spot
where you can balance the whole ruler on just one fingertip. That's the ruler's
centre of mass. The centre of mass is also called the centre of gravity.
"But sometimes the centre of mass is not in the
centre of the object. Some parts of an object may have more mass than other
parts. A sledge hammer, for example, has most of its mass on one end, so its
centre of mass is much closer its heavy end. In space, two or more objects
orbiting each other also have a centre of mass. It is the point around which the
objects orbit. This point is the barycentre of the objects. The barycentre is
usually closest to the object with the most mass. Where is the barycentre between Earth and the sun?
Well, the sun has lots of mass. In comparison, Earth's mass is very small. That
means the sun is like the head of the sledgehammer. So, the barycentre between
Earth and the sun is very close to the centre of the sun. Jupiter is a lot
larger than Earth. It has 318 times more mass. As a result, the barycentre of
Jupiter and the sun isn't in the centre of the sun. It's actually just outside
the sun's surface!
"Our entire solar system also has a barycentre. The
sun, Earth, and all of the planets in the solar system orbit around this
barycentre. It is the centre of mass of every object in the solar system
combined. Our solar system's barycentre constantly changes position. Its
position depends on where the planets are in their orbits. The solar system's
barycentre can range from being near the centre of the sun to being outside the
surface of the sun. As the sun orbits this moving barycentre, it wobbles around.
[Quoted from
here. Accessed 07/08/2022. Spelling modified to agree with UK
English; several paragraphs merged. NASA's website also has animated diagrams/videos
that illustrate several of the above points. Here, for instance, is a video illustrating this
specific phenomenon.]
So, not only can barycentres move they
can sometimes be located in 'empty space'. If so, according to Lenin (once more),
they
must be "objective", since they exist 'outside the mind', move and are "independent of
man":
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
"[T]he sole
'property' of matter with
whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Ibid.,
p.311.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Recognising the existence of objective reality, i.e., matter in
motion, independently of our mind, materialism must also inevitably recognise
the objective reality of time and space, in contrast above all to
Kantianism, which in this question sides with idealism and regards time and
space not as objective realities but as forms of human understanding. The basic
difference between the two fundamental philosophical lines on this question is
also quite clearly recognised by writers of the most diverse trends who are in
any way consistent thinkers." [Ibid.,
pp.202-03. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
"The different forms and varieties of matter
itself can likewise only be known through motion, only in this are the
properties of bodies exhibited; of a body that does not move there is nothing to
be said. Hence the nature of bodies in motion results from the forms of motion." [Ibid., p.248.]
Here, too, is Engels:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion,
nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy...expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it
can only be transmitted.... A motionless state of matter therefore
proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas -- a 'delirious
fantasy' of the purest water." [Engels
(1976), pp.74-75. Bold emphases alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe,
from mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels
(1954),
p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]
Lenin concurred:
"In
full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it,
Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring
(read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....'
'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin
(1914), p.8. Bold emphasis added.]
Again, based on the above, the conclusion facing
DM-theorists must surely be that since barycentres can not only move, they
certainly seem to exist
"outside the mind" (and sometimes even in 'empty space'), they must be material and hence
'objective'. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see dialecticians try to explain
how something that enjoys no actual physical existence -- that is, a barycentre isn't
composed of anything that is itself physical or material -- can nevertheless be
'objective' and material. But, if they are neither, can they really be part of the
"Totality"?
Any attempt to answer such questions by appealing to
'warped
spacetime' and geodesics [WSG]
would be no help, either, unless it were also accompanied by a clear explanation of
their exact physical
nature. That is because WSGs form part of a mathematical model of the universe, integral
to General Relativity [GR], and
mathematical models aren't physical structures, either.
[There is more about this
above,
below, and in
Note 15
-- as well as
here. Again, this isn't to question GR,
merely to remind the reader that physicists have yet to explain the physical nature of WSGs
(as well as all those 'fields' to which they appeal).]
Be this as it may, what are we to say about
'entities' whose status (or 'nature') is
even more problematic, such as vacua, mirages, illusions, holes,
shadows, 'The Unconscious', mirror and lens images,
reflections, refractions,
para-reflections, the perspectival properties of bodies, phantom limbs
(or the 'phantom
perception' of false limbs), dreams,
rainbows,
fogbows,
Brocken Spectres,
Heilgenschein,
Glories,
The
Bishop's Ring,
Ice Halos, pains, hallucinations,
memories and emotions? Are they legitimate denizens of the "Totality", or not?
If we disallow some, any or all of
the above how can we consistently admit entry to others that are merelytheoretical, or are of a highly speculative nature, such as
Black
Holes19a0,
Superstrings,
Spacetime,
n-dimensional space,
Instantons. [Instantons are "pseudoparticles"
-- i.e., they are
solutions to certain equations in
Yang-Mills theory in
Gauge Quantum Mechanics. Are these
'particles' physically real, or, since they are merely 'solutions' to mathematical puzzles, are they
not merely mathematical 'objects' and as such non-'objective', since they aren't
"independent of man"? Are they not the modern-day equivalent of the
epicycles of Medieval Astronomy?] What
then about branched
time zones,
Axions and
Branes -- whichare decidedly weird, even in comparison with several of the
items listed earlier?
Are we to be liberal or
exclusive in the way we draw up the
CML -- Menshevik or Bolshevik?
It could be argued that we
should admit into the "Totality" all and only the existence
of objects and
processes that scientists
themselves
acknowledge 'objectively' -- either now or in the future --, supported by the
weight of evidence.19a
[That is indeed the line John Somerville, for
example, takes,
here (i.e., Somerville (1967), pp.3-32).
It looks like the late John Molyneux
did, too -- cf., Molyneux (2012), pp.40-41. They aren't the only ones, either.]
The problem with a response like this is that it
would present scientists with far too generous an ontological 'blank cheque',
so to speak.19b
In fact, if this policy were adopted by DM-supporters, many
of the objects and processes in the "Totality"
that are currently regarded as 'objective' would possess a somewhat precarious -- if not decidedly fleeting --
existence.
In that case, just as soon as scientists changed their minds over the
nature and existence of these ephemeral 'entities' (as they regularly do), their
'temporary
residence permits' would have to be revoked. As should no doubt seem
obvious the problem here is that
a "Totality" like this, which grows or shrinks in line with the fickle decisions of
scientists, could in no way be 'objective' -- if, once again, we agree with
Lenin:
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
[Update July 2012: I will add a few
comments about the recent 'discovery' of a 'particle' (or supposed 'particle',
but which is really a 'wave' in the
Higgs Field) in
the energy range where the
Higgs Boson is presumed to
exist when it has
become a little clearer what exactly
has been found. (See also the
article reproduced in
Appendix A on this topic.) More-or-less the same can be said about the
recent detection of 'gravitational waves', the actual discovery of which
some physicists are
beginning to question.]
It is worth recalling that
the late
Stephen
Hawkingonce laid a bet that the Higgs Boson would never be found. Even though he
subsequently
conceded that he had lost the bet, it is still perhaps a little too early for anyone
finally to agree with
him. As we know only too well, scientists frequently change their minds.
Not that that is a bad thing, either! In a field
where theories are sensitive to new discoveries, one would, and should, expect regular
such changes.
Even worse, Physicists appear to be unable to
make up their minds over whether or not the Higgs Boson explains all the mass in the
universe:
"So, the Higgs boson has been
discovered! That's good news. You may have also heard that the Higgs
gives mass to everything in the Universe, and that it's a field. The odd thing is that all
of these things are true, if not intuitive. There are some
attempts to explain it simply,
but as you can see, even the top ones are
not very clear. So let's give you something to
sink your teeth into: How do fundamental
particles, including the Higgs boson, get their mass?" [Quoted from
here. Italic emphases in the original.]
"But how did
the electrons and quarks that make up all the matter in the universe (for
technical reasons, perhaps except for
neutrinos) get their mass? That we still
don't know. But once we understand how the
Ws and the Z
gain their mass from
their interaction with the
Higgs field, we assume that we also know how
mass in general is created: through the same 'Higgs mechanism,' and that this
primeval cosmic event shortly after the Big Bang has thus created the mass of
the universe: electrons, quarks, stars, galaxies, planets, trees, animals, and
us." [Quoted from
here.Italic emphases in the original.
Links and bold emphasis added.]
"The Higgs boson is important in the Standard Model
because it implies the existence of a Higgs field, an otherwise invisible field
of energy which pervades the entire universe. Without the Higgs field, the
elementary particles that make up you, me, and the visible universe would have
no mass. Without the Higgs field mass could not be constructed and nothing could
be." [Baggott (2012), p.3. Boldemphasis alone added.]
This is what Professor Stenger had to say
about this 'particle':
"In all the
recent hoopla about the long-sought Higgs boson, you often hear it said that it
is responsible for the mass of the universe. This is not true. Assuming it
exists, the Higgs boson is actually responsible for only a small fraction of the
total mass of the universe. This is not to
say that the Higgs boson is not important. The main role of the Higgs in the
standard model of elementary particles is to provide for the
symmetry breaking
of the unified
electroweak force
by giving mass to the
weak bosons and splitting
the
electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces. It also gives mass to the other
elementary particles. If elementary particles did not have mass, they would all
be moving at the speed of light and never stick together to form stuff like
stars, cats, and you and me.
"The mass of
the universe, however, is not simply the sum of the masses of the elementary
particles that constitute matter. Einstein showed that the mass of a body is
equal to its
rest energy. If that body is not elementary but composed of parts,
then its rest energy as a whole will be the sum of all the energies of its
parts. This sum will include the
kinetic
and
potential
energies of the parts in
addition to their individual rest energies." [Quoted from
here. Links
and bold emphasis added.
Several paragraphs merged.]
The following passage comes from an interview
with Duke University Physicist, Mark Kruse, which further muddies the water (and
not just because Kruse says the Higgs boson is a "point-like particle", when
we saw in Essay Seven
Part One that, according to
Quantum Field Theory, there are no such
particles, just excitations in an associated 'field'):
"1. Misconception: The Higgs particle gives other
particles mass. Correction: The masses of fundamental particles come from
interactions with the Higgs field. 'You see this statement all the time, but how
would another particle even "give" another particle mass?' Kruse asks,
explaining truly it's the Higgs field that provides mass to fundamental
particles, such as quarks, electrons and neutrinos.
"The Higgs particle is a consequence of the Higgs
field. By discovering the Higgs particle, it shows the Higgs field exists. In
the math that physicists use to understand the Higgs boson and field, there is a
piece of an equation that they interpret as the existence of a Higgs boson,
which they see as a point-like particle resulting from the Higgs field 'curling
in' on itself, like a knot in a spider's web. Physicists can't interpret the
Higgs boson itself to be giving anything mass, but by interacting with other
particles, they can argue that the Higgs field is giving resistance to the
particles' motion, thereby giving them mass.
"2. Misconception: The Higgs field generates the
mass of everything. Correction: The Higgs field generates the mass of about one
percent of observable matter and possibly all of dark matter. The Higgs field
generates mass for quarks, which are the building blocks of protons and
neutrons. The protons and neutrons, in turn, form the nuclei at the core of
atoms, which are the building blocks of molecules, proteins, cells, plants,
animals, planets, stars, galaxies and all the stuff we see in the universe. The
mass of quarks accounts for only one percent of the mass of a proton or neutron.
The other 99 percent of the mass of observable matter comes from the energy that
binds protons' and neutrons' constituent quarks together.
"It may seem kind of strange to think that the
discovery of the Higgs boson, and thereby the existence of the Higgs field,
means scientists have discovered an explanation for only one percent of the
observable mass of everything we see. But, 'that one percent is the mass of the
fundamental constituents of the universe,' Kruse says, adding that the Higgs
field has also incredible consequences for the structure of atoms and molecules.
'If the already small mass of electrons was zero, as it would be without a Higgs
field, then everything would just disintegrate,' he says. 'All the atomic
structure we are familiar with wouldn't exist. We wouldn't exist. There may
still be matter, but it wouldn't be the same. There certainly wouldn't be life
as we know it.'
"Also, unobservable matter also wouldn't have mass.
Scientists believe this unseen, or dark matter, comprises more than 80 percent
of the matter of the universe, but it doesn't interact strongly enough with
anything to allow its direct observation. Yet, because it has significant mass,
'it must interact with the Higgs field and that's another key point,' Kruse
says. 'The Higgs field generates about one percent of observable mass, with the
term 'observable' being a very important qualifier, because the Higgs field may
be responsible for the mass of all dark matter.'" [Quoted from
here. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added. Several
paragraphs merged.]
Moreover, as is the case in other areas of science,
the temptation is to try to account for mass, or even try to explain it, by
appealing to
several inappropriate metaphors --, for example,
here referring to the "syrupy
Higgs Field":
"Our theory
says that matter, at a fundamental level, is made up of particles called
quarks
and
leptons. The quarks make up
protons, and protons make up atoms.
Mathematically, it's easy to build a theory where the quarks have no mass at
all, and in fact they may have been mass-less at the time of the Big Bang, when
they came into existence. But clearly they do have mass now. Why?
"In the 1960s,
Peter Higgs
[a British physicist] and others found a kind of mathematical trick
to explain it. We now imagine there is a field permeating all of space -- we
call it the Higgs field -- and as particles interact with that field, they
acquire mass. Think of it like a syrup that the particles have to push their way
through. So it's that interaction with the syrup that we see as mass. And the
Higgs boson is the 'unit' that makes up this Higgs field." [Physicist Robert
Orr, quoted from
here. Paragraphs merged; quotation marks
altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Links and bold emphasis added. Physics
Professor Jim Al-Khalili
also appealed to
this useless metaphor/analogy in
this BBC video,
at about 08:30. He also asserts several times that the Higgs gives mass to
"every other particle" --, for example, at 36:25 and 37:10. If some of the
earlier quoted passages are accurate, that isn't the case.]
But, as should seem obvious, a syrup would bring all movement to a
halt. So,the Higgs Field is nothing like a syrup. Nor are the following metaphors
much
use, either:
"A Higgs field
(named after a Scottish physicist
Peter Higgs)
is a field supposed to be responsible for the genesis of
inertial mass
(and,
because of
Einstein's equivalence principle,
gravitational mass). When the
universe is extremely hot, a Higgs field (which is supposed to have a certain
curve of potential energy; as regards the shape of this curve, there is no
unique consensus, except for a certain general feature, among the physicists)
exerts a wild influence; but we will neglect this here. Once the universe cools
down enough, below a certain temperature, the Higgs field assumes a certain
value (i.e. a value of the Higgs field) which corresponds to the lowest energy
level (i.e. the potential energy is zero, but the value of the Higgs field is
nonzero; this level may be called vacuum). And this energy level continues to
prevail throughout the whole universe (uniform, nonzero Higgs field).
"Now, suppose a
quark or
electron moves (supposed fundamental particles which make up
composite particles such as proton,
neutron, or various atoms) in this uniform
Higgs field. If that particle changes its velocity of movement, that is,
if it accelerates, then the Higgs field is supposed to exert a certain
amount of resistance or drag, and that is the origin of inertial mass. In
a slightly more precise terminology, inertial mass is generated by
interactions between a particle and the (nonzero) Higgs field. In a
nutshell, this is the origin of inertial mass. Of course, other kinds of
interaction, such as the
strong interaction (governed by the force of
gluons,
particles gluing quarks together into a proton, say) may contribute
significantly to the resulting mass. Moreover, the degree of resistance
(drag) of the Higgs field is different depending on the kinds of fundamental
particles, and this generates the difference between the mass of electron and
that of a quark." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphases and links added.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
As we saw in Essay Eight Parts One and
Two (links below), a mathematical object, like a field, can't exert "drag
forces" unless it has some sort of physical presence of its own, and is
therefore
made of
something impenetrable or which resists penetration (but what?).
Now, if the above comment itself turns out to be misguided in some
way, and a field is somehow capable of exerting "drag forces" (but
how?), that
would simply push the problem one stage further back. A mathematical object, so
characterised, would be, or would be comprised of, or would be part of, a
scalar,
vector
or
tensor
field -- and as theoretical physicist,
Sean Carroll, points out in
this video lecture, a field is simply shorthand for numerical (or
other) values attributed to a point in that field, if a measurement were to be
taken. In other words, a field is simply a way predicting how an
instrument will behave if placed in, or is targeted on, a given point in 'space'. Cynics
might even conclude fields are little more than a mathematical version of the old 'Ideal
Observer' -- which, if true, would make much of High
Energy Physics a new form of
Instrumentalism -- or even
Objective Idealism.
[Which seems to be the conclusion reached in
Unzicker (2013), but definitely in Malek (2011) and Lerner (1992) -- a
situation which was more-or-less predicted in and by Lenin (1972), except he
tended to label such moves, 'subjective
idealism'.]
What are we to think when we encounter metaphors
like this (this one is quite common and widely used in contemporary Physics)?
"The collision of distant black holes generates
gravitational waves, or ripples in 'space-time'. Space-time can be thought of as
a 'fabric' in which the objects of the Universe are embedded. Those objects --
stars, planets, black holes -- make space-time curve in upon itself, just as an
elastic fabric holding a ball would do. The more massive the object, the deeper
the curve -- the same as in a fabric!" [The European Space Agency, quoted from
here; accessed 04/08/2023. Bold emphasis added.]
Physicists keep talking about 'the fabric of space and time', but
if it is a fabric,
what is it made of? If it isn't made of anything, why call it a fabric? How can
it be warped in that case? And if there is nothing there to be warped, how can
there be any waves for anyone to
detect? Finally, if the word 'fabric' is a misleading metaphor, why use it?
To which someone replied:
"It's a misleading metaphor, it's used because it's easy. The
same way black holes aren't holes, neutron stars aren't all neutrons, and dwarf
stars can be pretty big. Once a name sticks it can take a long time to shift it,
if ever."
I answered as
follows (slightly edited):
Yes, thanks for that. I am aware it's a misleading metaphor
(science in general is full of them), but it still fails to tell us what
space/spacetime is made of. If it is made of nothing it can't be physical and
hence physics has no business studying it. Worse still, how can it be 'warped'
if there is nothing there to
be
warped? On the other hand, if it is made of something, what is it?
[I will enter into this topic in more detail in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Clearly, mathematical structures/objects like this have no physical
presence -- especially when they turn out to be no more than (actual or
potential) instrument readings, mentioned in an earlier paragraph. In
which case, on their own they can have no effect on anything -- and,
for that matter, not
even on instruments if they don't actually exist. All we are speaking about
here then is the way instruments behave in certain regions of space,
under certain circumstances. In this way, contemporary Physics has given up
trying to explain physical reality. All it is interested in is measuring
and predicting.
[On this, see Becker (2018), which makes
more-or-less the same point. Also see Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976). I will cover
this topic in much more detail in a future re-write of Essay Eight Part Two. In
the meantime, readers are directed
here for further details. On the origin of
mass, see Strassler (2024), which also corrects ideas that all mass arises from
the Higgs Field.]
Admittedly, we might try to
represent a field by the use of
lines of force,
or by constructing a
scalar or even a
tangent/slope field, etc. However, lines
of force are 'infinitely thin' and yet are also absolutely 'unbreakable'. Even
worse they misrepresent the supposedly continuous nature of a field! But, such lines (or whatever a field is supposed to be composed of) must allow
particles to pass through, all the while remaining coherent themselves --, even
though they are in fact made ofnothing. Otherwise we should have to
appeal to forces of cohesion to account for each of the following:
(i) The structural integrity of those 'lines'
themselves (or, once more, whatever such a field is supposed to be composed of);
(ii) Their capacity to resist motion; and,
(iii) Their permeability.
[Of course, these are ridiculous questions to ask of
mathematical structures, but fields are supposed to be part of the
material world, so they are entirely pertinent. I return to this theme
below.]
But, this just reproduces the same problem one stage further back,
for we should now have to account for these new 'cohesive forces'..., and so on, ad
infinitem.
On the other hand, if a field is continuous (and isn't made of discrete 'lines
of force' -- or whatever it is supposed to be composed of), it would be even less capable of resisting motion
-- unless, of course, it were particulate in some way, after all. [For more on this, follow the
links below.]
[Once again, the above remarks are aimed at what are
taken to be the
physical correlates of mathematical objects and structures, but if we are to
explain the physical universe (not how a mathematical model 'behaves'),
these correlates must have some sort of physical constitution or presence, or
they wouldn't be able to affect anything material. Mathematical objects and structures
can't affect instruments.]
The above considerations simply form a contemporary
version of well-known classical problem, which,
as Leibniz noted, confrontsall forms of mechanical atomism (or, indeed, mathematical
atomism). Any attempt to translate mathematical structures/objects into what would amount to
some form of Bargain Basement Platonism (whereby the universe is viewed as fundamentally
mathematical -- as seems to be the case in contemporary Physics) would plainly be counterproductive. To repeat,
mathematic objects and structures can have no causal effect on anything
material.
[If anyone thinks otherwise, please
email me
your best shot.]
Again, some might complain about the sort of language used
above in relation to the mathematical objects/structures mentioned, since it
clearly depends on conflating them with physical objects/structures. But that is
itself a roundabout way of admitting they can have no physical effect on the
universe, which was the only point of describing them that way. If we refuse to
use such language in connection with these objects/structures (since it obviously
misrepresents their nature) then they can't be used to explain how the universe
works, either. Which might be why many physicists retreat into some form of
Instrumentalism and say things like "Don't try to explain, just calculate!"
-- or even: "Shut up and calculate!".19c
"NYU physicist Alan
Sokal likes to consider the big questions. In an interview in The
Philosophers' Magazine with
Julian Baggini Sokal says: 'I always took
an attitude towards physics where I was interested in the fundamental conceptual
questions, closer to Einstein's approach than
Feynman's.' Sokal asks questions like,
'What does quantum mechanics actually mean?' He says, 'I've been using quantum
mechanics for about 35 years, almost three-quarters of my life, and the more I
study it the less I understand it. So I can understand why a whole generation
of physicists threw their hands up in despair and said "let's just calculate",
but that's not to me a satisfactory final answer.'" [Quoted from
here; accessed 07/10/2022. Paragraphs merged. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis and
two links added.]
But, there will never be a physical explanation
of nature while the
universe is treated as a mathematical object.
[On this
in general, see the comments posted
here,
here and
here. Also check out my remarks over at
Wikipedia,
here and
here -- as well as
Video Nine of Essay Seven Part One.]
But, these developments
didn't take place
in a vacuum. In his book, What is Real?, Adam Becker presents
a convincing case in support of the view that the urgent, practical
requirements of the US Defence Department (during WW2 developing the Atomic
Bomb ahead of the Nazis, then post WW2, in nuclear competition with the former Soviet
Union) meant that fundamental questions about the nature of 'Quantum Reality'
(concerning local realism, causation, objectivity, the nature of measurement,
whether the
Copenhagen Interpretation violated other aspects of physics,
etc., etc.) were shelved since they only slowed things down. The pressure was
now placed on the need for rapid results, so calculation and prediction were the
order of the day, navel-gazing about what it all meant was out. Massive
investment in specific areas of Higher Education also meant that physics
departments grew in size exponentially over the next decade. In 1941, there were
approximately 170 graduate students who gained a PhD in Physics, in the US; in
1951, it was over 500, the number growing faster than in any other discipline:
"Plenty of physicists were alarmed and unhappy about
this new state of affairs.... Research into the meaning of quantum mechanics was
one of the casualties of the war. With all these new students crowding
classrooms around the country, professors found it impossible to teach the
philosophical questions at the foundations of quantum mechanics. Before the war
courses in quantum physics both sides of the Atlantic...spent a great deal of
time on conceptual issues. Textbooks and exams from the pre-war period asked
students to write detailed essays on the nature of the
uncertainty principle and the role of the observer in the quantum
world. But, with ballooning class sizes, detailed discussion of philosophy
became all but impossible.... The larger classes focussed on 'efficient,
repeatable means of calculation,' rather than focussing on foundations. And
textbooks nearly dropped questions about foundations altogether, as a new
generation of reviewers in physics periodicals praised a new batch of texts for
'avoiding philosophical discussion' and 'philosophically tainted questions.'
Textbooks that bucked the trend were condemned for spending too much time on the
'musty
atavistic to-do about position and
momentum.' The era of Big Science had arrived -- and it had no patience for
puzzling over the meaning of quantum physics." [Becker (2018), pp.80-83.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Links added.]
Becker also points out that while there was still no
settled or agreed upon understanding of the Copenhagen Interpretation (even
among its founders,
Bohr,
Heisenberg and
Jordan), it became expedient to claim that that wasn't the case,
and that there was only one way to read the theory:
"[T]he idea of a single settled interpretation of
quantum physics, associated with the giants Bohr and Heisenberg, went over well
in the post-Manhattan world of Big Science. ["Manhattan" was the code word for
the
top secret US Defence Department programme
during WW2 aimed at developing the atom bomb -- RL.] Most physicists were
perfectly happy with the jumble of ideas that purportedly constituted the
Copenhagen interpretation itself, since questions about the meaning of quantum
physics had little bearing on their work. The mathematical formalism of the
theory continued to work remarkably well in a wide variety of post-war
applications of physics to the
military-industrial complex, which turned most physicists to work in
nuclear physics or solid-state physics.... Questions of interpretation, while
vital for the progress of science in the long term, were immaterial when it came
to the hard-nosed applications of quantum theory that were so suddenly and
desperately prized. The Copenhagen interpretation's promise of a complete yet
obscure answer to the quantum mysteries allowed the new army of postwar
physicists to calculate answers without worrying about the meaning of the
theory.... The questions at the foundations of quantum physics that had seemed
so vital to Einstein and Bohr were dismissed by the new crop of American
physicists as dreamy trifles, hardly suitable as subjects of enquiry to be
funded by the rivers of money flowing from
the Pentagon." [Ibid., p.84. Link added.]
[This is, of course, a classic example of how there
is no such thing as pure science, especially in areas that touch on national
defence, under capitalism. The move away from trying to understand the basics of QM,
or debate
its implications and whether certain interpretations were consistent with other
settled areas of the subject, to a policy of simply calculating and
predicting (which approach still dominates Physics) was motivated, not by 'pure
science', but by criteria ultimately decided upon by priorities set by the Pentagon and the
military-industrial complex!]
The question now becomes: Does the "Totality"
possess the equivalent of
a 'metaphysical
revolving door', or 'ontological landfill site', to cater for all the rejected
and
discarded objects and processes we have consistently witnessed throughout the history of
science? Or maybe even an 'ethereal antechamber' to house all the hopeful,
future members of the "Whole", all those, shall-we-say, 'metaphysical migrants' waiting patiently to be allowed entry
--, in order to help scientists cater for or even cope with such
itinerant and ephemeral denizens of the
"Totality", like those mentioned above?
[The 'discovery' of the Higgs Boson and
'gravitational waves' --
or, whatever has been found -- only serves to underline this point.]20
Either the existence of
all of the above should be entertained, or those that supposedly fail to
qualify for
'objective' existence must be filtered out, the rest put on hold or consigned to
scientific 'limbo'.
Which are to be discarded, which retained?
And on what basis?21a
More importantly:
which unfortunate comrade is going to chair the 'Dialectical Selection Panel'?22
While we wait on those decisions, should
any ever be taken, it might be instructive to watch this video (from
February 2023), by Dr Hossenfelder (with relevant sections quoted
word-for-word, underneath):
"If you follow news about particle physics, then you
know that it comes in three types: it's either that they haven't found that
thing they were looking for, or they have come up with something new to look for
(which they later report not having found), or it's something so boring you
don't even finish reading the headline. How come that particle physicists
constantly make wrong predictions?...
"The list of things that particle physicists said
should exist but that no one has ever seen is very long: no supersymmetric
particles, no proton decay, no dark matter particles, no WIMPS, no Axions, no
Sterile Neutrinos. There's about as much evidence for any of
those as for Big Foot.... Some particle physicists even predicted
Unparticles and those weren't found either. It's been going like
this for fifty years, ever since the 1970s....
"Particle physicists believed there'd be more to
find and I guess more still believe this today. Or at least they'd tell you they
believe it.... Particle physicists wanted [the three fundamental forces] to be
unified to one force. Why? Because that would be nicer. Theories which combine
these three forces are called 'Grand Unified Theories'. You get them by
postulating a bigger symmetry than that of the
Standard Model.... But this time
more symmetries didn't work.... But you can make those models more complicated
so that they remain compatible with observations. That's what particle
physicists did and that's where the problems began.
"Next there was the Axion...[named by
Frank Wilczek in 1978 -- RL]. Unfortunately the Axion turned out
not to exist.... But physicists didn't give up on the Axion. Like with Grand
Unification they changed the theory so that it will evade the experimental
constraints. The new type of Axion was introduced in 1981 and was originally
called the 'Harmless Axion'. It was then for some while called the 'Invisible
Axion', but today it is just called the 'Axion'. Lots of experiments have looked
and continue to look for these Invisible Axions, none was ever detected, but
physicists still look for their 'invisible friends'. Wilczek, by the way,
invented another particle in 1982 which he called the 'Familon'. No one has
found that either.
"Yet another flawed idea that particle physicists
came up with in the 1970s is
Supersymmetry. Supersymmetry postulates that all particles in the
Standard Model have a partner particle. This idea was
dead-on-arrival because those partner particles have the same masses as the
Standard Model particles that they belong to. If they existed they'd have shown
up in the first particle colliders, which they did not. Supersymmetry was
therefore amended immediately so that the supersymmetry partner particles would
have much higher masses. It takes high energies to produce heavy particles so
it'd take big particle colliders to see those heavy supersymmetric particles.
The first supersymmetric models made predictions that were tested in the 1990s
at the large electron-positron collider at
CERN. Those predictions were falsified. Supersymmetry was then
amended again to prevent the falsified processes from happening. The next bigger
collider, the
Tevatron, was supposed to find them. That
didn't happen. Then they were supposed to show up at the
Large Hadron Collider and that didn't happen either. Particle
Physicists continue to change and amend those supersymmetric models so that they
don't run into conflict with new data....
"Then there are all kinds of
Dark Matter particles. A type that is particularly popular is
called 'Weakly Interacting Massive Particles' (WIMPs for short). Experiments
have looked for WIMPs since the 1980s. They haven't found them. Each time an
experiment came back empty handed particle physicists claimed the particles were
a little bit more weakly interacting and said they needed a better detector.
"There are more experiments that have looked for all
kinds of other particles, which continue to not find them. There are headlines
about this literally every couple of weeks. The
PandaX-4T experiment looked for light
fermionic dark matter. They didn't find it. The
STEREO experiment looked for Sterile Neutrinos. They didn't find
them.
CDX didn't find light WIMPS.
H.E.S.S. [High Energy Stereoscopic System -- RL] didn't find any
evidence for WIMP annihilation. The
MICROSCOPE experiment didn't find the fifth force. An experiment
called
SENSEI [Sub-Electron-Noise Skipper
Experimental Instrument -- RL] didn't find sub
GeV [Giga Electron Volts -- RL] dark matter..., and so on.
"The pattern is this: particle physicists invent
particles, make predictions for those invented particles, and when these
predictions are falsified they change the model and make new predictions. They
say it's good science because these hypotheses are falsifiable. I am afraid most
of them believe this. But just because a hypothesis is falsifiable doesn't mean
it's good science.... Good scientists should learn from their failures but
particle physicists have been making the same mistakes for fifty years." [Quoted
from the video, 00:00-10:12. Links added. Dr Hossenfelder then spends the next
ten minutes explaining in detail why she thinks particle physicists commit these
errors.]
The above should give pause to those who imagine
we should uncritically accept what scientists have to say, or give credence to anyone who
tries to populate the "Totality" with whatever researchers come up with. The next section
will further underline this point.
Worse still, if we delegate decisions like these to
scientists themselves, what are we to say when they revise their theories or
change their minds (as they regularly do)?
[CML = Cosmic Membership List.]
Would it mean:
(i) The "Totality"
itself changeswhenever the scientific community
ceases to acknowledge -- or they even reject -- the existence of what had once
been considered 'objective' objects and processes?
Or, would it show that:
(ii) Scientists' understanding of 'objectivity'
itself has
been revised?
If one or other (or even both) of the above are the
case, wouldn't it suggest that:
(iii) Some
(perhaps all?) 'objective' theories are really only 'subjective'?
In turn, wouldn't that:
(iv) Throw into question the 'objectivity' of science itself?
In light of these considerations, how would it
be possible to maintain the superior 'objectivity' of any given CML (provided by yours truly, or even
put together by DM-fans
themselves, should they ever
get their act together) if more 'ontological re-edits' are only to be
expected a few years down the line -- once again, as
invariably happens in science?22aa
Conversely, if option (i) turns out to be the case,
wouldn't that mean the CML itself depends on
decisions made by fallible/fickle human beings? If so, did the "Totality" change
when early modern scientists decided that the "fifth element", for
instance, no longer made it
onto the CML? Or when the Luminiferous Ether ceased even to be listed?
We have
already seen that Engels defined the "Totality" in the following way, and
that,
just like Lenin, he thought the (now defunct) Ether
was
an 'objective' member of the 'Whole':
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]
But, if the decisions of scientists
determine what belongs to
an
'objective' CML, then the "Totality" itself must change in
line with scientific fashion.
If so, did it change again when scientists concluded that Phlogiston and the Planet
Vulcan (this
isn't the planet mentioned on Star Trek!) were imaginary? Or, could it be that Vulcan was
put on hold, consigned to some sort of 'objective'/'subjective' limbo world, quietly subsisting away in a
'Meinongian ante-chamber' somewhere, while
researchers
made up their minds? Will the "Totality" mutate yet again if,
someday,
Superstrings
are granted (or maybe even denied) 'objective' existence?
Is the "Totality", therefore, an artefact of whim,
caprice
and fashion? Is it 'objective' in a 'subjective' sort of sense? Does
it depend on who is on the Metaphysical Review Board? Is itselection-panel-sensitive?
If we can't decide on what basis to include, or even
exclude, certain objects and processes
from this avowedly contradictory "Totality",
then maybe it allows entry to those that not only don't exist, but those that can't?22a
This latest (and surprising) turn of events now
presents those attempting to construct an Ontological Definition of the
"Totality" with far more daunting problems than the relatively minor
difficulties already encountered. That is because there are a number of
controversial DM-theories/laws/principles that imply the 'perimeter fence' (as
it were) enclosing the
"Totality" is, shall we say, full of holes.
Indeed, as we are about to find out, this 'boundary
wall' more closely resembles a
colander
than it does a
wok, a sieve more than a bucket.
Figure Five:
Is This An Apt Metaphor For
The "Totality"?
No Way! There Aren't Enough Holes!
While most rival ontological systems operate
with some sort of closed-border policy -- allowing entry to some
objects and processes, disallowing others -- it turns out that DM-theorists can't exclude
anything at all since they openly admit (if not emphatically insist upon) the existence
of innumerable 'contradictions' and paradoxes in
each and
every nanogram of matter!
In which
case, it might be more honest to acknowledge that the 'DM-border-fence' isn't so much porous as non-existent.
Hence, it looks like the DM-"Totality" could contain impossible, not just
contradictory 'objects', and maybe even mythical and imaginary entities, too.
Perhaps
it includes four-edged hexagons, the round square, the golden mountain,
unicorns, the
Olympian Gods, the end of the rainbow and
even the
Adhedral
Triangle?22b
Anyone tempted to respond that the above list is
absurd (since it includes contradictory items that can be ruled out in advance)
should once again consult their local DM-Soothsayer before they jump to that
conclusion. In fact, given the DM-'principles' mentioned earlier, it is difficult to see
how any of the above weird and wonderful prospective members of the "Totality" might be kept
out.
This means that if the DM-"Totality" is to be rescued
from oblivion, some way must be found of preventing these and countless other
absurdities from crossing its recklessly permeable 'boundary'.
In response, it could be argued once more that the above
claims are clearly ridiculous. Dialecticians
onlyacknowledge the existence of contradictions that can be, and have
been,
empirically verified.They
certainly don't
acknowledge the actual existence of 'theoretical' contradictions and assorted absurdities
like those mentioned earlier, nor do they
countenance the
mere existence of all contradictory, imaginary or impossible objects
and processes.
That proffered DM-counter-claim is itself demonstrably false, as we
will soon
find out.
Anyway, even if it were the case that DM-theorists refuse to admit the mere existence of
such entities, there is in fact nothing in their 'logic' that rules them out.
DL is, alas, remarkably accommodating.
Again, it could be objected that many such 'contradictory
objects and processes' could easily be excluded if it turns out
that they aren't material or don't represent
verifiable material forces.
But, how do we know that is so and will always
remain so? How can anyone be so sure that scientists will never discover such
oddities? They
already have enough of their own to contend with.
Several were listed
earlier. Would anyone like to
tell physicists that an electron travelling 'backwards' in time is impossible? Or that
'quantum objects' can't be 'in two places at once'? Or that certain particles
can't be instantaneously "entangled" across billions of light years of
'empty space'? Or even that
'virtual particles' aren't 'emerging' from that same 'empty
space' all the time?
Once again, such weird and
wonderful objects and processes can't be ruled out by
anyone appealing to the
obscure notions DL supplies its
unfortunate victims. Because of such 'logic', dialecticians
already admit the existence of countless billion contradictions (and other
assorted 'impossibilities') in every gram of matter, right across the universe
-- whose existence can't be,
and certainly hasn't been,
confirmed by empirical means.
In fact, if everything in
existence isa UO (as the
DM-classics maintain),
there should be at least as many contradictions in reality as there are
sub-atomic particles (and possibly even more). In that case, if we accept what
the DM-classicists have to say, the aforementioned 'impossibilities' and
'absurdities' can't be ruled out in advance of
all the evidence having been collected and processed, certainly not
on the basis of 'principles' exclusive to DL.
As we have already seen (in connection
with
Engels's analysis of motion,
in addition to several other core DM-theories covered
here,
here,
here,
here,
here and
here),
DM-theorists already acknowledge the existence of contradictory objects, as well as what might otherwise appear to be impossible objects,
processes and events. Examples include the unity of
opposite poles in magnets, 'contradictory'
opposing forces operating throughout nature
(at both the macro-, and the micro-level),
contradictory moving objects,
'contradictory' numbers
and mathematical concepts/objects, seeds which 'negate' themselves,
the existence of actual infinities (that is,
the existence of something which both terminates -- so that it is a determinateexistent
--
and which doesn't terminate because it isn't finite),
the fundamentally contradictory nature of matter (in that it is both wave
and particle, continuous and discontinuous, at the same time), the (supposed)
fact that
matter is just an 'abstraction', 'contradictory' cells that are somehow simultaneously alive and dead (or
they are teetering on the edge of, or they are caught between, both states), and
so on.
Once again, if Lenin is to be believed,
reality itself is fundamentally contradictory since everything is a UO.
He asserted the universal truth of that theory in the absence of any evidence
other than what he found in Hegel, Engels, Dietzgen and Plekhanov's work.
Lenin's conclusion that everything is a UO
couldn't even have been based on the science of his own day! Remember, these
have to be 'dialectical opposites', not just any old opposites. That is,
each has to imply the existence of the other, and neither can exist on its own
-- like the proletariat supposedly implies the existence of the capitalist class
and can't exist without it. So, where is Lenin's proof that every single
opposite in the entire universe is 'dialectical', in that sense? Did Lenin
even attempt to marshal evidence in support of such a contention? Have
any DM-fans since then done so? Has a single one of them shown these 'opposites'
are all 'dialectical' (in the above sense) right across the entire
universe? Or are they merely content to quote Hegel, Engels and Lenin to
that effect?23
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and
unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…. In brief, dialectics can be
defined as
the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the
cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials',
one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of
dialectics…. In
mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and
reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the
combination and dissociation of atoms….
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity
of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added.
Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Hence, DM-theorists alreadyaccept the actualexistence of countless contradictory objects, processes and
'impossibilities'
prior to all (or even most) of the evidence has
been collected,
let alone processed. In fact,
in many cases they do so in abeyanceof
any
evidence
at all! For example, they all agree
with Hegel and Engels that motion itself is contradictory even though not one
of them has ever offered any actual evidence in support of that claim. As I
have argued
later on in
this Essay (slightly edited):
Of course, the above...response/explanation is independent of the fact that
Marxist dialecticians (as well as card-carrying Hegelians) have yet to produce anyactual evidence that substantiates the idea that motion, for instance, is
contradictory. Indeed, it is difficult even to imaginewhat
evidence couldbe offered in support of that rather
odd theory. In that case, this Hegelian idea can't form part of scientific knowledge.
In fact, the theory that
motion is contradictory was and still is based solely on a superficial and highly
contentious 'thought
experiment' -- or, rather, it is the result of yet another exercise in
creative word juggling masquerading as a thought experiment (indeed, as we saw in
Essay Five). In that case, this
particular doctrine should be abandoned if DM is to remain consistent with its
supporters' own rather basic
understanding of 'the scientific method' -- i.e.,
that there should at least be some evidence offered in its support.
We can
also see this from the additional fact that DM-fans agree with Hegel, Engels,
Plekhanov, Lenin and Mao that
everything,and every process, is, or
'contains', a UO.
[The reason for the 'scare'
quotes around "contains" is explained in Essay Eight
Part One.]
If so,for all that
even dialecticians know,
the "Totality" could contain countless yet-to-be-discovered
absurdities. And that is all the more likely to be the case since DM-theorists themselves
already confusecontradictions with absurdities, impossibilities
and much else besides.
Furthermore, if Engels and Lenin
are to be believed, an
infinite amount of knowledge
still
awaits discovery.
In that case, at any point in history (such as the present) humanity must be
infinitely ignorant of the final contents of, or the principles supposedly
governing, the "Totality" (that is, if there is such a 'thing',
to begin with!). That is because the difference between a finite body of
knowledge (such as we currently possess) and an infinite amount is itself infinite. Hence,
those who rely on DL are in no position to
rule such absurdities out with anything other than infinite uncertainty.
Indeed, the only way they could legitimately be excluded would
be on the
back ofan
appeal to
principles exclusive to FLand ordinary language
--, and therefore on the basis of rules incompatible
with DL. [On that, see
Essay Four.]
This means that DM-theorists can't consistentlyexclude any of the contradictory or 'impossible' items
listed earlier solely because of their assumed 'contradictory'
or counter-intuitive nature. Theorists who postulate the existence of contradictions everywhere, but who
then become arbitrarily fastidious about such things whenever it suits them,
or whenever the ridiculous consequences of their theory are exposed, shouldn't expect
to be taken seriously.
But, what could be more contradictory than a
"Totality" that admits among its denizens things that not only do not exist (like
the past), but also those that can't exist -- like DM-'abstractions', since,
if they exist,
they must be concrete?
Unfortunately, once this DM-juggernaut starts
rolling it
takes something a little more substantial than DL to stop it, or even slow it
down.
If DM isn't to be
imposed
on the world, but read from it -- as its supporters constantly
claim
-- they can't consistently stipulate what their
"Totality" does or doesn't contain ahead
of an exhaustive (empirical) investigation to that end.23a
Others might be able to do so, but they
can't.
This is their millstone; they should
wear it with pride.
Hence, any attempt to rule out of existence
one or more of the contradictory or absurd 'objects' listed above would trap
DM-theorists between that millstone and a familiar hard place, FL.
By way of contrast, those of us who aren't -- shall
we say --
held in thrall by such an egregiously mis-titled 'system of logic'
-- i.e., DL -- not only
can, we do rule out of existence certain things because of
principles expressed by FL and ordinary language. And we are right to do so,
too.
[Or rather, it is perhaps better to
say that it makes no sense to suppose such things exist. (There is more on that,here.)
In like manner, we may justifiably deny the legitimacy of DM
because it is based on a belief in the existence of 'contradictions' in nature and society.]
However, as noted
earlier, such a defence is unavailable to dialecticians. That is because they hold
the view that humanity must wait on the result of an
infinite meander through 'logical space', along the
Yellow
Brick Road to 'Epistemological
Valhalla' (which supposedly leads believers
ever closer to a mythical end-state of 'Absolute Knowledge'), before anyone is able
to decide whether or not a given
empirical (fact-stating) proposition is 'fully true', or its content is even 'concrete'.
If so,
dialecticians have no good reason to complain about the above allegation -- that their
"Totality" might contain any, or even all, of the odd things listed earlier, the
(possible) existence of which is a direct result of their cavalier rejection of the
protocols of FL (many of which are expressed in the vernacular).
The dilemma facing DM-theorists is therefore quite stark; either they:
(1) Continue to depreciate/undermine FL and ordinary language --
which
unwise tactic helped create this problem --, thus admitting the possible existence of all
manner of contradictory objects, events and processes; or they,
(2) Reject the existence of contradictory objects,
events and processes, thus abandoning their core theory that contradictions and
other assorted absurdities exist everywhere in nature and society (because of rules codified by FL or expressed discursively in
or by ordinary language). [In addition, they should abandon their unworkable
theory of knowledge.]24
What
now seems clear is that an unwise rejection of certain principles formalised in
and by FL has left the DM-"Totality" wide
open to infestation by countless weird and wonderful 'entities', the elimination
of which will require a swift dose of those very same FL-protocols, in tandem
with the adoption of a
believable and workable theory of
knowledge.
Hence, as a result of yet another dialectical
inversion, FL would now be required to rescue DM-theorists from the
contradictory "Totality" they rashly called into existence; a Whole
that could include, for all we know -- or,indeed, for all they know
-- characters from
Alice in Wonderland and the nonsense rhymes of
Edward
Lear.24a
In addition to, but nevertheless compounding of, the
difficulties outlined above there remain several unresolved issues
concerning the exact nature and extent of the connections and relations that are said to exist between the objects and processes
that are supposedly part of this nebulous DM-"Totality" --,
should we ever be told with any clarity what any of these are, of course.
What little can be gleaned from the remarks DM-fans
have committed to paper seems to suggest that the "Totality" is
inter-connected, 'contradictory', constantly changing and that that is because of a 'dialectical' relation, or interaction, between its countless
'constituent'
UOs.
Earlier we saw Lenin advance the following rather
bold beliefs:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"To begin with what is the
simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already
we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective
connection in nature, etc...." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221,
359-60. Emphases
mostly in the
original.]
However, he was also disarminglyhonest
about where he had obtained these ideas:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the
dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of
concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word
dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence
of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the
transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of
notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to
nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions
all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in
a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.
Emphases mostly in the original.]25
This reveals that Lenin derived this theory, not from a scientific study of
nature,
but from a Christian Mystic.
Those who claim to be both materialists and
atheists should let that sink in for a minute.
In relation to the above admission (by Lenin), it is
also worth reminding ourselves that Hegel hasn't gone down in history as an experimental or observational scientist
of any note.
Of course, that doesn't mean he was ignorant of the science of his day, or that
he was mistaken or peddled false ideas just because of that, only
that he was in no way a scientist. So, why
his opinion on such matters should count in the way if has on the Marxist left is a mystery
(except perhaps as an accident of history -- a possible answer outlined in Essay
Eight Part Two. There I ask the following question:
If Hegel had died of Cholera as a
child, not as an adult, would anyone on the Marxist left (or anywhere else, for
that matter) show any interest at all in 'dialectics'? In addition to that, Lenin
also acknowledged that Hegel derived these ideas from a consideration of the concepts
supposedly involved, not from the science even of his day (as limited as that
was, anyway).
[Sceptical readers can check, but there is precious
little data in Hegel's work. The scientists back then were virtually all Christians,
so they were already in the grip of mystical ideas about the origin and nature
of 'the Whole'. As Marx himself pointed out: the ideas of the ruling
elite are always the ruling ideas, so none of this should surprise us in the
least.]
Be this as it may, the nature and extent of these
'universal inter-connections' is still far from clear. For example, does every
singleobject
and process in
the entire "Totality" instantaneously
and continually
influence everyother object and process in the "Totality" (assuming for
the moment that the "Totality" is meant to be the (known?) universe),
even across vast expanses of space and time? Does each object and process do
so equally or differentially? That is, do objects and processes on the far side
of the universe affect those here on Earth, for instance, equally as much
as (or is it
less than?) the effect objects and processes on this planet have on each
other? Or is this
influence as much as they affect those on the far side
of the universe on the 'return journey' (so to speak)? After all, if there is an
"inter-connection" at work here, it would seem there should be a two-way link
of some sort in operation. Indeed, as we will see in
Part Two, given the Hegelian doctrine of
'internal relations', the answer in this case to such questions would appear to be "equally as much",
in both directions! If so, this implies that when you, dear reader, brush your
teeth that will
have the same effect on your teeth as it has on galaxies billions of light years
away! That can't be right, and yet a strict reading of this dogma
seems to suggest that is indeed the case.
Even if the conclusion drawn at the end of the
previous paragraph is misguided in some way, how are inter-connections like
these even possible?
More important, how might any of
it
be confirmed?
At this point, it is worth recalling once more what
Engels, Maurice Cornforth, and George Novack had to say
about the necessity to provide evidence, and how this isn't an optional extra:
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
[I have quoted several more DM-theorists to the same
effect,
here.]
But, isn't that what
dialecticians have been doing
from day one -- reading these ideas into nature? They have been doing
that from the day they
first opened Hegel's 'Logic' and naively swallowed far more of it than is good
for any human being to have to ingest?
Nevertheless, as is the case with other DM-ideas, the belief
that everything in the universe is inter-connected soon unravels when it is subjected
to the sort of scrutiny dialecticians studiously ignore -- or try to
avoid.
To that end, it is worth
asking the following questions:
Exactly which parts of the Universe are inter-related?
To what extent are they linked? And in what way? Do these inter-connections extend
instantaneously across all
regions of space and time? Or is that true only of some?
If not, is there
some sort of time-delay affecting them all? Or only some? If either is the case, does this mean that the past, for instance, is currently
inter-connected with the present -- perhaps by means of light (or
maybe even by gravitational) waves as they travel across such vast expanses? Or, do these inter-connections operate only between
contemporaneous
objects and processes, thereby ruling out some of these (possible) delays? That is, are
only presently existing objects and processes inter-connected?
On the other hand, does this
theory imply that objects and processes in the past are nowinter-connected with other
objects and processes that exist in the
same or different time zones? In that case, are the following five
randomly-selected events (from
the past) still nowinter-connected:
(i) The election of Tony Blair
as Prime Minister (May
1997);
(v) The near extinction of all life on earth at the
end of the Permian (approximately 250 million
years ago)?
If not, which time zones/events areinter-linked and
which aren't? And on what basis? And what evidence is there in support of
any of this?
If the above are all still inter-connected, precisely what is it that
inter-links events like the above -- i.e., those thatno longer exist?
Is there a connecting/inter-linking 'force' of some sort operating here? If so
what is it? Does any such inter-connecting
'force' (or 'energy', or whatever it is that supposedly connects these non-existent
objects and processes) itself exist in the present? That is, is this mysterious
connecting 'agent'/'force'/'whatever' still operating? It would seem that
that must
be the case if all this inter-linking is itself still currently taking
place.
On the other hand, if it isn't, how
would this mysterious connecting 'agent'/'force'/'whatever' still be able to link anything?
Alternatively again, if this mysterious connecting 'agent'/'force'/'whatever' does
still exist
and is operating in the here-and-now, how is it
able to inter-connect objects and events that don't exist (like those
listed above, not to mention countless others) with those that do?
Even supposing such questions
could be answered (that is, should a single DM-theorist bother to do so -- or
even deign to consider
them), we would still be in the
dark over how this 'force', this 'energy' -- or this 'we-know-not-what' -- actually manages to do
all this inter-connecting.
Bemused readers will
search long and hard, and to no avail, through the DM-literature --, as well as
anything else written by religious mystics who also promote such ideas (in
relation to their openly mystical versions of the "Totality" -- for
many of these, the inter-linking 'force' is either 'God' or 'The Holy Spirit') --, for any answers to these and other
awkward questions. Or, indeed, for any sign they are even vaguely aware
that such
questions, such problems,
actually exist.
Anyway, and to spoil the fun, we already know (from certain precepts enshrined
in
Relativity Theory -- i.e., those connected with
so-called
"Light
Cones"),
that there are significant regions of the universe that can't (physically can't) be connected, let alone
inter-connected:
"In attempting to diagram relativistic spacetimes,
one of the most important features to capture is the causal structure of the
spacetime. This structure specifies which events (that is, which points of space
and time) can be connected by trajectories that are slower than light, which
events can be connected by trajectories travelling at the speed of light, and
which events cannot be connected by anything travelling at or below light speed.
Events in the first group are said to be 'timelike related', because a physical
clock could travel from one event to the other. Events in the second group are
'lightlike related' because a light ray can travel from one to the other. Events
in the third group are 'spacelike related'. Given that it is physically
impossible (on the standard interpretation of relativity theory) for any causal
process to exceed the speed of light, these three possible ways of being
connected tell us whether one event is able to influence another." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 16/06/2022. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site; spelling modified to agree with UK English. Bold emphases
added.]
Has a single DM-fans ever even considered this?
[Cynical readers will, I am
sure, forgive that facetious question. Of course they haven't! We are
dealing with DM-fans -- i.e., devoted, heads-in-the-sand practitioners of
Mickey Mouse Science
and
Minnie Mouse Philosophy.
So, that question was
merely rhetorical.]
Be this also as it may, in view of the fact that the past doesn't now exist shouldn't such
'connections across time zones' be ruled out or disallowed? Once more, that is because it
would seem impossible for anything to be connected (let alone
inter-connected)
with something that doesn't exist. On the other hand, if the past isn't
connected (or isn't
inter-connected) with the present, how would it be possible to give a historical
account of, say, the origin of class society or the demise of Feudalism?
Of course, it is always possible
to argue that there must be causal chains of objects, processes and events that connect
the past with the present -- perhaps imagined along the following lines:
C1: Assume there is series of
events stretching from the past to the present: E1,
E2, E3...,
Ek..., En-1,
En (where
E1- En-1
stand for events in the past and En
stands for a specific event in the present).
C2: Assume further there is a causal chain that
provides a series of links between these events: C1,
C2, C3...,
Ck..., Cn-2,
Cn-1 (where
C1 stands
for a
causal link between E1
and E2,
C2 stands for a causal
link between E2
and E3,
C3 stands for a causal
link between E3
and E4,
etc.).
C3: In addition,
let each E and each C, or their chains, be as complex,
'branched' and 'dialectically
sophisticated' as circumstances, explanatory power and DM-theorists themselves require
(should they ever deign to tell us).
[Indeed, each C
can even be described as a "mediating cause" (to use a DM-buzz word), just as
each E can be said to be subject to change through 'internal contradiction' itself.
Incidentally, the word "event" above should be taken to cover events, objects
and processes.]
But, even if any of the above were/are
the case, this supposed chain of causes
can't succeed in inter-connecting the past with the presentif at least two
(sets) of them don't actually exist
-- i.e., the first of these two being the past (or, rather, events in the past
-- in this
case the chain, E1,
E2, E3...,
Ek..., and
En-1, all
of which no longer exist), the second being the causal chain itself (or, rather, the series, C1,
C2, C3...,
Ck..., Cn-2,
which also no longer exists). [More on that presently.]
Also left out of consideration in all this is the
Hubble Sphere, about which we read:
"Currently, we are certain that we live in a
universe that is expanding at an increasing rate. As you read this, the universe
expands at about 70 kilometres per second per megaparsec. [A megaparsec is a
million
parsecs -- RL.] This means that a galaxy 1
megaparsec away from us is receding at about 70 km/s, another galaxy 2
megaparsecs away from us is receding at 140 km/s, and so on. This is
Hubble's law. Following the same logic, one could do the math to
compute how far a galaxy has to be in order to move away at the speed of light.
It turns out, galaxies 4300 megaparsecs away from us recede faster than light.
This distance defines the 'Hubble
sphere', an imaginary sphere centred at us, outside which everything
recedes faster than the speed of light. Note that, since the universe expands at
an accelerated rate, the Hubble sphere increases its radius as time goes by.
"Can we see light coming from galaxies outside the
Hubble sphere? Receiving light from a source moving faster than light might seem
odd, but this is actually possible. Imagine a galaxy outside the Hubble sphere,
which emits a light pulse towards Earth. The pulse tries to makes its way to us,
but it is 'dragged' away from Earth by a region of space receding faster than
light. It looks like we will never receive this pulse -- but wait a sec! As the
universe expands, the Hubble sphere gets bigger, too. Now, if the rate at which
the Hubble sphere expands is larger than the net velocity at which the photon
recedes from us, the pulse will eventually pass from a superluminal region [a
region moving faster then the speed of light - RL] into
a region receding from us slower than the speed of light. Take a look at this
video, which transforms these words into a cool animation. Of course,
as long as the pulse is travelling [in] a region receding from us at a velocity
smaller than the speed of light, it will eventually reach us. The conclusion is
that we still can observe galaxies receding faster than light! Put another way,
the Hubble sphere is not the limit of our observable universe.
"How can we tell the universe is expanding faster
than the speed of light in the first place? The wavelength of a light pulse
travelling the universe is stretched as space expands, so the light gets redder.
(That is, its wavelength increases.) This so-called cosmological redshift is
measured by astronomers, so distant galaxies can be labelled by their redshift.
The higher redshift of a galaxy, the faster it is receding from us. For any
plausible model of our expanding universe, there exists a relatively simple
conversion to translate redshift into recessional velocity. Not surprising by
now, some of the galaxies we have observed exhibit redshifts resulting in
superluminal recessional velocities!
"Finally, one should note that, in practice, a
receding galaxy may 'disappear' from our observations due to cosmological
redshift. Light coming from the galaxy gets redder and redder, leaving the
detectability range of our instrument (our eyes or even a radio telescope). In
addition, the time between successive pulses will increase so much that the
galaxy will fade out until it vanishes." [Quoted from
here; accessed 21/12/2022. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site; spelling modified to agree with UK
English. Minor typo corrected, links in the original. In the month since this
article was first accessed it has disappeared! However, a much more detailed
and technical article that says more-or-less the same can be accessed
here(consulted 03/02/2023).]
It is to be noted that the above article says that
this doesn't automatically mean that some radiation coming from regions of space
that are expanding faster than the speed of light will never reach the earth, it
leaves it open whether or not it is the case with light in general -- a point also
made in
this video by theoretical Physicist,
Lawrence Krauss (which physical limitation scientists
have labelled, the
"Particle
Horizon").
[Incidentally, the
video linked in the above article explains how
it is possible for space to expand faster than light and why that
doesn't violate Special Relativity, which means, according to Krauss, that
light and other forms of radiation (and that includes gravitational waves) from
some regions of the universe will never reach the earth.]
If so, those regions can't now be connected with this
planet, let alone inter-connected with it. Unless the background theory in
contemporary Physics is
fundamentally flawed -- or it is abandoned/modified --, that will always remain the case.
If we ignore the above
'problems' (at least for the
purposes of argument), it could be argued that the present
might beconnected with the past via such a causal chain --, for instance, from
the past
to the present (indeed, exactly as pictured a few paragraphs back). But, even if
that were the case, the present can't be inter-connected
with the past, anymore than you, dear reader, can be inter-connected with The Battle of the Little Bighorn, or The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
-- in the sense that you might now be linked to those events both from past to present (by
a complex causal chain of some sort) andreverse-linked
to it from the present
to
the past.
Either we acknowledge this insurmountable obstacle or we allow for the existence of backward causation.
If so, we would have to be prepared to contemplate the existence of causal links that travel back in time to objects and processes
in the past that themselves no longer exist to be affected in any way by
anything! In that eventuality, legitimate questions might well be asked about
what sort of causal influence can be experienced by something that no longer
exists.
However, as has also been
pointed out, no single item in
any of these (suggested) causal chains leading from the past to the present, except perhaps the
very last one, will now
exist. If so, how such an insubstantial chain of non-existent causes
is able to connect something that
does exist (the present) with something that doesn't (the past) is still
a mystery. At best,
that
would make this chain and those links Ideal, once more, and hence
not in the least "objective", let alone physical.
So, at the very
most, if the past is connected with the present (by what are in effect
'Ideal causal links') it
would make the "Totality" (so depicted) an Ideally connected 'Whole'.
Even then, it would still fail to be an inter-connected 'Whole', still less a
physically-connected system.
Does this surprise
anyone given the fact that all such talk originated in the over-heated
brains of ancient and early modern mystics?
In response to
any hard-core DM-fans that have made it this far and who might at this point be heard
muttering through clenched teeth: "Of course such things are inter-connected!"
one is tempted to reply
along the following lines: "Ok, so which minor deity informed you of that supposed
fact?". And that question would itself be uttered a few seconds before reminding them that
only Idealists foist
theories like this on nature, something
DM-fans have sworn never to do. That was, of course, the point being made by the
following
DM-worthies, a few paragraphs back:
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
[Dozens more passages like these
were
quoted
here and in
Essay Two.]
Be this as it may (once more), in order to help
resolve 'problems' like those aired above, let us call the following
(extreme) version of this theory,
"Maximal-Inter-Connectedness" (or,
MIC), which we can characterise like this:
MIC: [A] Every object, event and process in the "Totality"
is both instantaneously and permanently inter-connected across
all time zones.
Conversely, let us stipulate
that an attenuated version of MIC, which we can call "Non-Maximal-Inter-Connectedness"
(or, NMIC),
can be characterised as follows:
NMIC: [B] The
"Totality" is inter-connected, but not everything that has existed, will exist, or now exits is
both permanently and instantaneously inter-linked with everything else
across
all time zones.
MIC:
[A] Every object, event and process in the "Totality" is
both instantaneously and permanently inter-connected across
all time zones.
It is difficult to see how
MIC could possibly be true. If it were, it would
imply that every object, event and process in the entire history of the universe
(and perhaps even beyond?) is now, always has been, and always will be inter-connected
with every other object, event and process across every time zone, permanently
and instantaneously, whether or not any of them still exist!
Taking three such
objects or events at
random: it would mean that, for example, the median price of coffee grinders
in Brazil on the first of June 2021, the number of grains of sand on
Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.35656786098444317 million years ago, are all inter-connected with
one another, permanently and instantaneously.
Indeed, if everything
in reality is inter-connected, the above seemingly insignificant
events and processes would have to be taken into account in the scientific
explanation of what would otherwise be regarded as unrelated events, like the
assassination of Abraham
Lincoln, for instance. Historians and scientists would have to include such considerations (as well as countless others) in any
account they might give of
Lincoln's death.
[Issues concerning 'relevance' and
supposedly diminishing, and hence 'irrelevant', causal effects will be considered presently.]
For example, if MIC
were true then the taste of sugar would have to have something to do with
the angular velocity of stars in neighbouring and distant galaxies (at all times), and
with the three items mentioned above. In addition, all would have to be
inter-connected with the smell of diesel
oil, as well as the mean weight of all
Fiddler
Crabs in the Southern Hemisphere eaten by predators on or before 17:02
(local time), June
15th 1247 (Julian
Calendar), and with the effect of
Selenium Sulphide on the
dandruff of
Chelsea FC supporters who
own
Heritage Cherry Sunburst Gibson Les Paul guitars (2006 issue)
-- if there are
any(!).
So, if MIC were the case, all of these
(and gazillions more like them) would have to be taken into account by scientists
trying to explain the extinction of the
dinosaurs or the properties of
Tungsten
(and vice versa), and much else besides.
Figure Six: Is Bondi Beach
Still Inter-Connected
With Napoleon's Left Foot?
And Yours, Too?
Figure Seven: Are Ageing
Coffee Grinders Still
Inter-Linked With
The End Of The Last Ice Age?
Figure Eight: Is The Cartwheel
Galaxy Still Inter-Connected
Some might object at
this point and argue that dialecticians don't hold such simple-minded, ridiculous and extreme beliefs. Even worse, the
above remarks ignore relative connectedness, diminishing effects and hence considerations of 'relevance'.
[Once again, those
conveniently vague notions will be examined
presently.]
In advance of a response to
questions of relevance it is
worth reminding ourselves that:
(a) This sub-section is dealing with
MIC, not some other version of inter-connection; and,
(b) Speculation like this has been forced
on us
because DM-fans have consistently failed -- or have even steadfastly refused -- to say beyond
a few vague
banalities what their theory actually implies. So, it would be no use any
of them lodging complaints like this while they continue to indulge in what is
in effect a protracted 'dialectical sulk', refusing to say anything substantive
about their "Totality".
Any DM-fans who still object clearly
don't accept MIC. Ok, good for them. But, the question remains: Is MIC what
the DM-classicists themselves accepted and promoted?
If it is, any
rejection by contemporary DM-fans along the above lines would be beside the point.
This Essay is concerned with classical DM not recent attempts to
'sanitise' it, or provide hasty and ill-considered repairs, 'on
the hoof'.
Furthermore, because MIC postulates instantaneous
influences/effects,operating
ceaselessly
across
all regions of space and time,
inverse
square law drop-off rates
don't apply -- always assuming, of course, that inverse square law drop off-rates are what
the phrase "relative connectedness" itself implies.
But, once again, who can say? Certainly not DM-theorists. They have
collectively retreated into a corner and sunk into the aforementioned
prolonged
'dialectical sulk'.
Anyway, even if inter-connectedness were relativised in the above manner,
countless objects and events would still be linked, and it is the
links
themselves
that remain obscure (howsoever relativised or weak they are deemed to be).
[The idea that "internal relations" between objects and events (postulated by DM-theorists) decrease with distance
-- so that 'remote
effects' can be ruled out as irrelevant -- has been subjected to
sustained and destructive
criticism in
Part Two of this
Essay. The reader is directed there for further details.]
Moreover, even if these links were relativised in the
above manner, that would still fail to explain how everything is in fact
inter-connected. For example, and once again: how are objects and processes in the past
inter-linked with those in the present? Or, indeed, with those that supposedly lie in the future? Are
such links causal?
Are they physical in any way at all? Or
are they perhaps something a little more
esoteric?
According to current theory, it takes many light years for the vanishingly small
gravitational effects of distant objects to arrive in the vicinity of our
planet, but when they do finally reach us those effects are clearly located in the present. The
question now is: What
influence do extremely remote objects, some
10-12 billion
light years away -- which objects might no longer exist --
currently have
here on the earth? Admittedly, light from these distant regions might have some effect
(or it will do so when it makes it this far), but for MIC to be valid
objects like that must influence the Earth instantaneously across immense distances, even
beforethe aforementioned physical effects arrive in our neighbourhood,
and for that to be true in reverse!
Of course, as should now seem
reasonably
clear, if
MIC were to be adopted as an official DM-doctrine, it would beimpossibleto
verify.
Wherewould
anyone evenbegin?
More mysterious still is the
following:
whatever inter-connections are imagined to exist between objects, events and processes,
the connections themselves
can't change and neither can the elements so
inter-linked.
To see
why that is so, consider an
earlier sentence:
T1: The median price of coffee
grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2021, the number of grains
of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.35656786098444317 million years ago...
If it is now true that
there are such inter-connections between the above items -- call this set of connections, MICA
--, then since MICA
has been relativised to, and identified by means of, the times so specified, it
must always remain the same.
On the other hand, if T1 above
were false -- and MICA
were susceptible to change, after all -- then at any point in time it would be
incorrect to say that
the said relation expressed by T1 was MICA,
and the items mentioned wouldn't be inter-linked in the way that had just been
specified.
But, if it is now true to say this of them, it must be true to say the
same tomorrow (or at any time in the future) about that set of relations.
[Recall, MIC connects
everything with everything else, permanently and instantaneously, forever throughout all of time irrespective of whether whatever
happens to be linked
now exists, including the words used to make this very point. If
everything is inter-linked -- and words would also appear to be part of everything
-- they too must
be covered by MIC.]
It could be argued that
this implausible conclusion (i.e., that these DM-connections themselves can't change
and neither can the elements so
inter-linked)fails to apply here since dialecticians are
openly committed to universal change. In that case, the above relation must also change as
and when the objects and events it connects themselves change.
But, is this a safe
conclusion to draw given the extreme implications
of MIC itself?
[Anyway, the DM-theory that everything is always changing will be examined in
greater detail later on in this Essay, in Interlude Two. Its decidedly weird
implications have already been exposed in Essay Seven
Part Three.]
On the other hand, if the above conclusions are true, it would
imply that MIC
actually does exclude
the possibility of DM-change. That is, of course, because the items in the triple relation
(expressed by T1) do not now
exist and so can't change. In that case, MICA
can't change, either, and neither can the relation between the elements so
connected. Since the events in
question were time-stamped to make them determinate, this means MICAcan't change, either -- because a specific date-stamp identified
each element of the set.
This can only mean that if the "Totality" includes the past, then the vast bulk
of that 'Whole' not only doesn't, it can't change. How odd, then, that DM (if
it implies MIC/MICA),
supposedly the preeminent theory of change, has at its heart the opposite
implication that the vast bulk of the "Totality" is
Parmenidean not
Heraclitean!
T1: The median price of coffee grinders in
Brazil on the first of June 2021, the number of grains
of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.35656786098444317 million years ago...
Any response along the lines
that the above items don't exist so they can't be connected/inter-connected is
in fact just a different way of rejecting MIC, but it manages to do so by threatening
to question the reason for appealing to a "Totality" to begin with. That is because it would restrict
both inter-connection and the "Totality" to objects, events and processes that exist
only in the present, which we saw earlier threatens to make 'it'
existentially and explanatorily irrelevant. Existentially irrelevant since it
would mean the "Totality" is (possibly) durationless, given the extremely ephemeral nature
of the present. Explanatorily irrelevant since reference would have to be made
to objects, events and processes outside the "Totality" in order to
explain anything inside. Why then bother with it in the first place?
If we
now generalise the above remarks (to take into account every event and process in
the entire universe for all of time, including those not now existing
--otherwise, this widened set wouldn't comprise all of 'reality'), we would, unsurprisingly,
obtain the same result. Hence, if MIC were true, DM-change
would be impossible.
If every event in the past is now inter-related to every event in both the
present and the future (MIC-style), nothing could develop or
change. Otherwise we
would lose all contact with our capacity to refer to them, and hence link them.
[And it won't do to argue that
that conclusion is false since many of the objects concerned
do now exist; that is because MIC holds that even if many of them do exist,
they are all inter-linked with countless more that don't.]
Of course, it could be countered that this is
thoroughly misguided since nature takes no heed of our capacity to refer to such
things, or, indeed, our ability to link
them. In which case, the above argument once again confirms that Ms Lichtenstein is an Idealist.
In response, it is worth reminding readers
(again!) that all this speculation has been forced upon us because
dialecticians refuse to say what the "Totality" is, let alone anything specific about the
nature of the inter-connections they say exist throughout the whole of
'reality'. Hence, I am not reporting
my own beliefs!
So, if the universe is
changeable (not that I doubt it!), then one consequence of the above
considerations
is that not only would we be unable to describe nature, we couldn't describe
all those hypothetical
DM-inter-connectionswithout implying they were changeless, either. In that
case, the argument presents DM-theorists with the following dilemma (always assuming they accept MIC):
(A) If the DM-universe is describable, and
MIC is valid, then nothing can change; or,
(B) If the DM-universe changes, it can't be described
(in MIC terms).
Option
(A) above
is in fact the
Block View of
Time, only rather badly stated.
In the
following video a Physicist
helpfully explains that Theory of Time (alongside some of its less well appreciated
implications):
Video Six: The Block View Of
Time And Whether
Or Not The Past Still Exists
So, if the universe is a
four-dimensional 'object' (or, rather,
amanifold)
in
Spacetime, then each 'event' would in effect form a
proper part of an
orthogonal
three-dimensional 'slice' (i.e., a
hyperplane) through that 'object'/manifold embedded in 4-space (indeed, as
the above video also points out). In that case,
change couldn't actually happen. Or, rather,
at best, change would represent a 'subjective view of the world', which would
unfortunately mean
there is no such thing as 'objective' change.
The universe would then be
'objectively'
Parmenidean
and only 'subjectively'
Heraclitean.
[However, if
Special Relativityis
valid (and readers shouldn't take that to mean I think it isn't!),
there might be problems constructing such a hyperplane through all points
simultaneously. If correct, that complicating factor would make our view of the world even more
'subjective' and parochial. (On that, see Saunders (2002).)]
As should now perhaps seem
obvious, this means
Relativity is no friend of DM. Indeed, the 'Big Bang' itself (since it
is a consequence of the TOR) is its mortal enemy. So, when dialecticians
refer to the 'Big Bang' (to account for the "Totality" and
inter-connectedness), they are actually
drawing a viper to their collective bosom. As noted
here,
that is just one
of the reasons
earlier generations of Dialectical Marxists opposed --
and some still
reject
-- the revolutionary new Physics that emerged in the
first few decades of the 20th century.
On the other hand, if the aforementioned 'dialectical links' are
'objective', that would imply they must exist independently of our capacity to refer to them. And
if that is the case, it would still mean they still can't change. Here is why:
T2: Let us call the set of
all such
links, whether or not we know anything about them, S. In that case, S can't
change or it would no longer link the time-stamped items it is defined as connecting.
T3: Call the
set of elements that S connects, Ω. But, Ω can't change,
either, since all its elements are time-stamped, too.
T4: This means that at the 'moment'
of the 'Big Bang' (and possibly even before, if there was indeed such a 'before'),
the first elements of S and Ω came into existence and have remained fixed in
Parmenidean stasis ever since -- that is, if
MIC is true.
[The above still applies even if time is 'relativised.']
Despite the above, let us now suppose that:
(a) There is
some way of avoiding all of the paradoxical conclusions that MIC
brings in its train (outlined above); and
hence that,
(b) MICis compatible with DM-change, after all.
Even then,
MIC
would still face formidable problems. For example, MIC
would appear to
imply
the existence of ceaseless, instantaneous effects across vast
expanses of space and time, not least
those
supposedly connecting things that don't now exist with those that do. In turn,
it would
require the existence of non-relativistic effects 'travelling back and forth'
between such regions at
unimaginably large
superluminal velocities (leaving the 'warp'
speed of Star Trek trailing in the intergalactic dust). Either that, or it would appear
to involve (in most cases) inordinate time-delays for all relevant reciprocal
influences to do their work, undermining MIC in the process. [Since, in that case,
many wouldn't in fact be inter-connected because they would have ceased to exist in
the meantime.]
So, it
looks like MIC presents DM-fans with rather too many debilitating dialectical headaches
--, indeed, nothing less than a terminal case of 'Dialectical Migraine'. Hence,
if DM itself is to be taken seriously, its adherents would be well advised to
avoid MIC like the plague.
[Apologies for those mixed metaphors!]
Because of that,
I will no longer consider MIC
in this Essay in any detail (except, of course, in the End Notes!).
Any dialecticians still enamoured of it are welcome to
make of it what they can.
[Even so, should
any DM-fans remain committed to MIC, they
will have to abandon the idea that their theory is acceptable
only if it
has
been confirmed in some way. That is because MIC is as impossible to
verify as it is to believe.]
Let us assume, therefore, that NMIC
is the more acceptable alternative for DM-theorists to adopt.
From earlier we saw NMIC
committed dialecticians to the following:
[B] The
"Totality" is inter-connected, but not everything that has existed, will exist, or now exits is
both permanently and instantaneously inter-linked with everything else
across
all time zones.
However,
NMIC is itself rather vague (the above characterisation is clearly my
suggestion, which has, once more, been forced upon us because the meagre
details offered by DM-fans are about as useful as a chocolate fire door).
Nevertheless, the
nature and extent
of even these, shall-we-say, 'chastened' inter-connections are as vague as were
those outlined in relation to MIC, and it isn't easy to see how that defect can be rectified
-- except, perhaps, on a dogmatic or
stipulative basis.
But, even if the opposite were
the case, and NMIC was entirely perspicuous, it would still face serious
problems of its own. For example, some of the aforementioned Helium atoms in the
distant Galaxy (mentioned in
T1, reproduced below) could have decayed by the time their
vanishingly small effects had travelled very far. In which case, those atoms, at
least, would no longer exist for them to be inter-connected with anything.
Furthermore, the energy they released could fail to reach certain parts of the Universe
because of absorption elsewhere. And
what is true of them will be true of countless other objects and processes.
T1: The median price of coffee grinders
in Brazil on the first of June 2021, the number of grains
of sand on
Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.35656786098444317 million years ago...
In addition, NMIC also faces the
Light
Cone and the
Hubble Sphere
problems
(briefly examined earlier,
here
and here),
both of
which tell us there are parts
of the universe that not only can't currently interact, they never will be able to do so if Relativity Theory is to be
believed.
Further questions force
themselves upon us: Do these hypothetical 'travelling effects' influence other
'travelling effects' all the time (even if they happen to be moving in opposite
directions from a common source), or is that only the case across severely restricted
or highly circumscribed time
zones? Does the
energy from distant Galaxies travelling away from the Earth (never to
interact with our planet -- that is, if we assume the universe is infinite and
unbounded, and we assume it isn't absorbed somewhere, which means it won't affect
the earth, anyway) have any effect on energy radiating from the Earth and similarly
moving in the opposite direction, away from those Galaxies? If not, how can such events, or parts of nature, be inter-connected?
Is there some sort of
hierarchy of levels within or among these inter-connections, with some
things affecting others more than they do the rest? Does an inverse square law,
or something analogous, apply here?
More to the point: has a single DM-theorist attempted to work out the mathematical
implications of any of this,
let alone considered a single one of the above questions?
Worse still, is there any actual evidence
(not just more theory)
supporting the idea that every
sub-atomic particle in the Universe is inter-connected with every other for
all -- or even most -- of the time?
Of course, one possible response to
the above might involve reminding us that all of nature is subject to the same laws
(because everything originated in a 'Big Bang'
billions of years ago). That would appear to mean everything in the universe
is related "by birth and by law" (as it were) to everything else. Indeed, there are well-known theories in
Modern Physics that
seem to support the idea that the entire Universe might be inter-connected because of:
(i) Its unique origin, (ii) A steadily increasing number of universe-wide 'fields'
(one
for each new 'particle' discovered) and, (iii) "Quantum entanglement". [However,
on that,
see
Note 28.]
[As should seem reasonably clear, DM-supporters who
believe the universe is
infinite (and hence that there was no 'Big Bang') will have a hard time
explaining how everything in an infinite universe could possibly be
connected, let alone inter-connected. On that, see below and
Note 27.]
But, even if it is assumed that certain
contemporary
physical theories
are correct --, and we ignore the Light
Cone and the
Hubble Sphere
'problems'
(again, from earlier,
here
and here), and we draw a veil over the 'Block
View of Time' (and we forget that scientists never
change their minds; but,
on that, see below) --, that would still
fail to show
that everything is now inter-connected, or will always remain so.
For that conclusion to follow, solid evidence and cogent argument are required, certainly
far more than has been offered to date by DM-fans --, which, for all intents
and purposes, is virtually nil!
Furthermore, despite the fact
that the above theories in Modern Physics appear to lend support to the idea that certain
parts of nature areinter-connected, the actual evidence in their favour is
both remarkably thin
and heavily theory-laden.26
Incidentally, the above
response (that everything arose from the 'Big Bang') would fail to explain precisely whichlawsactually
inter-connect the aforementioned price of coffee grinders in Brazil with remote atoms of Helium, let alone the number of grains of sand on beaches in the antipodes,
mentioned in T1, above, to
say nothing about every other trivial, or even significant, event in the history of the universe --, or,
worse still, how any of it might be
evidentially confirmed.
Despite
this, there are several comrades -- whose ideas will be examined in
more detail elsewhere at this site -- who question the standard account of the
origin of the universe -- for example, Michael Gimbel [Gimbel (2011)], and our
old friends,
Woods and
Grant (1995/2007) [W&G]
-- both, henceforth, G&W&G.27
According
to these dialectical-luminaries, the Universe is infinite both in duration and
extent,
macroscopically and microscopically,
stretching on 'forever', as well as being 'infinitely divisible'.
[Having said that, and as far as can
be ascertained, W&G don't actuallysay they believe in infinitely divisibility (but Gimbel
does), even though it appears to be a direct implication of their
theory
that the universe is infinite in extent and intent. Be this as it may, if it were
the case that the universe is infinite in the above two directions,
most of reality couldn'tbe inter-connected since
nothing would have had a common origin -- plainly because, on this view,
there would be no
origin of the universe.
Oddly enough W&G failed to spot that
'unhelpful corollary' of their theory. I haven't yet been able to determine whether or not
comrade Gimbel recognises this disastrous implication of this version of DM.
However, on W&G
and 'the infinite', see Mason (2012).]
In which case, if the Universe
is indeed as these comrades
picture 'it', 'it' couldn't be a
"Totality". Here is why:
Imagine asking, say, a waitress to tell you what
the total bill is for a meal you had just enjoyed only to be informed that it is an "infinite bill".
If it is indeed infinite, it can't have a total. Any reply along the lines that the total is "infinite", or even that
it is 'Aleph
Zero', would be about as useful as being told 'God' is 'infinite'.
Some might object that a bill for such a meal is an inapt analogy. Maybe so, but
until we are told with far more clarity than has hitherto been apparent what DM-fans mean by "Totality"
(let alone what an 'infinite' "Totality" actually is), it will
have to do.
Others might respond that some infinities can be
totalled -- for instance, those that
converge.
While I don't wish to deny that some sequences do converge and thus have a total
(but only if we accept the possibility that there are
infinite
sets), from the context it is plain that I was referring to
physical
infinities, not mathematical infinites. An "infinite bill" would be a
physical object. It can have no total, not because the prices on the bill are
or aren't convergent (if put in a series), but because the object in question is
itself physically unmanageable. Who would there be to 'total' an infinite bill?
Upon which piece of paper might it be written or printed? If every elementary
particle in this (finite) universe were capable of being turned into a numeral,
and all of space into a sheet of rolled up paper, any number that could be symbolised that
way, no matter how large, would still be infinitely smaller that the smallest
Transfinite Cardinal. That being the
case, who could manage, or even handle, a physical bill that was big
enough to allow even that non-infinite series of numerals to be written down, let
alone totalled? The
paper on which an 'infinite bill' would have to be written would also be infinitely larger than this
(finite) universe itself. And who the hell would even be able to write such a finite bill, never
mind one that was supposedly capable of representing a genuinely infinite
number?
Anyway, exactly how
G&W&Gknow that the universe is infinite in extent, and
had no origin, they forgot to tell their audience/readers. Admittedly, Gimbel
did manage to provide several
weak arguments in support of that conclusion, but his main reason appears to be that Engels and
Lenin promoted these ideas, so that was enough for him! Here is Lenin, for example:
"The electron is as inexhaustible as
the atom,
nature is infinite,
but it infinitely exists.
And it is this sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of
nature's existence outside
the mind and perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from
relativist agnosticism and idealism." [Lenin
(1972), p.314.
Bold
emphasis alone added.]
Apparently what those two non-scientists
had to say -- great revolutionaries though they were --
was authority enough for G&W&G. That alone appears to run counter to the
following advice offered by Engels himself:
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing....
As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
In fact, as soon becomes clear to anyone
who actually checks, DM-theories about an
infinite universe don't "proceed...from facts", but from ideas inherited from
post-Renaissance
Hermeticism and Christian Mysticism, where an 'infinite
universe' was regarded as a fitting analogy that reflected the
'infinite nature of God'. Belief in anything less would be to demean, or even
blaspheme, the 'deity'. [On that, see Bruno (1998), De León-Jones (1997),
Koyré (1957),
Lovejoy (1964) (this links to a PDF), and Yates (1991).]
Unsurprisingly, those mystics also omitted the "careful empirical" work necessary to
substantiate the doctrine that the universe is actuallyinfinite,
as opposed to being finite but very large, or very old.
In addition, an obvious point (that
shouldn't really need to be made) is the following: Questions like this should
be settled by
scientific research not by an appeal to religious dogma (upside down or
the 'right way up'). Nevertheless, like many of the other things W&G have to say
about nature (and to a certain extent this also applies to
Gimbel's
ex cathedrapronouncements -- indeed, just as
it applies to those expressed by still other DM-fans), they
seem perfectly happy to
imposesuch quasi-theological dogmas on
the Universe.27a
Another possible reaction
to the above 'difficulties' might proceed along the following lines:
T5: While we might at
present be ignorant of these inter-connections, that doesn't imply there
are none. The history of science has shown that theories of the Universe have
always been framed in increasingly general terms. Over time, the laws scientists
eventually discover confirm the fact that wider and wider regions of the universe
areinter-connected (and in the way that DM-theorists suppose). Indeed, the
development of scientific knowledge shows that the more we discover about nature the more
inter-connections we find.
However, that
response doesn't even begin to tackle most of the problems raised earlier. For example,
issues connected with whether or not inter-connections within the "Totality" involve instantaneous
effects across vast expanses -- i.e., distances measured in billions of light years.
If they do, several of the aforementioned
scientific laws and principles would clearly be false (namely, those
that depend on
Special Relativity).
Worse still,
as has also been noted, the universal existence of such effects will never --
indeed, can never -- be confirmed. How, for example, would it be possible to test the entanglement of
two electrons sent on their way, to be observed when they are a billion or more light
years apart? Who is going to be patient enough, or even live long enough, to
carry out the required observations
across such vast
separation distances --, even assuming the human race
survived that long and there was anyone left to care, let alone remember they
were supposed to keep track of them?
Of course, it could be argued that it is "reasonable
to conclude" that entanglement occurs at such distances based on what we already
know and have already tested experimentally. But, this area of physics is still
highly contested, so the above isn't a safe conclusion to draw. There are
several other considerations to take into account.
First, based on the DM-principles
outlined earlier (those relating to the supposedly non-negotiable caveat that theories have to have empirical
support,
and mustn't be foisted on nature),
dialecticians themselves can't consistently accept the breezily up-beat opinion
expressed in T5, above. And that is because
such hypothetical possibilities are forever incapable of being confirmed. That is quite apart from the
additional fact that we still don't know what
these inter-connections, which stretch across such vast distances, are
supposed to be. Or, indeed, whether they connect/inter-connect events and
objects in the past with those in the present, which they surely can't avoid
doing if they actually manage to span even one such immense intergalactic
expanse.
Second, Einstein called such ideas "spooky". Not only did they appear to violate certain
tenets of Special Relativity, they also seem impossible to believe -- because of
the absence of any conceivable causal explanation or intervening medium.28
Third, having said that,
in the following video
Dr Hossenfelder explains why Einstein's comments have nothing to do with
"entanglement", but with measurement. She also shows how
"entanglement" doesn't imply "action at a distance", either, but depends on
localcorrelation. She illustrates what she means by the following
analogy: Suppose you have two socks, one red and one blue, and you seal each in
two separate envelopes. One of those envelopes is then sent on a long journey at
the end of which it is opened. If the sock in that envelope turns out to be red,
you know immediately that the other sock, thousands of miles away, is blue because
of the (prior) local correlation just described -- i.e., that two socks with different
colours had been locally correlated from the start. In which case, there has
been no "action at a distance". The opening of the second envelope had no
causal effect on the colour of the first sock, merely on our knowledge
concerning the colour of the second sock in the sealed envelope, which was
always blue. In that case, "entanglement" doesn't violate Special Relativity,
contrary to what was asserted earlier. Of course, Dr Hossenfelder's analogy
depends on 'local realism', that is, it is based on at least two assumptions: (i)
that we know that there are two socks and (ii) they have different
colours, red and blue. [And her sock example was clearly taken from
Bell (1981) -- this links to a PDF.]
Video Seven: What Einstein Actually
Meant
By "Spooky Action"
[See also this second video,
entitled "Three
Different Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics", which questions
even Hossenfelder's conclusions as well as those of other physicists. Also check
out a more recent video,
Video Twenty-One, where Dr Hossenfelder
defends her interpretation and defines more carefully what she means by "local
realism". Finally check out
this even more recent video (i.e., from November 2023), in which
Tim Maudlin explains the background to all this with admirable
clarity and in great detail, whatever one thinks of the conclusions reached.
(One of these conclusions is that if QM is a "local theory" (in the sense given
above) and there is correlation (like with those socks), then QM is
deterministic and the
Copenhagen Interpretation
is false.)]
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
There is, of course, one way out
of this quandary (if the phrase "way out" is stretched beyond breaking point!),
so-called 'Superdeterminism',
about which we read:
"However, there is a loophole through which Nature
could preserve local realism. Local realism could still be a true assumption if
physicists are not free to choose their experiments, that is, if they don't have
Free Will. Let's say that the universe is governed by Superdeterminism. Under
the assumption of superdeterminism, scientists and everyone else and everything
else are no more than puppets whose every move is determined. In this
situation, they might think that they are deciding to set a light polarizer to
measure vertical polarization rather than horizontal polarization. However, they
are deceived by Nature, who has actually determined in advance that the vertical
setting should be selected. And, importantly, Nature also determines the results
of the experiment. Possibly, the laws of Nature work such that local realism is
true but other laws of Nature obscure this when doing certain types of
experiments. If Nature is pulling all the strings, scientists would have no hope
of learning the truth -- all their actions when conducting experiments are being
choreographed. This is superdeterminism. Superdeterminism would defeat the
scientific enterprise. We could never know if we are moving closer to the truth
or only going through pre-programmed motions with pre-programmed outcomes.
"John Bell described the Superdeterminism loophole
this way:
'There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds
and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in
the universe, the complete absence of free
will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with
not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our
behaviour, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment
rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the
experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the
difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell
particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the
universe, including particle A, already 'knows” what that measurement, and its
outcome, will be.' [Interview with John Bell, quoted from
here; links in the original -- RL.]
"Were superdeterminism to hold, no experiment could
tell us if our universe is characterized by local realism or not.
Superdeterminism may seem like an extreme assumption to propose, but throwing
out local realism is also an extreme step." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/04/2024. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site; spelling modified to agree with UK
English.]
As I pointed out
over at Quora, in reply to someone who tried to offer a similar
explanation to Dr Hossenfelder's (who, incidentally,
accepts Superdeterminism!):
"Your explanation assumes
local realism. But, as
Bell's Theorem shows, quantum mechanics [QM] is locally non-real
and
non-local. So, QM, as it currently stands, does imply that when two 'entangled
particles' are separated by billions of light years, for example, what happens
to one instantaneously affects the other. However, one can perhaps take this as
a reductio
ad absurdum of
this interpretation of QM. There is, of course, no way that predictions like
these can be verified across such vast distances. So, this
isn't even science. It is metaphysics dressed up in some pretty abstruse
mathematics." [I have
debunked determinism (in general),
here and
here.]
However, assuming the above is indeed the
case (and we reject 'Superdeterminism'), if DM-theorists continue to base inter-connection on "quantum
entanglement", there would actually be no physical connection between
these
events/particles, just correlation. I am far from sure that that is what was meant
by "connection", let alone "inter-connection".
Moreover, as I pointed out
earlier with respect to another of Dr Hossenfelder's videos (i.e., Video Three):
In the above (video),
theoretical physicist,
Dr Sabine Hossenfelder, argues that
multiverses are intrinsically unobservable and hence can form no part of
science. [Of course, that doesn't itself imply they don't exist only that this
topic is no business of science.] And yet, that is also the case with many other states, events and processes that
are part of established science and which can't, even in theory, be
observed
-- such as 'Quantum
Superposition'. That state can't be observed without
collapsing the wave function involved, thus
losing that very quantum state. This isn't to deny there is such a quantum
state (nor that there is much indirect evidence such states exist), merely to point out that
Dr Hossenfelder's criterion would imply QM isn't a
science (at least
as it is currently understood)!
Dr Hossenfelder
argues that Einstein's objections to "spooky action" were
actually connected with the above, that is, with instantaneous measurement
-- i.e., faster than lightcollapsing wave functions. But, if
that is called into question, far more will be wrong with QM than
just "entanglement". Having said this, in
another video, Physicist Dr Ben Miles, outlines three possible
solutions to this 'puzzle' (one of which is, in effect, Dr Hossenfelder's --
summarised a few paragraphs back), the
weirdest of which involves "retro-causality"
(i.e., 'backwards causation')!
Which only goes to show how far some scientists are
prepared to stretch their credulity (and even their credibility!) in order to make a currently favoured
(or even 'trendy') idea
work that will, in all likelihood, be abandoned or revised beyond all
recognition a decade or so down the line! In the Middle Ages it was crystalline
spheres, epicycles and angels pushing the planets about the place; these days it
is eleven or more 'dimensions', 'rubber sheet geometry', 'warped spacetime', 'universal
fields', 'virtual particles' and 'effects preceding their causes'!
Of course, other physicists disagree with each of these
interpretations. Indeed, if the reader has studied this and related topics for
long enough (or to any depth), they will also know that if you gathered ten
physicists together in a room, you can practically guarantee there will be
upwards of twenty different interpretations of QM, never mind much of the rest contemporary
Physics (including non-locality,
entanglement, relativity theory, the nature of 'particles' and the 'field' --,
or even what energy is, for goodness sake!). Anyone who thinks that that
is a wild exaggeration only has to read the many discussions of such issues carried out on any
randomly-selected physics forum -- for example,
this one -- or watch enough YouTube videos/TV programmes (posted
and/or hosted by highly qualified, leading physicists -- some of whom
are Noble Prize winners, too -- not cranks!), to see that the above remark contains more than a grain
of truth. Indeed, in
this video alone physicist, Arvin Ash, even says "If you asked ten
physicists what a particle is, it would not be surprising to get ten different
answers...." (at approximately 01:16). And here is what one recent article pointed out
about said 'particles':
"When I recently asked a dozen particle physicists what a particle is, they gave
remarkably diverse descriptions. They emphasized that their answers don't
conflict so much as capture different facets of the truth. [However, the rest of
the article, with its six
radically different
theories concerning the nature of 'particles', makes the truth of that
'emphasis' hard to accept -- RL.] They also described two major research
thrusts in fundamental physics today that are pursuing a more satisfying,
all-encompassing picture of particles." [Wolchover
(2020); accessed 19/06/2023.]
Indeed, Swanson then went on to argue as follows (quoting
Cox):
"'Every electron around every atom in the universe
must be shifted as I heat the diamond up to make sure that none of them end up
in the same energy level. When I heat this diamond up all the electrons across
the universe instantly but imperceptibly change their energy levels.'
"You kind of expect the 'rock stars'
of physics to not spout crap like this [Swanson is here referring to the fact
that Cox used to be a rock star, in the band,
Dare -- RL], so it's disappointing when they do. But this isn't a
case of him mis-speaking: he doubles
down on this notion in a
WSJ [Wall Street Journal -- RL] article.
'I recently gave a lecture, screened on the BBC,
about quantum theory, in which I pointed out that "everything is connected to
everything else". This is literally true if quantum theory as currently
understood is not augmented by new physics. This means that the subatomic
constituents of your body are constantly shifting, albeit absolutely
imperceptibly, in response to events happening an arbitrarily large distance
away; for the sake of argument, let's say on the other side of the Universe.
This statement received some criticism in scientific circles. Not because it's
wrong, because it isn't; without this behaviour, we wouldn't be able to explain
the bonds that hold molecules together. The problem is that it sounds like
woo
woo, and quantum theory attracts woo-woo merde-merchants like the pronouncements
of New Age mystics attract flies -- metaphorically speaking.' [As I am sure
readers know "merde" is French for "s*it", which might help explain why Swanson
said "Cox is full of s*it" -- RL.]
"Well, no. The issue isn't the
Pauli Exclusion Principle itself -- that's sound science. It's
what he's done with it. The first, obvious problem is that relativity tells us
that the communication can't be instantaneous. The second is that the Pauli
Exclusion Principle doesn't work this way. It applies to a single system in
which you have all these identical electrons, and they can't be in the same
exact state. This is because of their QM [Quantum Mechanical] behaviour if you
were to exchange them -- something has to be different about the two electrons.
In a crystal, the energies are slightly different as a result, and you get a
band of energies. But this does not extend beyond the system, be it crystal or
even individual atoms -- the electrons belong to different systems, which are
not co-located. Exchanging electrons meaning exchanging systems as well. That's
what's different.
"Here's a simple argument why this can't be true: we
can tell time with atomic clocks. A
Cs atomic clock, for example, has electrons in one of two
possible ground states, separated by an energy which corresponds to a frequency
of 9 192 631 770 Hz. If the energy levels are different, as Brian contends,
because of all the other electrons in other Cs atoms in the universe, we
wouldn't have this sharp energy difference and shouldn't be able to get the
part-in-10^15 kinds of accuracy (and even better levels of precision) from
atomic clocks. That we can do this is a pretty strong indication that he's
wrong.
"Maybe QM is so misunderstood because some prominent
physicists are pitching it as mysticism instead of science.... I should be clear
that I'm good with pretty much everything else mentioned in the article. It's
the mysticism-connectedness angle, and the physics explanation, that is bogus, I
don't expect that from Brian Cox." [Quoted from
here; accessed 19/06/2023. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site; spelling modified to agree with UK
English; several paragraphs merged; one minor typo corrected; all but one link
added.]
As Swanson points out, the only 'reason' Cox has for
arguing that 'all things are connected' is that "some prominent physicists are
pitching it as mysticism instead of science" -- so, rather like DM-fans, in that
case.
On this specific topic, science writer,
Matthew Francis, had this to say about "entanglement" and Professor Cox's
views:
"If I had to pick one area of quantum mechanics that has the
greatest tendency both to bend the mind and to
cause mass confusion, that area would be quantum entanglement. Possibly more
nonsense has been written and spoken about entanglement than any other concept;
even physicists who understand it struggle to explain it to others. That's not
even getting into the challenge of comprehension: it can seem profoundly
disturbing, and I would say that if it doesn't bother you on some level, you
haven't thought about it carefully....
[After giving his interpretation of what
"entanglement" means, Francis then quotes the above passage from Cox, and
comments on it -- RL.]
"In other words, Cox seems to argue that every particle is
entangled with every other, across the entire cosmos. Besides the problems with
relativity and its ban on faster-than-light interactions (which are very
well established!),
his idea of what a system comprises is too broad. (Tom
Swanson has more on this.) Just as entanglement doesn't allow
instantaneous communication, it doesn't follow that entanglement from every
electron in the universe is responsible for the results of energy levels within
an atom. Quantum
interactions don't
work that way, and we have strong evidence in support of that." [Quoted from
here; accessed 19/06/2023. Links in the original.]
Moreover, this controversy wasn't just about
"entanglement", it also involved profound disagreements over how to interpret
Pauli's Exclusion Principle and Special Relativity -- as the
blog post by the aforementioned Physics Professor confirms (who was also concerned to air his rival interpretation of all three topics, in
addition to his ideas about much else besides!).
Finally, on this specific topic, historian of science, Adam Becker,
reports that the original founders of QM -- but more specifically
the physicists who developed what came to be known as the
('orthodox', standard and still dominant)
Copenhagen Interpretation --
Bohr,
Heisenberg and
Jordancouldn't agree among themselves what their own
theory implied, and often published remarks that contradicted one another,
and, on occasion, even themselves! [Cf., Becker (2018), pp.14, 43-60, 302.
For a truly comprehensive history of the countless different interpretations
there have been of all areas of QM, see Freire et al (2022).]
Indeed, according to Becker
there is to this day no settled version even of the Copenhagen Interpretation,
nor is there even a clear statement of its core principles (cf., Chapter
12 of the above book). The situation has only been further complicated by the
increasing support among physicists lent to
Hugh Everett's 'Many
Worlds' interpretation -- a theory that is, frankly, totally
unbelievable (and, if it weren't meant to be taken seriously, would surely
be viewed as yet another reductio ad absurdum of QM itself).
Becker even quotes (Physics) Noble Laureate,
Anthony Leggett, admitting that he must make "an awful
confession":
"If you were to watch me by day, you would see me
sitting at my desk solving Schrödinger's equation...exactly like my
colleagues. But occasionally at night, when the full moon is bright, I do what
in the physics community is the intellectual equivalent of turning into a
werewolf: I question whether quantum mechanics is the complete and ultimate
truth about the physical universe. In particular, I question whether the
superposition principle really can be extrapolated to the
macroscopic level in the way required to generate the
quantum measurement paradox. Worse, I am inclined to believe that
at some point between the atom and the human brain it not only may but
must break down." [Becker (2018), p.270. Italic emphases in the original,
links added.]
So, I repeat: if you gathered ten physicists together
in a room, you can practically guarantee there will be upwards of twenty
different interpretations of QM...
[Of course, that is a slight exaggeration!
However, concerning energy
itself -- the nature of which physicists still can't explain -- see my comments
here.]
Nor will it do to be told that
DM-theorists draw "reasonable conclusions from the available evidence",
which means the counter-claim (that the above effects stretching across such vast distances
will never be confirmed) is "irrelevant". As we saw in Essay Seven
Part One
(and will further witness as this Essay unfolds), DM-theorists aren't so easily
absolved. If DM-fans were simply drawing "reasonable conclusions from the
available evidence", we would see statements like this, for example:
R1: "The available evidence so far suggests that
the universe is an interconnected whole, but further research is need to determine the
nature and extent of these interconnections, whether they include the past and
whether or not they are instantaneous across all regions of space and time."
"Dialectics as the science of
universal inter-connections…." [Engels (1954),
p.17.
Bold emphasis added]
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Ibid., p.70.
Bold emphases added.]
"When we consider and reflect
upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual
activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations
and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what,
where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes
away. We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual
parts still more or less kept in the background; we observe the movements,
transitions, connections, rather than the things that move, combine, and are
connected. This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the
world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by
Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly
changing, constantly coming into being and passing away....
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental
reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and
apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For
him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be
itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another;
cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.
"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to
us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only sound
commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four
walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide
world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and
necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the
nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a
limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in
insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets
the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets
the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their
motion. It cannot see the woods for the trees....
"Further, we find upon closer investigation that
the two poles of an antithesis, positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable
as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually
interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are
conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but
as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the
universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when
we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects
are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause
there and then, and vice versa.
"None of these processes and modes of thought
enters into the framework of metaphysical reasoning. Dialectics, on the other
hand, comprehends things and their representations, ideas, in their essential
connection, concatenation, motion, origin and ending. Such processes as those
mentioned above are, therefore, so many corroborations of its own method of
procedure.... This new German philosophy
culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great
merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual,
is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change,
transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal
connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development."
[Engels (1892),
pp.405-08. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]
And these from Lenin:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
[Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics
of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others." [Ibid.,
pp.196-97.
Original emphases removed and bold added.]
"Dialectics
requires an all-round consideration of relationships in
their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.... A tumbler is assuredly
both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two
properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an
infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the
world. A tumbler is a heavy object which can be used as a missile; it can
serve as a paper weight, a receptacle for a captive butterfly, or a valuable
object with an artistic engraving or design, and this has nothing at all to do
with whether or not it can be used for drinking, is made of glass, is
cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth....
"Formal logic, which is as
far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower
forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring,
and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined
at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic
definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing
more.
"Dialectical logic demands
that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of
an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and
'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely,
but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.
Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in
development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is
not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too,
is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and
connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of
an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of
truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly,
dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the
late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin
(1921),
pp.90-93. Bold emphases alone
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Several paragraphs
merged.]
And Mao:
"The reason the dogmatist and empiricist
comrades in China have made mistakes lies precisely in their subjectivist,
one-sided and superficial way of looking at things. To be one-sided and
superficial is at the same time to be subjective. For all objective things
are actually interconnected and are governed by inner laws, but instead of
undertaking the task of reflecting things as they really are some people only
look at things one-sidedly or superficially and who know neither their
interconnections nor their inner laws, and so their method is subjectivist."
[Mao (1961b),
p.324. Bold emphases added.]
And Bukharin:
"The world
being in constant motion, we must consider phenomena in their mutual
relations, and not as isolated cases. All portions of the universe are actually
related to each other and exert an influence on each other. The slightest
motion, the slightest alteration in one place, simultaneously changes everything
else.... I am now writing on paper with a pen. I thus impart pressures to
the table; the table presses upon the earth, calling forth a number of further
changes. I move my hand, vibrate as I breathe, and these motions pass on in
slight impulses ending Lord knows where. The fact that these may be but small
changes, does not change the essential nature of the matter. All things in
the universe are connected with an indissoluble bond nothing exists as an
isolated object, independent of its surroundings. Of course, we are not
obliged at every moment to pay attention to the universal concatenation of
phenomena: a discussion of poultry -- raising need not always lead us into a
discussion of everything else same time, the sun, the moon, for instance; which
would be folly, for in this case the universal bond of all phenomena would not
help us. But in a discussion of theoretical questions it is very often necessary
for us to bear this relation in mind; even in practice it cannot always be
ignored. We are in the habit of saying that a certain man cannot 'see further
than his nose', which means that he considers his environment as isolated, as
having no relation with what lies beyond it.... When, in simple parlance, we
rightly say that 'all the circumstances must be taken into consideration', what
we really mean is that a given phenomenon or a given question must be considered
with regard to its connections with other phenomena, indissoluble union with
'all the circumstances'.
"In the first place,
therefore, the dialectic method of interpretation demands that all phenomena
be considered in their indissoluble relations; in the second place, that
they be considered in their state of motion.... Since everything in the world is in a state
of change, and indissolubly connected with everything else, we must draw
the necessary conclusions for the social sciences." [Bukharin (1925),
pp.65-67.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to agree with the conventions
adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
And, David Guest:
"Dialectical materialism
appears at first sight to be a return to the original Greek view of the world
from which philosophy started. And, indeed, like this Greek materialism, it sees
the world as a single interconnected whole in endless motion…. Every 'thing' is itself vastly complicated,
made up of innumerable sides and aspects, related in various ways to every other
thing." [Guest (1939), pp.38, 53. Paragraphs merged, bold emphases
added.]
And, George Novack:
"Nature cannot be
unreasonable or reason contrary to nature. Everything that exists must have a
necessary and sufficient reason for existence…. The material base of
this law lies in the actual interdependence of all things in their reciprocal
interactions…. If everything that exists has a necessary and sufficient reason
for existence, that means it had to come into being. It was pushed into
existence and forced its way into existence by natural necessity…. Reality,
rationality and necessity are intimately associated at all times…." [Novack
(1971), pp.78-79. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]
And, Tommy Jackson:
"Its world-conception is Materialist
alike in its Objectivity and in its Activity -- in that the world is conceived as
a totality, and by means of its inseparably connected and never ceasing
interacting movements. And it is Dialectical in that these
inter-acting movements are recognised as begetting, of necessity, a perpetual
self-transformation of the Universe as a whole -- a universally inter-connected
series of processes in which old forms, formations, and inter-relations are
constantly being destroyed and replaced by new forms…." [Jackson (1936), p.626.
Paragraphs merged, bold emphases alone added.]
And, Maurice Cornforth:
"Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics does not regard nature as just an agglomeration of things, each
existing independently of the others, but it considers things as 'connected
with, dependent on and determined by each other.' Hence, it considers that
nothing can be understood taken by itself, in isolation…. Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics considers everything as in 'a state of continuous movement and
change, of renewal and development….' The dialectical method
demands, first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but
always
in their interconnection with other things." [Cornforth (1976), pp.71-72.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
And, Afanasyev:
"The material world is not only a developing,
but also a connected, integral whole. Its objects and phenomena do not
develop of themselves, in isolation, but in inseverable connection or
unity with other objects and phenomena…. One of the most
important aims of materialist dialectics is the study of the world as an integral connected
whole, the examination of the universal connections of things." [Afanasyev
(1968), pp.84-89. Bold emphasis alone added; paragraphs merged.]
And, Kuusinen:
"The
theoretical and practical significance of the causal connection of phenomena is
tremendous. But it does not exhaust the multiformity of relations in the
objective world. Lenin wrote that 'causality... is but a small particle of the
universal connection' and that the 'human conception of cause and effect
always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of the phenomena of nature,
reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one or another aspect
of a single world process.' This means that the interconnection of
phenomena in nature and society is more extensive and complex than the
connection expressed by the relation of cause to effect. In particular,
cause and effect are subordinate to the broader relation of interaction.
Nature constitutes a single whole, all parts of which are connected in one
way or another. In this universal interconnection, any phenomenon, itself
the effect of some cause, also acts as a cause in some other connection, giving
rise to new effects. The evaporation of water in the seas and rivers owing
to the action of the sun's rays, for example, leads to the formation of clouds.
These, in turn, produce rain, which moistens the soil and feeds the brooks and
streams.
"Interaction is also observed in the influence exerted upon each other by cause
and effect within one and the same process; in this sense, the two change places
-- the cause becoming the effect, and vice versa. The continuous thermonuclear
reaction in the sun is an example of such interaction, for the process in which
hydrogen atoms are converted into helium atoms creates a high temperature (of
the order of millions of degrees) which, in turn, necessarily causes the
synthesis of helium atoms from hydrogen atoms. We often observe interaction also
when studying social affairs, for example, a greater popular demand for a
commodity stimulates greater production of it. In turn, the growth of production
produces increased demand. Cause and effect change places. Demand affects
production, and production affects demand. Hence, cause and effect should not be
viewed metaphysically as ossified, unconnected, absolute opposites. They
should be viewed dialectically as interconnected, interconvertible, 'fluid'
conceptions. However, it is not enough to demonstrate the interaction of
different factors or different phenomena. We still have to find out which side
is the determining one in this interaction. It is only when we have discovered
this that we can understand correctly the sources of the process, appraise the
forces involved in it, and see the main line, the direction of development. And
to give a proper idea of the interaction between growth of demand and growth of
production in the example cited above, it should be stressed that growth of
production is the determining factor in this interaction." [Kuusinen (1961),
pp.75-76. (This passage can be found at
pp.58-59 of the 1963, 2nd
ed., and this links to a PDF of the 2nd
ed.) Bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Marxism views society as a totality. It attempts to
understand all aspects of our world as interconnected and shaped by the
capitalist system into which we are all born." [Quoted from
here; accessed 08/10/2022. Bold emphasis added.]
And,of course, we mustn't forget, 'The Great Teacher' Himself:
"Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of
phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but
as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected
with, dependent on, and determined by, each other. The dialectical method
therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by
itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena….
"The dialectical method
therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the
standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the
standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into
being and going out of being…. Speaking of the materialist
views of the ancient philosopher
Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all
is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the rudiments of
dialectical materialism.' [PN,
p.347.]"
[Stalin (1941), pp.837-38, 845. I have used the on-line edition of Lenin's
PN,
here. Links added. Several paragraphs
merged, bold emphases added.]
[I have fully quoted Spirkin's more detailed
comments about the "Totality" and its supposed inter-connections in
Appendix B (followed by a few remarks
criticising the main points he tried to make).
Dozens more passages (and that is no exaggeration!),
which all
say the same sort of thing, were quoted in
Essay Two.]
The nature of the dogmatic (ruling-class) thought-form that runs through
-- and is what
actually inter-connects --
all of these highly repetitive,
boiler
plate assertions isn't so much revealed by the dearth of evidence offered in support of
the hyper-bold, universalist
claims they collectively advance (many of which were made before modern physics
emerged), as it is by the fact that each of the above theorists
imported the same obscure
ideas
from Hegel, who likewise lifted them from earlier mystical bumblers,
who in turn dreamt them up before there was any evidence to speak of. [On that, see
Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).]
Oddly enough, Marx and Engels
themselves explained why such ideas dominate thought for so many centuries:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels(1970), pp.64-65. Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added.]
"[O]ne fact is
common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the
other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite
all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms,
or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total
disappearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the most
radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its
development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." [Marx
and Engels (1968b), p.52. Bold emphasis added.]
Dogmatic, ruling-class ideas "rule"
Dialectical Marxism, too. There is no hint of 'reasonableness' anywhere in those
earlier passages. They are all unequivocally dogmatic.
Nor is there any recognition of their real origin in mystical systems of thought.
Unfortunately, the above passage (from Marx and
Engels 1968b) suggests that it will take a
working class revolution to rid humanity (and Dialectical Marxism) of
these ideas. As I have argued
elsewhere at this site:
If I
were an Idealist, I'd harbour illusions that my work could make some difference;
that is, I'd be under the illusion that Dialectical Marxists could be argued out of their adherence to this creed. But, as a Historical
Materialist, I know that only social change will bring to an end the conditions
(and the consequent alienation) that motivates the vast majority of comrades
into looking at the world in the traditional manner I outlined earlier. Since
fundamental social change can only come about through the revolutionary activity
of workers themselves, Dialectical Marxists of every stripe are going to need
the proletariat to 'save them from themselves'.
I stand no
chance -- I might as well be speaking Klingon to the cat!
[I have also explained in detail why that is so --
and why DM-fans cling to this theory like neurotically insecure Limpets -- in Essay Nine Parts
One
and Two.]
Once more, as we saw in Essay
Two,
this is par for the course right across Dialectical Marxism, and in relation to every aspect of DM,
not just the "Totality" or "inter-connection".
Be this as it may, more worrying still
is the following consideration: The
latest (volunteered) DM-reply -- i.e., in
T5 -- is itself based on a metaphysical view of
science. There are, of course, much deeper issues at stake here -- for example, those connected with how
Scientific Realism
itself should be interpreted (indeed, as hinted at above). In conjunction with that there are also issues
arising from any attempt to translate
into the vernacular the highly technical language scientists employ --, or, for
that matter, render
their ideas compatible with 'commonsense' --, should anyone wish to do either or both.
[Several of
these topics were discussed in Essay Eight
Part Two, others will be dealt with in
Essay Thirteen Part Two (to be published sometime in 2025). That is quite apart from the
fact that the doctrines concocted by the aforementioned mystics were
(originally) completely general themselves!]
Notwithstanding
the above, even if a plausible version of inter-connectedness were
forthcoming from the DM-fraternity, it would still appear inconsistent with other DM-theories/'laws'. For
example: if, according to
dialecticians,
all change is internally-driven and
based on 'inner conflicts' supposedly initiated by the dynamic relation between constituent
UOs
(supposedly present in all objects and processes), that would imply change
couldn't also be externally-motivated. But, what else does the doctrine of universal inter-connectedness amount to except an
appeal to the influence of more complex and remote external
causes, or 'mediations'? Hence, if universal inter-connections exist, change can't be wholly internal to an object or system. On the other hand, if
change were entirely the result of the conflict between the 'internal
opposites' within all objects, processes
and systems, inter-connectedness could, at best, only be local. It certainly
wouldn't be
universal.
[It is also worth
pointing out that there is a fatal equivocation lying at the heart
of the DM-theory that change is the result of 'internal contradictions'. On that
see
here,
here and
here. That topic was covered more fully in Essays Seven
Part One and Eight
Part One
(alongside the additional claim that there is some sort of 'dialectical' interplay at work between
'internal'
and 'external contradictions'),
which will be dealt with again in
Part Two of this Essay.]
In that
case, if dialecticians are determined to cling to their belief in this yet-to-be-defined "Totality", along with
all those equally obscure universal inter-connections, the doctrine
that change is exclusively generated by 'internal contradictions' will have to
be ditched. Conversely, vice versa.
Either way, DM would suffer yet another serious body blow.
Of course, it is always possible to argue that the
above objection relies on an 'either-or' dichotomy; that is, it is
predicated on the assumption that change is either
externally motivated or it is internally driven. But no dialectician
argues in such a crude manner. According to them, change is the result of a "dialectical interplay" between
internal and external factors.
Or so it could be objected...
However, that reply sits rather awkwardly with
several remarks made by the DM-classicists themselves, and it fatally
compromises the core theory of change proposed by Hegel, which was accepted by
Lenin (among others). I have covered that topic in Essay Seven Part Three,
here. Readers are referred there for more details.
Nevertheless, in connection with the former point --
the idea that there are external causes at work on bodies, processes or
systems, and which are involved in some sort of interplay with internal causes (whether these are
'dialectical' or otherwise) -- that was rejectedunequivocally
by Lenin:
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of
nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,'in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?)
conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase,
as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a
unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).
"In the first conception of
motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive,
remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject,
etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to
knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement. The first conception is lifeless,
pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new. The
unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The
struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and
motion are absolute." [Lenin
(1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Lenin didn't
just assert this rather odd idea once, he later "demanded" that all
DL-fans see things
this way (and he did so in a published work -- so this idea can't be
hand-waved aside with a claim that it appeared in unpublished notebooks):
"Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Lenin (1921),
p.90. Bold emphases in the original.
Italic emphasis added.]
In Essay Eight
Part One I then argue the following in
relation to the above words (slightly edited):
Well, perhaps Lenin was merely referring to the
development of certain systems, and not the movement of objects from place
to place, their locomotion?....
But, Lenin's words were in fact pretty clear; he
asserted that DL demands or requires that "objects" (not processes, nor yet
systems, but objects) be taken in "development, in 'self-movement'", so
he included both -- development and self-movement -- in this caveat. And,
all this is
quite apart from the fact that, as we have seen, Lenin counterposed this view of
reality to that of the mechanical materialists, who held that objects move because
of the action of external forces:
"In the first conception of
motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive,
remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject,
etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to
knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement. The first conception is lifeless,
pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new."
[Lenin
(1961), p.358. Bold emphasis alone added;
paragraphs merged. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
There
would be no contrast here if objects didn't move themselves in the DM-scheme-of-things, both developmentally and as
they locomote. As we will see, this is indeed how Lenin has
since been interpreted by his epigones, who hold the view that things actually
self-develop and
self-locomote.
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are....
"Contradiction is the very
moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is
unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction
is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when
cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of
the contrariety. The proximate result of opposition (when realised as
contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference
superseded and deposited to elements in the completer notion." [Hegel
(1975), p.174, Essence as Ground of Existence, §119.
Bold emphases added.]
"[B]ut contradiction is the
root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a
contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Hegel
(1999), p.439, §956. Bold emphasis added.]
"The metaphysical or vulgar evolutionist world outlook sees
things as isolated, static and one-sided. It regards all things in the universe,
their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and
immutable. Such change as there is can only be an increase or decrease in
quantity or a change of place. Moreover, the cause of such an increase or
decrease or change of place is not inside things but outside them, that is, the motive force is external.
Metaphysicians hold that all the different kinds of things in the universe and
all their characteristics have been the same ever since they first came into
being. All subsequent changes have simply been increases or decreases in
quantity. They contend that a thing can only keep on repeating itself as the
same kind of thing and cannot change into anything different. In their opinion,
capitalist exploitation, capitalist competition, the individualist ideology of
capitalist society, and so on, can all be found in ancient slave society, or
even in primitive society, and will exist for ever unchanged. They ascribe the
causes of social development to factors external to society, such as geography
and climate. They search in an over-simplified way outside a thing for the
causes of its development, and they deny
the theory of materialist dialectics which holds that development arises from
the contradictions inside a thing. Consequently they can explain neither
the qualitative diversity of things, nor the phenomenon of one quality changing
into another. In Europe, this mode of thinking existed as mechanical materialism
in the 17th and 18th centuries and as vulgar evolutionism at the end of the 19th
and the beginning of the 20th centuries. In China, there was the metaphysical
thinking exemplified in the saying 'Heaven changeth not, likewise the Tao
changeth
not', and it was supported by the decadent feudal ruling classes for a long
time. Mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism, which were imported from
Europe in the last hundred gears, are supported by the bourgeoisie.
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world
outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study
it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the
development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary
self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and
interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a
thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the
thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion
and development. Contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of
its development, while its interrelations and interactions with other things are
secondary causes. Thus materialist dialectics effectively combats the
theory of external causes, or of an external motive force, advanced by
metaphysical mechanical materialism and vulgar evolutionism. It
is evident that purely external causes can only give rise to mechanical motion,
that is, to changes in scale or quantity, but cannot explain why things differ
qualitatively in thousands of ways and why one thing changes into another. As a matter of fact, even mechanical
motion under external force occurs through the internal contradictoriness of
things. Simple growth in plants and animals, their quantitative
development, is likewise chiefly the result of their internal contradictions.
Similarly, social development is due chiefly not to external but to internal
causes.... According to materialist dialectics, changes in nature are due
chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in nature. Changes in
society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in
society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the
relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction
between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that
pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old
society by the new. Does materialist
dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes
are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and
that external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg changes
into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because
each has a different basis. There is constant interaction between the
peoples of different countries. In the era of capitalism, and especially in the
era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, the interaction and mutual impact
of different countries in the political, economic and cultural spheres are
extremely great...
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a
twofold meaning. One is that
contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other
is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites
exists from beginning to end.
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a
contradiction.'
Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as 'the recognition (discovery)
of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,
opposite tendencies in
all phenomena and processes of nature
(including mind and society)'.
Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are.
The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the
struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their
development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction;
without contradiction nothing would exist.
"Contradiction is the basis of the simple forms of motion (for instance,
mechanical motion) and still more so of the complex forms of motion." [Mao
(1961b), pp.312-13, 316. Bold
emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
And, here is a greatly
shortened list of quotations taken from the writings of lesser
DM-luminaries who declared (perhaps unwisely) that things do indeed change or
even move themselves....
Here...is comrade
Thalheimer (who
links this doctrine directly with ideas he derived from Hegel's 'Master Deduction',
analysed in Essay Twelve -- summarised
here):
"The most general and the most inclusive
fundamental law of dialectics from which all others are deduced is the law of
permeation of opposites. This law has a two-fold meaning: first, that all
things, all processes, all concepts merge in the last analysis into an absolute
unity, or, in other words, that there are no opposites, no differences which
cannot ultimately be comprehended into a unity. Second, and just as
unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different
and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as
the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single
thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and
its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of
infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest
contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of
infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human
mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited
differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present
in reality....
"...[I]t is more difficult
with such opposites as true and false and still more difficult with the concepts
of being and non-being, which are the most general of all, the most inclusive,
and, at the same time the poorest in content. The average person will say: how
can one unite such absolute opposites as being and non-being? Either a thing is
or it is not. There can be no bridge or common ground between them. In the
treatment of Heraclitus I have already shown how the concepts of being and
non-being actually permeate each other in everything that changes, how they are
contained in changing things at the same time and in the same way; for a thing
which is developing is something and at the same time it is not that something.
For example: a child which is developing into a man is a child and at the same
time not a child (sic). So far as it is becoming a man it ceases to be a child.
But it is not yet a man, because it has not yet developed into a man. The
concept of becoming contains the concepts of being and non-being. In this
concept they permeate each other....
"We shall now take up the
second main proposition of dialectics...the law of development through
opposites.... Not until Hegel was this law completely developed. This law applies to all
motion and change of things, to real things as well as to their images in our
minds.... [This law] states, in the
first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through
opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.... The negation of a thing
from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to law of the
transformation of things into their opposites...." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.161,
165-66, 170-71. Bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]
Novack adds his repetitive
two cents' worth
(here, at first, writing about plants and seeds, but soon
losing his grip on reality):
"Each phase of the plant's
manifestation appears as a reality and then is transformed in the course of
development into an unreality or an appearance. This movement, triadic in this
particular case, from unreality to reality and then back again to unreality,
constitutes the essence, the inner movement behind all appearance.... In this dialectical
movement, in this passage out of and into opposition, resides the secret to
the movement of all real things.... Dialectics is the logic of matter in
motion and thereby the logic of contradictions, because development is
inherently self-contradictory. Everything generates within itself that force
which leads to its negation, its passing away into some other and higher form
of being.... This dialectical activity is
universal. There is no escape from its unremitting and relentless embrace...."
[Novack (1971), pp.87, 94. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
And, as if
that weren't enough, here is
Cornforth:
"The second dogmatic
assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except
by the action of some external cause. Just as no part of a machine
moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter
as being inert -- without motion, or rather without self-motion. For
mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls is, it never
changes unless something else interferes with it.
"No wonder that, regarding
matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the
'initial push'.... So in studying the causes of
change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should
above all seek for the source of change within the process itself, in its own
self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained in things
themselves...."
"...'[S]truggle' is not
external and accidental. It is not adequately understood if we suppose that
it is a question of forces or tendencies arising quite independently the one of
the other, which happen to meet, to bump up against each other and come into
conflict. No. The struggle is internal
and necessary; for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a
whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are
inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate
and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process
as a whole.
"Movement and change result
from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal
contradictions. Thus, for example, the old
mechanist conception of movement was that it only happened when one body bumped
into another: there were no internal causes of movement, that is, no 'self-movement',
but only external causes. But on the contrary, the opposed tendencies which
operate in the course of the change of state of a body operate on the basis of
the contradictory unity of attractive and repulsive forces inherent in all
physical phenomena....
"Why should we say that
contradiction is the driving force of change? It is because it is only the
presence of contradictions in a process which provides the internal
conditions making change necessary.... It is the presence of contradictions,
that is of contradictory tendencies of movement, or of a unity and struggle of
opposites, which brings about changes of movement in the course of a
process." [Cornforth (1976), pp.40-43; 90, 94. Italic emphases in the original.
Bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
And Baghavan:
"Hegel pointed out that the
co-existence, the unity, the interpenetration of opposites constitutes an inner
and inherent contradiction, a basic instability in all things which leads to
development and change.... The existence of
contradictions in all things gives rise to self-movement." [Baghavan (1987),
p.90. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
And Mandel:
"All motion has a cause.... A fundamental cause of all
motion, all change, is the internal contradictions of the changing object.
In the final analysis, every object, every phenomenon, changes, moves, is
transformed and modified under the influence of its internal contradictions...."
[Mandel (1979), p.162. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
Here are our old friends, Woods and Grant:
"Dialectics explains that
change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through
contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction.... So fundamental is this idea
to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic
characteristic of matter.... [And, referring to a quote from Aristotle, they add
(RL)] [t]his is not
the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an
external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....
"The essential point of
dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but
that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction....
Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of
matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The
dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of
opposites....
"The universal phenomena of
the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and
development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce
the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the
fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself
involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting
tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter.... Matter is self-moving
and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 72. Bold
emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.]
And now, a handful of Communist Party hacks:
"The essence of the
dialectical contradiction may be defined as an interrelationship and
interconnection between opposites in which they mutually assert and deny each
other (sic), and the struggle between them serves as the motive force, the
source of development. This is why the law in question is known as the law
of the unity and struggle of opposites.
"This law explains one of the
most important features of dialectical development: motion, development takes
place as self-motion, self-development. This concept
is highly relevant to materialism. It means that the world develops not as a
result of any external causes but by virtue of its own laws, the laws of motion
of matter itself. It has dialectical meaning because it indicates that the
source, the motive force of development of phenomenais to be found in
their internal contradictions. In the past some materialists who rejected
any supernatural force as a constant factor influencing natural processes
nevertheless had to fall back on the mysterious 'first impulse' that was
supposed to have set matter in motion.
"The dialectical doctrine
that the motion or development of nature is in fact self-motion,
self-development, explains why many contemporary bourgeois philosophers are
so vehement in their attacks on the proposition of the contradictory essence of
things. Development understood in this way leaves no room for a
'transcendental', mystical 'creative force' external to nature.... Postulating that
internal contradictions are inherent in all things and processes and comprise
the motive force of the self-development of nature and society, materialist
dialectics explains how this process takes place." [Konstantinov
et al (1974), pp.144-45. Italic emphases in the original. Bold
emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
"Contradiction also expresses
this feature of the relation of opposition, i.e., the mutual exclusion and
mutual presupposing of its formative aspects. It can therefore be briefly
defined as the unity of opposites which mutually exclude one another and are in
struggle. The law of dialectics that demonstrates the driving force of
contradictions is formulated as the law of the unity and struggle of opposites. According to this law,
contradictions are the inner impetus of development, the source of the
self-movement and change of things. If things were a constant identity in
themselves, and lacked differences and contradictions, they would be absolutely
immutable.... Contradiction is a dynamic relation of opposites.... The
determining element in contradiction is therefore the struggle of opposites." [Kharin
(1981), p.125. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
"Motion is the mode of
existence of matter. To be means to be in motion.... Like matter, motion is
uncreatable and indestructible. It is not introduced from outside but is
included in matter, which is not inert but active. Motion is self-motion
in the sense that the tendency, the impulse to change of state is inherent in
matter itself: it is its own cause." [Spirkin (1983), p.75. Bold emphasis
added.]
"The development of the most
diverse objects and phenomena shows that opposite aspects cannot exist
peacefully side by side; the contradictory, mutually exclusive character of
opposites necessarily causes a struggle between them. The old and the
new, the emergent and the obsolete must come into contradiction, must clash.
It is contradiction, the struggle of opposites that comprises the main source
of development of matter and consciousness....
"...The struggle of
opposites is the inner content, the source of the development of reality. Such is the essence of the
dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites.... Motion, as understood by
Marxist dialectics, is the self-motion of matter, internal motion,
whose driving forces or impulses are contained within the developing objects
and phenomena themselves." [Afanasyev (1968), pp.95, 97-98. Italic emphases in the original. Bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
Incidentally,
Afanasyev and one or
two others have included in their remarks a discussion of the relation between
'external' and 'internal contradictions', which seems to answer some of the
objections made in this Essay. That escape route has been closed off in
Note 28.
However, we will see in Essay Nine Part Two
that these theorists originally introduced 'external contradictions' in order to 'justify'
the doctrine of Socialism in One Country [SIOC], as well as attempt to rationalise several regressive political decisions taken for other
reasons.
Academic
Marxists also concur with Lenin. Here is how two
HCD
theorists summarised Hegel's version of this theory -- after briefly
outlining and then rejecting
Lucio Colletti's
criticism of Hegel [in Colletti (1973)] -- thus revealing its immediate source,
as follows:
"Now, if we examine more closely the
dialectic of the finite in Science of Logic, it becomes clear that,
pace Colletti, those pages do not develop a demonstration of the ideal
character of the sensuous material world and therefore do not provide the key
argument for the idealist nature of Hegel's system. The only thing that Hegel is
proving (sic) there is the fact that things are 'finite' means that they carry
within themselves the necessity of their own negation. Consequently, they cannot
be properly grasped if represented as self-subsistent entities or immediate (or
unmediated) affirmations. Instead, things or objects need to be grasped as
self-moving, that is, as subjects of their own qualitative
transformation into another 'finite' form. An object thus realises its own
qualitative determination by becoming another, that is, through
self-mediation. This is, in our view, all that Hegel is trying to expound in
those pages: real forms of 'being' affirm through self-negation. It is in that
specific sense that according to him reality is the movement of contradiction.
To put it differently, Hegel's point in these pages is just to say that the true
infinite is nothing but the immanent self-movement of the finite, which
it affirms through self-negation....
"Thus, Hegel's insight into the
self-moving
nature of real forms, which constitutes his great scientific discovery (sic) and
thus that the rational kernel to be found in the Logic, is not inherently
tied to his absolute idealism.... [T]he rejection of that Hegelian
discovery...inevitably leads to an idealist representation of reality. In
effect, when real forms are represented as devoid of any immanent necessity
driving them to self-movement, forms of 'being' are reduced to lifeless
abstractions which can only be put into external relation with each other
by means of subjective reflection.... [O]nly when things are grasped as bearers
of an intrinsic objective potentiality for self-movement does it make sense to
raise the question of the ideal reproduction of the 'immanent life' of the
subject-matter." [Caligaris and Starosta (2015), pp.93-94. Italic
emphases in the original; bold added.]
In which case, it is clear that Lenin and the rest obtained this view
of movement and development, not from a scientific study of the world, but
from leafing through a book steeped in Christian and
Hermetic Mysticism.
----------------------------------------------
Moreover, it is surely the case that, as things develop, some other
things will have to move -- even if only inside whatever it is that is doing
the developing. So, it isn't easy to see how anything can develop if nothing else
locomotes.
Anyway, as we will also see, whatever Lenin actually intended, his 'innovative' mechanics
can in no way apply to nature. That isn't so much because he was
mistaken, but because it is entirely unclear what he could possibly have meantby what he said.
And
Lenin wasn't alone in wanting to return
modern science to this ancient 'theory' of change and motion (i.e., one that
views
nature as a
living, self-developing 'organism', or as a Whole that contains nothing but 'organisms'
of this sort
--, which, like animals, autonomously propel themselves about the place). On this view,
nature is en-souled, or even enchanted, where everything is alive, governed by some
form of 'Intelligence' or 'Will'.
[There is more on this in Essay Fourteen (summary
here).]
Other DM-worthies have made similar claims. Here is Bukharin:
"The basis of all things is therefore the law of change, the law of constant motion. Two philosophers
particularly (the ancient
Heraclitus and the modern Hegel…) formulated this law
of change, but they did not stop there. They also set up the question of the
manner in which the process operates. The answer they discovered was that
changes are produced by constant internal contradictions, internal struggle.
Thus, Heraclitus declared: 'Conflict is the mother of all happenings,' while
Hegel said: 'Contradiction is the power that moves things.'"
[Bukharin (1925), pp.72-73. Bold emphases
and link added.]
Not to be outdone, Plekhanov
also joined in with this backward-facing world-view:
"'All is flux, nothing is
stationary,' said the ancient thinker from Ephesus. The combinations we call
objects are in a state of constant and more or less rapid change…. In as
much as they change and cease to exist as such, we must address ourselves
to the logic of contradiction… [M]otion does not only make objects…, it is constantly changing them. It is for this reason that the logic of
motion (the 'logic of contradiction') never relinquishes its rights
over the objects created by motion…. With Hegel, thinking progresses in consequence
of the uncovering and resolution of the contradictions inclosed (sic) in
concepts. According to our doctrine…the contradictions embodied in
concepts are merely reflections, translations into the language of thought,
of thosecontradictions that are embodied in phenomena owing to the
contradictory nature of their common basis, i.e., motion….
"…[T]he overwhelming majority of phenomena
that come within the compass of the natural and the social sciences are among
'objects' of this kind…[:ones in which there is a coincidence of opposites].
Diametrically opposite phenomena are united in the simplest globule of
protoplasm, and the life of the most undeveloped society…." [Plekhanov
(1908), pp.92-96. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged. Unfortunately, the paragraphs above appear in the Appendix to Plekhanov (1908), which hasn't
been reproduced at The Marxist Internet Archive with the rest of the book. Nor
do they appear in Plekhanov's Selected Works -- i.e., Plekhanov (1976). They can,
however, be found
here, under the title Dialectic and Logic. As far as I can determine,
in print and in English, they only appear in the Lawrence & Wishart edition.
The notes to that edition tell us the following: "This appendix is an extract
from Plekhanov's preface to Engels's Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of
Classical German Philosophy. These notes on dialectic and logic were
included in the German edition of the book in accordance with Plekhanov's wish."
(Ibid., p.110, Note 98.)]
Countless
secondary DM-figures say more-or-less the same sort of thing (as we have seen in
Note 3).
Unfortunately, Lenin and his co-dialecticians failed to take into consideration
the origin of these archaic ideas in
Hermetic Philosophy, which is still based on the
doctrine that the
universe is alive. Indeed it is a
cosmic egg, later transmogrified by Hegel
into a Cosmic Ego.
Since eggs appear to develop all of their own, and
because
Hegel's Immaterial and Immanent Cosmic Ego self-develops, it seemed
'natural' for Lenin and his epigones to conclude this was true of nature, too.
Nevertheless, not even eggs develop of their
own; in fact, it is hard to think of a single thing in the entire universe (of
which we have any knowledge) that develops of its own, or which moves itself.
Not even Capitalism does. Switch off the Sun and watch American Imperialism fold
a whole lot faster than
Enron.4
And yet, if Lenin were correct, no object in the
universe could possibly interact with anything else (since that would amount to
external causation, and objects wouldn't be self-motivated). It seems
self-motivated
beings must be causally isolated from their surroundings,
otherwise they wouldn't beself-motivated. This in turn implies that, despite appearances to the contrary,
nothing in reality interacts with anything else. That would, of course, make a mockery of the
other DM-claim that
everything in reality is interconnected.
So, based on the defective doctrines
imported from the wild musings of
a handful of ancient mystics, and no evidence at all, we find Lenin once again
promulgating a set of cosmic verities that don't make senseeven in
DM-terms -- and which not even
the lowly chicken
obeys.
I then proceed to consider every conceivable
objection to the above in the rest of Essay Eight Part One (and especially in
Note 28); readers are again directed there for more details. In
which case, and in view of the above passages, the counter-argument summarised earlier
-- that change is the result of a
'dialectical interplay' between internal and external factors --, can't be
sustained.
If any
aspect of this maximally inter-connected "Totality" is to be rejected
(alongside the idea that every atom and molecule, past present and future, has a direct,
ceaseless
and instantaneous effect on every other atom and molecule across the entire
universe, for all of time),
then what interpretation can be placed on inter-connectedness that doesn't
simply amount to an act of faith?
Unless awkward
questions like this attract clear answers from the DM-fraternity, faith seems to be the only option available to
them.
That is because, as has already been pointed out, universal and omni-temporal
inter-connections will never and can never be verified.28a
Could this be where the "Epistemological Definition" offers a slender
ray of
hope to beleaguered DM-fans?
Might it allow them to cobble-together a solution (of sorts) to the above conundrum, one that is
perhaps compatible with a
non-mystical
view of the universe?
Plainly,
this new approach to understanding the "Totality" directs
attention away from
any attempt to construct a speculative
Ontology (along the lines of the 'contents list'
suggested earlier),
and re-focuses it
on what is
known about the 'Whole', and on any method or theoretical device we have
for investigating it systematically -- at least as it has been conceived, or might be conceived, at any point in history. Indeed, this
seems to be the characterisation John Rees Alan Norrie and Helena Sheehan
prefer.
We saw Rees,
for example, informing his readers that the "Totality" is an "insistence" of
some sort,
and he
later alluded to the "totality of human experience and knowledge", which
also appears to have something to do with the "Totality". [Rees (1998a),
pp.5, 236.] In what follows I will simply assume it does.
"open-ended, always striving, process. It is an
activity rather than an object. It is an orientation toward the whole, not a
finalized conception of the whole. It is a way of thinking that endeavours
always to understand each phenomenon within the pulsing whole and the complex
nexus of its interactions." [Quoted from
here.]
"Totality, then, is the place where different things
are seen in their connection and are viewed as a whole." [Norrie (2010), p.87.]
Unfortunately, as we are about to find out, this
switch of emphasis
away
from the supposed 'object' of knowledge and onto what might be known about 'it'
-- or even the methods we might use in order to investigate 'the Whole' --
only succeeds in creating even more problems for the DM-faithful, should they
join with the above theorists and choose this particular way of understanding
"Totality".
As should seem reasonably clear, unless it is
possible to say something (anything?) about the object of
knowledge, epistemologically-motivated claims about 'it' will be entirely
vacuous.
Consider the following example -- concerning meskonators. An appeal to the
"totality of human experience and knowledge" would be no help at all if no
one had the faintest idea what a meskonator is. Knowledge
about what? In like manner, similar references to the "totality of human
experience and knowledge" would be pointless if no one has a clue what the
"Totality" is, either. But, DM-theorists can't (or won't) ante-up.
Beyond a handful of oft-repeated, vague banalities they have remained studiously unspecific about the nature and extent of the supposed object of their
knowledge for over
a hundred-and-fifty years -- as indeed were generations of mystics before them, only for far longer.
And all the
signs are that they intend to maintain this tight-lipped approach into the
indefinite future. This Essay certainly won't shift them, even if they bothered to read it!
[In order to save readers from trying to search for
a definition, "meskonator"is a totally made up word!]
Why are dialecticians so reticent? Why do they shy
away from telling
the world the glad tidings about their "Totality"?
In reply, some argue that DM-theorists refuse to be
more specific because they will be accused of imposing their ideas on nature.
But, that response is rather puzzling when we remember that that that is what they end up doing
with respect to the rest of DM, anyway! In fact, they already "insist" that everything is,
or is part of, a "Totality" (all the while refraining from informing us what
that insistence actually involves or implies), happily imposing this
mystical and mysterious theory on nature, supposedly valid for all of space and time!
Beyond alleging there is, or there can develop, a
"dialectical" relation between the "knower and the known", and apart from
giving the whole shebang a quasi-religious label (i.e., "The Totality"), it
seems there is little else DM-theorists could say. Indeed, as we have seen,
there is precious little they have said about this elusive "Totality", even to one another!
An
analogous predicament plagued previous epistemologically-driven
theories of nature, whose advocates found they had to appeal (either implicitly or
explicitly) to an a priori, or even to an a posteriori,
ontology of some sort
to bail them out.
Lacking
a 'back-door ontology' of some sort to firm things up,
still others meandered off into a
Phenomenological
swamp, some even lapsed into outright scepticism.
In which case, DM-theorists have
only gestured at finding a solution to the following dilemma; they should either:
(i) Invent and then impose
a specific ontology on nature; or,
(ii) Face the
prospect that their theory is little more than an obscure backwater of
Phenomenalism --
or even
perhaps of
Subjective Idealism.
Some DM-fans
half-heartedly opt for the first alternative,
appealing to
a vague and attenuated 'sort of ontology', one that has been seriously
compromised by Lenin's refusal to commit Dialectical Marxism to any firm ideas in this area
--, shockingly, even about the nature of matter
itself!
The whole sorry mess is then hived-off into the
sciences.
[Earlier
we saw that
that was an unwise move, too.]
As we will
discover
in Essay Thirteen
Part One,
DM-fans are entirely unspecific
about what they even mean
by the word "matter" and "material".
While they certainly employ
materialist-soundinglanguage their ideas soon slide off into vague
and confused forms of Idealism.
[In fact, we saw in the above Essay that DM actually
does
turn out to be a form of Subjective Idealism, a doctrine that is
(provably) implied by Lenin's theory of knowledge, as the latter was laid out in MEC. Readers are directed to that Essay for
more details (summary here).]
While dialecticians certainly intend their 'ontology' to
be materialist,
the
asymptotic road to
Dialectical
Nirvana (along which they are all
supposedly feeling their way) is
actually paved with intentional but no less
Idealbricks. With such insubstantial building material it is impossible to
construct anything that even looks remotely materialist.
[MEC = Materialism and
Empiriocriticism (i.e., Lenin (1972).]
Indeed, there doesn't appear to be a single
DM-theorist on the planet (now or in the past) who is willing or able to
tell us (let alone inform his/her fellow travellers) what matter actually is, beyond describing it as an 'abstraction'!
[Follow the "matter" link three paragraphs back for textual proof and analysis.]
Since the universe is made of matter, for DM-fans that can only mean the universe is abstract!
Unfortunately, this untoward result puts
dialecticians in the same bind as theologians, who long ago found they could tell us
nothing about 'God' save they dust off yet another
via
negativa -- ending up with: "'God'
is not this, not that, not this, not…".
With DM-fans, that becomes: "Matter is not this, not that, not...".
So, without
a clear idea what these coy dialectical-'materialists' think matteris,
their "Totality" does indeed look like
Hamlet without
the…, er..., well...,
er..., um..., er..., eh..., well..., ah..., er..., um...?
It
is no surprise, therefore, to discover that this
timorous and ambivalent approach to ontology means the
above dilemma -- involving a choice between an
a priori or an
a posteriori 'membership list' --
re-surfaces in several different forms elsewhere in
DM.
On the one hand,
DM-theorists maintain the
delusion that they haven't imposed their theory on reality (in fact, in debate
they vehemently reject that accusation even in the face of
clear and
overwhelming evidence to the contrary), but have merely
"read it from nature and society"; on the other, the way their ideas are
actually worded
reveals that it has indeed been foisted on the facts. That alone shows their ontology
(if such it may be called) is a priori and dogmatic, after all.
[Those allegations were fully substantiated in
Essay Two.
They will be examined again in
much more detail in Essay Twelve Parts One to Seven (summary
here)
as well as in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
DM-theorists have saddled themselves with a metaphysical
theory that offers no clear conception of the "Totality" -- for example,
its extent, what it contains,
what it implies and what the nature is of the universal inter-connections they postulate.
Their theory in effect presents an ontology that has reified
the products of social interaction -- i.e., words -- as if they represented fundamental
features of reality (for instance, all those 'contradictions', 'dialectical opposites' and 'negations').
But their obvious incapacity (or unwillingness) to provide
any further
details means that they have saddled themselves with what can only be described
as their own version of Kant's
Noumenon. [On why that is so, see Essay Ten
Part One.]
If, according to DM-theorists, ordinary language is
incapable of capturing fundamental truths about the world (that allegation was
substantiated
here and
here), and if humanity is
locked in an infinite, possibly even eternal, "asymptotic"
traipse along
the
Yellow Brick Road to 'Absolute Truth' -- the
nature of which will, by definition,forever elude us --, then human
'knowledge' will always remain 'infinitely' far from that goal (if there is
indeed such a 'goal'!), which in turn means that humanity will
always be 'infinitely
wrong' about anything and everything!
In that case, for all that
DM-theorists know their quest for 'Absolute Truth' (or even their search for
some sort of decreasingly inaccurate, 'relative truth') could be going in
entirely the wrong direction! Given their theory, humanity is and
always will be infinitely ignorant at each and every stage
in this (supposed)
journey. Hence, the probability that the search for knowledge is progressing in
the 'right direction' will always remain vanishingly small (indeed, it is
'infinitely' small) -- that is, always assuming there is such a thing as
"knowledge", which, given this theory
there
couldn't be!
So, on this account humanity will always remain
infinitely far removed from 'Absolute Truth', and hence infinitely ignorant.
If DM-epistemology is correct, humanity can't even start building a
secure platform from which
to launch a scientific search for anything, let alone knowledge --, oreven
initiate any supposed 'asymptotic' approach on truth.
Hence, as we saw in Essay Ten
Part One, the DM 'convergence theory of
knowledge' actually collapses into irredeemable
scepticism.
In addition, it is little use
appealing to practice. If humanity is always infinitely far from 'Absolute
Truth' and thus infinitely ignorant of everything, then anything we conclude about practice
(or even about anything!) will have an infinitely high probability of
being false. And, that can't fail to be the case with respect to the supposed results of
practice. In that case, an appeal to
practice (in order to lend solidity to the 'infinitely insubstantial sands' upon which
DM-epistemology has so far been built --
those very same sands, incidentally, into which many a dialectical head
has been inserted) is no help at all.
In fact, given DM-epistemology, there might be
no such thing as 'Absolute Truth' for anyone to aim for, let alone
approach 'asymptotically'! Neither Engels nor Lenin even so much as
attempted to show that there is such a thing (nor did Hegel in
relation to his 'Absolute'). Indeed, any claim that there is such as thing as
'Absolute Truth' must itself have an infinite probability of being false. Once
more: since human knowledge is
always infinitely far from 'The Truth' -- according to DM-theorists
themselves -- the claim
that there even exist partial or 'relative' truths about anything, even
'Absolute Truth', has an
infinitely high probability of being false.
In that case, it turns out that the promise
seemingly held out by the 'Epistemological Definition' fatally
compromises any and all claims that DM is capable of delivering
even partial or relative knowledge about anything, let alone the "Totality"!
A few
readers who have made it this far might be tempted to conclude that the above rather
wild claims
are
completely misguided, if not downright impertinent and possibly even mendacious. Nevertheless, a consideration of
Engels's description of the "Totality" might give such individuals
pause for thought:
"'Fundamentally, we can know
only
the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in
raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity
and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the
finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is
knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition
of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.234-35.]29
Compare that with the following:
"The identity of thinking and being, to use
Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and
does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which
it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a
fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because
reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it
only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon
manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in
this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels
(1975), pp.457-58, and Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphases alone added.]
While Engels doesn't actually use the
term in the above passage, his words clearly relate to the "Totality" (or, rather, to
our knowledge of 'it'), only now expressed in
quasi-mystical terms. Admittedly, these remarks appear in unpublished
writings, but they succeed in
revealing just how close Engels came to overt Idealism, at least in private.
Lenin concurred:
"Cognition is the eternal,
endless approximation of thought to the object." [Lenin
(1961), p.195.]
"Dialectics
as living,
many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an
infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a
philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade) -- here we have an
immeasurably rich content as compared with 'metaphysical' materialism,
the fundamental misfortune of
which is its inability to apply dialectics to the Bildertheorie [theory of
reflection -- RL],
to the process and development of knowledge....
"Human knowledge is not (or does not follow)
a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles,
a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed
(transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which
then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into
clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the
ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification,
subjectivism and subjective blindness -- voilŕ the epistemological roots
of idealism. And clerical obscrutantism (= philosophical idealism), of course,
has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a sterile flower
undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living,
fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge." [Ibid.,
p.360-61. Italic emphases in the original.]
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and
a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties and qualities or
facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of
'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world." [Lenin
(1921, pp.92-93.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Ibid.,
p.90. Bold emphases
alone added.]30
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an objective process is full of
contradictions and struggles, and so is the development of the movement of human
knowledge. All the dialectical movements of the objective world can sooner or
later be reflected in human knowledge. In social practice, the process of coming
into being, developing and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of
coming into being, developing and passing away in human knowledge. As man's
practice which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas,
theories, plans or programmes, advances further and further, his knowledge of
objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The movement of change in
the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is man's cognition of
truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way exhausted truth but
ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice.
Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the
objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and we are opposed to
all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which depart from concrete
history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
The above view isn't limited to the DM-classicists,
either. Here,
for example, is
Abram Deborin:
"The idea does not coincide immediately with
reality, but it is derived from reality: reality corresponds to the results of
thinking, the idea corresponds to reality, only asymptotically approaching
it, to use Engels's expression. As we have seen, Lenin, too, develops the
same point of view." [Quoted from
here; accessed 08/06/2023. Bold emphasis added.]
"A 'concrete' truth is a logical system of
abstractions multilaterally reflecting the real concrete. One truth is more
concrete than another to the extent to which it reflects more essential traits
of the investigated object. Concrete truth like absolute truth,
can only be reached asymptotically ad infinitum." [Wald (1975), p.35.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
So, this appears to be about as
definitive a DM-idea as change through 'internal contradiction'.
[However, in order to avoid misunderstanding, it
will be argued in Essay Nine Parts
One and
Two that
Engels and the other DM-classicists adopted this quasi-theological world-view
unwittingly.Why
they did this is also explained in the second of
the above two Essays.]
These seemingly intemperate, even impertinent, remarks
concerning Engels and Lenin will be further
substantiated in what follows.
The language DM-theorists employ when speaking about the "Totality" reveals that, despite
protestations to the
contrary, they
regard it as an
a prioriconcept, 'object', or
'process'. Indeed, as noted earlier, their "Totality" is little more than a pale
echo of Hegel's Absolute -- and hence of 'God'.
The fact that the above isn't a
just another baseless accusation can be seen from a consideration of answers that might be
given to the following four questions:
(A) How do DM-theorists know that
reality is restricted to just one "Totality"? Couldn't there be several?
Leaving out of consideration sub-"Totalities" for the present,
might there not be countless intermingled or intercalated "Totalities"? Indeed, how
exactly do
DM-theorists count "Totalities" so that they know when to stop
at just one?31
(B) Following on from (A), how do DM-theorists know
that there aren't at least two "Totalities" (or even sub-"Totalities")
that are completely
unrelated to each other?
(C) If we now confine our attention to the
known Universe, how do dialecticians know that every part of
nature is
ceaselessly
inter-connected with all the rest? Might there not be
facets/areas of
'reality' that are totally unrelated to anything else? Or maybe regions that are inter-linked with
relatively few other objects and processes? Why is neither option viable?32
(D) What gives DM-theorists the confidence to
"insist" in advance of all -- or even most -- of the evidence having
been examined, let alone processed, that what they
say must be true of every last particle in the universe, for all
of time?
Ruling out 'divine revelation', there appear to be only two
possible responses that might conceivably have allowed DM-theorists to answer such questions in the
way they already have:
(ii) DM is a conventionalist theory based
upon a
definitional or
stipulative use of certain words.
Without doubt, claims like these will strike some
readers as highly controversial, if not patently false. So, the rest of this
subsection will be devoted to
explaining, defending and substantiating each of them.33
Having said that, because the above questions are themselves
inter-linked, explaining or discussing one of them -- i.e., (A) -- will automatically
cover the rest. Moreover, it will do likewise for assertions (i) and (ii)
above.
There are at least two ways of understanding that
reply, each of which corresponds to one or other of accusations
(i) and (ii), from earlier:
(a)
If the 'official', vague and loose DM-characterisation of the "Totality" itself
means that concept, or interpretive rule (if it is either
one of these) is meant to function as a way of
deciding what reality contains -- operating as a sort of methodological or
'theoretical filter', sieve, 'decoder' (so to speak), or, indeed, as a
theoretical tool by means of which
a series of fundamental truths
about nature and society may be constructed/derived, then that would be sufficient to
categorise DM as a metaphysical theory. That is because such an approach will
have confused a series of linguistic rules with truths about 'reality itself'.
[Why that
is so was explored at length in Essay Twelve
Part One
(summary
here). As noted earlier, DM-theorists have
an idiosyncratic way of understanding the word "metaphysics", which I have also
dealt with in that Essay,
here.]
Furthermore, if (a) above is
correct, it
would confirm an earlier contention, that well before even a
vanishingly small fraction of the evidence has been collected, let alone
analysed,
the theory that 'everything' must be viewed as an integral part of an
inter-connected 'Whole' had already been declared valid. This would
further support the allegation that subsequent evidence (such as there is) is
then simply 'shoe-horned' to fit a pre-determined pattern.
In that case,
if
Option (A)
were true, it would turn out to be a rather crude way of imposing a favoured view on
reality, onethat was based solely on the supposed meaning of the word "Totality", which is
an approach to knowledge that
DM-theorists have always effected to
disavow.
The fact that
Option (A) is the case -- and isn't just the opinion
of the present author -- can be seen by the way that the
above volunteered response
along with the
passages quoted earlier suggest that conclusions about the
fundamental nature of the entire universe have been drawn from
the meaning of a single word --
"Totality". Or, to be more honest, derived from what amounts to a vague gesture at providing little more than a loose
characterisationof it.
Even if the "Totality" had been
well defined in great detail with crystal clarity, and it was plain exactly
what DM-theorists were trying to say, 'unbelievers' would still
require aconvincing argument that at least
tried to justify the derivation of a set of fundamental truths,
valid for all of space and time, from the supposed meaning of a single word
(or even its wafer thin 'definition').
Of course, it isn't as if we
don'talreadyknow where these ideas came from (that is, it isn't as if we
don'talreadyknow how and why
this aspect of 'dialectics' had been decided upon long before even a
vanishingly small fraction of the evidence had been collected, let alone
processed). The source of this dogma has never been in doubt: it
was concocted by
Greek,
Christian and Hermetic
Mystics and polished into shape countless generations of ruling-class
ideologues, most of whom "divined" this dogma long beforethere wasany evidence
to speak of.
As I have argued in Essay Nine
Part Two (slightly edited):
These
considerations help explain why Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao and Dietzgen (to mention just a
few) thought it quite natural and uncontroversial to regard previous
(non-working class) thinkers as their precursors,
and, indeed, the source of many of the concepts and methods they imported into
Dialectical Marxism (for
example, the
yet-to-be-explained
'process of abstraction'),
and hence look to them for
inspiration.
Here are just a few
examples where this influence is openly admitted:
"With
this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976), pp.82-83.
Bold emphases added.]
"Marxism is an integral
world-outlook. Expressed in a nutshell, it is contemporary materialism,
at present the highest stage of the development of that view upon the worldwhose foundations were laid down in ancient Greece by
Democritus, and
in part by the
Ionian thinkers who preceded that philosopher." [Plekhanov
(1908), p.11. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphases and links added.]
"According to Hegel, dialectics is
the principle of all life…. [M]an has two qualities: first being alive,
and secondly of also being mortal. But on closer examination it turns out that
life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that in general
any phenomenon is contradictory, in the sense that it develops out
of itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to its existence
and will transform it into its opposite. Everything flows, everything changes;
and there is no force capable of holding back this constant flux, or arresting
its eternal movement. There is no force capable of resisting the dialectics of
phenomena….
"At a particular moment a moving body is
at a particular spot, but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if
it were only in that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become
motionless.
Every motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and as
there is not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do not have in
the long run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel, who said that
dialectics is the soul of any scientific cognition. And this applies not
only to cognition of nature….
"And so every phenomenon,
by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or
later, but
inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…. When you apply the dialectical method
to the study of phenomena, you need to remember that forms change
eternally in consequence of the 'higher development of their content….' In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit
consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from
the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin
and destruction…. [M]odern science confirms at every step
the idea expressed with such genius byHegel, that quantity passes into
quality….
"[I]t will be understood without
difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical
thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That's how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov
(1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163.
Bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged.]
"The theory of socialism, however,
grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by
educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By
their social status the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and
Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.
In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy
arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class
movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among
the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia."
[Lenin
(1947), p.32. Bold emphases added.]
"The history of philosophy and the history of
social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling
'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified
doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the
development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists
precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the
foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate
continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of
philosophy, political economy and socialism.
"The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive
and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable
with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It
is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth
century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and
French socialism." [Lenin,
Three Sources
and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone
added.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)….
[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth
is
always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin
(1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added.]
"Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e.,
reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflectionof the eternal development of
the world. Hegel brilliantly
divined the dialectics
of things(phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions,
Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others."
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition of
its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of
the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics…. The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the
'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most
ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with
other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc.
Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity,
of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and
the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we
disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence
from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin
(1961), pp.110,
196-97,
221-22,
357-58, 359-60.
Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves…. [T]he
axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does
not change, that is, if it does not exist…. For concepts there also exists
'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic…, but by the
dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing…. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into
quality, development through contradiction, conflict and form, interruption of
continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc…." [Trotsky
(1971), pp.64-66. Bold emphasis added.]
"I should like to make the reader
understand what the professors, so far as I know them, have not yet understood,
viz., that our intellect is a dialectical instrument, and instrument which
reconciles all opposites. The intellect creates unity by means of the variety
and comprehends the difference in the equality. Hegel made it clear long ago
that there is no either-or, but as well as...." [Dietzgen
(1917a), p.248. Bold
emphasis added.]
This approach isn't confined to the
DM-classicists; it is universally acknowledged:
"Previous chapters have shown that
dialectics has a history which embraces many thousands of years and that it has
passed through various stages of development. Disregarding the beginnings of
dialectics in Indian and Chinese philosophy, the following main stages can
be distinguished: (1) the dialectics of the old Greek philosophers of nature,
Heraclitus; (2) the second and higher stage, the dialectics of Plato and
Aristotle; (3) Hegelian dialectics; and (4) materialistic dialectics. Dialectics
itself has undergone a dialectical development. Heraclitus, representing the
first stage, develops the dialectics of one-after-the-other; Plato and
Aristotle, representing the second stage, develop the dialectics of
one-beside-the-other. The latter is in opposition to the dialectics of the first
stage, being its negation. Hegel embraces both preceding stages of development
and raises them to a higher stage. He develops the dialectics of the
one-after-the-other and the one-beside-the-other, but in an idealistic form; in
other words, he develops an historico-idealistic dialectics." [Thalheimer
(1936), pp.157-58. Bold emphases added.]
"The integrity, the wholeness, the
irrefutable logic and consistency (sic!) of Marxism-Leninism, which are
acknowledged even by its opponents (sic!), have been achieved by the application
of the unified philosophical dialectical-materialist world outlook and method.
Marxism-Leninism cannot properly be understood without its philosophical basis. The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism is a
result and the highest stage of the development of world philosophical thought.
It has assimilated al that was best ad most progressive in the centuries of
development of philosophy...." [Konstantinov (1974), p.15. Bold emphasis
added; paragraphs merged.]
"As the philosophy of the working class,
Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the supreme form of materialism, a logical
result of the preceding development of philosophical thought through the
ages, and of the whole spiritual culture of mankind." [Kharin (1981), p.12.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The
history of Western philosophy, however, begins not with idealism but with
materialism. This asserts...that the material world, known to us and
explored by science, is real; that the only real world is the material one; that
thoughts, ideas and sensations are the product of matter organised in a certain
way (a nervous system and a brain); that thought cannot derive its categories
from itself, but only from the objective world which makes itself known to us
through our senses.
"The
earliest Greek philosophers were known as 'hylozoists'
(from the Greek, meaning 'those who believe that matter is alive'). Here we have
a long line of heroes who pioneered the development of thought.... What was
startlingly new about this way of looking at the world was that it was not
religious. In complete contrast to the Egyptians and Babylonians, from whom they
had learnt a lot, the Greek thinkers did not resort to gods and goddesses to
explain natural phenomena. For the first time, men and women sought to explain
the workings of nature purely in terms of nature. This was one of the greatest
turning-points in the entire history of human thought....
"Aristotle,
the greatest of the Ancient philosophers, can be considered a materialist,
although he was not so consistent as the early hylozoists. He made a series of
important scientific discoveries which laid the basis for the great achievements
of the Alexandrine period of Greek science....
"The predominant philosophical trend of the
Renaissance was materialism. In England, this took the form of
empiricism, the school of thought that states that all knowledge is derived
from the senses. The pioneers of this school were
Francis Bacon
(1561-1626),
Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679) and
John Locke (1632-1704). The materialist school passed
from England to France where it acquired a revolutionary content. In the hands
of
Diderot,
Rousseau,
Holbach
and
Helvetius,
philosophy became an instrument for criticising all existing society. These
great thinkers prepared the way for the revolutionary overthrow of the feudal
monarchy in 1789-93....
"Under the impact of the French revolution, the German
idealist Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) subjected all previous philosophy to a thorough
criticism. Kant made important discoveries not only in philosophy and logic but
in science.... In the field of philosophy, Kant's masterpiece The Critique
of Pure Reason was the first work to analyse the forms of logic which had
remained virtually unchanged since they were first developed by Aristotle. Kant
showed the contradictions implicit in many of the most fundamental propositions
of philosophy....
"The
greatest breakthrough came in the first decades of the 19th century with George
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel was a German idealist, a man of
towering intellect, who effectively summed up in his writings the whole history
of philosophy.
"Hegel
showed that the only way to overcome the
'Antinomies' of Kant was to accept that contradictions actually existed, not
only in thought, but in the real world. As an objective idealist, Hegel had no
time for the subjective idealist argument that the human mind cannot know the
real world. The forms of thought must reflect the objective world as closely as
possible. The process of knowledge consist of penetrating ever more deeply into
this reality, proceeding from the abstract to the concrete, from the known to
the unknown, from the particular to the universal.
"The
dialectical method of thinking had played a great role in Antiquity,
particularly in the naďve but brilliant aphorisms of Heraclitus (c.500 B.C.),
but also in Aristotle and others. It was abandoned in the Middle Ages, when
the Church turned Aristotle's formal logic into a lifeless and rigid dogma, and
did not re-appear until Kant returned it to a place of honour. However, in Kant
the dialectic did not receive an adequate development. It fell to Hegel to
bring the science of dialectical thinking to its highest point of development.
"Hegel's
greatness is shown by the fact that he alone was prepared to challenge the
dominant philosophy of mechanism. The dialectical philosophy of Hegel deals with
processes, not isolated events. It deals with things in their life, not
their death, in their inter-relations, not isolated, one after the other. This
is a startlingly modern and scientific way of looking at the world. Indeed, in
many aspects Hegel was far in advance of his time. Yet, despite its many
brilliant insights, Hegel's philosophy was ultimately unsatisfactory. Its
principal defect was precisely Hegel's idealist standpoint, which prevented him
from applying the dialectical method to the real world in a consistently
scientific way. Instead of the material world we have the world of the Absolute
Idea, where real things, processes and people are replaced by insubstantial
shadows. In the words of Frederick Engels, the Hegelian dialectic was the most
colossal miscarriage in the whole history of philosophy. Correct ideas are here
seen standing on their head. In order to put dialectics on a sound foundation,
it was necessary to turn Hegel upside down, to transform idealist dialectics
into dialectical materialism. This was the great achievement of Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels...." [Woods
and Grant (1995), pp.40-42; pp.44-46 in the second edition. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and links added.
Italics in the original.]
"This world outlook of Marxism is called
dialectical materialism, a philosophy that is the direct descendent of the
great Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century but which revolutionized
their thinking by introducing a historical dimension. The achievement was
scientific materialism enriched with the theory of evolution propounded by G.W.F
Hegel. Materialism states that our ideas are a reflection of the material
universe that exists independently of any observer. It's dialectical in that it
is always in a state of movement, and change. One of the early dialectical
philosophers was the Greek Heraclitus, 'the obscure' (535-475 BCE)." [Brad
Forrest, quoted from
here. Accessed 22/12/2016. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[Quotations like the above, taken from across the entire spectrum of Dialectical Marxism,
would be easy to multiply, something that can be readily confirmed by anyone who has
access to as many books and articles on DM as I have, or, indeed, who
trawls the Internet.]
Notice
that according to Lenin, DM is "a continuation of the
teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy". Plainly, a
"continuation of" isn't a "break from"! Plekhanov also
thought that DM represented the
"highest stage...whose
foundations were laid down in ancient Greece";
again, that isn't a "break from", either. The others I have quoted pointedly do
not
demur. In fact, I have yet to encounter a single DM-theorist who rejects this
age-old and well-established connection. [If anyone knows of one, please
let me know!]
(b)
On the other hand, if the word "Totality" (and its associated
terminology) is
meant to function as a "form
of representation" -- that is, as a formal device aimed at
interpreting experience and legitimating what appear to be a series of inferences
that lead to what purport to be scientific conclusions about the world -- that would at least make it
clear that DM was just another form of conventionalism, albeit a vague
and thoroughly confused version.34
Of course, the first alternative, (a),
would suggest that DM is simply a re-boot of our old friend, LIE. That is, it
would confirm the suspicion that this theory/method is indeed part
of an age-old family of philosophical theories, all based on the idea that
substantive truths about the world,
valid for all space and time, can be derived from the supposed meaning of a
few words
and nothing more.
The second alternative, (b), would indicate that DM at least superficially
resembled the sciences -- but only at heavy price.
That is because, as noted above, it would
confirm that DM is form of conventionalism,based on little more than a series of overt stipulations and/or agreements --
which would unfortunately mean it had been foisted on the facts.35
As we are about to find out: while DM-theorists have
(unwittingly) adopted alternative (a),
the way they have done so has only succeeded in sending
their theory back in the direction of (b).36
There are,
of course,
many different forms of
Conventionalism.
Lessplausibleversions tend to be based on arbitrary
stipulation,37
while less implausible alternatives are more 'anthropological', founded on
a
wide range of customs and practices, many of which have helped
shape and drive human social evolution for tens of thousands of years.38
[DM = Dialectical
Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical
Materialism/Materialist, ditto for the context.]
Is DM conventional in one of these senses? If it is,
the idea that reality forms a contradictory "Totality" would then be based on one or more of the following:
(i) An overt agreement of
some sort;
(ii) An implicit (or even explicit) stipulation, or
series of stipulations; or,
(iii) A set of norms derived from, or constitutive of, a wide
range of social practices.
Of course, any admission that one or more of the above underpin 'dialectics' would confirm what
should now be plain for all to see: DM hasn't been read from the world (contrary to what is often
claimed
for it), it has been imposed on it.
That would certainly account
for all the
"demands", "insistencies", "requires" and "musts" that litter the
dialectical-literature --, and that includes the
dogmatic
nature of DM's 'laws', which are held to
be true for all of space and time.
[Some might try
to deny that that is the case (i.e., that DM-'laws' are "true for all of space
and time"), and hence claim that
DM grows and evolves over time in response to wider
historical, social and scientific developments. But that would be to confuse DM with HM; I have spelt out the difference between the two here.
That is quite apart from the fact it fails to tell us which of Engels's 'laws', which of Lenin's "demands", which of
Trotsky's "axioms" they are prepared to abandon or even consider revising this side of being accused of "Revisionism!" by the Orthodoxy Police.
And it flies in the face of the fact that DM hasn't fundamentally changed
in well over a century. (On that, see here.)]
Unfortunately, stipulative conventions are no more capable of being
empirically true than are rules. A straightforward example of a
convention of this sort is
the Metric System. However, that
system's conversion
rules (such as, 1000 kilograms = 1 tonne) are of little
use to dialecticians in this respect. Although it is obviously correct
to say
that one tonne is one thousand kilograms (or, rather,
that
any object weighing 1000kg will ipso facto weigh 1 tonne, so that an
empirical statement to that effect about
some object or other would itself be valid),
that
'conventionalised
fact' hasn't been derived from the 'nature' of the world (even though it is connected
with it in other ways,
via practice),
nor has it been read from it. It is based on a
series of
agreements and stipulations introduced and adopted a couple of centuries ago.
Hence, if
this conversion rule is 'true', it isn't empirically true. If it were, it
could be empirically false, too. But that would amount to a
rejection of the rule, not a new fact about the world. In that case, it is far
better to describe such rules as "practical" or "useful" rather than "true". [I have said more about
why that is so,
here.]
Furthermore, if such a system were
to be thought of as true, it would make sense for someone to
check it. But only
the radically confused would dream of trying to check the metric system by actually
weighing something in order to confirm that an object that weighed 1 tonne also
weighed 1000 kilograms, or attempted to measure a piece of wood to see if one
with a length of 10 centimetres was also 100 millimetres long. Plainly, such
rules can't be tested in practice, although practice certainly tells us whether or not they
are practical or useful, or even whether they have been applied correctly.
Obviously, the first of these rules
(i.e., 1000kg = 1t) can be used to confirm that a
given weight has been converted correctly between the relevant units, for
instance. Rules like this tell us
if or when a practical interface
with the world has been carried out
accurately and successfully, correctly or incorrectly, consistently or
inconsistently, according to the explicit (or implicit) criteria for their
application. [On that, see Polanyi (1962,
1983).]
Another more recent, controversial
stipulative and definitional convention was used in order to re-classify
Pluto, demoting it from its prior status as a planet to that of a "dwarf planet". [I
have said more about this in Note 19a.]
Having said that, it might now seem that conventional rules like these can create new sets of
truths (apparently) out of thin air, so to speak --, or, as happened with Pluto,
it might look like they can also create a few 'new falsehoods' alongside 'new
truths'. But, rules don't do this by being true themselves, since, once more,
they can't be true or false (only useful or useless). Such rules manage to do, or can be used to do,
the following:
(a) Redistribute truth-values among already existing indicative sentences
-- in the
sense that any such sentences that might have been written down somewhere or uttered by someone
(and recorded) at some
point, will have had their semantic status changed from true to false, or vice versa; or,
(b) Facilitate or enable the formation/use of novel sentences with new truth-values that
weren't possible before. So, in the tenth century, for example, no one could
come out with this sentence, "My sword is eighty-five centimetres long",
but in the nineteenth they could (which statement would now be capable of being either true or
false).
But, what about the creation of a 'new truth' seemingly out of nowhere? Consider this example: the following sentence
was true thirty years ago, "There are nine planets in the Solar System",
but
now it is false. By way of contrast, the following sentence is currently true: "The furthest planet from the Sun is
Neptune", but thirty years ago it was false. But, nothing 'out there' in the
universe has actually changed as a result, even though our stock of truths and
falsehood (if such it may be called) about The Solar System haschanged.
As will be demonstrated in Essay Thirteen Part Two, this is such a common
occurrence in science that it is easily missed, and is in fact missed, by most
philosophers of science -- and DM-theorists. This isn't the only serious problem
Scientific Realism faces, but it one of its most challenging.
[That will also be demonstrated in the aforementioned Essay. Part of that
material has already been published in Essay Twelve
Part One.]
However, these considerations also mean that if something is already empirically true,
stipulating it to be true would be wasted effort. On the other hand, if
a proposition is already empirically false, any stipulation to that
effect (or, indeed, its opposite) would be entirely
nugatory.
Of course, many socially-sanctionedconventions are far more
complex and are often nowhere near as precise as the above system of measurement
(or rules of planetary re-classification) might suggest. Furthermore, many conventions aren't typically based on
explicit agreement, either, but that doesn't affect the point being made.
[On this, see Lewis (1969).]
Plainly, the
truth-values of empirical (scientific) propositions depend on
a least two factors:
(a) The way the world happens to be; and,
(b) The conventions in whose range propositions like
this happen to fall. Any such conventions will also determine (or can be used to
determine) the meaning of the technical terms that appear in each relevant branch of science, with
wider background conventions doing likewise with respect to any words drawn from the
vernacular (the latter of which will also be connected with inferences
capable of being (validly) drawn in that system).
[I will say more about this in Essay Thirteen Part
Two; again, some of that material has already been published in Essay Twelve
Part One (link a few paragraphs back).]
However, even though we have seen how and why
conventions seem to be able to 'create new truths and new falsehoods' (or, indeed, how they can alter existing truth-values), these 'new' or
'changed' truth-values
still have to be sensitive to the way the world happens to be. So, no one who
uses the metric system can ignore what they are actually measuring (alongside
other conventions and assumptions that operate in the background, or are part of
the criteria of application peculiar to any given practice).
Furthermore, anyone who now
asserts that Pluto the largest planet in the Solar System will be wrong on at least two
levels -- i.e., calling Pluto a planet and mischaracterising its relative size
(as a 'planet').
In addition, if, say,
Neptune were to be wiped out --
or even captured -- tomorrow by a passing star, the statement
that there are eight planets in The Solar System would become false, even though
the convention that determines which satellites of the Sun are planets and which
aren't won't itself have changed. Nevertheless, the fact that
any such propositions are capable of possessing truth-values (i.e., their
ability to possess truth-conditions) is itself a consequence of
over-arching,
conventionalised linguistic practices human beings have evolved, developed and adapted
throughout the
course of their history (a point that was also alluded to in a previous paragraph).
How could it be otherwise? Conventions like
these didn't float down from 'Heaven', nor have they been imposed on humanity by 'aliens'.
As will be argued in Essay Twelve
Part One,
philosophical
and
ideologically-motivated attempts to give inappropriatelinguistic expression to
conventionslike these -- alongside their misrepresentation as
super-empirical truths about reality
-- is what originally helped motivate
Metaphysics.
That took place initially (in the 'West') in Ancient Greece; there were
analogous developments in the 'East' around the same time. Because metaphysical
propositions were/are based on what turn out to be a set of deliberate misconstruals
-- whereby the linguistic products of social interaction were
reconfigured/re-interpreted so that they now seemed to 'reflect' the real relation between things, or, indeed,
appeared to
become
those
things themselves -- they were/are thereby rendered incapable of being either true or
false. They lose their truth conditions. That is because they simply
become
garbled/misinterpreted rules of language. Muddled or not, they are still rules, so
they can't be true or false.38a
I outlined a specific example of this
sort of (deliberate) misconstrual in Essay Three
Part One (slightly edited):
We can
actually see this happening in the thought of
the Early Greek
Philosophers (the full details will be laid out in Essay Twelve (summary
here and
here)). These
theorists found that there were no words
available
to them in the vernacular
Greek
of their day
that allowed them to speculate about the nature
of their newly invented abstractions.
Hence,
they
simply manufactured their own terminology
--,or they borrowed and then
transformed jargon from earlier
myths and
Theogonies.
Consequently, words like "Being", "Logos",
"Fate", "The
Unlimited", "Nous"
-- and "abstraction" (aphairesis)
itself
-- were co-opted and then put to no good.
However,
in order to cope with the many and varied forms
of generality available in the vernacular,
these thinkers found they also had to
appropriate and then make use of words that were already in circulation in every day life. These
they nominalised
and particularised into "Justice", "Knowledge", "Beauty", "The Table", "Man",
"Manhood", "The Equal", and later, "Identity" and "Difference" -- turning ordinary
general words into the
Proper Names
of...newly minted
abstract particulars. [Added on
edit: A word is particularised when it is changed from a general to a
particular
term; in this case, when a
common noun is transformed into a
Proper Noun or
Definite Description -- for example, "man" into "Manhood", "beauty" into
"The Beautiful" -- or a general verb, such as "runs", is also converted into a
Proper Noun, in this case, "Runner". These moves were explained at length in
Essay Three Part One, alongside their philosophical, logical and ideological significance).]
"As long as preserved
communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained
only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is
gods.
Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great
story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of
gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas,
mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a
style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the
manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of
events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the
Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated
philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking
was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could
describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter,
body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity,
quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of
abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of
doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour
of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms
systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished
by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic
statement.
"The history of early
philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary
was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own
language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....
"Nevertheless, the
Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They
had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of
orally memorised speech, in particular the language of
Homer and
Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and
manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had
the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a
cosmic rather than a particular reference."
[Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with
UK English. Links added.]
Havelock then shows in detail that
this is precisely what the Presocratic Philosophers succeeded in doing:
inventing abstract nouns, eliminating verbs in place of these newly-coined nouns,
and transforming the verb "to be" in the required manner.
Thus was born the so-called 'problem' of
Universals (the
'problem' of the "One
and the Many"), a
family of
insoluble conundrumspredicated on the above distortion of ordinary language, and nothing more --
again, just as
Marx noted.
[Readers are referred back to
the above Essay for more details.]
In short, metaphysical propositions are
incapable of being true and incapable of being false, because:
(a) They are based on a misconstrual, distortion or reconfiguration of linguistic rules as
'profound' factual/empirical propositions; and,
(b) Traditional Philosophers (deliberately or inadvertently) confused
these social forms (these linguistic rules) with 'reality' itself.
This amounted to a
fetishisation of language, which neatly mirrors the
fetishism of commodities under capitalism.
[I have said much more about this topic in
Essay Twelve Parts
One, Two and Seven (summary
here), where the above seemingly dogmatic
assertions were fully justified. As we saw in that Essay, metaphysical theories aren't just non-sensical,
they are
also
incoherent
non-sense.]
Metaphysicians indulged in such linguistic duplicity because they thought it
would help them uncover 'fundamental truths' about the 'essential
nature', or even the 'logical form', of
'Reality Itself'. This gave the first metaphysicians we know of in
'the West' (i.e., in Ancient Greece) 'easy' access to 'secrets' hidden from
the 'ignorant majority', truths locked behind, or even 'beneath', 'misleading
appearances'. In effect, 'secrets' like these were
unavailable to 'the masses' -- those who lacked the 'correct' social background,
those possessed of insufficient leisure time, or even who lacked the motivation
required to
indulge in such ideological flights-of-fancy. By their use of such obscure jargon
(that
only they 'understood') Traditional Theorists were determined to keep the
majority in that condition, in the dark --
'The mushroom treatment'.
[I have said much more about the
use of metaphors like these
here.]
As I argued
in Essay Three
Part One (slightly edited, and following
on from the passage
quoted earlier):
This specially-concocted jargon...had to fulfil another
pre-condition: it must be capable of connecting 'finite minds' to
the 'Ultimate Ground Of Meaning' (which is the principle aim of all mystical
thought, a dogma that resurfaced as the "Subject/Object" problematic of
German
Idealism and
later still as a central concern of 'Materialist Dialectics'
-- on that,
see below).
As a result, a seemingly endless series of 'truths' could now 'legitimately' flow from the meaning of a handful
of words. For each theorist,
Super-Knowledge accessed in the comfort of their
heads.
Traditional
Philosophers were only too eager to latch onto the belief that human thoughts were universally
significant -- i.e., that what went on in certain heads was the best,
if not the
only, guide to 'Absolute Truth' --, and which also supplied a key to solving
the very 'problems' they themselves had concocted. Keith Thomas notes a similar tactic
adopted by 16th
century magicians:
"It would be tempting to
explain the long survival of magical practices by pointing out that they helped
provide many professional wizards with a respectable livelihood. The example of
the legal profession is a reminder that it is always possible for a substantial
social group to support itself by proffering solutions to problems which they
themselves have helped to manufacture. The cunning men and wise women had an
undoubted interest in upholding the prestige of magical diagnosis and may by
their mere existence have helped to prolong a mode of thinking which was already
obsolescent." [Thomas (1972), p.295.]
The bottom line was that they alone -- Traditional Theorists
-- had access to the 'hidden knowledge' superhighway,
a back-channel that penetrated right into the
heart of 'Being', which 'enabled' them to derive necessary truths from
jargon they themselves had invented for that specific purpose. This
'allowed' them to generate philosophical theories that couldn't
fail to be true, which, for that reason needed no evidence in support.
Acting as judge and jury in their own case, these 'thinkers' declared these Super-Verities "self-evident", arguing that only "crude materialists" would
think to challenge such a 'self-confirming' and
self-serving approach to 'knowledge'. In which case, the history of Traditional Thought amounted to
little more than collective indulgence in protracted self-deception.
Unfortunately however, this 'highway to Super-Knowledge'
was based on what was in effect a contingentfeature
of a minor aspect of the grammar of
one particular language-group -- theIndo-European
family --, in which most of these fairy-tales have been, and still are being,
spun....
But, whatever their
origin or provenance happened to be, these
abstract,
Ideal Forms (or what they allegedly 'reflected') were supposedly
more real than objects and processes in the natural and social world around us. In
fact, this meant the material universe was somehow 'unreal', 'inferior', 'ephemeral', a 'mere appearance'. Those
invisible, underlying 'essences' (just like the 'gods' of old) were the only really
real world.
Access to
nature's secret names
(all those
'abstractions') 'allowed' Traditional Theorists to forge a mystical,
intellectual link between their thought and the underlying, non-material 'essences' that governed all of reality, 'behind the scenes'
as it were. Indeed, it was a
near-universal belief that this 'secret knowledge' would help those 'in the
know' gain a special sort of control over nature itself (which, of course, is one of the
core principles of ancient, medieval and contemporary forms of magic and
alchemy). Far more importantly, 'secret knowledge'
like this helped 'rationalise' state power and hence the status quo. For
if the status and power of the elite were guaranteed by -- indeed, were a reflection of
-- The Cosmic Order,
class division and oppression could be 'justified' as an irrevocable feature of 'Being'.
Or,
at least as far as Hegel was concerned, an integral component in the
development of 'Being'.
In
that case,
theorists skilled in the art of 'jargon-juggling' and 'word magic' could
accrue to themselves no little
prestige -- if not power -- as skilled 'legitimators' of the
ruling
elite.
As far as ruling class ideologues were concerned -- in this instance most
notably Plato and Aristotle --
the fundamental nature of 'reality' should
be reflected in and by
the structure and character of the state, an anti-democratic,
hierarchical doctrine aimed at legitimating
class division and the supremacy of the ruling elite --, to which class such
theorists either belonged or by whom they were patronised. The 'content' of
these theories was then
dogmatically imposed on nature and
society since that was the only way to 'ratify' the status quo as 'natural' or
'god-ordained'. Because the state
was a 'reflection' of the 'fundamental nature of reality', ordained by 'heaven',
inequality, class division, exploitation and oppression 'must' therefore be 'natural', and
so couldn't 'legitimately' be opposed,
or even questioned.
Cosmic Conservatism was thus projected onto and
injected into the social and the natural world.
"[First, for Hegel] the concept or thoughts are
embedded in the world. The world has a definite logical structure. But these
thoughts, this logical structure, also form the core of the human mind. Human
beings are essentially thought or thoughts -- not thoughts that they can
explicitly unravel all at once, but thought that they can painfully and
circuitously become aware of over history in their manifold interactions with
the world. So if the thoughts that constitute the human mind are embodied in the
world, the world is itself a sort of mind. Second, human minds are an essential
phase of God. Without them God would not be self-conscious, not a proper mind at
all." [Inwood (2002), pp.xxii-xxiii.]
So, if the world is mind, and humans certainly contradict one
another, it makes some sort of crazy Idealist sense (for Hegel and anyone else
who buys into hardcore mysticism like this) to suppose contradictions can exist
in the world as it sort of 'argues with itself'. But, when Hegel later tells us
that:
"It
shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction
from it and then to transfer the contradiction to spirit [Geist -- RL], to
reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved.
In point of fact it is spirit which is so strong that it can endure
contradiction, but it is spirit, too, that knows how to resolve it. But the
so-called world (whether it be called an objective, real world or, according to
transcendental idealism, a subjective intuition and a sphere of sense determined
by the categories of the understanding) is never and nowhere without
contradiction, but it is unable to endure it and is, therefore, subject to
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be", [Hegel
(1999), pp.237-38,§529. Bold emphasis added.]
he surely can't expect to be taken seriously. That
is because, for him the world
is mind (and it is worth recalling that in German the word for "spirit" and
"mind" are the same -- "Geist"), which means that any
contradictions in the world must still be in the mind.
So,even for Hegel, contradictions only
occur in the mind! In that case, it isn't possible to "remove
contradiction from [the word] and then to transfer the contradiction to spirit";
hence no one can do it, not even those whom Hegel is criticising for supposedly
doing just that!
[DM-fans who cite this passage (and many do) never
tell their readers this. (I suspect they aren't used to joined-up thinking, so
haven't spotted this inconsistency.) Anyway, why should they? To do so would be the
philosophical equivalent
of shooting yourself in the foot you have just inserted in your mouth!]
As a result, alongside Theology, Philosophy became a key component in this, the
first systematic, ideological defence/'ratification' of ruling-class
wealth, privilege and power (that we know of).
No wonder then that Marx commented as follows:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence
equally to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used
the on-line version, here. Bold emphases and link added.]
Is there a single revolutionary socialist who, after reading what Inwood had to
say, now disagrees with Marx that philosophy is to be "condemned"? Alas, I
suspect there will be many...
Despite this, and in spite of Marx's warning, DM-theorists have unwisely
bought into this
ancient, ruling-class
tradition, failing to recognise the significance of its class-compromised origin,
or the ideological role it has played throughout much of human history.
As a result, they
seriously mistook the nature of Hegel's system (upside down
or 'the right way up'), indulging in their own (confused) brand
of metaphysical speculation and projection -- a key part of which was the time-honoured
(ruling-class) practice of
imposing their ideas on
'reality'. Hence, they, too, misinterpreted the product of social relations between human beings
(language) as if it
"represented" fundamental relations between things, or, indeed,
was
those things themselves. Language was no longer seen as a means of
communication, but as a representational device, a means by which humans
(actively) record, translate or express 'perceptions'/'images'/'abstractions' that
had supposedly been 'reflected' in the mind or (actively or passively) created
by it.
[I have subjected these moves to prolonged and destructive criticism in Essay Thirteen Parts One
and Three.]
The deleterious effect of false steps like these was further compounded by the misidentification of the origin and
nature of language as somehow 'natural', based on the 'concepts' and 'processes' mentioned
earlier -- "reflection", "inner representation", "image
formation", "abstraction" --, subsequently reified as 'emergent' properties of vague and
unidentified 'brain processes' or as 'mental objects' of some sort.
[Again, I have said much more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Three,
here.]
[Indeed, we saw this happen (specifically) when -- just like Aristotle and Hegel
-- DM-theorists
began to confuse
predicates with properties, conflating talk about talk with talk
about things. [For what that means or implies, see
here,
here,
here and
here.] Dialecticians do this
when they collectively misinterpretlinguistic categories -- for instance,
'negation' and 'contradiction' -- as 'reflections' of processes in nature and society,
or as those processes themselves.]
This means that DM is also a result of the systematic distortion and
misuse of language; for example, once again, misconstruing and misapplying the meaning of ordinary terms, like "contradict",
"identical", "different", "opposite", "conscious",
"sensation", "thought", and "perceive" --
studiously ignoring Marx's remarks, re-quoted below. As a result,
DM-theorists still fail to notice that this approach to 'knowledge' completely
undermines their commitment to the social nature of language.39
"The
philosophers have only to dissolve
their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order
to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that
they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases
alone added.]
Of course, the above characterisation of DM will
be totally rejected by dialecticians. Among other things they maintain the
belief that while
their theory/method might only be 'relatively true', it isn't merely empirically valid,
it is also "objectively"
true. That is becausethey maintain it reflects
a changing world, having been
repeatedly 'verified in practice' and then revised accordingly.
[The claim made by some that DM is simply a "method" will
be examined presently. Whether or not it has ever been tested in practice
was subjected to sustained criticism throughout Essay Ten
Part One,
as well as
here, in Essay Nine Part Two.]
However, even though DM bears all the
hallmarks of conventionalism -- since its adherents are
quite happy to "insist",
"require" or
"demand"
that this or that 'dialectical proposition'/'law' is valid for all of space and time
--, if the volunteered
dialectical denials outlined in the last but one paragraph are themselves
correct,
it would seem that DM can't be classified as a form of conventionalism.40
The only other way to account for dialecticians'
propensity to advance a priori, dogmatic and universal claims about reality,
valid for all of space and time,
is to conclude that DM is a metaphysical theory, after all.
Of course, that
claim itself raises serious
questions over the correct definition of
Metaphysics. That topic has been addressed in Essay
TwelvePart One
(more specifically,
here); readers are directed there for further details.
However, given Engels's own rather odd 'definition'
of the term "metaphysics" (also covered in the above Essay), dialecticians still insist that DM isn't
a metaphysical theory. On the contrary, they regard it as pre-eminently scientific,
concerning the material world itself and how to change it.41
In which case, it could be
argued that despite earlier claims to the contrary, DM is in fact a scientific theory.
But, if that were the case, what are we to make of
all the
universal, a priori, dogmatic 'laws' and propositions, to say nothing of
the many "musts", "insistences" and "demands" its supporters
regularly come out with in order to impose DM on the world?
Which genuine scientist has ever behaved that way? How often do
scientists "demand"
that metals "must" expand when heated, "insist" that copper "must" conduct electricity
or "require" continental drift to be true?
It could be
countered that DM isn't the least bit dogmatic; its laws (etc.) are simply hypothetical.
[I have met that response on the Internet several times -- for example from
this character.] But, that
reply isn't even remotely plausible. Not only are DM-theories not hypothetical, they don't even look
hypothetical. They are all expressed in language that can't under any stretch of
the imagination be interpreted that way. Even aside from all the many
aforementioned "demands", "unthinkables" and "insistences"
-- not to mention all those
"musts", "eternals", "impossibles" and "never anywhere"s all over the place
--,
DM-theorists themselves label their ideas as "laws of cognition",
"objective" and the most "general laws" there are.
Not one
single DM-classicist describes the claims they make as "hypothetical". [On that, see
Essay Two,
especially
here.]
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature….
[T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature,
and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of
nature. The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each
individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative
addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion…. Hence, it is impossible to alter the
quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion…. In this
form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational
but even rather obvious." [Engels (1954), pp.211,
62. Bold emphases added;
several paragraphs merged.]
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter.
Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be
created; it can only be transmitted…. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to
be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976),
p.74. Bold
emphases and link added; several paragraphs merged.]
Plekhanov
"According to Hegel, dialectics is the
principle of all life…. [M]an has two qualities: first being alive, and
secondly of also being mortal. But on closer examination it turns out that
life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that in general
any phenomenon is contradictory, in the sense that it develops out of
itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to its existence and
will transform it into its opposite. Everything flows, everything
changes; and there is no force capable of holding back this constant flux,
or arresting its eternal movement. There is no force capable of
resisting the dialectics of phenomena….
"At a particular moment a moving body is at a
particular spot, but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if it
were only in that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become motionless.
Every motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and as
there is not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do not
have in the long run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel,
who said that dialectics is the soul of any scientific cognition.
And this applies not only to cognition of nature…. And so every phenomenon, by the
action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but
inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite….
"When you apply the dialectical method to the
study of phenomena, you need to remember that forms change eternally in consequence of the 'higher development of their content….' In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit
consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from
the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin
and destruction…. [M]odern science confirms at every step
the idea expressed with such genius by Hegel, that quantity passes into
quality…. [I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added;
several paragraphs merged.]
Lenin
"Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e.,
reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflectionof the eternal development of
the world. Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics
of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others."
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition of
its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of
the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics…. The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the
'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most
ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with
other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc.
Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity,
of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and
the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we
disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence
from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.110,
196-97,
221-22,
357-58, 359-60.
Bold emphases alone added; several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…. [D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is
always concrete, never abstract, as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated
by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly
repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis
('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a
straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks
in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner
impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the
various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given
phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest,
indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a
connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of
motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the
ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases
added.]
Trotsky
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves…. [T]he
axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does
not change, that is, if it does not exist…. For concepts there also exists
'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic…, but by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything
is always changing….Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws:
change of quantity into quality, development through contradiction, conflict and
form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability,
etc…." [Trotsky (1971),
pp.64-66. Bold emphases added;
several paragraphs merged.]
"It must be recognized that the fundamental law
of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into quality, for it gives [us] the
general formula of all evolutionary processes -– of nature as well as of
society.... The principle of the transformation of quantity
into quality has universal significance, insofar as we view the entire
universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and
transformation…. In these abstract formulas we have the most
general laws (forms) of motion, change, the transformation of the stars of the
heaven, of the earth, nature and human society.… Dialectics is the logic of development. It
examines the world -- completely without exception -– not as a
result of creation, of a sudden beginning, the realisation of a plan, but as a
result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became the way it
is as a result of lawlike development." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88, 90, 96. Bold
emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
Mao
"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the
law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics.... As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook,
the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand
the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations
with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as
their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its
movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of
contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the
process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process
of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to
end.... There is nothing that does not contain
contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist.... Thus it is already clear that contradiction
exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the simple
or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological
phenomena.... Contradiction is universal and absolute,
it is present in the process of the development of all things and permeates
every process from beginning to end...." [Mao (1961b),
pp.311-18. Bold
emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
[Well over a hundred -- and that number is no exaggeration!
-- equally
dogmatic passages, taken from the DM-classics and the writings of more recent
dialecticians, have been quoted inEssay Two.]
DM-theorists also claim
that their theory only deals with 'real material forces' -- as opposed to 'static'
and 'abstract'
concepts --, which means that their main concern is with the
inter-relationship between concretely developing and historically-conditioned
objects and processes in the
"Totality" (even if abstraction has to be employed, dialectically, to assist
them to
that end). Furthermore, this approach
forms an integral part of the long-term strategy to bring about the revolutionary
transformation of society. Moreover, objects and processes in the "Totality"
are said to change as a result of their contradictory
nature and their dialectical inter-connection with other objects and processes -- i.e., because of the
countless oppositional forces
at work within 'The Whole'.42
But, as DM-theorists themselves insist, that doesn't spare them the difficult task of constantly
checking
their theory against experience, testing it in practice.
Unfortunately, the above
characterisation only succeeds in casting DM back into the metaphysical fold,
once more. That is because dialecticians insist that everything in the
"Totality" is related to (or "mediated" by) everything else (depending on which
version of 'inter-connectedness' is being promoted by any given DM-theorist),
subject to change through 'internal contradiction', and so on. All this is
insisted uponbefore even so much as a vanishingly small
fraction of the relevant evidence has been collected, let alone analysed. As
we have seen,
that helps explain the presence of all those "insistences", "musts",
"impossibles", "absolutes", "eternals",
"requires" and "demands" -- surely the philosophical equivalent of
banging the table --, alongside the equally ubiquitous references to "laws of cognition",
"axioms" and "general laws".
This should go without saying,
but if
there were adequate proof, and DM-theorists were in possession of it, all those "insistences"
and "demands" would be superfluous.
Again, how many
times do scientists have to "demand" that water is a liquid (at
ordinary temperatures and pressures), "insist" copper
is a metal, or "require" cats to be mammals?
In fact, just to take one example,
if parts and
wholes
weren'tactually inter-dependent in the manner suggested, there would be little point
DM-theorists arguing along
the following lines:
"[W]hen
we bring these terms [belonging to the Totality] into relation with each other
their meaning is transformed….
In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the
part is determined by its relationships with the other parts and so with the
whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts. In
this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of
the parts but also that the parts become more that they are individually by
being part of a whole…. [F]or dialectical
materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998a),
pp.5, 77. Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]42a0
That is because DM-theorists would
then have to admit their system was an a priori and dogmatic imposition onto a
world that might not actually be as they picture it. Indeed, no
amount of evidence could confirm the truth of the above remarks (or, for
that matter, the
truth of the passages quoted from the DM-classics a
few paragraphs
back), but that hasn't stopped dialecticians asserting them as if it were
settled science.
We can go further: if the entirenature of the
part were determined by the whole (and vice versa), then, as we
saw earlier, that fact could
itself only be confirmed when humanity knew everything about everything.
After all, if Rees were correct, only when the whole had been ascertained
would the nature of any part be understood. Until that blessed state is finally reached this theory will have to be imposed on
'reality'. It could only be readfrom the world at the end of
an infinite search for Absolute Knowledge --, if Engels, Lenin and Mao are to be
believed:
"'Fundamentally, we can know
only
the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in
raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity
and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the
finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is
knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition
of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.234-35. Bold
emphasis alone added.]29
"The identity of thinking and being, to use
Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and
does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which
it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a
fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because
reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it
only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon
manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in
this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels
(1975), pp.457-58, and Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Systematics impossible after
Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole,
but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Bold
emphasis alone added.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world…. [I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93. Bold emphases
alone added; paragraphs merged.]
"Dialectics
as living,
many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing),
with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality
(with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade) -- here we
have an immeasurably rich content as compared with 'metaphysical' materialism,
the fundamental misfortune of
which is its inability to apply dialectics to the Bildertheorie [theory of
reflection -- RL],
to the process and development of knowledge....
"Human knowledge is not (or
does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a
series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be
transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight
line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the
quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored
by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness,
woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness -- voilŕ the
epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscrutantism (= philosophical
idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless;
it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on
the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective,
absolute human knowledge." [Lenin (1961),
pp.360-61.
Bold emphases alone added.]
"Cognition is the eternal,
endless approximation of thought to the object." [Ibid.,
p.195.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Knowledge
is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate,
not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the
formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws,
etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally,
approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing nature.... Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as
a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality,'he can only
eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a
scientific picture of the world...." [Ibid.,
p.182. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Dialectical materialism
insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the
structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute
boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into
another." [Lenin (1972),
p.312.
Bold emphasis added.]
"'Here
once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between
the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its
reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is
a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is
for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of
generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as
not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much un-limited as
limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition..., its
vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not
sovereign and it is limited in its individual expression and in its realisation
at each particular moment....'
"'Truth
and error, like all thought-concepts which move in polar opposites, have
absolute validity only in an extremely limited field, as we have just seen, and
as even Herr Dühring would realise if he had any acquaintance with the first
elements of dialectics, which deal precisely with the inadequacy of all polar
opposites. As soon as we apply the
antithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow field which has been
referred to above it becomes relative and therefore unserviceable for exact
scientific modes of expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely
valid outside that field we really find ourselves altogether beaten: both poles
of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites, truth becomes error
and error truth'.... Here follows the example of
Boyle's law
(the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The 'grain of
truth' contained in this law is only absolute truth within certain limits. The
law, it appears, is a truth 'only approximately'.
"Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving, and does give,
absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths. Each step
in the development of science adds new grains to the sum of absolute truth, but
the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition are relative, now
expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge." [Ibid.,
pp.150-51, quoting Engels (1976),
pp.108-09, 114.
The on-line and published translations are slightly different. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and
link added.]
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In
social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away
is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in
accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and
further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.
The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so
is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the
course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the
subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and
we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which
depart from concrete history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Other DM-theorists concur. Here, for example, is
Cornforth:
"What then is truth? It is
correspondence between ideas and objective reality. Such correspondence between
our ideas and reality is only gradually established, and then the correspondence
is often no more than partial or incomplete.... In such cases, we should not say
that our idea was false, but yet it would not be absolutely -- completely and in
all respects -- true. Truth, therefore, is not a property which an idea,
or a proposition, either possesses or does not possess; it may belong to an idea
to a certain degree, within certain limits, in certain respects....
"This characteristic of
truth...is very well known to science. The laws which science establishes
certainly reflect objective processes; they correspond to the real motion and
interconnection of things in the external world. Yet science has established few
laws which can claim to be absolute truths.... [M]any erroneous views in
science and philosophy, which have had to be, not modified, but rejected as
errors, concealed a certain truth which received in them an erroneous distorted
expression....
"We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression.... Complete, full, absolute
truth -- the whole truth and nothing but the truth about everything -- is
something we can never attain. But it is something toward which we are always
approximating.... The correspondence is
never complete, exact, absolute. But it continually approaches yet is always
infinitely distant from that absolute limit as truth and knowledge continually
advance...." [Cornforth (1963), pp.135-45. Bold emphases added; several
paragraphs merged.]
Here is Dave McNally:
"Rather
than dogmatically dismissing a contending theory, dialectical criticism instead
enters into its system of thinking, engages it on its own terms, and integrates
its most critical insights. Truth, Hegel urges, is not a thing; it 'is not a
minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made.' Rather, truth resides in
the
process
of critical thinking, which can only move through
partial and one-sided understandings toward richer and more comprehensive ones.
The theoretical approach that prevailed at a particular point in time cannot
then be glibly dismissed as 'false.' Even where it is transcended by a more
robust theory, an earlier perspective full of false starts is still part of the
history of truth, as a process of discovery, exploration, and theoretical
formulation. 'This truth thus includes the negative, what would be called
the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract.
The evanescent itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as essential, not as
something fixed, cut off from the True.'" [McNally (2017), p.95. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis
added. McNally is here quoting
Hegel (1977), pp.22, 27; §§39,
47.]
And here is Henri Wald:
"A 'concrete' truth is a logical system of
abstractions multilaterally reflecting the real concrete. One truth is more
concrete than another to the extent to which it reflects more essential traits
of the investigated object. Concrete truth like absolute truth,
can only be reached asymptotically ad infinitum." [Wald (1975), p.35.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
Of course, we already know where the above ideas
originated; they didn't arise out of the sciences, they popped out of the fevered
imagination of a
card-carrying Christian Mystic -- as Lenin himself acknowledged:
"Hegel brilliantly
divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature)
in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more
popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the
alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97.
Bold
emphases alone added.]
"Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e.,
reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflectionof the eternal development of
the world. Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics
of things(phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions,
Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others."
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition of
its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of
the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics…. The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the
'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most
ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with
other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc.
Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity,
of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and
the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we
disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence
from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.110,
196-97,
221-22,
357-60.
Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, as already noted, these (totally
unscientific) ideas were imported from Hegel, who famously
(and dogmatically)
asserted the following:
"The truth is the whole.
The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness
through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said
that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very
truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or
self-becoming, self-development. Should it appear contradictory to say
that the Absolute has to be conceived essentially as a result, a little
consideration will set this appearance of contradiction in its true light. The
beginning, the principle, or the Absolute, as at first or immediately expressed,
is merely the universal. If we say 'all animals', that does not pass for
zoology; for the same reason we see at once that the words absolute, divine,
eternal, and so on do not express what is implied in them; and only mere words
like these, in point of fact, express intuition as the immediate. Whatever is
more than a word like that, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a form
of mediation, contains a process towards another state from which we must return
once more. It is this process of mediation, however, that is rejected with
horror, as if absolute knowledge were being surrendered when more is made of
mediation than merely the assertion that it is nothing absolute, and does not
exist in the Absolute." [Hegel (1977),
p.11; section 20. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks
altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
According to the above, this side of the
'completion' of an 'infinite epistemological meander', no one would
know the 'full truth' about anything. But, until humanity knew the 'full
truth about everything' (which blessed state we have just been told by
Engels & Co will
never
be attained), no one will be able to assert anything about the Whole -- even, for instance, that there is a
Whole, that it is indeed a Whole, or even
that it is a Whole
--
with anything other than infinite uncertainty.
In turn, similar remarks also apply to the parts. No
one would be able to assert anything about them -- for instance, that
this or that is a part
--
with anything other than infinite uncertainty, too, at least, not until the Whole had been
comprehended first.
In which case, when
DM-theorists advance claims about parts and wholes (even if they try to argue
that such claims are only 'partially', or 'relatively', true), they will have
to have access to knowledge that only the
hypothetical
Epistemological End-State could ever deliver
(i.e.,
the terminus that alone constitutes 'complete' or 'Absolute' knowledge -- 'Dialectical
Valhalla' Itself). Before then, DM-theorists
will be unable say, with anything other thanalmost zero confidence,
that what they have is
even 'relative' or 'partial' knowledge, to begin with.
That is because the assertion that there are such things as parts and wholes-- or even the claim that knowledge is only ever 'partial', or 'relative', etc. -- would still require complete knowledge. If the entire
nature of any part -- including at least this part of the total picture,
that is, this part here in this Essay (or in TAR, or in PN,
or MEC
-- or anywhere else for that matter), expressed in words (on this page/screen, or
on any page/screen) concerning 'partial knowledge' itself --
were actually determined by the whole (or vice versa), then no
one, least of all a dialectician, would be in any position to assert (with
anything other than almost zero confidence) this 'partial' truth (if such it
be) until 'Epistemological Judgement Day' had been reached and all was revealed to
the congregated 'DM-Elect'.
[PN = Philosophical
Notebooks; MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (i.e., Lenin (1961) and
(1972), respectively).]
On the other hand,
if the theory that there are parts and wholes (that completely inter-condition one
another) isn't itself a 'partial' truth (and
hence isn't subject to the above constraints), it must be an 'Absolute'
truth, and one
whose status had
been decided upon before every item in an infinite set of 'partial' truths has even been
formulated, tabulated or accessed, let alone processed/comprehended.
But, that would only succeed in undermining that very idea (i.e., the belief that
there are parts and wholes and that they completely condition one another). That is
because, on this view, at least one part
(i.e.,
this
view of the whole, expressed in this paragraph, or this view that is dependent on the whole being 'true')
wouldn't itself be conditioned by all the other
parts, since, plainly, the latter do not yet exist as items of knowledge for
them to be able to condition anything in this sense. Hence, the
entire nature of at least one part (i.e., this one, about the above, here
suggested, 'Absolute truth') wouldn't
be dependent on every other part, contrary to the claim.
Once more, if
that too were to be denied -- and, if dialecticians were still determined to maintain their
commitment to the validity of DM-epistemology (as it
now stands) --, that rejection will itself have been made in abeyance of
the infinite amount of evidencenecessary to substantiate it
(according to the
above quotes from Engels, Lenin, Mao & Co). At that point it
should become clear
to one and all that that denial will itself have been imposed on part and
whole alike, not derived
from either.
Hence, the above considerations mean that sweep-of-the-hand Wholism
like this is little more than a disguised form of
dogmatic apriorism.
And thinly disguised it is, too.
Be this as
it may,
and
despite what dialecticians mightstill try to maintain, it is
possible to show that DM-propositions
haven't been checked against the available evidence in anything like the
manner claimed. Nor have these DM-'super-truths' been derived from
the dearth of evidence its supporters have so far cobbled-together.
For example,
consider a typical DM-assertion (taken from the
opening page of
TAR):
"The very possibility of human
life is governed by contradictions." [Rees (1998a), p.1.]
Admittedly, Rees also mentioned several examples of
contradictions he thought supported the above claim (but which unfortunately turn out not
to be contradictions, to begin with; on that see
here).
Independently of that, his general claim can't be -- and in TAR it certainly wasn't -- supported by a careful analysis of all the evidence (or even a
sizeable or representative fraction of it). Indeed, no matter how much
evidence DM-theorists amassed it would
still only represent a tiny percentage of all the facts necessary to
justify a generalisation about "the very possibility of human
life" and what supposedly governs it. Moreover, as noted
above
(but in more detail
here and
Part Two): given
DM-epistemology the gap between any large finite body of knowledge and 'Absolute
Knowledge' is itself infinite.
Of course, it could be argued that it is perfectly obvious
to Marxists what Rees is referring to, even if it isn't to Ms Lichtenstein. But
that rather breezy response misses the point.
In order to see why, let us assume for the purposes of argument that DM-epistemology is
100% 'valid'. [The reason for the 'scare quotes' around "valid" will become
a little clearer reasonably soon.] Even supposing that were the case, the yawning
chasm of ignorance
that separates DM from Absolute Truth would still be infinite, if
Engels & Co are to be believed. Hence, the above proffered
DM-response is itself misguided. It, too, can't be asserted with anything other
than almost zero confidence, given the infinite abyss of ignorance that
separates it from Absolute Truth (again, if Engels & Co are correct).
That is what is so obvious to the present author even if DM-fans prefer
to insert their heads back into the nearest non-dialectical sand dune.
Nevertheless, the presence of this bottomless pit of ignorance hasn't
stopped dialecticians from advancing any number of "musts", "demands",
"requirements"
and "insistences"
concerning all of reality, for all of time -- for example, that it is
a
unified, 'contradictory', 'inter-connected',
a "mediated" 'Whole', and that every last particle within its
porous
boundary is constantly changing. The vast majority of DM-assertions
like these go way beyond what could
reasonably
be justified even by an appeal to alargefinite body of evidence
(i.e., one whose size is far greater than any currently available, and vastly more than DM-theorists
themselves have scraped-together, which, as we
saw in Essay Seven Part One, is precious little), never mind the infinite amount
that will only be available to humanity on 'Epistemological Judgement Day', way
off in the infinite future, which blessed state will have to have been attained if
DM-propositions may finally be asserted with 100% confidence.
In fact, and to
spoil the fun: as we have already discovered, many of these DM-claims will never,
and can't ever, be confirmed -- even at the End of Time--, let alone
tested in practice.
Sceptical readers are referred back to the Light Cone and
Hubble Sphere problems from earlier (here
and here)
for the reason why.42a
What is now abundantly clear: bold and expansive
DM-claims (like
this one) function in a different
way and serve a specific purpose. They 'allow' those who advance them to
stipulate, or lay-down, theoretical markers in advance that define the
approach they intend to take with respect to the interpretation of the
restricted range of facts about nature and society currently available to them. Indeed, as noted
above, they
are best described as a fetishised "form
of representation" -- which is a round about way of
saying (once again!) that they have been foisted on the facts.42b
[More about that later; until then,
see Glock (1996), pp.129-35. The political and contingent psychological factors
that motivate DM-theorists to make moves like this were exposed (at length) in Essays Nine
Part Two and Twelve
Parts One to Seven (summary
here).]
In response, it could be countered that not only is DM
a science, dialecticians themselves rely on the latest scientific research in
support of their ideas. Where relevant, this also informs the tactics revolutionaries adopt in furtherance of the
socialist transformation of
society.
Despite the above counterclaim, the fact that DM is conventional
in form -- but metaphysical in both intent and content, all the while
failing to be a science -- can be seen by the way its supporters themselves
try to
relate their ideas to the natural and social world.
DM-theorists take it as read that the world
exists independently of our knowledge of it, but they are nevertheless quite
happy to insist that they know in advance what its most general characteristics
must be.
As far as we know this dogmatic approach to
'knowledge' began in the 'West', in Ancient Greece, with (what are now) the
fragmentary and obscure ruminations of that
ancient mystic, Heraclitus. This
next-level obscurantist was quite happy to inform humanity what must be trueofall of realityforall of time based on what
he thought was true about stepping into a
river!
This is what we read about his almost unparalleled
influence on 'Western' thought:
"Heraclitus, along with
Parmenides, is probably the most
significant philosopher of ancient Greece until
Socrates
and
Plato; in fact,
Heraclitus's philosophy is perhaps even more fundamental in the formation of the
European mind than any other thinker in European history, including Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle. Why? Heraclitus, like Parmenides, postulated a
model of nature and the universe which created the foundation for all other
speculation on physics and metaphysics. The ideas that the universe is in constant change
and that there is an underlying order or reason to this change -- the
Logos -- form the
essential foundation of the European world view...."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases and links added.]
As we have also seen,
the above 'general features
of reality' weren't
derived by DM-theorists from a scientific examination of the world,
nor are they (even) now a representative summary of human experience
in its entirety.
They
were lifted from Hegel, who inherited them from previous generations of
mystics (like Heraclitus). In turn, those mystics dreamt them up at a time when there was hardly any evidence
to speak of.
Despite this, they were quite happy to impose these dogmas on nature and
society,
just like DM-theorists
do today.
[There is more on this topic in Essays
Two
and Nine
Part Two, but it will be covered in
much greater detail in Essay Fourteen Part One (when it is published).]
DM-theorists
claim these 'mystical ideas' have been given a materialist flip, having
rotated
them through 180ş, so that they now stand 'on their feet', the right way up --
which claim turns out to be about as genuine as a nine bob note (or
a sixty-one cent coin, if you are reading this in the United States!) -- the
'mystical' outer layer having excised.43But,
because these ideas allegedly relate to the "Totality" (and are
supposedly valid for
all of space and time), they can't have been obtained by anything other than a priori means,
whoever dreamt them up and through howsoever many degrees some claim they have
been spun.
In response, it could be objected that there are wider, theoretical considerations that help determine the
validity of the conclusions reached by DM-theorists. Indeed, it could be
maintained that this is exactly how scientists themselves frame the
universal laws they discover, many of which -- especially in physics -- are also
believed to operate across all of space and time.
If so, this approach to the study of nature is tried-and-tested, based on centuries of
experience and knowledge, in tandem with increasing levels of 'abstraction' and generalisation,
not to mention practical applications in engineering, technology, medicine,
agriculture, etc., etc. If this isn't a
problem for science and technology, how can it be one for DM? What has Ms Lichtenstein got to
offer in comparison?
Or, so
it could be argued...
However, leaving aside the obvious point that the
above response completely undermines the claim that DM hasn't
been
imposed on nature
-- since it openly admits it! -- DM
isn't like any known, or any conceivable,
science. Although the criteria distinguishing science from pseudo-science are
somewhat controversial, one thing is reasonably clear: scientists can't
claim the world is contradictory,in whole or in part.
That idea can't be entertained -- not because
of any supposed adherence to bourgeois ideology, or because of any alleged excessive "tenderness
toward the world" -- but because it would make science itself impossible.44
A scientific theory that admits reality is contradictory would lose its ability
to explain anything. That is because any theory that
contemplated the existence of contradictions everywhere would make it impossible
to distinguish confirmation from refutation. If an empirical proposition and
its contradictory were both true, or could both be true together, confirmation and refutation would be
all of a piece.45
[The handful of options available to DM-supporters
that might seem (to some) capable of neutralising this deadly dialectical defect
have
been neutralised
below in Interlude One. Now, in
connection with asking what the present author has 'to offer' in return, readers are reminded that if DM
isn't a science, it is surely important to point that fact out, which I am about to do. The rest
of that proffered DM-response clearly amounts to little other than 'sour
grapes', coming in from any dialectician temped to make use of it.]
To be sure, on its own
this doesn't prove DM itself is misconceived, but it does show that it can't bea science. And, as we will soon find out, DM isn't even remotelylike a science.
In fact, if DM were correct, scientific knowledge would be impossible, and not just for the reasons outlined above, or because
of the additional fact that if DM were true
change would
be impossible, but also for those about to be aired
below.46
DM isn't
even remotely like a
science because its theoretical and its empirical 'propositions' say
nothing at all (if they are understood as they were intended to be taken by their
proponents),
unlike empirical, scientific propositions. The latter present us with
certain (often specific) material
possibilities in relation to objects, events and processes, automatically excluding others.
For instance, consider the
following rather straight-forward example:46a
S1: Water boils at 100°C.
[Of course, propositions like S1 are these
days usually expressed using of universally
quantified conditionals. I have omitted
that (unnecessary) detail for obvious reasons. I have also deliberately kept this
example boringly simple so that the point being made isn't obscured by needless complication
or irrelevant technicalities.]
Given the usual
ceteris paribus
(i.e., "all things being equal") clauses, the truth of S1 makes the following sentence false (and vice versa):
S2: It is not the case that
water boils at 100°C.
If the aforementioned ceteris paribus
clauses (such as "under normal conditions of pressure and water purity",
etc.) are ignored, S2 itself might become true under certain circumstances --
for example, if the water in question contains impurities, or the ambient pressure
was either raised or lowered. But, even then, what S2 expresses would still rule out the truth
of S1. Against the required background conditions -- or even without them
-- when S1 is true, S2 is false, and when S1 is false, S2 is true.47
Compare that with a typical 'proposition'
taken from DM (or at least from
Trotsky's
version of it):
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and
doesn't weigh 1 kg.
Or (for dialecticians who aren't
Trotskyists!):
S3a: This moving object is
both here and not here, in one place and in another, at the same time.
Whatever background is supplied for
them, because S3 and S3a rule nothing out, they actually say nothing. [Why that is so will be
explained presently.]
The implications of the above remarks remain the
same even if S1 were to be replaced by a more specific (i.e., a more concrete example),
such as:
S4: This particular body/volume of water
boiled at 100°C.
S4a: It is not the case that this particular body/volume of
water boiled at 100°C.
[Henceforth, I will just speak of a body of
water. Of course, this assumes the above are speaking
about the same body of water.]
In that case, based on S4/S4a, the
temptation
might be to think that further qualifications could allow both (S4 and S4a)
to be true at once. For instance, the following:
S5: Parts of the water in this container boiled at 100°C, and parts of it did not. [Yielding what is called a "mixed
phase" state of affairs.]
S6: The same body of water may boil at
99.999°C on one occasion, and boil at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do
both or neither at the same time.
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and does not weigh 1 kg.
S3a: This moving object is both here and not here,
in one place and in another, at the same time.
Clearly, that is because the predicate,
"ξ boiled at 100°C"
is vague.
[The
use of Greek letters like,
"ξ", is explained
here. If that presents a problem for
readers, just view that predicate
expression as
"...boiled at 100°C", or even
"x boiled at 100°C".]
However, while this is an apparent drawback or limitation of thelanguagewe have to use
in such circumstances -- which can be remedied to
some extent by greater precision -- the
status of S3/S3a doesn't depend on such equivocation (that is, given the way
DM-theorists
themselves
see things).
That explains why dialecticians would
resist any attempt to 'correct' S3/S3a
on linguistic grounds alone
(even to the extent that they will accuse anyone who tried to do so of "pedantry",
of indulging in "semantics", or maybe even of "sophistry"
and "logic-chopping"
-- indeed, as has happened to me on more than one occasion).
DM-fans tend to view what S3/S3a have to say as a reflection of "objective" features of a
constantly changing world.
But, that just means the
dialectically-inspired flouting of
(certain specific) linguistic conventions -- in this case those expressed in, or formalised by, the
LOC -- denies both S3 and S3a a
sense.
That is in turn because whatever occurs
will both refute and confirm S3 and S3a. Even though this defect is
self-inflicted (thanks to Hegel and those who take him seriously), it still wouldn't be one of vagueness
-- again, as DM-apologists themselves view
things.
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction.]
It
could be objected that
despite the above it is still the case that S6 might very well be true. Anyway, isn't
"ξ weighs 1 Kg" vague, too? Indeed,
but S6 can be resolved to some extent purely linguistically
(as can the predicable,
"ξ weighs 1 Kg").
No DM-fan would accept the same is the case with respect to S3 and S3a.
S6: The same body of water may boil at
99.999°C on one occasion, and at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do
both or neither at the same time.
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and does not weigh 1 kg.
S3a: This moving object is both here and not here,
in one place and in another, at the same time.
And
that is why anyone
who appealed to, or agreed with, the above proffered DM-response would
no doubt
also
object to the way that most, if not all of the alleged DM-contradictions in nature
and society have been analysed away on purely linguistic
grounds in several Essays published at this site (for example, Essays Four Part
One to
Eight Part Three). As far as potential, prospective
or even actual DM-objectors
are concerned,
these aren'tlinguistic issues plain and simple.
Dialecticians certainly don't view them that way. They certainly hold that such
issues relate to 'objective',
scientific/philosophical questions that can't be 'pushed to one side' by a few
clever linguistic tricks -- which is, ironically, a response that conveniently forgets the "clever
linguistic tricks" Hegel used to conjure them into existence in the first place!
Indeed, as we have seen, DM-fans are only able to advance such counter-claims because of their own
sloppy use of
language and
logic--
just like Hegel.
I will develop and defend the above rather
controversial remarks (alongside several others) that question DM's scientific
status in the next
few subsections. However, before that we need to take a couple of lengthy, but necessary, digressions.
[Much of this material used to form part of
Note 5.]
[TAR = The Algebra Of
Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998a); OT = Orthodox Trotskyist.]
The previous sub-section ended by making the point
that DM can't be a science because of its commitment to the existence
of 'dialectical contradictions' in nature and society, such as these, for example:
S3:
This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and does not weigh 1 kg.
[Proposed by Trotsky -- see Essay Six, where his faulty logic was
exposed.]
S3a: This moving object is both here and not here,
in one place and in another, at the same time.
[Proposed by Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov,
Lenin..., see
Essay Five, where I have shown that motion isn't a
contradiction.]
S3b: The electron is both wave and particle.
[Proposed
by countless DM-fans -- see Essay
Seven
Part One, where I reveal why this isn't a contradiction,
either.]
S3c: There is a contradiction between the use- and
exchange-value of a commodity.
[Supposedly proposed by Marx himself -- this, too, isn't
a contradiction. On that, see
Essays Seven
Part Three and Eight
Part Two.]
However, as we are about to find out, the problem
for dialecticians is that the acceptance of 'propositions' like S3, S3a, S3b and
S3c threatens to undermine DM completely, not just compromise its status as a scientific theory. This Interlude
(and the next
one) will make that point abundantly clear. At the same time, both
Interludes will succeed in driving a few more nails in the DM-coffin, while establishing the conclusion that DM is, at best, described as a
vague and confused metaphysical theory, at worst, a pseudoscience.
In order to do both we first of all need to distinguish
Defective from Non-Defective Theories, at least as far as
dialecticians themselves see things.
In order to motivate the above claims, it would be
helpful to
examine how
DM-theorists view two (seemingly) different types of contradiction, namely:
(a) Those they don't like compared with,
(b) Those they
do.
The first variety surface in at least
two places, invariably (but conveniently) showing up as:
Type (A)
Contradictions in non-Marxist theories that rival or threaten the veracity of DM itself; or,
Type (B)
Contradictions in theories promoted by rival Dialectical
Marxist Parties, Tendencies or Theorists. 'Contradictions' in this category
are seen as a direct challenge to doctrines
promulgated by the Dialectical Marxist Party, Tendency or theorist sat in
judgement on this and which had (amazingly) managed
to spot them in theories advanced by (one or more) competitor revolutionary
parties or theorists. Often these turn out to be 'contradictions' that few outside
the judgemental Party
or Tendency seem able to see.
The second sort (of contradiction) also emerge in
two places, cropping up as:
Type (C)
Contradictions in older, less successful scientific theories.
These can arise:
(i) In a given theory;
(ii) Between two or more
competing scientific theories; or,
(iii) Between a given theory and
observation/experiment.
DM-theorists view Type (C) contradictions in a
much more positive light since their
resolution helps science progress. Without them -- or, rather, without their resolution -- science couldn't advance.
In short, a scientific theory advances because it has 'internal contradictions',
some or all
of which can or will be resolved (one day).
Alternatively, the second sort can surface as:
Type (D)
Contradictions in DM itself. Dialecticians view these in an entirely positive light
since DM is supposed to reflect 'objective contradictions' in nature
and society. In that case, it is hardly surprising that DM should itself contain
(or imply) 'good
contradictions' like these. Having said that, it is unclear whether these
contradictions,
(i) Hold up the progress of science and dialectics; or
(ii) Assist in their development.
As
we will see, DM theorists are decidedly equivocal on this issue -- and for good reason.
So, Type (A) and Type (B) are 'bad contradictions'
because they either:
(a) Threaten to hold up progress (possibly
even permanently), they reflect 'formalistic', 'static', 'metaphysical', or 'commonsense'
thoughts and beliefs, promote Idealism, they represent the ideology of current
or earlier
ruling-classes;
or they,
(b) Challenge the ideology of whichever
judgemental Party, Tendency or theorist that pontificates on such issues.
Hence, Type (C) and Type (D) contradictions
are 'good' for
obvious reasons.
It is important to add that these aren't hard
and fast category distinctions. There is, for example, no Chinese Wall between
Type (A) and Type (B) contradictions, and, as we will see below,
because of the influence of ruling class ideology, both of the latter Types
can even encroach, bias or impact on Type (C). As we will also see, several of
these Types are often run together, or even merged, by different
dialecticians/parties as the need arises, or as inter-party strife and sectarian in-fighting demand.
The above comments will now be expanded upon,
explained and defended.
Type
(A) And Type
(B)
Contradictions -- These Only Exist In Rival Or Oppositional Theories And Are
Sufficient To Discredit Anyone Who Promotes Them
Even though dialecticians depict the
"Totality" as internally 'contradictory', they don't in general
believe that flatly
self-contradictory theories (or propositions) are true (or "fully true").
This is something that TAR itself acknowledges (e.g., on p.235). Indeed, DM-theorists in general often regale their
readers or their audiences with the numerous internal-, or absurd-contradictions they
claim to have found
in rival or competitor theories -- for instance, those that supposedly lean too far in the direction of Idealism,
those that challenge or undermine pet theories of their own. In their
eyesthis
defect -- i.e., the mere presence of this type of contradiction -- is sufficient to
condemn such ideas and those who promote them (in whole or in part).
[TAR = The Algebra Of
Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998a); OT = Orthodox Trotskyist.]
Dialecticians who belong to a given (judgemental) Party or
Tendency
will claim that Type (A) and Type (B) contradictions impugn:
(i) Rival or competitor theories;
(ii) The credibility and trustworthiness of any
theorist responsible for inventing or promulgating them; or,
(iii) Rival/competitor parties that promote or
disseminate them.
Again, these are contradictions
that dialecticians view in a negative light -- or, perhaps more accurately and
honestly,
these are the sort of (real or imagined) contradictions they are happy to use against
their political
rivals, enemies, theoretical adversaries or any theorist whose ideas they view
as defective or threatening in any way (again, real or imagined).
For example, on p.84 of TAR, the
Young
Hegelians are criticized for being "self-contradictory", as are
bourgeois ideologues in general (p.238). Even Kant himself isn't spared (p.47), nor is
Kautsky (p.141).
Moving up the DM-hierarchy a few notches, Engels
himself wasn't averse to rejecting certain theories on this basis: cf., Engels (1954), pp.135,151,
163,
167; Engels (1976), pp.26,
63-65,
171,
247, and
324-25. Lenin also
used this tactic; cf., Lenin (1972), pp.76,94,
95, 97,
195,
256,
274, and
281.
Even Marx indulged, here speaking
about Proudhon:
"In other words, he [Proudhon] makes a
gratuitous assumption and, because actual development contradicts his fiction at
every turn, he concludes that there is a contradiction. He conceals the fact
that there is a contradiction only between his idées fixes [fixed idea]
and the real movement." [Marx
to Annenkov, 28/12/1846, in Marx (1982), p.100. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
In like manner, Trotsky found he wasn't avers to
adopting this tactic, for example, in his criticism of Stalin:
"Now we can appraise Stalin's philosophical
thesis on the importance of theory.... This totally contradictory,
self-devouring thesis finds itself, on top of everything else, in total disarray
grammatically.... The lack of substance of that definition
[quoted by Trotsky earlier -- RL] and at the same time its
contradictory nature betray themselves if we simply ask ourselves, what is
Marxism?" [Trotsky (1981b), p.396). Bold emphases added; paragraphs
merged.]
"Constantly beset with
innumerable contradictions, Khrushchov (sic) makes frequent changes in his
economic policies and often goes back on his own words, thus throwing the Soviet
national economy into a state of chaos. Khrushchov (sic) is truly an incorrigible
wastrel. He has squandered the grain reserves built up under Stalin and brought
great difficulties into the lives of the Soviet people. He has distorted and
violated the socialist principle of distribution of 'from each according to his
ability, to each according to his work', and enabled a handful of persons to
appropriate the fruits of the labour of the broad masses of the Soviet people.
These points alone are sufficient to prove that the road taken by Khrushchov
(sic)
leads away from communism." ['Refutation
Of The
So-Called Party Of The Whole People' (1964), quoted
from
here.
Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
More recently,
Tony Cliff seemed quite happy to dismiss
the ideas of certain
OTs because they were deemed 'contradictory';
cf., Cliff (1999), pp.28-30. The lateChris Harman
also faulted
Ernest
Mandel's analysis of the former Soviet Union [fSU], alongside the
latter's criticisms of his own theory,
State Capitalism, because of
its many 'contradictions':
"Yet even stranger is
Mandel's analysis, developed since, of the reasons for this post-war growth.
Apparently, it is because capitalism is undergoing a third 'industrial
revolution'. This has' (sic) been possible because 'during the "long period" of
stagnation of the capitalist world economy (1913-1940) a great "reserve" of
scientific and technological inventions had been built up, whose large-scale
productive application was delayed as a result of unfavourable economic
circumstances prevailing during that period'. The argument, however, is
simply contradictory. One moment these innovations are responsible for the
economic expansion: the next they were allowed to accumulate for 30 years
because there was no economic expansion. In that case, something other than the
innovations must be responsible for their present employment -- otherwise why
did they not cause expansion in the thirties? Mandel seems as incapable now as
when he wrote his book 10 years ago of identifying what this other cause might
be....
"The fashionable Marxists of
today are very like the revisionists of Kautsky's time (except that to protect
their left flank they usually claim that their 'improvement' of Marxism is a
version of the real thing). Mandel has not the method to refute them. Yet he
cannot deny the existence of some of the superficial phenomena to which they
point. And so he ends up half agreeing and half disagreeing with them. It is
this that leads to repeated self contradictions, to an underhand revision of
Marxism (as when in order to make concessions to the 'unequal-exchangists'
Mandel talks of value based upon 'labour' rather than socially necessary labour
time (p.345 & 351)) to absurd claims, and to random predictions....
"This leads him into all
sorts of contradictions. He writes that 'the bureaucratic layer monopolises
political power just as it does economic power'...and that 'The interests of the
mass of producers, the workers and peasants...are opposed to those of the
directors/managers...'. The Stalinist state
bourgeoisies of the East can no more escape from this violent, capitalist
dynamic than can the 'private' (more accurately, the state monopoly capitalist)
bourgeoisies of the West and Third World. That is what is so exciting about what
is happening in the USSR today. But to understand why, you have to move
beyond the vague, inconsistent, self contradictory formulations of Mandel,
and the best way to do so is to base yourself on Cliff's book." [Quoted from
here; accessed
15/08/2012. Bold emphases added; several paragraphs merged.]
Ted Grant
also latched onto the many 'contradictions' that supposedly afflict Cliff's
State
Capitalist Theory:
"Any analysis of Russian
society must start from that basis. Once Cliff admits that while capitalism is
declining and decaying on a world scale, yet preserving a progressive role in
Russia in relation to the development of the productive forces, then logically
he would have to say that state capitalism is the next stage forward for
society, or at least for the backward countries. Contradictorily, he
shows that the Russian bourgeoisie was not capable of carrying through the role
which was fulfilled by the bourgeoisie in the West and consequently the
proletarian revolution took place....
"We have seen that if the law
of value only applies because of the existence of capitalism in world economy,
then it would only apply to those products exchanged on the world market.
But Cliff argues two contradictory theses in relation to the Russian
economy.... Cliff gives two
contradictory answers to these questions. On the one hand he agrees that it
is the law of value on which all calculations and the movement of Russian
society develops. On the other, he finds the law of value only operating as the
result of pressure from the outside world although how he does not explain in
any serious way.... If one takes into account
the fact that this follows the previously quoted passage in the same section
where Engels defines capitalist mode of production (as social production,
individual appropriation), we must conclude that Engels hopelessly
contradicts himself, if we accept Cliff's conclusions." [Grant (1949),
quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]
"The section [on rising
population -- RL] starts well enough by pointing out the sobering reality that:
'Early in 2012 the world's population hit seven billion. The previous milestone,
six billion, was reached in 1999. Only slightly over two centuries ago the
world’s population was one billion. The rate of increase has been phenomenal;
readers who are over 45 have lived through the doubling of the Earth's
population'. (Page 188)
"The conclusion it draws from
these rather scary figures, however, is that this presents no problem at all for
the ecology of the planet! It is true that this conclusion is contradicted
(objectively contradicted) by the content of some of the later sections -- on
waste and on the water for example. The overall thesis, however, is that no
problem is posed by the current rate of increase or any figure it might
eventually reach. This to me is a serious departure from reality." [Quoted from
here; accessed 01/09/2014. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
The blurb (for the above book) over at the
(UK-SWP's) Bookmarks website even added these
thoughts:
"Martin Empson draws on a
Marxist understanding of history to grapple with the contradictory potential
of our relationship with our environment. In so doing he shows that human
action is key, both to the destruction of nature and to the possibility of a
sustainable solution to the ecological crises of the 21st century." [Quoted from
here; accessed 01/09/2014. Bold emphasis added.]
Dominic Alexander, in a review of Beyond Leviathan by the
late
Istvan Mészáros (published atthe
Counterfire website), made the following point:
"Liberal thinking constantly oscillates between the poles of determinism and
voluntaristic idealism, on the one hand tending to be supine towards the
dominant economic structures and imperatives of capitalism, and yet seeking to
square the resulting social contradictions by flights into abstract, voluntarist
idealism.
The argument of Beyond
Leviathan is
directed broadly towards the problems and contradictions of liberal thinking
about the state, which derive from the main lines of Western philosophy since
Plato and Aristotle. Liberal or modern bourgeois philosophy, from its inceptions
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, failed to escape the obfuscations
and evasions of the traditions of political philosophy that went before it."
[Quoted from
here; accessed 24/02/2023. Bold emphasis
alone added. This article is a review of
Mészáros (2022).]
Apparently then, all the nasty old "contradictions of liberal thinking"
are to be criticised, not the 'kosher contradictions' Hegel bequeathed
to our movement (but, of course, only if they have been sanitised by flipping them 'the right way up').
Last but not least, here is The Great Teacher Himself who,
like all the rest, wasn't
reluctant to employ this tactic (in his criticism of Bukharin and Trotsky, among others):
"What does all this show? It
shows that the opposition has got entangled in contradictions. It has lost the
capacity to think logically...." [Stalin
(1927), p.78. Bold emphasis added.]
"If now, nearly two years after the
ideological struggle in the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at
the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it possible in his
reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) to dig
up the old and quite inadequate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written
in April 1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided
question of the victory of socialism in one country -- then this peculiar trick
of his only goes to show that he has got completely muddled on this question. To
drag the Party back after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the
Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a Plenum of the
Central Committee, means to become hopelessly entangled in contradictions,
to have no faith in the cause of building socialism, to abandon the path of
Lenin, and to acknowledge one's own defeat." [Quoted from
here, Section VI. Bold emphasis added.]
So, Type (A) and Type (B)
contradictions turn out to be handy sticks with which to beat down or condemn rival
theories, theorists and parties.
Type
(C) Contradictions -- These
Are Integral To The Progress Of Science, But Only If They Have Been 'Resolved'/Removed
In
connection with this category of contradiction, Phil Gasper, Philosopher of
Science and revolutionary socialist, had this to say:
"[Lenin argued] that our
scientific views are generally only partially, relatively or approximately true,
and that scientific progress does not result in absolute knowledge, but only in
closer and closer approximations to the truth." [Gasper (1998), p.148.]
He went on to argue that ageing scientific
theories accumulate increasingly intractable internal problems:
"Newtonian
physics…dominated science for over two centuries, and…appeared to be invincible
-- eventually [it] ran into insuperable contradictions, and came crashing down.
At the same time, however, the new Einsteinian synthesis preserves the elements
of truth in classical mechanics, showing how Newton's laws are approximations to
the truth for systems in which velocities are low compared to the speed of
light." [Ibid., p.154.
Bold emphasis added.]
Paul McGarr,
a highly qualified Physicist and revolutionary socialist, pointed out
that:
"[R]elativity
and quantum theory…were part of the revolution which transformed science in the
first few decades of this century…. This revolution arose from a profound crisis
in science. By the time of Engels's death there were a series of glaring
contradictions between different branches of physics. Theories which
successfully explained different physical phenomena contradicted each other in
fundamental ways. It was out of the attempt to resolve these contradictions that
the new scientific revolution was born. A new, deeper understanding was built
which went beyond the previous contradictory elements, and at the same time
showed why these had worked within certain limits. This process is a fairly
typical one in the history of science." [McGarr (1994), p.159.
Bold emphasis added; minor typo corrected.]
[Several more examples of Type (C) 'contradictions' (also
to be examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two) have been quoted
below.
Recently, Thomas Weston has tried to explain how such 'contradictions' can be
'resolved'; I have subjected his ideas to searching criticism in the
Appendix A to Essay Five.]
Type
(D) Contradictions -- These
Are 'Dialectical', The Presence Of Which
'Confirms' The Superiority Of 'Dialectical
Thought'
Type (D) contradictions are viewed completely
differently. So, by way of stark contrast (compared with what he had
to say about Ernest Mandel's ideas, quoted
earlier),
the late Chris Harman positively lionised the contradictions envisaged in, or promoted by, his own theory, which
turn out to be
entirely
acceptable!
"Once you miss these
interconnections, you miss the dynamic of the system; you can see the system in
the manner of the bourgeois economist as made up of the different components of
a smooth running machine, even a machine that is subject to accidental
breakdowns (in Mandelese 'conjunctural' crises). But you cannot grasp the
intrinsic contradictions of the system, contradictions based upon the way in
which the total system accumulates, with accumulation producing an aging of the
system, and the aging destroying the mainspring of the system's own dynamic. For Marx, the categories he
developed were significant because they enabled you to see the system as a
self-contradicting totality, which is in a permanent process of
transformation -- a transformation that must affect the very categories of
analysis themselves....
"Nor is Mandel right when he
claims that a new wave of innovations brought on steam by this accumulated
surplus, makes it possible to evade the inner contradictions of the system as
outlined by Marx. The notion of innovation, of the 'third technological
revolution' as being able to prevent the drive of the system towards crisis,
even for a limited period (25 years) is a notion introduced into Marxism for the
first time by Mandel. And it is nonsense. The classical Marxists had no doubt
that the effects of accelerated technological progress would be to increase
not diminish the contradictions of the system.... Mandel just doesn't grasp
the contradictions in the arms economy. He accuses
Mike
Kidron of the 'truly astounding discovery that the arms economy is a factor
that slows down late capitalist growth.' But you only have to take a cursory
glance at the statistics for arms spending and economic growth to see that the
economies that have borne the greatest share of the arms burden have been those
with the worst growth records....
"What is true is that
capitalism is a continually developing system, with innovations and technical
progress taking place in some parts of the system before others. Elsewhere in
the system the old forms of 'tyranny inside the firm' -- the old methods of
capitalist planning -- then no longer correspond with what is needed to keep
abreast in the struggle for increased productivity. The law of value then
comes into contradiction with the existing forms of organisation of production. The contradiction between 'bureaucratic despotism' and the 'law of value'
occurs because society is subject to the law of value. Can this be true in the
USSR? Only if you accept that the USSR is a commodity producing society, a
variant of capitalism." [Quoted from
here; accessed
15/08/2012. Bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]
Indeed, as we have repeatedly seen at this site,
DM-theorists are either
remarkably forgiving of -- if not completely oblivious to -- the many
contradictions that litter DM; or, like Harman, they regard these,
the
contradictions thrown up by their own ideas, in a positive light, thereby adopting
Approach (iii), summarised below.
From this we can see
that for DM-theorists there are contradictions that
should be, and are, anathematised, or which can be used to underline how defective certain (rival)
theories are, while there are other contradictions that somehow, miraculously, have the opposite
effect on any theory that enjoys 'official approval', or which serve to
validate doctrines viewed as 'orthodox'.
[There are countless examples of dialectical double standards
like this,
but the above should suffice to make the point. Cf., Schaff (1960).]
So, contradictions in general lead DM-theorists in
at least three different directions and hence to adopt three different
Approaches:
Approach (i):
Dialecticians will reject
a theory as partially or even completely defective if it contains, exhibits or
implies
Type (A) or Type (B)
contradictions;
(a) Point out that the history of scientific
development
shows that Type (C) contradictions are (or were) either fully or partially
resolved by the adoption of superior, more effective, less contradictory
theories;
Or they will,
(b) Actually recommend that Type (C)
contradictions be resolved so that science might further advance, either by
abandoning older, less
effective/more problematic theories, or by
developing superior, less contradictory alternatives.
[Approach (ii) forms what is perhaps a core
strand of the DM-theory of scientific
development (to be examined
in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two).]
Having said that, the noxious influence of
ruling-class ideology means that Type (A) andType (B)
contradictions might also affect the content and perception of Type (C), which will in
turn sometimes means that Approach (i) and Approach (ii) might be
merged to some extent. Several examples of this will be given in the next subsection
and in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
Or, finally, dialecticians will adopt,
Approach (iii):
As such, they will promote, advertise, welcome, eulogise, or even bragabout
the presence of internal Type (D)
'contradictions'
in DM, since they are supposed to be a faithful
'reflection' of 'contradictory reality'.
It
could objected
that the above remarks seriously misrepresent the DM-theory of scientific
development. Essay Thirteen Part Two will address that complaint more fully.
However, it
is worth recalling that the
opening sections of this Interlude cited several actual examples
of Approach (i)
adopted by classical and contemporary Dialectical Marxists, so in response to this latest (proffered)
DM-Objection, it might help if several more examples of
Approach (ii)
were quoted (concerning which, see the next subsection).
In this subsection
I have added several more examples of Approach (ii),
which involve references to 'contradictions' that might hold up the progress of
science (temporarily or even permanently). As noted above, Approach (i)
might also be invoked because of the encroachment of Type
(A) or
Type (B) contradictions in science.
Here, for
example, is
Engels criticising the ideas of German scientist,
Gustav Wiedemann:
"Reading the above explanation of current formation given by
Wiedemann, one could believe oneself in the presence of a specimen of the kind
of
apologia
that wholly -- and half-credulous theologians of almost forty years ago employed
to meet the philologico-historical bible criticism of
Strauss, Wilke,
Bruno Bauer, etc. The method is exactly the same, and it is bound
to be so. For in both cases it is a question of saving the heritage
of tradition from
scientific thought.
Exclusive empiricism, which at most allows thinking in the form of mathematical
calculation, imagines that it operates only with undeniable facts. In reality,
however, it operates predominantly with out-of-date notions, with the largely
obsolete products of thought of its predecessors, and such are positive and
negative electricity; the electric force of separation, the contact theory.
These serve it as the foundation of endless mathematical calculations in which,
owing to the strictness of the mathematical formulation, the hypothetical nature
of the premises gets comfortably forgotten.
This kind of empiricism is as credulous towards the results of the thought of
its predecessors as it is sceptical in its attitude to the results of
contemporary thought. For it the experimentally established facts have gradually
become inseparable from the traditional interpretation associated with them; the
simplest electric phenomenon is presented falsely, e.g. by
smuggling in the two electricities; this empiricism cannot any
longer describe the facts correctly, because the traditional interpretation is
woven into the description. In short, we have here in the field of the theory of
electricity a tradition just as highly developed as that in the field of
theology. And since in both fields the results of recent research, the
establishment of hitherto unknown or disputed facts and of the necessarily
following theoretical conclusions, run pitilessly counter to the old traditions,
the defenders of these traditions find themselves in the direst dilemma.
They have to resort to all kinds of subterfuges and untenable expedients, to the
glossing over of irreconcilable contradictions, and thus finally land themselves
into a medley of contradictions from which they have no escape.
It is this faith in all the old theory of electricity that entangles Wiedemann
here in the most hopeless contradictions,
simply owing to the hopeless attempt to reconcile rationally the old explanation
of the current by 'contact force,' with the modern one by liberation of chemical
energy." [Engels
(1954), pp.138-39; bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links added.]
In a
continuation of the same passage, Engels
proceeds to outline what he thinks would be a better theory, free of the above
"contradictions" (which appear to be Type (C)).
[Readers are invited to check that
claim out for themselves.]
Here he is again,
this time adopting a scatter gun approach (in connection to what appear to be a
combination of Type (A), Type (C) and Type (D)
contradictions):
"Two
philosophical tendencies, the metaphysical with fixed categories, the
dialectical (Aristotle and especially Hegel) with fluid categories; the proofs
that these fixed opposites of basis and consequence, cause and effect, identity
and difference, appearance and essence are untenable, that analysis shows one
pole already present in the other in
nuce
[in a nutshell -- RL], that at a definite point the one pole becomes transformed into the other, and
that all logic develops only from these progressing contradictions.
-- This
mystical in Hegel himself, because the categories appear as pre-existing and the
dialectics of the real world as their mere reflection. In reality it is the
reverse: the dialectics of the mind is only the reflection of the forms of
motion of the real world, both of nature and of history. Until the end of the
last century, indeed until 1830, natural scientists could manage pretty well
with the old metaphysics, because real science did not go beyond mechanics --
terrestrial and cosmic. Nevertheless confusion had already been introduced by
higher mathematics, which regards the eternal truth of lower mathematics as a
superseded point of view, often asserting the contrary, and putting forward
propositions which appear sheer nonsense to the lower mathematician. The rigid
categories disappeared here; mathematics arrived at a field where even such
simple relations as those of mere abstract quantity, bad infinity, assumed a
completely dialectical form and compelled the mathematicians to become
dialectical, unconsciously and against their will. There is nothing more comical
than the twistings, subterfuges, and expedients employed by the mathematicians
to solve this contradiction, to reconcile higher and lower mathematics, to make
clear to their understanding that what they had arrived at as an undeniable
result is not sheer nonsense, and in general rationally to explain the
starting-point, method, and result of the mathematics of the infinite.
"Now, however, everything is quite different. Chemistry, the
abstract divisibility of physical things, bad infinity -- atomistics. Physiology
-- the
cell (the organic process of development, both of the individual and of species,
by differentiation, the most striking test of rational dialectics), and finally
the identity of the forces of nature and their mutual convertibility, which put
an end to all fixity of categories. Nevertheless, the bulk of natural scientists
are still held fast in the old metaphysical categories and helpless when these
modern facts, which so to say prove the dialectics in nature, have to be
rationally explained and brought into relation with one another. And here thinking is
necessary: atoms and molecules, etc., cannot be observed under the microscope,
but only by the process of thought. Compare the chemists (except for
Schorlemmer, who is acquainted with Hegel) and
Virchow's Cellular
Pathology, where
in the end the helplessness has to be concealed by general phrases.
Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity for natural
science, which has forsaken the field where rigid categories sufficed, which
represent as it were the lower mathematics of logic, its everyday weapons.Philosophy takes its
revenge posthumously on natural science for the latter having deserted it; and
yet the scientists could have seen even from the successes in natural science
achieved by philosophy that the latter possessed something that was superior to
them even in their own special sphere (Leibniz
-- the founder of the mathematics
of the infinite, in contrast to whom the inductive ass Newton appears as a
plagiarist and corrupter; Kant -- the theory of the origin of the universe before Laplace;
Oken
-- the first in Germany to accept the theory of evolution; Hegel -- whose [undecipherable]
comprehensive
treatment and rational grouping of the natural sciences is a greater achievement
than all the materialistic nonsense put together)." [Ibid., pp.202-05.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Links added; minor typo corrected.]
"Newton’s parallelogram of forces in
the solar system is true at best for
the moment when the annular bodies separate, because
then the rotational motion comes into contradiction with itself, appearing on
the one hand as attraction, and on the other hand as tangential force. As soon
as the separation is complete, however, the motion is again a unity. That this
separation must occur is a proof of the dialectical process." [Ibid., p.274.
Bold emphases and links added.
Italic
emphases in the original]
"But this
conception, correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of
appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details of which this
picture is made up, and so long as we do not understand these, we have not a
clear idea of the whole picture. In order to understand these details we must
detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one
separately, its nature, special causes, effects, etc. This is, primarily, the
task of natural science and historical research: branches of science which the
Greeks of classical times on very good grounds, relegated to a subordinate
position, because they had first of all to collect the material. The beginnings
of the exact natural sciences were first worked out by the Greeks of the
Alexandrian period, and later on, in the Middle Ages, by the Arabs. Real natural
science dates from the second half of the fifteenth century, and thence onward
it has advanced with constantly increasing rapidity. The analysis of nature into
its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and
objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organic bodies
in their manifold forms -- these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic
strides in our knowledge of nature that have been made during the last four
hundred years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of
observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their
connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as
constants, not as essentially variables, in their death, not in their life. And
when this way of looking at things was transferred by
Bacon and
Locke from
natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought
peculiar to the preceding centuries.
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses.... For him a
thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself
and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause
and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.
"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is
that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable
fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful
adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research.
And the
metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a
number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular
object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it
becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In
the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them;
in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of
that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood
for the trees." [Engels
(1976), pp.24-27. Bold emphases and links added.]
"But even lower mathematics teems with
contradictions. It is for example a contradiction that a root of A should
be a power of A, and yet A1/2 = sq.rt. of A. It is a contradiction that a
negative quantity should be the square of anything, for every negative quantity
multiplied by itself gives a positive square. The square root of minus
one is therefore not only a contradiction, but even an absurd contradiction, a
real absurdity. And yet sq.rt. of
-1 is in many cases a necessary result of correct mathematical
operations. Furthermore, where would mathematics -- lower or higher -- be, if it
were prohibited from operation with sq.rt.
of -1?" [Ibid.,
p.154. Bold emphasis added. I have had to replace the
square root symbol with the abbreviation "sq.rt.". And,
as I have shown in Essay Seven
Part One, these aren't even
contradictions!]
In the
above, Engels argues that older (and hence non-'dialectical') ideas that appear for example
in metaphysics and
mathematics are suffused with contradictions, but fortunately they have now been replaced
(in many instances) by superior, more 'dialectical' alternatives --, or perhaps
even by a better understanding of their 'dialectical nature'. Furthermore, his use of the
same critical language shows he was arguing along similar lines in relation to other areas
of science (for instance, in relation to chemistry, physics, physiology, evolutionary theory, etc.).
There,
older, less 'dialectical' (and hence more 'contradictory') theories were, or are
now being, replaced by superior rivals free of those 'problems' -- or, in
some cases, by a better understanding of their 'dialectical nature', once more.
But the
overall
process doesn't stop there:
"Here once again we find the same contradiction as we found above, between the
character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality
in individual human beings all of whom think only limitedly.
This is a
contradiction which can be resolved only in the course of infinite progress, in
what is -- at least practically for us -- an endless succession of generations of
mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign,
and its capacity for knowledge just as much unlimited as limited. It is
sovereign and unlimited in its disposition, its vocation, its possibilities and
its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its
individual realisation and in reality at any particular moment." [Ibid.,
pp.108-09. Bold emphasis added.]
"(3) Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws:
transformation of quantity and quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites
and transformation into each other when carried to extremes-development through
contradiction or negation of the negation --
spiral form of development."
[Engels
(1954), p.17.
Bold emphasis added.]
The above
comments foreshadowed
something Lenin also argued:
"Human knowledge is not (or does not follow)
a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles,
a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed
(transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which
then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into
clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the
ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification,
subjectivism and subjective blindness -- voilŕ the epistemological roots
of idealism. And clerical obscrutantism (= philosophical idealism), of course,
has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a sterile flower
undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living,
fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge." [Lenin
(1961), p.361. Bold emphasis alone added.]
[See also
several other "spiral" passages quoted
below.]
Here is
Engels again driving the point home (connecting these ideas with much wider social and
political issues):
"But precisely therein lay the true significance and the
revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy (to which, as the close of
the whole movement since Kant, we must here confine ourselves), that it once and
for all dealt the death blow to the finality of all product of human thought and
action.
Truth, the cognition of which is the business of philosophy, was in the hands of
Hegel no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic statements, which, once
discovered, had merely to be learned by heart. Truth lay now in the process of
cognition itself, in the long historical development of science, which mounts
from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge without ever reaching, by
discovering so-called absolute truth, a point at which it can proceed no
further, where it would have nothing more to do than to fold its hands and gaze
with wonder at the absolute truth to which it had attained. And what holds good
for the realm of philosophical knowledge holds good also for that of every other
kind of knowledge and also for practical action. Just as knowledge is unable to
reach a complete conclusion in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so is
history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect 'state', are things which
can only exist in imagination. On the contrary, all successive historical
systems are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human
society from the lower to the higher. Each stage is necessary, and therefore
justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the
face of new, higher conditions which gradually develop in its own womb, it loses
vitality and justification. It must give way to a higher stage which will also
in its turn decay and perish.
Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition, and the world
market dissolves in practice all stable time-honoured institutions, so this
dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of
absolute states of humanity corresponding to it.
For it [dialectical philosophy], nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals
the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure
before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of
endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.
And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of
this process in the thinking brain.
It has, of course, also a conservative side; it recognizes that definite stages
of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but
only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its
revolutionary character is absolute -- the only absolute dialectical philosophy
admits....
"If one
does not loiter here needlessly, but presses on farther into the
immense building, one finds innumerable treasures which today still possess
undiminished value. With all philosophers it is precisely the 'system' which is
perishable; and for the simple reason that
it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind -- the desire to
overcome all contradictions. But if all contradictions are once and for all
disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth -- world history
will be at an end. And yet it has to continue, although there is nothing left
for it to do -- hence, a new, insoluble contradiction.
As soon as we have once realized -- and in the long run no one has helped us to
realize it more than Hegel himself -- that the task of philosophy thus stated
means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that
which can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive
development -- as soon as we realize that, there is an end to all philosophy in
the hitherto accepted sense of the word.
One leaves alone 'absolute truth', which is unattainable along this path or by
any single individual; instead, one pursues attainable relative truths along the
path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of
dialectical thinking.
At any rate, with Hegel philosophy comes to an end; on the one hand, because in
his system he summed up its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and
on the other hand, because, even though unconsciously, he showed us the way out
of the labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world." [Engels
(1888), pp.588-90. Spelling modified to agree with UK
English; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Bold emphases added and minor typo corrected.]
In which
case, it looks
like 'contradictions' will remain unavoidable right up until the attainment of
'Absolute Truth'(should that ever happen!) -- which clearly implies
that all such Type (C) and
Type (D)(?)
contradictions will then have disappeared or have been 'resolved'! [More on that
later.]
Our old
friends, Woods and Grant, explained what this means (with what turns out to be an
admirably clear, but annoyingly superficial, version of Approaches
(ii)(a),
(ii)(b), and
even (iii), in relation to Type (C)
and Type (D)
contradictions:
"[The development of science] is itself a dialectical process,
where each generation arrives at a theory that explains many things. In this
way, human knowledge penetrates deeper and deeper into the secrets of the
Universe. And this process is as never-ending as the universe itself. In his
remarkable book The
Nature of Scientific Revolution
[that should be
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
i.e., Kuhn (1996) -- RL], Thomas Kuhn explained the dialectical
way in which science develops.
At regular intervals scientists establish a paradigm that apparently explains
everything. But at a certain point, small irregularities are found that
contradict the accepted model.
This eventually leads to its overthrow and replacement by a new model, which
will itself eventually be surpassed."
[Woods and Grant (2007), Author's Introduction to the
ebook
edition, quoted from
here.
Italic
emphasis in the original. The
whole of this book
has now been published on
one page
over
at the IMT (International Marxist Tendency) website, so if anyone wants to
locate this and each of the following passages on-line, they will need to do a page
search since the links I have posted only take the reader to the top of that
very long page,
not the exact quote!]
"Dialectics envisages the fundamental processes at work in the universe, in
society and in the history of ideas, not as a closed circle, where the same
processes merely repeat themselves in an endless mechanical cycle, but as a kind
of
open-ended spiral of development in which nothing is ever repeated exactly in
the same way.
This process can be clearly seen in the history of philosophy and science. The
entire history of thought consists of an endless process of development through
contradiction.
"A theory is put forward which explains certain phenomena. This gradually gains
acceptance, both through the accumulation of evidence which bears it out, and
because of the absence of a satisfactory alternative.
At a certain point, discrepancies appear, which are initially shrugged off as
unimportant exceptions.
Then a new theory emerges which contradicts the old one and seems to explain the
observed facts better.
Eventually, after a struggle, the new theory overthrows the existing orthodoxy.
But new questions arise from this, which in turn have to be resolved.
Frequently, it appears that we return again to ideas which were earlier thought
to be discredited. But this does not mean a return to the starting point.
What we have is a dialectical process, involving a deeper and deeper
understanding of the workings of nature, society, and ourselves. This is the
dialectic of the history of philosophy and science."
[Ibid.,
p.80.]
"Albert Einstein was undoubtedly one of the great geniuses of our
time. Between his twenty-first and thirty-eighth birthdays he completed a
revolution in science, with profound repercussions at many levels. The two great
breakthroughs were the Special Theory of Relativity (1905) and the General
Theory of Relativity (1915). Special relativity deals with high speeds, general
relativity with gravity.
"Despite
their extremely abstract character, Einstein's theories were ultimately derived
from experiments, and were successfully given practical applications, which
confirmed their correctness time and again. Einstein set out from the famous
Michelson-Morley experiment, 'the greatest negative experiment of
the history of science'..., which exposed an inner contradiction in 19th
century physics. This experiment attempted to generalise the electromagnetic
theory of light by demonstrating that the apparent velocity of light was
dependent upon the rate at which the observer travelled through the supposedly
fixed 'ether'. In the end, no difference was found in the velocity of light, in
whatever direction the observer was travelling.
"J.
J. Thomson later showed that the velocity of electrons in high
electrical fields was slower than predicted by the classical Newtonian physics.
These contradictions in 19th century physics were resolved by the special
theory of relativity. The old physics was unable to explain the phenomenon
of radioactivity. Einstein explained this as the release of a tiny part of the
enormous amount of energy trapped in 'inert' matter.
"In 1905,
Einstein developed his special theory of relativity in his spare time, while
working as a clerk in a Swiss patent office. Setting out from the discoveries of
the new quantum mechanics, he showed that light travels through space in a
quantum form (as bundles of energy). This was clearly in contradiction to the
previously accepted theory of light as a wave. In effect, Einstein
revived the old corpuscular theory of light, but in an entirely different way.
Here light was shown as a new kind of particle, with a contradictory character,
simultaneously displaying the properties of a particle and a wave. This
startling theory made possible the retention of all the great discoveries of
19th century optics, including spectroscopes, as well as Maxwell's equation. But
it killed stone dead the old idea that light requires a special vehicle, the
'ether', to travel through space." [Ibid.,
pp.149-50. In all of the above, bold emphases and links added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Here, too,
is John Rees (perhaps running together Type
(A) and Type (C) contradictions, also proposing the
adoption of Approaches
(ii)(a),
(ii)(b)):
"In a certain sense, of
course, all truth is relative -- it is just that some theorists do not
acknowledge this elementary fact. There is no final, faultless, criterion for
truth which hovers, like god, outside the historical process. Neither is there
any privileged scientific method which is not shaped by the contours of the
society of which it is a part. All that exists are some theories which are less
internally contradictory and have a greater explanatory power…. [I]f the truth
is the totality, then it is the totality of working class experience,
internationally and historically which gives access to the truth…. [A theory's]
validity must be proven by its superior explanatory power -- [which means it is]
more internally coherent, more widely applicable, capable of greater empirical
verification -- in comparison with its competitors. Indeed, this is a condition
of it entering the chain of historical forces as an effective power. It is a
condition of it being 'proved in practice.' If it is not superior to other
theories in this sense, it will not 'seize the masses,' will not become a
material force, will not be realized in practice." [Rees (1998a), pp.235-37.
Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
"[E]veryday
commonsense thought was a mass of contradictions that could only be resolved by
moving to progressively greater abstractions.... Hegel is also difficult for reasons that
are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms and
concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of which
everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are
stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these
are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of
Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change
because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that
Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes…. It is the
search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past commonsense
definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998a), pp.41-50. Bold
emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
So, we
can now see that the interpretation advanced earlier didn't
misrepresent the DM-theory of scientific development. Here is that
interpretation again:
From this we can see
that for DM-theorists there are contradictions that
should be, and are, anathematised, or which can be used to underline how defective certain (rival)
theories are, while there are other contradictions that somehow, miraculously, have the opposite
effect on any theory that enjoys 'official approval', or which serve to
validate doctrines viewed as 'orthodox'.
[There are countless examples of dialectical double standards
like this,
but the above should suffice to make the point. Cf., Schaff (1960).]
So, contradictions in general lead DM-theorists in
at least three different directions and hence to adopt three different
Approaches:
Approach (i):
Dialecticians will reject
a theory as partially or even completely defective if it contains, exhibits or
implies
Type (A) or Type (B)
contradictions;
(a) Point out that the history of scientific
development
shows that Type (C) contradictions are (or were) either fully or partially
resolved by the adoption of superior, more effective, less contradictory
theories;
Or they will,
(b) Actually recommend that Type (C)
contradictions be resolved so that science might further advance, either by
abandoning older, less
effective/more problematic theories, or by
developing superior, less contradictory alternatives.
[Approach (ii) forms what is perhaps a core
strand of the DM-theory of scientific
development (to be examined
in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two).]
Having said that, the noxious influence of
ruling-class ideology means that
Type (A)and Type (B)
contradictions might also affect the content and perception of Type (C), which will in
turn sometimes means that Approach (i) and Approach (ii) might be
merged to some extent. Several examples of this will be given in the next subsection
and in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
Or, finally, dialecticians will adopt,
Approach (iii):
As such, they will promote, advertise, welcome, eulogise, or even bragabout
the presence of internal Type (D)
'contradictions'
in DM, since they are supposed to be a faithful
'reflection' of 'contradictory reality'.
The
attitude shown toward Type (D) contradictions by DM-theorists is well
illustrated by the following remarks coming from both Engels and Lenin:
"[S]o
long as we consider things as at rest and
lifeless, each one by itself, alongside and after each other, we do not run up
against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly
common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but
which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and
therefore contain no contradiction within. Inside the limits of this sphere of
observation we can get along on the basis of the usual, metaphysical mode of
thought. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in
their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one
another. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is
a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about
through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in
another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the
continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is
precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976),
p.152.]
"The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to
say their 'unity,' -- although the difference between the terms identity and
unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct)
is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,
opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind
and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in
their “self-movement,” in their spontaneous development, in their real
life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the
'struggle' of opposites....
"In the first conception of motion, self-movement,
its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source
is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the
chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement.
The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The
second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps' to the 'break in continuity,' to
the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the
emergence of the new. The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of
opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of
mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are
absolute." [Lenin
(1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original;
several paragraphs merged. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Hence, there appear to be no problems at all with 'acceptable' DM-contradictions,
which are all fine and dandy since they (supposedly) reflect the
true, ever-changing nature of reality.
Nothing to see here, move on...
The next
three subsections of this Interlude will further explain and substantiate
the above allegations (as will Essay Thirteen Part Two).
First of
all, it isn't too clear whether
Approach (iii) is based on a 'fault' in a
given theory, on 'reality' itself or both. The same could be said, but perhaps
for different reasons about Approach (ii):
(a) Point out that the history of scientific
advancement shows that Type (C) contradictions are (or were) either fully or partially
resolved by the adoption of superior, more effective, less contradictory
theories;
Or they will,
(b) Actually recommend that Type (C)
contradictions be resolved so that science might further advance, either by
abandoning older, less
effective/more problematic theories, or by
developing superior, less contradictory alternatives.
[Approach (ii) forms what is perhaps a core
strand of the DM-theory of scientific
development (to be examined
in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two).]
Having said that, the noxious influence of
ruling-class ideology means that
Type (A)and Type (B)
contradictions might also be involved alongside Type (C), which will in
turn sometimes means that Approach (i) and Approach (ii) might
both be adopted. Several examples of this will be given in the next subsection
and in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
Or, finally, dialecticians will adopt,
Approach (iii):
As such, they will promote, advertise, welcome, eulogise, or even bragabout the presence
of internal, Type (D),
'contradictions'
in DM, since they are supposed to be a faithful
'reflection' of 'contradictory reality'.
In that
case, are the contradictions in older, less successful or less accurate theories a
reflection of:
(1)
The contradictory world they supposedly represent?
(2)
Humanity's inadequate
or limited thought/knowledge?
(3)
The social circumstances of their creation; or,
(4)
Regressive
class -compromised ideology?
I have yet
to see a clear explanation (or any at all!) in the DM-literature that untangles the
above muddle.
And this
isn't just an 'academic exercise'. There are real world, political and
social consequences (a topic explored in detail in Essay Nine
Part Two).
As we will discover in the next sub-section, the tension
between a theory that postulates the existence of contradictions everywhere in nature and
society (i.e., those of Type
(D)) and the reason DM-theorists give for
rejecting or abandoning a given theory -- because it is "contradictory"
(which thus involve Type
(A),
Type (B)
or Type (C)
contradictions) -- in favour of a 'superior alternative' presents Dialectical
Marxism with what turns out to be a truly fatal
dilemma.
However, there is
even more to this than the foregoing
might suggest.
Essay Nine
Part Two (link above) also demonstrated that DM-'contradictions' (Type
(D), again) are sometimes invoked whenever a dialectician wants to
rationalise and 'justify' an
opportunistic, or even an overtly counter-revolutionary, theory or course
of action (these are almost invariably decided upon for hard-headed political reasons,
but are then given a 'dialectical veneer' in order to help sell them to the
party cadres). In such circumstances,
self-contradictions (of this Type) aren't
anathematised, they become something to be welcomed, even
bragged about.
"It may be said that such a
presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same
'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand
for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the
strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and
strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state
power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of
state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is
'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully
reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political
Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B),
June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
[In addition
to those mentioned earlier (here
and here),
several more examples of this highlyuseful and convenient
dialectical-dodge
were quoted in Essay Nine
Part Two (link above)]
Despite
this, DM-theorists are keen to distinguish "absurd" and "insoluble" (Type
(A) and
Type (B))
contradictions that litter rival or competitive theories from the 'superior', but nevertheless mutant,
"dialectical" variant. [E.g., Engels (1976), p.154 and pp.25-26,
quoted
earlier. "Mutant" is, of course, my word, not his or theirs!] We saw that this was case
from the positive attitude openly displayed toward 'dialectical contradictions'
(in many of the passages
already quoted).
However,
the only way to tell these four types of 'contradiction' apart seems to be
that the first two -- Type
(A) and
Type (B)
-- among other things, fatally compromise any theories promoted by rival or
competitor Marxist parties and theorists, while 'contradictions' from the fourth variety
-- Type (D)
-- are integral to the pure-as-the-driven-snow
version of DM promoted by the favoured party to which each
judgmental, finger-pointing, dialectician
belongs. Their theories are miraculously free from such fatal defects, even though
they, too, areriddled with contradictions,
the presence of which they openly admit!
Of course, DM-'contradictions' aren't just
'called into action' in order to rationalise political expediency and
opportunism, they also serve as a
convenient way to distinguish those who "understand" dialectics from those who
(so we are told) don't. The latter 'benighted souls' -- if they claim to be Marxists -- are
roundly
castigated for their treacherous infidelity to the
'dialectic', a fatal defect compounded by (covert or even overt) bourgeois/'capitalist-roader' tendencies,
their 'formalistic thinking', or their serial compromise with anti-socialist ideology.
"Contradiction" along with other 'dialectical' terms-of-art clearly serve as a handy way of
separating the 'dialectical sheep' from the 'formalist'/'revisionist' goats.
[Evidence supporting the above allegations was laid out in Essay
Nine (link above).]
Naturally,
in DM-circles
all those
acceptable, 'kosher', Type (D), DM-contractions have simply
to be "grasped" -- or maybe even
Nixoned
-- the problems they introduce into Marxist theory and practice quietly swept under the rug. That attitude was neatly
summed up for us by the late John Molyneux:
"Dialectics is the logic of
change.... To understand the
significance of this compare it with what is know as 'formal logic' (originally
developed by Aristotle and usually thought of as the rules of sound thinking).
The basic idea of formal logic is that something either is the case or is not
the case, but that it can't be both at the same time. For example, the cat is on
the mat or it is not on the mat. For many purposes formal
logic is useful and necessary. But as soon as you take movement and change into
account, it ceases to be adequate. A cat moving goes through a moment when it is
in the process of passing onto the mat or in the process of passing off it --
when it is both on and off the mat. Dialectics is in advance of formal logic
because it enables us to grasp this contradiction." [Molyneux (1987), pp.49-50.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]
"This matters because the
dominant mode of thinking, based on the logic developed by Aristotle, is not
founded on the principle of universal change, rather it deals with fixed states
or 'things'. Its basic axioms are that A = A (a thing is equal to itself) and A
does not = non-A (a thing is not equal to something other than itself), from
which are derived sequences of sound reasoning known as syllogisms.... This formal logic was, and
is, all well and good and very necessary for practical human affairs but it is
limited -- it excludes change. Dialectical logic moves beyond formal logic by
starting not with 'things' but with processes, processes of coming into being
and passing out of being. The moment processes of change are fed into the
equation it becomes necessary to deal with contradiction. If state A (e.g. day)
changes into state B (night) it passes through a phase of A not being A or being
both A and B (twilight)." [Molyneux, '
None of the
serious problems that this approach to theory brings in its train were even so much as
mentioned. [Several
of the latter will be covered below -- others were analysed in
Essays
Five to Eight Part Three.]
Not so with the
(supposed) contradictions that litter
theories promoted by rivals or enemies; the serious problems
Type (A)
and Type (B) contradictions create for
such adversaries
are never swept
under the 'dialectical rug'.
As we are about to find out, the above
considerations bring with them a number of serious problems, several of which threaten
to undermine the entire 'dialectical project' (if such it may be called).
The most challenging of these may perhaps be
summarised as follows:
DD1:
DM-theorists have yet to provide their critics, let alone one another, with non-question-begging criteria
(or, indeed, any criteria!) that allow theories
that postulate the
existence of contradictions everywhere to be distinguished from those that are flatly
self-contradictory and which should be rejected because of that. [That is, between the
first two and the last two types of contradiction
listed earlier. And the term "question-begging" is being used
here with its
older meaning.]
Rees, for example, did make some attempt to address
this issue, arguing that among other
considerations a superior theory should be "less internally contradictory" and
"more internally coherent" than its (supposedly) inferior rivals.
[Rees (1998a), pp.235, 237 -- but,
see also below.] However, that claim was
itself advanced without any attempt to explain why it must be a defect for a rival theory
to be more contradictory, or even self-contradictory, when it isn't a defect for DM-theorists to
claim that reality itself is 'contradictory' -- with every object and process
in existence
internally self-'contradictory', into the bargain. If reality is indeed
'contradictory', then one would at least expect even a 'partially true' theory (that
accurately reflected
this) to reproduce some of those 'contradictions' in its theoretical and
empirical content. It would seem that if reality is
'contradictory', a
theory that was itself self-'contradictory', or which contained
'contradictions',
would reflect it more accurately than one that wasn't, or didn't!
The following considerations highlight the
disastrous consequences the DD holds out for DM-theorists:
DD2:
(i) Let any theory that is unambiguously self-contradictory, which
contains or implies contradictions, or which fails to reflect reality accurately
(to a greater or lesser extent) be labelled a
"defective theory" (DT,
for short). This category includes defective scientific theories, some of which
might rival or even oppose DM; others are those that are simply older or less
accurate, and hence are ripe for replacement, improvement or rejection.
[However, only theories that rival or oppose DM are relevant to what follows, and
while some DTs are self-contradictory, others aren't. Furthermore, of that
sub-category, only self-contradictory theories and those that contain or
imply contradictions will be considered pertinent.]
(ii) So, for the sake of argument, let DTs include each and
every one of DM's rival theories, those that attempt to 'refute' DM (if there are any
such), and those which are unambiguously 'self-contradictory' (in the manner outlined in the
previous
subsection), or which contain
or imply contradictions.
(iii) Also for the sake of argument, let
all and only those theories that accurately (or even adequately) reflect the "contradictory" nature of reality (such
as DM) be labelled "non-defective theories" (NDTs, henceforth)
--
even if they are still only 'partially' or 'relatively' true and have
supposedly been "tested in practice".
DD3:
(i) On that basis and in this respect, DM
would be the one and only NDT. The rest, every rival and oppositional
theory (of the sort mentioned above) are all DTs, to a greater or lesser extent.
DD4:
(i) However, and paradoxically, it now turns out that any NDT like DM is also a DT!
(ii) That is because, if an NDT accurately
captures or 'reflects' the allegedly contradictory nature of reality -- as DM
is supposed to do --
it must
be, or must have become,
self-contradictory, or it must contain or imply contradictions, at some point and to some extent as a result. [Why
that is so will be established
presently.]
DD5:
(i) If that weren't the case, no NDT would
be able to 'reflect' reality in all its contradictory glory.
(ii) So, an NDT like DM can't fail to be self-contradictory, or contain/imply
contradictions.
(iii) Hence, any such theory must
be both an NDT and a DT at the same time, otherwise it would fail to mirror nature and society accurately!
DD6:
(i) If so, there would now be no good reason to
reject any given DT in favour of an NDT on the basis that the DT
in question is
self-contradictory, or contains/implies contradictions.
(ii) That is because both DTs and NDTs must contain,
imply, or
have internalised an unspecified number of contradictions -- e.g., those that NDTs 'accurately' picture as existing in nature and society, while DTs
(i.e., those of present concern) contain or imply them, anyway.
DD7:
(i) Hence, dialecticians now have no good reason to reject
alternative or competitive theories on grounds that they are DTs.
(ii) That is because DM is itself a DT in
virtue of its being
an NDT of this sort!
The above considerations also present DM-theorists
with another serious problem. This is how
Rees highlighted it
(partially, and from a different angle):
"In a certain sense, of
course, all truth is relative -- it is just that some theorists do not
acknowledge this elementary fact. There is no final, faultless, criterion for
truth which hovers, like god, outside the historical process. Neither is there
any privileged scientific method which is not shaped by the contours of the
society of which it is a part. All that exists are some theories which are less
internally contradictory and have a greater explanatory power…. [I]f the truth
is the totality, then it is the totality of working class experience,
internationally and historically which gives access to the truth…. [A theory's]
validity must be proven by its superior explanatory power -- [which means it is]
more internally coherent, more widely applicable, capable of greater empirical
verification -- in comparison with its competitors. Indeed, this is a condition
of it entering the chain of historical forces as an effective power. It is a
condition of it being 'proved in practice.' If it is not superior to other
theories in this sense, it will not 'seize the masses,' will not become a
material force, will not be realized in practice." [Rees (1998a), pp.235-37.
Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
Clearly, Rees is arguing here that the more accurate a theory
is the
fewer
internal-contradictions it should contain. As we have seen (e.g.,
here
and here),
Engels and others appear to agree. If so, this would seem to imply that the 'more true'
DM becomes the
fewer contradictions it should either envisage, contain, imply or encompass,
and hence
the fewer it should reflect as actually existing in nature and society!
However, because the 'DM-world-view' holds that reality at every level is
('objectively') contradictory, that can only mean DM must become
decreasinglytrue (or increasingly false) over time! By (partially or fully) eliminating its own
contradictions (as a result of following Engels's and Rees's advice), DM would less faithfully reflect the 'objective contradictions' that
supposedly exist in
the natural and social world!
DD8:
(i) So, when fully true -- even
if that blessed state is never reached --, an
NDT like
DM ought
to reflect the fact that there are absolutely no contradictions anywhere in reality!
"If one
does not loiter here needlessly, but presses on farther into the
immense building, one finds innumerable treasures which today still possess
undiminished value. With all philosophers it is precisely the 'system' which is
perishable; and for the simple reason that
it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind -- the desire to
overcome all contradictions. But if all contradictions are once and for all
disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth -- world history
will be at an end. And yet it has to continue, although there is nothing left
for it to do -- hence, a new, insoluble contradiction.
As soon as we have once realized -- and in the long run no one has helped us to
realize it more than Hegel himself -- that the task of philosophy thus stated
means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that
which can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive
development -- as soon as we realize that, there is an end to all philosophy in
the hitherto accepted sense of the word.
One leaves alone 'absolute truth', which is unattainable along this path or by
any single individual; instead, one pursues attainable relative truths along the
path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of
dialectical thinking.
At any rate, with Hegel philosophy comes to an end; on the one hand, because in
his system he summed up its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and
on the other hand, because, even though unconsciously, he showed us the way out
of the labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world." [Engels
(1888), pp.588-90. Spelling modified to agree with UK
English; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Bold emphases added and minor typo corrected.]
(ii)
However, in that 'end state', if DM contained or implied so much as one
contradiction, it would still be a DT, and for that reason.
(iii) But, if DM is a DT, it must either be rejected
or amended until it contains no contradictions at all.
DD9:
(i) So, for an NDT (such as DM) to remain an NDT in this 'end state' (even if
that is never attained), it would
have to contain or imply no contradictions -- and hence it would have to reflect the
(new) fact that none
actually exist in nature and society!
DD10:
(i) And yet, by so doing, DM
would become false, if, as DM-theorists currently maintain, nature and society are
full of 'contradictions'.
(ii) Hence, this particular NDT (i.e., DM, again)
would become a DT
once more, but now in different sense. It would be a DT by failing to reflect the contradictions that dialecticians
currently claim exist
in nature and society!
DD11:
(i) On the other hand, if
dialecticians should refrain from eliminating some or all of the
contradictions in a given theory, then DM itself would remain a DT (and for that
reason -- it would still contain contradictions!).
(ii) But, as a DT, DM should be rejected.
(ii) Again, that is because an unspecified number of 'internal
contradictions' would remain -- i.e., those that supposedly reflect the many that allegedly
exist in nature and society.
(iii) Indeed, in that case, DM would now be
fatally compromised by its own internal contradictions!
This would represent a fitting and somewhat
ironic downfall for a theory that declares that change can only come about through 'internal
contradiction' -- now obviously including the demise of the very theory that says
this!
Of course, it could always be
objected that
dialecticians don't hold
that every contradiction in a given theory should be eliminated -- although I
have yet to see anything that supports that particular
counter-claim in a classic DM-text, or any other for that matter (and, somewhat
fittingly, it contradicts what Engels had to say,
re-quoted above). But, if that were
the case, and as noted
earlier, the
advancement of science would grind to a halt as a result. Furthermore, even if DM were
to have only some of its contradictions removed, it would still be
a DT and should be further modified or rejected (as already pointed out in
DD11).
DD12:
(i) Conversely, DTs would become NDTs in another sense: when
their proponents removed or attempt to remove their internal contradictions.
(ii) In that case, the DT in question here (i.e., DM,
once more) would have had
all its internal
contradictions eliminated (or 'resolved') and would thereby become an NDT, since it no longer
reflected 'objective reality' as DM-theorists currently see things.
(i) The only way to avoid this would be for
DM-theorists to withdraw the claim that there are contradictions in nature and
society.
DD13:
(i)Either way, the theory that
tells us that reality is
contradictory sends NDTs like DM one way (into oblivion) and DTs in another
(into science textbooks).
[The DD has been examined in even greater detail, but from a different
angle,
here. As we will see in Essay Thirteen Part
Two (where DM-theorists' ideas about scientific change will be
critically examined), a corollary of the DD is that the DM-theory of
scientific change is also fatally compromised.]
In fact, the full consequences of the DD are really quite disastrous -- as we are
about to discover.
[This material also used to appear in Note 5.
Its results depend on conclusions reached in previous sub-sections.]
DM-theorists claim that all valid theories are
converging
or "spiralling" on
Absolute Truth
(on that, see also
here and
Note 30),
even if that end point will never actually be reached. Here, once again, is
Engels:
"If one
does not loiter here needlessly, but presses on farther into the
immense building, one finds innumerable treasures which today still possess
undiminished value. With all philosophers it is precisely the 'system' which is
perishable; and for the simple reason that
it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind -- the desire to
overcome all contradictions. But if all contradictions are once and for all
disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth -- world history
will be at an end." [Engels
(1888), p.588. Spelling modified to agree with UK
English; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Bold emphases added.]
If that is
indeed the case, it becomes possible to show that DM is actually going in the wrong direction,
moving away from the goal of delivering what might even be called a minimally accurate 'picture of reality'.
So, given
Engels and Rees's
criterion for
determining theoretical validity, it turns out that we are now in a position to
declarethat 'reality' is actually a 'contradiction-free' zone. That is
because, if they (and others quoted earlier) are to be believed, the truer the theory the more it
must 'reflect' the fact that reality contains no contradictions. As we have
just seen in the previous sub-section, if a given theory failed to do that (maybe because its supporters
flatly reject this criticism, but for no good reason), it would still be a DT.
That is because it would contain severalinternal contradictions of its own. As TAR's criterion implies (and as
many
other DM-theorists also maintain), such theories should either be rejected as defective,
or they should be modified in order to 'resolve' or remove their internal
contradictions.
[DT = Defective Theory;
NDT = Non-Defective Theory (both were defined in the
previous sub-section);
DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; TAR = The Algebra of
Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998a).]
Alternatively, if Engels and Rees's criteria were
rejected
(for whatever reason), the result would be little different. As also noted
above, if
DM-theorists are actually supposed to retain, not eliminate or 'resolve', the
contradictions inherent in their theory -- an example of one such will be given
presently, although
several were outlined earlier --,
DM would still be a
DT, and, as such, it should be discarded or radically altered.
In that case, the 'picture' dialecticians currently paint of 'reality' should be rejected as
false.
[In fact, as several Essays at this site have shown
-- especially
this one -- DM is far too incoherent
even to be called "false". It doesn't make it that far.]
Either way, DM is a DT, so it can't be progressing toward 'the truth',
'asymptotically' or in any other way. Indeed, as we are about to find out, it
threatens to "spiral" off
into oblivion.
In order to make the above rather vague and
abstract accusations more concrete, let us suppose (again, for the purposes
of argument) that motion is actually
'contradictory'.
Unfortunately, if that were the case, no partially-, or even fully-true theory could
afford to reflect that presumed 'fact' for fear it would thereby become a DT
(since it would contain at least one self-contradiction, namely,
this one). Indeed, in order to
avoid being labelled a DT, DM-theorists would have to abandon the idea
that motion is contradictory or risk their theory being categorised and
castigated in that way. Hence,
no NDT, like DM, can afford to acknowledge the supposedly contradictory nature of
motion!
Naturally, this means that those who (already)
reject Engels's analysis of motion are closer to 'the truth' than he was -- or, closer than his epigonesnow
are, or even closer than Hegel was 200 years ago --, because those unnamed opponents already declare that motion isn't contradictory
(or, in the present author's case,
already declare that that idea makes absolutely no sense).
Of course, those who don't accept -- or those
who reject -- this specific DM-'contradiction' and who prefer to limit
'Materialist Dialectics' to human social development, can substitute
the
'contradiction' Stalin that claimed to have discovered
in the 'dialectical' nature of the USSR --, or, indeed, the almost identical
'contradiction' Ted Grant 'found' there, too:
"The whole contradiction,
a contradiction within the society itself and not imposed arbitrarily --
is in the very concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If one
considers the problem in the abstract, one can see that this is a contradictory
phenomenon: the abolition of capitalism yet the continuation of classes. The
proletariat does not disappear. It raises itself to the position of ruling class
and abolishes the capitalist class. But in the intervening period it remains the
working class. Therefore, surplus product in the form of surplus value is
produced. It is the case today as it was under Lenin and Trotsky. We have only
to pose the problem: what was the surplus value produced when Russia was
still a workers' state -- though even then with bureaucratic deformations?
What was the process by means of which surplus product before 1928
mysteriously became surplus value after 1928?..." [Grant
(1949), pp.212-13. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Alternatively, supporters of
Tony Cliff's theory might prefer to
substitute the following 'contradiction' for the two mentioned above:
"Dialectical historical development,
full of
contradictions and surprises, brought it about that the first step the
bureaucracy took with the subjective intention of hastening the building of
'socialism in one country' became the foundation of the building of state
capitalism." [Cliff
(1988), p.166. Bold emphasis added.]
"State capitalism and a
workers' state are two stages in the transition period from capitalism to
socialism. State capitalism is the extreme opposite of socialism-- they aresymmetrically opposed, and they aredialectically united with one another."
[Ibid.,
p.74.
Bold emphasis added.]
A theory like DM, which can be used to
'justify' practically anything
-- no matter how 'contradictory' that 'anything' might be -- and its
opposite (often this verbal-trick is performed by the very same theorist/activist
in the same speech, book or article, as we have just seen was the case with Stalin, Grant
and Cliff), is naturally going to
appeal to opportunists,
substitutionists and 'Marxist'
counter-revolutionaries of every stripe (and by that I am not
accusing Grant or Cliff of that, just those who might use their ideas to that end). That is, of course, just one
of the reasons why Dialectical Marxists cling to DM like grim death -- or, to be more honest,
have clung to it even in the face of the death of
countless thousands of workers! It enables opportunism and
substitutionism. [On that. see Essay Nine Parts One and Two,
here,
here and
here.]
On the other hand, those who reject the distinction
drawn
earlier -- between DTs and NDTs -- will no longer be able to
repudiate self-contradictory theories, or theories that contain/imply
contradictions (e.g.,
Type (A), Type (B) or Type C) without also having to
abandon DM (because it, too, is
self-contradictory -- as, indeed, we are about to find out).
The only other apparent way of avoiding such
disastrous implications would be to argue that no theory that truly reflects the
contradictions that (allegedly) exist in reality can be self-contradictory, since, with a dismissive wave of the hand, that
alone would seem capable of
absolving DM by (magically) transforming it
into an NDT by a simple act of will -- or even an impressive stamp of the foot.
Fortunately, it is relatively easy to show that that
counter-claim is itself misguided.
The argument substantiating
that assertion begins with the following two (innocuous-looking) propositions:
D1: (a) If DM is
true, reality will actually contain contradictions.
(b) DM postulates the existence of
just such contradictions.
In case some think that this appears to get things the
wrong way round (in that it begins with theory and not with reality), we
need only reflect on the fact that since we don't possess a direct scientific
or 'philosophical' access to
'reality', only an indirect avenue by way of increasingly less inadequate
theories about it -- even according to DM-theorists (so, the foregoing
isn't my theory!) --, this is a move dialecticians will
themselves have to make.
[Indeed, TAR itself appears to have conceded this
(e.g., on page 63, paragraph 2). We also saw Lenin do
something similar, in Essay Three
Part One.]
Anyway, even if an attempt
were made to 'begin from reality' (whatever that means!) -- presumably with the unmediated,
subjectless
'observation' of a least one material 'contradiction' in nature (maybe via some sort
of languageless, concept-free, 'apperception', 'intuition' or 'un-interpreted-image'(??)
'experienced' by 'some thing' that isn't sentient) --, the conclusion
would still follow, except perhaps even more quickly, as we are also about to find
out.
From D1(b), we can obtain the following:
D2: At least one of DM's propositions must
contain -- or must imply -- a contradiction.
[D1: (a) If DM is true, this implies reality actually contains contradictions. (b) DM postulates the existence of
just such contradictions.]
Consider the following schematic
representation of one such contradiction:
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, for some time, t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t.
[Where "R" goes proxy for a
relational expression -- for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
[Here, "¬"
stands for the negation operator applied to quantified and unquantified
propositions; in the vernacular, it goes proxy for the negative particle, "not",
or more long-windedly, "It
is not the case that...".]
One interpretation of D3 (partially expressed by D4
and then fully colloquialised in D4a) might be the following:
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least
one mat,
for some time, t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
[The use of Greek letters like those employed above is explained
here.]
Of course, D4 would normally be
disambiguated
-- that is,
by 'dialectical infidels' like the present author -- in order to
eliminate this apparent contradiction.
And for good reason; no theory can live with contradictions.
We are about to find out why.
[Reminder: DT = Defective Theory;
NDT = Non-Defective Theory;
TAR = The Algebra of
Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998a).]
Again, let us assume for the purposes of argument that DM-theorists are
100% correct about the
'contradictory nature
of reality'. In that case, it now becomes possible to derive the following fatal
result:
D6: Any theory that contains a
self-contradiction is a DT. [Definition -- again, also accepted by DM-theorists
(follow the above link).]
D7: TAR's author
holds that both D5 and D6 are true.
D8: Assume that D5 and D6
are
true.
D9: (a) TAR also claims DM is true. (b) Assume
that DM is an integral part of TAR's theoretical superstructure.
D10: Assume DM is true.
D11: DM contains postulates like D3
(or D4 and/or D4a).
[D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, for some time, t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t.]
[D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least
one mat,
for some time, t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.]
[D4a: For at least one moving
cat and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.]
D12: D3 (or D4 and D4a) is a self-contradiction.
D13: Therefore, DM contains at least
one self-contradiction.
D14: Therefore, DM is a DT (by D6).
D15: Hence, DM can't be true (by D5,
D13 and D14).
D16: Therefore, TAR contains a DT (by
D9 and D14).
D17: In that case, TAR
holds true what has now been shown to be a DT, namely DM (by D9, D6, D7 and D16).
D18: Therefore, TAR holds true a DT
which
is both true and not true (by D5, D6, D7, D9a and D17).
D19: Thus, TAR's theoretical structure contains a self-contradiction (by D18).
D20:
Therefore, TAR's theoretical structure is defective.
D21: TAR's theoretical structure should be
rejected (by D5).
Admittedly, D5-D21 contain one or two vagaries
and ambiguities,
which can be cleared up by the addition of a few extra lines or by the use of
more precise or more careful wording (etc.). For example, it might be necessary to
substitute "fully true" for "true", and maybe "partially rejected" for
"rejected", above (on that,
see below).
However, the outcome seems reasonably clear: TAR became defective when its
author accepted (and then promoted) DM!
[The fact that TAR is a non-standard DM-text
doesn't affect the above argument; its author only has to hold true one
DM-contradiction for the above to apply to his book.]
Of course, what goes for TAR goes for any other
DM-text that argues along similar lines -- i.e., which asserts that reality is
"contradictory" and that flatly contradictory, or
self-contradictory theories are defective and should be rejected or replaced.
There appear to be only a handful of ways this fatal result
might be avoided. The first could involve denying the
relevance, validity
or applicability of
FL.
But, that route, if taken, would be a rather desperate move -- somewhat
akin to a boss attacking the validity of arithmetic just because a strike vote
went the 'wrong' way. Even more to the point: FL hasn't actually been used above.
If anything, the
argument itself more closely resembles those that are studied in and by
Informal Logic. Furthermore, even though D3, for example,
has been expressed in
semi-formal terms, D4a hasn't.
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, for some time, t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t.
[Where "R" is a
relational expression, for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
A second way to avoid DM self-destructing might
involve the claim that no theory is ever fully rejected or declared completely false.
That is because science supposedly "spirals" in on the
truth:
"Dialectics as the science of universal
inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual
penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried
to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation --
spiral form of development." [Engels (1954),
p.17.
Bold emphasis added. I have criticised the "spiral form of development" aspect of Engels's 'Laws' in
Essay Ten Part One,
here.]
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated
by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly
repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis
('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a
straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks
in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner
impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the
various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given
phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a
connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of
motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the
ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914),
pp.12-13. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
"Human knowledge is not (or
does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a
series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be
transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight
line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the
quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored
by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness,
woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness -- voilŕ the
epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscrutantism (= philosophical
idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless;
it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on
the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective,
absolute human knowledge." [Lenin (1961),
p.361.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
"What then is truth? It is
correspondence between ideas and objective reality. Such correspondence between
our ideas and reality is only gradually established, and then the correspondence
is often no more than partial or incomplete.... In such cases, we should not say
that our idea was false, but yet it would not be absolutely -- completely and in
all respects -- true. Truth, therefore, is not a property which an idea,
or a proposition, either possesses or does not possess; it may belong to an idea
to a certain degree, within certain limits, in certain respects....
"This characteristic of
truth...is very well known to science. The laws which science establishes
certainly reflect objective processes; they correspond to the real motion and
interconnection of things in the external world. Yet science has established few
laws which can claim to be absolute truths.... [M]any erroneous views in
science and philosophy, which have had to be, not modified, but rejected as
errors, concealed a certain truth which received in them an erroneous distorted
expression....
"We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression.... Complete, full, absolute
truth -- the whole truth and nothing but the truth about everything -- is
something we can never attain. But it is something toward which we are always
approximating.... The correspondence is
never complete, exact, absolute. But it continually approaches yet is always
infinitely distant from that absolute limit as truth and knowledge continually
advance...." [Cornforth (1963), pp.135-45. Bold emphases added; several
paragraphs merged.]
"The law of the negation of the negation explains
the repetition at a higher level of certain features and properties of the lower
level and the apparent return of past features. There is a constant struggle
between form and content and between content and form, resulting in the eventual
shattering of the old form and the transformation of the content. This whole
process can be best pictured as a spiral, where the movement comes back to the
position it started, but at a higher level. In other words, historical
progress is achieved through a series of contradictions.Where the
previous stage is negated, this does not represent its total elimination. It
does not wipe out completely the stage that it supplants." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 04/04/2023. Bold emphasis added, paragraphs
merged.]
"Thus, social development did not proceed in a
circular course, nor a straight line, but a spiral. It reproduced some
features of the past, but it reproduced them at an immeasurably higher level.
Lenin described this essential feature of the dialectical conception of
development as follows: 'A development that seemingly repeats the stages already
passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ("negation of negation"),
a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line.'" [Kuusinen
(1961),
pp.100-101. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Hence, on the basis of the above it could be argued
that DM isn't nearly as crude as this Essay or this site are suggesting. The
above dialecticians were right; science clearly advances by "spiralling" in on the
truth. In which case, knowledge progresses by preserving some of the (partial)
gains in knowledge achieved by
earlier generations/theories, incorporating them in higher, more accurate,
perhaps more concrete alternatives. This
means that several contradictions from these earlier versions might very well be
reproduced in newer, increasingly accurate, more advanced replacements (maybe even
those related to the
contradictory nature of motion), which would then be expressed in a higher, more objective form. So, it isn't true that
dialecticians argue that all previous contradictions should be removed. What
must be rejected and what should be retained will depend on several factors -- for
instance, the theorists themselves, other theories that are still held
true, the results of practice, what is required for and by the further development of the
forces of production, or what will help promote the revolutionary transformation of
society, among other considerations.
Or so it could be objected...
Of
course, the above proffered pro-DM-response/explanation is independent of the fact that
Marxist dialecticians (as well as card-carrying Hegelians) have yet to produce anyactual evidence that substantiates the theory that motion, for instance,
is
contradictory. Indeed, it is difficult even to imaginewhat
evidence couldbe offered in support of that rather
odd idea. In that case, this Hegelian theory can't form any part of
scientific knowledge.
In fact, the claim that
motion is contradictory was and still is based solely on a superficial and highly
contentious 'thought
experiment' -- or, rather, it is the result of yet another example of
creative word juggling masquerading as a thought experiment (indeed, as we saw in
Essay Five). In that case, it should be
rejected if DM is to remain consistent with its
supporters' own (rather basic)
understanding of 'the scientific method' -- i.e.,
that there should at least be some evidence offered in its support.
Anyway, the above pro-DM-reply was
neutralised
earlier,
where it was pointed out that rebuttals along such lines still fail to distinguish contradictions that
(i) are implied by a defective theory from those that (ii) are supposed to be an
'objective reflection of reality'
(i.e., between
Type (A), Type (B) and
Type (D)contradictions).
We have also seen (in Essay Ten
Part One,
here,
here
and
here) that science in
no way 'spirals' in on anything, let alone 'the truth'.
[And by that, readers shouldn't conclude the present
author thinks
science only produces falsehoods! What it does mean is that there is no one goal toward
which scientific knowledge is progressing. Follow the above links for an
explanation.]
In addition to the above
pro-DM-avoiding tactic,
dialecticians (like, say, Lenin and Cornforth) also argue that no theory or
proposition is either absolutely true or completely false. All are in their own way
closer approximations to the truth;
or, rather, are closer approximations to 'partial' or 'relative truth',
stepping stones on the endless journey toward 'Absolute Truth'.
Quite apart from
the fact that no DM-theorist really accepts this idea (on that, see below), the
term "partial truth" is itself conveniently vague (as will be
demonstrated in
Essay Thirteen Part Two).
But, even if that weren't the case, and the
meaning of "relative truth" were crystal clear, those who say they
accept theories that are less
'partially true' (even if only provisionally) also claim that the goal should be to 'resolve' or remove
(most or all of the)
contradictions that remain so that they become evenless 'partially true' -- which means, of course, that the above conclusions still follow.
Hence, even if the DM-view of the advance of science were acceptable, a
maximally
true theory should contain fewer contradictions, possibly even none at all.
As we have already seen,
Engels himself suggested that if we had access
to 'Absolute Truth', contradictions would completely disappear:
"If one does not loiter here needlessly, but
presses on farther into the immense building, one finds innumerable treasures
which today still possess undiminished value. With all philosophers it is
precisely the 'system' which is perishable; and for the simple reason that
it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind -- the desire to
overcome all contradictions. But if all contradictions are once and for all
disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth -- world history
will be at an end. And yet it has to continue, although there is nothing left
for it to do -- hence, a new, insoluble contradiction.
As soon as we have once realized -- and in the long run no one has helped us to
realize it more than Hegel himself -- that the task of philosophy thus stated
means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that
which can only be accomplished by the entire human race in its progressive
development -- as soon as we realize that, there is an end to all philosophy in
the hitherto accepted sense of the word.
One leaves alone 'absolute truth', which is unattainable along this path or by
any single individual; instead, one pursues attainable relative truths along the
path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of
dialectical thinking.
At any rate, with Hegel philosophy comes to an end; on the one hand, because in
his system he summed up its whole development in the most splendid fashion; and
on the other hand, because, even though unconsciously, he showed us the way out
of the labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world." [Engels
(1888), p.590. Spelling modified to agree with UK English;
quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Minor typo corrected.]
Which clearly implies that contradictions don't
really exist in 'reality'! Otherwise how could the following ever be true?
"[I]f
all contradictions are once and for all disposed of, we shall have arrived at
so-called absolute truth...." [Ibid.]
Anyway, as has already been suggested, whatever they might say,
in practice few dialecticians accept the idea that there are no completely false
theories or propositions, even if they might sometimes tell their audiences the
opposite. Here, for instance, is Cornforth:
"Just as truths are for the
most part only approximate and contain the possibility of being converted into
untruths, so are many errors found not to be absolute falsehoods but to contain
a germ of truth.... We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression...."
[Cornforth (1963), pp.138-39. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]
Despite what Cornforth says, it would be
impossible to find a "germ of truth" in
any of the following:
(1) Ten litres of concentrated
Nitric
Acid applied directly to unprotected human skin dramatically improves the
complexion if left there for several hours.
(2) "Jews, Slavs, Romanies, Arabs, Asians and Africans
all belong to 'inferior,
sub-human races'."
(3) "Capitalism is a genuine expression of
eternally unchanging human nature, which is both acquisitive and selfish."
(4) "All women are completely happy with their oppression
and are keen to be reminded of it on a daily basis."
(5) "Imperialism is 100% progressive
everywhere, at all times, and always will be."
(6) "The
Ku Klux Klan and the
alt-right are exemplary leaders in the
fight for Black
Liberation and full equality for Muslims."
(7) In 2002, Iraq manufactured and stored more
WMD than any other country in the
entire history of the
planet.
(8) The earth is supported by a colossal tortoise,
on top of a huge locust, on top of a giant crab, on top of a...
(11) Karl Marx was a flagrant plagiarist from Mars who copied all his best ideas
from George W Bush.
(12) "Anyone who wanders about aimlessly for
several hours crossing and re-crossing a
busy main road during the day while blindfolded will live a long and happy life."
(14) The world was created about 6000 years
ago from a bowl of custard by the
Flying Spaghetti Monster.
I suspect that anyone who questioned the
truth of, say, (1) would be
hard pressed to find a single revolutionary who agreed with (2).
Naturally, that means the negation of (2) is absolutely true (for
all revolutionaries).
On
the other hand, if they were to reject as completely false one or both of these sentences --
i.e., (1) and/or (2) -- which they should(!), they would thereby
have confirmed the point at issue: that is, if either one of those sentences
is completely false,
then there is at least one sentence (namely (1) or (2)) that is completely
false.
QED.
And, just in case these remarks attract the
attention of any brass-necked, died-in-the-wool, hardcore Hegel Honchos, who might
claim that one or more of the above are 'partially true', 'partially false', they should
perhaps be encouraged to consider the following sentence:
H1: There are absolutely no partial truths,
and there never have been.
Now, is that 'partially'
true?
Another
way of avoiding the
fatal results obtained earlier might involve the claim that the above
considerations only apply to formal
contradictions. In that case, since DM-theorists concern themselves
exclusively with
"dialectical contradictions" (and, for that matter, only those that can beshown to exist 'objectively' -- i.e.,
"material-" or "real-contradictions"), it could be countered that DM
is totally unaffected by academic quibbles like these.
However, that pro-DM-response also fails. Consider the following,
supplementary argument:
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, for some time t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t.
[Where "R" goes proxy for a
relational expression -- for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least
one mat,
for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
D22: DM only postulates
the existence of objectively existing, material contradictions.
D23: D3 (or D4/D4a), when true, expresses just such a
material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth of D3
(or D4/D4a),
but only when
instances can be shown to be the case.
D25: Hence, even when instances
of D3 (D4/D4a) are found to be the case, they remain self-contradictions.
Critics might now try to retreat into a 'concrete
bunker', arguing that the above claims are 'abstract', whereas "all truth is
concrete" (according to Hegel, Plekhanov and Lenin):
"[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth is
alwaysconcrete,neverabstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin (1921),
p.93. Bold emphasis added.]
But that response would be no help, either. That is because it
would immediately prompt the following question: "Is the claim that all truth is concrete
itself absolutely true?" If it is, then the point is lost -- since we would
now have
at least one 'absolute truth'.
On the other hand, if it isn't true,
we can ignore it as an effective (or relevant) reply.
That is, of course, quite apart from the fact that
that Hegelian maxim (i.e., "Truth is always concrete, never
abstract") is itself
abstract and, as such, can't be true!
It could be argued that D22-D25 can be
disassociated from D5-D21
by rejecting either D23 or D25.
That is, it could be
objected
that DM-contradictions are
completely different from those
that are of interest
to formal logicians, and to such an extent that no comparisons can or should be
drawn between them.
D22: DM postulates only the
existence of objectively existing, material contradictions.
D23: D3 (or D4/D4a), when
true, reflects just such a
material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth
of D3 (D4/D4a), but only when instances can be shown to be the case.
D25: Hence, even when instances
of D3 (D4/D4a) are found to be the case, they remain self-contradictions.
However, the
above objection may only be sustained by rejecting another DM-precept
concerning the (alleged) superiority of DL over FL, which supposedly (or partially)
arises out of the former's capacity to
account for change through contradiction. That claim would lose all its
force if the contradictions countenanced in DL were completely different
from those studied in FL. If that were so, there would be nothing
in common between the two systems for a comparison to latch onto. The
much-touted superiority of DL over FL (at least with respect to the handling of contradictions)
would then be about as accurate as would an analogous claim be that, say,
Barclays Bank was a more
exploitative
bank than the
Dogger Bank.
That is quite apart from
the fact that DM-contradictions arose out of Hegel's criticisms of AFL --
especially the LOI, the LEM and the
LOC -- and hence DM is based on the presumed ability of Hegelian 'logic' (i.e.,
set the 'right way up') to
handle FL-contradictions. Moreover, as we have just seen, dialecticians claim that 'superior' theories
(like DM/DL, for instance) don't simply
reject or discard concepts drawn from previous theories, they build on them.
Plainly, that wouldn't be the case if DM-contradictions were completely different
from those studied in and by FL (at least, in so far as dialecticians themselves view this
issue).
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; LOI = Law of Identity; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; DL = Dialectical Logic; FL = Formal
Logic; AFL = Aristotelian FL.]
Anyway,
the above is certainly not how Hegel depicted such 'contradictions'. [On that, see
here and
below.]
Indeed, Hegel and Engels's claim that motion is contradictory was an attempt to
take what they believed was a contradiction -- even by the standards of FL
-- and show that it reflected (or
illustrated) the 'dialectical' nature of motion. To that end, they also believed
there was an overlap (so to speak) between the 'formal
contradiction' that a moving object is both 'here' and 'not here' at the same
time, being in two places at once, and the 'dialectical contradiction' it
supposedly revealed
in "motion itself". For them, the two
weren't
different, they were simply interpreted in radically different ways, one
formally the other 'dialectically'.
"[S]o long as we consider things as at rest and
lifeless, each one by itself, alongside and after each other, we do not run up
against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly
common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but
which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and
therefore contain no contradiction within. Inside the limits of this sphere of
observation we can get along on the basis of the usual, metaphysical mode of
thought. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in
their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one
another.Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is
a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about
through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in
another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the
continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is
precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.
Bold emphasis added.]
Of course, there are DM-theorists who
will tell all who listen that neither they nor Hegel reject the
LOC (but on that, see Essay Four
Part One, as well as
here), they
merely seek to underline the 'limitations' of FL (especially in relation to
change and development). So, they actually appeal to FL-contradictions in order to show that there are real 'dialectical contradictions' in nature and society.
Such moves 'transcend' the 'limitations' FL supposedly imposes on contradictions, and that
is what allows Hegel's method to develop a more comprehensive,
all-round 'dialectical' theory --, at least if it is turned 'the right way up'. So these
two 'varieties' of contradiction are
organically-, or, perhaps even 'dialectically'-connected. DL-contradictions are
then simply 'concrete' versions
of the abstractions found in FL. Indeed,
as Trotsky noted:
"The dialectic is...a science
of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems
of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and
drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar
to that between higher and lower mathematics." [Trotsky (1971),
p.63.
Bold emphasis added.]
In which case, just as "lower mathematics"
deals with familiar numbers
and operations -- such as,
addition, multiplication and division -- and employs well-known axioms
and rules
(e.g.,
commutativity,
associativity, distribution,
etc.), so does "higher mathematics". Numbers in the "lower"
system are
the same as those
in the
"higher", it is just that their use has been extended much further, into other
areas, involving different mathematical structures --, such as
Rings,
Groups and
Fields. No one supposes that
multiplication in "higher mathematics" is different from
multiplication in "lower mathematics" (even if it can be far more complicated). This isn't to suggest, either, that every single one of these
axioms and rules applies everywhere in "higher mathematics"; for example,
non-Abelian Groups aren't commutative under
multiplication, nor are
Matrices in general.
[On that, see here.]
No one
supposes that numbers (for example,
Integers) we find in "lower mathematics" are different from
those in "higher mathematics", so, in like manner,
DLenriches
and extends the use of numbers, just as it enriches
and extends our understanding of contradictions.
Or, so it might be
argued...
Anyway,
as we saw
here,
Hegel was only able to derive his 'contradictions' by confusing an abbreviating letter
(the ubiquitous letter "A") -- or, rather, what it supposedly
designates, for example, 'objects', 'relations' and 'processes' -- with predicates,
propositions, concepts, relational expressions, along with a whole host of other things. [Naturally, this means that
the belief that Hegel knew what he was talking about in this area is about as
reliable as the average Christian 'miracle healing' video.] Nevertheless,
from what he actually wrote, Hegel clearly wanted to link
his 'contradictions' with the mis-identified ancestral contradictions he thought he had found in the
bowdlerised version of
AFL taught in the universities of his day, which he later mangled even
further. [On this, see Kenny (2006), pp.11-13.]
[However, having said
that, readers should note the caveats posted
here.]
Nevertheless, what the DM-classicists (and any who
have followed in their footsteps) still needed to show was that at least some
of the contradictions countenanced by FL were derivable from, implied by, or
reflected
"real material contradictions", otherwise there would be no good reason to call
their contradictions, "contradictions",
to begin with -- as opposed to calling them "bananas", for instance -- or, indeed, for claiming that the former
were
simply 'static' or 'abstract' versions of the latter.
If so, the rejection of one or more of
D1-D25
above on the grounds that they refer to or employ totally different
senses of the word "contradiction" -- and to such an extent that there is
absolutely no connection between FL-, and DL-contradictions -- would be to deny DM-theorists an important
conceptual innovation they inherited from Hegel (who, once again, didn't
claim his 'contradictions' were of a new type, just a 'dialectical' form of them). As we have seen, this innovation thus runs along the
following lines:
contradictions in thought (FL-style) mirror real contradictions in nature and
society (DL-style), howsoever badly or inadequately they are initially
comprehended, or howsoever much they are misperceived/misinterpreted. If
DM-theorists are right, the latter sort of contradiction -- the 'real' sort --
can only be described as such when they have been verified (in practice, etc.), given a 'dialectical'/'concrete' make-over, or
have been flipped the 'right way
up', etc., etc.
That is clearly what the following dialecticians are trying
to argue:
"Contradiction is the very moving principle of the
world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. The
only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the
matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when cancelled, does not leave
abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The
proximate result of opposition (when realised as contradiction) is the Ground,
which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposited to
elements in the completer notion." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence, §119.
Bold emphases added.]
"If, now, the first
determinations of reflection, namely, identity, difference and opposition, have
been put in the form of a law, still more should the determination into which
they pass as their truth, namely, contradiction, be grasped and enunciated as a
law: everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that
this law in contrast to the others expresses rather the truth and the
essential nature of things. The contradiction which makes its appearance in
opposition, is only the developed nothing that is contained in identity and that
appears in the expression that the law of identity says nothing. This
negation further determines itself into difference and opposition, which now is
the posited contradiction.
"But it is one of the
fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking
that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a
determination as identity; but in fact, if it were a question of grading the two
determinations and they had to be kept separate, then contradiction would have
to be taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence.
For as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple
immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and
vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it
that it moves, has an urge and activity.
"In the first place,
contradiction is usually kept aloof from things, from the sphere of being and of
truth generally; it is asserted that there is nothing that is contradictory.
Secondly, it is shifted into subjective reflection by which it is first posited
in the process of relating and comparing. But even in this reflection, it does
not really exist, for it is said that the contradictory cannot be
imagined or thought. Whether it occurs in actual things or in
reflective thinking, it ranks in general as a contingency, a kind of abnormality
and a passing paroxysm or sickness....
"Now as regards the assertion that
there is no contradiction, that it does not exist, this statement need not
cause us any concern; an absolute determination of essence must be present in
every experience, in everything actual, as in every notion. We made the same
remark above in connection with the infinite, which is the
contradiction as displayed in the sphere of being. But common experience itself
enunciates it when it says that at least there is a host of
contradictory things, contradictory arrangements, whose contradiction exists not
merely in an external reflection but in themselves. Further, it is not to be
taken merely as an abnormality which occurs only here and there, but is rather
the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all
self-movement, which consists solely in an exhibition of it. External,
sensuous movement itself is contradiction's immediate existence. Something
moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at
one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at
once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions
that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is
no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction
itself.
"Similarly, internal self-movement
proper, instinctive urge in general, (the appetite or nisus of
the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple essence), is nothing else but the
fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and
deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity
has no vitality, but the positive, being in its own self a negativity, goes
outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive
only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this
power to hold and endure the contradiction within it. But if an existent in its
positive determination is at the same time incapable of reaching beyond its
negative determination and holding the one firmly in the other, is incapable of
containing contradiction within it, then it is not the living unity itself, not
ground, but in the contradiction falls to the ground. Speculative thinking
consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it,
its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary
thinking, where its determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other
determinations or into nothing
"If the contradiction in
motion, instinctive urge, and the like, is masked for ordinary thinking, in the
simplicity of these determinations, contradiction is, on the other hand,
immediately represented in the determinations of relationship. The most
trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on
ad infinitum, all contain opposition in each term. That is
above, which is not below; 'above' is specifically just this, not to be
'below', and only is, in so far as there is a 'below'; and conversely,
each determination implies its opposite. Father is the other of son, and the son
the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other; and
at the same time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other; their
being is a single subsistence. The father also has an existence of his
own apart from the son-relationship; but then he is not father but simply man;
just as above and below, right and left, are each also a reflection-into-self
and are something apart from their relationship, but then only places in
general. Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in
the same respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each other
and are indifferent to one another. Ordinary thinking when it
passes over to the moment of the indifference of the determinations,
forgets their negative unity and so retains them merely as 'differents' in
general, in which determination right is no longer right, nor left left, etc.
But since it has, in fact, right and left before it, these determinations are
before it as self-negating, the one being in the other, and each in this unity
being not self-negating but indifferently for itself.
"Opposites, therefore, contain
contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to
one another. Ordinary thinking when it passes over to the moment of the
indifference of the determinations, forgets their negative unity and so
retains them merely as 'differents' in general, in which determination right is
no longer right, nor left left, etc. But since it has in fact right and left
before it, these determinations are before it as self-negating, the one being in
the other, and each in this unity being not self-negating but indifferently for
itself." [Hegel (1999),
pp.439-41, §955-§960.
Bold emphases alone added.]
"[S]o long as we consider things as at rest and
lifeless, each one by itself, alongside and after each other, we do not run up
against any contradictions in them. We find certain qualities which are partly
common to, partly different from, and even contradictory to each other, but
which in the last-mentioned case are distributed among different objects and
therefore contain no contradiction within. Inside the limits of this sphere of
observation we can get along on the basis of the usual, metaphysical mode of
thought. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in
their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one
another. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is
a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about
through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in
another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the
continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is
precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976),
p.152.]
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental
reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and
apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is
"yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For
him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be
itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another;
cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.
"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to
us very luminous,because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only
sound commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own
four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide
world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and
necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the
nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a
limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in
insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets
the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets
the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their
motion. It can't see the woods for the trees." [Ibid., p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphases added.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line
of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation."
[Ibid.,
p.179.]
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature….
[T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature,
and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of
nature." [Engels (1954),
p.211.]
"Two philosophical tendencies, the
metaphysical with fixed categories, the dialectical (Aristotle and especially
Hegel) with fluid categories; the proofs that these fixed opposites of basis and
consequence, cause and effect, identity and difference, appearance and essence
are untenable, that analysis shows one pole already present in the other in
nuce, that at a definite point the one pole becomes transformed into the
other, and that all logic develops only from these progressing
contradictions." [Ibid.,
pp.202-03.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Let us examine the matter
from another angle. The motion of matter lies at
the root of all natural phenomena. But what is motion? Here we have what seems
to be a contradiction. If you are asked whether a body that is in motion is
located at a particular place at a particular moment, you will be unable,
however hard you try, to give an answer using [the above rules].... A moving
body is at a particular place, and at the same time it is not there."
[Plekhanov (1908),
p.90.
Bold emphasis alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
"According to Hegel, dialectics is the
principle of all life. Frequently one meets people who, having expressed
some abstract proposition, willingly recognize that perhaps they are mistaken,
and that perhaps the exactly opposite point of view is correct. These are
well-bred people, saturated to their finger tips with 'tolerance': live
and let live, they say to their intellect. Dialectics has nothing in common with
the sceptical tolerance of men of the world, but it, too, knows how to reconcile
directly opposite abstract propositions. Man is mortal, we say, regarding death
as something rooted in external circumstances and quite alien to the nature of
living man. It follows that a man has two qualities: first of being alive, and
secondly of also being mortal. But upon closer investigation it turns out
that life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that
in general any phenomenon is contradictory, in the sense that it
develops out of itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to
its existence and will transform it into its own opposite. Everything flows,
everything changes; and there is no force capable of holding back this constant
flux, or arresting this eternal movement. There is no force capable of resisting
the dialectics of phenomena....
"At a particular moment a moving body is at a particular spot,
but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if it were only in
that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become motionless.
Every motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and as there is
not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do not have in the long
run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel, who said that dialectics
is the soul of any scientific cognition."
[Plekhanov (1974),
pp.539-40.
Bold emphases alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into everyother….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition of
its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of
the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in allphenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the
'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22,
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Motion is a contradiction, a unity of contradictions."
[Ibid.,
p.256.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego,
to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at
the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and
overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who
believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of
opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical
method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the
dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature
as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the
development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions
in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature....
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that
internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature,
for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future,
something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between
these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is
dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and
that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of
development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative
changes into qualitative changes.
"The dialectical method therefore holds that
the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a
harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions
inherent in things and phenomena, as a 'struggle' of opposite tendencies
which operate on the basis of these contradictions." [Stalin
(1976b), pp.836, 840.]
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only
do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given
conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full
meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed
'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what
conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another...'. Why is it
that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as
living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because
that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or
identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living,
conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every
contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite.... In speaking
of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is
real and concrete opposites and thereal and concrete transformations of
opposites into one another....
All
processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into
their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability
manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao
(1961b),
pp.340-42. Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"The law of
contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the
basic law of materialist dialectics.... As opposed to the
metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds
that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it
internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the
development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary
self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and
interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development
of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within
the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence
its motion and development.... The universality or
absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that
contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the
other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of
opposites exists from beginning to end...." [Ibid.,
pp.311-18.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
"This conception of all
existence as movement, process, is the fundamental condition for the
understanding of the dialectic. Only from this standpoint do the
contradictions and opposites, their struggle, their transformation and
conversion into one another, their inter-penetration, their dialectical
interaction become comprehensible. Those who see rigid entities before them and
have rigid concepts of them in their heads will find it impossible to
understand how the same thing can possess contradictory determinations or change
into its opposite. But to those who regard both things and their reflection
in our minds as processes, it will not seem strange that a process should
have contradictory tendencies, sides, elements which conflict with one
another, penetrate one another and change into the other...." [Rudas
(1933), pp.19-20. (This links to a PDF.) Bold emphasis added.]
"Another basic idea of Heraclitus is that this change of all things follows the
rule that
opposites always emerge from opposites;
that is, that this
change always takes place in the form of contradictions.
For this, too, he found a striking metaphorical expression: 'Conflict is the
father of all things.'
The conflict of opposites is the impulse to all change, to all development.
This is also a fundamental conception of dialectics,
and Heraclitus was able to express even this thought in very general fashion. He
applied it to the relation of Being and Non-Being. Heraclitus said that Being
and Non-Being, these two extreme opposites, come together in the concept of
Becoming. The thought is clear. A thing that is becoming is, and at the same
time is not, that thing. These two ideas are contained in Becoming. Otherwise
expressed: The nature of all things and processes consists of the togetherness
of opposites.
All things, in other words, are polar, are composed of opposites or
contradictions...."
[Thalheimer (1936), pp.73-74.]
"Formal logic,
which is based on abstract, or simple, identity (A equals A), is too
one-sided to explain this negation of one state of matter and its transformation
into its opposite, in this case the lifeless into the living, because it
excludes from its premises real difference and contradiction, which is the
extreme development of difference. But the unity of opposites (A equals
non-A), which makes contradiction explicit and intelligible, can explain this
transition, which actually occurred on earth. The emergence of life from the
nonliving in turn substantiates the objective basis in nature of this law of
concrete contradiction, a cornerstone of dialectical logic." [Novack (1978),
p.239
and
Novack (2002), p.196. (The second links to
a PDF.)]
"A view that is
often encountered among dialectical materialists is that formal logic is
applicable to static situations, but since, in reality, nothing is static,
formal logic is superseded by dialectical logic, which permits logical
contradictions. Within the framework of this view, thought is the appropriation
(in the mind) of the objectively existing material world, while dialectical
logic, that is, dialectics taken as logic, must be considered to be the laws of
thought (or correct thinking). Thus, in the approximation where things are
viewed as static, formal logic becomes the laws of
thought, equally in approximation. When, however, things are viewed in their
motion, change, and development, dialectical logic becomes properly the laws of
thought." [Marquit (1990), quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The elementary rules of
thought are taken for granted by most people. They are a familiar part of life,
and are reflected in many proverbs, such as 'you can't have your cake and
eat it' -- a most important lesson for any child to learn! At a certain
point, these rules were written down and systematised. This is the origin of
formal logic, for which Aristotle must take the credit, along with so many other
things. This was most valuable, since without a knowledge of the elementary
rules of logic, thought runs the risk of becoming incoherent. It is necessary to
distinguish black from white, and know the difference between a true statement
and one that is false. The value of formal logic is, therefore, not in question.
The problem is that the categories of formal logic, drawn from quite a limited
range of experience and observation, are really valid only within these limits.
They do, in fact, cover a great deal of everyday phenomena, but are quite
inadequate to deal with more complex processes, involving movement, turbulence,
contradiction, and the change from quality to quality....
"Formal
logic (which has acquired the force of popular prejudice in the form of 'common
sense') equally holds good for a whole series of everyday experiences. However,
the laws of formal logic, which set out from an essentially static view of
things, inevitably break down when dealing with more complex, changing and
contradictory phenomena. To use the language of chaos theory, the 'linear'
equations of formal logic cannot cope with the turbulent processes which can be
observed throughout nature, society and history. Only the dialectical method
will suffice for this purpose...."
[Woods and Grant
(1995/2007), p.83/pp.87-88; 94/99. Bold
emphases alone added. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Dialectics is the logic of
change.... To understand the
significance of this compare it with what is know as 'formal logic' (originally
developed by Aristotle and usually thought of as the rules of sound thinking).
The basic idea of formal logic is that something either is the case or is not
the case, but that it can't be both at the same time. For example, the cat is on
the mat or it is not on the mat. For many purposes formal
logic is useful and necessary. But as soon as you take movement and change into
account, it ceases to be adequate. A cat moving goes through a moment when it is
in the process of passing onto the mat or in the process of passing off it --
when it is both on and off the mat. Dialectics is in advance of formal logic
because it enables us to grasp this contradiction." [Molyneux (1987), pp.49-50.
Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]
"This matters because the
dominant mode of thinking, based on the logic developed by Aristotle, is not
founded on the principle of universal change, rather it deals with fixed states
or 'things'. Its basic axioms are that A = A (a thing is equal to itself) and A
does not = non-A (a thing is not equal to something other than itself), from
which are derived sequences of sound reasoning known as syllogisms.... This formal logic was, and
is, all well and good and very necessary for practical human affairs but it is
limited -- it excludes change. Dialectical logic moves beyond formal logic by
starting not with 'things' but with processes, processes of coming into being
and passing out of being. The moment processes of change are fed into the
equation it becomes necessary to deal with contradiction. If state A (e.g. day)
changes into state B (night) it passes through a phase of A not being A or being
both A and B (twilight)." [Molyneux,
'The
Marxist Dialectic'. Paragraphs merged; bold
emphases added.]
"His starting point is that
most people's ideas are shaped by a hotchpotch of differing and sometimes
contradictory notions. These flow from the interaction between people's
experiences and the prejudices of the society they live in. The hotchpotch is
what is usually referred to as common sense. But in fact it makes it
difficult for people to fully understand the forces shaping their lives and the
possibilities of confronting them. Activists who say they do not need theory,
and follow the dictates of common sense are, in reality, failing to take the
effort to understand the world and their place in it." [Chris Harman, quoted from
here. Bold emphasis added.]
"The
unity of opposites and contradiction.... The
scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond
its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions.
The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a
dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually
incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong
to each other.
"It is even more important to remember this point
when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process
of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one
can't find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change,
old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a
dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their
struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they
form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity
for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the
unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and
transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity
of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a
relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite
objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its
constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of
thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They
are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....
"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a
whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally
ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility,
contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next
stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common
basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not
correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites,
which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of
contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal
inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph.
They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development
produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new
ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a
network of contradictions." [Spirkin
(1983), pp.143-46. Bold
emphases alone added.]
None of the above would make sense if
DL-contradictions had absolutely nothing to do with FL-, or even ordinary-contradictions,
and were therefore totally unrelated to them.
Since FL-contradictions are the formal equivalent of
every conceivable contradiction (real or imagined), DM-theorists can't afford to
drive a wedge between them and their own. If they were to do that, they wouldn't also
be able to argue that thought mirrored the world (howsoever darkly, inadequately
or 'abstractly'), and with that a
central plank of DM-epistemology
would have vanished.
Indeed, that seems to be what Lenin was
trying to say:
"Hegel actually
proved that logical forms and laws are not an empty
shell, but the reflection of the objective world.... The laws of logic are the
reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.180, 183.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis alone added.]
Trotsky agreed:
"Hegel himself viewed
dialectics precisely as logic, as the science of the forms of human
cognition.... What does logic express? The
law of the external world or the law of consciousness? The question is posed
dualistically [and] therefore not correctly [for] the laws of logic express the
laws (rules, methods) of consciousness in its active relationship to the
external world.... Thought operates by its own
laws, which we can call the laws of logic...." [Trotsky (1986), pp.75, 87, 106.
Trotsky is apparently referring to Hegel's Introduction to The Science
of Logic (i.e., Hegel (1999),
pp.43-64.
Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
Anyway, D3 is merely a formal
version of the type of material contradiction we find in DM (i.e., D4/D4a). Since
D20
and D21 follow from D4/D4a,
the earlier pro-DM counter-claim itself fails.
D3: For at least one x, and at
least one y, for some time t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t. [Where "R" is a
relational expression, for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least
one mat,
for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
[D20: Therefore, TAR's
theoretical structure is defective.
D21: TAR's theoretical structure should be
rejected (by D5).]
At this point, it is worth reminding ourselves that
the theory that nature is contradictory isn't a minor, peripheral
or insignificant
aspect of DM. It is one of DM's core precepts, a consequence
of the doctrine that everything is a
UO
(in conjunction with the 'part-whole dialectic'). That is certainly how Rees viewed this
aspect of DM. [ See, for instance, Rees (1998a), pp.4-10; but also compare that
with
this.
In addition, check out the comments posted
here.]
It is also how DM-classicists,
like Engels, Lenin and Mao, for example, viewed this aspect of their theory.
For those who might think differently, here is Lenin
(again!):
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into everyother…. In brief,
dialectics can be defined as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition of
its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of
the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in allphenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the
'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22,
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Other DM-theorists, quoted extensively elsewhere in
this Essay and at this site (for example,
here), say more-or-less the same.
In that case, if DM is defective here, it means
it isdefective to the core.
Indeed, this turns out to be the
rotten, not the "rational", core of
Hegel's
sub-Aristotelian 'logic', which the
DM-classicists unwisely imported into the workers' movement.
No amount of spin can change that material fact.
Finally, the only other conceivable way of avoiding
the above
fatal conclusions would be to find fault with one or more of the assumptions
used (implicitly or explicitly) in
that earlier argument. However,
any further
probing of, or looking for, possible pre-DM-objections would involve the present author doing DM-theorists' work for them.
This is their
hole; they should try to dig their own way out of it.
[Several other issues associated with this specific topic
were examined in Essay Seven Part One,
here,
here and
here.]
[The following material used to appear in Note 45.]
In this major sub-section, I propose to examine the
DM-theory that everything in the entire universe is subject to constant change.
However, it should come as no surprise to those who have made it this far that,
beyond a few vague and endlessly repeated remarks, we are never really
told what DM-theorists actually mean by this!
Nevertheless, following Hegel, DM-theorists regard
Heraclitus as
the very first dialectician that we know of in the 'West' and hence the father of this
idea. Here are a few quotations from the DM-classics and 'lesser' works that
place his ideas right at the heart of this theory/method (unless otherwise stated, quotation marks have been altered to conform with
the
conventions adopted at this site; apologies
are once again owed the reader for the extremely repetitive nature of these passages, but there
are good reasons for
quoting them all, which were spelled out in Essays Seven
Part Three and Nine
Part Two):
"We see, therefore, at first the picture
as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the background;
we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the things that
move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but intrinsically
correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was
first clearly formulated by Heraclitus:
everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing,
constantly coming into being and passing away.... [The] new German philosophy culminated
in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great merit -- for
the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is
represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change, transformation,
development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal connection that
makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development."
[Engels (1892),
pp.405-08.
Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]
"When we consider and reflect upon
nature at large or the history of mankind or our own intellectual activity,
at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and
reactions in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything
moves, changes, comes into being and passes away. This primitive, naive but
intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus:everything is and
is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing,
constantly coming into being and passing away." [Engels (1976), p.24.
Bold emphasis added.]
"According
to Heraclitus 'all
things flow' (80)..., i.e., 'everything is Becoming.'" [Lenin (1961),
p.105.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
"Speaking of the materialist views of
the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all is
one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the rudiments of dialectical
materialism.'" [Stalin
(1976b), p.845. Bold emphasis
added.]
"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of
dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar
unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law
of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites.
This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the
law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is
based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites.
There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in
the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and
likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until
Hegel, however, was this law developed.
"This
law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to
their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that
things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All
fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or
development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and
absolute rest coincide. The proof [sic] of this part of the proposition,
namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of
Heraclitus." [Thalheimer (1936),
pp.170-71. Bold emphases added.]
"With Hegel dialectics began to become
self-conscious...; with Lenin dialectics becomes not only self-conscious but a
dialectics of realization in practice. The seed was present in Heraclitus...,
and the oak in Lenin. Philosophy was changing the world. The
unity (struggle, identity, interpenetration) of opposites reflects the dynamics
of reality, both natural and historical, and it is vital to see its
operation in today's frontiers of science and social practice...." [DeGrood
(1978), p.45. Bold emphasis alone added.
Paragraphs merged.]
"Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic co-existence of
opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life and motion.
That
was already understood by Heraclitus 2,500 years ago....
Thus, two and a half
millennia later, Heraclitus' principle 'everything flows' turns out to be true
-- literally. Here we have, not only a state of unceasing change and motion, but
also a process of universal interconnection, and the unity and interpenetration
of opposites....
It was Heraclitus, the father of dialectics, who understood
correctly the nature of time and change, when he wrote: 'everything is and is
not because everything is in flux' and 'we step and do not step in the same
stream, we are and are not'". [Woods
and Grant (2007), pp.69,101, 143-44. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.
The
whole of this book
has now been published on
one page
at the IMT (International Marxist Tendency) website, so if anyone wants to
locate this passage on-line, they will need to do a page search since the
link I have used only takes the reader to the top of that
very long page,
not the exact quote!]
"Opposition is universal.
Every process coexists with its opposite(Heraclitus): harmony and conflict,
asymmetry and symmetry, union and separation, positive and negative, male and
female.... If
opposition is universal in reality, then opposition must be included in
logic. In contrast, it is excluded by the principles of no contradiction
(nothing is A and no[t]-A) and of the excluded third (either A or no[t]-A).
Other formulations of logic dismiss the excluded middle...or allow the
coexistence of opposites....." [Quoted from here.
Bold emphases and two letter "t"s added. Paragraphs merged.]
"Heraclitis [sic] also said:'We are,
and are not', in this he is absolutely correct. As Frederick Engels states,
every organic being is every moment the same and not the same; every moment
it assimilates matter supplied from without, and gets rid of other matter; every
moment some cells of its body die and others build themselves anew. In a longer
or shorter time the matter of its body is completely renewed and is replaced by
other molecules of matter, so that every organic being is always itself, and yet
something other than itself....
"A strength of their theory [i.e.,
a theory invented by the Ancient Greek Atomists -- RL] is the recognition that
matter -- and in this case matter takes on the form of atoms -- has always
been, and always will be in motion. As Engels explains: 'Motion is the mode of
existence of matter.' Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor
can there be. Things change, disintegrate or enter into combinations in the
natural course of events; but in doing so they cease to be what they were. A
weather worn rock is no longer the same rock; metal which oxidises turns into
rust....
"The mode of outlook of the great
founders of philosophy and science (some of whom we have looked at) was the
view that the whole of the natural world, from the smallest element to the
greatest, from grains of sand to suns
had its existence in eternal coming into being and passing away, in ceaseless
flux, in unresting motion and change." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 24/10/2013.
Bold emphases added.]
"Dialectics
is the philosophy of motion. The dialectical method of analysis enables us to
study natural phenomena, the evolution of society and thought itself, as
processes of development based upon motion and contradiction. Everything is in a constant state of
flux and change; all reality is matter in motion. The roots of dialectical thought can be
traced back to the ancient Greeks who, just because their civilisation was not
yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature in its separate parts, viewed
nature as a whole, in its connections, dialectically. Nothing in life is
static. In the words of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus: 'All things
flow, all change.'...
"Based upon the laws of motion,
dialectics enables us to see things in their connection. Our bodies and our
thoughts are continually changing. From conception to death there is never a
moment when our physical development is still. Neither are our thoughts and
mental growth. We are always evolving our ideas.... Everything, which exists, does so
out of necessity. But everything perishes, only to be transformed into
something else. Thus what is ‘necessary’ in one time and place becomes
'unnecessary' in another. Everything creates its opposite, which is destined
to overcome and negate it." [Robin Clapp, quoted from
here. Accessed 30/12/2013.
Several paragraphs merged. Bold emphases added.]
"At the end
of the day, the world is not a collection of happenings unrelated to one
another. Everything is
interwoven and interconnected. We cannot look at phenomena in isolation;
we can only understand something if we understand its relation to other
things.... Much ado was made among Chinese
revolutionaries about how 'one divides into two.' Indeed, this is the most
important aspect of dialectics. All things contain contradictions.... The
fundamental point is this: all things are made up of two aspects which are
constantly in struggle with one another, and these struggling contradictions
make up a unified whole. When two aspects within a unified whole are
struggling against one another, we call this a 'unity of opposites' or
'dialectical unity.'...
"The world is constantly changing.
The direction of motion of something is fundamentally determined by the
interplay between the contradictions within that thing.... The way in which things move is from
quantitative change to qualitative change. A quantitative change is a
small, almost imperceptible change that does not alter the fundamental aspects
of something. A qualitative change is a sudden leap that changes the
essence of a thing. The world moves by accumulating quantitative changes, until
they accumulate to the point where a sudden, qualitative leap occurs.... Dialectics holds that all change
operates in this manner...." [Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.]
"[T]here is
a contradiction between the particle and its movement, between matter and
motion. This contradiction is at the heart
of our understanding of the universe because it is impossible to conceive of
matter without [it?]. All matter is in motion; the particles that make up
everything are constantly vibrating, moving and changing. The planet itself
is in constant motion around the sun, and our solar system is in constant motion
with the spinning of the Milky Way, which in turn is constantly moving in
relation to other galaxies.
"Heraclitus, the ancient Greek
philosopher, famously said that 'everything changes and nothing remains the
same' and that 'you can never step twice into the same stream'. It is the ideas
of ceaseless change, motion, interconnectedness and contradiction that define
dialectical thought. The philosopher
Zeno famously tried to illustrate how essential dialectical
thinking is to our understanding of the world by using
thought experiments. He poses the following: Imagine an arrow in
flight. At any one durationless instant in time (like the
freeze-frame in a film) the arrow is not moving to where it
is going to, nor is it moving to where it already is. Thus,
at every conceivable instant in time, there is no motion
occurring, so how does the arrow move?
"To answer this we
are forced to embrace what appears on the surface to be a
contradictory idea -- that the arrow is, at any one time, in
more than one place at once. This thought experiment
serves to highlight the contradictory nature of the movement
of matter in the world.
The German
philosopher Hegel further developed the dialectical in a
systematic form.
Instead trying to discard contradictions Hegel saw in them
the real impulse for all development. In fact Hegel saw
the interpenetration of opposites as one of the fundamental
characters of all phenomena. Hegel's philosophy is one of
interconnectedness where the means and the end, the cause
and the effect, are constantly changing place. It explains
progress in terms of struggle and contradiction, not a
straight line or an inevitable triumphal march forward."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.
Does the author of this passage really think that a contradiction makes
an arrow move, or provide it with an "impulse" to move?
Moreover, as we have already seen (here),
motion isn't the least bit 'contradictory'.]
"The first of the truly
dialectical thinkers to emerge in the Aegean region was
Heraclitus who lived from c 540-483 BCE and resided in
Ephesus in modern Turkey. His seminal idea about change
being a fundamental aspect of reality reflects the
intensified class struggle of this crucial era. He is
probably the best known of these Presocratic thinkers with
his famous aphorism that ‘you cannot step into the same
river twice’ frequently cited
even today. Heraclitus
explicitly rejected the existence of the gods and proposed
fire as the primordial element of the universe: 'This one
order of things was created by none of the gods, nor yet by
any of mankind, but it ever was, and is, and ever shall be
eternal fire-ignited by measure and extinguished by
measure.'
"His emphasis on strife or
conflict as an essential and ever-present factor in all
aspects of nature was a significant influence, centuries
later, on the thinking of Marx and Engels about the
centrality of class struggle in human societies.
Heraclitus writes: 'We must know that struggle is common to
all and strife is justice, and that all things come into
being and pass away through strife.' Lenin also hailed
Heraclitus as one of the trailblazers of dialectics for this
underscoring of how the clash of conflicting forces is the
dynamo of progress at all levels...." [Sean Ledwith,
quoted from
here; accessed
29/08/23. Link in the original; bold emphases added.]
[I have quoted dozens more passages like the above
in other Essays published at this site, especially Essay Two (and
again below).]
Here is what I argued in Essay Three
Part Two concerning 'Heraclitean Change' (in
response to several comments advanced by
Bertell Ollman):
Ollman now
offers his readers the following (highly clichéd, equally vague) remarks about
'change':
"Beginning with historical movement, Marx's preoccupation with change and
development is undisputed. What is less known, chiefly because it is less clear,
is how he thought about change, how he abstracted it, and how he integrated
these abstractions into his study of a changing world. The underlying problem is
as old as philosophy itself. The ancient Greek philosopher,
Heraclitus,
provides us with its classic statement when he asserts that a person cannot step
into the same river twice. Enough water has flowed between the two occasions so
that the river we step into the second time is not the same river we walked into
earlier. Yet our common sense tells us that it is, and our naming practice
reflects this view. The river is still called the 'Hudson', or the 'Rhine' or
the 'Ganges'. Heraclitus, of course, was not interested in rivers, but in
change. His point is that change goes on everywhere and all the time, but that
our manner of thinking about it is sadly inadequate. The flow, the constant
alteration of movement away from something and toward something else, is
generally missing. Usually, where change takes place very slowly or in very
small increments, its impact can be safely neglected. On the other hand,
depending on the context and on our purpose in it, even such change -- because
it occurs outside our attention -- may occasionally startle us and have grave
consequences for our lives." [Ollman (2003),
p.64.
Bold emphases and link added.]
Although Ollman
claims Marx "abstracted" change, he forgot to say exactly how or where he did
this, or even what it means to "abstract" change, in the first place. What is common to every
conceivable example of change? Ollman neglected to inform his readers about
that not insignificant detail, too.
Among
professional philosophers a perspicuous, non-trivial definition of change has yet
to be agreed upon (Mortensen
(2020)). An appeal to something called, 'Cambridge
Change' (a term coined by
Peter Geach, in
Geach (1968) pp.13-14, reprinted in Geach (1969), pp.71-72),
would also prove to be a dead
end, as we are about to find out.
Despite
this, we might still try to define change in the following way (along lines
suggested by 'Cambridge Change'):
W1: Let Γ
be the set of predicates 'true of' A at t1,
where A goes proxy for a singular term designating some object (with
"object" defined
as "anything to which a singular term can legitimately be applied" --
that might sound circular, but it isn't), and tm
is a temporal variable (for m
∈Z+).
[Z+
is the set of
Positive Integers and "∈"
stands for "belongs to".
The verb phrase "true of" has been put in scare quotes since Γ
will only be capable of being 'true of A' when both variables have been
interpreted. The same comment applies
to "false of", used below.] blik
W2: Let Γ
comprise the following elements: {P1,
P2,
P3..., Pi..., Pn-1, Pn}
(for n
∈
Z+).
[Where Pk
goes proxy for legitimate, distinct predicate expressions.]
W3: For A
to change, then, at a minimum:
(i) Let Pj
be 'true of' A at t2
and Pj
be 'false of' A at t1; or,
(ii) Let Pj
be 'false of' A at t2
and Pj
be
'true of' A at t1
(where t2>t1).
[Here, ">" stands for "later than",
and
Pj
∈Γ.]
[Colloquially, W3 reads as follows: At a minimum: (i) Let something be 'true of' A
at a later time that was 'false of' it earlier, or (ii) Let something be 'false of' A at a later time that was
'true of' it earlier.]
The problem
with this attempt to define change is that (what would rightly be regarded as) superficial relational predicates,
which become
'true of' A, will imply it had changed when it clearly hadn't done so.
So,
if the new predicate 'true of' A were "NN thought about
ξ",
yielding "NN thought about A" -- or the new predicate
that had been 'true of' A, but was now 'false of' A,
were "NM wrote about ζ",
yielding "NM wrote about A" --, then, while both of these would satisfy
the above definition, implying A had changed, they wouldn't actually mean A had
changed because of that. Otherwise we would have to argue that if someone began
to think about, say,
the
Crab Nebula, that would mean it had changed simply because someone on earth
had thought about it! Or that if someone else stopped writing about Engels at,
say, 12:13:27 on May 17, 2023,
when she had been writing about him a few seconds earlier, Engels himselfhad changed!
[The use of
Greek letters like those employed above was explained
here.]
Obviously,
this definition of "change" is unacceptable, but no one has come up with a better,
non-question-begging or generally accepted alternative. So,
despite what dictionaries might tell you, there is currently no
(philosophical) definition of change!
[I won't enter into why we
don't actually need a philosophical definition of change -- or even why one can't be
found no matter how hard we try -- in this Essay, or at this site.]
Now, it is
reasonably clear that Marx, genius though he was, didn't solve this 'problem', which has dogged
Traditional Thought for over two thousand years, but it is even clearer still that
Ollman hasn't, nor did he point his readers to where he thinks Marx
(or anyone else) might have
done so. In that case, the question remains: how is it possible to form an 'abstract concept of change',
if, after over two thousand years, we still lack a workable, or acceptable,
definition of 'it'? What can possibly have been 'abstracted' if we have no clear
idea what we are aiming for? Or even where to begin, for goodness sake!?
With that in
mind, we might further ask: Precisely which examples of change are we to count
as relevant? Which of them will settle where we can even begin to
'abstract' the supposed 'concept of change'? Are social changes to be lumped
together with changes in nature? Are local changes on this planet to be equated
with those halfway across the universe? Are recent changes to be associated with
those that took place billions of years ago, which we will never experience (or
even know about)?
Are complex and simple changes to be compared? Are the above examples
(of 'intentional/relational change') also to be taken into account in this respect? That is, those concerning A?
If someone simply mentions a distant galaxy, have they 'magically' changed it? What about
other instances of change? Does, say, a tree in Chicago change if an apple hits
the ground in Tokyo? According to DM-fans,
everything is
interconnected, so that tree must change if an apple falls somewhere
half-way across the globe. So, does the Sun change if you scratch your head? What
about someone -- call her, "NN" -- who is second in line in a queue
on the phone -- or she is on a waiting list for
a flat, college course or organ transplant --, and NM, who was
first in line ahead of her, drops out. NN will now be first in line, but has
she actually changed just because of that?
We might be
tempted to reply with a
firm "Yes" to some, or even all, of those questions -- but what
do they have in common with, say, a leaf changing colour, a child having her hair cut
or someone just thinking about Karl Marx? If
we can't say what these and many other examples one can think of have in common
(and which don't also allow the ridiculous conclusions we met earlier in
relation to A to be drawn),
what chance is there that there is an 'abstract concept of
change' that applies to every single instance of it, past, present and future?
Or, one that we are all equally capable, not just of arriving at, but agreeing
over? And then that each of us manages to 'abstract', separately, successfully,
and correctly 'in
our heads'?
[Bearing in
mind the fact that no sense can be made of a 'correct abstraction' in such
circumstances. (On that, see
here.) Moreover, these
problems won't go away by the simple expedient of ignoring them -- a tactic
beloved of DM-fans with whom I have debated such topics in the past. (I have covered
possibilities like these -- as well as those that involve the obscure
DM-concept, 'internal relations' --, in much more detail in Essay Eleven Parts
One and Two,
here
and here.)]
Be this as it may, we
saw in
Essay Six that
Heraclitus got
himself into a terrible mess over the criteria of identity for
mass nouns
and count
nouns in his attempt to 'show' that change was universal, based
solely on his
thoughts about stepping into a river! In relation to which we read the
following:
"Among the best-known fragments is Heraclitus' claim
usually given as 'one cannot step into the same river twice' which is actually
translated from the Greek as 'In the same river we both step and do not step, we
are and are not' meaning that, since the waters of a river are constantly in
motion, one cannot ever experience the same waters across one's feet.... In this
same way, life is also in constant motion and one should not expect any aspect
of it to remain still for one's personal pleasure." [Quoted from
here; accessed 14/08/2023. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Engels
concurred:
"When we consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of mankind or
our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless
entanglement of relations and reactions in which nothing remains what, where and
as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.
This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that
of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus:
everything is and is not, for everything is
fluid, is constantly
changing, constantly coming into being and passing away."
[Engels
(1976), p.24. Bold emphasis added.]
But,
Heraclitus had a legitimate excuse. He lived at a time when little was known
(let alone had been concluded) about this terminological difference.
Indeed, I have
been told that the distinction between mass and count nouns doesn't actually
exist in the Greek language. Nevertheless, even though I have yet to verify that
supposed fact, no Greek speaker would try to count cabbage or chalk,
although they would happily
count cabbage heads or sticks of chalk. Nor would they even attempt to
weighbodies (that isn't a typo!) when asked how many supporters were sat inside a coach
on their way to a UK Premier League football (soccer) match, but they would try to count
them. [Trite examples like these illustrate the stark difference between count
and mass nouns and how we all handle them in everyday life, irrespective
of any (philosophical) theories we might hold.] That excuse is no longer available,
so Ollman's breezy
conclusions (which were clearly based on little or no awareness of
contemporary work in this area -- follow the "mass noun" link above for more
details) are far
less easy to absolve.
Now, had Heraclitus said that it was
impossible to step into the same body of flowing water twice he might
have had a point. Despite what he did say, it is quite easy to step into the
same river. [On that, see
here.] Indeed, without
that
particular
option not even Heraclitus could test his own 'theory' (or even imagine such
a test being performed in his 'mind's eye'),
for he wouldn't be able to recognise the
same
river to test it on, let alone assert anything about it! And, of course, the word
river legitimately applies to bodies of water that typically flow, so
anyone using the word "river" would already knowthat they flow,
otherwise they would be
using that word with no comprehension of its meaning. In which case, Ollman is
mistaken when he says:
"The underlying problem is as old as philosophy itself. The ancient Greek
philosopher,
Heraclitus,
provides us with its classic statement when he asserts that a person cannot step
into the same river twice. Enough water has flowed between the two occasions so
that the river we step into the second time is not the same river we walked
into earlier. Yet our common sense tells us that it is, and our naming
practice reflects this view. The river is still called the 'Hudson', or the
'Rhine' or the 'Ganges'." [Op cit., bold added.]
But, if the
above bodies of water are called rivers, that implies they change and flow, and
naming them doesn't alter that fact. As if names can't be applied to
changing objects! Who thinks that calling a hurricane "Katrina"
means it doesn't change? Who in their left mind thinks that calling a huge
conflagration, "The
Camp Fire", means that it won't kill them if they don't get out
of its way? [Ollman sort of half admits this, anyway, below.]
[The
'relative stability' of language defence was neutralised in
Essay Six,
so there is little point anyone appealing to it.]
Nevertheless, Ollman nowhere even so much as
questions Heraclitus's semi-divine ability to extrapolate froma single observation about stepping into a river
to what must be true right
across the entire universe, for all of time!
Independently of the above, what sort of theory of change do these
Ancient Greek ideas imply? This sub-section is aimed at examining several possible answers to
questions like that. As we will soon discover, a less well appreciated, but no less disastrous,
consequence of the doctrine of universal change (when it is coupled with the
theory that everything is 'inter-connected') is that a much stronger and
patently false idea follows --, namely,
that every
proposition and its negation must be true!
That "much stronger claim" is, of course, far too
vague as it stands, and, perhaps worse, is untenable on logical grounds alone.
Even so, beyond a rather basic definition (outlined below) the
construction of a much more detailed and clearer version of it won't be attempted
here. That would be for me (again!) to do the work of DM-theorists themselves,
and I have done more than my fair share of that already. I will merely lay out the reasons for
asserting that the above claim (that every proposition and its negation must be
true) is just one of the paradoxical, if not disastrous,
implications of the (maximalist) theory of universal change (when it is
allied with the doctrine that everything is 'inter-connected', which it must be if
absolutely everythingisinter-linked,
including doctrines like this!).
Fortunately, the many criticisms of the theory of
universal change aired in this Essay don't actually depend on the stronger version
-- abbreviated below as MAH (or, on one interpretation, "Cratylean
Change", or
CRAC) -- accurately representing what
DM-theorists themselves mean by 'dialectical change'. [Why that is so should become
clearer as the next few sub-sections of this Essay unfold.]
Nevertheless, it looks like dialecticians
(especially those responsible for the DM-classics) must be -- and probably are
-- committed to some form of
MAH. We might perhaps call this version, "The Maximal Thesis", or CRAC,
once more, which we will (later) also contrast with its "Minimalist" cousin, MERD.
The meaning, significance and implications of
MAH/CRAC and MERD will now be explained in a little more detail
and then critically examined.
However, throughout the following discussion readers should
(again!) keep in mind the
fact that all this speculation has been forced on us since DM-theorists
refuse to provide anything other than the barest, flimsiest and most superficial details
concerning core aspects
of the theory of universal change they inherited from Heraclitus (via Hegel).
[What little
they have said -- and readers should be warned, it is as mind numbingly
repetitive
as it is sketchy -- has been
quoted at length in Essay Seven Part Three,
here.]
This is all the more remarkable when we recall
that DM is supposed to be the theory of change!
[This is a continuation of material that also used to be
in Note 45.]
MAH (a term initially introduced in the previous sub-section) implies
the following:
H2:
Everything about an
object or process constantly and ceaselessly changes in every
respect, remote or proximate.
To be more honest, this particular theory is more accurately to be attributed to
Cratylus (not
Heraclitus --
cf., Priest (2002), pp.11-16), and so is perhaps better labelled, CRAC.
Lenin accused Cratylus of reducing Heraclitus's
ideas to "sophistry", but he failed to say why that was
the case. [Cf., Lenin (1961),
p.343.] Apparently, for Lenin, anyone
who tried to expose the absurd consequences of any given DM-theory (in
this case, one that expressed ideas Heraclitus influenced, directly or
indirectly) was a "sophist". He clearly thought that
name-calling and prejudicial-labelling were legitimate and acceptable forms of
disputation.
Unfortunately, by so
doing he
helped initiate a dishonourable tradition among DM-fans that has filtered down to this day. In my experience, and that of many
others, the vast majority of 'dialecticians' have adopted
Lenin's approach and hence think that if they simply label a critic in a
derogatory or negative way (never mind if those labels are inaccurate!), that alone
constitutes an effective refutation of everything they have said. Because of
that, everything that they then go on to say
can safely be ignored.
[That certainly helps explain why I have
been called all the names under the sun (on that, see
here
and here). Not that I am complaining;
I expect it.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
Given the truth of classical-DM, one reason why
dialecticians might be tempted to accept
MAH/CRAC
is that it appears to be a direct consequence of the theory that everything is a
UO.
[Henceforth, I will just refer to MAH, but it should be understood I am
also including CRAC in this, unless otherwise stated.]
In that case, since everything (presumably) existsin time, everything must also be in
continual, even ceaseless, change. After all, DM-theorists tell us that everything in
existence is a unity of what is and what is
not, at every moment --
indeed, just as Trotsky also argued (we saw others make the same point earlier):
"[A]ll
bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal
to themselves." [Trotsky
(1971), p.63. Bold
emphasis added.]
Earlier, we also saw that this idea originated with
Heraclitus:
"Among the best-known fragments is Heraclitus' claim
usually given as 'one cannot step into the same river twice' which is actually
translated from the Greek as 'In the same river we both step and do not step,
we are and are not'...." [Quoted from
here; accessed 14/08/2023. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis added.]
Here follow a several passages from the DM-classics
and the writings of more recent dialecticians making the same point:
[Apologies are once again owed the reader for the mind-numbingly repetitive nature
of DM-theorising, but long
experience has taught me that unless chapter and verse are quoted (both
extensively and often, with many different sources cited in support),
dialecticians tend to deny their theory commits them
to these ridiculous ideas or their even more bizarre implications. Indeed, when only one or two
passages are quoted they claim they "aren't
representative". (Where applicable,
quotation marks have been
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.)]
Trotsky continued:
"A
sophist will respond that
a pound of sugar is equal to itself at 'any given moment'…. How should we really
conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a
pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable
changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero
of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted
process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of
existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to
itself if it does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Trotsky (1971),
p.64.
Bold emphasis added.]
Here is Hegel himself:
"Everything is grounded in this unity
of identity and non-identity, of one and another, of sameness and distinction,
of affirmation and negation. The absolute is essentially dialectical.
Dialectic is the essence of Being or Being as essence. Essence is the
sufficient ground of all that seems to be non-absolute or finite. A is
non-A:
The Absolute maintains itself in that which seems to escape it." [Hegel (1959),
p.120. Bold emphases alone added.]
Engels concurred:
"Abstract identity
(a = a; and negatively, a cannot be simultaneously equal and
unequal to a)is likewise inapplicable in organic nature.
The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life identical with
itself and yet becoming distinct from itself, by absorption and excretion of
substances, by respiration, by cell formation and death of cells, by the process
of circulation taking place, in short, by a sum of incessant molecular changes
which make up life and the sum-total of whose results is evident to our eyes in
the phases of life -- embryonic life, youth, sexual maturity, process of
reproduction, old age, death. The further physiology develops, the more
important for it become these incessant, infinitely small changes, and hence the
more important for it also the consideration of difference within
identity, and the old abstract standpoint of formal identity, that an organic
being is to be treated as something simply identical with itself, as something
constant, becomes out of date.
[In the margin of the manuscript occurs the remark: 'Apart, moreover, from the
evolution of species.'] Nevertheless, the mode of thought based thereon,
together with its categories, persists. But even in inorganic nature identity
as such is in reality non-existent.Every body is continually exposed to
mechanical, physical, and chemical influences, which are always changing it and
modifying its identity. Abstract identity, with its opposition to
difference, is in place only in mathematics -- an abstract science which is
concerned with creations of thought, even though they are reflections of
reality -- and even there it is continually being sublated. Hegel,
Enzyklopädie, I, p.235. [This is a reference to Hegel (1975),
pp.169-70, §117 -- RL.]
The fact that identity contains difference within itself is expressed in
every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from the
subject; the lily is a plant, the rose, is red,
where, either in the subject or in the predicate, there is something that
is not covered by the predicate or the subject. Hegel, p.231. [This is a
reference to Hegel (1975),
pp.166-68, §115 -- RL.] That from the
outset identity with itself requires
difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident.
"Continual change, i.e.,
sublation of abstract identity with itself, is also found in so-called inorganic
nature. Geology is its history. On the surface, mechanical changes
(denudation, frost), chemical changes (weathering); internally, mechanical
changes (pressure), heat (volcanic), chemical (water, acids, binding
substances); on a large scale – upheavals, earthquakes, etc. The slate of today
is fundamentally different from the ooze from which it is formed, the chalk from
the loose microscopic shells that compose it, even more so limestone, which
indeed according to some is of purely organic origin, and sandstone from the
loose sea sand, which again is derived from disintegrated granite, etc., not to
speak of coal.
"The law of identity
in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the old outlook: a =
a. Each thing is equal to itself. Everything was permanent, the
solar system, stars, organisms. This law has been refuted by natural science
bit by bit in each separate case, but theoretically it still prevails and is
still put forward by the supporters of the old in opposition to the new: a
thing cannot simultaneously be itself and something else. And yet the
fact that true, concrete identity includes difference, change, has recently been
shown in detail by natural science (see above).
"Abstract identity, like all metaphysical categories, suffices for everyday
use, where small dimensions or brief periods of time are in question; the limits
within which it is usable differ in almost every case and are determined by the
nature of the object; for a planetary system, where in ordinary astronomical
calculation the ellipse can be taken as the basic form for practical purposes
without error, they are much wider than for an insect that completes its
metamorphosis in a few weeks. (Give other examples, e.g., alteration of species,
which is reckoned in periods of thousands of years.) For natural science in
its comprehensive role, however, even in each single branch, abstract identity
is totally inadequate, and although on the whole it has now been abolished
in practice, theoretically it still dominates people’s minds, and most natural
scientists imagine that identity and difference are irreconcilable opposites,
instead of one-sided poles which represent the truth only in their reciprocal
action, in the inclusion of difference within identity." [Engels (1954),
pp.214-16.
Bold emphases alone added.]
So did Lenin:
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of
opposites.
This embodies the essence of dialectics...."
[Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
inallphenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
isabsolute, just as development and motion areabsolute…."
[Ibid.,
pp.357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]
Subsequent DM-theorists agreed:
"The laws of logic are based on two main
propositions. The first is that of identity or of self-conformity. The
proposition very simply states: 'A is A,' that is, every concept is equal to
itself. A man is a man; a hen is a hen; a potato is a potato. This proposition
forms one basis of logic. The second main proposition is the law of
contradiction, or as it is also called, the law of the excluded middle. This
proposition states: 'A is either A or not A.' It cannot be both at the
same time. For example: Whatever is black is black; it cannot at the same time
be black and white. A thing -- to put it in general terms -- cannot at the same
time be itself and its opposite. In practice it therefore follows that if I
draw certain conclusions from a given starting point and contradictions arise,
then there are errors in thinking or my starting point was wrong. If from some
correct premises I come to the conclusion that 4 is the same as 5, then I deduce
from the law of contradiction that my conclusion is false. So far all appears to be clear and
certain. What can be a clearer law than that man is man, a rooster a rooster,
that a thing is always the same thing? It even appears to be absolutely certain
that a thing is either large or small; either black or white, that it cannot be
both at the same time, that contradictions cannot exist in one and the same
thing.
"Let us now consider the matter from the standpoint of a higher doctrine of
thought, from the standpoint of dialectics. Let us take the first law which we
have developed as the foundation of logic: A is A. A thing is always the same
thing. Without testing this law, let us consider another one which we have
already mentioned, the law of Heraclitus which says 'Everything is in flux,' or
'One cannot ascend the same river twice.' Can we say that the river is always
the same? No, the law of Heraclitus says the opposite. The river is at no
moment the same. It is always changing. Thus one cannot twice nor, more
exactly, even once ascend the same river. In short: the law 'A is A' in the
last analysis is valid only if I assume that the thing does not change.
As soon as I consider the thing in its change, then A is always A and something
else; A is at the same time not-A. And this in the last analysis holds for all
things and events." [Thalheimer (1936),pp.88-89. Bold emphases added.
Several paragraphs merged.]
"There are three fundamental laws of
formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be
stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with
itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.... If a thing is always and under all
conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or
different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from
the law of identity. If A always equals A, it can never equal non-A." [
"Formal Logic starts from the
proposition that A is always equal to A. We know that this law of identity
contains some measure of truth…. Now…when we go to reality and look for evidence
of the truth of the proposition: A equals A…we find that the opposite of this
axiom is far closer to the truth. Now what do we find when we go to reality
and look for evidence of the truth of the proposition: A equals A? We discover
that nothing in reality corresponds perfectly to the content of this
proposition. On the contrary, we find that the opposite of this axiom is far
closer to the truth. Wherever we encounter some really existing thing and
examine its character, we find that A is never equal to A." [
"This gives us a clue to the true nature of A. A is not the simple fellow, the
fixed, unchangeable category the formal logicians make him out to be. That is
only one of the appearances of A. In reality A is extremely complex and
contradictory. It is not only A but also at the same time something else.
That makes A very elusive and slippery. We can never quite catch hold of A
because the minute we try to pin A down, it begins to change into something more
or less different.
"What then, you may ask in exasperation, is A, if it's not simply and solely A?
The dialectical answer is that A is both A and non-A. If you take A as
simply A and nothing more, as the formal logician does, you see only one side
of A and not its other side, its negative side. A, taken by itself as simply
A and nothing more, is an abstraction that can never be fully realised or found
in actuality. It is a useful abstraction so long as you understand its limits
and do not take it or, better, mistake it, for the full and final truth about
any given thing. This elementary law of identity holds good for most of the
ordinary acts of everyday life and thinking, but it must be replaced by more
deep-going and complex laws where more complicated and long-drawn-out processes
are involved." [Ibid.,
p.37. Bold emphases added. Novack is particularly snotty about
FL,
a subject he barely understands. I have
subjected this rather smug comrade's work (in this area) to searching and unflattering criticism in
Essay Four
Part One.]
"This law of identity of opposites,
which so perplexes and horrifies addicts of formal logic, can be easily
understood, not only when it is applied to actual processes of development and
interrelations of events, but also when it is contrasted with the formal law of
identity. It is logically true that A equals A, that John is John….
But it is far more profoundly true that A is also non-A. John is not simply
John: John is a man. This correct proposition is not an affirmation of
abstract identity, but an identification of opposites. The logical category
or material class, mankind, with which John is one and the same is far more and
other than John, the individual. Mankind is at the same time identical with, yet
different from John." [Ibid.,
p.92.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Formal logic,
which is based on abstract, or simple, identity (A equals A), is too
one-sided to explain this negation of one state of matter and its transformation
into its opposite, in this case the lifeless into the living, because it
excludes from its premises real difference and contradiction, which is the
extreme development of difference. But the unity of opposites (A equals
non-A), which makes contradiction explicit and intelligible, can explain this
transition, which actually occurred on earth. The emergence of life from the
nonliving in turn substantiates the objective basis in nature of this law of
concrete contradiction, a cornerstone of dialectical logic." [Novack (1978),
p.239
and
Novack (2002), p.196.
(This links to a PDF.)
Bold emphasis added.]
"A moment's reflection will allow us to conclude that
formal logic is characterised by the thought processes which consist of putting
motion, change, into parenthesis. All the laws enumerated above are true, so
long as we abstract from motion. A will remain A so long as it does not
change. A is different from non-A so long as it is not transformed into its
opposite. A and non-A exclude each other so long as there is no movement
which combines A and non-A, etc. These laws are obviously
insufficient if we consider the transformation of the chrysalid (sic) into the
butterfly, the passage of the adolescent into the adult, the movement of
life into death, the birth
of a new species or a new social order, the combination of two cells into
a new one, etc." [Mandel (1979),
pp.160-61. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The basic principles of this Aristotelian or formal
logic were the 'law of identity' and the 'law of non-contradiction'. The 'law of
identity' stated, in symbolic terms, that A is equal to A, or an ounce of gold
equals an ounce of gold, or, taking a unique object..., Leonardo da Vinci's
Mona Lisa is equal to Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa. The 'law of
non-contradiction' stated that A cannot be equal to non-A, it makes no sense to
say that an ounce of gold is not an ounce of gold or the Mona Lisa is not
the Mona Lisa. On the basis of these apparently 'obvious' propositions a
system of logic or sound reasoning was erected, exemplified by the syllogism."
[Molyneux (2012), p.43. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original.]
"This matters because the dominant mode of thinking, based on the logic
developed by Aristotle, is not founded on the principle of universal change,
rather it deals with fixed states or 'things'. Its basic axioms are that
A = A (a thing is equal to itself) and A does not = non-A (a thing is not equal
to something other than itself), from which are derived sequences of sound
reasoning known as syllogisms.... This formal logic was, and is, all well and
good and very necessary for practical human affairs but it is limited -- it
excludes change. Dialectical logic moves beyond formal logic by starting not
with 'things' but with processes, processes of coming into being and passing out
of being. The moment processes of change are fed into the equation it becomes
necessary to deal with contradiction. If state A (e.g. day) changes into
state B (night) it passes through a phase of A not being A or being both A and B
(twilight)." [Molyneux,
'The Marxist Dialectic'.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
"Looking one step further into this
matter, Hegel suggests that the relation of A to not-A is doubly negative.
Identity is established (not immediately given) through a negative relation to
not-A. A is itself in not being not-A.
But this negative relation to not-A
is itself negated. That is, the identity of A does not consist
solely in its being not-A, there is a 'return' to A again --
which Hegel calls 'reflection.' Thus 'A
is A' is not a tautologous (sic) repetition of A (as 'abstract
understanding' would have it) but an affirmation that has been made possible
only through a doubly negative movement, a 'negation of the negation.'" [Lawler
(1982),
p.22.
Bold
emphases alone added.]
"It is necessary to ask, first of
all, whether and in what sense the fact that A necessarily relates to
what is not-A permits us to insert not-A in A. Hegel is quite
explicit that this relation is not to be understood in such a way that the
results would be the blurring of all identities in a single monistic being
-- as he accuses Spinoza of doing: 'Substance, as the universal negative power,
is as it were a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite content as
radically null, and produces from itself nothing that has a positive substance
of its own.'" [Ibid., p.32, quoting
Hegel (1975),
§151,
p.215,
in the edition I have used, which seems to be different from Lawler's. Bold
emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.]
"If we grant that A's
identity involves its necessary relation to what is not-A, and that this
not-A is 'its own other' -- a definite other being and not any being
whatsoever -- and that this relation to some definite other is necessary for the
existence of A or is essential to the constitution of A (A's
identity), it seems reasonable to look for some 'imprint' of this 'other' in
A, so that in some sense not-A is internally constitutive of A....
In other words, to understand the internal nature of A it is necessary
to study the determinate not-A not only as a necessary external condition
but as 'reflected' in A. This is not to say that one should expect to
find in A some direct and immediate duplication of not-A. The
direct identity of A and not-A would constitute the annihilation
of the beings involved." [Ibid., pp.32-33.
Bold
emphases alone added.]
[I have quoted many more passages
like this that say more-or-less the same in Essay Eight
Part Three, and even more again,
below.]
So, it looks like the
earlier
quotations (about 'The Heraclitean Flux'), coupled with those
above, commit DM-theorists to an extreme interpretation of 'universal and dialectical
change', that is to the doctrine that every truth about -- or, perhaps, every property and
relation of the 'relevant' sort belonging to -- an object or process
continually and unceasingly changes in every respect.
Admittedly, what constitutes just such a 'truth, property
or relation' of the 'relevant' sort might
not always be
easy to specify (not that DM-theorists have bothered themselves too much
over clarifying
that important point, either!).
In light of the above there appear to be several
distinct possibilities:
[A] One form of MAH we
could perhaps call "ultra-MAH"
(UMAH,or even
UCRAC -- i.e., Ultra-Cratylean Change). This might include among the 'relevant' properties and
truths about an object or process those expressed by every
conceivably true predicative or relational proposition relevant to it (along
with their negations) -- even if the content of such propositions might represent
states of affairs/processes that aren't physically connected with the original
object or process, including those separated by vast expanses of
space and possibly even time.
Furthermore, every single one of these constantly and ceaselessly changes, in
every respect.
[In
Note 32,
we saw an echo of (a weaker version of) this alternative show up in Graham Priest's attempt to derive a minimalist
version of universal Heraclitean change from his consideration of the external relationships
enjoyed by moving bodies located at arbitrary distances from one another. That
material has now been moved here.]
Hence, UMAHmight implicate
(true) propositions like the following about, for instance, Tony Blair:
[Where the reference of the word "now" is made clear
-- for example, 10:45:36
GMT, Tuesday 18/10/2022. That caveat also
applies to every other occurrence of B1 and B2 in what follows.]
If UMAH were correct, Blair, so described,
would be subject to countless 'remote changes' (as it
were) involving the (assumed!) truth expressed in B1!
[Recall that in the DM-"Totality", everythingis
inter-connected and (possibly?) "mediates" everythingelse. Hence, any change,
no matter how remote, alters everything else in the entire universe -- ifUMAH
were true. The "far-too-remote-to-have-any-discernible-effect" defence was
neutralised
here.]
The above truth about Blair would then be 'dialectically
united' with, and hence would be turning into, its 'opposite' (or 'contradictory'), as
part of a remote UO of some sort -- perhaps involving this pair:
B2: Blair is now walking on Planet
Neptune.
B1: Blair is not now walking on Planet Neptune.
Quite alarmingly,an acceptance of UMAH
would commit DM-theorists to thetruth of B1 and B2! Or, perhaps
better, to the
co-existence of what they express. It would also mean
that innumerable other irrelevant 'truths' about Blair (as well as 'truths' about
everything else in
existence), along with their contradictories, would be true together, too
--, since they are all supposed to be UOs and hence must co-exist and be
inter-connected. As we saw in Essay Seven
Part Three,
if these opposites didn't co-exist, they could hardly cause change, hardly
'struggle' with one another. And if the weren't inter-connected, they couldn't
be part of "the Totality".
[The response that dialecticians, following
Hegel, hold that objects and processes are linked to a
unique
'other', not to countless 'others', and further, that these relations have to be
'internal' to that object or process, was shown to be untenable
here.
Anyway, this isn't what most DM-theorists actually argue, or even believe (follow the
previous link for more details). Nor is it what universal inter-connection
implies. What would be the point of insisting on the truth of that
doctrine if each object and process had only one 'other' with which it was
somehow inter-connected, and which influenced its development?]
Amazingly, given this view it would now
be true that, for example, George W Bush both is and isn't a leading member of
the Central Committee of the US
Communist Party. That is
because, while it is certainly true that George W Bush isn't a leading member of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the USA, he is also a UO, subject to change through contradiction
in every respect -- if UMAH and the
DM-classics are to be believed. On that
basis, this 'fact' about that international terrorist must be locked in struggle
with its 'dialectical opposite', its contradictory --, namely: George W Bush is
a leading member of the Central Committee of the US Communist Party. In that
case, the contradictory of "George W Bush isn't a leading member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the USA" -- namely, "George W Bush is a
leading member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USA" --
must now also be true!
If one or other of the above pair of sentences (and if the DM-theory of change is to be
believed) -- alongside the countless other pairs of contradictory sentences
relating to the 43rd President of the USA -- weren't the case, or if what all
those pairs express
failed to exist, George W Bush couldn't change!
Recall what UMAH commits DM-supporters to:
[A(1)]UMAH (or evenUCRAC) asserts that the 'relevant' properties and
truths about an object or process
include all those expressed by every conceivably true
predicative or relational proposition relevant to it(along with their
negations) -- even if the content of
such propositions might represent
states of affairs/processes that aren't physically connected with the original
object or process, including those separated by vast expanses of
space and possibly even time. Furthermore, every single one of these constantly and ceaselessly changes, in
every respect.
Given this sort of
'logic', Bush would be slowly (or rapidly(?)) turning into a leading Communist as a result of his own
'internal contradictions'! And then into a non-Communist, soon after! And then
back again...
Without doubt, this is a highly ridiculous and
totally implausible interpretation of DM, and yet it isn't easy to see how it might be
avoided given the content of the quotations given
above
(and
earlier, as well as
below)
-- especially when they are coupled with the DM-theory that everything
is a UO, is inter-connected with everything else and can only change as a result of
its 'internal contradictions'.
Hence, it would be extremely unfair to saddle even the most rabid CRAC-headed DM-supporter
with a commitment to UMAH, despite what their own words (and those of the
DM-classics) clearly imply!
What then about a much less extreme version of MAH?
The following alternative might prove to be a little more acceptable:
[B] A
slightly less
implausible version of MAH would commit its adherents to more specific or limited
ideas relating to the properties, dispositions or "determinations" that objects or
processes actually possess, or to which they are subject, and how they
all change. We might even call this version of MAH,
"chastened-MAH", or "cut-price-MAH" -- CMAH.
Unfortunately,
so characterised,
CMAH might end up ruling out of account the relations between objects and
processes (especially those far removed from 'the action', as it were). In
which case, these relations (etc.) might have to be re-admitted as part of the 'domain of
application' of this theory, maybe
even as an after-thought.
Otherwise, the unity and integrity of "the mediated Totality" would be
seriously compromised, leaving the doctrine of 'universal inter-connection'
mortally wounded.
Unfortunately, any re-admittance of the above considerations means that it might now be impossible to prevent
CMAH from inflating into some form of UMAH, especially
if contemporary DM-theorists hold on to the theory that everything is inter-connectedwith
everything else, which as we have seen implies that objects and processes affect, and are
affected in return by, other (possibly all?) remote objects and processes in the
entire universe.
In addition,
dialecticians will only be able to maintain a
commitment to that particular
theory if it actually is the case that all objects and processes in
existence are inter-linked (as UOs) to all other objects and processes
via those (mysterious) DM-'internal relations'. That is because that type of relation appears to be the only causal or
'connecting'/'mediating' principle DM makes available to its unfortunate
devotees. So, unless relations like that are included, it isn't easy to see how
everything in nature could actually be inter-connected with everything else
(as a UO, or whatever -- i.e., if we are ever told!).
For example,
referring back to an
earlier example, how would it be possible for Tony Blair to be connected
(as a UO)
with every single
atom in, say, the
Sombrero Galaxy? Undeniably, every such
atom is "not Blair", however,
the ease with which wecan attach a negative particle to anything
that is adjective-, adverb-, noun-, pronoun-, or verb-like (which often happens in
'dialectical'-circles -- hence all those "not-A's"
and "non-A's" that pop-up like weeds across the DM-literature)
appears
to be sufficient (even in
DM-terms) to turn any targeted object
or
process in existence, along with its supposed 'negation', into an inter-linked UO.
But, apart from the aforementioned
dialectical
CRAC-heads, who in their left mind would be prepared to swallow that one?
[Several obvious, and a few less obvious, objections
to this interpretation of DM (i.e., that DM-fans are only too ready to glue a pre-fixing
negative particle to a given noun, pronoun, adjective, adverb or verb -- yielding all
those not-As and non-As, again -- in order
to magic into existence a 'dialectical opposite' as and when one is
required) were neutralised in Essay Eight
Part Three.]
Admittedly, there are DM-theorists who, in order to
circumvent this 'difficulty', try to appeal to 'external
contradictions', but even
'external contradictions' are (presumably?) the result of still wider UOs at work in nature
and society, or in a given system, about which we might currently know nothing. If so, and if everything
is
inter-connected, then everything must be part of some-UO-or-other-in-relation-to-something-else,
which would in turn mean that 'external contradictions' are in the end simply misperceived, or
even mis-described, 'internal contradictions' of some sort or description (indeed, as was argued
in Essay Eight
Part One).
Who can say?Certainly not DM-supporters.
They tend to throw in the towel or lob the word "pedantry"
(or even "semantics") at anyone who raises 'unhelpful'/'awkward' questions like these. Or, and perhaps far more likely,
they will simply accuse such unwelcome and annoying critics of not "understanding"
dialectics (even though their incapacity to respond effectively to questions
like this suggests they, too, don't "understand" dialectics!).
Failing that, the 'nefarious' or 'underhand' motives of such bothersome critics
will be
called into question.
[Anyway, as we saw in
Essays Eight
Part One and Seven
Part One, there is a serious (and
possibly even terminal) equivocation concerning the distinction between
'internal-' and 'external-contradictions' lying at the heart of DM, which
hides yet another
'DM-self-destruct-button'.]
Nevertheless, assuming that the above
catastrophic slide into some form of UMAH can be halted, side-stepped or
avoided in some way, CMAH faces serious problems of its own, not
the least
of which concerns the rate and extent of the changes that objects and processes
are supposed to undergo or experience.
For example,ifCMAH
commits DM-theorists to the belief that every property
belonging to an object or process changes into its opposite, instantaneously and all the
time (even if we exclude for now 'remote' properties and/or relations of the sort
mentioned earlier,
in connection with Tony Blair, for instance), humanity would face a pretty odd
sort of universe. While it might be a world with which Cratylus himself would
have been happy, it would be (patently!) incompatible with
experience. That is because if CMAH were true, anddespite appearances
to the contrary, Leopards, for example, would not only lose and
regain their spots countless thousand times a day, they would also sit and
stand, run and walk, wake and sleep, eat and regurgitate, defecate and...,
er..., run forwards and backwards, die and be re-born -- in addition to
countless other quasi-miraculous transformations performed 'dialectically', all at the same time, equally
often, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, until they eventually died from sheer
exhaustion. Even then this 'law' wouldn't be finished with them since they would
then come back to life again as
each one continued to turn into its opposite, a live
leopard!
Indeed, the above scenario seems to be the implication of the
following remarks by Lenin and Trotsky:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into everyother…."
[Lenin (1961),
p.222. Emphases in the original.]
"[A]ll
bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal
to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself
at 'any given moment'…. How should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it
is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during
the course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely
mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in
time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time
is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal
to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is
if it does not exist." [Trotsky
(1971), pp.63-64. Bold
emphases added.]
But, if these untoward implications are to
be ruled out -- as surely they must --, it is difficult to see how that
might be done by anyone who agrees with the DM-passages quoted
above,
earlier
and
below,
or, for that matter, by anyone impressed by the 'logic' one finds in Hegel's
writings -- not to mention those who agree with the rather odd ideas bequeathed to
humanity by
Heraclitus himself.
However, if the whole of reality
(from apples to archipelagos, bats to beer mats, earwigs to elephants, galaxies
to gorillas, mountains to muons, along with their properties) is
cram-packed full of interacting UOs, and are therefore all subject to ceaseless changes (that involve them in the transition "of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every
other...." -- according to Lenin), which objects and processes must also
include those listed a few paragraphs back (concerning the
'dialectical-antics' of Leopards). If such busy objects are part of
"everything" -- or if, according to Trotsky, they just exist -- it isn't easy to see how or why 'dialectical Leopards', for instance, shouldn't
constantly change their spots all day long, flickering away like badly-tuned
television sets.
And much else besides.
Of course, there is an obvious -- but,
nonetheless,
ill-advised -- reply that could be made to such 'dialectical difficulties', which might run along the
following lines:
H3:
Dialecticians are only committed to contradictions that can
actuallybeshownto exist in nature and society.
But, even if it were true that DM-theorists
were only committed
to, or interested in, 'contradictions' that are known or which can be shown to exist
(in nature and society),
it would be irrelevant. Presumably,
'reality' is what it is
independent of our knowledge of it. In that case, if, according to
DM-theorists themselves, everything is
both
inter-connected and a UO (or is part of a UO), the actual confirmation of
any such all-embracing 'contradictions' wouldn't
be necessary. And that isn't just because dialecticians already accept
the theory of universal inter-connection and the ubiquitous existence of UOs. The problem is that if
absolutelyeverythingisinter-connected and is
also a UO, that must surely apply to statements about 'reality',
too. They must also be
inter-connected with the rest of 'reality'. So, if the
DM-mantra about
parts and wholes is to be believed, the complete nature
of such statements
would be determined by their relation(s) with 'the Whole', and
vice versa. In turn, that would appear to mean they couldn't in fact be
false, but must be true in some respect or to some extent. If so, they don't
need to be checked against the facts. They can't fail to be true!
The bottom line here appears to be that if
everything is subject to constant change, and everything is
a UO, the world must be full of 'contradictions' whether we
confirm their existence or not.
Of course, everything might not
be inter-connected, just as everything might not be a UO (or part of one) -- or even subject to
constant change --, but the
actual failure on the part of dialecticians to confirm these
maximally-universalist aspects of their theory hasn't in any way stopped them from
asserting (with supreme confidence) the truth of these and
countless other dogmatic, all-embracing ideas. The latter are
dependent upon the core (maximalist) theory being true: that everything is, or is part of, a UO and everything is inter-connected with
everything else, subject to interminable, universal change.
And, we can now see why
that
represents
an accurate interpretation: DM theorists who
accept the inter-connectedness of nature needn'tactually look for
any evidence in support of their hyper-bold, universalist theory. As noted earlier, if everything is inter-connected
with everything else, any sentence
about the universe, no matter how incorrect it might seem, must also be
inter-connected with everything and so can't be totally 'incorrect'. It must be
'partially' or 'relatively' true in some respect or to some extent. [We saw that
that was, indeed, the case,
earlier.]
Here is Lenin's
'argument' to that effect (once again: Lenin didn't derive the content of the
following thoughts or establish their veracity via a scientific examination of the evidence.
He did so as a result of studying Hegel's Logic(!), aided by the latter's
highly superficial 'analysis' of a limited range of subject-predicate
sentences (the bogus nature of which was exposed in Essay Three
Part One):
"To begin with what is the simplest, most
ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition: the leaves of
a tree are green; John
is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal.The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with
other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc.
Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity,
of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and
the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we
disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence
from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledgein general. And natural science shows us (and here again it
must be demonstrated in any simple instance) objective nature with
the same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the universal, of
the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal
connection of opposites. Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel
and) Marxism. This is the 'aspect' of the matter (it is not 'an aspect' but the essence of
the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no
attention." [Lenin (1961),
pp.359-60. Italic emphases in the original;
some bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Engels had earlier advanced similar ideas:
"The identity of thinking and being, to
use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and
the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run
side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never
meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents
the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being
immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the
concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with
reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is
nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of
thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously,
and even then approaching it only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of
concept and phenomenon manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and
that is what it is, in this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt
(12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), pp.457-58, and Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64.
Bold emphases added.]
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.233-35.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
"Abstract
identity
(a=a; and negatively, a cannot be
simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in
organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life
identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself.... The fact that identity contains difference within itself is
expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from
the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red,
where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not
covered by the predicate or the subject…. That from the outset identity with
itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is
self-evident." [Ibid.,
pp.214-15.
Italic emphases in the original; bold added.]
[Hegel's comments to this effect were again covered in
Essay Three Part One (link above).]
All three theorists openly employed highly dubious,
purely 'linguistic' or 'semantic' arguments
in order to 'derive' these universal (or near universal) conclusions.
Thus, at least as far as Hegel, Engels and Lenin were concerned, it seems that
maximal inter-connectedness actually mediates, or even engineers, its own
discovery (and veracity!), communicated only to those who have the eyes to see
and the will to believe, or those who are capable of processing
such 'revelatory logic' that is somehow buried in all our subject-predicate sentences
--, which links
everything with everything else,including such
discoveries! These universal truths follow from language alone and require
no evidence their support. As Lenin himself admitted:
"This aspect of dialectics…usually
receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum
total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and
as a law of the objective world)." [Ibid.,
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added.]
So it
seems that
the need to provide evidence is a distraction, one
that dedicated dialecticians should rightly eschew. In this particular case, the
thesis that UOs exist everywhere in nature and society, and which govern every
single instance of change right across the universe, for all of time, since it
expresses a "law of cognition", a "law of the objective world", and
it is these "laws" that legitimise and justify the imposition of dialectical dogma on nature. Indeed, here is
Herbert Marcuse endorsing this a priori approach to knowledge:
"The doctrine of Essence seeks to
liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that
appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of
dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the
apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Minor typo corrected.
Bold emphasis added.]
'Observable facts' just get in the way of these dogmatists!
C L R James clearly agreed;
according to him,
even to ask for
any sort of proof of the 'dialectic' is
misguided:
"Hegel defines the principle of
Contradiction as follows:
'Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as
it contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.'
[Hegel (1999),
p.439, §956.]
"The first thing to note is that
Hegel makes little attempt to prove this. A few lines later he says:
'With regard to the assertion that
contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this
statement.'
"We here meet one of the most important
principles of the dialectical logic, and one that has been consistently
misunderstood, vilified or lied about. Dialectic for Hegel was a strictly
scientific method. He might speak of inevitable laws, but he insists from the
beginning that the proof of dialectic as scientific method is that the laws
prove their correspondence with reality. Marx's dialectic is of the same
character. Thus he excluded what later became The Critique of Political
Economy from Capital because it took for granted what only the
detailed argument and logical development of Capital could prove. Still
more specifically, in his famous letter to Kugelmann on the theory of value, he
ridiculed the idea of having to 'prove' the labour theory of value. If the
labour theory of value proved to be the means whereby the real relations of
bourgeois society could be demonstrated in their movement, where they came from,
what they were, and where they were going, that was the proof of the theory.
Neither Hegel nor Marx understood any other scientific proof.
"To ask for some proof of the laws,
as
Burnham implied, or to prove them 'wrong' as
Sidney Hook tried to do, this
is to misconceive dialectical logic entirely. Hegel complicated the question
by his search for a completely closed system embracing all aspects of the
universe; this no Marxist ever did (sic!). The frantic shrieks that Marx's dialectic is
some sort of religion or teleological construction, proving inevitably the
victory of socialism, spring usually from men who are frantically defending the
inevitability of bourgeois democracy against the proletarian revolution." [James
(1947), quoted from
here. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Links added.]
As I go on to argue in
Essay Two (slightly edited):
Another
DM-fan -- David DeGrood -- partially quoted the above
passage (by Marcuse) with approval:
"To take each and every quality
displayed by an object or even at face value would necessarily mean that neither
a scientific nor a philosophic account could be given of it.
"[Added in a footnote:] As Herbert Marcuse explains: 'The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of "observable facts"....'
Such an
anti-positivist, anti-phenomenalist, Hegelian conception of essence has been
continuously relied upon by Marxist philosophers ever since. The doctrine of
essence is a fundamental one. A [quotation] from
Mao Tse-Tung [is a] striking
confirmation of this: 'When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and
treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and once we cross the
threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and
scientific method of analysis.'
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1966),
p.213." [DeGrood (1976),
p.73. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.
Bold emphasis added.]
Neither DeGrood nor Marcuse (and, it must be said, this includes Hegel) bothered to prove
(or even provide so much as a weak argument in support of the
ancient idea) that
'essence' is anything other than an invention, a figment of the overheated
metaphysical mind -- or, indeed, substantiate the theory that anything in the universe actually has an 'essence'.
As noted in the
opening section of this Essay,
the invention of words like "essence" -- creations of the Ancient Greek fantasy
--, was the result of a verbal trick that 'allows' contemporary dialecticians to ignore the deliverances of
their senses, and hence impose their a priori dogmas on nature and
society.
DeGrood also failed to say what he thought of Engels's declaration that DM shouldn't
be imposed on nature (his words are quoted again below), and that is probably
because he (DeGrood) spends much of his time doing just that, appealing to the
following Idealist excuse to cover his rear:
"'The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate
knowledge from the worship of "observable facts"....' Such an anti-positivist,
anti-phenomenalist, Hegelian conception of essence has been continuously relied
upon by Marxist philosophers ever since." [Ibid.]
It
could be objected that this misrepresents the above argument. What Hegel,
DeGrood and Marcuse are arguing is that science and philosophy can't just
examine surface appearances, but must investigate underlying patterns and
general laws that reveal the essential nature of 'reality', as opposed to those
accidental, surface appearances.
I
will say more about that topic in Essay Three Parts One and Two, where I reveal:
Suffice it to say here that the above
response (volunteered on behalf of DM-theorists) fails to tell us how
they are able to 'see' things
the rest of us can't -- i.e., they seem to be able to spot these mythical 'essences'
with consummate ease. Do they possess a 'third
eye'? Are they specially gifted? How is this unexplained 'ability' (i.e.,
the capacity to 'see' what the rest of humanity can't) any different from
imposing dialectics on nature?
Recall what Engels, Maurice Cornforth, and George Novack had to say:
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
It
could be argued that scientists regularly make general statements about reality,
so why aren't they guilty of apriorism and dogmatism? [On that, see
Note 3, below.] More
will be said about the difference between science and Dogmatic Metaphysics (of
the sort indulged in by dialecticians) in Essays Twelve Part One and Thirteen Part Two (the latter of which will be wholly
devoted to DM and science, and will be published in 2025).
Again, suffice it to say here that only those scientists who are intent on promoting
their version of amateur metaphysics (which often surfaces in their attempt to write
popular science) will even bother to mention 'essences', let alone
come out with the sort of things Hegel, Marcuse and DeGrood inflict on their
readers. [I
have said more about that in Essay Four Part One,
here and
here.]
This
is quite apart from the additional fact that DM-fans have yet to prove -- or
even provide a weak argument in support of -- the ancient idea that 'essence'
even exists. It appears to be as elusive as 'God'.
Finally, this a priori approach to knowledge sits rather awkwardly with what
both Marx and Engels had to
say about scientific proof.
This helps explain how 'universal truths' like these
have been 'revealed' to
countless mystics
since the dawn of time, when
such
gnomic pronouncements didn't
require any supporting evidence -- nor was any sought -- just 'divine inspiration'/'revelation', fortified by
no little 'word magic' and several scoops of human
gullibility, duplicity and, yes, even avarice.
Readers should note that in the
passages quoted
earlier, Engels and Lenin both linked false sentenceswith the rest
of the universe! Here, for example, is Lenin, who pointedly failed to distinguish true from false
propositions (in this respect):
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary,
common, etc., [sic] with anyproposition: the leaves of a
tree are green; John
is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961),
p.359.
Bold emphases alone added.]
Engels did likewise:
"The fact that identity contains difference within itself is
expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from
the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red,
where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not
covered by the predicate or the subject...." [Engels (1954),
pp.214-15.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
As might be expected, they both imported these
rather odd ideas from Hegel:
"The interpretation of the judgment, according to
which it is assumed to be merely subjective, as if we ascribed a predicate to a
subject is contradicted by the decidedly objective expression of the judgment.
The rose is red; Gold is a metal. It is not by us that something is first
ascribed to them. A judgment is however distinguished from a proposition. The
latter contains a statement about the subject, which does not stand to it in any
universal relationship, but expresses some single action, or some state, or the
like. Thus, 'Caesar was born at Rome in such and such a year waged war in Gaul
for ten years, crossed the Rubicon, etc.', are propositions, but not judgments.
Again it is absurd to say that such statements as 'I slept well last night' or
'Present arms!' may be turned into the form of a judgment. 'A carriage is passing
by' should be a judgment, and a subjective one at best, only if it were
doubtful, whether the passing object was a carriage, or whether it and not
rather the point of observation was in motion: in short, only if it were desired
to specify a conception which was still short of appropriate specification....
"The abstract terms of the judgement, 'The
individual is the universal', present the subject (as negatively self-relating)
as what is immediately concrete, while the predicate is what is
abstract, indeterminate, in short the universal. But the two elements are
connected together by an 'is': and thus the predicate (in its universality) must
contain the speciality of the subject, must, in short, have particularity: and
so is realised the identity between subject and predicate; which being thus
unaffected by this difference in form, is the content." [Hegel (1975),
p.233,
§167. Bold emphases alone
added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"To say 'This rose is red'
involves (in virtue of the copula 'is') the coincidence of subject and
predicate. The rose however is a concrete thing, and so is not red only: it has
also an odour, a specific form, and many other features not implied in the
predicate red. The predicate on its part is an abstract universal, and
does not apply to the rose alone. There are other flowers and other objects
which are red too. The subject and predicate in the immediate judgment touch, as
it were, only in a single point, but do not cover each other.... In pronouncing
an action to be good, we frame a notional judgment. Here, as we at once
perceive, there is a closer and a more intimate relation than in the immediate
judgment. The predicate in the latter is some abstract quality which may or
may not be applied to the subject. In the judgment of the notion the
predicate is, as it were, the soul of the subject, by which the subject, as the
body of this soul, is characterised through and through." [Ibid., p.237, §172. Bold emphases added.
Hegel's longer, more involved and hence much more opaque version of the above
'argument' -- published in Hegel (1999),
pp.631-43
-- has been quoted in full in
Appendix A to Essay Three Part One.]
Lenin speaks about "any proposition",
while Engels
talks about "every sentence". This can only mean that they think that even false propositions/sentences reveal supposedly
fundamental truths about reality. The leaves on many trees aren't green and
many roses aren't red, but that didn't affect the point Lenin and Engels were trying to
make, which is that fundamental truths about reality follow from the
structure of language alone.
Figures Eleven And Twelve: "The
Rose Is Red"
Figure Thirteen: "The Leaves Of A
Tree Are Green"
In that case, if Hegel, Engels and Lenin are to be
believed, in some sense falsehoods must also
be 'true', and must be capable of revealing 'deep truths about reality'!
That being so, all three (Hegel, Engels and Lenin) clearly thought that
these aspects of 'dialectics' (i.e., the ubiquitous
existence of UOs and universal inter-connection) areconfirmed in and by each and every subject-predicate sentence, whether or not
they were true -- and whether or not there is any scientific evidence in
their favour!
As we also saw in Essay Three
Part
One, Lenin also thought that the structure of subject-predicate
sentences revealed an entire range of 'dialectical truths/laws' (such as
universal interconnection, necessity, appearance versus essence, etc.):
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc.,
with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a
dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised):
the individual is the universal.... Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with
other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we
have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection
in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the
phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a
dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes
as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the
one to the other. Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a
“nucleus” (“cell”) the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show
that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. And natural
science shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in any simple instance)
objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the individual
into the universal, of the contingent into the necessary, transitions,
modulations, and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics is the
theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism." [
[Lenin (1961),
pp.359-60.
Paragraphs merged. Original emphases have been removed and bold emphasis added.]
Of course, this means DM is
a
self-validating theory -- indeed, according to Lenin dialectics is a
"property of all human knowledge", and Engels assures it is "self-evident"
-- and whatever is "self-evident" clearly needs no evidence in support:
"Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961),
p.359. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"That from the outset identity with
itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is
self-evident." [Engels (1954),
p.215.
Italic emphases in the original; bold added.]
In that case, it is clear that dogmatic apriorism is an
in-built
consequence of
DL-, and DM-Wholism.
[DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Which is, of course, why Lenin called these
DM-precepts, "law(s) of cognition",
and (once more) Engels declared they were "self-evident"; they need no
evidence in support
since they follow from language and thought alone.
"This aspect of dialectics…usually receives
inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective
world)." [Lenin (1961),
p.357.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
As we saw earlier, based on the above it is no
surprise to see that Lenin, DeGrood, James and Marcuse
openly criticise those who actually looked for, or required, evidence in support of this
'theory/'method' (despite
what other DM-theorists have to say -- i.e., that evidence must
be sought!).
In response, it could be countered that just because
everything is inter-connected that doesn't mean every proposition is true
(in some sense or other).
Perhaps not, but the above quotes show that Engels, Lenin
and Hegel certainly believed that that was the case at a deep level in
connection with
subject-predicate propositions/sentences. If every proposition/sentence
(of that type) is
logically connected with its contradictory, as we saw was the case with B1
and B2:
B1: Blair is not now walking
on Planet Neptune;
B2: Blair is now walking on Planet Neptune,
then, if one is false, the other must be true. However, if
propositions/sentences like these are 'dialectically inter-connected' (as UOs),
they must both actually be true, or, alternatively, the contradictory situations they supposedly
'reflect' must both exist!
We have already seen that the following two
propositions/sentences are regarded exactly that way by dialecticians:
V1: Moving object, O, is located at (x1,
y1,
z1,
t1).
V2: Moving object, O, isn't located at (x1,
y1,
z1,
t1).
Following on from Hegel and Engels, DM-fans certainly
believe both V1 and V2 are true.
On the other hand, if
it turns out that propositions/sentences aren't inter-connected
(or, rather, if it turns out that whatever 'contradictory' processes or situations they supposedly
represent or reflect aren't inter-connected), then not everything in realityisinter-linked,
not everything is a UO, or not everything is both. If either or both
of the latter were the case, DM
would suffer a different but no less catastrophic body blow.
Hence, without some pretty radical surgery, the theory that
everything is:
(i) A UO;
(ii) Part of an inter-connected
"Totality"; and,
(iii) Subject to constant
change through 'internal contradiction',
the earlier conclusion (that, for example, not only should every Leopard flash on and off
all day long, but die and come back to life with alarming rapidity -- like some
sort of feline
Lazarus
on
Speed), seems inevitable. So, these
three dialectical doctrines threaten the viability of DM itself.
Another obvious objection that could be advanced
against the above material is that DM can't be saddled with such an extreme interpretation because it is inconsistent with
experience. Since DM is
predicated on the collective experience of humankind,
the above material doesn't just represent a patently ridiculous misconstrual of DM, they are
a figment of Ms Lichtenstein's imagination.
Or, so it might be argued...
That would indeed have been a cogent response had
it been made byanyoneotherthan a DM-fan (that
is, should any
of them choose to avail themselves of it). However, since dialecticians never tire of telling us that
appearances are contradicted by underlying 'essence' -- which
naturally means that
'superficial appearances' are deceptive (even if they only succeed in fooling
those who don't 'understand' dialectics), they are in no position to claim their
theory is based on humanity's collective experience. For them, in the final analysis,
'commonsense' can't be trusted, especially in areas linked in with 'philosophical'/scientific
inquiry, and especially in relation to problems connected with change and development. This shows that despite what they
might
say, dialecticians don't actually rely on experience. In fact,
they begin by
undermining it!
For DM-fans, since 'appearances' aren't
really real, neither are
'facts'. DM-fans have enthusiastically bought into this ruling-class version of neo-Platonism, via
Hegel:
"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I
say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and
apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in
no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be
regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for
they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted
in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by
true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by
persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in
true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men.
Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is
always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into
itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and
imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to
intelligence only." [Plato (1997c), 51e-52a, pp.1254-55. I have used
the on-line version here. Bold emphases added. The published edition translates
the third set of highlighted words as follows: "It is indivisible -- it cannot be perceived
by the senses at all -- and it is the role of the understanding to study it."
Cornford renders it thus: "[It is] invisible and otherwise imperceptible;
that, in fact, which thinking has for its object." (Cornford (1997), p.192.)]
"Already with
Fichtethe
idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of finding
a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be based.
Thinkers from
Kant
onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from
experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error,
incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be
foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been
established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers
believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied in the
laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the
Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise
empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these
laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996), p.29. Bold
emphasis and links added.]
"The notion of a universal and with it the celebrated
problem of universals was invented by Plato.... The distinction of particulars
and universals is complemented in many doctrines since Plato with the
distinction and division of labour between the senses and the reason or
intellect, or understanding. According to these doctrines, what is given to the
bodily senses is merely particular, and the understanding or reason alone
apprehends, or constructs or derives, the universal. Many philosophers take the
problem of universals to be that of the meaning of general terms without
realising that what makes the meaning of general terms a problem is the very
concept of a universal." [Cowley (1991), p.85.
Spelling modified to agree with UK English.]
So, only 'the mind' is able to penetrate behind
'appearance' to uncover what is reallyreal -- i.e., all those
'universals'/'abstractions' (or Plato's 'Forms'
by any other name). This is yet another "ruling idea" that never seems to grow old,
never seems to tire, never seems to be rejected, especially by the DM-Faithful.
And as far as 'commonsense' and 'appearances' are
concerned, this is what DM-theorists have to say:
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental
reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and
apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For
him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be
itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another;
cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.
"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to
us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only sound
commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four
walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide
world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and
necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the
nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a
limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in
insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets
the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets
the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their
motion. It cannot see the woods for the trees...."
[Engels (1892),
p.406. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphasis added.]
As I also point out in Essay Three
Part Two (edited):
In
this connection,
John Rees makes the
following series of points:
"The important thing about a
Marxist understanding of the distinction between the appearance of things and
their essence is twofold: 1) by delving beneath the mass of surface phenomena,
it is possible to see the essential relations governing historical change -–
thus beneath the appearance of a free and fair market transaction it is possible
to see the exploitative relations of class society, but, 2) this does not mean
that surface appearances can simply be dismissed as ephemeral events of no
consequence. In revealing the essential relations in society, it is also
possible to explain more fully than before why they appear in a form
different to their real nature. To explain, for instance, why it is that the
exploitative class relations at the point of production appear as the exchange
of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay' in the polished surface of the
labour market." [Rees (1998), p.187. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the
conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added.]
But, the highlighted
words above imply that
the surface phenomena in Capitalist society are
different from their underlying form, which, of course, means appearances
can't
be relied upon. That accounts for the author's use of the word "real".
Consequently, the idea that appearances aren't
"real" (or "fully real") might motivate the belief that just as, say, the Sun
appears to rise in the morning (but doesn't really do so), and
just as sticks, for instance, look as if they bend when partially
immersed in water (but they aren't
really deformed in this way), and just as objects, for example, seem
to shrink in size when they recede from us (when they don't really grow
smaller), and just as tables and floors, say, give the impression that
they are solid (when they are really 'composed' mostly of 'empty space'),
so the surface
appearance of Capitalism only seems to be fair when 'underneath' it
really isn't fair at all. In that case, it is clear that, for anyone
who thinks like this,appearances can't deliver a true picture of reality.
That
is why no one believes that deep down objects change their shape as we
walk round them, that the Sun is really the same size as the Moon, or that ships
slowly sink below the waves when they sail over the horizon. And, presumably, it
is also why only deeply confused (reformist?) socialists believe Capitalism
reallyis fair.
[Note
that I am not committed to the idea that appearances are deceptive, since only
human beings (or what they produce -- in writing, speech or art, for example)
can literally be deceptive. Quite the opposite, in fact. I'm merely drawing out the
consequences of this family of confused ideas, metaphors, analogies, and metaphysical
fairy tales that DM-fans have unwisely imported in Marxism. However, further
consideration of this would take us too far into
HM, an area largely
avoided in these Essays -- for reasons outlined in
Essay One.]
Moreover, the objection that Rees doesn't really believe that appearances are
deceptive implies that his own distinction between surface phenomena and
underlying, 'real essences' is pointless; his arguments would make no sense
unless he believed that appearances were
deceptive-in-themselves. Otherwise, why try to isolate or identify
underlying "essences" if surface phenomena have never, or won't ever, mislead
anybody? Why delve deeper if Capitalism not only looks fair, it can also
be regarded as
essentially fair (given this way of talking)? And, why try to explain to
workers that their wages represent only a fraction of the value they produce if
what they are actually paid does in fact represent a fair 'slice of the
cake'?
Others agree
with Engels and Rees:
"But, as Marx
said, 'all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the
essence of things directly coincided' and the sun appears to go round the
earth but in reality, as we all now know, it is the other way round." [John
Molyneux, quoted from
here. Accessed 09/02/2018. Bold emphasis added.]
"As we know appearances can be deceptive. Each day the sun
appears to circumnavigate the earth, when the reality is that the earth travels
around the sun. We therefore need to penetrate the veil of appearance in order
to reveal the reality that is disguised within. That is the reason for Marxist
economic theory. As the Soviet economist
Rubin
explained, 'Marx approaches human society by starting with things, and going
through labour. He starts with things which are visible and moves to phenomena
which have to be revealed by means of scientific research...'.
We must see beyond the appearance of things to the real
relationships." [Rob
Sewell, quoted from
here.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Link and bold emphases added.]
"It is because of this very sequence of the successive grades of
scientific knowledge that science can evolve. Knowledge advances by the road of
contradiction. It is accompanied by errors, by deviations from the direct
attainment of its object. The external appearance of things for a time hides
the true content of objects from the eyes of the seeker. Thus when first we look
at merchant-capitalist society the relations between people are hidden by the
relations between things. But the practical mastery of the material world tears
away the covering of appearance from the objects of investigation, rectifies
error by transforming into actuality the true objective content of knowledge,
and purges science of the illusory. Scientific experience, which is handed over
by one generation to the next, and is each time enriched by some new scientific
discovery, is all the time increasing the possibility of an adequate knowledge
of the objective world. The experience of industrial practice, the
traditions of revolution, scientific discoveries, the store of ideas, are handed
over from one epoch to the next and ever more deeply disclose the infinite
possibilities of human thought. In the unlimited advance of human history, at
every new step of its development there is a fuller, richer, more diverse
revelation of the absolute content of the material world, which content, though
confined within historically limited ideas, is nevertheless absolute truth. The
progressive advance of human thought, the law-governed connection of its
different stages, were guessed in an inspired manner by Hegel, who
criticized both the metaphysical view of knowledge (which admits only the
eternity of truths), and relativism. In his Phenomenology of Spirit he
characterizes the succession of philosophic systems in the following words:
'The more the
ordinary mind takes the opposition between true and false to be fixed, the more
is it accustomed to expect either agreement or contradiction with a given
philosophical system, and only to see the one or the other in any explanation
about such a system. It does not conceive the diversity of philosophical systems
as the progressive evolution of truth; rather it sees only contradiction in that
variety. The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say
that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes,
the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, for
the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are
not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with
one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them
at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not
contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this
equal necessity of all moments constitutes from the outset the life of the
whole.' [We might note in passing the batty nature of Hegel's analogy
between budding plants and the advance of knowledge -- RL. (Bold added.)]
"But, for Hegel, the inevitable development which gives rise to
these different ideas and successive systems arises from a merely logical
unfolding, so that they are revealed finally as only moments of the 'absolute
idea.' For dialectical materialists the unity of relative and absolute truth is
based on the limitless development of social-historic practice, in which the
systematic connections of the material world are disclosed." [Shirokov
(1937), pp.123-24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Bold emphases alone added. Shirokov is here quoting
Hegel (1977), p.2, although that published version differs slightly
from the version over at the Marxist Internet Archive (to which I have linked)
as well as the version quoted by Shirokov.]
"But this tendency in capitalism goes even further. The fetishistic character of
economic forms, the
reification of all human relations, the constant expansion and extension of
the division of labour which subjects the process of production to an abstract,
rational analysis, without regard to the human potentialities and abilities of
the immediate producers, all these things transform the phenomena of society and
with them the way in which they are perceived. In this way arise the 'isolated'
facts, 'isolated' complexes of facts, separate, specialist disciplines
(economics, law, etc.) whose very appearance seems to have done much to pave the
way for such scientific methods. It thus appears extraordinarily 'scientific' to
think out the tendencies implicit in the facts themselves and to promote this
activity to the status of science.
"By contrast, in the teeth of all these isolated and isolating facts and partial
systems, dialectics insists on the concrete unity of the hole. Yet although
it exposes these appearances for the illusions they are-albeit illusions
necessarily engendered by capitalism in this 'scientific' atmosphere it still
gives the impression of being an arbitrary construction." [Lukacs
(1971), p.6. Bold emphasis added.]
"[Appearance is a] philosophical term concerned with the
relativity of perception and the difference between immediately given sensual
knowledge and conceptual knowledge of the lawfulness of things. Appearance is
the dialectic of Form and Content, the recognition of the difference between
them. In Hegel's Logic,
Appearance is the second grade of Essence, moving beyond the recognition of the
outer form of a thing to its lawful, inner character or content. Appearance is a
modification of Being which includes Essence
but is transient and unstable, because it is still partial or abstractly
one-sided." [Glossary
of terms at the Marxist Internet Archive. Emphases and link in the
original.]
"Now, if you've never thought critically
about how a capitalist economy works or never had the benefit of reading
Marx, then all of that probably sounds like some pretty crazy sh*t.
About as crazy as telling Joshua of the Hebrew Bible that the Sun is the
stationary centre of the universe (or our solar system) and the Earth
revolves around it. Only a madman would think such a thing. It is
obvious that the Sun rises in East and sets in the West. But, in
reality, the Sun rising and falling around the Earth is merely the form
of appearance that the Sun takes from our immediate experience. If
we took the Sun simply as it appears, never thought critically about its
movements or lack thereof, then we would never be able to apprehend the
nature of our solar system.
"Critical thought demands abstraction. We
must organize the manifold objects of reality in the thought realm of
our minds, which means we have to provisionally distance ourselves from
the complex, concrete appearances and start with the most simple and
abstract category that captures the phenomena we are attempting to
understand. Hence, Marx starts with the commodity in the abstract."
[Quoted from
here. Bold emphases added; spelling
modified to conform with UK English.]
[I spend much of the rest Essay Three Part Two (link
below) debunking the above claims, including the misleading (and
inaccurate) things DM-fans have to say about the apparent motion of the Sun. [There is
much more on this specific topic (concerning DM-supporters' theories about 'appearance and
reality') in Essays Three
Part Two, Ten
Part One and Thirteen
Part One.]
We have already seen Lenin, DeGrood, James
and Marcuse question any reliance on 'facts', and hence on 'appearances'. I have
quoted Hegel and several DM-theorists (in addition to those already cited above)
to the same effect
here.]
Moreover, as argued earlier, the DM-classicists
themselves were committed to a theory that went way beyond
experience. In fact they were responsible for concocting a set of ideas that transcends allpossible
experience. So, as we have seen (for them) only 'abstractions' are really real,
'surface
appearances' aren't -- which is why they supposedly mislead us and can't be
trusted, and why DM-fans never tire of criticising
'commonsense' and ordinary language -- just like ruling elites and their
complaint ideologues have always done.
But, truth be told,DL
is itself
based on the limited 'experience' of thumbing through Hegel'sLogic. This entire theory (once it has been put 'back on its
feet') is predicated on the unwise acceptance of rather too many of
Hegel's Hermetically-inspired
fantasies.
Moreover, if the DM-classics are correct, the
proffered pro-DM-counter-claim above -- that the interpretation
of DM advanced in this Essay is inconsistent with experience --, must also be inter-connected with its own
negation. It must be inter-linked with this sentence: "The interpretation
of DM advanced in this
Essay isn't inconsistent with experience"!
[Recall: that that is because everything,
including each and every sentence, is a UO (or is part of one) -- if the
DM-classics are to be believed. And since what DL
implies must be held true (if you're a dialectician),
the rest follows. If that weren't the case, sentences like this (and their content) would
be eternally changeless. But sentences are material objects, too, subject
to change through 'contradiction' -- unless, of course, we are to suppose they are the only things
in the entire universe that never change and are therefore destined to last
(unaltered) way beyond the
heat death of the universe.]
In which case, DM-fans turn out to be pretend materialists --
'Materialists in Name Only' [MINOs]. In fact,
as we
discovered earlier, they even describe matter as an 'abstraction'. This
means that, for dialecticians, the material objects we see around us can't be
really real, only
the abstractions they instantiate are! So, you, dear reader aren't 'real'; not
the least of it! The
abstraction you happen to exemplify is. That is your 'essence', and it
is both invisible, intangible and undetectable by any physical means. Rather
like a
Christian/Cartesian 'soul', then!
Well, that's Diabolical Logic for you...
Some might regard the above accusations as
completely
unfair, but until someone manages to explain how the
following can be true and for them not to imply that DM-theorists believe tables and chairs, humans and animals, capitalists and workers aren't really
real, but are mere 'appearances' (while it is only the underlying 'essence' behind
each of them that is really, really real), they will have to do:
(i) Surface appearances
aren't real, they are misleading; and,
(ii) Matter is an 'abstraction'.
[These topics will be covered in much more detail in
Essay Twelve Parts One, Three and Seven, and Essay Thirteen
Part One
-- summaries
here and
here. I have responded to several objections to
this way of interpreting DM in Essay Three Part Two (links a few paragraphs back).]
Finally, it could be countered (once again) that the
above
remarks are misguided since dialecticians don't believe
concerning every contradictory pair of sentences that both are true.
There would be some force to that pro-DM counter-claim if those tempted to
reach for it would also make clear how it is possible to believe
that:
(i) Everything in reality is a UO (again, including sentences like
those above, which are themselves ink marks on the page, or blips on a screen near
you); and,
(ii) UOs actually exist in and between every atom in the universe,
and much else besides (details concerning each of which can be expressed by a true proposition); and,
(iii) These UOs are the cause of every single instance of change in the entire universe; while at the same
time,
(iv) Not believing that such propositions can be true all at once; and
hence that,
(v) Such propositions can't actually exist
as UOs,
or as part of a UO, after all!
Presumably, the only way the above might prove acceptable
would be to give credence to the following pro-DM counter-response:
B3: Dialecticians both
believe and do not believe that everything is a UO.
Without doubt, that contradictory sentence
would itself be internally-connected to a stubborn (but scarcely rational) desire to
defend Hegelian Mysticism, come what may. But, that would be all it had going for
it.
[There is more on this topic below.]
So, there seems to be no viable way for contemporary
dialecticians to escape from the Hermetic Hole into which the
'dialectical'-classicists dropped them --, or, at least, none that would fail to leave
significant parts of
their mis-begotten 'theory' in tatters.
[This is a continuation of material that
also used to be
in Note 45.]
It could still be objected that the foregoing
sections badly
misrepresent DM, indeed, as Mao himself pointed out:
"When we said above that two
opposite things can coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into
each other because there is identity between them, we were speaking of
conditionality, that is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can
be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of
these conditions, they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the
same entity and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because
the
identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said
identity is conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between
opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process
transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is
therefore unconditional and absolute." [Mao (1961b),
pp.342-43.
Bold emphases added. It is to be noted that Mao offered no evidence whatsoever in support of these dogmatic
assertions. No surprise there, then.]
Hence, it could be argued that dialecticians
don't believe that all things are continually changing into their opposites,
or even that their commitment to the
Heraclitean Flux [HF] implies the
ridiculous conclusions
supposedly reached earlier. In fact, Mao argued forcefully that such changes were conditional:
"When we said above that two opposite things can
coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because
there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality....
[I]n given conditions two contradictory things can
be united and can transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of
these conditions, they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the
same entity and cannot transform themselves into one another. It is because
the
identity of opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said
identity is conditional and relative." [Ibid., bold added.]
Or so it could be maintained...
However, there is small problem -- Mao also said that the:
"struggle
between opposites permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one
process transform itself into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle
is therefore unconditional and absolute." [Ibid., bold added.]
According to those who do
believe in the HF (as well as those who also agree with the
content of the DM-passages
quoted
earlier and again
below), all things
are continually changing into their 'opposites' (according
to the DM-classics). If not, it might well be wondered what they could possibly be changing intoif not their
'opposites'?
And how might
that take place if those 'opposites' don't co-exist with whatever they are
the 'opposite' of? If there were no such co-existent 'opposites', each
object/system/process would have nothing with which it could struggle in order to bring about
any such change.
"The fact is
that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite
aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one
contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist
independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would
be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below'; without 'below', there
would be no 'above'. Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without
good fortune, these would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no
difficulty; without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords,
there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no
landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the
proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of
nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or
semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with
all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each
other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating,
interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity.
In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of
non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also
possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what
Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'how opposites can be
and how they become identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the
condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.
"But is it enough to say merely that
each of the
contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is
identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity?
No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for
their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other.
That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a
thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its
opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by
means of revolutionthe proletariat, at one time the ruled, is
transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is
transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied
by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will
take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity
of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?" [Ibid.,pp.337-39.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Three minor
typos corrected; missing words "and how they become", present in the published
version, but absent on-line, have been added. I have informed the Marxist
Internet Archive (MIA) of these errors.]
Engels
agreed:
"And it is just as impossible have one side of a
contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in
one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891b), p.496. Bold
emphasis added.]
The online
version renders the above passage slightly differently:
"And one cannot have one side of this
contradiction without the other, any more than a man has a whole apple in his
hand after eating half." [Quoted from
here.]
In that
case, 'dialectical opposites' must universally co-exist, and if that is
so, change must be inherent in all objects and processes in the universe
(indeed, as the
earlier and
later
quoted DM-passages assert).
On the other hand, if
that isn't the case, and everything isn't subject
to the
HF (or if not everything is
subject to it) then there must be countless self-identical objects and processes
in existence, some or all of which might even persist for an unspecified length of time
in that unchanged state. The dread LOI will, therefore apply to them.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
Either way, DM would suffer yet another fatal
wound.
Of course, as already noted,
it might not be the case that all things are
changing (either continually or intermittently), just as it might not be the case
that everything develops into its
'opposite'. But, if either of these anti-DM alternatives turns out to be the case,
most of what
dialecticians
themselves have to say about change couldn't be true,
either. In that eventuality why on earth would anyone want to learn
anything from books and articles expounding DM if they commit such fundamental
errors? If much of what they say is incorrect?
Now, DM-fans might try to
Nixon
this 'problem', hoping somehow to brush it aside, or they might even attempt to
accommodate it by declaring that all things are always changing into their
'opposites' and that not all things are always changing into their
'opposites' -- holding both of these contradictory sentences true. They could
then refuse to comment any
further, and simply "grasp" this self-contradiction lying at the heart
of their theory(!) along 'sound' and well-trodden dialectical lines --,
followed by a retreat into yet another protracted dialectical sulk. In fact,
as experience has
shown,
DM-fans often become almost intellectually
catatonic when confronted with
'difficulties' like this -- or they develop a convenient case of selective
blindness, pretending not to have seen them.
Be this as it may, all of this is independent of the fact that
not only does the
above passage (from Mao) make little sense in its own terms, it
is inconsistent with other things he says
in the very same article! So, one minute he
declares that all things are contradictory and that without contradiction
"nothing would exist":
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a
contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as 'the
recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,
opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature
(including mind and society).' Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are.
The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the
struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their
development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction;
without contradiction nothing would exist." [Mao (1961b),
p.316. Bold emphases
added.]
Next he says that some things aren't
contradictory(!):
"...we were speaking of conditionality, that
is to say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can
transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions,
they cannot constitute a contradiction, cannot coexist in the same entity and
cannot transform themselves into one another." [Ibid.,
p.342.
Bold emphasis added.]
There would be no point in Mao
introducing conditionality here (in relation to the "identity of
opposites") if there were no circumstances under which it failed to apply --,
that is, if there were no circumstances under which such an identity was absent.
If there were no conditionality, that would rule out cases where there
just happened to be no identity of opposites, in effect saying that that could never happen,
and that there was always an "identity of opposites", come what may.
Ruling out conditionality would imply that. But if that were
so, the "identity of opposites" would be unconditional. For it to be
conditional, it must at least be possible for there to be instances
where the "identity of opposites" was absent, didn't exist or failed to
apply. In that case, in such circumstances, there would be no contradictions, either. Unfortunately,
that would in turn mean that whatever 'existed' then would in fact not exist,
according to Mao
"There is
nothing
that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist."
[Ibid.,
p.316.
Bold added.]
So, Mao's own ideas imply that if there is
any
conditionality here, it would mean that in some cases the "identity of
opposites" must fail to exist (in those circumstances). That would further imply that
such instances wouldn't contain or express a contradiction, and hence that they,
too, would fail to exist! So, the existence of conditionality (in this sense)
implies the lack of existence of whatever it is that was supposed to be conditional!
Existence here would imply lack of existence, a nice 'contradiction' in
itself!
To be more precise, and less flamboyantly, the contradiction
here is actually this (if we begin with Assumption (i), which plausibly
lies behind Mao's
'conditionality' clause):
(i) Object/Process, P, is a unity of
opposites, or expresses an "identity of opposites", IO, but only
under (certain) conditions, B. [Assumption.]
(ii) When B exists, P is
contradictory or it expresses/contains/exhibits a contradiction, C.
[Definition/Axiom.]
(iii) When B does notexist, P
isn't contradictory or expresses/contain/exhibits no contradiction, ¬C.
[Definition/Axiom. "¬" stands for "no", here.]
(iv) For this set up to be conditional, there must be,
(a) circumstances where B does not obtain, and (b) circumstances where
B does obtain.
(v) Assume the first is the case, and B does
not exist. [Assumption.]
(vi) If B fails to exist, IO also fails
to exist. [From Lines (i) and (v).]
(vii) The failure of IO to exist means P
can't be contradictory. [From Lines (iii) and (vi).]
(viii) "Without contradiction nothing would exist."
[Mao's Axiom.]
(ix) So, if P isn't contradictory, or
doesn't express/contain/exhibit a contradiction,it can't exist, either. [From Lines (vii)
and (viii).]
(x) Therefore, the conditional existence of
IO implies the non-existence of P (under certain
circumstances).
(xi) For P to exist under all circumstances,
the conditionality of IO must be ruled out. [From Lines (i) to (x).]
(xii) So, for P to exist under all
circumstances, the existence of IO must be unconditional. [From
Line (xi).]
(xiii) Hence, if P exists (under all circumstances),
IO can't be conditional. [From Line (xii).]
(xiv) But, this contradicts the assumption that IO
is conditional. [From Lines (i) and (xiii).]
QED.
[The only proposition that might (legitimately) be
questioned or challenged is in Line (iv), which is, in effect, an assumption.
However, it hasn't been labelled that way since it is far more involved and
ultimately depends on what we mean by "conditional". In the above argument, I
have used what I think is the natural meaning of this word (which tallies with
its
dictionary definition). So, for something to be conditional there must be circumstances
where it applies and circumstances where it does not. Otherwise it
wouldn't be conditional, it would be unconditional. Now, I have no idea
what Chinese word/words Mao used here, but if the translation is faithful to
his intentions (and I have used the 'official version', after all!), then he must
have meant this. However, if anyone disagrees, they should
email me with their best, or their most plausible,
alternative.]
Perhaps we can now see why such a fuss was made
earlier about "defective theories".
Dialecticians like Mao, who attempt to 'reflect' truths about what they take to be an
already
contradictory realitycan't avoid contradicting themselves.
After all, if there is "nothing that does not contain a contradiction", that
must include the words, sentences, thoughts, ideas and hence the theories
concocted by anyone who swallows that self-destructive idea.
Mao's theory is simply a classic example of that
intellectual malaise at work.
[This is a continuation of material that also used
to be part of Note 45.]
In view of the above serious problems DM
faces (at least with respect to the Heraclitean Flux [HF], universal inter-connection and the widespread existence of UOs), it might be wise to attribute to dialecticians
an even moreattenuated version of HF. This minimalist version of DM [or MERD] wisely draws back from
the insuperable problems MAH poses for any theory -- never mind DM --, several of which were
aired
earlier. According to this more 'restrained'
and 'tempered' view
of change,
objects and processes in nature and society would still be regarded as
UOs, but not everything about
them would be in oppositional tension all the time, and hence not everything
about them would be constantly changing. This might even be the option that captures what
Mao was
trying to say
about 'conditionality'.
Unfortunately, MERD clearly commits
what few adherents it might attract to the belief that some things don't
change, and hence, according to
Trotsky
and
Mao,
that would also mean they don't
actually exist! Or, perhaps
even
to the theory that if they do change, they don't do so as a result of their
'internal contradictions' (which were supposed to be a consequence of
all those bothersome UOs).
It isn't easy to say much more about this option.
That isn't just because DM-theorists themselves say absolutely nothing
about it -- it is, after all, part of an attempt made here to fill a few of
the gaping holes the DM-'theory' of change!
It is also because MERD is hopelessly vague itself. Worse still -- but
rather fittingly
--
it seems to contradict many of the passages quoted
above
and below.
[Further discussion of these issues will be
continued in the next sub-section.]
[This is a continuation of material that also used to be
part of Note 45.]
Despite the previous sub-sections, the following two
counterclaims might provide DM-theorists with a slender ray
of hope -- i.e., that the serious problems facing both versions of MAH
(i.e., UMAH
and
CMAH)
may be avoided or circumvented,
because:
(A) DM doesn't indiscriminately
postulate the existence of contradictions everywhere.
(B) DM doesn't claim that every
proposition and its contradictory is true, at the same time.
Even though both of the above pro-DM responses have
already been dealt with, it is worth (once again) pointing out the following:
(A) If all change is the result of some
contradiction or other, and if, according to the DM-classicists (such as Engels,
Plekhanov, Lenin, Mao and Trotsky):
(i) Everything constantly changes because
everything is a
UO;
and,
(ii) Everything in the universe is inter-connected,
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a
contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as 'the
recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,
opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature
(including mind and society).' Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are.
The interdependence of the contradictory aspectspresent in all things and the
struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their
development forward. There is nothing that does not contain contradiction;
without contradiction nothing would exist." [Mao (1961b),
p.316. Bold emphases
added.]
In view of the obvious difficulties
maximalist interpretations of change pose for DM, if it is now claimed that only somechanges are the result of 'internal contradictions', then we need to be told precisely what
it is that causes these 'other changes'.
As
we will see, a major theoretical
retreat like this would completely undermine, not just the DM-theory of change (i.e., the idea that all objects, processes and "determinations"
turn into their 'opposites', that "everything flows",
that change is generated by the internal tensions created by those
ubiquitous
UOs), but DM itself.
Once more, it could be argued in response that DM-theorists postulate the existence of contradictions
only as and when they can be verified by detailed empirical
investigation. However, as we have
also seen, it
is
in fact impossible to give any sense to
the claim that the existence of contradictions (to say nothing of "dialectical
contradictions", a phrase that has yet to be given any clear meaning) could
either be verified -- or even falsified --,
confirmed or disconfirmed in any way shape or form.
Even so, the above volunteered response sits rather
awkwardly with Trotsky's claim that:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size,
weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will
respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself at 'any given moment'…. How
should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval
of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that
'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely mathematical
abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and
existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is
consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to
'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is
if it does not exist….
"For concepts there also
exists 'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic…, but by the
dialectical logic issuing from theaxiom that everything is
always changing…. Dialectical thinking analyses all things and
phenomena in their continuous change…. Dialectics…teaches us
to combine syllogisms in such a way as to bring our understanding closer to the
eternally changing
reality." [Trotsky (1971),
pp.64-66. Italic
and bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]
That appears to leave little wiggle room. Trotsky
declares that DM-style change is an "axiom", which means it can't
have been, and wasn't in fact, derived from evidence. Indeed, the
Ancient Mystic who 'divined' this 'eternal truth', Heraclitus, came out with it on the basis
of no evidence at all. He relied on what a river supposedly does or doesn't do
-- or rather, on the basis of what seemed to him to be true about what
a river does or doesn't do. But there is no way that that could count as evidence concerning what happens to
everything in existence, for all of time, which is what DM-theorists
effortlessly
conclude from this ancient 'observation'. In fact, it is unclear what sort of evidence could
possibly confirm a claim that "everything is always
changing", or even that things are "eternally changing", that
"existence is an uninterrupted process of transformation", or even whether
it is true that if something doesn't change, "it does not exist".
At this point it is worth reminding the reader that
just because such ideas (about, the universal nature of the HF,
for instance) are being questioned, that doesn't commit the
present author to the opposite view, that nothing changes. This is an empirical
question to be settled by evidence not by studying the obscure and
confused ideas
ancient and early modern mystics dreamt up. In fact, as we saw in an earlier Essay, these
ideas are (probably) not even
empirically true.
As that Essays shows, evidence in fact suggests that there are hundreds of
trillions of objects in every kilogram of matter that just do not change. Of
course, that depends on what we mean by "change",
and, as pointed out, earlier there is
currently no accepted definition of "change". Perhaps even worse,
DM-theorists are themselves tight-lipped about this, about what they
mean by "change"!
[I return to this topic again in
the
next sub-section, where I discuss
Graham Priest's valiant attempt to clarify
some of the issues of interest to believers in the
HF.]
It is also hard to reconcile this modified version
of MAH with other remarks Engels came out with; for instance, this
one:
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature….
[T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature,
and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of
nature." [Engels (1954),
p.211. Bold emphases added.]
"If change is internally generated, it mustbe a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998a), p.7.
Bold
emphasis added.]
As now seems reasonably clear, Rees obtained the
doctrine of universal change from theories he inherited from previous generations of mystics; he certainly didn't derive the above "must"
from evidence. No amount of evidence (even if Rees had bothered to collect or
cite any, which
he didn't) would justify the use of a "must" here --, which is not only
impossible to confirm, or even test, it is itself (rather appropriately) internally
inconsistent
(as was demonstrated in Essay Eight
Parts
One,
Two and
Three).
Somewhat
ironically, what Rees said also appears to contradict something Engels claimed:
But, a "must" implies just such a 'necessity'. In
which case, Engels (inadvertently) agreed that no amount of observation can establish
any of these
dialectical-"must"s.
However, we already know where such gnomic
pronouncements originated, and how they were initially 'derived'. They
were concocted by the
aforementioned mystics, whose wild speculations were actually condemned by Engels himself
(here speaking disarmingly and about the three laws he obtained from the Arch Mystic
Himself, Hegel):
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Ibid.,
p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
And yet, as we have just seen, dialectical "musts" can't be
"deduced" from (any amount of) observational evidence, but have to be
imposed on the facts -- and which "must"s turn out to be
refuted by the
facts!
Ironically, the author of TAR actually agrees with Engels:
"[The laws of dialectics] are not, as
Marx and Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult empirical
task of tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical
master key
whose only advantage is to turn up when no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998a), p.9. Bold emphasis added.]
"'[The dialectic is not a] magic
master key for all questions.' The dialectic is not a calculator into which
it is possible to punch the problem and allow it to compute the solution. This
would be an idealist method. A materialist dialectic must grow from a
patient, empirical examination of the facts and not be imposed on them…."
[Ibid., p.271. Bold emphases alone added.]
And yet that appears to be what Rees himself has done -- i.e., impose these ideas on 'reality', for instance, when he says things like this:
"If change is internally generated, it mustbe a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998a), p.7.
Bold
emphasis added.]
But, where
has this "must" suddenly come from? And why call such things 'contradictions' when
they don't even look like contradictions. [On that, see Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three,
again.]
Likewise, Trotsky confidently asserted the following:
"The dialectic does not liberate the
investigator from
painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics and materialism are the
basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at
all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever-ready
master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from
facts, from their nature and development…."
[Trotsky
(1973), p.233. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Whenever any Marxist attempted to
transmute the theory of Marx into a
universal
master key and ignore all other spheres of learning, Vladimir Ilyich would
rebuke him with the expressive phrase 'Komchvanstvo' ('communist swagger')."
[Ibid.,
p.221.]
"The dialectic is not a
magic master key for all questions. It does not replace concrete scientific
analysis. But it directs this analysis along the correct road, securing it
against sterile wanderings in the desert of subjectivism and scholasticism."
[Trotsky (1971),
p.68. Bold emphasis added.]
But, again, that is exactly what
Trotsky did; he regularly used 'the dialectic' as a "master key". [On
that, see Essays
Two and
Six.]
Finally, on this specific point,
George Novack had this to say:
"A consistent materialism cannot
proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason,
intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source.
Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon
evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in
practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
"The
basic conceptions of dialectical materialism have in the first place been taken
from nature,
not arbitrarily imposed upon it...."
[Novack, quoted from
here. Bold emphasis added.]
Furthermore,
MERD also sits rather
awkwardly with the
following remarks by Lenin:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:]…internally contradictory tendencies…in this [totality]…and
unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing…is connected with every other…[this
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of
everydetermination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other…. In brief, dialectics can be
defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of
dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition
of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one
of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle'
of opposites.… The unity…of opposites is
conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive
opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.221-22;
357-58.
Some emphases in the original; some bold added.
Paragraphs merged.]
Problems only continue to increase for MERD
if we now include these thoughts courtesy of Plekhanov and Bukharin::
"According to Hegel,
dialectics is the
principle of all life…. [M]an has two qualities: first being alive, and
secondly of also being mortal. But on closer examination it turns out that
life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that in general
any phenomenonis contradictory, in the sense that it develops
out of itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to its
existence and will transform it into its opposite. Everything
flows, everything changes; and there is no force capable of holding
back this constant flux, or arresting its eternalmovement. There is
no force capable of resisting the dialectics of phenomena….
"At a particular moment a moving body is at a
particular spot, but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if it
were only in that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become motionless.
Everymotion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and
as there is not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do
not have in the long run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel,
who said that dialectics is the soul of any scientific cognition. And
this applies not only to cognition of nature…. And so every phenomenon, by
the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later,
but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite….
"When you apply the dialectical method to the
study of phenomena, you need to remember that
forms change eternally
in consequence of the 'higher development of their content'…. In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit
consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from
the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin
and destruction…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphases alone
added. Several paragraphs merged.]
"'All is flux, nothing is
stationary,' said the ancient thinker from Ephesus. The combinations we call
objects are in a state of constant and more or less rapid change…. [M]otion does not only make objects…, it
is constantly changing them. It is for this reason that the logic
of motion (the 'logic of contradiction') never relinquishes its
rights over the objects created by motion…. With Hegel, thinking progresses in
consequence of the uncovering and resolution of the contradictions
inclosed (sic) in concepts. According to our doctrine…the contradictions
embodied in concepts are merely reflections, translations into the language
of thought, of those contradictions that are embodied in phenomena
owing to the contradictory nature of their common basis, i.e., motion….
"…[T]he
overwhelming majority of phenomena
that come within the compass of the natural and the social sciences are among
objects' of this kind…[:ones in which there is a coincidence of opposites].
Diametrically opposite phenomena are united in the simplest globule of
protoplasm, and the life of the most undeveloped society…." [Plekhanov
(1908),
pp.93-96. Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.]
"There are two possible ways of regarding
everything in nature and in society; in the eyes of some everything is
constantly at rest, immutable…. To others, however, it appears that there is
nothingunchanging in nature or in society…. This second point of
view is called the dynamic point of view…; the former point of view is
called static. Which is the correct position?... Even a hasty glance
at nature will at once convince us that there is nothingimmutable
about it…. Evidently…there is nothing
immutableand rigid in theuniverse…. Matter in motion: such
is the stuff of this world…. This dynamic point of view is also called the
dialectic (sic) point of view….
"The world being in constant
motion, we must consider phenomena in their mutual relations, and not as
isolated cases. All portions of the universe are actually related to each
other and exert an influence on each other…. All things in the universe are
connected with an indissoluble bond; nothing exists as an isolated object,
independent of its surroundings….
In the first place, therefore, the
dialectic (sic) method of interpretation demands that all phenomena be
considered in their indissoluble relations; in the second place, that they be
considered in their state of motion….
Since
everything in the world is in a
state of change, and indissolubly connected with everything else, we
must draw the necessary conclusions for the social sciences….
"The basis of all things is therefore
the law of change, the law of constant motion. Two philosophers
particularly (the ancient Heraclitus and the modern Hegel…) formulated this law
of change, but they did not stop there. They also set up the question of the
manner in which the process operates. The answer they discovered was that
changes are produced by constant internal contradictions, internal struggle.
Thus, Heraclitus declared: 'Conflict is the mother of all happenings,' while
Hegel said: 'Contradiction is the power that moves things.'
"There is no doubt of the correctness of this
law. A moment's thought will convince the reader. For, if there were no
conflict, no clash of forces, the world would be in a condition of unchanging
stable equilibrium, i.e., complete and absolute permanence, a state of rest
precluding all motion…. As we alreadyknow that all things change, all
things are 'in flux', it is certain that such an absolute state of rest
cannot possibly exist. We must therefore reject a condition in which
there is no 'contradiction between opposing and colliding forces' no disturbance
of equilibrium, but only an absolute immutability….
"In other words, theworld consists
of forces, acting many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced
for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of 'rest', i.e.,
their actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces,
immediately the 'internal contradictions' will be revealed, equilibrium
will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on
a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the 'conflict,'
the 'contradiction,' i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in various
directions, determines the motion of the system…." [Bukharin (1925),
pp.63-67,
72-74. Bold emphases
alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Several paragraphs merged.]
And they grow even more 'problematic' when we add the following,
by Mao:
"The universality or absoluteness of
contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the
process of development of all things, and the other is that in the
process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from
beginning to end.
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a
contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as 'the
recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,
opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature
(including mind and society).' Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are.
The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the
struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their
development forward. There is nothing that does not contain
contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist. Contradiction is the basis of the simple
forms of motion (for instance, mechanical motion) and still more so of the
complex forms of motion.... Thus it is already clear
that contradiction exists universallyand in all processes, whether in
the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or
ideological phenomena...." [Mao (1961b),
pp.316-17. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added. Several
paragraphs merged.]
These claims seem pretty uncompromising.
Similar views can be found
in the writings of practically every
DM-theorist.
They all suggest that MERD is far too weak a theory.
Even so, not oneof the above passages was based on an exhaustive empirical investigation --
or, indeed, any at all! They are all general, law-like pronouncements concerning everything in
existence, for all of time --, nay, for all "eternity" in some
cases. However, and
once more, it isn't
as if we don't already know where they came from; they
were
lifted from
Heraclitus and other ancient and early modern
mystics,
who plucked them out of thin air before very much was known about anything.
Lenin's PN itself contains page-after-page of
hyper-bold generalisations like these, the truth of which Lenin couldn't
possibly have derived from a "careful empirical" investigation. Trotsky's philosophical
writings are similar in this regard, too, as are those of Engels, Plekhanov and
Mao. The same applies
to scores of other DM-theorists. [Cf.,
Trotsky (1986), pp.86-116. The a priori, dogmatic nature of DM was
exposed at length and in detail in
Essay Two.]
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks,
i.e., Lenin (1961).]
The inescapable conclusion here is that
unless radical changes to core parts of the theoryare in the pipeline, DM-theorists are
100% committed to the
doctrine that contradictions exist everywhere and at all times, and that
all things
are
constantly changing into their opposites.
In which case, it isn't easy to defend
the pro-DM counter-claim that dialecticians didn't accept some form of
MAH.
(B) If absolutely everything is a UO (i.e.,
if objects, properties, relations, processes are internally-related to their
supposed 'dialectical opposites'), then it follows that all things change because:
(i) Everything about them is permanently
locked in dialectical tension, as it were, and hence ceaselessly developing; or,
(ii) Change is an expression of the presence, or it
is a consequence, of the inter-relation between 'internally-linked opposites' (implying that
change is a permanent, if not an inherent feature of all objects and processes); or,
(iii)
Both.
So, such an 'inherent' property situates change at
the heart of all objects, systems and
processes, constituting their 'essence', which means change is a fundamental feature of
'Being' -- that is, if we were to believe what we find in the DM-classics and the writings
of 'lesser'
DM-clones (quoted extensively throughout this Essay and Essay Seven
Part Three).
Moreover, we have already seen that DM-theorists
aren't at all clear whether:
(a) Objects and processes change because of
a 'struggle' between their 'internal opposites' -- that is, whether an ever-present oppositional
'content' in or between every object and process (i.e., the fact that they are all
UOs, or are part of some UO) changes, or induces change in, them; or whether,
(b) Objects and processes change into these opposites (which means that the latter can't have caused change, since
change produces them, not them it); or whether,
(c) External opposites
also
cause
objects and processes to change into whatever they subsequently become (which would,
of course, mean that change isn't solely 'internally-induced'); or even whether,
(d) It is a combination of all three of the above
that brings about change. [On that, see
here, here and
here.]
Nevertheless, whatever it is that finally motivates or
initiates DM-change (if we are ever told with any clarity or
consistency!), MAH
poses serious,
if not fatal
consequences for the entire theory. Hence, it looks like that DM-theorists will
have to reject MAH even though their classic texts appear to have been
written by fully paid up members of the 'MAH
Supporters Society'.
So, the (volunteered) pro-DM-response
outlined earlier (i.e., that
DM doesn't claim that every proposition and its
contradictory is true at once) itself amounts to a rejection of another implied
assumption underlying MAH: that when anything changes, every
truth (and falsehood) about it changes, too. Add to that the fact that the
converse implication -- that not every truth or falsehood about an object or
process changes -- undermines other key areas of DM. For instance,
it implies that some things don't change, which is clearly inconsistent
with any commitment to the
HF
or with what DM-theorists themselves have to say about universal change (as
we have just seen, and will see again, presently), and the LOI.
[Once more, the 'relative stability' defence was neutralised
here and
here.]
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
However, if we rely only on what
the aforementioned DM-classicists themselves say about their own 'theory' of
change, we can see that even
this (volunteered) pro-DM-reply is seriously wide of the mark, and by a couple of
parsecs, too.
For example, we have witnessed Lenin rashly assert
the following:
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are]…the internally contradictory tendencies…in this [totality]…and unity of
opposites…[;] each thing…is connected with every other…[;]
not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
[Lenin (1961),
p.222.
Some emphases in the original, some added.]
From this, we may conclude that Lenin subscribed to
the theory that change affects everyaspect of an object (remote
or proximate, internal or external), because of universal 'inter-connectedness'
operating
in tandem with those ever-present UOs -- which he has just told us are
universal:
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle'
of opposites.… The unity…of opposites is
conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive
opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Ibid.,
pp.357-58. Bold emphasis alone added.]
If so, considerations like
those above must affect every truth
about a given object (i.e., those envisaged by MAH).
Worse still, Lenin seems to believe that everything changes
into everything else!
"[E]ach thing…is connected with every other…[;]
not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
[Ibid.,
p.222.
Some emphases in the original, some added.]
If Lenin is correct, it can only mean that at any moment,
dear reader, you could very well morph into Mt Everest (or, at least, into some
or all of its "determinations, qualities, features, sides, properties"), while
that mountain might be about to develop into a
narwhal...
I am sorry if
your pending transform into Mt Everest is bad news, but if you're a DM-fan, you
really have no excuse. Lenin did warn you!
Moreover, Trotsky appears to have agreed with
him:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in
size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves…. [E]verything
is always changing." [Trotsky (1971),
pp.64-65. Bold emphases added.]
According to Trotsky, objects and processes are also
"never equal to themselves" and "everything is always changing"
[bold added, again]; indeed, they "change
uninterruptedly insize, weight, colour, etc."
So, alongside Lenin it is
clear that Trotsky accepted some form of MAH.
If the volunteered pro-DM-response
above is acceptable to more recent
-- or, perhaps,
more cautious -- DM-theorists, and if the untenable nature of MAH
is taken into account, these DM-supporters would be well advised to abandon their commitment
to the actual existence of countless UOs in every object and process in
the universe, too. Of course, in so doing they would also have to reject what the
DM-classicists had to say -- particularly Lenin, who certainly thought the struggle
between these universally existing UOs was an "absolute":
"The
splitting of a single whole and the
cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence…of dialectics….
The identity of opposites…is the
recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,
opposite tendencies in all phenomena of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity
of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites….
"In the first conception
of movement, self-movement,
its driving force…remains in the shade…. In the second conception the
chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of
'self'-movement.…The second alone furnishes the key
to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the
'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the
opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new. The unity…of opposites
is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually
exclusive opposites is absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs
merged. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
So, it seems that Lenin's commitment to some form of MAH
is as unambiguous as it is dogmatic.
Be this as it may,
it isn't easy to
understand what a DM-UO is supposed to be. The notion
itself is so vague that it is impossible to determine with any certainty
whether or not the paradoxical conclusions outlined above (in relation MAH,
etc.) are valid, or even fair. On the other hand, it is also far too
vague for
anyone (including DM-theorists themselves!) to rule such paradoxical conclusions out.
Naturally, this means that anyone who accepts these highly dubious, obscure and vague ideas can't
legitimately appeal to them in any attempt to rule anything in or, indeed, anything out.
Once more, this is a
hole that dialecticians
have dug for themselves. And by all accountsthey seem determined to keep
on digging.
Don't forget to say "Hello" to the Earth's Core, comrades!
Figure Fourteen: The Dogged
Search For The
"Totality"
Enters Its Third
'Successful' Millennium
[The UO-'thesis' is
examined in more detail in Essay
Seven Parts
One
and
Three,
as well as in Essay Eight
Part Three.]
Another way of avoiding this
disastrous result (i.e., that MAH implies that every proposition and its
contradictory is true) would be to argue that the word
"contradiction", when used by DM-theorists, doesn't mean the same as it does
in
FL.
That
(rather desperate) escape route
has already been blocked.
Anyway, the argument
developed here focuses on the nature of UOs themselves. It doesn't actually depend on the
existence of 'dialectical contradictions', since that concept is itself a derivative DM-notion.
Of course, that claim itself depends on whether or not we are prepared to agree with Lenin that UOs are
more fundamental to DM:
"In brief, dialectics can be
defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of
dialectics…. The splitting of the whole and the cognition
of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one
of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle'
of opposites.… The unity…of opposites is
conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive
opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.221-22;
357-58.
Some emphases in the original; some bold added.
Paragraphs merged.]
If so, it would seem that UOs are
the formal and
the efficient cause of all those 'dialectical contradictions',
not the other way round. DM-theorists in general regard the two halves of a formal
contradiction (if "halves" is even the right word here!) as 'opposites' of some sort
-- or, rather, as 'dialectical opposites'. In fact, it is impossible to
see how there would or could be a single 'dialectical contradiction' if UOs didn't
already exist. [We saw
earlier that leading DM-theorists (like,
for instance, Engels and Mao) certainly believed this.]
Independently of that, dialecticians themselves
clearly intend their
use of the
word "opposite" to be the same as its use in the vernacular (even if some of them
also add a little
Hegelian spin). In that case, this latest
(possible?) delaying-tactic (i.e., the claim that DM-contradictions are
different since dialecticians are employing the word "contradiction" in a unique way,
which bears no resemblance to its use either in FL or ordinary language) must fail, too. That is because(according to the
DM-classics) DM-UOs exist everywhere. If so, the rest follows as before.
[Anyway, the obscure term "dialectical
contradiction" has been critically examined in Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three.]
However, if anything
could lend some level of clarity to the ill-conceived expression, "dialectical contradiction",
it would be the word "contradiction" itself, at least as it is used in FL and ordinary language. Indeed, Hegel began with his own
garbled
interpretation of what he took to be Aristotle's understanding of this word and
adapted it to his own ends. So, DM-theorists would be unwise to uncouple
their
understanding of this word from the meaning it already has in FL and ordinary language, whatever
connection Hegel himself might have imagined there was between his own use of
a typographically identical word and what he thought was Aristotle's
employment.
Independently of this, as we have already seen in Essays
Four,
Five,
and Eight Parts One, Two and Three (links above), it is in fact impossible to
determine
whether or not
these two terms (i.e., "dialectical contradiction" and "formal contradiction")
are connected in any way at all, since DM-theorists have yet to tell us (with any
clarity) what a "dialectical contradiction" actually is! While
DM-theorists themselves can't afford to sever the link between these two terms
(for reasons set out above, and
earlier), the rest of us can -- at
least, that is, until "dialectical contradiction" has itself been rendered perspicuous.
Few of us are holding our breath waiting on that one.
[I have also dealt with claims that the
word "contradiction" (as it is used in
MFL) is no less equivocal, in Essay Eight
Part Three.]
There now seems to be no obvious way for
DM-theorists to circumvent
or neutralise the serious difficulties this Heraclitean/Cratylean
doctrine (UMAH,
UCRAC or even MAHitself) poses for their entire theory. That might
help explain why the
author of
TAR came out with this rather odd comment:
"...[C]ontradiction
plays 'a relatively minor role…in the changes that occur in nature….'" [Rees
(1998a), p.120, Note 51. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
Admittedly, Rees was quoting
Bertell Ollman, here [i.e., Ollman (1993), p.65,
reprinted in
Ollman (2003) p.97], but there is nothing in
TAR itself to suggest
he
disagreed with Ollman about this.
Although, and to be fair, it is possible to
argue that the context of the above (Ollman) quotation suggests that both authors were merely
making a point about Marx's use of "contradiction" --
contrary to other dialecticians who argue that the latter concept helps
explain change in the natural world -- when that point is itself based on the further
assumption that Marx used this word solely in relation to human social development. But, if that is so,
it is entirely unclear what Rees and Ollman think actually brings about change
in extra-social reality. Worse still, it seems to suggest
human society isn't part of nature.
Anyway, if we assume this is genuinely held
belief (and
not a slip of the word processor by Rees and/or Ollman), the above apparently
minor, almost off-the-cuff revision to classical DM tucked-away in TAR,
actually represents a majorbreak
with tradition. It also appears to be inconsistent
with several other ideas aired in TAR itself. Much of what that book has to say about the
"Totality" (on pp.5-10, for example) seems to contradict the above passage,
which
fact alone is appropriately ironic, one feels.
It also appears to fly in the face of this
passage:
"[The] natural and
social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a result
of…internal contradictions…. [N]ature is an interconnected system that developed
for millions of years before humans." [Rees (1998a), pp.285-86.]
Perhaps, once again, this 'major revision'
was simply an inadvertent slip on Rees and Ollman's part. Who can say? Either we
assume that, or
it might mean DM -- at least as
these two interpret it -- is far more crisis-ridden than either of them would care to
admit.
Incidentally, Rees also quoted a reply that Ollman
himself had directed against certain unspecified critics of DM:
"Their error, however,
is to confuse a particular statement of these [dialectical] laws, usually one
appropriate to levels of generality where human consciousness is present, for
all possible statements." [Ibid., p.120. Rees is here quoting Ollman
(1993), p.65, reprinted in
Ollman (2003) p.97.]
But, one might well wonder who it was that
planted such "confusions" in the minds of these unnamed critics? Surely, it
can't
have been Trotsky when he referred to the "axiom" that things are "never equal
to themselves", because "all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour, etc."? Or, when he declared that "everything is always changing", can it?
If not, it surely can'thave been Engels
when he asserted
that dialectics was "nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion
and development of nature", and that "nature works dialectically", can it?
Nor could it possibly have been Lenin
when he
assured his readers that "The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature", and that change and development are "absolutes"
--, could it?
Or, even when he wrote the following:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the
dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of
concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word
dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence
of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the
transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of
notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to
nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions
all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in
a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97.
Italic emphases in the original.]
Lenin certainly can't have expected his readers to
take him seriously -- and definitely not any of those unnamed "critics" --, can he?
As for Mao, he positivelyhad no handat all
in adding to this confusion when he asserted the following:
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a
contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the unity of opposites as 'the
recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,
opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature
(including mind and society).' Are these ideas correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the
struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push their
development forward. There is nothing that does not contain
contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist.... Thus it is already clear
that contradiction exists universally and in all processes, whether in
the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or
ideological phenomena...." [Mao (1961b),
pp.316-17. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
Any suggestion to the contrary is surely a bourgeois
lie, isn't it?
And, naturally, there is no way that TAR's own
"insistence" concerning the nature of the "Totality", or its declaration that the
"natural and social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a
result of…internal contradictions…." (pp.285-86, bold added), and that "reality itself
is dialectically structured" (p.271, bold added)
could possibly have compounded this misapprehension, or increased the confusion
in the minds of these anonymous detractors, in any way at all, is there?
Not to mention the other passages
quoted
earlier (and
here); they surely can't have added
to this overall bewilderment, can they?
A few years ago,
Graham Priest
presented his readers with a what appears to be a simple, straight-forward argument
aimed at showing that everything (one assumes he meant everything in the
universe) was subject to, or underwent, continual change. He advanced this idea in support of a
mitigated version of Heraclitus's doctrine that there is a 'universal flux' at
work throughout nature:
"The weak form of the
doctrine is a very plausible one, at least if we restrict ourselves to the
material world. Given that there are two things in the cosmos that are in motion
with respect to each other (which seems to be beyond doubt), then it follows
that everything is in motion with respect to at least one thing. Hence,
everything is changing its position with respect to something, and so is
changing one of its properties." [Priest (2002), p.12.]
Naturally, only those impressed with the
semi-divine ability only philosophers seem to possess of being able to
derive universal truths from impressively superficial 'thought experiments' -- i.e., from the supposed meanings
of a handful of words -- will accept the validity, or even the cogency, of the above 'proof'.
However, those not so easily hoodwinked needn't
merely respond with impertinent rhetoric in support of their
initial scepticism. What little plausibility Priest's argument might seem to possess clearly derives from
the undefended assumption that the spatial (or kinematic) relations between
bodies (at arbitrary distances from one another) are properties of
those bodies themselves. If they aren't so prepared (and there is no reason to
suppose they are
properties of the said bodies --
or at least none that Priest thought to share with his readers), then the relative
motion of one body with respect to an indefinite number of others can't of
itself be a property of that body. In which case, such considerations can't (of
themselves) change that body, or any other -- always assuming that "change" here means "alteration of, or to, a given
body's properties".
If Priest were to be believed, then when you, dear
reader, move your little finger,
GNZ-11, the most distant Galaxy from us here on Earth (set at
13.4 billion light years -- approximately 8x1022
miles, or 1.3x1023
kilometres) changes, too! It isn't too clear if this is meant to be an
instantaneous change or one delayed by billions of years while the effect of
your finger waggling finally reaches that distant 'object' (if it still
exists!). The question is: what properties of that distant galaxy will have changed as a
result? We met similar problems associated with more sophisticated attempts to
define "change"
earlier in this Essay. Readers are
directed back there for more details.
Furthermore, when a scientist informs us of the properties
of, say, elemental Sodium, no one expects her to add to her list the relative
motion of a given lump of Sodium with respect to, say, the planet Neptune, or, indeed,
the relative motion of every atom of Sodium in the universe with respect to the
Eifel Tower. Should anyone disagree, they would be hard pressed to find even
as many as oneChemistry textbook (let
alone a single Chemist) that defines the properties of Sodium, or any
other element/substance, that way. Otherwise, dear
reader, you will be faced with the decidedly odd (and suspiciously
ego-centric/megalomaniacal) conclusion that when you stir, say, a cup of tea,
or even scratch your head, every atom in the entire universe will have had its
properties changed as a result.
Certainly, if we define change in
terms of external factors like these, then the 'truth' of Priest's conclusion
will
follow from that
definition. But, we should no more be prepared to accept that as a legitimate
(scientific or philosophical) move than we would be happy to acknowledge the truth
of the reactionary claim that 'human nature' will always stand in the way of
socialism, if human beings
are 'defined' as "naturally selfish". We would rightly be suspicious of any attempt to manufacture convenient truths by
the simple expedient of defining them into
existence in this way.
On the other hand, if anyone were prepared to do that,
how would it
be different from
imposing a given idea on nature?
Few DM-theorists will want to agree with
Priest's argument, anyway, since it implies that change is externally-motivated. DM-apologists usually claim the opposite,
that change is a consequence of factors internal to a body or system.
[However, as
we discovered in Essays Eight
Part One and Seven
Part One,
even that aspect of DM faces serious problems -- that is,
where any sense can be made of it.]
Nor is it clear that the changes Priest envisages
(i.e., those produced by the relative motion of bodies) are in any way 'dialectical'. That
is, it isn't clear that they have anything to do with
UOs and 'dialectical contradictions' etc. Admittedly, theorists
like Priest (following Hegel) regard motion itself as 'contradictory', but that
has nothing to do with the above argument. Whether or not motion itself is
'contradictory', the relative motion of bodies doesn't depend on, or even imply, a
'dialectical contradiction'. Or if it does, we have yet to be given a convincing
(or, indeed, any) argument in support. On the contrary, if it did so imply, that would mean these
objects would have to 'struggle' with and then change into one another --
if the DM-classics are to be believed.
So, in relation the galaxy example from earlier, if
your finger wagging could change the properties of that distant Galaxy, it must
be it, or their, 'dialectical opposite'; and, if the
DM-classics are to be believed, it
should struggle with and then change into those properties and they should
change into your finger wagging!
Readers are now encouraged to wag their little finger
to see if it enters into struggle with that distant object and then changes into it!
Furthermore, if your finger wagging and that galaxy
are indeed 'dialectical opposites', they should imply one another, such that
each couldn't exist without the other (just like the existence of the
proletariat supposedly implies the existence of the capitalist class, and
vice versa). Given that the aforementioned galaxy is at least 13.4 billion
years old, that must mean your finger wagging is that old, too! And, despite what
astronomers will foolishly try to tell you, this galaxy (or its properties) must
have popped into existence the moment you wagged your finger! Or, vice versa...
Consider, too, the Sodium example from earlier: if the
relative motion of that element were 'dialectically related' to other bodies in
the universe -- such as the planet Neptune -- so that they were 'dialectical
opposites', then every atom of Sodium would have to struggle with and then
change into Neptune -- again, if the DM classics are correct. And what is true of the
relation between Neptune and every atom of Sodium would also apply to the
relation between every atom of Sodium and every other atom (or every
element) in the entire
universe. So, every atom of Sodium would have to struggle with and change into
every other atom in the universe! But, that would also apply to every atom of
Sodium and every other atom of Sodium, too. There would then be an ever-lasting,
internecine struggle going on between every atom of Sodium and every other atom
of Sodium in existence, if the DM-classics and Priest are correct and these are
'dialectical' relations. Has anyone observed this
universal, 'inter-atomic
punch-up', or anything like it?
Is it any wonder that Dialectical Marxism has
been
such a long term failure with such a crazy
theory at its heart?
[Note, I am referring to Dialectical Marxism, not
Marxism, here!]
Once more, it might indeed be the case that everything is
subject to change, and is changing (then again, it might
not), but the 'truth' of that particular
proposition may only be established empirically, not conceptually, which
is what
Priest attempted to do. George Novack's words come to mind, again:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphases added.]
In which case, even if the above 'difficulties'
Priest's 'theory' faces could be side-stepped in some way, only a confirmed Idealist
would accept
the cogency of his argument.
In view of the
material presented in
earlier
sections and
the twoInterludes
-- which attempts to clarify the precise nature of the "Totality" and
substantiate the claim that not only is DM
not a scientific theory it is in fact the exact opposite -- we are now in a
position to explore some of its implications.
In advance of that, it is worth pointing out that the above considerations
help explain
why several attempts made in other Essays published at this site to clarify, improve or correct Engels,
Lenin, Trotsky and Mao's formulations of DM-style
'propositions' -- for example, Essays Three Part
One,
Three Part
Two,
Five,
Six, Seven Part
One,
Nine Part
Two, Twelve Part
One and Thirteen Part
One -- failed, whatever
was done with or to them. Indeed, we saw them either
collapse into banal and vacuous platitudes or fall
apart as
vague,
incoherentnon-sense. Plainly, that isn't a fate that
ordinary empirical or scientific propositions ever have to face.
Consider another example: according to
Trotsky-- and with
more apparent sophistication, according to Hegel --
it is impossible to express the LOI
by means of true propositions that attempt to 'reflect'
concrete reality. In short, Trotsky claimed it is never true that "A is
equal to A".
[Of course, that represents a gross misrepresentation of
Hegel's more convoluted 'argument' (if such it might be called), but that is itself because Hegel beat about the
'dialectical bush' considerably more than Trotsky. Indeed, Hegel did that to
such an extent it is now impossible to determine with any certainty, or clarity,
WTH [what the hell] he was trying to
conclude about the LOI, a dialectical conundrum underlined by the additional fact that not
even Hegel scholars can make their minds up about what, if anything, he was
banging on about! Independently of that, his ideas -- that is, what tiny
scraps of sense can
be made of them -- fall apart for other
reasons. (There is more on this in Essay
Twelve; until that is published in its entirely, see
here
and
here.)]
However, even if we assume for the purposes
of argument that Trotsky criticisms of the LOI
are 100% correct, it turns out that it would be impossible for anyone, least of
all Trotsky, to deny
the truth of that 'law' successfully, at least when applied to 'concrete' reality,
as he and subsequent DM-fans have tried to do. That is because, if
anyone who accepts his
criticisms of the LOI then attempted to do that (for the usual
'dialectical' reasons), at a minimum they would have to have some idea what that 'law'
itself entailed; they would have to
know what would be the case if it were true, even if only so they could
then rule that possibility out as false. And yet, if it should turn out theycan'tdo that, any criticisms they have of
it would be
entirely vacuous, at best.
Clearly, that is something
that can be (and typically is) done with respect to empirical
propositions. So, it is (typically) possible to specify in advance of
knowing that a given empirical proposition is
true what circumstances
would make it true or would make it false.47a
For example, even though A1 below is false, it is easy to specify what would make it true
--, for instance, the falsehood of A2. If A2 were false, A1 would be true.
A2: The Mississippi is longer
than, or is equal in length to, the Potomac.
A3: Julius Caesar ate an
apple between 3:00 pm and 4:00 pm (local time) on the 5th of March, 55BC (Julian
Calendar).
Of course, no one knows whether or not A3 is true, but it
is quite easy to specify what would make it, or would have made it, true, and what would make it, or would have made it, false, even if we never
actually find out which of these were the case, and even if no one ever wanted to find out.
Compare that with the LOI and what Trotsky (at
least) had to say about it:
"The
Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A'
is equal to 'A'. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of
practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality 'A' is
not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a
lens -– they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the
question is not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols
for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside
the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -– a
more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a
pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is true (sic) -– all bodies change
uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves.
A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself at 'any given
moment'…. How should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an
infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the
course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely
mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in
time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time
is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal
to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is
if it does not exist." [Trotsky
(1971), pp.63-64.]
Engels said something similar:
"Abstract
identity (a = a; and negatively, a cannot be
simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in
organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its
life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself, by
absorption and excretion of substances, by respiration, by cell formation and
death of cells, by the process of circulation taking place, in short, by a sum
of incessant molecular changes which make up life and the sum-total of whose
results is evident to our eyes in the phases of life -- embryonic life, youth,
sexual maturity, process of reproduction, old age, death. The further physiology
develops, the more important for it become these incessant, infinitely small
changes, and hence the more important for it also the consideration of
difference within identity, and the old abstract standpoint of formal
identity, that an organic being is to be treated as something simply identical
with itself, as something constant, becomes out of date.
[In the margin of the manuscript occurs the remark: 'Apart, moreover, from the
evolution of species.'] Nevertheless, the mode of thought based thereon,
together with its categories, persists. But even in inorganic nature identity as
such is in reality non-existent. Every body is continually exposed to
mechanical, physical, and chemical influences, which are always changing it and
modifying its identity. Abstract identity, with its opposition to
difference, is in place only in mathematics -- an abstract science which is
concerned with creations of thought, even though they are reflections of reality
-- and even there it is continually being sublated. Hegel, Enzyklopädie,
I, p. 235. [This is a reference to Hegel (1975),
pp.169-70, §117 -- RL.] The fact that identity contains difference within itself is
expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily
different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose, is red,
where, either in the subject or in the predicate, there is something that
is not covered by the predicate or the subject. Hegel, p.231. [This is a
reference to Hegel (1975),
pp.166-68, §115 -- RL.] That from the outset identity with itself requires
difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident.
"Continual
change, i.e., sublation of abstract identity with itself, is also found in
so-called inorganic nature. Geology is its history. On the surface, mechanical
changes (denudation, frost), chemical changes (weathering); internally,
mechanical changes (pressure), heat (volcanic), chemical (water, acids, binding
substances); on a large scale – upheavals, earthquakes, etc. The slate of today
is fundamentally different from the ooze from which it is formed, the chalk from
the loose microscopic shells that compose it, even more so limestone, which
indeed according to some is of purely organic origin, and sandstone from the
loose sea sand, which again is derived from disintegrated granite, etc., not to
speak of coal.
"The
law of identity in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the
old outlook: a = a. Each thing is equal to itself. Everything was
permanent, the solar system, stars, organisms. This law has been refuted by
natural science bit by bit in each separate case, but theoretically it still
prevails and is still put forward by the supporters of the old in opposition to
the new: a thing cannot simultaneously be itself and something else. And
yet the fact that true, concrete identity includes difference, change, has
recently been shown in detail by natural science (see above).
"Abstract
identity, like all metaphysical categories, suffices for everyday use,
where small dimensions or brief periods of time are in question; the limits
within which it is usable differ in almost every case and are determined by the
nature of the object; for a planetary system, where in ordinary astronomical
calculation the ellipse can be taken as the basic form for practical purposes
without error, they are much wider than for an insect that completes its
metamorphosis in a few weeks. (Give other examples, e.g., alteration of species,
which is reckoned in periods of thousands of years.) For natural science in its
comprehensive role, however, even in each single branch, abstract identity is
totally inadequate, and although on the whole it has now been abolished in
practice, theoretically it still dominates people’s minds, and most natural
scientists imagine that identity and difference are irreconcilable opposites,
instead of one-sided poles which represent the truth only in their reciprocal
action, in the inclusion of difference within identity." [Engels (1954),
pp.214-16.
Bold emphases alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
And yet, if the LOI never appliesto anything concrete,
to anything in nature or society -- andconceivablycould never
so apply -- its denial would rule nothing out, and in such circumstances that would mean it presented no truth
claims whatsoever.
So, if Trotsky and Engels were correct, no one would be able to say
what would make G1, for example, true, or what would make it false (even
when the letter "A"s it contains are interpreted). That
shows that G1 isn't like ordinary empirical propositions (such as A1). But,
what the above two dialecticians had to say about the LOI (i.e., about G1 or G2)
reveal they regarded it as an empirical proposition
that could be true or could be false. However, as we are about to
find out neither of them would have been able to specify under what conditions
G1, for example, was true, and if they couldn't do that, they would be in
no position to
say under what conditions it was false, either.
G1: A is equal to A.
G2: A = A.
A1: The Potomac
is longer than the
Mississippi.
[Why that is so will be explained shortly.]
But first, two objections (that might even have
occurred to the reader) need to be addressed:
[1] It is often complained that propositions like
A1, A2 and A3 are of little interest to dialecticians since they are:
(i) Banal in the extreme;
(ii) Single, isolated sentences that tell us
little about the inter-connected nature of 'reality'. Entire bodies of text are far
more important and relevant in this respect; and,
(iii) 'Static', that is they represent frozen'
states of affairs (so to speak) and thus fail to express or deal
with change and development.
A1: The
Potomac
is longer than the
Mississippi.
A2: The Mississippi is longer
than, or is equal in length to, the Potomac.
A3: Julius Caesar ate an
apple between 3:00 pm and 4:00 pm (local time) on the 5th of March, 55BC.
However,
as we have already seen, Hegel based his
ideas in this area on the following isolated, 'static' and banal sentences:
"The interpretation of the judgment, according to
which it is assumed to be merely subjective, as if we ascribed a predicate to a
subject is contradicted by the decidedly objective expression of the judgment.
The rose is red; Gold is a metal. It is not by us that something is first
ascribed to them. A judgment is however distinguished from a proposition. The
latter contains a statement about the subject, which does not stand to it in any
universal relationship, but expresses some single action, or some state, or the
like. Thus, 'Caesar was born at Rome in such and such a year waged war in Gaul
for ten years, crossed the Rubicon, etc.', are propositions, but not judgments.
Again it is absurd to say that such statements as 'I slept well last night' or
'Present arms!' may be turned into the form of a judgment. 'A carriage is passing
by' should be a judgment, and a subjective one at best, only if it were
doubtful, whether the passing object was a carriage, or whether it and not
rather the point of observation was in motion: in short, only if it were desired
to specify a conception which was still short of appropriate specification...." [Hegel (1975),
p.233,
§167. Bold emphases alone
added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"To say 'This rose is red'
involves (in virtue of the copula 'is') the coincidence of subject and
predicate. The rose however is a concrete thing, and so is not red only: it has
also an odour, a specific form, and many other features not implied in the
predicate red. The predicate on its part is an abstract universal, and
does not apply to the rose alone. There are other flowers and other objects
which are red too. The subject and predicate in the immediate judgment touch, as
it were, only in a single point, but do not cover each other.... In pronouncing
an action to be good, we frame a notional judgment. Here, as we at once
perceive, there is a closer and a more intimate relation than in the immediate
judgment. The predicate in the latter is some abstract quality which may or
may not be applied to the subject. In the judgment of the notion the
predicate is, as it were, the soul of the subject, by which the subject, as the
body of this soul, is characterised through and through." [Ibid., p.237, §172. Bold emphases added.
Hegel's longer, more involved and hence much more opaque version of the above
'argument' -- published in Hegel (1999),
pp.631-43
-- has been quoted in full in
Appendix A to Essay Three Part One.]
Engels and Lenin did likewise:
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary,
common, etc., [sic] with anyproposition: the leaves of a
tree are green; John
is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961),
p.359.
Bold emphases alone added.]
"The fact that identity contains difference within itself is
expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from
the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red,
where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not
covered by the predicate or the subject...." [Engels (1954),
pp.214-15.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
Trotsky also utilised 'static', banal and
isolated sentences about bags of sugar:
"In reality 'A' is not
equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens
-- they are quite different to each other. But one can object, the question is
not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal
quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point;
in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -- a more delicate scale
always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is
equal to itself. Neither is true -- all bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves."
[Trotsky (1971),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
In which case, if dialectics can be -- and was
--
motivated by the use of banal, isolated and 'static' sentences, critics can hardly complain
when similar banal, isolated and 'static' sentences are employed in order to undermine it.
Here is another common objection:
[2] Dialecticians do not treat he LOI as an empirical
proposition, so the points made earlier fail to apply.
This objection is easily dismissed since it is clear
that DM-theorists
do in fact treat the LOI as if it were an empirical proposition
(and that comment also applies to the way they regard the
LOC and the LEM, although that specific point will neither be substantiated
nor explored in this Essay). Just like Trotsky, they try to
produce evidence that this 'law' is false when applied to concrete reality
(quoted earlier):
"In reality 'A' is not
equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens
-- they are quite different to each other. But one can object, the question is
not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal
quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point;
in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -- a more delicate scale
always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is
equal to itself. Neither is true -- all bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves."
[Trotsky (1971),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
"Abstract
identity (a = a; and negatively, a cannot be
simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in
organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its
life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself, by
absorption and excretion of substances, by respiration, by cell formation and
death of cells, by the process of circulation taking place, in short, by a sum
of incessant molecular changes which make up life and the sum-total of whose
results is evident to our eyes in the phases of life -- embryonic life, youth,
sexual maturity, process of reproduction, old age, death. The further physiology
develops, the more important for it become these incessant, infinitely small
changes, and hence the more important for it also the consideration of
difference within identity, and the old abstract standpoint of formal
identity, that an organic being is to be treated as something simply identical
with itself, as something constant, becomes out of date.
[In the margin of the manuscript occurs the remark: 'Apart, moreover, from the
evolution of species.'] Nevertheless, the mode of thought based thereon,
together with its categories, persists. But even in inorganic nature identity as
such is in reality non-existent. Every body is continually exposed to
mechanical, physical, and chemical influences, which are always changing it and
modifying its identity. Abstract identity, with its opposition to
difference, is in place only in mathematics -- an abstract science which is
concerned with creations of thought, even though they are reflections of reality
-- and even there it is continually being sublated. Hegel, Enzyklopädie,
I, p. 235. [This is a reference to Hegel (1975),
pp.169-70, §117 -- RL.] The fact that identity contains difference within itself is
expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily
different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose, is red,
where, either in the subject or in the predicate, there is something that
is not covered by the predicate or the subject. Hegel, p.231. [This is a
reference to Hegel (1975),
pp.166-68, §115 -- RL.] That from the outset identity with itself requires
difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident.
"Continual
change, i.e., sublation of abstract identity with itself, is also found in
so-called inorganic nature. Geology is its history. On the surface, mechanical
changes (denudation, frost), chemical changes (weathering); internally,
mechanical changes (pressure), heat (volcanic), chemical (water, acids, binding
substances); on a large scale – upheavals, earthquakes, etc. The slate of today
is fundamentally different from the ooze from which it is formed, the chalk from
the loose microscopic shells that compose it, even more so limestone, which
indeed according to some is of purely organic origin, and sandstone from the
loose sea sand, which again is derived from disintegrated granite, etc., not to
speak of coal.
"The
law of identity in the old metaphysical sense is the fundamental law of the
old outlook: a = a. Each thing is equal to itself. Everything was
permanent, the solar system, stars, organisms. This law has been refuted by
natural science bit by bit in each separate case, but theoretically it still
prevails and is still put forward by the supporters of the old in opposition to
the new:a thing cannot simultaneously be itself and something else. And
yet the fact that true, concrete identity includes difference, change, has
recently been shown in detail by natural science (see above).
"Abstract
identity, like all metaphysical categories, suffices for everyday use,
where small dimensions or brief periods of time are in question; the limits
within which it is usable differ in almost every case and are determined by the
nature of the object; for a planetary system, where in ordinary astronomical
calculation the ellipse can be taken as the basic form for practical purposes
without error, they are much wider than for an insect that completes its
metamorphosis in a few weeks. (Give other examples, e.g., alteration of species,
which is reckoned in periods of thousands of years.) For natural science in its
comprehensive role, however, even in each single branch, abstract identity is
totally inadequate, and although on the whole it has now been abolished in
practice, theoretically it still dominates people’s minds, and most natural
scientists imagine that identity and difference are irreconcilable opposites,
instead of one-sided poles which represent the truth only in their reciprocal
action, in the inclusion of difference within identity." [Engels (1954),
pp.214-16.
Bold emphases alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
In addition to endlessly quoting Trotsky and Engels,
other DM-theorists make similar points;
for example, the following:
"Formal Logic starts from the
proposition that A is always equal to A. We know that this law of identity
contains some measure of truth…. Now…when we go to reality and look for evidence
of the truth of the proposition: A equals A…we find that the opposite of this
axiom is far closer to the truth." [Novack (1971), pp.32-33.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The laws
of logic are based on two main propositions. The first is that of identity or of
self-conformity. The proposition very simply states: 'A is A,' that is, every
concept is equal to itself. A man is a man; a hen is a hen; a potato is a
potato. This proposition forms one basis of logic. The second main proposition
is the law of contradiction, or as it is also called, the law of the excluded
middle. This proposition states: 'A is either A or not A.' It cannot be
both at the same time. For example: Whatever is black is black; it cannot at the
same time be black and white. A thing -- to put it in general terms -- cannot at
the same time be itself and its opposite. In practice it therefore follows that
if I draw certain conclusions from a given starting point and contradictions
arise, then there are errors in thinking or my starting point was wrong. If from
some correct premises I come to the conclusion that 4 is the same as 5, then I
deduce from the law of contradiction that my conclusion is false.
"So far
all appears to be clear and certain. What can be a clearer law than that man is
man, a rooster a rooster, that a thing is always the same thing? It even appears
to be absolutely certain that a thing is either large or small; either black or
white, that it cannot be both at the same time, that contradictions cannot exist
in one and the same thing.
"Let us
now consider the matter from the standpoint of a higher doctrine of thought,
from the standpoint of dialectics. Let us take the first law which we have
developed as the foundation of logic: A is A. A thing is always the same thing.
Without testing this law, let us consider another one which we have already
mentioned, the law of Heraclitus which says 'Everything is in flux,' or 'One
cannot ascend the same river twice.' Can we say that the river is always the
same? No, the law of Heraclitus says the opposite. The river is at no moment the
same. It is always changing. Thus one cannot twice nor, more exactly, even once
ascend the same river. In short: the law 'A is A' in the last analysis is valid
only if I assume that the thing does not change. As soon as I consider the thing
in its change, then A is always A and something else; A is at the same time
not-A. And this in the last analysis holds for all things and events." [Thalheimer (1936),
pp.88-89.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics
is quite simply the logic of motion, or the logic of common sense to activists
in the movement. We all know that things don't stand still, they change. But
there is another form of logic which stands in contradiction to dialectics,
which we call 'formal logic', which again is deeply embodied in capitalist
society. It is perhaps necessary to begin by describing briefly what this method
implies.
"Formal
logic is based on what is known as the 'law of identity', which says that 'A'
equals 'A' -- i.e. that things are what they are, and that they stand in
definite relationships to each other. There are other derivative laws based on
the law of identity; for example, if 'A' equals 'A', it follows that 'A' cannot
equal 'B', nor 'C'....
"Whereas
the formal logician will say that 'A' equals 'A', the dialectician will say that
'A' does not necessarily equal 'A'. Or to take a practical example that Trotsky
uses in his writings, one pound of sugar will not be precisely equal to another
pound of sugar. It is a good enough approximation if you want to buy sugar in a
shop, but if you look at it more carefully you will see that it's actually
wrong." [John
Pickard, quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
[I have
subjected these rather wild and unsubstantiated allegations about FL to sustained criticism in Essay
Four
Part One
and Essay
Six.]
So, the above
theorists all treat this 'law' as an empirical proposition, which is why they
offer evidence aimed at exposing its supposed limitations.
Furthermore, dialecticians also claim that 'laws' like
this "reflect" the world in some way, which they also claim is the case
with empirical
propositions:
"Hegel actually
proved that logical forms and laws are not an empty
shell, but the reflection of the objective world.... The laws of logic are the
reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.180, 183.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis alone added.]
That being the case, it is undeniable that
DM-theorists do treat the LOI as an empirical proposition (albeit a highly
general one). In fact they regard it as both abstract and empirical (or
'concrete'), that seeming incongruity resolved along sound dialectical lines:
"Logical concepts are subjective so long as they
remain 'abstract,' in their abstract form, but at the same time they express the
Thing-in-themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract,
both
phenomenon and essence, both moment and relation. Human
concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a
whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source." [Lenin
(1961) p.208. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
However, according to DM-theorists the LOI can never be true
-- or, rather, it fails to be 'absolutely' true of anything in 'concrete' reality,
and the reason for that is the HF. Paradoxically,
therefore, anyone who rejects the LOI on that basis will end up
rejecting nothing substantive.
That is because in order to declare the 'law' false, such a repudiator has to be able to rule out the truth of whatever it was that
they are now trying to reject. As we saw earlier in connection with other
empirical propositions, A2 would be used in relation to A1. That is,
anyone who denied A1 will typically do so on the basis of the truth
of A2. Moreover, if anyone wanted to rule out the truth of A1, they would have
in mind the truth of A2. But, of for some reason A2 were unavailable in a given
language, the truth of A1 would be impossible to deny.
Of course, "The Potomac
isn't longer than the
Mississippi" might very well be used, too, but then it would be unclear what it
implied, since it could mean (i) the Potomac was equal in length to the
Mississippi or (ii) it was shorter than the Mississippi. A2, on the other hand,
takes care of both possibilities at once. Hence, in order to declare an
empirical proposition "false" we need to have a clear idea what it rules in so
that those conditions can be ruled out conclusively without any ambiguity.
The problem here is that if it is impossible to say on the basis of true propositions what the LOI
proposes in each case, its rejection achieves nothing. The whole exercise
becomes an empty charade.48
A1: The
Potomac
is longer than the
Mississippi.
A2: The Mississippi is longer
than, or is equal in length to, the Potomac.
[Why that is so will be explained presently.]
Here, for example, is Trotsky, once more:
"In reality 'A' is not
equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens
-- they are quite different to each other. But one can object, the question is
not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal
quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point;
in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -- a more delicate scale
always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is
equal to itself. Neither is true -- all bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves."
[Trotsky (1971),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
According to Trotsky, even the letters we
have to use in order to express this 'law' are never equal. So, if
Trotsky and Hegel are correct, it would be impossible to say (using true propositions) what the LOI
actually proposes.
In that case, if
the following were indeed the case:
A4: A is
never equal to itself,
then A4
itself would never be equal to itself, either!
If the letter,
"A", is never equal to
itself, a sentence like A4 stands no chance. Hence, what A4 says can't be equal to itself,
either! And if that is so, nothing determinate can be
inferred from it since we wouldn't know from moment to moment what an
acceptance of A4 committed
anyone to,
or was even attempting to say.
Indeed, if A4
were
true, just as soon as what it was apparently trying to say had been
'comprehended', that, too, will have changed!
That must be so unless we imagine that sentences (or any thoughts about them) are the
only 'objects' in this
supposedly Heraclitean universe that are changeless, hence the only objects
in the entire world over which the HF has no sway. But, if that were
the case, if A4 now turns out to be changeless,
A4 must itself be false.
That is because,
if, for the sake of argument we assume A4 is changeless (even if only momentarily), that
would mean A4 is equal to itself (even if only momentarily). But
that must also be the case with the letter, "A" (inside A4);
it can't have changed (during the moment that A4 was supposed to be equal to
itself, even if only momentarily). That in turn is
because, if A had changed (during the moment A4 was supposed to be equal to itself) that
would mean A4 wasn't equal to itself (since part of itself --
i.e., the letter "A" -- wasn't the same), contrary to the assumption. So, if Ais equal to itself, what A4 says must be false.
That in turn must mean A5
(below) is true (again, even if only momentarily):
A5: A
is sometimes equal to itself.
Consequently, if we take A6 (below) to
represent the LOI, and if Trotsky and Hegel were correct, it would be impossible to say
by means of true propositions what it proposes, since A5
and A6 both face the same problems as A4. They too can't be equal to themselves.
And, if that
is so, nothing determinate can be inferred from them since we wouldn't know from moment to moment what an
acceptance of these two committed
us to,
or was even attempting to say.
A6: A is equal to A.
A4: A is
never equal to itself.
[Several objections to this
line of reasoning have been neutralised in
Note 48, but more fully in
Essay Six.]
An appeal
to the supposed defects of language (which might form part of a
'dialectical explanation' why A4, for instance, is true -- superficially
advanced by Engels and Trotsky) would be to no avail, either.
Even if it were correct to say that our words for identity were only "approximately
true", or were "true only within certain limits", that would be no
help.
That is because, for that counter-claim to work we would still have to
have some comprehension of the words used in any such expression of these more
restricted, limited or "approximate" versions of the LOI. That is because we would need to recognise those words
as an approximation to genuine identity, as opposed to
an approximation to something completely different --,
such as courage, fortitude or cowardice, for example. Hence, even
dialecticians will need to have some grasp of genuine/absolute
identity to
know whether or not these alleged approximations were indeed approximations to
it and nothing else.
As should seem reasonably clear, unless it is
possible to say something (anything?) about the object of
knowledge, epistemologically-motivated claims about 'it' will be entirely
vacuous. Consider the following example -- concerning
meskonators. An appeal to the
"totality of human experience and knowledge" would be no help at all if no
one had the faintest idea what a meskonator is. Knowledge
about what?
[Again, in order to save readers from having to search for
a definition, "meskonator" is a totally made up word!]
So, even ifA4
were 100% correct, DM-fans would have to know by how much or by how little the
words it uses fell short of
depicting 'absolute identity'. Once again, an approximation only makes sense if
you have a clear idea to what it is supposed to be approximating, so that it
becomes possible to specify how far short of that goal the approximation itself
lies. Otherwise it wouldn't be an approximation to absolute identity, but
maybe something entirely different (no pun intended).
And, if that is so, dialecticians will need to have some idea of absolute
identity itself. But, they have ruled that possibility out by an appeal
to
sentences like A4. In which case, they are in no position to claim their
version of the LOI
is an approximation to anything, let alone Absolute Identity.48a
This much
was at least clear to Plato 2500 years ago (even if he drew all the wrong
conclusions from it).49
A4: A is
never equal to itself.
It could be argued that the term "absolute identity" can't be
compared to a made up word like "meskonator". That is undeniable, but
that word
was used to make the point that unless DM-theorists know precisely what
they are talking about, what absolute identity means or entails, they might just
as well be talking about meskonators for all the good it does.
Again, it could be objected that language is
"relatively stable", so the above comments about rapid
linguistic or conceptual change are misguided. Here is what
I have
argued in response to that counter-claim in Essay Six (slightly edited):
[I]t could be
argued that all Trotsky requires is
the relativestability of the words he used, which won't have changed
significantly during the short intervals involved.
Unfortunately, Trotsky holed that response well below the water line, declaring that:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour etc. They are never equal to themselves… But everything exists in time;
and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation….
Thus
the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it
does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Trotsky
(1971), p.64. Bold
added.]
In that
case, since words are also material objects they must "change uninterruptedly"
(as must their meanings) and hence they are "never equal to themselves".
So, if,
according to Trotsky, every letter "A" is subject
to the Heraclitean Flux from moment-to-moment and each is "never equal" itself, words
and entire sentences stand no chance.
So, not only does this theory (DM) imply that there is no way of knowing whether or not
words (and/or their meanings) have changed dramatically --, even while they are
being uttered (including any of the words that might be used to argue
for or against either possibility) --, it also implies that, whether we
know it or not, they have changed in the above way.
[We saw earlier that
Voloshinov
seemed to hold this view.]
Consequently, the word "identity" (and its meaning) must itself fail to be
self-identical at one and the same moment (if Trotsky were to be believed), since everything (including
every meaning, again, if he were right) is a unity of itself and its 'opposite' (its
"other",
according to Hegel
and Lenin).
Plainly, that implies the word "identical" must also mean
and not
mean "not identical", at the
same time!
If that weren't the case, then dialecticians would have no way of
accounting for the change in meaning of the word "identity" itself, which,
according to
their own theory, has to change, and it can only do that because of
one or more of the following factors: (i) Its own 'internal
contradictions', (ii) The 'internal contradictions' of (or in) the meanings we attribute to it,
or (iii) A response to 'contradictions' in society-at-large (which we are told are reflected
in language). So, given the truth of DM, unless "identical" now
means "not identical", its meaning couldn't change.
The
same argument applies to anyone who uses
this word. So, by "identical" they, too, must mean "identical"
and "not identical". Moreover, if, for the purposes of argument, we
assume DM is true, it isn't easy to see how the comprehension of
these changed (and continually changing) meanings, allied with altered (and
continually altering)
intentions, could possibly be coordinated across an entire population of
dialecticians, let alone the wider community. Everyone would mean something
increasingly different by every word they used, and that would also be different
from their own previous use of the 'same' words. Clearly, this would scupper inter-personal communication, which in turn
would prevent DM-theorists themselves from communicating their ideas to the rest of
humanity, never mind one another. They too would continually mean something different
by their use of "identity", or, indeed, any word.
This would further imply that no one would
or could possibly "understand" dialectics -- not Hegel, not Marx, not Engels, not
Plekhanov, not Lenin, not Trotsky..., since the meaning of every single term
used would
be subject to unspecified changes, and hence consequent indeterminacies. Even
worse, given the truth of DM,
there is nothing that could be done to rectify the situation. Any attempt to do
so would also be subject to very same the tender mercies of the dread Heraclitean Flux.[Irony intended.]
Furthermore, if
we now apply DM consistently across the board,
any such a 'rectification' (should one be attempted) would be both a 'rectification' and 'not a
rectification' at the same time!
The only way to avoid 'ridiculous' conclusions
like these is to abandon the doctrine that all things change all the time
(as a result of their 'internal contradictions') --, or admit that some things remain
identical (namely, at least the word "identical" and its meaning), indefinitely. Either way, DM would
suffer
yet another body
blow.
Hence, in order to avoid the unremitting
confusion that the Heraclitean doctrine of universal change would introduce into DM itself, Trotsky needed the LOI to apply to his own
words and their meanings (as a rule of language or of practice) while he was using them.
In addition, that would have to
have been true for many years (possibly even for several centuries),
too, so that his supporters/epigones would be able to understand him correctly (or,
indeed, at all!). That would be the case especially when he hoped to employ
certain words to question the application of identically samelaw to
those letter "A"s and
bags of sugar! [Irony intended, once more.] Otherwise, for all he knew, his words and their meanings
could
be non-self-identical from moment-to-moment. [His theory
implies that anyway.]
In addition,
anyone consulting Trotsky's words today must be able to read them with
their original meanings intact or they wouldn't be able to agree with the
originally intended
content/message, and hence with what Trotsky had attempted to argue. If so, contemporary dialecticians who read Trotsky's words (or,
indeed,
Hegel's) must in effect take any argument against the application of a strict version of the
LOI with a pinch of salt or risk
failing to grasp the exact message Trotsky (or Hegel) had intended.
Alternatively, they would have to admit that what those two had to say about identity
and change can't be grasped by anyone if what they claimed about the LOI were
the case.
So, if
Trotsky and Hegel's words about identity and change (etc.) were correct, the message
they intended to convey wouldn't now be accessible, having changed in
untold ways over the years -- possibly (probably!) into its opposite! Indeed,
definitely into its opposite, if we were to believe what the
DM-classics have to say about
change.
It could be objected that our words do infact remain relatively stable, so the above comments are entirely
misguided. However, if Hegel and Trotsky are to be believed, there would be
no way that either of them (or anyone else, for that matter) could possibly
determine
whether or not words remain 'relatively stable'. Indeed, if
their theory were true, even the words in the previous sentence,
along with their
meanings, will have changed!
As should now seem obvious, if DM were a valid
theory, there would be nothing to which anyone could appeal in order to basea single
secure thought.
Hence, if Trotsky and the
other DM-theorists quoted earlier
were speaking the truth, this couldn't be true:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour etc. They are never equal to themselves… But everything exists in time;
and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation….
Thus
the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it
does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Ibid. Bold emphasis added.]
If nothing
in the entire universe -- including thoughts, words and their meanings -- is ever
"equal to" itself, then there can be no secure foundation for a single
DM-proposition, let alone anything else.
On the other hand, if there
were something upon which DM-theorists could ground their thoughts, then Trotsky, Hegel
and Heraclitus must have been mistaken, since, in that case, at least
something would remain
unchanged long enough for it to be of any use -- namely whatever it is that we
could ground even that thought upon. So, given the validity of Trotsky's
argument -- that nothing stays the same, that all things
change uninterruptedly and are never equal to themselves, they are never self-identical
-- there can't be any such grounding. An appeal to the
memory we might have of a given word (of its use or its meaning), for
example, would be to no avail, either. If
everything is changing, then memory itself can hardly remain unscathed. Not even
Cartesian 'clear
and distinct ideas' would be available to anchor a single
DM-cognition on solid epistemological bedrock. The words, concepts, and ideas
retrieved in order to formulate these comforting 'Cartesian certainties' would
themselves be non-self-identical
from moment-to-moment, subject to unremitting and continual change, in like
manner.
A moment's thought (no pun intended!) will
confirm that even the phrase "relatively stable" must itself be subject to change
-- along with its meaning -- if we were to believe what DM-theorists
try to tell us. How could dialecticians rule that out? In fact, it is implied by their
own theory! This must be so if everything is subject to relentless change in the way
that Heraclitus, Hegel, Lenin,
Trotsky and all the rest imagined. In which case, it is the DM-doctrine of
constant, universal change that must be rejected to save this theory from its
own absurd implications andeasy self-refutation. Of course, the only way
to do that would involve an invocation of the
LOI, interpreted now as a ruleof language or of practice,not as a metaphysical,
or any other sort of, truth.
Once again, DM-fans would have to appeal to
FL
and/or ordinary language to
rescue their theory from itself.
Alternatively, if it is indeed a fact that language is stable, then the
DM-theory of change must itself be wrong (and for reasons rehearsed above; see also
here and
here), since, at a minimum,
Awill equal A (even if only for few moments), thus refuting Trotsky,
Hegel and all the rest.
Hence, DM-type propositions saynothing because they rule nothing (material) out, and hence they rule nothing in.
Of
course, as is the case with other linguistically competent human
beings, DM-apologists understand perfectly well how to use words for identity –-
such as, "similar", "equal", "equivalent", "the same", and "identical" -- along with
their appropriate qualifiers (e.g., "exactly", "precisely",
"accurately", "spot on", "very", "nearly", "almost",
"slightly", and -- in normal circumstances -- even the word
"approximately").
Plainly, a grasp of terms like these arises out of their employment in everyday life
by each individual, not
from some supposed 'law' (that the vast majority have never even heard of).
Children learn to use the above words long before they even hear of any such
'law of identity' -- if they ever do! Nor does this facility
depend on the 'negation', nor yet the double 'negation', of the LOI. Similarly,
dialecticians themselves learned how to use the above terms long before they had
even heard of Hegel, let alone 'dialectics'. In fact, this
everyday facility with words for identity (etc.) is what enables DM-theorists
themselves to engage in the (no doubt genuine) pretence that the LOI is
either false or is only 'approximately true' when it is applied to objects and
processes in 'concrete reality'. As competent speakers they understand the LOI perfectly well
(or, rather, they know how to use the above words competently), and yet it is their
misinterpretation of the socially-sanctioned rules
we have for the use of such words as if they expressed empirical
truths about the supposed relationship between an object and itself that ultimately misleads them.
In
short: dialecticians misconstrue a social norm for reality itself,
and they thenmake a fetish out of the result.
[Why they do this will be explained in Essays
Twelve and Nine Parts
One and
Two.]
It is
also worth adding that DM-theorists aren't alone in this respect. The LOI itself
says nothing; i.e., it has no empirical content, since it is
a
misleading expression of a rule of language. But, because of its
(artificially) elevated status in Traditional Philosophy it has almost
universally been misconstrued as a 'necessary truth', which means that
metaphysicians and theorists in general have also misinterpreted this social
norm/rule as some sort of deep
reflection on 'reality itself'. Viewed that way, the LOI has traditionally been
seen as an expression of what can only be described as an 'industrial-strength', 'necessary'
truth, which supposedly applies to everything in existence. Hence, it appears to be telling us how things mustbe and how they can't be conceived of in any other way. Following Hegel,
DM-theorists go further (but still in the same direction), viewing this 'law' as
an 'approximation', and hence as an empirical statement. But, as we have seen,
they can't tell us what it actually approximates!
In which case,
an ancient, well entrenched misconstrual of the way we use certain words to
speak about sameness and difference
has been reified into a 'Law'
by an approach that
'allowed' philosophers to think they could derive 'fundamental truths about
reality' (i.e., what amount to super-empirical facts) solely from language and thought. That is, of course, why metaphysicians
believed that the LOI was 'necessarily true', independent of, and prior to, any apparent state of the world.
Indeed, alongside other such logical truths created or mandated by 'god', this
'law'
determined the form of any and all possible worlds.
In the last
analysis, that is also why DM-theorists
think they
can deny the absolutetruth of this 'law'
when it is applied to 'concrete reality'. This they do on (i) the basis of a handful of
rather weak and inappropriate 'thought experiments' (ŕ la
Trotsky), (ii) a few superficial and
ill-considered remarks about the natural world (ŕ la
Engels), or,
(iii) ultimately as a consequence of a fewverbal tricks
they
learned from Hegel. Hence, their rejection of the 'absolute' version of the
LOI is also based exclusively on language and 'thought', all of which
takes
place in a by-now-familiar
Idealist bubble first inflated by
Ancient Greek ruling-class hacks.
'Reality' was
then 're-interpreted'
-- or, to be more precise it was distorted -- accordingly.
Here are Marx and Engels, again:
"One of the most difficult tasks
confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual
world.
Language is the immediate actuality of thought.Just as
philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to
make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of
philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own
content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual
world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life.
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in
consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring
independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with
these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the
systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and
that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German
petty-bourgeois conditions. The
philosophers have only to dissolve
their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order
to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that
they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases
alone added.]
Hence, when the LOI is viewed as a
'super-empirical' proposition,
it seems
to express a 'necessary truth' about a
reflexive and
symmetric relation
that holds between
an object and itself, which possibility DM-theorists reject (or heavily qualify)
if any
attempt is made to apply it to
'concrete reality'. But, rules can no more be applied to 'reality' (in the sense
that they are able to 'reflect the world') any more than
they can be true or false. But,
as we have just seen, since the LOI is the expression of a rule of language, it
turns out that it is impossible to deny
its 'truth'
without also
having to use it
in the very act of attempting to do just that!
We saw
this happen repeatedly in
Essay Six.
There, we witnessed Trotsky having
to rely on the identity of temporal instants in order to deny the
absolute identity of bags of sugar! He was forced to do
that because he had to appeal to the same moment in time
during which an object or process wasn't supposed to be self-identical!
So, he had to apply
this 'law' in the very act of undermining it! He also had to rely on
the words he employed remaining 'self-identical' from moment-to-moment, even while he
was trying to argue that not even the letter "A"was
'self-identical' at
any given moment! Hence, he had to rely on
the absolute identity of temporal instants, as well as that of words and concepts,
so that he could then deny the LOI applied to anything in the physical universe! But,
by so doing he torpedoed his entire argument. In the very act
of denying that this 'law' applied to 'concrete reality', he ended up confirming its
validity by
so using it! His entire argument
in the end depends on this 'law' being 'valid'.
[Readers are directed to the
above Essay for more details.]
In which case, it is impossible to specify whatthe LOIrules out as 'false',
and hence specify what it rules in as 'true'.
[Why that is so is explained in detail
in Essay Twelve
Part One;
the central core of that argument has been summarised
here and
here.] Moreover, as we also saw in the aforementioned Essay,
anyeffort to do so readily
collapses into incoherence. Attempts to undermine a
rule of language -- while actually using it to try to do just that -- will always
face such a disastrous outcome.
Furthermore, as noted above and as argued in Essay Three
Part One,
as far as we know philosophical and logical 'problems' like these first saw the
light of day in Ancient Greece, where
ruling-class hacks (aka philosophers) conjured into existence politically-, and ideologically-useful
'concepts' by means of what later came to be called the 'process of abstraction'.
Unfortunately, that 'process' turns general nouns into the Proper Names of 'Abstract
Particulars', which destroys their generality, vitiating the entire exercise.
[Readers are
directed to Essay Three Part One (link above) for a detailed explanation of
exactly how and why that
happens -- and also how it succeeds in crippling the use of language, preventing it from being
employed to say anything,
true or false. (That argument has been -- summarised
here.)]
So, with respect to the LOI, a universal, super-empirical 'law' was
'abstracted' -- i.e., magicked -- into existence, not out of thin air,
but out of the ordinary words we have for sameness and difference, the results
then dogmatically imposed on 'reality'. All this was finally codified as the LOI
in the Middle Ages, thanks to the 'sterling work' of Roman Catholic theologians.49a
In this way,
everyday words for sameness and difference were
transformed into the Proper Names of the objects posited by general theories about the ultimate structure of
'reality'. Or, perhaps better: in the Middle Ages socially-sanctioned rules
that govern
the use of words we have for sameness and difference were
reified and then codified into the LOI. It was thatform of this 'law' which Hegel latched onto, misconstruing it as a super-empirical
'principle of abstract reason', which supposedly expressed a profound truth about the
'fundamental
nature of existence', valid for all of space and time. Hegel then attempted to
criticise what was in effect a 'conceptual
chimera', invented by the aforementioned
theologians four or five centuries earlier (the inner workings of which were
exposed in Essays Six, Three
Part One (links above) and Eight
Part Three).
Unfortunately for
Hegel and those who look to him for inspiration, since the LOI is in effect a badly-stated rule of language, it
can't be true or
false, it can only be practical or impractical, useful or useless.
Dialectical Marxists bought into this egregious fetishisation
of language, all the while committing the opposite error of imagining this
reified social norm was a 'empirio-logical law' that was at best only 'partially
true' of
everything in 'concrete' reality, supposedly reflected in 'consciousness'.
However, according to this ancient tradition, in order to
establish either result -- i.e., that the LOI is a 'universally true' law, or
that it is
only 'approximately true' when applied to the material world --, one semantic
feature of language had to be promoted at the expense of another. That is, truth
had to be privileged over
falsehood.
The LOI had traditionally been connected with the
presumed absolutetruth of identity statements -- but only
with their truth --, since it was supposedly a 'law of reason' that ultimately
expressed a 'empirico-logical truth' the 'deity' had stitched into the
fabric of the
universe by the power of 'His' speech (i.e., by the
Logos of the New Testament). In the
Book of Genesis, 'God' only had to speak and everything not only popped into
existence, it did as it was told ever more.
Unfortunately, these moves only succeed in
undermining the paired semantic foundations of empirical propositions: truth and falsehood. In the end, by
promoting truth -- thus depreciating, or even eliminating,
falsehood, in this context -- both options wound up being ruled out.
That is because empirical propositions (i.e.,
those pertaining to facts of the matter) leave it open whether what they
say is
true or what they say is false -- which is why their truth-values can't simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in
order to determine their actual truth or their actual falsehood, and why it is possible to
understand them before either has been
established.
How would it be possible to determine either if the
original proposition hadn't been understood first.
[The complex reasoning underlying these seemingly
dogmatic pronouncements is set out in detail in Essay Twelve
Part One
(but they should be obvious to anyone who thinks about them) -- again, summarised
here and
here -- where the reason for the
above rather stilted use of language has also been explained.]
When that isn't the case -- i.e., when either
option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off and propositions are declared
"necessarily true", or alternatively "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant.
As a result, such propositions lose the capacity they once seemed to have of
expressing either option: truth or falsehood. As such, they become
non-sensical.50
[Follow the above link for an explanation of
"non-sensical", which is not the same as "nonsensical"!]
In order to see why that is so, consider the following sentence
(M1/M3), quoted from Lenin's
MEC. Because Lenin held M1/M3 to be true, he would presumably have declared M2
"false" -- or perhaps even "necessarily false" (hence, "unthinkable"):
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
M3:
"[M]otion without matter is unthinkable."
[Lenin (1972), p.318.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare M2 necessarily (and
hence always) false, the
possibility of its truth (or what it supposedly represents) must first be entertained. That is
because, if the
truth of M2 (or what it supposedly represents) is to be permanently excluded by holding it
necessarily false (or what it supposedly represents is declared "unthinkable"), whatever would have
made it true (i.e., what it supposedly represents or 'reflects') has to be ruled out
conclusively. But, anyone who tried to do that would have to know what
M2 ruled in
(i.e., what made it true -- what it supposedly represents, again!)
so that they could then comprehend what the assertion of M1 was then ruling out
(i.e., rejecting what M2 supposedly represents) as always and
necessarily false. And yet, that is precisely what can't be done
if what M2 itself says is permanently excluded by M1 onconceptual grounds
alone.
Consequently, if a proposition like M2 is declared necessarily
false, the permanent exclusion of its truth (or what it supposedly represents) can't
even be attempted.
That is because it would now be impossible to say
(or even to think) what couldpossibly count as making M2 true. For, as
Lenin put it, that would be "unthinkable".
However, according to Lenin, because the truth of M2 can't even be conceived,
he was in no position to say
what was being excluded by its rejection
(i.e., repudiated by means of the supposed truth of M1). If M2 can never be true
-- nor eventhoughtof as true (since, according to
M1 what it supposedly reflects would be "unthinkable"), then it can't also be thought of as not true.
Anyone who even attempted to specify what constituted M2's failure to be true
would have to know what would have made it true just so they could
immediately rule that possibility out, as "unthinkable". But, if
Lenin is to be believed, that can't even beattempted since its
truth (the truth of M2), is
"unthinkable".
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
[As should
be obvious, I am
here assuming
that in relation to empirical propositions, "not true" is semantically the same as "false". That assumption has been
questioned by some philosophers and logicians. I have said more about that in Note 50ab.]50ab
Unfortunately, that prevents any account being given of what would make M2
false, let alone 'necessarily false'.
Contrary to the above, it might seem possible that
M2 could be thought of as 'necessarily false' if and only if what
would make it true could at least be entertained (even if only briefly), and then rejected. That would
now appear to allow the content of M2 to be ruled out as 'necessarily false'.
But that isn't so. According to Lenin, the conditions that would make M2 true
can't even be conceived (because they are "unthinkable"), so that train-of-thought can't be joined at any
point. In which case, if the truth of M2 -- or the conditions under which it
would be true or would make it true -- can't be conceived
in any shape or form, then
neither can its falsehood, for we would not then know what was being ruled out.
Someone could still object, arguing that it is easy to
specify what would make M1 false -- the existence of matter that is motionless
(i.e., the content of M2). But, Lenin ruled that thought out conclusively as
"unthinkable", so either Lenin was wrong, and M2 is true, or he was right and M2 is false.
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
However, it isn't easy to imagine there are many Leninists
who are prepared to argue that Lenin was wrong about this, and hence they must agree that M1 is
itself true. If so, the above conclusions still hold.
But there are even more persuasive reasons for
arguing along these lines. As we have seen, for both Lenin and Engels, matter
was defined in terms of motion -- indeed, it was for them the "mode of
existence" of matter:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion,
nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as
inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it
can only be transmitted." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe,
from mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels
(1954), p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]
"In
full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it,
Frederick Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring
(read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....'
'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin
(1914), p.8. Bold emphasis added.]
Other DM-theorists agree:
"Dialectical materialism considers
that matter is always in motion, that motion is the mode of existence of
matter, so thatthere can no more be matter without motion than motion without matter…."
[Cornforth (1976), p.47. Bold emphasis added.]
"Motion is the mode of
existence of matter. To be means to be in motion.... Like matter, motion is
uncreatable and indestructible. It is not introduced from outside but is
included in matter, which is not inert but active. Motion is self-motion
in the sense that the tendency, the impulse to change of state is inherent in
matter itself: it is its own cause." [Spirkin (1983), p.75. Bold emphasis
added.]
"Motion is the universal attribute, the
mode of existence of matter. Nowhere in the world is there matter without
motion, just as there can be no motion without matter...." [Konstantinov, et al
(1974), p.80. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Nature and society do not
know absolute rest, immobility, immutability. The world presents a picture of
constant motion and change. Motion, change
development is an eternal and inalienable property of matter.... Every
material body, every material particle -- the molecule, atom or its components
-- are by their very nature in a constant state of motion and change. The philosophical
understanding of motion and change implies more than the movement of a body in
space. As a mode of existence of matter, motion embraces all the processes
and changes taking place in the universe.... There are no permanently
fixed, ossified things in the world, only things undergoing change,
processes. This means that nowhere is their absolute rest, a state which
would preclude motion.... Only motion is absolute, without exceptions.
(p.35) [Kuusinen ((1961), p.35. Bold
emphases added.]
"For
dialectics..., matter and motion are the
fundamental elements and the primary conditions of all physical reality;
motion is the mode of existence of matter. Matter without motion is as
inconceivable as motion without matter.... " [Malek
(2011), p.30. Bold emphasis added.]
"A strength of their theory [i.e.,
a theory invented by the Ancient Greek Atomists -- RL] is the recognition that
matter -- and in this case matter takes on the form of atoms -- has always
been, and always will be in motion. As Engels explains: 'Motion is the mode of
existence of matter.' Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor
can there be. Things change, disintegrate or enter into combinations in the
natural course of events; but in doing so they cease to be what they were. A
weather worn rock is no longer the same rock; metal which oxidises turns into
rust....
The mode of outlook of the great
founders of philosophy and science (some of whom we have looked at) was the
view that the whole of the natural world, from the smallest element to the
greatest, from grains of sand to suns
had its existence in eternal coming into being and passing away, in ceaseless
flux, in unresting motion and change." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 24/10/2013.
Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
"Motion, space and time are nothing
else but the mode of existence of matter."
[Rob
Sewell. Bold emphasis added.]
"Motion is the mode of existence of
matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be.
As we mentioned earlier, everything in nature is transient, finite, and in
motion. Matter cannot exist without motion. Everything has its beginning and
its end. People are born, grow and eventually pass away. Stars such as our sun
eventually begin to die, either slowly burning out or self-destructing. Species
evolve, adapt, or go extinct. Rain falls from the clouds, evaporates back into
the clouds where it will once again rain. Human society is also part of nature
and is therefore subject to the same laws...."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added.]
"There is a strong tendency for idealist philosophers and
scientists to introduce much confusion concerning the concept of matter, but for
Lenin...it is simple enough. Matter is a general
philosophical category denoting all that exists external to,
and independently of, the world of thought, whatever its
nature, whatever we know of it today or may discover in the
future. The reason why we must think of matter dialectically
is because all matter is interconnected and is in eternal motion and change. Motion
is the fundamental attribute of matter, it is the mode of existence of matter.
Since, as we have said, matter is all that exists beyond the
world of thought, then this motion, the mode of existence
of matter, is included in the general concept of matter
itself, since it is its very nature. If we do not grasp the
external world in its movement and life, then we have not
grasped it materialistically." [Gerry Healy, quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added.]
"It is obvious to most people
that we do not live in a static world. In fact, everything in nature is in a
state of constant change. 'Motion is the mode of existence of matter,'
states Engels. 'Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can
there be.' For example, the earth revolves continually around its axis, and in
turn itself revolves around the sun. This results in day and night, and the
different seasons that we experience throughout the year. We are born, grow up,
grow old and eventually die. Everything is moving, changing, either rising
and developing or declining and dying away. The existence of matter is tied
to motion. In fact,matter cannot exist without motion. It is because
matter moves that it is being referred to as matter. So, one of the best ways to
define motion is to say, 'Motion is the mode of existence of matter, its
inalienable attribute'...." [Quoted from
here; accessed 22/12/2016.
Bold emphases added.]
"In the space of the last 100 years or so, physics has furnished a vast amount
of evidence to show that change and motion are fundamental qualities of matter.
Engels asserted that motion is the mode of existence of matter -- a brilliant
prediction.
But Einstein went much further than that. In 1905 he proved that matter and
energy are --
the same."
[Alan Woods, quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]
So, this is a core DM-idea.
In that case, if matter is defined in terms
of motion, anything that doesn't move can't be matter (at least, not for Engels,
Lenin and the rest of the above). Anyone who tried to argue
against this, that matter can be motionless, would fail to make their case since they would not now
be thinking about matter. Matter without motion (M1) is "unthinkable",
according to Lenin, and "inconceivable", according to Engels. Anyone who
disagrees and asserts M2 won't be thinking about matter but about
something else (by definition), rather like someone who tried to argue that a
week lasts longer than seven days.
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
In that case, any sentence that asserted, for
instance, that there was a lump of motionless matter somewhere in the universe
wouldn't be speaking about matter, as DM-theorists conceive of it, but
about 'matter', misleadingly using a typographically identical word. While
someone (possibly an anti-dialectician) might try to assert a sentence like M2a
what they would really be asserting (if we accept the implications of the above
DM-claims) is M2b:
M2a: This lump of matter isn't moving.
M2b: This lump of 'matter' isn't moving.
In fact, we can go further; anyone who asserted M2a
would be rather like someone who tried to assert M2c:
M2c: A triangle has four straight edges.
Just as it is impossible to conceive of the truth of
M2c (and that isn't because we might not have tried hard enough, it is because
of the definition of "triangle"). Despite its use of a topographically identical
word, M2c isn't actually about triangles. In fact, M2c is more like M2d.
But worse: anyone who asserted M2d might just as well have asserted M2e, for all
the sense it made:
M2d: A 'triangle' has four straight edges.
M2e: A schmiangle has four straight edges.
Indeed, if we accept the definition of matter
presented by Engels and Lenin, anyone who asserted M2a might just as well have
asserted M2f, and anyone who asserted M1a might just as well have asserted M2g :
M2a: This lump of matter isn't moving.
M2f: This lump of schmatter isn't moving.
M1a: Matter without motion is not unthinkable.
M2g: Schmatter without motion is not unthinkable.
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
And that is why Lenin argued motion without matter
is "unthinkable". Based solely on his definition, anyone who disagreed
with him wasn't thinking about matter after all. In fact they weren't
thinking since what they had tried to say was "unthinkable".
And that is why M1 can neither be false nor true.
Ordinary empirical (fact-stating) propositions are false just in case their
contradictories are true, and are true just in case their contradictories are false.
P1: Rome is the capital of Italy.
P2: Rome is not the capital of Italy.
P2a: It is not the case that Rome is the capital of
Italy.
When P1 is true, P2/P2a is automatically false, and
vice
versa. These sentences are logically connected; the truth or falsehood of one
automatically flips the falsehood or truth of the other.
But that isn't the case here with what appear to be
contradictory sentences, M1 and M1a/M1b:
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M1a: Matter without motion is not unthinkable.
M1b: It is not the case that matter without motion
is unthinkable.
If these two were logically connected,
then for M1 to be false, M1a/M1b would have to be true.
But, as we have seen, if we accept Lenin's definition, M1a/M1b isn't about matter.
Hence, despite appearances to the contrary, M1 and M1a/M1b don't contradict one
another since they aren't about the same thing. Each has a different
subject, misleadingly using typographically identical words. One relates to
matter (M1), the other doesn't (M1a/M1b). Even though M1a/M1b uses the word "matter",
since it contravenes Lenin and Engels's definition of matter, it is really about
"schmatter", or whatever.
Ordinarily, in the absence of the above definition of matter,
M1a/M1b would contradict M1, and the truth of M1a/M1b would imply the falsehood of M1,
just as the falsehood of M1a/M1b would imply the truth of M1. But since M1 and
M1a/M1b
are both about different things that is no longer the case. So, M1 and M1a/M1b are
logically unconnected. The supposed falsehood of M1a/M1b is unrelated to the
truth or falsehood of M1, and that is because M1a/M1b has changed the subject!
Hence, M1 can be neither true nor false. For M1
to be true it would have to imply the falsehood of M1a/M1b, but it fails to do that
since M1a/M1b has a different subject, 'matter' or schmatter. Similarly, for M1 to be false it would have
to imply the truth of M1a/M1b, but it fails to do that since they both have
different subjects.
So, it turns out that motion without matter is
"unthinkable" since any attempt to assert the opposite won't be about matter, but about
something else!
[Readers are directed to Essay Twelve
Part One
for a fuller explanation; for a much shorter (and perhaps clearer) one, go
here.]
This also means that whoever asserts M1 would have to know what
a proposition using "matter without motion" in this way rules in
so that they knew exactly what a proposition using "matter without motion"
in
this way rules out as always and necessarily false. And yet, that is precisely
what can't be done if the content of a proposition using "matter without motion"
in this way is "unthinkable". And for Lenin it is
"unthinkable", for the above reasons.
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M1a: Matter without motion is not unthinkable.
M1b: It is not the case that matter without motion
is unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
Super-Empirical indicative sentences
like these collapse under the weight of their own distorted use of language. They
thus become
non-sensical and incoherent.
Which perhaps illustrates once again why Marx and Engels were right
when they said the following:
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
[I am not suggesting that those two saw
things this way (partly because the ideas expressed in this Essay depend on
developments in philosophy and logic that took place after they both passed
away), or would
even have acknowledged the argument presented at this site as persuasive (in
relation to this topic) --, or, indeed,
would have viewed it as
in any way representative of what they intended, even had they encountered
it. Clearly, that would be anachronistic. What I
am
arguing is that the argument presented over the last score or more paragraphs illustrates why they were right to say what
they
did in the above passage, whether or not they knew why they were right to
assert it in the first
place!]
Returning now to the main point of this
sub-section: in like manner any attempt to limit the LOI in this way --
emphasizing one semantic feature of language (either 'necessary truth' or 'necessary falsehood')
at the expense of the other --, means that both
options are off the table.
[The argument in support of that contention mirrors the one outlined above, and
won't be entered into in this Essay. It will, however, feature in a future
re-write of Essay Six.] The LOI is a (garbled) rule of language. If it is viewed as a
'deep truth about reality', or as any sort of truth, that will only succeed in
rendering it non-sensical and hence incapable of being either true or
false -- or even being 'approximately
true'/'relatively-true'/'true-within-certain-limits'.
A similar
fate awaits all the 'necessary
truths' and 'necessary falsehoods' that litter Traditional Philosophy -- as has
been demonstrated in
Essay Twelve
Part One.
In this way,
therefore, the 'necessary truth' the LOI supposedly expresses only succeeds in
undermining
itself. Just like the
other pseudo-propositions we find throughout Metaphysics, the above considerations
deprive both the assertion and the denial of the LOI of all content. The LOI
can't therefore be used to assert anything true or
assert anything false of anything since it is a badly stated rule of language that
encapsulates how we just so happen
to use words connected with sameness and difference. As noted earlier, rules can neither be true nor false, only practical or
impractical, useful or useless, obeyed or disobeyed.
The LOI thus lacks a
sense because it
presents no truth conditions; that is, it expresses no conditions that
must obtain for it to be true, or which must obtain for it to be false.
Of course, that is
part of the reason why Traditional Theorists thought they could establish the supposed 'necessary' truth
of such 'laws' on purely 'conceptual' or linguistic grounds, independently of
the way the world happens to be,
and in abeyance of any evidence. [Follow the above link for an explanation
of the technical use of the word "sense" employed in this paragraph.]50a
Empirical
propositions are different precisely in this respect: their semantic status --
true or false -- is sensitive to
evidence and can't simply be read-off from the
words they contain. They have to face the facts in order to be declared one way
or the other. No amount of 'pure thought' will confirm their truth-status.50b
That is why it isn't
possible to establish the truth or the falsehood of, for example, "President
Biden is exactly six feet tall"
merely by thinking about it.
Of course, the above isn't typically the case
with propositions that express items of common knowledge or patent
truths/falsehoods. We often know their truth-value without the need to examine
evidence for or against. I covered that topic in Note 40a of Essay Twelve Part One (here repeated, slightly edited):
However,
some might wonder about
the status of patent
empirical truths, such as "Water is wet", or
"Fire burns". In such cases, truth and meaning seem to go hand-in-hand, so
that, for example, knowing what the word "water" means is ipso facto
to know it is wet.
That isn't quite right.
The truth of sentences like these plainly wasn't established by the
simple expedient of inspecting the
words they contained. Their actual truth had to be determined at some point
by some sort of confirmation or interface with the world -- or, in some cases,
this will have been the result of a stipulation of some sort. Of course, mundane
verities like these have now been "put in the archives" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein),
so to speak, and no one in their right mind
would think to question them. But, their actual truth depends on their being confirmable,
or on their having been confirmed at some point by reference to the world, not as a
result of linguistic
or conceptual analysis, or by the operation of thought alone. For example,
a child won't learn that water is wet merely by inspecting the
words or concepts involved; nor will he/she learn it by simply thinking
about water. At some point, that child will have to experience the wetness of
water and be taught to describe it using this word and associated terms (i.e.,
they would have to be told that this
is what "wet" means -- that can, of course, take place directly or indirectly).
Naturally, having learnt when to use this particular word, a child might take on trust or
accept by hearsay that other liquids are wet, too. But, no one learns such things by
simple contemplation, and on that alone.
[On testimony, see Kusch (2002). For a
different view, see Lackey (2008).]
[Compare this with
Wittgenstein's remarks on
The Standard Metre --
Wittgenstein (2009),
§40,
p.29e. (This links
to a PDF.) On this, see Baker and Hacker (2005), pp.189-99, Diamond (2001), Jacquette (2010),
Malcolm (1995b), and Pollock (2004); a copy of the latter can be accessed
here (this
links to a PDF).]
Others might wonder about
the status of propositions which are unquestionably empirical, but which nonetheless express
certainties (of the sort that exercised, say,
George Moore) -- such as our 'knowledge' of our own names, the content of
our memories, the fact that we (or most of us) have two hands, or that we all
have parents (even if in some cases we might not know who they are), etc. However, as is the case with the previous examples, the truth
of none of
these was ascertained by thought alone. [On this, see
Wittgenstein (1974). See also Williams (1999), Moyal-Sharrock (2007), and Moyal-Sharrock
(2013), pp.362-78.]
This isn't to suggest
that we can't infer from an already accepted truth, or set of truths, another empirical truth,
or truths. Indeed,
scientists do this all the time. But, even here, except in exceptional
circumstances, no scientist would accept such propositions as unquestionably
true until they had been confirmed in some way, at some point, by someone or
some team of researchers.
Some might
object that this can't be correct. For example, if a language-user didn't know
that water was wet, we would be reluctant to credit them with understanding
that word.
In response, it is
worth directing the reader's attention to a distinction
Wittgenstein drew between
what he called
criteria and
symptoms. [This links to a PDF.] Because of that
distinction, what might
at first sight appear to be an empirical
proposition -- or, indeed, what had once been regarded as an empirical proposition --, could in fact assume a radically different
role or logical status.
Symptoms are
those facts which we regard as lending support to, or which tend to confirm the truth of, say, an hypothesis
or tentative statement, whereas a criterion supplies conclusive proof, or helps
provide such proof, of its
truth -- or, indeed, of the proper application of an expression, such as "water" (with or without the use of other relevant criteria).
Hence,
a plane figure possessing three straight intersecting edges would be
a criterion for something to count as a triangle (or for calling it one), whereas a pavement being wet would
merely be a symptom that supported a claim, or which lent credence to the supposition, that it had been raining
in the vicinity. On the other
hand,
wetness would now be one of the criteria that could/would be employed in
order to decide if a certain liquid was water (but it wouldn't be the only
criterion,
of course). However, the absence of wetness on its own would provide conclusive proof that
the liquid in question wasn't water. So, for example, liquid Mercury doesn't feel wet to
the human skin, just cold. However, other obvious properties of Mercury
would clearly distinguish it from water well before it was allowed anywhere near
unprotected skin.
[Naturally,
that depends on how "wet" is itself defined. If it is taken to mean that a
certain liquid contains water, then the above criterion would more closely
resemble a colloquial tautology. It should go without saying, however, that the everyday meaning of "wet"
must be distinguished from the scientific term, "wetting".]
Furthermore, what had once been regarded as
a symptom could later become a criterion. For example, the observation that
acids turned certain substances red was once regarded by medieval dyers
and painters as an interesting fact about acids. That
quirk was originally viewed, therefore,
as a symptom.
Later, this peculiar fact about acids was employed by
Robert Boyleas a way of detecting, or of deciding upon, the presence of acids. It thus became a
criterion --
later used universally in connection with, for instance,
Litmus Paper.
Of course, we use
other
pH-Indicators
these days, but that just means this criterion has (or these criteria
have) now become more
varied and complex. The distinction itself still remains valid -- indeed, as
Peter Hacker notes:
"It is
true that we can, in certain cases, transform an empirical proposition into a
rule or norm of representation by resolving to hold it rigid.... It was an
empirical discovery that
acids are proton donors,
but this proposition was transformed into a rule: a scientist no longer calls
something 'an acid' unless it is a proton donor, and if it is a proton donor,
then it is to be called 'an acid', even if it has no effect on litmus paper. The
proposition that acids are proton donors...has been 'withdrawn from being
checked by experience but now serves as a paradigm for judging experience'.
[This is a quotation from Wittgenstein (1978), p.325 -- RL.] Though
unassailable, so-called necessary truths are not immutable; we can, other things
being equal, change them if we so please.... But if we change them, we also
change the meanings of their constituent expressions...". [Hacker
(1996), p.215. Link added.]
None of this
affects the ideas being rehearsed in this Essay since criteria are also rules.
That is, we appeal to various criteria (as rules) to decide if a substance is water, or if another is an
alkali, etc. Indeed, they comprise a
form/norm of representation.
Each one is "so to speak an empirical proposition hardened into a rule."
[Wittgenstein (1978), p.325.]
[On this, see Glock (1996), pp.93-97. More detailed accounts can be found in
Albritton (1959), Canfield (1981), pp.31-148, Harrison (1999), Hacker (1993),
pp.243-66, and Hanfling (2002), pp.38-50.]
Returning to the main theme of this
sub-section: linguistic rules -- such as the
LOI or the LOC -- are rendered metaphysical when they are misconstrued in the manner
described earlier --
when it is imagined they can be true or can be false in the way
that
"President
Biden is exactly six feet tall" can be the one or the other -- indeed, that it is possible
for them to have a truth-value, or have one assigned to them.
The same is the case if it is thought that evidence is relevant in this
respect, too -- which is the mistake DM-theorists make with respect to the LOI,
the LEM and the LOC.
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
Traditional Theorists further
imagined that the actual truth-status of the above 'laws' can be read solely
from the supposed meaning of the words they contain. Although, as we have seen,
DM-theorists also regard these 'laws' as in some way
empirical, that their falsehood (or their
'true-within-certain-limits-status') may in some way be demonstrated
by an appeal to evidence. So, Trotsky asked his readers to examine the letter "A" under
a magnifying glass and for them to try weighing bags of sugar!
"The
Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A'
is equal to 'A'. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of
practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality 'A' is
not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a
lens -– they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the
question is not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols
for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside
the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -– a
more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a
pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is true (sic) -– all bodies change
uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves.
A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself at 'any given
moment'…. How should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an
infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the
course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely
mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in
time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time
is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal
to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is
if it does not exist." [Trotsky
(1971), pp.63-64.]
[I have exposed the absurdity of Trotsky's entire
argument in Essay
Six. Readers are referred there for more
details.]
Other DM-theorists argue along similar lines, as I
have also demonstrated in the above Essay and
elsewhere in this sub-section.]
Throughout history, metaphysicians have
(deliberately or inadvertently) concentrated their efforts on misconstruing linguistic rules like this
(and in the above manner, too), devising theories about
'reality' that could onlybe true, never
false. Unfortunately, in so doing they actually
prevented
their theories from being the one or the other.
Contrary to what
DM-theorists maintain, our use of ordinary words for identity in every day life isn't defective (why that is so will be
explained in Essay Twelve Part Seven). Nor is that use based on the existence of one or more super-empirical 'truths'/'laws' about the
world. The vernacular is predicated on, and has been created by,
socially-, and historically-conditioned practices,which
can't be true or false, as we have seen. So the rules that lie
behind our use of ordinary words for identity
can neither be false nor 'true-within-certain-limits',
only useful or useless, practical or impractical.
This
aspect of language(i.e., if and
when truth-values do or do not apply) also applies to the LOC.
As is the case with the LOI, the LOC doesn't express a profound metaphysical truth
about the world since it isn't capable of being true to begin with. That
is because it
expresses a rule of
language (or logic) that formalises social conventions we have for the specific
roles the negative particle assumes in everyday life (or in logic).
As such it is impossible to challenge this rule without discourse degenerating into
incoherent non-sense -- or,
as Aristotle himself noted, without communication and rationality completely
breaking down.
Of course,
DM-theorists have only succeeded in compounding the errors they inherited from
past generations of ruling-class hacks. For example,
they fail to view the LOC as a 'rule', but regard it as (at best) an 'abstract truth' that is always
(or which is often)
concretelyfalse, especially in relation to change. Small
wonder then that over the last 150 years they have found it impossible to communicate their ideas
with any level of clarity to anyone -- least of all one another --
again, just as
Aristotle warned.
[On that, see Essays Four through Eight Part Three and
Interlude
One,
of this Essay.]
Traditional metaphysical 'propositions' masquerade as
super-empirical statements about 'fundamental aspects of reality', valid for all
of space and time, and they do this by a deceptive use of the
indicative mood. But, that is precisely what denies them
any
sense. In so far as they are
based on a misconstrual of the rules we observe in our endeavour to communicate
with and understand one another, metaphysical 'propositions' collapse intoincoherent non-sense and are thereby rendered incapable of being true or false.
As was the case with the
metaphysicians mentioned earlier, dialecticians
misinterpret linguistic rules -- which enable genuinely substantive truths about
the world to be stated by means of empirical propositions -- dialecticians
misinterpret linguistic rules as super-empirical truths, a
basic
error they have only succeeded in compounding
by encasing them in them in layer-upon-layer of
impenetrablelogo-babble they inherited from Hegel and
other mystics.
So, that is why DM can't be a science, and why it doesn't even look like one: its 'propositions' don't just say
nothing about the world, they saynothing whatsoever. They are incapable of saying anything, true or false.
They are therefore completely
vacuous.
As a result, dialecticians' theories aren't just
non-sensical, they are
incoherent non-sense.
If, as dialecticians maintain, DM is neither
conventional nor metaphysical maybe it is just a method? However, few dialecticians who regard DM as a scientific theory appear willing to accept such a
deflationary re-classification.51
That is quite apart from the fact that if DM
were simply a method, then, according to Lenin, it couldn't be
"objective":
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
Plainly, a 'method' isn't "independent of man".
It could be countered that the dialectical
method enables those who use it correctly to discover objective facts about
the world all the better to help change it. Quite apart from the further fact that there is no 'objective' way of deciding
whether or not the 'dialectical method' has ever been used "correctly" (or even if it
could be used "correctly" -- on that, see
here), if DM isjust a method, it is a
spectacularly useless one. That is because it would make
change impossible.
Of course, this isn't how
Engels, Lenin and Trotsky described DM:
"And so, what is the negation of the negation? An
extremely general -- and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important --
law of development of nature, history, and thought; a law which, as we have
seen, holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics,
in history and in philosophy --
a law which even Herr Dühring, in spite of all his stubborn resistance, has
unwittingly and in his own way to follow.... Dialectics, however, is nothing
more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature,
human society and thought." [Engels (1976),
pp.179-80.
Bold emphases added.]
"Flexibility, applied objectively,
i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world."
[Lenin (1961),
p.110. Bold emphasis added.]
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in allphenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing….
The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin
(1961), pp.
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"It must be recognized that the
fundamental law of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into quality, for it
gives [us] the
general formula of all evolutionary processes -– of nature as well as of
society.… The principle of the transformation
of quantity into quality has universal significance, insofar as we view the
entire universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and
transformation…. In these abstract formulas we have the
most general laws (forms) of motion, change, the transformation of the stars of
the heaven, of the earth, nature and human society. …Dialectics is the logic of
development. It examines the world -- completely without exception
-– not as a result of creation, of a sudden beginning, the realisation of a
plan, but as a result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became
the way it is as a result of lawlike development." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88,
90, 96. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
For those three classicists, at least, DM was
meant to be a (true, or 'relatively true') theory about reality itself in all
its developmental glory, not simply
a method.
I
began this Essay with several impertinent remarks about
the close, almost incestuous, similarities that exist between the DM-"Totality" and
Hegel's 'Deity'/'Absolute'.
Now that we are nearing the end
we are in a much better position to re-assess (and possibly withdraw, or even re-assert) thoseremarks,
perhaps without those earlier peremptory and impertinent
jibes attached.
On the contrary:
in fact,
we can now see why both they and their tone were fully justified.
Every mystical system of which we have any
knowledge has appealed to a 'Whole' or a "Totality" of one sort or
another (in order to account for 'Reality', and "Being" -- or even for change and
development), almost without exception openly identifying 'It' with some
sort of 'deity' or collection of 'deities'.52
[See, for example,
here and
here,
but an exhaustive compendium of examples of
ancient ideas like these would make this Essay far
longer that it already is. However, I have compiled two such shortlists,
here and
here.]
Be this
as it may,
Traditional Theorists soon found it impossible to relate, or even connect, each
'soul' with the 'infinite'/'incomprehensible cause' supposedly responsible for
its existence -- just as they found it impossible to link them to their
own version of the "Totality" -- without either:
(i) Denying the limited nature of the human 'soul', which implied each
was in effect an 'infinite being' itself, or perhaps an 'aspect' of, or
'emanation' from,
'God' 'Him'/'Her'/'Itself';
Or,
(ii) Demoting the 'Deity' so that 'He'/'She'/'It'
was equated with 'His'/'Her'/'Its' 'creation'.
Hence, as a result,
(iii) Human beings either became 'gods';
Or,
(iv) 'God' became human/humanoid.
This dilemma later
re-emerged in a
completely different form
as the "central problematic of German Idealism". That is, it reappeared as thepseudo-problem sometimes labelled "Subject-Object Identity". [Cf., Beiser (1993b, 2002).]
Earlier, we saw that this 'problem' was also
of central concern to Zen Buddhists,53
just as it re-surfaced in the writings of Engels,
Lenin and Mao in the following
form (again, I have quoted several different DM-authors, most of whom cite Engels,
in order to show this is a widespread belief among DM-theorists, not an
ephemeral or peripheral aspect of their thought):
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"The reproaches you make
against the law of value apply to all concepts, regarded from the
standpoint of reality. The identity of thought and being, to express
myself in Hegelian fashion, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle
and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run
side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never
meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents
the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being
immediately its own concept. But although a concept has the essential nature of
a concept and cannot therefore prima facie directly coincide with
reality, from which it must first be abstracted, it is still something more than
a fiction, unless you are going to declare all the results of thought fictions
because reality has to go a long way round before it corresponds to them, and
even then only corresponds to them with asymptotic approximation." [Engels
to Conrad Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphasis
alone added. (I have used the on-line version here, which
differs slightly from the published text.)]
"The great basic
question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that
concerning the relation of thinking and being." [Engels
(1888), p.593. Bold emphasis added.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world…. [I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"To begin with what is
the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with (sic) any proposition…. Here we already have
dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the
universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the
universal) are identical; the individual exists only in the connection that
leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through
the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every
universal is (a fragment, or aspect, or the essence of) an individual." [Lenin
(1961),
p.359.
Italic emphases in the original.]
"Knowledge
is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate,
not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the
formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws,
etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally,
approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing nature.... Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as
a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality,' he can only
eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a
scientific picture of the world...." [Ibid.,
p.182. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"In his Ludwig
Feuerbach
--
which expounded his own and Marx's views on Feuerbach's philosophy, and was sent
to the printers after he had re-read an old manuscript Marx and himself had
written in 1844-45 on Hegel, Feuerbach and the materialist conception of history
-- Engels wrote: 'The
great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is
the relation of thinking and being...spirit to Nature...which is primary, spirit
or Nature....
The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two
great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to Nature and, therefore,
in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other...comprised
the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded Nature as primary, belonged to
the various schools of materialism.' Any other use of the concepts of
(philosophical) idealism and materialism leads only to confusion." [Lenin
(1970), p.9.
Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In
social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away
is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in
accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and
further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.
The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so
is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the
course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the
subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and
we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which
depart from concrete history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"No matter how diverse philosophical doctrines
may be, they all, directly or indirectly, take as their theoretical point of
departure the question of the relationship of consciousness to being, of
the spiritual to the material." [Konstantinov et al (1974), pp.20-21.
Bold emphasis added.]
"In Ludwig
Feuerbach,
Engels states that the great basic question of all philosophy, especially of
modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of 'thinking and being',
of 'spirit and nature'. He then proceeds to deal with one of the most important
questions in philosophy: the theory of knowledge." [Alan Woods, quoted from
here. Accessed 17-07-2023. Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Re-examining Marx's work on the German idealist philosopher
Hegel and the materialist Feuerbach,
Engels observed that 'The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of
more recent philosophy, is the relation of thinking and being -- spirit to
Nature -- which is primary, spirit or Nature
-- the answer which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two
great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to Nature and, therefore,
in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other…comprised the
camp of Idealism. The others, who regarded Nature as primary, belonged to the
various schools of materialism." [Trevor Rayne quoted from
here; accessed 17-07-2023.
Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"There are two opposite approaches to the making and formulation
of theory about the human situation and its problems -- materialist and
idealist.
As Engels put it, 'The great basic question of all philosophy...is that
concerning the relation of thinking and being'
(Ludwig
Feuerbach,
2). To explain men's conditions of life and mode of life from their ideas, is
idealism; whereas to explain material conditions from material causes, and to
regard ideas and aims as arising in response to material conditions, is
materialism. Similarly, to consider the world as though created or modelled in
conformity to forms and categories of thought, is idealism; whereas to consider
the forms and categories of thought as consequential on our need to understand
for human purposes the conditions of our existence, is materialism." [Cornforth
(1965), p.251.
Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"Marxist philosophy is materialist. According to Frederick Engels
in Ludwig
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:
'The great basic question of all, especially of latter-day
philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being…. The
question of the position of thinking in relation to being…in relation to the
church was sharpened into this: did God create the world or has the world
existed for all time? Answers to this question split the philosophers into two
great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of the mind over nature and,
therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or
other…comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as
primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.'" [Molyneux
(2008), p.53. Formatting modified to conform to the conventions
adopted at this site.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Take the more familiar word first. Marxism is materialist
because it's a philosophy which recognises the primacy of matter.
As Marx's collaborator Fredrick Engels put it: 'The great basic question of all
philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the
relation of thinking and being…. The answers which the philosophers gave to this
question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of
spirit to nature…comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature
as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism.'" [Quoted from
here; accessed 17/07/2023.
Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
Among Dialectical
Marxists (like those above)
these ideas have largely been re-configured epistemologically,
formulated in such a way that it sent the 'dialectical theory of knowledge' off
on a 'wild-goose-chase' into oblivion, which ended up in covert scepticism. [On that, see Essay Ten
Part One.]
In
MEC,
Lenin tried (and failed) to bridge the yawning chasm that this bogus dichotomy had
introduced into DM-epistemology -- i.e., the gap created by the 'problem' of
"Subject-Object Identity" -- a fathomless abyss, an infinite chasm,examined
earlier, that forever separates human knowledge from
its supposed source in 'objective reality'. This can be seen by the way that Lenin
failed to notice his theory only succeeded in
making a bad situation worse.
Subsequent dialecticians
also failed to bridge this yawning gap, and their predicament hasn't
been helped by the fact that few, if
any, of them even seem to be aware such a wide gulf actually
exists (despite what
Engels and Lenin had to say about
"asymptotes" and infinite "mediacies", etc.). And that is
partly because they are intent merely to regurgitate Engels and Lenin (in
order to re-affirm openly, before the dialectical world, their orthodoxy and
their faithful adherence to 'dialectics') rather than subject these ideas to any
sort of scrutiny --, or, indeed, raise the sort of issues aired by the present
author in Essay Thirteen
Part One,
for instance.
So, this unresolved (and irresolvable) 'problem' still confronts
DM-epistemology, which is just one of the reasons why the
theoretical work churned out by
HCDs, for example,
is impenetrably obscure. Clearly, it is much easier to hide the fact that you are
hoplessly lost if you bury everything under pile of incomprehensible gobbledygook.
In the meantime, the mind-numbingly repetitive musings offered
up by
the
LCD fraternity (on this topic) remain
studiously
superficial and impressively vacuous. What is more, they are quite
determined to keep it that way.
[MEC = Materialism And
Empirio-Criticism (i.e., Lenin (1972); HCD = High Church Dialectician; LCD =
Low Church Dialectician; follow the above links for an explanation of the last
two acronyms.]
However, with respect to any given mystical system,
not only is it impossible to comprehend what is asserted either side of the 'Ontological Crevasse' that separates 'Being' from 'You-and-Me-ing', it is
even more difficult to re-connect them. No wonder then that DM-theorists prevaricate on this
and other related issues.
This might
also
help explain why
many of those who rise to
the 'top' of different 'Marxist' parties behave as if they
think they are
minor deities
of some sort, and,
as a such, feel free to treat 'underlings' with dismissive contempt, often
accompanied by personal and
sexual abuse. It might also
explain why they feel they are fully justified in concocting and spreading
theories that supposedly 'reflect' profound 'secrets' concerning fundamental
aspects of 'reality', valid for all of space and time, that only they 'understand'.
When in power this regressive personality
disorder is often further aggravated by the almost 'god'-like power over life
and death such leaders arrogate
to themselves -- for example, in the former Soviet Union [fSU], the defunct
'People's Democracies' of E Europe, Cuba, China, and North Korea. This is yet
another character defect they share with assorted religious 'gurus' -- also
known for their abuse of acolytes -- and who, in
like manner, seem only too
ready to order the murder, execution or assassination of
'infidels', 'heretics' and 'unbelievers'.
[Would anyone like to guess what would have happen
to yours truly if this material had been published in, say, the fSU in the early
1950s?]
Such elevated self-regard not only can be, it
has been used to 'justify' almost anything. As the late
Christopher Hitchens
used to say, "If you want to make good
people do wicked things, you’ll need religion" -- but he might just as well have
added "...or dialectics". [Even though to his dying day he claimed to
be a dialectician!]
[How that works has been explained in
detail in Essay Nine
Part Two.]
This Wholist Metaphysic is indeed just another
"ruling idea" that has dominated human thought, 'East' and 'West', for well over
two-and-a-half millennia. But, this
regressive
ideology has
yet to be recognised for what it is by Dialectical Marxists themselves,
let alone for any of them to disown or reject it.
Here, once more, is how
Marx famously expressed this general idea:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels(1970), pp.64-65. Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added.]
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence
equally to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line
version, here. Bold emphases added.]
Given the
above, it is hard to resist the conclusion that this and other areas of DM are
indeed part
of the "ruling ideas" about which Marx was speaking.
[Again, I am not claiming Marx
would have made the same points about DM that have been aired at the site,
but if he were consistent,
he should have!]
Be this as
it may, dialecticians certainly reject the accusation that their theory is just
another
form of mysticism.
In
fact, they are often offended by any such allegation.
That is partly
because:
(a) Their enemies have
accused them of this countless times;
(b) They claim they have
peeled away the outer layers of mysticism that plagued Hegel's system, leaving behind its "rational core";
and,
(c) They view their theory as quintessentially
scientific.
As these Essays have shown, the
above claims are so wide of the mark that the resulting credibility gap makes the
Grand Canyon look like a tiny crack in a Cornish Pasty in comparison.
Figure Fifteen: DM: A Half-Baked
Theory?
In relation to DM-fans themselves, the first of the three above responses (i.e.,
Point
(a)) is, of course, their problem. They invited the
accusation that their ideology is just another form of mysticism the day they began to take Hegel seriously (upside down
or 'the right
way up').
Nevertheless,
John Rees
did at least try extricate himself from the Hermetic Quagmire into which
Hegel had dumped him and his fellow Dialectical Marxists:
"Totality alone is not,
however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of
society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own
mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation.... 'The Taoist
tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole
being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.' [Quoting
Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.274-75.]
"...What unites all these
explanations is that they see the totality as static. Beneath all the
superficial bustle of the world lies an enduring eternal truth, the unchanging
face of God, the ceaseless search for balance between yin and yang.... What they
lack is any notion of totality as a process of change. And even where such
system grant the possibility of instability, it is considered merely a prelude
to he restored equilibrium.... But, even taken together,
change and totality are not sufficient to define a dialectical system. In
addition we have to provide some general indication of how such change
originates.... A dialectical approach seeks
to find the cause of change within the system.... If change is internally
generated it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development
as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998a), pp.6-7.
Several paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
But,
as we
have seen, there are countless
mystical systems that appeal to the sorts of things Rees denies of them (in
their endeavour
to account for change), Hegel's
being the most obvious, of course. And many also see the world, and even their 'deity', as a
process
of some sort. A long list
will be given in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here). [Until that is published, readers
are directed to
Appendix A of Essay Two, where
some of that material has already been posted. On this, see also
Note 4.]
Furthermore, unless Rees is committed to the
Stalinist idea that there will continue to be 'non-antagonistic contradictions'
in a future socialist society, his theory implies some form of equilibrium
descending on humanity at some point in a post-revolutionary state. Then, 'antagonistic contradictions' will,
it seems, no longer drive human social
evolution, since class division and hence the class war will be a thing of
the past:
"[T]he first step in the revolution by the working
class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the
battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest,
by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of
production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the
ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as
possible. Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means
of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of
bourgeois production....
"When, in the course of
development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has
been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the
public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so
called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another.
If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the
force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a
revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force
the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions,
have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of
classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a
class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class
antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each
is the condition for the free development of all." [Marx
and Engels (1968b), pp.52-53. Several paragraphs merged; bold
emphases added.]
"Within the co-operative society based on common
ownership of the means of production, the producers do not exchange their
products; just as little does the labour employed on the products appear
here as the value of these products, as a material quality possessed by them,
since now, in contrast to capitalist society, individual labor no longer exists
in an indirect fashion but directly as a component part of total labour. The
phrase 'proceeds of labour', objectionable also today on account of its
ambiguity, thus loses all meaning.
"What we have to deal with
here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations,
but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus
in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with
the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly,
the individual producer receives back from society -- after the deductions have
been made -- exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his
individual quantum of labour. For example, the social working day consists of
the sum of the individual hours of work; the individual labor time of the
individual producer is the part of the social working day contributed by him,
his share in it. He receives a certificate from society that he has furnished
such-and-such an amount of labour (after deducting his labour for the common
funds); and with this certificate, he draws from the social stock of means of
consumption as much as the same amount of labour cost. The same amount of labour
which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in another.
"Here, obviously, the same principle prevails as
that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of
equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered
circumstances no one can give anything except his labour, and because, on the
other hand, nothing can pass to the ownership of individuals, except individual
means of consumption. But as far as the distribution of the latter among the
individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the
exchange of commodity equivalents: a given amount of labour in one form is
exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another form. Hence, equal right here
is still in principle -- bourgeois right, although principle and practice are no
longer at loggerheads, while the exchange of equivalents in commodity exchange
exists only on the average and not in the individual case. In spite of this
advance, this equal right is still constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois
limitation. The right of the producers is proportional to the labour they
supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal
standard, labour.
"But one man is superior to another physically, or
mentally, and supplies more labour in the same time, or can labour for a longer
time; and labour, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or
intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This equal right
is an unequal right for unequal labour. It recognizes no class differences,
because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes
unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural
privilege. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every
right. Right, by its very nature, can consist only in the application of an
equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different
individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard
insofar as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one
definite side only -- for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as
workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored.
Further, one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than
another, and so on and so forth. Thus, with an equal performance of labour, and
hence an equal in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more
than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these
defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal.
"But these defects are inevitable in the first
phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged
birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the
economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.
In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of
the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis
between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labour has become not
only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have
also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the
springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly -- only then can the narrow
horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on
its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"
[Marx
(1968), pp.319-21. Bold emphases added. Spelling modified to
agree with UK English; several paragraphs merged. Quotations marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[I have said much more about 'antagonistic' versus
'non-antagonistic contradictions' in Essay Nine Part Two,
here.]
One might well wonder what, for Rees, would cause social change
in such a society if there are no longer any 'contradictions' in society (we
aren't told if they will rumble on in extra-social reality, in the natural
world, although,
as we have seen, Engels appeared to believe
they will eventually die out). This must imply
some sort of 'social equilibrium', the very thing he accused mystics of
believing in.
Rees is silent on this.
However, the opposite view to that
advanced by Rees is summarised for us in the following passage
(quoted earlier):
"The ancient
Egyptians believed that a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A
similar premise, that the interaction between yin (the female principle) and
yang (the male principle) underlies the workings of the universe, is at the
heart of much Chinese thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy
from the fourth century B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many
Chinese who are not Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the
Chinese. Peoples all over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas,
have come to the conclusion that the cosmos is a combining of opposites and
that one of the most important aspects of this dualism is the opposition between
male and female."
[Maybury-Lewis (1992), pp.125-26. Bold emphases added.]
For some inexplicable reason the sentence,
"The ideas of the ruling-class are in every epoch the ruling ideas"
keeps coming to
mind...
How odd!
[Point (c) was
dealt with earlier in this
Essay, while Point (b) will be
covered in Essay Fourteen Part One.]
It could be argued that this Essay is way over the
top, spending hundreds of thousand of words making a handful of points that
could have been made with a fraction of that number. Furthermore, several irrelevant issues have been given inordinate attention -- such as
speculation about the supposed content of the Totality, the nature of
science, whether or not DM is a science, the nature of the past, and of change, etc., --
topics that were rendered all the more longwinded by the repetitive quotation of
scores of passages from the DM-classics and more recent dialecticians. In
fact, this Essay hasn't so much taken a sledgehammer to crack a nut as it has
used a hydraulic press to crush a grain of corn!
However, in response it is worth adding (once
again!) that I have taken pains
to point out that DM-fans themselves have told us virtually nothing about
their "Totality" and its supposed "inter-connections". Given that several DM-theorists
have also informed us that the "Totality" is a key
'concept', 'object', 'system' or 'process' that is integral to DM itself, without which nothing can
be fully understood, the above complaint is itself misguided. As I argued in
Essay One (slightly edited -- bold emphasis
alone added):
Several other features of these Essays will
strike the reader as rather odd:
(i) Their almost exclusively negative, if not unremittingly
hostile tone;
(ii) Their quasi-dialectical structure (where the word
"dialectical" is to be understood in its older, classical sense);
(iii) The
total absence of any alternative philosophical theories;
(v) Their analytic, if not
uncompromisingly relentless, style.
The first two items above aren't unrelated.
Although I have endeavoured to construct as comprehensive a case against DM as
possible, I have also sought to
raise objections to my own criticisms at nearly every stage. While that
strategy has been adopted to test my ideas to the limit, it has also been of
considerable benefit in trying (where possible) to make sense of DM -- or
render it a little clearer and thus slightly more comprehensible.
To that end, the reader will find that many
issues have been raised at this site for the very first time ever, anywhere.
Core DM-theses have
been examined in unprecedented detail; most of them from a completely novel
angle. It is a sad reflection on the mental paralysis induced in those who -- in
Max
Eastman's words -- "suffer from dialectics", that DM-dogma has
escaped detailed scrutiny for well over a hundred years. It is nevertheless accurate for
all that.
Even if it should turn out that this project
is misconceived in some way, in whole or in part, it succeeds in breaking entirely new ground, as
readers will soon discover. In fact, should DM-supporters engage fairly with the
content of the Essays published at this site -- even if they remain
unconvinced by the end --,
they will find that their own ideas will emerge clarified and strengthened because of the
entirely original set of challenges advanced in this work.8
As noted earlier, it is the opinion of
the present author that DM has contributed in its own not insignificant way to
the spectacular lack of
success that has plaguedDialectical Marxism. It is an alarming fact that of all the major political ideologies
or movements in human history,
Dialectical Marxism is among theleast successful, ever.8a
The role that DM has played in helping engineer this disastrous state of
affairs partly accounts for the persistently negative, if not openly
hostile tone adopted at this site.8b
If revolutionaries genuinely wish to change
the world by assisting in a successful working-class revolution (and I certainly
count myself among those who do), then the sooner this
alien-class ideology (DM) is jettisoned the better.
In that case, if the ideas presented
here are valid, it is clear that DM has helped cripple
the revolutionary movement almost from the beginning. Because of that, those who
insist on clinging to this regressive doctrine (for whatever reason) risk
extending that abysmal record of failure, defeat and debacle well into this new century.
Unfortunately, it is far from certain whether humanity
--
oreven Planet Earth -- can take another hundred years of Capitalism.
One more protracted cycle of DM-inspired failures could (or, and far more likely, will) help guarantee that even fewer workers
will take Marxism
seriously --, or, and what roughly amounts to the same thing, live to tell the tale
in anything remotely resembling a civilised world.
Items (iii)
and (v) in
the above list are rather different, though.
As far as (iii) is concerned, from
time to time readers will find themselves asking the following question of
the author: "Well, what's your theory, then?" No alternative
philosophical theory will be advanced here, or anywhere else for
that matter. That tactic hasn't been adopted out of cussedness -- or even out of
diffidence --, but because it is a key aspect of
Wittgenstein's method
(adopted at this site) not to advance philosophical theories of any sort.
His approach in fact means that no philosophical theory
makes any sense.
[Exactly why that is so has been explained at length in Essay Twelve Part One. A brief summary of that Essay has now been posted
here. Objections coming in from the left concerning the use of Wittgenstein's ideas have been neutralised
here.]
As far as (v)
is concerned, those unfamiliar with Analytic Philosophy might find the overall style of these Essays somewhat
daunting, if not completelydeflating. That is because these
Essays challenge not only the
overblown
pretentions of Traditional Philosophy, but also those expressed in and by DM.
Moreover, they also adopt that approach with respect to
the shared assumptions upon which both traditions have been based (for example, the idea
that fundamental truths about reality, valid for all of space and time, can be
derived from thought/language alone, and which can then be dogmatically
imposed on nature and society).
In the end they clearly show that these "ruling ideas" have been founded
on little more than linguistic confusion and systematic distortion.
Nevertheless, the analytic method is much to be
preferred sinceit tends to deliver clear results.
Anyone who takes exception to this way of doing Philosophy (or, indeed, who is happy to
leave their head in the sand) can simply log-off this site now. I have no wish to wake
you up....
Item (iv)
also needs some explanation. The extraordinary length of these Essays has been
determined by two factors:
(a) The nature of DM itself; and,
(b) The recalcitrant attitude of its
supporters.
All of the major, and the vast majority of the
relatively minor,
DM-theories and 'laws' have been subjected to extensive and destructive
criticism throughout this site. Because of its totalising and interconnected approach to knowledge it can be
tackled in no other way. Had a single topic been left with only superficial
wounds -- and not
fatally injured -- its supporters might easily have imagined it could be
revived. Had even one of its theoretical strands been left intact,
because of the alleged inter-connections that exist between each and every part the temptation would have been to conclude that if one element is
still viable, the rest must be, too. Just like
Japanese Knotweed, DM would soon grow back. Hence, the
length of each of the main Essays is partly the result DM's holistic character
and partly because few of its supporters have ever bothered to analyse this theory in any detail
or to any great extent --
certainly not to the unprecedented level found at this site.
Those who still think these Essays are too long should compare them
with the works of, say, Hegel, Marx or Lenin, whose writings easily dwarf my own.
Nevertheless, I have attempted to summarise my main criticisms of DM in three
Introductory Essays of
decreasing length, difficulty, and complexity, here,
here and
here.
Finally, even though many of the
arguments presented at this site are in my view definitive, genuine
knock-down arguments in Philosophy are exceedingly rare. In
that case, readers will have to make up their own minds whether or not I
am alone in judging my Essays as definitive.9
[I have posted the entire passage above so that the
context of the points being made is itself clear.]
In addition, I have quoted DM-authors extensively
and repeatedly (and from right across the Marxist spectrum) since long and
bitter experience has taught me that unless DM-fans are presented with chapter
and verse, and often, they tend to deny that their theory is committed
to this or that doctrine. On-line discussion has shown that if they are
confronted with only one or two quotes, they complain that they aren't
"representative". If short quotes are used, they say they have been "taken out
of context". If they are quoted only once, they tend to ignore them. That is
especially so when the truly absurd consequences of the things the
DM-classics have to say (particularly about change) are brought to their
attention. And that itself is because
the vast majority of
DM-fans don't
really know their own theory, which means they are often genuinely surprised
by some of the off-the-wall ideas the DM-classics come out with. [We saw
this in
Essay Seven
Part Three, for example.]
Others might complain that this Essay places unreal
demands on active revolutionaries, who have far better and more important things
to do than produce a contents list for the "Totality", or waste time bothering
with the other academic issues raised earlier.
In response it is worth noting that throughout this site I have taken DM
seriously and, because of its centrality to revolutionary politics, I have given it thelong overdue attention to detail it deserves. Indeed, this has been done for the very first time in the entire history of Dialectical
Marxism.
If such critics still fail to appreciate its
important and refuse to engage with the issues I have raised,
that is their problem, not mine. But one thing is for sure, if they
persist with the dismissive attitude revealed in the last by one paragraph, they
can kiss "goodbye!" to the idea that DM is a scientific theory which lies at the
cutting edge of human knowledge. Can anyone imagine what would be said about a
genuine scientist who refused to specify with any clarity what her theory
entailed, or who brushed aside such questions with a curt sweep of the hand?
I said this at the beginning of this Essay:
Imagine now, if youcan, a
theory (or 'method') that its supporters tell us is, among other things:
(5) A general account of everything in
existence, how it develops and changes;
(6) A revolutionary 'method' aimed at helping change society;
(7) An explanation of how
everything is inter-connected in something
called the "Totality";
And finally that,
(8) The "Totality" is a fundamental concept, to
such an extent that nothing can be fully understood without
reference to it.
Consider, too, the following additional fact: every
single one of that theory's advocates studiously avoids -- or even refuses -- to say what
the "Totality" actually is, or what its supposed
"inter-connections" are deemed to be, or, indeed, how they knowso little
(and, indeed, say so little) about this obscure 'system', 'object' or
'process'...
Wonder no more! For that theory is
DM, those supporters are Dialectical Marxists, and they are serial
prevaricators and world champion
deflectors.
Perhaps readers will now appreciate why I said
it.
We have now reached the last desperate, 'scrape-the-bottom-of-the-barrel' stage of this inquiry, but still no 'Hamlet', no DM-"Totality".
Nevertheless, we do know a little more about what the "Totality"
isn't,chief among which isthatDM-theorists themselves
aren't at all clear what
it is! Nor do they seem to know much about its supposed 'inter-connections'.
At best, this DM-'non-Hamlet' has failed
to make its entrance
stage left, and, in the face of the above dialectical via negativa, 'it' is clearly in
need of a dose of Viagra to revive
his flagging fortunes.
But wait! Aren't the
above remarks still a little too hasty? Couldn't that itself be a direct
result of Ms Lichtenstein's persistent, almost obsessive attempt to
analyse each DM-proposition separately, one-by-one, all the while ignoring the holistic and
"mediated"
nature
of reality, and hence of DM,
where everything is conditioned by everythingelse?
Admittedly, there is
some truth to that counter-accusation --, but, fortunately,not much.
By the end of
Part Two even that faint ray of dialectical hope
will have been extinguished.
There,
the "Totality" will be put out of its mediated misery and
lowered at least six feet closer to the earth's core, fitted out with a snug
wooden overcoat.
May the non-existent 'deity' have no mercy on
its insubstantial soul...
Even though he was a Stalinist -- and, if fellow
Trotskyist critics are to be believed,supposedly in possession of with a 'wooden and formulaic' version of
dialectics -- Alexander Spirkin is to be commended for at least trying
to say something (beyond the usual superficial banalities gathering
dust in
'Academic' Marxist and Trotskyist books and articles devoted to
'dialectics') about the "Totality" and its
inter-connections:
"The concept of universal connection. Nothing
in the world stands by itself. Every object is a link in an endless chain and is
thus connected with all the other links. And this chain of the universe has
never been broken; it unites all objects and processes in a single whole and
thus has a universal character. We cannot move so much as our little finger
without 'disturbing' the whole universe. The life of the universe, its history
lies in an infinite web of connections.
"Whereas the interconnection of things is absolute,
their independence is relative. In the sphere of non-organic nature there exist
mechanical, physical and chemical connections, which presuppose interaction
either through various fields or by means of direct contact. In a crystal, which
is an ensemble of atoms, no individual atom can move in complete independence of
the others. Its slightest shift has an effect on every other atom. The
oscillations of particles in a solid body are, and can only be, collective. In
living nature there exist more complex connections -- the biological, which are
expressed in various relations between and within species and also in their
relations with the environment.
"In the life of society connections become more
complex and we have production, class, family, personal, national, state,
international and other relationships. Connections exist not only between objects within
the framework of a given form of motion of matter, but also between all its
forms, woven together in a kind of infinitely huge skein. Our consciousness can
contain no idea that does not express either imagined or real connections, and
in its turn this idea must of necessity be a link in a chain of other ideas and
conceptions.
"What is a connection? [I]t is a dependence of one
phenomenon on another in a certain relationship. The basic forms of connection
may be classified as spatial, temporal, causal and consequential, necessary and
accidental, law-governed, immediate and mediate, internal and external, dynamic
and static, direct and feedback, and so on. Connection does not exist by itself,
without that which is connected. Moreover, any connection has its basis, which
makes such connection possible. For example, the gravitational properties of
material systems condition the force connection of cosmic objects; atomic
nuclear charge is a connection in the periodic system of the elements; material
production and the community of interests serve as the basis for the connections
between human beings in society. The materiality of the world conditions the
connection of everything with everything else, expressed in the philosophical
principle of universal connection. In order to realise this or that connection
there must be certain conditions. They differ for various systems.
"Investigation of the various forms of connections
is the primary task of cognition. Connection is the first thing that strikes us
when we consider anything. We, of course, do not always think about such things.
And this is natural enough, for one cannot think only in terms of universal
connections when deciding simple everyday or even specific scientific problems.
However, on the philosophical level, when one tries to consider universal
problems, one cannot adopt the position of never looking further than one's
nose. This brings us to the methodological conclusion that in order to know an
object in reality, one must embrace, study all its aspects, all the immediate
and mediate connections. This is what drives scientific thought in its search
for systematic connections everywhere, both in particulars and in the whole. If
we deny the principle of universal connection, and particularly the essential
connections, this has a disastrous effect not only on our theory but also on our
practice. For example, forest-cutting reduces the bird population and this, in
its turn, increases the number of agricultural pests. Destruction of forests
sands up rivers, erodes the soil and thus leads to a reduction in harvests.
There are no birds or animals in nature that are absolutely harmful. The wolf,
for example, because it eats other animals, including the weak and the sick,
acts as a regulator of their numbers. Paradoxically, the mass extermination of
wolves, far from protecting other species, actually reduces their numbers, due
to the spread of disease.
"So everything in the world is connected with
something else. And this universal interconnection, and also the connection of
the elements within the whole at any level, form an essential condition for the
dynamic balance of systems.
"Interaction. The human individual, for
example, is not a lone traveller amid the jungles of existence. He is a part of
the world interacting in various ways with that world. Separate cultures are not
closed, isolated islands. They are like great waves in the ocean of history,
which work upon each other, often merging into even broader waves, often
clashing with waves of a different dimension, so that the regular rhythm of the
rise and fall of individual waves is broken. Like any other system, an organism
or a society lives and functions as long as there is a certain interaction of
the elements in these systems or of the systems themselves with other systems.
Everything that happens in the world may be attributed to the interaction of
things, one element of which is equilibrium. Interaction is a process by which various objects
influence each other, their mutual conditioning or transmutation and also their
generation of one another. Interaction is a kind of immediate or mediate,
external or internal relationship or connection. The properties of an object may
manifest themselves and be cognised only through its interconnection with other
objects.
"The category of interaction is extremely versatile
and may be used in various senses. In some cases interaction is understood as
the general basis or condition for the development of events; in others it has
the meaning of a complex causal relationship. But interaction is most widely
understood as a special form of causal connection, namely the two-way
relationship. Interaction operates as an integrating factor by
which the parts in a certain type of whole are united. For example,
electromagnetic interaction between a nucleus and electrons creates the
structure of the atom.
"The material unity of the world, the
interconnection of all the structural levels of existence is achieved through
the universality of interaction. The chain of interaction is never broken and
has neither beginning nor end. Every phenomenon is a link in the general
universal chain of interaction. In the immediate sense interaction is causal.
Every cause is simultaneously both active and passive in relation to another
cause. The origin and development of objects depend on interaction. Every
qualitatively defined system has a special type of interaction. Every kind of
interaction is connected with material fields and involves transference of
matter, motion and information. Interaction is impossible without a specific
material vehicle.
"The modern classification of interaction
distinguishes between force and informational interactions. Physics knows four
basic types of force interaction, which provide the key to our understanding of
the infinitely diverse processes of nature. These are the gravitational, the
electromagnetic, the so-called strong (nuclear) interactions, and the weak
(decay) interactions. Every type of interaction in physics has its own specific
measure. Biology studies interaction at various levels: in
molecules, cells, organisms, populations, species, biological communities. The
life of society is characterised by even more complex forms of interaction, for
society is a process and product of interaction both between people and between
man and nature. Unless we study interaction in its general and
concrete manifestations we cannot understand the properties, structures or laws
of reality. Not a single phenomenon in the world can be explained out of itself,
without taking into account its interactions with other objects. Interaction is
not only the initial point of cognition but also its culminating point.
"Development. Any type of connection or
interaction must take a certain direction. Nothing in the world is final and
complete. Everything is on the way to somewhere else. Development is a
definitely oriented, irreversible change of the object, from the old to the new,
from the simple to the complex, from a lower level to a higher one. The vector
of a developing phenomenon is towards acquisition of the fullness of its
essence, towards self-fulfilment in various new forms. The new is an
intermediate or final result of development in relation to the old. Changes may
involve the composition of the object (its quantity or quality), the type of
connection of the elements of the specific whole, its function, or its
"behaviour", that is to say, the means by which it interacts with other objects
and, finally, all these characteristics taken as a whole.
"Development is irreversible. Nothing passes through
one and the same state more than once. Development is a dual process: the old is
destroyed and replaced by something new, which establishes itself in life not
simply by freely evolving its own potential but in conflict with the old. The crucial feature of development is time.
Development takes place in time and only time reveals its direction. Even the
history of the concept of development goes back to the formation of the
theoretical notions of the direction of time. The ancient cultures had no
knowledge of development in the true sense. They saw time as moving in cycles
and all events were thought to be predestined. The old way of thinking was that
the sun must rise and set and hasten to its destined resting place, the wind
would blow where it listeth (sic) and return in its courses, what was bound to
happen would happen, and what was done would always be done, and there was
nothing new under the sun.
"The idea of a universe, perfect and complete, on
which the whole ancient view of the world rested, precluded any question of
oriented change that might give rise to new systems and connections. Any such
change was understood as the evolution of certain possibilities that had been
inherent in things from the beginning and had simply been hidden from view. With
the rise of Christianity, the notions of time and its linear direction begin to
be applied to the intellectual sphere, and, as experimental science takes shape,
these notions gradually begin to blaze a trail in the study of nature, giving
birth to the ideas of natural history, of oriented and irreversible changes in
nature and society. The turning-point here was the creation of cosmology and the
theory of evolution in biology and geology. The idea of development then became
firmly established in natural science and has since become an object of
philosophical investigation.
"This orientation of the sciences on the idea of
development substantially enriched it with a world-view and methodological
principles and played an essential heuristic role. For instance, biology and the
history of culture showed that the process of development was neither universal
nor homogeneous. If we consider development on a major scale, such as organic
evolution, it is quite obvious that certain interactions of processes taking
different directions are at work within it. The general line of progressive
development is interwoven with changes that give rise to blind alleys of
evolution or even paths of regress. Alongside processes of ascending development
we find degradation and decay of systems, descents from the higher to the lower,
from the more perfect to the less perfect, and a lowering in the level of
organisation of systems. An example of degradation is to be found in biological
species that die out because of their failure to adapt to new conditions.
"Degradation of a system as a whole does not mean
that all its elements are beginning to disintegrate. Regress is a contradictory
process: the whole falls apart but certain elements in it may progress. What is
more, a system as a whole may progress while certain of its elements fall into
decay. Thus, the progressive development of biological forms as a whole goes
hand in hand with the degradation of certain species. Cyclical processes such as the transmutation of
elementary particles play a significant role in the universe. The branch of
progressive development known to science consists of the pre-stellar, the
stellar, the planetary, the biological, the social and hypothetical metasocial
stages of the structural organisation of matter. On the cosmic scale the
processes of progressive and regressive development would appear to be of equal
significance." [Spirkin
(1983), pp.82-87. Emphases in the original. Several paragraphs
merged.]
Spirkin
begins with a by-now-familiar dogmatic flourish, in support of which he
offers zeroevidence:
"The concept of universal connection. Nothing
in the world stands by itself. Every object is a link in an endless chain and is
thus connected with all the other links. And this chain of the universe has
never been broken; it unites all objects and processes in a single whole and
thus has a universal character. We cannot move so much as our little finger
without 'disturbing' the whole universe. The life of the universe, its history
lies in an infinite web of connections. Whereas the interconnection of things is absolute,
their independence is relative. In the sphere of non-organic nature there exist
mechanical, physical and chemical connections, which presuppose interaction
either through various fields or by means of direct contact. In a crystal, which
is an ensemble of atoms, no individual atom can move in complete independence of
the others. Its slightest shift has an effect on every other atom. The
oscillations of particles in a solid body are, and can only be, collective. In
living nature there exist more complex connections -- the biological, which are
expressed in various relations between and within species and also in their
relations with the environment.... Connections exist not only between objects
within the framework of a given form of motion of matter, but also between all
its forms, woven together in a kind of infinitely huge skein. [Ibid. Paragraphs
merged.]
None of
the obvious problems that assertions like these face are even
mentioned let alone resolved by Spirkin. Based on a few remarks about the atoms in a
crystal Spirkin extrapolates to the entire universe for all of time! Admittedly,
he also talks about "fields" (by which he appears to mean the sort of fields
that are used in physics to try to understand the universe, discussed earlier in this Essay), which he says underpin
"interaction", but we aren't told if the past "interacts" with the present,
whether these "interactions" are instantaneous, whether they effect everything else in
the universe equally or differentially, or even whether there is some sort of hierarchy (with proximate
objects and processes being affected more than remote objects and processes).
Indeed, all the problems associated with the past (also raised earlier in this Essay
-- for example,
here,
here and
here)
are simply passed over in silence.
Worse
still, Spirkin doesn't even tell his readers what the "world" is, what its contents are,
or how he intends to overcome the
Light
Cone and the
Hubble Sphere
'problems'
(also aired earlier,
here
and here),
which reveal there are parts of the universe that
aren't now and never will be connected, let alone inter-connected.
However, to his
credit, Spirkin does at least try to tell his readers what he means by
"connection":
"What is a connection? [I]t is a dependence of one
phenomenon on another in a certain relationship. The basic forms of connection
may be classified as spatial, temporal, causal and consequential, necessary and
accidental, law-governed, immediate and mediate, internal and external, dynamic
and static, direct and feedback, and so on. Connection does not exist by itself,
without that which is connected. Moreover, any connection has its basis, which
makes such connection possible. For example, the gravitational properties of
material systems condition the force connection of cosmic objects; atomic
nuclear charge is a connection in the periodic system of the elements; material
production and the community of interests serve as the basis for the connections
between human beings in society. The materiality of the world conditions the
connection of everything with everything else, expressed in the philosophical
principle of universal connection. In order to realise this or that connection
there must be certain conditions. They differ for various systems.
"Investigation of the various forms of connections
is the primary task of cognition. Connection is the first thing that strikes us
when we consider anything. We, of course, do not always think about such things.
And this is natural enough, for one cannot think only in terms of universal
connections when deciding simple everyday or even specific scientific problems.
However, on the philosophical level, when one tries to consider universal
problems, one cannot adopt the position of never looking further than one's
nose. This brings us to the methodological conclusion that in order to know an
object in reality, one must embrace, study all its aspects, all the immediate
and mediate connections. This is what drives scientific thought in its search
for systematic connections everywhere, both in particulars and in the whole. If
we deny the principle of universal connection, and particularly the essential
connections, this has a disastrous effect not only on our theory but also on our
practice. For example, forest-cutting reduces the bird population and this, in
its turn, increases the number of agricultural pests. Destruction of forests
sands up rivers, erodes the soil and thus leads to a reduction in harvests.
There are no birds or animals in nature that are absolutely harmful. The wolf,
for example, because it eats other animals, including the weak and the sick,
acts as a regulator of their numbers. Paradoxically, the mass extermination of
wolves, far from protecting other species, actually reduces their numbers, due
to the spread of disease. So everything in the world is connected with
something else. And this universal interconnection, and also the connection of
the elements within the whole at any level, form an essential condition for the
dynamic balance of systems." [Ibid. Two paragraphs merged.]
Unfortunately, Spirkin
forgot to say how he knows that these "spatial, temporal, causal and
consequential, necessary and accidental, law-governed, immediate and mediate,
internal and external, dynamic and static, direct and feedback" processes stretch across
the entire universe, or how some of them have any effect at all on the rest (or
even if they do).
For
example, how do "temporal" connections affect objects and processes,
particularly
those billions of light years apart? And this doesn't just involve problems
associated with simultaneity highlighted by
Special Relativity (which Spirkin also ignores)? How do events
that we might now observe occurring at what is currently the
'edge of the visible universe', but which actually took place billions of years ago, exercise some sort of influence on the temporal order of
more recent events? For example: how does the fact that the death of
General 'Stonewall' Jackson at the Battle of Chancellorsville (in
May, 1863) occurred before the hundreds of recently observed
Supernovae (listed at
this University's site) affect any of those recently exploded stars? That
isn't to ask questions about any causal links which might exist between those
two specific events, but how their temporal orderalone has
any affect on either of them? How does the observation of a single one of
these Supernovae (for instance,
this one, that was detected earlier in 2022), which took place a
century-and-a-half after the death of that Confederate General, affect
that death? How does the fact that the second event took place long after the first affect
either of them? How does
their temporal order alone affect either of them? Spirkin is totally
silent on this even though he seems to think there is some way there can be some
such effect:
"What is a connection? [I]t is a dependence of one
phenomenon on another in a certain relationship. The basic forms of connection
may be classified as spatial, temporal, causal and consequential,
necessary and accidental, law-governed, immediate and mediate, internal and
external, dynamic and static, direct and feedback, and so on." [Ibid. Bold
emphasis added.]
However,
he
does make some attempt to explain a sub-set of these mysterious "connections" -- albeit
briefly and superficially -- but not all. Even so, none of these 'attempts'
tackles the fundamental problems exposed in this Essay (for example,
these).
Nevertheless, Spirkin is at least honest about the motivation at work, here:
"[O]n
the philosophical level, when one tries to consider universal problems, one
cannot adopt the position of never looking further than one's nose. This brings
us to the methodological conclusion that in order to know an object in reality,
one must embrace, study all its aspects, all the immediate and mediate
connections." [Ibid. Bold added.]
So, this
is a 'philosophical' not a scientific question. And yet, what
'philosophical' reason does Spirkin share with his readers that justifies this
approach? None at all other than a dogmatic assertion to that effect itself. But, that is what we have come to
expect from DM-fans; Spirkin is merely acting 'in character', true-to-form. In place of rational
argument supported by conclusive (or even persuasive) evidence, we have dogmatic assertion.
Is this being unfair to Spirkin?
Well, he
did add the following remark to the passage just quoted:
"[O]n
the philosophical level, when one tries to consider universal problems, one
cannot adopt the position of never looking further than one's nose. This brings
us to the methodological conclusion that in order to know an object in reality,
one must embrace, study all its aspects, all the immediate and mediate
connections. This is what drives scientific thought in its search for
systematic connections everywhere, both in particulars and in the whole. If we
deny the principle of universal connection, and particularly the essential
connections, this has a disastrous effect not only on our theory but also on our
practice." [Ibid. Bold added.]
Is that
really the case? In order to "know an object", do scientists
"embrace, study all its aspects, all the
immediate and mediate connections"? Perhaps in answer to those questions
(and maybe to illustrate the point), we were presented with an example taken from
ecology, zoology, botany and epidemiology:
"For example, forest-cutting reduces the bird
population and this, in its turn, increases the number of agricultural pests.
Destruction of forests sands up rivers, erodes the soil and thus leads to a
reduction in harvests. There are no birds or animals in nature that are
absolutely harmful. The wolf, for example, because it eats other animals,
including the weak and the sick, acts as a regulator of their numbers.
Paradoxically, the mass extermination of wolves, far from protecting other
species, actually reduces their numbers, due to the spread of disease." [Ibid.]
The
question is: Did the scientists involved in the above investigation (i.e., those who established these
links, or who might have tried to mitigate or even reverse their effects)
"embrace, study all its aspects, all the immediate and mediate connections"?
Surely not. How many of them thought it relevant to focus on any connections the
above might have had with whatever is happening
on the outer fringes of the galaxy? Or considered it relevant to take account of
the influence that distant
Quasars might have on those wolves or those
trees? How many even thought it important to investigate connections they might have
had with
the demise of the Neanderthals or the evolution of
mole-rats? If not, the above example can't
lend support to Spirkin's claim that scientists investigate 'universal
inter-connection'.
Of
course, if any such scientists had been influenced by
ruling-class ideology, like Spirkin clearly has, they might very well ask
'philosophical' questions like these, but then that would simply give the game
away. And it is no good pointing to what cosmologists, astronomers or physicists
might or might not study, since that would only introduce all the problems
highlighted earlier in this Essay (briefly mentioned in the last few
paragraphs).
It could
be objected that the topics mentioned above (concerning the outer fringes of the
galaxy, distant Quasars, the demise of the Neanderthals and the evolution of
mole-rats) are hardly relevant to the example Spirkin considered. I agree, but that is
why they were mentioned. The idea that scientists consider universal
inter-connections is clearly incorrect. They filter out whatever they think is
relevant from whatever they deem
irrelevant. That being so, vague, broad sweeps of the hand
concerning 'universal inter-connection' have nothing to do with science as it is
practiced. Such broad philosophical flourishes arethemselves clearly inter-connected with theological and mystical systems
of thought that long pre-dated modern science and Marxism, whose 'ideological
ripples' influence theorists still locked into traditional ways of thinking. And it is those extraneous ideological inter-connections
that are revealing.
Spirkin
continues:
"Interaction is a process by which various objects
influence each other, their mutual conditioning or transmutation and also their
generation of one another. Interaction is a kind of immediate or mediate,
external or internal relationship or connection. The properties of an object may
manifest themselves and be cognised only through its interconnection with other
objects. The category of interaction is extremely versatile
and may be used in various senses. In some cases interaction is understood as
the general basis or condition for the development of events; in others it has
the meaning of a complex causal relationship. But interaction is most widely
understood as a special form of causal connection, namely the two-way
relationship. Interaction operates as an integrating factor by
which the parts in a certain type of whole are united. For example,
electromagnetic interaction between a nucleus and electrons creates the
structure of the atom." [Ibid. Paragraphs merged.]
Well,
this is all rather vague, and parts of it aren't so much equivocal as truistic. None
of the problems highlighted in this Essay have even been
acknowledged by Spirkin, let alone addressed. For example, we aren't told how events in
the past can inter-act with those in the present -- or even whether they
actually
inter-act, to begin with. I don't propose to rehearse the serious problems this theory faces
trying to link, let alone inter-link, the past with the present. Readers are
referred back to that earlier material (for example, here, here
and here).
Spirkin,
again:
"The material unity of the world, the
interconnection of all the structural levels of existence is achieved through
the universality of interaction. The chain of interaction is never broken and
has neither beginning nor end. Every phenomenon is a link in the general
universal chain of interaction. In the immediate sense interaction is causal.
Every cause is simultaneously both active and passive in relation to another
cause. The origin and development of objects depend on interaction. Every
qualitatively defined system has a special type of interaction. Every kind of
interaction is connected with material fields and involves transference of
matter, motion and information. Interaction is impossible without a specific
material vehicle. The modern classification of interaction
distinguishes between force and informational interactions. Physics knows four
basic types of force interaction, which provide the key to our understanding of
the infinitely diverse processes of nature. These are the gravitational, the
electromagnetic, the so-called strong (nuclear) interactions, and the weak
(decay) interactions. Every type of interaction in physics has its own specific
measure.
"Biology studies interaction at various levels: in
molecules, cells, organisms, populations, species, biological communities. The
life of society is characterised by even more complex forms of interaction, for
society is a process and product of interaction both between people and between
man and nature. Unless we study interaction in its general and
concrete manifestations we cannot understand the properties, structures or laws
of reality. Not a single phenomenon in the world can be explained out of itself,
without taking into account its interactions with other objects. Interaction is
not only the initial point of cognition but also its culminating point." [Ibid.
Several paragraphs merged.]
Although
Spirkin asserts that "the interconnection of all the structural levels of
existence is achieved through the universality of interaction", we aren't told
anything about the extent (or even the duration) of these 'inter-actions'. Are they
instantaneous? Do they stretch across all regions of space and time? All the
time or only sporadically?
Deafening silence,
once more...
However,
Spirkin does mention cause and effect:
"Every phenomenon is a link in the general universal
chain of interaction. In the immediate sense interaction is causal. Every cause
is simultaneously both active and passive in relation to another cause." [Ibid.]
But, he
makes no attempt to explain how there can be any inter-action at all here. If
A causes B, then there will be some sort of 'action' of A on B
(howsoever the word "action" itself is to be understood),
but how will there also be an 'action' of B on A? There
would have to be something like that if there were to be any sort of inter-action
at work, here. Hence, if lighting causes a forest fire,
then, in its simplest form a powerful bolt of electricity will act on something
combustible or explosive in that forest to set off just such a conflagration. But, what sort of effect will that
combustible material have on that bolt of lightning (that no longer exists!) in return? This isn't to deny
that reciprocal action and
reaction can and does happen (such as two billiard balls striking one another, or
a group of picketing workers responding to
an attack by the cops), merely to point out that not every example of
causation is one of inter-action. And yet, that is precisely what Spirkin and DM seem
to require.
And it
is no use quoting
Newton's Third Law here -- "For every
action there is an equal and opposite reaction" -- until we are told what the
"equal and opposite reaction" is in the forest fire example cited earlier
(not to mention countless others that could be cited). That law certainly works
in simple cases (two interacting billiard balls being a
classic example), but not in complex situations (again, like the forest fire), so
that Law is of little help in any defence of Spirkin.
There
isn't much else in the above passage that merits comment, or which hasn't already been
covered earlier in this Essay (for example,
here),
except perhaps this:
"Not a single phenomenon in the world can be
explained out of itself, without taking into account its interactions with other
objects." [Ibid.]
Quite
apart from the fact that, if modern theory is correct, the origin of the
universe is to be "explained out of itself", Spirkin offers no argument or
evidence in support of that rather dogmatic assertion. Moreover, what he had to
say becomes difficult to square with what Lenin (and others) try to tell us:
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of
nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?)
conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase,
as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a
unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).
"In the first conception of
motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive,
remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject,
etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to
knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement. The first conception is lifeless,
pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new. The
unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The
struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and
motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58. Bold emphases
alone added. Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
"Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Lenin (1921),
p.90. Bold emphases in the original.
Italic emphasis added.]
That
seems pretty clear: according to Lenin everything in existence is subject to
"self-movement", which suggests that Spirkin is here disagreeing with
that. So, if the
following
were indeed the case:
"Not a single phenomenon in the world can be
explained out of itself, without taking into account its interactions with other
objects", [Ibid.]
nothing would be 'self-moving'.
Moreover, Lenin contrasts his theory of internally-caused movement with
explanations that
appeal to external causation, which he claims in the end lead to 'God'. In that case, it is
no big surprise that Spirkin's theory (that no "single phenomenon in the world
can be explained out of itself") originated in Christian and Hermetic
Mysticism. After all, one of the cornerstones of Theism is the belief that the
universe
can't be "explained out of itself". In
which case, the above comment appears to be
Spirkin's version of the
(debunked)
Cosmological Argument!
The rest
of Spirkin's remarks (concerning development) don't appear to be relevant to the
aims of this Essay. However, if I can summon up the will, I might
add a few more comments about them at a later date...
01a. I am, of course, speaking here about the
'God' of the Bible and the
Quran. Other references to
'gods' later on in this Essay are meant to be more general.
It could be objected that both words,
"God" and "Totality", do possess a meaning.
However, it is sufficient to remind ourselves that
with regard to the supposed "meaning"
of the word "God", other than offer several inappropriate metaphors and
misleading analogies (briefly examined later on in the main body of this Essay), theists have yet
to tell us exactly whatit does mean. On the other hand, with respect to
the word "Totality", the rest
of this Essay will demonstrate that that word isalso devoid of meaning
-- except in the senses mentioned below.
Of course, that depends on what is meant by
"meaning".
The following forms part of what I have written
about this
topic in Essay Thirteen
Part Three (slightly edited):
Part of the problem here is the fact that the word
"meaning" itself has many different meanings;
here are just a few:
(1) Personal Significance: as in
"His Teddy Bear means a lot to him."
(2) Evaluative Import: as in "May Day
means different things to different classes."
(3) Point or Purpose: as in "Life has
no meaning."
(4) Linguistic Meaning, or
Synonymy: as
in "'Vixen' means 'female fox'", "'Chien' means 'dog'",
"Comment vous appelez-vous?" means "What's your name?", or
"Recidivist" means someone who has resumed their criminal career.
(5) Aim or Intention: as in "They mean
to win this strike."
(6) Implication: as in "Winning
this dispute means that management won't try another wage cut again in a hurry."
(7) Indicate, Point to, or Presage:
as in "Those clouds mean rain", "Those spots mean you have measles", or
"That expression means she's angry".
(8) Reference: as in "I mean him over
there", or "'The current president of the USA' means somebody different at
most
once every
eight years."
(9) Artistic or Literary Import:
as in "The meaning of this novel is to highlight the steep decline in political integrity."
(10) Conversational Focus: as in "I
mean, why do we have to accept a measly 1% offer in the first place?"
(11) Expression of
Sincerity or
Determination: as in "I mean it, I do want to go on the
march!", or "The demonstrators really mean to stop this war."
(12) Content of a Message, or the
Import of a Sign: as in "It means the strike starts on Monday", or "It
means you have to queue here."
(13) Interpretation: as in "You
will need to read the author's novels if you want to give new meaning to her
latest play", or "That gesture means those pickets think you are a
scab."
(14) Import or Significance:
as in "Part of the meaning of this play is to change our view of drama",
or "The real meaning of this agreement is that the bosses have at last learnt their
lesson."
(15) Speaker's Meaning: as in "When
you trod on her foot and she said 'Well done!' she in fact meant the exact
opposite".
(16) Communicative Meaning: as in "You
get my meaning", or "My last letter should tell you what I meant", or "We have
just broken the code, hence the last message meant this...."
(17) Explanation: as in "When
the comrade said the strike isn't over what she meant was that we can still
win!", or "What is the meaning of this? Explain yourself!"
(18) Translation, or a Request for
Translation -- as in "What does 'Il pleut' mean in German?"
That isn't to suggest these are the only meanings of "meaning", or that
several of the examples listed don't overlap. For example, items (4) and (17)
intersect, as do (5) and (11), and (9) and (14), as well as (4) and (18). For
more on this and the distinction between "natural" and "non-natural" meanings
see
Grice (1957) -- this links to a PDF -- and Stainton (1996), pp.103-10,
although I don't necessarily agree with everything Grice has to say. A very useful summary of these and other
senses of "meaning" can be found in Audi (1999), pp.545-50 (written by
Brian Loar). This isn't, of course, to deny the sort of complexity
that interests linguists. On the latter, see Cruse (2000), pp.46-63.
While the
word "God" might conceivably have a 'meaning' in senses (1), (2), (14) and
possibly even (15), it clearly possess no other meaning. Some might think it
does have a meaning -- at
least in sense (4) -- but, as noted above,
other than offer up a few inappropriate metaphors,
misplaced analogies and traditional synonyms (such as "Being", "Mind", "Force",
"Creator", etc.), which are just as obscure as the word "God"
ever was, believers have yet to say what
that word does in fact mean in sense (4).
More-or-less the same can be said about "Totality".
If anyone disagrees, they should
email me
with their best shot.
1.
Relevant comments from other DM-luminaries
on this particular topic have been quoted
here.
Several of the latter declare
that they can't actually tell us what the "Totality" is since that
would pin reality down, rendering DM formalistic and dogmatic. However, as we
saw in Essay Two,
dialecticians end up doing just that, promulgating theories/'laws' they
dogmatically foist on nature and society.
So, this latest excuse/deflection is as bogus as much else that
passes for DM-apologetics.
George Novack, for example,
waxed
indignant during his heroic struggle against the 'forces of unreason' -- i.e.,
individuals who apparently
(and unfairly) required him to
inform them exactly what it was he believed. The nerve! The audacity!The arrogance!
Of course, he bravely resisted all such ridiculous and unreasonable
demands! However, he was adamant that they should provide him
with the sort of information he insisted they shouldn't ask him to supply in return -- i.e., concrete
details of their beliefs! Totally fair, as I am sure readers will agree.
And here he is doing just that:
"To insist that dialectics provide an expression of
its laws and ideas, good for all times, for all purposes, in all spheres, is to
ask the impossible of dialectics. Dialectics cannot fulfil it. Any attempt to do
so would violate its own inner nature and dialectics would slip back into
formalism." [Novack
(1971), p.73; Lecture V, 'The Dialectical Method 1' (this links
to a PDF).
On this in general, see
ibid, pp.69-83.]
Novack's point is that DM is a fluid theory,
hence any attempt to specify clearly what its core ideas are would be to make
the same mistake as the formalists. However, as I point out in Essay Thirteen
Part One, Novack nowhere tells us which DM-laws are revisable or
might one day be abandoned (which is what happens all the time in the sciences).
On the contrary, as I show in that Essay (and in Essay
Two), Novack is quite happy to impose DM on nature and society,
dogmatically. Here are just a few examples:
"Everything in motion is continually
bringing forth this contradiction of being in two different places at the same
time, and also overcoming this contradiction by proceeding from one place to
the next…. A moving thing is both here and there
simultaneously. Otherwise it is not in motion but at rest…. Nothing is permanent. Reality is
never resting, ever changeable, always in flux. This unquestionable
universal process forms the foundation of the theory [of dialectical
materialism]….
"According to the theory of Marxism,
everything comes into being as a result of material causes, develops through
successive phases, and finally perishes…. Dialectics is the logic of movement, of
evolution, of change. Reality is too full of contradictions, too elusive, too
manifold, too mutable to be snared in any single form or formula. Each
particular phase of reality has its own laws…. These laws…have to be discovered
by direct investigation of the concrete whole, they cannot be excogitated by
the mind alone before material reality is analysed. Moreover, all reality
is constantly changing, disclosing ever new aspects….
"If reality is ever changing,
concrete, full of novelty, fluent as a river, torn by oppositional forces, then
dialectics…must share the same characteristics…. Nature cannot be unreasonable or
reason contrary to nature. Everything that exists must have a necessary and
sufficient reason for existence…. The material base of this law lies in
the actual
interdependence of all things in their reciprocal interactions…. If
everything that exists has a necessary and sufficient reason for existence,
that means it had to come into being. It was pushed into existence and forced
its way into existence by natural necessity…. Reality, rationality and
necessity are intimately associated at all times…. If everything actual is necessarily
rational, this means that every item of the real world has a sufficient reason
for existing and must find a rational explanation….
"But this is not the whole and final
truth about things…. The real truth about things is that they not only
exist, persist, but they also develop and pass away. This passing away of
things…is expressed in logical terminology by the term 'negation'. The whole
truth about things can be expressed only if we take into account this opposite
and negative aspect…. All things are limited and changing….
In logical terms, they not only affirm themselves. They likewise negate
themselves and are negated by other things…. Such a movement of things and of
thought is called dialectical movement….
"From this dialectical essence of
reality
Hegel drew the conclusion that constitutes an indispensable part of his
famous aphorism: All that is rational is real…. [M]ovement…from unreality into reality
and then back again into unreality, constitutes the essence, the inner
movement behind all appearance…. Everything generates within itself
that force which leads to its negation, its passing away into some other and
higher form of being….
"This dialectical activity is
universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace.
'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of
consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be
viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead
of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and
this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the
finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate
or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia,
p.120)." [Novack (1971), pp.41, 43, 51, 70-71, 78-80, 84-87, 94-95; quoting
Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
"[D]ialectical materialism deals with the entire universe and its logic
holds good for all the constituent sectors of reality which enter into human
experience: nature, society and thought. The laws of dialectics, which have
arisen out of the investigation of the universal processes of becoming and modes
of being, apply to all phenomena. Although each level of being has its
own specific laws, these merge with general laws covering all spheres of
existence and development, which constitute the content and shape the method
of materialist dialectics." [Novack (1978), p.232. It is important to note that
although this was a report of what three other Marxists had to say (in a
debate), it is clear that Novack agreed with them. It is also interesting to
note that these other three Marxists were communists, not Trotskyists like
Novack. The 'wooden and lifeless' dialectic promulgated by communists was
apparently vibrant and spritely enough for Novack to agree with it. I return to
consider this odd fact about DM-fans right across every strand of Marxism (that
they largely agree about DM, 'wooden and lifeless' or not), in Essay Nine Part
Two. See also Essay Four Part One,
here.]
"Dialectical materialism admits no such barriers to its field of operations. It
has a universal character. It takes all reality for its province.
The materialist dialectics applies to all phenomena from the most distant
nebulae and the most remote time to man's most intimate feelings and elevated
thoughts."
[Quoted from
here. Bold emphasis added.]
Not much 'fluidity' evident in any of the above Those dogmas
have remained fixed and rigid for over a century-and-a-half, when science itself
has advanced beyond all recognition. Who now accepts the Physics, Geology and
Chemistry of the 1870s? Who now cares for the sick the way they were treated in
Victorian times? Who now uses candles to light their home? Or a horse and cart
to travel to work? Or the telegraph system the
Pony Express to send messages? But DM has remained locked in
Parmenidean stasis since at least the 1870s. Where there has been change and
development in Marxist theory, that has taken place in
HM, not
DM.
Plekhanov had a ready response for those who argued
along similar lines back then, and here it is:
"Mikhailovsky thinks this eternal and ubiquitous supremacy of dialectics
incomprehensible: everything changes except the laws of dialectical motion, he
says with sarcastic scepticism. Yes, that's just it, we reply: and if it
surprises you, if you wish to contest this view, remember that you will have to
contest the fundamental standpoint of modern science. In order to be convinced
of this, it is sufficient for you to recall those words of
Playfair which
Lyell
took as an epigraph to his famous work Principles
of Geology:
'Amid the revolutions of the globe, the economy of Nature has been uniform, and
her laws are the only things that have resisted the general movement. The rivers
and the rocks, the seas and the continents have been changed in all their parts;
but the laws which direct these changes, and the rules to which they are
subject, have remained invariably the same.'" [Plekhanov
(1974), footnote to p.541.
Italic
emphasis in the original; links added. Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.]
The above rebuttal has dated rather badly given that
Geology and the rest of science have dramatically changed since Playfair
penned those unfortunate words. Not so DM, whose patron saint should be
Parmenides, not Heraclitus.
Others might be tempted to point to Lenin's PN in
support of the counter-claim that DM has made significant changes in the last
hundred years, but that isn't so. All Lenin did was situate DM even closer to
Hegel, a major step backwards, not a move forwards. There is certainly more
philosophical detail in PN than there is in anything Engels wrote, and Lenin's
approach is much more sophisticated than Plekhanov's (which is much closer to
Engels in tone and tenor than it is to Lenin) or Engels's, but even having said
that there is little that is new in PN. But even if there were novel aspects of
DM evident in PN, that would still mean DM hadn't changed in over a hundred
years.
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks,
i.e., Lenin (1961); HCD = High Church Dialectician (follow the link below for an
explanation).]
Still others might point to the work of contemporary
Academic Marxists -- i.e., members of the
HCD-Tendency -- for example, Bhaskar (1993)
and Zizek (2012, 2015), as proof that DM has advanced significantly of late.
Well, try as I might, I could find nothing new in any of those books (or others
I could have mentioned), just more complication buried under even more
philosophical gobbledygook. If anyone disagrees, they should
email me
with the details, and if they are right, I will apologise and amend the above
remarks to take note of any genuine advances (in DM, not HM) they bring
to my attention.
On an issue related to the last
point, one or two readers
(who had made it this far in connection with an earlier version of the present
Essay) complained that I had failed
to quote what more recent dialecticians had to say about the "Totality". The reason for that
'omission' is
easy to explain (indeed,I covered this very issue in the main body of
the Essay,
here):
search as hard as I was able, I couldn't find any recent books and
articles to quote that didn't simply repeat
(almost verbatim!) what the
DM-classicists had already said about the "Totality" over a
century ago -- i.e.,
not a lot --
or, indeed, that hadn'tactually ignored the entire topic!
[The one
exception is the Stalinist, Spirkin, whom I have quoted at length in Appendix B.
In the same Appendix, I have also added
a few critical remarks about his
attempt to fill in the blanks, from which responsibility most DM-fans have shied away.]
Sure, many have much to say about social wholes,
but that form of holism isn't being questioned at this site (since it
is plainly part of HM, a scientific theory I fully accept),
so that topic is hardly relevant to the aims of this Essay.
Moreover, there are very few
books and articles on this nebulous theory (published in English) that I
haven't consulted, so the mystery deepens. Why is there such an epistemological,
even ontological,
black hole right
at the heart of DM? Certainly, the aforementioned readers failed to point me in the
direction of more recent examples of DM-literature that actually covered this
subject in any detail (or at all!).
One can only wonder why. If readers know of any relevant sources I have missed,
once again, please
email me
with the details.
"[N]ature forms a totality, which it must
unless we depart from materialism completely and become believers in the
supernatural…." [Rees (1998a), p.78. Italics in the original.]
While that doesn't appear to add much to our knowledge of the
"Totality", it does confirm the suspicion that Rees (probably?)
identifies it with "nature". Or,
rather, since he says that "nature forms a totality" -- not "two or more
totalities" -- it is reasonable to
conclude he intends this to be the DM-"Totality". Even so, it
still isn't clear whether Rees thinks "nature" comprises the
whole of this "Totality" or only part of it, since he doesn't say.
He is also silent about what he means by "nature". As we are about to
discover, addressing that topic is far less straight-forward than many
might think.
3. This
means that much of what appears in Jay (1984) after the opening chapter isn't relevant to the aims of this Essay,
or this site.
4. Of course, Rees isn't the only one to
advance such claims -- on that, see here, where I have quoted over
half-a-dozen DM-classicists and more recent dialecticians who (more-or-less) agree with Rees.
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
It could be objected that this Essay is
unfair
to Rees since he points out that these mystical systems don't appeal to "internal
contradictions" in order to account for change. But that isn't so. As we saw
above
(and will do so again,
here),
rarely do
mystics failto appeal to UOs to account for
stability and change (and they often include the 'deity itself' in
this,
especially those that identify themselves with the Hermeticist/Hegelian
tradition). Admittedly, these UOs might not always have
been called "contradictions" (however, in
Buddhism
and
Jewish
Mysticism
they were/are), but a rose by any other name...
Anyway, "contradiction" in DM is
a derivative term
based on those much more fundamental UOs.
Here is
Engels:
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature….
[T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature,
and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of
nature." [Engels (1954),
p.211. Bold emphases added.]
Lenin concurred:
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and
unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other…. In brief, dialectics can be
defined as
the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the
cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials',
one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of
dialectics…. In
mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and
reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the
combination and dissociation of atoms…. The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity
of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added.
Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
In which
case, it looks like it is UOs that give rise to 'dialectical contradictions', not the other
way round.
[On
"contradictions" in Buddhism, see this
on-line article by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest (this
links to a PDF). Priest is a Dialectical Marxist who is also a Buddhist; on
that, see
here. We have had occasion to examine some
of his other rather odd ideas
elsewhere in this Essay.]
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
"In Buddhist logic, the
origin of every judgment and concept from data of our senses starts with the act
of running through the manifold of undetermined pure sensations first before we
fasten upon one point of that series of pure sensations, a point with regard to
which the rest will be divided in two. On the one side we have a
comparatively limited number of similar things, on the other the less limited
number of dissimilar ones. Both parts mutually represent the absence of each
other. Therefore, every [part/aspect? -- RL] of our conscious thought or
cognition thus represents a division into two parts. Thus, our cognition begins
with an act of dichotomy.
"As soon as our intellectual
eye begins to 'see', our thought is already beset with contradiction. Once our
thought has stopped running and has fixed upon an external point, to produce a
judgment said (sic), 'this is blue', we have already separated the universe of
discourse into two unequal halves, the part that is blue and the infinite part
that is non-blue. Both parts are relative to
each other. There is actually nothing blue in itself. The Law of Contradiction
is an expression of the fact that all cognition is dichotomizing and relative.
We can only cognize or determine a thing by opposing it to what it is not. Now, everything be it real
or imagined, is subject to the Law of Otherness also. Otherness and opposition
are realized as representing the negation of the similar. Differences and the
contraries cannot be conceived so long as the non-existence of the similar is
not realized. Otherness and opposition is the absence of the similar indirectly.
"Contradiction can be
conceived in its logical or dynamic forms. View[ed] logically it is a complete
mutual exclusion such as e.g., blue and non-blue. They can co-exist in close
proximity with each other without interference with each others' (sic) existence.
This
mutual exclusion can also be referred to as the Law of Excluded Middle. In its
dynamic form, both the opposing parts are mutually endeavouring to oust one
another out of their mutual opposition. Light and darkness is such an example as
each is a complete negation of the other. They cannot peacefully co-exist in
close proximity with each other. They appear and disappear due to the totally of
causes. This is the Buddhist theory of causation. The Law of Excluded Middle
also fully applied here as well.
"In real phenomena, there is
always something in the middle. If light appears all of a sudden, there is
always an intermediate moment of twilight between darkness and light. This is
different in the case of logical opposition between light and non-light, the
opposition is complete without an intermediate twilight moment. Here, it can
also be mentioned that the
Theravada
tradition maintained that between pleasure and pain there is the third position
of Indifferent feeling in the middle. To the Buddhist logician, the last moment
of the series of darkness is the cause (in the sense of dependent origination)
of the first moment of light. Real causation belongs to a single moment only. On
the other hand, efficient opposition is between one set of moments (duration of
time) and another set which is constructed by our intellect. It is not ultimate
reality. It is constructed phenomena.
"The Laws of Contradiction is
one of the main tools used by the Buddhist logicians in establishing their
theory of Instantaneous Being, for Instantaneousness is the very essence of
every real thing. The logical law of contradiction does not apply to the
'Things-in[-]Themselves', as logic is thought and thought is imagination and not
ultimate reality. Ultimate reality in Buddhist philosophy is the reality of a
point instant. It is the efficiency of a point instant. There is no relation of
opposition between entities." [Aik Theng Chong,
The Buddhist Channel, May 31, 2011. Formatting and spelling
modified to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Accessed 18/07/2011.
Bold emphases and link
added; several paragraphs merged.]
Be this as it may, anyone reading the
above surely can't fail to notice the similarities that exist between what The Buddhist
Channel has to say and
much that passes for 'philosophy' and 'logic' in the Hegelian tradition. [On Hegel and Buddhism, see
Morton (ND).]
And here is what Ha Tai Kim had to say about Hegel
and
Zen Buddhism:
"The paradoxical nature of
Zen manifests itself in its ignoring of the law of contradiction. It does not
attempt to invalidate the law of contradiction, but ignores it only to
illuminate the law of identity. Thus the logical proposition of illogical Zen
is: 'A is not-A; therefore, A is A.' Zen believes that the true meaning of the
proposition 'A is A' will be realized only when 'A is not-A.' The Zen way of
thinking is to assert that to be itself is not to be itself, and also that I am
really I only by negating myself.
"The philosophical 'fun' of
contradiction manifested in the logic of illogical Zen seems to have two
intended purposes. First, Zen believes that the logical dissection of reality
will never bring about the unitive point of view, the only method by which
reality can be presented as it is. The unitive point of view achieved by the
intuitive method transcends not only subject and object but also all logical
categories, including affirmation and negation. Zen masters frequently resort to
the following pattern of argument: 'Do not call this a staff; if you do, it is
an affirmation; if you do not, it is a negation. Apart from affirmation and
negation say a word, quick, quick.' Zen aims at acquiring the pure experience in
which subject and object are not yet separated.
"The second purpose of Zen's
employment of this method may be detected from the fact that the logic of the
illogical accounts for many paradoxical problems of practical philosophy more
adequately than does ordinary logic. In a sense, it is a form of practical
reason; it is the logic of life. It is reasonable to say that 'living is dying'
(A is not-A), as existentialists seem to point out. A fine illustration of this
method is Jesus' pronouncement that 'He that findeth his life shall lose it, and
he that loseth his life shall find it' (Matt. 10:39). In the moral and religious
sphere, this method is frequently employed. Any idea of the good which is not
carefully scrutinized in the light of the practical and concrete situation
cannot really be called good; thus, we may say that 'good is not-good.' Only by
examining the idea of good to the ultimate extreme can we say that we understand
the idea. In order to understand fully the implications of a concept -- for
example, philanthropy -- we must allow room for reasonable doubt about the
concept, even stating that philanthropy is selfishness, that is, 'A is not-A.'
"The simple proposition 'A is
A' does not go beyond the socially accepted meaning of the term: it is limited,
and, therefore, infinite possibilities of the meaning of the term are excluded.
The proposition excludes all doubt and skepticism. However, in the proposition
'A is not-A' we can travel far beyond the limited and determined meaning of a
concept by placing it at the most extreme opposite. A is fully understood as A,
because A is scrutinized to the fullest degree, and all possible meanings of A
are exhaustively explored. This is precisely the meaning of Hegel's dictum that
'Truth is the whole.' By negating the very meaning of a concept, we are able to
move toward the apprehension of the whole. For both Zen and Hegel, the negative
method signifies that an affirmative concept contains within it the possibility
of a negative.
"We are surprised, at first,
to discover that the logic of the illogical in Zen is akin to Hegel's
dialectical method. But it is no surprise at all if we note that Hegel's
dialectical method is also the logic of life. The 'fun' of contradiction, or
'pretension' of the other, in the act of negating itself, is the comical
impersonation of which
Loewenberg speaks in describing Hegelian dialectic. 'The logic called
dialectical,' writes Loewenberg, 'is the logic of comedy par excellence. It is
the logic by which
ideas and beliefs are made to whip themselves, as it were, in
the process of exhibiting their internal contradictions.' It is the method
of the self-alienation of the Absolute in Hegel's philosophy. Even in his
legend, 'The Naked Boy,'
Eckhart
identifies the Naked Boy with God himself, 'who was having a bit of fun.' As
early as 1800, when Hegel wrote his
Fragment of a System, he knew that
the dialectical method was the logic of life, for he regarded life as the 'union
of union and nonunion.' Both Hegel and Zen thinkers assume the absolute
viewpoint to be the ground of unity between A and not-A, being and not-being.
The only difference is that the universal of universals in Hegel is the
Absolute, while in Zen it is Nothing, which is a sort of Absolute itself." [Kim
(1955),
pp.22-23. Accessed 18/07/2011. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and links added.]
So, and once again, Zen 'logicians' appear to be as
confused as Hegel (as well as many of
the latter's epigones and fans).
Kim
clearly failed to notice that if this approach to 'logic' were valid, there
would be no such thing as
the "unitive point of view, the only
method by which reality can be presented as it is". If it were correct to assert "A and not
A", then any method that attempted to show the world "as it is" must at the same
time show it as it isn't. [Otherwise, "A and not
A" can't be a guiding principle here.] If so, how might we disentangle these two
contradictory views of 'reality' and decide which was which, or which view
represents 'reality as it is' and which shows it as it isn't? As soon as we
decide that one of these two options is A (i.e., that one of these
options represents 'reality as it is'), we must also decide (and not decide!) that
not A
is correct (i.e., that one of these options represents 'reality as it isn't'),
as well as conclude that not A is also incorrect! Indeed, on that basis how might we decide
which is even the 'correct' method, for if the above claims are to be believed, the "unitary
method" would also (and wouldn't also!) be a "non-unitary method"!
Even worse, how might we decide what the correct interpretation of the above
passage is supposed to be? If Kim is correct, there must be at least two contradictory
readings of his words, or even two contradictory readings of those attributed to the Buddha! And how might they be
unscrambled, for goodness sake?
As Aristotle pointed out
(correctly!),
down that road all rational thought decays into irredeemable confusion.
Later in the above paper Kim commits a very common
mistake:
he attributes to Hegel a method that was actually developed by
Kant and
Fichte, the notorious 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis' triad.
[On
that, see
here.
Once again: the most comprehensive list of examples
of mystical systems that argue along similar lines to DM currently available at this site can be
accessed
here.]
5.However, Rees did add a few extra, all too brief comments about the "Totality", but most of them either relate
to the Epistemological Definition (discussed
later in this Essay), or the social and historical ramifications of DM-Holism (which,
once more, I largely ignore at this site). However, he added the following
remark in
an article that was published at more-or-less the same time as his book:
"Take the notion of totality, for instance,
vital to the Marxist method because it insistson the interconnectedness
of the social process and provides a guide for relating the various different
aspects of the struggle together." [Rees (1998c), p.173. Bold emphasis added.]
So, here we have another DM-"insistence"
-- and yet,
just two pages later, Rees added the following comment about revolutionary organisation:
"Building such an organisation is, therefore,
the forum and precondition for the development of Marxist theory which can in
Engels' words, not as a dogma, but as a guide to action." [Ibid., p.175.
Bold emphasis added.]
But, what is an "insistence" if not a
clear nod in the direction of dogmatism?
As seems reasonably clear, the above (additional) comments add little or nothing to our knowledge of the
"Totality" (as that term supposedly applies to the
non-social world).
6.Several other characterisations of the "Totality" -- or,
rather, several other extremely vague gestures at providing a 'sort-of-definition'
-- have been quoted
here.
See also
Appendix B.
7.
On this, see Rosen
(1982), Chapter Two. Rosen's arguments will be developed more fully in
Part
Two of this Essay.
8.
It is worth recalling that the (entirely reasonable)
caveat -- that evidence should be presented in support of each and every aspect
of DM -- isn't mine. Dialecticians
themselves tell us that that is an essential requirement if their theory
is to be prevented from lapsing into Idealism. [On that, see
here,
here,
here and
here.]
9.By now, it
should be reasonably clear that the "Totality" is none other than
Hegel's Absolute in drag -- and a rather poor disguise it is, too. In fact, it is even
lass impressive than
Clark Kent's.
Figure Sixteen:
Are Hegel's Absolute And The DM-"Totality" As
'Well-Disguised' As
Superman And Clark Kent?
10.Of course, this just scratches the surface of the 'problems' created by our
attempt to understand 'the nature of time' and what can be said to exist when.
For example, several of the questions about to be examined in the main body
of this Essay (albeit superficially) were first raised -- as far
as we know -- by
Augustine, in his Confessions [Book
XI, Sections 14:17-31:41; i.e., Augustine of Hippo (2004),
pp.230-45], although, some of them had been anticipated by
Stoic Philosophers.
[On that, see Sorabji (1983), pp.21-27; see also Suter (1989b). The general background can be found in Sorabji,
op cit. Cf.,
Note 14.]
Unfortunately,
as is the case with many of the Essays published at this site, I am forced to
employ a 'metaphysical mode of speech'
(i.e., the sort of language one finds in Augustine's work and the writings of the vast
majority of Traditional Philosophers on this and other topics), here. That doesn't imply I accept
any of it makes sense. In fact, it is only being
adopted in order to assist in its demise.
Sentences like: "The past does not exist", "The present does exist", or "The
past is no more" use phrases like "The past" and "The present"
almost as if
they were Proper Names,
referring expressions or labels that attach to or designate
specific time periods, which they aren't -- that is despite the syntactic role
they seem to occupy in some sentences (for example, as subject terms in
traditional grammar). But, words like "nothing" and "something" also appear to
play similar roles, but there is no way they are Proper Names or referring
expressions. [On that, see Essay Thirteen Part Three,
here.] If
phrases like "The past" and "The present" were Proper Names, or operated
like Proper Names/referring expressions, it would be possible for someone, somewhere, at some point,
to pick out their bearers
with either a demonstrative (like "this" or "that"), by
ostension, by means of identifying
descriptions (or even by an appeal to a combination of one or more of those
linguistic/extra-linguistic avenues) -- or maybe even by referring to some sort of baptismal or dubbing ceremony (with the word
"baptismal" being used here in its non-religious sense, of course!). But, none of
these is possible here. Their
role in discourse is far more complex.
[On this see
Hanna and Harrison (2004). However, the latter should be read in conjunction with
Baker and Hacker (2005), pp.227-49.]
The problem
is that if they are viewed as Proper Names (or as referring expressions), the
temptation becomes almost irresistible to think that what they name or refer to
must exist somewhere or somewhen -- this error is sometimes called "The
'Fido'-Fido Fallacy" or "The 'Fido'-Fido Principle":
"'Fido'-Fido principle, philosophy: Gilbert
Ryle's expression for the mistaken assumption that words function
as names and therefore must designate something. In the extreme case that the
typical dog name Fido stands for 'dogness'." [Quoted from
here; link added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Here is
Ryle's argument in full:
"Frege,
like Russell,
had inherited (directly, perhaps, from
Mill) the
traditional belief that to ask What does the expression 'E' mean? is to ask, To
what does 'E' stand in the relation in which 'Fido' stands to Fido? The
significance of any expression is the thing, process, person or entity of which
the expression is the proper name. This, to us, grotesque theory derives partly,
presumably, from the comfortable fact that proper names are visible or audible
things and are ordinarily attached in an indirect but familiar way to visible,
audible and tangible things like dogs, rivers, babies, battles and
constellations. This is then adopted as the model after which to describe the
significance of expressions which are not proper names, and the habit is formed
of treating the verb 'to signify' and the phrase 'to have a meaning' as
analogous relation-stating expressions. 'What that expression means' is then
construed as the description of some extra-linguistic correlate to the
expression, like the dog that answers to the name 'Fido.'...
"Now a very little reflection should satisfy us that the assimilation to proper
names of expressions that are not proper names breaks down from the start.
(Indeed the whole point of classing some expressions as proper names is to
distinguish them from the others.) No one ever asks What is the meaning of
'Robinson Crusoe'? much less Who is the meaning of 'Robinson Crusoe'? No one
ever confesses that he cannot understand or has misunderstood the name 'Charles
Dickens' or asks for it to be translated, defined, paraphrased or elucidated. We
do not expect dictionaries to tell us who is called by what names. We do not say
that the river Mississippi is so and so ex vi termini [by definition, or
by implication -- RL]. A man may be described as 'the person called "Robin
Hood",' but not as 'the meaning of "Robin Hood".' It would be absurd to say 'the
meaning of "Robin Hood" met the meaning of "Friar Tuck".' Indeed, to put it
generally, it is always nonsense to say of any thing, process or entity 'that is
a meaning.' Indeed, in certain contexts we are inclined not to call proper names
'words' at all. We do not complain that the dictionary omits a lot of English
words just because it omits the names of people, rivers, mountains and novels,
and if someone boasts of knowing two dozen words of Russian and gives the names
of that number of Russian towns, newspapers, films and generals, we think that
he is cheating. Does 'Nijni
Novgorod is in Russia' contain three, four or five English words?
"There are indeed some important parallels between our ways of using proper
names in sentences and our ways of using some, but not many sorts of other
expressions. 'Who knocked?' can be answered as well by 'Mr. Smith' as by 'the
landlord'; and in 'the noise was made by Fido,' 'the noise was made by the
neighbour's retriever' and 'the noise was made by him' the proper name, the
substantival phrase ['Mr Smith', or 'Fido' -- RL] and the pronoun play similar
grammatical roles. But this no more shows that substantival phrases and pronouns
are crypto-proper names than they show that proper names are crypto-pronouns or
crypto-substantival phrases.
"Two exceptions to the 'Fido'-Fido principle were conceded by its devotees.
(1)
Frege saw that the phrases 'the
evening star' and 'the morning star' do not have the same sense (Sinn),
even if they happen to apply to or denote (bedeuten) the same planet. An
astronomical ignoramus might understand the two phrases while wondering whether
they are mentions of two planets or of only one. The phrase 'the first American
pope' does not apply to anyone, but a person who says so shows thereby that he
understands the expression. This concession seems to have been thought to be
only a tiresome though necessary amendment to the 'Fido'-Fido principle. In fact
it demolishes it altogether. For it shows that even in the case of that
relatively small class of isolable expressions, other than proper names, which
are suited to function as the nominatives of certain seeded
subject-predicate
sentences, knowing what the expressions mean does not entail having met any
appropriate Fidos or even knowing that any such Fidos exist. The things
('entities'), if any, to which such expressions apply are not and are not parts
of what the expressions mean, any more than a nail is or is part of how a hammer
is used.
"(2) The traditional doctrine of terms had required (confusedly enough) the analysis
of proposition-expressing sentences into two, or with heart searchings, three or
more 'terms'; and these terms were (erroneously) supposed all to be correlated
with entities in the 'Fido'-Fido way. But sentences are not just lists like
'Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,' or even like 'Socrates, mortality.' For they tell
truths or falsehoods, which lists do not do. A sentence must include some
expressions which are not terms, i.e. 'syncategorematic
words' like 'is,' 'if,' 'not,' 'and,' 'all,' 'some,' 'a,' and so on. Such words
are not meaningless, though they are not names, as all
categorematic words were (erroneously) supposed to be. They are required for
the construction of sentences. (Sometimes special grammatical constructions
enable us to dispense with syncategorematic words.) Syncategorematic words were
accordingly seen to be in a certain way auxiliary, somewhat like rivets which
have no jobs unless there are girders to be riveted. I have not finished saying
anything if I merely utter the word 'if' or 'is.' They are syntactically
incomplete unless properly collocated with suitable expressions of other sorts.
In contrast with them it was erroneously assumed that categorematic words are
non-auxiliary or are syntactically complete without collocations with other
syncategorematic or categorematic expressions, as though I have finished saying
something when I say 'Fido,' 'he,' 'the first American pope' or 'jocular.'..." [Ryle
(1949), pp.226-28. (This links to a PDF.) Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the
original; links added.]
In relation
to the above, added these thoughts to Essay Twelve
Part One:
I
have discussed this topic at length in Essay Three
Part One. I distance myself,
however, from Ryle's declaration that Proper Names have no meaning, or, indeed,
that they might not even be words. On the one hand, Ryle was normally very
careful when it came to the complexities built into our use of language, on the
other he seems to have treated "meaning" (at least here) as a rather simple
term, when it isn't. In this I think
Ryle was likewise misled in this thinking by the very fallacy under discussion,
the 'Fido-Fido Fallacy', in that he appears to regard "meaning" as having only
one role to play, namely that of naming something! Nor is a dictionary an
arbiter of meaning, either! Having said that, his sharp criticism of the fallacy
is fully in line with the view presented at this site.
It could be
objected that it is surely possible to name things that not only don't exist,
but which have never existed -- for example, mythical and fabulous beasts of
yore, fictional characters, or the many 'gods' that litter the worlds religions, etc.,
etc.
Just because the past does not exist that doesn't mean it can't be
designated in some way.
That is
undeniable (indeed, it is a point Ryle himself made), but if the "The Past",
"The Present", and "The Future" were to be viewed in a similar light, it would only confirm the allegation advanced in this Essay:
at best, they resemble fictional labels
(i.e., they attach to 'subjects' that don't exist).
But, isn't
it possible to designate the present
with a demonstrative or by ostension? For example, can't a parent teach a child
what the present is by saying "This is the present", perhaps using a
pointing gesture?
In
connection with that it is important to note that an
earlier paragraph mentioned descriptions, not definitions.
That doesn't mean, of course, that ostensive definitions (of nameable 'objects')
can't be provided, only that the stage-setting for such linguistic rituals is rather complex.
Anyway, it is difficult to see how a 'definition' of "The Past, "The
Present" or "The Future" would be
possible without the automatic use of the present tense -- as in, for
example: "This is the past...". In cases like these,
identifying descriptions might perhaps gain some traction (even as definitions)
when used in conjunction with
pictures
and photographs, or even by means of suitable/appropriate stories, the point of which might be to
illustrate how things used to be, or even how they now are -- indeed, as one might teach a child, for example.
But if anyone tried to define the present by the use of the suggested sentence,
"This is the present", they would
still have to use the present tense in order to do so. In that case, what they
said would only be
comprehended by someone who already understoodwhat the present was
--
or, rather, who already understood how to use the present tense.
That would, of course, render this attempted 'definition' as circular, and as
useless, as this one: "A triangle is a plane shape that exhibits triangularity".
[On Ostensive Definitions, see
Baker and Hacker (2005),
pp.81-106.]
Evensupposing all of the
above, if anyone
were to take such
depictions/definitions literally (i.e., if they understood these stories, pictures or
photographs to be, or to designate, say, the past), they
would either be deluding themselves or they would have been misled in some way.
In such circumstances, they might
mistakenly
conclude that the past is a drawing, a set of black and white images on glossy
paper, or a series of fabulous (or even banal) tales. Either that, or they might entertain the idea that the past
currently exists somewhere
-- in the present(?) -- in a manner similar to the items they had just been shown, the tales they
had just been told or the
'definitions' they had just been given, all of which employ (directly or
indirectly) the present tense,
once more.
The use of any other tense in such
circumstances would, of course, be
self-defeating. For example, what sense could be made of: "The past was
this…"?
To be
sure, one can say things like: "This is how things were in the past", but even
then the present tense of the verb "to be" (namely "is") would still
have been used. The same can be said about the use of "This is how things will
be in the future."
[Other (well-known) problems confront
attempts to 'define' the past in similar ways, since such 'definitions' would
have to employ various forms of the present tense. (The
objection that the verb "to be" here is often tenseless will be
dealt with in
Note 14, below.)]
Admittedly, a sentence like the following, "This was how things were in the past",
doesn't use the present tense, but then it doesn't imply 'the past'
(still) exists, either.
It could be objected that the above responses
fail to deal adequately with our use of phrases like, "The present". It might still seem to some that that term operates as
a Proper Name of some sort, instead of a
definite description. But, what is it the Proper Name of?
Precisely what does it label? To what can anyone point, directly or indirectly, that is or might be the
referent of this term?
It
could be argued that the present is always with us as a sort of a-temporal, or
even as an omni-temporal, now. But, it seems this 'now' must be durationless, otherwise,
as
Augustine
pointed out, if it had any duration it would have its own temporal parts: a
before and an after, a later and an earlier. That would in turn imply that the
present was in fact part past, part future. And if that
were the case, an earlier question would once more force itself on us: Exactly what is this the Proper Name or label of?
Again, towhat
could anyone now point (directly or indirectly) that is, or might be, the referent of this term?
[I am not suggesting that all attempts to speak about the past are defective, only that
certain ways of talking about it not only can be, they are, misleading. Nor am I
denying that some uses of "The present" imply duration -- as in "The present
Queen of England is over ninety years old"
(if uttered before she passed away on the 8th of September 2022, of course!). But even that use of the term "The
present Queen of England" doesn't refer to anything in the way that a Proper
Name does, it is merely synonymous with "The current Queen of England",
and, one supposes(!), no
one imagines "The current" names anything.]
Be this as
it may, if anyone wants to adopt, or even defend the interpretation of "The present"
as a Proper Name (or as some other type of referring expression), they are welcome to
it, along with all the insoluble problems that will bring in its train. Anyway, the idea
that the past exists and can be named is susceptible to the objections raised against any and all metaphysical
theories highlighted in Essay Twelve
Part One (summarised
here and
here).
Finally, it
could be argued that terms like "The past", or "The future" are
definite descriptions. I have
no real objection to that
interpretation, since, just like fictional names and labels, definite descriptions
are often used to speak about non-existents -- such as "The Creator of the
universe", "The next President of the United States of America", or even "The
individual who succeeded in making DM entirely perspicuous".
11.There is more on this presently (no pun intended).
It should come as no surprise, therefore, to discover
that DM-theorists have never actually
revealed (in detail or with any clarity) what it means for all parts of the "Totality" to be "connected", let alone
"inter-connected". However, as we will see in Appendix B,
STD-theorist, Alexander Spirkin, did at least try to fill
in a few of these blanks. I
have said more about his attempt to shed some light in this dark and dismal area of DM in the
Commentsection of the same Appendix.
12.Not unless the word "correspond" were itself to be given a new meaning, perhaps making
it somewhat analogous to the connection between 'events' that relate to fictional characters and
events
correlated with
the 'same' (intentional) individuals in the 'real world' --, such as one might find in a historical novel, for instance. In that sense, of course, these characters and events
don't
actuallycorrespond with the individuals or events they seek to depict, otherwise,
of course, the said work wouldn't be fictional, it would be biographical!
It could be countered that in a novel about, for
instance, Trotsky, the name, "Trotsky", would correspond to the actual
individual Trotsky. And if, in that novel, "Trotsky", for example, was expelled
from the former USSR, that would
correspond to what really happened. But, that seemingly tidy picture just re-duplicates
the problem, for in this case both the individual and the events described no longer exist for
either of these to correspond with.
More importantly, if the aforementioned novel
is indeed a novel, it will depict, describe or feature many things Trotsky never
did or said -- otherwise, once more, it wouldn't be a work of fiction, it would bea
biography. So, if
that book were indeed a novel, it couldn't be
about Trotsky, but must be about 'Trotsky', a fictional character
with a typographically identical name, who typographically 'did' some of the 'same' things.
Indeed, if we now argue that Trotsky is
the individual who either did, or experienced, E1,
E2,
E3,...,
En
(where n is indefinitely large, and Ek
is a noun-, or verb-phrase (or -clause) expressing some event in this subject's life,
something he experienced, did, thought about, or which was true of him (etc.),
whether or not we know about them, or it --
Leibniz might have called such a set, "Trotsky's complete individual concept" -- and the Proper Name, "Trotsky",
referred to the human being who did, or experienced all these things), then this
fictional 'Trotsky' (logically) couldn'tbehim. That is because
the fictional 'Trotsky' did, or experienced, none of these things. Fictional characters can't
experience or do anything, they can only 'experience' or 'do' whatever the author decides for them. Not
only are they not autonomous agents, they aren't even agents.
"The nature of an individual
substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is
sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of
the subject to which this notion is attributed." [Leibniz, quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
"A notion that determines a certain
individual Adam mustcontain absolutely all his predicates, and it is
this complete notion that determines general considerations to the
individual.... So: I hold that every true proposition is
either immediate or mediate. An immediate proposition is one that is true by
itself, i.e., a proposition whose predicate is explicitly contained in its
subject; I call truths of this sort 'identical'. All other propositions are
mediate; a true proposition is mediate when its predicate is included virtually
in its subject, in such a way that analysis of the subject, or of both predicate
and subject, can ultimately reduce the proposition to an identical truth. That's
what Aristotle and the scholastics mean when they say 'the predicate is in the
subject'." [Leibniz to Arnauld, 1686, quoted from
here. See also
here.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
Does this mean we have to accept the idea that,
in the
above passage, "Adam" refers to an actual individual called "Adam", the fictional 'father' of us
all? Surely not. Maybe Leibniz was gullible enough to believe "Adam"
was a genuine Proper Name that designated a historical figure called Adam, the notorious character in the
first few chapters of The Book of Genesis, but I suspect few
reading this Essay will tend to agree with him.
It could be objected that no author of fiction puts
words in 'scare' quotes in the manner suggested above -- for example, who ever
uses 'Trotsky', or 'do', in a novel or story? Of course they don't. That is
plainly a
literary device I have used, specifically chosen to make a philosophical point about what the word
"Trotsky" is (supposedly) capable of referring to in fiction, and what such characters are
(supposedly) capable of doing.
12a.
Instead of looking at how we utilise the highly complex vocabulary normally associated with time
(in ordinary life), theorists
more often than not attempt to regale
us
with a few impromptu 'intuitions' about the 'real' meaning of phrases like "The past", "The
future" or "The present", augmented (or not, as the case may be) by the alleged implications of the TOR. Small wonder
then that they end up with 'paradoxical' and deeply puzzling results that
no one seems to understand. [On that, see
Note 13
and
Note 14.]
[TOR = Theory of Relativity.]
In relation to which theory we read (concerning an
analogy widely used to try to explain how gravity work in the TOR -- the
so-called "rubber sheet" or "trampoline" metaphor):
'The passage shown below comes from Isaacson's Chapter One.
"The general theory of relativity…can be described by using another thought
experiment. Picture what it would be like to roll a bowling ball onto the
two-dimensional surface of a trampoline. Then roll some billiard balls. They
move toward the bowling ball not because it exerts some mysterious attraction
but because of the way it curves the trampoline fabric. Now imagine this
happening in the four-dimensional fabric of space and time."
'We'd have to call that passage bafflegab. No one has the slightest idea what
Isaacson means when he refers to "the four-dimensional fabric of space and
time." We all can picture that trampoline -- but none of us knows how to imagine
that "four-dimensional fabric!" Nor does Isaacson give us the tools to do so, or
notice that he has failed.' [The above words were quoted from
here -- RL.]
"Somerby is complaining about a big problem here. But it's not Isaacson's fault.
Or even the fault of science writers in general. It's a defect in the universe
itself. As it turns out, explaining the 'fabric' of spacetime isn't hard. Yes,
it's four-dimensional. But all this means is that you define it using four
numbers. If you described me via my age, weight, height, and IQ, that would be a
'four-dimensional' representation of
Kevin Drum. It's not a big deal. Now
suppose you want to describe an event. You need to specify where it happened and
when it happened. Take, for example, the airplane crashing into World Trade
Centre 1. It happened at 40.71ş latitude, -74.01ş longitude, and 6,371
kilometres (relative to the centre of the earth) at 13:46:30 GMT on 11 September
2001 (relative to the common era calendar). As an event in spacetime it's
represented by an ordered 4-tuple.
(40.71, -74.01, 6371, 2001.09.46:30)....
"This is all pretty simple. You might not know the mathematics for dealing with
arrays of four numbers at a time, but it's well developed. And if you combine
that with a few other concepts -- like the idea that the speed of light is
always constant -- you'll eventually end up with the theory of gravitational
attraction that's called general relativity. Unfortunately, 'eventually' is a
long way away. I can teach you to add and subtract, and 'eventually' that will
lead you to the theories of financial derivatives that we lovingly called rocket
science when they were helping the economy implode in 2008. I can teach you the
colour wheel and eventually you might become the next
Rembrandt. I can teach you
to read and eventually you might tackle
Kant or
Wittgenstein.
"So what's a science writer to do? General relativity is a set of mathematical
equations. Plug in the numbers and it turns out to predict the way gravity works
with astonishing precision. But can someone who doesn't understand the math
picture in their head what those equations 'mean'? Well, what does a Rembrandt
mean to a blind person? What do derivatives mean to someone who doesn't
understand the
Black-Scholes model? What does Kant mean
to someone who's never studied philosophy? You can do your best to find some
kind of analogy that kinda sorta (sic) gets these ideas across, but none of them
will ever be simultaneously comprehensible and truly accurate to a layman.
"I
said earlier that this was a defect in the universe. Here's the defect: the
universe is hard! Humans have a hard time understanding it if they aren't
willing to study diligently. (And sometimes even if they are.) There's really no
way around this. In the case of science, there's no law that says the universe
has to work in ways that the overclocked ape homo sapiens can make
intuitive or visual sense of. You can read an article in
Discover and get
a glimpse. A really talented writer can give you a slightly better glimpse. If
you get a PhD in physics you'll get an even better glimpse. You'll start to
grasp simultaneity,
light cones,
stress-energy tensors,
geodesics,
world lines,
Riemannian geometries, and
frame dragging. But will you ever truly
understand? Will you ever truly be able to picture it? Probably not. You might
eventually be able to manipulate the algebra deftly, but at a visceral level our
brains evolved to understand spear throwing and baby raising, not differential
equations or tensor analysis. Welcome to the universe...." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 22/08/2018. Links added;
several paragraphs merged. Italic emphasis in the original; spelling modified to agree
with UK English; one abbreviation expanded. On this, see also
Note 15. (By
the way, the
second half of this article is well
worth reading, too.)]
Except for the odd idea that the universe itself is "hard", the above isn't a
million miles removed from the approach adopted at this site.
Readers might also like to check out a brief discussion I had recently (in the
comment section over at YouTube) concerning the use of the word "fabric" in
relation to space/spacetime. I have reproduced some of it
here.
13.Ordinarily, we have no difficulty using the (ordinary) vocabulary of time. Indeed, we
typically manage to do so on a daily basis (otherwise we'd not survive for long) --, using differently tensed verbs,
augmented by temporal-,
and location-specific
adjectives,
adverbs and
prepositions.
However,
certain
nominalisations (like "Time", "Past",
"Future", or even, "Present" --, and the latter are typically
employed in relation to the so-called "A-series"
in the Philosophy of Time) have only succeeded in motivating the creation of spurious problems
connected with something called "The nature of time", now irreversibly
reified into existence by a
determination to
view words like these as referring expressions.
It is no accident, therefore, that the "A-series"
and the "B-series" were
both invented by
an Idealist, the neo-Hegelian Philosopher,
John
McTaggart.
A classic statement of the approach to the
analysis of pseudo-problems like these (which has also been adopted
at this site) can be found
in the opening sections of Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown Books and his
Philosophical Investigations ( i.e., Wittgenstein (1969, 1958/2009);
this links to a PDF). On this topic in
general, cf., Cook (1979), Read (2002, 2003,
2007),
Rundle (2009), Suter (1989), pp.157-70, and Westphal (1996, 2002). See also, Anscombe (1950).
14. Notice that even the use of this locution (i.e., "The
past isno
longer in the past, but the present") requires the
employment
of the present tense, which, if it were also to be interpreted just as crudely,
would appear to suggest that
the past is actually part of the present, only remarkably well hidden!
That interpretation might seem (to
some) to resemble the following points made by Augustine:
"If future and past events
exist I want to know where they are. If I have not the strength to discover the
answer, at least I know that wherever they are, they are not there as future or
past, but as present. For if there also they are future, they
will not be there. If there also they are past, they are no longer there.
Therefore, wherever they are,
whatever they are, they do not exist except in the present.... What is by now evident
and clear is that neither the future nor the past exist, and it is inexact
language to speak of three times -- past, present and future." [Augustine (2004),
Book XI, Sections 18:23, 20:26), pp.233, 235. The online translation is somewhat different
from the published version. Paragraphs merged.]
However, Augustine posed this 'problem' epistemologically and psychologistically, whereas I would
rather focus
the discussion of time on how we
ordinarily use tensed verbs alongside other words drawn from our temporal (or even
our general) vocabulary, refusing to theorise or advance an
'ontology' of any
sort.
It could be objected that several of the verbs employed
in these contexts are tenseless,
which would mean that their use carries no implication that the past somehow
still exists in the present. But, even if that were
the case
(and in such contexts the verbs themselves can't tell us what connotations
they carry),
it would be even less clear what a tenseless depiction of the past
actually amounted to. If anything, it would seem to imply the past and the
future are always there, always exist! [I will say more about that in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
Anyway, how would such a re-interpretation
of these verbs work with a sentence like the following: "This is the past"?
That use of the verb "to be" doesn't
even look
remotely tenseless.
Of course, as we saw in Essay Three
Part One, in
predicative
sentences, where the word "is" functions as a mere
copula, it can be paraphrased away, even if
that often results in some expressive awkwardness. So:
[Where "F" stands for a suitable noun or verb phrase
-- although, one suspects that several (but not insurmountable) 'problems' connected with 'use
and mention' might nevertheless emerge, here.]
While P2 still apparently uses the present
tense, it doesn't have the same untoward implications.
On the other hand, if, according to
DL, the
"is" in P1 is really an
"is" of identity, then the above moves
would no longer be available.
P3: The past is identical
with F.
P4:
The past = F.
P3 and P4 still seem to be riveted to the
present!
I won't speculate about how DL-fans might handle this
awkward turn-of-events. They dropped themselves in this philosophical
quagmire
the moment they began listening to the 'logical'
advice doled out by that mystic and theoretical incompetent,
Hegel.
It is important to add that the views
expressed here aren't in any way connected with the metaphysical doctrine that
currently goes under the name "Presentism". Indeed,
my views favour, promote or express no philosophical theory whatsoever. There is in fact no
single way to depict
time. The vernacular allows us to speak about it in countless ways.
So, we often say things like the following:
"Time to go", "Time flies when you're enjoying
yourself", "One at a time, please!", "What time do you call this?", "We had a
great time on the picket line today!", "Procrastination
is the thief of time", "I've told you several times, tidy
your bedroom!", "Five times four is twenty",
"Time is money",
"We'll not see times like these again any day soon", "I have little time for
this", "There is no time to lose -- print the leaflets this morning!",
"The referee blew for time", "The pub landlord called time", "A good time was
had by all!", "There is still enough time to call your mother", "We ran out of
time, so we went home", "Next time, don't forget to knock!", "It's long past
time management listened to the union", "We're all living on borrowed time", "High time you listened to your
lawyer's advice", "This delay is costing too much time", "You need to spend
more time with your kids", "Where has all the time gone...?", "The new train
service has cut the time
taken for each
journey by a half", "You're wasting your time arguing with a fascist!", "Time
and tide wait for no man", "The boss says I have to make up the
lost time next week", "I have no time for fools like this!", "She wouldn't even
give you the time of day!", "Time's up!", "Any time
you're ready...", "The reinforcements arrived just in time", "There was a time
when I could have jumped that fence", "Only time will tell...", "You have
too much time on your hands", "Will this new route save much time?", "She's just
killing time...", "From time to time you will hear a bell ring...", "How much
free time does the new job offer you?", "Look, find time to spend with your
relatives!", "There's plenty of time so slow down!", "This job will take far
less time than the union agreed", "In this prison you will do hard time", "Once upon a time...",
"I'm sorry. I lost all track of time!", etc., etc.
[Of
course, I have limited myself to the use of the words, "time" and "times", here,
and have ignored other expressions we have in the vernacular that allow us to say similar
things -- such as "I have repeatedly told you to tidy your room!". "When you're
ready...", "In future, don't forget to knock!", as well as cognates of "time"
like "timing", "timely" and "timer" used in phrases and sentences like, "Nice
timing...", "Your engine timing needs some adjustment", "That was a timely
reminder for you to take some exercise", "The egg timer needs a new battery",
"Hey, old timer! How you doing?", etc. Nor have I included compound
words that use "time", such as "ragtime", "bedtime", "timeserver", "timetable",
"lifetime" and "timeless". (See
here for the etymology of "time".)]
Who can say where the road goes?
Where the day flows? Only time
And who can say if your love grows
As your heart chose? Only time
Who can say why your heart sighs
As your love flies? Only time
And who can say why your heart cries
When your love lies? Only time
Who can say when the roads meet?
That love might be in your heart?
And who can say when the day sleeps
If the night keeps all your heart?
Night keeps all your heart
Who can say if your love grows
As your heart chose? Only time
And who can say where the road goes?
Where the day flows? Only time
Who knows? Only time
Who knows? Only time
Was Enya singing about the same thing that
physicists study, or even philosophers?
Such a wide range of uses undermines the
idea that the word "time" has a 'real meaning', or even one set meaning. Indeed, speculation that there
is only one 'real meaning' of words associated
with the language of time,
the presumed referents of which are what philosophers or scientists supposedly study (or intend to study) amounts
to the
imposition
of yet another a priori,
dogmatic scheme on both language and 'reality', something DM-theorists at least affect to
disavow.
Of course, if there were something called 'the real meaning of
"time"' that philosophers and scientists hope to investigate/explain, they would in
fact be studying 'time', not time. That in turn would mean that what mightappear to be
'philosophical' or 'scientific problems' associated with
time, as opposed to those supposedly associated with 'time', won't have been
addressed.
Finally, these remarks shouldn't be taken to mean I
am criticising scientists who focus on time (or even on spacetime), or those who employ
temporal variables (etc.) to that end. The point is that whatever it is they are
studying has zero to do with "time" as we use that word in the ways mentioned
above.
[I will endeavour to say more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two (when
it is published). On this, see also
here
and Note 15.]
15.The
dis-analogy between space and time will be analysed
in more detail in
Essay Thirteen Part Two (when it is published). The similarly misleading analogy drawn between time and the structure of
the
Real Numbers
has already been
addressed,
here. There is an excellent discussion of
attempts to reify space and time -- simply because it is possible to represent both
by a combination of Real Numbers and a handful of
orthogonal axes (in Mathematics and
Physics, for instance) --, in Swartz (1991), pp.145-224.
[See also a passage
quoted earlier. I hasten to add that I
don't agree with everything Professor Swartz has to say! On
this, see also
Video Six, Note 12a
and Rundle (2009). The latter book has been severely criticised by
several reviewers, and some of the points they made seem entirely warranted (among
which was the accusation that what Rundle was trying to say is often completely obscure!).
Having said that, there is much in the book that was also unfairly criticised by the
said reviewers. I will say more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
However, the (mathematical) source of all these 'problems'
was (inadvertently) exposed by the following video:
Video Eight: Conjuring A New Dimension Out Of Thin Air
17.In order to
prevent any possible misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that
the Ideal nature of the past is neither being asserted nor
denied in this Essay, nor at this site. That is because both alternatives are metaphysical
and, as such, would be
non-sensicalandincoherent. The use of
'propositions' expressing either option (i.e., the
assertion, or even the denial, of the Ideal nature of time) result
from the systematic misconstrual of ordinary forms of speech. Such
an approach simply assumes that language alone is capable of revealing
fundamental truths about 'reality', when it turns out that
any indicative sentences employed to that end turn out to be incapable of being
either empirically-true or empirically-false. As such they can't
be used to picture or represent the world in any way, true or false. [Again,
on that, see Essay Twelve
Part One.
I have summarised the core of that argument,
here, and briefly
later
in this Essay.]
However, what is being
maintained is that DM-theorists themselves can't consistently deny that the past is
Ideal given their commitment to the CTT, coupled with their claim what
they have to say about it is 'objective'.
[Exactly why that is so will be postponed until the
CTT has itself been dealt with (alongside other classical 'definitions' of
truth), in Essay Ten Part Two.]
Incidentally,
a denial that statements about the
past are 'objective' doesn't imply they are false or even 'subjective'.
It amounts to a rejection of the metaphysical use of terms like "objective" and
"subjective", in such contexts. [I have also said more about that
and 'objectivity' in general
in Essay Thirteen
Part One. ]
It is also worth pointing out that the argument
developed in this Essay has nothing whatsoever to do with Postmodernism [henceforth, PM] and
the 'deconstruction of historical
truth'. The approach adopted here refuses to deny there are historical truths,
nor does it question the actual, verifiable occurrence of events in the past. Again, what is being
questioned is the Metaphysical-Realist/Idealist slant imposed on this entire
topic by Traditional Theorists.
However, a relatively recent attempt to expose the misguided
nature of PM, advanced by a handful of revolutionaries, was itself far
from convincing. For example, the views in this regard expressed by the late
Chris Harman [Harman (1998)] openly depend on
Richard Evans's
"Holocaust Argument" [HA], which was itself aimed at refuting PM-theories
of history. Hence, it was argued that any attempt to deny the objectivity of the
past would be tantamount to denying the Holocaust! But, Harman's reliance on
Evans's book was ill-advised on philosophical grounds alone, if for no other
reason. While Evans was rightly critical of any account of the past that falls
short of the highest academic or scientific standards, he nevertheless seemed
quite happy to base his philosophical objections
to PM on the most superficial refutation available to him -- i.e., the HA
itself. As far as could be determined, the only
other relevant philosophical argument he deployed was borrowed from Paul Boghossian's review of the infamous
and controversial "Sokal Hoax"
(of the 1990s, which will be examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two). Furthermore, Boghossian's
'demolition' was itself a rehash of the hackneyed "self-refutation"
argument (also to be examined in that Essay).
[Cf., Boghossian (1996), re-worked in Boghossian
(1998), but in more detail in Boghossian (2006). Cf., Evans (1997), pp.220-21.
On this, see the detailed and extended response to Boghossian and the above
'hoax', alongside others who have tried to defend Sokal, published
here.]
Now, whatever weaknesses the entire set of
PM-theories of history are supposed to have, they aren't susceptible to the
clichéd,
superficial and often ill-conceived criticisms regularly levelled at them by
revolutionaries (whether or not they are supported by references to Lenin's
philosophically-challenged and monumental waste of ink and paper, MEC -- again, I say that as a Leninist!).
[MEC = Materialism And
Empirio-Criticism; i.e., Lenin (1972),
examined in detail in Essay ThirteenPart One.]
On the other hand,
Alex Callinicos has published at least
three extended criticisms of PM -- for example, Callinicos
(1989, 1995, 1998). [Several of the issues Callinicos raises will be
analysed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Callinicos's
(more relevant) objections
to PM, and to something he calls "textualism", were aired in
Callinicos (1998), which are
themselves substantively more-or-less the same as those he advanced in
Callinicos (1987), pp.126-28,
and
which he claims must be integral to any valid criticism of PM-theories of history. According to Callinicos,
"textualism" involves an acceptance of the claim
that there is "nothing outside the text" (henceforth,
NOTT), against which he
argues that while it is trivially true that all representations of things in the
world are mediated by language, it doesn't follow that they are "constituted by
language". Unfortunately, Callinicos forgot to explain what he meant by
that term. What would it be for something to be "constituted by
language"? As should seem obvious, reasonably clear answer to that
question would be needed before it became clear what was being ruled in or even ruled out.
However, the problem here is that it looks like we might have to do one of both
of those without using any language! Otherwise, we wouldn't know what language was
operating on, or even "constituting", independently of a use of language
to do just that!
Of course, Callinicos might have had in mind the idea
that objects and processes in 'reality' are 'pre-linguistic', or
even 'extra-linguistic'. If so, he will find it difficult to say what
that amounts to without yet another use of language.
It could be argued that that is precisely the
point. While our representation of the world has to be linguistic
(by-and-large), or even mediated by language, that trivial fact surely has no effect or bearing on the nature
of the objects and processes represented, which surely exist independently of language.
Or so it might be maintained...
However, quite apart from the fact
that eventhat point has to be made linguistically, it amounts to little
more than a flat rejection of NOTT. It certainly doesn't show that PM is
false or invalid (in this respect). Plainly, that isbecause it
begs the question.
In order to show that PM is misconceived from
beginning to end it will require the use of conceptual tools considerably more powerful and
reliable than those that have been imported from
the same ideologically-compromised philosophical tradition(but more
specifically, from French
'Philosophy')
that gave rise to PM in
the first place. With respect to PM, however, some might still think that conceptual
resources drawn from
Traditional Thought must be part of any attempt to
construct a
superior
philosophical 'theory' that stood some chance of displacing/refuting
PM. But, there is no
way that
non-sensical
and incoherent theories (like PM) can be refuted by the construction of yet more of the same.
Clearly, in order to refute a theory (i.e., show it is false), a critic would
have to know what would make that theory true, and hence what would make it
false. But that can't be achieved by the construction of yet another
non-sensical theory, let alone one that is incoherent. But philosophical theories (like
PM) can be neither true
nor false (since they are
all non-sensical and incoherent), hence
they can't be shown to be false (and so can't be refuted). In that case, an entirely different approach is
required.
One
such will be aired in a later Essay, but the line it will take was hinted at
earlier.
Nevertheless, Callinicos advanced three
counter-arguments aimed at showing
that
NOTT-type theories are
completely misguided:
(1) Human beings gain information
about the world by their physical interaction with it;
[Earlier,
we saw Cornforth make a similar point -- indeed, as did Lenin, albeit
much more crudely.]
(2)
Discourse isn't autonomous; it is a social phenomenon integrated into other aspects of human interaction with
the world and with one another;
(3) Human
beings do not automatically and uncritically accept the deliverances of language they sort them into different categories using a range of
methods, criteria and
tests that help
determine which are the "most
accurate" depictions of the world and which aren't. Historians, for example, wouldn't check
sources, archaeological data, and artefacts (etc.) if texts were hermetically
sealed against reality in the way that NOTT-type theories seem to suggest. [Callinicos (1998), p.178.]
It could even be argued that one or more of the above points
might equally well be directed at many of the criticisms of
DM (and not just PM) advanced at this site.
However, that, too, would be a
mistake.
Callinicos himself acknowledged that Item (1) above
allows for the fact that "information [has to be] articulated linguistically" to
make it accessible, but he failed to notice that such a concession actually undermines his
overall argument.
I hasten to add, however,
that the validity
of that response itself depends on
what Callinicos meant by "information". If he meant "the content of an
empirical proposition" (i.e., a use of
words that
could lead to a given proposition (possibly) being declared true or declared false), then (1) wouldn't count against any of the Essays
published at this site. On the other hand, if he meant "pre-linguistic data", his point would be
impossible to assess until that phrase itself had been explained.
Exactly what "pre-linguistic data" amounts to I haven't a clue, and I suspect Callinicos hasn't either.
[The phrase "pre-linguistic data" is, of course,
mine, not Callinicos's. Either way, it appears to be a faint echo of the 'myth
of the given' successfully criticised a generation or so ago by
Wilfred Sellars. However, there are ways of understanding the
contentious phrase "pre-linguistic data" that undermine the Marxist
conception
of the origin and nature of language (as a social
product), a topic which will be discussed at greater length in Essays Twelve
Part One
and Thirteen
Part Three.]
Finally, (1) appears to be about as "trivially true"
as the claim that knowledge is mediated by language.
[On this
topic in general, see Hacker (1987).]
Item (2) is unexceptionable and is
fully consistent with ideas promoted at this site. Having said that, if
(2) were to be interpreted in a way that made it consistent with, or dependent
on, the above
reference to
"pre-linguistic data", that would actually render it inimical to
HM, not just PM. That is because it
would in effect represent a serious challenge to the idea that language is a social
product, which is, of course, integral to HM. [Again, why that is so has been
covered in Essays Twelve
Part One
and Thirteen
Part Three.]
Since Callinicos neglected to say what he meant by (2) it isn't easy to say much
more about it.
Finally,
Item (3) isn't incompatible with anything
advanced at this site, either. However, Callinicos might like to reflect on the
nature of the methods and criteria he says we employ in order to correct or even modify our use
of language. If they are themselves socially-, or
linguistically-conditioned, we are back to square one. But, if they
aren't, it is
difficult to see how social beings like us could ever have invented, let
alone learnt how to use them.
17a. Why that is so will be put to
one side for now.
18.
Onsurfaces,
see Stroll (1988), and
Varzi (2023); on shapes, see Bennett (2012). Parts and Wholes will be considered in more detail in the
second half of this Essay.
19.
N rayswere 'discovered' by
René Blondlot
at the turn of the previous century. Popular accounts of the rise and fall of
this formerly 'objective entity' can be found in Dewdney (1997) and Friedlander
(1998). For a much broader, wide-ranging but still popular study of similar scientific
oddities, see
Gratzer (2000). Cf., also Gardner (1957, 1989, 2000), Grant (2006, 2007, 2009), and Shermer (1997).
Details of the mysterious powers of the echeneis fish
can be found
here. The ('objective') existence of that fantastical
beast was accepted by philosophers and scientists for many centuries, and well into the
post-Renaissance era, too. On that, see Easlea (1980).
The,
shall we say,
'darker' side of science -- wherefraud,
deception
and regularly occurring
hoaxes are often
downplayed on what is in effect a
Whiggish,
post hoc
sort of basis (which has obviously been ed by a
desire to re-write the history of science along more
'acceptable'/'positive' lines), compounded by
the active
suppression and censorship
of novel/rival hypotheses and theories --, and where such 'negative aspects'
of science
have been greatly amplified by
the relentless search for profit and the endless wars this helps create.
Even though issues
like this are only of tangential relevance to the aims of this Essay, DM-fans
themselves can't afford to ignore those
that have been exposed by researchers working in the History
and Sociology of
Science for fear that fraudulent or class-compromised 'objects' and
'processes' might surreptitiously sneak into the "Totality", which will only have to be
unceremoniously evicted at a later stage (always assuming they are even noticed), as we saw was the case with the
Piltdown Hoax, for example -- but more
specifically with those detailed below.
On
social aspects of science -- including issues related to fraud, error and (enforced) 'revision'
-- see the following: Angell (2005), Barnes (1974, 1982, 1985, 1990), Barnes and Bloor (1982),
Barnes, Biagioli (1993), Bloor and Henry (1996), Bloor (1991),
Boettoet al (2020), Broad and Wade
(1982), Collins (1975, 1992, 1994, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2004), Collins and Pinch
(1998, 2002), Conner (2005), Cooter (1984), Crewdson (2003), Desmond (1989),
Desmond and Moore (1992), Fara (2009), Feyerabend (1975, 1978, 1987, 1991, 1993,
2011), Forman (1971), Fritze (2009), Galison (1987, 2003), Geison (1995), Gieryn
(1999), Golinski (1992, 1998), Goldacre (2012), Goliszek (2003), Gooding (1990),
Gooding and Pinch (1989), Goodstein (2010), Grant (2006, 2007, 2009), Greenberg
(2001, 2007), Judson (2004), Kohn (1986), Latour (1987, 1988), Latour and
Woolgar (1986), Lenoir (1997), LeVay (2008), Livio (2013), Longino (1990),
MacKenzie (1981, 1993), Macy (2021), Newton (1977), Park (2000), Pickering (1984, 1995),
Porter (1995), Principe (1998), Redondi (1987), Restivo (1983, 1992), Ritchie
(2020), Rudwick (1985), Shapin (1979a, 1979b, 1981, 1982, 1994, 1996), Shapin
and Schaffer (1985), Waller (2002, 2004), Wallis (1979), and Youngson (1998.
[Several more examples of fraud in science have been listed
here. See also the TV Mini Series,
Dopesick.]
For the psychological
factors underlying the above, see Travis and Aronson
(2008). [See also
here and
here.]
On the weaknesses of the 'peer review' system, coupled with its failure to find, or
even prevent, fraud
(etc.), see Judson (2004), pp.244-86. Cf., also
Broad and Wade (1982), as well as
here and
here.
It is worth noting at this point that there has been an effective defence of
Robert Millikan against several
of the
fraud accusations that have been
levelled against him in Goodstein (2010). [See also,
here.] However, Goodstein also rejects -- without explanation
-- similar allegations others
have levelled against
Ptolemy,
Galileo,
Newton,
Dalton
and
Mendel
(p.44). Plainly, this isn't the place to enter into this complex and
many-layered topic (even
though DM-fans will have to do this, or, once again risk populating their "Totality" with what
could very well turn out to be fraudulent and/or bogus 'objects' and 'processes').
[On Ptolemy, see
here,
here and
here (unfortunately, the last of these
links leads to a page that isn't at all easy to read!). Cf., also Thurston (2002), and Rawlins (2003).]
Update September 2012: Also worth checking out is a long and detailed
Guardian
article that focuses on recent revelations concerning widespread fraud uncovered in
recent psychological research,
most of which had successfully passed the peer review
system!
And here are
the conclusions of a June 2009 on-line report concerning fraud in
science:
"Science Fraud
"As scientists, we like to think that
science is a bastion of virtue, untouched by science fraud. The
perception is that, other than
junk science,
science should be beyond reproach, unsullied by lies and propaganda.
Results should always be regarded as
valid
and completely
unbiased.
Unfortunately, human nature dictates that scientists are human and
are always going to be prone to bias and
error.
Most such mistakes are subconscious, and a result of looking too
hard for patterns that are not there. Unfortunately, there are a number of more sinister cases, where scientists
deliberately
fabricated results,
usually for personal fame. With the advent of corporate and politically funded
research grants, poor results are becoming more dictated by policy than by
scientific infallibility.
"Some
of the More Common Types of Science Fraud
"There are many types of science fraud, from minor manipulation of results or
incorrect causal connections to full-blown
fabrication
of results and
plagiarism
of the work of others.
There have been cases of researchers stealing the work of their students to
obtain all of the credit and kudos. There is a well-documented rumour of a scientific referee delaying the work of
a rival, to ensure that he received the acclaim and a Nobel award. These
allegations are often difficult to prove, as institutions often cover them up
and try to sweep science fraud under the carpet. Citations are one area of the
scientific
process
that is coming under increased
pressure, especially with the easy availability of information on the internet. A
citation,
or reference, is supposed to credit past research that influenced the current
research. Now, a
bibliography and list of works cited often becomes a
list to impress, readers assuming that the longer the list, the better the
paper....
"For those who remember, this South Korean announced, to a fanfare, that he had
successfully cloned a dog, and also had some success in human cloning. This
research was published, passed the tests and then he was subsequently suspected
of fraud and ethical violations. He withdrew the paper and, as yet, there is no
consensus as to whether the fraud was deliberate or the result of a badly
written paper.
"This is probably one of the most famous science frauds of all time, which
persisted for many years. A fossilized skull, apparently of the 'missing link'
between apes and humans, was discovered in a quarry in Piltdown, Sussex,
England. The find was taken to a distinguished palaeontologist,
Arthur Smith
Woodward, head of the Geological Department at the British Museum. He declared the find authentic, but almost straight away, questions were asked,
and it gradually came to light that it was made up from bones of at least 3
hominid species, including the jawbone of an Orang-utan with filed down teeth.
Poor Woodward was the victim in this fraud, and his otherwise notable career
became forgotten, his name forever linked with the fraud. The perpetrators
remain unknown, although the discoverer,
Charles Dawson
is suspected as an
attempt to find fame and fortune.
"Institutional Problem
"Institutions are often reluctant to discipline wrongdoers, ignoring it, quietly
shifting the fraudster to another department or even disciplining the wrongdoer.
Science has a problem that people are reluctant to risk losing their careers to
report
science fraud.
The problem is that it is difficult for
reviewers
to isolate flawed results without repeating the experiment themselves...."
[Quoted from
here,
accessed 28/08/2014. Several paragraphs merged; spelling modified
to conform with UK English. Four links added; bold emphases in the original.]
Although the above article in the end defends the integrity and efficacy of the "peer review
system", other reports (referenced earlier) paint an entirely different picture.
Indeed, here is what The Guardian also had to say about that particular system:
"Accusations of fraud spur
a revolution in scientific publishing
"Three and a half centuries
after the first journal was published, post-publication peer
review is shaking up the old system. Scientific publishing may be on the
brink of a revolution fought, in part,
within the
chemistry
blogosphere. In the past few months it
has been the scene of debate about
whether the scientific publishing
practices initiated by members of the
Royal Society almost 350 years ago are
still fit for purpose. In 1665, when the
first scientific journal rolled off the
presses, it was the cutting edge of
science communication. The driving force
for
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society
(as it is still known) was the members'
desire to share their findings while
being assured that no one could
fraudulently claim credit for their
work.
"To
ensure quality, all articles underwent
peer review -- a process that is still
used by the thousands of journals that
fill academic libraries today. The
process is simple: authors submit their
findings to a journal and editors send
them out to be checked by the authors'
scientific peers. If those peers deem
the science to be valid then the journal
publishes the paper. But now
a system that was designed to share
knowledge and stop scientific fraud may
be suffering from the very same problems
that the pioneering publishers at the
Royal Society were trying to overcome,
namely fraud and poor communication. By
some estimates between
1% and 2% of papers now contain
fabricated data
and many more
are just plain wrong.
If papers have flaws then these might
get discussed in tea rooms and
conferences, but without an organised
way of communicating these
conversations, the wider world remains
ignorant of problems.
"There
have been murmurs in scientific circles
about these flaws in the publication
system for some time. But the issue blew
up earlier this year when bloggers
started reporting examples of suspicious
practices in otherwise reputable
journals. At first it was
just a report
of a throwaway comment accidentally left
in a paper's annex:
'Emma, please insert NMR data here!
where are they? and for this
compound, just make up an elemental
analysis....' Some
interpreted this as an academic inciting
his student to commit fraud. Or maybe it
was just an instruction to carry out a
particular experiment. It was certainly
sloppy practice by all concerned,
including the editors, peer reviewers
and co-authors, all of whom should have
spotted the errant sentence. But it is
not damning evidence of anything worse
than this.
"Ultimately the bloggers' actions were
vindicated, to the extent that all the
suspect papers have now been withdrawn
and investigations into scientific fraud
are under way. Nevertheless the debate
was largely confined to the blogosphere
-- until a few weeks ago when one of the
journals responsible for publishing the
supposedly photoshopped data, ACS Nano,
waded in with a highly critical
editorial aimed squarely at bloggers.
It was a naive attempt to squeeze the
social media genie back into the bottle
while simultaneously trying to curtail
free speech. The
article by the journal's editorial board
included 'instructions' on how suspected
fraud should be dealt with: 'When
plagiarism or data manipulation is
suspected, accusations should be
reported directly to the journal....'
"Then
they criticised the use of pseudonyms by
bloggers and commenters: 'We
strongly suggest that such comments
be made without the cloak of
anonymity....' This
seemed ironic since a central tenet of
the peer review process is the anonymity
of the reviewer, the point being that a
reviewer can write what they truly think
of a paper without fear of making
enemies or losing friends. Why then
should those who critique the paper
after publication not have the same
privilege? Finally
ACS Nano's editorial board threw some
crumbs to the bloggers:
'After we have made our decision,
all are welcome to comment on it in
any blog, even if they have
different opinions; this is their
privilege.' I
thought free speech was a right.
Of
course bloggers
responded angrily to the editorial.
But the spat did serve to highlight the
need for an open and fair mechanism for
recording and collating discussion of
scientific results. After all, handling
cases of suspected fraud on a handful of
blogs and Twitter threads is hardly
ideal,
and the old system of simply removing
suspect papers isn't particularly
transparent.
"This is
where the revolutionary part comes in.
Spearheaded by
PubPeer, there
is now a site that allows anyone to
comment on any publications. This may
not seem like much in an age where
comment threads at the foot of news
articles are commonplace. However, all
but a few scientific publishers have
steadfastly resisted following suit.
PubPeer, which is becoming the
Reddit
of the science world, is attempting to
make post-publication commenting the
norm. It may
still be small fry, but bigger fish have
taken notice, most notably
PubMed, an
enormous and well used database of
medicine-related articles. When Pubmed,
last week, added a
commenting facility
to its database it gave organised
post-publication peer review a huge
boost. Given this facility to openly
discuss scientific papers, we could be
in for a brave new world where
scientists are no longer judged on the
content of their papers but also on the
comment threads that follow.
Scientists had better grow thick skins,
quickly." [The
Guardian, 08/11/2013, accessed
28/08/2014. Several paragraphs merged; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. One link added; bold emphasis
in the original.]
On the widespread fallibility of science, see
here, as well
as Appendix A. Indeed,
there is now a site called Retraction Watch
where such mistakes and errors can be, and are, corrected or withdrawn. [Anyone
still holding on to a rosy view of science should check that site out, where they face a rude awakening.]
Can fans of the DM-"Totality"
afford to ignore any of this? Maybe they need their own 'Dialectical Retraction Watch'.
Add to the
above
the following documentary:
Video Nine: Fraud In
Science
Update May 2023: I have just heard
about the complex fraud perpetrated by
Jan Hendrik Schön,
whose work not only passed the peer review system countless times, he
very nearly
conned his way into winning a Nobel Prize! The full story is told in these
three videos:
1,
2, 3. See also Samuel (2009).
Then there is
Elizabeth Holmes and the Theranos scandal. In the early 2000s
Holmes built a $9 billion (Ł6.5 billion) medical technology company, conning investors and
fellow technologists for several years over what was supposedly a
revolutionary new, automated method for diagnosing a range of diseases from tiny
drops of blood (on this, see Carreyrou (2023):
Video Ten: Was This Process Ever
A Genuine Part Of The "Totality",
Or Simply A Fraudulent
Interloper?
Not to mention the story of disgraced South Korean
scientist,
Hwang Woo-suk, about whom we read:
"A disgraced cloning expert who falsely claimed
major breakthroughs in stem cell research was handed a suspended two-year prison
term today for embezzlement and other charges connected to the scandal. Hwang
Woo-suk, 56, once considered a national hero in South Korea, was cleared of the
main charge of fraud but was convicted of embezzling research funds and
illegally buying human eggs for his research. Prosecutors had asked for four
years in prison, but Judge Bae Ki-yeol of Seoul central district court said
Hwang had shown remorse and gave him a suspended sentence, sparing him jail time
if he stays out of trouble for three years....
"The verdict marked the culmination of a long fall
from grace for a man once hailed as a hero for his pioneering work in stem cell
research. In 2004, Hwang and former colleagues at Seoul National University
claimed in a paper published in the journal Science that they had created the
world's first cloned human embryos and had extracted stem cells from them. Stem
cell research is highly sensitive, and Hwang had been the only South Korean
scientist allowed to carry out studies on the master cells that scientists say
could lead to revolutionary cures for hard-to-treat diseases such as Alzheimer's
and Parkinson's. A year later, Hwang's team also claimed in the journal that
they had created human embryonic stem cells genetically matched to specific
patients, a purported breakthrough that promised a way to withstand rejection by
a patient's immune system. But questions about his claims led to an
investigation by a university committee. The committee concluded that the 2004
paper was based on faked data, and also cast doubt on the 2004 findings. The
journal, Science, retracted both papers.
"The South Korean government stripped him of the license to carry
out stem cell research in 2006. He was charged later that year of embezzling 800
million won (about Ł5m) and buying human eggs for research in violation of South
Korea's bioethics laws. Hwang eventually admitted the data was faked but claimed
he had been deceived by a fellow researcher.... Hwang, who with his team of
scientists had created the first known cloned dog in 2005, has focused on
cloning since being fired by Seoul National. He now is affiliated with a private
research institute." [Quoted from
here; accessed 30/05/2023. Several paragraphs merged.]
The full story has been told in these two excellent
videos:
1,
2
(and, now,
this even more recent video -- November
2023), which show how
reports about recent scientific 'breakthroughs' have increasingly
become dominated, hyped and distorted by their announcement through press
releases or via press conferences, by-passing the peer review system.
In addition the following have further corrupted the entire process: national
pride, public acclaim (in order to help secure government funding), professional notoriety and fame
(via 'clickbate'), career advancement
(ditto), earning
potential and marketing pressures (ditto, again; an example of the latter can be found
here).
However, with the rise of
capitalism, many of the above issues have become ever-present features of modern
science, but given the
influence of other social and political factors (some of which were aired in
those two videos and won't be news to Marxists), the situation is far
worse today than it has ever been.
[Details concerning the important influence exerted
by the Pentagon and the US military-industrial complex on nuclear physics and
QM have been posted
here.]
Finally, there is the case of
Victor Ninov who, in the early 2000s, was caught falsifying data
concerning the (fraudulent) discovery of elements 110, 112, 114, 116 and 118 in the
Periodic Table. The story is told in this other excellent video
-- much of which was itself based on Chapman (2019):
Video Eleven: The Man Who Tried
To Fake An Element
Other frauds are exposed in this video, which also
outlines the social-psychological reasons why it happens:
Video Twelve: Fraud In Science
Goes Deeper Than You Think
[See also
the report of another major scientific scandal, this time in stem cell research,
cited in Part Two.]
In response to regular examples of fraud that turn
up or are exposed in science we are often told that "science corrects itself",
but as demonstrated by this article in
Scientific American (dated August 2023), that isn't the case.
If anything, the opposite is in fact true. That article and Video Twelve
also explain why.
Other oddities gathering dust in the scientific
lumber room include the following:
Phrenology,
Animal Magnetism, 'water memory'
(reported in GuardianScience, p.3, 15/03/01; even the
New
Scientist picked up on that story), and
Mesmerism
(Waterfield (2002)).
Once again, are these now, or have they ever been,
legitimate objects or processes in the "Totality"?
On holes,
shadows (and the like), see Casati (2000), Casati and Varzi (1995,
1999,
2023), Lewis (1970), Sorensen (2008), and Varzi (1997,
2023). On
Polywater, see Ball (1999) and Van Brakel
(2000), pp.87-97; cf., also,
here. For
para-reflections, see Sorensen (2003,
2008). On this topic in general, see Williams (2000), as well as
here.
It is also worth recalling that
Lenin
accepted the "objective" existence of the
Ether. That was doubly unfortunate, not
least because it was badly-timed, situated as it was when that 'objective' entity was about to
fall through a
hole
in the Whole and slide off into (possible?) oblivion -- and, given the additional fact that
Lenin had used the Ether to support of his claims about the "objectivity" of dialecticsin
MEC!
[Cf., Lenin (1972), pp.50,
312, 314,
329-31, etc.]
"That is why Engels gave the
example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical
materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is,
from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, etherand so onexist as objective realities outside the human mind or not?
The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly (sic); and
they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as
they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to
organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the
concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but
objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it."
[Lenin (1972),
p.312.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
Lenin was still
talking about the Ether several years later, in
PN:
"Thus the conjecture
about the ether has existed for thousands of years, remaining until now a
conjecture. But at the present time there are already a thousand times more
subsurface channels leading to a solution of the problem, toa
scientific determination of the ether." [Lenin (1961),
p.250. Second bold emphasis added; other
emphases in the original.]
In which case, the following (by-now-all-too-familiar)
question naturally arises: Is the Ether an 'objective' part of the "Totality",
or not? Or is it merely 'subjective'? Since the contemporary equivalents of the (unnamed) scientists to whom
Lenin referred almost "invariably" and "unhesitatingly" currently
answer the first of these questions in the negative, it would seem that the
"Totality" must either be sensitive to fickle decisions like this or 'it' has either lost or misplaced
a significant
component of 'its' own
'objective' superstructure. Might this perhaps be the 'Cheshire Cat'
of Cosmology? Or is it the
Lord Lucan/Shergar
of DM?
Incidentally, Engels also appeared to believe in the
'objective' existence of the Ether:
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added. See also, ibid.,
pp.286-87. In fact, the term appears
dozens of times throughout DN -- for example, pp.26-27, 110, 119-21, 243-44,
276, 293.]
Back then, if there had been a
UDAC
charged with deciding what the
"Totality" supposedly does or does not contain, it is to be hoped that Engels, Lenin and
Plekhanov would have been kept well away. They were far too
accommodating, if not excessively gullible, for their own good.
Well, does this mean that Lenin's "Totality" is
different from, say, John Rees's "Totality"? Or, Woods and Grant's? Or Stalin's?
Or
Enver Hoxha's? Is 'it' the same as, or different from, Engels and Plekhanov's? Or, maybe
Trotsky's? Or, worse still, are any of those "Totalities" the same as, or different from,
Plotinus's or Hegel's? Could it be that the "Totality"
'itself' changed over the last century, divesting itself of the Ether and countless
other formerly 'objective' entities, replacing them with a different range of objects and processes,
which might also possess equally insecure squatters'
rights? Such as, maybe, 'Dark
Matter', a mysterious 'substance' scientists have been
desperately and unsuccessfully searching for or theorising about for at least
ninety years? [The term was first introduced in 1933, by
Fritz Zwicky.]
"For decades, astronomers, physicists and cosmologists have
theorized that the universe is filled with an exotic material called 'dark
matter' that explains the stranger gravitational behaviour of galaxies and
galaxy clusters. Dark matter, according to mathematical models, makes up
three-quarters of all the matter in the universe. But it's never been seen or
fully explained. And while dark matter has become the prevailing theory to
explain one of the bigger mysteries of the universe, some scientists have looked
for alternative explanations for why galaxies act the way they do.
"Now,
an international team of scientists says it has found new evidence that perhaps
dark matter doesn't really exist after all.
In research published
in November in the Astrophysical Journal,
the scientists report tiny discrepancies in the orbital speeds of distant stars
that they think reveals a faint gravitational effect -- and one that could put
an end to the prevailing ideas of dark matter.
The study suggests an incomplete scientific understanding of gravity is behind
what appears to be the gravitational strength of galaxies and galaxy clusters,
rather than vast clouds of dark matter.
That might mean pure mathematics, and not invisible matter, could explain why
galaxies behave as they do, said study co-author Stacy McGaugh, who heads the
astronomy department at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland.
"The new research reports that signs of a faint gravitational
tide, known as the 'external field effect' or EFE, can be observed statistically
in the orbital speeds of stars in more than 150 galaxies. The authors say
the effect cannot be explained by dark matter theories, but it's predicted by
what's known as the modified Newtonian dynamics
theory, or MOND.
'What we're really saying is that there is absolutely evidence for a
discrepancy,' McGaugh said. 'What you see is not what you get, if all you know
about is Newton and Einstein.' Astronomers long assumed that stars orbited the
centers of galaxies at speeds predicted by the theory of gravity formulated by
the English physicist and mathematician Isaac Newton more than 300 years ago.
Newton based his theory that objects attract each other with a force varying
according to their mass on observations of the orbits of the planets. With
refinements from the theories of the German-born physicist Albert Einstein in
the 20th century, it remains astonishingly accurate.
"But observations of the
Coma cluster of galaxies
in the 1930s by Swiss astronomer
Fritz Zwicky,
then working at the California Institute of Technology, found it was subject to
larger-than-expected gravitational forces -- an effect he attributed to 'dunkel
(kalt) materie,' which is German for 'dark (cold) material.' When the American
astronomers
Vera Rubin
and Kent Ford
found anomalies in the orbits of stars in galaxies in the 1970s, many scientists
theorized they were caused by masses of invisible 'dark matter' within and
around galaxies, and the idea has dominated astrophysics ever since.
"By
some estimates, dark matter makes up about 85 percent of all the matter in the
universe. It's said to interact with light and visible matter only through
gravity, and it explains the observed anomalies in distant galaxies. But it's
never been seen, and so far no one has fully explained what it might be,
althoughdark
matter candidates include
weakly interacting massive particles, or WIMPS,primordial
black holes andneutrinos.
MOND was formulated in the 1980s by an Israeli physicist, Mordehai Milgrom,
to explain the observed discrepancies without dark matter. It proposes that
gravity causes a very small acceleration, not predicted by Newton and Einstein,
at such low levels that it can only be seen in galaxy-size objects;
and it would mean the explanation of dark matter is not needed.
"So far, MOND has survived several scientific tests -- although
many scientists say it cannot explain observations of theBullet
cluster of
colliding galaxies, for example. McGaugh admits that MOND is a minority view in
astrophysics, and that most scientists favor the existence of dark matter -- an
idea he favoured himself, until he began to change his mind about 25 years ago.
'I
once would have said the same things: it's absolutely proven that there's dark
matter, don't worry about it,' he said. But many of the predictions of MOND have
been seen in astronomical observations, and the latest
research is
one more piece of evidence for it, he said. 'MOND is the only theory that has
succeeded in this way,' McGaugh said. 'It is the only theory that has routinely
had all predictions come true.'
"The new research raises 'a very interesting issue,' saidMatthias
Bartelmann,
a professor of theoretical astrophysics at Heidelberg University in Germany, who
was not involved in the study. 'Can
dark matter be explained by a different law of gravity? It would be most
important for cosmology as well as particle physics if it could,' he said in an
email. He has doubts, however, that the 'external field effect' reported in the
new research is truly a unique prediction of MOND, and that it cannot be
explained by some competing theories. And since MOND theory was formulated to
account for the rotational discrepancies in galaxies, testing it on galaxies
would be expected to return convincing results; instead, MOND needed to be
tested successfully on other objects, such as galaxy clusters, he said." [Quoted
from
here, accessed 27/06/2022. Quotation
marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.
Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Several links added and paragraphs
merged. Bold emphases alone added.]
As
this other, even more recent video (produced by physicist, Dr Ben
Miles, and posted in August 2023) points out, Newton and Einstein's theories of
gravity imply that at great distances measured in billions of light years the
affect of gravity tends to zero (which implies the universe isn't
inter-connected). Like other videos and textbooks, it also reminds us that Dark
Matter was introduced/postulated in order to allow both of these theories
explain, among other things, the anomalous
angular velocity of
certain galaxies. However, a more recent alternative theory,
MOND -- mentioned in the above quote -- doesn't
need such mysterious and undetected forms of matter to account for that
rotational speed, and it implies that gravity doesn't tend zero over such
great distances. As such, it is compatible with theories that postulate the
existence of an inter-connected universe. [The video also reports on
recent research (published in August 2023) that supports MOND and
disconfirms theories based on the existence of Dark Matter.] Shouldn't
DM-theorists now change course and accept MOND?
Hold the press!
In the same video, Dr Miles also highlights the
weaknesses of that research! [From approximately 05:40 onwards.]
I've said this before, and I'll no doubt say it
again: Where is the
UDAC when we need it?!
Independently of the above, it looks like
the Ether
itself could even be making a come-back of sorts. According to the following two
historians and philosophers of science, Geoffrey Cantor and Jonathan Hodge, the
Ether might be necessary if
Quantum Electrodynamics [QED] is itself to work:
"By 1951, however, we find an eminent
physicist,
P. A. M. Dirac, having to argue in the journal Nature (168:906-7)
that although Einstein's 1905 principle of relativity led, reasonably enough, to
the ether's generally being abandoned, with the new quantum electrodynamics we
may be, after all, 'rather forced to have an aether'.... [T]here have been, and
still are, many ether theories that, in principle, are perfectly compatible with
special relativity
and even
general relativity. Moreover, quantum theory has led to new conceptions of
ether, and not a few physicists have urged the necessity of some form of ether
theory." [Cantor and Hodge (1981), pp.ix, 53. Paragraphs merged; links
added.]
Cantor and Hodge even quote
Einstein
and Dirac in support:
"More careful reflection teaches us, however,
that the special theory of relativity does not compel us to deny ether. We may
assume the existence of ether; only we must give up ascribing a definite state
of motion to it.... [There] is a weighty argument to be adduced in favour of the
ether hypothesis. To deny ether is ultimately to assume that empty space has no
physical qualities whatsoever. The fundamental facts of mechanics do not
harmonize with this view.... According to the general theory of relativity space
without ether is unthinkable; for in such space there would not only be no
propagation of light, but also no possibility of the existence of standards of
space and time (measuring rods and clocks), nor therefore any space-time
intervals in the physical sense." [Ibid., p.54, quoting Einstein (1922a).]
"Physical knowledge has
advanced very much since 1905, notably by the arrival of
quantum
mechanics, and the situation has again changed. If one examines the question
in the light of present-day knowledge, one finds that the aether is no longer
ruled out by relativity, and good reasons can now be advanced for postulating an
aether." [Ibid., p.54, quoting Dirac (1951). I have not yet been able to
check this reference fully, but part of Dirac's paper has been reproduced on-line. I
have quoted it in the next paragraph below.]
"Physical
knowledge has advanced much since 1905, notably by the arrival of quantum
mechanics, and the situation [about the scientific plausibility of aether] has
again changed. If one examines the question in the light of present-day
knowledge, one finds that the aether is no longer ruled out by relativity, and
good reasons can now be advanced for postulating an aether.... We can now see
that we may very well have an aether, subject to quantum mechanics and
conformable to relativity, provided we are willing to consider a perfect vacuum
as an idealized state, not attainable in practice. From the experimental point
of view there does not seem to be any objection to this. We must make some
profound alterations to the theoretical idea of the vacuum.... Thus, with the
new theory of electrodynamics we are rather forced to have an aether." [Quoted
from
here. Accessed 02/10/2022.]
[These developments
were also reported
in the Wikipedia article on the
Luminiferous Aether.
On this in general, see
Kostro
(2000). Having said that, leading theoretical physicist,
Sean Carroll, rubbished the idea that
fields are, or can be interpreted as, the Ether, in the
question-and-answer section of
this video (at approximately 01:21:00). Although, as the quoted
passage
a few paragraphs below suggests, Carroll also appears to think Dark Energy might be the "the ether of
the 21st century" instead!]
However, the following video shows how Noble
Laureate
Hendrik Lorentz's theory was actually able to
reconcile classical electrodynamics with the existence of the Ether, and how
several contemporary physicists now think that his ideas should be able to provide solutions
to 'puzzles' that are difficult, if not impossible to solve using QM and RT:
Video Fifteen: Lorentzian Ether
Theory
[QM = Quantum Mechanics; RT =
Relativity Theory.]
If so, has the "Totality" progressed since Engels's and Lenin's
ex
cathedra pronouncements? Or has it regressed? Maybe it's
still dithering?
Even the New Scientist expressed an
opinion on this topic. Speaking about research into 'Dark Energy', it had this to say:
"Unfortunately, physicists
are having trouble finding a way to fit a
cosmological constant into their best
existing theories. 'A small non-zero dark energy is more difficult to explain
than zero,' says
Sean Carroll, a cosmologist from the California Institute of
Technology in Pasadena. 'So we are driven to wilder ideas.' One of those wild ideas is
quintessence, which postulates the existence of a hitherto unsuspected quantum
field permeating the universe.... Because this implies that there would also be
a new fundamental force of nature, the idea set some physicists thinking:
instead of adding a new force, why not modify an old one? Perhaps there are
unexpected properties of gravity that appear over gargantuan distances that
Einstein's general relativity does not predict....
"By giving us detailed
measurements of the acceleration of different parts of the universe, the next
generation of surveys could reveal the nature of the dominant component of the
universe. Whatever it turns out to be, it will be big news. 'Dark energy
could be the ether of the 21st century,' says Carroll. Even if we explain it
away, we will learn something profound about the universe. It is a viewpoint shared by
cosmologists everywhere. 'We are definitely seeing something extra in the
universe, we just do not know how to interpret it yet,' says [Ofer
Lahav of University College London].
And that has given cosmologists a new sense of purpose. A seismic shift in our
understanding of the universe is coming. How soon it will arrive and from what
direction it will come -- that's still anyone's guess." [Clark (2007), pp.31-33.
Bold emphases and links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
If so, is the Ether queuing up somewhere in a sort
of 'ontological
anteroom', waiting for rehabilitation, almost as if it were a member of
an ethereal version of the
Chinese
Communist Party? Or, is it a
Meinongian-like like entity, quietly
'subsisting' away until some bight spark stumbles across it
and conjures it into existence once more?
Well, maybe it is, for an earlier edition of the New
Scientist reported the following:
"'Ether' returns in a bid to oust dark matter
"Zeeya Merali
"From his office window,
Glenn
Starkman
can see the site where
Albert Michelson and Edward Morley
carried out their famous 1887 experiment
that ruled out the presence of an all-pervading 'aether' in space, setting the
stage for Einstein's special theory of relativity. So it seems ironic that
Starkman, who is at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, is now
proposing a theory that would bring ether back into the reckoning. While this
would defy Einstein, Starkman's ether would do away with the need for
dark
matter. Nineteenth-century physicists believed that just as sound
waves move through air, light waves must move through an all-pervading physical
substance, which they called luminiferous ('light-bearing') ether. However, the
Michelson-Morley experiment failed to find any signs of ether, and 18 years
after that, Einstein's special relativity argued that light propagates through a
vacuum. The idea of ether was abandoned -- but not discarded altogether, it
seems.
"Starkman and colleagues Tom Zlosnik and
Pedro Ferreira
of the University of Oxford are now reincarnating the ether in a new form to
solve the puzzle of dark matter, the mysterious substance that was proposed to
explain why galaxies seem to contain much more mass than can be accounted for by
visible matter. They posit an ether that is a field, rather than a substance,
and which pervades space-time. 'If you removed everything else in the universe,
the ether would still be there,' says Zlosnik.
"This ether field isn't to do with light, but rather is
something that boosts the gravitational pull of stars and galaxies, making them
seem heavier, says Starkman. It does this by increasing the flexibility of
space-time itself.... 'We usually imagine space-time as a rubber sheet that's
warped by a massive object,' says Starkman. 'The ether makes that rubber sheet
more bendable in parts, so matter can seem to have a much bigger gravitational
effect than you would expect from its weight.' The team's calculations show that
this ether-induced gravity boost would explain the observed high velocities of
stars in galaxies, currently attributed to the presence of dark matter.
"This is not the first time that physicists have suggested
modifying gravity to do away with this unseen dark matter. The idea was
originally proposed by
Mordehai
Milgrom
while at Princeton University in the 1980s. He suggested that the
inverse-square law of gravity only applies where the acceleration caused by the
field is above a certain threshold, say
a0.
Below that value, the field dissipates more slowly, explaining the observed
extra gravity. 'It wasn't really a theory, it was a guess,' says cosmologist
Sean Carroll at the University of Chicago in Illinois.
Then in 2004 this idea of modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND)
was reconciled with general relativity by
Jacob
Bekenstein at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel (New Scientist,
22 January 2005, p.10), making MOND a genuine contender in the eyes of some
physicists. 'Bekenstein's work was brilliant, but fiendishly complicated, using
many different and arbitrary fields and parameters,' says Ferreira. 'We felt
that something so complicated couldn't be the final theory.'
"Now Starkman's team has reproduced Bekenstein's results
using just one field -- the new ether (www.arxiv.org/astro-ph/0607411).
Even more tantalisingly, the calculations reveal a close relationship between
the threshold acceleration a0 -- which
depends on the ether -- and the rate at which the universe's expansion is
accelerating. Astronomers have attributed this acceleration to something called
dark energy, so in a sense the ether is related to this entity. 'That they have
found this connection is a truly profound thing,' says Bekenstein. The team is
now investigating how the ether might cause the universe's expansion to speed
up.
"Andreas
Albrecht, a cosmologist at the University of California, Davis, believes
that this ether model is worth investigating further. 'We've hit some really
profound problems with cosmology -- with dark matter and dark energy,' he says.
'That tells us we have to rethink fundamental physics and try something new.' Both Bekenstein and Albrecht say Starkman's team must now
carefully check whether the ether theory fits with the motions of planets within
our solar system, which are known to a high degree of accuracy, and also explain
what exactly this ether is. Ferreira agrees: 'The onus is definitely on us to
pin this theory down so it doesn't look like yet another fantastical
explanation,' he says. However, physicists may be reluctant to resurrect any
kind of ether because it contradicts special relativity by forming an absolute
frame of reference. 'Interestingly, this controversial aspect should make it
easy to test for experimentally,' says Carroll." [New
Scientist 2566, 25/08/06.
Several links and bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
[On Dark Matter, see also
Note 21. In fact, as was pointed out earlier, the existence of the Ether contradicts
neither Einstein nor Relativity.]
So, does this mean that the Ether both is and isn't part of the
"Totality", perhaps its most 'contradictory' occupant? It seems both to
exist and not to exist consecutively as intellectual fashion among physicists ebbs and flows. Or,
does it exist
and not exist concurrently?
At any rate, as we have just seen, the Ether
apparently has a modern-day analogue, somewhat disarmingly called by some, "The Field", by
others merely "Space-Time" ("Space-Time
Substantivalism"), and still others, "Dark Energy", as we
have seen. [On that, see
Granek (2001).] Of course, there are
many different fields, one for each 'fundamental particle', so we are told.
On that seethe following video:
Video Sixteen: Fields And
Inter-Connection
This highlights just how far the
reification of mathematics
has gone and how it now completely dominates contemporary Physics, a point
brought out well in Hossenfelder (2018) -- a detail also summarised in this video lecture of hers:
Video Seventeen:
"Lost In Mathematics -- How Beauty Leads Physics Astray"
[In relation to this, see also the passage I have quoted from
Lindley (1993),
below.]
Now, even though I disagree with the pro-DM stance
adopted in Malek (2011), what its author has to say about the new forms of Idealism implicit (or, in some cases,
explicit) in modern Physics is nevertheless worth noting. [There is
more on this in Essay Thirteen Parts
One
and Two.]
Some might conclude
that it is now possible to argue that the entire universe is
inter-connected because these fields span all of space and time. The following
video presents a lecture given by Professor
David Tong of Cambridge University, who informs his audience that
the best theories we have of the universe don't rely on particles but on fields
--,
which are:
"[A]bstract...fluid-like substances which are
spread throughout the entire universe.... [Fields] take a particular value at
every point in space...." [Beginning
at approximately 09:40.]
Video Eighteen: Our 'Best
Theories' Tell Us That
The Universe Is Fundamentally
'Abstract'
Just how something can be both "abstract" and
a "substance" at the same time the speaker left entirely unexplained, but, as
was pointed out earlier, this just means that 'fields' are simply mathematical
structures that help scientists predict how
different measuring
devices will behave in certain regions of space. They tell us nothing about the
physical nature, or the fine structure, of the universe. In fact, if anything, they
appear to tell us
the universe is Ideal!
If DM-fans want to appeal to 'abstractions' like
this to explain
how the entire universe is inter-linked, they will only succeed in
confirming that they accept full-blown Idealism, an untoward outcome that
was entirely predictable the day they began to take philosophical,
logical and scientific advice from Hegel and other mystics.
But, to spoil the fun again, even if it were to be admitted
(the as-yet-unconfirmed-idea) that these 'fields' spread throughout the entire universe, none of the problems
highlighted in this Essay will have even been addressed, let alone resolved.
To change the subject: At one time
Marx showed great interest in the work
of
Pierre Trémaux,
a French architect who thought he could advance human knowledge by rejecting key
areas of Darwin's theory of evolution by claiming that the nature of the soil in any specific region
influenced speciation. Well, is that process part of the "Totality", even
though Marx himself later abandoned Trémaux's theory (probably under the
influence of a rare flash of good sense coming in from
Engels)? Or, did this rather un-Darwinian process only show its face in the
"Totality" for a few short months -- as a 'reverse Cheshire Cat'
sort of phenomenon -- while Marx was chewing things over? [On that, see Weikart (1998).]
In fact, as things have since turned out, the above
remarks now seem both premature and prejudicial. That is because some of
Trémaux's ideas appear to have anticipated the work of
Gould and Eldredge, among others.
Since
this Essay was originally written (in 1998), it looks like the climate of opinion
has changed somewhat. [Who would have guessed that that would ever happen in
science, that scientists changed their minds!] This area of science has in
places swung full circle, back in favour of 'Trémaux-like' ideas. So, are they
about to be rehabilitated? Is the
"Totality" on the verge of 'changing its mind'? Or has its dithering,
or even the wavering of scientists, been taken to a
whole new level?
An even more vexing issue for STDs and
MISTs to consider is
Lysenkoism
-- or rather the processes about which Lysenko
speculated. Are they, or are they not, part of the "Totality"? For thirty
or so years
Soviet (and later Chinese) scientists certainly regarded his ideas as Gospel
Truth. Is the "Totality",
therefore, sensitive to sectarian splits in Marxism, with us Trotskyists perhaps displaying
'reactionary
scepticism' toward Lysenkoism while our Stalinist and Maoist cousins plumbed new depths of
dialectical
gullibility?
[On this, cf., Grant (2007), Joravsky (1970), Medvedev
(1969), and Soyfer (1994). See also my comments on other controversial aspects of 'dialectical
science' (including the decidedly odd
ideas given credence by one of
Lenin's friends,
Olga
Lepeshinskaya)
in Essay Four
Part One.]
Are the above objects and processes genuine parts of the "Totality" -- or
are they just temporary residents/itinerant interlopers?
In view of the fact
that Epigenetic -- or what could be
described as quasi-Lamarckian -- theories are gradually gaining
traction in certain areas of Genetics, it might well be wondered whether some form of Lysenkoism
is also on the verge of being rehabilitated. [On that, see
here.]
Is this not
yet more proof that the DM-"Totality"
might have its very own 'Metaphysical Revolving Door'? Or maybe even an
'Ontological Reverse Gear'?
Indeed, as we saw in Essay Thirteen
Part
Three, Lamarckism and
Epigenetic theories are now staging a comeback among biologists
and geneticists --, indeed, as this video interview with leading physiologist,
Professor Denis Noble, points out:
Video Nineteen: Why Richard
Dawkins Is Wrong
What was that again about 'revolving doors' and
'reverse gears'...?
19a0. Since this
Essay was first written, the nature and existence of several of these
'objects' and 'processes' has become much
less speculative -- for example, Black Holes, the existence of which is
now supported by a considerable body of evidence. However, on that, see Note 19a,
below.
19a.
Anyone tempted to argue that, in science, evidence alone is decisive should read the following,
and then perhaps think again:
"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to
Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence
available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong
support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern
would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early
corpuscularian chemistry to
Stahl'sphlogiston theory
to
Lavoisier's oxygen
chemistry to Daltonian
atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various
versions of
preformationism
to
epigenetic
theories of embryology; from the
caloric theory
of heat to later and ultimately contemporary
thermodynamic
theories; from
effluvial theories of electricity
and magnetism to theories of
the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from
humoral
imbalance
to
miasmatic
to
contagion
and ultimately germ theories of disease;
from 18th Century
corpuscular theories of light
to 19th
Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from
Hippocrates'spangenesis
to
Darwin's blending theory of inheritance
(and his own
'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to
Wiesmann's germ-plasm
theory and
Mendelian
and contemporary molecular genetics; from
Cuvier's
theory of functionally
integrated and necessarily static biological species or
Lamarck's autogenesis to
Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of
theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more
unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry
offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are
alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even
when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.
Links added.]
[I will cover several of the other factors that are
decisive in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Update September 2012: We now read
this, in the New Scientist:
"Then in 1956,
Joe Hin Tjio
and
Albert
Levan tried a new technique for looking at cells. They counted over and over
until they were certain they could not be wrong. When they announced their
result, other researchers remarked that they had counted the same, but figured
they must have made a mistake. Tjio and Levan had counted only 46 chromosomes,
and they were right.... It is obvious that scientific knowledge is continually
updated through new discoveries and the replication of studies, but until recent
years little attention had been paid to how fast this change occurs. In
particular, few had attempted to quantify how long it would take what we know at
any given moment to become untrue, or replaced with a closer approximation of
the truth.
"Among the first groups to measure this churning of
knowledge was a team of researchers at
Pitié-Salpętričre hospital in Paris, France. To get a handle on it,
Thierry Poynard and his colleagues chose to focus on
medical fields in which they specialised:
cirrhosis
and
hepatitis,
two areas related to liver diseases. They took nearly 500 articles in these
fields from over 50 years and gave them to a panel of experts to examine. Each
expert was charged with saying whether the paper was factual, out-of-date or
disproved (Annals
of Internal Medicine, vol 136, p.888).
Through doing this, Poynard and his colleagues were able
to create a simple chart that showed the amount of factual content that had
persisted over the previous decades (see
diagram). They found something striking: a clear decay
in the number of papers that were still valid. Furthermore, it was possible to
get a clear measurement for the 'half-life' of facts in these fields by looking
at where the curve crosses 50 per cent on this chart: 45 years....
"We can't predict which individual papers will be
overturned, of course, just like we can't tell when individual radioactive atoms
will decay, but we can observe the aggregate and see that there are rules for
how a field changes over time. The cirrhosis and hepatitis results were nearly
identical to an earlier study that examined the overturning of information in
surgery. Two Australian surgeons found that half of the facts in that field also
become false every 45 years (The
Lancet, vol 350, p 1752).... To understand the decay in the truth of a paper, we can
measure how long it takes for people to stop citing the average paper in a
field. Whether it is no longer interesting, no longer relevant or has been
contradicted by new research, this paper is no longer a part of the living
scientific literature. The amount of time it takes for others to stop citing
half of the literature in a field is also a half-life of sorts.
"Through this we can begin to get rough estimates of the
half-lives of many fields. For example, a study of all the papers in the
Physical Review journals, a cluster of periodicals of great importance to
physicists, found that the half-life in physics is about 10 years (arxiv.org/abs/physics/0407137).
Different publication formats can also have varied
half-lives. In 2008,
Rong Tang of Simmons College in Boston looked at
scholarly books in different fields and found that physics has a longer
half-life (13.7 years) than economics (9.4), which in turn outstays mathematics,
psychology and history (College
& Research Libraries, vol 69, p 356)....
"Extinct in a blink
"It's easy to mistakenly assume that some of the facts in
our heads are absolute, especially those learned in the textbooks of our youth
(see main story). As a child, I loved learning about dinosaurs. But I have since
discovered an incorrect fact that I had lived my childhood assuming was
accurate: the name Brontosaurus. The four-legged
saurischian,
with its long neck and tiny head, is iconic. And yet its name is actually
Apatosaurus.
Why? In 1978, two palaeontologists noticed that the skeleton used to identify
the Brontosaurus species had been graced with the skull of a different
plant-eating dinosaur. The body belonged to the Apatosaurus. The Brontosaurus
never existed.
"Since then, scientists have promoted the name change, and
it has gained some currency. Nevertheless, the Brontosaurus myth continues to
endure in popular knowledge and books -- no doubt aided by people who missed the
expiry of this fact." [Arbesman
(2012b), pp.37-39. Emphases in the original. Several links added. Quotation
marks and some of the formatting altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Many paragraphs merged.]
[More details can be found in Arbesman (2012a).]
In response, it is impossible to resist the
temptation to ask the following: How long will the above
conclusions remain 'true'?
Update April 2015: Not long, it seems!
The BBC now reports that the Brontosaurus has staged a dramatic
come-back, all
within three years of its sad and premature demise having been trumpeted around the world.
"The iconic name Brontosaurus, once used
to describe a family of huge dinosaurs, has been resurrected after being killed
off more than a century ago. In 1903, scientists decided Brontosaurus was
a more complete specimen of a different dinosaur. But many more specimens of
plant-eating sauropod dinosaurs are now known, revealing Brontosaurus to
be different enough to warrant its own name. The results have been published in
the open access
journal PeerJ. The name
Brontosaurus goes back to the so-called Bone Wars of the late 1800s, when
rival fossil hunters Othniel Charles Marsh and Edward Drinker Cope raced new
dinosaur names into the scientific literature.
"In their quest for new
specimens, Marsh and Cope were drawn to the rich fossil beds of the American
west. Marsh's team found two long-necked sauropods. He named one Apatosaurus
ajax (Apatosaurus means 'deceptive lizard') and the second skeleton
Brontosaurus excelsus (Brontosaurus means 'noble thunder lizard').
Shortly after Marsh's death, a team from the Field Museum of Chicago found
another dinosaur skeleton similar to both Apatosaurus ajax and
Brontosaurus excelsus, but with features deemed intermediate between the
two. This led the scientists to conclude that Apatosaurus and
Brontosaurus were just different species within the same scientific genus.
Apatosaurus took precedence because it had been named first so,
Brontosaurus excelsus became Apatosaurus excelsus.
"But the name Brontosaurus
is still known by several generations of schoolchildren. It's not entirely clear
why the name stuck, but it may be to do with its origins in the Bone Wars, when
there was intense public interest in the discovery of new dinosaurs. It may also
be because of the evocative meaning: 'thunder lizard'. Now, Emanuel Tschopp from
the New University of Lisbon in Portugal and colleagues applied statistical
techniques to calculate the differences between species and genera of diplodocid
dinosaurs (the large-scale grouping that includes Apatosaurus as well as
other long-necked plant eaters). It is only with new finds of dinosaurs similar
to Apatosaurus and Brontosaurus in recent years that it became
possible to undertake a detailed investigation of how different they were. 'Until very recently, the
claim that Brontosaurus was the same as Apatosaurus was completely
reasonable, based on the knowledge we had,' said Mr Tschopp. To their surprise,
Brontosaurus emerged from the analysis as a distinct dinosaur.
"The wrong skull
"'The differences we found
between Brontosaurus and Apatosaurus were at least as numerous as
the ones between other closely related genera, and much more than what you
normally find between species,' explained Roger Benson, a co-author from the
University of Oxford. Thus, the researchers argue that it is now possible to
resurrect Brontosaurus as a genus, different from Apatosaurus.
"Prof Paul Barrett, of
London's Natural History Museum, who was not involved in the research, told BBC
News: 'This paper is the most comprehensive study produced to date on the
evolution of Diplodocus and its closest relatives and sets out some
really interesting new ideas on how these animals are related, and how they
should be classified. The author finds a number of ways in which the original
specimens of Brontosaurus and Apatosaurus can be separated from
each other and uses these to resurrect Brontosaurus as a separate entity.
The conclusions seem entirely reasonable to me, as they are well argued and well
supported, and it will be interesting to see how quickly these suggestions
are adopted by the community.'
"Marsh's case was not helped
by making an incorrect reconstruction of Brontosaurus' skull because of
the limited material available at the time. He had assumed it was boxy, like
another long-necked dinosaur from the western US known as Camarasaurus.
But research in the 1970s showed that Apatosaurus -- and thus
'Brontosaurus' -- would have had a slender, horse-like skull. This gave rise
to a popular myth that 'Brontosaurus' was simply an Apatosaurus
with the wrong head." [Quoted from
here; accessed 07/04/2015. Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some
italic emphases added (since the original article seemed to use them inconsistently).
Minor spelling mistake corrected. Link in the original, although it now seems to be
broken!]
So, it looks like much of the
"Totality" itself, or at least
entries in its 'contents list', might have a relatively
short 'half-life'. In which case, one can only wish the
UDAC (charged with deciding what the
"Totality" actually contains) "good luck"! Any conclusions they
are likely to reach stand
a reasonably high probability of being labelled "obsolete" within a couple of
generations, or less.
Hold the Press, once more!
A
NASA scientist now informs us that it never stopped being a planet:
"Yes, Pluto Is A
Planet Says NASA Scientist At The Site Of Its Discovery 91 Years Ago This Week
"By Jamie Carter
"Is Pluto a planet? It's been
one of astronomy's most controversial questions since a meeting of the
International Astronomical Union (IAU) in August 2006 voted
to downgrade the then-ninth planet to mere
'dwarf planet' status. Not only is the IAU's definition of a planet 15 years ago
roundly ignored by planetary scientists, but the IAU's use of a vote made
science seem arbitrary and political, undermining trust in science itself. So
says Dr. Alan Stern, a planetary scientist who leads NASA's New Horizons mission
that explored the Pluto system in 2015. He was speaking at the 'I
Heart Pluto Festival 2021,' a virtual program
of lectures and events staged by Lowell
Observatory in Flagstaff,
Arizona -- the very sight of Pluto's discovery on February 18, 1930 by
astronomer Clyde Tombaugh.
"Stern's argument against the
decision to relate Pluto to 'dwarf planet' status boils down to this: it doesn't
make scientific sense. The IAU relegated Pluto after a flurry of new discoveries
of small planets in the outer Solar System -- notably Eris in
2005 -- so the IAU felt that it had to create a tighter, more exclusive
definition of a planet:
1. It orbits the Sun.
2. It has enough mass (and therefore gravity) to be
round.
3. It has 'cleared the neighbourhood' around its
orbit
"Pluto doesn't get tick that
last box because it's influenced by Neptune's gravity. It also shares its orbit
with other objects in the Kuiper
Belt. So Pluto was re-classified as a 'dwarf
planet' to sit alongside Eris, Ceres, Haumea and Makemake.
Stern thinks that definition of a planet is poorly worded. 'The IAU's definition
was created by non-experts -- astronomers -- who study stars, galaxies and black
holes,' he said. 'They botched it.' He thinks the IAU overacted because they
were horrified by the idea that there could be hundreds of small planets beyond
the orbit of Neptune in the Kuiper Belt....
"That's a shame because one of
the revolutions in planetary science in the last 40 years has been the discovery
that the Kuiper Belt -- that 'third zone' in the Solar System beyond the orbit
of Neptune -- is busy with comets, planetesimals and small planets like Pluto.
'They now outnumber the terrestrial and gas planets and are expected to number
in the hundreds when surveys are complete,' said Stern. He also makes the point
that the Solar System is littered with asteroids to the extent that no celestial
body has 'cleared the neighborhood' around its orbit. It's why planetary
researchers ignore the IAU's definition of a planet in
favour of a geophysical definition that's completely agnostic to the total
number of planets in the Solar System:
1. It has enough mass (and therefore gravity) to be
round.
2. It has insufficient mass to undergo nuclear
fusion in its interior.
"That way, Stern says, Pluto easily qualifies as a
planet -- as do all 'dwarf planets.' However, Stern also accused the IAU of
harming science itself when it publicly voted to relegate Pluto in 2006. 'Voting
is a terrible mechanism of doing science,' he said. 'We don't vote on the theory
of relativity. We don't vote on quantum mechanics. The image of the IAU taking a
vote was the single most damaging pedagogical event in science in probably a
century, because to many people it was easy to reach the conclusion that science
is arbitrary or political, which it is not.'
"The argument about Pluto is
about semantics. After all, where astronomers draw the line between planets,
dwarf planets, planetoids and moons is essentially arbitrary and makes zero
difference to reality. Even Stern's keynote -- provocatively titled 'Why Pluto
is a Planet, The Embarrassment of the IAU, and Why They Had It Coming' is a
callback to 'How
I Killed Pluto And Why It Had It Coming'...by Mike Brown, one of the discoverers of Eris. Stern's argument is merely
that science should be agnostic. 'There are countless stars and there are
countless planets -- and who cares?" [Quoted from
here. Accessed 20/07/2022. Several paragraphs merged. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links in the
original.]
[For more on this controversy, see Tyson (2009).]
However, for our purposes, a far more pressing question
turns out to be the following: Is Pluto
to be counted as a planet in the
DM-"Totality", or not?
A suggestion made earlier that the DM-"Totality"
should be fitted its very own revolving door , or even a 'Reverse
Ontological Gear', is
beginning to look like a good idea.
19b.
An excellent example of a work written by a dialectically distracted comrade, keen to tail-end the latest
scientific fad, is Mason
(2012), especially the article, 'Marxism,
Materialism and Particle Physics', which now appears
as the
Appendix to the third edition
(pp.113-36), although the title of the on-line version has been changed to
'Science: Quantum Mechanics and Dialectical Materialism'.
19c. For the origin of, and the underlying
rationale for, the "Shut up and calculate!" rejoinder, see Becker (2018),
Chapter 12, pp.267-88 (especially pp.274-77).
20.Much of the following material in the main body of this Essay (and below) was written before the scientific community claimed to have
finally confirmed the existence of the Higgs Boson. I have, however, commented on that discovery
lower down --
for example, here,
here and
here.
Update August 2022: The scientific
world was alight for a
few weeks in mid-2022 with the breathless
news that the 'Axial Higgs Boson' had been 'discovered', but it now seems it
hadn't been discovered, after all. It looks like this ephemeral 'particle', if it had
ever been a member of the "Totality", was simply playing 'peek-a-boo' (it even
had a temporary Wikipedia page, now deleted!). Fortunately, it didn't
hang around
long enough to trouble DM-fans with awkward questions about its legitimacy.
In fact, it came and went
even faster than Liz Truss!
I haven't deleted the following material --
some of which was originally written before the Higgs Boson was
discovered --
since it illustrates quite nicely
how fickle
scientists are.
The same is the case with a number of remarks posted in several other Notes, below.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
The elusive
Higgs Boson is at present just clinging
to 'existence' (cf., New Scientist, 08/12/01, pp.4-5). Of
course, the existence of that 'particle'
is still merely theoretical (although
some Physicists not only deny it exists, they claim it can't exist because
that possibility depends on the
Klein-Gordon equation, which is, apparently,
fundamentally flawed).
[The implications of that observation will be explored in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Earlier, we were being told (by some) that "Dark Energy"
might not exist, either. "Is Dark Energy a mirage?" asks Marcus Chown
(in the New
Scientist, Volume 180, No. 2424, 06/12/03, pp.10-11). [See also, Chown (2003,
2004), as well as the BBC Horizon documentary, "Is
Everything We Know About The Universe Wrong?" (broadcast in March
2010), which also raised serious questions about
Supersymmetry, often abbreviated, SUSY. I will say more about
that in an updated version of the Appendix (to be
published in the next few months). There is more
here and in Appendix A on the growing realisation among
astrophysicists that 'Dark Matter' and 'Dark Energy' don't exist. (Additional shady details can
also be accessed
here.)]
In fact,
concerning the first two of the above three theoretical entities, one Physicist had this to
say:
"In your article on the search for the Higgs particle, it is implicitly assumed
that the Higgs exists
(24
July, p.8).
This hope is shared by many physicists, and it was one of the main motivations
for building the
Large Hadron Collider. However, a small group of physicists, myself
included, is challenging this view. Some have even gone so far as to bet
thousands of dollars that it doesn't exist (though
Stephen
Hawking has bet only $100).
It is important to remember that the Higgs mechanism was invented in 1964 as a
'fix' to give mass to the particles called
vector
bosons, just as dark matter was suggested as a fix to explain the velocities
at which galaxies orbit each other in clusters. Neither of these entities has
been found." [R van Nieuwenhove,
New Scientist207, 2773, 14/08/2010, p.30. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Some links added; paragraphs merged.]
The individual who wrote the above letter did so before
the Higgs Boson was eventually 'discovered', but he might still win his bet because
recent research suggests that this 'particle' might not actually have been
discovered! [On that, see
Appendix
A.] And, as one might expect, there are physicists who claim it
hasn't been discovered -- cf., Unzicker (2013).
Two questions well worth asking at this point are the following:
(1) Is the
"Totality"
about to change, depending on the result of this latest bout of scientific dithering?
And,
(2) Must the Higgs Boson wait for the next issue of the New
Scientist, or
Nature, or Science Daily, or
Journal of High Energy Physics or..., before it is
even granted temporarysquatters' rights, followed maybe by a Permanent Residency Visa,
'officially' allowing it entry into the mysterious "Totality"?
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Now we are being told that
scientists have discovered a truly
massive 'hole' in space one billion light years across [New Scientist
195, 2619, 01/09/07, p.7], which, they say, contains nothing at
all! Could this be the part of the "Totality"
which is home to Hegel's 'Nothing'?
If so, have we not at last found the origin of 'Becoming'?
And, as if to pile yet more misery onto those who
still believe in the existence of the DM-"Totality", we can add to the above the recent anomalous
results concerning the so-called "Placebo" and "homeopathic" effects, reported in the New Scientist. [Volume 185, 2491, 19/03/05,
pp.31-33.]
This relates to work carried out by a (formerly) sceptical scientist in Belfast, N.
Ireland, who, so the
story goes, set out to disprove
homeopathy. However, in a series of
controlled experiments he found that the opposite
conclusion was more warranted. According to this report,
these results have "profound implications". Readers were even told that
scientists
may "have to rewrite physics
and chemistry" as a consequence. So, is the "Totality" about to morph
yet again? Or, will it fight
back and reject these 'New Age' impertinences, perhaps by means of death by a thousand
peer reviews?
And don't get me started on the
Nocebo Effect (which phenomenon emerged during the Covid-19 pandemic).
Moreover,
gravitational
waves, predicted by General Relativity, haven't
been
detected, yet,..., er,...,
or
have they? Well, as usual, that depends on who is telling the story.
[On this, see Collins (1994, 1998, 1999,
2004), and Kennefick (2007).] Even the
New Scientist was reporting major doubts recorded by physicists
as late as 2018. Are
there then two competing "Totalities"? One in which these waves
have been detected and one where they still remain elusive? [On this in general, see
the following
video, which raises serious questions about the alleged
detection of these 'waves'.]
Update March 2014:
The BBC has just published the following breathless report about the aforementioned waves:
"Scientists
say they have extraordinary new evidence to
support a Big Bang Theory for the origin of
the Universe. Researchers believe they have
found the signal left in the sky by the
super-rapid expansion of space that must
have occurred just fractions of a second
after everything came into being. It takes
the form of a distinctive twist in the
oldest light detectable with telescopes.
The work will be scrutinised carefully,
but already there is talk of a Nobel.
"'This is
spectacular,' commented Prof Marc
Kamionkowski, from Johns Hopkins University.
'I've seen the research; the arguments are
persuasive, and the scientists involved are
among the most careful and conservative
people I know,' he told BBC News. The
breakthrough was announced by an American
team working on a project known as
BICEP2.
This has been using a telescope at the South
Pole to make detailed observations of a
small patch of sky. The aim has been to try
to find a residual marker for 'inflation'
-- the idea that the cosmos experienced an
exponential growth spurt in its first
trillionth, of a trillionth of a trillionth
of a second.
Gravitational waves from inflation put a distinctive twist
pattern in the polarisation of the CMB [Cosmic
Microwave Background -- RL]
"Theory holds that this would have taken the infant Universe from something
unimaginably small to something about the size of a marble. Space has continued
to expand for the nearly 14 billion years since. Inflation
was first proposed in the early 1980s to
explain some aspects of Big Bang Theory that
appeared to not quite add up, such as why
deep space looks broadly the same on all
sides of the sky. The contention was that a
very rapid expansion early on could have
smoothed out any unevenness. But inflation
came with a very specific prediction -- that
it would be associated with waves of
gravitational energy, and that these ripples
in the fabric of space would leave an
indelible mark on the oldest light in the
sky --
the famous Cosmic Microwave Background.
"The BICEP2
team says it has now identified that signal.
Scientists call it
B-mode polarisation. It is a
characteristic twist in the directional
properties of the CMB. Only the
gravitational waves moving through the
Universe in its inflationary phase could
have produced such a marker. It is a true
'smoking gun'. Speaking at
the press conference to announce the
results, Prof John Kovac of the
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics,
and a leader of the BICEP2 collaboration,
said: 'This is opening a window on what we
believe to be a new regime of physics -- the
physics of what happened in the first
unbelievably tiny fraction of a second in
the Universe.'
"'Completely
astounded'
"The signal
is reported to be quite a bit stronger than
many scientists had dared hope. This
simplifies matters, say experts. It means
the more exotic models for how inflation
worked are no longer tenable. The results
also constrain the energies involved -- at
10,000 trillion
gigaelectronvolts. This is consistent
with ideas for what is termed
Grand Unified Theory, the realm where
particle physicists believe three of the
four fundamental forces in nature can be
tied together. But by associating
gravitational waves with an epoch when
quantum effects were so dominant, scientists
are improving their prospects of one day
pulling the fourth force -- gravity itself
-- into a Theory of Everything.
"The
sensational nature of the discovery means
the BICEP2 data will be subjected to intense
peer review. It is possible for the
interaction of CMB light with dust in our
galaxy to produce a similar effect, but the
BICEP2 group says it has carefully checked
its data over the past three years to rule
out such a possibility. Other experiments
will now race to try to replicate the
findings. Prof Andrew
Jaffe from Imperial College London, UK,
works on a rival telescope called
POLARBEAR. He
commented: 'A lot of this is technology
driven. And the next generation of
experiments, like the next generation of
POLARBEAR,
SPIDER
and
EBEX,
and things like that, will have far more
detectors and will go after this signal and
hopefully drag out much more detail.'
"Assuming the
BICEP2 results are confirmed, a Nobel Prize
seems assured. Who this would go to is
difficult to say, but leading figures on the
BICEP2 project and the people who first
formulated inflationary theory would be in
the running.
One of those
pioneers,
Prof Alan Guth
from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, told the BBC: 'I have been
completely astounded. I never believed when
we started that anybody would ever measure
the non-uniformities of the CMB, let alone
the polarisation, which is now what we are
seeing. I think it is absolutely amazing
that it can be measured and also absolutely
amazing that it can agree so well with
inflation and also the simplest models of
inflation -- nature did not have to be so
kind and the theory didn't have to be
right.'
"British
scientist Dr Jo Dunkley, who has been
searching through data from the
European Planck space telescope
for a B-mode signal, commented: 'I can't
tell you how exciting this is. Inflation
sounds like a crazy idea, but everything
that is important, everything we see today
-- the galaxies, the stars, the planets --
was imprinted at that moment, in less than a
trillionth of a second. If this is
confirmed, it's huge.'" [Quoted from
here;
accessed 28/03/2014. Several paragraphs
merged. Quotations marks
altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Some links added; bold
emphases in the original.]
However, since inflation appears to violate core principles
of the
TOR, this might
be a case of one step forward, ten back. Of course,
some scientists reject the claim that
'Inflation' violates the
TOR, but
will this more recent theory be ditched like so much else
that has been thrown out of the window in the history of science?
How would that affect the mysterious "Totality"?
Update February 2015:
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that a recent comprehensive study has
shown that the above results (concerning 'Inflation') were "mistaken".
[On that, see
Appendix A, as well as
here.]
[Over the next few years, I will be adding to
Appendix A several
more examples of 'mature science' that have been ditched or which have been, or
are being,
openly questioned by other scientists as the scientific community continues to
change its mind or appears to equivocate, vacillate and dither. See also, Note 21,Note 21a,
Note 22 and
Note 022aa, below.]
21. Once more, it is important to add that the existence or nature of these entities
isn't being questioned here.
The
point is that scientists themselves are sceptical of many of them, just
as we have seen they tend to change their minds at regular intervals.
How could it be otherwise if the entire discipline is to advance? [See
Note 19 and
Note 20, above.]
On this particular theme,
"Tetraneutrons"
were reported in the New Scientist (Volume 185, No. 2491, 19/03/05,
pp.34-35), which also mentions renewed interest in "Cold Fusion"
(p.37).
Update August 2022: The
Tetraneutron has
now apparently
been discovered. If these reports turn
out to be
accurate, that
alone might present DM-fans with a few more serious problems since this 'particle' --
which consists of four
neutrally-charged neutrons -- isn't held together by positive and negative
charges! Of course, that means this 'particle' isn't a UO, which in turn means that it
can't contain any 'internal contradictions' and hence can't change, 'dialectically'!
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
Dialecticians might now choose to keep alive the fond
hope that the above discovery is entirely bogus (like so many others
we have witnessed in the history of science, several of which have been
aired in this Essay), and hence that this 'dialectical imposture' will be
unceremoniously booted out of the
"Totality", one day...
Until then, the rest of us can read the following:
"Following these empirical and theoretical
considerations [here omitted - RL], the best candidate for experimental study is
the four-neutron particle. The search for
this particle has been ongoing since the 1960s, and physicists have reported
the discovery of the particle multiple times. However, the accuracy of
these experiments was not sufficient for the discovery of the tetraneutron to be
unanimously accepted by the scientific community. This was the case until
recently, when the
SAMURAI collaboration involving physicists
from 23 countriesfinally managed to observe the tetraneutron with a
sufficient confidence level. The experiment took place at the Radioactive
Ion Beam Factory operated by the RIKEN Nishina Center and the Center for Nuclear
Study at the University of Tokyo.
"In the experiment, the physicists bombarded a
liquid hydrogen target with beams of neutron-rich helium isotope nuclei
consisting of two protons and six neutrons — the nucleus of the most abundant
helium isotope contains only two neutrons. When the beam hit the target, the
nuclei of the helium isotope collided with protons in the hydrogen atoms, and as
a result of the collisions, a proton, an ordinary helium nucleus (also called
the α-particle), and a tetraneutron were
born. The tetraneutron is chargeless, which makes it much harder to
detect than a proton and an α-particle whose trajectories can be affected by a
magnetic field. Because of this, the researchers studied almost exclusively
these two reaction products, although some of the neutrons that the tetraneutron
eventually decays into have also been detected.
"The physicists measured the energies and momenta of
the protons and α-particles with the SAMURAI spectrometer and derived the
parameters of the tetraneutron from these data. The mass of the newly
discovered particle turned out to be about 0.05% higher than the sum of
the masses of four neutrons, and its lifetime was around 4x10-22
seconds. These numbers are consistent with some of the previous experimental
studies, making the researchers even more confident in their results. The
experimental data that the scientists obtained are inconsistent with modern
nuclear force theories, which means that more elaborated theories are necessary
to understand the physics of the tetraneutron. According to the authors of
the study, next-generation experiments studying different reaction mechanisms
and possibly detecting the four neutrons will reveal more insights into the
properties of the four-neutron system." [Quoted from
here; accessed 24/08/22. Several
paragraphs merged. Two links and bold emphases added.]
It also looks like the existence of the Tetraneutron
has been accepted by the US Department of Energy, too.
Then there is the Neutrino, about which we read:
"A neutrino is a subatomic particle that is very similar to an
electron, but has no electrical charge and a very small mass, which might even
be zero. Neutrinos are one of the most abundant particles in the universe.
Because they have very little interaction with matter, however, they are
incredibly difficult to detect." [Scientific
American,
07/09/1999; quoted from here. Accessed 26/08/2023.]
If this 'particle' has no electric charge, how can
it be the 'dialectal opposite' of anything (in the way that electrons and
protons are supposed to be)? Given that the neutrino is "one of the most
abundant particles in the universe" that must mean that much of the natural
world isn't the least but 'dialectical'.
Of course, it could be argued that the 'dialectical
opposite' of a neutrino is an antineutrino (an antimatter 'particle'),
about which
Fermilab has this to say:
"An
antineutrino is thus simply an 'opposite version' of a neutrino. But if one of
the main ways matter and antimatter are opposites is charge, then what does it
mean that neutrinos are neutral? Does that mean neutrinos and antineutrinos are
the same thing, only differing in the particles (positrons or electrons)
produced along with them? Scientists aren’t sure." [Quoted from
here; accessed 26/08/2023.]
But, if they were 'dialectical opposites' they
should struggle with, and then turn into, one another, if the
DM-Classics are to be believed. And yet,
when they meet these two beauties should annihilate one another, not turn into
each other. However, neutrino/antineutrino annihilation has yet to be observed
-- but they certainly don't turn into one another. In that case, are DM-fans
willing to allow these reactionary 'particles', which break fundamental
dialectical rules with seeming impunity, free access to their "Totality"?
Changing the subject: concerning recent work on the "magnetic monopole", see
here. But, have that rather odd entity actually been discovered?
This site says "Yes!", but as
late as February 2022
Physics Today was still arguing that
its existence has yet to be confirmed.
I hesitate to add any links to such reports about
the alleged discovery of this illusive 'form
of matter' since scientists seem to change
their minds almost weekly: "Dark Matter has been discovered..., er...,
Hang on! No, it hasn't.... Oh yes it has..., er..., Ah..., erm..., Wait..., er..., um..., er...".
Update November 2012: Sure enough, the
above reported detection proved to be yet another false alarm:
"Doubt cast on Fermi's dark matter smoking gun
"Lisa Grossman
"It was hailed as a smoking gun for
dark matter, raising hopes that we might finally
pinpoint the particle that is thought to make up 80 per cent of the mass in the
universe. But purported evidence of dark matter interactions in the centre of
our galaxy may not be as solid as hoped. Most physicists think dark matter is made of
weakly interacting massive particles, or WIMPs, which
only interact with normal matter via gravity. When two WIMPs meet, they should
annihilate and spew out new particles, including high-energy gamma rays. The
Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope searches for dark
matter by seeking these gamma rays. If it detects more gamma rays of a certain
energy than known sources can explain, that would be thought by many to be a
sign of WIMPs. 'This kind of narrow, distinct feature is not really
predicted to come from any other process,' says Fermi team member Andrea Albert
of Ohio State University.
"That's why scientists were abuzz in April, when
Christoph
Weniger of the Max Planck Institute for Physics in
Munich, Germany, reported observing a spike in gamma rays at 130
gigaelectronvolts (GeV). These were coming from the Milky Way's centre and had
no obvious astrophysical source. While not a member of the Fermi team, Weniger was able to
analyse publicly available data from 3.5 years of telescope observations. Other
physicists looked at the same data and agreed that the signal was strong enough
not to be a random fluctuation. Either the telescope was behaving oddly, or it
was seeing dark matter particles with energies of 130 GeV.
"'If the latter is true, it would dwarf the Higgs boson
discovery,' wrote physics blogger Jester on his blog
Resonaances.
The Fermi team remained quiet about the finding at the
time, but their reaction was hotly anticipated. In addition to having a full
four years' worth of data to analyse, the team also has access to an important
cross-check on any possible signal.
Dark matter should pool at the galaxy's centre, with
negligible amounts surrounding Earth. What Earth does have, however, is a ring
of gamma rays produced when
cosmic rays
strike the atmosphere. If, when Fermi is
pointed at this ring, Weniger's 130 GeV gamma ray signal shows up there, it
suggests that it isn't a dark matter signal. 'It's a good place for a sanity
check,' says Albert.
"The team first had to reprocess their data from the
galactic centre to account for a glitch caused by a damaged instrument on the
telescope. That revealed that the signal had shifted from 130 to 135 GeV,
Albert told the Fourth International Fermi Symposium in Monterey,
California, on 2 November. What's more, that signal had faded to statistical
insignificance. 'The feature's gotten a little smaller,' she says. 'It
hasn't gone away completely, but we do not see it to be very significant. At
this point, we have to cast doubt on this being a dark matter line.' The signal also showed up in the ring of gamma rays
around Earth, but it seems to account for only half of that detected from the
galactic centre, and there is no good way to explain why it is there. 'There is
nothing obvious, at least to me, that connects the galactic centre and the
[gamma-ray ring],' Weniger says.
"It could be that there is a fault with the Fermi team's
data processing methods, or that one line is false and the other is real. For
now, though, Weniger thinks there is still room for the line to be a dark matter
sign. 'It's difficult to get attached to a feature, because they come and go
often,' he says. 'But it could be the real thing. It could be the most exciting
discovery of the decade.'" [New
Scientist, 10/11/2012, p.15. Links in the original. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphases added.
Several paragraphs merged. The on-line article has a different title to the
print edition.]
And, in August 2023
we hear that the
JWST (telescope) has just found evidence of 'Super-massive Dark
Matter Stars'
Should an emergency meeting ofthe UDAC
be convened in order to decide whether or not Dark Matter is to be
counted as a legitimate member of the "Totality" or yet another interloper?
After all 'it' comprises up to 85% of matter in the entire universe
(so we are told -- although
other sources say it merely represents 27% of "visible matter"). If anything
should be counted as a member of the "Totality", it would seem this should. But is it?
We have yet to be told.
[For 'Red
Mercury', see Grant (2007), pp.130-32. See also
here.]
21a.
A relatively recent article in Socialist Worker highlighted the problems
faced by
DM-fans
who try to account for scientific
progress:
"Why
mass matters: the Higgs boson and particle physics
"Alice
Livingstone Boomla explains why we should care about the discovery of the Higgs
boson.
"Scientists have discovered a new particle -- which seems likely to be the
elusive Higgs boson. They have spent six decades trying to confirm what is
called the
Standard Model of particle physics. The Higgs boson is the last remaining
piece in the jigsaw of particles predicted by the theory. It has
unhelpfully become known as the God Particle. The hype around it fits into the
ideology of a quest for a
Theory of Everything -- an idea that carries almost theological significance
for some physicists.
"But it's
possible the discovery may not neatly confirm the theory, but expose its
contradictions and point towards new theories. The theory predicted the
existence of a large number of sub-atomic particles, only a few of which can be
observed in normal matter. Finding the others meant creating a 'particle soup'
through high-energy collisions in gigantic particle accelerators. Since
2000 it only remained to discover the Higgs boson, the particle which gives all
matter its mass. This was a mammoth task, because the Higgs boson was predicted
to decay too quickly to be observed directly. But we can see the particles it
decays into.
"Scientists compared the particles they expected to see if the Higgs boson had
been present with those they'd expect if it didn't exist. They have discovered a
new particle. And this new particle corresponds very closely to the predictions
for the Higgs boson. But it also appears to have some properties that don't
quite match. The
discovery points towards new theories and new hunts to embark on. For example
the theory of 'supersymmetry'
suggests that we may have found just one of five different Higgs bosons. That
gives the
Large Hadron Collider plenty to do before it shuts for a two year refit at
the end of this year.
"Revolutions
"Science
progresses through contradictions and revolutions. New evidence and new ideas
are constantly exposing contradictions within the theories that are widely
accepted. These contradictions open the door to overturning the old theory with
a new one that fits better -- until the cycle is repeated and a new scientific
revolution is needed to go beyond that theory in turn.
"The
Standard Model itself came out of an attempt to reconcile one of the fundamental
contradictions in 20th century physics -- between Einstein's theory of general
relativity and the strange new observations of quantum mechanics. It is
easy to fall into one of two traps. One is the narrow focus that scientists are
often pressured to take in order to prove the practical value of their research
for the purpose of funding. The other is the mysticism that saw even Stephen
Hawking argue that with the right theory scientists could know 'the mind of
God'. Frederick
Engels argued that 'Natural science developed in the midst of general revolution
and was itself thoroughly revolutionary'. [Quoting
Engels (1954), p.22 -- RL] The scientific breakthroughs of giants
like Galileo and Newton took place in the context of the rise of the capitalist
bourgeoisie against the old feudal order. New
social and productive forces raised new arguments. As Engels put it, although
'production owes to science...science owes infinitely more to production'.
[Quoting
Engels (1954), p.185 -- RL.]
"Today we
also see how capitalism can distort science and hold it back. Duplication of
effort between competing scientists, and between states, diverts resources. And
to get funding in universities, scientists have to look to research with obvious
profitable applications, or which fits in to the most fashionable theories. So
while we celebrate the new breakthroughs, we should also look forward to the
scientific revolutions that would be possible in a society based on cooperation
around human need." [Socialist
Worker, 2311, 14/07/2012, p.10.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Several paragraphs merged. Links added; bold emphases in the original.]
[See also an article on this topic in
Appendix A.]
Scientific change will be discussed in more detail
in Essay Thirteen Part Two (when it is published). However, anyone who accepts
DM must in the end disagree with the above remarks about the development of
science. Here is why (the following has been taken from an edited version of
a letter a supporter of this
site sent to Socialist Worker soon after the above article appeared):
If nature is fundamentally contradictory, then dialecticians can't
in the end distinguish
those contradictions that supposedly reflect nature accurately from those that are simply
the product of a defective theory, the continued acceptance of which would hold up
scientific development.
On the other hand, if dialecticians think nature is fundamentally
contradictory, why offer advice to physicists that they
should conduct more research to remove contradictions in a theory if that
theory reflects the fact that nature is contradictory? Surely, the more 'true' a
theory is the more it should reflect the contradictions they think exist in
nature. Hence, a 'true' theory should contain more contradictions than one that
isn't. But, if science progresses by removing such contradictions, then this
should produce theories that tell us that nature isn't contradictory, after all!
Alternatively, if scientists don't remove such contradictions, perhaps on the
grounds that a contradictory theory should reflect contradictory nature more
accurately (i.e., if they take the advice offered by dialecticians),
this would permanently hold up the progress of science.
We can call this The Dialecticians' Dilemma, for which there is no solution --
if, that is, we take advice on science and philosophy from Hegel and/or Engels.
[More details
here
and
here.]
They chose not to publish this letter.
No prizes for guessing
why...
22.However, if the existence of the
Higgs Boson
were
to be rejected at some point in the future, the
Standard Model (already
under serious threat,
so we are told) couldn't survive, and
structures like the
Higgs Field
will also need to be
'edited out of' the "Totality".
[Cf., New Scientist,
08/12/01, Leader Article, p.3.] Several alternative, rival theories that challenge the
Standard Model have already been proposed and are waiting patiently in the
wings. [On that, see
here,
here and
here.]
The problem is: which of the above represents,
or 'reflects', the 'objective' DM-"Totality"?
Update June 2011: The BBC now reports the following:
"The head of the US's biggest particle
physics lab has appointed an expert committee to establish whether or not a new,
unanticipated sub-atomic particle has been detected by scientists. Such a discovery, hinted at by
experts in April, would mark one of the most radical changes to physics in
years. But separate science teams at the
Tevatron
accelerator are at loggerheads over the matter. The Tevatron is the US rival to
Europe's
Large Hadron Collider
(LHC).
"The American machine is operated by
the
Fermi
National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) in Batavia, Illinois. Two separate multi-purpose detectors
-- or experiments -- analyse data from particle collisions at the Tevatron:
DZero and CDF. Each can cross-check the other team's
discoveries. The committee, set up by Fermilab
director Pier Oddone, will aim to resolve the differences between scientists
working on the CDF and DZero experiments. The panel members will 'compare
notes', aiming to determine the cause of the signal seen by CDF team members,
but not by DZero physicists. Professor Giovanni Punzi,
co-spokesperson for the CDF team, told BBC News: 'DZero did not confirm our
result, but it is not clear they reject it either. So we need to do more work
and look at more data.'
"He said the estimated size of the 'excess' -- the
possible signal of a new particle -- seen by CDF was affected by a large
statistical uncertainty. Because of this, he said, 'it is quite likely that the
disagreement [between the CDF and DZero analyses] is not nearly as large as it
appeared at first glance'.
"Comparing
notes
"The CDF team was analysing data from
collisions between protons and their anti-matter counterparts antiprotons. In
these collisions, particles known as
W bosons
are produced, along with a pair of 'jets' of other particles.
It was in these jets that the
unexpected 'bump' in the team's data
came to light,
potentially representing a particle that the widely accepted theory of particle
physics -- known as the
Standard
Model -- does not anticipate. Confirmation of the CDF results would have signalled a
radical change in physics. But last week, an independent analysis of the data
carried out by the DZero team
failed to find support for the observation.
Professor Stefan Soldner-Rembold,
spokesperson for the DZero collaboration, commented: 'The probability that the
CDF effect is really new physics is very low.'
"He told BBC News that the data bump
might have been caused by the procedure used to...remove the 'background' from
the soup of interactions produced by particle collisions in the Tevatron. However, he added: 'We would also be
open to other possible explanations.' As spokespeople for the CDF and DZero
collaborations respectively, Professor Punzi and Professor Soldner-Rembold will
sit on the committee. Fermilab theoreticians Estia Eichten
and Keith Ellis have also been appointed to the panel. There is currently no timeline for
the committee to report back, but one source said they hoped the matter would be
resolved soon." [Quoted
from
here. Accessed 01/12/2012. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged. Some links added;
minor grammatical error corrected.]
So, should DM-fans:
(a) Tail-end the committee
mentioned in the above article;
(b) 'Dialectically dither'; or,
(c) Set up their own filtering system?
[Since the above was written, The Standard Model has
received several more serious blows. On that, see
Appendix A.]
Indeed, the New Scientist reports
the following:
"Talk about mixed signals. An
inexplicable 'bump' in the data produced by the Tevatron particle collider that
hinted at a brand-new force of nature is nowhere to be found in a second
analysis. In April, members of the CDF
experiment at the Tevatron collider at Fermilab in Batavia, Illinois, reported
finding a curious signal in the debris from collisions between
protons
and
antiprotons.
The signal, which covered eight years' worth of collisions, created a stir
because it hinted at a particle not predicted by the standard model of physics.
"Now an independent analysis by a rival team has failed to
find any sign of the bump (arxiv.org/abs/1106.1921).
It uses the same amount of data as the CDF team, but this data was collected at
a different detector at the Tevatron, called DZero. 'Nope, nothing here --
sorry,' says Dmitri Denisov, a DZero spokesman. 'We're basically excluding a
signal at the 99.9992 per cent confidence level. The result shows good agreement
with the standard model.'
"Both studies look at how often
collisions between protons and antiprotons produce a particle called a W boson
and a pair of jets of quarks. But other events, involving different combinations
of particles, can mimic that signal, so if the CDF team incorrectly modelled the
number of those 'background' signals it might make it look as if there were a
bump in the data, Denisov says.
"Rob Roser, a spokesman for CDF, says
that is a possibility but argues that it's too soon to discount CDF's result:
'We have more work ahead of us before we understand what is going on.' To try to resolve the discrepancy,
Fermilab is putting together a task force that will include members of both
teams. But the final answer may come from the Large Hadron Collider at CERN near
Geneva, Switzerland, which will be able to collect more data than the Tevatron."
[New
Scientist210, 2817, 18/06/2011, p.6.
Accessed 02/12/2012. Several paragraphs merged; some links added.]
Well, is this mysterious 'particle' part of the
"Totality", or not?
[Apologies are owed to critics of the LEM -- since
their
answer to that question must surely be, "both". However, having
said that,
this video and Video Five explain why this keeps
happening in Physics, why anomalies keep arising and why new particles/forces
are 'discovered' only to 'disappear' a few weeks/months down the line.]
[LEM = Law of Excluded
Middle.]
Incidentally,the UDAC,
if one exists, will also need to decide whether or not Possible Worlds (mooted
earlier) exist, 'objectively', or not.
Until then dialecticians should console themselves with the
thought that there is a possible world where
the UDAC has already met and decided they do
exist. Unfortunately, there is also a possible world
where the opposite conclusion has been reached, just as there is third
possible world where ultra-hard-core-dialecticians
on the UDAC have decided that they both exist and don't exist, which is
the outcome one might
well have expected if it turns out that 'possible worlds' that contain 'possible selection committees' are
every bit as 'contradictory' as their
this-worldly counterparts are said to be.
Since writing much of this Essay I have
had the distinct pleasure of reading Eric Lerner's book, The Big Bang Never Happened
[Lerner (1991)]. Lerner is an Astrophysicist who is either a Marxist or
has been heavily influenced by Marxism. Comrades who think that modern
Physics is 'closer to the truth' than classical Physics would be well advised to
study Lerner's
book rather closely. [Several more general comments on this specific topic will be added to a later Essay.
Additional details
can be accessed at Lerner's
Home Page.
On this, see also
Note 26, as well as
here and
here, but balance both with
this.]
I have adopted no position concerning the validity or otherwise of the
BBT.
That
is something scientists must decide for themselves. But, the more they disagree,
dither or change their minds the stronger becomes the case against the
'objectivity' of the DM-"Totality" --, that is, if
dialecticians are determined to base both its existence and nature of the latter on the fickle decisions
of the former.
Questions might now be asked about the consistency
of the present author's remarks. One minute DM-theorists are taken to task for
allegedly tail-ending scientists and what they believe, the next we read
comments like the following: "I have adopted no position concerning the
validity or otherwise of the
BBT.
That is something scientists must decide for themselves."
Which is it to be?
Do we tail-end scientists or not?
This apparent inconsistency is easily resolved:
dialecticians who believe in the existence of the nebulous "Totality"
--
originally dreamt up by card-carrying mystics -- are the ones guilty of
inconsistency (i.e., in relation to their attempt to combine science with
mysticism), not yours truly, for pointing this out. I have nowhere said I accept
everything that scientists have to say, only that, in relation to what does or
doesn't exist or which theories are or aren't valid (and until something better turns up), science is
currently our only reliable long term guide. However, there is
no suggestion that everything scientists come out with should be uncritically
accepted, especially given what we now know about the history and sociology of science,
coupled with
the baleful influence bourgeois ideology often has on it (both of which topics will be covered in
Essay Thirteen Part Two).
The point at issue here revolves around the fact that DM-theorists have
yet to provide any clear and unambiguous details about their "Totality".
Furthermore, if they are determined to allow scientists to tell them what it contains, then,
as we have seen, at the very least 'it' will need to be fitted with
a well-oiled
revolving door.
22aa.Perhaps aimed at those who think science has at last 'matured', and that there will be no
more
fundamental changes to the way scientists conceptualise 'reality', a recent
article in the New Scientist (also quoted earlier) had this to say:
"Every now and again cosmologists decide that the
universe needs redecorating. Sometimes they declutter, as when
Copernicus
and
Kepler shuffled the sun and the Earth to get rid of all those epicycles and make
the planets move in straightforward orbits. Sometimes they embellish, as when
Einstein decided that there's more to space than good old-fashioned nothingness,
and introduced the concept of a deformable space-time.
"They are at it again, but this time it's
different. Like the decorator who strips away a layer of wallpaper to reveal a
crumbling wall, cosmologists are realising that their findings point to serious
problems with their models of the structure of the universe. This discovery is
forcing them to contemplate bold changes to fix the damage. When they are done, chances are we will hardly
recognise the old place. 'It will repaint not only our picture of the universe
but perhaps particle physics, gravitational physics and
string
theory too,' says
Rocky Kolb, a cosmologist at Fermilab in Batavia, Illinois.
"The problem giving cosmologists their big
headache goes under the name of 'dark energy'. This enigmatic entity -- which
could be some kind of a substance, or a field, or maybe something else entirely
-- forced itself into cosmologists' consciousness in 1998, when astronomers
discovered that something is speeding up the expansion of the universe. Almost a
decade later, it is beginning to sink in that there is no easy way to understand
what dark energy might be. The problem has become so intractable that many now
see it as the greatest challenge facing physics....
"It is a viewpoint shared by
cosmologists everywhere. 'We are definitely seeing something extra in the
universe, we just do not know how to interpret it yet,' says [Ofer
Lahav of University College London]. And that has given cosmologists a new sense
of purpose. A seismic shift in our understanding of the universe is coming. How
soon it will arrive and from what direction it will come -- that's still
anyone's guess." [Clark (2007), pp.28, 33.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Links added; several paragraphs merged.]
Those who remain unconvinced by the above might like to
consult
Smolin
(2006) -- The Trouble with Physics (with replies to critics,
here) --, which argues rather forcefully that a
major change in the way we interpret nature is long overdue, in view of the fact that
not only have there been no fundamental advances in Physics for well over thirty years,
current theories look less secure with each passing month.
[Of course, that, too, was written
before the Higgs Boson was 'discovered' and gravitational waves were detected. See also, Lindley (1993), Smolin (2013),
Woit (2006), Baggott (2013), Becker (2018) and
Hossenfelder (2018).]
In fact,Lindley's book is well worth quoting in
this regard:
"In 1960,
the Hungarian-American physicist
Eugene Wigner published an essay entitled 'The Unreasonable Effectiveness of
Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.' This was by no means the plaintive lament
of an aging scientist who couldn't cope with the increasing mathematical
sophistication and complication of modern physics: Wigner himself was a
distinguished theoretical physicist, who in the 1940s had encouraged his
colleagues to take up new kinds of mathematics, the theory of symmetries in
particular. What nagged at Wigner was the evident fact that mathematics is
invented by mathematicians for quite their own reasons and purposes, yet seems
inexorably to find its way into theories of the physical sciences. This transfer
had become increasingly noticeable in the twentieth century, as physicists found
places in their theories for the mathematics of curved geometries, symmetry
relations, matrix algebra, and the like -- concepts produced during the heyday
of Victorian science and regarded at that time as the purest of pure
mathematics. What puzzled Wigner puzzled many others, including Albert Einstein:
'How can it be that mathematics,' he once asked, 'being a product of human
thought which is independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the
objects of reality?'...
"The
modern version of the end of physics looks quite different from the classical
version. Nineteenth-century physicists believed that physics would be complete
when every natural phenomenon could be described in essentially mechanical
terms, by means of pictures based on forces and masses and rods and pulleys and
strings. These pictures were to be taken quite literally; to the classical
physicist, the fact that a physical phenomenon could be represented in such
homely terms was the very indication that truth had been uncovered. But the
modern physicist has done away with naďve mechanical models and believes that
truth is to be found in logical, mathematical structures, no matter how bizarre
and uncommonsensical they seem, no matter whether we will ever be able to
perceive the purity of the structure directly. The most recent speculation
of the theoretical physicists is that elementary particles are not particles at
all but vibrations of tiny loops of quantum-mechanical string, wriggling around
in twenty-six-dimensional space. This is the modern equivalent of the classical
physicist's hope that all matter could be understood in terms of atoms that
behaved essentially like little billiard balls. If strings rippling through
twenty-six-dimensional space turn out to be the basis for our ultimate
understanding of nature, the end of physics will hardly resemble the neat
mechanical vision of classical days.
"Modern
particle physics is, in a literal sense, incomprehensible. It is grounded not in
the tangible and testable notions of objects and points and pushes and pulls but
in a sophisticated and indirect mathematical language of fields and interactions
and wave-functions. The old concepts are in there somewhere, but in heavy
disguise. To the outsider, it may seem that the theoretical physicists of today
are in the grip of a collective mathematical zaniness, inventing
twenty-six-dimensional spaces and filling them with strings out of obfuscatory
glee. Their use of language is as esoteric and bafflingas that of the
literary deconstructionists: they seem to speak in words and sentences, but it
is a kind of code. The mathematical physicist and the deconstructionist share
the same popular image: each speaks in a private gobbledygook understandable
only to those similarly initiated. It is easy to imagine that both are lost in a
world of pointless fabulation....
"On the
other hand, the inexorable progress of physics from the world we can see and
touch into a world made accessible only by huge and expensive experimental
equipment, and on into a world illuminated by the intellect alone, is a genuine
cause for alarm. Even within the community of particle physicists there are
those who think that the trend toward increasing abstraction is turning
theoretical physics into recreational mathematics, endlessly amusing to those
who can master the techniques and join the game, but ultimately meaningless
because the objects of the mathematical manipulations are forever beyond the
access of experiment and measurement. When physicists come up with a new
mathematical construction in which different pieces of fundamental physics are
incorporated, it is natural enough for them to think they have achieved a
further step toward complete unification and passed another milestone on the
road to the end of physics. But what is the use of a theory that looks
attractive but contains no additional power of prediction, and makes no
statements that can be tested? Does physics then become a branch of aesthetics?
"If there
is an end of physics, in short, can we ever get there, and how will we know we
have arrived? If the ultimate theory deals in entities that are, by their very
construction, irreconcilably divorced from the measurable world, does it make
any sense even to think that there is an ultimate theory? Will the end of
physics be reached not because we have discovered all the answers but because
the questions that remain are forever unanswerable, so that we must simply make
do with what we have?" [Lindley (1993), pp.1-20. Link and bold emphases added.]
And this
comes from the blurb to the same book:
"For more than a century, physicists have hoped that they were closing in on the
Holy Grail of modern science -- a unifying theory that would make sense of the
entire physical world, from the subnuclear realm of quarks and gluons, to the
very moment of the creation of the universe. This book is a history of the
attempts to find a 'theory of everything', arguing that it will never be found,
and warning that the compromises necessary to produce a final theory may well
undermine the rules of doing good science. At the heart of the book is the rise
of the particle physicists, and their attempts to reach far out into the cosmos
for a unifying theory.
Working beyond the grasp of the largest telescopes or the most powerful particle
accelerators, and unable to subject their findings and theories to experimental
scrutiny, they have moved into a world governed by mathematical and highly
speculative theorizing, none of which can be empirically verified.
David Lindley argues that a theory of everything derived from particle physics
will be full of untested -- and untestable -- assumptions. And if physicists
yield to such speculation, the field will retreat from the high ground of
science, becoming instead a modern mythology. This would surely be the end of
physics as it is known today." [Bold emphasis added.]
And here is the blurb from Baggott's book:
"In this stunning new volume, Jim Baggott argues
that there is no observational or experimental evidence for many of the ideas of
modern theoretical physics: super-symmetric particles, super strings, the
multiverse, the holographic principle, or the anthropic cosmological principle.
These theories are not only untrue, it [sic] is not even science. It is fairy-tale
physics: fantastical, bizarre and often outrageous, perhaps even
confidence-trickery. This book provides a much-needed antidote. Informed,
comprehensive, and balanced, it offers lay readers the latest ideas about the
nature of physical reality while clearly distinguishing between fact and
fantasy...." [Baggott (2013). Bold emphasis added.]
This topic will become a major theme of
Essay Thirteen Part Two -- i.e., the claim that modern Physics only 'works' because the
universe is now widely regarded a giant mathematical object (an idea
covered rather well in this PBS video, which also summarises
the core ideas expressed in Tegmark
(2015)). This means that in its present state much of modern Physics is just an elaborate
and highly technical reincarnation of
old-fashioned Idealism (i.e., Platonism). But, what else might one expect of Late
Capitalism?
In relation to 'Cosmic Inflation', we read the
following (in an
Editorial published in the June 7th, 2008 edition of the New Scientist):
"Ptolemy,
the ancient Greek astronomer, is renowned in scientific circles for thinking up
a
cosmological system in
which the sun and planets orbit the Earth. It had to be tweaked to fit every new
astronomical observation, and the end result was an elaborate system of
epicycles. When
Copernicus showed that the observations fitted more elegantly with a theory
in which the Earth went around the sun, Ptolemy's work became redundant. Now
when scientists call a system Ptolemaic, they mean it is clunky, over-elaborate
and in need of a revolution. One theory facing such an accusation is
inflation, the idea that something caused the universe to blow up rapidly
moments after the big bang. When
Alan Guth
proposed it in 1980, inflation solved almost all the problems with big bang
cosmology. It still does -- but physicists are beginning to doubt whether it
really is the answer." [New
Scientist2569, 07/06/08, p.5.
Paragraphs merged; some links added.]
And a few pages later
we encounter these remarks:
"Sometimes cosmology talks can be exciting -- riveting
even. Take, for instance, the occasion when a young graduate student called Alan
Guth heard all about the serious problems with the big bang theory. It was so
provocative and stimulating it led Guth, now a professor at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, to make one of the most audacious suggestions in
science.
"Guth's idea is called inflation and it suggested that the
major problems in cosmology could be solved if the universe had blown up like a
balloon, inflating faster than the speed of light in the moments after its
birth.
The lecture that inspired Guth was more than 25 years ago
and the idea of inflation is still king in cosmology. How ironic, then, that the
talk now threatening to dethrone inflation was such a snoozefest. 'It was the
most boring talk you've ever heard,' says
Benjamin Wandelt, a
cosmologist at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. And Wandelt should know -- he was doing the talking.
Speaking at a conference on
the first moments of the universe,
held last December in Cambridge, UK, he described how satellite measurements of
the
cosmic microwave background radiation (CMB), the echo of the big bang, seem
to contradict the predictions of inflation. Wandelt claims his analysis puts
inflation to its most precise test yet -- and that the theory seems to have
failed.
"Most physicists find this hard to swallow, so to get
anyone to even think about accepting his analysis Wandelt had to spend his
allotted hour refuting a seemingly endless litany of possible flaws. That's why
his talk was so dull. 'I had to examine effect after effect after effect,' he
says. It was worth the effort, though. Wandelt's analysis was published last
month in the prestigious journal Physical Review Letters (Volume
100, p. 181301), an outcome that will surprise
anyone who thought inflation was ironclad. It is, in fact, one of a number of
recent setbacks for inflation, which is starting to look a little vulnerable." [Brooks
(2008), p.31. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site; some links added. Several paragraphs merged.]
Predictably,
though,
as we saw earlier, in 2014 scientists began to
regale the public with the opposite story about Inflation, that recent
date supported this theory!
But, if Inflation is finally rejected,
BBT
is in big trouble.
Indeed,
in a different area of science, on the basis of recent research
we are now being told that the connection between saturated fat and heart disease is "a myth", and that
such fats could in fact
help
prevent heart
disease. This, after being told the opposite for decades. [On that, also see
Appendix A.]
Does any of the above even look
like 'mature science'?
Despite all this, every so often some bright
spark will try to sell us the idea
that science has finally 'matured'. For example, back in the 1890s (a few years
before contemporaneous physical theory was shaken to the core by Einstein and
research that later coalesced into
QM), Lord Kelvin is supposed to have
informed the world that Physics had solved every single one of its problems. All
that remained was for scientists to calculate the physical constants to a greater degree of accuracy:
"There is nothing new to be discovered in physics
now. All that remains is more and more precise measurement." [Quoted from
here. Although
there is considerable doubt that these were Kelvin's words; they
are more likely to have been those of that other great Physicist,
Albert Michelson (apparently quoting Kelvin): "An eminent physicist remarked
that the future truths of physical science are to be looked for in the sixth
place of decimals."]
Perennial optimism like this flies in the face of
everything we know about the history of science; indeed, this rosy view of
science is
regularly undermined as each batch of prematurely crowned 'mature theories'/'facts'
is replaced
sixty or seventy years
later (or, in some cases, even sooner) by a new crop of 'mature theories'.
Science, it seems, has 'matured' more times than a lorry load of
Cheddar Cheese. [On that, see also
here.]
Figure Seventeen: Mature? Or Just
Rancid?
However, it is important to add that the above comments shouldn't be seen as yet
another example of an 'anti-science bias' supposedly evident at this site. In
fact, such remarks question the fetishisation of current
theory as if it were Gospel Truth or had been written on Stone Tablets. [I return to this theme in more detail in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
In fact, as we will see in that Essay, the
'laws' scientists discover are more accurately to be described as rules (the
argument in support of that controversial claim has been
summarised
here). In that case, when one 'law' is
abandoned, modified or has been replaced, all that really changes are the rules
we use to help us understand and control nature. Since truths as such feature
nowhere in such theories (because they are rules and rules aren't capable of being true or false, they can only be practical
or impractical, useful or useless, obeyed or disobeyed), it means that the 'problem' of
explaining how one set of 'truths'/'laws' can suddenly become 'false' (or lose
their 'objectivity') simply vanishes. Theories can neither
gain a truth-value nor lose one. They just cease to be useful -- where "useful"
is defined in terms of our attempt to understand and control nature.
Of course, when I say that "truths as such feature
nowhere in this" I am referring to the rules themselves, not
empirical propositions, as such. I have said much more about that in Essays Twelve
Part One
and Thirteen Part Two.
22a.
This
introduces issues loosely connected with
Russell's
Paradox, mentioned earlier. I have omitted consideration of that
Paradox in this Essay since, in its technical form, it depends heavily on MFL
and Set Theory, the former of which, despite disclaimers to the contrary, is
largely rejected by DM-fans (an attitude that has hitherto invariably been based on
almost total ignorance, as we
discovered in
Essay Four).
So, rather
like Creationists, whose ideas are also predicated on woeful ignorance of The Theory of Evolution (and,
indeed, of science in general), dialecticians' self-inflicted ignorance of FL is
largely the result of their preferential acceptance of Sub-Aristotelian Obscurantism,
an unwise move
further
compounded by the adoption of key elements of
Christian Mysticism
(courtesy of Hegel -- upside down or 'the right way up') of the sort we have met
in this Essay and in
other Essays published at this site.
However, as we will see in the
main body of the present Essay, the 'problems' the nebulous DM-"Totality"
brings in its train turn out to be a discursive, or even a less technical
version of the 'difficulties' highlighted by
Russell's Paradox. [On that, see Hellman (2006).]
[FL = Formal Logic; MFL = Modern FL.]
22b. Essay Thirteen
Part
One showed that if we were to give credence to Lenin's (or
even Engels's) characterisation of the 'objective' world and our knowledge
of it, it would be possible to show that the universe (howsoever it is defined) could
even
contain 'God'! Such a result shouldn't really surprise us since DM is itself a crude version of
Hegel's
theory (supposedly flipped through 180ş and then stripped of its mystical
outer shell). Readers are referred to that Essay for further details.
23. Any who still harbour doubts should perhaps re-read what Lenin actually said:
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and
unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…. In brief, dialectics can be
defined as
the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the
cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials',
one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of
dialectics…. In
mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and
reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the
combination and dissociation of atoms….
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity
of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added.
Several paragraphs merged.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
[The supposedly 'contradictory' nature of
sub-atomic particles
will be examined in more detail in a later version of Essay Seven Part One. Until then, readers are directed
here, in addition to several remarks made earlier about the
recent
discovery of the Tetraneutron, a 'particle' that consists of four
neutrons. That clearly means this 'particle' isn't 'held together' by positive and negative charges,
and hence isn't a UO. As such it must be
changeless, if DM-theorists are to be believed.]
Examples of dogmatic assertions that claim nature is
fundamentally 'contradictory' are found throughout the
DM-literature.
[On that, see Essay
Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three.]
Two excellent examples of the genre are
Baghavan (1987) -- which uncannily
resembles the sophomoric material inflicted on humanity by
Jehovah's Witnesses (e.g.,
here and
here) --, and Woods and Grant
(1995/2007); ditto on those two, but in their case substitute
Creation Science
for the JWs (e.g., for instance,
here).
In this respect, Rees's book is itself
a 'revisionist' text, and that is probably because, as he admits, he approached this topic
via a study of
Lukaçs. Rees largely ignores or perhaps even downplays key
areas of the 'dialectics of nature',
applying 'dialectics' mainly to human social and economic development. [Of course, that would
seem to imply humanity isn't part of nature!]
Just over a
decade after his book was published Reesresigned from the UK-SWP,
and since then the reputation
of TAR among his ex-comrades has slipped markedly.
[Concerning that specific allegation, I am speaking
here from
personal experience based on Internet discussions I have had with a number of SWP members, and
nothing more. Anyway, as far as can be ascertained, TAR is no longer referenced
to the same extent by his former comrades, since 'orthodoxy' now clearly depends
on whether or not an author still possesses a UK-SWP membership card, or is to
be found among a 'favoured' group of non-members! In its place, the SWP published the vastly inferior Molyneux (2012),
then
two embarrassingly weak articles,
and later still
a number of stunningly unimpressive videos (which just recycled the same tired
old material). However, Molyneux's book and those two articles do in fact list TAR in the Guide to
Further Reading -- p.215 and the 'References' sections, respectively.]
23a.
Unfortunately, dialecticians can't
stipulatein advance what the "Totality" contains without lapsing into
some form of dogmatic apriorism.
On the other hand, they can't avoid asserting at least something about
'it', no matter how vague, otherwise they risk
denying 'it' of all content (indeed, as we have seen). Hence, they find themselves trapped between the rock of
dogmaticapriorism and the hard place of banal vacuity. In the end
they have only succeeded in promoting an
all but
empty theory that relies far more on faith than it does on fact. [On that, see Essay
Thirteen
Part One.]
Earlier,
we saw that was the case with George Novack.
It could be objected that DM-theorists don't
reject FL they merely highlight its specificlimitations,
especially in relation to change and development. However, readers will
no doubt have noticed that the comments in the main body of this Essay
pointedly related to the reservations
DM-fans have expressed about the LOC.
The, shall we say, unhappy relationship between DM
and FL was covered in detail in
Essay
Four.
[FL = Formal Logic; LOC =
Law of Non-Contradiction; DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Nevertheless, it could still be
argued that the discussion in the main body of this
Essay fails to show why dialecticians are in any way forced to accept
the possible existence of impossible objects, fabulous beasts and assorted imaginary beings.
That
isn't so. It was pointed out that there are two unique
featuresof DM that mean -- unlike others -- its supporters can't
actually rule
such things out:
(i) The alleged
infinitary nature of knowledge; and,
(ii) Their
belief in the actual existence of countless 'true contradictions' and 'paradoxes'
throughout nature and society.
In relation
to (i) and (ii) -- as has also been pointed out
here -- it is worth adding that if
the search for knowledge is infinite, then at any point in history humanity must be
infinitely ignorant of everything (since the gap between any finite body
of knowledge and an infinite amount is itself infinite). In that case, if
every 'contradictory' DM-object and process has been issued with an Access All Areas
Pass in relation to the "Totality" (and we have been led to believe they all possess
one such because of all those 'universal inter-connections'), then DM-theorists can't rule out the possibility that one day
scientists might discover, or even conclude that some of these weird and
wonderful beasts actually do exist.
Of course,
that possibility can be ruled out in advance as completely ridiculous -- but only
by
historical
materialists who don't foolishly reject or undermine FL, who don't consider
the latter defective when applied to inferences about this world, who don't accept the
unworkable DM-theory of knowledge,
who don't take logical and philosophical advice from card-carrying mystics, and, perhaps more importantly, who don't
depreciate or denigrate the vernacular.
It could be
objected that the above comments are grossly unfair. Dialecticians use a combination of FL
and DL (in alliance with up-to-date scientific knowledge) in order to assist
them toward a dialectical understanding of the world, in
order to help change it.
To be
sure, DM-fans often say such things -- indeed, Somerville (1967) is an
excellent
example of the genre, as is Molyneux (2012), Chapters Four and Five. But, practically every single DM-fan (including
Somerville and Molyneux) then let slip they are about as cognisant of FL as
George W Bush is of
Quantum Field Theory, so the above
declaration of faux reasonableness is about as convincing as much that
that warmonger has to say, too.
[Anyone interested in just how
many deranged and stupid things George Dubbya has blurted out should consult Carlysle (2006),
which contains 500 pages of classic Bush inanities! Come to think of it, that is nearly as many as the
crass things
DM-fans say about FL.
(Minor exaggeration!)]
Moreover, whenever it suits them DM-fans still seem happy to ignore, if not
actively undermine, the rational principles we ordinarily employ in order to
assist us in
comprehending and controlling nature. Hence, their
'method' is as subjective as it is
opportunistic, just as objections like
the one offered above are self-serving.
Worse still: if nature is indeed riddled with
contradictions (as the many quotations drawn from the DM-grimoire
posted
elsewhere in this Essay
and at this site attest), employing FL to study and understand nature would surely be a
retrograde step -- at least as far as DM-fans see things. That is because FL turns its
face against such reckless abandon. In which case, dialecticians should either
withdraw the claim
that nature contains countless trillion contradictions in each cubic
metre of matter (i.e., in every atom, and possibly in, or in relation to, every sub-atomic particle!), or admit what is
already obvious to non-believers: that they never have used and never will
employ FL to arrive at any conclusion whatsoever, except, of course, those that
appear
to embarrass their opponents. And, in order to do that they will no doubt continue to
use their own
garbled and distorted version of it.
Indeed,
halfway down this linked page readers
will find an excellent example of a DM-fan who bemoans the way that Cosmologists
have imposed their ideas on nature all the while conveniently forgetting that
the DM-tradition to which he belongs has been doing just that for well
over a century, albeit in
this
case with
respect to a different, but vastly inferior, set of Hegel-inspired fantasies.
24a. Anyone tempted to respond with a
dismissive wave of the hand at this point should perhaps join forces with the
hand-waving parents we met earlier.
25.We
also saw that Lenin wasn't alone in this respect.
26. Cf.,
Lerner
(1992) and Mitchell (1995, 2002); cf., also Chown (2005). In addition, see
here,
here and
here -- as well as
Note 28 below and
Note 22 above.
27.
There is an article published at
the
IMT's website that also questions the
'Big Bang' --
accessible
here -- with a contrary view and
discussion,
here. See also, Mason
(2012), which not
only defends the
BBT it
attacks
RIREon that very score -- and, by
implication, the IMT --, using DM to that end!
[Apologies for all those abbreviations, but each one has been
linked to an explanation of what it stands for!]
Readers might also like to check out these videos:
Video Twenty: Marxists
Question Relativity
Video Twenty-One: Further Doubts
Expressed
[There is a third video on this topic posted by the
same comrade,
here.]
As I pointed out in the comments section underneath the
first of the above two YouTube videos, it seems to me that comrade Gimbel (the main
speaker) has uncritically swallowed a theory (DM) that is incomparably weaker than any
that Modern Physics has ever come up with.
Gimbel later engaged with me in discussion over some of these
issues (as did one or two others). Readers are invited to judge
for themselves who is currently 'winning'
that argument.
See also Gimbel (2011), which is itself a towering monument to Dialectical
Obfuscation.
[Incidentally, my posting the above videos doesn't imply I agree
with any of the criticisms of Modern Physics they advance.]
Update January
2020: It looks like my criticisms of Gimbel's version of DM over at YouTube
have been deleted, maybe because comrade Gimbel had no effective response.
27a.
Woods and Grant [W&G], alongside anyone impressed by RIRE, might take exception to the
epithet "quasi-theological" used to describe their version of DM (in the main body of this Essay).
That label was in fact deliberately chosen because of W&G's fondness for
imposing on nature
and society a set of a priori
dogmas imported from
Mystical Christianity and
post-Renaissance
Hermeticism. [On that, see also
Mason
(2012).]
Although there are also these rather unfortunate remarks, courtesy
of
Joseph Dietzgen:
"Friends and Fellow-Citizens:The teachings of
Communism contain the material for a new religionwhich, unlike any other
religion, appeals not merely to the heart and emotions, but at the same time to
the brain, the organ of knowledge. From all other earthly knowledge
communism is distinguished by its religious form, by its fervid appeal to the
heart and soul of man. Generally speaking the object of religion is to save the
suffering soul from the gloom and misery of earthly life. This object it has
thus far realized only in an unreal and fantastic manner, by referring us to an
invisible God and to a Kingdom inhabited by ghosts. The gospel of today
promises to save us from misery in a real and palpable way. God -- that is
the Good, the Beautiful and the Holy -- is to be made man, and is to descend
from heaven unto the earth, not as in the days of old in the flame of religion
and in the spell of wonder, but in reason and reality. We want our saviour, our
Word, to become flesh, and to be materialized not in one individual only. All of
us desire, the people want to become sons of God.
"Religion was until now a matter for the dispossessed. Now,
however, the matter of the dispossessed is becoming religion -- that is,
something which takes hold of the whole heart and soul of those who believe.
The new faith, the faith of the proletariat, revolutionizes everything, and
transforms after the manner of science, the old faiths. In opposition to the
olden times we say: Sun, stand thou still, and Earth, move and transform! In the
old religion man served the gospel, in the new religion the gospel is to serve
man. In order to emancipate humanity from religion not only vaguely but
distinctly and really, it is necessary to overcome religion by analyzing and
fully comprehending it. The new gospel asks for a thorough revision of the whole
system of our thought. According to the old revelation the law was the primary,
the supreme and the eternal, and man the secondary element.
"According
to the new revelation, man is the primary, the supreme and the eternal,
and the law the secondary, temporary and transitory element. We do not live for the sake of the law, but, on the contrary, the law exists
for our sake, to serve us, and to be modified according to our needs. The old
gospel required of us patience and submissiveness;
the new gospel requires of us energy and activity.
In the place of grace it puts conscious work.
The old bible was named authority and faith; the new has for its title
revolutionary science."
[Dietzgen
(1917a), pp.90-91. Bold emphases alone added. Two paragraphs
merged.]
And, of course, we also have the following words from Marx himself:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence
equally to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line
version, here. Bold emphasis and link added.]
Hence, according to Marx, not yours truly:
if you engage in any form of Traditional Philosophy -- more specifically any
inspired by Hegel and other Christian/Hermetic mystics -- it is no use shouting
"Unfair!", or complaining when you' are lumped in with the open-and-honest 'god-botherers' amongst us -- especially if you end up talking like
Dietzgen.
However, I repeat: I am not claiming DM is
a religious dogma only that it operates in an analogous way to one.
[I have said much more about that in Essay
Nine
Part Two.]
28.
So-called "Quantum Entanglement" [QE] was briefly discussed in Essay Seven
Part One,
here.
A recent series of experiments (reported in late summer 2015) are said to
have shown that Einstein was wrong and Bohr right -- in
the controversy between
those two great physicists -- about the
implications of this aspect of
QM. Here is the New Scientist on this:
"It's official: the universe
is weird. Our everyday experience tells us that distant objects cannot influence
each other, and don't disappear just because no one is looking. Even Albert
Einstein was dead against such ideas because they clashed so badly with our view
of the real world. But it turns out we are wrong -- the quantum nature of
reality means, on some level, these things can and do happen. A groundbreaking
experiment puts the final nail in the coffin of our ordinary view of the
universe, settling an argument that has raged for nearly a century. Teams of
physicists around the globe have been racing to perfect this experiment for
decades. Now, a group led by Ronald Hanson at Delft University of Technology in
the Netherlands has finally cracked it. 'It's a very nice and beautiful
experiment, and one can only congratulate the group for that,' says Anton
Zeilinger, head of one of the rival teams at the University of Vienna, Austria.
'Very well done.'
"To understand what
Hanson and his colleagues did, we have to go back to the 1930s, when
physicists were struggling to come to terms with the strange predictions
of the nascent science of quantum mechanics. The theory suggested that
particles could become entangled, so that measuring one would instantly
influence the measurement of the other, even if they were far apart.
What's more, it also suggested that, prior to being measured, a
particle's properties only exist in a fuzzy cloud of probabilities.
"Nonsense, said
Einstein, who famously proclaimed that God does not play dice with the
universe and called entanglement 'spooky action at a distance'. He and
others favoured the principle of local realism, which broadly says that
only nearby objects can influence each other and that the universe is
'real' -- observing it doesn't bring it into existence by crystallising
vague probabilities. They argued that hidden variables at some deeper
layer of reality could explain quantum theory's apparent weirdness. On
the other side, physicists like Niels Bohr insisted that we accept the
new quantum reality, because it explained problems that classical
theories of light and energy couldn't handle.
"In the 1960s, the
debate shifted to Bohr's side.
John Bell, a physicist at
CERN, realised there was a limit to
how connected two particles' properties could be if local realism was to
be believed. He formulated this insight into a mathematical expression
called an inequality. If tests showed that the connection between
particles exceeded the limit he set, local realism was toast. 'This is the magic
of
Bell's inequality,' says
Johannes Kofler, a member of Zeilinger's team. 'It brought an almost
purely philosophical thing, where no one knew how to decide between two
positions, down to a thing you could experimentally test.'
"And test they did.
Experiments have been violating Bell's inequality for decades, and the
majority of physicists now believe Einstein's views on local realism
were wrong. But doubts remained. All prior tests were subject to
potential loopholes, leaving a gap that could allow Einstein's camp to
come surging back. 'The notion of local realism is so ingrained into our
daily thinking, even as physicists, that it is very important to
definitely close all the loopholes,' says Zeilinger.
"A Bell test begins
with a source of photons, which spits out two at a time and sends them
in different directions to two detectors, operated by a hypothetical
pair conventionally known as Alice and Bob. The pair have chosen the
settings on their detectors independently so that only photons with
certain properties can get through. If the photons are entangled, they
can influence each other and repeated tests will show a stronger pattern
between Alice and Bob's measurements than local realism would allow. But
what if Alice and Bob are passing unseen signals -- perhaps through
Einstein's deeper hidden layer of reality -- that allow the detectors to
communicate? Then you couldn't be sure that the particles are truly
influencing each other in their instant, spooky way. This is known as
the locality loophole, and it can be closed by moving the detectors far
enough apart that there isn't enough time for a signal to cross over
before the measurement is complete. Previously, Zeilinger and others did
just that, including shooting photons between two Canary Islands 144
kilometres apart.
"Close one loophole,
though, and another opens. The Bell test relies on building up a
statistical picture with repeated experiments, so it doesn't work if
your equipment doesn't pick up enough photons. The problem gets worse
the further you separate the detectors, seeing as photons can get lost
on the way. So moving the detectors apart to close the locality loophole
begins to widen the detection one. 'There's a trade-off between these
two things,' says Kofler. That meant hard-core local realists always had
a loophole to explain away previous experiments -- until now.
"'Our experiment realizes the first Bell
test that simultaneously addressed both the detection loophole and the
locality loophole,' writes Hanson's team in a paper detailing the study.
In this set-up, Alice and Bob sit in two laboratories 1.3 kilometres
apart, far enough to close the locality loophole. Each laboratory has a
diamond containing an electron with a property called spin. The team
hits the diamonds with randomly produced microwave pulses. This makes
them each emit a photon that is entangled with the electron's spin.
These photons are sent to a third location, C, where a device clocks
their arrival time. If photons arrive from Alice and Bob at exactly the
same time, the two electron spins become entangled with each other. So
the electrons are now entangled across the distance of the two labs --
just what we need for a Bell test. What's more, the detectors observing
their spin are of high enough quality to close the detector loophole.
But the downside is that few pairs of photons arrive at C together --
just a few per hour. The team took 245 measurements, so it was a long
wait. The result was clear: they detected more highly correlated spins
than local realism would allow (arxiv.org/abs/1508.05949v1).
The weird world of quantum mechanics is our world. 'If they've
succeeded, then without any doubt they've done a remarkable experiment,'
says Sandu Popescu of the University of Bristol, UK. But he points out
that most people expected this result -- 'I can't say everybody was
holding their breath to see what happens.'
"What's important is that these kinds
of experiments drive the development of new technology like quantum
cryptography, he says. Networks that use quantum properties to guarantee
secrecy are already springing up across the globe, but the loopholes are
potential bugs in the laws of physics that might have allowed hackers
through. 'Bell tests are a security guarantee,' says Kofler. You could
say Hanson's team just patched the universe." [Quoted from
here; accessed 12/09/2015.
Several paragraphs merged; three links added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Er..., hold the front page!
Apparently, the
controversy hasn't been settled, after all!
This, from the same article:
"There is one loophole left
for local realists to cling to, but no experiment can ever rule it out. What if
there is some kind of link between the random microwave generators and the
detectors? Then Alice and Bob may think they are free to choose the settings on
their equipment, but hidden variables could interfere with the choice and thwart
the Bell test." [Ibid.]
Of course, this takes no account of
additional 'loopholes' that always seem to 'emerge' as science advances, nor does it
consider the serially fickle nature of scientists themselves. In addition, it is
far from clear what the inappropriate metaphors
in the above article are themselves doing. Is equipment
really free to 'choose'
or able to 'think'?
Seventy or eight years ago,
von Neumann constructed a comprehensive mathematical proof that
there were no 'hidden variables' in QM, and hence that theories based on
'local realism' were non-starters. For years this result was believed to be
final and definitive until errors were discovered in the 'proof'. One wonders
how many times this has to happen in the sciences before theorists learn to
exercise a little more caution and a modicum of scepticism -- certainly over
claims like this and the one reported above in the New Scientist. On
this, see Becker (2018), pp.14-15, 66-69. About this we read:
"Proofs of what is impossible, as John Bell once
remarked, often demonstrate little more than their authors' own lack of
imagination. Bell said this in discussion of one of the most famous, and
famously erroneous, impossibility proofs of all time, one constructed in 1932 by
Hungarian physicist John von Neumann. It purported to show that no
hidden-variables interpretation of quantum theory -- one attributing definite
trajectories and other objective properties to quantum systems that might
account deterministically for experimental outcomes -- could possibly reproduce
all the predictions of quantum theory.
"Of course, von Neumann certainly had more than a
little imagination, although this was perhaps not the only time it showed its
limitations. (In the 1950s, he strongly advised US authorities on the wisdom of
an immediate unilateral nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, apparently because
he could see no conceivable way that the two nations might escape eventual
mutual annihilation.) In any event, Bell's phrase does capture a truth -- that
impossibility proofs really demonstrate only what is inconceivable to one mind,
or one set of minds, which may (for all their other wonderful capacities) be
blinkered. Such traps, as history illustrates, afflict us far more frequently
than we expect.
"Von Neumann's mistake was subtle enough -- and on a
topic on which most physicists were already convinced -- that it stood as
received wisdom, beyond questioning, for over two decades. He started from five
assumptions that, he thought, any hidden-variables interpretation of quantum
theory would clearly have to satisfy. To most physicists, these assumptions seem
eminently plausible. His fifth and final assumption asserted that the
expectation values of summed variables, evaluated for example in experiments on
a set of systems prepared so that all the hidden variables are identical, should
satisfy the algebraic relation, <X + Y> = <X> + <Y>: the average of a sum of two
variables should equal the sum of the averages of those variables.
"This does indeed seem plausible, at least naively.
It seems hard to get your head moving towards any conceptual space where this
condition might not be true. It took Bell's mental dexterity and perseverance to
clarify how totally inappropriate was von Neumann's use of this condition. The
assumption rests on the idea of so-called 'non-contextuality' -- that physical
quantities can be thought of as having values completely independently of the
devices used to measure them. Of course any classical theory would work this
way. But contextuality is precisely one of the most interesting things about
quantum theory, and one of the things that any hidden-variable theory needs to
capture. Any such theory worth its salt has to allow the action of experimental
devices to help determine the values of a system's variables. This, Bell showed,
makes von Neumann's assumptions completely out of place -- 'absurd', as he put
it.
"This example illustrates the general problem -- the
inherent weakness of such proofs to hidden assumptions, because such assumptions
are sometimes so difficult to see amidst the conceptual debris surrounding them.
Proofs have loopholes that are effectively invisible to their authors. It is as
true today as it was four centuries ago. In 1651, an Italian Jesuit
Giovanni Battista Riccioli published a book entitled Almagestum
Novum, in which he gave seventy-seven proofs of the impossibility of the
Earth's motion, in particular its rotation. Riccioli's book was written against
the Copernicans, and he was no fool. In one historian's view, Riccioli produced
'the lengthiest, most penetrating, and authoritative analysis of the question of
Earth's mobility or immobility made by any author of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.'
"Riccioli's proofs were, I expect, just as
convincing to him and many of his contemporaries as von Neumann's proofs about
quantum theory were to physicists of the latter twentieth century. As
Christopher Graney points out in a paper that has made Riccioli's writings
available from the original Latin text (arxiv:10113778), only two of the
seventy-seven proofs are obviously religious. Most make eminently good sense
given the empirical knowledge of the day.
"'If Earth had a diurnal rotation', one proof
observes, 'then heavy bodies falling near the equator would have a fundamentally
different motion than identical bodies falling near the poles under identical
conditions.' Similarly, 'Heavy bodies launched perpendicularly upwards fall back
upon the location from which they were launched. If the Earth had diurnal and
annual motions, these bodies would follow curved trajectories.' Indeed, Riccioli
was right -- it's only that the weakness of the
Coriolis force he clearly envisaged meant that it hadn't yet been
measured in 1651....
"In recent times, we've seen a string of proofs
establishing the alleged impossibility of breaking the security of various
schemes for quantum cryptography. Yet each progressively more intricate scheme
only seems to inspire counter efforts that identify new loopholes. Perhaps the
only impossibility proofs that really work are constructive proofs that actually
establish positive results. For example,
David Bohm's 1952 alternative formulation of quantum theory gave
a proof by explicit construction that von Neumann's argument couldn't possibly
be correct; indeed, that no argument could establish the impossibility of a
consistent deterministic interpretation of the non-locality inherent in quantum
theory; after all, Bohm had produced one. It couldn't then be proved out of
existence. I'm sure this is a lesson humanity will be learning for centuries to
come...." [Buchanan (2011), quoted from
here; accessed 28/08/23. Links added; italic emphasis in
the original. Several paragraphs merged. Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.]
Also worth pointing out is the fact that
QE itself
depends on another controversial theory,
Quantum Superposition [QS],
which several leading physicists have had occasion to question, and even reject --
for instance, David Bohm and
Roger Penrose, the latter of whom won
the 2020 Nobel Prize for Physics. If QS turns out to
be untenable, then not only will QE fall by the wayside, so too will much of
QM (which is supposed to be one of the most successful theories
in the history of science).
[I will say much more about this
topic in a future re-write of this Essay.]
For those not too well acquainted with the
complexities of contemporary physics there is a relatively straight-forward
explanation of locality and non-locality available at
this site.
Video Twenty-Two: Why Is Quantum
Mechanics Non-Local?
[Comments to follow in a future
re-write of this Essay.]
28a. Some who have made it
this far might be tempted to respond as follows: All this emphasis
on "empirical verification" only confirms the suspicion that Ms Lichtenstein
is a
Positivist, or
maybe even an
Empiricist.
In reply, it is worth reminding ourselves about Marx's
approach to such matters, summarised for us in the German Ideology:
"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones,
not dogmas, but real premises.... These premises can thus be verified in
a purely empirical way.... The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are
productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and
political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance
bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the
connection of the social and political structure with production. The social
structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of
definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or
other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate,
produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits,
presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." [Marx
and Engels (1970), pp.42, 46-47. Bold emphases added.
Paragraphs merged.]
Was Marx a 'Positivist' for appealing to
empirical evidence? Was Engels an 'Empiricist' when he expressed the following
opinion?
"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment." [Engels
(1954),p.47. Bold emphases alone
added.]
Was George Novack mistaken when
he came out with this remark?
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Were other DM-theorists
misguided when they expressed the following views?
"[The laws of dialectics] are not, as Marx and
Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult empirical task of
tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key
whose only advantage is to turn up when no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998a), p.9. Bold emphasis added.]
"'[The dialectic is not a] magic master key for
all questions.' The dialectic is not a calculator into which it is possible to
punch the problem and allow it to compute the solution. This would be an
idealist method. A materialist dialectic must grow from a patient,
empirical examination of the facts and not be imposed on them…."
[Ibid., p.271. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay
claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint
which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they
are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
"This law of dialectical process is like the
others in that it cannot be arbitrarily 'foisted' on Nature or history.
It cannot be used as a substitute for empirical facts, or used to
'predict' things without a concrete study of the facts in question…. Dialectics is not magic. It provides no
mysterious formulas with occult properties, by means of which most marvellous
and unexpected results can be arrived at. [Dialectical laws] are...merely the
most general, universally found characteristics of process, and as such
they give us a method for investigating processes concretely in various
particular fields. But they can in no way eliminate the need for this detailed
investigation which falls within the province of one or other of the special
sciences." [Guest (1939), pp.49-50, 74. Italic emphasis in the original;
paragraphs merged.]
[Earlier
in this Essay I quoted several additional DM-theorists to the
same effect, and even more in Essay
Two.]
If I am a Positivist and/or an Empiricist, so were
the above.
29.As we have seen, there are passages similar to the above in Lenin's
PN
and elsewhere (see below and
Note 30), which
underline how close he and Engels came to full-blooded Idealism in private,
whatever else they might have said in public. Once more, this is hardly
surprising given their class origin and the baleful influence Hegel had on their
thought.
I explain more fully why the DM-classicists were tempted in that
direction, if not biased toward Idealism, in Essay Nine
Part Two.
However, readers should also take into account the caveat I have added to
Note 30,
here. This helps explain why Lenin said this:
"Intelligent idealism is
closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead
of intelligent; (sic) metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of
stupid." [Lenin (1961),
p.274.]
Again, I have said more about this in Essay Three
Part Two.
One such quote (which we have already met) reads as
follows (again, on this see also
Note 30):
"To begin with what is
the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with (sic) any proposition…. Here we already have
dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the
universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the
universal) are identical; the individual exists only in the connection that
leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through
the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every
universal is (a fragment, or aspect, or the essence of) an individual." [Lenin
(1961),
p.359.]
"Cognition is the eternal,
endless approximation of thought to the object." [Ibid.,
p.195.
Bold emphasis added.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world…. [I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93.
Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]
If the Idealism implicit in the first two of
the above passages -- or, indeed, the Idealism
apparent in the quotations from Engels
reproduced in the main body of this Essay -- isn't obvious it may perhaps become
more so after consideration of the additional fact that while Lenin quite openly acknowledged
that he lifted these ideas from that über-Idealist, Hegel, he neglected to specify upon which set of "painstaking empirical enquiries" they
were based. Indeed, the same can be said about Engels's analogous opinions.
In relation to
which it is
worth quoting George Novack, once more:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphases added.]
[Hundreds of dogmatic, universal, a priori (and thus Idealist)DM-assertions
were quoted in
Essay Two
(and the word "hundreds" is itself no exaggeration!).]
31. Hegel cobbled-together an 'argument' (of sorts)
that might seem relevant to answering several of these questions. The hot air it contains will be let out
of it in Essay Twelve
(summary
here).
Some
scientists already think they have evidence other universes
exist 'beyond' our own; on that, see
here. Indeed, we read the following at
the Phys Org website:
"In the most recent
study on pre-Big Bang science posted at arXiv.org, a team of researchers from
the UK, Canada, and the US, Stephen M. Feeney, et al, have revealed that they
have discovered four statistically unlikely circular patterns in the
cosmic microwave background
(CMB). The researchers think that these marks could be 'bruises' that our
universe has incurred from being bumped four times by other universes. If they
turn out to be correct, it would be the first evidence that universes other than
ours do exist." [Quoted from
here; accessed 25/11/2015.
Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site; link added.]
[A
quick Google search will reveal several other links to reports like the
above;
here are just two:
1,
2.]
Are these
'additional universes' part of the "Totality", or not? Are they connected with
everything/anything in this universe? Do those connections (if there are any) apply in reverse? That is, are these
'universes' inter-connected with ours and with each other -- and not just
connected?
So many questions, so
few answers...
It would be
no use, either, being told that it isn't up to DM-theorists to answer such
questions. That is because they have already tackled questions about the
supposed inter-connection of everything in this universe long before
the countless lorry-loads of evidence that would be required to substantiate
that ancient idea have shown up, or anything even like them.
32.
We have already seen that there are
parts of this universe that aren't now, andnever will be, connected, let
alone inter-connected. Readers are referred back to earlier sections that dealt
with this (for example, here
and here).
[Material that used to be here (concerning an argument put
forward by Graham Priest) has now been moved to the
main body of the Essay.]
33.There is an intriguing (and
admittedly very Kantian, if not quasi-Hegelian) passage
that appears in what is arguably
one of Marx's most profound works, where he attempts to prove that everything in nature is inter-connected
with everything -- or at least with something -- else:
"A being which does not have its nature
outside itself is not a natural being and plays no part in the system of nature.
A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being
which is not itself an object for a third being has no being for its object,
i.e., it has no objective relationships and its existence is not objective. A
non-objective being is a non-being…. A being which is not the object of another
being therefore presupposes that no objective being exists." [Marx
(1975b),
p.390.
Paragraphs merged.]
Once again, it is clear that the 'obviousness' of
Marx's conclusions arises from what he took to be the meaning of words like
"being", "objective" and "nature" (as well as from what appears to be
a suppressed premise that such "beings" are somehow either aware of each other or that an
'Ideal' observer has somehow gained cognisance of them). This then 'allowed' him to
derive several
universal truths about 'reality', valid for all of space and time. No doubt
Marx thought he was reasoning about "things-in-themselves" and not just about
what he thought were the ('real') meanings of a handful of ink marks on the page,
or even about the associated 'concepts' lodged in his thought processes. However,
it isn't possible to reason
from objects themselves, only from propositions (or, rather, from our use
of them -- on that, see Essay Three
Part One). In that case, if Marxdid
so think, he was clearly mistaken.
[Despite this,
his subsequent opinions concerning
'philosophical questions' like this are far more important
in this regard.]
In this respect alone, it is worth reminding
ourselves that the vast majority of Philosophers (past and present) would agree
with Marx -- not about the conclusions he drew but about the method he used.
Indeed, they would concur with the
traditional view that this is
how 'genuine' Philosophy should proceed. After all, bona fide
Philosophers wisely by-pass all those tedious, boring and time-consuming empirical shenanigans
foolishly engaged in by scientists, since it 'allows' them to draw 'profound conclusions'
about 'Reality' via the 'arduous task' of
devoting a few minutes thought to the meaning of a handful of words --, like,
"Being", "Existence", "Property", "Substance", "Objective", etc.,
etc. Of course,
Philosophy like this is not only far easier to 'do' than
science, it is far less expensive, much more 'exciting' and the 'conclusions' that
'emerge' at
the end needn't be checked -- indeed,
can't be checked -- against any
evidence (even if there were some!). After all, how
would anyone even begin to check
Marx's conclusions? What observations could be carried out? What experiments performed?
What instruments deployed? What measurements taken? What surveys conducted?
Perhaps even better: anyone can 'do'
philosophy. All they need are a few spare hours, a comfortable armchair, a
fertile imagination, and, of course, a flare for inventing obscure jargon.
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphases added.]
As do Engels's:
"[Hegel's] mistake
lies in the fact that [his] laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of
thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and
often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be
arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the
product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis added.]
However, Marx's conclusions themselves don't follow
from (neither were they based upon, nor were they
even
meant to be based on) a consideration of evidence, which is why Marx
cited none. And no one has provided any since. Once more, they were
derived from what appeared to Marx to be the real meaning of certain
words/'concepts'. Even if he were right about that, the passage
quoted
earlier would constitute as good an example of LIE as one could wish to
find.
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; that
term was explained in Essay Three
Part One.]
So, the conclusions Marx 'drew' depended on:
(a) The unexamined assumption that fundamental aspects of
reality can be deduced from words alone; and,
(b) The further assumption that linguistic meaning
on its own is a reliable (and convenient) shortcut that 'enables' the derivation of an unlimited
number of Cosmic Super-Facts, valid for all of space and time.
At this point it is important to add that the above comments
aren't
intended to disparage Marx or belittle the work of genius from which that
earlier
passage was taken. Indeed, in view of the fact that
Marx later went on toreject Traditional Philosophyin that
very same book, it is highly likely he would have disowned those remarks
later in life. That neo-Leibnizian/neo-Kantian passage has been
highlighted for the sole purpose of
pointing out that even a thinker of Marx's unquestioned stature was all too easily seduced by the a priori
methodology he had been socialised into accepting -- i.e., the idea that this
dogmatic approach to knowledge is what 'genuine' Philosophers not only do
engage in, they should engage in, where
such 'word-magic' is as ubiquitous as it is
de rigueur.
[Exactly why Marx was conned in this
way, alongside its
political and ideological
aetiology, will be examined in detail in
Essays Nine
Part Two, Twelve and
Fourteen (summaries of which can be found
here,
here and
here.)]
Independently of that, in these Notebooks
Marx drew our attention to fundamental aspects of the human (social) condition:
alienation, exploitation and our potential for self-emancipation, employing
ideas he derived from earlier German and French thinkers, among others -- and, of course,
from his own experience of the world. However, and more importantly, he
expressed much of this in language that immediately resonates with anyone who
has ever had to work for a living under Capitalism. That is why they make
eminent good sense to those with a working-class background (if and when they
are ready to read them).
Nevertheless,
Marx's reasoning in that passage clearly depends on the
sort of semantic and syntactic tricks performed on ordinary words by Ancient Greek theorists, analysed in detail in Essay Three
Part One. These moves were based on
the misinterpretation of the grammatical rules necessary for the expression
of any thoughts about the world as if they were logical, or even
quasi-physical, principles that governed all of 'reality'. In this specific
case, they depend
on the misconstrual of predicate and relational expressions
as if they are the Proper Names of
Abstract Particulars, a topic that was examined in detail
in Essay Three
Part One. By so doing, Marx
only succeeded in reproducing this
age-old error, thus inadvertently bequeathing this approach to knowledge to his 'followers'.
Fortunately, as noted
above, Marx abandoned Traditional Philosophy root-and-branch
by the mid-, to late-1840s. In which case,
it is impossible to believe he would have asserted anything like this, for
instance, in the
1850s, '60s or '70s. [On that, see also
here.]
Nor is there any evidence he
did.
34.
Conventionalism will be examined
inmore detail Essay Thirteen Part Two. The phrase "form of representation"
originated with Wittgenstein, at least as it is being used at this site. For a summary of its relevance, see Glock (1996), pp.129-35.
In the above Essay, that term will be used to help
examine the linguistic and social factors that enable
scientists to express truths about the world without lapsing into
Metaphysics. Some of the background to that way of viewing science can be found in Brockhaus
(1991), pp.215-50.
35.
As argued above, the
conventional nature of science will be examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Two,
where it will be given a novel, Wittgensteinian, if not anthropological, twist.
36.That assertion will be substantiated below, and throughout the rest of this site.
37.While stipulative and other forms of conventionalism aren't themselves true (since
they are founded on or express socially-constituted practices and rules), they allow truths about the world to be
formulated and stated. So, even though the fact
that one metre is one hundred centimetres isn't a profound truth about reality
(while it is obviously applicable throughout nature), it
nevertheless forms part of a normative system of rules which enables
scientists, for example, to state empirical truths about the relative size and
velocity of objects, or the distance between them.
Having said that, stipulative formsof
conventionalism are themselves of
limited relevance because such systems of rules are based on
explicit agreements, announcements or proclamations, which mean they are
somewhat exceptional. Anyway, because stipulations like this presupposethe existence of language
they can hardly account for it. In which case, while discourse itself may (also)
have incorporated the results of a range of explicit stipulations (these are
often to be found in more specialised, technical areas -- for instance, in science,
mathematics, logic, finance, insurance, law, etc.), language itself it can't be
based on a series of
stipulations, nor can it be the result of some theory (and for the same reason).
For more on that, and for more
general discussions of language, see Essays Twelve
Part One, Thirteen
Part Three
and Four
Part One. [On
conventions, cf., Lewis (1969).]
38.Anthropological models of science and the social nature of both knowledge and language will
also be covered
in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
38a.
How and why they are still rules is explained in Essay Twelve
Part One.
The term "super-empirical" applies to
token indicative sentences that superficially
resemble ordinary empirical/factual indicative
sentences supposedly about the world but which go way beyond them. This they do in order to
'reflect fundamental truths about
reality', valid for all of space and time. [More
details on this can also be found in Essay Twelve Part One -- specifically,
here.]
39. The claim that DM-theorists (in effect) undermine the Marxist commitment to the social nature of language might at first sight appear
to be highly
contentious. However, that
topic is one of the main themes of Essays Three
Part One and Thirteen
Part Three.
Readers are directed there for further details. It is also discussed
extensively
in Essay Twelve Parts
One to
Seven (summary
here).
'Mind',
'cognition' and 'consciousness' -- when they are combined with the other tangled confusions dialecticians have visited
upon themselves in this area -- were also examined
in detail in
Essay Thirteen
Part Three.
40.
The background to these rather sweeping
statements was set out in Essay
Two. They will
be further substantiated throughout the rest of this site.
41.Engels's 'definition' of Metaphysics is both problematic and contentious in itself. I have
said much more about
that in Essay
Twelve
Part One.
42. As we discovered in Essays Seven Part Three and Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three, these two
DM-principles (i.e., that
change is the result of the 'contradictory
nature' of objects and processes -- or of their 'internal contradictions' -- and the 'dialectical' interplay between them)
are
impossible to reconcile.
42a0.
John Rees isn't the only
dialectician to make similar comments. Here are the thoughts of a card-carrying
Stalinist, Sheptulin:
"When we consider a
phenomenon from the point of view of its content it appears as a whole, as a
totality of all the elements and aspects that make it up and of all their
interactions. It is through this totality that content relates to form.... [The content of a part],
however, is conditioned not only by their specific nature, but also by the
general nature of the whole. For this reason they play their specific roles not
by themselves but as parts of the whole. On the other hand, the general nature
of the whole...depends on the specific nature of the parts that make it up....
"The interconnection of the
whole and part, expressed in the dependence of the quality of the whole on the
specific nature of its component parts, on the one hand, and the qualities
of the parts on the specific nature of the whole, on the other, results from the
interconnection between parts within the whole, this interconnection
constituting the structure of the whole. It is the interconnection of the
elements that underlies the inception of the whole and the transformation of the
elements into component parts of the whole.... [T]he properties of the
elements depends on the structure of the whole they make up, whereas the
structure of the whole depends on its constituent elements, their nature and
quantity. In other words, the elements of an object and the structure of this
object (the manner of connection of the elements) are necessarily interdependent
and constitute a dialectical unity." [Sheptulin (1978), pp.227-31.
Several paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
"Nothing exists or can exist in splendid isolation,
separate from its conditions of existence, independent of its relationships with
other things. Things come into being, exist and cease to exist, not each
independent of all other things, but each in its relationship with other things.
The very nature of a thing is modified and transformed by its relationships with
other things. When things enter into such relationships that they become
parts of a whole, the whole cannot be regarded as nothing more than the sum
total of the parts. True, the whole is nothing apart from and independent of its
parts. But the mutual relations which the parts enter into in constituting the
whole modify their own properties, so that while it may be said that the whole
is determined by the parts it may equally be said that the parts are determined
by the whole." [Cornforth (1976), pp.46-47. Bold emphases added.]
Several other DM-theorists have also been quoted to
the same effect in Essay Eleven Part Two.
42a.
Anyone tempted to accuse me of 'empiricism'
-- or even 'positivism' -- at this point should re-read
this,
and then perhaps think again.
42b. This isn't just to pick on
TAR. An epistemological black hole
like this is a universal feature of Dialectical Marxism. [That was established
here and
here.]
43.Of course,
DM-theorists in general claim their ideas have been condensed from -- or
they are
even based on -- the entire stock of relevant human experience and knowledge to
date. As we discovered in Essays Two through Eight Part Three that contention isn't even remotely true.
"It
shows an
excessive tenderness for the world to remove contradiction from it and
then to transfer the contradiction to spirit, to reason, where it is allowed to
remain unresolved. In point of fact it is spirit which is so strong that it can
endure contradiction, but it is spirit, too, that knows how to resolve it. But
the so-called world (whether it be called an objective, real world or, according
to transcendental idealism, a subjective intuition and a sphere of sense
determined by the categories of the understanding) is never and nowhere without
contradiction, but it is unable to endure it and is, therefore, subject to
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be." [Hegel (1999), §529,
pp.237-38.]
In fact, and as we will
see, it requires an excessive fondness
for mystical dogma -- compounded by a
reckless disregard of
ordinary language
and
logic
-- for anyone to agree with Hegel, let alone promote his confused
ideas.
45.One particular aspect of
the claim that if DM were true,
confirmation and refutation would be all of a piece, was covered in more detail
in Essay Seven
Part One, where it was linked with what I have
called the "Dialecticians Dilemma". [I have also discussed that topic in
much greater
detail, and from a different angle, in Interlude One.]
Nevertheless, should that be considered far too strong a
pre-condition, it can easily be replaced by the weaker claim that if specific
propositions expressing scientific predictions and their contradictories can
both be true at once, then scientific theories and hypotheses would be un-testablein
principle -- and for the same reason. [An
example of the problems this weaker condition creates was examined
here.]
46.Of course, this interpretation of science is based on what scientists
actuallydo, not what they sayabout what they do. Scientists are
notoriously (and demonstrably) bad at theorising about their own activities.
They are worse still at translating their ideas
into ordinary language. Even their technical work is shot-through with dubious
metaphors, misleading analogies, half-baked metaphysics, 'scare' quote encrusted
words, unhelpful neologisms and ill-considered
nominalisations.
As
Philosopher of Science,
Imre Lakatos
(who was also a qualified scientist) once wrote:
"This…bears out my pet thesis that most
scientists tend to understand little more about science than fish about
hydrodynamics." [Lakatos (1978), p.62, Note 2. I owe this reference to Dupré
(2001), p.113.]
Moreover, practically all scientists are philosophically illiterate, as
Lenin himself pointed out: cf., Lenin (1972),
pp.189,
322).
[These controversial claims will be further substantiated in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
46a.
In fact, I prefer to call this the (linguistic) expression of a rule -- or, indeed,
describe it as a "form
of representation".
Nevertheless, I am here arguing against the traditional view of the nature of
scientific propositions, which typically involves sentences like S1
being viewed as empirical statements, capable of being true or false. S1 is in fact a
criterion of what counts as water (at 'normal temperature and
pressure' -- on that
topic, see
Note 50b),
so it would be highly misleading to characterise it as an ordinary, fact-stating
proposition.
S1: Water boils at 100°C.
Anyway, I will soon switch to a consideration of
far less controversial examples of scientific (and/or empirical) propositions, such as S4
(where the reference of the
indexical, "this" will of
course have
been made clear):
S4: This particular body/volume
interval of water
boiled at 100°C.
47.However, if too many background details are altered or abandoned, or the liquid in
question behaves rather oddly, there might be good reason to question whether it
was
indeed water.
[That forms part of the reason for characterising S1 in the
way suggested in Note 46a above and Note 50b, below.]
47a.
Of course, when that isn't the case -- i.e., where it isn't possible to specify
in advance (concerning what is supposed to be an empirical proposition)
what would make it true or what would make it false --, that would be
tantamount to re-classifying the sentence in question as non-empirical.
Or, indeed,
for concluding that anyone who uttered/used it didn't actually understand
what they were trying to say to
begin with.
48.This
is a highly condensed version of a much more involved argument developed in
Essay Six, the
background to which was itself covered at length in Essay Twelve
Part One (summarised
here and
here).
Of course, it could be argued that the LOI expresses a partial, relative,
approximate or even an 'abstract' truth. In which case, the criticisms advanced in this
Essay
are completely misguided.
Those specific objections were neutralised in
Essay Six;
they will be further analysed
below (in the main body of this Essay), and in
Note 49. Anyway, this topic
encroaches on issues raised in the Philosophy of Language, a subject-area discussed in much more detail in Essays Twelve Part One (link above) and Thirteen
Part Three.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
In addition, it could also be objected that DM-theorists
don't claim that the LOI is never true. Instead, they argue that it is
both true and
not true at all times -- or, rather, that it is true only "within certain limits",
or even that it is merely 'relatively true' (all of which paraphrases, and more, can be found
in the DM-literature -- on that, see Essay Six,
here and
here).
Unfortunately, much of that response contradicts
what Trotsky himself asserted:
"In reality 'A' is not
equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens
-- they are quite different to each other. But one can object, the question is
not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal
quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point;
in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -- a more delicate scale
always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is
equal to itself. Neither is true -- all bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves."
[Trotsky (1971),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
If bodies are never equal to themselves, it can't be the case that they both are and are not equal to
themselves, since they never are. Conversely, if bodies both are and are not
equal to themselves (that is, if there is an "identity-in-difference" [IED,
henceforth] at work here), then it can't
be true that they are never equal to themselves, for plainly they are,
sometimes (according to the IED principle), which would mean that, either way, Trotsky was wrong.
Moreover, if bodies both areand are not never equal to themselves
then Trotsky's argument self-destructs, once more. Hence, if bodies are
equal to themselves (i.e., if it were false to say that they are never equal to themselves),
the LOI would at least be correct here --, and a pound of sugar, for example, will equal a pound of sugar, even if only momentarily. On the other hand, if bodies are never equal to themselves, it would be false
to say that they
both are and are not equal to themselves. Otherwise, DM-theorists should stop
using the word "never", and in its place substitute "sometimes".
[A more sophisticated and convoluted version of
Trotsky's 'argument' (originally constructed by Hegel) has been
taken apart
here.]
48a.Of course, the way such issues have been raised in the present Essay might
suggest this all takes place at the cognitive level (i.e., that those who use
this particular rule are aware of it, or that it is part of a 'conscious
psychological state-of-mind', or some such). But, that isn't so -- as will be argued
in
Essay Twelve. In the meantime, the reader is referred to Robinson (2003b).
Anyway, since DM-theorists certainly talkas if they
believe this process manifests itself cognitively, the objections
advanced in the main body
of this Essay certainly apply to them (i.e., as a sort of reductio).
However, as has been pointed out several times, Plato's
interpretation of Heraclitus is itself misleading. Indeed, it could even be
called a caricature. Nevertheless, that doesn't affect what Plato was
trying to say about change and motion. On this in
general see Colvin (2007). [For contrary views, see Vlastos (1955) and Kahn
(1981).]
Of course,
it could be objected that we all
possess some idea of abstract identity, but because it is
abstract it applies nowhere in concrete reality.
Clearly, that response itself depends on a
psychologistic theory of knowledge. That is, it is based on a mysterious, yet-to-be-explained skill we are all supposed to possess
-- the 'power of
abstraction' -- the existence of which there are good reasons to doubt (on that, see
here and
here); always assuming that some sense can be made of it, to begin with.
Nevertheless,
even if some sense could be made of our supposed ability to 'abstract'
concepts into existence (out of thin air -- which 'process'' actually neutralises
the generality that
common nouns express by turning
them into the Proper Names of
Abstract Particulars), it would still be
far from clear what abstractidentity itself amounted to.
For example, it would be unclear whether
Trotsky's sentence, "A is equal to A", is actually'true' in, or relates to, some sort of
abstract, 'parallel reality', applicable only to abstract letter "A"s
(whatever they might be!). If it were true in that sense,
Trotsky's criticism of two seemingly identical letter "A"s should be
directed
there, too, in that 'abstract' world. His analysis must surely apply to two abstract letter "A"s,
or two 'abstract' ideas of two individual letter "A"s --, or even to one
'abstract' idea of two distinct, abstract letter "A"s --, just as much as it does to
two real letter "A"s in
this world, reproduced on a page or screen near you. In that case, not even two abstract
letter "A"s, or two 'abstract' ideas of two individual letter "A"s,
nor yet one 'abstract' idea of two abstract letter "A"s, will
be 'equal to each other'.
But, if that were so, no one would have the faintest idea what 'abstract identity'
amounted to,
either. If, according to Trotsky, real material letter "A"s
are never identical, never 'equal to themselves', their abstract, 'shadowy' counterparts stand no chance.
In that case, a direct or indirect reference to 'abstract'
identity offers no help to beleaguered dialecticians. That is because,
if we are to believe Trotsky, not only would
they have
no idea what the phrase "abstract identity" meant, even if they had
some sort of vague inkling what it might mean, no two depictions
(or copies) of the phrase "abstract identity" in
any physical or psychological state --,
written, spoken, or even thought about in this world, by physical
beings like us --, would be identical with each other, or even to themselves,
let alone any material correlate they might have.
In that case, no depictions of any sort of the phrase "abstract identity" would be about the 'same
thing'.
Of course, that is always assuming it would be possible
to form a clear idea what the word "same" -- not to mention "same
thing" -- might conceivably mean in
such a context! If DM were true, neither of these phrases would have a clear
meaning, or one that remained stable from moment to moment.
The above comments highlight a serious difficulty
that is all too easily missed: if there is a problem concerning identity statements
in this world (with respect to material objects like bags of sugar, or even
letter "A"s), there is a far more intractable one concerning
the identity of 'abstract' ideas (or 'objects') in an Ideal, counterpart
'reality' -- or even such 'ideas' that might surface in 'thoughts' about one or
both. Worse still: there is an even
more daunting problem concerning
the alleged identity between 'abstract' ideas (like these) and their supposed material
correlates/counterparts -- that is, in this specific case between any given 'abstraction' (in the
mind, or wherever they reside) and each physical,
this-worldly 'copy', each letter in Trotsky's
(or Hegel's) hackneyed equation printed on paper (or even on your screen).
Of course, if Trotsky were correct, there could be
no such identity: in that case, no idea about, or 'mental image' of, a letter "A"
will be identical with an actual letter "A" written on a page or
reproduced on your screen. Naturally, that observation must also apply to collections
of letters, in sentences, and the like. In that case, DM-supporters
will never be in a position to declare, concerning any material embodiment
of the LOI (or its criticism), expressed in real letters printed on the page or reproduced on a
screen, that it was the same as, or that was even different from, an 'abstract
idea of identity'. Or, indeed, whether it was the same as, or was different from, a real or 'abstract' idea of one or other of them, as the
latter might be 'reflected' in individual dialectical heads.
If so, and once again, an appeal to 'abstract'
identity can't work. That is because no one, least
of all DM-fans,
would have any idea what Hegel, Trotsky, Lenin or any other DM-theorist was
comparing or contrasting ordinary material identity with. Worse still, nor
would they even know whether or not any such comparisons were identical
with, or were different from, their intended
target --, which, if DM-theorists are to be believed, they couldn't be!
Nevertheless, as intimated in the last but one
sentence above, any attempt to express 'abstract' identity would require it to be
represented in linguistic-,
or some other material-form. That is, it would necessitate the use of physical
objects and processes located in space and time. Typically, that will require
the employment of written, typed, or spoken words (or other symbols). The latter will
in turn depend on an ability to re-identify such objects and processes in the ordinary material world so that
it proved possible to recognise a successful depiction of an
'abstract' version of the LOI as identical with it, That is just another way of
saying that even if there were such a thing as 'abstract identity', whatever
it meant would
depend on the use of ordinary words for identity in this world, not the
other way round. That, too, is just another way of pointing out that our
understanding of identity arises from our use of ordinary terms for sameness and
difference not from some abstract 'law'.
Moreover, even if it could be shown that we
all possess an 'abstract idea of identity' (or, an idea of 'abstract identity'),
there would be no way of deciding whether or not we all had the same or
different versions of it -- or even whether or not they were the same as, or
were different from, any we held 'in our minds' only a few seconds earlier, let
alone those supposedly Hegel, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky entertained or intended, decades or
even centuries
ago.
Furthermore, we wouldn't even be able to make
someattempt to
resolve any of the above issues without employing 'non-abstract' identity -- i.e.,
ordinary identity -- based on our use of the vernacular and our
everyday powers of recognition (etc.), in this world, in order to determine whether
or not these were indeed
the same ideas of 'abstract' identity 'in the minds' of two or more
human beings, including ourselves.
In which case, we would all have to appeal to ordinary
identity to help identify its supposed 'abstract' alter ego, which would, of
course, mean
that the latter was either surplus to requirements or was
completely useless -- even if we knew what it was!
[The above is a highly condensed version of a much more
involved argument set out at length in
Essay Six.]
49a.With
respect to the
LOI itself,
that 'law' was introduced into logic and philosophy by Roman Catholic theologians in the Middle Ages. Aristotle knew
nothing about it (although he certainly wrote about sameness and difference!). On that, see Essay Four
Part One.
50.It is only when such 'propositions' are knitted-together in a metaphysical
theory, where an
attempt is made to exclude certain semantic possibilities (in this case,
either ruling out truth or ruling out falsehood) that they become non-sensical and incoherent.
[These issues were examined in much greater detail in
Essay Twelve
(summaries
here and
here).]
50ab. The claim that a proposition
could fail to be true but not yet be false -- since it might be truth-valueless
(in the sense that it will never have, or can't ever be given, a truth-value, not that it
contingently
lacks one at present) --, will
be tackled in Essay Twelve
Part One. The short answer is, of course,
that any indicative sentence that lacks a truth-value and can
neither be true nor false can't be a proposition, to begin with. That is because it
would be unclear what was being proposed.
An
indicative sentence
can contingently fail to have a truth-value if, for example, we don't (at some
point) happen to know whether it is true or whether it is false. For instance, we currently
have no idea whether or not the following proposition is true or false: "King
George II began to eat an apple at 09:46pm on the 4th of
August 1758". Clearly, it could be true and it could be
false, but at present it lacks one of those two assignable truth-values
because of our lack of relevant information. Naturally, that is
unlikely (ever) to change!
Contrast that with the following sentence "Time is a relation
between events". As I have shown in Essay Twelve
Part One,
that indicative sentence can't be true
and can't be false. At best, it is a badly-stated rule of language
related to some actual or proposed use of words associated with time, despite the fact that it has traditionally been misconstrued as a profound metaphysical truth
concerning the 'deep structure of reality'.
[Readers are directed to the above linked Essay for more details.
(The central core of that argument has been summarised
here.)]
50a.
Asnoted
earlier, my use of the word "empirical" here doesn't imply I am an
empiricist, as some critics have
peremptorily assumed. It merely expresses my
commitment to a basic requirement that evidence is needed if
the semantic status of a proposition is to be ratified as true or rejected as false --,
or,
indeed, if a theory is to
avoid being branded "Idealist". [More on that
here and
here.]
It is
worth reminding ourselves, once again,
what DM-theorists themselves have to say about evidence in parallel with their (supposed) refusal to impose
their ideas on the facts:
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597.
Bold emphasis alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
"[The laws of dialectics] are not, as
Marx and Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult empirical
task of tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical
master key
whose only advantage is to turn up when no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998a), p.9. Bold emphasis added.]
"'[The dialectic is not a] magic
master key for all questions.' The dialectic is not a calculator into which
it is possible to punch the problem and allow it to compute the solution. This
would be an idealist method. A materialist dialectic must grow from a
patient, empirical examination of the facts and not be imposed on them…."
[Ibid., p.271. Bold emphases alone added.]
"The dialectic does not liberate the
investigator from
painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics and materialism are the
basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at
all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever-ready
master key. Dialectics cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from
facts, from their nature and development…."
[Trotsky
(1973), p.233. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Whenever any Marxist attempted to
transmute the theory of Marx into a
universal
master key and ignore all other spheres of learning, Vladimir Ilyich would
rebuke him with the expressive phrase 'Komchvanstvo' ('communist swagger')."
[Ibid., p.221.]
"The dialectic is not a
magic master key for all questions. It does not replace concrete scientific
analysis. But it directs this analysis along the correct road, securing it
against sterile wanderings in the desert of subjectivism and scholasticism."
[Trotsky
(1971), p.68. Bold emphasis added.]
Several more passages like the above were quoted
earlier and
in Essay Two.
51.Anyway, that
deflationary view was itself rejected by
Rees. [TAR,
p.247. This topic was examined in more detail in
Essays Three Parts
One and
Two,
and Ten
Part One.]
52.Cf., Jay (1984), pp.21-80. This isn't generally disputed by
dialecticians --, for example, Woods and Grant (1995),
p.64 (or, Woods and Grant (2007), pp.69-70). See also Rees (1998a), p.6;
Thalheimer (1936), passim, and
Gollobin (1986), pp.110-12. Also
see Tian (2005), as well as
here.
However, apart from Tian (2005), the above authors
fail to explore the close, detailed and almost incestuous connection that exists between DM and
other mystical systems
of thought (on that see
here,
here and
here); nor do they even attempt to
account for what few parallels they actually acknowledge.
[That glaring omission will be
addressed in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).] Worse still, all of them (and that
includes Tian (2005)) fail to link this class-compromised intellectual tradition
with Marx's famous words:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from
here. Bold
emphases added.]
53.
On
that, see Beiser (2002, 2005). There is an excellent summary of this
(compromised)
'intellectual' background in Kolakowski (1998),
pp.9-80.
[I hesitate to reference
anything by
Kolakowski since his work (on such
topics) is generally extremely poor, if not thoroughly mendacious and
overtly biased
in relation to Marxism (which, like may others, he confuses with Stalinism and
Maoism). Having said that, with respect to the philosophical
background leading to the development of DM, this particular book of his is
uncharacteristically accurate and reasonably comprehensive, even though the
author approaches the
entire topic from the
opposite angle to the
one adopted at this site. That is: he is hostile to Marxism, I am not.
Quite the reverse, in fact.]
Several of Marx and Engels's works listed below have
been linked to the Marxist Internet Archive, but since Lawrence & Wishart
threatened legal action over copyright infringement many no
longer work.
However, all of their work can now be accessed
here.
Afanasyev, V. (1968), Marxist Philosophy
(Progress Publishers, 3rd ed.).
Ahmed, A. (2010) (ed.), Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations. A Critical Guide (Cambridge University Press).
Albritton, R. (1959), 'On Wittgenstein's Use Of The Term "Criterion"',
Journal of Philosophy56, pp.845-57, reprinted in Pitcher (1966),
pp.231-50.
Ananthaswamy, A. (2012), 'Earthly
Powers', New Scientist215, 2878, 18/08/2012, pp.38-41. [The on-line
version has a different title.]
Baker, G., and Hacker, P.
(2005a), Wittgenstein: Understanding And Meaning.
Volume One Of An Analytic Commentary On The Philosophical Investigations, Part I
-- Essays (Blackwell,
2nd
ed.).
Ball, P. (1999), H2O. A
Biography Of Water (Phoenix Press).
Barnes, B. (1974), Knowledge And
Sociological Theory (Routledge).
--------, (1982), T.S. Kuhn And Social
Science (Macmillan).
--------, (1985), About Science (Blackwell).
--------, (1990), 'Sociological Theories Of
Scientific Knowledge', in Olby,et al (1990), pp.60-73.
Barnes, B., and Bloor, D. (1982),
'Relativism, Rationalism And The Sociology Of Knowledge', in
Hollis and Lukes (1982), pp.21-47.
Barnes, B., Bloor, D., and Henry, J. (1996),
Scientific Knowledge. A Sociological Analysis (Athlone Press).
Barnes, B., and Shapin, S. (1979) (eds.),
Natural Order: Historical Studies Of Scientific Culture (Sage Publications).
Barras, C. (2015), 'Adapt
First, Mutate Later', New Scientist225, 3004, 17/01/2015,
pp.26-30. [This links to a PDF.]
Barrett, J., and Alexander, J. (2001),
(eds.), PSA 2000, Part 1, Supplement toPhilosophy of Science68, 3 (University
of Chicago Press).
[PSA = Philosophy of Science
Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]
Becker, A. (2018), What Is Real? The Unfinished
Quest For The Meaning Of Quantum Physics (John Murray).
Beiser, F. (1993a) (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion To Hegel (Cambridge University Press).
--------, (1993b), 'Hegel And The Problem Of
Metaphysics', in Beiser (1993a), pp.1-24.
--------, (2002), German Idealism. The
Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Harvard University Press).
--------, (2005), Hegel (Routledge).
Bell, J. (1981), 'Bertlmann's
Socks And The Nature Of Reality', Journal de Physique,
Colloque C2, Supplement 3, pp.41-61; reprinted in Bell (1988), pp.139-56. [This
links to a PDF.]
--------, (1988), Speakable And Unspeakable In
Quantum Mechanics (Cambridge University Press).
Bennett, D. (2012), 'Seeing Shape: Shape
Appearance And Shape Constancy', British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science63, 3, pp.487-518.
Bernal, J. (1935), 'Dialectical Materialism', in Levy, et al
(1935), pp.89-122, reprinted in Bernal (1949), pp.365-87.
--------, (1949), The Freedom Of Necessity (Routledge).
Caligaris, G., and Starosta, G. (2015), 'Which
"Rational Kernel"? Which "Mystical Shell"? A Contribution To The Debate On The
Connection Between Hegel's Logic And Marx's Capital', in Moseley
and Smith (2015), pp.89-111.
Callender, C. (2002) (ed.), Time, Reality And Experience.
Royal Institute Of Philosophy Supplement 50 (Cambridge University Press).
Callinicos, A. (1987), Making History
(Polity Press).
--------, (1989), Against Postmodernism
(Polity Press).
--------, (1995), Theories And Narratives
(Polity Press).
--------, (1998), 'Marxism And The Crisis In
Social Theory', in Rees (1998b), pp.25-40 and 177-79.
Canfield, J. (1981), Wittgenstein: Language And World (University of
Massachusetts Press).
Cantor, G., and Hodge, M. (1981) (eds.),
Conceptions Of Ether. Studies In The History Of Ether Theories, 1740-1900
(Cambridge University Press).
Carey, N. (2011), The Epigenetics
Revolution. How Modern Biology Is Rewriting Our Understanding Of Genetics,
Disease And Inheritance (Icon Books).
Carlysle, J. (2006), Dumbass. Outrageous Quotes From The
World's Most Powerful Moron (Horton House Publishing Group).
Carreyrou, J. (2023), Bad Blood. Secrets And Lies
In A Silicon Valley Startup (Picador).
Colletti, L. (1973), Marxism And Hegel (New
Left Books).
Collins, H. (1975), 'The Seven Sexes: A Study
In The Sociology Of A Phenomenon, Or The Replication Of Experiments In Physics',
Sociology9, pp.205-24.
--------, (1992), Changing Order (University of Chicago
Press,
2nd ed.).
--------, (1994), 'A Strong Confirmation Of
The Experimenters' Regress', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science25, 3, pp.493-503.
--------, (1998), 'The Meaning Of Data: Open
And Closed Evidential Cultures In The Search For Gravitational Waves',
American Journal Of Sociology104, 2, pp.292-338.
--------, (1999), 'Tantalus And The Aliens:
Publications, Audiences And The Search For Gravitational Waves', Social
Studies of Science29,
pp.163-97.
--------, (2002), 'The Experimenter's Regress
As Philosophical Sociology', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science33, pp.153-60.
--------, (2004), Gravity's Shadow. The
Search For Gravitational Waves (University of Chicago Press).
Collins, H., and Pinch, T. (1998), The
Golem. What You Should Know About Science (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed.).
--------, (2002), The Golem At Large. What
You Should Know About Technology (Cambridge University Press).
Colodny, R. (1965) (ed.), Beyond The Edge
Of Certainty (University Press of America).
Colvin, M. (2007), 'Heraclitean Flux And Unity Of
Opposites In Plato's "Theaetetus" and "Cratylus"', Classical Quarterly,
New Series 57, 2, pp.759-69.
Conner, C. (2005), A People's History Of
Science. Miners, Midwives And "Low Mechanicks" (Nation Books).
Cook, J. (1979), 'A Reappraisal Of Leibniz's
Views On Space, Time And Motion', Philosophical Investigations2, 2, pp.22-63.
Cooter, R. (1984), The Cultural Meaning Of
Popular Science (Cambridge University Press).
Copenhaver, B. (1995), Hermetica. The Greek Corpus Hermeticum And The Latin
Asclepius In A New English Translation With Notes And An Introduction
(Cambridge University Press).
Cornford, F. (1960), Plato's Theory Of Knowledge
(Routledge).
--------, (1997), Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus Of
Plato (Hackett Publishing Company).
Cornforth, F. (1963), Dialectical
Materialism. An Introduction. Volume Three: The Theory Of Knowledge
(Lawrence & Wishart, 3rd
ed.).
--------, (1976), Materialism And The
Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5th ed.).
[A PDF of the 2015 reprint of this book
(which appears to be slightly different from the 1976 edition used in this
Essay) is available
here. A PDF of the 4th
edition is also available here.]
Cowley, F. (1991), Metaphysical Delusion (Prometheus
Books).
Crewdson, J. (2003), Science Fictions. A
Scientific Mystery, A Massive Cover-Up, And The Dark Legacy Of Robert Gallo
(Back Bay Books).
Cruse, A. (2000), Meaning In Language
(Oxford University Press).
DeGrood, D. (1976), Philosophies Of
Essence. An Examination Of The Category Of Essence (B. R. Grüner Publishing
Co.).
--------,
(1978), Dialectics And
Revolution, Volume One (B. R. Grüner Publishing Co.).
De León-Jones, K. (1997), Giordano Bruno
And The Kabbalah. Prophets, Magicians And Rabbis (Yale University Press).
Desmond, A. (1989), The Politics Of
Evolution (Cambridge University Press).
Desmond, A., and Moore, J. (1992), Darwin
(Penguin Books).
Deutsch, D. (2015),
'Definitely Not Maybe', New Scientist228, 3041, 03/10/2015, pp.30-31. [The on-line version of this article has a different
title.]
Dewdney, A. (1997), Yes, We Have No
Neutrons (John Wiley & Sons).
Diamond, C. (2001), 'How Long Is The Standard
Meter In Paris?', in McCarthy and Stidd (2001), pp.104-39.
Flew, A., and MacIntyre, A. (1963) (eds.),
New Essays In Philosophical Theology (SCM Press).
Forman, P. (1971), 'Weimar Culture,
Causality, And Quantum Theory, 1919-1927: Adaptation By German Physicists And
Mathematicians To A Hostile Environment', Historical Studies in the Physical
Sciences, 3, pp.1-115.
Francis, R. (2012), Epigenetics: How
Environment Shapes Our Genes (W. W. Norton & Co.).
Freire, O., Bacciagaluppi, G., Darrigol, O., Hartz,
T., Joas, C., Kojevnikov, A., and Pessoa, O. (2022) (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook Of The History Of Quantum Interpretations (Oxford University
Press).
Friedlander, M. (1998), At The Fringes Of
Science (Westview Press).
Fritze, R. (2009), Invented Knowledge.
False History, Fake Science And Pseudo-Religions (Reaktion Books).
Galison, P. (1987), How Experiments End
(University of Chicago Press).
Geach, P.
(1968), 'What
Actually Exists',
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume,
42,
Issue 1, 14 July 1968, pp.1-16, reprinted in Geach (1969), pp.65-74.
--------,
(1969), God And The Soul (Routledge).
Geison, G. (1995), The Private Science Of
Louis Pasteur (Princeton University Press).
Gieryn, T. (1999), Cultural Boundaries Of
Science (University of Chicago Press).
Gimbel, M. (2011), Dialectical Materialism
vs. 'The New Physics'. A Response To The Myths Created By An Idealistic Theory
Called 'Relativity' (New Vista Publishers).
Glock, H-J. (1996), A Wittgenstein
Dictionary (Blackwell).
Goldacre, B. (2012),
Bad Pharma: How
Drug Companies Mislead Doctors And Harm Patients (Fourth Estate).
Golinski, J. (1992), Science As Public
Culture. Chemistry And Enlightenment In Britain, 1760-1820 (Cambridge
University Press).
--------, (1998), Making Natural
Knowledge. Constructivism And The History Of Science (Cambridge University
Press).
Goliszek, A. (2003), In The Name Of
Science. A History Of Secret Programs, Medical Research, And Human
Experimentation (St. Martin's Press).
Gollobin, I. (1986),
Dialectical Materialism. Its Laws, Categories, And Practices (Petras Press).
Gooding, D. (1990), Experiment And The
Making Of Meaning (Kluwer Academic Press).
Gooding, D., and Pinch, T. (1989) (eds.),
The Uses Of Experiment (Cambridge University Press).
Goodstein, D. (2010), On Fact And Fraud.
Cautionary Tales From The Front Lines Of Science (Princeton University
Press).
Granek, G. (2001), 'Einstein's Ether. Why Did Einstein Come Back
To The Ether?', Apeiron8, 3. [A PDF of this article is available
here.]
Grant, J. (2006),
Discarded Science: Ideas That Seemed Good At
The Time (Facts, Figures and Fun).
--------, (2007), Corrupted Science.
Fraud, Ideology And Politics In Science (Facts, Figures and Fun).
--------, (2009), Bogus Science.
Or, Some People Really Believe These Things (Facts, Figures and Fun).
Lackey, J. (2008), Learning From Words.
Testimony As A source Of Knowledge (Oxford
University Press).
Lakatos, I.
(1978), The Methodology Of Scientific Research Programmes (Cambridge
University Press).
Latour, B. (1987), Science In Action
(Harvard University Press).
--------, (1988), The Pasteurization Of
France (Harvard University Press).
Latour, B., and Woolgar, S. (1986),
Laboratory Life (Princeton University Press).
Lawler, J.
(1982), 'Hegel On Logical And Dialectical Contradictions, And Misinterpretations
From Bertrand Russell To Lucio Colletti', in Marquit, Moran, and Truitt (1982),
pp.11-44.
--------, (1980), On The Question Of
Dialectics (Progress Publishers).
Lenoir, T. (1997), Instituting Science. The
Cultural Production Of Scientific Disciplines (Stanford University Press).
Lerner, E. (1992), The Big Bang Never
Happened (Simon & Schuster).
LeVay, S. (2008), When Science Goes Wrong.
Twelve Tales From The Dark Side Of Discovery (Plume Books).
Levins, R., and Lewontin, R. (1985), The
Dialectical Biologist (Harvard University Press).
Levy,
H., Fox, R., Bernal, J., Macmurray, J., Page Arnott, R., and Carritt, E. (1935),
Aspects Of Dialectical Materialism (Watts & Co.).
Lewis, D. (1969), Convention (Harvard
University Press).
--------, (1970), 'Holes', Australasian
Journal of Philosophy48, pp.206-12; reprinted in Lewis (1983),
pp.3-9.
--------, (1983), Philosophical Papers,
Volume One (Oxford University Press).
--------, (1986), On The Plurality Of
Worlds (Blackwell).
Lindley, D. (1993), The End Of Physics. The Myth
Of A Unified Theory (Basic Books).
Livio, M. (2013), Brilliant Blunders From Darwin
To Einstein. Colossal Mistakes By Great Scientists That Changed Our
Understanding Of Life And The Universe (Simon & Schuster).
Longino, H. (1990), Science As Social
Knowledge (Princeton University Press).
Macy, B. (2021),
Dopesick: Dealers, Doctors And The Drug Company That Addicted America
(Apollo).
Malcolm, N. (1995a), Wittgensteinian Themes
(Cornell University Press).
--------,
(1995b), 'Kripke And The Standard Metre', in Malcolm (1995a), pp.56-65.
Malek, A. (2011), The Dialectical
Universe -- Some Reflections On Cosmology (Agamee Prakashani).
Mandel, E. (1976),
'Introduction' to Marx (1976), pp.11-86. [This introduction hasn't been
reproduced on-line as far as I know, which is why I haven't added a link.]
--------,
(1979), Introduction
To Marxism (Pluto Press, 2nd
ed.).
Marquit, E.,
Moran, P., and Truitt, W. (1982) (eds.), Dialectical Contradictions And
Contemporary Marxist Discussions, Studies In Marxism, Volume 10
(Marxist Educational Press).
--------,
(1976),
Capital, Volume 1 (Penguin Books).
[The Penguin edition is different from the translation published at the Marxist Internet Archive.]
--------, (1987), MECW Volume 25 (Lawrence
& Wishart). [Unfortunately, as far as I know, the passage from this Volume (quoted
earlier) hasn't yet been
published at the Marxist Internet Archive.]
Newton, R. (1977), The Crimes Of Claudius
Ptolemy (The John Hopkins University Press).
Norrie, A. (2010), Dialectic And Difference. Dialectical Critical Realism And
The Grounds Of Justice (Routledge).
North, D. (1991), Gerry Healy And His Place In The Fourth International
(Labor Publications).
Novack, G. (1964/65), 'Is Nature Dialectical', International Socialist Review,
Summer 1964 and Winter 1965 issues; reprinted in Novack (1978), pp.231-55, and
Novack (2002), pp.189-203 (this links to a PDF). [A copy of this
article is also available here.]
--------, (1965), The Origins Of Materialism (Pathfinder
Press).
Park, R. (2000), Voodoo Science. The Road
From Foolishness To Fraud (Oxford University Press).
Pickering, A. (1984), Constructing Quarks. A
Sociological History Of Particle Physics (Edinburgh University Press).
--------, (1995), The Mangle Of Practice
(University of Chicago Press).
Pitcher, G. (1966) (ed.), Wittgenstein. The Philosophical Investigations
(Macmillan).
Plato, (1997a),
Complete Works,
edited by J. Cooper
(Hackett Publishing).
--------, (1997b),
Theaetetus,
translated by M. J. Levett and M. Burnyeat, in Plato (1997a), pp.157-234. [This links
to a different translation.]
--------, (1997c),
Timaeus,
translated by
D. J. Zeyl, in Plato (1997a), pp.1224-91.
Plekhanov, G. (1908), Fundamental Problems Of Marxism
(Lawrence & Wishart). [The Appendix to this work -- which had
formed part of Plekhanov's Introduction to Engels (1888) -- can be found
here under the title, 'Dialectic And Logic'. It
is also reprinted in
Plekhanov (1976), pp.73-82.]
Samuel, E. (2009), Plastic Fantastic: How The
Biggest Fraud In Physics Shook The Scientific World (St. Martin's Press).
Saunders, S. (2002), 'How Relativity Contradicts Presentism', in
Callender (2002), pp.277-92.
Schaff, A. (1960), 'Marxist Dialectics And
The Principle Of Contradiction', Journal of Philosophy57, pp.241-50.
Shapin, S. (1975), 'Phrenological Knowledge
And The Social Structure Of Nineteenth Century Edinburgh', Annals of Science32,
pp.219-43.
--------, (1979a), 'Homo Phrenologicus:
Anthropological Perspectives On An Historical Problem', in Barnes and Shapin
(1979), pp.41-71.
--------, (1979b), 'The Politics Of
Observation: Cerebral Anatomy And Social Interests In The Edinburgh Phrenology
Disputes', in Wallis (1979), pp.139-78.
--------, (1981), 'Of Gods And Kings: Natural
Philosophy And Politics In The Leibniz-Clarke Dispute', Isis72,
pp.187-215.
--------, (1982), 'History Of Science And Its
Sociological Reconstructions', History of Science 20, pp.157-211.
--------, (1994), A Social History Of
Truth (University of Chicago Press).
--------, (1996), The Scientific
Revolution (University of Chicago Press).
Shapin, S., and Schaffer, S. (1985),
Leviathan And The Air Pump (Princeton University Press). [Chapter Two of
this book can be accessed
here.]
Sheptulin, A. (1978), Marxist-Leninist
Philosophy (Progress Publishers).
Shermer, M. (1997), Why People Believe
Weird Things (W.H. Freeman & Company).
Shirokov, M. et al
(1937), A Textbook Of Marxist Philosophy (Victor Gollancz). [This book in fact has no publication
date, but internal evidence suggests that it was published in the mid-, to
late-1930s, so I have arbitrarily assigned it the given date. The entire book
can now be accessed here (as a PDF), and
parts of it
here.]
Smart, J. (1964) (ed.),
Problems Of Space And Time (Macmillan).
Smolin, L.
(2006), The Trouble With Physics. The Rise Of String Theory, The Fall
Of Science, And What Comes Next (Houghton Mifflin).
--------, (2013), Time Reborn. From The
Crisis In Physics To The Future Of The Universe (Allen Lane).
Somerville, J. (1967), The Philosophy Of
Marxism (Random House). [Chapter One of this book can be accessed
here.]
Sorabji, R. (1983), Time, Creation And The
Continuum (Duckworth).
Sorensen, R. (2003), 'Para-Reflections', British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science
54, 1, pp.93-101. [A PDF of this paper is available
here; it also appears in a modified form in Sorensen (2008), pp.136-45.]
--------, (2008), Seeing Dark Things. The
Philosophy Of Shadows (Oxford University Press).
Soyfer, V. (1994), Lysenko And The Tragedy
Of Soviet Science (Rutgers University Press).
--------, (2003), Joseph Stalin On The
Chinese Revolution (University Press of the Pacific).
Stanford, P. (2001), 'Refusing The Devil's
Bargain: What Kind Of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?', in Barrett
and Alexander (2001), pp.1-12.
Strassler,
M. (2024), Waves In An Impossible Sea: How Everyday Life Emerges From The
Cosmic Ocean (Basic Books).
Stroll, A. (1988), Surfaces (University
of Minnesota Press).
Suter, R. (1989a), Interpreting
Wittgenstein. A Cloud Of Philosophy, A Drop Of Grammar (Temple University
Press).
--------, (1989b), 'Augustine On Time', in
Suter (1989a), pp.157-70.
Thomas, K. (1973), Religion And The
Decline Of Magic (Penguin Books).
Thurston, H. (2002), 'Greek Mathematical
Astronomy Reconsidered', Isis93, 1, pp.58-69.
Tian, C. (2005), Chinese Dialectics. From
Yijing To Marxism (Lexington Books).
Travis, C., and Aronson, E. (2008),
Mistakes Were Made (But Not By Me). Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad
Decisions And Hurtful Acts (Pinter & Martin Ltd.).
--------,
(1974),
On Certainty,
translated by D. Paul and
G. E. M. Anscombe(Blackwell).
--------, (1978), Remarks On The
Foundations Of Mathematics, translated by
G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, 3rd ed.).
--------, (2009),
Philosophical
Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, revised by
P. Hacker and J.
Schulte (Blackwell, 4th
ed.). [This links to a PDF.]
Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995/2007),
Reason In
Revolt. Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications, 1st/2nd
ed.). [The online version now appears to be the Second Edition. That Edition has now been posted
here.]
Yates, F. (1991), Giordano Bruno And The
Hermetic Tradition (University of Chicago Press).
Youngson, R. (1998), Scientific Blunders. A Brief History Of
How Wrong Science Can Be (Robinson).