Internet
Explorer 11 will no longer play the videos I have posted to this page.
As far as I can tell they play as intended in other Browsers.
However, if you have
Privacy Badger [PB] installed, they won't play in Google Chrome unless you
disable PB for this site.
[Having said that,
I have just discovered that they play in IE11 if you have
upgraded to Windows 10! It looks like the problem is with Windows 7 and earlier
versions of that operating system.]
If you are using Internet Explorer 10 (or later), you might find some of the
links I have used won't work properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View'
(in the Tools Menu); for IE11 select 'Compatibility View Settings' and add
this site (anti-dialectics.co.uk). Microsoft's browser,
Edge, automatically
renders these links compatible; Windows 10 does likewise.
I can only assume this will also be the case with Windows 11.
However, if you are using Windows 10,
IE11 and Edge unfortunately appear to colour these links
somewhat erratically. They are meant to be mid-blue, but those two browsers
render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and red!
Firefox and Chrome reproduce them correctly.
Unfortunately, several browsers also
underline these links erratically. Many are underscored boldly in black, others
in light blue! They are all meant to be underlined in the same colour as the
link itself.
Finally, if you are viewing this
with Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have
used; Mozilla often replaces them with an "º'.
There are no problems with Chrome, Edge, or Internet Explorer, as
far as I can determine.
As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between
Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
It is also worth pointing out that a good 50% of my case
against DM has been relegated to the
End Notes.
Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence is to
be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more
smoothly. This means that if readers want fully to appreciate my case against DM, they will need to
consult this material. In many cases, I have added numerous qualifications,
clarifications, and considerably more detail to what I have to say in the main
body. In addition, I have raised several objections (some obvious, many not --
and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments, which I
have then answered.
[I explain why I have adopted this tactic in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any
qualms or objections they might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments
and clarifications.
[Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for well over thirty years, I have heard all the
objections there are! (Many of the more recent debates have been listed here.)]
Furthermore, phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (i.e., in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise, the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that question will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed
here,
here, and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially
here,
here,
and here).
In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the
argument -- but this time for absolute beginners --
here.]
Several readers have
complained about the number of links I have added to these Essays because they
say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly
lodge that complaint since they believe everything is interconnected, and
that must surely apply even to Essays that
attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those
who find such links do make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have linked to familiar
subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of
recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of
popular films, or certain words
that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of May 2024, this Essay is just over 143,500 words long; a
much shorter summary of some its main ideas can be accessed
here.
The
material presented below does not represent my final view of any of the
issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
Anyone
following these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links below won't work!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
In this
Second Part of Essay Eight I intend to substantiate a claim advanced in Part
One, which was that it isn't possible to equate 'contradictions' with 'opposing
forces', either literally or figuratively. Hence, the aim is to sever
the link that most
dialecticians believe exists between opposing forces and 'dialectical contradictions'.
In
Part Three, I will pose and then answer the question: What
sense, if any, can be made of the term "dialectical contradiction"?
[Spoiler Alert: none whatsoever.]
[As with other Essays at this site, much of the material below has been
deliberately restricted to the use of DM-terminology, the employment of which
doesn't imply I accept its validity, or that it even makes any sense. It
is only being used in order to assist in its demise.]
Be this as it may, Marxist dialecticians
nevertheless continue to assert that 'dialectical
contradictions' (in nature or society) may be understood as, or modelled by, the
inter-relationship between "opposing forces". These forces allegedly condition
one another, operating either in equilibrium or in disequilibrium, depending on
the prevailing circumstances -- and, indeed, on exactly who is telling the tale.
But, they also admit that this view of forces is only valid if it is backed-up
in each case by a careful scientific and theoretical analysis of all the
relevant issues, the results
having been thoroughly and repeatedly tested in practice.
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter…. All rest, all equilibrium,
is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or another form of
motion…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without
matter…. Each separate movement strives toward equilibrium, and the total motion
puts an end to the equilibrium...." [Engels
(1976), pp.74-77.]
"So long as we consider things at rest and lifeless, each one by itself…we do
not run up against any contradictions in them…. But the position is quite
different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their
life, their reciprocal influence. Then we immediately become involved in
contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction
objectively present in things and processes themselves, a contradiction is
moreover an actual force...." [Ibid.,
pp.152-53.]
"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal
contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…. [This is] the
negation of the negation…. [which is a] law of development of nature, history
and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal an the vegetable kingdoms, in
geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing
more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature,
human society and thought." [Ibid.,
pp.179-80.]
"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex
of ready-made things, but as a complex of
processes, in which the things apparently stable…go through an uninterrupted
change of coming into being and passing away…. [T]he transformation of energy,
which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the
first instance in inorganic nature -- mechanical force and its complement,
so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat),
electricity, magnetism and chemical energy -- are different forms of
manifestation of universal motion…. [W]e have now arrived at the point where we
can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in
particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on
the whole…by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself." [Engels
(1888), pp.609-11.]
"All
motion is bound up with some change of
place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected
totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this
mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they
either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar
opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be
noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called
'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954),
pp.70-71.]
"All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion,
however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a
corresponding repulsion somewhere else…. Hence, all attraction and all
repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another…. Dialectics
has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar
opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite
poles on each other, that the separation and opposition of these poles exist
only within their mutual connection and union...." [Ibid.,
p.72. Bold added.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least
two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to
its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies
that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a
resistance...." [Ibid.,
p.82.]
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which
asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of
the opposites…determines the life of nature...." [Ibid.,
p.211. Bold added.]
"[A]ttraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But
attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive and negative, and hence
from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that the true theory of
matter must assign a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a theory
of matter based on mere attraction is false…. Equilibrium is inseparable from
motion…. All equilibrium is only relative and
temporary…. Motion of the heavenly bodies [is an] approximate equilibrium
of attraction and repulsion in motion." [Ibid.,
pp.243-46. Bold emphasis alone added.]
This is how Bukharin made the point:
"[T]he world consists of forces, acting many ways, opposing each other.
These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a
state of 'rest', i.e., their actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change
only one of these forces, immediately the 'internal contradictions' will be
revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again
established, it will be on a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of
forces, etc. It follows that the 'conflict,' the 'contradiction,' i.e., the
antagonism of forces acting in various directions, determines the motion of the
system…." [Bukharin
(1925), p.74. Bold added.]
And here are
Lenin's thoughts:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites." [Lenin
(1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Here, too, is
Stalin:
"Dialectics comes
from the Greek
dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of
arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an
opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient
times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the
clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This
dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature,
developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the
phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant
change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the
contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in
nature." [Stalin (1976b), p.836, quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
Veteran communist philosopher,
Maurice
Cornforth, argued as follows:
"If we consider the real, complex
movements and interconnections of real complex things, then we find that
contradictory tendencies can and do exist in them. For example, if the forces
operating in a body combine tendencies of attraction and of repulsion, that is a
real contradiction…. [C]ontradiction is the driving force of change…. [O]nly
the presence of contradictions in a process…provides the internal conditions
making change necessary…. The real universe is…full of contradictions -- the
contradictions of attraction and repulsion studied by physics…." [Cornforth
(1976), pp.92-95. Bold added.]
The author
of TAR, John Rees, had this to say:
"The conservatism of Hegel's system is
thus buried in his notion of contradiction. Contradictions in Hegel are merely
intellectual contradictions to be resolved by merely intellectual methods….
The dialectic is therefore only a pseudo-dialectic; its contradictions are never
those of opposed material forces capable of doing real damage or of effecting
real progress…. Marx was, however, obliged to transform completely the
terms of the dialectic when he altered its starting point from abstract concepts
to real material forces…. The contradictions are no longer simply between
concepts but between real, material forces…. Marx and Engels's dialectic is
utterly different from Hegel's. It starts from real, material, empirically
verifiable contradictions." [Rees (1998), pp.67-69, 83. Bold added.]
Here is
leading Trotskyist theorist, the late George Novack:
"The
unified process of development is the universality of the dialectic, which
maintains that everything is linked together and interactive, in continuous
motion and change, and that this change is the outcome of the conflict of
opposing forces within nature as well as everything to be found in it."
[Quoted in Green Left, 20/10/1993. I owe this reference to Petersen
(1994), p.156. Bold emphasis added.]
Woods and
Grant expressed themselves as follows:
"Dialectics explains that change and
motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions....
Dialectics is the logic of contradiction.... So fundamental is this idea to
dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic
characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not
the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an
external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....
"The essential point of dialectical
thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it
views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction
is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself.
It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical
law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....
The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the
motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it
is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain
movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories.
Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of
the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all
forms of matter....
"The opposing tendencies can exist in a
state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a
small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical
state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the
structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging
from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension
striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few
more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to
shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and
the whole thing falls.
"Attraction
and Repulsion
"This is an extension of the law of the
unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the
whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest. At the base of the
atom are immense forces of attraction and repulsion.... Engels points out the
universal role of attraction and repulsion:
'All motion consists in the interplay of
attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual
attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else. Otherwise
in time one side would get the preponderance over the other and then motion
would finally cease. Hence all attractions and all repulsions in the universe
must mutually balance one another. Thus the law of the indestructibility and
uncreatability of motion is expressed in the form that each movement of
attraction in the universe must have as its complement an equivalent movement of
repulsion and vice versa; or, as ancient philosophy -- long before the
natural-scientific formulation of the law of conservation of force or energy --
expressed it: the sum of all attractions in the universe is equal to the sum of
all repulsions.'
"In Engels' day, the prevailing idea of
motion was derived from classical mechanics, where motion is imparted from an
external force which overcomes the force of inertia. Engels was quite scathing
about the very expression 'force,' which he considered one-sided and
insufficient to describe the real processes of nature. 'All natural
processes,' he wrote, 'are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least
two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however,
owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world,
and further from terrestrial mechanics, implies that only one part is active,
operative, the other part being passive, receptive.'
"Engels was far in advance of his time in being highly critical of this notion,
which had already been attacked by Hegel. In his History of Philosophy, Hegel
remarks that 'It is better (to say) that a magnet has a soul (as Thales
expresses it) than that it has an attractive force; force is a kind of property
that, separate from matter, is put forward as a kind of predicate -- while soul,
on the other hand, is this movement itself, identical with the nature of
matter.' This remark of Hegel, approvingly quoted by Engels, contains a profound
idea -- that motion and energy are inherent to matter. Matter is
self-moving and self-organising." [Woods
and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 71-72. Their
reference is to Engels (1955), pp.95-96, 110. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added. Several
paragraphs merged.]
It is
interesting to note in passing that Woods and Grant naively record Engels's
approving reference to Hegel's depiction of magnets as having 'souls' while
failing to notice its mystical implications. How could that notion -- i.e., 'having a soul'
-- be given a 'materialist spin' aimed at putting Hegel's theory 'back on its
feet'/'the right way up'? Presumably a soul is a soul,
upside down or not.
"What characterises the dialectical
world, in all its aspects, as we have described it is that it is constantly in
motion. Constants become variables, causes become effects, and systems
develop, destroying the conditions that gave rise to them. Even elements that
appear to be stable are in a dynamic equilibrium of forces that can suddenly
become unbalanced, as when a grey lump of metal of a critical size becomes a
fireball brighter than a thousand suns....
"This appearance of opposing forceshas
given rise to the most debated and difficult, yet the most central, concept in
dialectical thought, the principle of contradiction.... For us, contradiction
is not only epistemic and political, but ontological in the broadest sense.
Contradictions between forces are everywhere in nature, not only in human
social institutions.... [O]pposing forces lie at the basis of the evolving
physical and biological world. Things change because of the action of
opposing forces on them, and things are the way they are because of the
temporary balance of opposing forces....
"The dialectical view insists that
persistence and equilibrium are not the natural state of things but require
explanation, which must be sought in the actions of the opposing forces....
The opposing forces are seen as
contradictory in the sense that each taken separately would have opposite
effects, and their joint action may be different from the results of either
acting alone.... However, the principle that all things are internally
heterogeneous directs our attention to the opposing processes at work within
the object.... Thus systems are either
self-negating (state A leads to some state not-A) or depend for their
persistence on self-negating processes.
"We see contradiction first of all as
self-negation. From this perspective it is not too different from logical
contradiction. In formal logic process is usually replaced by static
set-structural relations, and the dynamic of 'A leads to B' is replaced by 'A
implies B'. But all real reasoning is takes place in time, and the classical
logical paradoxes can be seen as A leads to not-A leads to A, and so on.... As against the alienated world view
that objects are isolated until proven otherwise, for us the simplest
assumption is that things are connected...." [Levins and Lewontin (1985),
pp.279-87. Bold emphases alone added. Spelling altered to conform with UK
English. Several paragraphs merged.]
Quotations like those
given above (and in Note 1) can be multiplied almost indefinitely.1
Admittedly, such passages
are often hedged about with numerous qualifications -- again, depending both on the context and the author
in question
-- but the overall message is
reasonably clear.2
Nevertheless, my concern here isn't so much with whether these passages are
consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has (ever) been
made to substantiate the sweeping generalisations they make with anything
like adequate evidence
--
or, indeed, any at all --, but with
whether the claim that forces can be used to model, illustrate or explain
'dialectical contradictions' makes any
sense at all.3
However, as we are about
to find out, the identification of forces with contradictions
is about misconceived an idea as anything else we have so far encountered in the
DM-Grimoire -- that is, where any sense can be made of it.4
First of all, there here are several obvious 'difficulties' with the whole idea. For example,
if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are thus 'contradictory' --
there would presumably have to be at least two of them, with both
operational and
both in opposition to one another (actually or potentially), for that to be the case. But, when we consider one of the most important
and universal examples of motion in the universe -- i.e., the orbital trajectory
of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in Classical Physics, at
least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one
force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in
question toward the
centre of mass of the system it is affected by or is orbiting. So, if Classical Physics is to be believed, it isn't easy to see how such forces could be viewed as
'contradictions'.5
Admittedly, the
picture just painted is highly simplified,
for even in such circumstances
there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body -- the resultant
motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting
in, or on, the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of the
orbiting body, motion isn't the result of two different sorts of forces
-- those of attraction and repulsion -- but a consequence
of justone (resultant) force. Hence, orbital motion (at least) is produced by the action of
only one (resultant) force (in Classical Physics), and, plainly, if there is only one force, there
can be no 'contradiction'. Now, since orbital motion implicates the
overwhelming
bulk of motion in the entire universe, this means that most of the latter can't be the
result of any sort of 'contradiction'.
Furthermore, any
secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the
system), which happens to be superimposed on the primary action, only serves to complicate
the above picture, it doesn't alter it. This extra activity might also be the result
of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces in Classical Physics
(once more), which clearly affect the said resultant. While they might influence
that resultant, they don't turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic,
along with
several other options, is examined again in more detail
here.]
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the motion of such bodies
around others is determined by
the operation of the two forces of attraction that pass between them:
body, A, attracts body, B, and B
does likewise with A.
Even so,
it is difficult to see how two attractive forces could be
regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories' -- nor yet how they are
supposed to be 'struggling' with each other. Anyway, Engels himself
argues that oppositional forces are those of attraction and repulsion
(even though he prefers their translation into
different forms of motion),
despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in the
universe they seem to
have little or no part to play. Not only that, but the motion of, say, planet, A, around, say, star,
B, is caused by forces originating in B, notA. While, the forces originating in
A may affect B, they don't affect A itself, or its motion around
B.
It could be argued once
more
that the interconnected and reciprocal chain of effects in play between A and
B
show that such forces are dialectically-linked. Hence, on this view, B would affect A's
motion while A reciprocates; this in turn alters B's motion, which must then
affect A's movement, and so on. But, even then, these attractive forces don't
confront each other as oppositional or as 'contradictory'.
At best, such forces
affect the motion of the two bodies in tandem, which motion in turn then affects any
other forces in play, and so on. In fact, they appear to augmentone another. On that basis, if we insist on anthropomorphising nature
in this way, shouldn't we say (with more justification, too) that such forces aren't contradictory,
they
are in fact tautological?
Moreover, these attractive forces
don't turn into one another, and they
certainly don't imply each other, in the way that the proletariat is supposed to imply
the capitalist class, where we are also told that the one can't exist without the
other
(although
I have thrown that claim itself into considerable doubt
here).
So, whatever else they are, these
forces can't be
'dialectical opposites'. Either that, or the
DM-classics were
seriously mistaken.
And, even if we take two such forces into account, it is their combination
(in a resultant force) which causes, or which changes, the said motion.
Notwithstanding this,
Thomas Weston has recently made a valiant attempt to find a
'second force' (or cause) in such cases -- which he locates in...'inertia'!
"In the classical mechanics pioneered
by Newton, elliptical motion of a body will result if it is attracted to another
'central' body by a force inversely proportional to the square of the distance
between them, provided that the body has an initial velocity that is not too
large or too small, and not directly toward or directly away from the central
body. This situation involves only a single force on the body, which, in the
case of a planet orbiting the Sun, is the force of gravity. Gravity is not the
only cause of this motion, however.
"An elliptical orbit is the result of two causes, which
produce two tendencies of motion. One tendency results from the force directed
toward the central body, which makes the body turn toward that central body. The
second tendency is that of the body to continue in a straight line at a constant
speed. This tendency is usually called 'inertia'. Inertia is not a force, since
forces cause change in speed or direction, and inertia is the tendency not
to change speed or direction. Inertia is a causal principle, as Newton
recognised, calling it an 'innate force of matter'. He expressed this principle
in his first law of motion, while forces are described in the second law. In
elliptical motion, these two causes, gravity and inertia, are united by the
physical fact that the mass responsible for inertia is proportional to the mass
that gives rise to gravity. This fact is an important element in recognising the
dialectical contradiction in elliptical motion." [Weston
(2012), pp.6-7. Bold emphasis alone added.]
One moment Weston tells us that inertia isn't
a force, the next he quotes Newton to the effect that it is (or, to be more
precise, it is "a force
of matter")! However, nowhere
does Weston explain how gravity and inertia can "struggle" with each other (whether or not
they are, or they cause, opposing "tendencies"), or how they could possibly turn into
each other -- which the
DM-classics tell us they must "inevitably" do. Nor yet how this set-up is
even a 'contradiction' to begin with! As is the case with other DM-fans, Weston
simply helps himself to that word with no attempt to justify it.
Indeed, as Weston admits, Hegel
himself argued that the orbital motion of a
planet is governed by the operation of only one force:
"We must not therefore speak of forces.
If we want to
speak of force, then there is but one force, and its moments do not, as
two forces, pull in different directions." [Hegel (2004), p.65. Italic
emphasis in the original. Bold added.]
As noted earlier, it is difficult to see
how a 'dialectical contradiction' can be cobbled together from only one force.
Another serious difficulty arising from Weston's attempt to
shoehorn Marx's comments into this ill-fitting dialectical boot is the inconsistent way he
uses the word "tendency". One minute "tendencies" aren't causes, but are
caused by
something else (in the first of the above passages, where it seems that an
elliptical orbit "produce[s] two tendencies of motion"), next they are causes:
"Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite
tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and
conversely." [Weston
(2012), p.17. I examine variations on this theme later
on in this Essay.]
Finally, Weston only mentions the TOR once (p.7, ftn.17), but
even then he fails to notice that one of the components of the 'contradiction'
here has been edited out of the picture; 'the force of gravity' has been replaced
by motion along a geodesic.
According to the TOR, we no longer have even one force operating here,
we haveno gravitational forces at all!
[TOR = Theory Of Relativity.]
In which case, post-Classical Physics offers
even less assistance to DM-theorists in their endeavour to find a physical
correlate for these 'contradictions' in nature. According to the TOR, all such motion is either a function of the topology of
Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been edited out of the picture), or
it is the result of the body in question being situated in a
tensor,
vector, or
scalar field, in as
many dimensions of
phase space as are deemed necessary and
appropriate.6
As one of
the standard textbooks on gravitation points out:
"Whatever aspect of
gravity one measures, and however one measures it, one is studying the geometry
of space-time." [Misner,
et al (1973), p.400. Bold emphasis added. (This links to a PDF.)]
One
history of the concept of force also points out:
"In Newton's theory the symbol F in F = ma refers to the
cause of the acceleration of the body. Force, then, is an external agent that
acts on matter with an inertial mass m, causing it to accelerate at the rate a.
In the GTR [General Theory of relativity -- RL], however, there is no external
force. Indeed, Einstein was able to derive Newton's equation F = ma from purely
geometric considerations. He saw the possibility that all 'external' forces may
be only apparent -- that the 'effect' of other matter may be representable by a
generalization of the geometry of space-time that describes the motions." [Stinner
(1994), p.84.
Bold emphases added.
(This links to a PDF.)]
Video One: Why Gravity Isn't A Force
Even in
Classical Hamiltonian Mechanics, such forces have been edited out of the
picture, replaced by dynamical considerations -- indeed, along lines later
suggested by Engels
himself.
Once again, if there are no such forces, there can be no
DM-'contradictions', so conceived.
[On this, see Goldstein, et al (2002),
pp.34-36, and Jammer (1999), pp.158-264.]
And, that isn't just the case with
respect to gravity, as physicist,
Max Jammer, notes:
"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined
to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind
do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated
debates.... In
quantum chromodynamics,
gauge theories, and
the so-called
Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an
exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the
ontologically less demanding
concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the
exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer
(1999), p.v. Paragraphs merged; links and bold emphasis added.]6a
"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real
objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is
'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is
not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do
we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead
of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other."
[Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]
However, and despite what those
two say, it is reasonably clear that a mere "relation" between two bodies is
incapable of making either of them move -- unless there were a 'force' of
some sort operating between them, or, indeed, something else consequent
on that relation, such as a time-based
trajectory along a "world-line",
perhaps(?) to bring it about.6b
Unfortunately, this means that most (if not all!) of the
bulk
motion in the universe can't be accounted for by DM (that is, if such
motion, or, change of motion, is the result of 'contradictions' interpreted asopposingforces).
Again: if there is only one force present -- or perhaps even none at all!
-- there can't be any 'dialectical
contradictions', to begin with.
Admittedly,
Engels made a weak attempt to solve the orbital 'problem' by
inventing a repulsive force, which he implausibly identified with "heat" (for example,
Engels (1954), pp.73-80).7
[I haven't reproduced those passages here since
they are far too long. The reader is invited to check for herself what Engels has to say to
see if I have either misrepresented him or have missed something.]
Nevertheless, it is far
from clear what Engels was driving at in that section. If he meant to say
that heat operates as a repulsive force then that would have been a desperate
and unconvincing dodge. Not only do cold bodies have satellites (e.g., Neptune),
hot bodies swallow matter up all the time. However, it is possible that Engels simply
copied this idea off several theorists working in the previous century. [Hesse (1961), Williams
(1980).]
Admittedly, Engels considered other repulsive forces that could operate in
a planetary system, but his ideas weren't just speculative and fanciful, they
were manifestly ad hoc. I
can find no evidence that anyone else -- DM-fan or otherwise -- has followed up
on, or has developed any of these ideas in the intervening years.
For example,
Engels appealed to the original repulsive properties of the "individual particles
of the gaseous sphere" from which the Solar System was formed (as a result of
"contraction"), to account for its origin by means of an "interplay of
attraction and repulsion." [Ibid.,
pp.73-74.]
It would be difficult to
find a better example than this of how the 'dialectical method' has
been
imposed on nature, not deduced from the phenomena. And we can assert that
with some confidence. Even if this 'theory' weren't so obviously fanciful, it
certainly couldn't
have been deduced from the phenomena since the alleged incidents took
place billions of years ago. Admittedly, there might have been theoretical
considerations that recommended these ideas to Engels as a tentative 'explanation'
of how the Solar System could have formed -- although even that is
questionable since Engels explicitly based his theorising on the old
Kant-Laplace model, itself
nearly a century old in his day. But, even granting all this, Engels's
account is superficial, impressionistic and lacks both mathematical and evidential
support. It was clearly motivated by his desire to find some force -- anyforce -- to counterbalance gravity just because DM requires it,
not because the phenomena dictate it -- rather like
Thomas Weston, in fact. This is a classic example of Engels
using the concepts he inherited from Hegel as a dogmatic
"form
of representation",
and, as we will see, a thoroughly confused one into the bargain.
Of course,
scientists employ formal devices like this all the time, but Engels turned this
particular example into a
non-sensical metaphysical thesis.
[The difference between Metaphysics and
Science will be discussed in Essay Thirteen Part Two. On Metaphysics and DM, see Essay
Twelve
Part One.]
Indeed,
Einstein himself wasn't above inventing forces to suit his
theory (the same was also the case with Newton cf., Cohen (1970) and Jammer
(1999), pp.116-57), introducing "the cosmological constant"
to account for the fact that the Universe hasn't collapsed in on itself, an
idea which has now morphed into
Dark Energy. [Cf., Lerner (1992),
pp.131-32.] There are countless examples of moves like this in the history of science.
Thomas Kuhn
called them "paradigms"
if or when they gained some traction.
[On that, see Kuhn (1970,
1996), and Sharrock and Read (2002).]
Incidentally, an appeal to so-called
'centrifugal
forces' ("fictional
forces" found in Classical Physics) won't save Engels's
theory either, since they
don't
'exist'. If anything they are the result of misleading
shorthand for the way that rectilinear, tangential motion will resume if a force responsible
for
centripetal acceleration ceases to operate
for whatever reason, subjectively experienced in certain
rotating systems.
John Molyneux
also weighed in with the following comment:
"If anything (a grain of sand, a mountain, a tree, a fish,
a human, a society) gives the appearance of stability and permanence it is
because it constitutes a particular moment in a longer process of change. That
moment constitutes a particular balance between forces within it working for and
against change -- a unity of opposites; much as the earth's, or any planet's,
orbit around the sun represents a balance between the force of gravity pulling
it into the sun and the momentum which would send it flying off into space."
[Molyneux (2012), pp.44-45. Bold added.]
Once again, if
the TOR is correct,
there is no force of gravity.
Even supposing there were such a force, in Molyneux's scheme-of-things
it isn't balanced by an opposing force, just "momentum", which can in no
way be interpreted as a, or even the, 'dialectical opposite' of the force of
gravity. [The significance of that particular comment (i.e., why there has to be
a unique oppositefor each object or process -- something Hegel
and Lenin called its "other") is explained
here.] But, even if
this attempt to impose dialectics on nature could be made to work, or was
in any way plausible, and
"momentum" was a/the 'dialectical opposite' of the force of gravity, the
following aspect
of Molyneux's theory would still fail to work:
"That moment constitutes a particular balance between
forces within it working for and against change -- a unity of opposites...."
[Ibid.]
What are the
opposing forces internal to the Earth that make it orbit the Sun? Or, the internal
forces in the Sun that make the Earth orbit it? Molyneux is
surprisingly silent on this issue.
Of course, it could be replied that these opposites are
internal to the Sun-Earth pair, or perhaps even the Solar System itself.
But, as we have seen, there are no opposing forces there either! Nor are there
any relevant united 'opposites'. And, even if there were, which of them is providing:
"a particular balance between forces within it working for
and against change...." [Ibid.]
Is
gravity the cause of change, or is it opposing it? Is "momentum" opposing
change, or creating it? Is the 'dialectical union' of these two doing
one or the other?
[See also my
earlier comments
about a Thomas Weston's recent attempt to recruit inertia, but not
momentum, to the cause.]
Moreover, are we really supposed to believe that gravity "struggles" with
momentum? Or that they turn into one another (as the
DM-classics tell us they should)? In what way does momentum imply gravity, which
it should do if they form a
UO (rather like the
proletariat is said to imply the capitalist class, and vice versa)?
As usual,
in books and articles on DM,
we are presented with what are
in effect
less than half-formed thoughts and off-the-cuff musings, which don't make sense
even in their own
terms.
In view of the above, it
might be wise to interpret "opposing forces"exclusivelyas
'figurative contradictions' -- or, maybe, the other way
round, interpreting 'dialectical contradictions' solely as 'figurative forces'. Either one or both
of these might
then form part of an analogical, or perhaps even metaphorical (but non-literal),
depiction of nature and society. Alternatively, forces could be described as
'contradictions' as a sort of shorthand, which would then enable the modelling
of different types of accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be
edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right. Indeed,
Engels seems to have had that in mind in the passage quoted below,
where he argues that attraction and repulsion shouldn't be regarded as
forces, but as simple forms of motion. This major theoretical retreat perhaps
recommended to him by his admission that the concept of "force" was
originally derived from
ancient animistic/mystical theories of nature, hence its use in DM
would
smack of anthropomorphism:8
"All motion is bound up with some change of
place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected
totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this
mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they
either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar
opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be
noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called
'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.
Bold emphasis added.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are
based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction.
The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human
organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the
other part being passive…[and appears] as a resistance." [Ibid.,
p.82.
Bold emphasis added.]
However, the above revision had two untoward consequences
Engels appears not to have noticed:
(1) It makes his version of DM look even more
positivistic
that it might already seem -- at least as Engels presents it in DN. If an appeal to forces in nature is no
more than a shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then, plainly, forces will have
no real counterpart in nature (since, of course, they have just been edited out of
the picture!). Forces would then be little more than
"useful fictions", introduced
in order to account for the phenomena,
instrumentally
-- rather like the
epicycles of Ptolemaic Cosmology. This would make the identification of forces with
'contradictions'
even more problematic (as will be
demonstrated below). Once again: if there are no forces, there can be no
DM-'contradictions'.
[DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e.,
Engels (1954); UO = Unity of Opposites.]
(2) Given this re-write of the word "force", the
supposed 'contradictory
relationship' between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative
motion. [Woods and Grant also seem to be thinking along those lines, as we saw
earlier.]
Unfortunately, in that case, there would be no
interconnection between any of these moving bodies, which appears to be an essential factor required
by other DM-principles -- for instance, where we are told that
everything is "interconnected".
The
alternative put forward by Engels clearly means that causal interactions of this sort are
in fact external, not mediated by forces,
and thus can't be internally inter-conditioned. In which case, the
'unity-in-opposition' between objects and processes in
the Totality has been broken; the thesis that change is the result of 'internal
contradictions' would then be left without any sort of internal, mediating
factors.
[This confusion was analysed in much more detail in
Part One.]
Not even the relative motion between bodies
travelling in opposite directions could supply a credible
dialectical connection in this case -- should an interaction
result from this.
Without question, this would fail to capture the "internal relations" that DM-theorists
claim must exist between such bodies. Once more, objects behaving like this wouldn't be internally interrelated (as part or parts of a
UO, the one wouldn't
imply the existence of the other, as they should if there were a dialectical
relation at work, unlike the relation that is supposed to exist between the
proletariat and the capitalist class), since the connection,
or mediation, between moving bodies is now missing. In that case, any
subsequent interaction would appear to be difficult to account for dialectically, which
would be, to state the obvious, bad news for DM-fans.9
As already noted, with events and processes
sealed-off from each other DM would begin to resemble
CAR and 'crude materialism'
all the more.
Indeed,
if this is how DM is supposed to be interpreted, it would
differ from 'crude mechanical materialism' in name alone.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism; follow
the above link for more details.]
Of course, even if Engels's version of DM could account for motion
along a certainline of action -- but in diametrically opposed
directions --, it would be of little help because most of the bulk motion in the
universe isn't of this sort; it is either orbital motion under the
action of a central force, or it is movement along a
geodesic
(depending on which version of modern Physics one accepts). In fact, as we
will see, matter in general moves in complex ways which are difficult, if not
impossible, to depict in such crude oppositional terms.
Like it or not, DM-theorists needreal material forces
acting between bodies so that their "Totality" has the holistic,
or mediated, integrity
we are told it possesses. A
theoreticalfiction like this is no use at all. If DM is to work, forces
must exist, and any reference made to them as 'contradictions' must be
concrete and
literal, which in turn means that interacting bodies, or even these forces
themselves, are 'internally-related' to each other.10
Naturally, this exposes an ambiguity brought out by these two questions:
(i) Are forces related to each other 'dialectically' -- so that they are
'dialectical opposites' of one another, and their relation is
what forms the 'contradiction' here? Or.
(ii) Are the
bodies and process involved dialectically related to one another?
(b) Between the
forces operating in the system? Or,
(c) Both?
That
ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep
it in mind.
Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as
'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by dialecticians that what they
are offering is an 'objective' account of nature. It isn't easy
to see how figurative language is capable of filling the gaps in an explanation
of the relationship between objects and processes in the material world -- at
least,
no more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:
"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun." [Romeo
and Juliet, Act Two, Scene Two.]
Or, indeed,
no more than would describing a man as a "pig" imply he has a curly tail, four legs and was a
convenient source of bacon.
Despite this, in view of the above difficulties -- and in addition to those
that will be examined below --, interpreting forces
figuratively might prove to be the only viable way that contradictions could
be 'interpreted' as 'forces', even if it compromises DM's avowedly 'objective' picture
of reality.11
Of course, if this view of the nature of forces were
to be adopted by
dialecticians, it would be difficult to distinguish
their theory from a 'poetic' version of
Instrumentalism or
Conventionalism.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how
'figurative forces' could account for anything. What sort of explanation would
it be to say that contradictions -- already suspiciously figurative themselves
-- can be modelled by forces, which are themselves just figures of speech? Once
more, describing a man as, say, a "pig" might
perhaps account for his crude behaviour (but not because his anatomy or
physiology is literally pig anatomy or physiology), but the utility even of that metaphor would be virtually nil if it were
now admitted that the word "man" was figurative, too. Unlike
iterated negation, multiple
tropes
don't
undo each other.
Nevertheless, even if this proved to be an acceptable resolution
of Engels's problem, it would still fail to provide DM-theorists with a
viable way
out of this impasse. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation
of DM-'contradictions' with forces in nature or society can't work.
That is so for several reasons
--, to which I now turn.
The first of these is connected with the way that forces are
already represented. for example, in Mathematics and Physics, which
doesn't appear to be an even remotely appropriate way of depicting DM-contradictions as literal forces. Consider the
following:
(a) Forces often operate according to an
inverse square law.
It is difficult to see how the same could be true of contradictions. Presumably, two objects,
states of affairs, or processes contradict each other in nature or society or
they don't.12Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a contradiction could
operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the
appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its oppositional elements
is doubled. Do bosses really become more conciliatory if workers walk away
from them? Or if the local trade union offices are moved to a new location ten
miles further away? Does wealth
cause less conflict if the rich stash their money to the Cayman Islands? Do
appearances 'contradict' reality any the more -- or less -- if someone used a
microscope, or pressed their face against the surface of an object?13
Indeed, little sense can be made either of the idea that there
is a literalseparation distance between
components of
DM-'contradictions'; for
instance, that there is, or could be, a separation distance between Capital and Labour, or that
there might be a literal gap between the forces and relations of production, or
even between an object and itself as it moves in a 'contradictory' sort of way.
What could it possibly mean to suggest, for example, that the "contradiction
between use value and exchange value" changes if these two terms (or the
commodities to which they are supposed to apply) are moved further
apart? Clearly, these two 'entities' can't be separated (except perhaps in thought),
since they aren't the sorts of thing that could be physically moved away
from, or even closer to, each other -- but even if they
could, they would still be just as contradictory as they were before they
had been moved (one
presumes?). And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote magnitude unaffected
by such changes.
Admittedly,
dialecticians speak about the "contradictions" in the capitalist system
"intensifying", but that isn't because the 'separation distance' between the
relevant classes has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists think they mean by "intensification"
here (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions" become more obvious,
intractable, or crisis-ridden), they certainly don't mean
it in the same way that physicists mean it when they talk about, say, the
strength of a force field intensifying. Nor has there ever been any mathematics
applied in
such DM-goings-on.
So, while a scientist, for example, might be dispatched to measure the intensity of forces
in the earth's crust prior to an earthquake (as part of a genuine scientific research
programme), no one,
it seems, has ever been asked to do
the same with these
"intensifying" 'dialectical contradictions'. They (or at least their
'strength') appear to be permanently locked in subjective space, stubbornly
resistant to scientific investigation.
Be
this as it may, what sense can be made of the other 'contradictions' alleged to
exist in nature? For instance, can a moving object be more 'contradictory' than it
used to beat any point along line of action? Increasingly here and not here? Or increasing and not
increasing at the same time? Perhaps an object can be In
more than two places at
once, as it
accelerates? Maybe an electron can be more of a particle and a wave, at the same
time? Is it possible for 'appearances' to 'contradict' underlying 'essences'
more today than last week? Anyone who thinks they can, please
email me the numbers, along with the
details of the experiment(s) you performed or the measurements you took in order
to ascertain them.
(b) Forces in nature can be
(and are) represented by
vectors,
the use of which is
governed by
well-understood rules. As such,
for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added,
subtracted and multiplied (to give
inner,
vector or
scalar triple
products, and the like), by means of which diverse quantities such as areas, volumes, field densities,
boundary fluxes (etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors may be parallel
or orthogonal
to one another, or to previously defined axes, just as they can be decomposed into their components and
projected
onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can also be used to identify and
classify the mathematical properties of
various manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined
in a given vector space, providing it with a base and
spanning set.
Modulii can be
ascertained for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can
also be
determined. Furthermore,
matrices
may be employed to represent vectors more
efficiently, their
determinants
and
inverses ascertained (where they exist). The ordinary and
partial derivatives
of vectors can also be calculated,
and they can be integrated (as part of
line,
surface or
volume
integrals), too, and so on.
It is difficult to see how any
of the above (and many
more besides) could possibly be the case with a single DM-'contradiction', interpreted literally or
figuratively as a force. What, for example, is the angle between the
'contradictions' mentioned on the opening pages of
TAR:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149
wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the
numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths
in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth
century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of
human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its
destruction…. Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How
can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world,
the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is
it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession,
produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below
the poverty line? The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze
from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern
Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced
the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2. Paragraphs merged.]
And, while
we are at it, what is the
cross
product of the following 'contradictions' (mentioned in Socialist Worker)?
"Elvis's career illuminated a contradiction at the heart of capitalism.
Capitalism needs to generate profits in order to survive. But to suck profit out
of workers it also needs an ideology to ensure that workers know their place in
society...." [Ian Birchall,
Socialist Worker, 14/08/2007.]
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers. It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting
'you're breaking the law' to
the strikers.... Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to
accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main
jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers
have a proven record of racism and violence. Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA
shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling
fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.' Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA
members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Simon Basketter,
Socialist Worker, 01/09/2007. Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]13a
Is it possible to find the inner
product of the 'contradiction' between freedom and necessity? Is there an
eigenvector applicable to the 'contradiction' between 'appearance' and 'underlying
essence'? Is there any way of specifying the extent to which bosses and workers -- Capital and Labour --
contradict one another, individually or as a class? If so, what is the modulus
of the 'contradiction' between boss NN and worker MM -- or, between the
classes to which they belong? Is the 'contradiction' between ice and water
orthogonal to…, well, what?
But, what of the
div, curl and grad of the
'contradiction' between a grain of barley and the plant that grows from it? Can
we ascertain the
Jacobian for the contradictory relationship between wealth and poverty? Is
the 'contradiction', between "John" and his "manhood" normal to a given
direction or manifold?
In her otherwise excellent book,
Lindsey German
had this to say:
"The Working class has to have a party to
overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its
actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle
by an organised minority…." [German (1996), p.87.]
If contradictions were
indeed literal forces, we would be able to
ascertain, say, the i, j and k components of "the contradiction between [the] potential
revolutionary role [of the working-class] and its actual situation",
differentiate it/them, and find out how quickly this link was changing, and in
what direction.14
The fact that we can't
do this -- and no sane Marxist has ever even so much as suggested this was a
possibility --
implies that
in practice not even DM-fans think this analogy is at all apt, or,
indeed, is all
that literal.
Plainly, if 'contradictions' could be interpreted literally
as forces, it would be possible to construct a vector algebra depicting them in nature and
society. Do we possess such a
'Vector Algebra of
Revolution'? Has anyone ever bothered to construct one?
Given the title of his
book, the author of TAR was mysteriously silent about this.14a
It could
be objected that social contradictions were never meant to be interpreted in
this crude and inappropriate manner, as vectors (etc.). Maybe not, but this
section of the Essay is trying to make some sort of sense of the equation
of forces with contradictions, and forces certainly can be represented by
vectors. If it isn't possible to represent social forces in this way,
then all well and good. But, in that case, we are still no nearer
understanding what these 'social contradictions' are, or in what way they can be
described as, or be illustrated by, forces. In fact, we are now further away!
Also in
doubt is
exactly how
something that actually exists (i.e., the current state of the working class)
can 'contradict' in a 'dialectical' sort of way (involving forces) something
that does not exist (i.e., the proletariat's potential revolutionary role, as
Lindsey German characterised it). We have already seen that dialecticians use the word "contradiction"
almost ad nauseam in
inappropriate circumstances to depict things that seem quirky, odd, paradoxical,
contrary to expectations, and so on -- almost as the mood takes them. [On that,
see, for
instance, here and
here.]
"The Working class has to have a party
to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its
actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle
by an organised minority…." [German, op cit.]
What Lindsey
might have had in mind in the above passage is that there is what seems
to be a contradiction in revolutionary theory, which depicts the
proletariat as the revolutionary class, but it does so in the face of the
undeniable fact that workers are often quiescent or compliant (or relatively so)
for long periods. But, this is no more a contradiction than it would be if, say,
we heard that a heavy object near to the surface of the earth didn't actually
fall to the ground. As soon as we learnt that this heavy object was held in
place by pillars, cables or magnets, the phenomenon would puzzle us no more.
Three questions
worth posing in relation to this are the following:
(i) Do the
above
factors struggle with each other?
(ii) Do they
change into one another (as the
DM-classics assert they should)? And,
(iii) Do
they imply one another (like, say, the proletariat implies the bourgeoisie -- although
I have thrown even that inference into considerable doubt
here)?
The answer
is surely in the negative in each case. That being so, whatever else it is,
what Lindsey mentioned
isn't a 'dialectical contradiction'.
It could be
replied that there is a struggle going on in the working class. Maybe so, but
there isn't one going on between "its potential revolutionary role and
its actual situation". One of these at least is an abstraction which can't
struggle with anything. And are they changing into one another?
Another
moral here is that no law in Physics is 'true' on its own; each one is hedged
about by all manner of ceteris
paribus (i.e., "all things being equal") clauses. [On this, see
Cartwright (1983). However, there is a forceful rebuttal to this way
of seeing things
here. See also Earman, et al (2002), and van Brakel (2000), pp.151-69.
Naturally, it would be out of place to pursue that topic any further in this
Essay; it will be discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it
is published.]
In that
case, and analogously, as soon as we know what is holding the working class
back, the above puzzle also disappears.
Hence,
Lindsey German's worry about overcoming this 'contradiction' can now be shelved --
since
there isn't one.
Naturally,
that
doesn't mean that socialists should just let things drift, fail to
intervene, or, indeed, sit back and wait for workers to organise themselves, but
since further consideration of this topic would take us into areas involving
HM, no more will be
said about it here (for reasons set out in
Essay One).
The second reason why this is an inappropriate way to depict
'contradictions' is in fact connected with a possible response that could
be made to the objections outlined above: it could be argued that it is the
inter-relationship between contradictory forces that explains change, and
hence it is only within a network of forces situated in a Totality of
some sort that their contradictory inter-play becomes clear. Indeed, it could be
maintained that the above interpretation of contradictions (which seems to
picture them
isolated from their surroundings) completely misconstrues their role in DM,
as well as their operation in nature and society.
The
above
volunteered objection was in fact considered in
Part One
of this Essay -- but from a slightly different direction (no pun intended) -- where
it was pointed out that there are serious ambiguities in DM on this issue. That
is because dialecticians are unclear whether 'contradictions':
(a) Are internal to objects
and processes, causing them to change as a result of an internal dynamic,
(b)
Arise externally between objects as they form part of a mediated system,
group of systems and processes,
(c) Merely
result from our
description of objects and processes as 'contradictory', this perhaps
arising from our partial or relative knowledge of reality, etc.,
(d) Derive
from a combination of all three
Or, indeed,
whether they,
(e) Emerge
because of some other factor about which we are currently unaware.
This confusion is further compounded by the fact that
in the hands of DM-theorists the meaning of "internal"
oscillates erratically between "spatially internal" and "logically internal".
And, as we also
saw in
Part One, while each of the above options faces serious difficulties
of its own,
in the end they all fail to explain change because they merely re-describe
it, and
they do so in a thoroughly obscure manner. That is why they
fall apart so readily when
examined closely (as we will see is also the case with the
equation of forces and
'contradictions' in what follows).
In
response, it could be argued that the problem with the analysis of dialectical systems promoted in these Essays is that it
attempts to 'objectify' contradictions (i.e., it endeavours to make objects
out of them). Hence, it could be countered that in Materialist Dialectics it
isn't 'objects' that are
subject to contradictions -- or which contain them, or which constitute
them --, but systems, or totalities, in change that reveal their inner contradictions,
and which motivate further development. In that case, it could be maintained that
contradictions are properties of systems, or totalities, in the process
of change, not
'objects' as such.
In reply to these volunteered DM-responses,
it is worth asking where this leaves forces if contradictions are no longer to
be viewed as 'objects' or as 'object-like'. Forces presumably have a physical
form of some sort. They aren't just
relations, are they? Furthermore, this response makes a mockery of many
things the DM-classicists themselves say about change. Here is Lenin, for
example:
"Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original.
Italic emphasis added.]
[Numerous
similar-looking quotations were added to
Part One of this Essay.]
It
could be objected that this misrepresents Lenin, since he went on to argue
as follows:
"The gist of his
[Bukharin's -- RL] theoretical mistake in this
case is substitution of eclecticism for the dialectical interplay of politics
and economics (which we find in Marxism). His theoretical attitude is: 'on the
one hand, and on the other', 'the one and the other'. That is eclecticism.
Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their
concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces. I have shown
this to be so on the example of politics and economics....
"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and
a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or
facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of
'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world.... Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and
should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal
definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two
or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder
and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative
of different facets of the object, and nothing more.
"Dialectical logic demands that we should
go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must
look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is
something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of
comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly,
dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development,
in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not
immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is
in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection
with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of an object must
include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a
practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical
logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late
Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel. (Let me add in parenthesis for the
benefit of young Party members that you cannot hope to become a
real, intelligent Communist without making a study -- and I mean study
-- of all of Plekhanov's philosophical writings, because nothing better has been
written on Marxism anywhere in the world.)" [Ibid.
pp.90-93. Bold emphases
alone added;
quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Several paragraphs merged.]
From this it is clear that Lenin in fact argued that an
understanding of the inter-relation between an object and the rest of the world
was essential to comprehending that object's contradictory development. [I have
discussed this topic in much more detail
here and here.]
Or so it
could be argued.
[This
response creates problems of its own, which will be discussed presently.]
But, even if forces were just relations, it is far from easy to see what
it is that could possibly physically relate objects and processes in nature and society
in this way
--
that is, over and above the gratuitous insertion of a
few Hegelian 'concepts' (of dubious provenance and even more
questionable content).
Indeed, in all this, it seems that the idea that objects change because of an
'inner dynamic' has been lost sight of again. If objects change only because of a set of
external forces -- albeit, which forces might also be internal to a system of some
sort, mediated, or not,
by the
yet-to-be-explained 'influence' of the
"Totality" --, this
can only mean that "external" has now become the new "internal". In that case,
"internal contradictions" have now in effect become factors that an object merely experiences
as part of
its
external relations with other objects and processes (which are, in turn, internal to the "Totality"). But, once more: what is the point of arguing that change is
"internally-motivated" if external mediation is the only show in town, and
forces are merely "relations"?
[As we will
see in Essay Four Part Two (when it is published), these "relations" are
supposed to be
'logical' (in a quasi-Hegelian sort of sense), but they are no less bogus for
all that. Until then, readers are redirected
here.]
Before we
proceed, my I remind readers of something that was pointed out
several sections ago?
So, is the
'contradiction' here:
(a) Between the bodies and processes
themselves?
(b) Between the
forces operating in the system? Or,
(c) Both?
That
ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep
it in mind.
We are now
about to find out why.
In addition, the proffered DM-response outlined a few paragraphs back fails to
resolve the problems also mentioned earlier.
First of all, as we will also see in Essay
Eleven Part One, there is good reason to question the nature of the nebulous DM-"Totality"
-- or, to be more honest, there would be if we knew what 'it' was, and
there was some sign that dialecticians themselves knew what 'it' was! Its re-appearance here
can only hinder comprehension.
Secondly, even if
a clear account of the "Totality" were forthcoming, this way of depicting
forces would still fail to work. If contradictions are properties of
totalities -- as opposed to their parts -- then those parts couldn't change,
since, on this account, contradictions wouldn't belong to them, but to the
whole, taken as a whole. In that case, while the whole might change, it would do
so only as a
result of the rearrangement of its changeless parts. Given this way of thinking,
the "Totality" (or, indeed, any sub-system of the "Totality") would be:
(a) Composed
of infinitely small changeless elementary particles, or,
(b) Composed of infinitely complex further sub-systems, which enjoy no connections
among themselves.
[The reader is referred back to
Part One
for a more detailed explanation of this point.]
Again, it could be objected that a Totality is
constituted by its
own internal contradictory relations and processes. That is precisely what a Totality
is
--
a contradictory, differentiated unity. The account given above seems to want to
separate the parts from the whole.
However,
that reply
still won't do, for on that basis
it would now seem that it is part and whole which are contradictory (and
in a manner that has yet to be
explained with any clarity). And yet, such parts can't be contradictory
in the same way that wholes are. That is because, on this account, parts mutually condition one another; this
is, presumably, the nature of their mediated 'unity in contradiction'. However, the
"Totality" is
related to nothing else that could condition it (one also
supposes, should we ever be told what
the Totality is!). So, if the "Totality" is a contradictory whole,
then it would appear to be so in a new and so-far-unexplained sense. The 'parts' of a
'dialectical contradiction' are said to imply one another, being a 'reflection'
of each other's 'essence' in development, such that one couldn't exist without
the other (just as the proletariat both implies and couldn't exist without the
bourgeoisie, for example).
Not only does the whole here not imply any one of its parts, it could exist
without many its parts. Does the universe itself really imply Venus, or the Crab
Nebula? The universe could surely have existed without Venus or the Crab Nebula.
If so, whatever else is true of the relation between part and whole here,
it can't be "contradictory" in the required DM-sense of that word.
In fact, as
seems obvious from what little DM-theorists themselves have said about the
"Totality",
it looks like
'it' must be an Unconditioned Absolute. It certainly can't be conditioned from the
'outside',
otherwise
it wouldn't be the Whole (one presumes!). If, on the other hand, it were
conditioned from the 'outside', an infinite 'exgress' (or inflation -- an
infinite exgress is the opposite
of an infinite regress,
sometimes called an "explosion") would be
implied. That is because we should now want to know if and how this 'external'
object or process (about which we know
even less) was itself conditioned, and by what -- and so on,
forever. But we have been
here already.
And, it seems
these
disconcerting observations must apply otherwise,
for the "Totality" to be contradictory, it would have to 'contradict' its
parts. [Ex hypothesi it would have to do this anyway, since there is nothing else
for it to condition.] Moreover these parts must then
contradict each other in turn in the same way, after all.
[The opposite
supposition will be considered presently.]
But, if
we ignore the above 'problems' and the "Totality"
is composed solely of its parts and their inter-relations (unless, of
course, we assume the Totality is "more than the sum of its
parts" -- that Wholist cliché was exposed as yet another DM-dead-end in Essay Eleven
Part Two), the contradiction between
the "Totality" and its parts must be:
(i) The same as the
contradiction between each of the aforementioned parts, or,
(ii) More
than the
contradiction between its parts (since, as we have just seen, dialecticians believe that the
whole is more than the sum of its parts).15
As far as (i) is
concerned, it seems that the "Totality" must drop out of the picture as a sort
of shorthand for the sum total of 'its' parts in contradictory change and
development, becoming a
mere fiction, only this time a useless one.16
On the other hand, if (ii)
were the case, we would be owed an explanation of the alleged 'contradiction'
between this 'more' and that 'less' -- i.e., between this 'more-of-a-Totality' and its
'lesser
parts'.
But, as things stand, we have no idea whether this new 'contradictory' relation between whole
and part is the same as that which operates between the parts, or is
different.
[Anyone impatient with
all this
'nit-picking' should re-direct their
complaints to their local Dialectical Magus. Such 'pedantry' is forced upon us because
even now,
after more than 200 years, we still have no idea what these 'forces' are,
how they can possibly 'contradict' one another, or even what the mysterious "Totality"
is. The first two of these allegations will be substantiated as this
Essay unfolds; the third was considered in detail in Essay Eleven
Part One.]
However, and independently of the above
'difficulties', this 'theory' still faces other serious problems. If the
'contradiction' between the whole and its parts is the same as (but no more
than) that which exists between the parts, then manifestly the whole wouldn't then be more than the sum of the parts (in at least this respect), since the whole would in that
case be the entire 'contradictory' ensemble, all of whose elements (whole and part)
operate alike. But, this would be contrary to the DM-hypothesis that
wholes (whether these are wholes made of 'contradictory' parts or not) are more
than the sum of their parts, whose natures (including the nature of their
"internal
contradictions") are said to be determined entirely by, while not
being reducible
to, the nature of their
parts and the interconnection between these parts. Conversely, if the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts
weren't the same as that between the parts, then we would still have
an unexplained type of 'contradiction' -- that which exists between a mysterious whole that
is "more than the sum of the parts" and those parts themselves.17
Anyway, the idea that the whole 'contradicts' the parts in the
same way that the parts 'contradict' each other doesn't appear to be a viable option for
DM-theorists. The parts relate to each other by some form of "mediation",
so we are told; but how
can the part-whole relation be one of "mediation"? The mutually 'contradictory'
nature of the parts in development constitutes the whole; if now the whole has
its own 'contradictory' relation with the parts over and above this (if, as we
are told, this whole is
more than the sum of its parts), then this new 'contradictory' relation
can't be one of part on part. But, if not, then what is it?
Hence, as noted in
Part One of this Essay, it seems that a literal
interpretation of DM-'contradictions' as forces lapses either into some form of CAR,
or it inflates alarmingly into HEX (or, indeed, into Absolute Idealism). Conversely, if the identification of forces with
contradictions is merely figurative, then DM would be indistinguishable from,
say, metaphysical poetry.
[HEX
= Hegelian Expansionism;
CAR = Cartesian
Reductionism. Follow those links for more details.]
Notwithstanding
this, in order to examine this issue more
thoroughly, it might be useful to suppose that some sort of solution to all of
the above 'difficulties' can be found -- by someone, at some point, somehow.
However, even if we assumed this the
analogy drawn between forces and contradictions will
still fail to work.
The
substantiation of that allegation brings us to
the third reason for questioning the connection between forces and
'contradictions'.
This option
is connected with a point
made earlier that the reader was asked to keep in mind.
So, is the
'contradiction' here:
(a) Between the bodies and processes
themselves?
(b) Between the
forces operating in the system? Or,
In a physical system
there may be several different combinations of interacting attractive and repulsive forces. If we abbreviate "attractive"
and "repulsive" to "A" and "R", respectively, there appear to be only three
types of combinations of just two of these: AA-, AR-, and RR-forces.18
Of course, this assumes that these
relations are symmetrical --
i.e., that
AR
= RA, which seems reasonable enough. Another simplifying assumption is
that these forces are in binary systems; that is, this discussion
concentrates exclusively on force-couples. It is reasonably clear, I take
it, that this simplification doesn't materially affect the conclusions drawn.
Anyway, further complications will be introduced as this Essay unfolds.
Naturally, a
comprehensive, scientific (or even philosophical) account of the concept of force would have to include
modern ideas about
gravity, the strong
nuclear,
weak
and electroweak forces, etc.
As I noted earlier, forces have now been
edited out of the picture in favour either of exchange particles or the
geometry of space-time --
here The first option is illustrated in this simplified
video:
Video Two -- Exchange Particles
And
Apparent 'Forces'
And
here is a video of the second option:
Video Three -- Visual Representation Of
Motion Governed
By The Geometry Of Space-Time
[I will return to discuss one or two issues
raised in Video Three later on in this
Essay.]
However,
it is possible that as
science develops, reference to forces (even in school Physics) will
progressively disappear [cf., Jammer
(1999), pp.iv-vi (partially quoted earlier)]. In
that eventuality, if DM-theorists continue to promote the idea that
'forces' give their 'contradictions' some sort of materialist/physical grounding, their theory
would thereby become 'unscientific' by default. Either that, or they will have to
abandon all talk of the 'objective' nature of forces and join with Engels in
regarding them as shorthand for relative motion. Of course, in that case, forces
wouldn't just be "useful fictions", they would be useless
fictions.
On the other hand, should that scientific
development (i.e., the editing out of all forces from
nature) fail to materialise, it would be interesting to see how DM-theorists might try to harmonise their
attraction/repulsion scenario with successful attempts to unify the
four fundamental forces in a
Grand Unification Theory
(or even in
Superstring/M Theory,
etc.) -- and perhaps into one over-arching 'force'. It might finally kill-off informed talk in DM-circles about the existence
of 'contradictory' forces in nature.
Clearly, if there is
only one force, it can hardly 'contradict' itself.
Nevertheless, many of the quotations given
earlier and in
Note
1
clearly imply that in DM onlyAR-forces are 'contradictory'. This
category of
force couples will be examined later on. However, AA-, and RR-forces weren't explicitly ruled
out, and in a thoroughgoing analysis of every conceivable option
available to DM-theorists, they will also need to be addressed. Hence, it is to
them that I now turn.
Unfortunately, and
upfront, it is difficult to see how an
AA-force could be
interpreted as a unity of opposites, let alone as 'contradictory'. They
are the same type of force, so they can hardly be opposites. But, such
forces abound in nature. For example, as noted earlier, the centre of gravity of
any conglomeration of matter in the universe is the result of countless such
AA-forces. Plainly, in systems like this,
kinematic
(or, rather,
dynamic) changes are caused by non-opposites.
So, when, say, a planet is in the process of formation, particles begin to gravitate together
under the operation of forces of mutual attraction --, i.e., these
aforementioned non-opposites.19
[This is, of course, to adopt the
vocabulary of
Classical Physics. However, no
inference should be drawn from this about the present author's views concerning the
'ontological' status of forces. As noted elsewhere, this terminology is
only being employed here in order to expose the confusions that abound in DM. It
is up to scientists to tell us what the world contains, not Philosophers -- or
even yours truly --,
and definitely not Mystics like Hegel.]
Nevertheless, with
respect to the above comments, it is assumed that R-forces prevent the
collapse of accumulated matter into a 'singularity' under the action of local
AA-forces.
[If the gravitational field is strong enough, this
should happen -- a singularity should form, at least in theory. [On this
see
Curiel (2019).] However, physicists get around this fatal flaw in their theory with a
handful of ad hoc
mathematical dodges. That alone suggests these theories are at least incomplete.
This
reminds one of the
additional epicycles that were required to make Ptolemaic Astronomy
'consistent'.]
Clearly, this just complicates the point without altering
it. In such circumstances we would have an ARA-system-of-forces, which would be even
more difficult to interpret as 'contradictory'. As pointed out
below, the
meaning of the word "opposite" would have to be altered so that systems of forces could
then have any number of 'opposites', components or contributory forces. If so, these artificial 'contradictions'
-- "artificial" since they would be
the product of an arbitrary choice of words --, won't have been based on 'objective'
factors, but on linguistic tinkering.
Moreover,
if the DM-theory of change is to survive, there has to be only one 'opposite',
and that 'opposite' has to be dialectically-, not accidentally-, related to its
own 'opposite', or "other", too. [On that, see
here.]
Finally,
and once again, given the
classical picture, motion itself is actually altered by the operation of a single
resultant force. This is even more difficult to square with the idea that forces
are 'contradictions'. [More on that later, too.]
Similarly, it isn't easy to see how
RR-forces could be
interpreted as 'contradictory' -- or even as opposites --, either, and yet these
are also found throughout nature. For example, intra-atomic forces of repulsion
prevent atomic nuclei from approaching one another.20
Even in
DM-terns it is difficult to see how such forces could be opposites. As we noted above, 'dialectical opposites' are not
only supposed to imply one another, each can't exist without the other. But, which
A-force implies another A-force; which one of these can only exist if
the other does? Which R-force implies another R-force;
which one can only exist if the other does?
One objection to the above immediately springs to mind: it
ignores the fact that such forces operate in the manner they do because they work in
opposition to one another -- that is, they do so in a way that brings
them (or the system to which they belong) into, or out of, equilibrium. However,
that response in fact concerns forces
acting as AR-couples, which will be examined
presently. It
can't therefore assist us
in our attempt to analyse/understand AA-, and RR-forces.
Despite this, even if
it were true that A-forces are opposites of each other, in order for them
still to be regarded as 'contradictory', they couldn't also
be regarded as the opposite of R-forces -- unless, that is, these
A-forces are
now allowed to have two sorts of "opposites": (a) other A-, and
(b)
other R-forces. But, in that case, this would make a mockery of the notion that
there are "polar opposites" at work in natural (or even social) systems of forces (implicated
either in
change or in equilibria, and in connection with 'contradictions'):
"All motion is bound up with some change of
place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected
totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this
mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they
either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar
opposites of attraction and repulsion…." [Engels (1954),
pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
It is difficult to see how a particular
A-force could be the
"polar opposite" of another A-force while at the same time being the polar
opposite of an R-force -- i.e., it isn't easy to see how A-, and R-forces could have two
"polar opposites" without altering the meaning of the phrase "polar opposite".
Even then, if the meaning of "polar opposite" were modified to neutralise this
'difficulty', it would succeed in so doing only because
of yet more linguistic tinkering. In that case, any 'truths' that
suddenly sprang into
existence as a result would plainly be a by-product of yet another example of
terminological juggling, not because of the way the
world happened to be -- which would in turn mean that dialectics had been
read into nature, not
read from it.21
[However, there are dialecticians who claim that objects and
processes not only can, they do possess many "opposites"; for example Gollobin (1986), p.122
(but
even
he says they are "paired").]
Of course, this whole metaphysic originated in the
defective
'logic' Hegel concocted, who posited a unique opposite (an "other", as he
called it) for each and every item implicated in change. He did so in order to
forestall the criticism that if everything changes into 'what-it-is-not' (i.e.,
its 'opposite'), then, since everything else in the universe is 'what-it-is-not'
in relation to any given object or process, every object/process could or would
change into
anything-else-whatsoever. [On that, see
here.]
In which case, instead of growing into barley plants,
a barley seed, for
instance, could turn into a volcano, an unexploded bomb, Stalin's moustache or
your left hand, and much else besides -- since all of these are
'what-a-seed-is-not'.
[However,
in Part Three
of this Essay we will see that in the end Hegel had to abandon the idea that objects and processes were
somehow linked to a logical(?), or unique, 'opposite', or "other". In Essay
Seven Part Three it will be shown that this concession fatally damages Hegel's
attempt to respond to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation (reposted
below).]
But, if objects and processes are allowed to have many (and
possibly an infinite number of)
'opposites' -- all of which they could
change into --, that would
completely undermine what little is left of Hegel's already tattered system,
which, as we have just seen, postulates that everything is paired with its own
unique "other". Naturally, if that were the case,
it would mean that the
Empire State Building, for example, could change into, say, a
T Rex, and
the Pacific Ocean could morph into a crate of Tennessee Whiskey, and much else
besides. Since things like this don't happen, so far as we know, we
must conclude that, either:
(i) Hegel was right: objects and processes have
only one unique "other" that is either:
(a) 'Dialectically'-,
or logically-'internal' to that object or process, which would
in turn mean that no object or process could turn into this unique 'other',
since the latter already exists, or,
(b1)
'External' to that object or process, meaning that the cause of change can't be
internal to objects and processes, or, perhaps even,
(b2) 'External' to that object or
process, which object or process turns into that 'other', meaning that change
can't have been caused by that 'other'
(since it isn't 'dialectically'-related to it) -- and the whole point of accepting this
dogma will now have vanished;
Or even:
(ii) Objects, processes
and forces have only one opposite, not many.21a
Nevertheless, it could be
argued once again that
in this context
the word "opposite" really means "oppositional".
That change of emphasis now
highlights the active inter-relation that exists between forces rather
than their passive interconnection, which is something the above discussion seems to
have ignored. Hence, it would seem perfectly natural to
speak of RR-, or AA-forces as contradictory in this
respect --, i.e., in the sense that all and only those
forces that are oppositional (i.e., which engage in, or are part of, some sort
of "struggle") should be classed as contradictory.
Or, so it might be objected.
However,
this latest revision seems to be inconsistent with the claims made in several of
the passages quoted earlier. They appear to suggest that only certain forces were to be regarded as
inseparable from matter. Others indicate that forces are merely the
consequence of the complex inter-play between quanta of energy (or of motion).
For example, Engels claimed that:
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a
system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and
it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies
act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in
short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It
is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as
so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954),
pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
Once again, this seems
to lose sight of internally-connected
oppositionality, since Engels appears to edit out of the picture the dialectical interrelation
between forces, replacing it, or them, with mere "forms of motion".
Now, "forms of motion" aren't in any
obvious way interconnected -- that is, if the relevant forces are edited out
of the picture. But, DM requires
bodies in motion to be inter-related; that is why intermediary forces
seemed to be so useful -- no, strike that, so crucially important -- to its theorists. Forces and 'contradictions'
were
clearly supposed to assume just such a role -- i.e., forming
part of the
'connective tissue' of reality, as it were.
If they are now re-classified as little more than "useful fictions" -- i.e., as relative
"forms of motion" --, there
would seem to be nothing physical left in nature to act either as the bearer
of,
or as the mediator between, these interconnections.
Without a material substrate
(pictured as just such forces),
'contradictions' could only operate on bodies or processes magically --, or, perhapssupernaturally --, it would seem.
Ignoring these
serious difficulties again -- at least for the present -- perhaps
the above objection can be
summarised in the
following way:
F1: All and only those forces that are
oppositional -- or are implicated in struggle -- are contradictory.
But, if F1 were true, motion itself couldn't be regarded as
the product of 'contradictory forces' -- unless we confine our attention solely to
accelerated motion -- since, ex hypothesi, no net forces operate in cases
where there is no acceleration (in post-Aristotelian Physics, that is). Even
then, accelerated motion (under
gravity, say) is subject to only one force (or, rather, one resultant
force) in classical Physics, and none at all in relativistic Physics.
At
best, therefore, taking the classical view, most of the accelerated motion in the universe
(which covers, as far as we know, all of the bulk, non-rectilinear movement in
nature) is
the product of only one force (or resultant force). Given F1, it is hard to see how such
motion could be viewed as part of a 'contradictory' Totality, if the 'classical
view' were correct. So, if F1 does indeed express what DM-theorists mean, then
most (perhaps all) of the motion in nature can't have been induced, caused,
changed or sustained by a set of DM-'contradictions'.
With that observationmuch of classical DM
falls apart.22
It could be objected to this that, as a matter of fact, all
motion in the universe is the result of a disequilibrium between oppositional
forces; that is precisely what a resultant force is. In that case,
therefore, bodies would move (or their state of motion would change) because of
just such an imbalance between forces. Hence, for example, the planets -- which
traverse in what are apparently steady orbits around the Sun --
actually have their trajectories determined by resultant forces internal to the
Solar System, the Galaxy, and, indeed, beyond, all of which are induced by complex inter-relating systems of forces.
Or, so it could be argued, once more.
This objection will be considered in more detail
later, but for present purposes
it is sufficient to point out that it is difficult to see how such forces could be regarded
as oppositional. Presumably, these forces
don't affect each other;
they operate on, or they merely change, whatever motion is already present in the system. At best,
then, such forces would only oppose the impressed motion already apparent,
which motion would itself have been the result of still other forces operating
earlier, or elsewhere, in the system. This can be seen from the fact that if the moving bodies
in question hadn't been in the said 'force field', these forces would
have had nothing on which they could act. In 'empty space', plainly, we would see
no new motion.23
Forces without bodies to operate on don't interfere with each other, as
far as we know -- unless they are themselves regarded as particulate in
some way, or are
carried by particles, which would, of course, mean they weren't forces, they
were bodies, to begin with.24
Readers are again reminded of something they were
earlier advised to keep
in mind (which is connected with the above remarks):
So, is the
'contradiction' here:
(a) Between the bodies and processes
themselves?
(b) Between the
forces operating in the system? Or,
(c) Both?
That
ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep
it in mind.
This is, of course,
just one aspect of the classical 'ontological problem' concerning the precise nature of
forces, and it is
partly why it is so difficult to understand them. Indeed, the detection
of forces seems to depend only on the effects they have on bodies, or on
instruments -- or, rather, a 'force' seems to be little more than the way
scientists either depict or measure certain relationships between bodies, as Engels, in an uncharacteristically
sober mood, pointed
out (on
that, see Note 4) -- or, indeed, on other
'fields'.
However, if
forces are now seen as particulate (that is, if certain
particles are viewed as
the 'bearers' of forces -- on that, see
Video Three), the problem simply reappears at a lower level, and
we would be no further forward -- which is a conundrum that
Leibniz was, I think, among the first to
recognise. [On that, see here,
here,
here and
here.]
So, it would seem that
an interaction between forces could only take place if they were viewed as
particulate in some way -- that is, if they registered some sort of
resistance to one another (i.e., if they are impenetrable to a
greater or lesser
extent).
On the other hand,
if they aren't
particulate, it is hard to see how they could interact at all, let alone
'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no
impenetrability that enables them to exert forces of any sort (except, of course, as part of a
figurative extension to particulate interaction, after all).
[This has
been questioned in Smith (2007). My response that article will be posted in Note 30 in the next few weeks.]
But, there are well-known classical problems
associated with the idea that forces are particulate (they have been
outlined
here) -- not the least of
which is the observation that if forces were particulate then they could only
interact if they exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of
reaction, and so on, which hold them together or lend to them some sort of
coherence), so that they could act on other
particulates and hence resist disintegration -- which considerations would,
plainly, initiate an infinite regress. That is, in
order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another, we would
need to appeal to yet more forces internal to a given body to stop, say, one
of them penetrating the other, or prevent distortions tearing them apart when
two or more collide. But, if the forces internal to bodies are particulate,
too -- as it seems they must be, given this view -- that would require
further forces to account for the internal coherence of these new, smaller,
'force-particles', and so on...
Alternatively, if these 'internal forces' were
in fact continuous (i.e.,
non-particulate), they would be incapable of sustaining their inner coherence
-- once again, since they would have no rigidity, etc., etc.
In the end nothing would be accounted for
since at each level there would be
nothing to provide the required resistance or coherence.
So, it seems that reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies
explains nothing. It also implies that
particles can't 'contradict' one another without exerting non-particulate
forces on each other -- which would mean, once again, that such entities are
incapable of exerting forces, having no rigidity to do so, etc., etc.
[It is
important to add that I am not arguing that there can be no interactions -- as
Kline and Matheson (1987), for example, maintains -- just that we have as yet no
idea how they can happen! I have said more about this in Note 30.]
"We learn in school that the basic building blocks of
matter are particles. In fact, we often continue to teach this in universities
where we explain that quarks and electrons form the lego-bricks from which all
matter is made. According to our best laws of physics, the fundamental building
blocks of Nature are not discrete particles at all. Instead they are continuous
fluid-like substances, spread throughout all of space. We call these objects
fields. The most familiar examples of fields are the electric and magnetic
field. The ripples in these fields give rise to what we call light or, more
generally, electromagnetic waves.
"If you look closely enough at electromagnetic waves,
you'll find that they are made out of particles called photons. The
ripples of the electric and magnetic fields get turned into particles when we
include the effects of quantum mechanics. But this same process is at play for
all other particles that we know of. There exists, spread thinly throughout
space, something called an electron field. Ripples of the electron field get
tied up into a bundle of energy by quantum mechanics. And this bundle of energy
is what we call an electron. Similarly, there is a quark field, and a gluon
field, and Higgs boson field. Every particle your body --- indeed, every
particle in the Universe --- is a tiny ripple of the underlying field, moulded
into a particle by the machinery of quantum mechanics." [Quoted from
here; accessed 13/12/2017. Several paragraphs merged.
Italic emphases in the original.]
However, this poses serious problems of its own. The forces exerted in the above
manner (inside exchange particles or, indeed, other particles they act upon)
must themselves be the result of
rigidity, cohesion, and contact (etc.), if they are capable of stopping the force carrier particle passing
right through the target particle without acting on it. Of course, as noted
above, physicists these days appeal to
fields, energy gradients,
Feynman
diagrams and the like, and reject such 'mechanistic' notions like those
rehearsed in the previous couple of paragraphs, but if fields and particles are
bothcontinuous, the above problems will simply re-emerge at
this new level.
On the other hand, if they are
particulate, after all, this merry-go-round just takes another spin across the
metaphysical dance floor.
So, the neat
picture painted in and by Video Three,
where, for example, repulsive forces are explained by an analogy drawn between
two individuals stood or sat in two separate but closely aligned boats (on a
lake). If one individual throws a heavy ball to the other individual, both boats
will move apart, and it will seem that there is a repulsive force acting between
the two boats/individuals (as momentum is conserved). But that only works if the
first individual's body is rigid enough to allow the ball to be thrown in the
first place, and the second individual's body is rigid enough to stop the ball
passing straight through their body unopposed. If they are both rigid enough
then that will be because of forces internal to those two bodies, which can't
also be explained in the same particulate terms without an infinite regress
being initiated. So, if forces are communicated by carrier particles, nothing
will have been explained. On the other hand if forces aren't particulate, but
are continuous, then nothing would actually happen (for reasons explored in the
previous few paragraphs).
Of course, it could be objected
once more that the
above approach adopts an out-dated 'mechanistic' view of interaction and is,
as a result, completely misguided. However, the modern 'mathematical' approach has
clearly abandoned the
possibility of giving a causal, or even physical account of forces --
or, at least, an explanation that doesn't itself depend on a figurative use of the sort of verbs we
find in the vernacular that allow a physical explanation to be given why things happen in the
everyday world (such as "push", "move", "resist",
"hit", "collide", "deflect",
"interact", and the like).
So,
if a particle is viewed as the carrier of a force, and that force can be given
no
physical content, for want of a better word, but is still deemed capable of making things happen, deflecting
other particles from their line of action (etc.), then
the above verbs must themselves lose contact with
the meaning of typographically identical everyday verbs when they are used to
talk about macro-phenomena.
Now,
there is no problem with that
providing we are aware of it and don't make the mistake of interpreting the technical use of
such verbs literally,
understanding them in their everyday sense.
Even so, a 'mathematical account'
like this would thereby merely
be descriptive, not explanatory.
Differential
Equations,
Hamiltonians, vectors, tensors and abstract spaces can't make anything move, or alter the path of
a single particle. To be sure, we can describe these phenomena using mathematical
language and symbols, thus enabling us to 'balance the books of nature', as it
were. But, the downside is that mathematical models can't
explain
why anything actually happens in the physical world.
[Of course,
this depends on what one means by "explanation". I will say more about that in Essay
Thirteen Part Two. However, for more
recent qualms in this area, see Note 30. Cf., also my comments over at Wikipedia,
here
(at the foot of the page) and
here. Readers shouldn't conclude at this point
that I am questioning the existence of 'The Field'. What I am doing is
questioning whether it can account for anything physical, or explain why
anything actually happens in the universe. On that, see the discussion between myself
and Paul
Cockshott,
here, and another between myself and a comrade who posted under the name
"Lynx",
here. (Unfortunately those links are now dead!)]
This, perhaps, helps
explain Engels's own suspicion of forces. Ontologically, they appear to be
deeply mysterious, if not animistic. He isn't alone. [Other relevant aspects of the nature of
forces have been discussed here.]
Clued-in
physicists already appear to be aware of this problem (i.e., that this presents
them with serious difficulties connected with the language they use). Here, for
example, is the late
David Peat:
"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as
Lee Smolin's
The Trouble with Physics and
Peter Woit's
Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that
string
theory, the brightest hope for
formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation,
has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s,
when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists
believed they would soon, to use
Stephen
Hawking's words, 'know the mind of
God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.
"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final
step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist
Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is
wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics
concerns what we can say about nature.' At first sight that seems strange.
What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about
solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's
path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we
choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the
nature of the result.
"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of
1925, when the young
Werner
Heisenberg worked out the basic
equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate
consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with
total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would
always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values. Heisenberg needed an explanation for
this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is
used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon
of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position,
then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making
this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the
electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the
position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg
argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic
properties.
"However, when Heisenberg showed his
results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr
argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is
like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These
are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level.
The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a
particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature
replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts. This is where language comes in.
While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the
equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the
blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the
language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality --
assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we
are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'.
Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.
"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists
discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly
reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist
Michael Green
a few years after he and
John
Schwartz
published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory
mainstream. Green remarked that when
Einstein
was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the
philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space
and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply
in philosophy.
"In contrast, Green felt, string
theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same
deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were
for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in
the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.
The American quantum theorist David Bohm
embraced Bohr's views on language,
believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages
we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of
Newtonian physics. When we say
'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns),
which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects
that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields.
But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably
hindered.
"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects
are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a
process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary
role....
Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But
what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter.
In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places
on how we can think about the world...." [Peat
(2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases
and several links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Now,
I don't want to
suggest for one moment that I agree with the above comments about the nature of
language (or even aboutthe nature of scientific language), but
the above passage certainly shows
that at least some leading scientists are aware there is a problem here.
[To be sure, Peat
agrees with Bohm's suggestion that we need to learn from Native American languages, which seem to
have rather odd grammars; but it is to be wondered how a culture that has
produced no advanced science or technology has much to teach one that has,
least of all about physics. Thus isn't to disparage Native American culture --
far from it -- it is merely to point out that no such culture could be
expected to compete with one that is so much more technologically advanced. On this, also
see Essay
Eleven Part One.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
So, classically, forces seem to work only on bodies by altering their
motion. In which case, the supposed opposition isn't between bodies, nor is it between
bodies and forces, nor yet between forces and forces -- it is
between forces and the motion already in the system. But, this
picture is difficult to square with the idea that there is a
UO at work here -- nor does it seem to tally with the claim that dialectically polar
opposites ultimately induce all motion and change. That is because (once again)
forces don't oppose each other; they oppose or augment whatever motion is
already present in the system, howsoever it was caused.
In
short, given this 'revised' view, the term "contradiction" wouldn't apply to opposing
or opposed forces (i.e., to forces that oppose one another), nor
to bodies; on the contrary, 'contradictions' would now connect forces with
whatever
movement is already present. But, as yet, no DM-theorist has given any clear sense to the idea
that a force could 'contradict' the impressed motion in a system. And rightly
so; there are no opposites here for a single DM-'contradiction' to latch
onto. How could a force be the 'opposite' of movement -- i.e., the
'opposite' of a change of place?
It could be objected that as a matter of fact
forces in nature oppose (in the sense of change) motion. Indeed, it could be
argued that dialecticians are concerned with
forces as they actually operate in nature and society (as opposed to those abstracted
from it); such opposites objectively exist and can't be analysed away.
That
much won't be disputed here (even if its wording might).
But, in what way can this set-up be said to involve the interconnection of
opposites required by the theory? And, what sense can be given to the idea that motion in
one direction is the opposite of any force that affects it? Certainly these
aren't unified opposites (i.e., opposites on the same type, so
they are 'dialectically'/'logically' connected -- that is, the existence of one
implies the existence of the other, in the Hegelian sense of that word, which, as we have seen, is a
DM-requirement). So, whatever else it is, this can't be a
'dialectical' interaction. That is because movement itself doesn't imply the
existence of the force that is supposedly opposing it, nor does the force imply
the existence of the motion it is opposing. They can both exist without
the other (unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which supposedly
imply one another). If this were
a 'dialectical' interaction, they would imply one another and neither
could exist
without the other.
At best,
the forces involved might tend to produce an opposite motion (or change
of motion, perhaps) to that
which already exists -- or even none at all. But, to describe force and motion as
"opposites" would appear to make about as much sense as claiming that "left" was
the opposite of "television", even if as a matter of fact someone
moved a television to the left. Their actual linkage in reality has
nothing to do with whether it is sensible to describe such items as unified opposites,
or even as oppositional. These terms are categorically different -- as
are "force" and "motion". Hence, it isn't a question of whether or not
DM-theorists are dealing with 'objective' facts; it is why the above
counter-claim can only be 'justified' by
mis-describing the phenomena.25
Admittedly, when viewed as vectors, velocities, accelerations and forces can, in
some circumstances, be represented as 'opposites', but this is given within
vector algebra and follows from certain definitions. However, unless we are
prepared to admit all the absurdities outlined earlier
(arguing, for instance, that vectors 'struggle' among themselves), this approach
can't lend any support to DM. That is quite apart from the fact that these forces
don't imply one another in a dialectical-sort-of-way, which they should do if
they were 'interpenetrated' opposites' -- for example, again, in the way that
we are told that capitalist relations of production imply the existence of the
proletariat, and vice versa.But, if
these forces aren't 'internally related' then the
dialectical
theory of change simply falls apart.
Anyway, if
vector, v, has an opposite, -v, that vector could be
a billion miles away or it could be co-terminal with v. Either
way, these two don't 'struggle' with one another, nor do they turn into each
other (which is what they should do
if the DM-classics are to be believed). Again, whatever else they are,
such vectors aren't 'dialectical'.
In addition, as will be argued
in Interlude Six,
mathematics can in no way be regarded as an abstraction from reality.
And, of course, as noted earlier, most vectors aren't opposites, anyway. Many augment,
while
others operate at various angles to, one another.
[In fact, this topic is
connected with 'real negation', a concept introduced into Philosophy by
Immanuel Kant.
I will have much more to say about this in Appendix A. Other related issues will be examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it
is published.
Finally, this topic is
also connected with the fact that, where there is more than one force at work in
a
system, change in motion is caused by a resultant force,
discussed in more detail
here.]
As already noted,
when forces are represented as vectors they can produce accelerations that
appear to 'oppose' the motion already in the system. Ignoring for the present the
fact that the use of such language is arguably anthropomorphic (or, at
best, metaphorical), in such
cases we would be
establishing connections between objects, events, and processes drawn from the same category (i.e., vectors connected with
movement), which clearly makes sense. In this way, forces could be
replaced with relative accelerations by means of
Newton's Second Law, etc. But,
even then, an acceleration in an opposite direction doesn't oppose the
original velocity; an acceleration (in vector algebra, which is what we are
speaking of here!) just is a description of that changing velocity, it
doesn't produce that velocity or create it. A force is supposed to do that (in
Newtonian Physics). Even in the physical universe, accelerations
aren't 'disembodied beings' that inhabit the world, throwing their weight about, bullying velocities to do their bidding.
They just are
changing velocities --, no more, no less. Period. And velocities, in like manner, simply represent
a rate of change of displacement. Even in DM-terms,the idea that they
might 'contradict' one another seems rather odd
(to say the least); that is because no accelerating body implies the existence of the
velocity in any other body, and both can surely exist without the other -- unlike,
once more, the connection between the capitalist class and the proletariat,
which do imply one another,
or so we are told.
However, in vector algebra no sense can be made of the addition (or subtraction)
of force and velocity vectors, unless it is mediated by the Second Law (etc.),
once more. Even then, the relation between acceleration and velocity vectors has
to be established by well-known equations. The various physical quantities
represented by these equations can only be connected by means of such translations, which set up analogies between categorically different items, but in a
dimensionally consistent manner. That is one reason why no mathematical or
physical sense can be
given to 'equations' like the following:
(1) F
= -v(sic)
(2) a
= kv(sic)
[Where "F" stands
for "force", "v" for "final velocity", "a" for "acceleration", and "k" is
a
constant of proportionality.]
Equations like these
would be regarded as
dimensionally incoherent (unless further dimensions were built into the
'constant' -- but now variable --, k). Compare them with the next series of
examples:
(3) s
= ut + ½at2
(4) a
= -ω2r
(5) F
= -mrω2
[Where "r"
represents radial displacement, "u" is the initial velocity, "t" is time, "ω"
is
angular velocity, "m" represents mass, "F"
centripetal force, and "a" centripetal
acceleration in (4), but linear acceleration in (3).]
In Classical Physics, by means of translational
or analogical
equations like these -- or, perhaps to make the same point more clearly --, by the use of
algebraic rules that enable inferences involving physical quantities to be drawn
in which forces appear as part of a "norm of representation",
we can 'convert' forces into accelerations, compare magnitudes, and thus account
for
change in motion.
Unfortunately, this is
of
little help to DM-enthusiasts, since the translation of forces into relative
accelerations means that forces are, indeed, "useful fictions", once more, which
would simply re-introduce all the difficulties noted earlier
(and again, below).
[This isn't a problem
for the account presented here, for reasons expressed in the previous
paragraph but one.]
However, even if the above comments were rejected for some reason, this would
still lend scant support to dialecticians, for such representations aren't oppositional;
they don't slug it out on the page, screen or whiteboard.
And, manifestly, they don't turn into one another (as we are told they should by
the
DM-classics).
Hence, if two ('opposite') forces (for
instance,F and G, inclined at θo
to the x axis in
R2) are in equilibrium and are resolved (into
their i and
j components), and then
equated as follows:
|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ = 0,
|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ = 0,
no one would suppose (it is to be hoped!) that these symbols are locked in a
life-or-death 'struggle', and will one day change into each other.
Naturally, the above conclusions aren't affected in any way if these forces
aren't in equilibrium:
|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ > 0
|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ < 0
and/or:
|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ > 0
|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ < 0
And, it would be little use arguing that while it is true that the
above expressions may be lifeless (and thus incapable of struggling and then turning into
each other), what they represent in the real world not only can they actually
do struggle and then turn into each other.
It would be little use because the above considerations were aimed at undermining the idea that the vector calculus is
'dialectical'. The allegedly 'dialectical' nature of forces 'in
reality' represented by the above symbols is an entirely separate issue, which
has been systematically demolished throughout the rest of this Essay, as well as here.
However, it would be interesting to see if there are any DM-fans out there who
can explain how these forces manage to struggle with, and then turn into, each
other (as they should if the DM classics are to be believed). Exactly how do F and G above turn into one another?
[On
the allegedly 'dialectical' nature of 'Higher Mathematics' and the Calculus in general, see
here.]
Incidentally, some readers may be puzzled by
the use of the word "analogical" in an
earlier paragraph. The use of that word
is connected with:
(i) The history of the development of mathematical language
associated with
this area of Physics and Applied Mathematics, and,
(ii) The way we make sense of such equations.
More specifically,
a significant change in terminology (or at least what it signifies) arose out of:
(iii) The reservations expressed by Ancient Greek mathematicians
concerning
the relationship between the so-called
"incommensurables" (i.e., physical quantities from different categories
for which no common noun or predicate could be found
that allowed them to be 'co-measured'), and
then with,
(iv) How these problems were resolved by European mathematicians in the High
Middle Ages.
Following on the
growth and development of market economies in
mid-, to late-feudal society, the artificial barriers between these categories
were progressively eroded as new grammars ('concepts') were introduced by
merchants and traders to help them account for the exchange of quantities drawn
from just such different categories. Since they had to be co-measured (to balance the
books!), the language and mathematics involved were adjusted accordingly.
Hence, these new
concepts were introduced
by mathematicians, merchants, and bankers so that what had been regarded as incommensurable quantities could be
compared analogically -- enabling, for example, the calculation of the
exchange value of a widely diverse range of commodities. As a spin-off, these
conceptual innovations -- when they were also incorporated into the physics of
the day -- allowed theorists to move beyond
an earlier 'commonsense' approach to motion encapsulated in Aristotelian Physics,
thus enabling the foundations of modern mechanics to be laid down in the period
between the 13th and the
18th centuries.
This emphasis on the
analogical nature of modern algebraic forms depicting motion follows on from an
approach to mathematical development that sees it as conditioned by contingent
historico-economic factors predicated on material
and social relations.
This view of mathematical innovation also helps undermine the idea that
mathematics is concerned with, or is derived from, some form of 'abstraction' --
which further undercuts theories predicated
on the belief that there is an Ideal World anterior
to, but more real than, the world we see around us. Since this Ideal World
may only be accessed by thought, it then appeared to make sense that
mathematics was solely based on thought, too. In which case, it was then but a
short step to conclude that mathematics is founded exclusively on thought processes, on 'abstraction'
-- and
much later still,
on
logic itself.
To many, this appeared to put
mathematics/mathematicians in direct touch with the 'Divine', and hence with
a range of pure concepts originally called into existence by 'God', a doctrine
explicit in Plato. In fact, the
universe itself was regarded as a reflection of 'Divine Thought', which, of course,
implied that 'God' was a
Mathematician and the world was a mathematical object of some sort -- which is a paradigm
that currently dominates Modern Physics
(indeed, as we will see in Note 30),
and thatincludes the ideas of physicists who
even claim to be agnostics or atheists.
Here area
just few recent examples of the genre:
"All science
proceeds from the assumption that the cosmos is ordered in an intelligible way.
Beneath the bewildering richness of natural phenomena there lies an elegant
mathematical unity. How astonishing that the human mind is attuned to this
hidden subtest of nature!" [Physics Professor,
Paul Davies,
quoted in the flyleaf to Livio (2009), and
quoted at the publisher's website (expand the 'Praise' section). Bold added.]
"Philosophy is
written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes (I mean the universe)
but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the
characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics,
and the characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without
which it is humanly impossible to comprehend a single word of it, and without
which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth." [Galileo, quoted in Livio
(2009), pp.76-77. Bold added.]
"The
Higgs Boson was predicted with the same tool as the planet Neptune and the
radio wave: with mathematics. Galileo famously stated that our Universe is a
'grand book' written in the language of mathematics. So why does our universe
seem so mathematical, and what does it mean? In my new book 'Our Mathematical
Universe', I argue that it means that our universe isn't just described by math,
but that it is math in the sense that we're all parts of a giant mathematical
object, which in turn is part of a multiverse so huge that it makes the other
multiverses debated in recent years seem puny in comparison." [Max
Tegmark, excerpted from Tegmark (2015). Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis and link added.]
"In [Plato's] famous cave analogy, he likened us to
people who'd lived their entire lives shackled in a cave, facing a blank wall,
watching the shadows cast by things passing behind them and eventually coming to
mistakenly believe that these shadows were the full reality. Plato argued that
what we humans call our everyday reality is similarly just a limited and
distorted representation of the true reality, and we must free ourselves from
our mental shackles to begin comprehending it. If my life as a physicist has taught me anything
at all, it's that Plato was right: modern physics has made abundantly clear that
the ultimate nature of reality isn't what it seems.... Our external physical reality is a mathematical
structure." [Tegmark (2015), pp.8, 254. See also Tegmark (2008).
Paragraphs merged; bold added. I have
added a lengthy passage from Plato (1997b) to
Appendix B, where the allegory of
the cave first saw the light of day (no pun intended).]
One wonders
why Tegmark trusts a single experiment or observation in physics or any of the
other sciences (which he seems to take for granted in the rest of his book, and
which he also appears to think aren't illusory) if it is all just a 'shadow', or
based on 'subjective experience' --, and that includes anything written by mathematicians.
Does he have direct access to this hidden world that the rest of us don't? Is he able to apprehend mathematical theorems
that somehow bypass the senses? If not, then just as soon as anything
mathematical has been committed to
paper, or typed onto a screen, it too must be a 'shadow', and hence can't reflect
'reality'.
Anyone who thinks this misrepresents Tegmark need only read Chapter Nine of
his book (Tegmark (2015)), where the author tries to sell the reader a downmarket, revamped
view of the world first aired by
John Locke
and David
Hume, but he doesn't once consider how to construct "external reality" out of
what he calls "internal reality". Now, I have no wish to praise
Immanuel Kant,
but Tegmark's amateur metaphysics would put epistemology back to where
it was before the
Critique of Pure Reason rolled off the presses (this links to a PDF).
[I
have covered this topic extensively
here.
Readers are directed there for more details.]
Something like this, but which comes across as less extreme, seems to be motivating Greene
(1999, 2004) and Penrose (1989, 1995, 2004); it also appears to be (partially)
exercising Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006). For example, here is Roger Penrose:
"But are
mathematical notions things that really inhabit a 'world' of their own? If so,
we seem to have found our ultimate reality to have its home within that highly
abstract world. Some people have difficulties with accepting Plato's
mathematical world as being in any sense 'real', and would gain no comfort from
the view that physical reality itself is constructed merely from abstract
notions. My own position on this matter is that we should certainly take Plato's
world as providing a kind of 'reality' to mathematical notions..., but I might
baulk at actually attempting to identify physical reality with the
abstract reality of Plato's world.... [Penrose then commits himself to the
'three world' theory, somewhat similar to
Karl Popper's view (this links to a PDF), that there are mathematical,
physical and 'mental' components to 'the world' -- RL.] I like to think that, in
a sense, the Platonic world may be the most primitive of the three, since
mathematics is a kind of necessity, virtually conjuring its very self into
existence through logic alone." [Penrose (2004), p.1029. Italic emphasis
in the original; bold emphases and link added.]
Earlier in
the same book Penrose argued as follows (with respect to mathematical models):
"If the model itself is to be
assigned any kind of 'existence', then this existence is located within the
Platonic world of mathematical forms. Of course, one might take a contrary
viewpoint: namely that the model is itself to have existence only within our
various minds, rather than to take Plato's world to be in any sense absolute and
'real'. Yet, there is something important to be gained in regarding mathematical
structures as having a reality of their own. For our individual minds are
notoriously imprecise, unreliable, and inconsistent in their judgements. The
precision, reliability, and consistency that are required by our scientific
theories demand something beyond any one of our individual (untrustworthy)
minds. In mathematics, we find a far greater robustness than can be located in
any particular mind. Does this not point to something outside ourselves, with
a reality that lies beyond what each individual can achieve?...
"Mathematics itself indeed seems to
have a robustness that goes far beyond what any individual mathematician is
capable of perceiving. Those who work in this subject, whether they are actively
engaged in mathematical research or just using results that have been obtained
by others, usually feel that they are merely explorers in a world that lies
far beyond themselves -- a world which possesses an objectivity that
transcends mere opinion, be that opinion their own or the surmise of others, no
matter how expert those others might be." [Ibid., pp.12-13. Bold emphases
added.]
Clearly, Penrose is a moderate
compared to Tegmark, for whom the world is an illusion of some sort, and only
mathematical structures/objects are really 'real'.
By way of contrast, the
approach adopted at this site also helps
neutralise yet another core DM-thesis: i.e., that scientific development somehow
depends on the ability of theorists to 'abstract' concepts, or general terms, into existence.
Abstractionism has already been destructively analysed
here and
here. There is a detailed
discussion of these issues in Hadden (1988, 1994), upon which much of the above
was based. Hadden's pioneering work is
only prevented from being Marxist classic by the absence of a clear account of
the nature of language and the logic of analogical reasoning. However, in view of the fact that
the logic of analogy
hasn't advanced much
since Aristotle's day (although it has proliferated in detail, extensively), this is hardly Hadden's fault.
On what has been achieved in this area, see White (2010). White's book is
in fact a pioneering study, only slightly spoiled by the author's attempt to
divert
his many clear insights into trying to make sense of talk about 'God'.
[Hadden's conclusions are
themselves a development of ideas originally found in Borkenau (1987), Fleck (1979) and
Grossmann (1987). Cf., also Sohn-Rethel
(1978).
Clagett (1959) contains many of the original medieval sources. See also Zilsel (2000), and the more detailed
historical study, Kaye (1998).]
In that case, the
admission that forces can be edited out of the picture (so that relative
acceleration and motion can be viewed as opposites) might succeed in winning
this particular battle, but only at the cost of losing the war. Once again, that
is because it would imply the universe was much more CAR-like than DM-theorists are
prepared to admit. On this account, any reference to a DM-UO would be little
more than a confused way of alluding to relative acceleration and relative
velocity. The connection between events could only then be explained in one
or more of the following two ways:
(b) A
detailed analysis of the vector and scalar fields in which the said processes
were embedded.
[CAR= Cartesian
Reductionism/Reductionist, depending on the context; UO = Unity of Opposites.]
In
either case, the
connection between events and processes wouldn't be governed by any sort of
physical
mediation (or, indeed, with the rest of the Totality) -- which is what DM
requires, since, on this view, a moving body would have no 'internal connection'
with any other moving body.
At least an appeal to forces had the merit of
appearing to provide some sort of mediating link between bodies in motion,
required by DM. They at least appear to be capable of connecting
moving bodies in some
sort of 'dialectical' relationship. Of course,
that is only because the literal interpretation of forces depends on the acceptance of
what is in effect an animistic view of nature.
In which
case, any
attempt to edit forces out of the picture would result in the disappearance of
the dialectical 'connective-tissue' of reality (as it were); and with that DM would become
indistinguishable from mechanical materialism (i.e., a version of CAR itself), which its
theorists sought to
replace or surpass.
As noted
earlier, DM-theorists require
forces to be part of the ontological fabric of the universe, which is why they
become defensive, if not highly
agitated and emotional when the existence of forces is questioned. Even
after what Engels said about forces has been brought to their attention, they
totally ignore the fact that he
had already questioned
their nature.
In which case, DM-fans pick and choose which parts of Engels's work they finally
decide to accept.
So, in order for DM even to seem to
be able to work, its theorists require the existence of a world populated by
anthropomorphic concepts (or what they supposedly 'reflect') -- in this case,
forces --, which were themselves a result of the fetishisation of the products
of social interaction as if they were real objects and processes in nature. This is, of
course, just another
toxic spin-off of their supposed 'inversion' of Hegelian 'logic'.
Hence, whether
or not DM-fans
acknowledge it, the language they use suggests that objects and processes in
nature are quasi-intelligent, engaged in what can
only be described as some sort of mystical conversation, or shouting match, with other objects
and processes, as
they 'contradict' and 'negate' one another.
[DN = Dialectics of
Nature, i.e., Engels (1954).]
As has already been
pointed out, in parts of
DN Engels pictured motion in dynamic terms, portraying it as no more than the
transfer of energy. [Engels (1954),
pp.69-102.]
That seems
to connect these rather sketchy ideas with more recent theories of motion,
modelled by vector and scalar fields -- maybe with the
Laws of Thermodynamics. Or perhaps even with concepts employed in the study
of
non-EuclideanSpacetime, where talk
is no longer of forces --, which theories began to be constructed late on in Engels's life
and completed a generation or so after
he died. Unfortunately for DM-fans, such a re-write would mean that familiar DM-concepts (such as
"contradiction", "polar opposite", "UO", "internal
relation", etc.) would
become as obsolete as
"natural place", "substantial form", "accident" and "substance"
are now --, notions that once featured prominently in ancient scientific and metaphysical theories.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, say, an energy
gradient (depicted as a
scalar field) could be interpreted as 'contradictory'
in any way at all, even
though gradients like this often feature in modern theories of motion. Well,
no more perhaps than, say, a ladder should be regarded as contradictory if
someone fell off it.
Far worse:
it is even more difficult see how states of affairs involving vector and
scalar fields, the
geodesics of Spacetime -- or even the
'strings' of M-theory --
could form part of a material universe. If everything in nature is
just a complex array of energy gradients, vector fields and differential
curvatures in Spacetime (which, as we have just seen, many Physicists now
suppose) -- spruced up with a few probability density functions
-- there would seem to be no place left for anything that even looks remotely material.
Given the 'modern', mathematical picture of reality, matter itself
becomes a "useless fiction", too, explanatory of nothing at all. Small wonder then
that Lenin was highly suspicious of the Idealism implicit in the Physics of his
day (even if he had no answer to it). The situation has only grown worse
in the years since.
[On that, see
Essay Thirteen
Part One. I hasten to add -- but
it should be obvious by now -- that I don't accept this 'mathematical picture of
reality'; or, to be more accurate, I
view it as thoroughly metaphysical if interpreted along realist/Platonic lines.
(No pun intended!)]
Quite apart from this, the 'ontological status' of 'energy' itself is highly
problematic -- and that situation is unlikely to change. [On that, see
here.] Energetics is thus no friend of
DM/'Materialist Dialectics'.
[I have said more about this topic in Essay Seven Part One,
here. Independently of
that, I regularly ask Physicists who post, for example, on
Quora what
energy actually is. I either receive no answer, or they admit they don't
really know -- see, for example,
here and
here (in the comments section).]
Of course, in DM-writings, clear definitions
of matter are as rare as hens' teeth -- as we will see in Essay Thirteen
Part One.
Indeed, when pressed, DM-fans think matter is
just
an 'abstraction'!
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Only those who feel confident that they can
give a clear sense
to the claim that forces and motion are ('dialectical') opposites will be in any
position to reject an objection from earlier with anything more
substantive than a
simple wave of the hand. Moreover, as we will
see, forces often augment motion, they don't always "oppose" it; indeed, most of the bulk motion
in the universe is of this sort, as was pointed out earlier.26
However, even if it were possible to give a clear sense to the idea that forces and motion are
'dialectical' opposites, that would still be bad
news for DM-fans. That is because any other oppositional force in the
system couldn't also be the opposite of the original pairing
between this force and that change in movement. And, that in turn would mean that systems of
opposing forces couldn't function (in DM) as is currently supposed. In that case,
it wouldn't be forces that opposed one another (as had originally been claimed);
in such a set-up, forces would oppose motionalready present (not other forces), and the idea that change
is the result of systematically inter-related forces would have to be
abandoned.
Readers are
again reminded of something they were asked to keep in mind from earlier:
So, is the
'contradiction' here:
(a) Between the bodies and processes
themselves?
(b) Between the
forces operating in the system? Or,
(c) Both?
That
ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep
it in mind.
As should now seem
obvious, each constituent part of a complex array of forces like this would have to be viewed as
the opposite of every other. Given such an ensemble,
moving bodies would have countless 'opposites' (i.e., any other forces or moving bodies in the system).27
This would put a strain on the meaning of the word "opposite", once more,
rendering it meaningless -- in which condition it would remain until its meaning had been
clarified,
or, indeed, modified so that it would now allow several elements to be regarded as the "opposite" of any one or more
of the rest. Under such circumstances, as we have already seen, the notion of a polar
opposite would lose its key role in DM. In fact, it would become meaningless if
everything possessed countless "polar opposites". [This is quite
apart from the fact that this would
undermine the DM-theory
of change, given the fact that none of these forces would imply the
others, and each could exist without the rest -- which shouldn't be the case
with DM-'opposites'.]
Not only
that, as we have also seen several times, adhoc linguistic tinkering
like this implies that
this theory/method would apply to nature and society only because of yet another
bout of subjectively applied terminological juggling.
Unfortunately, this
jellyfish-of-a-theory can't be squeezed
anywhere without some of it slipping through our fingers somewhere else. On this
interpretation, what
had been touted all along as a grand theory capable of explaining change because
it took serious account of the 'contradictory' nature of reality, interpreted as the result of the
interplay between opposite forces, now amounts to little more than
a few vague ideas about the relation between a force and the motion already in
a system compounded by the realisation that the DM-Totality is a
mediated system of forces only because the definition of a "polar
opposite" had conveniently been 'adjusted'. If this is what DM-theorists mean when they come
out with their
impressive sounding 'dialectical' ideas, then it would seem that their theory can only be rescued
from oblivion if reality were Ideal. As we will see in Essay Twelve, that
is a direct consequence of making the 'truth' of DM-theses dependent on ad
hoc linguistic 'tinkering'.
However, even if the above objections
were misguided in some way, in
DM-terms none of this theory makes any sense, since not one of these opposites
(i.e., force and motion) turns into the other, as the DM-classics tell us they should:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar
opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...."
[Engels (1954),
pp.17,
62. Bold emphasis added.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only
a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.
[Engels (1976),
p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world,
nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more
popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the
alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their
opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change,
movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things
to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all
without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97. Bold emphasis
added.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally
contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its
opposite?]…. [Ibid., pp.221-22. Last set of parentheses in the original;
bold emphasis added.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its
existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own
opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead,
rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one
another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is
that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or
rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given
conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are
referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete
transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves
into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the
mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is
absolute." [Mao (1937),
pp.340-42. Bold emphases added.]
[Dozens of other quotations that make the same points have been posted
here.]
Consider any given force and the motion it supposed opposes: Clearly, that
force doesn't change into that movement, nor does that movement
change into that force.
[Incidentally, that disposes of
Weston's attempt to interpret the second
force in a gravitational field as 'inertia' --
Weston (2012), p.7. It
could be objected that modern physics interprets force as an exchange of
momentum; so force and movement are connected, contrary to the above
claims. But, there are no forces in modern physics; just an exchange
of momentum. So force and movement can't be
connected if one half of this pair doesn't actually exist.]
Someone could further object that they do indeed change into one another
-- perhaps via an exchange of energy, or as part of equal and opposite
reactions, etc., etc.
But, if that were so, another problem would immediately assert
itself. If force, F, were to turn into new movement, N, then the
second of these two
would follow the first -- i.e., F first, N second. But, F would create N at a later time,
otherwise it couldn't turn into it. [Recall that,
according to the
DM-classics, objects and processes turn into that with which they 'struggle'.] Plainly, if N
already exists, Fcan't turn into it. On the other hand, F and N
can't 'struggle' with one another for the two
of them can't exist simultaneously in order for one to turn into the other. If, on the other
hand, F were to change as a result of some (as yet) unspecified factor, say
U*, then U*, not N, would be the opposite of F,
and F
would turn into U*, not N! The same is the case, vice versa.
And the
same applies if we substitute "inertia" for "momentum", or "movement".
Alternatively, consider force,
R, and
episodic movement, M, the
first supposedly opposing, or 'contradicting', the second -- perhaps R is
the reaction force of a body that has just collided with another moving body. It
could be argued that in this case, the motion, M, of the second body
is what produces the reaction, R, and that reaction then alters
M in response.
[It is worth
recalling that we are here considering the relation between a force and the
motion already in the system, not the relation of a force with a body.
That is because we are trying to make sense of the idea that forces contradict
the motion already in the system. We will return to consider the relation
between forces and bodies below.]
To that end, let us imagine two bodies,
A and B, are in collision. Let the motion of both be MA1
and MB1,
respectively before the collision, and MA2
and MB2
after. Further, let the reaction force produced in each body be RA
and RB,
respectively.
Hence, in this scenario, MA1
produces RB,
and MB1
produces RA.
In turn RA
then induces MB2,
and RB
induces MA2.
But, according to the
DM-classics, an object or process turns into that with
which it 'struggles', its 'dialectical opposite'. So, since MA1
turns into MA2
it must have 'struggled' with it. The same must apply to MB1
and MB2.
But, this can't happen since neither of MA2
and MB2
yet exist for MA1
and MB1 in
order to
'struggle' with anything! If they did, MA1
and MB1
couldn't change into them, since they already exist! On the other hand, if MA2
and MB2
don't exist, then there will be nothing with which MA1
and MB1
could 'struggle' and hence change. That can only mean that, according to this
moribund theory, MA1
and MB1
can't change!
[At least, not in the above way.]
On the other hand, if RA
'struggles' with MB1,
then, according to the DM-classics, it must change into it. The same applies to
RB and MA1.
But, MB1
changes into MB2, notRA,
and MA1
changes into MA2, notRB.
Once more, we hit the same brick wall.
[No pun intended.]
Even worse, there is an
equal and opposite reaction force in
A and B, namely, RC
and RD
-- both produced by RA
and RB,
respectively. This means that: RC
= -RA and
RD
= -RB.
Exactly how these are now supposed to fit into this 'dialectical' interaction is even
less clear.
DM-fans are invited to play around with the
above as much as they like,
the result won't change. [No pun intended.]
Howsoever we try to re-package this
ill-considered 'theory', none of it seems to make any sense.
If a force
'contradicted' a moving body (and not
any motion in
the system), then this force would change in to the body and the body would
change into this force -- if the
DM classics are to be believed.
[The
above are just specific examples of a more general, but fatal, defect
that sits right at the heart of the DM-'theory' of change, exposed in detail
in Essay Seven Part Three.
Nevertheless, this point can and will be generalised
in order to show that no two or
more forces could 'contradict' one another in the way that dialecticians
imagine.]
Nevertheless, in order to examine every possible alternative
available to DM-fans, I
propose to analyse this particular option in even more detail. To that end, I will offer an
alternative
clarification of what it might mean.
Perhaps then
the following re-write might succeed in repairing the holes in the above
interpretation of DM at the same time as preventing the theory that UOs operate
everywhere in nature from being completely undermined:
F2: A UO involves the opposition between a
force, P1,
and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has produced (or
would have produced) in a body, B, had P1
never existed. The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this
struggle.
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
F2 links the operation of one force (P1)
with that of another set of forces (Q). However, it is difficult to
distinguish what F2 says about these two factors from the vector resultant of two forces
if we subjected this system to the usual mathematical analysis. If so, the word
"struggle" would amount to little more than an anthropomorphic re-write of the
functional relations that exist within the vector calculus, only now applied to
just one force, the resultant. In that case, if and when P1
and Q interact, they will produce just one resultant force, R, and
it is this force which
would induce the recorded change in motion.28
But,
if that is so, a contradiction between
forces can't arise here: if there is only one force operating in the
system, there can be no contradiction (if we adopt this interpretation). In that case, F2 threatens to undermine
this interpretation of DM, killing it for want of forces.29
This section of the Essay might be
dismissed as just the latest unsympathetic reading of yet another
artificially modified DM-proposition.
Maybe so, but the reader will find that
dialecticians themselves consistently fail to examine their own
theory in anything like the detail attempted here, despite the fact that DM is
supposed to represent the best, if not the very epitome, of
scientific and philosophical thought. The present Essay, in contrast, has
endeavoured to set-out in more detail than has ever been attempted anywhere
else before the implications of this area of DM. As such, it ventures into
entirely unexplored territory. Hence, it is impossible to say whether or not
this misrepresents DM -- indeed, dialecticians themselves would be
hard-pressed to decide among themselves whether or not this is the case. For
one thing,
they can't even decide what matter is! [As Essay Thirteen
Part One
shows, their 'materialism' is rather like
Hamlet
without the Prince!]
In
addition, it is worth pointing out yet again that F2 was motivated by the idea
that forces contradict impressed motion. As we have just seen,
because change in motion is the consequence of just one resultant force
(when analysed classically), the alleged 'contradiction' between two forces
simply disappears.
F2: A UO involves the opposition between
a force, P1,
and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has
produced (or would have produced) in a body, B, had P1
never existed. The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this
struggle.
It would take an especially alert, or eagle-eyed, dialectician, therefore, to be
able to spot 'contradictory'
forces in a system where there is only one force responsible for the
said change in motion!
Worse still, F2 postulates a 'contradiction' between a force and the motion
that is (or might be) produced as the
counterfactual
result of the action of other forces, but since some or all of the latter's
effects won't have been actualised (having been
prevented from doing so by P1),
the alleged 'contradiction' here contains only one real term.
Even
the most committed of DM-fans might find it difficult to visualise (let alone explain) a
'contradiction' between something that is real and something that isn't (in that
either it never existed or it was prevented from existing): i.e., the motion
that would have occurred if the impeding force, P1,
hadn't acted.
It could be
objected that these other forces
don't vanish; they are still there, as is the resultant. If they were to vanish,
so would the resultant. That response will be examined later in the
Essay.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
This
suggests we should reconsider an option left unexplored earlier, where it was argued that forces are the only legitimate
candidates to be placed in such oppositional couples, not the motion they change
or induce, or the bodies upon which they act -- contrary
to what Engels seems to have believed when he tried to replace forces with
relative motion. To that end
it might prove useful to see whether F2 can be modified to provide support for
the idea that the forces involved contradict each other before
they combine to create the resultant, R.
On this
revised view, forces are
'contradictory' only of other forces, and not of bodies or of any motion
in the system. The
following might, therefore, bring out more clearly this latest alternative:
F3: Given a body, B, and a system of
forces, V, comprising n vectors, v1-vn,
operating on B, a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome
of the struggle between these contradictory force vectors. In this scenario, R
needn't be fixed, but could itself be subject to countless changes as B
moves under the influence of V, which would also change accordingly.
One immediate problem with this is that the specification of the
forces belonging to V depends on the choice of co-ordinate system and
inertial frame.30
This shows that even if F3 were acceptable, the representation of forces as 'contradictions' is perhaps
more convention-sensitive than it is reality-driven -- which would mean, of
course, that 'dialectical contradictions' are no more 'objective' than, say,
latitude and longitude.
However, even if this latest difficulty is put to one side,
it is
still worth
asking whether any sense can be made of F3.
As
noted above, F3 seems to bring us back full circle to the idea that forces --
not bodies, or the motion of bodies -- are mutually 'contradictory'. And yet, as
we have seen, it isn't
possible to depict AA-, and RR-forces as 'contradictory', unless their effects
are involved in some way.
On
the other hand, as we have noted several times, if force is just a
convenient shorthand for relative motion, it would mean that this
part of DM is more consistent with a CAR-like picture of reality -- because the elements of the "Totality" would now be externally-, not internally-related
to one another.
To repeat: it isn't easy
to see how the motion of one body could be internally-related to that of others
without re-introducing the idea that bodies exercise some sort of an effect on one another
independently of how they are moving. While this relative motion might subsequently affect their movement, it
still wouldn't
internally-link such bodies. And yet, this is precisely the difficulty that
exercised Traditional Philosophers in relation to the classical metaphysical problem
of the nature of forces; DM has simply reproduced this conundrum in an even more obscure form.
If relative motion were an internal, or 'logical' link, of the sort required by
DM, then the movement of one body in one direction would imply the movement of
another body in a different (or even the same) direction. The existence of the
one would imply the existence of the other; they would 'interpenetrate' one
another, such that one couldn't exist without the other (just like the
bourgeoisie couldn't exist without the proletariat, and these two classes imply
each other, for example --
although, once more, I have thrown that inference into considerable doubt
here). But, unless
DM-theorists have been keeping the salient details to themselves, that isn't the
case with relative motion. So, the relative motion of bodies can't be a
'dialectical' relation, whatever else it is. The same comment also applies
to forces. They don't imply one another, and can exist without each other.31
Ignoring this fatal defect for now, perhaps the unwelcome slide into CAR
can be
forestalled by means of the following
re-wording of F3:
F4: Given a
system of forces, V,
comprising n vectors, v1-vn,
a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between
these n force vectors.
F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a
Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.
F5 is clearly one aspect of the thesis that the
whole determines the
nature of its parts, and vice versa. Hence, F4 and F5 appear to restore the dialectical unity
that earlier paragraphs seem to have sundered.
Unfortunately, this just brings us back full circle to a consideration of the
relationship between the "Totality" and its parts. That is
because F5 introduces its own pernicious version of
HEX, for it seems
impossible (on this account) to determine whether or not anything is
'contradictory'
unless the nature of the whole had already been ascertained. But, since the latter is
always changing, no element in this 'cosmic wild-goose chase' will ever be
hunted down and trapped, as it were. [We encountered different versions of this fatal defect in
DM-epistemology in other Essays at this site; see, for examplehere,
here and
here. Readers are
directed there for more details. Much of what follows takes the conclusions
drawn there for granted.]
The most relevant aspect of this latest quandary centres on the
idea (entertained by several
dialecticians) that
the growth of scientific understanding means that the 'contradictions' that now
plague our knowledge of the world will somehow diminish (or would somehow be
'resolved') as science progressed. Presumably, this implies
that, in the limit (i.e., in an ideal state where humanity possesses (at least in
theory) the Absolute Truth about everything), there will be, or should be, no
contradictions at all in or between scientific theories, or between theories and
'reality'. The problem with this is
that, according to DM-theorists, in order
for a
scientific theory to be true it must faithfully 'reflect' the world. But
the state of knowledge in this hypothetical Ideal Limit can only mean that the
world itself can't contain any contradictions, otherwise they would be
reflected in theory, even in the limit, which possibility has just been discounted. In turn, this implies that
even if humanity never actually reaches this blessed state (i.e., Absolute
Knowledge), we can, in the here-and-now, draw this safe conclusion: the Absolute Truth is that not only is the world not
contradictory, the motion of bodies and the operation of forces isn't
either.32
In
fact, the above must be true now, for if it weren't now true
that there were few, or even that there are no 'contradictions' at all in the ultimate future state of
knowledge of the "Totality", then either (a) The DM-view of the limit of knowledge
(where most if not all contradictions have been resolved) must be false, or
(b) The belief that humanity is converging on that limit must itself be
erroneous,
since there is no such limit. As we have just seen, that outcome is actually implied by the DM-theory of knowledge
itself -- that reality is
a largely, or is a completely, contradiction-free zone.33
(i) There is no limit toward which knowledge
is converging, or,
(ii) As
knowledge advances external reality alters accordingly, or even,
(iii) It is now true to say that, in the
limit, the world contains no contradictions whatsoever.
Plainly,
unless we are Idealists,
(ii) can't be the case. We aren't to suppose (it is to be hoped!) that our
understanding of the world alters the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly
give life to or which power the whole of reality -- so that as knowledge increases 'objective contradictions' slowly disappear.
Of course, many of the latter might vanish in a socialist society (so we are
told), but not those in the natural world. Does anyone who believes that motion
is contradictory, for instance, think that anything humans can do, or will
or come to understand, will alter this supposed fact -- which would, of course,
mean that meaning that motion isn't objectively contradictory?
But
if not, then as (iii) indicates, it must now be true that absolute knowledge
of the world (even if we never attain to it) implies that nature isn't
contradictory -- complete knowledge of reality will have removed all the
contradictions from our thought, or our theories about it. It doesn't matter if we never reach this
blessed state, the possibility of complete knowledge means that nature
itself must be a contradiction-free zone. [However, on that see
here.]
Of course, it might be incorrect to conclude that dialecticians believe that as
science advances all contradictions will be resolved -- even though it isn't easy to see how they could
consistently deny
it. Faced with each new contradiction -- if they are committed to the view
that science can only advance if it overcomes or resolves contradictions in our knowledge --
dialecticians must believe they can be resolved, if we but knew more about
the world. Otherwise they will have to admit
that science can't advance beyond a certain point. But they deny that, too. In
that case, they must either believe that:
(iv) There is no
limit to scientific advance, or
that,
(v) There is a limit (because there are irresolvable contradictions
in nature and hence in our theories about it).
But, if they also believe that there is
scientific advance has no limit, then they must also believe both of the
following:
(vi) There is no
limit to scientific advance, and,
(vii) There is a limit
to scientific advance.
[(vi) follows from the asymptote metaphor to
which Engels referred, and which Lenin and subsequent DM-theorists have lent
their credence. On that, see the quotations listed
below.]
But, the
combination of (vi) and (vii) is itself a contradiction, and it lies right at the
heart of DM (if this line of reasoning is sound).
Of course, this means
that DM itself can only advance if this contradiction is resolved.
But, since DM-theorists don't even recognise this blatant contradiction in their
own theory, that must mean DM can't advance!
Hence, either:
(viii) DM can't advance, or,
(ix) Dialecticians must hold that all
contradictions are resolvable.
But, and once more, if (ix) is the case, by the above
argument, there can be no objective 'contradictions' in reality.
So,
in terms of DM's own theory, it would seem that nature can't be fundamentally contradictory!
Again,
the only apparent way of avoiding this fatal result is either to:
(a)
Deny science can only advance by resolving all contradictions, or,
(b)
Deny that Absolute Truth 'exists'.
However, the
rejection of option (i) from earlier
(i.e., "There is no limit toward which knowledge is converging") would mean that there is a
(non-Absolute) limit to knowledge, after all. In which case, plainly, the DM-thesis that human knowledge is unlimited would have to be
abandoned, and along with that would go the idea that knowledge is converging on
it. Inaddition, the
belief that there is an
'objective' reality (out there) for us to know (even if we never fully attain to
it) would have to be jettisoned,
too.
It would also leave dialecticians with no way of deciding which of the
allegedly irresolvable contradictions their theory throws up is:
(c) An 'objective'
feature of reality, or is,
(d) A by-product of their own imperfect, or even defective, theory
-- which
could be resolved if only we had more knowledge.
These
observations of course assume that the universe might be 'infinite' (a
view held by many DM-theorists) and constantly changing. But, neither
of those factors affects the idea that there must now be a set of truths(possibly
infinite) about reality toward which human knowledge is asymptotically
converging (even if that set itself grows over time) -- that is, if
Engels and Lenin were correct when they said the following:
"'Fundamentally, we
can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge
consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality
into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing
the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge
of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute….
The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic
progress." [Engels (1954), pp.234-35;
paragraphs merged.]
"The identity of
thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your
example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them (sic), the concept of
a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always
approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the
very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately
reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept
has the essential nature of the concept (sic) and does not therefore prima
facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in
the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that
all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only
very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), p.457.]
"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation
of thought to the object." [Lenin (1961),
p.195.]
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the
abstract -– provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from
the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law
of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all
scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more
deeply, truly and completely." [Ibid.,
p.171. Emphases in the original.]
Of course, if there is no such set
of truths,
no such limit, then Engels's metaphor is
defective and Lenin was mistaken, since, once again, there would be no such
thing as 'objective truth' (if the latter is defined as the limit toward which
human knowledge is heading).
However, in this regard, Woods and Grant quote a revealing
passage from DN:
"The fact that our subjective thought and the
objective world are subject to the same laws, and that consequently too in the
final analysis they can't be in contradiction to one anotherin their results,
but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the
unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought." [Woods and Grant
(1995), p.349; quoting
this source. Bold added.]
Admittedly, the above passage wasn't included in the 'official'/final
version of AD, but it
does tend to suggest that Engels believed either that:
(e) Despite
appearances to the contrary, the 'objective'
world is actually free from contradiction, or,
(f) In the
end there will be no contradiction between our thoughts about reality and
reality itself (the first of which alternatives -- (e), it must be
admitted, is impossible to distinguish from the second -- (f)), or even that,
(g) In the
limit there will be no contradictions at all in any of our theories.
So, to take
just one example (and assuming Engels is to be believed): if any
randomly-selected dialectician were to conclude that motion is 'contradictory',
then that subjective thought can't itself contradict 'objective' reality
-- or 'objective' theory itself, one presumes, even if that blessed end state is never
actually attained. So, if knowledge is to advance, even this 'contradiction' (i.e., the
subjective thought that motion is 'contradictory') must itself be resolved, and thus removed.
It, too, is a 'contradiction' that should be resolved if and when know more, or
when we finally attain 'objective knowledge' of the world.
[But, of
course, as we saw in Essay Five,
it isn't even a contradiction!]
Naturally, that doesn't
commit Engels to the view that reality is, in the limit, a contradiction-free
zone, but if science can only advance by resolving contradictions in our subjective
theories (so that they become progressively more 'objective'), the conclusion
(given above) seems inescapable: In the limit, human knowledge of the world must
picture nature as progressively, if not totally, free from contradictions.
However, in the absence of any clear
indication from Engels that he genuinely believed what the above passage says, little more can be asserted here with
any confidence.
It is
a reasonably safe bet that because the DM-classics are silent on this topic, modern-day
dialecticians won't even be able to decide among themselves
about this -- that is, without their being
branded 'Revisionists', perhaps sparking yet another dialectical dog fight,
and then more debilitating splits.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Again, if this is what dialecticians mean by 'contradictory
forces',34
then nothing may be so described until everything has been so described.
[Once more, I am taking for granted the conclusions mentioned earlier. If readers
find this latest assertion hard to accept, they should consult the full argument
presented in the other Essays listed.] And yet, this
reverses the dialectical story, for, as we have just seen,
some DM-theorists appear to believe that things only look 'contradictory'
because we don't possess the Big Picture -- i.e., an 'Absolute View' of reality
--, and that if humanity ever were to
attain to such an all-encompassing vantage point, 'contradictions' would disappear (or largely disappear -- the
story gets a little vague at this point). In contrast, the idea seems to be that we may
only depict forces in nature as absolutely 'contradictory' after The
Epistemological Trumpet has finally been blown on 'dialectical' Judgement Day -- when humanity
at last hits the asymptotic buffers to
which Engels referred. The problem here
is that this may only be done when all (or most) 'contradictions' have been resolved!
Paradoxically, this in turn appears to mean that, 'objectively', these 'contradiction' both exist
and do not exist -- or, maybe even, we do and we don't know whether they
do or they don't!
So, one horn of this
dilemma seems to suggest that 'dialectical contradictions' don't really
exist (because they are merely the artefacts of 'relative knowledge'), and
hence if they
don't, they can hardly play any part in change and development. The other horn
of this dilemma appears to suggest that we are now in no position to assert that
'dialectical contradictions'do
in fact exist (since we aren't in possession of
'Absolute Knowledge'). In which case,
because we aren't in possession of the full picture, we
can't claim
to know
whether 'dialectical contradictions'
actually cause change! Either way, yet another core DM-thesis self-destructs!35
At any rate,
and to return to the main theme, if AA-, and RR-forces are mutually oppositional, change would still be caused by
resultant forces. But, as we saw in
Essay Seven, it is far is easier and more natural to interpret
this scenario as 'tautological', not 'contradictory' -- that is, if we insist on viewing nature in such
figurative, anthropomorphic or animistic terms.
Of course, if we resist such
a capitulation to mystical primitivism, as
indeed we ought, then both descriptors
(i.e., "contradictory" and "tautological") should rightly be fed into the
'obsolete-concept-shredder'. [More on that
here.]
Perhaps, then, it would be wise to draw a veil over this self-imposed
dialectical impasse, and turn to a much more likely source of these
DM-'contradictions'. To that end I will return to F4 and F5, but consider them
from a more promising angle -- as
AR-force couples.
F4: Given a
system of forces, V,
comprising n vectors, v1-vn,
a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between
these n force vectors.
F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a
Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.
In the previous section, it became clear that little sense can
be made of the equation of 'dialectical contradictions' with AA-, or
RR-forces, and this turned out
to have nothing to do with the difficulty of seeing whether or not such force-couples
contained 'opposites' -- which they manifestly do not. An A-force isn't the
opposite of another A-force; the same is true with respect to two R-forces.
However, a primafacie case could be made for
regarding AR-force couples as the polar
opposites to which DM-theorists refer in order to depict 'contradictions' as they
supposedly operate in DM and
HM.
Unfortunately, as we will see, this slender straw once clutched
soon turns into a dead weight, sinking this doomed 'theory'. Quite apart from the
considerations outlined above, no clear sense can be made of the idea that
AR-forces can be co-opted to model 'contradictions', anywhere, any way, anyhow.36
Figure One: Hey, Comrades! Grab This --
It's A 'Dialectical
Straw', Honest It Is!
An
initial serious difficulty confronts this idea: AR-couples don't appear to operate in nature in quite the manner this handy
prefix seems to suggest: i.e., as AR-forces.
Consider a straightforward case: the accumulation of
matter that formed the stars, planets and their moons (etc.) over billions of
years. There, R-forces
(operating at the nuclear level) apparently prevent(ed) (for a time) the
catastrophic collapse of these growing masses into 'singularities' by
balancing-out the A-forces that presumably set the whole thing in motion.
The
problem with these R-forces is that, while they look as though they
oppose any other A-forces in the system, they aren't their polar opposites
(in the way that, say, the North and South poles of a magnet are said to be) --
that is, they aren't opposite manifestations of the sametype of force.
So, the inter-atomic forces preventing the above collapse aren't the same type
of force as the gravitational forces that initiated the process.37
While a case might be made for depicting North and South poles of a magnet as
polar opposite magnetic forces (but on that, see
below), gravitational and nuclear forces
aren't 'interpenetrated' opposites of the same type, and so can't, it seems,
'contradict' each other in the 'dialectical' sense required. For example,
neither force turns into the other, contrary to what the
DM-classics tell us they should.
Maybe we
need to learn more about 'dialectical opposites'?
So, even though,
for example, male and female, dead and
alive are said to be 'opposites', a male dog isn't the opposite of a female flower,
and a dead cat isn't the opposite of a live wire.
Such contrasts can only work as opposites if they apply to, or implicate, the same substantival
(or, at least, if they involve a use of the same common noun). Hence,
on this view, a male dog will be the opposite of a female dog, a
dead cat the opposite of live cat, and so on. Logical connections of this
sort are essential if objects and processes are to count in DM as
'interpenetrated opposites'.
Naturally, this undermines much of what dialecticians themselves
say about UOs; but since this ground was covered
extensively in Essay Seven
Parts One
and Three, no more will be said about it here.
Having said that, a hot oven isn't the DM-'opposite' of a cold can of
beer, in which case it is difficult to see how, in DM-terms, they can interact, with the one
heating
the other up. But who doesn't know a hot oven can heat up all manner of things,
including cold cans of beer? Who
doesn't know that cold hands can be warmed by a hot fire, even if they aren't
'dialectical opposites', and even if they don't imply one another or turn
into each other (which they would
have to do if they were 'dialectical opposites')? And yet, if we were to
accept what we read in
Hegel's work and the DM-classics
-- that only 'dialectical opposites' can interact
--
then you couldn't warm your cold hands on anything other than another pair of
warm hands! You couldn't cool a hot can of beer with anything other than a cold
can of beer.
(b) Between the
forces operating in the system? Or,
(c) Both?
However, even if A-,
and R-forces were opposites of the same type, they
manifestly alter the motion of bodies; they don't directly
confront each other asopposing forces, and hence don't 'struggle'
with one another. Admittedly, they can be
represented as 'oppositional' in a vector calculus, but we have
already seen that even this formal translation
is of little use to DM-supporters -- and that is partly because the relevant forces disappear,
only to be replaced by a single resultant force
that is the cause of all the subsequent action.
It could be argued that these initial difficulties can be neutralised if emphasis
is placed once more on the oppositional nature of AR-forces as a way of
explaining change.
Unfortunately, this detour is no more successful than it
was when it was considered above in relation to
AA-, and RR-forces. AR-forces don't imply one another such
that one can't exist without the other (unlike, say, the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, which are supposed to imply one another). In which case, whatever else they are, they can't be
'dialectical opposites'. They don't 'interpenetrate' each other.
Even if this further difficulty is shelved for now, it would still
be difficult to see how AR-forces could be interpreted literally (or
figuratively) as 'contradictions' (especially in
HM). That is because of the
way in which they can combine and augment one another.
For example, consider
two forces operating in diametrically opposite directions tangentially placed
around a rotating body (and hence not acting in the same line). These two forces -- although 'opposites' at their point
of action -- exercise a combined, augmenting effect on the angular acceleration of that body, thus ceasing to be
oppositional in any plausible sense of that word.38
This is a familiar feature of force vectors. In some instances,
they seem to 'oppose', in others they appear to 'augment' one another,
while in still others they look like they do both at once.39
, 40
Engels himself regarded the
two poles of a magnet as a clear example of the unity of AR-opposites in nature
(another idea he borrowed from Hegel and other German Idealists, and which has been parroted down the ages
by countless 'highly original' DM-echo-chambers).
[AR = Attraction-Repulsion.]
Here
is Hegel:
"Positive and negative are supposed to express an
absolute difference. The two however are at bottom the same: the name of either
might be transferred to the other. Thus, for example, debts and assets are not
two particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative to the
debtor is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also a way to the west.
Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically conditioned by one another,
and are only in relation to each other. The north pole of the magnet cannot be
without the south pole, and vice versa. If we cut a magnet in two, we have not a
north pole in one piece, and a south pole in the other. Similar, in electricity,
the positive and the negative are not two diverse and independent fluids. In
opposition, the different is not confronted by an other, but by its other." [Hegel
(1975), §119, p.173. There are
somewhat similar comments in
Hegel (2004), §312, p.165. (This links to a Scribd page which
features a photographic reproduction of this book.) Clearly, Hegel lifted these
ideas from Kant and his theory of 'real negation'. On that, see Appendix A.]
And here Engels:
"Dialectics has proved from the results of our
experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined
by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on one another, that the
separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and
inter-connection, and, conversely, that their inter-connection exists only in
their separation and their unity only in their opposition. This once
established, there can be no question of a final cancelling out of repulsion and
attraction, or of a final partition between the one form of motion in one half
of matter and the other form in the other half, consequently there can be no
question of mutual penetration or of absolute separation of the two poles. It
would be equivalent to demanding in the first case that the north and south
poles of a magnet should mutually cancel themselves out or, in the second case,
that dividing a magnet in the middle between the two poles should produce on one
side a north half without a south pole, and on the other side a south half
without a north pole. Although, however, the impermissibility of such
assumptions follows at once from the dialectical nature of polar opposites,
nevertheless, thanks to the prevailing metaphysical mode of thought of natural
scientists, the second assumption at least plays a certain part in physical
theory." [Engels
(1954), p.72.]
The alleged 'unity' in this case
clearly revolves around the presumed fact that the
North and South
poles of a magnet can't exist independently of each other, or, indeed, without
one another; their 'opposite'
nature is shown by the affect they have on magnetically susceptible bodies and upon each other.
However, upon closer
examination, it is clear that the relationship between the poles of a
magnet
is in fact an example of AA-, or RR-, but notAR-opposites. That is because in this case,
non-opposites -- i.e., alike poles --, repel each other (i.e., two Norths or two
Souths). On the other hand, opposites attract -- i.e., a North and a
South. Consequently, in the way that these poles inter-relate, magnets are thus AA-, or RR-type forces. A moment's thought will
also confirm
this: since when do magnets attract and repel one another at the same
time?
In that case, it now turns out that the magnet
is hardly a paradigm example of an AR-force -- united in opposition --, as
DM-lore would have us believe.
Mysteriously, DM-theoristsen massehave failed to notice this obvious flaw in one of their key examples!
So
much for the claim that DM-theses have been
read from -- but not
imposed on -- the facts.
The same
comments apply to electrical, and thus also to sub-atomic, phenomena in general
-- like
charges repel, unlike charges attract. This means that much of the
(sub-atomic) dialectical 'evidence' in, say, Woods and Grant (1995), is
seriously misguided. How on earth do electrons and protons 'struggle' if they attract one
another? [There will be more on this in Essay Seven Part Two (when it is published).]
It could be objected
that while it might be true that two unlike poles are examples of AA-forces, their continued motion toward one another will be prevented at some point
by structural forces within the magnets themselves, and these
couples will operate as AR-forces. In that case, R-forces operating between
approaching atoms of the material from which the magnets are made will prevent
these opposite poles closing in on one another, counteracting the A-forces that brought them together. This
implies that the relation between the poles of a magnet is in fact that of an
AR-couple,
Or, so an objector might claim.
Even so, this means that, as magnetic opposites,
the poles themselves still
fail to be AR-UOs. To be sure, other forces might come into play, but
this doesn't affect
that salient point. In which case, these new forces and those magnetic forces
wouldn't be opposites of the same
Aristotelian/Hegelian type (as noted
above).
Despite this, the above
objection would reduce the oppositional relationship between forces originating in these magnets to
the effect that these poles have on motion (since, manifestly, these
opposite forces don't affect each other, just the relative motion induced by
each force). Hence, once more, the two poles aren't inter-related
to each other directly as opposite AR-forces; they would simply oppose any motion that either
or both of them
had induced in the system. We have already had occasion to dismiss this option as
inimical to DM.
In which case, the
inter-atomic forces governing the operation of AA-, RR-, or even
AR-couples,
actually oppose, limit or augment whatever motion is already present in the system
-- or, they restrict the freedom of bodies to move once set in motion.
But, they still don't seem to oppose -- i.e., 'contradict' -- each other as force upon force.
Again, this is probably one reason why
Engels toyed with a positivistic
re-interpretation of forces (in
DN, as pointed out above, in Note 4), since no physical
sense can be given to any such relation between forces (as was also noted
earlier) -- that is, over and above
seeing any such relation as an obscure way of attempting to represent the relative motion between bodies.
Of course, it could be argued that the force field of each pole
does in fact affect that of the other; hence, the above claims are incorrect. But,
these force fields are merely the expression of the motion of, or the motion induced
in, measuring instruments (or, indeed, patterns created by scattered iron
filings) placed near the said poles, so the above claims aren't incorrect. Such forces are,
as Engels argued, a shorthand for
relative motion.
Figure Two: Force Fields And
Iron Filings
On the other hand, if by "force field" we mean the mathematical
structures postulated by scientific theory, they can't affect one another, for they aren't
physical. They certainly affect the theorists in question, those who do the
calculations and draw the diagrams.
[This was discussed in more detail in Interlude Two, and will be again, below.]
Anyway,
as we have just seen, the
nature of the UO here
clearly depends on what is meant by the terms "opposite" and "unity". North and
South poles aren't united in the sense that they are
one (as DM-theorists would be the first to point out), they are connected in
the sense that they 'depend' on each other. But, this 'dependence' is causal,
not logical;
magnetic properties are the result of the vector configuration of
the 'motion' and 'spin' of certain electrons. There is nothing in nature that
logically forces this physical interrelation on these poles (as, for
example, the capitalist class supposedly 'implies' the proletariat). Indeed, the idea that such a configuration
represents a 'dialectical'-UO is misconceived, since the 'forces' involved are the consequence of a
vector field, which is no more 'contradictory' than your front and back
are. And, as we have also already seen,
it isn't easy to see how vectors can be regarded as 'contradictions' (or,
indeed, as UOs).
Moreover, in
ferromagnetic substances, the magnetic field is built up by the cooperative
alignment of individual magnetic moments (perhaps illustrating the fundamentally
cooperative nature of reality once again, created by those helpful 'dialectical tautologies' we
met elsewhere in this Essay).
Certainly, given Engels's use of the term "force" (whether interpreted
realistically -- or positivistically as a
"useful fiction"), this is a rather poor example of a DM-UO, anyway; it
is consequent upon a particular sort of mathematical analysis (i.e., it
is
based on the alignment of electrons, which orients the vector field that
arranges the direction of the
magnetic field). Calling this
a UO would be to substitute an obscure metaphor for a clear mathematical
description, for no extra explanatory gain.
Of course, there is no UO here
anyway,
since the field in question is the result of
one sort of
cause, the
electron,
which is a single charged elementary particle (or wave?) that isn't itself a UO.
(That DM-busting fact has
already been commented upon
here.) Do
these arrows form a UO? But this is how we picture vectors (especially those
associated with a magnetic field).
Naturally, deflationary conclusions like these will satisfy few DM-fans since it depends on a non-standard view of the nature
of mathematical 'objects' (i.e., vectors,
matrices,
manifolds,
dimensions,
abstract spaces, etc.).
Hence, in response it could be argued that
mathematics in fact represents what is really out there in the world,
since it has been abstracted from nature by human beings as a result of their
practical activity and social development. This means that mathematics presents us with an
abstract reflection of reality.
[Chapter 16 of
Woods and Grant (1995) contains
a classic (but nonetheless confused) version of this idea. Because of its
influence, I will be devoting a special Essay to this book, which will be posted
at this site (as Essay Seven Part Two) in the next year or so.]
However, this interpretation of
mathematics is seriously mistaken. Mathematics can't be a description of the
world (nor an 'abstraction' from it) for reasons rehearsed in Essays Three Parts
One and
Two and Thirteen
Part One (as well as
earlier). Mathematics is based on systems
of concepts that aren't causally inter-linked. The concepts that mathematicians
construct do not exercise any sort of causal influence on material bodies; nor do they
'correspond' to anything in reality that could conceivably so behave,
unlike material bodies and processes that can and do. [On that, see
here and
here.]
Mathematical propositions and theorems yield neither an abstract nor a concrete
picture of reality. That is because they aren't pictures to begin with, nor
could they be. They express rules for the manipulation of
certain symbols that licence inferences we make about objects and events in nature
and society (or, indeed, in formal systems).
At best, they set up complex analogies that assist in our understanding of
processes in the material world.
The
development of
Field Theory since
Maxwell's
day doesn't alter this picture
in any way.
Vector and scalar fields are mathematical structures that not only enable
scientists to model nature, they assist in the derivation and interpretation of
the empirical consequences of their hypotheses. To imagine otherwise (i.e., to suppose that
mathematics is an abstract description or picture of the world) would reduce its
structures to absurdity. For example, it would imply that, say, a vector field
--
in reality -- is actually composed of a set of infinitelythinand infinitely strong wire-like curves, or curve segments (of mysterious
composition and provenance), and which aren't actually made of anything. Or, that a scalar field is actually an
invisible array of real numbers 'floating' in (abstract?) space -- or, worse still,
that it is an infinite n-dimensional set of dimensionless connected,
dense but
disjoint points (which can't themselves exist physically -- they have no
shape (circular, spherical, or otherwise), or they wouldn't be points, just volume intervals) --, and so on.
We might picture, say, a
mathematical point as a infinitely small dot if
that helps us make appropriate inferences,
but, as we have just seen, a dot has a shape (circular to normal vision, irregular under a microscope);
but no mathematical point has a shape, circumference, radius, or even centre. What
then can a mathematical point possibly share with anything in the universe? What
could mathematical points, lines or surfaces be
abstracted from, or be a generalisation of, if they share absolutely nothing
with the material points, lines, or surfaces they supposedly represent? Of course, at this point (no pun intended), abstractionists go
rather quiet. They have in fact nothing with which to work.
Here is a
comment I left on Quora recently (slightly edited):
Clearly, mathematical points have no shape, circumference, diameter or radius --
and they aren't even circular or have a centre! They aren't containers, either,
so no other point can 'occupy' them. Otherwise they'd be volume intervals, not
points.
We sometimes say lines are 'made of points', but that can't be so or they'd fall
apart rather quickly (and they would be rather bumpy, like a string of pearls),
since there is no 'mathematical' force to hold those points together. Lines are
also perfectly strong and rigid, they neither age nor begin to fray at the edges
-- and yet they can be easily cut/intersected by other lines and planes, as well
as bent into any shape we please by a suitable homeomorphism. But even then the
original line is still there in 'mathematical space', 'unbent', so that someone
else can use it as many times as they like and for whatever mathematical purpose
they choose, as can any number of other mathematicians and they can all do that
at the same time. They don't need to form a queue.
Lines are supposed to intersect other lines at a 'common point', but if neither
line is made of points, they can't have 'common points', can they? How then do
they intersect?
And if planes aren't made of points, either -- otherwise we could ask the same
questions as those above about lines --, how can a line intersect a plane at a
'common point'? Furthermore, planes can't be made of lines (or they'd be like an
array of really thin knitting needles with nothing to 'hold them together'), and
if that is so, planes can't intersect at a 'common line', either.
Furthermore, there are no 'perfect circles', since there are no mathematical
circles to begin with. If there were, we might well ask where they exist, and
what their size or thickness is -- or even what they are made of. Are they
solid, or do they have a big hole in the middle, like a rarefied polo mint, with
an extremely thin non-minty rim?
The same goes for rectangles, squares, cubes, cones, ellipses, spheres,
ellipsoids, paraboloids…
As Philip, the original answerer, rightly says, we mathematicians deal with
'objects’ that not only do not exist, they can't exist, and not just in
real life -- but, anywhere. They soon exhibit contradictory properties
when we think otherwise or we confuse them with physical objects. But are they
even 'non-physical' objects, or, indeed, 'objects' of any sort? If they were
'non-physical', how could they be perfectly rigid, for example? Is a line
comprised of 'non-physical' points? And how does that hold together? What
exactly are 'non-physical points', anyway? They, too, have no shape,
circumference, or centre. They, too, aren't containers, otherwise they'd be
'non-physical volume intervals'! If that is so, no other 'non-physical point'
can occupy them, either.
Much of traditional analytic and differential geometry, as well as topology,
will need to be re-written if we are to free them of such crude ideas, and,
indeed, avoid such awkward questions.
The traditional approach to mathematical 'objects' and 'processes' thus confuses
mathematics with physical science -- and physicists return the compliment with
interest by treating the universe as a mathematical object in its own right.
Hence all those 'worm holes', 'parallel' universes, 'branched' time zones,
'warped spacetime', 'branes' -- and, of course, the 'paradoxes' of 'time
travel'. No wonder physicists face insuperable problems explaining 'force',
'energy', 'space' and 'time' -- not to mention all those particles that seem to
be wave and particle all in one go, can be in two places at once and can 'pop
into existence' whenever they feel the urge.
And such problems don't stop there; the 'paradoxes' of number theory (and,
indeed, set theory) also arise from viewing even these as if they were
physical objects of some sort.
Of course, this means that there are no viable versions of mathematical
Platonism, which theory positively invites awkward questions and 'difficulties'
such as these.
And that also goes for 'bargain basement' Platonism — i.e., 'mathematical
realism'.
Added on edit: You can see this confusion spreading through many of the
comments in this thread as Quorans, for example, try to work out the 'pressure'
exerted by a mathematical sphere (!!) (as if such objects are subject to gravity, or
any other force!), or when they make comments about the size (!!) of a
mathematical point. If it had any size, it wouldn't be a mathematical
point, for goodness sake, whatever else it was. They are still conflating
mathematical objects with physical objects, hence their puzzlement, the
'contradictions' this generates, and all those inexplicable 'infinities' that so
'effortlessly' emerge from nowhere.
Furthermore, if abstractionism were
true, no two mathematicians
would or could agree with each other. Indeed, if abstractionism were true,
they could dispense with all
those useless definitions, theorems, lemmas and proofs, and just brain scan
one another.
[On Maxwell, cf., Buchwald (1985); on
mathematics as it features in Physics, see Morrison (2000),
pp.62-108. In addition, the last chapter of Harré and Madden (1976) is also
relevant. Other literature
related to this
topic has been listed here.
In addition to the links posted above, more will be said about the nature of mathematics
and 'mathematical objects' in later Essays -- for example,
here; see also
here.]
But, even if
it were conceded that DM-theorists are correct about the nature of mathematics,
it would still fail to explain how, for example, the arrows from earlier could
possibly be part of a UO. Again: this is how mathematicians represent vectors.
So, even if mathematical objects and structures were 'abstractions from
reality', or they 'reflected' what exists in the physical world, it still
behoves DM-fans to explain exactly how these arrows would be a UO:
→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→
Figure Five: Still A 'Dialectical
Tautology'?
Indeed, it would be as ridiculous to regard the above alignment as a UO as it
would be to regard a column of ants as a UO if they were all marching in the
same direction.
Figure Six: Anti-Dialectics?
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Cases like
those considered beforeInterlude Six
illustrate a well known fact that forces aren't rigidly fixed as permanent
opposites, nor are they always oppositional, even when they are classified as
opposites. Hence, it isn't easy to see how viewing forces only as polar oppositional pairs could accommodate
this particular property of natural forces.
In that case, this is unwelcome news, for little sense can be given in DM to the idea
that opposites can switch in this way.41
That
could
be regarded as a serious interpretive error -- given the fact that change is
central to DM. But, the point being made here is specifically targeted at
the DM-notion that all change is a consequence of the interplay between
polar opposites.
Clearly, if these alleged polar opposites can combine in some way to augment one
another, the term "opposite" can't fail to lose its dialectical bite. If change
can occur as a result of 'opposites' that don't work as 'opposites' (still less as "polar" opposites) then this
particular dialectical 'law' stands in some danger of violating a dialectical
equivalent of the metaphysical
Trades Description Act.
If this
picture is now extended to take in
HM, and if, for example, we consider the operation of
"opposing" forces in the class war, it isn't easy to see how,
say, one social force could switch around in the way that forces operating in nature
manifestly can.
Is it possible, therefore, for the capitalist class to swap sides in the class struggle
(as a class force -- not as individual members of that class) to augment workers' battles in
the latter's interests and on their terms? Admittedly, the detailed
structure of -- and processes within -- the class war are complex; elements from
each side may detach themselves (or be detached), and can work against their own
(misperceived) class interests (on a temporary or even semi-permanent basis),
but this isn't
something upon which revolutionaries can or should depend -- still less ought they to trust in
the
outcome. If they were to do this, it would clearly encourage reformism and centrism (let
alone invite defeat). Even at the margin (where whole class forces aren't
involved), switches are sporadic.
But, such things occur all the time in nature.
Hence, this crude analogy relating opposite forces to 'contradictions' lifted
from DM is useless, at best, when it is imported into, and then applied in, HM.
Again, it could be objected here
that this is a gross distortion since the
above phenomena are actually consistent with DM. Dialecticians themselves
reject the idea that there are fixed and unchanging forces in
nature. Hence, the recognition that forces can change and operate in 'opposite
directions' is one of DM's strengths, not one of its weaknesses.
Or, so it
could be maintained.
However,
this volunteered response
succeeds in achieving one thing: it helps
focus on what has been a recurring problem throughout this
site: DM is so vague and equivocal that it is impossible to say with any
clarity what
its consequences amount to, or even if it has any. The claim that 'contradictions' in
nature must be understood as opposing forces has, under close examination, turned
out to mean that such forces might not actually oppose each other --
indeed, according to
Engels, the
concept of a force could simply be a convenient shorthand for the complex
relative motion of bodies. Now, it seems that even this is incorrect, for
oppositional forces may actually augment one another, but only if they aren't viewed as shorthand for the relative motion of bodies.
And, to cap it all, we have just discovered
that they can't even be 'dialectical opposites'!
It is
therefore impossible to decide which
of these DM-type forces are genuine opposites (or,
indeed, which are polar opposites, if any are), or even distinguish
any that are from those that aren't. But, if every force can work in any manner
whatsoever, then it becomes deeply mysterious why only some are depicted as opposites.
And, what has become of the AR-typology Engels regarded as fundamental?
Given such vague and ambiguous terminology, little meaning may be given to a
single DM-concept in this area; still less to the idea that DM force
'laws' operate anywhere in nature.
Imagine a
Chemist, say, who identified an element as having just so many protons in its
nucleus, except it didn't really have that number of protons, and
these alleged protons weren't really protons, and the element rarely if ever had a
nucleus, and anyway it wasn't an element to begin with! Suppose further
that this chemist claimed that she knew what she was talking about (even if no
one else did) because she was an expert player of the 'Nixon
Card', and thus skilled in the art of "grasping contradictions", which
unfortunate lack of 'flexibility' and slavish adherence to 'formal concepts' prevents her critics from seeing the
truth as she sees it.
Few, I think, would take her seriously.
The same judgement should, I think, be reserved for DM-theorists, too.
Unfortunately, such discursive and theoretical 'contradictions' are
grist to the DM-mill, but this isn't something about which dialecticians should feel proud. For if
Capitalists, say, (as a social force) can indeed operate in such a contradictory
manner, who is to say whether a revolution is necessary to overthrow
them? Perhaps -- as result of a 'dialectical inversion' -- the class
enemy could become the strongest ally of the working class? In such a topsy-turvy
'dialectical universe'
anything might happen. Capitalism might be reformed away;
Imperialists could assist in the abolition of poverty; the Nazi's might one day help create
'racial' harmony; and the
Ku Klux Klan
could wind up supporting Black Lives Matter. Who
knows? The ruling-class might even overthrow itself42
If it is a central postulate of the theory that 'contradictions'
are oppositional forces, and that these can change in
'contradictory' ways to become 'non-oppositional', then reformism, centrism,
class collaboration (and the prospect of having the Fascists (etc.) as allies)
can't be ruled out. On the other hand, if these possibilities are to be
rejected (as surely they must), then the importation of such 'contradictory'
DM-ideas into HM must be resisted no less emphatically.
In fact, as we will see in Essay Nine
Part Two, this is
indeed how class collaborationists have argued: the supposedly 'contradictory'
nature of the
Guomindang, for example, 'allowed' the CCP to 'justify' the formation of an alliances with them.
DM also supplied the, shall we say, flexible
theoretical atmosphere that 'allowed' the Stalinist regime to enter into a
pact
with the Nazis, and then help
rationalise this treachery before the communist movement world-wide. As we
will also see, this contradictory theory can be, and has been, used to defend
whatever is expedient, and its opposite in the next breath
and
oftenby the very same dialectician.
Of course, it could be
countered that forces operate in history
in more complex ways than those we find in nature, so the above analogy with
natural forces (and the KKK, etc.) is inapt -- especially if it is applied in
the crude manner just illustrated. Unfortunately, if this rebuttal were itself
successful then it would be misleading to describe natural and social forces as
'contradictory', for if the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' is
inapt, it is inapt. End of story. Of course, that admission would amount to the abandonment of this unhelpful
analogy in its entirety: that 'contradictions' may be depicted as oppositional forces
anywhere at all.43
Nevertheless, even if all of the above points turn out to be
completely misguided, there are other far more fundamental
reasons for ruling-out the identification of opposing forces with 'contradictions'.
Most of the above criticisms were aimed at demonstrating that the
analogy between forces and 'contradictions' was seriously misguided. Despite
this, it could be argued that this doesn't affect the view that the
identification of forces with 'contradictions' is in fact literal, not
figurative.
Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that despite its centrally-important role in DM,
and as far as can be ascertained, the precise details of the literal connection between forces and 'contradictions' have never been
worked-out by a single dialectician!
One reason for this might be that they consider this identification to be so obvious
that the specifics either don't matter or they are deemed to be trivial. On the other hand, it could
turn out to be the case that nothingcould have been saidin this respect, which would more obviously explain this
protracted, deafening silence. Indeed, as will soon become clear, this in fact seems to be the case: this omission isn't the least bit
surprising, for the imagined connection between forces and 'contradictions'
turns out to be entirely illusory.
In
order to substantiate this latest allegation it might help if we back-tracked a little. Part of the argument in favour of the identification of
forces and contradictions at first appeared to depend on an analogy drawn
between literal contradictions and conflict (which view, as we will see in Essay
Twelve (summary here),
is a throw-back to ancient and animistic theories about the origin of all forms
of conflict, locating them in the activities the 'gods'
or other invisible, personified forces
at work 'behind the scenes', or 'beneath appearances').
Mere
contradictions are clearly verbal wrangles, which can indeed look oppositional.
When one person asserts p, and another person denies it (or asserts not
p,
where "p" stands for a spoken
tokenindicative sentence),
then at the level of discourse at least some sort of opposition appears to be implied
(but on that, see here).
So, analogously, it seems that a 'contradiction' in nature signals the existence of
real
material opposition -- but, alas, only to those who are happy to
fetishise
social relations as if they represented real relations in nature itself.
DM-theorists view
real, material
'contradictions' as their primary concern; verbal wrangles are clearly only
of peripheral interest. Having said that, many dialecticians refer back to the origin of
'the dialectic'
in the verbal wrangles recorded in Plato's dialogues. Here are just a few:
"In his
Phänomenologie des Geistes [Hegel] compares human life with dialogue, in the
sense that under the pressure of experience our views gradually change, as
happens to the opinions of disputants participating in a discussion of a
profound intellectual nature. Comparing the course of development of
consciousness with the progress of such a discussion, Hegel designated it by the
word dialectics, or dialectical motion. This word had already been used
by Plato, but it was Hegel who gave it its especially profound and important
meaning." [Plekhanov (1917),
p.601. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego,
to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at
the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and
overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who
believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of
opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical
method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the
dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature
as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the
development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions
in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature...."
[Stalin
(1976b), p.836. Bold emphasis added.]
"Let us inquire into the sources of dialectics in antiquity. Why was it that in
antiquity man had already come upon the foundations of the dialectical method of
thinking? 1. The old philosophers of nature, Heraclitus, Anaximander, etc.,
investigated the emergence and decline of the world. They thus had to arrive at
the concept of the universal change and the universal motion of all things. I
refer to Heraclitus especially. 2. Social relations, meditation on the form
of the State, on religion, etc., stimulated the consideration of all things as
changeful and self-contradictory. (This applies especially to Socrates, Plato,
etc.) The immediate stimulus was that in public life contradictory viewpoints
clashed one with another. Public life in Athens was a very lively affair. In the
market-place discussions were constantly taking place concerning what is good
and what is evil, how the State should be constituted, etc. One said A, another
Not-A. This was true of all things in public and private life. From this there
ultimately developed an art of conversation, and this art of conversation became
the source of the art of dialectics. Dialectics was originally called the art of
discourse because it grew out of discourse." [Thalheimer (1936),
pp.98-99. Bold emphasis added.]
"This consideration enables us to understand the original
meaning of the term 'dialectics.' The word is derived from the Greek
dialego, meaning to discuss or debate. It was considered that to discuss a
question from all sides, and from all angles, allowing different one-sided
points of view to oppose and contradict each other during the debate, was the
best method of arriving at the truth. Such was the dialectics employed, for
example, by Socrates. When anyone claimed to have a formula which answered
some questions once and for all, Socrates would enter into discussion with
him and, by forcing him to consider the question from different angles, would
compel him to contradict himself and so to admit that his formula was false.
By this method Socrates considered that it was possible to arrive at more
adequate ideas about things." [Cornforth (1976), pp.60-61. Bold emphases alone
added.]
"Elaborated first by the Greek philosophers (dialego – I debate), dialectics
remained something of an intellectual curiosity, a philosophical cul-de-sac,
particularly when religious beliefs dominated." [Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics
is derived from the Greek word 'dialego' which means to discourse or debate.
Many of the old Greek philosophers were dialecticians like, Aristotle and Plato.
Heraclitus formulated masterpieces of dialectic. Plato used the 'dialectical
method' in his dialogues, whereas Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic intellect
among these philosophers, investigated the most essential forms of dialectical
thought." [Quoted from
here.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Minor typo corrected. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics was initially a particular
kind of dialogue invented in Ancient Greece in which two or more people holding
different points of view about a subject seek to establish the truth of the
matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments.... Today dialectics denotes a
mode of cognition which recognizes the most general laws of motion,
contradiction and new development.
In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by exposing the
contradictions in arguments of opponents and overcoming these contradictions.
They thought that the clash of opinions was the best method of eventually
getting to the truth."
[Quoted from
here. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]
"The word dialectics refers to a method of intellectual discussion by dialogue.
It is a term of logic. The meaning of dialectics is the conflict between two
mutually opposite forces or tendencies. According to the Greek philosopher
Aristotle (384-322 BC) it referred to the art of deputation by question and
answer." [Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added]
Even so, the
theory that there are contradictions, even 'dialectical contradictions', in
nature and society is still analogical, for we were certainly aware that contradictions
involve verbal wrangles well before we were informed
(by Hegel)
that there were any such in nature and society. In that case, Hegel's argument must have
proceeded from the social to the natural world, which is indeed
what the history of the subject reveals: Hegelian dialectics didn't exist
in pre-historic times (nor even before the 18th
century), even though people have been arguing and contradicting one another for tens of thousands of
years.43a Hence, social interaction has plainly been projected analogically onto nature,
and DM-theorists have
manifestly relied on an analogy
drawn between the way human beings argue (or fight) and the way conflict seems
to occur in the
natural and social world. Unfortunately, this makes the literal
interpretation of forces as 'contradictions' unavoidably dependent on analogical and figurative language,
leaving perplexed non-believers with absolutely no clue what literal meaning, if
any,
could possibly be attributed to this way of picturing conflict. Even
to this day, we are still in the dark about thematerial groundingthat DM-theorists
assume exists.
We certainly have a
much clearer grasp of the use of
contradictions in language, and arguably also in logic, but we have none at all
when it comes to those that allegedly occur in nature -- or, indeed, in
society --, as we will see.
Having said that, there is this minimal consideration in favour of the
application of DM to society: 'contradictions' in capitalism, for example, are
based on the presumed fact that certain concepts (or what they supposedly
'reflect') are dialectically linked. For instance, the capitalist class not only
implies the working class (the proletariat), the one can't exist without the
other (although
I have thrown that clichéd inference into considerable doubt
here)
-- hence, they are said to be 'dialectically-united opposites', interpenetrating
one another (or so the story goes). But, as we have discovered, there is nothing
in the natural world that enjoys this sort of 'logical' inter-connection -- as
we have already seen,
not even the opposite poles of a magnet,
or positive and negative poles in atomic theory and electrodynamics can be
viewed this way. In that
case, the application of DM to the non-social world is, at best,
figurative and non-literal, which, as we have found out in the first half of
this Essay, won't wash either.
Nevertheless, this would at least account for the figurative way
that 'dialectical contradictions' continually surface in DM (and
which are
seriously overused in HM), and why
dialecticians regularly conflate their social and material forms with each other.44
Once
more, even if we ignore this problem, one thing is
clear: for DM-theorists verbal contradictions represent perhaps the
least significant category of opposition. Changes in nature and society are (for
them) the
result of much more fundamental 'contradictions' than those occasioned by the
mere gainsaying of another person's words. In many cases,
of course, discursive contradictions might turn out be a 'reflection' of more basic
conflicts in the real world, and it is the latter that are of interest to
DM-theorists.
However,
when this 'neat' picture is examined a little more closely
much of it falls apart.
As has already been noted, DM-theorists have so far failed to
offer a clear account of the precise nature of the connection between
'contradictions' and opposing forces that their theory requires. In that case, once again, one will have to
be provided for them.45
Presumably, when DM-theorists claim that 'contradictions' are
represented in nature by opposing forces they have something like the following
in mind (if they but knew it):45a
F6: Let force, P1,
oppose force, P2,
in configuration, C1,
in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set, E1,
and those of P2
be elements of an event set, E2.
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites, such that elements of E1
and E2
taken pair-wise respectively from each set form oppositional couples.46
[Here, the content of C1
could include any other local or remote forces and/or processes operating in the system;
alternatively, the forces themselves may even be 'edited out' on the lines envisaged by
Engels (as a sort of shorthand for relative motion, etc.). In addition, all the internal
"mediations" between these forces and/or events in the Totality (T) may
also be incorporated into the picture at any point. Other 'dialectical' caveats could, of
course, be stirred into the mix, as deemed necessary or appropriate.]
It is worth emphasising at this point that P1
or P2 must
operate 'independently' in C1.47
This seems to be an essential assumption so that sets E1
and E2 may
be determinate themselves.
[Admittedly, this qualification runs foul of the idea that everything in the
Totality (T) is interrelated, but we can avoid that untoward consequence by modifying the stated condition to
"relative independence". Naturally, this would mean that several other comments
in this part of the Essay (originally aimed at trying to make this
aspect of dialectics clear for the very first time ever) would become
rather vague by default. However, as will readily be appreciated, a 'theory' like this
-- beset as it is on all sides by an internally-generated fog, further
aggravated by
its supporters lobbing metaphysical smoke bombs in its general
direction -- will always resist attempts to dispel the
Stygian gloom in which it seems permanently engulfed. Anyway, this
'independence' needn't suggest a
CAR-like scenario since it could form part of the 'dialectical development' of
new forces and processes as C1
and the rest of T develop. Naturally, this simplifying assumption could
be modified at a later stage, as the need arises.]
The first problem with the above account centres on the term
"opposites", in F9. Something a little more precise than merely an "opposite"
seems to be required here in order for
DL to surpassFL in its ability to
account for change, etc.48
F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites, such that elements of E1
and E2
taken pair-wise respectively from each set form oppositional couples.
Unfortunately, the difficulty here lies in seeing whether even this
minimal condition is actually implied by F6-F9, and whether the rather weak
concept of an "opposite" is capable of bearing all the weight usually put on it.
These can't be 'dialectical opposites', anyway, since they don't imply one
another. They can surely exist independently of each other (unlike, say, the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or so we have been told), and hence they aren't 'interpenetrated
opposites'.
[I have
resisted representing E1
and E2propositionally since I want to concentrate on real material opposites,
rather than their linguistic correlates. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling, once again, that in
FL two contradictory
propositions can't both be true and can't both be false at once. One
implication of this condition is that the claim that two allegedly contradictory states of
affairs could both exist at the same time (expressed by two
supposedly true 'contradictory' propositions) must rest on either a mis-description or an un-discharged ambiguity --,
or even, of course, on the projection of logical categories onto nature.
This topic will be analysed in more detail in a
later subsection -- as it
has also been in Essay
Five -- and will be further examined in Interlude Eleven and
Essay Eight Part Three.]
However,
quite independently of these latest
'difficulties',
far more problematic is the fact that given F6-F9, it would be impossible to
say what the 'contradictory' state-of-affairs here is meant to be, whether or
not it is actually 'dialectical'.
That is
because F6-F9 imply that E1
and E2 do
not in fact obtain together, for if just one of P1
or P2 is
operative, then only one of E1
or E2 will
be instantiated.
Clearly, in such circumstances there
could be no
'contradiction' -- even if we were accommodating enough to accept the vague DM-'definition'
of a 'dialectical contradiction' -- since, at
least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction wouldn't actually
exist for it to contradict anything, having beenprevented
from actingby the operation of either one of P1
or P2!49
Of course, this conclusion (i.e., that at least one 'half' of the alleged
contradiction wouldn't actually
exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented
from occurring by the operation of either one of P1
or P2)
itself depends on the peculiar Hegelian doctrine that contradictions can somehow exist. If
that thesis is abandoned, DM falls apart, anyway.
F6: Let force, P1,
oppose force, P2,
in configuration, C1,
in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set, E1,
and those of P2
be elements of an event set, E2.
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites, such that elements of E1
and E2
taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
However, it could be objected that the disjunction of
the effects of P1 and P2 (as in "E1 or E2")
completely distorts the picture. Indeed, it could be maintained that what is missing here is an account of howP2
interacts with E1,
which would itself be dialectical. [One variation on this theme will be considered
presently, others later on -- for example, in Interlude Nine.]
Indeed,
what hasn't been taken account of in this Essay is that
alterations induced in E1
by these interactions
would
mean that the idea that change comes about through contradictions
-- modelled by material forces -- could still gain some sort of purchase.
Hence, it could be argued that the contradiction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes, say,
E1a. In that
case, we would have real termshere for the 'contradiction' to reflect, which
in turn means we would
have here a concrete example of change through 'internal contradiction'.
Or, so it
could be argued.
But, plainly, this would only be the case because a decision had already been taken to describe these forces as
"contradictory", when it hasn't yet been established whether this is an accurate, or even an
appropriate, way to depict the relationship between
them.
Nevertheless,
and ignoring even that rejoinder for now, and as has been underlined
already, what actually happens here is that
the resultant of
these two forces actually causes the said change. If so, and once more, calling this a change
motivated by a 'dialectical tautology'
would be far more accurate. [That particular option among
others will be examined again below.]
Moreover, even if the DM-objection
volunteered above were
valid -- whereby
the interaction between
P1 and P2
alters E1
so that it becomes
E1a -- it would
still be of little use to
dialecticians. That is because, in
this case,E1 itself will have been altered externally,
and so change here wouldn't have been the result of E1's own 'internal
contradictions'. That is because, as we have seen many times, these items
don't imply one another, so they can't be 'internally-connected', in the way
that the proletariat is supposedly internally related to the capital class, so
that the one can't exist without the other since they
supposedly imply one
another. So, whatever else it is, this can't be an example of dialectical change through
'internal contradiction'.
Worse still, if
this is to be the model for all DM-change,
then no
change at all would be 'internally-generated'. We saw this problem recur throughout
Part
One of this Essay, where no matter how we tried to re-package this
theory,
the result was always the same: if everything is "self-moving"
(according to Lenin and several other DM-theorists quoted in Part One), then the
universe must be populated by:
(i) Eternally changeless simples, or by,
(ii) Non-interacting systems.
On the other
hand, if systems of forces actually change the objects internal to the system to
which they belong, then, plainly, those objects can't be "self-moving". The
volunteered response above simply reproduces this fatal defect in a more
abstract form.
["System" and "simples" were defined in
Part One.]
Anyway, this volunteered DM-response will be tackled later in this
Essay -- and in more detail below, in Interlude Nine.
Since this Essay was originally written, a superficial
attempt has in fact been published which at least endeavoured to specify the
precise nature of the link between oppositional forces (or, to be more honest,
oppositional "tendencies") and 'dialectical contradictions' -- i.e.,
Weston (2012).
Here are two
different translation of Marx's words and what I have said about them in Essay
Nine Part One:
Tom
Weston refers his readers to this passage from Das Kapital (I have quoted
it as it appears in Weston's article first, and then as it has been rendered in
MECW):
"We saw that the process of exchange
of commodities includes relations that contradict and exclude one another. The
development of the commodity does not overcome [aufhebt] these
contradictions, but creates a form within which they can move themselves. This
is in general the method through which real [wirkliche] contradictions
solve [losen] themselves. It is a contradiction, for example, for one
body to continuously fall into another, and just as constantly fly away from it.
The ellipse is one of the forms of movement in which this contradiction is
actualised [verwirklicht] just as much as it is solved [lost]."
[Quoted in
Weston (2012), pp.5-6. This links to a PDF; italic emphases in the
original.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the
exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions.
The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep
away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi,
a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which
real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to
depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time,
constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while
allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Marx
(1996), p.113.
This links
to a PDF; italic emphases in the original.]
Weston takes exception to several of the translated phrases in the second of the
above two passages, such as "it
is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another",
on the grounds that:
"[T]he phrase 'it is a
contradiction to depict' conveys an idea directly opposite to the assertions of
the German text. The contradiction is not only in the depiction of elliptical
motion; it is in the motion itself. This is the clear sense of the German text's
assertions that the contradictions are 'real [wirklich]', are 'actualised
[verwirklicht]', and that the sides of the contradiction are the two
tendencies of motion that are mentioned, not their depictions." [Weston
(2012), p.28. Italic emphases in the original.]
Be
that as it may, for this and other reasons, Weston clearly prefers the first
translation to the second.
The
following is
also a passage we have already had occasion to quote in part -- concerning the
above
obscure throw-away comment in Das Kapital concerning the elliptical motion of planets around the Sun:
"As we saw above, an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present,
that is, if the two sides interfere with each other.... Although tendencies can
interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest the following criterion is
a sufficient condition for negativity of, or interference between,
opposing tendencies A and B:
Tendency A, if strong enough, with cause the opposite
tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and
conversely.
"This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx
finds in the ellipse case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun
will only result in its actually flying away (a parabolic or a hyperbolic orbit
[in that case, these wouldn't be orbits, just trajectories -- RL]) if the
tangential velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by
gravity. On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will
only result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is
small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the
tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the
realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both
may be partially realised." [Weston
(2012), pp.17-18. Italic emphasis in the
original.]
I
will return to this passage again
later on in this Essay, in a
section where I plan to discuss these and other possibilities in much greater
detail. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that:
(a) Just like other
DM-theorists, Weston simply helps himself to the word "contradiction" with no attempt to
justify its use in such contexts -- that is, over and above stipulating that these
phenomena are to be so described. Plainly, this is little other than an attempt to
foist this
concept
on nature (in defiance of what DM-fans
tell us they never do);
(b)
We have already seen that "tendencies"
aren't in any way causal, and can only be called forces by those with an agenda;
(c) Weston has plainly
appealed to "tendencies" as an
artificial way
of trying to link these phenomena, since "force" won't work here, nor
will "inertia" (his other favoured word);
(d) Even if the DM-use of
"contradiction" were justifiable, how can "less fully realised" be viewed as
the equivalent of
"dialectical contradiction"? Weston failed to say. Finally,
(e) Do these
"tendencies" turn into each other? And how exactly do they "struggle" with one
another? But they should do both if the
DM-classics are to be believed.
(f) As we
saw in Essay Nine
Part One, Marx told us he was merely "coquetting" with Hegelianisms like
this in Das Kapital. In which case, in conjunction with the points made
above (and below), very little, if no
weight at all, can be placed on Marx's words.
So, whatever
else it is,
this relation isn't
'dialectical'.
It is also worth pointing out that
Newton's First Law (which appears to be integral to Weston's attempt to defend
this neo-Hegelian world-view) says nothing about "tendencies":
"Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation states that any two
objects exert a gravitational force of attraction on each other. The direction
of the force is along the line joining the objects.... The magnitude of the
force is proportional to the product of the gravitational masses of the objects,
and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them." [Quoted
from
here. Accessed 04/07/2016.]
"Newton's Law
of gravitation: every particle attracts any other particle with a gravitational
force whose magnitude is given by
F = G m1m2
r2
"Here m1
and m2 are the masses of the particles, r is
the distance between them, and G is the
gravitational constant." [Halliday, et al (1993), p.412. Link added.]
Later on, I will examine the question whether E1
and E2
(from earlier), even though 'opposites', can legitimately be described as 'contradictory'. In what
follows, I will simply assume that they are.50
Despite this, it could be claimed that the following propositions
are all that DM-theorists really require:
F10: P1
prevents E2,
and P2
prevents E1.
F11: Anything that prevents something else
happening contradicts it.50a
F12: Therefore, P1
and P2
contradict each other's effects.
If so, then plainly P1
and P2
don't actually contradict one another, just each other's effects. In
that case, it is far from clear whether or not DM-theorists (who are keen to maintain the
orthodox view that forces contradict each other) will want to embrace F10-F12 too
enthusiastically. It is also worth repeating an earlier, fatal objection to
this attempt to do
CPR on this dying theory: when, for example, P1
prevents E2,
it can't be contradicting it in dialectical sense of that word, since these two
factors don't imply one another, and both can exist without the other (unlike
the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which do imply one another, so we are told).
Hence, whatever
else this is, it, too, can't be a 'dialectical contradiction'. That is the same fatal
objection to this entire way of viewing 'dialectical contradictions' we have
met several times in this Essay.
Nevertheless, I will once again ignore it so that other defects of this theory may be
highlighted.
However, I will introduce it again from time-to-to-time to remind the reader
that this is, rather like that Monty Python parrot, an ex-theory, it has gone to meet
its maker:
F11: Anything that prevents something else
happening contradicts it.
This appears to be
a line adopted in
Weston (2012):
"Hegel
distinguished contradiction from opposition by the category of negativity,
which means, roughly,
conflict of the opposite
sides: 'Opposites...contain contradiction in so far as they relate to each other
negatively in the same respect or are both mutually canceling...and
indifferent to each other.' It is the negativity
of a contradiction that is responsible for its key role in dialectical theory,
that contradiction causes motion: 'The sides of a manifold only become active
and lively against each other when they are driven to the peak of contradiction,
and contradiction contains the negativity, which is the indwelling pulse of
self-movement and liveliness.'... (p.12)
"For Marx
as for Hegel, the main difference between opposition and contradiction is
negativity, the internal activity of a contradiction.... (p.13)
["
Negativity
is an abstraction of conflict,
notof the absence of something....
(Footnote p.13)]
"As we saw above, an opposition is a
contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two sides interfere with
each other. From Marx's brief comments, he appears to have thought that it is
obvious that falling into a body and flying away from it are contradictory
tendencies, but we can reinforce his conclusion. Although tendencies can
interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest that the following
criterion is a sufficient
condition for negativity of, or interference between, opposing tendencies
A and B:
Tendency A, if
strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully
realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely.
(α)
"This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse
case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its
actually flying away (a parabolic or hyperbolic orbit) if the tangential
velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity.
On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only
result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is
small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the
tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the
realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both
may be partially realised.... (pp.17-18)
"A reasonable interpretation of
increased intensity or sharpness of a contradiction is an increase in the mutual
interference of the two sides. As the contradiction undergoes the fullest
possible development and nears resolution, this interference is increased to
such an extent that the two sides cannot coexist any longer, and one must defeat
the other, either by destroying it or by weakening it so completely that it can
no longer interfere with the victorious side.... (p.24)
(β)
"In that case, the inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the
gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational
tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the
tendency to fly off to infinity. Thus the two tendencies interfere with each
other, and represent a contradiction." (p.34) [Weston
(2012), pp.12-34.
Italic emphases in the original.]
Weston here
appeals to a handful of rather obscure ideas connected with "negativity" the latter of which we are told is "an abstraction of conflict"
and "interference" (whatever
that means!). This suggests that Weston's analysis
doesn't rely on 'one side' of a contradiction preventing the 'other' from
operating, but merely "interfering" with it. In other words, it is
clear that for Weston the two sides of
the 'contradiction' in such cases must co-exist.
If so, it should
be possible to adapt what was said earlier (except, of
course, Weston has dropped the use of "force", replacing it with
"tendency"), as follows:
W1: Let force/"tendency", P1,
oppose/interfere with force/"tendency", P2,
in configuration, C1,
in nature.
W2: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).
W3: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set, E1
(comprised of sub-events, E1a-
E1n),
and those of P2
be elements of an event set, E2 (comprised
of sub-events, E2a-
E2n).
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.
W4: By W2, E1
and E2
contain only opposites, such that elements of E1
and E2
taken pair-wise respectively from each set form oppositional couples.
From what Weston says in paragraphs (α)
and (β) above "opposite" can be given a
Weston-style spin so that it means something like "the opposite result of...", or
maybe "prevent
the full realisation of...", one or more events. This means
that one or more of E1a-
E1n
and E2a-
E2n
will be prevented from occurring. This seems to be the only way of
interpreting the following sentence:
"[T]he inertial
tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency --
falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the
full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity."
[Ibid.]
So,
P1
might prevent, say, event, E2i,
while P2
will prevent, say, event, E1j.
In which case:
W5: P1
and P2
contradict one or more of each other's effects.
But, if these effects don't happen, or don't take place
(even on Weston's recognition), then they
can't exist to be contradicted by anything, let alone by a force/"tendency".
More to the point, these two forces/"tendencies" don't actually 'contradict' one
another, just each others effects. As noted
earlier (edited):
In that case, it is
far from clear whether or not DM-theorists (who are keen to maintain the
orthodox view that forces contradict each other) will want to embrace [the
above] too enthusiastically.
No surprise, we hit the same brick wall!
[I will
return this side-argument again later, after a few
peripheral 'difficulties' have been ironed out.]
To continue: the above passage seems to imply that the
aforementioned planet
will orbit the Sun when the "tendencies" involved have balanced one
another out:
"As we saw above,
an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two
sides interfere with each other. From Marx's brief comments, he appears to have
thought that it is obvious that falling into a body and flying away from it are
contradictory tendencies, but we can reinforce his conclusion. Although
tendencies can interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest that the
following criterion is a sufficient condition for negativity of, or
interference between, opposing tendencies A and B:
Tendency A, if strong enough, will
cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were
absent, and conversely.
"This criterion is
satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse case. The tendency
of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its actually flying
away (a parabolic or hyperbolic orbit) if the tangential velocity is large
enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity. On the other side,
the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only result in the planet
actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is small compared with the
gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the tendencies is too weak to
constrain the other, each tendency prevents the realisation of the other. At
least one will not be fully realised, although both may be partially
realised.... (pp.17-18)
"In that case, the
inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational
tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will
prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off
to infinity. Thus the two tendencies interfere with each other, and represent a
contradiction." (p.34)
So, it looks like the "tendency" to fly off at a tangent is
balanced by the "tendency" to fall into the Sun, and when that
happens the planet will enter into
an orbital trajectory.
I take up
this notion (i.e., "balancing"), and several other related issues below (here,
here, and
here), and in more detail
in Interlude Nine, where I consider
several variations on Weston's theory. [See also
here.]
Independently of this,
we have
already had occasion to note that Hegel's invention of 'negativity' was
thoroughly misconceived since it was based on
(ii) Kant's
introduction of the concept of "real negation", which has been debunked in Appendix A.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
Finally, it is far from clear that the two "tendencies" Weston has
recruited to his cause are 'dialectical opposites' of one another in the
required manner; they don't seem to imply one
another in any sense of that word, which they would have to do in order to qualify as
'internally-connected' opposites. In what way does a "tendency" to fall into a
planet imply a "tendency" to continue to move in the same line of action
-- in the way that one class under capitalism (the bourgeoisie) is said to imply
the existence of the other (the proletariat), such that one can't exist without
the other -- or so we
have been told? Weston
omits consideration of this core Hegelian principle, and it isn't hard to see
why: that omission hides the fact that this isn't by any measure a 'dialectical
relation' and hence it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction', either, whatever else it is.
[On that, see here.]
[I will offer a different reading of this
passage in Essay Nine Part One -- and one that
absolves Marx of any
involvement in this 'Hegelian' farce (which, as we have just seen, turns out not to be Hegelian, after
all!).]
But,
what about the "fully realised" aspect of Weston's argument?
"Tendency A, if strong enough, will
cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were
absent, and conversely." [Ibid.]
This
has already been covered: If a 'tendency' is "less fully realised" then some of
its effects won't follow or take place, as we have
found out. We have also seen that, whatever else it is, this can't be a
'dialectical' interaction since these 'tendencies' don't imply one another. In which case, Weston's entire analysis is
devoid of rational support, at
any level -- even in DM-terms!
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
So despite this, in order to examine
every possible way of reviving this moribund theory, I will concede for
the purposes of argument that
E1 and E2are 'contradictories' after all. However, it now appears from the above
considerations, and from F10-F12,
that not only does E1
'contradict' E2,
but also that P1
'contradicts' E2,
and P2
'contradicts' E1,
as well. I shall return to consider these added complications,
below.
F10: P1
prevents E2,
and P2
prevents E1.
F11: Anything that prevents something else
happening contradicts it.
F12: Therefore, P1
and P2
contradict each other's effects.
But, there
now appears to be no good reason
to accept F11,
and every reason to reject it. Consider the following scenario -- aimed at
showing why F11 is unacceptable (even given the truth of other DM-theses):
The problem here lies not so much with the non-standard use of
language found in the above sentences, but with the fact that if a drowning (or if
anything) is prevented from happening then it never actually took place.
In that case, if the said incident didn't happen it can't have been
'contradicted' by any of the forces or events doing the preventing -- since there
would be no 'it' for anything to contradict. Unless we are prepared to
envisage forces 'contradicting' things that don't exist, or we allow them to
'contradict' unrealised possibilities -- or even 'contradict' ideas
(perhaps those in NN's mind above) --, the word "contradiction" can gain no grip
here, even
in DM-terms.
It might
also become problematic explaining how something
that exists can 'struggle' with something that doesn't.
It might
prove even more problematic explaining how this 'contradiction' is
dialectical, since what an individual does or doesn't do in no way implies
what they hoped to prevent, in this case, the drowning. The two can certainly
exist without one another (unlike the proletariat and the capitalist class, or,
so we have been told). If so, whatever else this is, it can't be dialectical'.
It could be
objected that if NN formed the intention to prevent a drowning that
intention implies there is a drowning to prevent. In fact all that is
implied here is that NN believed someone was drowning and intended to
save that individual. It certainly doesn't imply that there is someone who is
drowning since NN could be mistaken, delusional, or a publicity seeker.
Even more
problematic, did what NN attempt turn into the drowning? But that is what
the
DM-classics tell us must happen if this is to be counted as a dialectical
relation. That is, if these are 'dialectical opposites' locked in struggle, they
must change into each other!
Again, whatever else it is, this can't be
dialectical'.
One obvious fall-back position for dialecticians to occupy
in response to the above would
be to argue that the action mentioned in F13 halted a series of events that
would have led to the said drowning. In that case, that intervention contradicted
that series of events. This objection will be looked at more closely in Interlude Nine -- and again presently, below.
However, in case
this latest counter-example is considered prejudicial, or contentious (in that
it doesn't deal with real forces,
or with the sort of forces over which DM-theorists are exercised), then perhaps the
following considerations might prove to be more acceptable. To that end, let us begin with this
rather obvious assumption:
F16: Any process or series of events that is prevented from occurring does not exist
(or take place).51
It is clear that while
F16 is a truism, it seems to ignore protracted or extended events and processes, so it might not be
acceptable as a clarification of the 'contradictions' that are of interest to DM-theorists.
Consider, then, the following emendations:
F17: Event, E, consists of a set of
inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.
F18: E1-En
form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and
contradictory nature) within T.
F19: Let P2
prevent some or all of E1-Enfrom taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not
exist, will never exist, or do not take place.
["T"stands for "The Totality".]
It is quite plain from this that because of
the operation of
P2,
certain events failed to materialise. But, that simply generalises the point made in
relation to the drowning example considered
earlier. Even if it were assumed that the vague notion
of a 'contradiction' employed by DM-theorists is viable, it would still be difficult to see
how anything could 'contradict' something else if the latter doesn't exist or
never occurred. Hence, in the example above, if P2
halted certain unspecified elements of the series of events -- perhaps, Ei-En
--, which would have led to the said
drowning had they not been prevented, then those prevented events never happened (nor did the drowning), and
hence didn't exist, and
so can't have been 'contradicted'.
That
objection also appears to be fatal to DM since it appears to tell us that,if
anything,forces actually prevent 'contradictions' from
arising!
Of course,
all this is
independent of the fact that even if it could be shown that this was a
'contradiction', it couldn't be a 'dialectical contradiction' since the factors
involved -- i.e., the actions aimed at preventing the drowning and the events
that led up to the drowning -- do not imply one another, and can (surely) exist without
one another, unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, so we have
been told. Nor do they turn into each other.
As we have
seen time and again, this is a recurring problem which has sunk every such attempt to
breath life into this corpse of a theory. [Apologies for that mixed metaphor!]
Therefore, far from forces being
DM-friendly, they appear to be among its very worst enemies.
In that case, if this
fatal weakness is to be neutralised, a new and more consistent account of the
relationship between 'contradictions' and forces must, as a matter of some
urgency, be found.52
In order to construct a
more viable account,
we need to reconsider a difficulty we met earlier that was
temporarily put to one side: the claim that forces -- not forces and effects, or simply
effects, but forces -- forces are directly contradictory to one another. Consider then the following
scenario:
F21: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.
Again, this perhaps puts too much
weight on the term "prevent"; it might prompt F21 to self-destruct just as fast
as F17-F20 did, for if one of these forces fails to operate (it having been
prevented), no 'contradiction'
would be implied.
[Whether or not the actual act of prevention is what
constitutes the 'contradiction' here will be considered below,
here and in Interlude Nine.]
But, perhaps
that conclusion is just a little too hasty. For example, both of the above
forces could still exist even if one ceased to operate in an F21-style
configuration, and no problem need arise because of that since no reference has been made to the non-existent effects
of either one of them.
This means that even
though one of P1
or P2
might have been prevented from acting, they could
both still exist in some form or other. If so, F21 might appear to be the viable
option that dialecticians require. One further advantage here would be that F21 connects forces
directly with 'contradictions', rather than linking 'contradictions' to the
effects of forces. Could this be the lifeline DM requires?
Alas, upon closer examination, this lifeline soon
turns into a noose.
Figure Seven -- A DM-'Lifeline'
Unsurprisingly
Turns Into A Noose
The fatal consequences
this option presents DM-theorists become apparent when we attempt to unravel what it
means for a force to be 'prevented' from operating.
Despite disclaimers, it
seems that if a force no longer operates, it no longer exists. Perhaps the
problem lies not so much with the precise physical form that forces take (which,
even to this day, is still mysterious; on that, see Interlude One), but with the fact that the word "operate" is ambiguous. Consider the
following examples of forces that are capable of being rendered inoperative:
F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate
when worker
NN threw the switch.
F23: An aerofoil produces the lift necessary to keep an
aeroplane in the air provided that there is sufficient relative velocity
between that aerofoil and the ambient medium to prevent the force of gravity from operating
normally, pulling the aircraft to the ground.
[In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, I
have left F23 in a more colloquial form -- for instance, by my use of "pulling".]
In F22, the relevant force simply ceased to exist (or it was
converted (or reverted) back into another force, 'potential' force, or some form of energy, etc.)
when the switch was thrown. But, in F23, a second force (lift) 'opposes' the effects of the first force (gravity) -- which, of course, still exists
(perhaps as part of the resultant force in the system).
Can F21 now be interpreted along lines
similar to those suggested in F23? This way of viewing the relation between
P1
and P2
would see them both as still existing, even while they counterbalance each other. In which
case, it might prove helpful to re-write F21 in the following manner:
F24: P1 contradicts P2
only if it counterbalancesP2.53
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]
Now,
F24 doesn't appear to face any of the existential problems that F21 encountered
since the relevant forces co-exist,
counterbalancing each other. Perhaps then we have here the clear statement that
DM-theorists require?
Alas not.
A new difficulty arises
just as soon as we ask why only
counterbalancing forces should be considered 'contradictory'. This is
relevant since F24 simply restricts our attention to situations where there is
an equilibrium between forces, and ignores dis-equilibria.54
But surely, it is largely as a result of the latter that change occurs
(certainly changes of the sort that interest dialecticians) -- meaning
that 'contradictions' should be connected with dis-equilibria, rather than
equilibria. If so, F24 must be re-written in the following way:
F25: P1 contradicts P2
whether it counterbalances P2or not.
Unfortunately,
F25 can't now provide the clarity that was missing from previous attempts to
illuminate this part of DM. That is because F25 fails to
distinguish between equilibria and dis-equilibria. F24 seemed to express a clear definition of 'contradictory' forces, but in order to make it
applicable to the real world, F25 had to be recruited in support, completely
undermining F24. F25 informs us that forces are 'contradictory'
whether or not F24 is true. Worse still, F25 could be true even when F24 is false:
F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.
F25: P1 contradicts P2
whether it counterbalances P2or not.
Hence,
if the following were true, F24 would be false:
F26:
P1 contradicts
P2
even though it doesn't counterbalance P2.
Now, anyone reading these three sentences (and taking them for an
accurate exposition of this area of DM) would rightly complain that nothing had
actually been explained, since there is nothing about the relationship between
the forces mentioned that indicates what the overall theory is committed to.
In response, others could
argue that this latest problem is not only spurious, it is solely the result of
a use of the phrase "only if" in F24. Its removal should eliminate the
difficulty.
Unfortunately, the removal of the "only if" in F24 would plunge the
theory back into all the existential problems it had been introduced to
eradicate. This can be seen if we try to re-word F24 in the following manner:
Although F27 might look
acceptable, it is merely a sufficient
condition; hence, it does not rule out the following:
F28: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2
acting, and/or vice versa.54a
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in
so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]
[F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate
when worker
NN threw the switch.]
But,
F28 is just a resurrected version of F21, which we found didn't rule out F22,
and thus non-existent forces. What was required here instead was a description
of 'contradictory' forces that doesn't imply that one of the forces operating
ceased to exist as a result of the action of any other force in the system.
Furthermore, we also required an account that doesn't rely on forces merely 'contradicting' the effects
of other forces
--
because of the serious difficulties that that particular alternative encountered earlier.
That is why an appeal had to be made to forces that
counterbalance one another, since (clearly) they must exist to do this --
hence, the "only if" had to be introduced, making this a
necessary condition.
But, as we discovered, this more restrictive version ruled out forces that didn't counterbalance one another,
which DM seems to need; reintroducing these at a later stage simply ruined this neat
picture.
Unfortunately, F24 and F26 seem to divorce 'contradictions' from
equilibria, since the presence or absence of the latter is in no way affected by
the former.
F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.
F26:
P1 contradicts
P2
even though it does not counterbalance P2.
This means that if F24 and F26 reflect the real nature of things,
then 'contradictions' are in fact unrelated to the balancing effects of forces.
As paradoxical as this might seem, DM-theorists should deny the truth of the
conjunction of F24 and F26 if they want to maintain their belief that there is
some sort of a
connection between forces, 'contradictions', equilibria and disequilibria in nature and
society. Alas, in order to account
for the 'contradictory' nature of reality, DM-theorists can't actually afford to do this.
For, as soon as F24 and F26 are adopted, DM ceases to be explanatory; but the minute
these two are rejected, this attempt to render comprehensible the nature of DM-forces collapses.
Nevertheless, that
annoying conclusion might appear to some to be a little too hasty and contrived.
And yet, with so little in the writings of DM-theorists to guide us, how is it possible for anyone to decide
whether or not the
above attempt to understand DM is misleading or prejudicial? Indeed, how could dialecticians
themselves arrive at a clear decision on this score without some form of theoretical innovation,
an option that has so far been complete anathema to the 'Orthodox' DM-community, who are only too happy to wave the 'Revisionism'
(or even the
'pedantry') card at anyone who has the temerity to try to 'think outside the
box' on this and other 'difficulties' this theory faces?
Nevertheless, if we adhere to the
requirement that 'contradictions' are capable of explaining change -- when pictured as
opposing forces (that is, if we give 'contradictions' some sort of physical
bite) --, then this theory must self-destruct by the above argument. That is
because the theory maintains that forces are 'contradictory' whether what its
theorists claim about them is true or not -- if that is, indeed, what
DM-theorists claim or what this theory
actually implies.
Naturally, all this is independent of the far more fundamental question whether
the theory that 'contradictory' forces are capable of counterbalancing each other
can itself be explained without referring to the sort of 'prevented', or
'non-existent', effects we met earlier. If it can't, this latest detour would
prove to be just another dead end, since 'prevented' effects don't exist to be contradicted. On the other hand, if
this theory can be explained
without referring to such effects, then it would be difficult to decide what
impact it could possibly have on the real world. How could such
forces be described as "material" if they have no effect on anything
material --,
except, perhaps, on those seemingly insubstantial 'non-existent' effects?
Of course,
all this is independent of the fatal defect mentioned earlier; that these forces
and effects do not imply one another (unlike the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie), so they can't be 'dialectical contradictions', whatever else they
are. For example, gravity doesn't imply the existence of the lift created by a
wing (or anything else that can provide it). Gravity existed for billions of
years, and wings for maybe a couple of hundred million (in winged insects, or
plants that use the air to spread seeds, etc., flying dinosaurs and birds). Of
course, if there were no gravity, then such things wouldn't have evolved, but
then again, if there were no gravity, there would be no universe. Clearly,
gravity can exist without such flying devices, so the relation between the force
provided by a wing and gravity can't be 'dialectical'. Even if they were
'opposite' in some-as-yet-unspecified way, they don't 'interpenetrate' each other,
and can't be 'dialectical'.
Well, this is another
dialectical hole out of which DM-fans can dig themselves. I am merely content to remind them that
it is a hole, it is very deep, and it is one they have dug for
themselves.
Maybe even
this is being a little too hasty. Perhaps we should begin
again.
To
that end, it might help if we
re-examined a passage from Cornforth's book, quoted in Part One of this Essay:
"The unity of opposites in a
contradiction is characterised by a definite relation of
superiority-inferiority, or of domination, between the opposites. For example,
in a physical unity of attraction and repulsion, certain elements of attraction
or repulsion may be dominant in relation to others. The unity is such that one
side dominates the other -- or, in certain cases, they may be equal.
"Any qualitative state of a
process corresponds to a definite relation of domination. Thus, the solid,
liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different
domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic
of the molecules of bodies.... Domination relationships are
obviously, by their very nature, impermanent and apt to change, even though in
some cases they remain unchanged for a long time. If the relationship takes the
form of equality or balance, such balance is by nature unstable, for their is a
struggle of opposites within it which is apt to lead to the domination of one
over the other....
"The outcome of the working
out of contradictions is, then, a change in the domination relation
characteristic of the initial unity of opposites. Such a change constitutes a
change in the nature of a thing, a change from one state to another, a change
from one thing to another, a change entailing not merely some external
alteration but a change in the internal character and laws of motion of a
thing." [Cornforth (1976), pp.97-98. Some paragraphs merged.]
[This
is in fact a differently worded version of Weston's
argument, where forces/"tendencies" 'interfere' to a greater or lesser extent
with one another --
Weston (2012). I have examined Weston's alternative
elsewherein this Essay.]
Now, the above argument might
appear to work when applied to human social systems, where agents
(individually or in groups) are capable of 'upsetting' any number of 'balanced'
configurations, and
who don't need too much in the way of external motivation to do that (although, in
order for Cornforth to be able to say eventhat much with any clarity, he found
he had no use for the obscure words Hegel employed). However, when this theory is applied to nature as a whole, it can't work. Consider, therefore, the following:
F29: Let FDbe a set of force 'elements' in a 'dominant'
relation to FS, which is
a 'submissive'
set of forces (i.e., FD>FS),
and let both operate in system, S, however that is defined or
characterised.
F30: For this relation to change so that a qualitative transformation
occurs in the overall system, S, one or both of FD
and FS will
have to change first.
F31: If the change occurs in FD
it will have to do so because of the latter's own 'internal contradictions', otherwise the
theory must fail at the first hurdle. [The same applies to FS,
or, indeed, to both taken severally or collectively.]
F32: But, if that is so, then the same analysis will now apply one more level down,
as it were: whatever causes FD
to change will have to be the result of further dominance/submissive relations
inside,
or internal to,FD itself.
In turn, the pre-conditions noted in F31 will also apply at, or to, these 'lower level' relations;
they must change because of their own 'internal contradictions'.
F33:
Either this continues forever, or it will halt at some point.
F34: If it halts at some
point, then there must be fundamental units that don't change
because of their 'internal contradictions', and the theory will fail at this point. [In fact, these fundamental units
can have no effect on each other for reasons set-out in detail in
Part One
of this
Essay.]
F35: If
this process continues forever, then there would be nothing to condition
anything internal to anything else, just more and more layers, tailing off to
infinity (i.e., to "who knows where?"). DM would thus have its own "bad
infinity". [We saw that this was a non-viable alternative, anyway, in
Part One, as
well as
here.]
F36: All this is independent of whether or not an external cause (or causes) initiated
these
internal changes in FD
or FS. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to
Cornforth), external causes can't bring about the internal, qualitative changes
required (again, according to Cornforth). The latter must be
internally-generated in the last analysis.
It looks, therefore, like this
'theory' can't be rescued if this line is adopted.
Howsoever we try, there seems to be no way of rescuing this self-destructing theory -- killed-off by its own
internal obscurities.
In short: if a force
prevents something from happening, that force can't contradict it; once
prevented, the latter doesn't exist. Moreover, when an effect of that force has
been prevented, it can't contradict any other effect that hasn't existed.55
However, some may still object and claim that if a force prevents something coming into being,
or happening,
it must have contradicted it.
Let us say, therefore, that:
Ω1:
If event, Ei,
at time, t, belonging to process, Δ (normally comprising sub-events, E1-En), is prevented from becoming Ei+1,
at t+1 by force, P, then Ei
will have been contradicted by P. [t+1 > t]
[Here, "event" can be interpreted as widely, or as narrowly, as is required so
that it is compatible with plausible/acceptable 'dialectical' theories of "causation", or of "mediations", and their effects.
I have had to use Greek letters "Ω" and "Δ"
here since I have run out of viable Latin capital letter options I haven't
already employed! I originally used the letter "T" (now replaced by "Ω"),
but decided that it might be confused with the "T"s I have also used to
stand for time and for the "Totality".]
Hence,
it could be argued that in this sense it is clear that forces prevent the effects of other forces
from being realised by
contradicting certain events, stopping them from occurring.
But, even
then, forces
still fail to
'contradict' one
another as force-on-force, they merely prevent the events, or effects,
induced
by other forces from happening. So, this alternative can't help us
understand how forces actually 'contradict' each other.
Nevertheless,
we need to
examine this objection a little more closely so that every conceivable possibility has
been explored.
Consider then the
following:
Ω2:
Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En,
which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not
stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
Ω3: Had
these events proceeded as 'normal', Ei
would have been followed by
Ei+1,
but as things turned out,
Ei+1
failed to occur because P prevented it.
Ω4: Hence, P contradicted
Ei+1.
However, since
Ei+1
never existed or occurred, it can't have been 'contradicted' by P -- unless, once
more, we assume that a force
can 'contradict' non-existent objects, events or processes. Moreover, since P
didn't prevent Ei
itself,
it can't have 'contradicted' it, either.
And, as we
have seen several times, Pand Ei+1
don't imply one another and both can (and do) exist without one another (indeed,
as we have just seen). Hence, whatever else it is, this can't be a
'dialectical relation/contradiction'.
We hit the same brick wall
once again.
Consider now this variant on
Ω3:
Ω5: P contradicted Ei
by stopping it producing
Ei+1.
But,
this is no good either. That is because events aren't like eggs that
produce other egg producers (i.e., chickens!). If so, events themselves can hardly be prevented from producing other
events if they don't produce them in the first place.
In that case, perhaps the following revision will do:
Ω6: P contradicted Ei
by stopping
Ei+1 following on from
Ei.
But, again, the alleged 'contradiction' amounts to the
prevention of something that doesn't now exist (and never did). If forces can
only
'contradict' something by preventing or stopping non-existent objects, process,
or events from taking
place, then all the above objections still have their place.
It could be argued that if the
chain of events above is replaced by a series of causes and their effects, the
contradiction will become clear -- perhaps along the following lines:
Ω7:
Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En,
which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not
stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
Ω8:
In the 'normal course of events', let each event, Ei,
cause the next event,
Ei+1.
Ω9: However, Ei+1
failed to occur because P prevented
Ei
causing it.
Ω10: Hence, P contradicted
Ei.
This looks more promising, but there
remain several problems with it:
(i) Once again, if this were so, then
DM-fans will have to drop their claim that forces contradict each other;
(ii)
Force, P, and event, Ei,
aren't 'internally related' -- how can a force be 'internally related' to an
event? So, to repeat, whatever else this is, it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction'
(we saw something similar to this obstruct
Weston's attempt to
recruit Marx to this mystical view of nature, just as we have seen it neutralise
other, alternative rescue attempts);
(iii)
Even if it were a legitimate example of a 'dialectical contradiction', P and event, Ei,
would have to
turn
into one another, if the DM-classics are to be
believed.
Consider, therefore,
a more concrete example: Imagine a fire that had been started in a forest by a match
inadvertently dropped on some tinder dry
grass. All things being equal, the resulting and growing conflagration will be
maintained by the following factors, at least: (a) The organic material in the
grass, (b) The energy released by this fire, and (c) The oxygen in the
surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the burning grass with a fire
broom before the conflagration has a chance to grow, putting it out. Plainly the
force of the blow from the broom deprived the nascent conflagration of enough oxygen to keep it going and so quelled the blaze.
In that case,
one cause (the supply of oxygen) was prevented by the force of the broom from
further causing a series of damaging events or effects. But, does the blow from the broom
turn into the oxygen? Or, into the organic material comprising this tinder dry grass?
What if that fire were extinguished by a rain storm? Would such a fire turn into
a rain storm? And yet it ought to do all of these if the
DM-classics are to be believed.
[Anyone interested can read
the doomed attempts of one comrade to defend the DM-theory of change in the face
of objections like this,
here.]
However,
the biggest problem with the above DM-volunteered response lies in the dearth of
details, and the difficulty of filling them in on behalf of DM-fans who don't
seem to be too bothered to do so!
Consider
a different example: a match used to light a trail of gunpowder. The match
sets off a series of chemical reactions that pass along that trail, each of
which causes the next reaction in line. Call this series of events, or causes,
C1-Cn.
Let us further imagine that some force (say, a violent thunder storm, S,
which either blows the trail of gunpowder away, or which drenches it in a
downpour) stops this series at the Ci-thstage, preventing the next cause/event,
Ci+1,
from happening. In that
case, should we not say that S contradicted Ci?
However,
problems (i)-(iii) above still apply in this case
(as they also do in relation to the forest fire example considered earlier, when
the details are filled in) -- which
would involve, for example, a thunder storm turning into a chemical reaction
in the gunpowder, and vice versa, if the
DM-classics are to be believed!
In fact,
the idea that causes necessitate their effects (whether or not the latter are
themselves causes in their own right), upon which the above depends, is itself predicated
upon an anthropomorphic view of nature. Since I have considered this topic in
more detail in Essay
Thirteen Part Three,
I will say no more about it here.
Exactly
why this view of causation depends on necessitation is connected with the
points raised in Essay Seven
Part Three
(concerning Kant and Hegel's response to
Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation).
There, it was demonstrated that in order to defuse Hume's attack, Hegel had to
find a dialectical-logical, and therefore necessary, link between a cause and
its effects:
Hume had argued that there is no logical
or conceptual connection between cause and effect. This struck right at the
heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume and the
Empiricists were radically mistaken. Kant had already attempted to answer Hume, but his solution
pushed necessitating causation off into the
Noumenon,
about which we can know nothing. That approach was totally unacceptable to
Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect; he
found it in (1) Spinoza's claim that determination is also negation (which,
Hegel rendered "Every determination is negation" -- by the way, neither
Spinoza nor Hegel even so much as attempted to justify this 'principle' -- more about
that in Essay
Twelve; on this, see
Melamed
(2015)), and in (2) His argument that the
LOI "stated negatively" implies
the LOC (which,
unfortunately for Hegel, it doesn't).
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of
Non-contradiction.]
Based on this, Hegel was 'able' to argue that for any concept A,
"determinate
negation" implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A. [I
am, of course, simplifying greatly here! I have reproduced
Hegel's argument below for
those who think I might have misrepresented him.]
This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built
into it as
A
transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This move provided him with the
logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it
doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A,
which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational
consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that
for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it),
not-A,its 'internal' and hence its unique 'opposite'. Hegel
was forced to
derive this consequence since, plainly,
everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A
could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't introduced this limiting factor,
this unique "other".
From these moves
was born the "unity of opposites". So, the link between cause and
effect was now given by a 'logical' unity, and causation and change were the result of the interaction
between these logically-linked "opposites".
Plainly, this
paired,
unique opposite,
not-A, was essential to Hegel's theory, otherwise, he could provide his
readers with no
explanation why A should be followed by a unique not-A as opposed
to just any old not-A -- say,
B, or, indeed, something else, C, for
example -- all of which would also be not-A.
So, since B
and C (and an indefinite number of other objects and
processes) are all manifestly not-A, Hegel had to find some way of eliminating
these, and all the rest, as candidates for the development of A, otherwise he
would have had no effective answer to Hume.
[Hume, of course,
wouldn't have denied that A
changes into "what it is not", into not-A, he would merely have
pointed out that this can't provide the conceptual link that rationalists require unless all the
other (potentially infinite) not-As could be ruled out in some way. He
concluded that it is only a habit of the mind that prompts us to expect A
to change into what we have always, or what we have in general, experienced before. There is no
logical link, however, between A and what it develops into since there is no contradiction in supposing A to
change into B or C, or, indeed, something else. (In saying this the
reader shouldn't conclude that I agree with Hume, or that Hume's reply
is successful!)]
Hence, as an integral part of his reply, Hegel introduced
this unique "other" with which each object and process was conceptually
linked -- a unique "other" that was 'internally' connected to A --, something he claimed could be derived by 'determinate
negation' from A.
[How he in fact derived this "other" will be examined in Essay Twelve Part
Five, but a DM-'explanation' -- and my criticism of it -- can be found in Essay
Eight Part Three.]
This special not-A
was now the unique
"other" of A. Without it
Hegel's reply to Hume falls flat.
Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Marxist
dialecticians) bought into this spurious 'logic' (several of them possibly unaware of the
above 'rationale'; although, as far as I can see, of the DM-classicists, only Lenin seems
to be explicitly aware of it!), and attempted to give it a 'materialist make-over'. And, that
is why this Hegelian theory (albeit "put back on its feet")
is integral to classical DM. It supplied Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the
rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.
[There are in fact far better ways than this to neutralise Hume's criticisms,
as well as
those of more recent Humeans, which do not thereby make change
impossible. More details will be given in Essay Three Part Five. Until then, the
reader is directed to Hacker (2007), and Essay
Thirteen Part Three.]
Here is Lenin's open acknowledgement and endorsement of this
theory:
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming
change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is
that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another,
not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular
only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite
right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite."
[Lenin
(1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this
particular quotation coming from p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"But
the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing
which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the
first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and
altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus
essentially contained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold
fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the
presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition;
also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the
absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the
examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961),
p.225, quoting Hegel (1999),
pp.833-34, §1795. Emphases in
the original.]
Lenin
wrote in the margin:
"This
is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961),
p.225.]
To which he added:
"Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians
and Humists [Humeans -- RL] more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than
of Hegel." [Ibid.,
p.179.]
This shows that Lenin understood this to be a reply to Hume, and
that it was integral to comprehending dialectics.
It is
worth quoting the entire passage from Hegel's
Logic (much of which Lenin approvingly copied into the above Notebooks --
pp.225-28):
"Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a
universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of
itself. Taken
quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first
immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal
appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being
is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the
first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in
the other, but the other is essentially not the empty
negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather
is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore
determined as the mediated -- contains in general the determination of the first
within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even
in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of
the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in
rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to
convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far
as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic
consists of such.
"Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to
begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simple
determination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is
present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and
the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a
proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its
predicate; for example, the finite is infinite,
one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate
form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgment
it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form
of the positive judgment, is incapable of holding within its grasp
speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the
negative judgment, would at least have to be added as well. In the
judgment the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent
subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this
negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their
positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in
them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a
proposition.
"The
second determination, the negative or mediated, is at the same
time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first
instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a relation
or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the
positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the
other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case
it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the
other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it
includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction,
the posited dialectic of itself. Because the
first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and consequently is also only
implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in
it the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is
itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it
the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship,
judgment, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at
once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is
solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For
the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and
at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the
contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception,
into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in
juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without
reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for
its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the
thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking
does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in
saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract
negation." [Hegel (1999),
pp.833-35, §§1795-1798. Bold
emphases alone added. I have used the on-line version here, correcting a few
minor typos.]
The most relevant and important part of which is this:
"It is therefore the other, but not the other
of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an
other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own
self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own
other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited
dialectic of itself." [Ibid.
Bold emphases alone added.]
This "reflection", as Hegel elsewhere calls it, of the "other in
its own self", a unique "other", provides the logical link
his theory required. Any other "other" would be "indifferent", and not
the logical
reflection he sought. It is from this that 'dialectical contradictions' arise, as Hegel
notes. Hence, Lenin was
absolutely right, this "other" is essential for "understanding"
dialectics -- except he forgot to mention that dialectics is in fact rendered incomprehensible and
unworkable as a result!
Hegel underlined this point (but perhaps less obscurely) in the
Shorter Logic:
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the
same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to
its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the
contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence,
§119.
Bold emphases added.]
[The problems these rather odd ideas in fact create
for Hegel have been highlighted
here.]
Hence, any attempt to (1) Eliminate the idea that change results from
a 'struggle of opposites', or (2) Deny that objects and processes change into these 'opposites', or
even (3) Reject the idea that
these 'opposites' are 'internally'-related as one "other" to another
specific "other", will
leave DM-fans with no answer to Hume, and thus with no viable theory of change.
[For Hegel's comments on Hume, see Hegel (1995b),
pp.369-75.]
In which case,
Hegel's theory
(coupled with the part-whole dialectic) wasat least a theory of causation,
change
and of the supposed logical development of history; so the above
dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into
DM. It allowed them to argue that, among other things, history isn't accidental
-- i.e., it isn't just 'one thing after another' -- it has an inner logic to it. Hence,
Hegel's
'logical' theory enabled them to argue, for example, that capitalism must
give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to
nothing else. Hume's criticisms -- or, rather, more recent incarnations of them (which,
combined with contemporary versions of
Adam Smith's
economic theory (Smith was, of course, a close friend and collaborator of Hume's)
in
essence feature in much of modern economic theory and large swathes of
contemporary philosophy, and thus
in criticisms of Marx's economic and political theory) -- are a direct
threat to this idea. If these bourgeois critics are right, we can't predict what the class struggle will
produce. Or, rather, if Hume is right, the course of history is contingent, not
necessary, not "rational" -- and there is no 'inner
logic' to capitalism.
As far as
I can tell, other than Lenin, very few dialecticians have discussed (or have even
noticed!) this aspect of their own theory. The only authors
that I am aware of who take this aspect of DM into consideration are Ruben (1979), Lawler (1982), and Fisk (1973, 1979). I will examine Fisk's arguments, which
are the most sophisticated I have so far seen (on this topic), in other Essays published at this
site. Lawler's analysis is the subject of Essay Eight
Part Three. [However, since writing this I
have also come across some of Charles Bettelheim's
comments
that suggest he, too, understood this point.]
Incidentally,
this puts paid to the idea that there can be such things as 'external
contradictions' (a notion beloved of STDs and MISTs). If there were any
of these oddities, they couldn't be 'logically'
connected as 'one-other-linked-with-another-unique-other' required by Hegel's
theory. For Hegel, upside down or the 'right way up', this would fragment
the rational order of reality, introducing contingency where once there had been
'logico-conceptual' or 'necessary' development. Hence, any DM-fan reckless
enough to introduce 'external contradictions' into his or her system/theory
would in effect be 're-Hume-ing' Hegel, not putting him 'back on his
feet'! In which case, it is no surprise to find that 'external contradictions'
were unknown to Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov.
[I have analysed several other fatal defects implicit in the idea that there can
be 'external' and/or 'internal contradictions' (in nature or society) in Essay
Eleven Part Two, here
and here. See also
here, where I develop the above argument in response to a 'Marxist-Leninist'
who seems not to know his own theory.]
Nevertheless, as
we have seen, it is precisely this which makes the entire theory unworkable, as
points (i)-(iii) above have shown.
How this is connected with my
reply to the earlier proffered response will now be explained. Here is that response again:
Ω7:
Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En,
which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not
stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
Ω8:
In the 'normal course of events', let each event, Ei,
cause the next event,
Ei+1.
Ω9: However, Ei+1
failed to occur because P prevented
Ei
causing it.
Ω10: Hence, P contradicted
Ei.
The first point
worth making is that for this to be a
'dialectical contradiction', P and Ei
must be "internally-connected opposites"; indeed, P must be the "other" of
Ei.
But, P and Ei
are of logically different categories, so they can't be "internally-related
opposites". In which case, the above response falls at the first hurdle!
Moreover, P and Ei don't imply one another (and each can exist without the other, unlike the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie,
so we are told),
in which case, they can't be 'dialectical opposites', to begin with.
Moreover, as we
witnessed in detail
here,
if, in the normal course of things, Ei
is to cause, or to change into, Ei+1,
these two must also be opposites (which means that P can't be the
'dialectical opposite' of either of them, after all!), and they must
'struggle' with each (i.e., Ei
must struggle with Ei+1
), if the DM-classics are to be
believed. But, they can't struggle with one another since Ei+1
doesn't exist yet! [Unless, of course, we suppose it exists before it exists!]
On the other hand, if
Ei+1already exists, so that Ei
can 'struggle' with it, and thus cause, or change into, Ei+1,
Ei
can't in fact do that
since Ei+1
already exists! In which case,
Ei
would no longer be the cause of Ei+1,
and so P couldn't have prevented it from causing Ei+1,
meaning, clearly, that this supposed contradiction simply vanishes! The same applies to the
supposed relation between S and Cimentioned earlier.
Either way, if DM were 'true', change here would be impossible.
Of course, there is an
obvious clause missing from
Ω7-Ω10 above -- namely,
Ω11:
Ω7:
Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En,
which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not
stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
Ω8:
In the 'normal course of events', let each event, Ei,
cause the next event,
Ei+1.
Ω9: However, Ei+1
failed to occur because P prevented
Ei
causing it.
Ω10: Hence, P contradicted
Ei.
Ω11: Instead of Ei+1
following Ei,
because of the operation of P, Ei
was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of
sub-events,
W1-Wn.
Ω11 must be
the case otherwise, at the
Ei-th
stage we would have to suppose that Ei
was no longer part of the 'causal structure of the world', and hence ceases to have an
effect on anything around it.
Consider again the concrete scenario examined earlier:
Imagine
a fire that had been started in a forest by a match
inadvertently dropped on some tinder dry
grass. All things being equal, the resulting and growing conflagration will be
maintained by the following factors, at least: (a) The organic material in the
grass, (b) The energy released by this fire, and (c) The oxygen in the
surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the burning grass with a fire
broom before the conflagration has a chance to grow, putting it out. Plainly the
force of the blow from the broom deprived the nascent conflagration of enough oxygen to keep it going and so quelled the blaze.
In that case,
one cause (the supply of oxygen) was prevented by the force of the broom from
further causing a series of damaging events or effects.
No one supposes that if this fire is put out, the grass that was
burning, and is now out, disappears from the world or ceases to have a
causal effect on anything else ever again. It, too, will initiate or take part
in another series of
events, depicted schematically perhaps by
Ω11:
Ω11: Instead of Ei+1
following Ei,
because of the operation of P, Ei
was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of
sub-events,
W1-Wn.
But, if that is so,
Ei
will now be the dialectical opposite of W1,
its new 'unique other' (since,
as we have seen, dialectical objects/processes turn into their opposites,
into that with which they have 'struggled', their 'unique other'), which would mean that Ei's
earlier 'unique other' -- Ei+1
-- will have been deposed, making a mockery of Hegel's argument that each
object or process has a 'unique other'.
[But we have
already shown that this entire
theory is a defective, anyway.]
Even so, what hasn't yet been made clear is how this is
connected with my reply
to the proffered response
outlined earlier. Given the fact that causes, E1-En,
aren't accidentally linked in the DM-scheme-of-things, but are connected
by a 'necessary law' (or 'law of necessity') of some sort, Ei
itself isn't just plain-and-simple-Ei.
In fact, in DM, each one of causes, E1-En,
is identified by what it is not -- its 'other'. [This was the whole point of "determinate
negation" in Hegel's theory, as we saw
above.]
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
So, Ei
isn't justEi,
it is also not-Ei
(since, by 'determinate negation', Ei
is 'identical' with what it is not -- why that is so is explained
here, but more
concisely here),
which is alsoEi+1.
That is, Ei+1
is also not-Ei,
its Hegelian 'other'. But, by the NON, Ei
is also not-not-Ei
-- and hence Ei
is not-itself, and thus not-itself by 'reflection' -- this is in fact what
supposedly causes Ei
to
develop, according to Hegel -- the lack of identity between itself and its 'concept'.
This is
'reflected' in what it subsequently becomes -- Ei+1.
This means
that Ei
is identical with Ei+1
in an identity-in-difference sort of way, and this is what links these two together,
'logically', in an Hegelian sort of way. So, Ei
is not now justEi,
it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1
(except, perhaps, this needs translating back into something a little more Hegelian
-- maybe along
these lines).
These
'dialectical' moves now provide
the necessary link between a cause and its effect(s) in Hegel's scheme of
things -- or between a cause and
whatever comes next in this (necessary) causal sequence, or chain. Since Hegel
imagined he had 'proved' this 'logically', he clearly didn't feel it needed any
confirmation from experience or supporting evidence. So, even if it
isn't possible to observe these 'necessary' links
-- how could they be observed? -- they nevertheless must exist (if
we are prepared to buy into this Idealist fantasy).
Denial of this is what provides superficial plausibility to
Hume's attack on rationalist
theories of causation --, this theory nevertheless tells us these 'necessary'
links are there since Hegel had presumably shown they
existof necessity -- a perfect, a priori 'answer' to Hume (and, indeed,
Kant).
And that is why P
'contradicts' Ei:
P isn't now just affectingEi,
it is changing it from Ei-that-causes-Ei+1
into Ei-that-causes-W1
(or, indeed, Ei-that-doesn't-cause-Ei+1):
Ω11: Instead of Ei+1
following Ei,
because of the operation of P, Ei
was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of
sub-events,
W1-Wn.
So, the
following now seems correct:
Ω12:
It isn't the case that it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1,
which is, of course, the contradictory of:
Ω13:
It
is the case thatit is
Ei-that-causes-Ei+1.
[I am
well aware that this is unsatisfactory as it stands, since P can't
'contradict' Ei
by altering it in the above manner, but this is the only way I can make sense of
the idea that P could conceivably 'contradict' Ei.
If anyone can make clearer sense of it in any other way,
please enlighten me.]
But, if
there are no necessary links here (and we have seen why there can't be any -- in Essays Seven
Part
Three and Twelve
Part One), then P
can't affect Ei
in this way, since, in that eventuality, it isn't the case that it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1.
And that is because there is no such defining condition for Ei,
and hence no such thing as is represented byEi-that-causes-Ei+1,
to begin with, as we have just seen.
[But, the real problems lie much deeper than even this, as we will see in a later Essay.]
Of course, in an Ideal
'Hegelian
Universe' this 'theory' might be made to work somehow. However, I will pass
no comment on that bare possibility here; but, as we will see in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six, this 'theory'
in
the end collapses faster than a portfolio of
Enron shares.
In
which case, P
can't 'contradict' anything at all.
At this point, it could be objected that this entire approach to 'events'
and 'forces' is totally misguided since it atomises them, putting them in rigid categories,
compartmentalising and thus fragmenting the flowing nature of reality. In
contrast, dialectics deals with the unified,
fluid and organic nature of
the world, which means it depicts interactions like those above in a totally different, albeit contradictory, light.
Hence, the analysis in this Essay is completely misguided.
Or, so it
might be
maintained.
Unless and until DM-apologists tell us
with some clarity what it is they do intend, or
what, for example, the "fluid nature of reality" actually amounts to
(that is, over and above the phrase "fluid nature of reality" looking like an inappropriate metaphor -- or,
indeed, what this odd
metaphor about 'fluidity' couldpossibly mean), that objection is itself devoid
of content (since it contains several empty terms). [Anyway, it has been neutralised
here.]
Independently of that, in what way does the phrase "fluid
nature of reality" help explain how any of the forces involved in change are
'internally-related'? For example,
how are force, P, and event, Eifrom earlier 'dialectical opposites'; how can
a force be 'internally related' to an event? How are a rain storm and a forest
fire (also from earlier) 'dialectically'
linked if the first extinguishes the second? They don't imply one another (like
the proletariat and the capitalist class imply one another,
so we are told);
rain storms happen all the time with no forest fire anywhere in sight -- and
vice versa. But there can be no proletariat without there also being the
capitalist class (again, so we are told). Furthermore, rain storms don't turn
into forest fires (nor vice versa), which they should do if the
DM-classics are to be believed.
So, whatever else it is this,
supposed "fluid
nature of reality"
isn't 'dialectical'.
[The allegedly 'fluid
nature of reality' will be examined in more detail in a later re-write of Essay
Eight Part Three. It is reasonably clear that this metaphor derives from
Heraclitus's dogmatic 'theory' that 'everything flows'. However, we have
already seen that Heraclitus based that 'universally valid' conclusion solely on what he thought was the
case when someone steps into a river! And,
he got those
details wrong, too! That is quite apart from the fact that there are
countless trillion
particles in each microgram of matter
that don't change (unless acted upon externally).]
Once
again, faced with the above, there is a simple solution staring us in the face: dialecticians should
tell us what, if anything, they do mean by their use of
obscure,
incoherent Hermetic language/metaphors like
this.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Alternatively, if forces affect one another externally
(as seems to be the case), then, clearly, change can't be the result of 'internal contradictions'.
On the other hand, if forces have an internal influence on one another (in some
as-yet-unspecified way), and they change as a result of their own 'internal
contradictions', then either they are composed of simple units that don't change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing
internal to them can condition anything else 'internally', for there would be no
such thing.
It
could be objected that these spurious results have been cherry-picked, tailored, and skewed to fit a
pre-determined conclusion -- the motivation behind which is which is clearly to malign DM,
come what may;
the choice of F24 (repeated below) being a prime example of this
'anti-dialectical' mind set.
In that case, a much better way of representing the oppositional
and contradictory nature forces might prove to be
the following -- in fact, with suitable changes in wording, this is the line taken in
Weston (2012), for example:
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into
opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel
each other out.
[F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.]
This means that the 'contradictory' relation between two or more
forces would operate along a sort of continuum, or sliding scale -- as it were -- with no fixed
relation between them. The arguments presented above clearly make the link between
'contradictory' forces an "either-or", all-or-nothing sort of affair.
At this point, an example from mechanics might
help illustrate the complex relationship that is intended here: un-damped
Simple Harmonic
Motion. [SHM -- that link requires JAVA; try
here if you have no JAVA installed (scroll down the page!).]
Consider a particle set in motion under the operation of two
forces, such that its acceleration is proportional to its displacement from the
point of equilibrium, and directed toward that point. Since the acceleration of
this
particle changes in proportion to its position, the net force operating on it
must also change accordingly. This is due to the fact that the resultant force
in this system is the vector sum of these two distinct but changing forces, which at the
equilibrium point counterbalance one another, but at any other point they either augment or
partially 'nullify' each other, depending on the physics of the situation. Because
these two forces work in opposite directions and cause the impressed
acceleration (achieving this by their -- let us say for
now -- 'dialectical interaction') we appear to
have here an example of F37-type motion.
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into
opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel
each other out.
[F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.]
In this
highly simplified picture of just one type of motion, the forces present in the
system appear to 'contradict' one another in complex but changing ways, as DM
seems to require. But, if this scenario actually does illustrate F24-, or
F37-type 'contradictions', several untoward
consequences also seem to follow from it:
(1) Clearly,
this analogy means that 'contradictions' (just like forces)
operate on a continuum. Hence, at any point along the path of the above particle
(other than the equilibrium point), the net force operating isn't equal to the net force at any other point (in the
same cycle). So, at a specific displacement, the modulus of the net force might
be, say, only 1% of its maximum, at another it might be 99% of that
maximum --
while at a symmetrical location on the other side of the point of equilibrium, the same would be
true but in an opposite sense. Even so, it isn't easy to see how such a picture may
be made to fit seamlessly into the DM-view of 'contradictions'; and as we saw above,
such a model would have unacceptable consequences for HM (involving, for example,
the Nazis fighting racism!).
(2) This trope depends on forces being viewed as basic
units of reality, as opposed to the product of the relations between bodies in
motion.
[Recall, Option
(2) appears to be one that
Engels himself
rejected when he spoke of relative velocities replacing forces. However, if
the term "force" is just a shorthand for relative motion (or if it depends on
the presence of a "field"), then, as we have also
seen, the
'dialectical unity of nature'
would be thrown into question. On that basis, the links between bodies and processes
would be external, whereas DM requires them to be 'internal', with the
existence of forces
providing the 'connective tissue' of reality, as it were. However, if forces themselves depend on
bodies in relative motion, then reality would be discrete, not continuous.]
But, DM-theorists have yet to tell us what the
physical nature of a
single force is. Physicists themselves have ceased to use this word (except as a
sort of shorthand, as noted earlier). If forces have no physical nature, can
they really be part of nature? How could such 'useful fictions' feature in a materialist account of
the universe?
(3) This neat picture,
tailor-made to be consistent with F37, obscures the complexity found in nature. Even so, it isn't
easy to see how such a tidy model could cope with systems of forces, which,
given this view, indicate that several things must be 'contradicted' all at once
by countless others, or, indeed, which suggest that bodies and/or processes
could have innumerable 'contradictories'. That would, of course, divorce DM-type
'contradictions' completely from both FL-contradictions and
Hegelian 'contradictions'. While this might not be totally unacceptable to some,
it would mean that the former sort of contradiction would be even more tenuously
linked to the latter (or, for that matter, with contradictions that supposedly feature in everyday life). In that case, the meaning of the word "contradiction",
as it is used in DM, would be even
more obscure than it already is. In addition, it would imply that any
object or process in nature had more than one opposite at any point in time. The
word "opposite" would thereby cease to have any clear meaning. But, we have
been here several times already.
Despite these niggling problems, it might be felt that F37 suitably modified could still capture essential features of the
'contradictory' nature of forces.
In order to investigate this alternative
further, let
us suppose that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so
that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57
F38: Let the first force be F1,
and the second, F2.
F39: At t1, let F1
+ F2 < 0.
F40: At t2, let F1
+ F2 = 0.
F41: At t3, let F1
+ F2 > 0.
[t3 > t2
> t1.]
[F24:
P1 contradicts
P2
only if it counterbalances P2.
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into
opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel
each other out.]
F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the
system in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where
no net force exists.
But, as we saw earlier, we face immediate problems with
this way of depicting forces -- those encountered above in relation to the
inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects/structures
like these --
i.e., forces represented by vectors.
Ignoring
that 'problem', too, it is worth pointing out once
more that F40
in fact implies that
there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero
vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only
one force -- the resultant -- at work. On that basis, F37 would collapse for want of forces.
As we have seen, no contradiction
seems possible if only one force -- the resultant -- is present in the
system. Still less if no forces are at work (as is the case in F40).
F39: At t1, let F1
+ F2 < 0.
F40: At t2, let F1
+ F2 = 0.
F41: At t3, let F1
+ F2 > 0.
[t3 > t2
> t1.]
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into
opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel
each other out.
It could be objected that
in the above both of the
original forces (F1 and F2) still exist,
since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in
the system (as they do in F39 and F41).
The problem with this reply is that
it is difficult to see how the two original forces may also be said to
exist alongside this third force -- the resultant --, whether the latter is
zero or not. If they do exist in this way, we would plainly have three
forces at work here, not two.
That would, of course, create energy out
of nowhere.58
To be sure,
our ability to calculate resultants involves us in applying some mathematics to
the relevant components, but that doesn't itself
mean nature does the calculating. If it did, that would clearly imply nature was
Mind, or the product of Mind! No one, it is to be hoped(!), thinks that in nature there are three forces
here where once there were only two. And yet, it is this third force that does all
the work.
It could be
objected that there is no third force at work here, no resultant. That is just
how we express the relation between two genuine forces (or their components) in
the system. Resultants are therefore just mathematical fictions. The problem
with that response is that resultant forces can be measured and what
happens to the bodies involved can be predicted from the magnitude and direction
of that resultant. If we can reject resultant forces so easily, then what are we
to say to those who reject forces altogether, even though they can also be
measured and their effects predicted? Aren't forces in general just mathematical
fictions that we can edit out of nature in favour of the relative motion of
bodies, just as Engels concluded?
Rid the
world of resultant forces and all forces threaten to follow them into
oblivion.
Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to
conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or that between
the forces and relations of production), say, produces a resultant third
social force, the nature of which has to this day remained not just completely obscure,
but totally unacknowledged. Based on
this model, since all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this
mysterious "third
force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the
utmost importance!59
It
might be
felt that this view of forces is simplistic in the extreme. In
HM,
social forces are far too complex to be represented as vectors, which means that
the criticisms aired above are once again exposed as completely misguided.
In
response, it is worth recalling that the
analyses that have been developed in this Essay
have been forced
upon us (no pun intended) because DM-theorists have so far failed to say what
they mean (if anything) when they equate 'dialectical contradictions' with
opposing forces. Dialecticians seem quite happy to assert that these
'contradictory' forces operate everywhere in the universe, even though that has
been done in
the absence of any clear or detailed account having been presented of the
supposed relationship at work here. This means,
of course, that erstwhile critics of this Essay are objecting when they are almost
totally in the dark about their own theory!
Is
this not yet another example of them foisting dialectics on
nature and society?
[It is worth reminding the reader
here
that the existence of forces in HM isn't being questionedby the
present author (nor will it be), merely the assumption that they can
be equated with, or modelled by, 'contradictions'. But see also
Note 61, below.]
Apart
from simplyconforming to tradition -- as was argued
here
-- DM-theorists
appear to use the phrase "contradictory forces" in order to provide their theory with a
scientific-looking
façade, linking it with a genuine and successful science like Physics. Otherwise, why
do this?
If that seemingly impertinent allegation is correct, it would be disingenuous of DM-supporters to
complain that the analogy given above (i.e., using SHM to illustrate changing
forces) doesn't apply to social forces. If the word "force" wasn't
meant to be taken in its usual scientific sense (as a vector), the
analogy would, indeed, be inapt. But, in that case, the exact meaning of the word
"force" (as it appears in DM) would be even more obscure. If "force" isn't being employed in the way that
physicists use it, what other scientific way is there?
Anyway, as
far as the complexity of social forces is concerned, the counter-argument
(mentioned above) itself
fails to address the problem of the identification of forces with
'contradictions' in nature and society. If it is impossible to give a clear sense
to an avowedly simplified picture of forces as 'contradictions' (i.e., as they seem to operate in nature), a more
complex one applied elsewhere stands no chance.
As has been
pointed on many occasions at this site, if dialecticians object to any of the
comments made in this Essay, there is a simple remedy: they should say
clearly, and in detail, for the first time ever what they mean when they
equate forces, or the relations between them, with 'contradictions'.
Moreover,
forces appear to be 'contradictory'
when and only
whenthey producea third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans
with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is
triadic), but it would in fact sink the theory faster than a lead-lined
diving suit sinks a diver. That is because change would then be a result not of
contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.
And, as we have seen already, it is just as easy to describe such a
set-up as 'tautologious'
as it is to picture it as 'contradictory' -- even though both options should rightly be fed into the 'mystical-concept-crusher'
as irredeemably
anthropomorphic. Moreover, we have already seen that whatever else they
are these forces aren't involved in a 'dialectical contradiction' with one
another since
none of them imply the existence of the other in a force couple, or
configuration of forces -- again, unlike the alleged 'dialectical contradiction'
between the proletariat and the capitalist class (so we have been told).
Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of forces with
'contradictions' seems to be as misconceived as anything could be. When
interpreted metaphorically it turns out to be inappropriate (if not
paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally it crumbles into incoherence and
confusion, even in DM-terms.
In
order to avoid these difficulties we need to return to an alternative that was considered briefly, earlier -- one that could provide
DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions'.
However, before this alternative is re-examined in more detail, it is necessary to counter an objection that
should by now have occurred to the reader:
This entire analysis is abstract
andfails to consider "real material forces".59a1
As noted above, considerations like those
aired above would stretch the
patience of most dialecticians. Indeed, they would probably be the first to point out that this
Essay fails to consider real material, empirically verifiable
contradictions, and by this they generally (but not exclusively) mean the
'contradictions' that feature in
HM, in the class war
and that help account for the dynamic in history.
First
of all it is worth
reminding ourselves that many of the examples
considered earlier were in fact typically concrete, and undeniably material!
What else is gravity, for instance?
Nevertheless, if no sense can be made of 'contradictory forces' in nature (as
we have seen), then that
automatically throws into question their role in HM.
Now, as is easy to demonstrate, revolutionaries
seriously overuse the
word "contradiction" in their endeavour to depict not just capitalism,
but the class war in general. In fact, comrades
seldom bother to justify their almost neurotically profligate application of this word to everything
and anything they just happen to be discussing or
analysing.59b
Here are
just a few examples of the profligate use "contradiction":
1,
2,
3,
4,
5 -- with a particularly crass list posted
here
(which link will take the reader to a site called
Dialectics
ForKids, so it can perhaps be forgiven somewhat for its
sub-sophomoric
over-simplifications). Several more
cases in point were itemised
earlier. Readers
should also check out the handful of egregious examples on offer in that rather poor film, Half
Nelson, a movie not unconnected with the aforementioned site; indeed,
the director of that film
is the son
of the owner of Dialectics for Kids!
Updates: December 2011 and October 2013: See also my
recent debate with
Mike Rosen
(in the 'Comments' section at the bottom; organise these "Newest First").
[Unfortunately, these comments are no longer available!]
See also
here, again in the comments section at the bottom.
Here
is another recent example:
"The current debate over stem cells provides a
very good illustration of the contradictions inherent within capitalism. On the
one hand it is capable of generating amazing new technologies. However, the amount of money flowing into stem
cell research is still miniscule compared to that being used for developing new
ways to kill people. A recent report concluded that while stem cell
research was pioneered in this country, lack of funding was compromising the
ability of British scientists to keep things moving forward in this area.
Meanwhile, as the leader of the richest country
on earth talks about the sanctity of a ball of cells, in Iraq the most
sophisticated weapon systems are being used to murder real, living human
beings." [Parrington
(2007), p.9. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]
In
fact,
this illustrates the by-now-familiar fact that dialecticians like Parrington are only too ready
to confuse 'contradictions' with unacceptable, paradoxical, irrational
or unexpected events, as I alleged in
Essay Five.
Even in DM-terms this makes
no sense: Does either 'half'
of the above 'contradiction' struggle with the other? Does one of them turn into
the other (which they should do, if the
dialectical classics are
to be believed)? Is George W Bush, or the rest of his class, about to 'develop'
into a bunch of under-funded scientists or new equipment, and vice versa? Does the one imply the other, such that the
first can't exist without the second? Hardly.
If not,
where is the 'dialectical contradiction' here?
Update,
October 31/10/2021:
Not to be
outdone, here is
David
Harvey, who thinks there are seventeen basic contradictions in capitalism;
here they are:
"The direct provision of adequate use values for all
(housing, education, food security etc.) takes precedence over their provision
through a profit-maximising market system that concentrates exchange values in a
few private hands and allocates goods on the basis of ability to pay.
"A means of exchange is created that facilitates the circulation of goods and
services but limits or excludes the capacity of private individuals to
accumulate money as a form of social power.
"The opposition between private property and state power is displaced as far as
possible by common rights regimes -- with particular emphasis upon human
knowledge and the land as the most crucial commons we have -- the creation,
management and protection of which lie in the hands of popular assemblies and
associations.
"The opposition between private
property and state power is displaced as far as possible by common rights
regimes -- with particular emphasis upon human knowledge and the land as the
most crucial commons we have -- the creation, management and protection of which
lie in the hands of popular assemblies and associations.
"The appropriation of social power by private persons is not only inhibited by
economic and social barriers but becomes universally frowned upon as a
pathological deviancy.
"The class opposition between capital and labour is dissolved into associated
producers freely deciding on what, how and when they will produce in
collaboration with other associations regarding the fulfilment of common social
needs.
"Associated populations assess and communicate their mutual social needs to each
other to furnish the basis for their production decisions (in the short run,
realisation considerations dominate production decisions).
"New technologies and organisational forms are created that lighten the load of
all forms of social labour, dissolve unnecessary distinctions in technical
divisions of labour, liberate time for free individual and collective
activities, and diminish the ecological footprint of human activities.
"Technical divisions of labour are reduced through the use of automation,
robotisation and artificial intelligence. Those residual technical divisions of
labour deemed essential are dissociated from social divisions of labour as far
as possible. administrative, leadership and policing functions should be rotated
among individuals within the population at large. We are liberated from the rule
of experts.
"Monopoly and centralised power over the use of the means of production is
vested in popular associations through which the decentralised competitive
capacities of individuals and social groups are mobilised to produce
differentiations in technical, social, cultural and lifestyle innovations.
"The greatest possible diversification exists in ways of living and being, of
social relations and relations to nature, and of cultural habits and beliefs
within territorial associations, communes and collectives. Free and uninhibited
but orderly geographical movement of individuals within territories and between
communes is guaranteed. Representatives of the associations regularly come
together to assess, plan and undertake common tasks and deal with common
problems at different scales: bioregional, continental and global.
"All inequalities in material provision are abolished other than those entailed
in the principle of from each according to his, her or their capacities and to
each according to his, her, or their needs.
"The distinction between necessary labour done for distant others and work
undertaken in the reproduction of self, household and commune is gradually
erased such that social labour becomes embedded in household and communal work
and household and communal work becomes the primary form of unalienated and
non-monetised social labour.
"Everyone should have equal entitlements to education, health care, housing,
food security, basic goods and open access to transportation to ensure the
material basis for freedom from want and for freedom of action and movement.
"The economy converges on zero growth (though with room for uneven geographical
developments) in a world in which the greatest possible development of both
individual and collective human capacities and powers and the perpetual search
for novelty prevail as social norms to displace the mania for perpetual compound
growth.
"The appropriation and production of natural forces for human needs should
proceed apace but with the maximum regard for the protection of ecosystems,
maximum attention paid to the recycling of nutrients, energy and physical matter
to the sites from whence they came, and an overwhelming sense of re-enchantment
with the beauty of the natural world, of which we are a part and to which we can
and do contribute through our works.
"Unalienated human beings and unalienated creative personas emerge armed with a
new and confident sense of self and collective being. Born out of the experience
of freely contracted intimate social relations and empathy for different modes
of living and producing, a world will emerge where everyone is considered
equally worthy of dignity and respect, even as conflict rages over the
appropriate definition of the good life. This social world will continuously
evolve through permanent and ongoing revolutions in human capacities and powers.
The perpetual search for novelty continues." [Harvey (2014), pp.294-97; I have
quoted the above from
here. Spelling altered to agree with UK English.]
Does Harvey
even attempt to derive any of the items in the above pairs from the other
in the same pair? Do any of the items in any pair imply the other? Is it the
case that each one can't exit without the other? Do they struggle with and then
turn into each other? But they ought to do both since that is what the
DM-classics insist they should.
Readers can
check, but Harvey just asserts that the above are contradictions; he nowhere
makes any move to show they are even 'dialectical', let alone that they
are any other sort of contradiction. But that is par for the course on Planet
Dialectics.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Indeed, this word/concept seems to operate almost as a code word, even a
shibboleth, the use of which signals to others of like mind that the one
employing it belongs to
the same 'speech
community' with its
own
distinctive jargon,
thus defining an 'in-group'
that excludes those belonging to the 'out-group',
rather than genuinely applying in each and every case
-- or in any case --
or, indeed, in a way that means anything at all.
[Why DM-fans do this will be revealed in Essays Nine
Part Two and Fourteen Part
Two (when it is published).]
But, perhaps this, too, is
a little unfair?
In order to substantiate
the above allegations it might be wise to consider a few (generally agreed upon)
examples of "real material contradictions"
in capitalism that supposedly underpin and drive social development.60
[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e.,
Rees (1998); HM =
Historical Materialism.]
TAR, for example, opens with several apposite and well-observed
examples of the irrational and destructive nature of Capitalism. As
John
Rees correctly points out, while life expectancy, for instance, has increased
dramatically over the last hundred years or so (even in the poorest regions of the
planet), other factors have grown alongside these developments that counteract or undermine them:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149
wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the
numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths
in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth
century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of
human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its
destruction…. Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How
can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world,
the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is
it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession,
produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below
the poverty line? The contradictions are no less striking if we
shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to
Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has
actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2. Paragraphs
merged; bold emphasis added.]60a0
Bertell Ollman had something similar to say:
"Like
virtually everyone else in his day, Marx was astounded by the scope and rapidity
of the changes that were occurring all around him,
but also by their contradictory nature. The enormous growth in the production of
wealth, for example, came along with an increase in the worst forms of poverty;
progress in science and technology that had a potential for making work much
easier only
succeeded
in speeding up the pace of work and lengthening the working day; even the
increase of personal freedom due to the abolition of various feudal ties came on
the back of an even greater decrease in freedom due to the unforgiving
conditions in which people were forced under pain of starvation to live and work
(or what Marx was later to call the 'violence of things'). Meanwhile, more and
more of the world was becoming privatized, commodified, fetishised, exploitable
and exploited, and alienated as 'all that is solid melts into air.'" [Ollman
(2005); quoted from
here. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; bold
emphasis added.]
First
of all, it should be emphasised that in what follows the validity of the above
criticisms of Capitalism won't be questioned -- nor will the
explanation given by Rees or Ollman for these and other intolerable features of
the political, economic and social system that still dominates this planet. The sole aim here is to ascertain what if anything they (or any one
else, for that matter) mean by calling unacceptable developments like these
"contradictions", or why they and other dialecticians insist on linking that word with material forces in
nature and society.
Second, I have chosen the above passages since few DM-fans
belonging to other wings of Marxism (be they Stalinists, Maoists,
anti-Leninists, Orthodox Trotskyists, Libertarian Marxists, or Academic
Marxists) would disagree that the things the above two call "contradictions" are indeed
contradictions. While they will certainly disagree over some of their causes, or
even over what to do to remedy them,
they will all characterise them in the same way as 'dialectical contradictions'.
In
what follows, I will focus mainly on Rees's comments.
Of course,
a trite and impertinent answer to the question "Why do DM-theorists use
'contradiction' in the way they do?" would be to point out that
they use this word simply because it is part of the 'Marxist tradition',
adherence to which helps define
a dialectical 'in
group', as noted earlier. It is reasonably clear that the use of this word is
only part of
'Materialist Dialectics' because of contingent features of the lives of Marx and
Engels -- i.e., those related to (i) when and where they were born, (ii) which
class they found themselves members of, (iii)
how they were educated,
and (iv) who they studied -- specifically, Hegel.
In fact, had Hegel died of Cholera (or whatever it was that
finally killed him) 45 years earlier than he
actually did,
does anyone really think we would be using this term -- "contradiction"
-- in the way DM-theorists do, or would even be bothering with 'dialectics'?60a
Be
this as it may, because of the towering authority that Marx and Engels have
assumed ever since, all subsequent dialecticians
have been constrained to think and reason along similar lines. They have to
use the obscure vocabularybequeathed to them or risk being be accused of
'Revisionism', branded 'anti-Marxist', and maybe suffer expulsion,
political
isolation, or even worse.
[Or, of course, face the same sort of ritual abuse
with which I am constantly regaled.
Not that I am complaining; I expect it, and would be puzzled had there been
none of it.]
In
short, it is quite clear that theorists (like Rees and Ollman) use obscure Hegelian
concepts and jargonised expressions because prominent comrades have always done
so, and they are merely
conforming to tradition.
Naturally, the impertinent nature of this 'trite' explanation won't win over many dialecticians -- but since a less impertinent one stands
no chance
either, there is little to lose advancing it here.
In that case, there is a pressing need to try to find a better
reason why hard-nosed materialists should want to anthropomorphise nature and
society in this manner, using terms drawn from
Hermetic Mysticism --
such as "contradiction" -- in what
is
supposed to be a materialist theory.
Unfortunately, as we will soon find out, there
isn't a
better explanation why confirmed materialists have allowed themselves to be
conned into accepting the use of
Hermetic
jargon like this,
or for employing it quite so indiscriminately,
as we have seen.
We have also seen that
each and every attempt to render viable the analogy between forces and
'contradictions' fall apart; hence, it should come as no surprise to see the very
same thing happen when we examine the use of "contradiction" in HM,
below.
[Spoiler Alert: The result will be that,
apart from the ideological and political motivations mentioned in the next
paragraph,
the impertinent reason mentioned above turns out to be
the only viable one left standing.]
[The political
setting to the use of "contradiction" is
examined in detail
in Essay Nine Part Two, and more
generally in Essay Twelve (summary
here), where I also
examine the social and
class background of the originators of this theory in order to link it with
the reason why DM-theorists were, and still are, pre-disposed to adopt such an
ancient, decrepit and class-compromised world-view -- alongside their use
of "contradiction". Indeed,
as hinted above,
there are political and ideological reasons over and above the impertinent explanation offered
here for its use. They are also explored in Essay Nine Part Two,
specifically
here.]
The underlying cause of the many absurdities
caused by capitalism
is, as TAR rightly points out, the complex, changing interplay
between the "material productive forces of society" and the associated "relations
of production". [Rees (1998), p.2, quoting Marx.] That account of the driving force of capitalism (but, interpreted
humanistically, in terms of the class struggle), I fully accept.
However, this brings us no closer to understanding what it is about
opposing (social) forces that merits calling them "contradictions". Why
turn a clear employment of an ordinary word drawn from the vernacular
into an obscure concept in a doctrine peppered with other impenetrable jargon lifted from mystical
Idealism (i.e., phrases such as "determinate negation", "identity of opposites", "negation of
the negation", "mediate", and the like), the use of which
completely undermines our ability
to explain change, anyway?
In HM, we can certainly make sense of the term "force" -- and
even of words like "opposing" and "struggle" --; but what is there to gain by calling these
"contradictions"?61
Some might regard this as a
harmless use of a certain word, but, as we
will see in Essay Twelve (summary
here), in this case there is no
such thing, just as there is no such
thing as a neutral use of the word "oppression". We will also see in Essay
Nine Part Two that this particular word
'allows' DM-fans to impose contradictory tactics,
strategies and theories on the party faithful in order to 'justify', among other
things, class collaboration,
substitutionism, splits,
expulsions, and even mass murder, all predicated on the idea that if reality is
contradictory, the Party should be, too. Indeed, as Lenin noted:
"The
splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts...is
the essence (one of the 'essentials,' one of the
principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics....
The struggle of mutually
exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute...."
[Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Paragraphs merged.]
"Splitting" is therefore an "essential" part of this theory, and "struggle" is an "absolute".
That must also involve the relations between comrades.
An emphasis on intra-party strife and splitting thus sits right at the heart of
Dialectical Marxism!
In which case, we needn't sit around
waiting for the ruling-class to divide us, we are already experts!
[An
excellent example of the use of this theory to 'justify' a regressive political
dogma (which would be condemned if anyone else were to do it) is the way that Trotsky used
dialectics to justify the revolutionary defence of the former USSR on the basis
of its 'contradictory' nature as a 'degenerated workers' state', in which workers
exercised no power and were systematically oppressed and exploited for their
pains -- and hence also the
murderous invasion
of Finland. Another is the way that
Ted Grant, for instance, used 'Materialist
Dialectics' to 'justify' his
confused and contradictory theory of 'Proletarian
Bonapartism' (sic), which then 'allowed' him to rationalise the substitution of the
Maoist ruling-clique for the Chinese working class -- a topic I have debated
here. (This link is unfortunately now dead!)]
So, these mystical concepts aren't 'innocent bystanders',
as it were; their
use has helped
turn Dialectical Marxism into a spectacularly unsuccessful
long-term disaster.
[Notice the use of "helped" here. DM is just
one of the
reasons for the protracted failure of Dialectical Marxism.]
Nevertheless, the relevant part of the argument in TAR appears to be the following:
F42: Capitalism seems to offer unprecedented possibilities
for human development.
F43: But, in reality Capitalism delivers only
partial or faltering progress.
F44: Alongside this progress we have witnessed
major regression.
F45: Thus, Capitalism actually delivers a mixture of
progress and regression.
For Rees, the "contradiction" appears to be based on the fact that
Capitalism holds out certain possibilities, which it either can't fully deliver,
or can't provide at all; almost invariably the opposite of what it
promises (to the majority of ordinary working people, one presumes) is what actually unfolds.
Rees clearly believes that the involvement of
opposites is important here: instead of peace we find war; in the place
of prosperity we find poverty (where it need not be); the growth in human need
isn't catered for by the incessant search for profit; the waste of human
potential conflicts with the increased capacity society has for augmenting and
satisfying its members needs, and so on. So, it looks like 'contradictions' arise
either from the incongruity that exists between what might be expected of
Capitalism (by those who don't understand its nature, presumably) and what it actually
delivers. Or, perhaps this arises from the yawning gap that exists between its potential to satisfy
human need and its
obvious inability to do so. In that case, forces and structures brought into
existence by Capitalism seem capable of freeing
humanity from want and oppression also appear to be inextricably linked with
structures and forces that only
succeed in
intensifying or spreading both.
However, these by-now-familiar observations
still leave the supposed link between forces and
'contradictions' entirely unclear. In
order to clarify Rees's point we perhaps need to consider various plausible
interpretations of what he might have meant.
There appear to be several distinct possibilities:
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only
not A.
F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both
A
and not A.
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only
B, where A and B
are opposites.
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
A and B, where A and B
are opposites.
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
C instead, where C is
a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
A and not A as well as
B and C.
[The
denotation of these capital letters will be revealed as the argument unfolds.]
Doubtless there are many other combinations that could be
imagined along similar lines, but they would, I think, merely be elaborations on
these six possibilities. I propose, therefore, to examine each of them in turn, beginning,
naturally, with the first.
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not
A.
[F46a:
Capitalism offers abundance, but delivers only scarcity (i.e.,
'not-abundance').]61ao
But, F46/F46a presents us with a scenario we have met already; it
resembles several earlier unsuccessful attempts to solve this overall problem.
As we discovered, whatever forces there are in the system that actually produce
not A, no contradiction can arise between A and not A because
A itself
does not exist, since only not A will have been actualised in place of A. Nor can
any forces which are at work in the system contradict what they themselves
actually produce (viz., not A in this case) --, especially if
whatever they 'offer' (i.e., A) doesn't exist.
F46
and F46a
are, therefore, of no use in our search
to find a viable way of equating forces and
'contradictions' in HM.
[But do
these factors struggle with and then turn into one
another? Does abundance struggle with turn into scarcity, and vice versa?
But they would have to do both if these were 'dialectical opposites' (according
to the DM-classics). Once again: whatever else this is, it isn't a
DM-'contradiction'.]
F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both
A
and not A.
This seems to be a little more promising since
A and not A
certainly looks like a genuine contradiction. However, because F47 appears
to depict contradictory outcomes it can't illuminate the alleged
contradictory connection between forces in nature and society that exist
prior to their emergence. That is because F47 is manifestly not about the
forces themselves, but about their results.
So, even here, we don't seem to have contradictory forces.61a
It could be
objected that there are forces in capitalism that produce just such opposites, and
those forces can, therefore, be described as contradictory. For example,
competition forces individual capitalists to accumulate capital, but this
accumulation has a tendency to reduce the rate of profit for the whole
capitalist class. So, here we have one tendency imposed on individual units in
the system (in order to maintain or increase their own share of surplus value), which,
when actualised, produces the opposite result for the entire class. The search
for increased profit only succeeds in eroding it in the long term.
Maybe so, but in what way is this a 'contradiction'?
It would be
if this were the case:
Q1: Individual capitalists search for increased
profits and they don't.
Or, this:
Q2: Profit both rises and doesn't rise at the same
time and in the same respect.
But,
no sane Marxist would argue any of these.
Of
course, DM-fans might be using the word "contradiction" in
a new and as-yet-unexplained sense. If so, what is it? [On that, see
here.]
It is worth emphasising at this point that I am
not objecting to
a new use of "contradiction". [However, on this, see
Interlude Fourteen.] DM-fans can use words as they see fit
(not that they need my permission!). But,
when they do, they can't also claim to be using such words with their old
meaning in place -- and hence, with respect to "contradiction", they can't also use
it to justify claims about, say, the 'contradictory' nature of the former Soviet
Union, either -- where this word is now being used in a more ordinary,
familiar sense. And, if that is so, this new use of "contradiction" will bear no
relation to its use in FL and ordinary language, which in turn means that DL
in effect fails to 'surpass' FL
and 'banal common sense'. [I
go into this in much more detail
here. See also
here,
and
here.]
[Although, there are Hegel scholars who deny this is what Hegel actually
intended -- for example, Hahn (2007).]
[FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical
Logic.]
But, far
more importantly, do these forces, whatever they are, struggle with
and then change into each other, which is what the
DM-classics tell us they must do?
Call these
forces, F1
and F2,
respectively. But, if these two forces do struggle with one another they must
surely coexist. If so, F1
can't change into F2
since it already exists! If it didn't, no struggle could take place.
[This
general objection to the 'dialectical theory of change' has been expanded upon in
extensive detail in Essay Seven Part
Three, where I have responded to several objections, some obvious, some not
so obvious.]
But,
independently of that, it is clear that we are once again talking about the
effects of these forces not the forces themselves. Those forces are
described as 'contradictory' because their effects are contrary to expectations,
not that they actually contradict one another.
In fact,
what we have here is one economic factor (the accumulation of capital)
that somehow produces the opposite effect to what might be expected, not two
forces doing this with one of them predominating.
But, by no
stretch of the imagination can this be the option we are looking for in our
attempt to find out what Rees meant. There aren't even two forces at work here!
Nevertheless, this section is aimed at considering the last few remaining
options available to DM-theorists to make their ideas comprehensible, so F47
won't be abandoned just yet.
However, as noted above, F47 corresponds to a relation depicted abstractly in an
earlier section (i.e., that between E1 and E2,
in F6 to F9, reproduced below) -- but interpreted here concretely (albeit schematically).
In which case, it looks like we might at last have found a genuine interpretation of E1
and E2 that is undeniably
'contradictory'.
F6: Let force, P1,
oppose force, P2,
in configuration, C1,
in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set, E1,
and those of P2
be elements of an event set,E2.
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites, such that elements of E1
and E2
taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
Unfortunately, this appearance is illusory since the conjunction of A and not
A can't be considered contradictory until it is clear what
interpretation is to be given to the schematic letter "A".
At this point, it is worth recalling that we are searching for a
literal interpretation of the term "contradiction" that will allow
DL to
surpass FL -- not a metaphorical or analogical
use of this word -- still less one that
possesses a secondary or derivative sense (or even one that carries the 'special' DM-sense
that has yet to be explained with
any clarity). As should
seem obvious, this search is of the
utmost importance if we are to rescue from oblivion the idea that forces and
'contradictions' may be equated objectively -- and not, for instance,
poetically, or even in some
other fanciful sense.
Clearly, there are several different ways of reading the
expression "A and not A"; some of these will be contradictions, others not.
In what follows, I shall
utilise a further example taken from TAR
(quoted above), which seems (at least to many DM-theorists) to be a genuine contradiction
(i.e., that which supposedly exists between wealth and poverty). In that case, this might involve interpreting "A"
as "wealth", and "not A" as "not wealth" (it clearly can't be "not poverty"!). In that case, "A and not
A" would cash out as "wealth and not wealth".62
Unfortunately, the problem with this way of
interpreting "A
and not A" is that it actually creates a phrase, not a clause,
indicative sentence or proposition.63 As such, it can't be aliteral
contradiction.
[The vast
majority of
DM-fans will fail to appreciate this point since their knowledge of logic is
woefully
defective. That, of course, hasn't stopped them pontificating
on the subject as if they were all latter-day Aristotles.]
The only
apparent way to situate the
schematic noun phrase -- "A
and not A" -- in
a propositional context would be to interpret it a little more loosely --
perhaps along the following lines:
F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not
wealth.
Or perhaps even:
F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not
wealth for others.65
Again, F53 itself is short for:
F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism
produces not wealth for others.
None of these look at all promising; they are not only stylistic
monstrosities, their import is rather unclear. Anyway, F53 and F53a aren't
contradictory -- that is, no more than, say, a tap would be contradictory if
it supplied water for some but not for others, or any more than the claim that
"opposing forces are contradictory" would itself be 'contradictory' if it
convinced some but not others. No one would think they had been contradicted if
they asserted that a certain factory, say, produced several batches of defective
Widgets, and someone else clamed it also produced some that weren't defective.66
Anyway, F52a is far too vague as it stands -- it is certainly no
more of a 'contradiction' than F53 and F53a were, and probably for the same reason.
If sentences like these have no clear meaning they can't possibly assist in any
attempt to clarify DM. Hence, a further widening of the interpretation of "A and
not A" is called for if we are to gain a clearer understanding of the implications of F47.
Perhaps the following will do?
F54: Capitalism produces capitalists who
are wealthy and workers who aren't wealthy.
F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both
A
and not A.
[F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not
wealth for others.
F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism
produces not wealth for others.]
As was the
case with F53 and F53a, F54 isn't even a contradiction. Again, anyone asserting
the first clause of F54 who was then confronted with the second wouldn't feel
that they had been contradicted. That is plainly because the first clause is about Capitalists,
while the second is about workers. To be contradictory F55 would have to
be:
F55: Capitalism produces worker, W1 (or
Capitalist, C1), who is both wealthy and not wealthy at the same
time and in the same respect.
But, quite apart from the fact that no one would assent to, or
even want to assert F55, it possesses no clear sense. The situation would be no better
if it were re-written as:
F55a: Capitalism produces a set of workers, W (or
Capitalists, C), who are both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and
in the same respect.
It is reasonably certain that Rees meant neither F55 nor F55a.
[If he had intended either, it would be
entirely unclear what he could possibly have meant by one or both of them.]
At best, F55
and F55a might be re-interpreted in a comparative sort of way, as follows:
F55b: Capitalism produces a set of workers, W, that is
both wealthy (in comparison to a set of peasants, P) and not wealthy (in
comparison to a set of Capitalists, C), at the same time and in the same
respect.
But, F55b is no more contradictory than this would be:
F55c: John Rees wrote a book that is both long
(when compared with an average weekday print copy of
The Guardian) and not long
(when compared with Das Kapital).
The observation
that TAR is both long compared to The Guardian and short compared to
Das Kapital is not, one imagines, what most DM-theorists mean by "contradiction". If it were, their theory would
plainly be based on
logico-linguistic naivety, or linguistic incompetence, but little else.
Consequently, it looks like F47 can't be shoe-horned into
this particular
dialectical boot after all.
More problematic,
however, is the following question: is either one of
these options going
to turn into the other?
In the above example, is W going to turn into C,
and C into W? Indeed, is wealth going to turn into poverty? But,
if these were 'genuine' 'dialectical opposites' or 'contradictions', they most surely
should. In which case, whatever else it is, this can't be a 'dialectical
contradiction'.66a
Further attempts to interpret "A and not
A" can be
extended almost indefinitely. DM-enthusiasts are welcome to play around with
them as much as they like, the end result will be no different. There are no
literally true contradictions that can be manufactured out of "A and not
A"
--
where these relate to the same person, persons, groups, forces, etc., in the same respect,
at the same time. And as we have seen, this can't even be a 'dialectical
contradiction'!
In addition to the reasons given above:
that is because, if a
putative 'contradiction' were
held true, it would thereby cease to
be a literal contradiction. As was established in in
Essay Five, if such a
'contradiction' were encountered in everyday life, it would normally be viewed
either as figurative or based on an undischarged ambiguity of some sort. There
is no way around that socio-linguistic convention this side of altering the meaning of the word
"contradiction". [On this, see also Interlude Eleven, below.] And, even that would be of little help to DM-theorists since
that would 'solve' this 'problem' by means of yet more subjective,
question-begging, linguistic reform, thereby
imposing this part of DM on the
facts.67
And as we
have just seen, this can't even be a 'dialectical contradiction'!
Linguistic
tinkering like this merely creates 'contradictions'
by fiat when what is required is an example of a real material
contradiction --
not a
reified linguistic expression for one, hastily cobbled-together simply
to save the theory.
Nevertheless, some might argue that the claim advanced earlier (i.e., that
contradictions would normally be regarded as figurative or ambiguous, if held
'true') is
controversial -- and yet it is based on
how we would respondnow when faced with a contradiction in ordinary life. So, this claim is controversial only in the sense that some have
thought to controvert it.
[There
is a partial explanation of the background to this approach (based on
Wittgenstein's work),
here.]
Naturally, this means that the earlier observation isn't a consequence of the
present author having been 'corrupted' by
Analytic Philosophy. On the contrary, it is informed by the way workers
themselves speak, and how anyone not suffering from 'dialectics' talks when
they operate in the real world. Indeed, it is based on the way DM-theorists
themselves would have to speak in order to make themselves understood in
everyday life, let alone when they try to communicate with the working class.
Nevertheless, the following comments will test the patience of any dialecticians
who have made it this far. They will no doubt regard the examples of
contradictions given below as discursive, not dialectical,
contradictions. That worry will be laid to rest in Essay Eight
Part Three, where examples of just such
'contradictions' (i.e., those advanced by DM-theorists themselves) will be
considered. The only point of the following argument is to illustrate how we
might proceed if anyone were to utter (and try to mean) a contradiction in everyday life.
In that
case, in order to illustrate how we would now handle such 'contradictions',
consider
how worker,
NN, would respond if she were faced with the following scenario:
C1: Boss
BB: "NN, you are being paid £9.50 an hour and not being paid £9.50
an hour."
[Of course, no one who isn't the worse for drink, drugs or mental confusion
speaks like this, but other than the examples considered
here it isn't easy to cite
instances where ordinary human beings (again, not in the grip a some
theory or under the influence of Zen Buddhism) utter 'true contradictions', or,
indeed, intend to utter them and genuinely mean them.]
At
first sight, C1 would in all likelihood be interpreted as a joke of some sort, a
slip of the tongue, or a mistake. If the boss insisted that none of these were
the case, then the only way to proceed would be to ask what on earth this boss
meant by the sentence quoted in C1. In the event, the explication of the use of
that sentence might involve interpreting the word "paid" in one of three
ways:
(1) It
might indicate what NN was going to earn, regardless of whether or
not she will ever receive the money. Hence, in a round-about sort of way, the
sentence quoted in C1 could be alluding to the effect of taxation and other
deductions on NN's pay. It might even refer to the boss's intention to
pay the worker in 'kind'. Or:
(2) It
could mean that although the money had been earned, it wouldn't actually
be paid
to NN for some reason. So, it might be withheld as a part of the boss's
attempt to victimise her for helping to lead a successful strike, for example.
Or:
(3) It
could mean that although
NN will be paid at the stated rate, the true value of her
contribution to production can't be measured in cash terms. Hence, it might
suggest that BB intends to reward NN with more than mere money (or
maybe with none at all) -- but, with his/her 'highest esteem', etc. A clue to
this way of viewing the sentence quoted in C1 would be the inflection in the
boss's voice -- a note of sarcasm, perhaps.
[Of course,
there might be other ways of interpreting C1, but the above seem the most
obvious to me.]
However, 'contradictions' like this would never be regarded as literally
true, for as soon as NN was actually paid the said money the second
half of the sentence quoted in C1 would become false -- which means that the
conjunction of a falsehood with a truth (in C1) could never become
literally true (short of altering the meaning of the words employed, or,
indeed, of those used to assert that it is true -- or, without
altering the meaning of "literal", of course). We wouldn't be able to make sense
of anyone who thought that this sort of eventuality could arise (save in the
ways indicated above, etc.). Certainly, without the alternatives outlined
in (1)-(3) -- or, perhaps, expressed by several other possible interpretations
--, no worker (or anyone else, for that
matter) would be able to understand the sentence quoted in C1.
C1: Boss
BB: "NN, you are being paid £9.50 an hour and not being paid £9.50
an hour."
This
brings us back to a difficulty DM-theorists must always face if they persist in
regarding 'contradictions' as true, or they continue to use the word
"contradiction" in the loose and indiscriminate way to which they have become accustomed
-- where one minute they sort of half mean the word in its ordinary-, or even
its FL-sense, the next they sort of half mean it in this new, and
as-yet-unexplained,
DL-sense. When we
bring this word back to its ordinary meaning, any propositions that
contain it -- if they are still to be regarded as true -- could only ever be
understood in a non-standard way, and then disambiguated along lines
suggested earlier.
Exactly why
we should want to do that was made clear by Marx himself:
"The
philosophers have only to dissolve
their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order
to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to
realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their
own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
If, on
the other hand, the word "contradiction" is meant to be taken in a special or
technical (but as-yet-unspecified) sense, DM-theorists risk being
misunderstood at every turn -- with their words failing to communicate anything
determinate, especially if they hope to depict the sorts of situations in the
material world that are familiar to ordinary people and workers. Furthermore,
to make the same point once more, that risk will remain in place unless and until
DM-apologists make it clear (and for the first time ever) what they mean
by their odd use of this word in such contexts.
This means
that
in practice, when faced with sentences like C1, DM-theorists would
interpret the alleged "contradictions" they express in a standard way, in line
with the vast majority of ordinary human beings -- and hence paraphrase them
away. Despite their commitment to dialectics, few DM-fans would
understand the words attributed to the fictional boss in C1
literally. In fact, only the most useless trade union organiser in
history
would allow such a boss to get away with the nonsense reported in C1.
Representing and defending the material interests of the working-class certainly
doesn't mean that we let bosses off the hook by adopting, or accepting, ways of
speaking that have been invented by ruling-class hacks, mystics and Idealists.
C1: Boss
BB: "NN, you are being paid £9.50 an hour and not being paid £9.50
an hour."
However, socialists, who are normally alert to the dangers of class
collaboration when they surface
elsewhere, seem only too happy to allow ordinary language to suffer from
ideological contamination of this sort when it comes to philosophy.
Even
if the word "contradiction" were intended to be taken literally,
DM-theorists themselves wouldn't be able to say what in nature or society
a 'true contradiction' would, or could, depict without helping themselves to
yet more figurative language.
If (per
impossible) they could do this, then the word "literal" would have to
be taken non-literally!
In
Essay
Five, we saw every attempt to
unravel the confusions that plague Engels's (brief) account of motion fail. It turned
out that it was impossible to make sense of what Engels thought he might have
meantby what he actually said -- that is, if
we attempt to take his words literally.
So, it
is no big surprise to find that
DM-theorists have remained consistently unclear and equivocal about core
DM-theories like this for well over a hundred years. There is in fact
nothing that anyone could say, or could have said, to make
the incomprehensible comprehensible. Just like the mysteries of
Transubstantiation and the
Incarnation of Christ, DM-propositions resist all attempts at clarification.
Indeed, as David Stove argued:
"If a statement 'p' is impossible to understand if taken
literally, it will also be impossible to understand the statement 'So-and-so
believes that p', taken literally. If you could understand the statement that
knowledge is literally a poached egg, then you could understand the statement
that Smith literally believes that knowledge is a poached egg; but since you
can't understand the former, you can't understand the latter either." [Stove
(1991), p.28.]
[Readers should, however, check out the warning I have also posted about Stove,
here.]
At present,
unless DM-theorists come up with the goods, it is impossible to understand a
single thing they say about these mysterious 'dialectical contradictions', and
hence it is equally impossible to understand anyone who swears that DM-theorists
themselves understand them.
[This is on
a par with Wittgenstein's aside: the negation of nonsense is also nonsense.]
When I have made this point to DM-fans in
'debate', they tend to respond with something like the following:
"Just because
you can't make sense of this use of 'contradiction' doesn't mean it makes no
sense. Your failings can't be attributed to our theory!"
To which I invariably
reply:
"I agree. But in that case, help me out. What do
you mean by your odd use
of 'contradiction', for example?"
That is usually met with silence, abuse or
further attempts at deflection. But in the nearly 35 years I have been arguing
with DM-fans, not one of them has been able to help me out. Not that I ever
expected it, any more than I expect Christians to explain with any clarity, or
even candour, the nature of their
Trinity to me.
At
this point, DM-apologists might be tempted to complain about the continual use
of contradictions drawn from FL to make points against their use of "dialectical
contradiction". The obvious response to this is (once again) to request a
clear explanation of what a 'dialectical contradiction' itself could possibly
be so that those advancing this complaint could themselves
convince critics that they
do meansomething (anything?) by that phrase, as opposed to their
having used an empty string of words for well over a hundred years -- just because
it is traditional to do so.
Until
then, the volunteered complaint (recorded at the beginning of the previous
paragraph) would itself be devoid of meaning since it contains a
term that is, so far,
meaningless -- i.e., "dialectical contradiction".
DM-theorists might just as well use "schmontradiction" for all the good it does.
Finally, the claim that there
are 'literally true contradictions' (advanced by philosophers like
Graham
Priest) will be examined in a later Essay. [However, it is a moot point
whether the examples and paradoxes he considers are, or ever could be called
"dialectical".
Strike that; they aren't.]
Until then
the reader is directed toward the following: Goldstein (1992, 2004), Slater
(2002, 2007b, 2007c), and
this review,
by Hartry
Field.
[Field has
now published a book on the
paradoxes,
where he is able to show that the
Dialetheic and
Paraconsistent Logic Priest favours can't even handle the
paradoxes of
truth, which had in fact been one of the main motivators for this branch of
non-standard logic -- i.e., Field (2008), pp.36-92.]
[An entire
sub-section on 'dialectical contradictions' that used to appear here has now
been moved to form Essay Eight
Part Three.]
In that case, perhaps F48 is the reading we are searching for?
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only
B, where A and B
are opposites.
Unfortunately, as we have seen several times already, since A doesn't exist --
Capitalism not having delivered it --, it can't 'contradict' B. This means that
F48 isn't a viable reading of Rees's intentions, either.
Even if B 'contradicted' any forces and/or processes already present in
the system,
that would just return us to where we were when we considered several earlier examples, such as
this one (but substituting the word "society" for "nature"):
F6a: Let force, P1,
oppose force, P2,
in configuration, C1,
in society.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the
following: the normal effects produced by P1
in C1 (had
P2 not been
present) are the opposite of the effects P2
would have produced in C1
(had P1similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's
normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set, E1,
and those of P2
be elements of an event set, E2.
For the purposes of simplicity let E1
and E2 be
disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites, such that elements of E1
and E2
taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
It
seems this is yet another dialectical dead-end, for here we have even
more
non-existents 'contradicted' by existents.
[This follows on from Interlude Five. and depends on
the conclusions reached there.]
But,
are opposites always contradictory? At this moment I am sat in front of my
computer looking at the house opposite. Is my house therefore in some sort of
'struggle' with that house? Or, indeed, am I 'struggling' with it?
Unfair?
Perhaps so. Dialecticians will be the first to point out that the
opposites they regard as contradictory are those that are involved in a
dialectical union of some sort (i.e., as
UOs). Since my house
and the one opposite aren't so linked (and neither am I), they aren't therefore in 'struggle',
nor could they be.
Well,
how do we know? Clearly we don't. Nature often surprises us. Anyway, isn't everything
interconnected in DM?
Be this as
it may, consider the
opposite sides of an equilateral triangle (and one that
has been carefully drawn on paper, so this isn't
an abstract example). Such a triangle has two opposite sides; do they
'contradict' one another? Are they
both battling against the third side, or with each other? Here, these sides are physically-, and logically-,
or 'internally'-, linked. Even so, they
steadfastly refuse to contradict one another. If we now extend this example to cover more
complex
manifolds, these 'difficulties' only multiply.
But,
once again it could be argued that these counter-examples aren't relevant since the items involved aren't
dialectically-logically linked.
It
seems then that only certain logical connections in reality are allowed to be,
or to constitute, a DM-UO, which means that objects and processes that are merely
physically-, or even those which are formally-, connected
can't be so described.
However, on a
purely empirical
basis, since no
house has yet been observed to be engaged in a life-and-death struggle with
another property across the way, can they be ruled-out conclusively as UOs? Who can say? And yet, who has ever actually
witnessed a set of use values slugging it out with a set of exchange
values? Or seen 'appearances' locked in a bitter tussle with 'underlying
essences'? Or even witnessed a billiard ball struggling with itself as it rolls
along. But, which DM-fan would now want to disagree with Engels (who claimed
that motion like this is contradictory) simply on the basis that it is
impossible to observe this alleged contradiction? If not, empirical niceties
(i.e., observation) like this can't be crucially important in such
cases.
We
are still in the dark, therefore.
Some might object to the
banal examples covered in this Essay. But Hegelian
opposites look pretty banal themselves (and so do those that litter most
DM-texts -- for example: magnets,
males and females, up and down, seeds that negate plants, etc.) -- and theydon't work, either, even in their
own
terms.
Oddly enough,
and by sheer coincidence (I'm sure), 'dialectical opposites' turn out to be (by-and-large) the kind
of 'opposites' dreamt-up by Idealist Philosophers thousands of years ago (and,
indeed,
more recently). Now, since this doctrine is a central tenet of
Hermeticism, that
should be enough to malign it in the eyes of anyone concerned to remain
consistent with atheistic materialism:
"For everything must be the product of opposition and
contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise." [Copenhaver (1995), p.38. Bold
emphasis added.]
[In fact, pointing out
that DM has appropriated the ideas of previous generations of mystics has absolutely no effect on dialecticians; why that is so
will be
revealed in Essay Nine Part Two.]
To test this claim,
readers should now try to spot the difference (over
and above a handful of superficial, stylistic variations) between the following
two passages:
"CHAPTER X POLARITY
'Everything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites;
like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different
in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be
reconciled.' -- The
Kybalion.
"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle
-- the
Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two
sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees
between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind
of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always
recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it
by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and
isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is
half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to
every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the
difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a
matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,'
and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in
degree'; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a
recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations
of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the
real nature of anything
"Light and Darkness are poles of the same thing,
with many degrees between them. The musical scale is the same-starting with 'C'
you moved upward until you reach another 'C,' and so on, the differences between
the two ends of the board being the same, with many degrees between the two
extremes. The scale of colour is the same -- higher and lower vibrations being the
only difference between high violet and low red. Large and Small are relative.
So are Noise and Quiet; Hard and Soft follow the rule. Likewise Sharp and Dull.
Positive and Negative are two poles of the same thing, with countless degrees
between them....
"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests;
everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.
"The great Third Hermetic Principle-the Principle
of Vibration-embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the
Universe-that nothing is at rest-that everything moves, vibrates, and circles.
This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers
who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of
by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century
physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific
discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this
centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.
"The Hermetic Teachings are that not only is
everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences'
between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to
the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL,
in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of
intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the
teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the
physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be
at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole
of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter.
Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes
of vibration.
"Modern Science has proven that all that we call
Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more
advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists
who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion.
Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in
matter and energy.
"In the first place, science teaches
that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from
temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same
things-it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and
vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle
to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes.
The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move
around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the
particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and
movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of
Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The
atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc.,
which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and
which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all
forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of
Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first has been posted
here;
the second
here.
Spelling altered to conform with UK English. For more quotations along the same
lines (taken from other mystical systems/theorists), see
here
and here.]
Compare the above with this:
"The Unity and Interpenetration of
Opposites
"Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic
co-existence of opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life
and motion. That was already understood by Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.) two and a
half thousand years ago. It is even present in embryo in certain Oriental
religions, as in the idea of the ying (sic) and yang in China, and in Buddhism.
Dialectics appears here in a mystified form, which nonetheless reflects an
intuition of the workings of nature. The Hindu religion contains the germ of a
dialectical idea, when it poses the three phases of creation (Brahma),
maintenance or order (Vishnu) and destruction or disorder (Shiva). In his
interesting book on the mathematics of chaos, Ian Stewart points out that the
difference between the gods Shiva, 'the Untamed,' and Vishnu is not the
antagonism between good and evil, but that the two principles of harmony and
discord together underlie the whole of existence....
"In Heraclitus, all this was in the nature of an
inspired guess. Now this hypothesis has been confirmed by a huge amount of
examples. The unity of opposites lies at the heart of the atom, and the entire
universe is made up of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. The matter was
very well put by
R. P. Feynman: 'All things, even ourselves, are made of
fine-grained, enormously strongly interacting plus and minus parts, all neatly
balanced out....'
"The question is: how does it happen that a plus
and a minus are 'neatly balanced out?' This is a contradictory idea! In
elementary mathematics, a plus and a minus do not 'balance out.' They negate
each other. Modern physics has uncovered the tremendous forces which lie at the
heart of the atom. Why do the contradictory forces of electrons and protons not
cancel each other out? Why do atoms not merely fly apart? The current
explanation refers to the 'strong force' which holds the atom together. But the
fact remains that the unity of opposites lies at the basis of all reality.
"Within the nucleus of an atom, there are two
opposing forces, attraction and repulsion. On the one hand, there are electrical
repulsions which, if unrestrained, would violently tear the nucleus apart. On
the other hand, there are powerful forces of attraction which bind the nuclear
particles to each other. This force of attraction, however, has its limits,
beyond which it is unable to hold things together. The forces of attraction,
unlike repulsion, have a very short reach. In a small nucleus they can keep the
forces of disruption in check. But in a large nucleus, the forces of repulsion
can't be easily dominated....
"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the
'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion;
north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and
anti-matter; male and female in biology; odd and even in mathematics; even the
concept of 'left and right handedness' in relation to the spin of subatomic
particles. There is a certain symmetry, in which contradictory tendencies, to
quote Feynman, 'balance themselves out,' or, to use the more poetical expression
of Heraclitus, 'agree with each other by differing like the opposing tensions of
the strings and bow of a musical instrument.' There are two kinds of matter,
which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike
attract....
"Moreover, everything is in a permanent relation
with other things. Even over vast distances, we are affected by light,
radiation, gravity. Undetected by our senses, there is a process of interaction,
which causes a continual series of changes. Ultra-violet light is able to
'evaporate' electrons from metal surfaces in much the same way as the sun’s rays
evaporate water from the ocean.
Banesh Hoffmann
states: 'It is still a strange
and awe-inspiring thought, that you and I are thus rhythmically exchanging
particles with one another, and with the earth and the beasts of the earth, and
the sun and the moon and the stars, to the uttermost galaxy....'
"The phenomenon of oppositeness exists in
physics, where, for example, every particle has its anti-particle (electron and
positron, proton and anti-proton, etc.). These are not merely different, but
opposites in the most literal sense of the word, being identical in every
respect, except one: they have opposite electrical charges -- positive and
negative. Incidentally, it is a matter of indifference which one is
characterised as negative and which positive. The important thing is the
relationship between them....
"This universal phenomenon of the unity of
opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in
nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of
external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all
mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only
possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie
at the heart of all forms of matter.
"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of
uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small
quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state
which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the
structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging
from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension
striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more
molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to
shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and
the whole thing falls." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.64-68; quoted from
here.]
"'Everything Flows'
"Everything is in a constant state of motion,
from neutrinos to super-clusters. The earth itself is constantly moving,
rotating around the sun once a year, and rotating on its own axis once a day.
The sun, in turn, revolves on its axis once in 26 days and, together with all
the other stars in our galaxy, travels once around the galaxy in 230 million
years. It is probable that still larger structures (clusters of galaxies) also
have some kind of overall rotational motion. This seems to be a characteristic
of matter right down to the atomic level, where the atoms which make up
molecules rotate about each other at varying rates. Inside the atom, electrons
rotate around the nucleus at enormous speeds....
"The essential point of dialectical
thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it
views motion and change as phenomena based upon contradiction. Whereas
traditional formal logic seeks to banish contradiction, dialectical thought
embraces it. Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the
heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and
development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the
unity and interpenetration of opposites...." [Ibid, pp.45-47; quoted from
here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that the same
brand of Mickey Mouse Science
is prominent in the Hermetic tract and the Dialectical mantra intoned by comrades Woods and Grant.
Even so, DM-texts still make no
attempt to explain with any clarity what it could
possibly mean to suggest that 'dialectical opposites' could
contradict one another. For example, who taught them to speak?
Unfair once more?
Not so.
Not, unless dialecticians mean something else by their use of "contradiction",
which they have so far kept to themselves. If these 'opposites' do indeed
'contradict' one another, they must be able to talk.
If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we
would appear to have the following:
F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and
poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.
However, there are several problems with this paraphrase
and, indeed, this option. One of these concerns the supposition that capitalism actually does offer
wealth. Admittedly, for propaganda purposes its ideologues often claim it
does -- but who believesthem? Certainly, blatant lies like this
can't serve as part of a socialist analysis.69
The following might therefore be regarded as a more
viable option:
A1: Capitalism has
the potential to offer wealth to all but delivers wealth and poverty, where
wealth and poverty are opposites.
[F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers
B and C,
where B and C are opposites.]
In fact, this alternative has already been considered; it is just a variant on F49a.
Once again, an
unrealised potential can't contradict anything sinceit doesn't exist. So, even if it were true, A1 would be of no help in understanding what
DM-theorists mean by their equation of forces with 'contradictions' in
HM.
Someone could argue, for example, that the fact that there will be a sea battle
tomorrow is contradicted by the fact that there won't (to use
Aristotle's example). Neither of these scenarios is actual, but that doesn't stop them from contradicting one
another.
Or so it
could be maintained.
Certainly, those two
sentences look contradictory (who has ever denied it?), but the
question is, can both be true? That would have to be the case if this were an example of a
'dialectical contradiction' -- and, not insignificantly, they would have
to imply one another (like the proletariat implies the capitalist class,
so we have been led to
believe), which they don't.
Once
again: whatever else this, it isn't a 'dialectical contradiction'.
[The reader is
also referred back to my
earlier
discussion of the distinction between "contradictory" and "contradiction".]
DM-enthusiasts regard their 'contradictions' as
real material forces (they are a consequence, or they are the effects of
such forces -- DM-fans are
somewhat unclear about this, as we have seen), and the latter can only 'contradict' (in
their sense
of the word) whatever they can
materially interact with, which plainly means that such factors have to co-exist -- as, indeed, Mao
himself argued:
"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can
exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for
its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a
concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no
death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no
'below'.... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without
tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there
would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie.
Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or
semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist
oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the
one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are
interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this
character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory
aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being
in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are
interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies
'how opposites can be and how they become identical'. How then can they be
identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the
first meaning of identity." [Mao (1937),
p.338.
Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
Indeed, as
Ira Gollobin also
opined (quoting Engels):
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually
exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate
each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of
opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in
mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as
such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual
action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of
these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely,
their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in
their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side
alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986),
p.115; quoting
Engels
(1891), p.414.
Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
The
proletariat could hardly 'contradict' the capitalist class if one of them
didn't
exist! Same with the forces and relations of production --,
and, indeed, with forces of attraction and repulsion.
Hence, while propositions about unrealised potentialities (or 'tendencies' --
or, indeed, sentences about future contingencies) might
contradict one another (in the sense that they can't both become true, or both
become false), in DM-terms an unrealised potential (or 'tendency') can't
'contradict' (in the sense that it actively opposes) something that isn't
actual.
While it is possible to speak about
'contradictory
tendencies' in an object or process, the point of referring to these as
"contradictory" is that they can't both be actualised at once. So, for example,
while it is possible for one end of a rather long iron bar to cool down while the other end
is being heated (at the same time), it makes no sense to suppose that the same section of that
bar (which could be specified in terms of precise volume intervals) can be in both states at once.
[If
anyone thinks differently, they can e-mail
me with their best shot. On the alleged 'contradictory tendencies' in capitalism, see
here,
here,
here,
here, and
here.]
Perhaps then we should re-interpret F49 in the following manner?
F57: Capitalism develops productive forces
capable of delivering wealth to all, but it actually delivers wealth to
a minority, and poverty to most of the rest, where wealth and poverty are opposites.
[F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
A and B, where A and B
are opposites.]
However, in F57 we are confronted with a subtle change in the
way that the "A" of F49 has been interpreted in the opening clause: it now
stands for something like the "capacity to develop productive forces
capable of delivering wealth". But, in the last clause it simply stands for
"wealth", as before. Hence, F57 is actually equivalent to the following:
F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers
B and C instead,
where B and C are opposites.
Or perhaps:
F49b: Capitalism develops D (which has the
potential to produce B or C), but in the end delivers BandC,
where B and C are opposites.
Here, the 'contradiction' would seem to be
between either:
(a) The capacity Capitalism has for delivering wealth and its actual delivery of
poverty, or,
(b) The wealth it delivers to some and the poverty it
imposes on
the rest.
In the first case, clearly we don't have a contradiction. That is because, as we have just seen, a capacity is an unrealised potentiality,
and as such it can't contradict something which does exist -- no
more than, say, a woman's un-actualised capacity to play the flute contradicts
her actualised expertise with the piano, or even her actualised state of not having a flute -- or, indeed, that of not being able to play the flute while she has to make do with
a piano.
The second alternative above is no contradiction either, however much it
offends our sensibilities. Option (b) is no more a contradiction than, say, £10,000
($13,000) in one pocket contradicts £0.15 ($0.20) in another. Or no more than a £5 (or a $10) note in a
millionaire's wallet (assuming this is all she has on her at the time)
contradicts the £1000 ($1300) in a worker's pocket (who has just won a compensation
claim, say) -- even if these two are sat next to each other at a UK Labour
Party rally. To call these "contradictions" would be bizarre -- even
on DM-terms. Are they 'struggling' with each other? Do they
turn into one another?
Does one imply the existence of the other?70
As we saw earlier, anyone who thought
otherwise would be openly drawing attention to their own logico-linguistic naivety, if not perversity.
In any case, as we have also seen, there can be no literal
contradiction between something that doesn't exist (i.e., the prospect of wealth under
Capitalism, where this is 'meant to be' wealth for all) and something that does exist (i.e., the mixed fortunes of the
people who have to endure conditions as they are).
Despite this, it might still be felt that the situation isn't as
bad as the above makes out. The emphasis in F49 is on what
Capitalism actually delivers, not on what it genuinely (or otherwise)
offers. If "wealth" and "poverty" are real opposites,
F49 could still
serve in the way DM-theorists intend -- or, so it might seem.
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
A and B, where A and B
are opposites.
Unfortunately, this rather desperate alternative reading diverts attention away from
allegedly
'contradictory forces' onto their effects, once more. In that case, the nature of the
direct relation between whatever the forces are that manage to produce these effects is still obscure,
and not the least bit contradictory.
Nevertheless, even when consideration
is given to such effects
and the relation between them, a nagging question
remains: just what is so
contradictory about wealth and poverty existing side by side? Admittedly, to
any socialist, this state of affairs is as intolerable as it is indefensible,
but there still doesn't seem to be a literal contradiction involved here.
True, this state of affairs may be paradoxical (but not to a Marxist);
even so, the presence of one of these alleged opposites doesn't entail that an
assertion that the other opposite also obtains is false, as would have
to be the case if a literal contradiction were intended. They don't appear to
imply one another, like the proletariat and the capitalist class supposedly do.71
If, on the other hand, we
wish to re-define the word "contradiction" so that it becomes the equivalent of
"paradox", "unjust", "something contrary to expectations", "deplorable" (and so
on), all well and good. But that would merely concede the
point being made in these Essays: that social reality is only 'contradictory' because of linguistictinkering to that end, which naturally means that the claim that DM-'contradictions'
haven't been imposed on the facts will have to be
withdrawn. Seen in this way, DM-'contradictions' would, at best, be
either figurative,
or they would depend on the use of a word ("contradiction") that has been
'redefined' in order to produce the right result.72
Of
course, someone might foolishly try to 're-define' their financial status by
declaring that their bank balance of £5 ($7) was really one of £1,000,000
($1,300,000). While this audacious ploy might make an ideal millionaire
out of a fake one, it would have no
material impact on their finances (except, perhaps, negatively, when they
are found out).
Since
the ordinary word "contradiction" already has a sense -- or, even a range of
senses -- in everyday life, redefining it in ways that are unconnected with it/them, similarly has no physical effect on reality, no matter how ideal a
temporary fix it might seem to be for one's ailing theory.
To be sure,
and once again, it could be argued that dialecticians are at liberty to use
words any which way they like, and that it isn't up to the 'thought-police'
(such as the present author) to try to stop them.
As we saw here,
DM-theorists can indeed use words as they please (not that they anyone's
permission), but they can't then claim
connotations for these words that wholly or partially apply toother
words that already have an established use, which they then try to emulate,
import, co-opt, or replace. So, they aren't at liberty to claim their use of
"contradiction" is in any way connected with its ordinary use, or even with its
role in
FL, not without
causing confusion -- but mercifully, so far, only to themselves.
In that
case, this novel use of "contradiction" requires an explanation -- since the
connections it once enjoyed with its supposed vernacular-, or FL-'twin' have
long since been severed, leaving it adrift, and hence meaningless --
something that dialecticians have signally failed to provide (not that they have
tried all that hard to produce one for well over a century).
And, that is
why I have repeatedly been asking for such clarification in this Essay. [More on
that in Essay Twelve Part One.]
However,
as a matter of fact, DM-apologists
aren't
employing this word in any which way they please. DM-jargon has a
chequered history and an equally chequered origin, which means it already
possesses specific connotations, which they had no part in choosing or
establishing. Just like
those who use jargon associated with, say, the
Christian Trinity (whose terminology, unsurprisingly, emerged from the same
cess-pit of Neo-Platonic
Thoughtthat gave birth to Hegel's fantasies), dialecticians have
appropriated this particular word (i.e., "contradiction") from
Hermetic/Hegelian Philosophy
alongside the confused
ramblings of other mystics, which means that DM is in fact
Mystical Christianity's direct descendant and now poor relation.
Dialecticians should feign no surprise, therefore, when they are accused of
being covert mystics; because they can't explain what their words mean in
comprehensible terms -- using the vernacular (as Marx enjoined) -- their terminology is as big a
mystery to them as it is to anyone else!
Those who
think that ordinary language is far too limited to be of any use in such
contexts should read
this and
this, and then
perhaps think again. They should also take issue with Marx himself:
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary
language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the
distorted language of the actual world...." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases
alone added.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
On the
other hand, if the word
"contradiction" possesses a special,
DM-sense, which allows for its legitimate use in such circumstances, then
DM-theorists have yet to say what that is.
In response, it could be argued that their use of the word "contradiction" implies opposition and/or tension. But, even though "wealth" and "poverty" are opposites in the ordinary
sense, they don't seem to
oppose each other in an active way, as one would expect they should if they
genuinely illustrated the validity of the equation of 'contradictions' with forces.
Admittedly, poverty acts as brake on development of the productive forces at
certain points in history (warping the development of those who have to endure
it, etc.), stoking up resentment, class hatred and (as a result) fomenting
'labour unrest'. But, over and above the influence these
states of affairs have on human agents, these lifeless concepts appear to
have no active connection with one another. Sure enough, the material conditions
they express, or 'reflect', might indeed create tension in those who have to
endure them, but none of the latter would describe what they feel by using the
word "contradiction", unless, of course, a fast-talking DM-evangelist had sold them on the idea. In ordinary
language the word can't be given such a meaning without altering the sense it
already has.73
Furthermore, if this set of consequences is meant to be taken as
a new gloss on F49 (by way of illustrating the alleged 'contradiction' between
E1-, and E2-type
events discussed earlier) then it, too, reduces to the claim that it is the effects of effects
that are 'contradictory', and not the original effects themselves. Down this
road there lies, I fear, yet another "bad infinity" --, which
ends "who knows where?"
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
A and
B, where A and B
are opposites.
The
second difficulty with this reading is that although wealth and poverty are
genuine opposites (again, in the ordinary sense), they don't appear to be classic examples of dialectical-UOs (even
if we knew what they were!). To be sure, under
Capitalism the wealth of one class is connected with the poverty of others, but
this is a familiar causal connection. They aren't internally-, or
logically-related, despite claims to the contrary. That this is so
can be seen from that fact that were this not the case, we would find we
couldn't agree (with Engels) that under Capitalism poverty exists "where it
need not be".
If there were a 'dialectical' (or "internal") "unity
in difference" connecting poverty and wealth (like that which dialecticians
allege between, say, the north and
south poles of a magnet, or that between capitalist and worker (as classes)),
then we couldn't argue that socialism will eliminate one at the same time as abolishing the
other. But, the whole point of a socialist society is that all should
become as wealthy as the productive forces will allow. If there were a
logical link between these two states (poverty and wealth) then they would
be inseparable in all modes of production and we would have to temper our
slogans somewhat. We might then have to point out that in eradicating poverty,
workers would be eradicating wealth, too. That we do not so argue -- we
actually claim the opposite that socialism can produce wealth for all --
indicates that the relation between wealth and poverty isn't a logical (or
internal) connection, but causal.
Of course, it could be argued that there is an internal/logical
link between "wealth and poverty
under capitalism". The above treats these terms abstractly. That
objection will be dealt with below.74
A genuine example of an "internal relation" might help here: if the
Prime Meridian at
Greenwich were to be abolished, the whole system of longitudes would
automatically go with it. Moreover, anyone employing this system correctly is
able to derive conclusions about where they are on the planet in relation to the
Prime Meridian. Where they are in terms of their latitude is therefore 'internally related' to that
Meridian by a series of inferences based on a set of measurements and
conventions established by international agreement. Of course,
these days this is all done automatically, and has been greatly augmented by
GPS guidance systems. But the point is still valid. This isn't at all like the elimination of poverty. Poverty will be
eradicated not by destroying wealth, but by extending wealth production
and establishing equitable forms of distribution -- and, of
course, by
abolishing class division (etc.).
It could be
argued here that this misconstrues the nature of the link between poverty and
wealth under Capitalism, turning it into something abstract that supposedly exists between
two unchanging concepts. Contrary to this, dialecticians hold that wealth and
poverty are dialectically linked --, and not just to each other. They are related
to, and are constituted by, the Mode of Production in which they both exist. Hence,
under Capitalism, wealth can't exist without the creation of poverty. To
eradicate the latter, Capitalism must be abolished. In a fully socialist society, the
present connection between wealth and poverty would vanish.
However, the
link between wealth and poverty is still causal (wealth creates poverty
under capitalism, and it does so for well-known historical, economic and social
reasons); dressing these up in pseudo-logical/'dialectical' finery can't change that fact -- even if it does succeed in
mystifying something that has clear social and material roots.
But,
even if that weren't so, none of it makes sense in DM-terms, since wealth and
poverty don't "struggle" with one another, nor do
they change into each other, which they should do if the
DM-classics
are to be
believed.
The basic problem here, of course, revolves around the
anthropomorphism implicit in the idea that concepts can enter into
struggle with one another. This mystification appears as part of the belief that
because wealth and poverty are opposites they are actively oppositional
and cause or initiate struggle, in andof themselves. On this account, it is the opposite/oppositional
nature of concepts that creates or induces struggle -- whereas in reality it is
clearly material conditions that cause it. Only by confusing a causal with a conceptual
connection can DM even seem to gain some purchase -- that is, if this is what
dialecticians mean here. But, as we have seen, this entire thesis is just one more consequence of
the RRT and LIE (both defined in Essay Twelve -- this was also a conclusion
reached in
Part One
of this Essay).75
It could be objected that DM-theorists don't disagree with this, even though
they maintain that these material forces are "dialectically
inter-linked". Hence, no dialectician of any sophistication thinks that concepts can,
ofthemselves, cause, change, or initiate struggle, only that the
material roots of struggle are mediated by the ideas people form of their
circumstances and the contradictory interests these generate.
Worded
differently, this wouldn't be inconsistent with anything written in these
Essays, since it involves concepts drawn from HM.
Nevertheless, if the
above is meant to illustrate the real meaning of F50, then we would once more
have an example of the effects of the effects being used to illustrate the action of a
force or set of forces. That impasse was criticised at length earlier.
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
C instead, where C is
a paradoxical outcome.
However, dialecticians
might object to the accusation that they believe that concepts enter into
conflict with one another; they would surely point out this is vaguely how Hegel
might have things (if it is worded more carefully). By way of contrast, they emphasise the fact that it is real people, and real
forces in the material world that enter into conflict.
But,
when the language dialecticians use is examined, the allegation that
dialecticians anthropomorphise nature and society by projecting human qualities
onto both of these forces itself upon us (no pun intended).
[On this seeInterlude Thirteen.]
The
animated contrast that is imagined to exist
between dead concepts like these seems plausible only because they are
viewed as the idealised equivalents of the real relations between human
beings, reified in an inappropriate metaphysical or linguistic form. Human
beings give life to the concepts they use, but under circumstances not always of
their own choosing, and they do so as a result of their practical activity modified
and shaped by ambient class and social relations. The reverse doesn't take place.
'Concepts' don't give life to human relations, although their use by human agents can
affect the roles they play or assume in everyday life. They certainly modify the
ideas that individuals from antagonistic classes form of their own material
interests, etc. Unless we suppose concepts are agents in their own right (in a
sort of inverted Hegelian form, whereby they perhaps walk the earth in place of human
beings), they can't 'reflect' things that human beings haven't already sanctioned for them
as a result of their own social relations
(and by
means of the above constraining factors). History is, after all, the result of the class war,
not a consequence of the struggle between concepts.
[DM-supporters might be tempted to argue that the above is a travesty of
their theory; no Marxist dialectician believes that concepts enter into
struggle with one another. I have already tackled that objection
above.]
As should seem obvious,
these comments are based on theoretical considerations drawn from HM, but this
is precisely where that scientific theory can provide the interpretative
sophistication which DM and 'Materialist Dialectics' obscure and then invert
in an idealised or fetishised form.76
This shows, once again, that the inversion DM-theorists say
they have inflicted on Hegel was, at best, merely formal, at worst, illusory.
In which
case, it seems their theory can only 'work' in
an
Ideal or Mystical 'universe'.
Nevertheless,
it could be objected once more that the above assertions are unfair because it was
in fact dialecticians who first pointed out that FL uses lifeless and
dead concepts, as a result of which it can't explain change.
However, the
unwelcome truth is
that it is DM-theorists who employ concepts that come to life only
when they are
anthropomorphised and are viewed as the abstract expression of conflict
(i.e., in effect, these are the fetishised analogues of social forms, as we have
seen -- for
example, in Interlude Thirteen). This is
revealed,
for example, by their profligate use of words like "contradiction" and
"negation" in connection with natural
processes, and now in relation to social change
(on
this, see Interlude Ten).
In contrast, the
rejection of this fetishistic approach re-humanises concepts -- but only
in relation to social development and interaction -- by revealing them for what they are:
the conditioned products of social relations among human beings. So, in HM, in place of the fetishised
theories we find in DM, we have concepts enlivened by human practice,
expressed in the material language of ordinary life (indeed,
as Marx enjoined). In this way, it is possible
for our description and analysis of the social world to become fully humanised -- a small but
important step in the fight to make it fully human.
Once again, if this is regarded as unfair or inaccurate,
the reader is referred back to:
(i) Essay Three Part One (for example, here
and here), where
the archaic linguistic moves underlying this pernicious form of Idealism were unmasked;
(ii) Essay Three
Part Two, where the roots of this
abstract approach to theory were traced back to traditional ruling-class and Idealist
forms-of-thought;
(iii) Essay Two, where
the dogmatic and Idealist nature of DM was exposed;
(iv)
Essay Four, where the anthropomorphic
nature of DL was laid
bare;
(v)
Essay Five, where
the confused nature of the
language Engels used (to depict motion) was
debunked;
(vi)
Essay Seven, where it was shown
that the 'Three Laws of Dialectics' were based on a
fetishised view
of discourse, compounded by an unhealthy dose of
Mickey Mouse Science;
(vii) Essay Eight Part One,
where further aspects of this
anthropomorphic doctrine were uncovered;
(viii)
Earlier sections of
this Essay, where the
application to nature of Hegelian concepts was shown to be
openly
animistic; and,
(ix) Essays Twelve and
Fourteen (summaries here
and here), where
these sordid details are traced back to ancient, ruling-class dogmas that
no self-respecting socialist or materialist should want to touch with someoneelse'sbargepole.
Indeed, it has been a unifying theme of all the Essays posted at
this site that the application to nature of concepts drawn from
Hermetic
Philosophy has branded DM as an irredeemably Mystical and Idealist theory, and,
further, that this has only succeeded in compromising the scientific status of HM. Anyone who still
takes exception to the claim that dialecticians use animistic notions drawn from
Hermetic Philosophy (where conflict is re-configured
in linguistic terms,
and then projected back onto nature and society) should feign no
surprise when that is where this sorry
tale has in
fact been heading all along.
The
solution is, therefore, for recalcitrant comrades to stop complaining, and point
their fingers in the right direction: at the DM-classicists who imported these
"ruling ideas" (upside down or 'the right way up') into Marxism.
However, Scott Meikle makes a valiant attempt to argue that some sort of sense can be made of the idea
that there are indeed 'dialectical contradictions', for example, in capitalism.
His case
revolves around a short and relatively clear account of the alleged
'contradiction' between
use-value
and
exchange-value -- or more pointedly, between the "relative
form" and the "equivalent
form" of value -- in
Volume One,
Chapter One, of
Das Kapital.
Now, I don't want to enter into whether or not Meikle's interpretation of Marx
is accurate; my concern here is whether he can explain how and why the relation between
the relative and the equivalent form of value is indeed an example of a
'dialectical contradiction'. Moreover, since Meikle's comments are typical of
the way that many Dialectical Marxists use language in this area -- and, indeed,
how they conceptualise 'contradictions' supposedly at work in
HM (this is especially
true of theorists belonging to the
HCD-tendency)
--, an examination of his
argument will help illustrate where many
of them descend into a irredeemable confusion.
[Of course, in
what follows
I am well aware that many will take issue over Meikle's specific interpretation of Marx,
or with some of the more detailed points he raises -- or even with his
entire approach. I will, however, be looking at the work of others who have tried
to make sense of a 'dialectical' interpretation of Das Kapital (with
"dialectical" understood,
not in its classical,
but in its post-Hegelian sense) in
a later re-write of this Essay. Until then, readers are redirected to the
discussions here
and here.]
This
is how Meikle
initially approaches the topic:
"All the contradictions of capitalist
commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and
exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the
commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....
"The simple form of value itself contains
the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value....
[Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two
inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at
the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the
first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards
of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen
can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The
relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other
commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the
other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't
simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't,
therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value.
These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'
"This polar opposition within the simple form is
an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the
individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between
use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore
represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation
between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only
as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an
exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple
form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the
commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]76a
But, what evidence
(or argument) is there to show that these are
"polar opposites", let alone that they are 'dialectically-united'? Or,
indeed, that there is a distinction here with a difference? And, why call this a
"contradiction"? However, like so many others, Meikle neglected to
say; he was nevertheless happy to help himself to the use of this word.
[There is, however, a
relatively clear attempt to justify its use in Heilbroner (1980),
pp.29-58, but more specifically, pp.41-42). I have examined Heilbroner's
interpretation,
below. Readers should note that I am
not questioning Marx's use of non-dialectical terms, such as "relative form" and
"equivalent form" [RF and EF, henceforth]. I
have also discussed his use of the word "contradiction"
here.]
Nevertheless, as we will see in
Essay Eight Part Three, this way of talking is based solely on Hegel's egregious
misconstrual of the 'negative form' of the LOI
as equivalent to the LOC.
In that case, what has Meikle
got to offer the bemused reader that stands some chance, any chance, of
filling the gaping hole Hegel left behind in his misbegotten 'theory'?
Apparently, only this:
"Marx's absolutely fundamental (Hegelian) idea
[is] that the two poles united in an opposition necessitate one another ('belong
to and mutually condition each other')...." [Ibid., p.19.]
But, what precisely is the source of this necessitation? Well,
after a brief discussion of
Quine's
ill-considered views concerning logical 'necessity' (which, it is worth
pointing out, confuse logical 'necessity' with extremely well-confirmed
empirical veracity -- but,the inference between these two 'concepts'
-- RF and EF-- is apparently
immune from this reduction, since that inference itselfcan hardly be a well confirmed empirical
truth -- Quine only just having dreamt it up a few generations ago, and on
which few if any scientists have done any work).
Be
this as it may, Meikle rejects the idea that the source of 'necessity'
can be found in
logic as such:
"So, 'logical necessity' does not promise to
account for the necessity that unites opposites within a contradiction. The
unity of use-value and exchange-value within the commodity is certainly not
something which, despite all necessitation between the two poles, may be
abrogated (on Quine's conventionalist account). Not, that is, without
'abrogating' the commodity itself; for the commodity is precisely the unity of
use-value and exchange-value. Use-value can exist alone. But exchange-value
can't; it presupposes use-value because only what has use-value can have
exchange-value. What has exchange-value, a commodity, is, thus, necessarily
use-value and exchange-value brought into a unity. The commodity-form of
the product of labour has as its essence the unity of the two. That is
what it is. Their conjunction or unity constitutes its essence." [Ibid.,
p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]
However,
Meikle has just admitted that "Use value can exist alone". But that just means
this can't be a dialectical concept. Unlike the paradigmatic 'dialectical
relation' between the proletariat and the capitalist class, neither of
which can't exist alone and both of which imply one another (so we are told),
here we have use value which can. In what way is the relation between use
value and exchange value 'dialectical' if one of these (use value) can exist
without the other, and hence one of which (use value) does not imply to
other?
But,
can't
an exchange value also exist where there is no use value at all? What about antiques?
They seem to have an exchange value but many don't
have a use value. Same with most works of art and other collectables (such as
stamps and old coins). And can't criminals exchange useless items in order to
launder money? [I have raised these and similar objections in more detail,
here. Readers are invited to see how DM-fans disagree with each other and
flounder in their attempt to respond to me on this topic. Added on Edit:
I have decided to add a few sections of that 'debate' to Appendix C.]
However, even if Meikle were
100% correct, why isn't
this just a de
dicto (that is, merely a verbal) necessity?
Not so fast, RL! Meikle had that particular base covered:
"Use-value and exchange-value are, therefore, not
'merely' abstractions arrived at in thought about reality; they are constituents
of reality in partaking in the essence of the commodity. And the opposition or
contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although
in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the
fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as
equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the
original. Bold emphasis added.]
But,
whateverelse is true of these value-forms, how can they
'contradict' one another if they can't co-exist -- i.e., if they
can't "act simultaneouslyas relative and as equivalent form of value"?
As we saw earlier:
"'The value of linen
can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The
relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other
commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the
other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't
simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't,
therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value.
These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'
"This polar opposition within the simple form is
an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the
individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between
use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore
represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation
between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only
as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an
exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple
form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the
commodity.'" [Ibid., pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.
Bold added.]
"The relative
form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent
and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are
mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression.
They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into
relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in
linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the
contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else
than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of
the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other
commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore,
the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an
equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent
cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not
the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the
material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are
worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1
coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation,
in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that
the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity
cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both
forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive."
[Marx (1996),
pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of
commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The
differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away
these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can
exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are
reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly
falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from
it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to
go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid.,
p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
[I have
dealt with what Marx said about elliptical motion earlier in this Essay, taking into account a recent article by Tom
Weston -- on that, see here,
here,
here,
here,
here, and
here. I have also criticised the
"mutually exclusive" criterion below.
I will be tackling Weston's claim that this passage can be recruited to support
the belief that
Marx accepted the idea that there is a 'dialectic in nature', in a future
re-write of Essay Seven Part One.]
If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at
the same time? On the other hand, if both do in fact co-exist, so that
they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "exclude" the other?
[We have already seen this insurmountable barrier
stand in the way of earlier
attempts to comprehend what 'dialectical contradictions' are and how they are supposed to work.]
Of
course, it could be argued that the concept of one of these forms both implies
and excludes that
of the other, perhaps by definition. If so, we seem to have a de dicto,
not a de re,
necessity, here, after all. And if this is merely a verbal necessity, how
can it have any effect on the economy?
[The second
of the above two links provides a
much clearer explanation of the distinction between these two forms of
necessity than the first.]
Otherwise, this would be a real
exclusion (and not merely verbal), so the two halves couldn't co-exist (indeed, as Marx
clearly
indicated, above). Consider a different example: the class of proletarians and
capitalists mutually condition and exclude one another, but one can't exist
without other, so we are told. However, this sense of "exclude" isn't one of
opposition (even though it can and does leadto opposition), which is what is required. This use of "exclude" here means that no member of one class can
belong to the other class; that is, there is no one who is a member of both classes at the
same time. [This alleged
'contradiction' will be examined in a future re-write of Essay Eleven
Part Two.] Once more, this sort of
exclusion doesn't imply opposition. In order to derive that conclusion more
is need than mere exclusion. After all, if an organism is a tulip, that excludes it from being an
elephant. But does that imply opposition? Or conflict? Hardly.
To be sure, this introduces issues connected with
Kant's concept of "real negation",
later rendered completely obscure
by Hegel's use of the term, "determinate negation". However, we have
already seen that Hegel dropped
the ball on this one, so his ideas are no help at all. In
addition, I
have dealt with Kant's rather confused ideas on this topic in Appendix A.
[I will return to consider "real exclusion" when I examine Heilbroner's arguments
later on in
this Essay.]
Even so, this
isn't the case
with commodities, where the same item's category can and must appear in
each class, as relative form of
value and as equivalent form
of value --
but apparently not at the same time. [That is, they are both forms of value,
whether or not they co-exist.]
"'[T]he relative form of value and the equivalent form are
two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but
at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.'" [Meikle
(1979),
p.17.]
"...the opposition or
contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although
in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the
fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as
equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the
original. Bold emphasis added.]
So,
this is the implication of the phrase "mutually exclude" applied in the present case -- otherwise it doesn't appear to do any
work. "Mutually exclude" here means "can't co-exist" -- not merely "must be from
different categories or sets" -- unlike capitalist and worker who have to
co-exist, so we are told.
[Marx
is quite clear:
"A single commodity cannot, therefore,
simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms." So, they
can't co-exist.]
Once again, if
the EF and the RFcan't co-exist, how can they
'contradict' one
another? Meikle failed to say.
[And, as far as can be determined, no one else has
been able to say, either
-- and I have asked this of several comrades, including one prominent Marxist
Professor of Economics (as
noted earlier), who, in an e-mail response told me to "Eat sh*t and
die!" Or, failing that, "Drink some
hemlock"
for even thinking to pose such blasphemous questions!]
Meikle has either
failed to notice this serious flaw in his theory, or he thinks the answer is obvious.
It isn't.
Putting this 'difficulty' to one side for now, why is
this particular 'necessity' not merely the result of a determination to use the
relevant words in certain ways? Why is this
not simply a de dicto necessity?
[In fact, it is a bit rich of Meikle to employ ideas drawn from Quine to
criticise logical necessity, when the latter would have taken an even dimmer
view of
de re
(real world) necessities himself. (On Quine's ideas, see the references listed
here).]
Of course, this has become a hot topic ever since
Saul Kripke
upset the de dicto apple cart a generation or so ago. [Kripke (1977,
1980).] Hence, it is no surprise to see Meikle appeal to Kripke's work to
buttress the argument that these aren't merely de dicto, but are also de re,
necessities.
Unfortunately, Kripke's arguments aren't quite as sound as
Meikle seems to think. [On this see, Dupré (1993), Ebersole (1982), Hallett (1991),
and Hanna and Harrison (2004), pp.278-88. See also this entertaining article by
Jerry Fodor:
Fodor (2004). More on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is
published, sometime in 2025.]
Nevertheless, in support,
Meikle draws attention to a (by now) hackneyed series of examples:
"The commodity is the unity of use-value and
exchange-value, in precisely the same way that water is H2O,
that light is a stream of photons, and that Gold is the element with
atomic
number
79. All these statements are necessarily true. They state truths that are
true of necessity, not in virtue of any logical or 'conceptual' connexions, but
in virtue of the essences or real natures of the entities in question. Water is
necessarily H2O.
Anything that is not H2O can't be water..., and the 'can't' is ontological not epistemic.... We did not
always know this, of course; it was a discovery people made about the
essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical
development requires it)." [Ibid., pp.22-23. Italic emphasis in the
original.]
The Gold example isn't too clever,
either, since its
Atomic Number
depends on our counting system (and on the number of
protons and
electrons
the
element possesses -- but
Gold
has many different isotopes
and thus has variable numbers of
neutrons). So why isn't this
'necessity' simply de
dicto? It could be argued that the
Atomic
Number of an element defines it as a natural kind -- in this case,
Gold has Atomic
Number 79. Once again, Gold has at least 19 isotopes (18 of which are
radioisotopes, one is stable), so, unless we are prepared to classify all 19
of these isotopes (all of which have different properties) as part of the same
natural kind, an appeal to the Atomic Number is of little use.
It could be
argued in response that all and only Gold atoms have an Atomic Number 79.
In that case, we might just as well include, say, all vertebrates in the same
natural kind on the grounds that all and only vertebrates have vertebra.
Moreover, as with all the other elements, Gold doesn't exist anywhere in an absolutely
pure state (appearing in all cases in ionic form (see below), with various
'impurities'), but that doesn't stop us calling it "Gold". Hence,
there are substances that even scientists call "gold", which
don't exclusively have an Atomic Number 79, samples of which contain other atoms with a
different Atomic Number.
Of course, this won't stop determined necessitarians from
insisting that an Atomic Number 79 defines a natural kind; the only problem
is that this 'natural kind' appears nowhere in nature, so far as we know.
It is only in the
abstract world of Traditional Philosophy that Gold is Absolutely Pure Gold. And, if
it doesn't exist in nature, it can hardly be a natural kind, can it?
The 'light' example isn't too
convincing, either, since there
are scientists who question the existence of
photons;
they could hardly do that if light was necessarily a de re, or
even a de dicto, stream of photons. And, of course, light is also a wave
(so we are told), hence it isn't true that light is a stream of photons.
[However, there are other, far more
serious problems defining theoretical objects -- like photons, electrons and
protons -- than this. They will be explored in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it
is published.]
The water example is
even worse, since water isn't even contingently
H2O!Hydrogen
bonding means its structure is far more complex. Indeed, because both
Hydrogen and Oxygen have several isotopes (Hydrogen, for example, exists as
Deuterium
and Tritium,
and there are
three
stable isotopes of Oxygen) not even these elements are "natural
kinds". Furthermore, just like Gold, no elemental atom
of Hydrogen
actually appears in its atomic form; Hydrogen atoms invariably exist in
ionic form, so
far as we know.
The idea (that Kripke and
Putnam
advanced) is that the word "water", for example, "rigidly
designates"
H2O,
even though most people who have ever lived have been totally unaware of this
supposed fact. However, as a result of the above considerations (and those
outlined below)
not even chemistsare referring to
H2O when they use
the word "water"; because of the aforementioned isotopes and hydrogen bonding,
they
tell us water is H2nOn,
or D20, D4O2,
D6O3,...,
D2nOn,
etc. ["D" is the abbreviation for "Deuterium".]
Moreover,
(i) Because of impurities and ionisation (etc.),
pure water (as
H2O)
is nowhere to be found on earth, or anywhere else for that matter;
(ii) Much
that isn't water is also H2nOn,
etc. -- for instance, ice, steam, and what comes out of your tap, or the liquid in that
bottle of water you just bought at the store (it contains
impurities, atoms that aren't hydrogen or oxygen, or which are compounds of
other elements). Moreover, the liquid that fills most lakes, seas and oceans is also
water, but it most certainly isn't
H2O, and,
(iii) A molecule of
'H2O'
possesses none of the physical properties of
water: it isn't a liquid, it doesn't boil at 100oC, it doesn't have a
density of 0.99707, it exerts no surface tension, it can't extinguish fires,
wash clothes, or quench a single thirst. So, a lone molecule of
H2O isn't water in any sense of the term.
Hence, not only does the word "water" not refer to
H2O,
it can't refer to that molecule!
It could be argued that Kripke merely claimed that the following
is the case:
K1: If water is H2O,
then water is necessarily H2O.
However, K1 could be true even if its antecedent
were false -- and we already know it is false. [Just as, "If 2 is odd,
then 2+2 is necessarily odd" is true even though the antecedent is false.]
But, despite Kripke, even if this weren't the
case, why isn't this just a de dicto necessity?
[On that and other serious difficulties
confronting
Essentialism, see VandeWall (2006). See also van Brakel (2000), and Hacker (2007), pp.29-56.]
It could be argued that Meikle had that base
covered, too, for he added:
"[I]t was a discovery people made about
the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical
development requires it)." [Ibid.]
But,
if such things can be revised, that just makes them epistemic truths and not the
least bit essential, or de re, 'ontological'. [And, as we have
just seen, there is in fact no "essence" of water!]
However, let us assume for the moment that these 'difficulties'
can be ironed out in some way, somehow -- although, in Essay Thirteen
Part Two we will see that that isn't the case. There it will be
shown that contemporary Essentialism
is a confused dead end, at best.
[In addition, Essentialism also faces
the serious objections I have raised against all forms of 'Ontology' in Essay Twelve
Part One.]
So,
again, even if we assume the above 'problems' can be cleared up in some way, Meikle's
account faces further difficulties -- not the least of which is the fact that the sort of essentialism he
lionises depends on
Possible
World Semantics [PWS] in order to work. To be sure, Meikle attempted to down-play this
untoward implication (pp.23-25), but in so doing he only succeeded in
undermining the case he had
just constructed for
accepting this brand of essentialism, in the first place. That is because
PWS turns de re necessities into super-duper empirical,
extensional truths, and, as a result, each putative de re
'essence' simply de sappears.
That
fatal defect will also be put to one side (for the present).
[However,
readers should consult
this paper, which outlines several serious objections to modern-day
Essentialism -- but, it comes with a health warning attached: its author then proceeds to defend an
Aristotelian version of the same doctrine!]
In addition, I
won't be asking (here) other awkward
questions about the precise origin of 'natural necessities' like this, or how they can
possibly cause change, but the following passage (taken
from Part One)
will give the reader some idea of how it will be tackled later:
A passage from Baker and Hacker (1988)
underlines the futility of this aristocratic approach to knowledge
(although they don't use that particular word, and are not making
any
political points) -- which, incidentally, also
reveals why dialecticians (like Rees and the others quoted
here) have become fixated on a futile search for a metaphysical (and thus ultimately rational) "why" of things:
"Empirical,
contingent
truths have always struck
philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that
none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained….
Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute
contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in
explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature
of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere,
e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in
quantum mechanics
today. One feature that
explains philosophers' fascination with
truths of Reason
is that they seem, in a
deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is
to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of
things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be
otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical
discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by
Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential
relations of
Simple Natures; mathematical truths are
apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by
a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting
pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build
upon them mythological structures.
"We think of necessary
propositions as being
true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We
conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even
about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about
universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as
the truth-functions or (in Frege's
case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as
describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics.
So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence
investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a
process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the
empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and
mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a
supra-empirical domain (a 'third
realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of
mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein
(1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however
these authors record this erroneously as p.139 -- RL] or the 'mineralogy of
numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g.,
Pascal,
admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal.
Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were
confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again,
these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41 -- RL]. Logic seems to
investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a
description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a
reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is
correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….
"In our eagerness to ensure
the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality
and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are
no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude
being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green
merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems
to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on
axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by
means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are
necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent
'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see
clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that
the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness
or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell
(1937), p.xv (this links to a PDF); again these authors record this erroneously as p.v;
although in the edition to which I have linked, it is p.xliii -- RL], then the
mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical
that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary
propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities
which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products
of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of
physical theorising, such as
Planck's constant."
[Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original
have been altered to conform with those adopted at this site.]
As
should be clear from all that has gone
before, DM-theorists have bought into this view of 'necessary truths' (even if
few of them use that particular phrase -- although Lenin and
Dietzgen
seem to have been rather fond of it; more on that in a later Essay).
For example, dialecticians in general locate
the cause of
change in
the relation they believe holds between internally-linked opposite (logical?) properties of objects and
processes. But, why this should cause change is left entirely unexamined.
Indeed, it is
left as a
brute fact, as the above passage suggests it always must remain -- in which
case, it is
just a fact about the world that 'contradictions' cause change. No further
explanation is necessary.
In reality, this
account of change is plainly a consequence of a certain way of
describing things (and in a fetishised way, into the bargain), as we
will discover in Essay
Twelve Part One.
Nevertheless, as we have alreadyseen, there is no reason why contradictory states of affairs should cause
change any more than there is a reason to suppose that non-contradictory states
should. Both of these options rely on descriptions of the
presumed, or even imposed,
relations between objects and processes (but not on evidence since (i) no
further explanation is possible and (ii) it isn't possible to
verify or confirm their
existence); they supposedly capture or picture processes in nature that are held
capable of making other objects or processes change or 'develop'. Again,
how
and why they are able to do this is left as a brute fact.
Even an appeal to 'contradictory forces' --
in order
to explain why things change -- merely involves yet more objects
and processes, more brute facts, none of which adds anything to the
'necessitation' that such an account promised, and now requires. In the end,
these forces depend on
certain descriptions of them being translated into the vocabulary of
QM (or some other branch of
Physics), and hence into
another set propositions expressing yet more brute facts. When asked why forces
must do what they do (or even why a
Field, say, is capable of making anything move) the only
response possible is: "They just do.... It's just a fact about
forces/fields/...". Indeed, as should seem plain,
Differential Equations,
Hamiltonians,
Matrices and the
Kronecker Delta can't actually move anything about the
place, or even deflect a single particle from its path.
Moreover, the infinite regress (or
even a "bad
infinity") dialecticians hoped to avoid by appealing to 'internal
contradictions' now simply reappears elsewhere in
their theory. When it is fleshed-out, DM just relates objects
and processes to yet more objects and processes
(or, to be more honest, yet more words about objects and processes), as well as
to 'negations', 'opposites', and 'interpenetrations', and the like (i.e., yet more "brute facts",
either about the world, or about how human beings are supposed (by
dialecticians) to think and talk), 'internal' to other objects and processes.
In all this, the necessitation that
had originally been sought simply vanishes in an impenetrable mist of jargon (which leads "who
knows where?"). In this regard, the logical, or 'rational', foundation for knowledge
constructed by DM-advocates turns out to be no different in form from any concocted by
Traditional Metaphysicians. In place
of the reasons we were promised (i.e., the "why and the how" of things), all we find are
yet more
DM-objects and processes(or, again, yet more
words about what they think are objects and processes) -- except, these have now been shunted off into a
mysterious, 'abstract' realm, fluffed-up with a handful of vague terms-of-art (like, "mediation", "unity in difference",
"internally related", "thing-in-itself"), of convenient and
permanent obscurity,all of which possess impressive Idealist credentials.
While DM-theorists promised the world a brand
new set of explanations, all they delivered was a batch of
shop-soiled goods
imported from
Traditional Philosophy, comprised
almost entirely of jargonised expressions, masking the 'brute facts' hidden beneath,
indeed, as Lenin himself acknowledged:
"The history of philosophy and the history of
social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling
'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified
doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the
development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists
precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the
foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate
continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of
philosophy, political economy and socialism.
"The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive
and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable
with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It
is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth
century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and
French socialism." [Lenin,
Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone
added.]
Despite this, how does Meikle address the problem of
change? Indeed, how does he introduce opposition?
"The poles of an opposition are not just united.
They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within
that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of
labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that
contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and
exchange-value within it." [Meikle (1979), p.26.]
Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted,
it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, this appears to be just another
brute fact and not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe.
Unfortunately, there are so many metaphors in the above passage it isn't easy to
make much sense of it. Anyway, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has
reified the products of social relations (e.g., use-, and exchange-value, etc.),
and in this reified state they have become the actual agents, with human
beings (or, perhaps, even commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to
understand the word "repel", here? Do they actually repel each other (like
magnets, or electrical charges)? Or, do we do this 'repelling' because of the way we
manufacture use values and then exchange them?
And
do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one another? Does use value
struggle with and then change into exchange value -- as the
DM-classics assure us
they must?
[Incidentally, I am using the word "patient" here in its older sense;
that is, it relates to that which is acted upon, not that which acts.]
Independently of this,
it is worth asking: How can the forms that underpin use-, and
exchange-value (EF and RF) provide an analogue of
the forces Meikle requires? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other
bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial conditions first, the most important of which is
that they should at least
have the decency to exist. But, as we have seen, these two forms can't
co-exist. So, other than conceptually, how can they possibly repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other
objects and processes to repel -- anything?
That is, of course, the
non-dialectical rock upon which we have
seen all such Idealist speculations founder.
It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thought
about the simple commodity form. But, even there, they can't co-exist,
for if they could, they wouldn't "mutually exclude" one another! On
the other hand, if they do genuinely "exclude" one another, we can't even think
of them acting on one another, for if we were so to think of them both at once,
we
would, of necessity, be misconceiving them.
Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling
match taking place in our heads,
such that, when we think of the one it elbows out of the way (out of
existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we could declare
EF
the winner over RF by two falls to a submission (UK
rules)?
Figure Nine: EF Slam Dunks
RF
In A Skull Near You
Furthermore, even if
in thought they could exist together, that would be of little help since it makes a
mockery of Meikle's appeal to de re
necessities. This retreat into the Ideal leaves him with two seriously
undernourished de dicto 'skeletons' shadow boxing each other instead of
the robust
de re 'pugilists' we had all along been promised.
Of course,
it could be objected that the fact that something is an RF excludes it
from being an EF. That is where the opposition
arises; the one is the opposite of the other.
But, "opposite" isn't the same as "oppositional", as we have
already seen.
Despite this, it could be
maintained that these are opposite poles of the
same kind -- that is they both qualify the commodity form. But,
"commodity" isn't a specific term (unlike "domestic cat", which is species
specific), it is generic (that is, it is a general term applying to many
different kinds of use values).
And we have also seen that if an organism is a tulip,
that excludes it from being an elephant without implying opposition; and
"organism" is a generic term, too.
So, we still
lack a derivation of opposition
from exclusion; the assertion that the former implies the
latter clearly isn't enough.
Is there a way out of this
Dialectical
Quagmire? Meikle thinks
there is:
"But in its simple form, the commodity is an
unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may
present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities,
or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their
realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its
potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that
will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence
with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Ibid., p.26.]
It now seems that metaphor is all Meikle has to offer
his bemused readers in support of his attempt
to make this mysterious process comprehensible. And, it is quite
clear where all this reification has landed him: the commodity itself
invented money, not human beings! Or, perhaps even: the commodity form mesmerised human beings into inventing money.
Once again,
if that were the case,
we would be the patients, while those
metaphorical beings (i.e., these disembodied 'commodities') are the real agents of social change!
In which case,
given this approach, the Ideal constitutes the Real, just as Idealists have
all along maintained.
How else are
we to understand the above passage?
[There is a
faint echo here of Leibniz's
"monads" (which he regarded as a logical extension to Aristotle's concept
of substance (ousia) -- on
that see here,
here,
here, and
here). We may think we
control some objects and the events they cause (or in which they find themselves
embroiled --, or
even the bodies with which
they interact), but they in fact control themselves since they are self-motivated,
self-propelled
beings, miniature intelligences whose 'necessities' follow from the fact that
they 'contain' every predicate that is, has been, or ever will be true of them.
So, while we might think that commodities have value (exchange-, and/or use-value),
because of the relationship they have to human activity, in reality they
possess an intrinsic value which force us to employ them in the way we
end up doing. In this case, it seems they coerced or bamboozled our ancestors into inventing money! As we will
soon see, that
interpretation of Meikle's theory isn't as crazy as might at first sight
seem.]
Is there any way of re-configuring this theory so it can be
rescued from the shredder before
the switch is thrown? Well, Meikle turns to
Aristotle
for assistance; but before he does that he (in effect) concedes the truth
of the above observation, for it seems that these value forms do indeed force
us humans to do their bidding:
"This line of development is not accidental or
fortuitous; it is not a process of aggregating contingent and extraneous
additions. It is, rather, process of development of the potentialities within,
and the increasing differentiation of, an original whole. If history does not
block the growth of exchange activity, then that growth will find out the
inadequacy of the simple form of value. Then, looked at from the point of view
of
efficient causation, those engaged in that activity, being rational and
inventive in the face of the problems thrown up by their developing class
interests, will act so as to solve their practical difficulties by measures that
overcome that insufficiency to the requirements of their developing commerce.
The solution to their practical problems is the money-form." [Ibid., pp.26-27.]
Now, this either means that:
(i) Those involved in the
invention of money were hapless puppets of these (pre-existing) value forms, or,
(ii) They
had a clear understanding of the nature of use-, and exchange-value -- which
must at least have been equal to Marx's, but more than two-and-a-half thousand
years before he was
born --, so that they
could make the 'correct' set of rational choices in such circumstances.
Otherwise, how could these value
forms exercise any sort of causal influence on those who invented money?
As we have already seen:
"But in its simple form, the commodity is an
unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may
present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities,
or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their
realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its
potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that
will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence
with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Ibid., p.26.]
No problem; Meikle tackles that unexpected difficulty head-on:
"Looked at from the point of view of final
causation, money is the final cause of this phase of social development. This is
not to say that final causation is a form of efficient causation in which the
future acts on the past, such that the developed form beckons from the future to
the past less developed form; rather, the embryonic entity has a structure that
develops, if it develops, along a certain line. Thus, final causation and
efficient causation, here, are not mutually exclusive but mutually supportive:
the one explaining the emergence of the other, and the other the success and
development of the one. What we have here is a development that, barring
accidents, will take its course -- an evolution that is necessary; its final
form immanent as a potentiality within its original one." [Ibid., p.27.]
Fine words, but merely asserting that
final and efficient causes are "mutually supportive" won't cut mustard. How is
it possible for
"the future [to act] on the past"?
Meikle resolves this conundrum by telling us that "the embryonic entity has a
structure that develops, if it develops, along a certain line".
And yet,
this solves nothing, for,
as we saw earlier, it seems to mean that some sort of
plan or program must have been written into these value forms that 'determined'
how they should --, indeed, must -- develop, rather like a fertilised seed or egg has a genetic code
that (we are told) does likewise -- which suspicion has only been prompted by Meikle's frequent use of
embryonic language.
[That, of course, implicates this view of social development with other,
well known ancient
and mystical ideas connected with belief in the Cosmic or
Orphic Egg (a topic briefly mentioned in
Part One of this Essay, and again
in Essay Eleven Parts One
and Two, but more
fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here)). And,
as we will see in a later re-write of Essay Eight Part Three, this represents an
anthropomorphic (Leibnizian or Hegelian) view of development, and is, of course,
part of the reason why DM itself is inherently teleological.]
But,
perhaps this is once again being a little too hasty, for Meikle now introduces the
aforementioned Aristotelian concepts in order to neutralise these annoying 'difficulties':
"The necessity that Marx sees in the line
of development of the value-form is that which Aristotle contrasts with events
that are 'accidental' and it is bound up with organic systems and Aristotle's
conception of
ousia. Where there is
constant reproduction there is a whole system, an ousia." [Ibid., p.27.]
"[E]verything that happens phusei, 'by
nature', happens always or for the most part, but nothing that happens apo
tuches, by 'chance', or apo tautomatou, 'just of itself', happens
thus frequently. Therefore, no natural events are thus purely accidental, and
therefore all natural events are non-accidental. But all non-accidental events
are heneka tou, 'serve some purpose', are given sense by their ends....
The fact that rain is always being produced makes it impossible to doubt that
there is an organic system here, and such systems are 'finalistically'
identified. To answer the question 'what is it?' we must reply in terms of its
natural line of development...genesis, the process of coming-to-be-, is what it
is because ousia is what it is, and not vice versa." [Clark
(1975), pp.60-61, quoted in Meikle (1979), pp.27-28. Italic emphases in the
original.]
In
this we see clear references to 'divine providence', and the nauseating stench of
Christian Mysticism, which once again helps explain why so many DM-fans
(especially those who hale from the
HCD-wing
of Dialectal Mysticism)
revert to open and honest mysticism quite so often and so readily. Indeed, this is no surprise
at all given Marx's
opinion of Philosophy in general:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis
added.]
Unfortunately,
linguistic chicanery like this fails to solve the problem,
for the necessities pictured here work only if one is prepared to
anthropomorphise nature. That is
because as soon as it is asked why events can't proceed otherwise than they in
fact do, it becomes obvious (from the above) that events must exercise
some sort of control over others that have yet to occur (which is problematic in
itself since they don't yet exist to be acted upon, or controlled!), directing them along the right "natural line" (which is why Meikle
found he had to use that phrase). Either that, or they develop in "line" with
their 'entire concept', in accordance with the complete
list of predicates that has somehow been
programmed into them.
And
this, too, is quite clearly the point of all that talk about "ends" and
"purposes" in both Aristotle and Leibniz's theories; they
formed part of an
overtly mystical doctrine, the nature of which
Meikle simply ignores, and which only works if nature is controlled by some sort
of 'Mind', as
Aristotle certainly believed -- or, it is populated with 'tiny minds',
'programmed' by 'God' to behave the way they do, as Leibniz also imagined.
So, it is worth pointing out once again: dialecticians can only make their
'theory' even seem to work if they adopt the a priori
thought-forms concocted by earlier
ruling-class thinkers and card-carrying mystics.
[Aristotle and Plato are in fact the two most important figures in this respect,
with Leibniz and Hegel on the subs' bench.] Meikle nails his colours
firmly to this mystical mast: if nature has a purpose, as it had for
Aristotle and
Leibniz, then that implies the status
quo must be, and is in fact, in harmony with it -- or, is perhaps developing toward that end. And, if that is so, the status
quo can't legitimately be challenged. Indeed, if this were the case, the future
would be as
determined as any
Second International theorist ever supposed it was.
In which case,
the rule
of the
elite isn't 'accidental', either, but serves some rational,
'god'-ordained 'end' (and we all know
what that is), which further implies human beings are mere puppets of 'history',
there being no such thing as 'human agency' in such a universe.
Again, in that case, we are the patients,
history is the agent.
Or,
so this approach to theory would seem to imply.
The reader will
now no doubt
now appreciate more fully why I asserted
this back in Essay Two:
As
will soon become apparent, for all their claims to be radical, when it
comes to Philosophy
DM-theorists are
surprisingly conservative -- and universally incapableof
seeing this even after it has been pointed out to them!
At a
rhetorical level, this conservatism is camouflaged behind what at first sight
appears to be a series of disarmingly modest denials --,
which are then promptly flouted.
The
quotations listed...in
Note 1 show that DM-theorists are anxious to
deny that their system is wholly or even partly
a priori, or that it has been imposed on
the world, not merely read from it. However, the way that dialecticians actually
phrase their theories contradicts these superficially modest-looking claims,
revealing that the opposite
is in fact the case.
This
inadvertent dialectical inversion -- whereby what DM-theorists say
about what they do is the reverse of what they actually do
with what they say -- neatly mirrors the distortion to which Traditional
Philosophy has subjected ordinary language over the last two millennia (outlined in Essays
Three Parts
One and
Two, and Twelve Part
One), a point underlined by Marx himself:
"The
philosophers have only to dissolve their
language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to
recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to
realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their
own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
However, unlike
dialecticians, Traditional Metaphysicians were quite open and honest about what
they were doing; indeed, they brazenly imposed their a priori theories on
reality, and hung the consequences.
But,
because dialecticians have a novel (but nonetheless defective) view of both
Metaphysics and FL (on that, see
here and
here), they are oblivious of the
fact that they are just as eager as Traditional Theorists have always been to
impose their ideas on the world, and equally blind to the fact that in so-doing
they are aping the
alienated thought-forms of those whose society they seek to abolish.
Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked before
they were even loaded; with such weapons, it is no wonder that DM-theorists
fire nothing but philosophical blanks.
DM is
a conservative theory precisely because its adherents have imported and
then adopted the
distorted methods,
a priori
thought-forms, theories and meaningless jargon of Traditional Philosophy.
[This topic was discussed at length in Essay Three
Part Two; the reader is
referred there for more details. It will again be covered in Essay Three Part
Five. The theoretical background to all this will be analysed more fully in Essay Twelve
Parts Two and Three (summary
here).]
Of course, Meikle should have paid heed to Marx's
warning not to take philosophical jargon seriously:
"...[A]nd even, here and there,
in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of
expression peculiar to him [Hegel]." [Marx (1976),
p.103. Bold emphasis added.]
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Now, there are far better ways than this
to make
sense of Das Kapital; there is no need to appeal to Leibnizian or
even mystical Hegelian concepts to make it work. [I will, however, leave that to another time.]
It might
seem to some that an effective response to the above could be constructed along
lines suggested, for example, by
Roslyn
Bologh:
"A contradiction occurs when a term refers to two mutually
exclusive things, A and not-A. This is the case with the category, exchange
value. It is both a use value and not a use value. A commodity has a calculable
exchange value regardless of the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of
any use value. Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use
value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value,
the commodity must have a use value." [Bologh (1979). Italic emphasis in
the original.]
However, Bologh's 'definition' of "contradiction" leaves much to be desired, and
looks suspiciously like it was tailored to fit the example chosen -- in other
words, this is a persuasive definition. [On that, see
here.] Independently of
the latter, her
definition is defective in its own right -- not the least because, and once again, we aren't told
what these As are. Furthermore, Bologh seems rather confused, since her
'contradiction' occurs when a "term" refers to letters "A" and "not-A",
as opposed to 'things':
"A contradiction occurs when a term
refers to two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A." [Ibid.]
Nevertheless, it looks like Bologh's example might help to resolve this
minor difficulty:
"This is the case with the category, exchange value. It is
both a use value and not a use value." [Ibid.]
So, the contradiction appears to be this:
B1: Exchange value is both a use value and not a
use value.
From
this it appears that these As are (in this case) noun phrases, or they are what the latter supposedly
designate. Earlier we had
occasion to point out that when these As are interpreted as phrases (or,
again, what they supposedly
designate), no contradiction is implied, but Bologh has circumvented that
difficulty by situating them in a propositional context.
However, the other things she says only succeed in undermining
the status of B1 as an example of a genuine contradiction:
"A commodity has a calculable exchange value regardless of
the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of any use value. Hence, in
determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the
other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a
use value." [Ibid.]
This means that B1 actually becomes this:
B2: An exchange value isn't a use value when it
is being determined as an exchange value, but it is a use value when that
exchange value has to be realised.
In other words, B1 becomes:
B3: Exchange value is
A at
t1
and not A at t2
(t2
> t1).
But, that is no more a contradiction than this is:
B4: Tony Blair was the UK Prime Minister but he
no longer is.
For B1 to be
a contradiction it would have to become this:
B5: Exchange value is both a use value and not a
use value at the same time and in the same respect.
The following might assist the reader in more fully appreciating
this point (partially quoted from
here).
Added by a supporter of this site ('Nemesis'):
At Marxism 1990, in separate meetings on dialectics I was given two,
three minute impromptu slots in the discussion period at the end. It is only possible to make highly superficial
points in such short intervals, which, because they challenge fundamental
ideas, are quite easy to dismiss. However, the level of argument advanced in response to
what I had said
was quite lamentable....
In the refectory [later], I engaged in
debate with Andy Wilson...who attempted unsuccessfully
to explain what a 'dialectical contradiction' is.
His example (that the revolutionary party both is and is not a part of the
working class) was easy to dispose of as an undischarged ambiguity. That is, the
revolutionary party is part of the working class in so far as..., while it isn't part of the working class
in so far as.... (Readers can fill in the blanks according to their own theory
of the party.) But this is no more a contradiction, let alone a 'dialectical
contradiction', than this would be: Das Kapital is part of my personal
library and not part of my personal library. It is part of my library in so far
as I have a copy of the book on my shelves. But, it isn't part of my library in
so far this particular book (i.e., the original) isn't
identical with any of its copies. So, the actual book Marx wrote (in
his own hand-writing) isn't on my shelves.... [Compare this with the
examples Rosa gives of ambiguous pseudo-contradictions in Essay
Five.]
Filling in the missing "in so far as..." that Bologh omits, her
example is really of this form:
B6: Exchange value is an A that is
F, but not an A
that is G.
Where the
phrase "in so far as..."
expands as follows:
B6a: Exchange value is an A in so far as it is
F, but
not an A in so far as it is G.
Consequently,
as soon as the ambiguity in Bologh's original
persuasive definition is discharged (via B6/B6a) we can see that no
contradiction is implied.
Later in
the book, Bologh repeated the above 'definition' in a
slightly modified form:
"A contradiction occurs when a term means two mutually
exclusive things, A and not-A. A contradictory form of life of life is a
totality of opposing moments, moments that negate each other. This is the case
with the commodity in the form of capital." [Ibid., p.64.]
As we saw above, it isn't too clear how these "moments" succeed
in "negating" each other. Does exchange value "negate" use value? Do objects
actually become useless at any point in this process? Do objects that have a
use cease to be exchangeable? Do they 'oppose' one another like the two
wrestlers we met earlier? But, they would have to do this if the above were the
case.
In the next
few paragraphs Bologh does make some attempt to explain what she means, but
those passages merely repeat what we saw
earlier, only with more jargon
thrown in for good measure.
In fact, Bologh's whole book is a classic example of a Marxist
intellectual (seemingly haphazardly) throwing Hegelian jargon, unintelligible phrases and dogmatic
assertions at the page.
Convoluted prose
like this is de rigeur in
HCD
circles. HCDs dote on it and positively refuse to regard anything that isn't
couched in such
terms, expressed in
prolix
jargon, as 'genuine theory'. [On that, see
here.
Recent classic examples of that intellectual malaise can be found in
this
exchange.]
In which case, it is still far from clear what either Meikle or
Bologh (or Rees from earlier) mean by "dialectical contradiction", or, even if such ill-defined beings exist,
and how they can actually make anything change --
unless, that is, DM-theorists think we should anthropomorphise nature and society to
order, and read human
traits into inanimate objects and processes at every turn.
[I pick this theme up again in Essay Thirteen
Part Three. On
Quine, see Arrington and Glock (1996), Glock (2003), Hacker
(1996), pp.189-227. See also this
PDF (which is an article about Quine's method, written by
Peter Hacker).]
Having said that, a genuine attempt was made in
Heilbroner (1980) to try to render the term "dialectical contradiction"
comprehensible. Heilbroner's account, although not always sympathetic to
Marxism, has the distinct advantage of being much clearer than most DM-theorists
care to be,
especially when it comes to explaining what a 'dialectical contradiction' is (and in
a much less jargon-polluted environment, too).
However, after making a rather poor attempt to define a logical contradiction, Heilbroner
added the following thoughts:
"This kind of logical contradiction
is not, however, the meaning of contradiction that applies to dialectics. In
dialectics, the word does not refer to the simultaneous assertion and denial of
the existence of static things; instead it refers to the nature of those
conflicting elemental processes that are believed to constitute the essence of
reality itself. As a first rough description of what such a 'contradiction'
implies, we can resort to another famous Hegelian phrase -- 'the unity of
opposites'. Contradictions therefore refer to the idea that all of reality is
changeful because it consists, in its very innermost being, of the unstable
coexistence and successive resolution of incompatible forces....
"Hegel gives us a famous example of
this...in his discussion of the terms Master and Servant. The very concept of
Master, he shows, implies the opposite of such a concept in the Servant, one who
is mastered. Without the idea of one, we cannot form the idea of the other,
although each idea 'by itself' is the contradiction (the 'negation,' in Hegel's
terminology) of the other. Note that this use of contradiction does not assert
that a Master 'is' and 'is not,' which would involve us in the same absurdity as
making that assertion about a stone. [From earlier: "Thus, we cannot say that a
stone exists and that it does not exist, referring to the same stone at the same
instant." (p.34) -- RL] Rather, the point is that a Master is a being who can
only be defined or described by using a concept that is its meaningful opposite or
negation. Without Servants there are no Masters, and vice versa." [Heilbroner
(1980), pp.35-36. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
What
we are still owed, however, is some explanation why any of this constitutes a
contradiction. It isn't as if the following is true "MM is a master and not a
master", or even "SP is a servant and not a servant". To be sure, as part
of our understanding of the word "master" (used in this way) we associate the
word "servant", just as we understand that a servant isn't a master. In that
sense then it would be true to say: "SP isn't a master" -- or more
generally "A servant isn't a master". But, not even thatis a contradiction,
so why such things have been called 'dialectical contradictions' is still far
from clear. [But, see below.]
Of
course, DM-theorists are at liberty to call anything they like a 'dialectical
contradiction' (not that they need my permission -- but see
here), however, what they aren't entitled to do is claim this
cobbled-together theory of theirs represents a superior form of logic when compared with
FL, and that is because this term ("dialectical
contradiction") has been
introduced by means of a stipulation --
i.e.,
it is
an imposition on the facts
by any other name. As such, it bears no connection with the criticism of
Aristotle's concept of a contradiction (which at least was supposed to be one point of departure for
Hegelian dialectics).
This means, of course, that Hegel and DM-theorists might just as well have
chosen "coffee grinder", and have called putative 'dialectical contradictions',
"dialectical coffee grinders" for all the good that would have done. There seems to be just as much justification for
calling these 'contradictions', "coffee grinders", as there is for calling them
"dialectical contradictions".
[If
we throw in Kant's comments about 'real opposition', it might seem we could
construct
an acceptable rationale for linking these terms together, and hence for calling
such things "dialectical contradictions". That seemingly promising
'dialectical life-line' has been permanently cut, the rope incinerated, in Appendix A.]
But,
Heilbroner adds the following thoughts which might appear to clarify things
somewhat:
"...[T]he presence of conflicts
within social processes does not in itself suffice to establish these conflicts
as contradictions. The social world, like the natural world, is full of
opposing forces, most of which have no more 'contradictory' significance than
the chance encounter of two particles.... Contradictions refer to those
oppositions that are both necessary for, and destructive of, particular
entities." [Ibid., p.39. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Quite
apart from still failing to explain exactly why the word "contradiction" is
appropriate
here, we have seen in this Essay that no sense can be made of attempts to equate opposing forces
with contradictions, at any level. So, the above words turn out to be no help at all.
Heilbroner now gets to the heart of the problem (which, to some, might seem to be
an effective response to many of the points made in the last few paragraphs):
"The difficulty arises, I believe,
because many critics continue to interpret 'contradiction' in its logical,
Aristotelian sense in which the contradiction (sic) of A is not-A. This easily reduces
dialectical usage to violations of sense and meaning.... But that is not the
meaning that contradiction holds as a relational view of the world. The logical
contradiction (or 'opposite' or 'negation') of a Master is not a Slave but
'not-Master', which may or may not be a slave. But the relational opposite of a
Master is indeed a Slave, for it is only by reference to this second 'excluded'
term that the first is defined." [Ibid., p.41.]
Once again, the above is a caricature even
of Aristotle's understanding of contradiction, as we saw in
Essay Four,
but we can let that annoying niggle slide for now. Independently of this, A can
only be part of a contradiction (A and not-A) if it stood
for a proposition or a clause; but we can see that, according to
Heilbroner, "A" stands for "Master" and "not-A" for "not-Master",
two phrases! So, we don't even have a contradiction here, let alone the mutant
'dialectical' variant.
However,
Heilbroner's use of "excluded" calls to mind the words Marx used to characterise
the connection between RF and EF, we met earlier:
"The relative
form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent
and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are
mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression.
They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into
relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in
linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the
contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else
than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of
the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other
commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore,
the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an
equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent
cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not
the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the
material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are
worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1
coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation,
in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that
the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity
cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both
forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive."
[Marx (1996),
pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of
commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The
differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away
these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can
exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are
reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly
falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from
it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to
go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid.,
p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
But, this 'exclusivity' falls foul of
what Hegel and Engels had argued elsewhere:
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite.Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the
same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to
its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the
contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence,
§119.
Bold emphasis added. The serious problems this dogmatic and a priori
diktat creates for Hegel, which he nowhere tries to justify, are detailed
here.]
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or
does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else.
Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in
a rigid antithesis one to the other.
"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is
that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable
fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful
adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the
metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a
number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular
object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it
becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In
the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them;
in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of
that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood
for the trees." [Engels
(1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"For a stage in the outlook
on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all
opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical
method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no
hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which
bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises
also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is
the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage.
Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical
categories retain their validity." [Engels
(1954), pp.212-13.
Bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Plainly,
this would make Marx's economic
and social theory metaphysical, since his distinction between these two
forms of value is a hard and fast
dichotomy!
If RF and
EF
are mutually exclusive --
"A single commodity
cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both
forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive...." --
then we would have here a reasonably clear 'either/or'! On the other hand, if there is no exclusivity
in this case, the sort of 'dialectical relationalism' that Heilbroner
describes falls apart. If no master can be a slave -- which means that MM, say, is
either a master or a slave, but not both -- then a core principle of
Hegel's dialectic disintegrates. On the other hand, if a worker can be
a boss as well as a worker, and a boss can be a worker as well
as a boss, too -- if the two main classes under capitalism aren't mutually
exclusive -- then Marx's social theory bites the dust that was left behind by Hegel's
decayed
corpse.
This
brings us to a consideration of a
'problem' that has been touched on several times throughout this Essay: if
the capitalist class and the proletariat imply
each other, such that one can't exist without the other, and both are mutually exclusive classes, then:
(a) Engels
should have labelled Marx's work 'metaphysical' (since, as we saw at the end of
the last sub-section, this idea is based on an overt use of 'either'/'or');
And,
(b)
There should be a very clear distinction between the two classes such that,
concerning
any given wage or salary earner, it should be crystal clear to which class
they
belong.
If this were
a logical question the answer to (b) would be crystal clear; but
it isn't. That is why Marxists have for decades spilt much ink
in an attempt even to define the proletariat and the capitalist class,
as well as specify exactly who falls into which category, often markedly disagreeing with one another. Is every white collar
worker a proletarian? What about the unemployed or the families of
proletarians? Their children, their partners, their retired grandparents? What
about strike-breakers, security guards, community police, those on zero-hour
contracts, unpaid interns, 'self-employed'
gig-economy workers (Über
and Lyft drivers, etc.),
or those who are between jobs? What about individuals on long-term stay in hospital or
the terminally ill? What are we to say about those who have taken a year off to do
charity work in, for example, Indonesia, or public servants tasked with
pressuring the unemployed to 'find work'? What about members of the military
(squaddies and the lower ranks), cops,
prison guards, immigration workers, or junior managers who perhaps have a second job as
bar-tenders or salesmen/women? What about professional footballers,
entertainers, rock, media and film stars? What about pensioners? What do we say
about those who work in public relations, marketing, or advertising? What about
workers who own shares? What about bloggers, or those who now derive most or all
their income from social media? And how do we classify sex workers? How does the unpaid
housework of "homemakers" fit into this paradigm? Or students who have part-time jobs?
What do we even say about 'professional revolutionaries'?
If
the class to which any or all of the above belong were simply a logical
question, and the connection between them and the capitalist class were a 'dialectical-logical relation', the answer would be
perfectly clear, just as it is clear
to which set of numbers,
π, for instance, belongs, or which grammatical category "to be" should
be assigned. But, it isn't. Deciding to which class a group or an individual belongs
is one of the thorniest areas of Marxist theory. Any who doubt this should check
out
Callinicos (1983), and Callinicos and Harman (1987). I happen to agree with
much of what Callinicos and Harman have to say, but there will be many who
don't. Indeed, Callinicos even admitted that readers of Socialist Worker
objected to his analysis -- and that must include members of his own party! [Callinicos (1983),
p.87.] Clearly, it wouldn't be necessary to write such articles -- or even books like
Wright (1985/1998, 1989/1998) -- if this were a plain-and-simple, logical
distinction.
[Update October 2023: See also
this excellent video
(and my response to it in the comment section).]
"Class is not a fixed and positivistic position that can be defined by exact
boundaries. Rather, it is a social relationship, and individuals are always
bound within a mesh of different such connections. The result is a complex of
social tendencies, not static categories." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2021.]
But, not even Alexander attempted to derive one
class 'logically' from any other, or, indeed, from anything else. His reference to
"positivism" was slightly misleading since even he will have to refer to
(empirical) data at
some point in order to identify the relevant classes -- indeed, as Callinicos
and Harman did (in the studies mentioned above).
Unfortunately, Marx left us with no clear or comprehensive guidance on
this issue. Indeed,
Volume Three of Das Kapital notoriously breaks off with the section on Classes
left
unfinished:
"The owners
merely of labour-power, owners of capital, and land-owners, whose respective
sources of income are wages, profit and ground-rent, in other words,
wage-labourers, capitalists and land-owners, constitute then three big classes
of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of production.
"In
England, modern society is indisputably most highly and classically developed in
economic structure. Nevertheless, even here the stratification of classes does
not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate
lines of demarcation everywhere (although incomparably less in rural districts
than in the cities). However, this is immaterial for our analysis. We have seen
that the continual tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of
production is more and more to divorce the means of production from labour, and
more and more to concentrate the scattered means of production into large
groups, thereby transforming labour into wage-labour and the means of production
into capital. And to this tendency, on the other hand, corresponds the
independent separation of landed property from capital and labour, or the
transformation of all landed property into the form of landed property
corresponding to the capitalist mode of production.
"The first
question to he answered is this: What constitutes a class? -- and the reply to
this follows naturally from the reply to another question, namely: What makes
wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords constitute the three great social
classes?
"At first
glance -- the identity of revenues and sources of revenue. There are three great
social groups whose members, the individuals forming them, live on wages, profit
and ground-rent respectively, on the realisation of their labour-power, their
capital, and their landed property.
"However,
from this standpoint, physicians and officials, e.g., would also constitute two
classes, for they belong to two distinct social groups, the members of each of
these groups receiving their revenue from one and the same source. The same
would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into which
the division of social labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and
landlords -- the latter, e.g., into owners of vineyards, farm owners, owners of
forests, mine owners and owners of fisheries."
"[Here the
manuscript breaks off.]" [Marx (1998),
pp.870-71.]
In which case, the question now becomes: To whom does this comment apply: "Unpaid
surplus-labour is pumped out of the direct producers"? [Marx, quoted in Callinicos
(1983), p.82.] But, not every worker produces "surplus value" -- or do they?
That, too, is controversial. It is connected with what Marx called "productive
labour". Here is Callinicos, again:
"Marx defines productive labour as follows:
'Productive labour, in its meaning for capitalist production, is wage-labour
which, exchanged against the variable part of capital...reproduces not only this
part of capital (or the value of its own labour-power), but in addition produces
surplus-value for the capitalist.' Productive labour is thus labour productive
of surplus-value. Unproductive labour, on the other hand, 'is labour which is
not exchanged with capital, but directly with revenue, that is, with wages or
profit.'
"The distinction between
productive and unproductive labour is, therefore, one
between labour which contributes to the self-expansion of
capital and labour which does not. Marx's main example of
the latter is that of domestic servants, the largest single
category of workers in Victorian Britain, employed out of
the revenue of the middle and upper classes. The precise implications of
Marx's theory of productive and unproductive labour are not
wholly clear. However, the interpretation most consistent
with the version of the theory expounded in Capital volumes
2 and 3 suggests that only those wage-labourers involved in
the production of commodities (including their
transportation to the point of final consumption) are seen
by Marx as productive labourers.
"Marx argues, for example, that
time devoted to the circulation of commodities -- buying and
selling, book-keeping and so on -- is a pure cost to
capital, creating no surplus-value. A commercial capitalist
who invests in these activities merely creates a claim to
the surplus value created elsewhere, and thus reduces the
general rate of profit. If the capitalist employs
wage-labourers 'this advance of capital creates neither
product nor value. It reduces pro tanto [to such an
extent -- RL] the dimensions in which the advanced capital
functions productively.' However, wage-labour employed to
transport goods does create surplus-value, since 'the
use-value of things is only materialised in their
consumption, and their consumption may necessitate a change
of location of these things, hence may require an additional
process of production in the transport industry.'
"If we accept productive labour
thus conceived as defining the working class, then only
wage-labourers in extractive, manufacturing, and freight
industries would form the proletariat. On such a view, the
working class would apparently be narrowed down to its
nineteenth-century stereotype of male manual workers.... This approach contradicts that
pursued by Marx in Capital. Marx himself insisted
that many white-collar workers were themselves productive
labourers. This was a result of the increasing socialisation
of production, which meant that:
'the real lever of the
overall labour-process is increasingly not the individual
worker. Instead, labour-power socially combined and
the various competing labour-powers which together form the
entire production machine participate in very different ways
in the immediate process of making commodities.... Some work
better with their hands, others with their heads, one as a
manager, engineer, technologist, etc, the other as overseer,
the third as manual labourer or even drudge. An
ever-increasing number of types of labour are included in
the immediate concept of productive labour, and those
who perform it are classed as productive workers,
workers directly exploited by capital and subordinated
to its process of production and expansion.' [Callinicos is
here quoting from the Results of the Immediate Process of
Production --
Productive and Unproductive Labour, published in the
Appendix to the Penguin edition of Capital Volume One,
i.e., Marx (1976), pp.1039-1040, although the version
on-line is clearly a different translation. Italic
emphases in the original published version, although
Callinicos has emphasised sections of this passage
differently.]
"Thus, all those who form part of
what Marx called 'the collective worker', the complex
division of labour involved in producing commodities, are
productive workers, even if they do not work with their
hands. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Marx
regarded only productive workers as forming the proletariat.
On the contrary, his analysis of commercial employees, whom
we have already seen he did not believe produced
surplus-value, suggests the opposite. Marx writes:
'In one respect a commercial
employee is a wage-worker. In the first place, his
labour-power is bought with the variable capital of the
merchant, not with money expended as revenue, and
consequently it is not bought for private service, but for
the purpose of expanding the capital advanced for it. In the
second place, the value of the labour-power, and thus his
wages, are determined as those of other wage-workers, i.e.,
by the cost of production and reproduction of his specific
labour-power, not by the product of his labour-power.'
[Callinicos is here quoting Capital Volume Three;
i.e., Marx (1998),
p.291 -- RL.]...
"As Erik Olin
Wright puts it:
'both
productive and unproductive workers are
exploited; both have unpaid labour
extorted from them. The only difference
is that in the case of productive
labour, unpaid labour-time is
appropriated as surplus-value; whereas
in the case of unproductive labour,
unpaid labour merely reduces the costs
to the capitalist of appropriating part
of the surplus-value produced elsewhere.
In both cases, the capitalist will try
to keep the wage-bill as low as
possible; in both cases the capitalist
will try to increase productivity by
getting workers to work harder; in both
cases, workers will be dispossessed of
control over their labour-process. In
both cases, socialism is a prerequisite
for ending exploitation. It is hard to
see where a fundamental divergence of
economic interests emerges from the
position of unproductive and productive
labour in capitalist relations of
production.' [Callinicos is here quoting
Wright (1985), pp.49-50 -- RL.]
"If we accept this reasoning, then
we must reject the 'narrow' definition of the proletariat as
comprised only of productive workers. Ernest Mandel offers
the following broad definition: 'The defining structural
characteristic of the proletariat in Marx’s analysis of
capitalism is the socio-economic compulsion to sell one’s
labour-power. Included in the proletariat, then, are not
only manual industrial workers, but all unproductive
wage-labourers who are subject to the same fundamental
constraints: non-ownership of means of production; lack of
direct access to the means of livelihood (the land is by no
means freely accessible!); insufficient money to purchase
the means of livelihood without more or less continuous sale
of labour-power'. [Callinicos is here quoting Ernest
Mandel's Introduction to the Penguin Edition of Capital
Volume Two -- RL.]...
"The implication of the previous
section is that the proletariat should broadly be identified
with the mass of wage-labourers. It follows that the present
century has seen a considerable expansion, rather than a
decline in the size of the working class...." [Callinicos (1983),
pp.87-94. Several paragraphs merged.]
Of course, if we don't accept this definition,
or, indeed, the reasoning behind it, then everything is up for grabs again. The point is that if
this were a 'dialectical-logical relation', it would be much clearer cut
and wouldn't depend on a contestable definition, a long and tortuous argument,
or the collection of data.
So,
because the decision about which class an individual or group belongs requires
in-depth analysis, complex argument, evidence and debate, the distinction
between the proletariat and the capitalist class can't be 'dialectical-logical'.
Like much else in science, this distinction is convention-based, dependent on decisions theorists
make, in tandem with the discussions, arguments and negotiations that take place
between theorists as they collectively arrive at some sort of consensus (that is,
if they do --, which, in Marxism, is, alas, all too rare). So the
relation between workers and capitalists isn't in the end
de
re it is de dicto.
This now means that
thebest
example of a 'dialectical relation' in a DM-theorist's box of tricks --
the link between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie -- isn't 'dialectical'
after all! Workers and capitalists don't imply one another
existentially -- at best, they do so conceptually, and even then they do
that only after much argument, re-definition, stage-setting, debate, data
collection and analysis!
But,
the question remains: Can one such class exist without the other? Plainly not, but
that is only because the two main classes in Capitalism have been inter-defined,
and that definition turns out to be about as clear as mud. Which explains all the
attendant theory, compounded by years of debate -- in an endeavour to come to some
sort of consensus, which has
yet to be achieved! Now, as I noted above, I largely accept Callinicos's
conclusions, but I had to be persuaded to that end. My agreement wasn't to be
had by asking me to think really, really hard about the definition of each
class.
Contrast that
with deciding to which (number) set the fraction, two-fifths, belongs, or whether a
regicide is a king-killer.
[As a side
note, if readers want to provoke a 'lively' (and interminable) debate online, in
a meeting, in a journal or even down the pub, just try asking for a definition
of productive labour or surplus value. Even better, ask exactly who
belongs to the proletariat and/or the capitalist class. You will be hard pressed
to find two Marxists who agree, or even agree how to decide on the answer.
But if this were a dialectico-logical or a dialectico-conceptual
question (on a par with deciding whether or not a vixen is a female fox, or even
if 2 + 3 = 5) there would be almost 100% consensus -- not the endless confusion
we still see concerning such issues, over 150 years since Das Kapital was
published! A small clue as to how such a discussion might go can be gleaned by
checking out the comment section below the
video to which I
linked earlier. Or the 'discussion' I have reproduced in Appendix C, concerning use value
and exchange value. Readers will no doubt notice how easy it was for me is to
sow confusion in the minds of the dialectical dogmatists who tried to take me
on. In both cases, conceptual chaos doesn't quite capture the nature or
mood of that 'debate'.]
All this is quite apart from the fact that we
have yet to be told why it is appropriate to call such things, or such relations, "contradictions",
to begin with. After, well over one hundred-and-fifty years, we are still owed an explanation. Just as it also quite apart from
the additional fact that none of this is of any use explaining how Hegel's
'relationalism' can conceivably apply to objects and processes in the natural
world. As we have seen in Essay Eleven Part Two, it isn't at all easy to
identify a
'Master-Slave dialectic' at work anywhere in the universe outwith human society. How, for example, could the Sun 'imply' the planet Mercury as part of its
'concept'/'definition', or vice versa? While employees might not be able
exist without employers, the Sun can surely exist without Mercury or Neptune.
Hegel tried to justify the application of the 'dialectic' beyond the social sphere by
appealing to a link that was supposed to exist between acids and bases, but we
have already seen that not
eventhat can be made to work. In which case, whatever one thinks of Hegel's
'logic' applied to social development, its application to nature looks about as
convincing as UK Tory and US Republican Party election videos.
And this, too, is quite apart from the
extra additional fact that, if the
DM-classicists are to be believed, and such things are actually related
to one another as
'dialectical opposites', they should struggle with and then turn into each other!
Has anyone noticed Mercury locked in a life-or-death struggle with the Sun and
then turn into it? Or the Sun turn into Mercury? Or, indeed, every master turn into a slave/servant, and vice versa?
Heilbroner's
'life-line' thus turns into
a much less appealing anvil:
Figure Ten: Hey! Comrades! Catch
This! It Will 'Dialectically'
In that case, the only options left open
to us in our endeavour to understand what John Rees had to say are F50 and F51. They
were:
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
C instead, where C is
a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
A and not A, as well
as B and C.
However, since these two are clearly variations upon F48 and F49, they don't appear to be viable alternatives. DM-apologists are welcome to make
of them what they can.
Even so, dialecticians
maintain that there are indeed 'true
contradictions' in reality. By far and away the most sophisticated of these
endeavours is to be found in the work of Graham
Priest. However, it is far from clear whether the 'contradictions' upon
which he focuses
are actually 'dialectical' -- that is, should we ever be told with any clarity what a 'dialectical
contradiction' actually is!
[Priest's work will be considered in more detail in an
Additional Essay to be posted at this site at a later date. In the meantime, readers should consult
this and
this.]
Veteran communist theoretician,
the late
Maurice
Cornforth, also attempted to argue that there
are 'true contradictions' in the natural and social world -- contrary to the view endorsed
at this site, which is that a
contradiction (in its simplest form, in logic and ordinary life) is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, which has nothing to do with 'what exists':
"The contradiction in things is a very
familiar state of affairs. There is nothing in the least abstruse about it, and
it is often referred to in everyday conversations. For example, we speak of a
man as having a 'contradictory' character, or as being 'a mass of
contradictions'…." [Cornforth
(1976), pp.92-93.]
In which case, presumably, when we describe someone as a "bit of
a puzzle" Cornforth thinks we mean that he or she can be purchased in a magic
store or a toy shop.
Or that when we read this:
we
should all try and remember our lines and stage cues, pay attention to the
director, make sure the audience can hear us and ignore the reviews?
Clearly, Cornforth has never heard of metaphor.
[Why the
above isn't
a literal use of "contradiction" is considered in more detail
below, where we will
also see
that "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradict", or even "contradiction".]
It is worth recalling that Hegel attempted to show that
logical contradictions, and not so much ordinary contradictions, were far too
one-sided, abstract and philosophically limited. His reconfiguration of this
troublesome word was intended to
transcend an alleged 'Aristotelian' view of contradiction. (As far as I am aware, he was silent about the everyday use of "contradict", and its cognates.) Now, DM-theorists might want to use "contradiction" in
a different way to Hegel
-- whether or not his theory and its 'contradictions' have been turned "the right way up" or
have been left
upside down --, but, if that were so, their 'contradictions', the
DM-variety, might not in that case (obviously) transcend
FL-contradictions. On
the other hand, if that were indeed so -- if they intended their use of
this word to be the same as Hegel's --, that would make
their criticisms of FL rather empty, since they wouldn't be addressing the same
term or concept. Nevertheless, they certainly intend that their
employment of this word should transcend the use of "contradiction" in FL, and
that is why I have largely restricted my attention to the latter area of
discussion (in
this Essay).
However, it is
also clear (from the examples they themselves give) that DM-theorists -- like Cornforth and the
others considered below -- focus on what look like ordinary contradictions
(as opposed to FL-contradictions, or even 'dialectical contradictions') when
they try to argue that there are 'true contradictions', or that 'contradictions'
exist in nature and society. It is clear, too, why they do that: FL-contradictions are totally uninteresting
(even when translated into the vernacular), and, what is worse, they are
politically useless, too.
Who, for example, is going to get excited about the following (these have been
taken from a letter sent
to
Socialist Review a few years back by a supporter of this site):
A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate
and there isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).
A2: Capitalism is governed by a blindly competitive
market and it isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).
Even these
two are merely discursive equivalents
of FL-contradictions. They are totally useless and exceedingly boring.
As we saw in
Essay Four Part One, DM-theorists
concentrate their attention on the simplest form of FL-contradictions, namely: p & ¬p. Seldom (in
fact never) do they consider more complex FL-contradictions. Here are
just two of the latter:
V1:
¬[(p
→
q) v (p
→
r)
↔
(p
→ (q v
r))].
V2: ¬[¬(Ex)(Fx & ¬Gx)
↔ (x)(Fx
→ Gx)].
[In the above, "(E...)" is the existential
quantifier
(and often stands for "There is at least one..." or even just "There is...");
"↔"
is a biconditional sign (and stands for "if and only if"); "(x)" is the
universal quantifier (and often goes proxy for "All..." or "Every..."); "&" stands for "and"; "v" is the inclusive "or"
(i.e, "and/or"); "¬"
stands for the negation operator ("It is not the case that...");
"→" is
the conditional sign (i.e., "If...then"); "p", "q", and "r" are propositional
variables; "F" and "G" are one-place,
first-level predicate letters; and "x" is a
second-level predicate-binding variable. (More details
can be found
here and
here.)]
V1 reads: "It isn't the case that [(if
p then q
or if p then r) if and only if (if p then q or r)]."
V2 reads: "It isn't the case that [(there isn't
something which is F and not G) if and only if (everything which, if it is
F,
is also G)]."
V2a:
"It isn't the case that [(there isn't
anything which is F and not G) if and only if (everything which, if it is
F,
is also G)]."
[V2a is perhaps a more colloquial semi-translation.]
These V1 and V2 are, of course, just two
examples of the potentially infinite number of logical
contradictions which can be generated in MFL, with ease. Nevertheless, DM-theorists would be hard-pressed
to find space -- even in their quirky universe -- for contradictions like
these (i.e., once they have been
interpreted).
Moreover,
dialecticians often conflate the LEM, the PB (or
propositional bi-polarity) and the LOC
with one another
--
and, indeed, all of them with
opposites,
inconsistencies, absurdities, contraries, paradoxes, puzzles, quandaries, oddities, irrationalities,
oppositional processes, antagonism, interacting forces, events that go contrary to expectations
alongside a whole host of other idiosyncrasies. In fact, they are so eager
to see contradictions everywhere that they find they have to tinker with the
meaning of that word, so that (for them) it becomes synonymous with
"struggle", "conflict", "opposition", or even "antagonism", as we will see.
Indeed, in debate DM-fans are often
genuinely surprised to see examples of
discursive FL-contradictions -- like those repeated below (i.e., A1 and A2) --, or even the more formal examples posted
a few paragraphs back (i.e., V1 and V2).
From this it is clear they are totally oblivious of (genuine) contradictions
like these, and when they see them they hastily reject them as relevant examples of what
they intend when they use this word.
A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate
and there isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).
A2: Capitalism is governed by a blindly competitive
market and it isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).
[Here
is a recent example of this
(in the comments section at the bottom -- unfortunately, these comments are no
longer available!). When
confronted with an FL-contradiction, the comrade with whom I was debating --
Mike Rosen,
no less(!)
-- denied that this was what he meant. He had wanted to show that there was a
perfectly ordinary use of this word that picked out what Marx and other Marxists mean
by it. And
yet none of his examples were 'dialectical contradictions', either, which rendered the
whole exercise rather futile -- as, indeed, I pointed out to him. There are many more examples
like this in the debates recorded
here. See also,
here.]
On the one hand, whatever else DM-'contradictions' are supposed
to be,
they appear to be totally unrelated to FL-contradictions, and so can hardly surpass them. On
the other hand, they have to be related to FL-contradictions, otherwise dialecticians
will have to drop any pretence that
DL is superior to FL.
In that case, in what follows, I will continue to refer to
FL-contradictions in my criticism of DL-'contradictions'. If DM-fans mean
something different by their use of this word, they should tell us -- and for
the first time in over 150 years -- exactly what that is.
Returning to Cornforth;
he concedes
the point that describing someone as "contradictory" involves a reference to their dispositions
(or "tendencies"):
"This means that [they evince] opposed tendencies
in [their] behaviour, such as gentleness and brutality, recklessness and
cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice." [Cornforth
(1976), p.93.]
Unfortunately, that prevents Cornforth's own examples from being
literal contradictions. He seems not to have noticed that fact.
Be
this as it may, if the above quote is meant to commit Cornforth to a
dispositional account of contradiction, then much of classic DM would become
obsolete by default. The fact that someone might have, say, a disposition to be
brave in certain circumstances, but cowardly in others, in no way suggests
he/she can be both of those at once. Indeed, what could that possibly amount to?
Standing one's ground while running away?Putting oneself in harms way to save
or rescue someone else while shrinking from doing one or both? What is open to
question, however, is whether the simultaneous
actualisation of these dispositions (in certain states or performances) may
be expressed by means of true propositions (and without ambiguity), and which
are (or can be) both true at the same time.
Indeed, the fact that an iron bar, for example, can be red hot at one end and
icy cold at the other at the same time isn't a contradiction (even though, plainly, an iron bar is at
any time disposed to be either of these, and much else besides, at all
times). But, no one supposes
(it is to be hoped!) that such a bar could
actually be red
hot and freezing cold all over, and in the same respect, at the same time.
[To be
sure, the
supposition that the entire bar
could be both of these at the same time might be thought by some to be a contradictory
supposition; and yet even
that would merely be an inconsistency,not a contradiction, since both
could be false if the said bar was in fact merelywarm.]
Anyway, as noted above, the emotions Cornforth imagines capable of being
expressed by
contrary suppositions are
inconsistent, not contradictory. For example, if NN was said to be both angry and calm at the same
time, that would only be a contradiction
if it couldn't be
false to assert NN was both. But, it would be false to assert both if
NN
were only slightly agitated (in which state NN would be neither angry nor calm),
for instance.
[Recall, two propositions are contraries, or are inconsistent, if they both
can't be true, but they can both be false, at once. Two propositions
are contradictory only if they can't both be true and they can't
both be false, at once.]
So, even if both of these states were actualisable at the same
time (which is, of course, a rather difficult scenario to imagine, to put it
mildly!), it still wouldn't be a contradiction!
On the other hand,
ifNN could be described (without ambiguity) in the following way:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger,
we might have a genuine contradiction here. But, it is unlikely
that Cornforth meant his words to be understood that way, and it is even more
doubtful whether he would have been able to say under what conditions he, or
anyone else for that matter, would or could hold N1 true -- or under what
conditions he/they could or would attribute to NN such odd dispositional actualisations.
Consider the
following more precise example of the above scenario:
N2: At time, t, NN is angry with
MM for lying
to her at t, and not angry with MM for lying to her at t.
Or, perhaps even more precisely:
N2a: At times,
t1
and t2,
NN is angry with MM at t2
for lying to her at t1,
and not angry with MM at t2
for lying to her at t1.
[t2
> t1]
Or, in more ordinary terms:
N2a1: NN is angry with MM today for lying to her
yesterday and not angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday.
Naturally, there are several other possibilities allowed for in logic and
ordinary language, such as the following:
N2b: At time,
t1,
NN is angry with MM at t1
for lying to her at t1,
and not angry with MM at t1
for lying to her at t1.
Or, in ordinary (if somewhat stilted) terms,
again:
N2b1: NN is currently angry with
MM for lying to
her just now and currently not angry with MM for lying to her just now.
Of course,
someone could object that it is possible to have
mixed emotions at one and the same time. Perhaps, then, they might mean the
following
(confining our attention to N2, but not N2a or N2b, for simplicity's sake):
N3: At time, t, NN is both angry with
MM for lying
to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for
lying to her at t (because she fully understands the pressures on MM when he lied).
In that case, N3 is really this:
N4: At time, t, NN is both φ-ing
at t, and not ψ-ing at t.
Here, we have two different
'actions', or emotional states, involving different objects of a particular emotion
(this is an example of the sort of ambiguitymentioned earlier): anger at MM because it was a violation of trust (i.e.,
"φ-ing"), and lack of anger at
MM because
of extenuating circumstances (i.e.,
"ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1
was mentioned:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time,
and with respect to the same object of that
anger.
[Greek letters like "φ" and
"ψ" are used in FL and
Analytic Philosophy
to help distinguish action-, or state-predicates (like "...walks", "...sits", or
"...has refuted DM") from others (such as, "...is a man" or "...is a confused
dialectician"). Naturally, several of the latter might overlap
somewhat.]
As soon as we fill in the details concerning the nature of the emotion
involved we can see that we have two different objects of the said anger,
or two different states/actions, and hence no contradiction.
To be sure, someone might still object, but they will (like
Cornforth) find it hard to say what the content of that objection is
without ignoring or editing out of the picture some object or other of the said anger/emotion,
thus misrepresenting the intended situation.
[Which is, perhaps, why DM-fans dislikeprecision
(i.e., they call it 'pedantry');
indeed, attempts to state preciselywhat they might mean always
seem to undermine
rather too many of the doctrines they unwisely imported from Hegel -- as we can
now see happening with these 'contradictions'.]
In fact, by his use of the word "tendencies", Cornforth himself seems
half ready to concede this point. But, not even he would want to describe
the same action (performed by the same person) as, say,
literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (without
equivocation). While it is possible to ascribe contrary properties to the same
object (e.g., one part of the aforementioned iron bar could be hot while another
part is cold, as we have seen), a 'contradiction' may only be extracted from
such familiar facts by someone who has never heard of ambiguity -- or, of
course, who is
terminally confused or who has no idea about the difference between contraries
and contradictories. No one would think they had been contradicted by someone
who asserted that the far end of an iron bar was red hot just after they
themselves had asserted the near end was ice cold. Nor would they think they had been contradicted if someone had said they were
angry today, but calm the day before -- or, indeed, that they were angry and calm
about different things at the same time.
Anyway, as noted above, any description of the same action (that
asserted it
was literally both gentle and brutal at the same time, in
the same respect and
without equivocation) would merely be an inconsistency -- since both
alternatives would be false if the said act was in fact neutral (i.e., if it was neither
gentle nor brutal, but performed, or displayed, with equanimity, or indifference).
Once more we
ask: Do these emotions imply one another such that they must co-exist (like the
proletariat and the capitalist class,
so we are told)? No, they neither imply
one another, and they can all exist independently of each other. Nor do they
struggle with and then change into each other, which they would have to do if
they were dialectically related --
and if the DM-classics were to be believed.
So,
whatever else they are, these aren't 'dialectical opposites', so they can't even
be 'dialectical contradictions'.
[However,
the slow disintegration of the Communist Block finally caught up with
Cornforth; in one of his last works [Cornforth (1980)], he systematically
retracted many of the theories he had once declared were cornerstones of the "world
view of the proletariat".]
Another benighted comrade
has remained undeterred by such contradictory antics, and has vainly tried to defend the employment of this obscure notion (i.e.,
"dialectical contradiction"), appealing to (yes, you guessed it!) an everyday use of "contradiction"
(re-posted below), in connection with contradictory
behaviour, when it isn't at all clear that the examples he himself
gave
were
even 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with!
But,
what did this comrade
mean by "contradictory behaviour"? Perhaps someone who
actually stands and sits all at once? Or, maybe an individual who has a 'tendency' to do
both? But, a 'tendency' to do
what? Stand and sit all at once? Or, who threatens to do both? But
what sort of threat would that be if it is
impossible to carry out? Maybe this applies to someone who goes on strike and refuses to
go on strike
at the same time?
We aren't told. As usual, DM-fans offer their bemused readers
what are in effect less than
half-formed thoughts and theories.
This benighted comrade
tried to argue along these lines in
a 'debate' he had with me concerning the UK
Prison Workers' Strike,
which took place a few years ago:
"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it. Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?" [Paragraphs
merged. I have reproduced core parts of this 'debate'
here.]
Now, in relation to
the
aforementioned strike, it looks like this comrade meant his comments to apply to workers who support the state one minute, but
act against it the next, or perhaps those who hold what appear to be inconsistent beliefs
about one or both. But, put this way, that isn't even a contradiction
(ordinary, or otherwise)! On the
other hand, if these workers both supported and didn't support this strike at the same
time (without ambiguity), that would have been a contradiction, but he
plainly didn't mean that.
Of
course, as we have seen, contraries
aren't contradictions, and "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradiction". As indicated earlier,
concerning two contrary propositions both can't be true, but they both can be false
(i.e., in this case, they would merely be inconsistent with one another), at
once.
For example, the contraries "All swans are white" and "No swan is
white" can't both be true (in a non-empty domain),
but they
can both
be false -- for instance, if either or both of "Some swan is not white", or
"Some swan is white" were true (the first of which turned out to be
the case when black swans
were discovered in Australia). But, two contradictory propositions can't both
be true and can't both be false, at once.
Again, dialecticians invariably
ignore such "pedantic" details.
Moreover, if someone
were asked to consider these two propositions:
"All swans are white" and "Some swan is not white" they will have been presented
with two contradictory propositions, but we would only have a contradiction if
they were conjoined to give: "All swans are white and some swan is not white".
"Contradictory" applies to propositions or clauses that could be conjoined
to form a contradiction (or one of which could be used to contradict someone who
asserted the other), whether or not they are so conjoined,
or so used. "Contradictory" also applies to states and performances (among other
things), which, if expressed in propositional or clausal form, could also be conjoined
to yield a contradiction, whether or not they are so conjoined. Analogously, a
vase, for example, can be described as breakable -- that is, it can be broken, whether or not it
is actually broken. The term ("contradictory") can also apply
to
imperatives which would undo one another when obeyed or acted upon, such as "Open the
door!" and "Do not open the door!" -- which are contradictory
imperatives --, while "Open the door!" and "Close the door!" are merely
contraries. That is because they would both be countermanded by "Leave the door
alone!"
[There
are analogous distinctions and complications that also apply to "contradict" and "contradiction". See
also here. We will
see later how
Kant succeeded in confusing himself and his readers by failing to notice such
fine distinctions. Indeed, we have
already seen
how Hegel also fell headlong into this trap.]
But even if
the above responses of mine are misguided in some way, do any one of the paired
items that the benighted comrade came out with imply the other in the pair, such that
they both couldn't exist without one another (like the proletariat and the
capitalist class,
so we are told)? But that would have to be the case if they are to be counted as
'dialectical contradictions'. Do any of them struggle with and then change into
one another? Once again, they would have to do that if the
DM-classics are to be believed. The aforementioned comrade was,
unsurprisingly, silent about such issues.
In that case,
and once more: whatever else they
were, his examples weren't 'dialectical
contradictions'.
There
is another excellent example of 'dialectical confusion'
like this in Simon Basketter's article in Socialist Worker
about the same strike:
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers. It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to
the strikers.... Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to
accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main
jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers
have a proven record of racism and violence.
Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the
POA
shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling
fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.' Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA
members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest."
[Paragraphs merged.]
Once more, what is the 'contradiction'
meant to be, here? Maybe, it has something to do
with the following?
P1: Prison officers uphold the law.
P2: This either results from, or leads them into,
holding right-wing ideas.
P3: But, this strike has forced some to defy
or disrespect the law.
P4: However, later, when some prisoners
protested, the same officers rushed back to work in order to re-establish
control.
Now, I have already commented on the
loose, indeterminate
and often indiscriminate
way that dialecticians like to use "contradiction", but even given such conceptual
profligacy, what precisely is the contradiction here?
Let us try again -- using "NN" this time to stand for the name of a randomly
selected prison
guard who thinks and acts along the above lines, and "L1"
to stand for a law he/she rejects, or opposes, even if only temporarily:
P7: One day, as a result of the strike,
NN says
"Screw law, L1!"
[No pun intended.]
P8: Later that day he acts in support of a
totally different law.
Once more, where is the contradiction, here?
Now, if NN had said, "Screw all laws!" we might be able to cobble-together an
inconsistency of some sort in this case (such as "Screw all laws!" --
i.e., "All laws ought to be screwed!" and "No laws ought to be
screwed!"), but not even that is implied by the above story.
In fact, a contradiction in this case
could (perhaps) be formed from something like
the following: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that
shouldn't be screwed."
Or, maybe: "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that
should be screwed."
To be sure, people
say all sorts of odd things, and it is relatively easy to
utter contradictory sentences. Who has ever denied that! [Look, I have just posted
several contradictory sets of propositions in the last few paragraphs.] The question is, can both be held true, or
held false (or, in this case, advocated
and repudiated, asserted and denied, as a
moral or political code), at the same time and in same respect? Well, did anyone from Socialist
Worker try to ascertain from the aforementioned prison guards if any of them
would have assented to and rejected the following, at the same time:
"All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that shouldn't be screwed";
or, "No laws
should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed"?
Apparently not.
Indeed, if NN had assented to "No laws should be screwed", we could
safely infer from his later strike action that he no longer held it true. Plainly, as a result of the strike he
must have come to accept the following alternative in its place: "I now think there is at least one law (namely,
law,
L1)
that should be screwed".
And that would still be the case even if tomorrow
NN went back
to holding his former beliefs about every law. Dialecticians, least of all, shouldn't need
reminding that people and things change!
Unless, that is, we think NN
holds this odd belief: "I don't believe
that there is at least one law that should be screwed and I also believe there
is at least one law that should be screwed." Or, perhaps, "Screw
L1
and do
not screw
L1!"
Even so, it is also reasonably clear that we could only attribute
schizoid beliefs like this to NN if he were about to go insane, or had suffered
a blow to the head. We certainly
couldn't rely on such a confused character to help win a strike -- nor could we
depend on him to report
his genuine beliefs with any accuracy, either!He is just as likely to
tell anyone who asks him: "Yes I believe this and I do not...". Would Socialist
Worker have even quoted such a confused individual? Hardly.
[No wonder
'dialectical reasoning' has (rightly) been described as a form of "mental
confusion".]
Elsewhere at this site, I argue that 'dialectics'
was itself originally based on little more than
a series of egregious
logical blunders committed by Hegel (be they those that are still supposedly on their feet, the 'right
way' up, or those that even remain 'upside down', it matters not), but I
also pointed out that DM-fans base their
assertions on half-formed thoughts, seriously garbled caricatures of logic
(both formal and
discursive) and laughably thin evidence
-- which is why I have called DM a
Mickey Mouse Science.
Simon Basketter's obscure claims
amply confirm
allegationslike these. For example, do
these odd beliefs, held by prison officers, imply each other, like the
proletariat implies the capitalist class, such that one can't exist without the
other? No. Do they struggle with and then turn into each other, which they
should do,
according to the DM-classics? Again, no, they don't. But, if not, they can't
be 'dialectical contradictions', whatever else they are.
Did, Basketter even ask himself these questions? Apparently not.
Then why on earth did he use the word "contradiction"?
In answer to that question, the Impertinent
Explanation (from
earlier) only gains in credibility.
But, let us return to the benighted comrade and re-examine what he had to say, in order to see if anything
at all useful can
be extracted from it.
"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it. Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?" [Paragraphs
merged.]
Consider this,
first:
"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests
were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my
interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in
relationship to some enquiry we have about it."
Well, who can blame theorists for wanting to use old words in new ways? But, the
above examples seem to be framed in ordinary language already. So why then the
following
question?
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Of course, these examples relate to what humans beings do, or can think, so they
aren't much use in showing how there are, or can be, 'true contradictions' in nature.
Now this benighted comrade might not have noticed (but it was
staring him in the face in the
example I gave, and in the ones
he listed) that contradictions can relate to the inner workings of one proposition
just as they can apply to the connection between several propositions, at once,
both in ordinary language and in logic. In which case, neither the complexities
of logic nor the confused state of his thought processes can be used to defend
this comrade from his self-inflicted errors -- for he himself provides his own
counterexamples!
Consider this, for instance:
"Certainly some data might appear contradictory in
relationship to some enquiry we have about it."
Unfortunately, that is far too vague to
do much with. Perhaps he meant something like the following (taking
an example from Astronomy)?
D1:
The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.
D2:
The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.3 million light years.
But, these don't contradict one another,
since the true distance to YY could be 4.5 million
light years, making both D1 and D2 false.
And, it is irrelevant whether the true
distance to YY is actually 4.8 or even 4.3 million light years. The fact is that
it might not be, or might not have been, either of these.
It is worth recalling that if this were a genuine
contradiction, D1 and D2 couldn't both be true and couldn't both be
false at once (whether or not one of them was either of these). At best,
therefore, D1 and D2 are inconsistent -- they are contraries not
contradictories. So, even if D1 were true, it is still
the case that both D1 and D2 couldn't both be true but could both
be false, at once. That wouldn't happen if they were contradictories -- unlike the
following two, which are:
D3:
The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.
D4:
It isn't the case that the measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light
years.
D4a: The
measured distance to star, YY, isn't 4.8 million light years. [This is
a colloquial version of D4.]
Now,
D3 and D4 have to have opposite truth values (assuming, of course, that there
is such a
star); they both can't be true and they both can't be false. Given what
we mean by "star", YY has to be some distance or other from the earth. One
or other of D3
and D4 has to be true, and they have to have opposite truth-values. Either YY is 4.8 million light years from earth or it
isn't (otherwise the meaning of the words used must have changed -- or the star itself has ceased to
exist, etc., etc.).
Some
might object that the above is misleading; the star will have moved while its
distance is being measured so the above 'either-or' is misguided. FL can't cope
with such changes, whereas DL can.
Or so
it might be argued...
However, even though this star might have moved, all that this would mean is that
D3 used to be true, and now it is false; and this in turn will imply that D4 was
false but now it is true. My point still stands, therefore. They would still
have opposite truth-values -- in spite of any changes that might have occurred.
[Again, always assuming the star still exists! Any
who object to the use of the LEM in the above should read
this, and then perhaps think again.]
[LEM = Law of Excluded
Middle.]
To be sure, an
inconsistency here might imply a contradiction, but it is far from clear
that the
benighted comrade meant this. But, even if he did, who has ever denied
two propositions can contradict one another (if conjoined)? [Again, I have
posted two of them above!] The point is, they can't both be true and they can't both be false, at
once.
DM-fans seem to want both propositions to be true --
but, alas, that would automatically prevent them from being contradictory, from forming a
contradiction, or from even being propositions, to begin with!
Now, this comrade might have meant that
raw data (not yet expressed in a propositional context or form)
could contradict some theory or other. Perhaps then he meant these examples of
raw data:
D5:
4.8 million light years.
D6:
4.3 million light years.
But, neither of these
is capable of being true or false since they aren't even
indicative sentences.
And, if that is so, they can't contradict
anything (since in order to do that they would both have to be capable of
being true or false). Moreover, as soon as a (sentential) context is provided
for them, they would merely be inconsistent, once
more.
But, couldn't D3 and D4, or even D5 and
D6, contradict the predictions of some theory/enquiry or other? Perhaps this is
what was meant?
D7: Theory, TT, predicts that star,
YY, is 5.7 million
light years away.
D8: Observation tells us that
YY is 4.8 million light years away.
And yet, the proposition "YY is 5.7 million light
years away" is merely inconsistent with D8. This star could actually
be 4.4 million light years away, making D7 and D8 both false. So, D7 and D8 are
dealing with
contraries.
In
which case, we
still don't have a contradiction!
So, until this comrade supplies us with
clearer or more precise details about what he means, little more can be done with his
rather vague comments.
[I will, however, be
looking in detail at how data can 'contradict' scientific theory, alongside the
confused things DM-fans have to say about it, in Essay
Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
Be this as it may, is it possible for an individual to have contradictory
interests or goals in a relationship, as this comrade asserts?
Perhaps by that he meant the following (for simplicity's sake, I will
concentrate on potential or actual interests an individual might have; the
argument can easily be extended to cover actual or potential goals -- those details will be left to
the reader):
B1: NM has interest, A, in relationship, R.
B2: It is not the case that NM has interest, A, in
relationship, R.
This appears to be a genuinely
contradictory pair. If
B1 and B2 were conjoined they would form a contradiction -- always
assuming they both applied simultaneously and with no equivocation:
B2a: NM has interest, A, in relationship, R,
and it is not case that NM has interest, A, in relationship, R.
But, did the benighted comrade mean this?
According to his own wording, apparently
he did not:
"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests
were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my
interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in
relationship to some enquiry we have about it."
Well, what about the following?
B3: NM has interest, A, in relationship, R.
B4: NM has interest, B, in relationship, R.
B5: Interest, A, in relationship, R, contradicts interest,
B, in relationship, R.
But, if we are talking about literal contradictions
here (and not the
loose and ill-defined dialectical-sort-of-contradictions we have come to know and
loathe) then A and B in relationship
R can
only contradict one another if they are expressed in propositions (or in clauses), as
indicated in B5a-B7:
B5a: Interest, A, contradicts interest, B.
B6: "A" stands for "I,
NM, must love my partner".
B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I,
NM, must
love my partner".
It is hard to see how anything could be called an interest (as opposed to
it being a vague
sort of non-linguistic 'feeling') unless it were expressed in this way, or
their
equivalent.
The question is can anyone assent to such
conflicting interests all at once? Well, as we saw with
NN earlier,
people can assent to all manner of
odd ideas and feelings, so there is nothing to prevent B6 and B7 from forming the content of someone's overall
intentional or emotional make-up.
However, before we hastily slap a
'contradiction' label ('dialectical' or otherwise) on this scenario, it is plain that this alleged contradiction can be disambiguated
along lines that were suggested, and attempted, above (in relation to N3 and
N4, reproduced again below), providing we supply plausible background details (ignoring,
however, the
complexities mentioned in N2a and N2b). That
is because people don't just have
interests simpliciter any more than they have emotions
simpliciter.
[For something to be an emotion it has to be
object directed; so, we are angry with someone or something, fearful of
something or someone, in love with someone or something, etc. Of
course, an individual could just be in a fearful state, with no object of that
fear, but that would be enough to diagnose him/her as (acutely or chronically)
mentally disturbed or ill (in this case, they would be in the grip of an
"irrational fear"). This wouldn't count as a genuine emotion,
otherwise a mental disturbance wouldn't have been diagnosed. We can tell the
difference between a genuine emotion and a mental disorder by the fact that the
latter don't have clear objects (that aren't also delusional).]
As with most things connected with intentional
behaviour, such episodes are goal-, or object-directed (which is why we use
transitive verbs to characterise them). We wouldn't be able to make sense of
someone who was just in love, but with no one or nothing in particular.
N3: At time, t, NN is both angry with
MM for lying
to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for
lying to her at t (because she fully understands the pressures on MM when he lied).
N4: At time, t, NN is both φ-ing
at t, and not ψ-ing at t.
[The reader is directed
here for an
explanation of these symbols.]
Hence, in this case,
we would have something like the following (in an abbreviated, even if slightly
stilted form, for clarity's
sake):
N3c: NN feels she must love MM because of his
caring for her, and NN feels she mustn't love MM for sleeping with her best
friend.
[I have left N3c in a slightly stilted
form so that it is clear
what is being said.]
In that case, N3c is in fact this:
N5: NN feels she must love MM for
φ-ing, and not
love MM for ψ-ing.
As
before, we have in effect two different objects of NN's love:
his caring for her (i.e.,
"φ-ing")
and his violation of her trust (i.e.,
"ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was
added earlier (now re-written as N1a):
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time,
and with respect to the same object of that
anger.
N1a: NN both loves and does not love
MM at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that
love.
Plainly, in
N5, we have two different objects of the said love,
and thus no contradiction -- or, at least, no more than there would be here:
N6: NN saw MN in the distance with her
binoculars.
N7: NN saw NM in the distance with her
binoculars.
Here we have two different objects of
NN's sight, MN and NM. If
anyone thought these two propositions were contradictory, that would provide
clear evidence they were in the grip of linguistic confusion, not the author of
a breakthrough in the science of optics -- or even philosophy.
[N6 and N7 aren't even inconsistent with one another. NN might be
able to see both MN and NM,
after all!]
It could be argued that the above
examples in fact express the cause of
those emotions, or whatever it was that occasioned them, not their objects. In fact, it
isn't too clear that this is a distinction with a difference, any more than these
are:
N8: MN in the distance caused NN to see him with her
binoculars.
N9: NM in the distance caused NN to see him with
her binoculars.
So, whatever the cause happens to be, the aforementioned emotions had
different objects (in N3 and N43,
for instance), and so aren't contradictory.
Of course, if this benighted comrade meant something other than
this, he should perhaps learn to be a little clearer.
However, it
could t be objected that it is reasonably obvious that the contradiction here is
this:
B7a: NN: "I must love my partner
and it isn't
the case that I must love my partner".
Once more, it is far
from clear how this qualifies as a 'dialectical contradiction' -- that is, should we
ever be told what one of these is. [Do these two contradictory states
both turn into one another, as
the DM-classics insist they should?Do they imply one another, as
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are supposed to?]
Ignoring this minor
niggle for now, it is undeniable that
human beings experience conflicting emotions like this all the time, but when faced with
B7a, the normal reaction would be to respond with: "Er..., what on earth do you mean by
that?". And, we wouldn't be surprised if NN found it impossible to say why she felt this
way. We would certainly expect some form of disambiguation or clarification of what she
meant, perhaps along the following lines:
N3a: NN feels she must love MM because of his
caring for her, and NN feels she mustn't love MM for sleeping with her best
friend.
N3b: "I, NN, must love my partner
MM because of his caring for me, and I, NN, feel I mustn't love MM
for sleeping with my best friend".
If so, and once more,
no contradiction would be implied.
But, even if B7a were an unambiguous contradiction, that would simply
confirm the fact that contradictions in ordinary language and in
logic are built around the content of propositions, and the logical links
we hold between them -- undermining this benighted comrade's point:
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
The question now is, has anyone ever held the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true
or both false at the same time? Or anything like them? Perhaps they have (who
can say?), but how that shows that there are in fact 'true
contradictions' in nature and society still remains unclear.
B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".
B7: "B" stands for "It is
not the case that I must
love my partner".
[B5: Interest, A, in relationship, R, contradicts interest,
B, in relationship, R.]
As should seem
obvious, the fact that
someone believes (or holds) something to be true, or even believes something to be
false, doesn't automatically make it true or make it
false!
[Once again, it is worth recalling here that two contradictory propositions
can't both be true and can't both be false, at once. So, if someone
does assent to two contradictory propositions, they must believe both can
be
true or both can be false, at the same time and in the same respect. That is they must (implicitly,
or possibly even, explicitly) deny the following:
"Two contradictory
propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once." But,
that would just mean they had misunderstood the word "contradiction"
(or had perhaps been led astray by a
persuasive definition of some sort). We
certainly can't build a new science of human behaviour on the basis of
confusion like this -- still less revolutionary theory and practice.]
However, it could be argued that because
NN holds the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true -- if
coupled with the fact that NN is an individual who exists in the real world --,
that shows that it is
at least possible to assert the existence of true contradictions. Once
that possibility is allowed, the objections set out in this Essay can be seen for
what they are: empty rhetoric.
B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".
B7: "B" stands for "It is
not the case that I must
love my partner".
Or, so it might be claimed.
Indeed, an argument somewhat like that was
aired by
Roy Edgley a few years
ago:
"Since thought and theory are also part of
reality and thus real objects that can be thought about, contradictions in
thought, though not true of reality, certainly exist in reality;
and it is only because they do exist in reality that they can be the object of
criticism -- criticism for failing to be true of reality. Moreover, it is
because two contradictory theories can't both be true that each bears a
critical relation to the other: instantiated in actual thought this relation of
logical opposition is in fact a critical relation of real opposition, Kant
notwithstanding. It is no less logical opposition and no more simply natural
'conflict of forces' for taking the form of real historical and social
struggle." [Edgley (1979), pp.24-25. Italic emphases in the original;
bold added.]
The following would presumably be one such contradiction (although Edgley
himself was apparently interested in more overtly scientific propositions), and one such
existential claim:
B8: Let "p" be "I must love my partner and it
is not the case that I must
love my partner".
B9: In so far as p exists, contradictions exist
in reality.
Edgley's argument appears to be the
following:
While a proposition like p wouldn't actually be true, it would still exist,
and hence contradictions exist (at this minimal level, at least). Admittedly, it is an entirely different matter whether p is true or false.
[I
will return to consider that option later on.]
So, what about the claim that this argument shows
that contradictions at least exist?
Well, certainly those words exit, but that is no more illuminating than the following
would be:
B10: Let "G" = "God".
[I.e., "G" stands for the word, "God".]
B11: In so far as G exists, God exists in
reality.
The question would still remain as to whether there is a 'God' or not.
[As those who know their logic will also
appreciate, Edgley has confused a
propositional sign with a proposition (and perhaps
also
use with mention). B10 and B11 partially expose that muddle.]
Someone might object:
the above argument in fact confirms that the word "God" exists just as Edgley's
argument shows that contradictions exist.
Well, all it shows is that
a
propositional sign or a simple sign exists (in some form or other, but the details become
rather unclear when we look to Edgley to tell us where he thinks such signs
actually exist), but who has ever denied that? Put another way, Edgley's argument is no more illuminating than would be
an argument that had been aimed at showing
'God' exists, but which instead showed that the word "God" exists!
Once more, no one has ever questioned the existence of inscriptions of
contradictions (indeed, these Essays contain scores of them), but that sheds no
light at all on the claim that there are 'real contradictions', or 'true
contradictions', in nature and
society. If the mere thought of a contradiction, or an actual inscription
on the page (or screen), were enough to show that DM-contradictions exist in the
real world, then we should have to admit that there were 'real tautologies', too.
But worse, we should have to accept LIE -- that is, the doctrine that solely from
thought, or from words alone,
substantive
ontological conclusions
(as opposed to trivial inscriptional conclusions) may be
deduced. [There will be more on this in Essay Twelve.]
[The
word "inscription"
above applies to physical marks on a page/screen/wall/blackboard/whiteboard/cavewall
that aren't considered random, but are held to be the product of intentionality, part of a natural-, or even a formal-language -- or perhaps
even a work of
art, no matter how 'primitive' or 'advanced' they are.]
But, signs and inscriptions don't have
such existential implications. If they
did we should all have to believe in
the actual existence of
The Tooth
Fairy and
Bigfoot. At
best, therefore, all that Edgley's argument shows is that inscriptions of
contradictory sentences exist.
Edgley then argues:
"Though a system of thought that is contradictory
can't be true of its real object, this isomorphic relation between the
structure of a society's thought and the structure of its material life thus
gives sense to the idea that such thought is true to that material life:
in being contradictory it 'reflects', and so discloses, though its content does
not explicitly assert, the contradictory structure of the material life of that
society." [Ibid., p.25. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Unfortunately, some writers are a little
careless over the use of words like "isomorphic". How, it might be wondered, can
a set of words be isomorphic to items in the world that they don't in any way resemble.
Especially since some of these words are abstract common nouns,
and many aren't even referential? With what are "if" and "or", for example,
isomorphic?
Putting this 'niggle' to one side for
now, we might further wonder how Edgley knows this is indeed an "isomorphism" if none of
his contradictions are true of capitalism, as he concedes. Moreover, his claim that this theory is
"true to" capitalism is far from clear; how something can be "true to", but not
"true of", a social system is something Edgley failed to explain.
Edgley also asserts that these linguistic contradictions (or at least the
more theoretical examples to which he refers) are a "reflection" of "real
oppositions" in society. That claim is partly defused below, and will be further
laid to rest throughout this Essay. [See also
here.]
Independently of this, Edgley makes a serious mistake (one that all DM-fans
are victims of): confusing
contradictions in FL with what might or might not exist. As noted above,
and again in Essay Four Part One, FL makes
no existential claims. To be sure, logicians as individuals might make such
claims, but logic itself is neutral in this regard (since logic isn't an agent, and is
capable of making no assertions, still less any about the world). While it is true that certain logical systems
might need an
ontology (or even a
model)
in order to work, even then, contradictions don't make existential claims.
The background 'ontology', if there is one, does
that.
To repeat: in its simplest form, a
contradiction in logic is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its
negation, such that both can't both be true and both can't be false at once. So,
the fact that inscriptions of contradictions exist has no bearing on that
logical principle. Furthermore, FL doesn't rule out the
existence of contradictions, since FL isn't a science, nor is it an agent
(as already noted).
It neither rules in, nor rules out, the existence of anything. In fact, in the construction of
indirect proofs, logicians and mathematicians make use of contradictions all the
time! The study of logic, in this
specific respect, revolves around the truth-functional implications that hold between a proposition and its
negation. So, it isn't about existence, in any shape or form.
In
that case, contradictions can't "reflect" anything, for they represent
one form
of the disintegration of the expressive power of language, as Wittgenstein
pointed out.
[Admittedly, there are many different
definitions of "contradiction" in FL and
Philosophical Logic; that topic is discussed in Essay Eight
Part Three. Readers are directed there for more details. There is also more on this
here,
here and in
Essay Twelve Part One.]
"Perhaps someone is in the midst of an unhappy love affair and says
'I love him
but I also hate him'. It's not just the statement but the feeling which is a
contradiction surely? If Freud is held to describe the human individual not as a
unified subject but a bundle of contradictory drives and desires, might one not
imagine contradictory drives (if not desires) in a particular social system? Can I not have contradictory emotions about a subject, situation or person (I
know I do about all sorts of things!)." [Paragraphs merged.]
Thus, on the back of some rather egregious Freudian Pseudo-Science, this comrade is
content to build
his 'case'.
But, is there anything in these fraudulent Freudian
fancies (even if we put
to one side all the lies, deceit, client abuse, intellectual bullying,
cocaine-induced fantasy, paranoia, and fabricated evidence that marked Freud's career)?
Well, once more, can people have, or be
subject to, contradictory emotions?
Perhaps these will
suffice?
B12: NN hates Tony Blair.
B13: It is not the case that NN hates
Tony Blair.
However, and once again, I rather think
that the benighted comrade didn't mean a
contradiction like that.
However, it is worth noting that love
and hate aren't automatically contradictory (when put in a propositional context), unless, say,
hating someone implies not loving them; but, as the above quotation shows, it
doesn't imply this! [That must be so unless by "contradiction" we mean something
entirely different. If so, what?]
Moreover, we have
already seen that B14 isn't even a contradiction, since it could be
false -- that is, if NN were indifferent toward Tony Blair.
Nevertheless, it is worth drawing
attention to the
following points:
The reader is advised to re-read
the caveats posted here. She
should note that in order to give content to the above ideas idea (if that is what
was
meant by the benighted comrade, or if his ideas actually mean anything at all), we had to use a propositional
context to make their implications clear,
once more.
This rather makes a mess
then of the following rather rash remarks courtesy of the aforementioned comrade:
"I'm just very puzzled about what it means to restrict the meaning of the term
contradiction to a rule of formal logic. It's always been the least compelling of
your arguments it seems to me. I don't understand the linguistic scandal that is
supposed to be involved in talking about the human subject as a 'bundle of
contradictory drives and desires' or talking about the capitalist system as
encompassing contradictory tendencies (how TRPF [the Tendency of the Rate of
Profit to Fall -- RL] is held to operate inside a concrete capitalist social
formation for example).... I don't see how there can be anything ipso facto absurd or meaningless about
such statements to anyone familiar with ordinary language." [Bold emphasis
added. Paragraphs merged.]
There is no "scandal" here at
all. This comrade's badly garbled and ill-considered examples themselves imply the
conclusions reached earlier -- that is, when we try to make sense of them.
Evenhe
had to use propositions to inform us of these Freudian foibles.
[Supposedly contradictory drives and emotions were
disambiguated
earlier. The alleged 'contradictions' in capitalism have been dealt with
here and
here.
Finally, it has already been pointed out, just as it was pointed it out to this comrade,
several times (since he tended to develop selective blindness when it suited him),
my concerns aren't solely with FL-contradictions!]
Of course, it could be argued that certain
brain states (that at some level provide a material basis for psychological
or social forces) are what lie behind these contradictory emotions and tendencies
-- details about which seem to have exercised this benighted comrade -- and it
is perhaps here that these contradiction are to be found. [This also appears to be what motivated Professor
Edgley's comments examined earlier.]
Unfortunately, the thesis that there are such things as 'contradictory forces'
has been laid
to rest in this Essay; but, the overall
idea is susceptible to the next series of objections, anyway.
[The argument below also applies to the
claim that there might be certain brain states, process, or psychological 'drives' -- or even social forces
and tendencies -- at work, about which we are as yet
unaware, that constitute such 'material contradictions', or which cause or
'mediate' them. They could even turn out to be those mythical Freudian fancies
mentioned above. Who knows?]
To that end, let us define "Φ" as the brain states, processes, psychological
'drives', and/or social forces/tendencies that result in, 'mediate', or from which
"emerge", the following:
B15: NN loves Tony Blair.
Or, which can be expressed in the first
person:
B15a:
I, NN, love Tony Blair.
Let us also define "Φ*"
as the brain states, processes, psychological 'drives', and/or social
forces/tendencies, that result in, 'mediate', or from which "emerge", the following:
B16: NN hates Tony Blair.
Or, which can again be expressed in the first
person:
B16a:
I, NN, hate Tony Blair.
So, "Φ" stands for the social or psychological forces (etc.,
etc.) that
'mediate' (etc., etc.) "NN
loves Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent), and
"Φ*" stands for the social forces (etc., etc.) which 'mediate' (etc.,
etc.) "NN hates Tony
Blair" (or its first person equivalent). We can also stipulate that Φ
and Φ*
aren't fixed and immutable, but change in accord with whatever dialectic laws
or processes DM-fans care to throw at them.
Let us further assume that Φ 'contradicts'
Φ*, i.e., that they are
'dialectically-united opposites'.
Now, even given these give-away and
recklessly profligate assumptions, this
theory still won't
work!
According to the
DM-classics
-- where
we are told that all things change into their opposites, and that they do so because of
a "struggle" going on between them -- Φ must change into Φ*, and vice versa.
But,
Φ can't change intoΦ*
since Φ* already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this
theory, Φ couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with which
it could 'struggle'
in order to make it do just that!
And, it is no good propelling
Φ* into the future so that it now
becomes what
Φ*will change into, since Φ* will do no such thing unless
Φ is already there to make
that happen!
Now, it could be objected that love can surely turn into hate, and vice versa.
Indeed, it can, but the whole point of introducing
Φ and Φ* was to show that if and when that happens,
dialectics can't account for it -- and for the above reasons! This is quite
apart from the fact that
Φ and Φ* aren't the abstractions love and hate, they are
real material states and processes
(etc., etc.) -- so, and once more, Φ can't turn into Φ* since Φ*
already exists.
[For those interested, this argument
has been developed in
extensive
detail here, where
'social contradictions' have also been taken into account, and several objections --
some obvious, some not so obvious -- have been also neutralised.]
Of course, if they aren't
'dialectically-united opposites' to begin with, then the above comrade's
objection fails by default. So, do these brain states (etc., etc.) imply one
another? But one of them can surely exist without the other. If so, they can't
'interpenetrate each other -- again, unlike, say, the capitalist class and the
proletariat-- which, so we are told, imply one another such that one can't exist
without the other, and vice versa.
Once again, none of this makes sense,
even in
DM-terms!
Finally, the following represents an
edited version of an exchange between myself and a far more reasonable comrade
(whose name has been withheld at their request):
Comrade M (commenting on the dialectical use of
the word "contradiction"): I mean what most people mean -- conflict,
inner tension...
Rosa: Do they really? Give me one sentence drawn from ordinary language (the vehicle
most people do in fact use, so what you say should appear there, somewhere)
where such an interpretation could be put on the word "contradiction"
-- i.e.,
one not infected with the sort of idealist guff you read in Hegel. An idealist
will have no problem with asserting such things; if reality is Mind it can
surely argue
with itself. Not so a materialist who bases his/her science on the language
of ordinary workers (ordinary language).
But, even then, why call such things "contradictions"? What link does this
particular use
have with the "gainsaying" of someone, which is what the word usually means?
How is a conflict in society a contradiction?
Sure, you can re-define the word to mean whatever you like, but if we all did
that
we could re-define anything to mean anything, and we'd lose touch with meaning
altogether.
Apart from that, you'd be forcing a view
onto reality (contrary
to what 'dialecticians' tell us they never do), not reading one from it.
Linguistic Idealism -- as I asserted in those parts of my work I sent you --
would then automatically have raised its ideal head. Society would be
'contradictory', not because it really is so, but because we have re-defined
it to be so. A linguistic dodge would have created a few empirical 'truths';
this is 'science' on the cheap...
Comrade M: Rosa said: "Give me one
sentence..." Okay, what about "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!" Or
"That's a
contradiction in terms".
Suppose someone says "military intelligence" is a contradiction in terms. What
they mean is that there is a conflict or a tension between the first and the
second word, thus conjugated.
At any rate, you are berating a new convert. I can't be expected to know
everything at once, much less know it as wisely as the central committee (you).
Rosa: First, the phrase "contradiction in
terms" is either a misnomer or a rhetorical device. Why? Well, since contradiction has to do with truth and falsehood
as much as it has to do with "gainsaying", and since one term on its own
can't
be true or false (only sentences and clauses can be), and since single words do
not say anything, no term can contradict
another.
In that case, "contradiction
in terms" means something like "incompatible phrase(s)", as in "round square".
Now, "A is round and it is square" would only be a contradiction if
"A is round" were taken to mean "A is not square", but then you would not now
have a contradiction in terms, just a sentential contradiction with no "conflict (or) inner
tension" anywhere in sight.
And, if the above conclusion were
rejected (for some reason), you still wouldn't have a "contradiction in terms" that expressed some
sort of
"conflict (or) inner tension", since, once more, words can't conflict (or be
tense, or be in tension) because they aren't agents. Moreover, anyone who
uttered a "contradiction in terms" would not necessarily be in "conflict (or)
inner tension", just confused. And even if they weren't confused, the
"contradiction in terms" they uttered wouldn't necessarily indicate "conflict
(or) inner tension"; it could be a sign of all manner of things (ranging from
lack of clarity, through puzzlement, to playfulness).
As to the idea that such a phrase could indicate
the presence of "conflict (or) inner tension" I have no doubt, but if a
"contradiction in terms" meant that a "conflict (or) inner tension" had to be
present, it would mean this, and not merely could mean this, just as the truth of
"not p" would mean the falsehood of "p" (as opposed
merely to "not p" could
mean the falsehood of "p"). So they can't be synonymous, as you allege.
[Apologies for the prolixity of that paragraph, but logic
is a pain in the dictionary!]
But, even if this weren't so,
"contradiction" here still wouldn't mean "conflict (or) inner tension",
it would mean "gainsaying oneself or another", which could be true without an
inner conflict being implied. It might be a joke, an attempt to puzzle, part of
a game, a mistake, etc. The possibilities are endless. The
attempt to squeeze this into an idealist boot can only succeed if the almost
endless possibilities allowed for by ordinary language are ignored, or can be
ruled out.
As for "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!", the
verb "to contradict" in this command (it isn't in fact a proposition, so it
can't itself be a contradiction, literally speaking -- not that you suggested
it was) clearly means "gainsay". No quibble there. But, if it meant
"conflict, inner tension", you would have:
"Don't you conflict/inner tension me you little bastard!",
which is meaningless.
Even if we were to edit this down to:
"Don't you conflict with me you little bastard!",
it wouldn't mean the same as:
"Don't you contradict me you little bastard!"
One can conflict
with someone without contradicting them, and vice versa (e.g., two friends could
contradict each other (out of fun) without conflicting with each other, say).
Hence these can't mean the same.
However "Don't
you inner tension with me you little bastard!" can't be beaten into shape at
all.
Of course, I
should have also pointed out that if we already have words (such as "conflict")
that capture what we mean, why do we need to repurpose the word "contradiction"
in this way, especially since it brings in its train such unwelcome baggage? [I
have explained just what this 'baggage' is in Essay Nine
Part Two -- to which
we can now add the multiple confusions exposed in this Essay.]
Because dialecticians have so far neglected to explain with any
clarity, or in any detail, what it means to equate forces in nature and society
with 'contradictions', I have been forced to offer my own attempts at
clarification (no pun intended). All have so far failed. In this final main
section I will endeavour to present what I think is the only viable interpretation
of the presumed link between forces and 'contradictions'.
We have seen that the concepts DM-theorists have
imported from
Hermetic Philosophy have badly
failed them when any attempt is made to apply them to, or connect them
with, the forces operating in nature and
society. In that case, other that the ideological reasons outlined in Essay Nine
Part Two (summarised
below), the
impertinent answer to the question why hard-nosed
revolutionaries insist on using such obscure, mystical jargon (which terminology
they struggle to explain) is the only one left standing:
Dialecticians use obscure jargon like this simply because it is traditional to
do so.
This means that this part of DM (already under intensive care in the Emergency Resuscitation
Ward) is now ready to be measured for
a pine overcoat and then lowered six feet closer to the Earth's core.
A Last Desperate Attempt
However, before we call for
the local Hermetic High Priest to read DM
its Last Mystical Rites,
we should, I think, make one last attempt to resuscitate this moribund 'theory'.
In fact, we are now
in a position to reconsider some abandoned alternatives from earlier in an attempt to rescue this part of DM from its long overdue
funeral.
Below, I present another re-interpretation of the alleged connection between
forces and 'contradictions', based on F6-F9, above:
F6: Let force, P1, oppose force,
P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal
effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2
not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would
have produced in C1 (had P1similarly not
been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1
be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2
be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity, let E1
and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1
and E2
contain only opposites, such that elements of E1
and E2
taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
To these we can add the following:
F58: Force, P1, contradicts P2
in so far as some or all of E1 and E2
are contradictory (internally, or with one another).
Unfortunately, this latest re-interpretation can't work, either.
That is because if one or both of E1 and E2
don't exist (as a result of the operation of P1 and P2)
there can be no contradiction. As we have seen several times already, F58 would
imply a 'contradiction' between sets of events not all of which co-exist.77
However, we also need to consider events that are 'internally contradictory':
F58: Force, P1, contradicts
force, P2,
in so far as some or all of E1 and E2
are contradictory (internally, or with one another).
F58a: Force, P1
contradicts force, P2, in so far
as the event set
that one or other produces (i.e., E3)
is internally contradictory.
Given that one or
more of the elements of E3 (or even E3
itself) could be 'internally contradictory', F58, or perhaps F58a, might
allow the interpretation of 'contradictions' as opposing forces to stand.
Unfortunately, even
if sense could be made of contradictory contemporaneous events, the link
between forces and 'internally contradictory' sets of events would once again
have been severed. Hence, even if F58 and F58a were
completely acceptable, they would still fail to connect 'contradictions' with
opposing forces, merely with the inter-relationship between the effects of
forces.
Now, let us suppose P1
and P2 operate as the above
propositions suggest; in that case, plainly, given the truth of F58a, onlyE3
would take place or exist. But, if E3
were 'internally contradictory', presumably parts
of it (i.e., sub-events of E3,
say, E3i
and E3k)
would constitute the postulated 'internal contradiction'. In that case, F58a
would collapse back into a variant of F58.
[Of course, if,
as we are told, 'dialectical
contradictions' are "mutually exclusive", they can't co-exist. In which case,
E3i
and E3k
can't co-exist, either, and so can't 'contradict' one another.]
On the other hand, if
all of E3
were in this state because of its 'internally contradictory' dispositional
properties, then that, too, would be an non-viable option, and for reasons that
have already been considered. [On this, see the discussion of F57
earlier this Essay.]
However, as far as F58
itself is concerned, if one event prevents another from happening, no
contradiction is implied since such a 'conflict' would have only one real term
-- as noted
several times already. [See, for example, Interlude Nine]
[Nevertheless, this might
allow for the consideration of more complex examples allegedly drawn from
HM.
On this, see the discussion aired here.]
As far as events being
'internally contradictory' is concerned, we saw that this was a dead-end, too (in
Part One of this Essay).
It might be felt that
"mutually exclusive" doesn't imply that the items involved can't co-exist. After all the capitalist class
and the proletariat are mutually exclusive, but plainly they can and do
co-exist.
However, as we saw earlier, dialecticians simply assume there is
a link between "mutually exclude" and "oppositional" and/or "contradictory". But, many
things in nature and society mutually exclude one another without implying a
contradiction, or even "opposition". The reader is referred to Interlude Fourteen for
more details, where I have shown that this entire idea is both seriously misguided and hopelessly vague.
It
looks, therefore, like this particular interpretative seam has been thoroughly
worked-out; there is no gold in it, only slag. Unfortunately, what little
apparent 'gold'
there was,
mined long ago by Hegel & Co., turned out to be nothing
but
Iron
Pyrites.
We need to find a new approach to save this rapidly fading 'theory'
from being sent to the
knackers yard.
The last remaining escape route left open to DM-theorists relies on
reviving yet
another interpretation which was postponed from earlier (no pun intended), wherein
'contradictions' were said to exist between the effects of forces (or
between forces and the effects of other forces), rather than between forces themselves. One
such alternative involved taking
Engels's suggestion
seriously:
that forces should be edited out of the picture, leaving behind only the relative motion between bodies to give some content to
the idea that 'contradictions' can cause change.
However, the first of these had to be abandoned because
it meant that forces 'contradicted' prevented effects, implicating this
part of the theory with the idea that forces could 'contradict' non-existent
entities, once more. The second appeared to undermine the dialectical unity of
nature.
Nevertheless, I now propose to examine a re-vamped version of the first of these
alternatives, which is aimed at circumventing the difficulties noted
above.
The good news is that this new option solves the problem created
by the second alternative.
The bad news is that it introduces far worse difficulties of its own.
The aforementioned earlier attempt was based on the following:
F17: Event, E, consists of a set of
inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.
F18: E1-En, form
a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory
nature) within T.
F19: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En
from taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not
exist, will never exist, or do not take place.
["T"stands for "The Totality".]
As we saw above, an existing force, P1,
appears to 'contradict' a non-existent event (or series of events), which
rendered this interpretation useless. The following re-vamped version appears to
fix that problem:
F59: Event, E, consists of a set of
inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.
F60: E1-En, form
complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory
nature) within T, if ever they occur.
F61: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En
from taking place.
F62: Therefore, some or all of E
do not exist, will never exist, or do not take place.
F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En
have been prevented from
taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.
Since, an expectation can exist alongside
a realisation that it has
been thwarted (in some cases), this appears remove the difficulty.
However, F63 is clearly of little use since, not only would it be
inapplicable throughout the Universe at all times, it doesn't even record a contradiction.
[That is because the propositions
it contains are of the form "p and q" not "p and not
p", as required -- where
"p" is, say, "Ek
has been prevented", and "q" is, say, "Ek
was expected" --, when these were required: "Ek
has been prevented" and "Ek
has not been prevented", etc.]
F63 may be altered to circumvent this
latest problem, perhaps along the following lines:77a
F64: Propositions that express
the prevention of one or more of E1-En
from
taking place contradict propositions that depict the dispositional properties of Pn,
the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En,
but for the presence of P1.
One immediate problem with F64 is that it isn't at all clear
what the "dispositional properties" of forces are. Objects
certainly have dispositional properties as a result of their microstructure and their relationship with other bodies -- if, that is, the term "dispositional"
is read in its traditional sense. [More on that in a later
Essay.]
Even so, since forces
aren't
obviously body-like (although they can apparently be carried by
bodies/particles -- if certain theories in
modern
Physics are accepted --, but even then this phenomenon is now explained in terms
of transferred momentum, i.e., along neo-Engelsian lines),78
the ascription of dispositions to forces themselves perhaps amounts to a
disguised reference to the affect forces could or would have on certain bodies
under specific circumstances. In that case, we
would have here an explanation
of "contradiction" that appealed to the effect of effects, once more.
[Anyway,
F64 doesn't even record a contradiction since the propositions it
expresses are of the form "p and
q" not "p and not p",
as noted earlier.]
Nevertheless, perhaps F64 can be re-jigged -- maybe
in the following way:
F65: Propositions that express
the prevention of one or more of E1-En
from
taking place contradict propositions that depict the normal operation of Pn, the set
of forces that would have produced all of E1-En,
but for the presence of P1.
Unfortunately, not only does F65 fail to record a contradiction
(yet again: the propositions it expresses are of the form "p and
q" not "p and not p"), so what it says
returns us to a consideration
of the inter-relationship between forces as a way of understanding
'contradictions', instead of the present model, which sought to interpret
'contradictions' as the relationship between forces and the effects of
other forces.
Anyway, F65 is of little use: if the normal operation of
Pn
is prevented (so that it doesn't take place) there would be
nothing for P1 to
'contradict'. This annoying, but
recurring, 'problem' is precisely what prompted a turn to the current consideration of the
actual effects of forces, since they do exist, as opposed to the
prevented effects of forces -- or even forces which cease to operate --, which don't.
It now seems that unless we can specify how the
effects of forces can 'contradict' other forces (or other effects), this
part of DM will be as good as dead -- even if not yet buried or cremated. Maybe the following
option will help revive it:
F66: Propositions that express the prevention of
one or more of E1-En
taking place contradict
propositions that express the operation of Pn,
such that the presence of E1
(i.e., an effect of P1) excludes some or all of E2-En.
However, this is no use, either, since it matters not how effectively
some or all of E2-En
are excluded; E1
may only 'dialectically contradict' that which exists, and, ex hypothesi,
once excluded, E2-En would no longer be
around to be 'contradicted' in this way.
The next suggestion constitutes, in my view, the
only way to keep this critically ill part of DM alive:
F67: The prevention of one or more of
E1-En
taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces
that would have produced all of E1-En but
for the presence of P1.
[However, F67 will need to be re-written in
'propositional' form, but since that would make this example even more
unwieldy than it already is, that task has been left to the reader to figure out.]
The good news is that since aims can exist where results and effects do not, we seem at
last to have a genuine 'contradiction'.
The bad news is that this
seeming tonic soon turns into a dose of
strychnine.
That is because, of course, not only
does F67 not record a contradiction (for reasons given several times already --
the propositions it expresses to are of the form "p and
q" not "p and not p"),
we can't attribute aims to forces unless we wish to introduce teleology
and anthropomorphism
into nature and society.
F67 can therefore only apply to forces under the control of
human agents -- or to their animistically projected counterparts in
reality -- that is, if we are determined to go down this route and picture nature in
such mystical terms.
It is therefore no surprise that the only interpretation
that appears to make this part of DM viable is one that reveals the
anthropomorphism implicit in the concepts its theorists have imported from Hegel
and Mystical Hermeticism.
Alternatively, it is equally unsurprising that this is the
only option that underlines the reading that
works in HM, one that puts forces under human control (but with no
'contradictions' anywhere in sight).79
Unfortunately, this now means that F67 can't help
revivify this DM-corpse.
It was pointed out earlier that there
are insurmountable problems facing any attempt to identify forces with
'contradictions' -- i.e., if they are viewed as dialectically-united 'opposites'. In connection with
that, we have also seen
that DM-classicists
maintained that all such
opposites inevitably turn into one another, into that with which
they have struggled. But, is it even plausible
to suppose forces are capable of doing this? Is it credible that a gravitational force,
say, can turn into a magnetic force, or an electrical force? Do all
R-type forces turn into
A-type forces? Where in Physics is it postulated that gravity can become a
repulsive force, its opposite?
Do any of them really 'struggle' with
one another? Undoubtedly, electricity and magnetism are
inter-linked in modern Physics (and are in fact manifestations of one of the
four fundamental forces, so we are told), but they certainly don't 'struggle'
with one another, and neither do the particles on which they depend. According
to current theory, such forces are "carried" by
exchange particles, but they aren't an expression of a 'struggle' going
on between such particles, either. [It turns out that if
Quantum Field Theory is correct, there are no particles anyway! That
surprising denouement was covered in Essay Seven
Part One.]
Admittedly, magnetic fields are
reversible, as are electrical fields, but this isn't true of all fields
(even though all four forces can change in a variety of ways), but it is far
from clear that this is because of any 'struggle' going on between them.
For example, the
origin of the reversal of the Earth's magnetic field may lie deep inside the
planet's
core, or, perhaps, inside the crust --, or it may even have an external cause
(with one set of theorists blaming meteor impact); scientists aren't sure. But, not one single
Geophysicist, to my
knowledge, is investigating the alleged 'contradiction', or even 'struggle', between North and South to find
its 'real' cause. And if an electric field has reversed, what exactly has been
struggling with what?
[Of
course, this
magnetic phenomenon is a consequence of the direction of a field carried by
certain particles, which simply reverses. But, it doesn't turn into its opposite. It
could be argued that the direction of that field does indeed turn into
its opposite; maybe so, but that isn't the result of one of those directions struggling
with the other!]
If so, then even if it should turn out
that every single one of the objections aired in this Essay is misguided in some way, the 'dialectical' equation of
forces and contradictions doesn't workeven in its own terms!
Do the Relations of Production really turn
into the Forces of Production? Does a use value struggle with and then change
into an exchange value? Do any of these imply the other like the proletariat implies
the bourgeoisie (or, so we are told)?
Since there appears to be no way that DM-'contradictions' can be
given a literal, oreven a figurative, interpretation as forces (opposing or
otherwise, when applied in nature or society, in
abstract or in concrete form) that is capable of surviving scrutiny, this part of DM can at last be given a decent
burial.
One
of the more recent dialecticians to try to connect forces with 'dialectical
contradictions' is Thomas Weston [Weston
(2012)].
I have now added some thoughts about Weston's failed attempt,here,
here,
here,
here,
here, and
here.
Here also is
Maoist, Lenny Wolff:
"To begin with, the method forged by Marxism -- materialist dialectics --
is the most systematic concentration of the scientific method ever achieved, the
most accurate and critical tool of inquiry into the world (indeed, the universe)
and how it works. Marxism is materialist: it focuses on the material world
for the ultimate causes and directions of every event and phenomenon in nature
or society. And it is dialectical in that it comprehends all phenomena in their
changingness (sic) and development and in their interaction with other
phenomena, and because it studies the struggle of opposites within a thing or
process as the underlying basis of its motion and change.... (p.12)
"Constant development and
transformation, explosiveness and changeability, all based on the struggle of
opposites, drives forward not only the sun but the entire material universe; and
this fundamental law forms the basis of materialist dialectics. 'Marxist
philosophy,' Mao wrote, 'holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the
fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the
natural world, in human society, or in man's thinking.' ('On the Correct
Handling of Contradictions Among the People,' MSR, pp.442-443).
"To grasp the
contradictory properties within a phenomenon and the character of their constant
struggle and mutual transformation, to understand how that struggle in turn
gives rise to qualitatively new things -- that is the heart of the dialectical
method....
"The struggle and interpenetration of
opposites that actually give a thing or process its character generally goes on
beneath the surface. Dialectics uncovers the hidden mainsprings not apparent to
'sound common sense,' which as Engels once remarked, while a 'respectable
fellow...in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful
adventures' when he enters 'the wide world of research.' (Anti-Dühring,
p.26)
"...[After quoting
Lenin] Note that Lenin underscores 'All phenomena' in his opening
sentence. Can this be true? Is everything driven forward by internal
contradiction?... Contradiction is
universal, propelling every process and thing. But universality also
means that in the development of each thing, a movement of opposites goes on
from beginning to end. The growth of a child, for instance, unfolds in
contradictions between bursts of rapid growth and periods of relative
consolidation, dependence and independence, learning the old ways and forging
and trying out (their own) new ideas. Where, at any point in the process, is
there not contradiction and struggle?...
"Lenin lays great stress on
internal contradictions as the 'driving force' of development; but this does
not mean that external causes play no role at all. Ice, when heated enough,
changes into water, which is certainly a change in quality, and not just
degree (as one can test by diving into a swimming pool full of ice cubes, or
pouring water into a Coke). Still, this does not make external causes principal;
no amount of heat can transform ice into chocolate milk, or molten Iead. The
ability of ice to undergo certain qualitative changes and not others results
from its internal contradictions, in this case the contradictory properties of
hydrogen and oxygen in their simultaneous interdependence and struggle with each
other. Yet that example alone doesn't
sufficiently address the question of the relation between internal and external
contradictions. Can it not be said, for example, that the transformation of
water into steam is the result of the contradictory struggle between heat and
water -- in other words, that on a different level (e.g., considering a steam
engine) the contradiction between water and heat is internal and not external?
And that ultimately the very concept of external cause is meaningless?
"No, it is not meaningless...but it
is relative. This is bound up with the fact that there are qualitatively
different levels to the structure of matter (speaking here of all matter,
whether subatomic particles, human societies or galaxies). Water molecules, for
example, contain atoms. These atoms, however, are not 'mini-molecules,' but
qualitatively different organizations of matter with distinct contradictory
characteristics, properties and structures. Their combination into a molecule is
conditional -- and in the absence of certain underlying conditions, the molecule
will break down. But, at the same time, the behaviour of these atoms when they
are integrated into the structure of a molecule will be more determined
by the contradictions of the molecule than by their own internal particularities
as atoms....
"The point here is that the
concrete character of the process or thing being analyzed must be kept to
the forefront. There are different levels of structure to matter, and any level
is both relatively autonomous and at the same time linked to and influenced by
other levels. Therefore clarity on what exactly is under study, and on that
basis which contradictions should be considered internal and which external, and
how they relate, is critically important to dialectical analysis. Mao emphasized
understanding the 'law of contradiction in things in a concrete way.' ('On
Contradiction,' MSR, p.90) The actual opposites which constitute and push
forward the development of a thing or process must be ascertained, their
interaction and struggle studied and understood....
"To begin with, identity has both a
popular and a philosophical meaning. Philosophically, the identity of opposites
does not mean that the two aspects of a contradiction are the same as
each other, or can't be told apart; it refers instead both to the coexistence of
opposites within a single entity, and to their property
under certain circumstances of
transforming into each other, thereby qualitatively transforming the
character of the thing or process at hand. To begin with the first aspect of
the philosophical meaning of identity, the coexistence of opposites: while every
entity or process is a contradiction composed of opposing forces, through most
of their existence entities exist in a relatively stable state. To put it
another way, within any entity or process there are new and rising forces
struggling against the framework of the thing, striving to negate its character
and bring something new into being; nevertheless, at any given time a thing is
still more itself than 'not itself.'... The opposites in a contradiction coexist
with one another, and this (temporary) coexistence is one aspect of what is
meant by the 'identity of opposites.'
"Such coexistence, however, is not
static; it's more in the character of a relatively stable framework within which
the ceaseless struggle of opposites goes on. And this ongoing struggle of
opposites partially alters the character of the identity itself even before it
reaches a point of intensity which fundamentally ruptures the identity (or the
framework). Let's look at a few other cases of
mutual coexistence and interdependence of opposites. Life is obviously
diametrically opposed to death -- but really, wouldn't the very concept of life
be meaningless without death, and vice versa? Death only has meaning as a limit
to life, and life itself only continues so long as organisms break down and
synthesize elements from dead plants and animals (and simultaneously expel the
dead cells and toxic waste from their own selves).
"Such coexistence, however, is not
static; it's more in the character of a relatively stable framework within which
the ceaseless struggle of opposites goes on. And this ongoing struggle of
opposites partially alters the character of the identity itself even before it
reaches a point of intensity which fundamentally ruptures the identity (or the
framework). Let's look at a few other cases of
mutual coexistence and interdependence of opposites. Life is obviously
diametrically opposed to death -- but really, wouldn't the very concept of life
be meaningless without death, and vice versa? Death only has meaning as a limit
to life, and life itself only continues so long as organisms break down and
synthesize elements from dead plants and animals (and simultaneously expel the
dead cells and toxic waste from their own selves).
"Or take war; war is qualitatively
different from peace -- still the two have identity as well. Peace treaties turn
out to be nothing but the framework within which rival bourgeoisies compete with
each other and prepare for new wars, while war itself is not conducted for its
own sake, but to set the terms for new (and more favourable) peaceful
arrangements. And there is identity and struggle in the contradiction between
just and unjust wars, too -- as when the Russian proletariat transformed the
unjust, imperialist war waged by its own bourgeoisie in World War 1 into a
revolutionary civil war in Russia. Further, wars waged by oppressed classes and
nations for their liberation develop as a qualitative leap out of the --
relatively -- nonmilitary struggle of the oppressed against the oppressor.
"But the matter, does not end with the
dependence of opposites upon each other for their existence. As Mao wrote:
'...what is more important is their transformation into
each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory
aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position
to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of
contradiction. ("On Contradiction," MSR, p.119)'
"While the struggle between its two
aspects goes on throughout the life of the contradiction, and both aspects
undergo partial transformations through different stages as a result of this (as
well as other contradictions influencing the process), there inevitably comes a
point when the old identity can no longer comprehend the contradictory aspects
in their changed character. The subordinate aspect bursts forth, overcomes the
formerly principal aspect, and brings a qualitatively new and different entity
into being. The shell of the egg is destroyed and replaced by ifs opposite, the
chicken; the shell of capitalist society is ruptured by the proletarian
revolution and a new society begins to be created.... (pp.24-31)
"The identity of opposites in the preceding examples resides not only in
their coexistence, but also in their change of place in their relationship
within the contradiction. In the leap from water to ice, the contradictory
identity between the energy of the individual molecule (which tends to random
motion) on the one hand, and the bonding force between molecules on the
other, goes from a state in which the molecular energy is dominant enough to
permit a degree of fluidity to one in which the molecular bonding force becomes
principal, and the molecules are frozen. Between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie (as noted) does not vanish immediately after the
socialist revolution but continues to exist and wage struggle (speaking here
specifically of the internal makeup of socialist countries) as a dominated and
subordinate aspect of the contradiction (as long as the society remains on the
socialist road); what has changed is the respective position of the two aspects
in the contradiction. This
transformation of opposites into each other changes the qualitative
character of the entity as a whole and the forms assumed by its contradictory
aspects - from water to ice, or capitalism to socialism. In the latter case, the
period in which the bourgeoisie is dominated (first in various countries, later
on a world scale) will eventually result in its full disappearance -- at which
point the proletariat itself will also go out of existence (after all, how could
there be a proletariat without its opposite?) and another new entity, communist
society, with its own contradictions and struggle, will arise....
"Identity, to sum up, is contradictory:
opposites both coexist and transform
themselves into one another. Their coexistence is itself a process of
mutual transformation, and their transformation into each other is generally not
absolute but goes on in wave-Iike, or spiral-like, development (more on this
later).... Further, in the relationship between the opposite aspects of a
contradiction, identity and struggle do not exist on a par. Struggle is
principal over identity. Identity, or relative order, is a temporary condition,
but struggle never ceases; it permeates a process from beginning to end and leads to the transformation of opposites
and the eventual annihilation of the process (and its replacement by something
new). In fact, when struggle ceases, identity goes out of existence as well,
since the process itself has come to an end....
"The stars, the planets, different organisms -- all are forms of matter in
motion in which the constituent opposites coexist for a time in one form, only
to eventually be severed through struggle and dissolve (and become in different
forms the elements of new entities). Each individual person, for example, is
nothing but a particular and conditional combination of matter...matter which
existed in different forms previously and will exist in other forms in the
future.... Again, Lenin's warning to take the
identical opposites in a thing or process 'not as dead, rigid, but as living,
conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another' ('Conspectus
of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic,' LCW, Vol.38, 109) rings home; and
his characterization of socialism (in another work) as a combination of dying
capitalism and nascent communism is an important application of just this
principle of the identity and struggle of opposites.... (pp.32-35)
"At the same time, contradictions do not
necessarily develop in a predetermined path; different processes and things
interpenetrate and influence one another, and relatively external contradictions
(in one context) can alter a process' direction of development and even
eliminate it altogether.... (p.47) Change does not proceed by simple addition,
nor simply from within a given process. While internal causes are principal
over external, contradictions cannot be viewed simply as 'things unto
themselves.'... (p.59)
"But back to the central point -- the opposition of materialism to idealism. The
basic split between idealism and materialism concerns the nature of the
contradiction between matter and consciousness.
Matter has existed eternally, in an infinite and everchanging variety of forms;
but through it all it exists, whether as mass or energy, a block of steel or an
exploding supernova.
As life on earth developed, matter began to give rise to its opposite,
consciousness. The rudiments of this are found in the earliest, most primitive
organisms and their ability to respond to environmental stimuli. This reaches a
qualitatively higher state in the more intelligent animals, who can draw
conclusions about their immediate environment and make decisions, and it takes
another leap with human consciousness. Humans have the capacity to analyze their
experience, dream up different ways the future might be, and work to make
reality conform to their ideas and dreams, constantly comparing one to the
other. Still, developed as it is, consciousness is nevertheless based on
material reality and the product and property of a highly organized form of
matter, the brain. This much is basic to all materialism." (p.61) [Wolff
(1983), pp.12-61. (This links to a PDF.) Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered, and in
some cases added, in order to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Several paragraphs merged.]
Fortunately,
fellow Trotskyist,
Peter Mason, was a little more concise:
"Dialectics is a holistic
philosophy, which always considers things in their relations and their
development, as Lenin said.... [The development of Ionian
philosophy] emerged from internal conflict, a war of opposing forces within all
things, a 'unity of opposites' as Lenin called it, an 'interpenetration of
opposites' as Engels termed it. These warring opposites were what drove the
eternal flux of change. Dialectics is a philosophy born of revolution. Marxists have a unique
definition [of materialism]. For Marxists, in this context, materialism can be
described as the philosophy that the world is primary, and thought is
secondary." [Mason
(2012), pp.114, 116. Bold emphases added.
Paragraphs merged.]
Here are few
others found on the Internet:
[1] "Dialectics was initially a
particular kind of dialogue invented in Ancient Greece in which two or more
people holding different points of view about a subject seek to establish the
truth of the matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments.... Today dialectics
denotes a
mode of cognition which recognizes the most general laws of motion,
contradiction and new development. There exist four 'laws' to the
dialectical method. They are:
"1) Everything is in a constant state
of motion, development and change.
"2) Everywhere there exist opposing
forces which are mutually exclusive yet cannot exist without the other.
Their conflict results in movement.
"3) Change occurs suddenly, all at
once. A quantitative amount of something results in a qualitative change (a
'breaking' point).
"4) Development moves in spirals,
from lower to higher planes of development....
"Dialectical materialism is the
recognition of a transient nature --
a physical reality in constant motion and change. What makes dialectical
materialism a revolutionary scientific method is that it excludes all static
states, all metaphysical views of reality, all one-sidedness and inflexibility.
Because it recognizes the concrete and present side of things, at the same time
it acknowledges that this present state is bound to end. For dialectal
materialism, the only absolute is that there are no eternal absolutes....
"Motion is the mode of existence of
matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be.
As we mentioned earlier, everything in nature is transient, finite, and in
motion. Matter cannot exist without motion. Everything has its beginning and its
end. People are born, grow and eventually pass away. Stars such as our sun
eventually begin to die, either slowly burning out or self-destructing. Species
evolve, adapt, or go extinct. Rain falls from the clouds, evaporates back into
the clouds where it will once again rain. Human society is also part of nature
and is therefore subject to the same laws....
"The
principle governing all growth and development is the idea of opposition and
contradiction. Two mutually exclusive forces which at the same time cannot
exist without each other has been a common theme in many philosophies for a
long time (i.e. yin and yang) exactly because such processes occurring around us
reflect this concept upon our minds...." [Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Minor typos corrected.]
[2] "The modern
materialist dialectical method developed by Marx is much
more definite and therefore, able to provide us with a much
clearer understanding. Materialist dialectics goes beyond
just seeking the truth of a statement, beyond just
understanding that contradictions are present in statements,
into understanding that contradictions exist throughout
nature and the whole material world. The Marxist
dialectical method has four basic features. First, all
phenomena of nature (or simply put, all real things) are
connected. Second, everything is in constant motion. Third,
all phenomena are undergoing constant change. Fourth, the
change and development of things is the result of the
interaction of opposing forces or internal contradictions
within everything. All this is in opposition to what is
called metaphysics. Metaphysics sees the world and things in
it as static, isolated, one-sided. It views any change there
is as simply one of magnitude, a mere increase or increase
in quantity on a set stage. Metaphysics is the common
philosophy advanced by capitalist thinkers and is taught in
U.S. schools. In general it is the type of world outlook the
capitalist system tries to foist on us so we stay in the
dark about what's really going on....
"[B]esides all the outside influences on a thing (and
let us remember we are talking about everything that
exists), the thing in question has internal contradictions.
Everything has two opposing aspects (internal
contradictions) and each set of these opposite aspects forms
a contradiction. When we speak of a thing we are really
talking about a set of opposites that struggle with each
other, yet coexist and combine to form the thing itself.
There is no up without down, no cold without hot, no victory
without defeat, no capitalist class without a working class,
etc. When a ball is thrown in the air two contradictory
forces are at work simultaneously -- the force propelling
the ball upward and the force of gravity. While gravity is
weaker, the ball goes up. When gravity becomes stronger the
ball changes direction and comes down....
"This last point,
then, says that there is a constant movement, constant
struggle, between the two opposing aspects of the thing in
question and this conflict of the internal contradictions is
the most important single force that leads the thing to
change. Or, to put it briefly, there is an internal
contradiction in every single thing and this, more than all
else, causes its motion and development. External forces
are also important, but dialectics understands that external
causes are the condition of change, while internal causes
are the basis of change. For example, a chicken sitting on
an egg will lead to a baby chick, while the same chicken can
sit on a rock forever and hatch nothing -- the internal
contradictions are the most important factor in the
development and motion of not just the egg, but all things...." [Quoted from
here; accessed 22/02/2014. Minor typos corrected.
Bold emphases added.]
[3] "The world is full of opposing forces. In philosophical language we
would say that the world is full of contradictions. But opposing forces
always exist together. For example, the positive pole of a magnet attracts the
negative pole of another magnet. But every magnet has both a positive and
negative poll (sic). If you cut the magnet up it always has a positive and
negative poll (sic). These opposites exist together -- they 'interpenetrate'. Let's examine the apple. The chemical bonds that hold its atoms together are
being opposed by chemical processes causing those bonds to break leading to the
rotting of the apple. The forces are in opposition to each other. They
contradict each otherbut are contained within the same object." [Quoted
from
here; accessed 22/12/2016. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
[4]
"Fundamentally,
everything that exists is a combination of opposites. It is in the nature of
existence for things to occur as a synthesis of opposite entities. In fact, it
is said that development occurs only where opposites do exist. Therefore,
the way of nature presupposes that in everything material which exists, there
must be a unity of opposites. Taking the human being as an example, man is a
conglomerate of numerous opposites. It is in the nature of man to be a moral
being i.e. to be inclined towards the doing of virtuous deeds, for the sake of
peace in society. However, it is also presupposed in the nature of man that he
should desire to carry out some acts that are vicious. Paradoxically, man is a
contradictory; a synthesis of both good and evil, virtue and vice. It is a
natural law that both these elements must exist in man,without these, no
development can occur. This is what the unity of opposites mean.
"As it is a fact that
opposites necessarily presuppose each other, it is also a fact that they must
clash. The very fact that they are contradictories implies their destiny to
struggle with each other. Thus, two sides of a dilemma cannot exist peacefully;
no way! They must move, and in doing so, clashes must occur between them. There
is usually a continued struggle between them as to which one must prevail over
the other. So, when one of them prevails, then we can say development has taken
place. For example; as usual, it is when one willingly refuses to do vice and
embrace virtue, that one is said to be exhibiting a virtuous character and
vice-versa. Thus, without the existence and clashing of opposites, there can be
no movement, change and development. Therefore, development is when an element
moves against the influence of its opposite. This is what the struggle of
opposites mean.
"The conclusion of all this is that, every material system in reality by
default, contains within it, elements that would certainly lead to its
disfunctionality; and this is based on which has the stronger force or power...." [Quoted from
here and
here; accessed 22/12/2016.]
[5]
"...Marxist materialism makes use of
dialectics -- a way of thinking which explains how things develop and change.
The laws of dialectics can be summarised as follows:
"Everything is part of the whole, interconnected, an element
in the material unity of the universe. So we
should not be partial, blinkered or narrow in our outlook and analysis.
Everything is in flux, in motion, in the process of changing.
Movement or change may be dramatic, sudden, obvious -- or small, gradual,
virtually invisible. Although on the surface nothing appears to be happening,
underneath elements are growing or declining, moods are changing -- sometimes
through connections with things happening elsewhere. So nothing is unchanging
forever. No form of human society is infinite and unchangeable. Movement
and change occur through the conflict of opposites.
"Within
any particular thing there are elements, forces and tendencies opposed to one
another. They give rise to the internal contradictions within a given
thing. At the same time, these conflicting elements, forces and tendencies are
parts of the whole of that particular object or phenomenon, co-existing within
it as a 'unity of opposites'. However, this object also exists in a wider
context or environment, thereby giving rise to external contradictions between
it and other particular things, and between the object and its environment as a
whole. Internal or external contradictions which reflect conflicting interests
that cannot be reconciled are said to be fundamentally antagonistic. Such
conflicting elements and forces will not be able to co-exist permanently in the
same unity or environment. Something has to give. Eventually, an antagonistic
contradiction sharpens to the point where one force has to vanquish the other.
The old unity is broken, and a new unity has to be constructed under the
leadership of the victorious force.
"In the process of struggle, the opposing forces have an
impact on one another, changing each other to a greater or lesser degree.
This is what Marxism calls the 'interpenetration of opposites'. The struggle
itself will also have an impact on the contending forces. At the conclusion of
the struggle, the victorious force is not the same as it was at the beginning.
It may, for example, have absorbed some features of the contrary force,
themselves transformed in the conflict.
Changes of degree -- of quantity -- will at some point
produce a fundamental change in the quality of something -- a change in its
essence or character. For instance, a workplace
may begin with just a few workers in a trade union. But as the level of unionism
increases and the employer is compelled to negotiate collective terms and
conditions, so the whole character or quality of industrial relations in that
workplace will change. Recruitment to the union multiplies—an example of
qualitative change in turn producing quantitative change. The same processes can
come to embrace whole industrial sectors and whole national economies." [Quoted
from
here. Accessed 18/05/17. Underlining removed. Bold emphases alone added.
Some paragraphs merged.]
We have already
seen that one on-line dictionary 'defines'
contradiction in somewhat similar terms -- as 'opposing forces' -- but since
that has already been covered no more will be said about it
here.
2. Engels,
for example, went to great lengths to qualify what he meant by
"force" -- cf., Engels (1954),
pp.69-86
-- where he doesn't even once consider the classic problems associated
with interaction that had been highlighted by Leibniz,
and echoed, for example, by
Schelling.
Nevertheless, as we saw
in that Essay (and Twelve Part One),
DM-theories (like those quoted in the
main body and Note 1) in fact function as a "form of
representation", not as a summary of the available evidence. Indeed,
in many
cases, sweeping DM-generalisations like these have invariably been advanced on the basis of littleor
no evidence at all. For example:
"Dialectics…prevails
throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself
everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the
opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954),
p.211.]
"Processes which in
their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of
one extreme into its opposite…[is] the negation of the negation…. [This is a]
law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the
animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in
philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws
of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976),
pp.179-80.]
Engels was quite
happy to call such sketchy, half-formed, sub-hypotheses, "laws", even
though they were based solely on a superficial survey of a limited range of
examples -- each specially-selected and highly simplified -- drawn from
the sciences of his day. And, even then, they were all either
superficially described or were entirely misconstrued -- indeed, as we saw in
Essay Seven Part One. No wonder then
that I have labelled this aspect of DM, "Mickey Mouse Science".
[Their role as a "form of representation" will be further analysed in the section dealing with
the RRT in Essay Twelve Part Four.]
4. However, in one of
his comments in DN, Engels openly questioned the identification of contradictions with
forces:
"All motion is bound
up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a
system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and
it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies
act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in
short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It
is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as
so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954),
pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.
Paragraphs merged.]
Even though
Engels elaborated on this theme in the succeeding pages of DN,
this passage alone completely undermines the subsequent DM-equation of forces with
contradictions -- or, at least, forces with attraction and repulsion.
[Of course, this quotation was taken from unpublished
notebooks, so it might not have represented Engels's more considered views. But,
as far as I can determine, he nowhere repudiated it.]
[DN = Dialectics of Nature;
i.e., Engels (1954).]
Nevertheless, this re-interpretation of
the word "force" as a sort of shorthand for "simple forms of motion"
is consistent with contemporary approaches to the nature of forces, which sees them as an expression of the exchange of momentum between
'force-carrier particles' (which are
themselves interpreted as 'perturbations in the field', as we also saw in Essay
Seven Part
One). Even so, Engels's 'revised
view' itself presents DM with serious problems which he appears not to have
noticed. Several of the latter are examined in the main body of this
Essay, and again in
Interlude Two.
Thomas Weston has made a recent attempt to find a
'second force' (or cause) in such cases -- which he locates in..., 'inertia',
which isn't, of course, a force.
I return to consider
other aspects of Weston's ill-advised article, here,
here,
here, and
here, as well as in the material that
used to be here but is now in the main body -- link in the last but one
paragraph.
Again, this is an oversimplification but the point is still valid.
Even if it could be shown that gravity is a property either of matter (as a result,
perhaps, of the activities of the by now legendary "graviton"),
of Spacetime, or, indeed, of something else, 'motion' through
Spacetime would still
fail to be a function of
attractive and repulsive forces. [On this, see
Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi. It
is
also worth noting that this view has recently been
challenged by, for example, Wilson (2007). There is more on this
below.]
[In the previous
paragraph, the word "motion" has been put in 'scare' quotes, since it is a moot
point whether anything actually moves in
four-dimensional Spacetime.]
6a. This
isn't, of course, how nature is pictured in school or Physics textbooks used in
college, where
the word, "force", is still
employed for
heuristic purposes. But, as Jammer notes, in
higher Physics "force" has been edited out of the story, replaced by
exchange particles.
This development is re-iterated by Nobel Laureate,
Professor Wilczek:
"The paradox deepens when we consider force from
the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is
conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It
doesn't appear in
Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of
quantum field theory, or in the foundations of
general relativity. Astute
observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence
of relativity and quantum mechanics.
'In all methods and systems which involve the
idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the
introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it
was originally based.'" [Quoted from
here. By "sense-suggested", Tait is obviously referring to the origin of the
concept of force in human interaction with the world and with other humans,
a fact also acknowledged by
Engels.]
[The above now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38.
It should be pointed out that, compared with Jammer, Wilczek is in the end a little more
equivocal about this issue.]
Again, this view has been criticised quite effectively in
Wilson (2007).
[I will add a few comments
here concerning Wilson's article in the next few weeks.]
However, there are alternative versions of Classical
Physics
(for example,
Newton-Cartan Theory) in which the force of gravity can be "geometrised"
away in like manner. On this, see Malament (2012), Manchak (2012) and Trautman (1965).
Anyone wanting to pursue this topic
further might like to consult the following (although a knowledge of
contemporary Philosophy of Science, Modern Logic and Applied Mathematics will be
required in order to appreciate them all fully): Bigelow,
et al (1988), Cartwright (1983), Chao and
Reiss (2017), Coelho (2021),Cohen
(1970), Creary (1981), Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976), Hanson (1965a,
1965b), Hesse (1961), Hunt and Suchting (1969), Jammer (1999), Massin
(2009, 2012), Moore (2012), Rowbottom (2017), Stinner (1994), Williams (1980),
and Wilson (2002, 2007, 2009, 2010).
I will
return to consider several of the above when we have occasion to examine the 'ontological
status' of component forces,later in this Essay, and
in Note 57. [See
also Note 30.]
6b.
Despite this, it could be argued that it is the
relation between bodies that determines any subsequent change in motion,
which supports the idea that there is a contradiction in this case. But, in
relativistic physics, it is the 'relation' between a body and the gravitational
field in which it is embedded that changes its motion, and once that is admitted we have left far behind the idea
that there are "contradictory forces" at work in any meaningful sense of the term.
Once more, it could be objected that
there is still a relation between bodies in this case, since a more massive body
will deform the gravitational field that surrounds it, thus changing the motion,
for example, of a
secondary orbiting body. Maybe so, but exactly how this is a 'contradiction' has
yet to be explained. There seems to be no "struggle" going on here, or are we to imagine that bodies
'struggle' with tensor fields or even with abstract spaces (i.e., with mathematical structures),
and that these then turn into one another (which they should do if the
DM-classics are to be believed)? There is no 'unity' or 'identity in
opposition' here; one body just happens to be situated in the deformed results
of another body's field, and so moves along local
geodesic trajectories. Once again, if anything -- and if we
absolutely have to employ fanciful metaphors here --, because of the regular and
smooth (non-developmental) nature of such movement, this looks much more like a 'dialectical
tautology'!
8. In that case, for
once, Engels's views would appear to be consistent with contemporary Physics (indeed, as
indicated by Max Jammer)!
He also noted the
anthropomorphic origin of this concept (something Woods and Grant, for example,
failed to spot -- even though they quoted this very passage!):
"All natural
processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two
operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to
its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies
that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a
resistance." [Engels (1954),
p.82. Bold emphasis added.]
[On the animistic and anthropomorphic origin of the
concept of force, see Hesse (1961), Jammer (1999), and
Agassi (1968),
who references
Francis Bacon'sNovum Organum (Book
One: Aphorisms; Aphorisms XXXVII-LXVIII)
as a locus classicus of this
idea.]
DM-theorists aren't alone in finding their ideas embarrassed by an
over-ambitious and incautious use of anthropomorphic concepts; the theories of metaphysically-motivated Philosophers and scientists have
been similarly compromised in this way for far too many centuries.
[The ideological origin of theories like this
is exposed
in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries
here
and here).]
9.
Of course, not all objects that collide would be, or would
have been, moving in
opposite directions. Many will be on trajectories inclined at some angle or
other to those of the rest. Indeed, many move in the same direction, only at
different speeds. It isn't easy to see how any of these
can be seen as 'contradictory'.
[Classical problems
associated with the 'ontology of interaction' have now been posted in Interlude One. See also
Note 6a.
This was also dealt with in Essay Eight
Part One.]
10.
It could be argued that forces are 'abstractions', which concept has been constructed to assist in the
scientific study of nature and society, the comprehension of which helps
revolutionaries change the world.
But, this means that the concept, "force", is little more than a "useful fiction", only
it is now located in a 'metaphorical'
universe all of its own, situated somewhere between genuine fantasies
(such as ghosts and apparitions) and mathematical fictions (such as the centre of mass of the
Galactic System to which our Galaxy belongs, the
Virgo
Supercluster). If that were so, the 'objective' status of forces, and hence
of 'contradictions', would be
fatally compromised. Forces and 'contradictions' would now have no physical counterpart, which would
in turn mean
that the real material correlates of DM-'contradictions' must be non-existent,
too. I'm far from sure many DM-fans will want to adopt that option too
enthusiastically.
All this is quite apart from the fact that if forces
were 'abstractions', no two individuals would agree about their nature.
[That result was established in
Essay Three Parts One
and Two.]
11. Once more, this isn't a problem
confined to DM-circles. Scientific theories are themselves shot-through with metaphor, and
scientists use analogical reasoning all the time. Not that this is a problem in
and of itself.
On the nature and use of metaphor
and analogy in the sciences, cf., Baake (2003), Brown (2003), Benjamin,
et al (1987), Guttenplan (2005), Hesse (1966), Ortony (1993), and White
(1996, 2010). [Several of these base their ideas on
Max Black's
work in this area, which is
extensively criticised in White (1996).]
However, there
is as yet no satisfactory or definitive treatment of the content and significance of
the use of figurative language in science.
Unfortunately, given the ubiquity of such language, this means that the precise
nature of scientific knowledge is, as yet, poorly understood. [I hope to say more
about this
in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
12. This might be one
particular use of the LEM that DM-fans would be wise not
to question. If objects, states of affairs and processes were held to be
both non-contradictory and contradictory at the same time, little
sense could be made of the theory, even before it was examined.
[LEM = Law of Excluded
Middle.]
Nevertheless, as with any application of the 'laws' of
FL (but I prefer to
called them rules), in any application to complex situations some sensitivity is
required. In that case, it could be argued that DM is only committed to the view
that parts of one system or process 'contradict' parts of another,
while still others do not.
To be perfectly honest,
it is impossible to give a clear answer to
this volunteered response since DM is far too vague and sketchy for anyone
(supporter or critic alike) to
decide whether or not this is a legitimate reading. Perhaps it is both and neither
at the same time?
Nevertheless, dialecticians do in fact speak about contradictions
"growing", "intensifying", and "lessening" -- or, even
about them being "resolved". [Indeed, Thomas Weston covers these
factors in detail, explaining how 'contradictions' can 'intensify' or be
'resolved', in Weston
(2012), pp.19-25 (this links to a PDF).] But, this is clearly
a
subjective opinion since we are supplied with no units by means of which these
supposed changes to various 'contradictions' themselves may be measured, no data
to support these contentions or even make comparisons. Nor do DM-theorists even so much as attempt to quantify them in any way
at all (which, on its own, is a rather odd
thing to have to say about for those who claim that DM is the very epitome of
scientific and philosophical knowledge).
However, if DM-apologists
ever do decide to invent a unit applicable to the 'contradictions' they see
everywhere, we might make some progress.
Until then, may I
suggest the 'Neg' as just such a unit?
So, one Neg could be defined as that strength, level,
or intensity
of a 'contradiction' necessary to make either (i) a stick (of arbitrary size) look bent
in water, (ii) an object (again of arbitrary dimensions) look smaller as
it recedes from the viewer, or maybe even that which is required to make (iii) at least one capitalist
or employer look fair
to a randomly chosen trade union bureaucrat (and one that might even have been 'confused' or misled by
"banal commonsense").
In that case, a Nano-neg would be enough to make an electron move,
and a Pico-neg would enable it to be both a wave and a particle. Extending
this, a Milli-neg would be strong enough to move a
millipede.
[The reader can decide for herself what a Centi-neg would be capable of setting
in motion.] A Deci-neg would be sufficient to represent a formal contradiction
in logic, while a Deca-neg (colloquially, "A Blair")
would be enough to spin a pack of capitalist lies (about the affordability of,
say,
pensions), or even publish and endorse at least one 'dodgy'
Iraq dossier.
Perhaps then, a Hecto(r)-neg would be sufficient to set off a factional dispute
in yet another dialectically-distracted Trotskyist, Communist, or Maoist sect, while the class war
itself would need a Kilo-neg to initiate a strike, a Mega-neg to motivate a
massive anti-war movement, and a Giga-neg to prompt a
proletarian insurrection. Moving up the
scale, a Tera-neg would be enough to keep the Earth in orbit around the Sun, and,
of course, a Yotta-neg
sufficient to kick-start the 'Big Bang'.
We could even introduce a special unit to measure
or record the
contradictory stench created in the nostrils of most working-class people by the
oppression, mass murder, counter-revolutionary antics and sectarian in-fighting
this misbegotten theory has
helped motivate Dialectical Marxists to engage in
throughout the twentieth century: the
Rotta-neg.
All we would need then is an intrepid dialectician (perhaps
one of those who claim to be able to derive fundamental scientific truths from
thought alone simply by juggling with obscure Hegelian jargon, upside down or
the 'right way up') to invent a "Neg-ometer" (and they would surely be able
to do that
if they stopped wasting time writing yet another identical 'Introduction to
DM' -- perhaps instead by just cutting and pasting large sections from the
'classics', as has usually been the case up to now) to measure these
super-scientific 'dialectical contradictions'. That done,Mystical Marxism might at least begin to look
a little more
precise and scientific. After all, if
Scientologists have the
E Meter, DM
should at least have their Neg-ometer.
[To be honest, I would have suggested the "Con", here, instead of
the "Neg" as a suitable unit
with which to measure the strength of DM-'contradictions', but
when I typed "Mega-con" into an earlier version of the above, that seemed to me to
be a little too on-the-nose, a little too facetious. (Compare these
comments with the suggestions made about dialectical "nodes"/"leaps" posted
here.)]
13. This
assumes, of course, that
'contradictions' have (metaphorical) 'geometric
centres' and possess (figurative) 'separation radii'. [Well, maybe they can be
photographed, weighed, have their toe- nails clipped and be given a new hair-do, too?]
Cheap debating points?
Maybe so; but if
all parts of nature (animate and inanimate, macroscopic or microscopic) behave as if
they can argue
amongst themselves -- which is how things are depicted in DM when its theorists
try to sell us the idea that objects and processes can 'contradict' one another, bickering
away (that is, if the word
"contradict" is understood literally)
--, in comparison, the above 'cheap shot' is hardly worth mentioning. So,
instead of the 'gods' being attributed with human characteristics, DM-fans tell
us that is true of inanimate objects!
DM takes the
p*ss out of itself. It needs little help from me.
13a.
Indeed, when asked to explain why this is a 'contradiction',
Ian Birchall
[aka 'Grim and Dim' -- his choice of pseudonym, not mine -- and I am not
'outing' a comrade here!]
failed to respond. However, in a
later thread he made another
unsuccessful attempt to reply, as
did a few
other
confused comrades. [Unfortunately, these links are now dead!] Readers are encouraged to read
this lengthy exchange on this topic. [Unfortunately, this link is dead,
too!] My thoughts on the 'arguments' of
one of the egregious participants in this debate ('JohnG') can be found
here and
here, and now
in a revised form here. [In general
on this comrade, see here.]
The same always seems to happen whenever I ask
dialecticians to explain why these are 'contradictions' -- even knowledgeable
comrades soon begin to flounder!
One wonders, therefore, what would become of us
Dialectical Dissidents in the unlikely event that fellow Trotskyists ever managed to secure real power. The
vitriol, hostility, lies and smears I
have had to face now for many years suggest I, for one, wouldn't last long in such circumstances!
[Please note, I am not complaining about this; I
expect this level of vitriol. If I hadn't received it, I would have concluded I had gone wrong somewhere!]
For example, in an e-mail exchange a few years ago, one
prominent Marxist Professor of Economics
--
Andrew Kliman
no less -- expressed the fervent hope that I would "Eat sh*t and die!" -- either that
or quaff some
Hemlock -- simply because I had
the temerity to question the 'sacred dialectic'. I had asked him to explain
exactly what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, which he signally failed to do. His DM-inspired vitriol was
subsequently repeated in October 2013,
here (in the
comments section -- again, this link is now dead!), but it was deleted by the moderators because
of the violent and intemperate nature of the language the good Professor thought to use. Another SWP comrade (implicitly)
accused
me of being worse than the Nazis, and for the same reason! Incidentally,
this particular comrade has now left the UK-SWP. Apparently, he still thinks
that 'truth
is tested in practice'.
I
have also critically evaluated
what I consider the best (Marxist) response to the question 'Exactly
What is a Dialectical Contradiction' ever published,
here.
February
2009 Update: Another attempt can be found
here (this link is also now dead!). In fact, the owner of that site (a Marxist economist) deleted my replies, since he
found it far too problematic to defend his own use of "contradiction".
Autumn
2009 Update: Yet another attempt --
this time involving academic dialecticians, which began
here (this link is dead, too!) and continued
here,
here,
here,
here,
here, and
here -- was
no less unsuccessful.
December 2011
Update:
Here's another discussion (in the comments section), mainly between myself
and Mike
Rosen, on the nature of these obscure 'contradictions'. [Unfortunately, when Disqus
-- the hosting service for the site to which the first of these links will take
the reader -- was re-organised a few years ago, older comments sections were lost.]
[And
here (this link is also now dead!) are
another
three attempts. (In order to access the second of these, click on 'Comments').]
Several more examples of this DM-tendency to label anything and
everything as "contradictory" can be found
here and
here.
Indeed, a recent (March 2013) example illustrates this cavalier
attitude shown toward the use of this word:
"In the Communist Manifesto Marx
makes two contradictory assertions: 1. The ruling ideas in any epoch are the
ideas of the ruling class. 2. The emancipation of the working class is the act
of the working class itself." ['Mark', quoted from
here, p.24. Italic emphasis in the original. In fact, Marx said this:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas...",
and it wasn't in the Manifesto, it was in the German Ideology.]
But, why are
these contradictory? As usual, we aren't told. Even so, it
isn't hard to guess a possible answer -- as
Tony Cliff
points out:
"The fact that the working class needs a party
or parties is in itself a proof of the cleavages in the working class. The more
backward culturally, the weaker the organisation and self-administration of the
workers generally, the greater will be the intellectual cleavage between the
class and its Marxist party. From this unevenness in the working class flows the
great danger of an autonomous development of the party and its machine till it
becomes, instead of the servant of the class, its master. This unevenness is a
main source of the danger of 'substitutionism'...."
[Cliff
(1960), p.126.]
In
other words, the working class can't emancipate itself since it is dominated by
ruling-class ideology -- and yet it must emancipate itself if
socialism is to be won. This seems to be the 'contradiction' here. Indeed, as 'Mark'
from earlier went on to argue:
"When workers
fight back they find that some of the ideas once held, ruling class ideas, are
challenged in the very process of struggle. Workers discover they can make
speeches and organise solidarity. Racist or sexist ideas are challenged as
people unite and fight back together. People change their ideas in struggle.
Consciousness is contradictory. Those fighting
back make up the vanguard of the class. The uneven nature of the class struggle
across the class means we need a revolutionary party, one that orients on those
engaged in struggle, the 'vanguard' of the class. Unevenness in the Party, as
well as the need to totally reject ruling class ideology, means we need a
central leadership in the Party." ['Mark'
quoted from
here, p.24. Paragraphs merged.]
Hence, the "self-emancipation of the working class" can only
materialise with the intervention of the party, which is somehow capable of
freeing itself from bourgeois ideology. Or, rather its "central
leadership" is capable of performing that seeming miracle, while the working class isn't! Of course, in struggle,
as 'Mark' points out, workers often change their ideas, but nowhere does he
suggest that they can free themselves completely from ruling-class
ideology. If they could, there would be no need for the party!
Well,
this conundrum is ironic in view of the fact that Bolshevik-style parties -- and
especially their "central leadership" -- and Marxists in general have
themselves been held in thrall to
23-carat
gold, ruling-class thought-forms (upside down or 'the right
way up') for well over one hundred and fifty years, as these Essays have amply demonstrated.
But, and once more, why
is
the above example a
contradiction, as opposed to an impossibility? Or yet another example
of confused
thought?
Again, we are left in
the dark.
Here
is another typical example of DM-profligacy in this respect, which surfaced in a letter
sent to Socialist Worker at the end of August 2011:
"I'm
writing regarding Charlie Hore's article on economic growth during the reform
period in China (Socialist
Worker, 20 August). It
doesn't mention the powerful contradictions that emerged within the ruling
bureaucracy as a result of the reforms. Not all
sectors of the bureaucracy have benefited from the reforms. There has
been a shift from ideological campaigns towards a performance-based notion of
state legitimacy. This has
meant that many officials have experienced anxiety about their relevance in
Chinese politics and have been dragged into protest movements. A
socialist analysis has to make sense of these contradictions."
[Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]
Again,
no one ever bothers to explain why such things shouldrightly be
called "contradictions" when they are obviously far better described as
"tensions" or "conflicts". For example, do the above factors imply one another? No. Can one
exist without the other? Yes. This is quite unlike the alleged 'contradiction'
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, where one supposedly implies the
other, and neither can exist without the other
(although
I have thrown even that widely accepted inference into considerable doubt
here).
Some might
conclude that this is just another example of Ms Lichtenstein's pedantry,
but that isn't so. [On 'pedantry', see
here.] There are
important political reasons for rejecting the use of "contradiction" in
the way it is used by Dialectical Marxists. [On that, see Essay Nine
Part Two.]
(1) It 'allows' dialecticians to argue
in favour of anything they like
and its opposite
(often this is done by the very same dialectician, on the same page or
in the same speech!),
no matter how anti-Marxist or counter-revolutionary this "anything" might prove
to be. These are then often 'justified' on the basis that since everything is
'contradictory', Marxist theory and practice should be contradictory,
too!
(2) "Contradiction" is used to
rationalise a whole raft of
substitutionist tactics, strategies and moves on the basis that even though Marx insisted on the self-emancipation of the working class, we can
substitute one or more of the following for the proletariat: (i) The Party, (ii)
The Red Army, (iii) 'Third World' guerrillas, (iv) 'Progressive' nationalists, (v)
Students, (vi) Sympathetic, left-leaning politicians, and/or (vii) An assortment of social forces,
'rainbow coalitions',
and minority rights movements,
no matter how contradictory this might otherwise seem. And those who
object to all this? Well they just don't 'understand' dialectics and the 'contradictory' nature of Marxism, the class war, the former USSR..., etc., etc.
(3) The use of this word 'allows' DM-fans to look at the
protracted failure of Dialectical Marxism and fail to see it for what it is:
a
long-term and profound refutation
of their core theory, 'Materialist Dialectics'. It also
'allows' them to interpret
this abysmal record as the
opposite of what it is -- on the grounds that
appearances 'contradict' underlying 'essence'. So, if Dialectical Marxism looks
hopelessly unsuccessful, a catastrophic failure, the opposite is in fact the case.
This then encourages dialecticians to stick their heads in the sand while our
movement slowly runs into it.
So, this isn't
the present author's 'pedantry',
nor is it merely 'academic' point-scoring. The use of "contradiction" has had, and continues to have,
disastrous political and ideological implications.
14a.
It could be argued that in
so far as forces in nature can be represented as vectors,
this is also the case with contradictions. That option will be considered
presently.
Any who object to my presumed use of the LEM here should
check
this out, and then perhaps think again.
16.
It may be felt that this completely misconstrues the relation between parts and
wholes in DM (wherein "the whole is more than the sum of the parts", etc.).
However, that dubious dialectical doctrine has been examined in extensive detail in Essay Eleven
Part Two, where it was shown to
be no less confused as other aspects of DM are.
17. Of course, it could be argued that this objectifies
the Totality, thereby distorting it. But, if the Totality isn't a kind of object (even if
it might be a
changing 'object' of some sort), how can 'it' have
any relation to 'its' parts, and how could 'contradictions' be properties of
'it'?
It could
now be objected that the Totality
is in fact a process, and hence it would be an 'it' (or, a sort
of 'it') in that sense. Naturally, the answer to these (and
other) questions concerning this mysterious entity/process, the Totality, will have
to be put to one side until DM-advocates tell us (if ever) what (if anything) they think 'it' is.
[They might find a few useful ideas (consistent with much else
we find in
DM) set out here.]
Despite this, it
could be further objected that abstract reasoning like this demonstrates nothing
since DM is concerned with verifiable, concrete material contradictions,
which exist in the real world. That response has been examined
here and
here.
20. This
rather simple picture is, of course, ruined to some extent by the complexities
we find in nature.
However, the more complications there are, the less applicable DM-concepts
seem to be. In this case, we would have here an RARA-system-of-forces.
Again, a choice would now have to be made whether we should widen the meaning of the
word "opposite" in order to accommodate DM, or change DM in order to accommodate
the facts.
To date, DM-theorists have generally preferred the former over the latter.
Since
AR-forces are discussed below, I
will postpone comment until then.
21.
This needn't be as serious a problem as is suggested in the main body of this
Essay. As
pointed out elsewhere, scientists do this sort of thing all the
time. Unfortunately, this is bad news for DM since it confirms the view that science is a conventionalised social practice, and further substantiates
the claim made at this site that
metaphysical theses arise from a misconstrual of conventionalised
linguistic formsas if they were fundamental
features of reality. In short, the conventions we use in order to
represent the world are conflated with material truths about it.
This is about as
egregious an error
as would, say, an assumption that reality itself must have an edge to it simply because
every photograph or painting has one.
[This topic is examined in detail In Essays Twelve
Part One and Thirteen
Part Two, when the latter is published.]
(iii) This way of looking at the world
is indeed as
crazy as it looks!
[This
topic is examined more extensively in
Essay Eight Part Three.]
22. It might be felt that this
Essay, indeed, this site, is so heavily biased against DM and any way of interpreting forces as
'contradictions', that scientific facts and theories have regularly been twisted and slanted
so that they appear to be prejudicial to DM
-- this latest assertion (that much of DM has fallen apart) being
the most recent example. Surely -- it could be argued -- accelerated motion
in the real world is the result of several forces operating on a body; the
ensuing motion simply follows as a result of their oppositional nature.
This
volunteered response will be examined presently in the main body of this Essay.
23.
Once more, it could be objected that there is no such thing as "empty space".
But even if that were so, and the objects referred to in the main body of this
Essay weren't situated in the said force field, any forces present would still
fail to operate on each other, but only on
any bodies present in the system. In which case, forces seem to affect bodies,
not each other. [See Interlude One
on this, too.]
24. It could be
argued that force fields do in fact interact, and they certainly alter one another. That
objection,
too,
will be examined presently.
The material
that used to be here has been moved to Interlude One.
25.The material
that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Two.
26.Those who still think that forces
are capable of opposing
motion, and can therefore contradict it, should consult the
arguments presented in
Interlude Two,
and presently in the main body of this Essay, where this idea will finally be laid to rest.
Nevertheless, it is worth
pointing out that if it were correct
that forces were capable of opposing
motion, and could therefore contradict it, the
thesis that forces
'contradict' one another will have already flown out of the non-dialectical
window. Plainly, if forces oppose
motion, they can hardly also oppose each other directly. [Unless, of course,
we agree with Engels
that the concept of "force" should be ditched and replaced by talk
about "relative motion".]
27.
In which case, it might be wondered whether only those bodies that approach each
other along the same
line of action
(where the angle between their
trajectories is 180°), or which operate in a force field (where the 'lines of
action' of that field are similarly orientated at 180°) are to be counted as
'opposites'.
However, since forces
and velocities are vectors -- or, rather, may be represented by vectors
-- they can be resolved to circumvent this difficulty. Even so, any solution
sought along these lines -- no pun intended -- would clearly be conventional,
since the components of vectors don't exist in nature in any meaningful sense;
they are merely integral to the calculating procedures we use to help us make
sense of change in motion (etc.).
28. Anyone
who thinks that the vector calculus is a description
of reality would be suffering from the same sort of confusion as someone who,
for example, thought that the weather actually is the wavy lines, or even the
tangent fields,
on a map, which show, for example,
wind direction and speed, simply because a TV weather forecaster had used them. [On this see Interlude Two and
Interlude Six.] And, for
reasons set out earlier,
mathematics isn't even a 'model of reality'.
29. The material
that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Three.
30.Admittedly, some vectors are invariant under certain transformations, but the
physical interpretation of the operation of forces isn't a given; it is set
by convention. On this, cf., Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976), as well as the books and
articles listed in Note 6a.
[Ellis
(1976) was written in reply to Hunt and Suchting (1969). See also Hanson (1965a, 1965b),
and Jammer (1999).]
Mysteriously, however, Ellis has backtracked on his earlier
views (for what appear to be instrumentalist
reasons); cf., Bigelow,
Ellis and Pargetter (1988), and the response to this in Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi.
The difficulty with finding a physical analogue of, or a correlate for, vector spaces
(or, worse,
for any tensor
extension to them) is examined in Cartwright (1983), pp.54-73; see also Hesse
(1961). A recent challenge has been registered to this way of seeing forces in
Wilson (2007); on that, see Note
6a, again.
[Material in response to Smith (2007) will
appear here in the next few weeks.]
32.This
topic was
discussed in much more detail in Essay Seven Part One, where I have called it The Dialecticians' Dilemma.
[See also, here.
The supposed contradictory nature of motion was destructively criticised in
Essay Five.]
The material
that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Four.
34.As noted
in Interlude Four,
it is entirely possible that this isn't
what DM-fans really mean by "contradictory forces"; but then again it is
no less
doubtful that they have ever subjected their own theory to this level of
scrutiny before so that eventhey would be in any position to accept or reject this interpretation. Hence, as things
now stand, there would be
little point asking a DM-supporter for an answer to such questions -- i.e., "Is
this
what you mean by 'contradictory force'?".
And
good luck to anyone who doubts my assessment of DM-fans' knowledge of
their own theory! Personal experience
stretching now across over thirty years
has taught me that
anyone foolish enough to ask a DM-fan to devote even so much as one minute to this
topic will face no little personal abuse, misrepresentation, and 'scatological
hostility', at best, for even thinking to ask. (Here
is just the latest example -- unfortunately that link is now dead! Here then is the
next most recent.)
Compare this
slipshod
and superficial approach to theory with the
care
and attention to detail devoted by
fellow Marxists when they try to analyse concepts employed in
HM -- such as "the forces
and relations of production", "ideology", "racism", "class", or
"the tendency of the rate of profit to
fall". Whole books have been written about ideology, class, and racism.
Not one single bookhas been written about forces interpreted as
'contradictions' --not even so much as one chapter!
35.It is worth repeating
here that these assertions are aimed neither at affirming nor denying
DM-theorists' claims about the Totality, and that includes its supposedly
'contradictory' parts, since both of those alternatives would be metaphysical, hence
non-sensical and
incoherent.
[That is because the 'negation' of non-sense is also non-sense. The reasons for
saying that take up most of Essays Twelve
Part One and Eleven
Parts One and
Two.] As pointed out earlier, their intention here is simply to make patent the latent
non-sense they contain.
Moreover, an appeal to 'relative truth' would be of little help, either -- surprising as it might seem,
that notion was
(inadvertently) torpedoed by Leninhimself!
36.As we saw
earlier, these 'difficulties' revolved around the question whether it is:
(a) A force's effects,
(b) The
relative motion between objects, or
(c) The interrelationship between
bodies and/or processes, that are supposed to be 'contradictory'.
37.
This is so on Hegelian and Aristotelian grounds.
The material
that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Five.
38.
So, this appears to be yet another ironic "dialectical inversion"
-- the said forces wouldn't actually 'contradict' each other since they augment one another -- even though they are still
supposed to be
'opposites'. Perhaps then we should call such configurations "dialectical
tautologies"?
On that basis, therefore, we
might be able to construct an entirely new
-- and, it must be openly admitted, a wholly insincere -- theory of
universal
harmony. This is especially so if we recall that forces 'naturally
combine' to form resultants, and opposites more often than not attract
rather than repel each
other (on
that, see Interlude Sixand
here), both of which
phenomena are
also connected with motion and change. As a result of
such an 'inversion' -- putting DM 'back on its heels', as it were -- change would
then be
an expression of cooperation,
not conflict.
We could even
re-introduce the idea of an 'Immanent Deity' (a suitable -- but no less
mysterious
-- analogue of the
DM-'Totality') to give this novel, insincere 'theory' the unity and cohesion it
requires, all the while claiming that these ideas haven't been imposed on nature, merely
'read from it'.
Since this insincere 'theory' is based on a more realistic appraisal of the interplay
between forces, who could reasonably object? We could even call this 'theory' "Anihalectics"
(in that it eliminates dialectics). Any subsequent 'contradictions' implied by this 'theory' could, of
course, be
Nixoned away along
classical DM-lines.
We could even declare --
with equal pomposity and 'justification' -- that anyone who rejects this new
'theory' just doesn't "understand" Anihalectics,
ending all discussion.
On the positive side, this 'theory' enjoys much more evidential support than the
average DM-thesis -- given the fact that resultant forces govern every example of change in motion in
the entire universe, so far as we know.
On the negative side,
however, this 'theory' would mean that class collaboration and harmony will
'inevitably' usher in
the 'revolution'. [We saw that this was an implication of DM, anyway,
here and here.]
Anyone critical of the above wholly insincere, fanciful and
off-the-wall 'theory' should now point an equally censorious finger at
DM, and for the same reason.
39.
Even so, and once again, howsoever it is imagined that forces finally manage
to combine, change itself isn't initiated by
contradictory forces, but by the aboveannoyingly 'harmonious'resultants -- those 'dialectical tautologies'.
40.The material
that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Six.
42.
At this point, it is
worth recalling how the Stalinists attempted to 'justify' the frequent, sometimes overnight tactical and strategic
180° changes
of direction which they regularly performed in the 1930s, on the basis that they
were 'dialectical', when they had in fact been made for hard-headed political
reasons. So, a pact with the Nazis appeared to make eminently good, 'dialectical'
sense. Anyone who disagreed with this zig-zag approach to politics clearly didn't "understand" dialectics.
Indeed, the 1939,
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was as good an example of a
UO as one could wish
to find. Who could possibly complain? -- Except, perhaps, those motivated by "bourgeois"
prejudice compounded by an antiquated reliance on 'formal thinking'? Or maybe even those in the grip of an excessive "tenderness" toward treaties with fascists?
[Topsy-turvy dialectically-inspired phenomena like this have been illustrated with dozens of examples in Essay Nine
Part Two. Except, of
course, the above pact wasn't a UO, since the existence of the Soviet State did not imply
the existence of the Nazi State, or even a 'non-aggression treaty' with them. In DM-terms it
actually made no sense, but that is just par for the course with this screwy
theory.]
Nevertheless, any number of
equally
incongruous and counter-revolutionary UOs have been rationalised by this
theory. For instance,
John Rees attempted to justify the "united front of a
special kind" -- entered into by the UK-SWP a few years ago -- by appealing
to yet
another 'UO
argument'. But, as we have seen over and over, neither side of this 'UO' implied the other, unlike the
supposed connection between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Hence, this, too,
didn't even make sense in DM-terms. But, because DM glories in contradiction it can be and has been used to
'justify' any conclusion deemed expedient and its opposite -- this trick often
performed by the same individual (or party hack) in the same speech, book
or article. in which case, DM has proved
itself to be an invaluable tool in the hands of substitutionists, opportunists and
sectarians of
every stripe.
[Again, more details can be
found in Essays Nine Part
Two and Ten Part One.]
43a. Of course, Hegel's ideas
were themselves inspired by countless centuries of mystical thought, but the explicit use of
"contradiction", and the key role
it assumed in his work is unique and,
except for its presence in Zen Buddhism, it is almost without precedence. This isn't to
deny that philosophers and mystics have always
appealed to oppositional
forces (and UOs) in order to account for change and
stability in nature and society, but they, too, had to co-opt words and concepts
drawn from the vernacular -- as the late Professor Havelock
pointed out (quoted earlier):
"As long as preserved
communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained
only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is
gods.
Hesiod
takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great
story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of
gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas,
mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a
style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the
manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of
events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the
Presocratics
were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated
philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking
was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could
describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter,
body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity,
quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of
abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of
doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour
of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms
systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished
by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic
statement.
"The history of early
philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary
was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own
language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....
Nevertheless, the
Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They
had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of
orally memorised speech, in particular the language of
Homer
and
Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and
manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had
the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a
cosmic rather than a particular reference."
[Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with
UK English. Links added; some paragraphs merged.]
On this, see Essay Twelve and Essay Fourteen Part One (summaries
here,
here and
here).
Cf., also
Barnes (2009),
Kahn (1994, 2003), Lloyd (1971), and Seligman (1962).
44.
That insurmountable obstacle lies in the path of all forms of Metaphysical
Realism, so this isn't just a problem for DM-theorists. [More on that in Essays
Twelve Part One and
Thirteen Part Two (when it is published).]
45.
Admittedly, this could turn out to be a complete distortion of DM, but, as we
have repeatedly seen, over the last hundred years or so dialecticians have been
more intent on reproducing almost word-for-word yet another repetition of
the dogmas handed down
to them (by the Dialectical Classicists -- on that, see
Essay Two) than they have been
analysing
them with a critical eye they so readily apply to other forms of ruling-class
ideology. Far worse, there
is precious little in the DM-Classics that is of much assistance to
dialecticians
themselves so that even they would be hard-pressed specifying exactly
where or how the points advanced in this Essay misrepresents
their theory.
Once
again, there is an simple solution: DM-apologists are invited to produce their
own clear account of the precise nature of the link between forces and
'contradictions',
making this aspect of DM perspicuous for the very first
time in its history.
Wisely, though, neutral bystanders won't be holding their breath, and for
reasons aired in
Essay One.
46. Of course, this initial attempt
at clarification is unclear itself! We should normally want to
distinguish the opposition between forces, P1 and P2,
from that between event sets, E1 and E2, or
indeed any pair-wise combination of all four. Complications like these will be
examined in what follows (in fact, some of them were examined earlier).
49.The material
that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Seven.
50.
It could be objected that forces actually make things happen,
as opposed to preventing them. But, even then this would be the case if only one force
were to 'win
out', as it were -- the resultant. Furthermore, making something happen is even less easy to
interpret as a 'contradiction' than opposing or preventing something from
taking place. In that case, once more, calling this a 'dialectical
tautology' would be far more appropriate.
Be this as it may, the analysis in the main body of this Essay
was based on
the idea that one of P1
or P2brings about, or causes, its own event set as opposed to initiating the other set. So,
even here, these forces do "make things happen".
Finally, it is rather odd arguing in one breath that forces don't prevent things,
while in the next
asserting that forces oppose one another! [On this, see the
next sub-section.]
Maybe
this DM-conundrum should simply be
Nixoned...
50a.The material
that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Eight.
51.
The terminology I have employed here isn't what I should prefer (for reasons
also set out in
Essay One), but
tinkering around with it won't make the conclusion any clearer. Nevertheless, the following is, perhaps, a little more 'correct':
F16a: Anything that is
prevented from occurring does not happen.
But, F16a is just a discursive tautology -- although I should prefer to call it
a "grammatical remark",
since it expresses a linguistic convention, or rule for the use of certain words.
52.
It should be pointed out (once again!) that this 'new' account of the connection
between forces and contradictions (advanced in the main body of this Essay) is
only being offered here tentatively since DM-theorists are as hopelessly unclear in this area
as we have seen they are elsewhere.
53.
The phrasing of F24 might be considered prejudicial; F24a is perhaps a slightly more acceptable version:
F24: P1 contradicts
P2 only if it counterbalancesP2.
F24a: P1
contradicts P2 if it counterbalancesP2.
That option will be considered presently
in the
main body of the Essay (as F27).
54.
We saw in the passages quoted at the beginning of this Essay that
several DM-authors regard disequilibria
in nature and society as just important as
corresponding equilibria, and in
need of explanation. [Indeed, Weston also seems
to accept that reading, at least in so far as it pertains to the orbit of
planets around stars (etc.).]
S1: All things being equal, NN will arrive in
London, UK, if she takes the
M1.
[F27: P1 contradicts P2
if it counterbalances P2.]
But,
S1 is a
sufficient condition,
not a necessary condition, so it doesn't rule out S2 or S3:
S2: All things being equal, NN will arrive in
London, UK, if she takes the
A1.
S3: All things being equal, NN will arrive in
London, UK, if she takes the
M40.
Since there are many different ways to travel to
most cities -- even though none of them is necessary, they could each be
sufficient; none is unique in this regard, which they would be if they
were necessary.
So, S1-S3 are sufficient, not
necessary, conditions. Of course, if there were one and only one way to get to
London, that would be both a necessary and sufficient condition.
[Often the former is expressed by the
use of
"only if". Unfortunately, the
Wikipedia article on this topic isn't a model of clarity; the
Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article is much better, but
it is far more complicated.
This is
perhaps the best article on-line about this distinction for those new to logic.]
The verb phrase "All things being equal" (also
called a ceteris
paribus clause) is required, here, since it is assumed that other adventitious
events don't prevent NN reaching her destination, such as a crash, a
breakdown, a phone call cancelling the trip, an illness, etc., etc. If this caveat is allowed, then
S1-S3 are sufficient conditions, otherwise, plainly, they wouldn't be -- simply
travelling along a road doesn't guarantee you'll arrive at your destination!
There are in fact several suppressed ceteris paribus
clauses in most of the (futile) attempts I have made to render this part of DM clear. I
have omitted them in order to reduce complexity.
55.The material
that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Nine.
56. Admittedly,
this is to use
dialectical-terminology (of obscure meaning and
dubious provenance).
This doesn't imply I accept that any of it makes the slightest sense.
In fact,
this whole idea is an echo of Kant's concept of "real negation"
[Kant (1763, 1998)], which
we met in Essay Seven Part One. I
have critically evaluated Kant's theory inAppendix A.
57.
Of course, in
an analysis of situations where the smallest angle between these two forces
lies between 0°and 90°, or, indeed, between 90°and 180°, the components of these forces would be put in the required relation.
Unfortunately, the prospects for a realist, or even a metaphysical, account of
forces (given such an analysis) do not look at all promising. Indeed, it is worth asking
this question: Are the components
of such forces in effect merelyshadow forces -- that is, are they
just mathematical fictions? Are they
genuine forces in the first place? And how might we distinguish them from 'real forces'?
Does anyone think that
these components actually exist? If they don't exist, how can splitting
forces into non-existent components help us in any way? On the other hand, if
they do exist, and we can split such forces in a potentially infinite
number of ways (as we rotate the relevant axes, or move into
other
coordinate systems), then does every single one of these components co-exist
with each other and with the original force?
Or, do they exist only when we think about them? [I have discussed this further in
Note 58.]
In fact, as is
suggested in this and other Essays at this site,
it is more fruitful and less problematic to regard mathematical structures as rules we use to make sense of,
or manipulate, nature for our own purposes. That being the case, the above
'difficulties' simply vanish.
[I will add
a few more thoughts about component forces to this Note in a future
re-write of this Essay. (On this see the books and articles listed in Note 6a.)]
58.
Hegel-fans might not object too much at this point since they have become inured to the hypnotic,
if not narcoleptic, affect of obscure terminology like this -- indeed, just as they are inured to
the Word Magic upon which it depends. The latter amounts toa series of verbal tricks that
attempt to derive fundamental truths about all of 'reality' for all of time, solely from the supposed meaning of a few jargonised expressions. Anyone who
doubts this only has to leaf through a few academic studies of, or commentaries
on, Hegel's Logic to be convinced that these Captains of Confusion will happily swallow
such guff whole before breakfast, seldom blinking as they comment (favourably)
on Hegel's ability to conjure 'Nothing' out of 'Being', and then
'Becoming' out of both -- miraculously 'deriving'
all three from a quirky re-configuration of the diminutive verb "to be"!
However, at this point genuine materialists will
no doubt pause and see the above 'derivation' for what it is: Idealist word-juggling at its best -- as, indeed, George Novack
inadvertently conceded:
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added. "Inadvertently", since Novack was
himself an expert at "proceeding" from "abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source", as we
discovered in Essays
Two
and
Four.]
And,
as Engels himself emphasised (in relation this time to Dühring's
a priori 'system'):
"The general results of the investigation of the world are
obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points
of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in
one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the
world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every
species of materialism hitherto existing.... AsDühring proceeds from
'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one
only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they
appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one
can only read something into them...." [Marx and Engels (1987), Volume
25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphases added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
[Hegel's
attempt to 'derive' Nothing and Becoming from Being will be
destructively criticised in Essay Twelve Part Five.]
Even so, this latest twist
once again brings into question the 'ontological' status of forces, and whether 'resolved
forces' actually exist. And if they don't, what are we to say about those
forces that had been their source -- those that had just been resolved to create
those very components? Again, if resolved forces don't exist, then what are we
to say of resultant forces that have in effect been 'reverse resolved' from them, for want of a
better phrase? If we now decide that resultant forces do exist, then when
we try to resolve them back into their components, so that those components are
now themselves resolved forces, do they thereby cease to exist? But, that can only
mean that the original forces that had been combined to make that resultant must
both exist and not exist!
[On this, see also the comments and links added to Note 57 above.]
59.
How have revolutionaries managed to overlook this 'third force' for so long?
59a1.
In fact, we have been considering real material forces since the
beginning of this Essay! After all, what are gravity, magnetism and other fundamental forces
if not real and material? What we haven't done (fully yet) is consider forces
at work in class society, but that is all. See also,
here.
59b.
The material that used to be
here has now been moved to Interlude Ten.
60.
Several examples of 'real
material forces' that are supposed to be 'contradictions' (such as those between the forces and relations of
production, or between use and exchange value) will be analysed in Interlude Fourteen
[See also, here.]
60a0. Bertell Ollman has a somewhat
similar story to tell:
"Marx’s
approach to the future could not be more different. Like virtually everyone else
in his day, Marx was astounded by the scope and rapidity of the changes that
were occurring all around him, but also by their contradictory nature. The
enormous growth in the production of wealth, for example, came along with an
increase in the worst forms of poverty; progress in science and technology that
had a potential for making work much easier only succeeded in speeding up the
pace of work and lengthening the working day; even the increase of personal
freedom due to the abolition of various feudal ties came on the back of an even
greater decrease in freedom due to the unforgiving conditions in which people
were forced under pain of starvation to live and work (or what Marx was later to
call the 'violence of things').
Meanwhile, more and more of the world was becoming privatized, commodified,
fetishised, exploitable and exploited, and alienated as 'all that is solid melts
into air.'" [Quoted from
here. Accessed 22/12/2017. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English.]
True
to form, Ollman helped himself to the word "contradictory" without even once thinking
to explain why what he says is contradictory is
contradictory.
Had Hegel died of Cholera (or whatever it was that
finally killed him) 45 years earlier than he
actually did,
does anyone really think we would be using this term -- "contradiction"
-- in the way DM-theorists do, or would even be bothering with 'dialectics'?
might perhaps like to inform the rest of us from where else
the DM-classicists might have derived their odd use of "contradiction",
or its equivalent?
Other
than a long line of mystics, who else employed it/them this way?
61. As
noted above, if
this phrase is to assume a viable role in
HM, it must be understood
analogically.
[The details surrounding my own interpretation of such a core
HM-concept will have to wait on another occasion.]
In the main body of this Essay, however, I am
questioning both the literal and the metaphorical application of the word "contradiction" to situations
that present themselves in HM and DM.
61a0.
In relation to the first alternative interpretation (i.e., F46), I will offer
what I take to be a plausible interpretation of it in the context of HM (i.e.,
F46a). I won't, though, do that for all the
other alternatives.
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not
A.
F46a:
Capitalism offers abundance, but delivers only scarcity (i.e.,
'not-abundance').
62.
The negation of wealth might appear to be poverty, but that is so in only a very
loose and figurative sort of sense. Recall that something could fail to be
wealth without automatically becoming a cause of, or being identical with,
poverty. Naturally, that is because the two words have a complex set of
application conditions. So, for example, £10,000 ($13,000) (invested as capital,
or held in cash) doesn't constitute wealth in and of itself, and the lack of it
doesn't automatically amount to poverty,
either. Both options obviously depend on the surrounding
historical and social
circumstances.
Of
course, in Marxist economic theory, wealth is associated with use-value and
capital.
[That isn't being denied here. It is unclear, anyway, whether or not the
introduction of that technicality at this stage would alter things in any
significant way.
However, on this see
Note 70and Interlude 13.]
Some might want to
interject at this point that the contradiction here is between the forces that create wealth and
those that produce poverty -- or, perhaps, the contradictions inherent in the
processes that operate toward either or both ends. Furthermore, social forces
like this are inextricably
interlinked and work in opposite directions in capitalist society. [On this, see the material that
used to be inNote 61a, above, but which has now been
moved here.]
Even
so, do these forces turn into one another? They should do if the
DM-classics are to be believed. I have yet to read, meet, or engage in
discussion with a
single DM-fan who claims they either do, or will one day, turn into each other.
Be this as
it may, and once again, why call these "contradictions"? The only apparent reason
seems to be that this word was imported from
Hegel's work, who in turn based his use of it on some
seriously
garbled 'logic'.
[More on that in Essay Eight Part
Three.]
Anyway, this
topic has been covered
more thoroughly in this Essay, here and
here.
63. Earlier, we encountered similar problems
over the simplistic interpretation of schematic letters (such as "A" and "not A") in connection with Trotsky's criticism of
the LOI (i.e., in Essay Six),
as well as part of an extended and detailed analysis of
DL and
FL (in
Essay Four).
There, it was demonstrated that these apparently simple-looking schematic
letters are deceptively complex.
I have also ignored the couplet "A and non-A" here, which has a different logic,
even though dialecticians don't appear to be aware of the difference between
"A and non-A"
and
"A and not A". [On that, see
here.] I
have done so because: (i) The use of predicate-term negation (as this use of
"non-" is itself called) isn't in general colloquial and (ii) It is even
less easy to derive a contradiction from this use of the negative particle.
[This topic will be
explored at greater length in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six. Anyway, the comments in the main
body of this Essay aren't affected by this particular distinction.]
It is also worth adding
that it is only the sloppy, it not slap-dash, way these letters have been employed by dialecticians
(beginning, of course, with
Hegel)
that 'allows' their 'theory' even appear to be viable. [More
on that, here.]
64.
Unfortunately, F52 requires the use of some rather stilted language if it is to remain
literal. Anyway, the "poverty" reading will be adopted presently (in connection
with F49).
F52:
Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.
[F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers
A and B, where A and B
are opposites.]
A much more detailed analysis of the alleged 'contradiction' between
use-value and exchange-value can be found in Interlude 13.
[See also here.]
65. F52a has to be interpreted this way
otherwise it might suggest that
Capitalism had in fact made the very same person (or group of people)
both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time. Not even Mad Dog
Dialecticians, I presume, would want to accept that as a valid interpretation!
F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not
wealth.
66.
This would, of course, be a contradiction if the first person in this fictional
conversation had said "There
are no defective Widgets" while the second came out with "There are some defective
Widgets", or the first
had said "Every Widget is defective!" and the second retorted "Some Widgets aren't defective", but,
plainly, they aren't the examples at issue,
since there is no way any of them can be viewed as interpretations of A and not A
in F47:
F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both
A
and not A.
[Since
Aristotle, logicians have recognised that (in a non-empty universe)
"Every
F is G"
is the contradictory of "Some F is not G", and "No
F is G" is the contradictory
of "Some F is G". Both can't be true and both can't be false at the same time;
they have opposite
truth-values.]
Someone might object that these are rather trite examples, and not at all the sort of
contradictions of interest to dialecticians. Maybe so, but since the
nature of
the 'contradictions' they do in fact intend has been left permanently obscure, they will have to
do for now -- and that will continue to be the case until such objectors manage to say clearly, and for the first time ever, what they
do mean by their odd use
of "contradiction". Moreover, if this DM-concept/word fails to work
with respect to
these allegedly 'trite'
examples, it stands no chance in relation to more complex objects and/or processes.
70. If,
say, an abundance of money in one pocket (or even a large horde of "use values"
in, for example, a warehouse somewhere) did, per impossible, manage to 'contradict' another
empty
warehouse, locally or remotely, it would make no sense, even in DM-terms.
Presumably, since such lifeless objects have no effect on one another they could
effect no change, nor could they develop into each other (as
DM-'contradictions'/UOs are all
supposed to do).
Even worse, the existence of one does not imply the existence of the other; so
they aren't 'interpenetrated opposites', either.
So, even in DM-terms,
it is unclear what sense it makes to say that such things are part of, or
could even constitute, a 'dialectical contradiction'.
The
material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Thirteen.
71. Naturally, and once again, these
comments will have to remain tentative until we are told what (if anything)
DM-theorists mean by the phrase "dialectical contradiction". Since this ground has been
raked over several times, yet another pass here will be avoided.
76a.
For those not too familiar with the terms "relative form" and "equivalent form,
this might help:
"In the simple expression of value the two types of commodities, linen and coat,
obviously play two
different roles.
The linen is the commodity which
expresses its value in the body of a commodity different from it,
the coat. On the other hand, the commodity-type coat serves as
the material in which value is expressed.
The one commodity plays an active, the other a passive role. Now we say of the
commodity which expresses its value in another commodity:
its value is represented as relative
value,
or is in the relative
value-form.
As opposed to this, we say of the other commodity, here the coat, which serves
as the material of the expression of value:
it functions as
equivalent to
the first commodity or is in
the equivalent form."
[Quoted from
here;
italic
emphases in the original. Accessed 01/11/2021.]
77a.
The reference to "p and q"
and "p and not p", in relation to F63,
might seem a little obscure to some:
F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En
have been prevented from
taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.
If "p" stands for, say, "E1
has been prevented from taking place", then "not p" will stand for "It is not the
case that
E1
has been prevented from taking place". "Not p" can't therefore stand for "E1
is expected to take place". Since the latter is clearly not of the form
"not p", so "q" was recruited in order to represent that logically unconnected sentence.
78. The import of this
particular claim
is obscure, at best, even if many physicists believe this doctrine to be true.
However, since this idea seems to have no real bearing on the issues at hand, no more will be said about it here.
79.
This alternative provides us with a clue as to why it is that HM
works and why it does sojust where DM
self-destructs. Clearly, only human beings (as individuals or as members
of a class) canform contradictory aims and intentions
-- even if they and the connection between them are often only dimly perceived,
or not perceived at all. Plainly, therefore, this would allow F67
to be re-written in a way that rendered it conducive to HM -- the exposition of which will not,
alas, be attempted here.
F67: The prevention of one or more of
E1-En
taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces
that would have produced all of E1-En but
for the presence of P1.
80.
To be fair, analogous problems afflict every account of causality concocted by
Traditional Philosophers and Metaphysicians, and not just DM-theorists. [This topic is discussed in more detail in
Essays Thirteen Part
Three and Three Part Five.]
Hegel scholars
have attempted to argue that 'dialectical contradictions' (partly) derive from Kant's introduction of the
concept of 'real negation'/'opposition' (in Kant (1763)). In this
Appendix I propose to examine only
those sections of Kant's writings that are relevant to the aims of this Essay
and this site.
[Some of the background to this topic can be found in Redding (2007), Chapter Three.]
Kant begins by distinguishing between two
types of opposition:
"Two
things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited
by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either logical through
contradiction, or it is real, that is to say, without contradiction.
"The first opposition, namely logical
opposition, is that upon which attention has been exclusively and uniquely
concentrated until now. The opposition consists in the fact that something is
simultaneously affirmed and denied of the very same thing. The consequence of
the logical conjunction is nothing at all [nihil negativum irrepraesentabile
-- 'A negative nothing which is incapable of being represented' -- translation
on p.439; RL], as the law of contradiction asserts. A body which is in motion
is something; a body which is not in motion is also something (cogitabile
-- 'Capable of being thought' -- translation on p.439; RL); but a body which
is both in motion and also, in the very same sense, not in motion, is nothing at
all.
"The second opposition, namely real
opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other,
but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that
which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile).
The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same
body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they
are simultaneously possible in one body. The consequence of such an
opposition is rest, which is something [repraesentabile -- 'Capable of
being represented' -- translation on p.439; RL]. It is, nonetheless, a true
opposition. For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing
on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true
predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously.
The consequence of the opposition is also nothing, but nothing in another sense
to that in which it occurs in a contradiction [nihil privativum,
repraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is capable of being
represented' -- translation on p.439; RL]. We shall, in future, call this
nothing: zero = 0. Its meaning is the same as that of negation (negatio),
lack, absence -- notions which are in general use among philosophers -- albeit
with a more precise determination which will be specified later on." [Kant
(1763), p.211. Bold emphases alone added.]
We have already seen that
contradiction has
nothing to do with 'cancellation', nor has opposition. If, for example, you
and others oppose
fascists
on the streets, they aren't thereby cancelled. Would that it were this
easy to 'cancel' fascists! Furthermore, it is quite
clear from the above that, just like many other Traditional Philosophers, Kant has confused talk about talk with
talk about things (that is, talk about language with talk about the
world). This is obvious enough from the opening sentence:
"Two things are opposed to each other
if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is
two-fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is to
say, without contradiction." [Ibid. Bold added.]
"Things", of course, can't "posit" anything
since they possess neither brain, intellect nor language. A similar muddle
'allowed'
Hegel, for example, to confuse what we might say when we contradict one another
with how the universe itself works! Hence, Kant's jumping-off
point was misguided and confused from the start since he began with a
'definition' of opposition that was itself based on two serious errors (i.e.,
the conflation of opposition with cancellation, and a confusion over the nature
of language). We have
also seen
that two opposing forces don't cancel one another, even
where one force nullifies, or partially nullifies the effects of the other. This in turn means that if it is true that Hegel derived
this doctrine (in
whole or part) from
Kant's
ruminations about opposing forces, then his ideas were no less defective as a result.
[However, we have already
noted that Hegel's
'logic' was seriously flawed for other reasons -- on that, see
here and
here.]
Despite this, we can
determine from the above passage
where the idea that opposing forces are 'contradictory' probably originated:
"The second opposition, namely real
opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other,
but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that
which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile).
The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same
body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they
are simultaneously possible in one body." [Ibid.]
Exactly how predicates can be 'opposed' to
one another Kant neglected to say. Having said this, it turns out that the examples he subsequently offered his readers only succeeded in undermining other things he
wanted to say about this
type of opposition (as we will soon see).
Indeed, this entire notion derives from ancient, mystical ideas about the nature of opposition --
explored in
Essay Two -- except in
Kant's work
they were translated into what it is that predicates are capable of doing,
as if they
are agents in their own right!
That in turn connects these archaic doctrines with religious
notions about the
creation of the world by the 'Word' of 'God'. If the world (or if 'things') are
fundamentally linguistic, mind-like, then they can surely 'posit' whatever they like and can,
therefore, be said to 'oppose' one another, should they so choose. Otherwise not.
Super-ScientificTruths, which Ancient Greek Philosophers had 'derived' solely
from the meaning of a set of specially-selected and 'surgically-enhanced' words,
began to mirror the abstract view of reality adopted by this new layer of
theorists, just as the theories they concocted also reflected
their daily experience of class society. In this way, their mode of being
mirrored their view of 'Being'. The lifestyle of these theoretical drones was largely
dominated by leisure -- leisure bought (directly or indirectly) at the expense of the necessary
labour-time of those whose language and experience they also denigrated. In order to give expression to this form of estrangement, they
concocted obscure, Idealist 'jargon'
deliberately set in opposition to the 'debased' and 'unreliable' language of those who had
to work to stay alive.
In
earlier
myths and
Theogonies,
conflict in this world was viewed as a reflection of the rivalries that existed
between warring 'gods' -- struggles that took place in a hidden world
beyond the reach of the senses. Their verbal wrangles and machinations became the model upon
which later Idealist and Hermetic
thinkers based their shiny new,
Super-Scientific Theories, theories that attempted to explain all of 'Being', which they then happily imposed on nature and society.
Language, originally the product of collective
labour and developed as a means of communication, is ill-suited if
pressed into service as a means of representation (especially when it is
interpreted as means of representing the thoughts of 'God'). In order to
transform the vernacular into a representational device, theorists found they
had to take words that had grown out of, and which expressed, relations between
human beings as well as those they enjoy with nature, applying them to the relations between objects and processes in nature itself
--,
or, indeed, between these warring 'deities', as the late Professor Havelock
noted:
Language, which was originally the
product of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, is ill-suited
when
pressed into service as a means of representation (especially when it is
interpreted as a medium for representing the thoughts of 'God'). In order to
transform the vernacular into a representational device, theorists found they
had to take words that had grown out of, and which expressed relations between
human beings, and apply them to the relations between objects in nature
--,
or, indeed, between those warring 'deities' --, as the late Professor
Havelock
noted:
"As long as preserved
communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained
only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is
gods.
Hesiod
takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great
story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of
gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas,
mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a
style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the
manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of
events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the
Presocratics
were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated
philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking
was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could
describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter,
body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity,
quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of
abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of
doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour
of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms
systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished
by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic
statement.
"The history of early
philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary
was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own
language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....
Nevertheless, the
Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They
had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of
orally memorised speech, in particular the language of
Homer
and
Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and
manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had
the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a
cosmic rather than a particular reference."
[Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with
UK English. Links added; some paragraphs merged.]
Unfortunately, these ordinary
expressions carried with them
(into these new ideological surroundings) the connotations they possessed in
their everyday use in connection with inter-human
relations. These moves then had a inevitable result: when imposed on nature the traditional view of the world became
a projection
of human social relations. This only succeeded in anthropomorphising nature.
Again, as Marx pointed out:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b),
p.381. Bold emphasis
and link added.]
As we will see in other Essays published at
this site: because they appropriated and then elaborated upon these
anthropomorphic concepts, later generations of thinkers (including Marxist
dialecticians
and the vast majority of post-Renaissance Philosophers) anthropomorphised
nature in like manner. In this way, much of subsequent thought failed to break free from this
ancient, animistic view of reality.
[This process has been analysed in detail in Essay
Thirteen Part Three (especially
here,
here, and
here),
but in relation to the anthropomorphisation of the human psyche -- where
the brain is pictured as 'seeing' things, sending 'messages' or conveying 'information' to other parts of the body, employing
'signals' and 'codes' in order to so do.... It will be further illustrated in Essay Three Part Five
(when it is published), where it will be shown that this view of nature and
humanity lends superficial plausibility to 'determinism' (and by default to metaphysical
theories concerning the 'freedom of the will'), as nature and society were
themselves attributed with
capacities, 'laws', and powers that enabled it to 'determine' the course of
events with 'iron necessity'. Until that Essay is published, the reader is
directed here and
here for more
details.]
Superstitious individuals had earlier tried to interpret natural processes as
the work of various assorted 'spirits' or 'deities', using anthropomorphic language to
that end. Subsequently, in more developed class societies, priests and
theologians indulged in these thought-forms for ideological reasons, in
order to suggest that the natural and social order are 'divinely-ordained', the
legitimacy of which not only couldn't, it shouldn't be questioned, let alone resisted. Subsequently, as we can see from the record,
Ancient Greek Thinkers began looking for increasingly secular ways of theorising
about the world in order to construct a less animistic rationale for the new forms of class
society beginning to emerge in the 6th century BC.
However, they also retained use of this
transformed language, not noticing they had in fact banished the
aforementioned 'spirits' and 'gods' in name alone (as Feuerbach half
recognised), but the
anthropomorphic
connotations still lingered on, and there they remain to this day.
Unfortunately for humanity, these
developments also meant
that it became 'natural' for theorists (like
Anaximenes and
Heraclitus) to see conflict in conceptual, logical and
linguistic terms. And this is from
where Hegel appropriated these archaic and terminally obscure ideas.
That, of course, set
this new form of discourse in direct opposition to the language of everyday
life. Again, as noted above, this alienated thought-form was bequeathed to all
subsequent generations of thinkers, since the latter largely shared the same
privileged material conditions, ruling-class patronage and ideological predispositions that came with this slice of the
intellectual territory.
In this artificial
'intellectual' world,
populated by indolent thinkers like these,
words appeared to
exert
their own irresistible authority; commands, edicts and orders seemed to
possess their own secret, magical power (which, of
course,
accounts for the ancient and early modern search for the original language that 'God' gave to mankind;
on this, see
Eco
(1997), partially quoted
here).
In this artificially-constructed 'intellectual' world, populated
by indolent thinkers like these,
words appeared to
exert
their own irresistible authority; commands, edicts and orders seemed to
possess their own secret, magical power (which, of
course,
accounts for the ancient and early modern search for the original language that 'God' gave to mankind;
on this, see
Eco
(1997), partially quoted
here).
Words were, after all, capable of moving slaves, servants, and
workers effortlessly about the place. Codified into law,
words
also appeared to possess genuine
coercivepower,
which helped mask the class domination on which this parasitic social form was
predicated. Naturally, this
entirely superficial aspect of official language would blind those who benefited from
these social forms
to its material roots in class society.
The very real social power that words seemed
to possess would
'naturally' suggest to such theoretical 'drones'
that if language underpinned
the authority of the State, and if the
State mirrored
Cosmic Reality, then the universe must run along discursive lines.
These theorists would therefore begin to
misinterpret a
conventionalisedsocial
form as a secret code that powered the universe -- mastery of which would help
those inducted into these mysteries to grasp the 'essential' aspects of 'Being', and then, perhaps, control
it.
In that case, Traditional Theorists would
start to see
reality as not simply 'rational', but as ultimately linguistic,
constituted by the word of some 'god', or other. In ancient creation myths, the 'Deity' spoke and everything not only
popped into existence, it sprang to attention and thereafter always did as it was told.
On this view, seemingly
inert matter had the capacity to obey orders (but only when addressed with the right sort
of language -- hence, once again, the search initiated by generations of sorcerers for these magical words),
as if matter was intelligent and possessed of a will of its own. Nature thus
came to be viewed as an enchanted
'Being', with 'secrets' hidden 'beneath the surface', and because of the distorted view of language
that underpinned it,
this 'Being' could be recruited to the 'legitimation' and 'rationalisation' of class power.
Indeed, as these
Ancient Theorists saw things, nature was
governed by
opposing forces:
good and evil, light and dark, order and chaos, love and hate, hot and cold. All
of these were either personified as good/evil intelligences, or were viewed as
discursive principles (i.e., as 'logical' laws -- which weren't in fact just 'laws of thought', but were
principles that governed all of reality,
and had been established and stitched into the fabric of nature by the supreme
Logos, who made everything in 'His' image). Here is Hegel:
"This objective thinking, then, is the
content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it
standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it
is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to
employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not
external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the
absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of
pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is
without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the
creation of nature and a finite mind.
"Anaxagoras
is praised as the man who first declared that Nous,
thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be
defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual
view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic.
"What we are dealing with in logic is
not a thinking about
something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from
it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks
of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of
thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel
(1999), pp.50-51,
§53-54.
Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original.]
These ideas feature in
ancient creation myths, in Greek Philosophy, in
Hindu, Buddhist and Chinese thought (appearing in the latter as Yin and Yang, for
instance -- for more examples, see
here). Hence, for such
thinkers, the internal source of movement and development was
ultimately linguistic, determined by these discursive
opposites. Either that, or reality was founded on an Intelligence or Will
of some sort (thus also on language), and, once again, all this was directly linked
to the rationalisation of ruling-class power.
Material reality was thus not so
much congealed energy as condensed language, no less the slave of 'God'
than human servants were subjects of the state. "Ruling ideas" were thus
derived from the alienated thoughts either (i) of those who in fact ruled or
(ii) those who rationalised
that rule on their behalf. "Ruling ideas" thus ruled society because, for such
Idealists and Mystics, these ideas ruled the world.
As above, so below;
the microcosm mirrored the macrocosm, just as their thought supposedly
mirrored the world.
Few Traditional Thinkers have strayed
far from these archaic forms-of-thought, even if they had to be expressed in
a different idiom as each Mode of Production came and went, and as each state
altered its legal form and developed new ideological priorities....
These
thought-forms represented both a significant ideological leap for alienated mankind and a major step backward for oppressed humanity.
That is
because Traditional Theorists carved these "ruling-ideas"
into the very fabric of the heavens.
And, in one form or another, there they remain
to this day.
It is no surprise, therefore, to see Kant's
thought processes travel along these well trodden intellectual paths.
Indeed, as
Wittgenstein noted:
"Language has the same traps ready for
everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false paths. And thus we see one
person after another walking down the same paths.... One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy
really doesn't make any progress, that the same philosophical problems that
occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who say that don't understand the
reason this must be so. The reason is that our language has remained constant
and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. So long as there is a verb
'be' that seems to function like 'eat' and 'drink', so long as there are the adjectives
'identical', 'true', 'false', 'possible', so long as there is talk about a flow
of time and an expanse of space, etc., etc. humans will continue to bump up
against the same mysterious difficulties, and stare at something that no
explanation seems able to remove.
"And this, by the way, satisfies a longing
for the transcendental [an alternative version of the manuscript has
'supernatural' here -- RL], for in believing that they see the 'limit of human
understanding' they of course believe that they can see beyond it. I read '...philosophers are no nearer to the
meaning of 'Reality' than Plato got...'. What a strange state of affairs. How
strange in that case that Plato could get that far in the first place! Or that
after him we were not able to get further. Was it because Plato was so
clever?" [Wittgenstein (2013), pp.311-12e. Italic emphases in the
original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Several paragraphs merged.]
While Kant himself rejected the application
of the word "contradiction" to opposing forces, it didn't take much
effort for
subsequent Idealists to stretch the meaning of "opposition" so that it finally became
synonymous with
"contradiction", especially after Kant had stirred the terms "real
opposition" and "negation" into the pot. The 'intellectual' slide from the one to the other was further
motivated by his sloppy use of "cancel". If that word applies to both
terms (i.e., if
it applies to "contradiction" and "real negation" alike), then what might at
first sight appear to be 'passive opposition' -- for want of a better term --
was all the more easily transformed into 'active opposition', and then into 'dialectical
contradiction'.
We can also see in
the above passage where
the equation of "forces" with "tendencies" -- an equivalence subsequently appropriated by
Tom Weston, as we discovered earlier -- might have originated:
"The second opposition, namely real
opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other,
but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that
which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile).
The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same
body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they
are simultaneously possible in one body. The consequence of such an
opposition is rest, which is something (repraesentabile -- 'Capable of
being represented' -- translation on p.439; RL). It is, nonetheless, a true
opposition. For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing
on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true
predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously.
The consequence of the opposition is also nothing, but nothing in another sense
to that in which it occurs in a contradiction (nihil privativum,
repraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is capable of being
represented' -- translation on p.439; RL). We shall, in future, call this
nothing: zero = 0. Its meaning is the same as that of negation (negatio),
lack, absence -- notions which are in general use among philosophers -- albeit
with a more precise determination which will be specified later on." [Kant
(1763), p.211. Bold emphases alone added.]
We
have already seen that Traditional
Philosophers regularly confused predicates with properties; i.e., they
interpret
predicates one minute as linguistic expressions the next as the properties of
bodies, or even of forces, themselves. Hence, they too confused talk about talk with
talk about things. And we find Kant doing likewise here, when he says,
for instance:
K1: "The
second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a
thing are opposed to each other.... The motive force of a body in one
direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do
not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in
one body." [Ibid. Bold added.]
K2: "For
that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing on its
own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true
predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it
simultaneously." [Ibid. Bold added.]
In
K1, predicates are properties of bodies and forces --, like, say, colour and size are. In
K2 they can truly be posited, so they are now linguistic expressions,
although they are also the properties of 'things'.
Not
content with that, Kant also confused "nothing" with "zero",
which is another serious error. As
Blaise Pascal pointed
out, if zero (i.e., 0) and nothing were the same, then 10 would equal 1 since both are
immediately followed by nothing!
Be this as it may, Kant expanded on what he
thought he meant by appealing to a series of examples taken from elementary arithmetic and,
for want of a better term, navigation:
"Mathematicians make use of the
concepts of this real opposition in the case of mathematical magnitudes. In
order to indicate them, the mathematicians designate them by means of the signs
'+' and '−'. Since every such opposition is reciprocal, it can easily be seen
that one magnitude cancels the other, either complete or in part.... Suppose
that a ship sails from Portugal to Brazil. Let all the distances which it covers
with the east wind be designated by '+', while those which it covers with the
west wind are designated by '−'. The numbers themselves signify miles. The
week's journey is +12 +7 −3 −5 +8 = 19 miles; this is the distance the ship has
sailed westwards." [Kant (1763), pp.212-13. There is a similar argument
advanced in Hegel (1975), pp.172-74. Bold emphasis
added.]
Several years later, Hegel regurgitated a garbled version of the same
argument:
"If +W mean 6 miles to the West, and -W mean 6 miles to the East, and if the +
and - cancel each other, the 6 miles of way or space remain what they were with
and without the contrast. Even the mere plus
and minus of
number or abstract direction have, if we like, zero, for their third: but it
need not be denied that the empty contrast, which understanding institutes
between plus and
minus, is
not without its value in such abstractions as number, direction, &c." [Hegel
(1975), p.172, §119.
Good luck trying to understand what this bumbler was trying to say -- without
first having read Kant!]
But, Kant's ship example undermines his
(and Hegel's) claim that these mathematical operations "cancel" one
another. If the ship in question has indeed sailed the above miles, then it has clearly travelled a total of 35 miles (not 19).
Just because it has sailed 8 miles (west), that doesn't mean it hasn't also
travelled those -8 miles (i.e., the -5 and -3 miles) to the east. Of course, the ship has in the end sailed a
net total of 19
miles west (anda gross distance 27 miles west), but the 8
miles west it has also travelled fail to cancel
anything, nor do the -8 miles (again, the -3 and -5) it has travelled east. The ship has still
sailed those miles. If you replace that ship with a car, then the
odometer in
that vehicle will show a total of 35 miles travelled -- unless, of course, it was driven backwards
at some point. But, even then,
that car will still have covered 35 miles, and its petrol tank will have
consumed a commensurate amount of fuel. Consider a car with a full tank that
will (all things being equal) allow it to be driven, say, 400 miles. No one
supposes that if it is driven 200 miles west, and then 200 miles east,
that the petrol tank will miraculously re-fill itself on the second leg of the
journey -- that is, that the use of petrol to travel in one direction is somehow
'cancelled' by the use of petrol travelling in the opposite direction -- even though +200
−200 = 0 (to use for the present Kant and Hegel's rather
confused
symbols -- more on that presently).
As is the case with many others, Kant
and Hegel have muddled an operation that undoes another operation with
cancellation. Cancellation would mean that the said operation wasn't carried out;
an inverse operation on the other hand undoes whatever another operation had achieved. So, if the
captain of a ship wants to cancel part of her journey, she will just not sail.
In order to cancel it what she wouldn't do is sail west and then sail the same distance east! If you cancel your
holiday, you just don't go. What you don't do is go to Ibiza,
Cancun, Florence, or
Costa Rica and then come straight back! Of course, if your holiday had
been cancelled by someone else while you were on your way to your destination,
that might involve you having to return, but no one in their left mind would
cancel their own holiday by travelling to that destination and then promptly
returning home.
Kant continues:
"The magnitudes preceded by '−' have
this sign in front of them simply to signify opposition, for they are to be
combined with those magnitudes which are preceded by '+'.... And since
subtraction is a cancellingwhich occurs when opposed magnitudes are taken
together, it is evident that the '−' cannot really be a sign of subtraction, as
is commonly supposed; it is only the combination of '+' and '−' together which
signifies subtraction. Hence the proposition '−4 −5 = −9' is not a subtraction
at all, but a genuine increase and addition of magnitudes of the same kind. On
the other hand, '+9 −5 = 4' does signify a subtraction, for the signs of
opposition indicate that the one cancels as much in the other as is equal to
itself. Likewise, the sign '+' on its own does not really signify addition
itself. The sign '+' only signifies addition in so far as the magnitude which it
precedes is supposed to be combined with another magnitude which is also
preceded by '+', or is thought of as preceded by '+'. If, however, it is to be
combined with a magnitude preceded by '−', this can only occur by means of
opposition, and then both the sign '+' and the sign '−' signify a subtraction,
one magnitude cancelling as much in the second magnitude as is equal, namely, to
the first, as for example '−9 +4 = −5'. For this reason, the sign '−', as it
occurs in the example '−9 −4 = −13', does not signify a subtraction but an
addition, in exactly the same way as the sign '+', as it occurs in the example
'+9 +4 = +13' signifies addition." [Ibid., p.213. Bold emphases added.]
First
of all, Kant has again helped himself to the word "opposition" with no attempt
to justify his odd use of that word
in such
contexts. In what way is a "−" sign oppositional? Consider, for example, a
temperature of -5°C. Is the sign in front to the "5" here in 'opposition' to
anything? Perhaps it 'opposes' +5°C? But, when we turn these temperatures into Fahrenheit, we
obtain 23°F and 41°F, respectively. [Something analogous occurs if we switch to
degrees Kelvin.] Where has the alleged 'opposition' gone?
Second,
Kant has plainly confused positive
and negative integers with the operations of addition and
subtraction. 7, for example, is a positive integer; adding 7 is what we do
with it. Running the two together would be like confusing, say, a pencil with what
can be done with it. This muddle hasn't been helped either by mathematicians using
"−", for instance, to indicate both an operation and
a sign attached to
a numeral to map it onto an element in the set of
negative integers. Hence, in order to distinguish these two different uses of what
look like the same sign, novices in arithmetic are often taught to
distinguish a number from an operation by the use of brackets.
Hence, the integer 7
would be written as "(+7)", and the integer -5 as "(-5)";
so, when the latter is subtracted from the former that would be written as "(+7) - (-5)". However,
even this is far from perspicuous, and often causes confusions of its
own. In which case, I will henceforth distinguish
the operation of subtraction from the negative integer sign itself
in the following way: "─"
(a long dash) signifies the operation of subtraction, and "-" (a short dash) the
negative sign used to signify elements of the set of negative integers.
[Of course, Kant wrote at a time when
mathematicians themselves were unclear what they meant by numbers in general --, or, indeed,
operations and functions. Subsequent philosophers who uncritically draw on Kant's
ideas are less easy to absolve.]
Now, it isn't too clear how Kant would classify,
for instance, the following: -8 ─ -3 = -5. Is this subtraction or
addition? Well, according to Kant's comments above, since there is no '+' and '-' sign
together,
it
can't be a subtraction!
Consider an overdraft of £8. Suppose the bank
manager discovers an error of £3 in the said account and wipes £3 off that
overdraft in order to correct this mistake. The overdraft will now be £5.
Plainly, the owner of that account won't have any more money in her account as a
result (she is still overdrawn!) -- so, nothing has been added. All that has
happened is that some of the debt has been subtracted -- taken away or removed.
This
nicely illustrates what happens when operations are conflated with numbers --,
or, for that matter, mathematical operations are muddled with cancellation (or,
indeed, with "opposition"). "Mighty thinker" though he was, Kant's thought is
confused from beginning to end on these issues. Hegel's doubly so.
Someone might object that the above bank
manager did in fact cancel part of the debt, but that isn't so. An error
was rectified, that is all. Of course, debts can be cancelled, but the
cancellation of a debt isn't itself a mathematical operation (you don't
learn your 'cancellation tables' at school, nor are there 'cancellation theorems'
in Number
Theory). The cancellation of a debt involves one or more of the following:
an act of goodwill (or of charity), a rectification, a humiliation, or, indeed, a host of other incidental
social or interpersonal actions/relations.
We can certainly work out the mathematic result or consequence of a cancellation, but that
doesn't remove the clear distinction between how we calculate and how we
describe the causes or the results of such moves socially, should we so choose. If
someone pays off a debt, that is different from cancelling it, and the same
applies to errors that are put right -- although the end result in each case
might be the same.
Finally, if a debt is cancelled simpliciter, then someone
else
will have lost out (willingly or otherwise), which isn't the case with debts
that have been paid off, or where an error has been rectified. So, let us assume
that NN has $100 in his bank account and that he also
owes MM $25; if MM cancels NN's debt, then someone otherthanNN will lose out (in this case MM will have
voluntarily lost $25). But if NN pays MM the $25, only NN will lose
out. The result in each case for NN will be the same in some respects but
not others. It will be the same in that NN will now no longer owe that
money (this being the result whether the debt is paid or wiped), but it will be different in
that in the second instance (if the debt is paid), NN will be $25
worse off, not MM. In the first instance, however, if the debt is wiped, NN will be free of the
debt, but nothing will have been added to his bank balance, which remains $100. The debt will just be forgotten and it is MM who will have lost out. So,
as we can see, paying off a debt is significantly different from that debt being cancelled.
Kant
once again ran these notions together and only succeeded in confusing himself
and others, who should, perhaps,
have known better.
It might
help to consider a more perspicuous example: imagine a collection of eight
marbles all labelled with "-" signs. If three of those marbles are removed
then there will only be five of those
labelled marbles left: -8 ─ -3 = -5.
Nothing has been cancelled.
Kant then proceeded to sink himself into even
deeper
confusion:
"In order to extract what is
philosophically significant from this concept and to do so without particularly
looking at magnitude, we shall begin by offering the following remark. The
mathematical concept of negative magnitudes involves the opposition which we
have above called 'real opposition'. Suppose there are +8 units of capital and
-8 units of passive debt; no contradiction is involved in attributing them to
the same person. However, one of these magnitudes cancels an amount which
is equal to that which is posited by the other, and the consequence is zero."
[Ibid., p.214. Bold emphasis added.]
But, Kant's running together of concepts
that should be kept separate (e.g., confusing the repaying of a debt with cancelling
that debt) now means he has to answer these two distinct questions in the
same way:
If he
is consistent he will have to say "Yes" to both. These options are
indistinguishable if you work with such confused ideas. For Kant, if the result
is zero, then it matters not how we arrived at that result. So, we could say
that we 'cancelled' a debt of -8 with +8 capital, or we could say that we
'cancelled' capital of +8 with a debt of -8! Or, more colloquially, someone
could say (if he were a Kantian in this respect) "I paid off my bank balance of
$8 with a debt of $8."(!) In reply to that, a neutral observer could only
respond incredulously, "How can you pay off a bank balance of $8! You pay with
the money in your bank account, surely? You can't pay with a debt. A debt isn't
currency!"
Of course, one can pass a debt on so
that someone else gets paid instead (when that debt is finally discharged by the
debtor); but, even then, no debt has been used as payment. It has merely been
transferred.
Couldn't that be regarded as payment in such a case? Mightn't this
be how an IOU
could work? Sure, just as swapping cigarettes in prison, or bartering, say, an
Ox for two wagons of hay can be so regarded. But, in the case of passing on a
debt, what has in effect been transferred is a hold on someone else's money (the
original creditor's), and that is what has in the end made the payment. Debts
and IOUs still fail to be currency, despite what
Jim Carrey
appears to believe:
Video Five: Dumb And Dumber
-- IOU's Are 'As Good As Money'
No one plans a bank heist to steal a load of debts!
No mugger has ever demanded "Hand over your IOUs!" A robber might, indeed,
steal someone's IOUs so that those debts can't be redeemed, but that still
doesn't make IOUs currency. Next time you want to buy something, try paying for
it with an IOU. See how far you get. While you are at it, check on Google
what the exchange rate is for IOUs. Who has ever been banged up for
counterfeiting an IOU?
Someone might point out that banknotes
originally grew out of the use of IOUs, or promissory notes. That isn't quite
right; they were originally introduced into Europe (from China by Marco Polo) as
"value received" notes, as opposed to "sight bills", which were promissory
notes. Even so, that doesn't elide the clear distinction that exists today
between legal currency and an IOU. There is a world of difference between
promissory notes issued by a public authority and an IOU written by a guy at the
pub.
Although we can
see there is a real difference here
between currency and debts, Kant's confused analysis can't distinguish between the two.
He continues -- and it is here where
see the above
implicit confusion become explicit:
"I shall, accordingly, call the debts
'negative units of capital'. But in doing so I do not mean they are negations or
mere denials of units of capital, for it they were they would themselves be
designated by zero.... What I mean when I call debts 'negative units of capital'
is this: debts are positive grounds of the diminishment of the units of capital.
In order to make this clear, we shall adopt the method of the mathematicians and
call descent 'negative ascent'; falling 'negative rising', retreat 'negative
advance'. In this way, it is instantly apparent from the expression itself that,
for example, falling is not to be distinguished from rising merely in the way in
which 'not a' is distinguished from 'a'. It is rather the case that falling is
just as positive as rising.... I can just as well call descent 'negative rising'
and I can call rising 'negative descent'. Similarly, units of capital are just
as much negative debts, as the latter are negative units of capital. But it is
rather more appropriate to apply the name 'negative' to that on which the
intention is primarily focused in a given case, if one wishes to designate its
real opposite. For example, it is rather more appropriate to call debts negative
(sic) 'negative units of capital' than to call units of capital 'negative
debts', although there is no difference to be found in the reciprocal relation
itself.... 'The negative of rising is setting'. What I intend to convey by this
expression is not that the one thing is the negation of the other, but rather
that there is something which stands in a relation of real opposition to
something else." [Ibid., pp.214-15. Italic emphasis in the original.
There is clearly a serious misprint in this passage, where the text has
"negative 'negative units of capital'". I have however left the above as it is
in the published version. Bold emphases added.]
Clearly, it
is this rather careless attempt to connect certain noun phrases with other noun
phrases (that can be used to describe operations, actions or states (and their
inverses)), but this only succeeded in compounding Kant's
confusion. For if we insist on calling debt, "negative
capital", then the choice will become indifferent between the questions
posed earlier -- so 'paying off a negative
debt' or 'paying off capital' will make some sort of crazy sense --, which helps explain this rather
odd comment:
"[D]ebts are positive grounds of the
diminishment of the units of capital." [Ibid.]
Which isn't a million miles distant from
this:
Z1: "I paid off my bank balance of $8 with a debt
of $8."
In addition, while it might make some sort of
rhetorical sense to call ascent "negative descent", that won't work in every
case. Is murder really "negative life-saving"? Is birth "negative death", or is
it "negative burial"? When a mother gives birth does she really "negatively
kill" her baby? What about painting a door red? What is that the negative
of? Indeed, what is the negative of Kant writing the above comments?
It has been asserted many times at this site
that dialectics -- indeed, much of Traditional Philosophy -- arose out of a careless and sloppy use,
or indeed misuse, of language and it looks like Kant's
argument above hasn't strayed too far from that intellectual quagmire -- as we
saw Marx concur:
"The
philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language,
from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted
language of the actual world...." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
Kant merely
elaborates on these confusions throughout the rest of this work (except, he
later attempts to derive several sweeping, if not decidedly odd, metaphysical
theories from them), so there seems
little point pursuing this Kantian detour into dialectical disaster any further, given the aims of
this site.
More-or-less the same can be said with respect to Kant's masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason [Kant (1998),
pp.369, 373 (this links to a PDF)], which adds nothing to the above. [Readers are invited to check
the veracity of
that assertion for themselves.]
In which case,
as we have seen, it is hardly surprising that
Kant's many confusions found their way into the even more muddled ramblings of The
Caliph of Confusion, Hegel. Hence, there is no good reason to suppose there
are any 'real negations' out there that somehow power the universe -- even if sense
could be made of the supposition that there could be.
Or, perhaps more accurately: it makes no sense to suppose such
confusions power anythingother than an over-active imagination.
As Bertrand Russell pointed out:
"This illustrates an important truth, namely,
that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it
gives rise." [Russell (1961), p.715.]
One or two
DM-fans, when
confronted (by yours truly) with the above quote, thought Russell was somehow advocating the use of sub-standard logic
on the basis that it results in "more interesting" consequences. They failed to note
that Russell was being sarcastic.
This allegory appears in a 'discussion' between Socrates and a character called
Glaucon (who
was Plato's older brother and who was in effect both a sounding board and
nodding dog to much of what Socrates just baldly asserts). Readers
will no doubt recognise the right-wing, aristocratic tone of this passage (I
have highlighted in bold those sections where that is the clearest). I have also made one
or two minor changes to the text in light of the published version.
The dialogue
begins with Socrates, and each paragraph alternates between Socrates and
Glaucon:
And now, I
said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or
unenlightened: -- Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a
mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been
from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot
move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning
round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and
between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if
you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette
players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.
I see.
And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of
vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various
materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.
You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.
Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows
of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?
True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never
allowed to move their heads?
And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see
the shadows?
Yes, he said.
And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that
they were naming what was actually before them?
Very true.
And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side,
would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice
which they heard came from the passing shadow?
No question, he replied.
To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the
images.
That is certain.
And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are
released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated
and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look
towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and
he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen
the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before
was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his
eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision -- what will
be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the
objects as they pass and requiring him to name them -- will he not be perplexed?
Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the
objects which are now shown to him?
Far truer.
And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in
his eyes which will make him turn away to take and take in the objects of vision
which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the
things which are now being shown to him?
True, he [would].
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged
ascent, and held fast until he's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is
he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes
will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now
called realities.
Not all in a moment, he said.
He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he
will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the
water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the
moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the
stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?
Certainly.
Last of [all] he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in
the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and
he will contemplate him as he is.
Certainly.
He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the
years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain
way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to
behold?
Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.
And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his
fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the
change, and pity them?
Certainly, he would.
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those
who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them
went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were
therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he
would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would
he not say with Homer, 'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master', and to
endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?
Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything [rather] than
entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.
Imagine once more, I said, such an [individual] coming suddenly out of the sun
to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes
full of darkness?
To be sure, he said.
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with
the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still
weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed
to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be
ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his
eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one
tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the
offender, and they would put him to death.
No question, he said.
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous
argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the
sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be
the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief,
which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows.
But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the
idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when
seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and
right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the
immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the
power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life
must have his eye fixed.
I agree, he
said, as far as I am able to understand you.
Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific
vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever
hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of
theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.
Yes, very natural.
And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to
the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his
eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding
darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about
the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the
conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?
Anything but surprising, he replied.
Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes
are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light
or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as
of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision
is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether
that soul of man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see
because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is
dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and
state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at
the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in
this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light
into the den.
That, he said, is a very just distinction.
But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they
say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like
sight into blind eyes.
They undoubtedly say this, he replied.
Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in
the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to
light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the
movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of
being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest
and best of being, or in other words, of the good.
Very true.
And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and
quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already,
but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?
Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.
And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily
qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted
later by habit and exercise, the of wisdom more than anything else contains a
divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful
and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never
observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue --
how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the
reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and
he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness.
Very true,
he said.
But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their
youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating
and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth,
and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that
are below -- if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned
in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the
truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.
Very likely.
Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely. or rather a necessary
inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of
the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able
ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty
which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the
latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that
they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.
Very true, he replied.
Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to
compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be
the greatest of all -- they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the
good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do
as they do now.
What do you mean?
I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they
must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of
their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.
But is not
this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a
better?
You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator,
who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the
happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by
persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and
therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please
themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.
True, he said, I had forgotten.
Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our
philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them
that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils
of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet
will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they
cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never
received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings
of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and
more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in
the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the
general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you
have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the
inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what
they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their
truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream
only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which
men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle
for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the
State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and
most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.
Quite true,
he replied.
And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils
of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one
another in the heavenly light?
Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose
upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take
office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of
State.
Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your
future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may
have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they
rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom,
which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration
of public affairs, poor and hungering after [their] own private advantage,
thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be;
for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which
thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.
Most true, he replied.
And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that
of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?
Indeed, I do not, he said.
And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there
will be rival lovers, and they will fight.
No question.
Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be
the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best
administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a
better life than that of politics?
They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.
And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how
they are to be brought from darkness to light -- as some are said to have
ascended from the world below to the gods?
By all means, he replied.
The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell [tossing a coin
-- RL], but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little
better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below,
which we affirm to be true philosophy? [Plato
(1997b) Book VII, pp.1132-38, 514-521c. I have used the on-line version
here, even though the edition I have cited is a far superior translation. Bold
added.]
From this we can see that Plato connects this wild fantasy -- that
the world of
common experience is in effect a play of shadows, which are merely reflectedartefacts,
not 'real objects', and that only those who have 'seen the light' after they
exit the cave know 'true
being' -- with those who are alone fit to rule, Philosophers(!). It is this fantasy
upon which Professor Tegmark, for
instance, hoped to base his theory. Of course, he might not be aware of the
connection this allegory had with the 'justification' of anti-democratic,
aristocratic wealth, power and privilege, but that just underlines the insidious nature of the "ideas of the
ruling-class" (of which class Plato was a card-carrying member).
Be this as
it may, that idea is still, over two thousand years later, a powerful image that
underpins the theory
that the universe is a mathematical object, and the world of 'appearances' is a
shadow of that hidden world. [As we saw in Essay Three Part Two (here
and here),
this is a "ruling idea" that motivates Dialectical Marxists, too.
See also Note 6a
and Note 25 of
the same Essay.]
However, Plato's allegory doesn't work even in its own terms, not least because
those trapped in this cave from birth will have no
language, and hence won't be able to name anything, conclude anything or
talk about anything, whether they are inside or outside the cave. This
entire
fairy-tale collapses as a result.
Exactly how this fantasy managed to influence so many and for so long, and
why anyone took it seriously, is, therefore, a mystery we will just have to pass
over in silence for now...
Appendix C:
Dm Fans Struggle To Explain Use Value And Exchange Value
Here follows the relevant parts of a 'debate' I had
with several DM-fans
over at Libcom back in 2012.
This material has been slightly edited to remove
spelling errors and typos, and the quotation marks have been altered to conform with
the conventions
adopted at this site. In addition many paragraphs have been merged and
material that isn't relevant to the relation between Use Value and Exchange Value [UV
and RV] has largely been omitted (as have some of the off-topic disputes among
DM-fans themselves). Any other edits have either been explicitly
acknowledged or they have been put in square brackets. Other than the name
abbreviations, all emphases are in the original (unless otherwise stated).
Finally, spelling has been modified to agree with UK English.
It is worth pointing out that in what follows I am
not questioning the validity of Marx's distinction between UV and
EV, merely pointing out that:
(i) We have as yet no clear idea concerning what we now mean
by these two terms (that can be seen by the way that even my adversaries can't
agree among themselves); and,
(ii) The connection between UV and EV
can't be 'dialectical', whatever else it is. As we will see, UV and EV
don't imply one another (unlike the proletariat and the capitalist class,
so we are told), nor do they 'struggle' with and then turn into each other (which they
should do if the
DM-classics are to be believed).
Finally, in this discussion, I am clearly RL.
RL
(the following short passage was in fact quoted from an earlier version of this Essay):
"Can't exchange values exist where there
is no use value at all? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange value
but many do not have a use value. Same with many works of art and other
collectables (such as stamps and old coins). And can't criminals exchange
useless items in order to launder money?"
Jura (whose first language isn't English):
"This is laughable, but not that
surprising in a 21st century Trotskyist. You don't even understand the basic
relationships between value, exchange value and use-value, i.e. the fundamental
concepts of Marx's analysis (first five or six pages of Ch1 of Volume 1). How
can anything you say be relevant to questions of the structure of Marx's theory
-- which is exclusively what the Marxian dialectic relates to -- if you don't
understand its actual content?..."
S Artesian
(henceforth, SA -- SA is one of
those all too frequent DM-fans who liberally mix abuse in with their responses to me, and not just
in this particular debate, but over at RevLeft and elsewhere, which helps explain my
dismissive and irreverent attitude toward him):
"This claim of Rosa's was answered long ago on revleft. Marx is concerned with
the organization of social production, the dominant, determining mode. The
accumulation of curios, pets, antiques is exactly what he is not talking about,
no more than he is discussing a tailor who is 'kept' by a wealthy individual,
producing suits only for that individual. Get rid of the troll."
Jura (replying to
SA):
"That's not the issue at all. Marx would
never deny that antiques, pets or works of art are use-values. It's right there
on the first page."
SA (replying to
Jura):
"The issue isn't if these objects are use-values, but are they commodities. Of
course they can have a use-value; and they can even claim exchange value when
sold, but are they 'produced as commodities'? Are they values? Is the suit made by
the private tailor a value? Absolutely not. There are objects of individual
desire that are not results of social production, consequently their 'values'
have nothing to do with the socially necessary labour time of their reproduction,
just as the value of an artist's painting has absolutely nothing to do with the
labour time embedded in its production. Marx is dealing with the organization of
labour as abstract labour; an antique, curio, work of art claims its identity as
an antique, curio, work of art precisely because it is not a product of abstract
labour."
Jura (replying to SA):
"I agree with the substance of your posts, but you're not
paying attention to what Rosa said. Rosa claims that some commodities (like some
antiques) don't have use-value (how their value is determined is not important
right now). I'm saying -- repeating Marx -- that this is nonsense: all
commodities, regardless of whether their price is regulated by SNLT [Socially
Necessary Labour Time -- RL] or not, must have a use-value in order to be sold
to someone."
SA
(replying to Jura):
"Well of course it has a 'use value.' Somebody wants it, likes it, exchanges
something for it -- represents or translates its use value into an exchange
value. That very process, of finding the translation of use value into
exchange value is what Marx is examining -- how is it that the use value of
one object can be expressed as an exchange value with another object, a
value in exchange with all other objects. But antiques, curios, etc. are not
the organizing principle of commodity production and their status or
magnitudes of use and exchange have nothing to do with Marx's explication of
value and of the social fusion of use value with exchange value."
RL:
"What is the 'use value' of an antique chair, stored in a cellar, which everyone
has forgotten about? Perhaps: its use is to collect dust, or provide a framework
for spiders to spin their webs? Or maybe its use is to puzzle you?"
Jura (replying to RL):
"You don't seem to understand Marx's definition of
use-value at all (Jura now quotes Marx):
'The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this
utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by the physical properties of the
commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity. A commodity, such as
iron, corn, or a diamond, is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use
value, something useful.' [Quoted from
here. Link added on edit.]
RL (replying to Jura):
"So, what is the use value of that chair?"
Jura
(replying to RL):
"My point is that as long as someone buys it, it has to have one. Marx is very
clear about this. Perhaps the old chair satisfies a need for historical
furniture associated with certain aesthetic or other properties (as with
antiques). Or someone's need for just something solid to sit on (as with old
shit sold at flea markets). As long as it is brought to market and sold
(becoming a commodity), it must have a use-value (for at least one person,
regardless of whether they end up actually using it or find out it's useless),
otherwise it wouldn't have found a buyer in the first place."
SA (attempting to reply to RL's question about that chair
-- note the abuse; it gets worse):
"Says all that needs to be said about Rosa's supposed understanding of Marx,
of the commodity, of value. What a display of ignorance. The chair that is
stored in a cellar may have been produced in a factory, or it may have been
produced by a craftsman working in a guild-type arrangement, or it may have
been home-produced for home use. In any and all cases, in the first two
cases it was produced as a [commodity?] in order to claim, receive an exchange value; it
was produced for the purpose of exchange. Such purpose can only be realized
if the chair has a use. In the third circumstance, the chair is produced as
a use value, and only a use value. There is no exchange value in this case.
It is produced for direct consumption, for self-subsistence. 100 years later
the chair becomes an 'antique' -- antique is a market, and marketing
designation. Does the chair have 'use'? Of course it does, as it satisfies
the need of someone who will provide a value in exchange for the chair. Does
the chair have use as a chair? Perhaps not, and that's not necessary. If a
photographer buys the chair because he/she wants to photograph it for an
article in the Sunday Times, does the chair have use? Of course it does. If
a museum buys the chair to display the method and styles of chair
construction 200 years ago, is that use? Of course it is. That our troll
thinks of use only as simple, immediate, direct consumption shows how little
she understands about social production, accumulation, use, and........Marx.
It makes her, fundamentally, a peasant."
RL (replying to Jura):
"So, all the labour power congealed
in that chair, which vanishes if it stays in that cellar, suddenly comes
back, does it? Even so, I asked what use value it has in that cellar,
gathering dust -- not when it was being sold." [I have very slightly altered
my last sentence to make its meaning clearer -- RL. The original was this:
"Even so, I asked what use value it has in that cellar, gathering dust --
not as it was being sold."]
RL (replying to SA):
"Where did I deny this? The question is what use value has it got in a
cellar, gathering dust, and forgotten about? Maybe this: to annoy SA?
You seem to want to duck that question -- or raise side issues that have
nothing to do with what I asked."
Jura (replying to RL
-- and becoming irate):
"Now you're asking about value, which has nothing to do with the present
problem. Even things that don't have value can be use-values. Even
things that are not products of any labour can be use-values. For how
much that chair is going to be sold at an antiques auction or at the
flea market is irrelevant. You said (in your writings) that some
commodities namely antiques, don't have use-value. I'm saying it's
nonsense.... You're saying something which has (exchange) value does not
have to have use-value. Utter nonsense!"
RL (replying to Jura):
"But, I thought all things were interconnected in that quirky
dialectical universe of yours? So, what is the use value of an
antique chair, in a cellar, forgotten about and gathering dust?
Maybe this: to get you to ignore the question?"
Jura (replying to RL):
"Anyway, it depends. It can be stored away as a memory of someone's old
times as the chairman of the SWP. It can be stored away due to lack of
space. You know, whether a thing has a use-value or not is a different
question than whether this use-value is being realized in consumption
(as long as the thing is not destroyed or does not decay). But remember:
you said this (notice the lack of cellars and dust in the paragraph).
'Can't exchange values exist
where there is no use value at all? What about antiques? They seem to
have an exchange value but many do not have a use value. Same with many
works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins).'
"You're saying something which has (exchange) value does not have to
have use-value. Utter nonsense!"
[Emphasis in the original.]
RL (replying to Jura):
"Jura:
'Anyway, it depends. It can be stored away as a memory of someone's old
times as the chairman of the SWP. It can be stored away due to lack of
space. You know, whether a thing has a use-value or not is a different
question than whether this use-value is being realized in consumption
(as long as the thing is not destroyed or does not decay).'
"Sure, but that wasn't my example, it's yours. If you don't like, and
can't answer, that one, try this: What is the use value of an antique
chair, washed up on a desert island, hidden under tons of sand?
"Imagine this scenario: An antique dealer buys a house with its
contents, and pays $1,000,000 for it. In the cellar (which she never
visits) there is an antique chair, forgotten about, and gathering
dust. Ten years later, after still not visiting the cellar, she
sells the house and contents for $1,500,000. The new owner, a fan of
Hegel, also never goes into that cellar. Ten years later, the house
burns down, and all the contents are destroyed. So, the chair has an
exchange value (part of the $2,500,000), but no use value (before it
was burnt). Plenty more examples like that to keep you busy...."
SA (replying to RL
-- note the continued abuse):
"You are so completely ignorant. Clearly you never bothered to
read the 1st volume of Capital, or at least beyond the afterward
to the 2nd edition. Whether it sits in a cellar, or on the floor
of the NYSE [New York Stock Exchange -- RL], or in the National
Academy of Design, it's still a chair. Whether the queen's bum
graces it or it is used simply as a place to stack old
magazines, or it's forgotten about completely, it's a chair with
a use value. The question is in the transformation, the
expression of the use value as an exchange value -- in the chair
establishing itself as an object that can command labour, or the
expression of labour as it exists in all other objects, as value.
"Does scrap metal sitting in a junkyard have use value? Of
course it does, even if it is not being consumed at the moment.
Does a 1958 Chevrolet Corvette have a use value? Of course it
does. Even if it sits in its owners garage and he only looks at
it on national holidays? Yes, even then. You've claimed antiques
have an exchange value without a use value. Clearly you're the
one who thinks Marx was an imbecile to point out that the
commodity must have a use value to carry, circulate, forward the
value the capitalist seeks to realize from its exchange. Even
without realizing that value, however, the commodity still
retains its use value.
"Do the fleets of jets stored in the desert due to the downturn
in 2008 still have a use value? Of course they do. Does the 10%
of the world's maritime capacity currently at anchor have a use
value? Of course those ships have a use-value; but that utility
can only be expressed under certain economic conditions -- when
a profit can be had. This is why Marx refers to the
contradiction between use-value and exchange value; at some
point the production of one, which is the production of the
other, negates the impulse, and the ability, for the
accumulation of capital. I'd like to thank you for exposing the
full range of your ignorance regarding Marx's critique of
capital....
"Tell us again Rosa why chairs not being directly and
continuously sat upon have no use value. According to you, every
night when the lights are turned out, and people are in bed, the
chairs in the dark have no use value. And in the day when people
awake? Then the beds have no use value, clearly. Dunce. Or
Ignoramus. Or both."
RL (replying to
SA):
"From this it seems that it's not the object itself, but
the intention to treat something as a chair that gives it a
use value. In that case, if the chair in question has been
forgotten about, locked away in that cellar, so that no one
knows it's there and can thus form no intention toward it,
it has no use value. In which case, you agree with me! Alas,
the rest of what you say, fascinating though it was, does
not seem to address my point."
Kambing (who now enters the debate, replying to
RL):
"OK, I'm going to agree with you that it doesn't really
make sense to talk about the 'use-value' for an object
that no people are relating to in any way, but nor does
it make any sense to talk about such objects having
'exchange value' or any other sort of value for that
matter. 'Value' is not a static quality of an object,
but refers to the social relations in which an object is
embedded. So without people 'relating' to the objects in
some fashion, they do not have value. Furthermore, the
value categories and relationships that Marx establishes
in Capital refer specifically to the social relations of
generalised commodity production, so they have
relatively little utility with respect to objects that
are not mediating the capital-labour relation.
"'Use-value' loses most of its utility as a coherent
category if you are talking about an object outside of a
market relation -- it is really more of a catch-all
category for all the various qualitative ways that
people relate to objects (or to other people through
objects), which really only has analytical applicability
in distinction from (and as a necessary precondition
for) 'exchange-value', in the context of market
exchange. I think that the way you have framed your
discussion on value demonstrates that if you attempt to
remove the dialectical logic from Marx's concepts of
value (value as a dynamic, contradictory social
relation) you evacuate those concepts of their useful
meaning."
RL (replying to
Kambing):
"Kambing, I largely agree with what you say, but I'm not
too sure about this:
'I think that the way you have framed your discussion on
value demonstrates that if you attempt to remove the
dialectical logic from Marx's concepts of value (value
as a dynamic, contradictory social relation) you
evacuate those concepts of their useful meaning.'
"Well, I deny these relations are 'contradictory',
to begin with, and I don't see how dialectics helps
in any way at all. Indeed, I argue that it gets in
the way, mystifying Marx's work for no gain at all.
After all, you tried, largely successfully, to
explain yourself in the first two paragraphs of your
reply without any dialectics at all (except perhaps
that vague reference to 'mediating'). And there is
no need to use 'dialectics', either, since, as I
have shown, Marx abandoned this way of looking at
things in Das Kapital." [That refers to
earlier pages in this debate. I have omitted the
rest of the discussion I had with Kambing since it
drifted off into other, off-topic issues.]
SA (replying to RL):
"First, it's your claim that the chair, locked
away in the cellar and forgotten about has NO
use value but.......retains exchange value.
Remember? Your claim is that antiques have
exchange value with no use value, right? So
Rosa, do the fleets of airplanes in the desert,
or the ships at anchor, or the rail cars in
storage maintain their use value, or does it
disappear? Do they have an exchange value
without a use value?
"This issue, BTW, is one of the reasons Keynes
'make 1/2 dig holes, and the other 1/2 fill them
back up' theory falls apart.... no use values
are being created. To be a commodity the object
must have a use value. Use values can exist
without being commodities, but commodities in
order to be values must have a use value. Try
reading more than just the afterward to volume
1. It might help you. Then again it might not."
RL (replying to
SA):
"My answer is that this is a problem for you, not
me. I'm not going to try to solve it for you. Read
the Afterword again, yourself -- you seem to have
missed the section where Marx endorses a summary of
'the dialectic method' (the only one he published in
his entire life)
which contains not one atom of
Hegel." [Link added -- RL.]
SA (replying to
RL):
"Problem for me? No, it's not a problem for me,
because I assert that the old chair has a use
value, whether it's in a cellar or in the kitchen
or in a museum or a flea market; just as wood
has a use value even when it simply lays on the
ground in a forest with no one 'knowing' it's
there or looking for it, much less collecting
it. Wood burns; its combustibility is a physical
characteristic, independent of the social
relation that harvests, processes, distributes
the wood. In any case, your ignorance of Marx's
most fundamental categories, and the relations
of those categories has been exposed for all to
see. That's a fair day's work."
RL (replying to
SA):
"Once more: so it's the intention to use an
object in a certain way that gives it a use
value, not the object itself. In other
words, it's not an intrinsic property (or an
'essential property') of the object in
question, but an extrinsic property -- one
we supply to the object concerned. We can
see this from the way you word your reply:
'just as wood has a use value even when it
simply lays on the ground in a forest with
no one 'knowing' it's there or looking for
it, much less collecting it.'
"This either means that wood had a use value
long before human beings existed, or it only
assumed a use value when we evolved
sufficiently enough to form an intention to
use it. Otherwise you might be committed to
the view that wood can have a use value
for lightning, since it can set wood on
fire. However, given the fact that you also
want to regard use value as a social
concept, it seems that the latter is the
case: only when something can be used
intentionally in a certain way is it a use
value. Which is it to be? Do objects have
an intrinsic use value, or do they acquire
one extrinsically when we form an intention
to use them in some way?
"Think carefully before you reply. I have a
rather nice trap waiting for you if your
answer is pitched at your usual, sloppy and
slapdash level. Alas, that [often] happens since you
let your emotions rule your head. We can see
that by the way you rapidly become abusive.
So, this might be a good time to put away
those childish traits we have come to know
and loathe, and act like a man, for a
change. Give it a go, you might get to like
it. Tantrums don't win arguments...."
SA (replying to RL):
"You're the one arguing that use-value
is a matter of intent. You essentially
have a version of the old 'If a tree
falls in the forest and nobody's around
to hear it, does the tree make a sound?'
Your argument by intent is really
nothing but childish idealism. A
use-value is an object that satisfies a
human want, need, desire. Nature can
certainly provide use values without
human intent. Wood does not have a
telos, a purpose, to be burnt in its
make-up; it has the intrinsic quality of
combustibility whether or not it sits in
the forest or is sold in the
supermarket. It has the property of
combustibility intrinsic to it. It does
not need a human being to buy or sell it
to provide warmth. If there's a fire in
the forest, and nobody is there to see
it, or feel it, is the fire hot? The
chair retains its use value even
when not being used. Intent does not
endow wood with its ability to provide
warmth in combustion. Intent to sit in
the chair does not make it useful. Its
existence as a chair, as something of
utility for sitting upon exists whatever
your intent may be. As an antique, the
chair can only claim value in exchange
if it has use. The exchange is based
upon the chair's usefulness in
satisfying the need of a collector to
collect, or as a representative of some
form of craftsmanship, as a decorative
piece, or even as a decorative piece to
be used as a chair. It does not derive
its utility from exchange in any of
these cases; exchange is derived from
the utility of the chair, the different
utilities in these scenarios."
RL (replying to SA -- in
what follows, emphases are in the original):
"SA (oh dear, into the trap
this numpty falls -- I did try to
warn him):
'You're the one arguing that
use-value is a matter of intent. You
essentially have a version of the
old "If a tree falls in the forest
and nobody's around to hear it, does
the tree make a sound?" Your
argument by intent is really nothing
but childish idealism.'
"In fact, I have expressed no
opinion about the nature of use
value. I have, though, posed several
problems for you with your odd view
of this subject, since it's not too
clear whether you accept an
intentional view of use values or an
essentialist view -- your social
interpretation suggests the former,
while your comments about wood
suggest the latter.
"[As seems plain, you have not given
this much thought, but have
blundered around in the usual way,
oblivious of this distinction
-- until I kindly pointed it out to
you.]
'If a tree falls in the forest and
nobody's around to hear it, does the
tree make a sound?" Your argument by
intent is really nothing but
childish idealism'
"Not at all. I posed a series of
problems for you; if you now want to
divert attention from your
predicament, as I predicted you
would (in that other thread), that's
up to you. Now, if we adopt an
unsympathetic interpretation of your
views, wood had a use value for
lightning long before we evolved,
since it can be set alight by it.
(Before you complain I have ignored
what you said about human need etc.,
be patient -- we'll get to that soon
enough.) Is that your view? But it
follows from what seems to be your
essentialist view of wood. If wood
has been flammable since it first
evolved, then it must have acquired
this essential property long before
we emerged. In that case, if you do
indeed hold an essentialist view of
use values, you must also believe
that wood is a use value for
lightning. [Again, patience,
please!] This has nothing to do with
trees falling in forests unheard,
since the hearing of sound is not an
essential property of falling trees.
But, as seems to be the case with
your odd theory, the capacity of
wood to burn is an essential
property of that wood. And if that
is so, it must be a use value for
lightning. (Again, patience,
please!)
"[This isn't my belief, I hasten to
add -- just in case you try to foist
it on me, as you have several other
things! -- but a consequence of
your sloppy approach to HM
[Historical Materialism -- RL]. (I
blame dialectics. However, you can
console yourself with the thought
that you're not the first comrade to
have his brains addled by Hegel --
upside down or the 'right way up'.)]
"On the other hand, if you hold
an intentional view of use values,
then wood can't be a use value until
someone decides to use it, but not
before. This would absolve you of
the ridiculous belief that wood is a
use value for lightning. However,
this option would create other
problems for you -- since it implies
that antique chairs are only use
values if someone decides to use
them to sit upon. However, between
episodes of sitting, they'd not be
use values -- unless there was
someone always present with that
intention. That's because, of
course, intentions can't be stored
in chairs. This is indeed why many
prefer the essentialist view, since
a chair, they hold, is essentially a
chair, even if no one ever actually
uses it. Hence it's always a use
value. But, as we have seen, a
consistent application of this idea
implies wood is a use value for
lightning -- and a field is a use
value for a worm that burrowed into
it -- 50 million years ago.
(Patience please!)
"Now I sympathise with the
predicament you are in. The Hegelian
tradition has bequeathed to the sad
souls whose brains it has colonised
far too few and crude conceptual
tools to extricate you from it.
But, hey, that's why I am here, to
help you poor sods out.
"Ah, but you now fall into the
trap:
'A use-value is an object that
satisfies a human want, need,
desire.'
"So, you do favour the intentional
interpretation, after all. In which
case, wood isn't a use value per
se -- only if someone decides to
use it. But then you back-sass and
say this:
'Nature can certainly provide use
values without human intent.'
"This either means nature has
intentions, or you favour the
essentialist interpretation. So,
'nature' provided the earth with
wood many million years ago, which
one day humans would use. In that
case it was a use value 50 million
years ago. And, its use value,
according to your earlier comments,
is its capacity to burn. But that
capacity is actionable by lightning,
too. So it seems that wood is a use
value for lightning, also
provided
by nature. (Patience please!)
Now the only way out of this
predicament is to emphasise this
clause:
'satisfies a human want, need,
desire.'
"But if nature:
'can certainly provide use values
without human intent...'
"Then it looks like you are
committed to a
teleological/anthropomorphic view:
that nature provides the
intention here. But then you
have this answer:
'Wood does not have a telos, a
purpose, to be burnt in its make-up;
it has the intrinsic quality of
combustibility whether or not it
sits in the forest or is sold in the
supermarket. It has the property of
combustibility intrinsic to it.'
"So, we are back to the essentialist
view of use values, again! But, this
just means that anything that is
capable of being burnt is a use
value. So, since it is possible to
burn almost anything (if the energy
input is high enough) then
practically everything in the
universe is a use value! Hence,
the moon is a use value, so is the
Kuiper Belt and Proxima Centauri.
Hence your 'definition' is far too
generous. You will thus have to
modify it so that you include a
reference to attainability (since
most of the universe will be forever
unattainable to us humans). I'll
leave that to you.
"But, let us examine that definition
again, to see how you fell into the
trap:
'A use-value is an object that
satisfies a human want, need,
desire....'
"In which case, we are back full
circle: if an object (like an
antique chair) is in a cellar,
forgotten about and gathering dust,
it no longer 'satisfies a human
want, need, desire', since no one
knows about it.
"Now, I did tell you to frame your
response carefully, and not in your
usual slap-dash manner. Here we can
see you ignored my good advice. You
unwisely put your definition in the present
continuous tense. That means
that anything that isn't at the
moment satisfying a "human want,
need, desire" can't be a use value.
[Your definition, not mine!]
Hence, if a piece of wood isn't actually
being used, or lies unknown in
the forest, it can't be a use value
after all. In trying to unite an
intentional definition with an
essentialist definition you end with
an unworkable theory. The rest of
what you say, interesting though it
is, falls foul of this serious
screw-up on your part. I did try to
warn to warn you...
"Back to that lightning. It seems
that the only way you can extricate
yourself is to widen your definition
along these lines:
'A use-value is an object that has,
is now, or could satisfy a human
want, need, desire.' [These aren't
SA's words; this is my
suggestion.]
"Ok, so I want it to be the case
that wood is a use value for
lightning. Hence, it is.
"QED."
SA (replying to RL):
"I agree. Use value is relational.
It cannot exist for the human
relation without the human relation.
Wood is combustible. Combustibility
is not an intrinsic use value.
Combustibility is useful for human
beings. Human beings purposefully
utilizing objects makes use values.
So once again, do the fleets of jets
stored in the desert have a use
value? The 10% or so of the world's
container fleet at anchor... does it
have use value? If they're not being
used, do they have a use value? But
more importantly, getting back to
the original assertion...... do they
have value, exchange value? The
argument after all is that objects
can have an exchange value without a
use value. Remember, supposedly the
antique chair in a cellar has no use
value, but has an exchange value. As
the warehoused jets and ships show
us, the use value continues to
exist. Whether or not the use value
is expressed is determined by the
needs of capital accumulation."
RL (replying to SA):
"SA:
'Wood is combustible. Combustibility
is not an intrinsic use value.
Combustibility is useful for human
beings. Human beings purposefully
utilizing objects makes use values.'
"But, your definition of use
value:
'A use-value is an object that
satisfies a human want, need,
desire...',
"implies that if an object
isn't at this moment satisfying
a 'human want, need, desire',
then it can't be a use value.
So, that chair, in that cellar,
forgotten about, which is not
now satisfying a 'human want,
need, desire' can't be a use
value, contrary to what you
assert elsewhere. And, if you
relax your definition (which
would make your theory a version
of stipulative conventionalism
-- that is, you'd be aiming to
solve a scientific problem by
means of linguistic tinkering),
that would be no help either, as
I pointed out earlier:
'Back to that lightning. It seems
that the only way you can extricate
yourself is to widen your definition
along these lines: "A use-value is
an object that has, is now, or could
satisfy a human want, need, desire.'
[Again, these aren't SA's
words; this is my suggestion.] Ok,
so I want it to be the case that
wood is a use value for lightning.
Hence, it is. QED'"
SA (replying to RL):
"And in your argument;
everything loses its use value,
except the bed and the blankets,
when humans go to sleep. Again,
do the jets parked in the desert
have use value? Yes or no? Does
a jet, not officially removed
from the roster of equipment of
an airline, not being utilized
on any particular day, lose its
use value? In short, your
argument becomes 'A chair is
only a chair when being sat
upon' -- which has nothing to
do with Marx's analysis at all.
Marx is talking about human
appropriation of nature, through
labour, and what factors
determine the expression, the
mode of that appropriation. In
the case of capital that mode
is value.
"And this:
'Ok, so I want it to be the case
that wood is a use value for
lightning. Hence, it is',
"is exactly what artists do. The
wood can be used to represent
lightning -- that's its use
value to the artist. That's the
point. Wood can't be [useful
to?] lightning,
but it can, to an individual,
satisfy a need to represent
lightning. Now the artist can
buy the wood, in which case the
exchange value cannot exist
separate from the use value. Or
the artist may find the wood, in
which case the use-value exists
without a coincident exchange
value. The mode of appropriation
for society, however, is
determined by the social
organization of labour."
[Added
on edit: From this we can
see that SA hasn't got the point
about wood and lightning. There
were no artists around 50
million years ago!]
RL (replying to SA):
"SA:
'And in your argument;
everything loses its use value,
except the bed and the blankets,
when humans go to sleep.'
"Well,
in fact, that's a consequence
of your definition. Or do
you deny that you posted this?
'A use-value is an object that
satisfies a human want, need,
desire....'
"Given this definition that
chair can't be a use value!
'Again, do
the jets parked in the desert
have use value? Yes or no? Does
a jet, not officially removed
from the roster of equipment of
an airline, not being utilized
on any particular day, lose its
use value?'
"Given your defective
definition, they don't appear to
[have a use value], either! May
I suggest, therefore, that you
re-think your definition? (And
good luck with that one, given
the impoverished conceptual
tools Hegel dumped on all those
who think he had anything of
value to say!)
'In short, your argument becomes
"A chair is only a chair when
being sat upon" -- which has
nothing to do with Marx's
analysis at all. Marx is talking
about human appropriation of
nature, through labour, and what
factors determine the
expression, the mode of that
appropriation. In the case of
capital that mode is value.'
"Once more, this follows from your definition,
not mine (since I haven't
defined use value).
'The wood can
be used to represent lightning
-- that's its use value to the
artist. That's the point. Wood
can't be lightning, but it can,
to an individual, satisfy a need
to represent lightning.
Now the artist can buy the wood,
in which case the exchange value
cannot exist separate from the
use value. Or the artist may
find the wood, in which case the
use-value exists without a
coincident exchange value. The
mode of appropriation for
society, however, is determined
by the social organization of
labour.'
"But, what about a lump of wood
that is lying in a forest,
unknown to any artist, or to
anyone at all, 50 million years
ago? Given your defective
definition, it can't be a use
value -- since it is not now:
'an object that satisfies a
human want, need, desire....'
"But if you relax your useless
definition, then it can be a use
value to lightning, if I want
it to be:
[RL
from earlier] 'Back to that
lightning. It seems that the
only way you can extricate
yourself is to widen your
definition along these lines:
[SA from earlier, my
words in his mouth] "A
use-value is an object that has,
is now, or could satisfy a human
want, need, desire...."
[RL from earlier] "'Ok, so
I want it to be the case that
wood is a use value for
lightning. Hence, it is. QED.'"
SA (replying to someone
else -- but note the fatal
admission -- I have only
included this passage here
because of that):
"I agree that the assertion that
there can be exchange value
without use value is
nonsense.... but moreover the
'pretence' of exchange value
without use value is indicative
of fraud, swindling, scams...
all those things that accompany
capital like pilot fish
accompany the shark. We can look
at the flim-flam scams of the
emerging US railroad industry in
the 1830s and 1840s to see
all sorts of examples of
'exchange value' without use
value -- every single
occurrence collapsed leaving the
holders of the paper values,
exactly that: holders of the
value of the paper and nothing
else." [Bold added.]
SA (replying to RL
-- SA has a habit of
ignoring anything he can't
answer (he has just ignored my
last comment in its
entirety(!)), a trait he
perfected over at Revleft):
"Tell us again how antiques have
exchange value without use
value."
RL (replying to SA):
"I see that you have once
again ducked a question you
can't answer:
[RL from earlier] 'But if
you relax your useless
definition, then it can be a use
value to lightning, if I want it
to be....
Back to that
lightning. It seems that the
only way you can extricate
yourself is to widen your
definition along these lines:
"A use-value is an object that
has, is now, or could satisfy a
human want, need, desire...."
Ok, so I want it to be the case
that wood is a use value for
lightning. Hence, it is. QED.'
"But, to answer your (spurious)
question: A woman buys a house
and contents for $1,000,000. In
the cellar there is an antique
chair which she knows nothing
about, and neither does anyone
else. Five years later she sells
the house and contents for
$1,500,000, still knowing
nothing of that chair. Now
according to your defective
definition of use value (which,
despite being warned [about
being] careful, you unwisely put
in the present continuous
tense):
'A use-value is an object that
satisfies a human want, need,
desire....'
"that chair isn't a use value --
since it does not satisfy, and
has not (for at least five
years) satisfied a: 'human want,
need, desire....'
"And that's because no one
knows about it. Even so, it
has an exchange value. Now
it's all the same to me if
this has stumped you, but
when, in x months or years
time, you claim yet again to
have answered all my
questions, I will quote this
conundrum back at you (and
this page, too) to show you
are just as full of hot air
now as you were at RevLeft."
Kambing (replying to
RL):
"While the ownership of the
chair may have legally
changed hands due to the
'contents' being included in
the sale, it clearly hasn't
actually been specifically
factored into the exchange
value. By your logic, used
tissues that got left under
the bed would also have an
exchange value. Besides,
typically in a home and
contents sale the exchange
value of the contents is not
all precisely determined,
presumably because the owner
(or their agent) has decided
that the time it would take
to sell off the contents
individually is worth more
than the lost income.
"Regardless of its legal
status, unknown contents
don't really factor into it
at all. I mean, what if
there was a lost $10,000,000
work of art hidden in the
attic? Or several million
dollars in cash? Has their
'exchange value' suddenly
plummeted and then risen
again? (Ok, presumably there
may be laws that may exclude
such things from the sale
itself, I'm not sure). But
the point is that exchange
value and use value are
both ascribed by human
beings, they are social
phenomena. It seems like
your 'non-dialectical'
approach is a bit
metaphysical and
fetishistic, with objects
being magically imbued with
value without any human
action or thought
whatsoever."
L Bird (replying to
RL -- L Bird
is henceforth LB):
"Rosa, my tentative
answer to your question
would be that this issue
of 'use value/exchange
value' can't be
addressed at the level
of individual objects,
whether 'known about' or
not. The theory is
intended to explain
exploitation at the
level of society, and is
not intended to compete
with psychological
theories of what
individuals think of
isolated objects. I
suppose the simple
answer to your question
is that 'it is
immaterial' (poor
joke)."
RL (replying to
Kambing):
"Kambing:
'While the ownership of
the chair may have
legally changed hands
due to the 'contents'
being included in the
sale, it clearly hasn't
actually been
specifically factored
into the exchange value.
By your logic, used
tissues that got left
under the bed would also
have an exchange value.
Besides, typically in a
home and contents sale
the exchange value of
the contents is not all
precisely determined,
presumably because the
owner (or their agent)
has decided that the
time it would take to
sell off the contents
individually is worth
more than the lost
income.'
"Not my 'logic': it
follows from the sloppy
wording being bandied
about by SA and
one or two others."
'Regardless of its legal
status, unknown contents
don't really factor into
it at all. I mean, what
if there was a lost
$10,000,000 work of art
hidden in the attic? Or
several million dollars
in cash? Has their
'exchange value'
suddenly plummeted and
then risen again? (Ok,
presumably there may be
laws that may exclude
such things from the
sale itself, I'm not
sure). But the point is
that exchange value and
use value are both
ascribed by human
beings, they are social
phenomena. It seems like
your 'non-dialectical'
approach is a bit
metaphysical and
fetishistic, with
objects being magically
imbued with value
without any human action
or thought whatsoever.'
"This is a problem for
the mystics here, not
me. I have attempted to
define nothing, nor have
I posted a single
theoretical statement
about use and/or
exchange value.
So pick a fight with
SA, not me."
RL (replying to
LB):
"LB, thanks
for at least trying
to answer my
question:
'Rosa, my tentative
answer to your
question would be
that this issue of
"use value/exchange
value" can't be
addressed at the
level of individual
objects, whether
'known about' or
not. The theory is
intended to explain
exploitation at the
level of society,
and is not intended
to compete with
psychological
theories of what
individuals think of
isolated objects.'
"Well, with all due
respect, that's a
bit like arguing
that Newton's theory
of gravitation, say,
is not intended to
deal with single
objects (like that
apple, for example),
but the solar
system/the galaxy
etc. as a whole. The
only reason I aired
this example was to
embarrass the intentional definition
of use value SA
here was trying to
sell us, since
that does introduce
psychological
factors. Recall, I
am not offering my
own views here,
merely putting
pressure on SA
by drawing out the
ridiculous
consequences of his
characteristically
sloppy approach in
this area. (True to
form, he has gone
rather quiet. If he
replies, expect more
prevarication and
delaying tactics
from him.)"
LB (replying to
RL):
"I think you've
chosen a poor
counter-example,
Rosa.
Gravity does work at
the level of single
objects, as well as
at the level of
systems like the
solar system. I
think a better
example is the
property of 'dog
protection', which
works at the level
of 'walls', not at
the level of wall
components, like
bricks. One can't
find a mysterious
property of 'dog
protection' in a
brick, no matter how
hard one looks!...
'Recall, I am not
offering my own views
here, merely putting
pressure on SA by
drawing out the
ridiculous consequences
of his
characteristically
sloppy approach in this
area.'
"Hmmm... well, since I
don't believe in
'objective positions'
from which to view the
world (social or
physical), I think
you are 'offering your
own views', because this
is an inescapable
component of criticism,
but your views have
always remained
unspoken, in this
debate, at least. Well
done, for arguing from a
hidden position, like
the good sniper you are!
The troops in the open
trying to attack you are
taking a terrific
mauling!"
RL (replying
to LB):
"LB:
'I think you've
chosen a poor
counter-example,
Rosa. Gravity does
work at the level of
single objects, as
well as at the level
of systems like the
solar system.'
"In that case, this
seems to mean that
SA's version
of Marx's theory
can't explain a
single thing.
'I think a better
example is the
property of "dog
protection", which
works at the level
of "walls", not at
the level of wall
components, like
bricks. One can't
find a mysterious
property of "dog
protection" in a
brick, no matter how
hard one looks!'
"Sorry, but I can't
see what this has
got to do with my
example -- my choice
of example doesn't
depend on being able
to see a property in
anything. So, I'll
stick to my example,
if that's Ok with
you."
'Hmmm... well, since I
don't believe in
"objective positions"
from which to view the
world (social or
physical), I think you
are "offering your own
views", because this is
an inescapable component
of criticism, but your
views have always
remained unspoken, in
this debate, at least.'
"Well, I don't
pretend to be
arguing from an
'objective' position
(in relation to
this, or anything
else, for that
matter), since I
do not accept this
use of 'objective'
-- and that's
because I reject all
philosophical
theories of
'objectivity' as
non-sensical. And,
of course, my views
have remained
unspoken, but if you
adopt this line,
then you will be
forced to argue, for
instance, that my
view of the taste of
butter is part of my
argument here, since
it too was unspoken
-- just as your
unspoken view of
[the] history of, say, the
Eiffel Tower
motivated your
choice of 'dog
protection'. [Link
added.]
'Well done, for
arguing from a
hidden position,
like the good sniper
you are! The troops
in the open trying
to attack you are
taking a terrific
mauling!'
"As I pointed
out to SA,
the reason for
this is that the
vast majority of
comrades who
have allowed
'dialectics' (in
the
post-Hegelian
sense of that
word) to
colonise their
brains, have
also bought into
an impoverished
intellectual
tradition.
Unfortunately,
that tradition
in 'continental
thought' has
bequeathed to
its acolytes
'logics' and
methods that are
far too weak,
conceptually
impoverished,
and confused for
them to be able
defend
themselves. This
has been
compounded by
the fact that
they also reject
analytic
philosophy and
the advanced
analytic
techniques it
has developed
that expose the
poverty of
thought that has
devolved from
this mystical
tradition. And
they refuse to
be told too. So,
they only have
themselves to
blame..."
LB (replying
to RL):
"RL:
'Sorry, but I can't see
what this has got to do
with my example -- my
choice of example
doesn't depend on being
able to see a property
in anything. So, I'll
stick to my example, if
that's Ok with you.'
"Yeah, sure, I was
merely trying to
point out that
'value', etc., work
at the conceptual
level of 'dog
protection', not at
the lower level of
'bricks'. You can
'stick to your
example' in your
debate with SA,
et al, but if
you do then I think
you are missing the
'social' meaning: of
course, if SA wants to
fight you on that
level, I think
you'll triumph.
'And, of course, my
views have remained
unspoken, but if you
adopt this line, then
you will be forced to
argue, for instance,
that my view of the
taste of butter is part
of my argument here,
since it too was
unspoken -- just as your
unspoken view of history
of, say, the Eiffel
Tower motivated your
choice of "dog
protection".'
"This is poor logic from
you, Rosa. The fact that
one relevant thing is
unspoken doesn't
logically lead to every
unspoken thing being
relevant.
'This has been
compounded by the fact
that they also reject
analytic philosophy and
the advanced analytic
techniques it has
developed that expose
the poverty of thought
that has devolved from
this mystical
tradition.'
"While I have a lot of
sympathy for your
characterisation of
'dialectics' as the
'mystical tradition', I
also think that
'analytic techniques',
'advanced' or not, have
to be located
within some assumptions
and axioms. I feel that,
perhaps, it's in that
discussion that I'll be
revealed to be closer to
our 'dialectics'
experts. Perhaps, not.
You say you think
historical materialism,
of some sort, is useful,
and I think I, and even
syndicalistcat [another
character in this
debate, whose comments I
have omitted -- RL] and
others, would agree with
that."
RL (replying to
LB):
"LB:
'This is poor logic from
you, Rosa. The fact that
one relevant thing is
unspoken doesn't
logically lead to every
unspoken thing being
relevant.'
"I'm not too sure
that is anything to
do with logic, but
even supposing it
has, I don't think
you will be able to
advance a
non-question-begging
way to exclude my
examples while
maintaining the
allegation that
unspoken views lie
behind my argument.
And it wasn't part
of the point I
wished to make that
'every unspoken
thing being
relevant', only that
you are guessing --
and without any
evidence, too.
'While I have a lot of
sympathy for your
characterisation of
"dialectics" as the
"mystical tradition", I
also think that
"analytic techniques",
"advanced" or not, have
to be located
within some assumptions
and axioms. I feel that,
perhaps, it's in that
discussion that I'll be
revealed to be closer to
our "dialectics"
experts. Perhaps, not.
You say you think
historical materialism,
of some sort, is useful,
and I think I, and even
syndicalistcat and
others, would agree with
that.'
"Sure, in many areas
of Analytic
Philosophy there are
just such
assumptions, but
there are no
philosophical (in
the traditional
sense of that word)
assumptions
underlying the
Wittgensteinian
method I use.
Indeed, if there
are, and you can
identify any to
which I adhere, I
will abandon them
immediately, and
apologise
profusely."
LB (replying
to RL):
"RL:
'And it wasn't part
of the point I
wished to make that
"every unspoken
thing being
relevant", only that
you are guessing --
and without any
evidence, too.'
"But, Rosa, what
counts as 'evidence'
depends on one's
conceptual schema,
so to maintain I
haven't supplied
'evidence' means
that you must have a
way of measuring
'evidence', to be
aware of its
absence. How do you
measure 'evidence'?"
'Sure, in many areas
of Analytic
Philosophy there are
just such
assumptions, but
there are no
philosophical (in
the traditional
sense of that word)
assumptions
underlying the
Wittgensteinian
method I use.'
"You'll have to
define 'traditional' for us, Rosa. I think Wittgenstein's method has
philosophical assumptions, just like every other human method."
SA
(replying to RL):
"I think it would be helpful if Rosa
could demystify the first three chapters of vol 1 for LB, who finds
Marx's presentation 'magical, religious, mystical' in the mode of
dialectics. All Rosa's nonsense about exchange value without use value is
exactly that, nonsense from the perspective of Marx's examination of value,
because Marx's explication is an analysis of how and why the use value of
any single commodity is expressed as, or translated into, the exchange value
of any and all other commodities. If Rosa's 'Anti-dialectics' has any
validity, any practical consequences for Marx's analysis, then surely that
consequence will become evident in Marx's examination of value.
"Now I certainly don't expect Rosa
to engage such a challenge -- what we will get is more puffery about 'as
soon as you answer my questions' blahblahblah... but I'm not the person
asking for clarification of those chapters, LB, who substantially
agrees with Rosa's 'critique' is, and he thinks those chapters are examples
of Hegelian obfuscation. So it would be nice to see, since clearly those
three chapters are critical to Marx's work, to see them 'demystified.'
"Edit: Here's where Rosa takes the
argument rather than deal with the concrete issue at hand:
'But, your
definition of use value: "A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want,
need, desire...", implies that if an object isn't at this moment satisfying a
"human want, need, desire", then it can't be a use value.'
"No such
implication is contained in Marx's description of a use-value. The inference is
particularly and peculiarly Rosa's. We can state Marx's definition this way: a
use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire." [Added
on Edit: Readers will no doubt have noticed that my prediction -- "expect
more prevarication and delaying tactics from [SA]" -- has been amply
confirmed.]
SA
(replying to LB -- whose comment I have omitted):
"But Rosa believes that Marx
extirpated Hegel in volume 1 of Capital. So why then are these three
chapters so mystifying and difficult for many people to grasp? Is it that
Marx, 'flirting' with Hegel, like a moth flirts with a flame, got way too
close? Is it possible that Marx, writing volume 1 for the 'general public'
deliberately mystified this analysis of value and the commodity, of the
basic unit of capital? There have been numerous explanations of Marx's first
three chapters. Some have even been provided in the discussions at this
site. Others in books by Rubin and many other writers. If the first 3
chapters have a significance for all that follows in the volume, and in
capitalism, surely Rosa's anti-Hegelianism should be able to clarify Marx's
analysis of value."
[I have also omitted several
exchanges between SA and one or two others since they don't directly
impact on my comments.]
RL (replying to LB):
"LB:
'But, Rosa, what counts as
"evidence" depends on one's conceptual schema, so to maintain I haven't
supplied "evidence" means that you must have a way of measuring "evidence",
to be aware of its absence.'
"Well, I don't have a
'conceptual scheme', and I doubt anyone else has, either. (The idea that
we all operate with one is based on some highly dubious a priori psychology,
which can be shown to be non-sensical, too.)
'How do you measure "evidence"?'
"Are you asking me what I mean by
the word 'evidence'? I have to ask this since I am sure evidence can't be
measured (except with a tape measure or weighing scales, etc.).
'You'll have to define "traditional"
for us, Rosa. I think Wittgenstein's method has philosophical assumptions,
just like every other human method.'
"By 'traditional', I mean, of
course, philosophy as it has been practiced 'in the west', by the vast
majority of philosophers since Ancient Greek times. And I challenge you to
show us one philosophical assumption that Wittgenstein adopts. And even if per
impossible you succeed, I
will promptly reject that assumption and criticise Wittgenstein for adopting
it."
[I have omitted the rest of my reply
to LB since it strays into areas that aren't relevant to the purpose
of this Appendix.]
RL (replying to SA):
[I have omitted most of my reply to
SA since it concerns other matters unrelated to this specific
discussion.]
"SA:
'Now I certainly don't expect Rosa
to engage such a challenge -- what we will get is more puffery about "as
soon as you answer my questions" blahblahblah... but I'm not the person
asking for clarification of those chapters, LB, who substantially
agrees with Rosa's "critique" is, and he thinks those chapters are examples
of Hegelian obfuscation.'
"Which questions you have failed to
answer [also in other discussions
on other boards] -- and here
at LibCom there are now two more: 1) You can't respond effectively to my
demonstration that your definition of use value implies that an
antique chair, left in a cellar, and forgotten about, can't be a use value;
2) That the only justification you can offer for your odd use of
'contradiction' is tradition.
'No such implication is contained in
Marx's description of a use-value. The inference is particularly and
peculiarly Rosa's. We can state Marx's definition this way: a use-value is
an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire.'
"This is your intentional
definition again, and it implies that the aforementioned chair can't
be a use-value. Or do you suppose that this chair, which no one knows
about is satisfying 'a human, want, need, or desire'?
"But you now alter your earlier
definition. It's no longer:
'A use-value is an object that
satisfies a human want, need, desire....'
"But:
'a use-value is an object that can
satisfy a human, want, need, or desire....'
"Ok, so I want it to be the case
that wood is a use value for lightning. So, it is. QED."
[Again, I have omitted several more
exchanges between myself and several others for the same reason.]
SA (replying to RL):
"I haven't ducked a thing. I've
refused to engage in your absurd, irrelevant discussions about whether
or not a chair hidden in an attic that nobody knows about is a use
value. You have ducked all practical inquiries regarding your
[assertion] -- that there are exchange values without use values...."
RL (replying to SA):
"SA:
'I haven't ducked a thing. I've
refused to engage in your absurd, irrelevant discussions about whether or
not a chair hidden in an attic that nobody knows about is a use value.'
"But my conclusions followed
from your changing definitions of use value. First you tried to
palm this off on us:
'A use-value is an object that
satisfies a human want, need, desire....'
"Then this:
'a use-value is an object that can
satisfy a human, want, need, or desire....'
"The first, since it's in the
present continuous tense, implies that if no one knows about that chair,
then they can't want, need or desire it. So, it can't be a use value.
The second implies that if I want something to be a use value, it is --
so if I want wood to be a use value for lightning, it is.
Your definitions sunshine; you deal with them."
[Again, I have omitted several
paragraphs from my reply to SA for the same reason.]
RL (replying to SA):
"Whimped out, I see... No
worries, SA, I'll just link to these threads the next time you
try to con the members of another board into thinking you have answered
my questions."
SA (replying to RL
-- and here comes the extreme abuse I generally receive from this
'comrade' (and others) -- on one board he even accused me of being a cop
in disguise!):
"GFY [Go F*ck Yourself -- RL]
Rosa, nobody's whimped out. There's just no point engaging with a
pathological shirker like you. I've answered every point you've
raised.... Go troll somewhere else."
RL (replying to SA):
"SA:
'There's just no point engaging
with a pathological shirker like you.'
"In other words, you can't
answer this question (which I have been asking you now for at least two
years, here and at RevLeft):
"Assuming
you are 100% right about Marx and the 'dialectic' -- in that case, other
than merely copying his use of 'contradiction', what is your
justification for using it? And I predict that you will deflect
attention from it and/or avoid it some more -- since you can't answer it
without admitting that the only reason you have for using
'contradiction' in the way you do is a slavish adherence to tradition.
'I've
answered every point you've raised and showed how nothing you raise
makes any practical difference to Marx's critique of capitalism.'
"Not [in] the above, nor have
you shown how or why your intentional 'definition' of use value does not
imply that an antique chair, forgotten about in a cellar, has no use
value."
The discussion breaks off at this point -- with SA
slinking away and retreating into a by-now-familiar dialectical sulk.
Several of Marx and Engels's works listed below have
been linked to the Marxist Internet Archive, but since Lawrence & Wishart
threatened legal action over copyright infringement many no
longer work.
However, all of their work can now be accessed
here.
Arrington, R., and Glock, H-J. (1996) (eds.), Wittgenstein And
Quine (Routledge).
Baake, K. (2003), Metaphor And Knowledge.
The Challenges Of Writing Science (State University of New York Press).
Baker, G., and Hacker, P. (1988),
Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity Volume Two (Blackwell, 2nd
ed.).
Barnes, J. (2009),
Truth, Etc. Six Lectures On Ancient Logic (Oxford University Press).
Benjamin, A., Cantor, G., and Christie, J.
(1987) (eds.), The Figural And The Literal (Manchester University Press).
Béziau, J-Y., Carnielli, W., and Gabbay, D.
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