This page might take
up to half a minute to load because of the many YouTube videos it has embedded
in it.
Unfortunately, Internet Explorer 11 will no longer play these videos. As far as I can tell, they play as intended in other Browsers.
However, if you have
Privacy Badger [PB] installed, they won't play in Google Chrome unless you
disable PB for this site.
[Having said that,
I have just discovered that they will play in IE11 if you have
upgraded to Windows 10 or Windows 11. It looks like the problem is with Windows 7 and earlier
versions of that operating system.]
If you are using Internet Explorer 10 (or later), you might find some of the
links I have used won't work properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View'
(in the Tools Menu); for IE11 select 'Compatibility View Settings' and add this site (anti-dialectics.co.uk). Microsoft's browser,
Edge, automatically
renders these links compatible; Windows 10 and 11 do likewise.
However, if you are using Windows 10
or 11,
IE11 and Edge unfortunately appear to colour these links
somewhat erratically. They are meant to be mid-blue, but those two browsers
render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and red!
Firefox and Chrome
appear to reproduce them correctly.
Unfortunately, several browsers also
underline these links erratically. Many are underscored boldly in black, others
in light blue! They are all meant to be underlined in the same colour as the
link itself.
The editor I have used to
post this material on the Internet -- Microsoft's FrontPage -- has for
some reason inserted several formatting glitches into the final version that are only visible in Internet Explorer so far as I can tell, and even then only in relation to this Essay and Essay Six! I have no idea
why this has happened and all my attempts to correct these problems have so far failed.
Finally, if you are viewing this
with Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have
used.
Mozilla often replaces them with an "º'.
There are no problems with Chrome, Edge, or Internet Explorer, as far as I know.
[DM = Dialectical
Materialism/Materialist, depending on the context; HM = Historical
Materialism/Materialist, also depending on the context.]
As is the case with all my Essays,
nothing here should be read as an attack
either on HM -- a scientific theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
over thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between
DM and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
Some
readers might wonder why I have quoted extensively from a wide variety of
DM-sources in the Essays published at this site. In fact a good 10-20% of the
material in many of them is comprised of just such quotations. Apologies
are therefore owed the reader in advance for the length and
extremely repetitive nature of most of these quoted passages. The
reason for their inclusion is that long experience has taught me that
Dialectical Marxists simply refuse to accept that their own classicists
-- e.g., Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and Mao, alongside countless 'lesser' DM-theorists
--, actually said the things
I have attributed to them. That isespecially the case after they are confronted
with the absurd consequences that flow from their words; and that remains the
case unlessand until they are shown chapter and verse
and in extensive detail. In debate, when I quote only one or two passages in
support of what I allege, they are simply brushed off as a "outliers"
or as "atypical". Indeed, in the
absence ofdozens of proof texts drawn from many such sources (across all areas of Dialectical Marxism) they tend to regard anything that a
particular theorist had to say -- regardless of whether they are one of the
aforementioned classicists -- as either "far too crude",
"unrepresentative" or even(!) unreliable. Failing that, they
often complain that any such quotes have been "taken out of context".
Many in fact object since -- surprising and sad though
this is to say --, they are largely ignorant of their own theory or they
simply haven't read the DM-literature with due care,or at all!
The only way to counter such attempts to deflect, reject and deny is to quote
DM-material frequentlyandat length.
In addition,
because of the highly sectarianand partisan nature of Dialectical Marxism, I
also have to quote a
wide range of sources from across the entire 'dialectical spectrum'.
Trotskyists object if I quote Stalin
or Mao; Maoists and Stalinists complain if I reference Trotsky -- or even
if I cite "Brezhnev era revisionists".
Non-Leninist Marxists bemoan the fact that I haven't confined my remarks
solely to what Marx or Hegel had to say, advising me to ignore the confused, even
"simplistic", ideas expressed by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Mao
and Trotsky! This often means I have
to quote the lot!
That itself has had the
(indirect) benefit of revealing how much and to what extent they (the classicists and
subsequent epigones across all areas of Dialectical Marxism) largely agree with each other
(despite sectarian rhetoric to the contrary), at least
with respect to DM!
Some critics have complained that my linking to Wikipedia completely
undermines the credibility of these Essays. When I launched this project on the
Internet in 2005, for the vast majority of topics there was very little material
easily available on-line to which I could link other than Wikipedia. In
the intervening years alternative sites have become available (for example, the
excellent
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the InternetEncyclopedia
of Philosophy), so I have been progressively replacing most of the old
Wikipedia links with links to these other sources. Having said that, I
haven't done so for some of the Wikipedia links -- for instance, any that
are connected with geographical, historical, scientific, biographical (etc.)
topics,
where the relevant areasaren't considered controversial, at least by
fellow Marxists. In every instance, I have endeavoured to avoid linking to
Wikipedia in relation to key areas of my arguments against DM so that at no
point does my criticism of this theory/method depend exclusively on such links.
In addition to the above (as readers will soon see
if they consult the
Bibliography) I have provided copious references to other published
academic and non-academic books and articles (posted on-line or printed in hard
copy) in the End Notes to this Essay, which further develop or substantiate
anything I argue, claim, allege or propose.
Others have complained about the sheer number of
links I have added to these Essays (because they say it makes them very difficult
to read). Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they
believe everything is inter-connected, and that must surely apply even to
Essays that attempt to debunk that
very idea. However, to those who find these links do make these Essays
difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Still others wonder why I have linked to familiar
subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of
recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of
popular films, or certain words
that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice. In general, links to Haloscan
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
It is important to point out that a good 30% of my case
against DM has been relegated to the
End Notes.
That has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more
smoothly. This means that if readers want fully to appreciate my
criticisms of DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have
raised objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to
the reader) to my own arguments, which I have then answered.
[I explain why this tactic has been adopted in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my
response to any
objections they might have will be missed, as will the extra evidence and
argument. Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for well over 30 years, I have heard all the
objections there are! [Many of the more recent on-line debates are listed here.]
I have also linked
to Woods and Grant's book, Reason in
Revolt, many times in this Essay, but the link I used now only takes the
reader to parts of the second edition instead of the entire book, as used to be
the case. However, anyone who wants to access a complete version of that edition
can now do so
here. I haven't changed the scores of links to the old
site that I have inserted in what follows since they used to take the reader to
specific chapters of that book, but that faculty is no longer available.
It is also important to add that
phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise, the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that issue will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then,
the reader is directed
here,
here and
here
for more details.
[**Exactly
how this applies to DM has been explained in several other Essays
published at this site (especially
here,
here,
and here).
In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the
argument (but in this case aimed at absolute beginners)
here.]
Anyone puzzled by the
unremittingly hostile tone I have adopted toward DM/'Materialist Dialectics'
[MD] might find it helpful to read
this first.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Finally, Formal
Logic [FL] is a highly technical subject, but since the vast majority of
revolutionaries know little of no FL (that isn't to put them down, one can know
zero FL and still be an excellent revolutionary!) in what follows I have had to
keep such complexities totally at bay. What little FL I have used has
deliberately been kept simple and straightforward. Any technical terms I have
used I have endeavoured to explain or provide links to where they are explained.
If there is anything I have left obscure, unclear or unexplained, please
let me know and I will do my best to
rectify the problem.
Because of that I have endeavoured to keep this Essay as simple and
straight-forward as possible, minimising the sort
of technicalities normally found in modern logic, since -- as noted above -- most
dialecticians appear to know little or no logic. That can be seen from the crass things they say about
it. Even Marxist Academics (who should know better!) are guilty in this regard; on that, see
here.
In which case, the indulgence (and patience!) of those trained in logic (some of
whom
might read the material presented below) is required.
Anyone who wants to read more substantial accounts of the
sort of logic that forms a background to this Essay should consult the numerous
books and articles referenced in
the End Notes
(as well as in other Essays published at this site).
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of April 2025, this Essay is
just over 130,500 words long; a much shorter summary of some of its main ideas
can be accessed
here.
The material below does
not represent my final view of any of the
issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
The relationship
between DL and FL hasn't been a happy one.
Nevertheless,
Dialectical Marxists (in general) take great pains to make it clear that while they don't reject FL,
they certainly regard its scope as seriously limited, especially in relation to motion and change. For example, John Rees commented as follows:
"[T]he dialectic is
not an alternative to 'normal' scientific methods or formal logic. These
methods are perfectly valid within certain limits…. [But] formal logic…has
proved inadequate to deal with the 'more complicated and drawn out processes'."
[Rees (1998), p.271. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"The elementary rules of
thought are taken for granted by most people. They are a familiar part of life,
and are reflected in many proverbs, such as 'you can't have your cake and
eat it' -- a most important lesson for any child to learn! At a certain
point, these rules were written down and systematised. This is the origin of
formal logic, for which Aristotle must take the credit, along with so many other
things. This was most valuable, since without a knowledge of the elementary
rules of logic, thought runs the risk of becoming incoherent. It is necessary to
distinguish black from white, and know the difference between a true statement
and one that is false. The value of formal logic is, therefore, not in question.
The problem is that the categories of formal logic, drawn from quite a limited
range of experience and observation, are really valid only within these limits.
They do, in fact, cover a great deal of everyday phenomena, but are quite
inadequate to deal with more complex processes, involving movement, turbulence,
contradiction, and the change from quality to quality....
"Formal
logic (which has acquired the force of popular prejudice in the form of 'common
sense') equally holds good for a whole series of everyday experiences. However,
the laws of formal logic, which set out from an essentially static view of
things, inevitably break down when dealing with more complex, changing and
contradictory phenomena. To use the language of chaos theory, the 'linear'
equations of formal logic cannot cope with the turbulent processes which can be
observed throughout nature, society and history. Only the dialectical method
will suffice for this purpose...."
[Woods and Grant
(1995/2007), p.83/pp.87-88; 94/99. Italic
emphasis in the original; bold added. Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.]
And, here is Trotsky himself:
"The dialectic is neither
fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it
is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an
understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and
formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower
mathematics." [Trotsky
(1971), p.63.]
However, and despite the above, in the next breath
DM-theorists
often proceed to depreciate -- or even ridicule -- FL:
"The old logic has fallen into Verachtung [disrepute]. It
requires transformation.... The old, formal logic is exactly like a child's
game, making pictures out of jig-saw pieces....
In the old logic there is no transition, development (of
concept and thought), there is not 'eines inneren, notwen-digen Zusammenhangs'
[an inner, necessary connection] of all the parts and 'Übergang' [transition] of
some parts into others." [Lenin
(1961), pp.96-97. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs
merged. Bold emphasis
added.]
"A view that is
often encountered among dialectical materialists is that formal logic is
applicable to static situations, but since, in reality, nothing is static,
formal logic is superseded by dialectical logic, which permits logical
contradictions. Within the framework of this view, thought is the appropriation
(in the mind) of the objectively existing material world, while dialectical
logic, that is, dialectics taken as logic, must be considered to be the laws of
thought (or correct thinking). Thus, in the approximation where things are
viewed as static, formal logic becomes the laws of
thought, equally in approximation. When, however, things are viewed in their
motion, change, and development, dialectical logic becomes properly the laws of
thought." [Marquit (1990), taken from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Formal categories, putting
things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change
and development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a
new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]
"Formal logic considers all
things as motionless and changeless, each as separate from all others, isolated
in itself. Dialectics is a higher form of thought, since it considers them also
in their motion and in their interconnection.... The use of formal logic is
limited, restricted. It is a restricted, inferior approach to phenomena. It is
admissible so far as I can consider things as unchanged and rigidly demarcated
from each other. Dialectics is a superior, more universal, more exact, and more
profound approach to phenomena. As soon as I consider things as moved, as
changeable, or in their reciprocal connection, I get nowhere with formal logic
and I must turn to dialectics. I wish to add that the dialectics of both Plato
and Aristotle had an idealistic character; that is, both assume that
contradictions have their origin in the mind and that the contradictions in
actual things derive from the mind. We materialistic dialecticians say that the
contradictions in concepts are only a reflection of the motion of things." [Thalheimer
(1936), p.97.]
"The introduction of symbols into logic
does not carry us a single step further, for the very simple reason that they,
in turn, must sooner or later be translated into words and concepts. They have
the advantage of being a kind of shorthand, more convenient for some technical
operations, computers and so on, but the content remains exactly as before. The
bewildering array of mathematical symbols is accompanied by a truly Byzantine
jargon, which seems deliberately designed to make logic inaccessible to ordinary
mortals, just as the priest-castes of Egypt and Babylon used secret words and
occult symbols to keep their knowledge to themselves. The only difference is that they actually did
know things that were worth knowing, like the movements of the heavenly bodies,
something which can't be said of modern logicians."
[Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.97-98.
This appears on p.102 in the 2nd
edition. Bold emphasis added.]
Opinions like these, and worse, concerning FL are now as widespread as they are
unchallenged in DM-circles (see, for example,
here). Nevertheless, puzzled
readers will search long and hard -- and to no avail -- through books and articles
written by DM-advocates for
anyattempt to substantiate these sweeping generalisations with anything
that even remotely resemblesevidence, let alone a perfunctory argument in support of
such
allegations -- more specifically, that
it is incapable of handling change.
However,
W&G did come up with a rather weak attempt to substantiate the claim that FL deals
solely with 'static' forms (this is in fact the one and only example I
have encountered in over forty years studying DM where dialecticians even nod
in the direction of trying to substantiate the rather
wild things they say about FL):
"In an interesting article
entitled The Origins of Inference, which appeared in the anthology
Making Sense, on the child's construction of the world,
Margaret Donaldson draws attention to one of the problems of ordinary logic
-- its static character:
'Verbal
reasoning commonly appears to be about 'states of affairs' -- the world seen as
static, in a cross-section of time. And considered in this way the universe
appears to contain no incompatibility: things just are as they are. That object
over there is a tree; that cup is blue; that man is taller than that man. Of
course these states of affairs preclude infinitely many others, but how do we
come to be aware of this? How does the idea of incompatibility arise in our
minds? Certainly not directly from our impressions of things-as-they-are.'
"The same book makes the
valid point that the process of knowing is not passive, but active:
'We
do not sit around passively waiting for the world to impress its 'reality' on
us. Instead, as is now widely recognised, we get much of our most basic
knowledge through taking action.' [Woods
and Grant (1995/2007), p.84/p.88. Except for the first two titles, italic
emphases can't be found in the original, but which nevertheless appear in the on-line version. Link
added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. W&G are here quoting from Donaldson (1990), pp.98-99.]
Unfortunately, the
first passage above appears to contradict the second; i.e., the first stresses the 'static'
nature of reasoning while the second emphasises its active component!
It could be objected that
the first part focuses on ordinary logic (which supposedly deals with
static "states of affairs"), while the second emphasises the active nature of
the search for knowledge. So, there is no conflict at all!
Or, so it might be claimed...
In fact,
as pointed out
below, ordinary reasoning
makes use of countless verbs, adverbs and adjectives, so the idea that it is 'static' is
quite frankly, bizarre. Furthermore, many of the nouns we use don't imply a 'static'
view of the world, either. For example, anyone who thought our concept of a
river implied that they were changeless, or that they didn't flow, would
have simply underlined a
seriously flawed understanding not just of language, butalso the world. Indeed,
Heraclitus,
the Dialectical Guru DM-fans endlessly quote, used the fact that rivers
flow to
argue for universal change! More-or-less the same can be said about our use of
the following nouns: wind, hurricane, wave, tide, ripple, waterfall, thunder, lightning,
runner, explosion, inflation, human being, cat, dog, rabbit, swift (the bird),
cheetah...
If anyone used these terms and thought they were talking about something
static or changeless, they would also be advertising their own lack of
comprehension of language and the world.
Moreover, anyone who, one minute, argued
that:
"We
do not sit around passively waiting for the world to impress its 'reality' on
us. Instead, as is now widely recognised, we get much of our most basic
knowledge through taking action",
but who then went on to claim that:
"Verbal reasoning commonly
appears to be about 'states of affairs' -- the world seen as static...",
would
surely have some explaining to do. How is it possible to argue (consistently) one
minute that "verbal reasoning" is somehow static while the search for knowledge
isn't? If our reasoning were "static", how could the search for knowledge
be "active"?
Do we not "reason" while we search for knowledge? Do scientists and
engineers not use language in their work? Donaldson certainly failed to explain
this incongruity, and it seems to have sailed right over W&G's collective head, too.
Be this as it may,
it might well be wondered what "ordinary logic" has to do with FL. W&G also
failed to be clear about this, and
it isn't hard to see why: there is no connection. Anyone who leafs
through any textbook of MFL -- or who consults
websites devoted to it, let alone
AFL -- will soon discover that their
content has absolutely nothing to do with "ordinary logic".
As I pointed out over atWikipedia
(in response to an individual who claimed to be able to think in syllogisms and
the formulae found in MFL):
Thanks for those thoughts,
during the expression of which, by the way, you did not use even so much as one
syllogism or a single wff [added on edit -- wff = well-formed formula -- RL]
from
Principia, but you will note that I in fact said this:
"Does anyone seriously
think that people actually cogitate in syllogisms, or that they use the formal
calculi found in Principia Mathematica when they reason?"
I did not speculate whether
or not there were maverick individuals on the planet who might at least claim
they think in syllogisms (a remarkably useless and inefficient way to think,
anyway) or the calculi of Principia (but I retain a healthy scepticism
that you actually think using symbols like this: ~[(P→Q)v(P→R)↔(P→(QvR))], or this
~[~(Ex)(Fx&~Gx)↔(x)(Fx→Gx)]),
but whether "people" do this, i.e., the majority of the population. And if they
don't, then logic can't express 'laws of thought', otherwise we'd all be at it,
and we'd have been doing it for thousands of years before Russell and/or
Aristotle were thought of.
But, and more importantly,
even if everyone on the planet thought in syllogisms etc., that would still
not make logic the study of the 'laws of thought' -- as I also pointed out:
"If logic were the science of
what went on in people's heads (or the study of the 'laws of thought' -- added
comment), then logicians would busy themselves with brain scans, surveys,
psychometric tests, and the like. They certainly would not bother with all those
useless theorems and proofs."
My comments still stand,
therefore.
[See also my more detailed
remarks set out in Note 5.]
Furthermore, as noted above, Donaldson
and W&G
ignored the thousands of verbs, adverbs, and adjectives we have
in
ordinary language, which alone show that 'ordinary logic', whatever it turns
out to be, is the opposite of what
they would have us believe. [Again, I have listed several dozen
such words,
here.]
More importantly, even though
Donaldson wrote her book many years after logicians began to explore what has come to
be known as
Informal Logic[IF]
-- a discipline that grew rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and
which focuses on what might otherwise be called 'ordinary logic' -- she clearly
neglected to take this significant development into account. Of course, that might be
because Donaldson was only interested in how children learn to reason.
However, at least in so far as IF deals exclusively with the reasoning
strategies adopted by adult speakers, it still fails to support what Donaldson has to
say about these supposedly 'static states of affairs'. As a result of their
seriously limited research, W&G also failed to notice this, too.
Apart from that, W&G offered absolutely
no evidence in support of the accusations they continually level against FL.
But, that is just par for the course for these two; the accusations they
level against FL remainconsistently unsubstantiated, save for the above reference to Donaldson's similarly
baseless assertions. What W&G have to say is not only demonstrably false,
it is grossly inaccurate, too, as we will discover
as the rest of
this Essay unfolds. [See also,
here.]
The same can be said -- but
perhaps with even more justification -- about similar allegations advanced by
other dialecticians, who quote even fewer (i.e., zero!) sources in support of
their baseless and oft-repeated claims.
Independently of the above,
and to reiterate: as far as DM-theorists are concerned, the real problem here appears to
be that even though FL works well enough in everyday contexts, it
can't cope with
motion and change, with "long drawn out processes", with development, or
with the complex, 'contradictory' nature of
reality. That is because, once again, it supposedly operates with a "static" view of the world;
or,
at least, it employs "fixed and immutable" concepts.
But, is there any truth in these
frequently repeated accusations?
As we are about to
find out, when examined closely,
they bear
zero resemblance to the truth.
In fact, as is well known, the criticisms DM-fans level
against FL
are an echo of Hegel own critique of the FL of his day, which was itself a
garbled
and
bowdlerized version of
AFL.1
The reasoning behind their approach was outlined by Rees:
"Formal categories, putting
things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change
and development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a
new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]
The claim that concepts
aren't 'static', but develop and change, was central to Hegelian Idealism.
Nevertheless, dialecticians are also keen to point out that even though their
ideas have been derived from one of the most notorious examples of
Absolute Idealism
ever inflicted on humanity, their
theory, DM, represents an inversion of that system, which has supposedly put the dialectic "back
on its feet", preserving its "rational core". [I have questioned
the validity of that claim, here.]
This enables DM-theorists to offer a materialist account of 'change through
contradiction', but only when it has been fully tested in practice.
Or, so we have been told.
Whatever merit these claims turn out to have
(which is zero, as the rest of this Essay and Essay Eight
Parts One,
Two and
Three will
show), I propose to confine my attention in this part of the Essay to the idea that
FL 'can't cope with change',
because it supposedly relies on a "fixed" and "static" view of the world, and is
somehow, or to some extent, one of the more important obstacles to a philosophical
and scientific understanding of change. Again, to quote
Rees:
"The reason why formal logic
is often forced to abandon its own procedures in the face of the facts is that
it attempts to analyze a living, evolving reality with static concepts. Formally
things are defined statically, according to certain fixed properties -- colour,
weight, size, and so on…. [This] is satisfactory only under conditions where the
scale of change is not vital to our understanding…. But for more complex tasks
in politics, history, and science generally, this will not do. Common sense and
formal logic are agreed on static definitions…. But 'dialectical thinking
analyzes all phenomena in their continuous change'….'" [Ibid., pp.272-73.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Rees is here quoting
Trotsky (1971), p.65. (Rees has this as p.50, but that might be because he
is using the Pathfinder edition, which I haven't consulted.)]
However, in line with
other dialecticians (who advance similar allegations), Rees failed
to substantiate these claims with quotations from, or even references to,
a single ancient or modern logic text (and John has even blocked
me on Twitter for having the temerity to point this out to him!).
Here, too, is Trotsky:
"Logic involves unchanging
qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities. Dialectics is
constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the reverse....
Dialectics is the logic of development. Logic (formal) is the dialectic of
motionlessness." [Trotsky
(1986), pp.87, 111. Paragraphs merged.]
In fact, and in relation to FL,
DM-authors in general -- indeed, unanimously --, rely on little other than unsupported
allegations like
these, which they then copy off one another from generation to generation, without bothering to check their veracity. As we will also discover,
every single one of them has failed to explain
precisely how AFL, never mind MFL, is quite as handicapped as they contend -- save they
merely repeat the same baseless assertionsyear in, year out.
And, they all appear
to advance
identical claims.
[Irony intended.]
Indeed, as is easy to
show, the revolution that took place in logic nearly 150 years ago(that
helped motivate the long
overdue demise of
AFL and its replacement with MFL -- and which was largely the result of
Frege's pioneering work) has gone almost completely unnoticed by the
vast majority of
dialecticians.2
The old Aristotelian syllogistic, which DM-theorists seem to
think still comprises the whole of FL, is now only of interest to antiquarians,
historians of logic and traditionalists -- and, of course, dialecticians who remain
sublimely unaware of these major developments. Here, again, are
W&G:
"It
is an astonishing fact that the basic laws of formal logic worked out by
Aristotle have remained fundamentally unchanged for over two thousand years.
In this period, we have witnessed a continuous process of change in all spheres
of science, technology and human thought. And yet scientists have been content
to continue to use essentially the same methodological tools that were used by
the mediaeval School men in the days when science was still on the level of
alchemy." [Woods
and Grant (1995/2007), p.89/p.93. Bold emphasis added. I have slightly
qualified my comments about W&G on this topic in Note Two (link above).]
Here, too, is Trotsky (in an
open letter to
James Burnham):
"I know of two systems of
logic worthy of attention: the logic of Aristotle (formal logic) and the logic
of Hegel (the dialectic). Aristotelian logic takes as its starting point
immutable objects and phenomena. The scientific thought of our epoch studies all
phenomena in their origin, change and disintegration. Do you hold that the
progress of the sciences, including Darwinism, Marxism, modern physics,
chemistry, etc., has not influenced in any way the forms of our thought? In
other words, do you hold that in a world where everything changes, the syllogism
alone remains unchanging and eternal?... If you consider that the syllogism as
immutable, i.e., has neither origin nor development, then it signifies that to
you it is the product of divine revelation. But if you acknowledge that the
logical forms of our thought develop in the process of our adaptation to nature,
then please take the trouble to in form us just who following Aristotle
analyzed and systematized the subsequent progress of logic. So long as you
do not clarify this point, I shall take the liberty of asserting that to
identify logic (the dialectic) with religion reveals utter ignorance and
superficiality in the basic questions of human thought." [Trotsky
(1971), pp.91-92. Bold emphases added.]
"You,
however, serve up to us only a stale re-hash of Engels. The latest scientist
admitted to your pages is -- Darwin; apart from Aristotle, the only 'logic
worthy of attention' is that of -- Hegel, the century-dead arch-muddler of human
thought. Comrade Trotsky, as we Americans ask: where have you been all these
years? During the 125 years since Hegel wrote, science has progressed more than
during the entire preceding history of mankind. During that same period, after
2300 years of stability, logic has undergone a revolutionary transformation: a
transformation in which Hegel and his ideas have had an influence of exactly
zero....
"In a
most sarcastic vein, you keep asking me to 'take the trouble to inform us just
who following Aristotle analysed and systematised the subsequent progress of
logic', 'perhaps you will call my attention to those works which should supplant
the system of dialectic materialism for the proletariat...' as if this demand
were so obviously impossible of fulfillment (sic) that I must collapse like a
pricked balloon before it. The sarcasm is misplaced, for the demand is the
easiest in the world to fulfil. Do you wish me to prepare a reading list,
Comrade Trotsky? It would be long, ranging from the work of the brilliant
mathematicians and logicians of the middle of the last century to one climax in
the monumental
Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead (the historic
turning point in modern logic), and then spreading out in many directions -- one
of the most fruitful represented by the scientists, mathematicians and logicians
now cooperating in the new
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. For logic in its narrower sense,
C. I.
Lewis'
Survey of
Symbolic Logic is an excellent, though not easy, introduction. I am
afraid, however, that in all of these works you will find scarcely a single
reference to Hegelian (or Marxian) dialectics; nor will you in those of a single
reputable contemporary scientist -- except the Soviet scientists, whose necks
depend upon such references, or one or two Kremlin hangers-on, like
J.
B. S. Haldane, in other nations. The study of these works would be not
uninteresting; but I am afraid that when we finished we would be not much nearer
the solution of the question of the role of Russia in the war." [Trotsky (1971),
pp.236-37. Burnham's response hasn't been published alongside the
on-line edition of Trotsky (1971), but it has been posted as
a separate entry at the James Burnham archive. Italic emphases
are those in the
published edition, but were omitted from the on-line version. Links added.]
Admittedly, throughout its history Logic has
been conflated with a wide range of unrelated disciplines --
for example, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ontology, Theology, Psychology (including the so-called
"Laws Of Thought"), Mathematics, and,
indeed,
Science itself. In such circumstances,
it is
understandable that the only legitimate role that FL can occupy -- the study of
inference -- was all too easily lost. Unfortunately, that is just
one more tradition
DM-fans have been only too eager to emulate.3
One explanation for this sorry state of
affairs is that DM-theorists have allowed themselves to be led astray by what
turns out to be an elementary mistake -- an
error novices often make --, that is, they confuse
validity with truth. As will soon become apparent, the
limitations DM-theorists attribute to FL arise out of their
misidentification of rules of inference with logical, or even empirical,
truths, but not from the supposed inability of FL to accommodate change.4
Unfortunately, this
accusation is far easier to make than it is to substantiate. That in turn isn't because it is
incorrect, or even because it is itself questionable, but because dialecticians rarely
bother to explain exactly why they regard FL as defective -- that is,
over and above merely asserting that assumed
fact, copying it off one another, year after year, without
making any attempt to justify or substantiate it.
Neither is it to claim that DM-theorists
collectively fail
to make the point that FL is defective because it supposedly deals with "static"
forms, etc. Far from it, they all sing the same tune -- on that, see
below. It is
simply to underline the fact that they are content to rely on the mere repetition of this baseless
accusation without ever bothering to check whether or not it is correct -- or, for that
matter, without explaining what it could possibly mean.5
To be sure, the confusion
of rules of
inference with 'logical' or metaphysical 'truths' dates back to Aristotle himself
(and arguably even further back, to Plato,
Parmenides,
Heraclitus,
Anaxagoras, Anaximander
and Anaximenes).
And, it isn't hard to see why. If a theorist -- or, indeed,
if practically everyone -- believes that everything was created by a 'deity' (or
'deities') of some
sort, they won't find it too difficult also to believe that fundamental principles
underpinning that 'creation' somehow express how 'the gods' actually went about creating
all we see around us -- including their own capacity to think -- and therefore that their own
thought
processes were capable of reflecting how 'he'/'she'/'it'/'they' reasoned while
so doing. This idea would
then automatically connect 'correct thinking about reality, society and human cognition' with
the divinely-constituted order that governs absolutely everything. Logic
itself would then be seen as an indirect way of studying 'divine thought',
but interpreted now as a sort of
Super-Science supposedly capable of reflecting
core principles underlying 'Reality Itself'/'Being'.
This general approach to 'philosophical knowledge' later came to be known as Metaphysics.
However, when Logic is
re-described, or re-configured, as the study of 'how we actually think and reason', that only
succeeds in conflating it
with psychology and hence with science itself. In light of the foregoing,
such moves originally aimed at connecting Logic with how the 'deity' also 'thinks'
-- that is, with 'Divine Psychology'.
This meant that early on Logic became intimately linked
with the search for 'ultimate truth', and 'divine truth' -- not simply the study of
inference (which role was, until recently, largely sidelined, or de-emphasised).
Furthermore, if only aselect few
are capable of 're-presenting' 'God's thoughts' (for instance, by studying
Logic), why would they concern themselves with anything
as menial, as demeaning, as evidence? That is indeed how Hegel 'reasoned', except in his case
such
'thoughts' were buried under several layers of gobbledygook -- for
example, here dutifully echoed for us by
Herbert Marcuse:
"The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.'The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth.
The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential
from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse
(1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse
is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Minor typo corrected; bold emphases added.]
[I have covered this topic in
much more detail in Essay Three Part Two (here,
here and
here), where this overall attitude was traced back to an ancient,
aristocratic view of 'philosophical knowledge', alongside the theory that 'surface appearances' -- i.e.,
those that result from sense
impressions caused by the material world, a world largely occupied by the great
'unwashed', which, 'unfortunately', creates in them a 'superficial', 'un-philosophical'
and 'uneducated'
range of confused opinions about 'reality' -- are fundamentally deficient/flawed.
This elitist attitude was later
transmogrified into the Hegelian dogma that 'appearances' are
'contradicted' by 'underlying essence', a belief that was itself motivated by the
Platonic dogma that all 'true knowledge' must be based on the latter, not the former.]
As a result, those who had been (and
still are being) seduced by the above mantra-like (ruling-class) way of thinking and talking felt fully justified in imposing
their dogmatic theories on 'reality' with no evidence to back
them up (since, according to them, none was needed).
[Essay Seven
Part One and
Essay Two reveals, this is also the
case with Dialectical Marxists, who have been only too ready to copy Hegel and Plato in this regard,
thereby
imposing DM on the world.]
As
Umberto Eco
points out (in relation to the 'Western', Christian Tradition -- which, of course,
drew heavily on Greek Philosophy and Religion):
"God spoke before all things, and
said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for
with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation
itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names
that he created them and gave them their ontological status.... In Genesis..., the Lord
speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke
to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior
illumination, in which God...expresses himself....
Clearly we are here
in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of
the
nomothete, the
name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Paragraphs merged.]
Fast forward a score or
more centuries and these ancient presuppositions re-surfaced in Hegel's work (which,
ironically,
was supposed
to be
presuppositionless!) where they now became
an integral part of a mystical/ontological doctrine connected with what he took to be a
series of 'self-developing' concepts -- which idea itself arose out of an
egregious error committed over the nature of
predication (a topic covered in detail in Essay Three
Part One), further compounded by an even more serious blunder
over the nature
and status of the LOI.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
'Presuppositionless'?
Attentive readers might be able to spot the 'non-existent presuppositions' (and Hegel's acceptance of the above
traditional thought-forms) in the following passage:
"This objective thinking, then, is the
content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it
standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it
is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to
employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not
external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the
absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of
pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is
without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the
creation of nature and a finite mind. Anaxagoras
is praised as the man who first declared that Nous,
thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be
defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual
view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic.
What we are dealing with in logic is
not a thinking about
something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from
it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks
of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of
thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel
(1999), pp.50-51, §§53-54.
Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. I have
reproduced the published version, since the on-line version differs from it; I
have informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. They
have now corrected the on-line version! Paragraphs merged.]
In the above book alone,
readers will find page-after-page of 'presuppositionless',
dogmatic assertions like these. Hegel even manages to contradict himself (somewhat
ironically, one feels) within the space
of just two paragraphs (here merged into one), in the following quotation taken from his Shorter Logic:
"Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other
sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural
admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of
cognition,
either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted. The objects
of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion.
In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which
God
and God only is the
Truth.
Both in like manner go on to treat of the finite
worlds of
Nature
and the human
Mind,
with their relation to each other and to their truth in God. Some
acquaintance with its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must
presume, that and a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other
reason than this: that in point of time the mind
makes general images of objects, long before it makes notions
of them, and that it is only through these
mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking mind rises to know and
comprehend thinkingly. But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes evident
that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity
of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their
nature and qualities. Our original acquaintance with them is thus discovered to
be inadequate. We can assume nothing and assert
nothing
dogmatically;
nor can we accept the assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make
a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption,
or rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a
beginning at all." [Hegel
(1975), p.3., §1. Bold emphases alone added; links in the on-line
version. Paragraphs merged.]
So, in one breath, Hegel says we can
"assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically", but in the previous
breath
he did just that,
dogmatically asserting that the object of Philosophy is "Truth" and that "God
and only God is Truth", that "the mind makes general images of objects long
before it makes notions of them", all the while asserting that
"philosophy may and even must presume" certain things about "objects", and that
to make a start in Philosophy is to make an "assumption"!
After having read that,
one may well wonder why anyone takes this bumbling fool seriously!
Well,
WRP-theorist, the late
Cliff Slaughter, certainly did:
"Hegel insisted on a Logic which was not
something separate from the reality which confronted man,
a Logic which was
identical with the richness and movement of all reality, a Logic which expressed
the whole process of man's growing consciousness of reality, and not just a dry
summary of formal principles of argument, reflecting only one brief phase in the
definition of reality by thinking men." [Slaughter
(1963), p.9. Bold emphasis added.]
I suspect many will agree
that that, too, looks like a pretty dogmatic set of pre-suppositions.
Be this as it may, when this
ideologically-compromised 'ontological'
interpretation of Logic is abandoned (or 'un-presupposed'), the temptation to identify
it with science
(i.e., with the "Laws of Thought", or even
with 'absolute' or 'ultimate' truth) loses whatever
superficial plausibility it might once seemed to have possessed. If Logic is
solely concerned with the study ofinference, then there is no good reason to
saddle it with such inappropriate metaphysical baggage, and every reason not to. On the other hand, if there
is indeed a link between that discipline and metaphysical, scientific or 'ultimate' truth -- as both
legend, Hegel and DM-theorists would have us believe --, then that theory
will need substantiating.
It isn't enough just to assume or merely assert that such a connection
exists (especially since it has easily confirmed links with mystical theology, as we have seen),
which
has
generally been the case in Idealist and DM-circles ever since.
Despite this, the idea that 'fundamental
truths about reality' may easily be discovered by an examination of how
(certain)
human beings think they think is highly suspect in itself. But, like most things, much
depends on what is supposed to follow from that assumption; and that in turn
will depend on what it is taken to mean. As we will see, the
many differing views that have been expressed in this area sharply distinguish
materialist theory from
Idealist
fantasy. Unfortunately, DM-theorists have so far revealed themselves to be
far more content
tail-ending Traditional Philosophers
by supposing
(alongside Hegel)
that logic functions like a sort of cosmic code-cracker, capable of
revealing profound
truths about (what would otherwise be) 'hidden aspects of reality' buried
beneath
'appearances' --
aka the
perennial search for all those elusive 'essences' -- than they
have been with attempting to justify this entire approach with a single
cogent supporting
argument. In its place they have shown they prefer a heady mixture of dogmatic assertion
and unsubstantiated presupposition (again, rather like Hegel). Nor have they been
at all concerned to examine any of the motivating forces that gave rise to this class-compromised
approach to Super-Knowledge, concocted over two thousand years ago in
Ancient Greece by card-carrying ruling-class ideologues.6
[Concerning the other
(ancient) dogma that language
somehow 'reflects'
the world, and that truths about it can be derived from words/thought alone, see Dyke
(2007). However, the reader mustn't assume that I agree with Dyke's
own metaphysical conclusions (or, indeed, with any metaphysical conclusions whatsoever).
As Essay Twelve Part One shows,
the opposite is in fact the case: I regard them all as
non-sensical and
incoherent.]
Of course, contemporary
logicians are now much clearer about the distinction between rules of inference and
logical truths than their counterparts were in the Ancient World -- or even
in the Nineteenth Century. That fact alone means the criticisms DM-theorists
level against FL are even more anachronistic and difficult to justify.6ao
Anyway, if materialists
are to reject the mystical view of nature prevalent in Ancient Greece, which
approach is both
implicit and explicit in Hegelian Ontology --, as surely they must --,
then the idea that FL is just another branch psychology, or physics, or even that it is the
'science of thought' -- becomes even more difficult to sustain.
Indeed, how is it possible for
language to 'reflect' the logic of the world if the world has no logic to it? Which it couldn't have unless Nature were 'Mind'
or the 'Product of Mind'.
If the development of Nature isn't in fact
an expression of the 'development of
Mind'
(as Hegel supposed),
how can concepts drawn from that (alleged) 'development' apply to
Nature --, unless, once more, Nature were itself 'Mind' or the 'Product of Mind'?
Of course, dialecticians have
invariably responded to
challenges of this sort with an (implicit or explicit) appeal to the RTK (i.e.,
its sophisticated version); but, as we will see (in Essay Three
Part Five and
Twelve Part Four), that, too, was an unwise move. And that is because the RTK in
fact turns out to be RRT.
[RTK = Reflection Theory of
Knowledge. RRT
= Reverse Reflection Theory (which is perhaps better described as the Projection
Theory of 'Knowledge').
Basically, the idea is that, given DM, language and 'mind' do not in fact
'reflect reality' (as its proponents maintain). The reverse is the case. 'Reality' is
deliberately
structured so that it conforms with how DM-theorists
think we cognise it;it is therebymade to reflect the contingent features of how
they think we think or think we talk (or, indeed, how they think we
should talk!). So, discourse doesn't reflect the world, the world
is made to conform with how 'dialectical jargon' tries to picture it. Language and meaning are thereby projected
onto the world. Hence, the ersatz 'reality' that results from this
'reverse-reflection' (this projection) is little more than a shadow cast on the
world by a systematic distortion of language, to
paraphrase Wittgenstein
(and Marx). The RRT is therefore intimately connected (via Hegel and other mystics) with ancient theories about the
origin of the world via speech, a universe created by the Logos (as
illustrated in The Book of Genesis) -- a topic covered
here and here. The world is therefore
depicted as ultimately discursive; it is both a product
of
language and constituted by language. For those who prefer this way of
'doing philosophy' (i.e., dogmatically, treating it as a sort of
Super-Science), it seems 'perfectly natural and legitimate' to impose linguistic
categories on the world, in a 'like-reflects-like' sort of way. These are just
two sides of the same coin: the world is ultimately linguistic so philosophical
theories may be imposed on it,
dogmatically. Unsurprisingly, dialecticians bought into this approach when
they began to take philosophical and logical advice from a Christian Mystic
(upside down or the 'right way up'). (See also
here.
The RTK and the RRT will both be
covered in Essay Twelve Part Four; until the latter is published readers are re-directed
here and
here.)]
This means that if FL is
solely concerned with the study of the inferential links between propositions -- and isn't
directly
involved
with ascertaining their
truth-values
(that is left to science and common
understanding) -- then the criticism that FL
can't account for change becomes even more bizarre.
It is instructive to recall
that since the Renaissance, 'western' society has (largely) learnt to separate
religious fantasy from scientific fact, so that the sort of things that used to be said as a
matter-of-course about
science (for example, that it is the "systematic study of God's work", etc.,
etc.) look rather odd and anachronistic today -- that is, to all but the incurably
religious or the naively superstitious. In like manner, previous generations of logicians used to confuse
logic, not just with science, but with the "Laws of Thought", also as a matter-of-course; and
this they did for
theological and ideological reasons, too. In that case, one would have thought
that self-professed historical materialists (i.e., Dialectical Marxists) would be loathe to promote
and then propagate this ancient confusion.
Clearly not...
As will be argued at length later
on at this site:
only if it can be shown (and not simply presumed or even merely asserted) that nature has a
rational structure, would it be plausible to suppose that there is
any connection between the way (certain) human beings think they think and the
underlying, inner constitutionof
'Reality'. Short of any such demonstration, the idea that there is a link between the way
(certain) humans
think we draw conclusions and the fundamental nature of 'Reality' loses all credibility. Why
should the way we knit premises and conclusions together mirror
the structure of the universe? Why should our use of words have such profound 'ontological'
implications, valid for all of space and time?
Did the rest of us miss a
meeting?
It could be objected that if language
is part of the world, it must have coded into it all sorts of features that
are
part of, or which do reflect, core facets of reality.6a
That response will be defused in
Essay Twelve, where it will be shown that it depends on an implicit form of LIE.
[A short summary of that Essay can be accessed
here.]
I have also said more in Note 6a (link above).
Even to ask such questions is to
answer them. In fact, there is no reason to suppose any of this is the case, other than
class-compromised motives
that stem from religious/ideological interests and commitments, which were
simply taken for granted until relatively recently and which still appear to be
thriving in DM-circles.
How
is it possible that 'metaphysical
truths' were only capable
of being derived from, or expressed in, Indo-European languages?
This is the only language family that has the required grammatical structure --
the subject-copula-predicate form -- that allows such moves to be
made. Was the group of humans that invented this linguistic form uniquely blessed by the 'gods'
-- or even by social evolution?
Are there really 'subjects', 'copulas'
and 'predicates' out there in nature for just this language group to
'reflect'?
[Follow the first of the above links for more details.]
On the other hand, if it could be shown that
the universe does have an underlying, 'rational' structure, the
conclusion that nature is 'Mind' (or, that it was 'constituted by Mind') would
be all the more difficult to counteract. If all that is real is indeed 'rational', then
the identification of rules of inference with the "laws of thought" and
then with fundamental metaphysical truths about "Being Itself" would become
nigh on irresistible.
As noted above: the History of Philosophy,
Theology and Mysticism reveal that from such esoteric assumptions it is
but a short step to the derivation of 'philosophical truths' from thought/language alone.
Dogmatic, a
priori theory-mongering and Idealism thus go hand-in-hand.
If Nature is
Ideal, then it would seem truths can legitimately follow from thought/language alone
--
a point underlined by George Novack:
"A consistent materialism cannot
proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason,
intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source.
Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon
evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in
practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17.]
In
several other
Essays posted at this site
(for example,
here and
here) we
will see that this is a step DM-theorists and metaphysicians of every stripe
were only too eager to take -- and, many times over, too.
Nevertheless, there is precious little
evidence to suggest that DM-theorists have ever given much thought to thisspecific implication of the
belief that DLreflects the underlying structure of reality -- i.e., they
have given little or no consideration to the fact that
their 'logic'actually implies'Reality' is Ideal. If logic does indeed reflect the structure of 'Being', then
'Being' must be 'Mind', after all.
[On this, see Essay Twelve Part Four (to be published in 2025) -- a partial summary of which can be
accessed here.]
The above considerations
further strengthen the suspicion that the
much-vaunted materialist "inversion" -- supposedly inflicted on
Hegel's system/'method' by the DM-classicists -- was either illusory or merely formal.
That in turn implies DM is simply an inverted form of Idealism -- which means it is
still avariety of Idealism. If so, questions about the nature of
Logic can't fail to be related to the serious doubts raised at this site about the
supposedly scientific
status of 'dialectics'. In that case, if Logic is capable of revealing fundamental,
scientific
truths about nature -- as opposed to its only legitimate role being the systematic
study of inference -- then
it becomes much harder to resist the conclusion that DM is indeed just another
form
of Idealism that has yet to 'come out of the closet'.
But we all know it is hiding in
there!
Anyway, since the aim of this sub-section is to examine the
specific allegations that DM-theorists level against FL, the above
issues will be addressed more fully in other Essays posted at this site (for example, Essays Three
Part One
and Twelve
Parts One and Four).
As it turns out,
despite the dearth of evidence offered in support of the allegations
examined in an earlier
sub-section, there is good reason to question
the perennial accusation advanced by dialecticians that FL deals only with "static" definitions,
and hence that it can't cope with change.
As we
have seen, DM-theorists regularly advance the
following, consistently unsupported, allegations about FL:
"The old logic has fallen into Verachtung [disrepute]. It
requires transformation.... The old, formal logic is exactly like a child's
game, making pictures out of jig-saw pieces....
In the old logic there is no transition, development (of
concept and thought), there is not 'eines inneren, notwen-digen Zusammenhangs'
[an inner, necessary connection] of all the parts and 'Übergang' [transition] of
some parts into others." [Lenin
(1961), pp.96-97. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs
merged; bold emphasis added.]
"The
Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A'
is equal to 'A'…. In reality 'A' is not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if
we observe these two letters under a lens -– they are quite different to each
other. But one can object, the question is not the size or the form of the
letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound
of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is
never equal to a pound of sugar -– a more delicate scale always discloses a
difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself.
Neither is true (sic) -– all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour etc. They are never equal to themselves." [Trotsky
(1971), pp.63-64.]
"Logic
involves unchanging qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities.
Dialectics is constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the
reverse." [Trotsky
(1986), p.87.]
"It is necessary to acquire a
concrete understanding of the object as an integral system, not as isolated
fragments; with all its necessary interconnections, not torn out of context,
like a butterfly pinned to a collector's board;
in its life and movement, not as
something lifeless and static. Such an approach is in open conflict with the
so-called 'laws' of formal logic, the most absolute expression of dogmatic
thought ever conceived, representing a kind of mental rigor mortis. But nature
lives and breathes, and stubbornly resists the embraces of formalistic thinking.
'A' is not equal to 'A.' Subatomic particles are and are not. Linear processes
end in chaos. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Quantity changes
into quality. Evolution itself is not a gradual process, but interrupted by
sudden leaps and catastrophes....
The problem is that the
categories of formal logic, drawn from quite a limited range of experience and
observation, are really valid only within these limits. They do, in fact, cover
a great deal of everyday phenomena, but are quite inadequate to deal with more
complex processes, involving movement, turbulence, contradiction, and the change
from quality to quality."
[Woods
and Grant (2007), pp.86-88. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.
Paragraphs merged.]
"A view that is
often encountered among dialectical materialists is that formal logic is
applicable to static situations, but since, in reality, nothing is static,
formal logic is superseded by dialectical logic, which permits logical
contradictions. Within the framework of this view, thought is the appropriation
(in the mind) of the objectively existing material world, while dialectical
logic, that is, dialectics taken as logic, must be considered to be the laws of
thought (or correct thinking). Thus, in the approximation where things are
viewed as static, formal logic becomes the laws of
thought, equally in approximation. When, however, things are viewed in their
motion, change, and development, dialectical logic becomes properly the laws of
thought." [Marquit (1990), quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Formal categories, putting things in
labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and
development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a new
content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The reason why formal logic
is often forced to abandon its own procedures in the face of the facts is that
it attempts to analyze a living, evolving reality with static concepts. Formally
things are defined statically, according to certain fixed properties -- colour,
weight, size, and so on…. [This] is satisfactory only under conditions where the
scale of change is not vital to our understanding…. But for more complex tasks
in politics, history, and science generally, this will not do. Common sense and
formal logic are agreed on static definitions…. But 'dialectical thinking
analyzes all phenomena in their continuous change….'" [Ibid., pp.272-73.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Bold emphases added.]
"There are three fundamental
laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law
can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical
with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.... If a thing is always and
under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal
to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably
from the law of identity. If A always equals A, it can never equal non-A." [
"Formal Logic starts from the
proposition that A is always equal to A. We know that this law of identity
contains some measure of truth…. Now…when we go to reality and look for evidence
of the truth of the proposition: A equals A…we find that the opposite of this
axiom is far closer to the truth." [
"Dialectics is the logic of
change.... To understand the
significance of this compare it with what is know as 'formal logic' (originally
developed by Aristotle and usually thought of as the rules of sound thinking).
The basic idea of formal logic is that something either is the case or is not
the case, but that it can't be both at the same time. For example, the cat is on
the mat or it is not on the mat. For many purposes formal
logic is useful and necessary. But as soon as you take movement and change into
account, it ceases to be adequate. A cat moving goes through a moment when it is
in the process of passing onto the mat or in the process of passing off it --
when it is both on and off the mat. Dialectics is in advance of formal logic
because it enables us to grasp this contradiction." [Molyneux (1987), pp.49-50.
Paragraphs merged.]
"This matters because the
dominant mode of thinking, based on the logic developed by Aristotle, is not
founded on the principle of universal change, rather it deals with fixed states
or 'things'. Its basic axioms are that A = A (a thing is equal to itself) and A
does not = non-A (a thing is not equal to something other than itself), from
which are derived sequences of sound reasoning known as syllogisms.... This formal logic was, and
is, all well and good and very necessary for practical human affairs but it is
limited -- it excludes change. Dialectical logic moves beyond formal logic by
starting not with 'things' but with processes, processes of coming into being
and passing out of being. The moment processes of change are fed into the
equation it becomes necessary to deal with contradiction. If state A (e.g. day)
changes into state B (night) it passes through a phase of A not being A or being
both A and B (twilight)." [Molyneux,
"Dialectics, or the logic of motion, is distinct from formal or static logic.
Formal logic is based on three fundamental laws:
"(a) The
law of identity: A is equal to A; a thing is always equal to itself.
"(b) The
law of contradiction: A is different from non-A; A can never equal non-A.
"(c) The
law of exclusion: either A, or non-A; nothing can be neither A nor non-A.
"A
moment's reflection will allow us to conclude that formal logic is characterised
by the thought processes which consist of putting motion, change, into
parenthesis. All the laws enumerated above are true, so long as we abstract
from motion. A will remain A so long as it does not change. A is different
from non-A so long as it is not transformed into its opposite. A and non-A
exclude each other so long as there is no movement which combines A and
non-A, etc. These laws are obviously insufficient if we consider the
transformation of the chrysalid (sic) into the butterfly, the passage of the
adolescent into the adult, the movement of life into death, the birth
of a new species or a new social order, the combination of two cells into
a new one, etc." [Mandel (1979), pp.160-61. Italics in the original. Bold emphasis added.]
"The 'logic' that we have
been discussing is very different from what commonly passes for logic, the formal logic which deals with syllogisms and is to be found in the text
book. Formal logic is necessary for dealing with the abstractions which
are formed in the first stage of thinking.... The essence of its technique is to
keep apart, to prevent from confounding the distinctions which have been
made. It is therefore based on a development of certain very fundamental
principles about identity and contradiction, principles such as
the famous 'law of the excluded middle' which states that a thing must be one
thing (say 'A') or not that thing (say 'not A'). It can't be both 'A' and 'not
A' at the same time. This logic, which may be
termed the 'logic of common sense,' is perfectly justified and indeed essential
within certain limits -- the same limits within which the abstractions it deals
with are valid. But just because it is based on taking these abstractions,
for the time being, as absolute, and because it necessarily overlooks their
inter-connections, and the development of one quality or thing into another,
formal logic is unable to grasp the inner process of change, to show its
dialectical character. For this we require dialectical logic...." [Guest (1939),
pp.71-72. Italics in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
"Dialectics is a way of
studying the phenomena of the world in a way that is quite a bit different than
formal logic. Logic is undoubtedly very useful in many instances, but it has its
limitations. Even the fundamental axioms of logic, which often seem intuitively
obvious to western thinkers (e.g. A = A), only really hold when looking at the
world at fixed moments in time." [Quoted from
"Formal logic regards things as fixed and
motionless." [Rob
Sewell.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The false reasoning which assumes that
hard-and-fast, black-and-white categories are the only valid ones, and that
therefore the existence of transitional and intermediate forms constitutes
evidence that the categories don't exist, is called formal logic. The
limitations of formal logic are illustrated by these analogies, as well as by
the false arguments against the binary nature of sex put forward by the
scientists in this discussion. Dialectical logic looks at things in motion,
their origins, development, and eventual negation. Dialectics is the logic of
evolution and revolution. It brings human thought into closer correspondence
with the constant motion and transformations of things in the real world."
[James Robb, quoted from
here; accessed 16/12/18. Bold emphases added.]
Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that every
single one of the above dialecticians failed to quote or cite any evidence that FL is
guilty in the way they allege. [Any who think I might have misrepresented these
individuals
are invited to re-check the
references I have given, as well as the dozens more cited elsewhere in this Essay and at
this site.] What is more, DM-fans continue to assert such things despite being asked (repeatedly,
and by yours truly!) to provide
evidence and proof (here
is just the latest example -- from May 2015 --, and
here is my request for this comrade to provide the 'missing' evidence --
which, predictably, was simply ignored). [Unfortunately, these links are
now dead!]
[FL = Formal Logic; AFL =
Aristotelian FL.]
However,
far from it being the case that
FL depends on 'changeless categories', eventraditional
AFL employed variables to stand
for propositions and predicates (i.e., general terms) long before they were used in
mathematics. This fact alone shows that traditional AFL was no more incapable of
handling change than is modern Mathematics.7
"One has to give Aristotle
great credit for being fully conscious of this [i.e., of the need for a general
account of inference -- RL] and for seeing that the way to general laws is by
the use of variables, that is letters which are signs for every and any
thing whatever in a certain range of things: a range of qualities, substances,
relations, numbers or of any other sort or form of existence.... If one keeps in mind that
the Greeks were very uncertain about and very far from letting variables take
the place of numbers or number words in algebra, which is why they made little
headway in that branch of mathematics...then there will be less danger of
Aristotle's invention of variables for use in Syllogistic being overlooked or
undervalued. Because of this idea of his, logic was sent off from the very start
on the right lines." [Nidditch (1998), pp.8-9. Italic emphasis in the
original. Paragraphs merged.]
As
Engels himself
pointed out, the introduction of variables into Algebra allowed mathematicians
to cope with change. That being the case, it is difficult to understand why DM-theorists believe that traditional FL
can'tcope with change, either. If mathematiciansare fully ableto depict changeby their use
of variables, why deny this of formal logicians who have employed
the very same device for at least 2400 years?
Of course, it could always be argued that the variables that designate
quantities in mathematics aren't at all the same as the variables that relate to
concepts, properties or qualities employed in FL. That is undeniable, but not relevant. The point is that
both
sorts of variable allow for change, even if they do so in different ways.
[I will return to that specific point
in the next sub-section.]
Despite this, does the charge that FL can't cope with change itself hold water?
In order to answer that question, consider one
particular valid
argument form taken from
AFL:
[Where "A", "B"
and "C" can stand for noun phrases, such as "mammal", "mortal", or
"rational". Where I use capital
letters in the above way in this Essay I will highlight them in bold to distinguish
them from the ordinary use of capital letters -- except where I am directly
quoting DM-sources that don't do this.]
With respect to this argument schema,
the only condition validity requires is the following: if, for a given
interpretation (concerning that word, see the next but one paragraph), the premises are true then the conclusion is true.
This is a necessary condition for validity, but it isn't sufficient. For it to be sufficient,
another necessary condition must apply: the conclusion must follow from
the premises by the rules of inference of that formal system.
This
characterisation of validity isn't affected by the fact that schematic premises can't
themselves be true or false -- plainly, since they are schematic sentences,
not propositions.
[Any who doubt this need only ask themselves "Is it true that all As are
C?"] The point is that for any legitimate interpretation of these schematic sentences,
if the premises are true, the conclusion is true -- again, providing the latter follows
from the premises according to the aforementioned rules of inference. But, it will
automatically follow from them if the original schematic argument is valid.
Below, I have
given an interpretation of the above syllogistic form, and it is one that validly argues from
false premises to a true conclusion, a condition many novices find hard
to accept. In this specific case, hadthe premises been true, the
conclusion would be true. [A clear explanation of this counter-intuitive fact
about validity, with many more examples, can be
found
here.]
It is also important to add that the
word "Interpretation"
doesn't mean the same in logic as it does in the vernacular; it relates to the
legitimate substitution instances that result from the systematic replacement of
variable letters with suitable words drawn from some
lexicon or other (often
these are taken from ordinary
language, but they can also be from technical, scientific or mathematical
languages), according to the syntax and
the semantics of the formal system involved.
"Legitimate" means "substitution instances that
comply with the syntactic rules of the given system". So, for example, a Proper
Name can't be substituted for a schematic predicate expression or propositional
variable, nor vice
versa.
[Semantics:
what words or symbols are supposed to designate, refer to, signify, or mean --
rules that help us determine which sentences are true or are false.
Syntax: formal or discursive rules that underlie the
construction of legitimate strings of words in a formal or natural language.]
One
interpretation of L1 that might illustrate this is the following:
L1a: Premise 1: No moving object is
stationary.
L2a: Premise 2: All objects with zero velocity are
stationary.
L3a: Ergo: No moving object has zero
velocity.
[L1: Premise 1: No As are
B.
L2: Premise 2: All Cs are B.
L3: Ergo: No
As are C.]
[Certain stylistic
modifications were required above in order to prevent the ordinary language interpretation from becoming somewhat stilted.
It is also assumed that L1a-L3a relate to the same
inertial frame.]
The above syllogism is valid, and would remain valid even
if all motion ceased. But, it also copes with movement, and hence with
change, as is clear from what it says.
And we don't have to employ what seem to be 'necessarily true' premises (or,
indeed, use this particular argument form) to make the same point:
Premise 1: All human beings
are aging.
Premise 2: All Londoners are
human beings.
Ergo: All Londoners are aging.
[Premise 1: All As are
B.
[Premise 2: All Cs are
A.
[Ergo: All Cs are B.]
Admittedly,
phrases like "aging" and "one with zero velocity" aren't of the
sort that Aristotle himself would have countenanced in a syllogism, so far as I can
determine. However, if we free
Aristotle's logic from his metaphysics, the above inferences are clearly valid, based on a syllogistic form. Anyway, the term "aging" can easily be replaced by
a bona fide universal term (such as "the class of aging animals"), to
create the following stilted, but genuine, syllogism:
Premise 1: All human beings
are members of the class of aging animals.
Premise 2: All
Londoners are human beings.
Ergo: All Londoners are members of the class of aging animals.
[Except, of course, Aristotle would have
employed "All men" in place of "All human beings".]
Finally, here is an (interpreted) argument that depends on change:
A couple of points are worth making about the
above argument:
(a) In order for the conclusion to follow, the
premises of an argument don't have to be true -- clearly Premise 1 is false.
(b) The above argument isn't of the
classic syllogistic form, although it parallels it.
(c) Anyone who understands English will
already know that rivers are changeable, and that they flow; this example
alone shows that logic can not only cope with changeable 'concepts', it actually
uses them. Hence, logic is capable of employing countless words that express
change in a far more varied and complex form than anything Hegel (or his
latter-day DM-epigones) imagined. [On that, see
here.] I have
listed several such words, here.
Here are two more examples:
Premise 1: All fires will release heat.
Premise 2: I have just lit a fire.
Ergo: That fire will release heat.
And:
Premise 1: All sound waves transmit
energy.
Premise 2: Thunder is a sound wave.
Ergo: Thunder transmits energy.
The
above examples are perhaps more akin to argument patterns found in
IF, but that is also true of many
interpretations of argument schemas drawn from FL.
To be sure, the above changes aren't of the sort that
interest dialecticians, but, as I pointed out above, examples like this have only been
given in order to refute the claim that FL
can't cope with change. Combine this with the additional thought that dialectics can't
cope with change anyway (on that, see
here) and the alleged 'superiority of DL over FL turns into its own opposite.
[Which is yet another rather ironic 'dialectical' inversion.]
Someone could object that while the above examples might
appear to cope with some
of the changes we experience in nature and society, they ignore conceptual change, and as such show once
again that FL is inferior to DL. I have dealt with conceptual change
elsewhere in this Essay.
It could further be objected
that this fails to show how FL can cope with complex or extended changes,
or with
interconnected development.
However, I have been studying
DM for more years than I care to mention, but I have yet to see a single example
of these 'complex drawn-out' changes that DM-fans continually bang on about.
Perhaps the following example might allay their qualms:
Premise 1: All fertilised chicken eggs
will hatch in
about 21 days.
Premise 2: This egg is a fertilised
egg.
Ergo: This egg will hatch in about 21 days.
[Premise 1: All As are
B.
[Premise 2: All Cs are
A.
[Ergo: All Cs are B.]
[Try saying any of the above in
Hegel-speak.]
It wouldn't be difficult to
replace eggs with tectonic
plates that move slowly over millions of years, and in complex ways, too. How
much more 'drawn-out' do DM-fans need? Of course, what the latter are looking
for are changes expressed in 'dialectical' language, not the language of FL (or
even IF). Well, they are welcome to that, especially since 'dialectical'
language would in fact make change
impossible; but the only point worth making here is
that we can now see that both FL and IF can easily cope with 'drawn-out'
change.
[IF = Informal Logic.]
Returning to the above
schema:
L1: Premise 1: No As are
B.
L2: Premise 2: All Cs are B.
L3: Ergo: No
As are C.
In this rather uninspiring valid argument schema the
conclusion follows from the premises no matter what legitimate substitution
instances replace the variable letters. So, L3 follows
from the premises no matter what. But, the
argument pattern this schema expresses
is transparent to change; that is, while it can cope with change, it takes no stance on
it (since it is comprised of schematic sentences that are incapable of being
assigned a
truth-value until they have been interpreted).
Some might regard this as a serious drawback, but it is no more a failing than it would be, say, for Electronics to take no stance on the evolution
of Angiosperms
-- even
though electronic devices may be used to assist in their study. Otherwise, one might
just as well complain that FL can't launder clothes or paint a wall.
What FL
supplies us with are the conceptual tools that enable scientists theorise about change,
and much else besides. That is especially true in Mathematics.
As
noted above, the possible
truth-values of each of the above schematic sentences depend on the
interpretation assigned to the variables (i.e., "A", "B" and "C"). The premises of L1 aren't
actually about anything until they have been interpreted;
before thisthey are neither true nor false (which is why I referred
to possible truth-values). Not only that, but the indefinite
number of ways there are of interpreting schematic letters like these
means that it is possible for changeless and changeable items to feature
in any of its concrete instances (indeed, as we have just seen).
[That was the point behind the observation made earlier that dialecticians and
logical novices often confuse validity with truth; the above schema is valid,
but its schematic propositions can't be true or false, for obvious reasons.]
Of course, when the method of
truth-tables
is used (in MFL),
truth-values are assigned to such schemas, but, in that case, what is
being considered are the truth-values of interpreted propositions, should
any be assigned.
[I have given an elementary example of the use of truth tables,
here.]
To illustrate
further the absurdity of the idea that
just because FL uses certain words or letters it can't handle change (or that it uses
nothing but 'rigid' terms), consider this parallel argument:
(1) If x = 2 and f(x) =
2x + 1, then if y = f(x), y = 5.
(2) Therefore, x and y
can never change or become any other number.
No one would be foolish enough to argue this
way in mathematics since that would be to confuse variables with constants.
But, if that is the case in mathematics, then DM-inspired allegations about the
supposed
limitations of FL are all the more bizarre -- to say the least.
Of course,
and once more, it would be naïve to suppose that
the above considerations address issues of concern to DM-theorists. As
John Rees himself pointed out:
"Formal categories, putting
things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change
and development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a
new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]
But, as a criticism of
FL, this is entirely misguided. FL doesn't put anything in "boxes", and
its practitioners don't deny change as a result.
[Sure, some logicians might have metaphysical reasons for denying change, but that can't be
blamed on logic, any more than the belief in three persons in one 'god'
(as part the
Christian
Doctrine of the Trinity) can be blamed on mathematics.]
Indeed, without an ability to reason discursively (along lines that have been
systematised in FL -- and which have been explored more
extensively in
Informal Logic), dialecticians would themselves
find it impossible to argue rationally.
[TAR = The Algebra of
Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]
For
example, the argument above (from TAR) appears to draw certain
conclusions from apparently 'fixed definitions' (or a 'fixed'/'relatively fixed'
use) of certain words -- like "change" and "static" -- in order to make a point about change
itself. If, however, Rees's argument is now deliberately and uncharitably
mis-interpreted (that is, if we emulate the tactics used by dialecticians when they
deliberately misconstrue FL), it would soon turn into a self-refutation.
In that case, in order to point out the supposed limitations of FL, Rees found he had to
use the very things he accused FL of employing -- i.e., "static" terms. Of course, if this unsympathetic
way of reading Rees's book were correct, or even fair, it
would mean that if he and other DM-theorists want to argue validly about the
limitations of FL using "static" categories such as these, their arguments would
self-destruct along these lines.
On the other hand, if dialecticians were to employ
'non-static
categories' consistent with their own precepts, then that would rapidly undermine
any conclusions they hoped to derive. That is because such categories
(having no fixed meanings) would sanction no inferences, for it isn't possible to decide
what follows from what if the meaning of the terms employed is indeterminate or
is liable to change. So, while it is unwise of DM-theorists to criticize FL for
employing supposedly
changeless categories, it would be even more inept of them to do
this while using terms whose meanings are apt to alter unpredictably. Hence, in
practice, DM-theorists must either ignore their own principles and argue from
'fixed categories' about the limitations of FL, or they will have to construct a case
against FL using 'slippery' terms, which would establish nothing at all.
Like it or not, rational criticism of
FL can't succeed,
or even proceed, if either tactic
were adopted.9
Some might feel that there is a
contradiction here between what was said earlier about variables that can stand
for things that change, and the objection above to the effect that changeable
terms would prevent a conclusion following from its premises. So, it could be objected that
while the following had been
claimed
earlier about the variables used in FL:
RL1: "...the indefinite number
of ways there are of interpreting schematic letters like those in L1 [re-quoted
below -- RL] means that it is possible for changeless and changeable items to feature
in any of its concrete instances...",
the following point was
also made:
RL2:
"If, on the other hand, dialecticians were to employ
'non-static
categories' consistent with their own precepts, then that would rapidly undermine
any conclusions they hoped to derive. That is because such categories
(having no fixed meanings) would sanction no inferences, for it isn't possible to decide
what follows from what if the meaning of the terms employed is indeterminate or
is liable to change. So, while it is unwise of DM-theorists to criticize FL for
employing supposedly
changeless categories, it would be even more inept of them to do
this while using terms whose meanings are apt to alter unpredictably. Hence, in
practice, DM-theorists must either ignore their own principles and argue from
'fixed categories' about the limitations of FL, or they will have to construct a case
against FL using 'slippery' terms, which would establish nothing at all."
One minute we are being told
that these variables stand for things that can change, the next that the idea
that they can change would undermine any conclusion DM-theorists wanted to
derive.
Which is it to be? Are these variables or are they constants? Do
they change within the body of an argument, or do they remain 'fixed' as DM-theorists allege?
Of course, the point of RL2
was to bring out the imprecise nature of the allegations levelled by DM-fans. If
the denotations of the terms used in FL change within an argument, then L1-L3
might just as well become:
Here, B changes into D in L2b,
A
into E, and C into F, and/or whatever they supposedly stand
for in L3b, which means that
L3b no longer follows from L1b or L2b (or even L1 and L2).
But this is to misread these
variables. In order to make this clearer it might help if we translate L1-L3
into hypothetical form:
RL3: If it is the case that no
A, or whatever they become, is whatever B is, or becomes, and if it is
the case that all Cs, or whatever they become, are whatever
B is, or becomes, then it is the case that no A, or whatever they
become, is whatever
C
is, or becomes.
This shows that AFL can cope
with change.
However, the point being made
in RL2 (repeated below) is that the above constraints don't apply. The nondescript 'changes'
referred to by DM-theorists mean that their arguments more closely resemble
L1b-L3b, not RL3, and so the point made in RL2 still stands.
RL2:
"If, on the other hand, dialecticians were to employ
'non-static
categories' consistent with their own precepts, then that would rapidly undermine
any conclusions they hoped to derive. That is because such categories
(having no fixed meanings) would sanction no inferences, for it isn't possible to decide
what follows from what if the meaning of the terms employed is indeterminate or
is liable to change. So, while it is unwise of DM-theorists to criticize FL for
employing supposedly
changeless categories, it would be even more inept of them to do
this while using terms whose meanings are apt to alter unpredictably. Hence, in
practice, DM-theorists must either ignore their own principles and argue from
'fixed categories' about the limitations of FL, or they will have to construct a case
against FL using 'slippery' terms, which would establish nothing at all."
[I am not suggesting that
this is how Aristotle would have viewed any of this (in fact, he probably wouldn't!); L1-L3
have only been expanded to show that AFL can cope with change.]
Of course, concerning the
examples of interpreted arguments given
earlier, words like "river" or "fire" don't change their meaning in the
course of an argument, but their meaning shows that logic can deal with concepts
that express change in nature and society.
Finally it could be argued
that the syllogism is a categorical, not a hypothetical, argument form
(although Aristotle hinted at hypothetical syllogism when arguing from
hypothesis, later developed into a system by
Theophrastus (c.371-287 BCE) and
Alexander of Aphrodisias fl.200CE) -- Kneale and Kneale (1962), pp.105, 110).
Indeed, but RL3 was only employed to make the point clear: that syllogisms can be
interpreted so that they can cope easily with change.
Anyway, here is a categorical
version of RL3 to show that it, too, can be interpreted along the same lines:
L1c: Premise 1: No As (or whatever they
become) are Bs (or whatever they become).
L2c: Premise 2: All Cs (or whatever they
become) are Bs (or whatever they become).
L3c: Ergo: No
As
(or whatever they become) are Cs (or whatever they become).
And, here is an
interpretation that might make the point clearer still:
L1d: Premise 1: No salmon (or whatever
they become) are mammals (or whatever they become).
L2d: Premise 2: All cats (or whatever
they become) are mammals (or whatever they become).
L3d: Ergo: No
salmon (or whatever they become) are cats (or whatever they become).
Now, it isn't to the point to
argue that L1d and L2d might very well turn out to be false (if evolution takes,
or had taken, an odd turn, for example), thus making L3d false. That is because it
once again confuses truth/falsehood with validity. The hypothetical form in
RL3 brings this out a
little better: Whether or not L1 and L2 are false, if they were true, the
conclusion would follow.
RL3: If it is the case that no
A, or whatever they become, is whatever B is, or becomes, and if it is
the case that all Cs, or whatever they become, are whatever
B is, or becomes, then it is the case that no A, or whatever they
become, is whatever
C
is, or becomes.
Again, another interpreted
argument might show this to be so -- here using two unambiguously false
premises that imply a true conclusion:
The schematic letters
employed earlier
don't in fact possess "definitions" only interpretations;
hence, questions about the 'fixity' of those 'definitions' or otherwise are entirely misplaced. The
flexibility of interpretation permitted here -- even with respect to traditional schematic argument
patterns, like the one given above -- enables change to be accommodated by the simple
expedient of choosing appropriate substitution instances for each and every schema.
Moves like this will
have the effect of re-distributing truth-values among the constituent sentences
without affecting the associated inference.
Unfortunately,
even this might still fail to
address the worry exercising DM-theorists, which seems to centre on the alleged superiority of DL over FL
--
especially with respect to its alleged ability to
depict complex change through 'internal contradiction'.
[DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Admittedly, whatever one thinks of the ability or inability
of classical FL to handle change, few question its
intolerance of 'true contradictions'. However, since this section of the Essay
is largely concerned with a narrow range of logical issues, I will postpone the
examination of DM-theorists' appeal to 'dialectical change' through 'contradiction'
until later Essays.10
Nevertheless, a more
effective way of rebutting the claim that FL can't handle change would be to
provide a counterexample (in addition to those given
earlier!). The example below is based on a very simple
pattern drawn from MFL, which employs a valid argument form despite the changes
it records when interpreted. This is in fact an example of the schema known as
Modus Ponendo Ponens
(MPP):
1 (1)P→Q.
A. [Here, and in the next box, "A" stands for "Assumption".]
1,2 (3) Therefore, 64Ni atoms, positrons and neutrinos are formed. 1, 2, MPP.
[The numbers, letters and
terms used above have all been explained in Note 11 (link above).]
This
simple interpretation of MPP (and one involving reasonably rapid change) is perhaps
as good a counterexample as one could wish to find, which refutes the claim that
FL can't handle change. Moreover, there are countless other inferences
that MPP itself can instantiate, and many inferential forms other than MPP, all
capable of depicting change equally well, when suitably interpreted.11a
This indicates that the accusations levelled by
DM-theorists
against
MFL are even less accurate than those they direct at
AFL.
Of course, the example above will hardly satisfy dialecticians, since no "new
content" has been added in the conclusion. Fortunately, that 'defect' is relatively easy to fix. Consider this
valid,
one premise argument:
Premise 1: All dialecticians
are human beings.
Ergo: The refutation of a
dialectician is the refutation of a human being.
Here, the conclusion 'contains' more than the
premise, so new content has 'emerged', and, mercifully, with no 'dialectics' anywhere in sight. [And,
which is perhaps an additional bonus, it depicts change to our dialectical friends,
too!] This argument form is used in mathematics and the sciences all the time to derive results not
available to those who are still super-glued to the old logic -- and, of course,
DM-fans who are
blissfully unaware of any of this.
However, dialecticians
might still wonder if
the changes depicted above are at all relevant to their concerns.
They tell us that
DL
is superior in the way it accounts for social change; that is, it handles
developments of far greater complexity than the above rather trivial examples could possibly countenance.
Nevertheless, those examples were simply aimed at
countering the specific claim that FL can't handle change. In later
Essays we will see that it is DL itself can't account for
changes of any sort
-- simple or
complex, whether they occur in
nature or society. In
that case, no matter how poorly FL copes with change (if that is indeed the
case), DL fares far, far worse. Even worse still, if DM were true, change would be impossible.
Of even greater significance is the fact that
over the last hundred years or so theorists have developed several post-classical
systems of logic, which include
modal,
temporal,
deontic,
imperative,
epistemic and
multiple-conclusion logics
(among many others). Several of these systems sanction
even more sophisticated depictions of change than are available in AFL, or even
MFL (i.e., so-called 'Classical
Logic').12
Notwithstanding all of this, the feeling may
perhaps persist that the above
examples still employ "fixed concepts" and "static definitions". Unfortunately, because
DM-theorists seldom (if ever) provide examples of what they mean by a "fixed concept"
--
or what they imagine formal logicians take these to be (rightly or wrongly) -- it isn't easy to make much sense of their complaints.12a
[I have responded to the
obvious objection that dialectician have given such examples, in Note
12a (link above).]
However, there are several confusions that might lie behind, or, indeed, which might
motivate, this odd belief in 'changeable', or even 'changeless',
concepts.
The first confusion
revolves around DM-theorists' own concept of material change. They frequently depict
it in terms that are uncomfortably reminiscent of the Hegelian doctrine, which holds
that change is fundamentally conceptual. How else are we to interpret John Rees's
words that any account of change must explain how: "…new
content emerges from old conditions"? [Rees (1998), p.59.] How else are we
to interpret the following comments by Lenin?
"Hegel brilliantly divined the
dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of
concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word
dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence
of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the
transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of
notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to
nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions
all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in
a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97.
Emphases in the original.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:]…internally contradictory tendencies…in this [totality]…and
unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing…is connected with every other…[this
involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of
everydetermination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other…." [Ibid.,
pp.221-22.
Emphases in the original.]
Or,
indeed, this from Trotsky?
"Cognizing thought begins
with differentiation, with the instantaneous photograph, with the establishment
of terms -- conceptions in which the separate moments of a process are placed
from which the process as a whole escapes. These terms-conceptions, created by
cognizing thought, are then transformed into its fetters. Dialectics removes
these fetters, revealing the relativity of motionless concepts, their transition
into each other. (S. Logik, I.
26-27)." [Trotsky (1986), p.97-98.]
Admittedly, Rees appealed to the 'materialist inversion'
that has allegedly been imposed on Hegel's system (to turn it into "materialist
dialectics", and hence put "back on its feet"), as, indeed, did
Lenin and Trotsky. But, all three pointedly failed to explain how
conceptual change is related to material change, upside down or 'the
right way up'; or, indeed, how the one can become the other merely by the
expedient of flipping them or the entire system upside-down. Precisely how is it possible
for a concept, or a category, to change if neither of them is material? And it
won't do to suggest that concepts, for example, change because the objects they
'reflect' change, since that would be to confuse concepts with objects, once
more. Does the
concept of colour, for example, change every time a leaf turns from green to brown? Or, a
traffic light from red to green, and then back again? [In fact, in Essay Three
Part One we saw that this approach to concepts represents a dead
end. We will have occasion to examine it again in more detail presently.] Nor will it do to argue that
concepts change because we reflect on them (that is, if we employ the
'sophisticated' version of the
RTK, here), since that would be to treat concepts as objects,
again.
It might be thought that concepts
are somehow
formed or are reflected 'in the head' as objects of "cognition". In that
case, the question becomes: does
the concept of colour change when, say, anyone thinks about a traffic light altering from red
to green, and then back again? Indeed, does the concept of colour -- as
a concept, once it had been, or might have been, apprehended by an individual apprehender -- change in such
circumstances? But, how could anyone possibly tell whether or not it had? If we have lost touch
with the old 'concept' of colour (since it will have changed), with what could
anyone compare the new 'concept' of colour so that they were able to declare it had in fact
changed? No good appealing to memory, since the concept itself has
allegedly changed -- unless we are to suppose there are now two concepts
of colour: one that has changed, and one (in the memory?) that hasn't. And how
might that be ascertained or confirmed? Any response to the above
that tried to argue that these concepts must have changed since everything does
will have confirmed earlier allegations that this theory only appears to work
because it has been imposed on nature and society -- or, here, on human
cognition. In this case, it will have assumed, and then imposed on thought, a view of
concepts that has yet to be proved.
Even worse, how might it be decided
whether or not our
memories hadn't also changed?
[That intriguing possibility
will be left dangling for the time being. I return to it
again,
below.]
The problem now facing DM-theorists is how to explain
'mental objects' like this (i.e.,
'images', 'reflections', or 'concepts' that are supposedly located in our heads,
brains, or
in 'consciousness') while successfully avoiding
reductionism -- or, indeed, bourgeois
individualism.12b
[RTK = Reflection Theory
of Knowledge. The 'sophisticated' version involves the active input of human
"cognition" and practice, as opposed to the 'naive' version which
(apparently) doesn't -- and
which merely stresses the passive 'subject' of perception or knowledge. Both theories will be criticised in
Essays Three Part Six and Twelve Part Four.]
[It is worth pointing out here that I am
not denying conceptual change, merely questioning what dialecticians could
possibly mean by "fixed" compared with "developing" concepts.]
Furthermore, how
might it be possible for changes that material objects undergo even to be recorded by our use of concepts? In DM-writings the impression is given that these two sorts of change are simply the same, or,
at least, that
one is a 'reflection' of the other. To
be more honest, the impression is that little thought has
actually gone into either sort of change -- that is, over and above the
regurgitation of the obscure (andsanitised) ideas dialecticians
have imported from Hegel's work.
[The word "sanitised" was used here
because of the way that DM-theorists have appropriated the
Christian/Hermetic
concepts Hegel inflicted on his readers, but which they say they have flipped
and are now 'the
right way up', in order to render them 'consistent' with materialism. This ploy
is reminiscent of the way that Christian theologians, for example, re-interpret the scientifically 'unacceptable' passages in the Book of
Genesis as 'allegorical' or 'figurative', 'sanitising' them in order to
render them 'consistent' with post-Enlightenment 'sensibilities' and modern science.]
It could be objected that the above comments ignore the dialectical relation
between the "knower and the known", just as it fails to take note of the fact
that our concepts change in accord with the development of material and social
reality -- as well as in response to practice.
Admittedly, DM-theorists have
made an attempt (of sorts) to explain the relationship between material and
conceptual change along such lines, but, as noted earlier, they have invariably
tried to do this by means of a detour into the RTK, buttressed by an appeal to practice
-- both of these they then connect with a
materialist analysis of the dialectical relationship between the abstract and
the concrete. Since these topics are have been addressed in
other Essays at this
site, no more will be said about them here.
A second (perhaps hidden) source of confusion might be
because
conceptual change isn't
at all easy to depict -- if we rely on Traditional Philosophy to guide our
way. Indeed, if it should emerge that conceptual change
can't be pictured using traditional-, or even DM-terminology --
as it is just about to! --, then
the alleged superiority of
DL
over
FL would become even
more difficult to sustain.
In order to motivate this unexpected turn of events a brief
digression into a consideration of
some of the problems involved in any attempt to express conceptual change (along
traditional lines) might be in order. Consider,
therefore, the following sentence:
C1: Green has changed.
The word
"green" in such circumstances would normally be understood as the
Proper Name of an
individual (perhaps this
guy) -- as opposed to
signifying a concept. On the other hand, if it were made clear that C1 was
actually speaking about the
colour green itself, and not someone called "Green", it would probably be re-interpreted
along the following lines:
C2: This patch of green has changed.
That is because little sense can be made of
the idea that the concept green (expressed in C3 below) could have
changed like this (for reasons that will be explored presently). In which case, C1
(re-interpreted as C2) would perhaps be understood as an allusion to a change in
the colour of a material object, or part of an object -- but not to
the concept green itself. That can be seen if the following sentence were substituted for C1:
C3: The concept green has changed.
Despite what C3
seems to say, the phrase "The concept green" is longer an expression
for a concept; it is asingular term designating an object!
Concept expressions are expressed by a specific use of general terms (often
signified by the employment of
the indefinite article).But, C3transforms the supposed
concept expression into one designating an object of some sort.
As
noted earlier, if the concept itself had changed, or if it were
asserted that it had changed -- and we understood this concept to be a 'mental entity'
of some sort, apprehended somehow by each individual (in their own way?), which
is often how it is viewed in Traditional Philosophy and now in DM -- then it would be
impossible to decide whether or not it had actually changed. With what could we (as individuals)
compare our supposedly subjective apprehension of the concept green if it had
indeed changed? All we would have is a fading memory of the 'old concept green',
which, ex hypothesi, would also have changed! Otherwise, the
concept green, as we 'individually apprehend it', won't actually have changed.
Any attempt to access the 'old concept green' (perhaps via memory) will
of necessity have to appeal to, or employ,
the current
apprehension of the concept green!
Hence, in order to recall the 'old concept green' (labelled in G2
below, "greenn",
which refers to the nth instantiation of 'the concept green', either in the memory or
via a contemporaneous act of 'cognition'), something like
the following would have to be 'cognised':
G1: My memory of the concept
green1 is such and such, which tells me my current apprehension of the
concept green2 has changed.
Or,
more generally:
G2: My memory of the concept
greenn
is such and such, which tells me my current apprehension of the concept
green(n+1)
has changed.
But
if is so, it is reasonably clear that in order for this to be of any use to the
individual concerned, the concept greenncan't itself have changed, for if it had, then it wouldn't be possible to decide
if it had indeed changed! Plainly, that is because it would no longer be
the concept greenn,
it would be
the concept green(n+1)
-- or maybe even
the concept
greenk, what the old concept
greenn
had changed into. Of course,such an act of intellection would simply have changed the subject, or the target, of this
supposed 'mental
concept search'. Unless, of course, the individual
concerned had access to an even older 'concept of
green' (or an even older memory of 'the concept green') that hadn't
itself changed,
pushing this 'search' one stage further back. In that case, the following would
have to be the case:
G3: My memory of the concept
green(n-1)
is such and such, which tells me my past apprehension of the concept
greenn
has changed.
And so on...
Of course, if that were so, there would be no
such thing as "the concept green" to change, just a potentially
infinite set of fading memories of something that now no longer resembled the
'current concept green' as apprehended by the said individual!
[The 'relative
stability of language' response (that is, as it has been made by DM-theorists) has been batted out of the park here
and here.]
Finally, if an individual's memory of the concept green
hadn't changed, there would be 'fixed and changeless concepts',
after all -- namely one such for each colour, taste, smell...
[There are other, perhaps more fundamental
reasons, explored in Essay Three Parts
One and
Two, that fatally undermine any
theory that implies we 'cognise' concepts individually, or even as individuals. They will be
briefly covered
again in what follows and in the End Notes associated
with those comments.]
Be this as it
may, it now
becomes difficult to decide precisely what "the concept green"
actually designates -- at least
not without completely misconstruing what C3 is apparently trying to say
about 'the concept green' itself (but only if we insist on interpreting concepts traditionally). As noted above, "the concept green" can't in fact
pick out the
concept it appears to designate since that would transform its supposed target (i.e., what
the "the concept green" is said to signify -- that is, 'the concept
green' itself) into an object -- now denoted by the
definite description, "the concept green". Naturally,
that would fatally compromise the
distinction
drawn between concepts and objects, all the while failing
to pick out the intended concept! As noted above, concepts are actually
expressed by a specific use of general terms, but only when we aren't trying to refer to
them!13
C3: The concept green has changed.
The paradoxical nature of sentences like C3
may perhaps be illustrated by a consideration of the following (where "ξ
is a concept" is seemingly predicated of "The concept green"; the use of Greek
letters -- like "ξ" in "ξ
is a concept" -- is explained
here):
C4: The concept green is a concept.
If it is first of all
stipulated that C4 is well-formed (when it isn't!), then it looks like
it is
analytically true. In
fact, and on the contrary, C4 is analytically false (i.e., if we also allow for
the use of these two terms-of-art here for the purposes of argument
-- i.e., "analytically true" and "analytically false")! That is because
(once more) "the concept green" is a
singular term, and as such it designatesan object, not a
concept!14
[The words "false" and "true" in the
above paragraph should both be in 'scare quotes', but they aren't because of the
assumption made that C4 is well-formed.]
Alas, absurd sentences like C4 are to
metaphysicians what carrots are to donkeys. So, beginning with linguistic monstrosities
like C4, some theorists hastily conclude that language -- or 'thought' (or
'reality', or 'Being', or 'everything', or whatever) -- must be defective in some way, or must be
'contradictory', or must be paradoxical, or must be this, or must be that. That is
because Traditional Philosophers
imagine they can dictate to 'reality' what it must
be like based solely on their idiosyncratic use, or
distortion, of language (exemplified by C4).
With reasoning like this one might just as well argue that if a metre rule, say, had been
manufactured
incorrectly, then everything it has been used to measure must
be defective, too! To be sure
any
subsequently recorded lengths will be incorrect, but the objects that had been
measured will remain
sublimely unaffected.
From linguistic sins such as these -- committed by our philosophical forebears
-- much of subsequent Metaphysics has descended without modification by
unnatural selection. Unfortunately, DM isn't the only
deformed progeny of mutant syntax
such as this.15
In that case, it isn't possible to specify how concepts change by means of sentences like
C3; in such sentential contexts, the (actual) logical role of terms that supposedly
signify concepts means they no longer function as concept expressions, or even as
expressions signifying concepts.16
C3: The concept green has changed.
[It is important to add that I am not
denying that concept expressions can be
nominalised
or particularised,
or that we can't legitimately use expression like "The concept green", only that nothing
metaphysically deep, paradoxical, or 'ontological' follows from this superficial linguistic
transformation. Nor am I
denying conceptual change!]
Of course, it could be objected that the mere fact that we can't express
conceptual change in the manner suggested above doesn't mean that it doesn't
happen or doesn't exist; after all, reality isn't constrained by the real or imagined limitations of
language.
Maybe not, but if a 'development' like this can't be put
into words without the sort of distortion outlined above following form it -- or, when it has
been put into words, what it appears to say undermines what some individuals
might imagine such expressions can be used to say about a concept -- then no
coherent option has been presented for anyone to
consider.
Not only that,
but the above objection clearly
trades on the supposition that there are indeed concepts in reality that
can change; but that itself would be true only if reality were mind-like. No one
supposes -- it is to be hoped(!) -- that
actual concepts pre-dated the evolution of sentient life, or that they reside in a sort
of 'limbo world', waiting to be thought about, and onlythen, do they begin to change
(which seems to be Hegel's position -- that is, if it were possible to tell!).
On the other hand, if reality isn't
mind-like (and which DM-fan wants to deny that?), then there are no concepts in nature for our minds to reflect.
Or, rather, it makes no sense to
suppose there are,without turning them into objects once more.
Alternatively, again, if it is claimed
that the mind can and does reflect reality (howsoever that metaphor is fleshed
out), and it employs concepts to that end, then it will end up distorting
'reality'
by so doing.
That is, it must actively distort it like this because there no concepts 'out
there' for it to 'reflect'.
Others might refer to George Novack's argument
(which unfortunately conflated
Logical Positivism
with Analytic Philosophy in general):
"Locke
analysed, among other things, the function of precise terms in the process of
knowledge. But, like
Hobbes,
he held that 'words are wise men's counters; they do not reckon by them; but
they are the money of fools.' The logical positivists are 'foolish' in this
sense. They think that words are more important for reasoning than the realities
they represent. Instead of focusing on real things and relations and their
conceptual reflections in the human mind, they limit themselves to dissecting
the structure of sentences and focusing endlessly and fruitlessly over the
multiple meanings of logical formulations and grammatical terms....
"It is useful and often
necessary to eliminate unclarities and ambiguities from language to improve the
functioning of that indispensable instrument of thought. But it is a paltry
enterprise to convert this task into the paramount aim of philosophy. On the
intellectual plane this is equivalent to reducing the process and purpose of
material production to the sharpening and cleaning of a tool...." [Novack
(1971b), pp.107-08. Links added.]
After a sideswipe at Wittgenstein (which
wasn't based on anything the latter actually argued!), Novack continues:
"The logical positivists have
created a modern scholasticism which threshes the empty husks of once valuable
ideas and squabbles over the meanings and relations of terms apart from their
connections with things in their development." [Ibid., p.108.]
Ignoring Novack's
idiosyncratic understanding of Locke and Hobbes for the moment, when he
originally wrote
all this (in the late 1960s) Logical Positivism [LP] had been a dead duck for
nigh on twenty
years. Notwithstanding that, attentive readers will note that, true-to-form,
Novack nowhere quotes or cites a single LP-er in support. Of course, it could be objected
that Novack devoted an entire section on
A J Ayer,
a leading
advocate of
Logical Empiricism [LE] after Ayer abandoned LP sometime in the 1950s. [Ibid., pp.109-12 -- a whole three pages!]
He also mentionsBertrand
Russell and
Rudolph Carnap, two more leading LP-ers of the first
half of the twentieth century (except Russell was never an LP-er!). Novack then refers his readers to a book by that
[Stalinist!] philosopher, Maurice Cornforth -- i.e., Cornforth (1965) -- for
more details. But, he fails to quote Ayer, let alone Russell or Carnap, in
support of his wild allegations! He also manages to conflate LP with LE!
Be that as it may, what about
Novack's allegations themselves?
First of all, the LP-ers
(many of whom were Marxists and socialists, an inconvenient fact also ignored by
Novack) were concerned to rescue science from the clutches of the
metaphysicians, as they saw things; so it is farcical to argue that:
"The logical positivists have
created a modern scholasticism which threshes the empty husks of once valuable
ideas and squabbles over the meanings and relations of terms apart from their
connections with things in their development." [Novack (1965), p.108.]
The LP-ers weren't interested
in analysing sentences or words for its own sake, but in understanding the logic
of both technical and ordinary language the better to understand the nature of
science. We now know the foundation of their entire approach was seriously
misguided, but that doesn't excuse Novack's egregious misrepresentation of their
laudable aims.
Second, it is rather odd that
Novack believes that being clear about our use of important words -- the
meaning of which DM-fans
take for grantedand on which they impose their own idiosyncratic understanding
(such as "consciousness", "mind", "matter", "image", "contradiction",
"negation", "opposite", "knowledge", "facts",
"motion", "place", and even the verb "to be"!)
-- is
in any way different
from what those words express about the world we live in and with which we
interact. For example, clarity about how we use colour terms tells us about the nature
of colour as we conceptualise it (and hence what colour is), which in turn sets conceptual boundaries not
only to how much science can also tell us about it, but whether or not what they
say is misguided. As I have argued in Essay Thirteen Part One:
[It] could be pointed out that colours
are certainly material. However, such a response
would be a mistake. Colour perception may have causal and/or material
concomitants, but colours cannot be material.
It could be argued that light has momentum (or, rather, "carries
momentum"); that is undeniable, but colour isn't the
same as light. We might ask "What momentum does red light carry?" but not "What
momentum does red carry?"]
Of course, colour isn't made
out of anything not already coloured and it has no constituent parts (which
aren't already coloured). So such a question would have no answer that wasn't viciously
circular (i.e., it would be rather like saying matter is made of matter).
In that case, it is little use
being told that a certain colour is F, or is G (where "F" and "G" go proxy for
suitable reductive phrases or (compound) clauses, such as "energy
of a certain wavelength", or "a disposition to excite in us certain
perceptions"), for unless F and G contain or use terms drawn
from the vocabulary of colour, we would be no further forward. Manifestly,
"energy of a certain wavelength" has itself only been identified as causing the
perception of colour because of the fact that we already perceive colour and have a
specific vocabulary to match.
On the other hand, if F and Gdo contain
or use words drawn from the vocabulary of colour,
all such
reductive definitions would be circular.
[Which is just another way of saying that we cannot get behind the vocabulary of
colour without already presupposing a mastery of it.]
For example:
C1: The colour red is a
neural event E whereby a subject sees red.
C2: The colour red is a
neural event E whereby a subject reports seeing red.
C3: The colour violet is
caused by light of wavelength of
approximately 400nm
hitting the retina creating a perception of violet.
Here, as seems clear, a prior understanding
of the use of "red" or "violet" would inform the imputed scientific facts (and
this would be the case for both subject and researcher),
not the other way round. [The significance of that particular observation is explored in
Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
On this, see Stroud (2000).
Again, it could be objected that
colour is actually made out of photons of different energies, or of light
of different wavelengths. However, that response simply confuses the causal
agent responsible for our colour perception with colour itself.
Once more, it might be
objected that colour is caused by the interplay between light rays and the
microstructure of atoms, or that colour is a dispositional property of
material objects -- or perhaps even of perceivers themselves. Whether these
claims are true (or not) won't be
entered into here; but, once again, these responses confuse the causal agents
and/or concomitants
responsible for colour perception with colour itself. [These and other related topics are discussed at length in Wittgenstein (1980). Cf., Glock (1996), pp.81-84, Hacker
(1987), Hanfling (2000), Harrison (1972, 1973), and McGinn (1991).]
"Take blueness, for
example. What enters our eyes -- the blue light -- is simply (objectively)
electromagnetic radiation. Yet the electromagnetic radiation is not blue. Colour
has at least three dimensions -- hue, brightness, and saturation -- and four of
the hues -- red, green, yellow, and blue -- are
primary, that is,
visibly non-composite. There can be reddish blues, but no
yellowish blues or reddish greens.
Yet such characteristics of colour are not characteristic of
electromagnetic radiation. For example, no unique wavelength can be identified
with a unique hue, since identical colour experiences may be produced by
different combinations of wavelength. So light of any particular wavelength
cannot be identified with a colour, that is, light is not coloured.
"Blueness, then, is not a
property of electromagnetic radiation. Perhaps it is a property possessed by
blue objects, that is, a property that they possess whether or not anyone is
looking at them. But are objects intrinsically coloured? There is a strong
temptation to suppose that all the objects that we perceive as blue have
something, for example a certain molecular surface structure, that makes them
so. Yet, when we actually conduct a detailed analysis of the different kinds of
blue things that we see, it soon becomes clear that this supposition is
incorrect. The blueness of the sky is due to the scattering of white light by
particles of a certain size, and the same cause is responsible for the blueness
of the eyes of some Caucasians and of the facial skin of many monkeys. But the
blue of a rainbow has quite a different cause from that of the blueness of
certain stars. And what makes sapphire blue is quite different from what makes
some birds blue, and both are different from what causes the blue of certain
beetles." [Goldstein (1990), pp.185-86. Spelling altered to conform with UK
English. Italic emphases in the original. Links added.]
Although, Professor Goldstein concludes that
colour isn't an "objective property of things" (p.186), that observation isn't
so much false as non-sensical. [On the status of such hyper-bold claims about
'things-in-themselves', see Essay Twelve
Part One.
Again, see Stroud (2000).]
Be this as it may, the
point is that Professor Goldstein is right when he points out that electromagnetic radiation
itself isn't coloured.
Some,
like the above Professor, might claim that colours are 'mental' phenomena and
exist only in conscious minds, not in the external world. But this, too, is an
age-old mistake. Colours don't exist
merely in the mind since (plainly!) they exist in the outside world; any theory
that located colours exclusively in the minds of perceivers would clearly have
misidentified them. So, when, for instance, a scientist describes
Copper
Sulphate crystals as blue, she is referring neither to the contents, nor to the state, of
her mind/central nervous system. Anyone who thought otherwise would simply
have called attention to their own misuse of language....
Nevertheless, we all already know what colour is (or, at least, competent speakers of the language already
know) -- we learnt what it is when we were taught how to speak about it and how to
interact with coloured objects. In fact, we must already understand what
colour terms mean if we are to be informed by scientists what its physical
concomitants and properties are supposed to be. We certainly couldn't be educated (or re-educated)
by them concerning the physical nature of colour if no one understood what
the word "colour" already meant.
That non-negotiable logico-linguistic constraint applies with equal force
to scientists themselves; they too must grasp what ordinary colour terms mean (and
they must do so in the same way that the rest of us do, or they won't be
speaking about colour, but about 'colour') if they are to study the physical properties of the correct
natural
phenomenon successfully. Scientists (and/or sceptics) can only undermine the ordinary use of the
word "colour" (if that is what they do) at the cost of making
all they say about 'it' entirely vacuous. If colour isn't what we suppose it to be when we use
the ordinary
language of colour, then we must surely lose the solid ground upon which
scientists sought to
build a properly scientific explanation of 'it'.
This means that the claim that colour is a
(dispositional) property of material objects cannot be the whole truth about it,
in that it isn't all that colour is. And this "all" cannot be
accommodated to any theory without a prior recourse to the ordinary language of
colour....
Of course, it could be objected that the
nature of colour is a scientific not a linguistic issue --, but this response would be
equally misguided. As we will see
here (in
relation to the word "change"), it isn't up to scientists, philosophers or
dialecticians to tell us what our colour words mean (and that constraint applies to the
rest of our every day vocabulary, too). Any attempt to do so would plainly
undermine the language used in any endeavour to
do just that.
Again, it could be objected that this isn't
something that can be settled by (or, indeed, brushed aside with) an appeal to the
ordinary meaning of words. This is a scientific and/or a philosophical issue.
However, scientists,
philosophers and/or
dialecticians will have to use language in order to tell us what they take
colour to be (i.e., if they are to address the right subject of their
enquiries), and, plainly, in order to make a
correct start they themselves will have to begin
with terms drawn from the vernacular -- otherwise they would be addressing their
comments at some other target, not colour.
Now, it is precisely
here
that any attempt to revise (or even tinker with) the vocabulary of colour that we
already have will back-fire. Since the details underlying that observation
have been worked-out in detail
here, and because further discussion will take us too
far from the main theme of this Essay, I will leave the reader to re-familiarise
herself with that discussion (in the course of which, she will need to replace
the word "change" with the colour terms of her choice).
Finally, Novack asserts,
without proof, that Wittgenstein was an empiricist (Novack (1971b), p.109); he
compounds this error a few pages later by adding the following:
"Since
Bishop
Berkeley set forth his
subjective idealism and
Hume his doubts
about any rational proofs for the objective existence of causation and natural
law, subjectivism and skepticism have tainted empiricism and its adherents.
These features are exhibited in exaggerated form by contemporary logicians like
Wittgenstein who do not believe that the world exists apart from their sensations
and ideas about it. As Wittgenstein says 'The world is my world,' that is,
reality is as I alone sense and interpret it." [Novack (1971b), pp.113-14. Links added.]
Leaving aside for the moment
Novack's serious misrepresentation of Hume, his characterisation of Wittgenstein
is about a wrong as anything could be. Novack's only 'evidence' for his claim that
Wittgenstein was a subjective idealist is a brief comment that appeared near the
end of his first book, the Tractatus (i.e., Wittgenstein (1972),
5.62,
p.115). That short sentence is situated in a series of remarks about
solipsism,
which Novack ignores since it would have torpedoed his argument:
"This remark [i.e., from the
previous paragraph: 'We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot
think we cannot say either...' -- RL] provides the key to the problem, how much
truth there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite
correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is
my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language
(of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my
world....
"Here it can be seen that
solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with
pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and
there remain the reality co-ordinated with it." [Wittgenstein
(1972), 5.62, 5.64, pp.115-17. (This links to a PDF of two parallel
translations; I have used the one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness version.) Bold emphasis alone added,
several paragraphs merged.]
In the Tractatus,
what Wittgenstein meant by "said" was our use of indicative sentences
that had a sense,
that is propositions that were capable of being true or were capable of being
false. In which case, when the implications of solipsism are worked out (but it
is unclear how that could even happen if what a solipsist wants to say -- or "mean" --
isn't expressed in propositions like this) it coincides (i.e., it collapses into)
"pure realism", and all that is left is "reality", which is what Novack would
call "the objective world". The reason for Wittgenstein asserting this is
connected with the entire logic of the Tractatus, which involves an
attempt to show that our employment of fact-stating language isn't based on sensation,
but on the logical possibilities such language expresses, so that
when we try to say anything, plainly, we have to use language, and that is what
commits us all to the same (possible) facts language is capable of expressing, the same logic, and hence to same "reality".
The solipsism tries to say "the world is my world" (and Wittgenstein indicates
he agrees with that intention, the solipsist is correct to say "the world is my
world" since that is what the solipsist, not Wittgenstein,
believes), but in so doing solipsism drops out of the
picture. In the end what solipsists think they want to say can't actually be said
without lapsing into "pure realism", the exact opposite of what they
intended. The only way that the solipsist can
avoid this is by saying nothing.
So, Novack couldn't be more
wrong about Wittgenstein. [On this, see White (2006), easily the best
introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus.]
Now, we saw in
Essay Three
Part One
that the defective logic dialecticians inherited from Hegel (whereby they
misconstrue of
the "is" of predication as if it were an "is" of identity) was founded on an
even more archaic confusion
over the nature of predicate expressions, re-interpreted as the Proper Names of
Abstract Particulars,
which is what
motivated this error -- i.e., the confusion of object-, with conceptual-, change.
Only if concepts are viewed as abstract objects
of some sort (that exist in the 'mind', or 'somewhere in reality') does it become
difficult not to conflate
these two sorts of change.
So, no wonder then that dialecticians
who take logical advice from Hegel end up talking about concepts developing, and
berate the rest of us with tall tales about the 'limitations' of FL because it
supposedly uses 'fixed concepts'!
We can now see where the real problem lies;
it isn't with the 'fixed concepts of FL', but with
the slippery jargon found in DL, which is in turn based on a crass syntactical
error committed by a set of ruling-class hacks in Ancient Greece! And they
did that because it was conducive to their world-view tore-configure reality conceptually,
and hence represent it as 'Mind'-like, or the product of 'Mind'.
[Until
Essay Twelve is published in full, there are a few brief explanations why I have alleged this
here,
here,
and here.
It is also worth pointing out that the above remarks won't be fully understood by anyone who
hasn't read
Essay Three
Part One!]
In that case, it is still unclear what exactly
is being proposed by those who
speak about 'changing', or 'developing', concepts. Once more, this isn't to
suggest that we can't make sense of conceptual change, or of general terms that
express change in the vernacular (such as "river", "walk", "run", etc.). Far from it; it is an
integral feature of our social life and our use of language. But, we
certainly can't do so by using a philosophical theory
that relies on an egregious distortion of the medium by means of which it is expressed,
on a set of doctrines based on Ancient Greek and Hegelian Mysticism (upside down
or 'the right way up').
Despite the above, it is
also possible to express
conceptual change in FL
by means of an ascent into Second Order Logic.
Now, this latest twist doesn't
contradict the observation made in the previous sub-section (i.e., that what seem to be empirical truths about concepts
can't be
expressed in language -- it was in fact maintained that they can't be directly
expressed by means of distorted sentences), since higher order logic is,
among other things, a calculus that expresses rules
ofinference, not logical (or any other) truths.
In Second
Order Logic, concept expressions become variables ranged over by Third
Order Quantifiers, and so on.17
Even so, such systems only
indirectly relate to the ordinary use of the words we have for change. Despite
what some Philosophers and practically every DM-theorist claim, the vernacular is
perfectly capable of expressing change -- andchanges of almost unimaginable complexity,
too. That is partly because (a) The word "change" is an
ordinary language term itself, and (b) The vernacular was invented by
those who interface with material reality in collective labour (etc.) on a daily
basis --
i.e., workers. In fact, as will be demonstrated
below, and in
Essay Six, ordinary language is capable of expressing change
far
better than the obscure 'language' Hegel inflicted on his readers -- or, indeed,
the vague and obscure terminology
one finds in DM. The
vernacular contains literally thousands of words that are capable of
depicting change and development in almost limitless detail and complexity.17a
Again, it
could be objected that the above considerations concentrate on the linguistic
expression of change. Whether or not it is possible to represent change in the
vernacular isn't really relevant to the issues that exercise DM-theorists. Their
focus is on real material
change in nature and society, utilising ideas developed both out of, and tested in, practice in order to
help terminate class
society. That being the case, the above comments are academic, at best, misguided, at worst.
Or, so it could be maintained.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting yet again that the
points raised earlier were specifically aimed at the DM-thesis that
FL can't handle change, not
at whether material change is or isn't different from any of our attempts to
depict it. Hence, the above complaint is itself misplaced. Since FL systematises
certain aspects of some of the inferences we make, or are able to make, in ordinary life -- formalising
but a
fraction of the discursive principles implicit in our capacity to reason,
communicate and picture the world, truly or falsely -- a defence of FL (even if
that is what I am doing here, which I am not; FL needs no defence) can't
suddenly pretend that our expressive powers and the discursive tools by means of which we
manage to communicate aren't relevant.
[Of course,
IF is capable of expressing even more of the above
inferences.]
Anyway, the DM-account of material change is
analysed in detail in other Essays posted at this site (for example, Essays
Five,
Seven Part Three, Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three); there, it will be shown that dialecticians
themselves are incapable of doing the very thing they find fault with in
FL -- that is, accounting for, or even depicting, change!
At first sight, it might seem obvious that a
logical system based on a static view of the world -- as is alleged of
FL -- would have few if any practical
consequences or applications. On the other hand, it would appear equally clear that a different logical
system based on the opposite view of reality -- as is claimed of
DL
--
should have countless practical applications in science and technology.
Ironically, the
exact opposite of this is the case: DL has no discernible practical or scientific
applications and has featured in none of the advances in the
natural or physical sciences (and arguably none even in the social
sciences) -- ever. Worse still, DL has made no contribution to technological
innovation or development.
[Some might object and point
to the successful application of DL in Biology, for example. I shall bat that idea out
the park later on in this Essay, alongside other alleged applications of DL --
in the next main section,
for instance.]
In stark contrast, FL has played an key
role in
the development both of science and mathematics, and has featured in countless
applications in technology and the applied sciences.18
Indeed,
the development of computers is a particularly good example (among the many) of the impact of FL on science and technology. The origin
of these machines goes back many centuries,
but advances in
control
systems
(in the textile industry in the 18th
century) -- including the path-breaking work of
Ada
Lovelace, Lord Byron's daughter -- alongside
the development of
mathematical logic (post 1850), proved decisive. The
invention of
Boolean and
Fregean Logic, the mathematical logic of
Russell,
Whitehead,
Hilbert,
Peano,
von Neumann and
Church, among many others -- along with the
logico-mathematical work of
Alan Turing -- all helped make possible the
development of computer technology. FL not only contributed to the evolution of
software and
computer languages, the principles of
Propositional Calculus govern the operation of all
standard processors.19
In addition, there are
many other examples of the practical applications of FL, ranging from
Cybernetics to
Code Theory, from Linguistics to
Game Theory and
Discrete
Mathematics. The question is:
Can DM-theorists point to a single successful application of DL in
technology or the natural and physical sciences? The answer is reasonably plain:
they can't. But that glaring failure becomes all the more revealing when it is
remembered that dialecticians never tire of telling us that their 'logic' is superior to
FL when it is applied to the material world.
This is perhaps one paradoxical
mismatch between DM and recalcitrant reality that can't be solved by the simple
expedient of "grasping" it.20
Naturally, DM-apologists will
want to deny this (indeed, they do deny it!), but apart from claiming that
scientists are all "unconscious dialecticians", their evidence
in support of those denials peters out
alarmingly quickly. [Again, on that, see the next main section.]
"Every individual is a
dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A
housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that
added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman
guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of
quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on
the basis of the Hegelian dialectic." [Trotsky
(1971)
[I have
commented at length on this unfortunate passage, which does Trotsky few favours,
in Essay Seven Part One, here,
here and
here.]
Of course,
should the claim that all scientists
are "unconscious dialecticians" continue to be maintained, what is to stop Buddhists,
for example, claiming that all scientists are "unconscious followers of
The Eightfold
Path"?
That is no joke; some already have!
On this, see McFarlane (2003), and, of course, the fanciful writings of
Fritjof
Capra; except in his case, scientists are perhaps "conscious"
Daoists! Cf.,
also Wilber (1984). A timely corrective to this contemporary drift toward 'scientific
mysticism' can be found in
Stenger (1995).
But, why don't we go the whole hog? Why
not claim that scientists are "unconscious head-hunters"
-- there is about as
much evidence in support of that contention as there is that they are
'unconscious dialecticians'.
Finally,
here is a video of a lecture given by a Marxist logician who,
fortunately, knows what he is talking about -- Graham Priest
explaining the importance of the Fregean revolution in Logic and Philosophy (I
hasten to add that while I don't agree with everything Priest has to say, he
does get all the broad brush strokes right):
Video One: Graham Priest On Frege's Revolution
In Logic And Philosophy
Would that other Marxists were as clued in about
logic as
Priest.
As we saw above, dialecticians have become
so divorced from reality that some have even claimed that scientists are "unconscious
dialecticians", and because of this they imagine that the
spectacular success of science can be chalked up to
DL! For example, George Novack refers
his readers to a series of arguments advanced by the famous French Physicist,
Jean-Pierre Vigier -- who was also a Dialectical Marxist -- in a public
debate he had with
Jean-Paul Sartre, in December 1961. In the course of their discussion,
Vigier responded to the criticism that DM has no practical or scientific
applications with the following comments (I am relying here on Novack's summary):
"The
existentialist [Sartre -- RL] resents and rejects the rationalism and
objectivity of science. It supposedly leads us away from real being, which is to
be perpetually sought, though never reached, through the ever-renewed,
ever-baffled effort of the individual consciousness to go beyond our human
condition. The terrible destiny of the human race is like 'the desire of the
moth for the star/the night for the morrow/the devotion to something afar/from
the sphere of our sorrow'.
So the
exasperated existentialist Sartre flings as his trump card against the
dialectics of nature the current crisis in science. 'There has never been, I
believe, as grave a crisis as the present one in science', he cries to Vigier.
'So when you come to talk to us about your completed, formed, solid science and
want to dissolve us in it, you'll understand our reserve.'
"Vigier
calmly replies: 'Science progresses by means of crises in the same manner as
history; that's what we call progress. Crises are the very foundation of
progress.' And he concludes: 'The very practice of science, its progress, the
very manner in which it is today passing from a static to a dynamic analysis of
the world, that is precisely what is progressively elaborating the dialectic of
nature under our very eyes.... The dialectic of nature is very simply the effort
of the philosophy of our time...of the most encyclopaedic philosophy, that is,
Marxism to apprehend the world and change it.'
"This
ringing affirmation will appear bizarre to Anglo-American scientists who may
respect Vigier for his work as a physicist. They summarily disqualify
dialectical logic on the ground that, whatever its philosophical or political
interest, it has no value in promoting any endeavour in natural science. If the
method is valid, the anti-dialecticians say, then purposeful application by its
proponents should prove capable of producing important new theories and
practical results in other fields than the social. Marxists are challenged to
cite instances where the dialectical method has actually led to new discoveries
and not simply demonstrated after the fact that specific scientific findings
conform with the generalisations of dialectical logic.
"The most
splendid contribution of this kind in recent decades has been
Oparin's theories on the
origin of life, which are widely accepted and have stimulated fruitful work on
the problems of biogenesis and genetics. The Soviet scientist's theory is based
on the hypothesis that the random formation and interaction of increasingly
complex molecules gave rise to the simplest forms of living matter, which then
began to reproduce at the expense of the surrounding organic material.
"Oparin
consciously employed such principles of materialist dialectics as the
transformation of quantity into quality, the interruption of continuity
(evolution by leaps), and the conversion of chance fluctuations into regular
processes and definite properties of matter, to initiate an effective new line
of approach to one of the central problems of science: How did inanimate nature
generate life on earth? Such cases would undoubtedly multiply if more practicing
scientists were better informed about the Marxist method of thought." [Novack
(1978b),
pp.245-46. I have used the on-line version here. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site; spelling modified to agree
with UK English. Several typos corrected. Links added and some paragraphs merged.]
However,
as we have seen in Essay Seven Part One, these 'dialectical laws' are so vague and imprecise (that is, where
any sense can be made of them), that they can be bent and twisted to conform with
practically any theory or scientific fact DM-fans find either expedient or convenient.
Even so,
what truth is there in the claim that Oparin "consciously employed"
DM-principles, whether or not they are valid?
In fact,
upon reading the above comments, I promptly obtained a copy of Oparin's book --
Origin of Life -- but could find no dialectics in it, conscious or
unconscious! Oparin mentions Engels only five times in the entire
book [Oparin (1953), pp.31-33, 131, 136], dialectics and its 'laws' not once.
And, even where he mentions Engels, it is only in connection with (i) His idea that
proteins are important for life and (ii) His criticisms of
spontaneous generation.
Having said that, W&G quote Oparin along
these lines (using what must have been a different edition of The Origin of
Life to the one I have consulted):
"This problem [of life's origins] has however always been the focus of a bitter
conflict of ideas between two irreconcilable schools of philosophy -- the
conflict between idealism and materialism.... A
completely different prospect opens out before us if we try to approach a
solution of the problem dialectically rather than metaphysically, on the
basis of a study of the successive changes in matter which preceded the
appearance of life and led to its emergence. Matter never remains at rest, it is
constantly moving and developing and in this development it changes over from
one form of motion to another and yet another, each more complicated and
harmonious than the last. Life thus appears as a particular very complicated
form of the motion of matter, arising as a new property at a definite stage in
the general development of matter.
"As early as the end of the last century Frederick Engels indicated that a study
of the history of the development of matter is by far the most hopeful line of
approach to a solution of the problem of the origin of life. These ideas of
Engels were not, however, reflected to a sufficient extent in the scientific
thought of his time." [Oparin, quoted in Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.239-40. (This appears on the same pages in the second edition.) Bold
emphasis added; some paragraphs merged.]
Nevertheless, how the above considerations might have helped Oparin in his research is far from
clear. How does knowing that matter is always in motion help anyone design an
experiment to investigate how life might have evolved?
It
could be argued that it is quite plain that DM prompted Oparin to investigate
nature materialistically, but there is no evidence that that is so -- even though
Oparin never said he was investigating it materialistically, but "approaching"
it "dialectically". There were many other materialist theories that would, or
could, have motivated him. We have
also seen that DM is in fact the exact opposite of a materialist theory.
It
could be countered that Oparin specifically mentions DM (which he does in
other writings) and no other theory.
Maybe so, but there were political reasons why Oparin and other Russian
scientists felt constrained to refer to DM (on that, see below), so his words
aren't conclusive proof. Moreover, European and Russian science had become increasingly materialist
throughout the previous century, with materialism, for example, making its presence felt in
the work of
Nicholas Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), who helped found
Narodism,
and whose ideas would therefore have been well known to anyone associated with the
Bolshevik Party or Russian socialism (for instance, Plekhanov and
Herzen).
Other Russian materialists included
Dmitrii
Pisarev (whose work influenced
Ivan Pavlov
as well as Lenin himself, whom he quotes in
What Is To Be Done?),
Nikolai Dobroliubov,
Ivan
Sechenov (named by Pavlov as the father of Russian Physiology).
[On
the history of materialism in Europe, see Lange (1925).]
Of course, the
first point
worth making is that while Novack is at pains elsewhere to distance his own
brand of Trotskyist,
'superior', dynamic dialectics from the 'wooden, scholastic and lifeless'
form
that was allegedly on offer in Stalin's Russia (cf., p.232) -- even after The
Great Teacher had passed away -- he seemed quite happy to quote the work of a
card-carrying
Stalinist scientist, and who was state apparatchik, no less, in
support!
[We have
already
seen him quote and agree with the 'wooden and lifeless' dialectic
expressed by several communists in the same debate. Vigier was no Trotskyist!]
Perhaps, then, Stalinist dialectics [SD] isn't quite so "ossified and scholastic"
as Novack and other Trotskyists would have us believe. On the other hand, if SD is
"ossified and scholastic", it can't have been of any use to Oparin in
his research! Novack seems to want to have it both ways; but then that is what
one has come to expect of DL-fans.
The second point worth making is that
scientists in Stalin's Russia learnt rather quickly that if they didn't appeal
(directly or indirectly)
to the 'laws' of dialectics in their work (but only as those 'laws' had been
interpreted by party hacks, particularly The Great Teacher Himself), then either their careers or they themselves soon disappeared (cf.,
Nikolai
Vavilov). In which case, Oparin's "conscious employment" of DM was more of a
conscious and understandable desire to save his own neck than it was an application of
"conscious" dialectics. That suspicion is confirmed by the
Wikipedia article about him:
"
The Communist
Party's
official interpretation of Marxism,
dialectical materialism, fit Oparin's speculation on the origins of life as 'a
flow, an exchange, a dialectical unity'. This notion was re-enforced by Oparin's
association with Lysenko."
[Quoted from
here.
Accessed 08/07/2018. Bold added. Link in the original; some links omitted.]
Loren Graham, on the other
hand, argues at length how influential DM was on Oparin's ideas and work, but
concludes with this thought:
"To be sure, there is the
possibility that these sections of his writings were merely responses to
political pressures...." [Graham (1987), p.71. Bold emphasis added.]
However, Graham finally dismisses that as a reason since, in his opinion, Oparin's entire
career reveals he had been consistently influenced by DM, even quoting him to this
effect:
"Only dialectical materialism
has found the correct routes to an understanding of life. According to
dialectical materialism, life is a special form of the movement of matter which
arises as a new quality at a definite stage in the historical movement of
matter." [Ibid., p.71. These words of Oparin's were first publishedin 1953!]
Even so, Graham failed to
show how these 'laws' in any way informed his scientific work, as opposed to
influencing how he interpreted it (hence his "Only dialectical
materialism has found the correct routes to an understanding of life"
-- emphasis added). That was
also the case with Novack. Graham is uncharacteristically accommodating with
Oparin; given the fact that the ideological straight-jacket imposed on all
Russian thought and science lasted into the 1980s, Oparin's steadfast commitment
to DM is easy to understand. He knew what would happen if he reneged on it.
Despite this, another
commentator, Birstein, disagrees
that Oparin adopted 'dialectics' merely to save his neck; he claims Oparin
appropriated DM and supported
Lysenkoin order toadvance his career:
"I strongly disagree with
[those] who justified Oparin's behaviour [in supporting Lysenko -- RL] as the
condition necessary for his survival.... In fact, nothing threatened
Oparin's survival. He was an academic and director of the Institute of
Biochemistry, which then was not directly involved in the study of genetics or
evolutionary theory. He was not attacked by Lysenko or Prezent [a Lysenko
supporter, DM-fanatic and self-styled 'philosopher' -- RL] in the press. He simply was an opportunist who saw
his chance to advance his career in exchange for his support of Lysenko.
Academician Schmalhausen,
Professors Formozov and Sabinin, and 3000 other biologists, victims of the
August 1948 Session, lost their professional jobs because of their integrity and
moral principles and because they would not make compromises with their
consciences." [Birstein (2001), p.289. Details of the above events can be found on pp.255-62.
I hesitate to quote from this work because it is rabidly anti-Leninist.
Paragraphs merged.]
Furthermore, we are all aware
of the truly
wonderful results Lysenko obtained when he tried to apply dialectics to
Soviet agriculture, don't we? [On Lysenko, see
below.]
But, Birstein is right, nothing did threaten Oparin's life, and we know why: he towed the
party line. Had he not done so, that wouldn't have been the case; his career
would have nosedived, as would the prospects of him living long enough to receive
his pension.
The third and perhaps more important
point is that Novack nowhere tells us what these "quantities" and "qualities"
are which Oparin is supposed to have taken into account. We have already seen
that DM-fans are quite happy to make
stuff up as they go along (especially with respect to this particular 'law'), using
conveniently vague and malleable 'definitions' (or, what is more
often the case,
no definitions at all!) of "quality", as and when the need arises. Novack's lack of detail
is no surprise, therefore.
Anyway, here is how
Wikipedia summarises Oparin's work in this area:
"As early as 1922, he asserted the following tenets:
"1. There is no fundamental
difference between a living organism and lifeless matter. The complex
combination of manifestations and properties characteristic of life must have
arisen as a part of the process of the evolution of matter.
"2. Taking into account the
recent discovery of methane in the atmospheres of Jupiter and the other giant
planets, Oparin suggested that the infant Earth had possessed a strongly
reducing atmosphere,
containing methane, ammonia, hydrogen, and water vapour. In his opinion, these
were the raw materials for the evolution of life.
"3.
In
Oparin's formulation, there were first only simple solutions of
organic matter, the behaviour of which was
governed by the properties of their component atoms and the
arrangement of these atoms into a molecular structure. Gradually
though, he said, the resulting growth and increased complexity of
molecules brought new properties into being and a new
colloidal-chemical order developed as a successor to more simple
relationships between and among organic chemicals. These newer
properties were determined by the interactions of these more complex
molecules.
"4.
Oparin posited that this process brought biological orderliness into
prominence. According to Oparin, competition, speed of cell growth,
survival of the fittest, struggle for existence and, finally,
natural selection
determined the form of
material organization characteristic of modern-day living things.
"Oparin
outlined a way he thought that basic organic chemicals might have
formed into microscopic localized systems, from which primitive
living things could have developed. He cited work done by de Jong on
coacervates and research by others,
including himself, into organic chemicals which, in solution, might
spontaneously form droplets and layers. Oparin suggested that
different types of coacervates could have formed in the Earth's
primordial ocean and been subject to a selection process that led,
eventually, to life." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 09/10/2011; subsequent changes to the on-line text were incorporated
on 05/06/2015. Spelling altered to conform
with UK English.
Links in the original.]
First, Point 1 above isn't unique to DM, so
it can't be attributed to that theory. Neither are Points 2 and 4.
Second, we might
be on
firmer ground with Point 3. But, as noted above, this can't be viewed as an
application of the 'Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality', either
-- at least, not until we are told what these new 'qualities'/'properties'
are. If they are the result of novel arrangements of the constituent
atoms of each of the molecules involved (as the above seems to suggest), then that, too, can't
be an example of Engels's 'Law' in action. Here is what I have argued
in Essay Seven Part One on
this:
Engels...said the following:
"For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossibleto alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
added.]
In response, once more, it is worth pointing out that this makes
a mockery of Engels's claim that such changes can only come about through
the addition of matter and/or motion, and that it is "impossible" to alter a body
"qualitatively" in any other way.
Notice that neither "rearranging constituent atoms" nor "rearranging matter and
energy" make no appearance in the above passage.
Even worse, this implies that "rearranging constituent atoms" and "rearranging
matter and energy" can't have the desired effect on any of the bodies involved
since it says: "it
is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or
subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the
body concerned." [Ibid., bold added.] So, if anything, Oparin was "consciously"
failing to apply this 'Law', since these new molecular arrangements
manifestly don't involve
the addition of matter or energy.
[Possible objections to this
line-of-argument, including the claim that energy has been "added",
were neutralised
here.]
But, what about the claim that increased
complexity results in the 'emergence' of new 'qualities"? I will deal with
"emergent properties" in Essay Three Part Three.
Independently of that, what
can be said about the following claim advanced by Vigier?
"Oparin consciously employed
such principles of materialist dialectics as the transformation of quantity into
quality, the interruption of continuity (evolution by leaps), and the conversion
of chance fluctuations into regular processes and definite properties of matter,
to initiate an effective new line of approach to one of the central problems of
science: How did inanimate nature generate life on earth?" [Novack (1978b),
p.246.]
But, where is the
"interruption" of continuity here? Does Vigier imagine that, for example, nature
gradually incorporates elementary particles into organic molecules until this
amounts to the addition of a new atom, and thus a "leap"?
Presumably not. On the other hand, maybe he thinks that atoms are added one at a
time; if so, there is
no continuity here, either, just discontinuity.
Here is what I have
written on this (also taken from Essay Seven
Part One,
slightly edited),
where I quoted
several DM-theorists:
However, far more fatal is the observation that the
Periodic
Table doesn't in fact conform to Engels's 'Law'! To see why, we need
to re-examine once again what Engels and others have actually said about this 'Law':
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
The argument here is plainly this: (a) Quantitative increase
or decrease in matter
or energy results in gradual change, and hence that (b) At a certain point, further
increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a "leap", a sudden "qualitative"
change.
But, this doesn't happen in the
Periodic Table! Between each element there is no gradual
increase in protons and electrons leading to a sudden change -- there are only sudden changes as these 'particles' are added!
For example, as one proton and one electron are added to Hydrogen, it suddenly
changes into Helium. Hydrogen doesn't slowly alter and then suddenly "leap" and
become Helium. The same is true of every other element in the Table. In that
case, one of the 'best' examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' this 'Law' in
fact refutes it! There is no "interruption" in gradualness.
This is a more honest reading
from the extant data, is it not? And not a single foisting anywhere in sight!
These comments also apply to the other
examples drawn from Organic Chemistry [quoted by Engels (and Woods and Grant
(1995), examined
in Note 4,
of Essay Seven Part One); cf., Engels
(1954), pp.161-63 and (1976), pp.65-68].
So, between each
of
the organic molecules (to which
DM-theorists refer)
and the
next in line there is no gradual increase in atoms leading to a sudden change -- once again, there are only sudden changes as atoms are added!
For example, as one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen are added to
Butyric Acid,
it suddenly changes into
Valeric Acid.
Butyric Acid doesn't slowly alter and then suddenly "leap" and become
Valeric Acid. The same is true of every other molecule in similar organic
series. In that case, another of the 'best' examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' their 'Law' in fact refutes it! There is no "interruption" in gradualness, here,
either. Recall what Lenin said:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin
(1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
In
all these cases there is no continuity, only discontinuity. This
means that the most widely-, and over-used example in the DM-book-of-tricks
that supposedly illustrates this 'Law' doesn't in fact do so!
Once again, if Oparin
did in fact make use of this particular idea, then, whatever else he was,
he wasn't
even a "consciousdialectician".
Another comrade who has
also appealed to Oparin's work as an example of 'dialectics' in action is John
Parrington:
"The 'decentralisation'
of DNA's role within the cell raises important issues about how life arose in
the first place. We know that the chemicals that make up living cells would soon
be burned up in the earth's oxygenated atmosphere if they weren't contained
within the protective enclosure of the cell. A major insight was supplied in the
1930s by the Russian scientist Oparin, whose dialectical way of thinking proved
crucial. He argued that, originally, the earth's atmosphere must have been quite
different from now. Instead of the present highly oxidising atmosphere, it must
have been a reducing mixture of hydrogen, ammonia and methane, together with
carbon dioxide, exactly the composition that the Galileo probe is now revealing
on the surface of Titan, Jupiter's moon.
"The present day
atmosphere is very different precisely because it is a by-product of life
itself, in particular the photosynthesising work of plants. Following Oparin's
work it was shown that the major building blocks of life could be created
spontaneously in such conditions. However, major questions still remained. How
did the living cell itself arise? And at what point did DNA appear on the scene?
For those with a DNA centred view the answer is simple. DNA must have arisen
first. But given what we have said about the reliance of DNA on the cellular
environment, it seems hard to imagine how this could have been the case. In
fact, it seems far more plausible, as Rose argues:
'[that the] presence of
the cell membrane boundary, rather than replication, was the first crucial step
in the development of life from non-life, for it is this that enables a critical
mass of organic constituents to be assembled, making possible the establishment
of an enzyme-catalysed metabolic web of reactions. Only subsequently could
accurate replication based on nucleic acids have developed.' [Parrington is
here quoting from Rose (2005), p.254 -- although Rose, wisely, nowhere mentions
'dialectics'. Parrington referenced the first edition of Rose's book; I have
referenced the second edition. The page numbers are the same.]
"In fact, the creation
of such a membrane and the concentration within it of the necessary chemical
components is a process that can be mimicked experimentally today. In summary
then, when DNA did finally arrive on the scene, it must have radically
transformed the form of proto-life, but to do so there had to be the
pre-existing cellular environment to receive it." [Parrington
(1998), pp.111-12. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the
original printed copy. Parrington has repeated this allegation in
Parrington (2017).]
However, just like the others
considered above, Parrington neglected to say what was so 'dialectical' about
Oparin's work! One might be forgiven for concluding that for comrades like
Parrington the word "dialectical" only applies to work that turned out to becorrectin their eyes (except in this case we have no idea if this work is
correct, or even remotely correct -- but see below).
It is worth noting that
Fundamentalist Christians
claim the same sorts of things for their belief in the
literal truth of the Book of Genesis (as do
Muslim
literalists, too); indeed, even 'mainstream believers' attribute the
advancement of science to 'divine guidance' or 'divine providence'. [On that, see
here.] It seems that this
is one straw that both wings of contemporary mysticism (i.e., in its religious and
its 'dialectical' wings) appear only too eager to grasp
-- for all the good it does
them.
This is, naturally,
quite apart from the fact that
Oparin was wrong in almost everything he
concluded about the origin of life. For example, contrary to Oparin, the early
earth didn't have
a reducing atmosphere. Concerning his notion that there were "complex
coacervates" in the early formation of life, we
read the following: "This hypothesis of
colloidal assembly has largely been displaced by other concepts of
life's origins." So, if he was using DM, it clearly led him astray.
But, that it seems that that is what DM does all the time.
Dialecticians have been forced to invent the fantasy that scientists are
'unconscious dialecticians (but only when scientists are right!) since, of course, few human
beings have ever heard of dialectics. Outwith of the old Communist Block
(the states that have collapsed and those that have survived) it is reasonably certain that there aren't
enough 'dialectical scientists' to fill an average-sized cinema.
But if, as we are constantly being told, scientists
are stuck with the rusty old concepts that FL and
IL have gifted them -- this fable is
retailed countless times in RIRE, for instance; here are just a few
of the places where W&G attempt to do
this: pp.42,
67,
69,
82,
83,
85,
86,
87,
88,
89,
91,
94,
95,
96,
97,
98,
99,
106,
107,
119,
132,
148,
152,
156,
234,
255,
354,
365,
387,
406; even John Rees has joined in -- cf., TAR, pp.3-4
--, how was it
possible for human knowledge and technology to
advance quite so dramatically
over the last four centuries, for example? If, in practice, scientists actually use these
'decrepit, outmoded, formal categories', and
science has advanced
spectacularly
as a result, doesn't that amount to a practical refutation of the idea
that FL is inferior to DL?
Well, one
would think so,
but DL compromises the brains of those who have unwisely fallen under its spell,
so it would be unwise to expect its
hapless victims to be able to arrive at such a glaringly obvious conclusion.
[RIRE = Reason in Revolt,
i.e., Woods and Grant (1995/2007); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees
(1998).]
On the
other hand, is there a scrap of evidence to show that there is (or
there has ever been)
a single scientist who is
(or who was) an "unconscious" dabbler in the
Dialectical Black Arts? If there is any such evidence, DM-fans would be
unwise to keep it to themselves any longer.
[The DM-appeal to Mendeleyev has been dealt with
here. However, Novack claims
[in Novack (1978), pp.254-55] that
Ernst Mayr
used DL in his work -- but he did so only on the basis of Mayr's
ruminations about evolutionary novelty. Even so, this connection would have been news to Mayr!
On this basis, we may perhaps be allowed to conclude that whenever Mayr
referred to an animal's head, that was sufficient proof he was an 'unconscious
head-hunter'!]
What of the few genuine examples
where DM has been used (consciously) in science? If the work of
Lysenko
is anything to go by, we must surely conclude that it hasn't been a ringing
success;
Lysenko's
theory held Soviet agriculture back for over 30 years.
[On Lysenko, see
Birstein (2001), Graham (1973, 1987, 1993, 2016),
Joravsky (1970),
Lecourt (1977)
[this links to a PDF], Medvedev (1969), Sheehan (1993), pp.220-28, 315-68, and Soyfer (1994). Also see, Werskey
(1988), pp.292-304. For a different view,
see Lewontin and Levins (1976), reprinted in
DB, pp.163-96. Cf., also
here.]
Of course, if and when things
go wrong in non-Soviet, non-DM science, dialecticians manifestly
fail to attribute that to
"unconscious dialectics"; rather they put it down to
"bourgeois logic", "formal thinking", or an unwise adherence to "commonsense", etc.,
etc. Which is odd given the fact
that all the evidence suggests that logic (both Formal anddiscursive) has actually helped scientists refine and test their theories
for centuries -- while
there is none whatsoever that DL has featured anywhere at all -- except, of
course, negatively in the case of Lysenko and Olga
Lepeshinskaya
(who was a personal friend of Lenin's), for example.
[On that fraud, see below.]
Small
wonder then that dialecticians also believe that appearances 'contradict
underlying
reality';
given the above, they would, wouldn't they?
That particular Hegelian dogma has 'allowed' them to rationalise countless mismatches between DM and the facts. [On
that, see Essay Nine Part
Two.] This is, of course, an odd sort of thing for materialists to have to argue:
if the material world contradicts, and continues to contradict, a certain idea,
ignore reality and cling to the idea! To be
sure, dialecticians consciously do that! And here
is one of them actually doing it -- this is
Herbert Marcuse, commenting on Hegel:
"The doctrine of Essence
seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth.
The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential
from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse
(1973),
pp.145-46.
Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions employed at this site. Minor typo corrected.]
"Prior
to this formalisation, the experience of the divided world finds its logic in
the Platonic dialectic. Here, the terms 'Being,' 'Non-being,' 'Movement,' 'the One
and the Many,' 'Identity,' and 'Contradiction' are methodically kept open,
ambiguous, not fully defined. They have an open horizon, an entire universe of
meaning which is gradually structured in the process of communication itself,
but which is never closed. The propositions are submitted, developed, and tested
in a dialogue, in which the partner is led to question the normally unquestioned
universe of experience and speech, and to enter a new dimension of discourse --
otherwise he is free and the discourse is addressed to his freedom. He is
supposed to go beyond that which is given to him -- as the speaker, in his
proposition, goes beyond the initial setting of the terms. These terms have many
meanings because the conditions to which they refer have many sides,
implications, and effects which cannot be insulated and stabilised. Their
logical development responds to the process of reality, or Sache selbst
['thing itself' -- RL]. The laws of thought are laws of reality, or rather
become the laws of reality if thought understands the truth of immediate
experience as the appearance of another truth, which is that of the true Forms
of reality -- of the Ideas. Thus there is contradiction rather than
correspondence between dialectical thought and the given reality; the true
judgment judges this reality not in its own terms, but in terms which envisage
its subversion. And in this subversion, reality comes into its own truth.
"In
the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of
dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But
this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which
states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of
their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are;
consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to
that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As
such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence --
potentiality....
"This
contradictory, two-dimensional style of thought is the inner form not only of
dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grips with reality.
The propositions which define reality affirm as true something that is not
(immediately) the case; thus they contradict that which is the case, and they
deny its truth. The affirmative judgment contains a negation which disappears in
the propositional form (S is p). For example, 'virtue is knowledge';
'justice is that state in which everyone performs the function for which his
nature is best suited'; 'the perfectly real is the perfectly knowable'; 'verum
est id, quod est' ['the true is that which is' -- RL]; 'man is free'; 'the
State is the reality of Reason.'
"If
these propositions are to be true, then the copula 'is' states an 'ought,' a
desideratum. It judges conditions in which virtue is not knowledge, in
which men do not perform the function for which their nature best suits them, in
which they are not free, etc. Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is
not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the
proposition involves a
process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is.
The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not
state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it
could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with
inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the
eyes of God, by nature, etc....
"Under the rule of formal
logic, the notion of the conflict between essence and appearance is expendable
if not meaningless; the material content is neutralised....
Existing as the living contradiction between essence and appearance, the
objects of thought are of that 'inner negativity' which is the specific quality
of their concept. The dialectical definition defines the movement of things
from that which they are not to that which they are. The development of
contradictory elements, which determines the structure of its object, also
determines the structure of dialectical thought. The object of dialectical logic
is neither the abstract, general form of objectivity, nor the abstract, general
form of thought -- nor the data of immediate experience. Dialectical logic
undoes the abstractions of formal logic and of transcendental philosophy, but it
also denies the concreteness of immediate experience. To the extent to which
this experience comes to rest with the things as they appear and happen to be,
it is a limited and even false experience. It attains its truth if it has
freed itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind
the facts -- that is, if it understands its world as a historical
universe, in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice
of man. This practice (intellectual and material) is the reality in the data of
experience; it is also the reality which dialectical logic comprehends."
[Marcuse (1968),
pp.110-17. Italic
emphasis in the original; bold emphases added. Spelling adjusted to conform to
UK English. I have used the on-line text here, and have corrected any
typographical errors I managed to spot. Some paragraphs merged.]
Marcuse nowhere criticises
Hegel for this Idealist approach to knowledge; quite the reverse, he endorses it.
George Novack concurs:
"What distinguishes essence
or essential reality from mere appearance? A thing is truly real if it is
necessary, if its appearance truly corresponds to its essence, and only so long
as it proves itself to be necessary. Hegel, being the most consistent idealist,
sought the source of this necessity in the movement of the universal mind, in
the Absolute Idea. Materialists, on the other hand, locate the roots of
necessity in the objective world, in the material conditions and conflicting
forces which create, sustain and destroy all things. But, from the purely
logical standpoint, both schools of philosophy agree in connecting reality with
necessity.
"Something acquires reality
because the necessary conditions for its production and reproduction are
objectively present and operative. It becomes more or less real in accordance
with the changes in the external and internal circumstances of its development.
It remains truly real only so long and insofar as it is necessary under the
given conditions. Then, as conditions change, it loses its necessity and its
reality and dissolves into mere appearance.
"Let us consider a few
illustrations of this process, this contradiction between essence and
appearance, resulting from the different forms assumed by matter in its motion.
In the production of the plant, seed, bud, flower and fruit are all equally
necessary phases or forms of its existence. Taken separately, each by itself,
they are all equally real, equally necessary, equally rational phases of the
plant's development.
"Yet each in turn becomes
supplanted by the other and thereby becomes no less unnecessary and non-real.
Each phase of the plant's manifestation appears as a reality and then is
transformed in the course of development into an unreality or an appearance.
This movement, triadic in this particular case, from unreality into reality and
then back again to unreality, constitutes the essence, the inner movement behind
all appearance. Appearance cannot be understood without an understanding of this
process. It is this that determines whether any appearance in nature, society or
in the mind is rational or non-rational." [Novack
(1971a), pp.86-87. Bold emphases added.]
On the contrary, all the
signs are that dialecticians are visible practitioners of self-delusion. So, on the one
hand, we are told that dialectics is and always has been central to revolutionary
practice, and that revolutionary cadres always were, and still are,
not just choc full, they are positively over-flowing with conscious dialectics,
while on the other we have
witnessed little other than the failure of Dialectical Marxism to seize
the masses, or even so much as lightly tap them on the shoulder.
Hence, if we are to believe this
DM-fable, conscious dialectics
seems to be associated with long-term failure, while 'unconscious' dialectics appears to be
superglued to long-term success!
What
conclusion should we draw from this? Perhaps the following: Every single revolutionary should emulate non-DM scientists and become consciously
ignorant of DM.
Maybe then our movement will
begin to
experience some success.
Or, does that recommendation reveal yet
another failure on my part to "understand" dialectics?
Furthermore, do any DM-fans regale us with the
following salutary tale involving the 'dialectical ruminations' of
"In the 1920s Lepeshinskaya
discredited the work of her supervisor,
Alexander Gurvitch,
who investigated
biophotons
and
mitogenic rays. She claimed that low doses of
ultraviolet light
were released by dying cells that had been treated with high doses
of UV light. Later she claimed that cells could propagate by
disintegration into granules which could generate new forms of
cells, different from the parental cells. Also, crystals of
inorganic matter could be converted into cells by adding nucleic
acids. Further, she espoused
spontaneous generation
and the presence of a 'vital substance'. These claims were
propagated as official dogma in the Soviet Union. A claim that soda
baths fostered
rejuvenation
led to a temporary shortage of baking soda. She based her career on
claims to observe
de
novo emergence of living cells from non-cellular materials,
supporting such claims by fabricated proofs which were 'confirmed'
by others eager to advance in the politicized scientific system.
Actually, she filmed the death and subsequent decomposition of
cells, then projected these films reversed.
"In May 22–24, 1950 at the
special symposium 'Live Matter and Cell Development' for the
USSR Academy of Sciences
and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences that was supported by
Stalin and chaired by Alexander Oparin, Lepeshinskaya gave the
keynote speech, and her discoveries were celebrated as revolutionary
by the invited audience. She was the recipient of the
Stalin Prize
for that year, and her ideas became mandatory instruction in
biology. In 1952 a second conference took place to demonstrate
'using experimental methods' that the bourgeois
Virchowian
concept of cell development (only a living cell can produce another
cell) was replaced by a 'new dialectical-materialistic theory on the
origin of all living cells from non-living matter.' While her impact
and dogmatic dominance have parallels to those of Lysenko, her
claims were never officially renounced but just faded away.
"She involved her daughter
Olga and her son-in-law Vladimir Kryukov in her work; in contrast,
her husband, Panteleimon Lepechinsky, thought little of it. 'Don't
you listen to her. She's totally ignorant about science and
everything she's been saying is a lot of rubbish' he told a
visitor...." [Wikipedia,
accessed 09/10/2011. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphases
added.]
Birstein added a few extra details:
"Academician Aleksandr Oparin (1894-1980) was another who gained significantly
from the August 1948 Session. In 1949 he became secretary academician of the
Biology Division instead of
Academician Orbeli. In
contrast to Prezent, he was a serious scientist and the author of a theory on
the origin of life. The first version of his book Origin of Life was
published in Russian in 1924, and the English edition that appeared in 1938 was
widely read by Western scientists. He became corresponding member of the academy
in 1939, academician in 1946, and director of the Bach Institute of
Biochemistry in 1946. But from the 1940s-1960s, Oparin was more a Soviet
official than a scientist. Besides his positions at the academy, in 1950 he was
appointed a member of the International Council for Peace, and in 1952 and 1962,
he was elected vice president of the International Federation of Scientists.
"During his years of power,
Academician Oparin was an open pro-Lysenkoist. I have already mentioned his role
in the tragic fate of Sabinin [pp.255-56 -- RL]. He became even more famous as a
supporter of Olga Lepeshinskaya and her pseudotheory on 'the origin of cells
from noncellular matter.'
"Lepeshinskaya (1871-1963), an old Bolshevik,
a personal friend of Lenin, and
an active Party functionary, started her biological studies in the 1920s, when
she was over fifty years old. In the 1930s, she published a few papers on 'the
origin of cells from non-cellular matter,' which were seriously criticised by
many scientists, including Professor Koltsov [who was also an outspoken critic of Lysenko --
RL]. It was evident that all Lepeshinskaya's 'discoveries' were simply based on
artefacts (i.e., artificial substances or structures formed during the
preparation of microscopic slides) obtained because of poorly and
nonprofessionally made
histology preparations
(she worked at home with her daughter, granddaughter, and daughter's husband,
who assisted her)....
"Finally, with the help of another old Bolshevik, F. Petrov, in 1945
Lepeshinskaya managed to publish a monograph under the same title as her
theory. It had a forward written by Lysenko and one of his closest co-workers,
the
VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences -- RL] academician Ivan
Glushchenko. The book described Lepeshinskaya's experiments in which, for
instance, red blood cells 'were developed' from yolk.
"After Lysenko's victory in
1946 and using her Party connections in the Central Committee, Lepeshinskaya
initiated a joint meeting of the Academy Biology Division, the Medical Academy,
and representatives of the Agricultural Academy. This meeting took place on May
22-24 1950. Academician Oparin presided over the commission that organized it.
He formulated the goal of the meeting:
'The attempts to create living systems are possible...only in the Soviet Union.
Such attempts are not possible anywhere in capitalist countries because of the
ideological position.... I think that the goal of the meeting should be the
criticism and destruction of...the last basics of
Mendelism in our country,
the
Virchowian description of
the cell theory [i.e., that a cell can be originated only from another cell].'
"Twenty-seven speakers
praised Lepeshinskaya's alleged discovery.... Some of them were forced to speak
by personal order from the Central Committee.
"The same year (1950),
Lepeshinskaya received the highest Soviet award, the Stalin Prize. Two years
later, in 1952, with the involvement of Oparin, a second joint conference of the
Medial Academy and the Academy Biology Division on the problem of cell origin
was organized. As Lepeshinskaya declared '[U]sing experimental methods...a new
dialectical-materialist theory of the origin of all cells from non-living matter
has been developed.'
"All this nonsense was
stopped only after Stalin's death. However, Oparin continued to be an admirer of
Lysenko. In 1954 he wrote:
'The August 1948 Session of the VASKhNIL and the joint session of the USSR
Academy of Sciences...had a profound influence on the development of Soviet
biological science. They were turning points after which all branches of biology
in our country started to be developed on the basis of materialistic principles
of the
Michurinist biology and
Pavlov's
physiology.... Our duty is to continue to guard biological science from the
influence of foreign reactionary concepts of
Morganism and vitalism.'"
[Birstein (2001), pp.260-62.
Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphases added.]
[See also Wetter (1958), pp.451-55,
Soyfer (1994), pp.213-29, and Grant
(2007), pp.277-80.]
As seems reasonably clear, all this pseudoscience
was a direct result of a "conscious application" of
DM. It is rather odd, therefore, to find that neither Vigier, Novack, nor Parrington
mention
Oparin's support for the 'dialectical science' promoted by Lepeshinskaya.
Indeed, Lepeshinskaya isn't even mentioned -- even though she was a conscious DM-fan!
It could be objected that any theory
can be misused -- and that includes FL.
But FL isn't a theory any more than mathematics, biology or technology is a theory. It
is a discipline.
But how is it possible to decide whether or
not DM has ever been used correctly? After all, it 'allows' its acolytes to
derive anything
they find useful or expedient and its opposite (and that trick is often
performed by the same individual,
sometimes on the very same page, in the very same paragraph, or even
the very same
speech!). As we have seen, any 'difficulties' or internal contradictions that emerge in a political
or economic theory generated by the alleged use of DM are glossed over by
labelling them 'dialectical' (in a way that is reminiscent of Christians who, in
the face of natural or man-made disasters, absolve 'God' by telling anyone who
will listen that 'He' works in "mysterious ways"). So, if a DM-fan
can't actually explain why something happens, they say it is 'dialectical' and
that comment is somehow able to fill the explanatory gap. As one comrade commented about his time
in the old
Workers' Revolutionary Party (WRP), which operated at the extreme end of the
'Dialectical Thought Control and Manipulation' spectrum:
"[All this] was 'complimented' by
the most abject
philosophical philistinism and theoretically dissolute publication of
Healy's
very unremarkable 'Studies in Dialectical Materialism' which turned out to be an
incomprehensible dog's dinner of convoluted mumbojumbo phrasemongering and
terminological confusion. One comrade in Hull sarcastically recommended it as
'bedtime reading' when I told him I was having trouble sleeping. Because we
didn't grasp it, we thought it was 'too advanced' for us. We didn't possess the
'supreme dialectical mind of a Gerry Healy'. As things turned out, when we
looked at it as the fog started to lift, it was clear that we didn't understand
it because it was unadulterated gobbledegook. Here again, we see a
characteristic of cult-existence in which its leader was, momentarily at least,
attributed powers which he really didn't hold. None of us understood the
'Studies' and so we were told to 'theoretically discipline ourselves' like a
mental or intellectual form of self-flagellation or 'penance' found in physical
form in some religious cults or sects...." [Quoted from
here; accessed
09/10/2013. Quotation marks altered to conform with conventions adopted at this
site. Bold emphases and link added.]
The word "dialectical"
thus operates like magic wand or spell, capable of transforming confused
thought into 'cutting edge science' -- but only in the minds of DM-'true
believers'. It bamboozles the rest of
humanity.
[Dozens of examples of the above phenomenon
have been given in
Essay Nine Part Two.]
Admittedly,
a handful of 'dialectical biologists' have
claimed that DM has played a crucial part in their study of living
organisms -- for instance, the authors of DB, along with several notable members
of the Communist Party from a few generations ago (e.g.,
Haldane,
Levy and
Bernal).
[See also, Lewontin and Levins (2007) -- as
well as
here.
On these and other 'dialectical' scientists, see Roberts (1997), Sheehan (1993),
and Werskey (1988). (I hesitate to list Roberts's book since his summary of
Wittgenstein's ideas is lamentable, to say the least.)]
The authors of DB
informed their readers that they consciously used DM in their work.
However, in a debate
between the present author and Richard Levins a few
years ago, it became clear that he, like so many other DL-fans, had a very
insecure grasp of FL. Would he, for example, be prepared to accept the
biological opinions of a Creationist as authoritative? Why then should we accept
criticisms of FL as in any way reliable when they are delivered by those who
struggle with its basic concepts?
[DB = The Dialectical
Biologist; i.e., Levins and Lewontin (1985); DL = Dialectical Logic; FL =
Formal Logic.]
Without doubt, an
appeal to organic wholes and interconnectedness makes some sort of sense in the
Life Sciences, as well as in the study of social development. However, that admission doesn't mean we have to accept the
entire DM-enchilada, and opt
for Universal Holism, especially since it has yet to be shown that the
universe is an organism or a even complex society. [On this, see Essay Eleven Parts
One and
Two.] Anyway,
as will be demonstrated throughout the rest of this site, the concepts found in DL and DM are far too
vague, confused and incoherent for them to play a useful role in any of the sciences.
Hence, it is little wonder that conscious dialectics helped ruin Soviet
Agriculture and Genetics, or, indeed, that subsequent dialecticians found they had to
appeal to all those 'unconscious dialecticians' in non-Soviet science
to help them undo the damage.
Nevertheless, the authors of DB advance
a number of claims
(which TAR quotes approvingly; e.g.,
on p.4) that require comment:
[1] Levins and Lewontin [L&L] maintain that something called the "Cartesian mode" [i.e., Cartesian Reductionism, CAR]
has dominated post-Renaissance science. Unfortunately, they failed to
substantiate the following claims and simply left them as a series of bald assertions:
"The dominant mode of
analysis of the physical and biological world and by extension the social
world...has been Cartesian reductionism. This Cartesian mode is characterised by
four ontological commitments...:
"1. There is a natural set of
units or parts of which any whole system is made.
"2. These units are
homogeneous within themselves, at least in so far as they affect the whole of
which they are the parts.
"3. The parts are
ontologically prior to the whole; that is, the parts exist in isolation and come
together to make wholes. The parts have intrinsic properties, which they possess
in isolation and which they lend to the whole. In the simplest case the whole is
nothing but the sum of its parts; more complex cases allow for interactions of
the parts to produce added properties of the whole.
"4. Causes are separate from
effects, causes being the properties of subjects, and effects the properties of
objects. While causes may respond to information coming from the effects....
there is no ambiguity about which is causing subject and which is caused
object...." [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.269.]
The above claims are themselves
framed
in rather broad, general and somewhat vague terms. While it is undeniable that
some philosophers and scientists adopted certain aspects of the world-view
that L&L attribute to CAR, many either failed to adopt CAR, or they actively
opposed it. Indeed, since the vast majority of the
theorists who supposedly accepted and employed this mode-of-thought (if it is one) were
Christians, they could hardly posit 'parts separate from wholes' given
what that religion teaches them. Naturally, that conclusion (or, indeed, its
opposite) depends on what one
means by "separate". [On that, see below and
here.] It is worth
adding, however, that L&L cite no sources (primary or secondary) in support of the above
--
and no wonder, since that would have ruined the rather neat picture they
hoped to paint.
Admittedly, different forms
of atomism were prominent in early modern science, but Atomic Theory
and the belief in the existence of molecules wasn't universally accepted among scientists until after
(i) The publication in 1905 of Einstein's work on
Brownian
motion
and (ii) The work of
Jean
Baptiste Perrin,
a decade later. [Cf., the remarks on this topic in Miller
(1987), pp.470-82; a detailed history can be found in Nye (1972).] Also, worthy of note
is the fact that classical Atomic Theory (propounded by
Dalton) had to be
rejected before these novel innovations became generally accepted.
[Cf., Laudan
(1981). There is an illuminating discussion of these
developments in Toulmin and Goodfield (1962), pp.193-305. See also
Mason (1962), Brock (1992), Pullman (1998), and Pyle (1997).]
L&L also ignore the fact that
up until about 150 years ago many scientists and philosophers -- those two
disciplines weren't
in fact ideologically or institutionally distinguished until the middle of the 19th
century -- almost invariably understood the 'unity of the world' in
theological, or even mystical, terms. Many of the pioneers of modern science and
Philosophy openly accepted
Hermetic,
Rosicrucian,
Alchemical,
Occultist,
Kabbalist,
Neo-Pythagorean,
NeoPlatonic and
Teleological
theories of the nature and origin of the world.
[L&L = Levins and Lewontin.]
[On this see:
Bono (1995),
Copenhaver (1990,
1998), Coudert (1995, 1999),
Debus (1956, 1977, 1978, 1987, 1991), De
León-Jones (1997), Dobbs (2002), Easlea (1980), Faivre (1994, 1995, 2000), Harkness (1999), Henry (1986),
Hughes (1992), Katz (2005), Linden (2003),
Lenoir (1982),
McGuire (1967, 1968), McGuire and Rattansi
(1966), Newman and Grafton (2001), Newman and Principe (2005), Pagel (1986),
Principe (1998), Ross (1983a,
1998 -- unfortunately
this link is now dead!), Shumaker (1972),
Vickers (1984), Webster (1976, 1982), White (1999), and Yates (1991, 2001, 2004). See also
here.]
"During the
middle of the seventeenth century, there was a growing consciousness of a divide
between two rival and apparently incompatible world-views. On the one hand,
there was the materialist, mechanist picture, according to which the world was
to be understood exclusively in terms of particles of matter interacting with
each other in accordance with the laws of motion. On the other hand, there was
the spiritualist, occultist picture, according to which some or all natural
phenomena were to be understood in terms of the sympathies and antipathies of
spiritual beings acting purposefully. An important dimension of Leibniz's
philosophy was his project of synthesising these two approaches through a new
set of concepts which would do justice to the insights of each." [Ross
(1983b). Unfortunately, this link is
now dead. An expanded version of this passage can be accessed
here.]
Moreover, the impact of Christianity on the
development of 'Western
Science' was no less profound; a particularly illuminating account of its
influence can
be found in Hooykaas (1973). The book on this is, of course, Webster
(1976).
However, of much more interest
and importance is the metaphysical thread that runs through science, as well as Traditional Philosophy
-- the
influence of which also casts DM in a compromising light,
certainly more than the
authors of DB might be prepared to admit. [The political context
surrounding much of this will be covered in
Essays Nine Part One,
Twelve Parts One and Two, and Fourteen Parts One and Two; summaries
here and
here).]
Concerning
the influence of Hermeticism on
Hegel, see J White
(1996), pp.36-43, and Magee (2008); the Introduction to the latter has been re-posted
here.
On Goethe, see Bortoft (1996), Naydler (1996) and Tantillo (2002). Cf., also
Collingwood (1960) and
Lovejoy (1964).
[This links to a PDF.] On the
Natürphilosophie of thinkers
like
Böhme, Schelling,
Oken,
Kielmeyer, and Goethe, see Benz (1983), Mason
(1962), pp.349-62, O'Regan (1994), Richards (2002) and Tuveson (1982).
On
Oersted's influence on Engels, cf., Graham (1973), and Williams (1980).
See also, Brown (1977), Harrington (1996), Horn (1997), and Weeks (1991, 1993). There
is an excellent summary of the ideas of several of the above theorists -- alongside
the extent of their
influence on Hegel -- in
Beiser (2005), pp.80-109; see also
Heidelberger (1998).
[Unfortunately, this link is now dead.]
To be fair, Rees also argued that a holistic view of nature
on its own
is insufficient to distinguish DM from other superficially similar, mystical systems of
thought; however, he claimed that there was a way to tell the two apart:
"Here the key is to see all the different
aspects of society and nature as interconnected. They are not separate, discrete
processes which develop in isolation from each other. Mainstream sociological
and scientific thought 'has bequeathed us the habit of observing natural objects
and processes in isolation, detached from the general context'. Much of our
schooling today still follows this pattern -- the development of the arts is
separated from that of the sciences, and 'technical' subjects are separated from
languages, history and geography. Our newspapers and TV news programmes divide
the world up in the same artificial way -- poverty levels and stock exchange
news, wars and company profit figures, strikes and government policy, suicide
statistics and the unemployment rate are all reported in their own little
compartments as if they are only distantly related, if at all. A dialectical
analysis tries to re-establish the real connections between these elements, 'to
show internal connections'. It tries, in the jargon of dialectics, to see the
world as 'a totality', 'a unity'.
"To see society and nature as an
interconnected totality which is in a process of constant change still leaves
one vital question unanswered. What makes this whole process develop? Why does
it change? There are any number of religious and philosophical theories which
try to answer this question by insisting that the motor of change lies outside
the historical process -- with god, or in the unchanging pattern of human nature
or in the eternal features of the human soul. Marx and Engels rejected these
approaches as mystical and, literally, supernatural. They insisted that the
processes which drove the development of nature and society forward must be internal
contradictions, not supersensible entities like god, the soul or, as Hegel
had argued, the general essence of human consciousness existing somewhere in the
ether beyond the consciousness of actual living human beings." [Rees
(1994), p.62.]
"Totality alone is not, however, a sufficient definition of the
dialectic. Many undialectical views of society make use of the idea of totality.
The Catholic Church has its own mystical view of the all-embracing nature of
God's creation and a very practical view of the temporal hierarchy that goes
with it. 'The Taoist tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on
wholeness, the whole being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin
and yang'.... [Rees is here quoting DB, pp.274-75.]
"What unites all these explanations is that they see the totality
as static. Beneath all the superficial bustle of the world lies an enduring,
eternal truth: the unchanging face of God, the ceaseless search for the balance
between yin and yang, or the timeless shapes, for good or ill, of human values.
What they all lack is the notion of a totality as a process of change. And even
where such systems grant the possibility of instability and change it is
considered merely as the prelude to a restored equilibrium.... [Rees failed to
notice that he had just contradicted himself; one minute none of these mystical
systems admit of change; next some of them do! -- RL.]
"Change, development, instability, on the other hand, are the
very conditions for which a dialectical approach is designed to account. The
'great merit' of the Hegelian system, wrote Engels, is that:
'[F]or the first time the whole world, natural, historical,
intellectual, is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion,
change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the
internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and
development. From this point of view, the history of mankind no longer appeared
as a wild whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally condemnable at the
judgment seat of mature philosophic reason and which are best forgotten as
quickly as possible, but as the process of evolution of man himself.'" [Rees
(1998), p.6. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Rees is here quoting
Engels (1892), p.408 -- that is, in the edition I have used.]
However, I have challenged Rees's claims,
here,
here, and
here, where I
have shown that numerous mystics also believed in (i) Totality, (ii) Change
through forces analogous to contradictions, and (iii) The idea that 'God' is
subject to change, and that 'He' is a process, too. [I have listed even more of
the same in Appendix One
to Essay Two.]
Admittedly, not all of those immersed in such belief systems
thought that change was caused by contradictions, but many
argued that things were ruled by 'dialectically-connected' and 'inter-related
opposites',
distinguishable from Hegel and Engels's 'contradictions' in name alone.
Nevertheless, Rees also failed to mention the important Organicist tradition in
post-Renaissance science, nor did he alert his readers to the latter's influence on
Schelling and Hegel (and hence on Engels).
Indeed, Rees failed to note that Hegel's mystical 'Totality' itself is suffused with
change, motivated by 'contradictions', from top to bottom, inside and out, and that includes his 'Absolute',
'God'.
Furthermore, it is also clear that
L&L
themselves adopt a mildly revisionist view of Engels's work;
in fact, they even tell us that "much of what he [Engels] wrote about [the physical
world] seems quaint." [DB, p.279.]
Despite this, they also equate contradictions with opposing forces
[DB, p.280]; but, as Essay Eight
Part
Two shows, that was an unwise move on their
part.
Nevertheless, in their characterization of CAR, L&L pointedly failed to
argue that the absence of an appeal to "contradictions" (to account for
change) was one of its weaknesses. Perhaps this was an oversight, but it does
tend to ruin the neat picture L&L and Rees sought to paint.
[2] DB counterposes DL
to CAR as a superior method, at least in the Life Sciences -- and, by implication, throughout the rest
of the sciences. However, as we will see in other Essays posted at this site, DL introduces into
epistemology a far more pernicious brain virus: HEX.
[HEX = Hegelian
Expansionism; this term is explained in Essay Ten
Part One;
DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Small wonder then that the vast majority of
scientists (outwith the old Stalinist block and its 'fellow travellers') have
completely ignored DL -- that is, if they have ever even heard of it!
[On Soviet Science, see Birstein (2001),
Graham (1973, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2016), Joravsky (1961), Kojevnikov (2004),
Krementsov (1997), Pollock (2006), Soyfer (1994), and Vucinich (1980, 2001).]
In his reply to Burnham,
Trotsky commented on a related issue:
"In order to deal me a blow
in the most vital spot Burnham informs me that in the university textbooks on
logic that he deals with, the dialectic is not mentioned at all. He should have
added that in the university courses on political economy Marx's labour theory
of value is not mentioned either, or it is mentioned only under the sign of
condemnation. And the main thing that should have been mentioned is that in the
university textbook there is no mention, or only a condemnation, of historical
materialism. In the courses in civil law there is no exposition, or only a
condemnation, of the socialist attitude toward property forms, etc., etc....
From the fact that the dialectic is not mentioned in the university textbooks
[it is essential] to draw some conclusions about the class nature of official
scholarship -- its fear of revolution, the inability of bourgeois thought to go
beyond the limits of empirical tasks, etc. For Burnham and his ilk the banning
of Marxism from official scholarship suffices to disprove the scientific nature
of Marxism." [Trotsky (1973),
p.403.]
To be sure, there is deep
seated prejudice against Marxism in academic circles (and elsewhere), but the reason DL
isn't mentioned in logic textbooks can't simply be attributed to bourgeois hostility
since Hegel was a quintessentially bourgeois philosopher -- whose
work and ideas are, alas, experiencing a significant revival even among
Analytic Philosophers
of late
(for reasons that will be explained in Essay Twelve). [On that, see for example, Redding
(2007).] And yet, DL still fails to make it into logic textbooks -- that is,
other than those that tout
'Dialethic'/'Dialetheic' [DiL] and 'Paraconsistent
Logic' [PaL], which systems are openly based on Hegelian ideas -- but which are,
arguably, also not based on them! [On that, see Note 1].
The
reason for this is plain, and it is similar to the reason why Astrology doesn't make it into
textbooks on Astronomy, or why
Crystal
Healing fails to be included in Medical textbooks -- DL isn't even logic.
Nevertheless, Rees refers his
readers to several other theorists who have tried to find some sort of scientific role for DL
to play. [Rees (1998), p.120; Note 60.] Attempts like this -- to squeeze science into a dialectical boot
it won't fit -- will be
covered in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
[On
the allegation that
David Bohm
used DM in his work, see Essay
Seven
Part One.]
Finally, L&L offer their
readers only sketchy details concerning exactly how DM has
featured in their research; indeed, they are set at such a low intellectual level that would
make both of them fail any of their undergraduates who turned in such
fourth rate,
superficial work.
[I will add more
details on this topic in a future re-write of this Essay.]
What then of the general boast that DL is a
superior form of logic? Is there any way of confirming it? Perhaps there is;
John Rees claims that DL doesn't
reject FL, and neither is it:
"[A]n
alternative to 'normal' scientific methods or formal logic…. Formal Logic, like
Newtonian physics, has proved inadequate to deal with 'more complicated and
drawn out processes.' So the dialectic stands in the same relation to formal
logic as Newtonian physics stands to relativity theory or, as Trotsky puts it,
as 'that between higher and lower mathematics'." [Rees (1998), p.271,
quoting
Trotsky (1971), p.63. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
If it can be shown that DL does all that Rees
claims for it, then perhaps the 'academic' quibbles aired in this Essay can be set aside.
Other material posted at this site is directed at examining
these claims, and much more besides. However, a few rather awkward, initial problems need to be
cleared first before the main feature can begin.
First of all, while it is clear that
Relativity has largely superseded
Newtonian Physics
it isn't at all obvious
that this was related to the latter's inability to deal with "drawn
out processes". Still less clear is exactly what FL and DL have in common that
makes Trotsky's analogy with higher and lower mathematics at all apposite. If
anything, the opposite appears to be the case; DM-theorists are only too
happy to begin their discussions of FL by pointing out that most of what
they (but no one else) take to be its central tenets are in fact fundamentally defective.
This includes the LOI, the LOC and the LEM (among others). [These allegations
will be fully
substantiated in the next
subsection.]
Furthermore, although lower mathematics is clearly limited in scope, none of its
precepts are defective and we certainly don't find professional mathematicians (or
even amateurs) criticising
it in any way from the outset because of that, quite unlike the attitude adopted toward FL by DM-theorists,
who constantly excoriate it for limitations we have now shown are entirely
baseless.
[LOI = Law of Identity;
LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; FL = Formal Logic;
DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Secondly,
and as will be demonstrated in Essays Five and
Six, Trotsky's attempt to criticise
the LOI and Engels's 'analysis' of motion collapse into incoherence with
remarkable ease. In stark contrast, higher mathematics doesn't disintegrate when we pass beyond its
'lower' forms. In fact, far from being able to handle "more complicated and drawn
out processes",
DL has great difficulty even coping with an ordinary bag of sugar or
the movement of the average cat on or off assorted mats!
Furthermore, higher and lower mathematics
aren't inconsistent
with each other. Hence, we don't find mathematicians correcting elementary addition,
subtraction, multiplication or division, for example; nor do we find them expanding on the limitations of,
say, the equal sign, the cube root function or methods used to solve simple linear equations. Admittedly,
higher mathematics contains concepts and rules not found in lower mathematics,
but there is no suggestion that the latter uses defective procedures, methods or symbols,
or even that they are the exact opposite of what they are normally taken
to be. Compare that with the sort of comments made by
DL-enthusiasts concerning FL:
"Trotsky saw that it
was the inadequacies and contradictions of formal logic that drove theorists
toward dialectical formulations. Even those who pride themselves on a 'deductive
method', which proceeds 'through a number of premises to the necessary
conclusion,' frequently 'break the chain of syllogisms and, under the influence
of purely empirical considerations, arrive at conclusions which have no
connection with the previous logical chain.' Such ad hoc empirical adjustments
to the conclusions of formal logic betray a 'primitive form of dialectical
thinking.'" [Ibid., p.272. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Again, it is worth
pointing out once more that fundamental criticisms of FL (like the above) advanced by DL-fans
are never substantiated with examples taken from the work of a
single logician.21
Add to this Lenin's remarks:
"The inaneness of these forms
of formal logic makes them deserving of 'contempt' and 'derision'…. Hegel
shrewdly adds [concerning the Syllogism]: 'Boredom immediately descends when
such a syllogism is heard approaching.'" [Lenin (1961),
pp.93,
177.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
It would be difficult
to find a single mathematician who was as dismissive of lower mathematics as
Lenin was of FL -- or any contemporary scientist, for that matter, who would be prepared
to call Aristotle or Newton's work "inane" and fit only for "contempt" and
"derision".22
[Readers should compare much of what follows with
what Buddhists and Zen Buddhists have to say about the LOC and the LEM, posted
here
and here, for
example.]
Returning now to the DM-fairytale that there are exactly three principles
underlying FL: In fact, there are countless principles
employed in
MFL --, indeed, as many as there are authors prepared to invent and/or define them. But,
as we
are about see, this hoary old DM-fable isn't even true of AFL!
As noted several times, dialecticians who pontificate on this topic seldom (if
ever) substantiate their fanciful attempts to re-write the history and foundations of FL with
quotations from,
or citations to, a single logic text (except those badly mis-titled books
Hegel inflicted on the world). In fact, their lamentably weak effort to come to
grips with FL bears an uncanny resemblance to the
lame attempts made by Creationists
to do the same with
respect to Evolutionary Theory, in their literature and on
their
websites.
[FL = Formal Logic;
MFL = Modern FL; AFL = Aristotelian FL;
LOC = Law of Non-contradiction; LOI = Law of Identity; LEM = Law of
Excluded Middle.]
Compare the above attitude with the
following valid point made by John Molyneux:
"Marxist materialism is
repeatedly attacked by the method of oversimplifying and caricaturing it to the
point where it is obviously false...." [Molyneux (2012), p.36.]
As
we are about to see, this
is precisely
what he and other DM-fans regularly do when they attempt to summarise, discuss
or criticise FL!
Grossly inaccurate
caricatures like this will only ever impress those who know nothing about logic,
which, sad to say, appears to be the aim. On the other hand, those who
know even a modicum of MFL (or, indeed,
AFL) will see these attacks for what they are: ill-informed bluster. Those who don't
know any logic will be led
astray accordingly. Moreover, if my experience debating this topic on
the Internet is anything to go by, benighted DM-fans refuse to be told,
preferring instead to believe what Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin or Trotsky tell them about
AFL, or, indeed, logic in general, again without a scintilla of supporting
evidence. They are as impervious to correction as are rabid Donald Trump
supporters or Fundamentalist Christians. Psychologists have a name for this
debilitating condition:
The Dunning-Kruger Effect.
This must surely be among the many 'explanations' there are for the fact that
highly intelligent comrades (who are otherwise knowledgeable in
science,
economics, history, current affairs, politics, social theory, and even
mathematics) continually publish comments about FL that are not only demonstrably incorrect, they aren't even coherent in their own
terms -- as will be demonstrated presently.
[I
examine several other reasons
for this self-inflicted DM-ignorance in Essay Nine Parts
One
and Two.]
It is to be hoped that long
exposure to DL hasn't completely destroyed these comrades' critical faculties,
although, in what follows, it will become painfully clear that the case for the
defence is considerably weakened by the publication of each new book or
article on dialectics by DM-fans.
Below, I have reproduced just a
few of the scores of crass things dialecticians have to say about AFL and FL, much of which is
highly repetitive, anyway.
It is to be hoped that having
read through what follows, the conclusion that dialecticians simply copy
their wild allegations off one another (many being almost identical, word-for-word)
without bothering to check -- let alone devote much thought to what
they have to say
--
will also have occurred to the reader and not just the present writer.
Apologies are owed once again to the hardy souls who will have to wade through what follows for my having to inflict
this sorry
material on them -- but they can spare a thought for yours truly who has
had to read this stuff, and much more like it, over and over again for
the best part of forty years, in order to try to make
some sort of sense of it.
Recall, too, that the quotations reproduced below are only a tiny fraction of
those that could have been posted. Finally, I have chosen examples from right
across the political spectrum of parties, tendencies and individuals committed
to some form of Dialectical Marxism -- i.e., from Stalinists and
Maoists to Trotskyists and Libertarian Marxists, from academic Marxists to rank
amateur revolutionary activists and internet bloggers. Whatever the sharp disagreements these
groups or individuals have over concrete political questions,
they all agree, almost to the letter, about the alleged nature and limitations of
FL, and they all make the same mistakes while they are at it!
A particularly egregious example of
'dialectical confusion' can be found in (Trotskyist) George Novack's woefully misconceived book on DL
-- The Logic of Marxism:
"There are three fundamental
laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law
can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical
with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.... If a thing is always and
under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal
to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably
from the law of identity. If A always equals A, it can never equal non-A.
"This conclusion is made
explicit in the second law of formal logic: the law of contradiction. The law of
contradiction states: A is not non-A. This is no more than the negative
formulation of the positive assertion expressed in the first law of formal
logic. If A is A, it follows, according to formal thinking that A can't be
non-A. Thus the second law of formal logic, the law of contradiction forms the
essential supplement to the first law. Some examples: a man
can't
be inhuman; a democracy can't be undemocratic; a wageworker can't be a
non-wageworker.
"The law of contradiction
signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought
about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be
different from itself. Difference and identity are, according to these two rules
of formal logic, completely different, utterly disconnected, mutually exclusive
characteristics of both things and thoughts. This mutually exclusive
quality of things is expressly taken note of in the third law of formal logic.
This is the law of the excluded middle. According to this law, everything is and
must be either one of two mutually exclusive things. If A equals A, it can't
equal non-A. A can't be part of two opposing classes at one and the same time.
Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs confront each other, both
can't be true or false. A is either B or it is not B. The correctness of one
judgement invariably implies the incorrectness of its contrary, and vice versa."
[Novack (1971a), pp.20-21.
Several paragraphs merged.]
The LOI will be discussed in considerable detail in
Essay
Six, but the reader will note that Novack --
except in one instance (discussed below) -- nowhere attempts to substantiate
these wild allegations with a single reference books or articles devoted to FL. To be sure, he
paraphrases Aristotle from time to time, but it is just as plain that he grasped little
of what he read (as we are about to see).
True to form, however, we are
never told what the As
he speaks about are, or what they stand for (why that is important with be discussed later), but Novack and
all the rest considered below nowhere even consider the possibility that A
might be identical with itself at t1and then change while it is still identical with itself at
t
2
(t2
>
t1)
-- that is, A, whatever it is, is self-identicalas it changes from moment to moment,
even if it isn't identical with what it used to be!
Humanity invented tensed verbs
(alongside an associated vocabulary that includes adverbs and adjectives) to cope with such possibilities
long
before Aristotle even existed.
"So it must be possible to
deny whatever anyone has affirmed. Thus it is clear that for every affirmation
there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation.
Let us call an affirmation and a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I
speak of statements as opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the
same thing -- not homonymously, together with all other such conditions that we
add to counter the troublesome objections of sophists....
"I call an affirmation and a
negation contradictory opposites when what one signifies universally the
other signifies not universally, e.g. every man is white -- not every man is
white [i.e., some man is not white -- RL], no man is white -- some man is white. But I call the universal
affirmation and the universal negation contrary opposites, e.g. every man is
just -- no man is just. So these can't be true together, but their opposites
may both be true with respect to the same thing, e.g. not every man is white --
some man is white.
"Of contradictory statements
about a universal taken universally it is necessary for one or the other to be
true or false; similarly if they are about particulars, e.g. Socrates is white
-- Socrates is not white.
But if they are about a universal not taken
universally it is not always the case that one is true and the other
false. For it is true to say at the same time that a man is white and that a man
is not white, or that a man is noble and that a man is not noble.... This might
seem absurd at first sight, because 'a man is not white' looks as if it
signifies also at the same time that no man is white; this, however, does not
signify the same, nor does it necessarily hold at the same time." [Aristotle
(1984b), 7, 17-38, pp.27-28. Emphasis added. The on-line translation
is different from the one I have used.]
In the above passage,
Aristotle was alluding
to an early version of his famous "Square of Opposition":
Readers will, I hope, notice the
nascent sophistication
apparent in Aristotle's first faltering attempts to say clearly how he
intends to use certain words, and indeed, how they are used, just as they will no doubt take note of how little
the musings of comrade Novack correspond with them. In fact, what Aristotle has
to say about the LOC, for example, bears no relation to what Novack thinks
Aristotle had to say. Aristotle nowhere uses
identity, or lack of identity, to define a contradiction -- that is a
fiction invented by post-Renaissance philosophers and logicians, an odd idea
Hegel was only too happy to propagate; on that, see
here.
Aristotle, again:
"So it must be possible to
deny whatever anyone has affirmed. Thus it is clear that for every affirmation
there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation.
Let us call an affirmation and a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I
speak of statements as opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the
same thing -- not homonymously, together with all other such conditions that we
add to counter the troublesome objections of sophists....
"I call an affirmation and a
negation contradictory opposites when what one signifies universally the
other signifies not universally, e.g. every man is white -- not every man is
white [i.e., some man is not white -- RL], no man is white -- some man is white. But I call the universal
affirmation and the universal negation contrary opposites, e.g. every man is
just -- no man is just. So these can't be true together, but their opposites
may both be true with respect to the same thing, e.g. not every man is white --
some man is white." [Ibid.]
Novack:
"The law of contradiction
signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought
about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be
different from itself. Difference and identity are, according to these two rules
of formal logic, completely different, utterly disconnected, mutually exclusive
characteristics of both things and thoughts." [Loc cit.]
,
where I have shown that the passages taken from Aristotle's work, to which some appeal
in their attempt to
show he did in fact use the LOI, don't in fact show this. Readers are referred
there for more details. But, it is important to add that I have posted about half a
dozen comments about this on the same page. So readers will need to scroll down
to find them.]22a1
The original Wikipedia article -- which has been changed since I first
quoted it -- asserted that no
occurrence of the LOI could be found in anyone's work prior to that
of
Thomas Aquinas in the 13th
century; however, the
comments page asserts that the first instance of it occurs in
John Locke.
However,
we find the following comment in Hamilton's Logic
(published in the mid-19th
century):
"The law of Identity, I
stated, was not explicated as a coordinate principle till a comparatively recent
period. The earliest author in whom I have found this done, is Antonius
Andreas, a scholar of
Scotus,
who flourished at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth
century. The schoolman, in the fourth book of his Commentary of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, -- a commentary which is full of the most ingenious and
original views, -- not only asserts to the law of Identity a coördinate dignity
with the law of Contradiction, but, against Aristotle, he maintains that the
principle of Identity, and not the principle of Contradiction, is the one
absolutely first. The formula in which Andreas expressed it was Ens est ens.
[Being is being -- RL.] Subsequently to this author, the question concerning the
relative priority of the two laws of Identity and of Contradiction became one
much agitated in the schools; though there were also found some who asserted to
the law of Excluded Middle this supreme rank." [Quoted from
here (accessed 04/10/2014). I haven't yet been able to check this source
directly.
Bold emphasis and links added.]
The aforementioned editorial change
to that Wikipedia article -- on this see Note 22a1-- doesn't
alter much, but it does attempt to pin-point a use of "identity" in Aristotle's
work. This means that Aristotle didn't base his logic on the LOI, or even
on the LOC, despite what generations of DM-theorists have tried to tell
their readers.
Be
this as it may
, the aforementioned
Wikipedia article quoted Aristotle
as follows:
"Now 'why a thing is itself'
is doubtless a meaningless inquiry; for the fact or the existence of the thing
must already be evident (e.g. that the moon is eclipsed) but the fact that a
thing is itself is the single formula and the single cause to all such questions
as why the man is man, or the musical musical, unless one were to say that each
thing is inseparable from itself; and its being one just meant this. This,
however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the
question." [Aristotle (1984e), p.1643; Book VII, Part 17. Bold emphasis
added. I have quoted a more recent translation than seems to have been used by the author of the Wikipedia
article. The latter is available
here; scroll down
to Part 17. That is clearly the source the author of the
said article used.]
So, far from basing his logic on 'identity',
Aristotle seems quite dismissive of it!
Indeed, he appears to be making
a totally different point, as I noted on the 'Talk' page over at Wikipedia:
And [this] quotation takes
[the] 'law'
out of context, for not only does Aristotle not mention 'identity', he
specifically talks about predication (and since identity is a relation,
he can't be talking about identity -- the conflation of relational with
predicative expressions is more modern):
"Let us state what, i.e. what
kind of thing, substance should be said to be, taking once more another
starting-point; for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that
substance which exists apart from sensible substances. Since, then, substance
is a principle and a cause, let us pursue it from this starting-point. The
'why' is always sought in this form -- 'why does one thing attach to some
other?' For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to
inquire -- as we have said why the man is musical, or it is something else.
Now 'why a thing is itself' is a meaningless inquiry (for (to give meaning to
the question 'why') the fact or the existence of the thing must already be
evident -- e.g. that the moon is eclipsed -- but the fact that a thing is
itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all
such questions as why the man is man, or the musician musical', unless one
were to answer 'because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being
one just meant this'; this, however, is common to all things and is a short
and easy way with the question). But we can inquire why man is an animal of
such and such a nature. This, then, is plain, that we are not inquiring why he
who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable
of something (that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the
inquiry is an inquiry into nothing). E.g. why does it thunder? This is the
same as 'why is sound produced in the clouds?' Thus the inquiry is about
the predication of one thing of another. And why are these things, i.e.
bricks and stones, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the
essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is the end, e.g. perhaps in
the case of a house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover; for this
also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of
genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being also."
[Quoted from
here. Bold emphases added.]
There is, however, another
site on the Internet that
does manage to trace the history and origin of this 'Law' -- and it isn't to Aristotle
--, but,
in line with Hamilton, above, it traces the LOI to
Medieval Roman Catholic Logicians. However, since that site
is run by an overt fascist, I won't cite it. [A Google search will
soon find it, though --
that is, if you can stomach the rest of the material you will find there!]
Now, it may be that
Novack consulted a spectacularly bad logic text (and, alas, there are plenty of
those about), or maybe none at all,
and so just made
things up. But, if he did, he wisely kept that shameful secret to
himself.
[In fact, as we will see in Essay Twelve, Novack was relying largely on
Hegel, and possibly also on a handful of traditional 18th
or 19th
Century logicians, who made similar mistakes.
Readers are encouraged to read the rest of
De Interpretatione; the above
passage gives only a hint of the sophistication
Aristotle attempted to bring to the subject all those years ago,
something Hegel either failed to appreciate, or tried his best to undo.
DM-fans have only succeeded in aggravating that backward step
--, and, ironically, they have done so at a time when logic
is far better understood than at any other period in history, progressive developments that
have sailed over their ideologically-compromised heads.]
Now, as noted above, Aristotle says the opposite of what Novack attributes to FL:
"...For example, the negation
of 'to be a man' is 'not to be a man', not 'to be a not-man', and the negation
of 'to be a white man' is 'not to be a white man', not 'to be a not-white
man'.... For it is possible for
the same thing to be and not to be: such statements are not contradictories of
one another...." [Aristotle
(1984b), 12, 1-12, p.34. Bold emphases added.
Paragraphs merged.]
It is reasonably clear from
this that
Aristotle wouldn't have accepted Novack's particular use of non-A as the
contradictory of A, for
instance.
The sort of negation
Aristotle is alluding to above (where he rejects expressions containing
locutions like
"not-man" as contradictories of those that contain "man") is called
predicate-term negation. (On that, see
here.)
The failure to notice the difference between
propositional negation,
predicate negation and predicate-term negation (but more specifically
the second two of these) has clearly confused dialecticians like Novack. Once again, such errors abound in the writings of DM-theorists. Aristotle drew attention to this distinction over two
thousand
ago! Now, it could be that DM-fans haven't had quite enough time to catch up, or for
this 'hot-off-the-press-news' to sink in.
L
ogic has moved on
considerably since Aristotle's day, as have mathematics and the sciences in
general.
No one today -- other than traditionalists -- would be happy with Aristotle's
characterisation of contradictions, etc.
However, it is nevertheless apparent from what Novack and the other DL-fans quoted below
have to say
that they are significantly less logically advanced than Aristotle was
2400 years ago!
It is equally clear that Novack didn't consult Aristotle's writings before he
simply made up the above comments, just as it is
equally clear that the same can be
said of the other DM-fans quoted in what follows. For example, Novack pointedly confused
the LOI 'stated negatively' with the
LOC:
"This conclusion is made
explicit in the second law of formal logic: the law of contradiction. The law of
contradiction states: A is not non-A. This is no more than the negative
formulation of the positive assertion expressed in the first law of formal
logic. If A is A, it follows, according to formal thinking that A can't be
non-A. Thus the second law of formal logic, the law of contradiction forms the
essential supplement to the first law. Some examples: a man
can't
be inhuman; a democracy can't be undemocratic; a wageworker can't be a
non-wageworker.
"The law of contradiction
signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought
about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be
different from itself. Difference and identity are, according to these two rules
of formal logic, completely different, utterly disconnected, mutually exclusive
characteristics of both things and thoughts.
"This mutually exclusive
quality of things is expressly taken note of in the third law of formal logic.
This is the law of the excluded middle. According to this law, everything is and
must be either one of two mutually exclusive things. If A equals A, it can't
equal non-A. A can't be part of two opposing classes at one and the same time.
Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs confront each other, both
can't be true or false. A is either B or it is not B. The correctness of one
judgement invariably implies the incorrectness of its contrary, and vice versa."
[Novack (1971a), pp.20-21.
Some paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
As I have shown in Essay Eight
Part Three
(that material has been reposted below),
there is no connection at all between the LOI "stated negatively" and the LOC.
So, Novack has just made this up:
"The law of contradiction
signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought
about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be
different from itself." [Ibid.]
The same comment applies to Novack's attempt to drag the
LEM into this
'dialectical
black hole'.
To be sure, Aristotle made many mistakes
(on that, see here);
for example, he often confused propositions with what he called "terms"
(indeed, almost all the way through Prior Analytics), and he crossed
effortlessly between talk about talk and talk about things,
running both together at times; but he did
at least try to be careful, even if not always crystal clear! As the late
Peter Geach pointed out:
"
[L]ogicians
as distinguished as Aristotle and Russell have fallen into almost inextricable
confusions, so that you just cannot tell whether a predicate is something within
language [talk about talk -- RL] or something represented by means of
language [talk about things -- RL]." [Geach
(1968), pp.22-23 (this links in fact to the 3rd
(1980) edition and so has different page numbers:
pp.49-50.]
Aristotle was, after all,
beginning
virtually from scratch. Anyone who reads his work (and who doesn't rely on comrades like Novack to put them
off) will soon see why Marx thought so highly of him.
Despite the above, Novack did at least
attempt
to support what he said in the following passage with a direct reference to Aristotle (his only
one in the entire book, as far as I can determine):
"Let me cite an interesting
example of this kind of thinking from Aristotle's writings. In his Posterior
Analytics (Book 1; ch.33, p.158 -- this is in fact pp.146-47 in the edition I have used
--
RL), Aristotle says that a man can't simultaneously apprehend first, that man
is essentially animal, i.e., can't be other than animal -- and second, that man
is not essentially animal, that is, may assume that he is other than animal.
That is to say, a man is essentially a man and can never be thought of as not
being a man." [Novack (1971a), p.21.]
Now, if we check what
Aristotle actually said, we will soon see things aren't quite as Novack
would have us believe (which is perhaps why Novack chose to paraphrase,
but not quote, the passage in question):
"Similarly there is both
knowledge and opinion of the same thing. For the one is of animal in such a way
that it can't not be an animal, and the other in such a way that it can be
-- e.g. if the one is just what is man, and the other of man but not of just
what is man. For it is the same because man is the same, but the manner
is not the same.
"It is also evident that it
is not possible to opine and to understand the same thing at the same time. For
one would at the same time hold the belief that the same thing can be otherwise
and can't be otherwise, which is not possible. For in different men it is
possible for there to be each of these attitudes with regard to the same thing,
as has been said; but in the same man it is not possible even in this way; for
he will at the same time hold a belief, e.g. that a man is just what is an
animal (for this is what it was for it not to be possible for something not to
be an animal), and that a man is not just what is an animal (for let that
be what it is for it to be possible)." [Aristotle (1984d),
Book 1, 33, 89a:34-89b:6, pp.146-47. Bold
emphases added. Again, I have used a different translation to the one published
on-line.]
Admittedly, this passage
isn't the clearest that has ever been committed to paper, but it nowhere
mentions "essence", and although it contains allusions to the LOC, it is couched
in terms that make Novack's 'paraphrase' prejudicial, if not misleading, to say
the least. The sections highlighted in bold bring that out. Hence, Aristotle's
position was far more nuanced and complex than Novack acknowledged, but he was nevertheless happy
to misrepresent him.
Finally, Aristotle had the
following to say: "It is also evident that it is not possible to opine and to
understand the same thing at the same time...". In relation to Novack, at least, I think we can
agree with Aristotle on that one. Indeed, just like other DM-fans, Novack
revealed that
not only had he failed to grasp the basics of FL, but he was nevertheless quite happy to
pontificate and "opine" about it as if he were an expert (indeed, just as
The Dunning-Kruger Effect predicts).
Be this as it may, a measure of the
sophistication modern
logicians have brought to the subject can be judged from the content even
of introductory textbooks on the Philosophy of Logic.
For example, one such that takes a
very 'Oxford' view of the subject is Wolfram (1989); a completely different slant can be found in Haack
(1979). Dialecticians often label the attention to detail evident in
books like this,
"pedantry",
but it is
abundantly clear that their own
relaxed, if not downright sloppy approach to what is a very
difficult and complex discipline allows them to indulge in some easy, but quintessentially
confused, 'thought'.
[Bertrand Russell once said:
"Most people would rather die than think, in fact they do." He didn't have
dialecticians in mind when he said that, but perhaps he should.]
More challenging material can be found in, say, Goble (2001), Jacquette (2002,
2006), Quine (1970) and
Shapiro (2005).
[This links to a PDF.]22a2
As an excellent historian of
science, one would expect Clifford
Conner to have known better, but as an avowed pupil of George Novack, he plainly
doesn't. In fact he seems only too happily to emulate the master, making all the usual mistakes
-- except he is content to make do with only one basic law of FL:
"The central principle on
which formal logic is built can be expressed in a simple formula that at first
glance appears to be a self-evident truth 'A equals A'....
Beginning with this law you
can derive all of formal logic. One important
corollary
is the law of exclude of middle. That is, if 'A equal B' is a true statement,
then 'A is not equal to B' must be a false statement. A is either identical to B
or it is not. It's one or the other; there is no middle ground." [Conner (1992),
p.22. Link added and paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]
[The above comments appear
in a section entitled Aristotle's Formal Logic, leaving the reader in no
doubt that the author associated these confused musings with Aristotle's logic.]
As expected, Conner offered his
readers no evidence at all in support of these allegations (we have already seen they
can't be found in Aristotle), nor did he explain how the LEM can be derived from
the LOI. Of course, if the LEM is valid, then what Connor says about it is
indeed the case ("there is no middle ground"),
but even then the LEM can't be a corollary of the LOI, since what he says follows
only on the basis of both 'laws'. Neither takes precedence, and they aren't
inter-derivable, either. [I explain why,
below. I have summarised the
argument here.]
Be this as it may, it would
be interesting to see Conner attempt to derive all of FL from the LOI -- including
disjunctive and
conjunctive normal forms, to say nothing of consistency and completeness
proofs. [On this, see
Lemmon (1993), pp.75-91, 189-200, and Hunter (1996),
pp.137-215.] If Connor managed to do that, he would be odds on favourite to
win a
Fields Medal:
"Beginning with this law you
can derive all of formal logic. One important
corollary
is the law of exclude of middle. That is, if 'A equals B' is a true statement,
then 'A is not equal to B' must be a false statement. A is either identical to B
or it is not. It's one or the other; there is no middle ground." [Conner (1992),
p.22. Link added.]
Earlier, Conner had defined the LOI as follows: "A is equal to A",
but it has now morphed into "A equals B". It looks like Conner's
definition isn't 'equal' to Conner's definition!
Compare this with Novack's earlier
comment, which seems no less confused:
"This mutually exclusive quality of things is expressly taken note of in the
third law of formal logic. This is the law of the excluded middle. According to
this law, everything is and must be either one of two mutually exclusive things.
If A equals A, it can't equal non-A. A can't be part of two opposing classes at
one and the same time. Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs
confront each other, both can't be true or false. A is either B or it is not B.
The correctness of one judgement invariably implies the incorrectness of its
contrary, and vice versa." [Novack
(1971a), pp.20-21.]
"Both can't be true or false"?
That must
mean they are truth-valueless!
However, one minute, A is the
name of an object -- which is its legitimate role in simple versions of the LOI
--; we can see this when Novack tells us that "According
to this law, everything is and must be either one of two mutually exclusive
things....
A can't be part of two opposing classes at one and the same time".
The next it stands for a proposition (i.e., a "statement") or even a "state of
affairs"(!) -- which we can see when he says that
"Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs confront each other, both
can't be true or false."
But, if A stands for a name, or an object, and then for a proposition, we
end up with unvarnished nonsense: so while "Socrates is identical with Socrates"
makes sense (even if DM-fans think the latter is both true and false at
once -- i.e., if "A" stands for "Socrates", for example), "Socrates is true"
and "Socrates is false" make no sense at all (if we take A to stand for
something that could be true or could be false, i.e., if it stands for a
proposition or indicative sentence). [I return to consider such
'innovative' DM-syntax and DM-semantics in more detail, below.]
As we will see throughout this site, when DM-theorists try to 'explain' their
'logic', the 'abbreviations' they use are as slippery as eels coated with olive
oil.
Of course,
anyone familiar with Aristotle's work -- or who bothers to check! -- will
already know he never puts things this way. Indeed, I have been unable to find a
sentence remotely like any of the above in
his work. [E-mail me if you think
differently.]
Finally, Conner rightly emphasises the
importance of empirical over theoretical knowledge in his
excellent book, in the following manner:
"As far as the kinds of activities that
produce scientific knowledge, the primary focus in this book is on empirical
as opposed to theoretical processes. It is my contention that the
foundations of scientific knowledge owe far more to experiment and 'hands-on'
trial-and-error procedures than to abstract thought.... [The privileging of
theoretical over empirical knowledge is] a reflection...of the ancient prejudice
that proclaims intellectual labour more honourable than manual labour." [Conner
(2005), pp.11-12. Spelling adjusted to agree with UK English; italic
emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
Given the above, is it puzzling why Conner
then accepts a theory (upside down or 'the right way up') that has been derived
from that haven of intellectualism, Mystical
German Idealism,
in place of empirical knowledge that so
easily refutes it.
"Let
us examine the matter more closely. The basic laws of formal logic are:
"1) The law of identity ('A' =
'A').
"2) The law of contradiction
('A' does not equal 'not-A').
"3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')....
"The
law of contradiction merely restates the law of identity in a negative form.
The same is true of the law of the excluded middle. All we have is a repetition
of the first line in different ways. The whole thing stands or falls on the
basis of the law of identity ('A' = 'A'). At first sight this is
incontrovertible, and, indeed, the source of all rational thought. It is the
Holy of Holies of Logic, and not to be called into question. Yet called into
question it was, and by one of the greatest minds of all time....
"Similarly
with the law of the excluded middle, which asserts that it is necessary either to assert or deny, that a
thing must be either black or white, either alive or dead, either 'A' or 'B'.
It can't be both at the same time.For normal everyday purposes, we can
take this to be true. Indeed, without such assumptions, clear and
consistent thought would be impossible. Moreover, what appear to be
insignificant errors in theory sooner or later make themselves felt in practice,
often with disastrous results. In the same way, a hairline crack in the wing of
a jumbo jet may seem insignificant, and, indeed, at low speeds may pass
unnoticed. At very high speeds, however, this tiny error can provoke a
catastrophe. In Anti-Dühring, Engels explains the deficiencies of the so-called
law of the excluded middle:
'To the metaphysician,' wrote Engels, 'things and
their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other
and apart from each other, fixed, rigid objects of investigation given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely unmediated antitheses. 'His communication is "yea,
yea; nay, nay"; for "whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." For him a
thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be itself
and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause
and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.'" [Woods and Grant
(1995),
pp.57,
91-93.Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.
This material now appears in the second edition, Woods and Grant (2007), pp.63,
95-98.]
In Essay Seven
Part One, we will have occasion
to note that Engels wasn't averse to drawing his own hard and fast antitheses
-- for example, when he claimed that water exists either as a sold (ice), as
a liquid (water), or a gas (steam), but not as a solid-liquid, or as a
gas-liquid -- even when they change into one another where these 'fixed and
rigid dichotomies' are supposed to break down. (What these two have to say about the LOI will be dealt with in
Essay Six.)
Again we see in the above the same slippery DM-abbreviations slide (those letter
As again!) effortlessly
between different denotations. One minute A is the name of an object, the
next it stands for a proposition. Readers should keep this slide in mind as they
proceed, since every DM-theorist covered in this main sub-section seems happy to
allow them to slide all over the place -- if they do that will save me having
to point this out every time they do it.
I have made several comments
about the sophomoric errors in W&G's book,
here,
as well as at the end of this section,
but for present purposes it is worth pointing out
that (just like other DM-fans) these two comrades referenced zero evidence
in
support of their 'definitions'. To be sure,
here and there they referred to a few
ideas lifted from two introductory logic texts (i.e.,
one
written many years ago by
A. A. Luce, and another by
Morris and Nagel), but they failed
to reveal from which misguided textbook they retrieved these prize
examples:
"1) The law of identity ('A'
= 'A').
"2) The law of
contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').
"3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')...."
[Ibid.,
p.91. In the second edition, Woods and Grant (2007), this appears on p.95.]
Quite what
the
LOC
has to do with whether A can or can't equal not-A, Woods and Grant
failed to say. As we will also find is the case with Hegel (and as we discovered
with Novack, above), these two have
confused the LOC with the LOI "stated negatively"; however, the LOC
concerns the
truth-functional connection
between a proposition and its negation; it doesn't relate to objects
represented by A
(that is, if that is what A stands for!), still less about
"equality". As will be argued more fully below, the letter "A"
in the LOI is a variable that stands for an object or the name thereof, so it
can't feature in the LOC, which concerns propositions not objects.
[This topic is discussed
extensively in Essay
Eight Part Three
(I have reposted some of that material
below). On the LOC in general, see
Horn
(2006/2024). Unfortunately, Professor Horn alleges without textual support that
the LOI was a foundational axiom for Aristotle's logic. I have e-mailed him about this (January 2009).
For his reply, see
Note 1. (Horn (2006) has now been superseded
by Horn (2024) -- same link.)]
Readers
will note, too, that Aristotle, for example, can only be made to say such inane
things if what he actually says (reproduced earlier) is ignored, or his words are
altered so that they say the opposite of what he intended.
In that
case, clearly, "Aristotle does not equal Aristotle", according to W&G! Hence,
it looks like
the
important thing here isn't to interpret Aristotle, but to change him.
W&G
aren't averse to making what seem to be otherwise irrelevant points; for example, this one:
"Moreover,
what appear to be insignificant errors in theory sooner or later make themselves
felt in practice, often with disastrous results. In the same way, a hairline
crack in the wing of a jumbo jet may seem insignificant, and, indeed, at low
speeds may pass unnoticed. At very high speeds, however, this tiny error can
provoke a catastrophe." [Ibid.]
But,
what catastrophe has ever resulted from the alleged misconstrual of the
'laws' of FL? W&G failed to say, but unperturbed by this omission they immediately deflect to faults that
arise in metallurgy! As if a theory is anything like a crack in an aluminium
wing! Well, even if they couldn't cite a single example from logic that might cause,
or have caused, a
'catastrophe', we already know that DL led to a catastrophic decline in
harvests in the former USSR, as soviet agriculturists tried to apply the batty
DM-ideas promulgated by Lysenko.
Indeed,
while W&G seemed happy to tell us that according to FL, "the whole is equal to the
sum of its parts", what Aristotle in fact said was this:
"In the case of all things
which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere
heap, but the whole is something beside the parts...." [Aristotle (1984e),
p.1650. I have used the on-line version from
here.]
"Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the
individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part." [Aristotle
(1984i), p.1988. I have used to published version, not the on-line
translation.]
Except for those whose brains haven't been colonised by 'dialectics', Aristotle's
"the whole is prior to the parts" and "the whole is something beside
the parts" isn't the same as "the
whole is equal to the sum of its parts"
(which we
met earlier, from W&G's book). Perhaps W&G think that "prior to part"
and "beside the parts" mean the same as "equal to the sum of
the parts"?
Moreover, their characterisation of the
LEM
is no less
risible. What, it may be wondered, has "A is not equal to
B" got to do with
whether, concerning proposition, p, either p is true or
p is false -- or, in some versions of the LEM, p v ¬p ("¬" being the sign for negation)? Do these two honestly believe
that an intellect of the stature of Aristotle believed that their version of the
LEM was one of his
foundational principles? [Indeed, the long passage from De Interpretationegiven above explicitly contradicts what
W&G assert.] Or
even that there are any
other logicians not the worse for drink or drugs who would accept this
caricature of the LEM? No wonder they failed to quote a single logic text
that supports their fictional 'version' of it.
Moreover, concerning the
choice of colour that they give their readers (i.e., "a
thing must be either black or white"), do they honestly think
that logicians don't know that some things can be other colours -- red, green or sky blue
--, and that such colours
sometimes change? Or that while something is red (like a traffic light), it
can't at the same time be green. If W&G think otherwise, they will only be a danger to themselves and other road users. Of course,
DM-theorists say their theory is particularly applicable at the point of change.
But, even at the point of change, a traffic light can't be red and green at the same time! Yes, sure,
lights can be red and orange at the same time, but which logician has ever said
otherwise? And we have already seen
that if DM were true, change would be impossible, so we don't need lectures from
DM-theorists either about logic or about change.
[I am, of course,
referring here to UK traffic lights, but
most lights across the planet work on similar principles and with the same
colours.]
Of course,
this depends on what they mean by:
"a
thing must be either black or white... It can't be both at the same time."
[Loc cit.]
Do they think
logicians have never seen something like this?
Figure Two: No One Has
Ever Seen One Of These --
According To W&G
Is the above "a thing"?
Is it red, blue, green, yellow,
white and orange at the same time? What about this?
Figure
Three: Not Cricket
These objects (and countless others) can
be many colours at the same time, whether they change or not.
"Even the simplest judgement, as Hegel points out,
contains a contradiction. 'Caesar is a man,' 'Fido is a dog,' 'the tree is
green,' all state that the particular is the universal. Such sentences seem
simple, but in fact are not. This is a
closed book for formal logic, which remains determined to banish all
contradictions not only from nature and society, but from thought and language
itself. Propositional calculus sets out from exactly the same basic postulates
as those worked out by Aristotle in the 4th century B.C., namely the law of
identity, the law of (non-) contradiction, the law of excluded middle, to which
is added the law of double negation. Instead of being written with normal
letters, they are expressed in symbols thus:
"a)
p = p
"b) p = ~p
"c) p
V = ~p (sic)
"d) ~(p ~ p) (sic)
"All this looks very nice,
but makes not the slightest difference to the content of the syllogism."
[Ibid.,
pp.97-98.
Unsurprisingly, after a supporter of this site pointed out the garbled nature of
this passage, it has now been dropped from the Second Edition -- although it remains
in place in the on-line version. Update July 2018: The above pig's ear has now
been axed from the on-line version, too.]
Now, a) above would be
syntactically viable if p stood for an object -- that is, it operated as a singular term
(standing for a Proper Name or a
Definite Description), but in logic this letter normally goes proxy for a proposition
or indicative sentence.
If in a), pdoes stand for a proposition -- which seems to be
W&G's intention,
since identity (which they mean by their use of an "=" sign) expresses a
relation between objects or the names thereof -- then that would imply
propositions are (i) objects of some sort or (ii) p is a singular
term! But, propositions can't be objects or singular terms (why that is so, see
here; I have also said
more about this, below).
However, and connected with the
previous point, in relation to b) it isn't clear what role the term, "not-",
occupies. Is it an operator mapping a name onto a 'negative name' (whatever that
is!), or is it an operator mapping a propositional variable onto its negation?
If the latter were the case, then p can't be operating as a singular term, as it
is in a). If the former were the case, if it is a name-operator, then it would be pertinent to ask W&G what
"not-Socrates" could possibly mean -- turning b) into "Socrates is equal to
not-Socrates". [Again, on that see
below,
as well as
here.]
Even supposing some sense could be made out of those
two, what
sense can be made of c) or d)? If p stands for a name, then they would
translate out as
these prime examples of unvarnished nonsense:
c) Socrates or equals
not-Socrates. (sic)
d) Not both Socrates
not-Socrates. (sic)
c) and
d) are just plain gibberish.
On the other hand, if p stands for a
proposition (such as "Paris is the capital of France"), then the situation would,
if anything, be even worse:
c) Paris is the capital of
France or equals
not-Paris is the capital of France. (sic)
d) Not both
Paris is the capital of
France
not-Paris is
the capital of France.
(sic)
If this is the best DL-fans can do, the
ruling-class will rest secure in their beds.
Furthermore,
if p were an object (as opposed to it being the name of an object), it couldn't be used to say
anything. This is precisely the mistake Hegel made, which error W&G seem
happy to
copy. [More on that
here, and in detail in Essay Three Part One,
Sections 5-9.
Treating concepts as objects of some sort -- for example mental constructs,
'objects of thought', or ideas --, also means they can't be used to say
anything. That was established in Essay Three Part One (link above).]
Clearly, these two comrades found these prize specimens
of syntactical confusion in a logic text written nowhere on this planet --
which must mean they simply made them up!
[The
aboveprime example of syntactic confusion has now been removed from the second edition of
W&G's book
-- probably because a supporter of this site e-mailed Alan Woods about it
fifteen or so years ago. Having said that, Woods was also made aware of several other
serious errors
in RIRE, and they haven't been corrected.
The above garbled syntax remains in the
on-line version (or it did up until at least May 2016, the last time I
checked).Update March 2018: It has now been removed!]
At any rate, this shows that they made no serious attempt to comprehend much of
what they constantly deride. Witness the way they confuse the
Propositional Calculus with
Aristotelian
Syllogistic. The former was invented by the
Stoics
(and then largely forgotten about, or lost, until the middle of the 19th century); Aristotle
knew nothing about it since it was developed after he died, although he did
comment on the
Megarian School, which heavily influenced Stoic Logic. [Kneale and Kneale
(1962), pp.113-76.]
About this period in the history of logic,
we read the following:
"Aristotle's logic,
especially his theory of the syllogism, has had an unparalleled influence on the
history of Western thought. It did not always hold this position: in the
Hellenistic period, Stoic logic, and in particular the work of
Chrysippus
[c.279-c.206 BCE -- RL], took pride of place. However, in later
antiquity, following the work of Aristotelian Commentators, Aristotle's logic
became dominant, and Aristotelian logic was what was transmitted to the Arabic
and the Latin medieval traditions, while the works of Chrysippus have not
survived." [Quoted from
here, accessed 17/03/2020. Bold emphasis added.]
[Oddly enough, Stoic Logic was also known as
"dialectic" logic (Kneale and Kneale (1962), p.113). It bears no relation to
the pseudo-logic Hegel dreamt up.]
Of course,
what
W&G have to say about the contradictions allegedly implicit in simple predicative
propositions is itself based on a 'novel' conception of grammar (which they also
uncritically imported from
Hegel, who in turn appropriated it from
Medieval Logicians).
"Even the simplest judgement, as Hegel points out,
contains a contradiction. 'Caesar is a man,' (W1 -- RL) 'Fido is a dog,' 'the tree is
green,' all state that the particular is the universal." [Ibid.]
Sentences like W1
(i.e., "Caesar is a man")
do not say 'the particular/individual is the universal', as
these two -- and
Lenin -- allege, and can only be made to
say so by imposing on it a grammatical theory they all failed to justify.
[Indeed, it can't be justified; on that see Essay Three
Part One.] Even if,
per impossible,
W1 could be construed this way, W&G failed to explain why that is a contradiction, as opposed to it being a simple falsehood --
or, indeed, just plain, unvarnished nonsense. As Aristotle would have said,
propositions like W1 tell us that manhood applies to Caesar, not that the
"particular is the universal". And, even if this were a contradiction,
we would expect these two elements (the particular/individual and the universal)
to struggle with and the turn into each other -- as the
DM-classics (and even W&G)
tell us they must:
"The world of subatomic particles is in a state of constant
movement and ferment, in which nothing is ever the same as itself. Particles
are constantly changing into their opposites, so that it is impossible even
to assert their identity at any given moment of time. Neutrons change into
protons, and protons into neutrons in a ceaseless exchange of identity. [Is a
proton really the opposite of a neutron? In fact,
on p.67 (p.72 of the second edition), Woods and Grant tell us that the
opposite of a proton is an
antiproton!
Moreover,
protons are highly stable -- RL.]
"Contradiction is an
essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself.
It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The
dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and
interpenetration of opposites….
"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change
into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and
the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history
of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a
bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike.
And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped,
embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious
minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical
reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely
decisive role....
"This universal
phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all
motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a
contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies
and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"Contradictions
are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not
only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move
simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative
but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their
opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into
positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not
destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a
neutral charge.
"This is an extension of the law of the unity
and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of
nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...."
[Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.45-47,
63-71. Bold emphases added.]
If this doesn't happen (as it
plainly doesn't) with respect to
"the particular/individual and the universal" then how can they be described as
contradictory of one another? On the other hand, if they are
contradictory of one another, then why don't they struggle with and then turn
into one another, as even W&G assert they should. In DM-terms this makes no
sense at all.
Exactly
who W&G are seeking to influence with these blatant fibs and incoherent ideas is reasonably clear (i.e.,
anyone as ignorant of FL as they clearly are), but the fact that they have linked Marx's great
name and reputation to this rubbish is something for which they should hang
their heads in shame. The fact that they won't do that just about says it all.
We also find something
similar, but no less inventive, at the website run by the UK
Socialist Party. Here
is Robin Clapp (revealing that he, too, has confined his reading of logic to books about DM,
all the while failing to consult a single logic textbook, which, of course, makes him an expert
in the subject):
"The formal
logician operates within the limitation of three laws:
"The Law of
Identity -- where A is equal to A
"The Law of
Contradiction -- where A can't be equal to non-A [This is a garbled version
of Hegel's attempt to negate the LOI -- RL.]
"The Law of
Excluded Middle -- where A must be equal to A, or must not be equal to A."
[Quoted from
here.]
It looks like the split in
The Militant Tendency between W&G and what later became the Socialist Party hasn't
noticeably improved either side's
grasp of logic.
[The lack of any connection between the LOC and the supposed negation of
the LOI has been exposed here.
Other criticisms of this approach to logic were covered earlier and will be
again, below.]
Not to be
outdone in this respect, other comrades have vied to be crowned 'The Worst
Expositor Of Traditional Logic Since Hegel'. Here is
Plekhanov's
impressive bid:
"The 'fundamental laws of
thinking' are considered to be three in number: 1) The law of identity; 2) the
law of contradiction, and 3) the law of the excluded middle. The law of
identity...states that 'A is A' or 'A = A'. The law of
contradiction... -- 'A is not A' -- is merely a negative form of the first law.
[Again, this is a version of Hegel's attempt to negate the LOI --
RL.]
"According to the law of
the excluded middle...two opposing judgements that are mutually exclusive
can't both be wrong. Indeed, 'A is either B or non-B'. The truth of either of
these two judgements necessarily means the falseness of the other, and vice
versa. There is not, neither can there be, any middle." [Plekhanov (1908),
pp.89-90.
Italics in the original, several paragraphs merged.
The online version translates this passage slightly differently.]
Once more, we aren't told
what "A" or "B" stand for. Are they Proper Name or general noun surrogates; or
are they propositional variables, or
predicables? Are they objects, concepts or property tokens?
But, how does Plekhanov counter the
above garbled
ideas that he attributed to FL?
"Let us examine the matter
from another angle. The motion of matter lies at
the root of all natural phenomena. But what is motion? Here we have what seems
to be a contradiction. If you are asked whether a body that is in motion is
located at a particular place at a particular moment, you will be unable,
however hard you try, to give an answer using [the above rules].... A moving
body is at a particular place, and at the same time it is not there."
[Ibid.,
p.90. Italics in the original,
paragraphs merged.]
As we saw in
Essay Five,
these moves were unwise
(no pun intended); there it became clear that the 'contradiction' that Plekhanov and many
others say exists here is in fact no contradiction; motion isn't contradictory
-- or, rather, it makes no sense to suppose it is. The reader is referred to
that Essay for more details.
Even so, Plekhanov's
own formulation of the LOC is fraught
with problems: "A is not A" is merely the (alleged) negative
form of his own ill-defined version of the LOI! He would be hard-pressed to find
a logician (not the worse for some sort of mental disorder)
who would recognise it as the LOC (not the least, once more, because it confuses
-- à
la
Hegel
--
objects, or the names thereof, with propositions). Small wonder then that Plekhanov (like other
DM-fans) failed to refer his readers
to a single logic text in order to substantiate these brazen examples of pure fiction.
[To be sure, Plekhanov elsewhere references
Überweg's
Logic, but
not in support of this particular 'definition' of the LOC. We will see
later
that Hegel was the source of this rather odd idea: that the LOI
"stated negatively" yields the LOC.
Added on Edit: As far as I can determine, this error can be traced back
at least to Leibniz, a
vastly superior
logician and philosopher, nonetheless! Hegel simply copied it uncritically.]
Moreover, it is equally clear that Plekhanov
has confused the LEM with Aristotle's definition of contraries (see
above), and then
later with a semi-classical version of the LOC (that is, a version that conflated propositions with "judgements"). Whether the LEM allows for
the sort of examples Plekhanov considers will
depend on the examples chosen, as well as on how a proposition is characterised. [On
this, see Geach (1972c).]
[Once again, readers should compare Aristotle's
carefully worded (but difficult) prose with the sloppy language employed by Plekhanov.]
"Modern philosophy, beginning
with Bacon of Verulam
and closing with Hegel, carries on a constant struggle with the Aristotlean
(sic) logic. The product of this struggle, the outcome of philosophy, does not
deny the old rules of traditional logic, but adds a new and decidedly higher
circle of logical perception to the former ones. For the sake of better
understanding it may be well to give to this circle a special title, the special
name of 'theory of understanding,' which is sometimes called 'dialectics.' In
order to demonstrate the essential contents of this philosophical product by an
investigation of the fundamental laws of traditional logic and to explain it
thereby, I refer once more to the teacher of elementary logic, Dittes.
"Under the caption of
'Principles of Judgment' he teaches: 'Since judging, like all thinking, aims at
the perception of truth, the rules have been sought after by which this purpose
might be accomplished. As universally applicable rules, as principles or laws of
thought, the following four have been named:
'(1) The law of uniformity (identity).
'(2) The law of contradiction.
'(3) The law of the excluded third.
'(4) The law of adequate cause.'...
"The first
principle, then, declares that A is A, or to
speak mathematically (sic), every quantity is equal to itself. In plain English: a
thing is what it is; no thing is what it is not.... The square is excluded from
the conception of a circle, therefore the predicate 'square' must not be given
to a circle. For the same reason a straight line must not be crooked, and a lie
must not be true.
Now this so-called law of
thought may be well enough for household use, where nothing but known quantities
are under consideration. A thing is what it is. Right is not left and one
hundred is not one thousand. Whoever is named Peter or Paul remains Peter or
Paul all his life. This, I say, is all right for household use.
"[The old
logic] insists on its first, second and third law, on its identity, its law of
contradiction and excluded third, which [sic] must be either straight or crooked, cold
or warm and excludes all intermediary conceptions." [Dietzgen (1906),
pp.385-89. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this
site; several paragraphs merged; link added.]
First
of all, Dittes wasn't a logician; this is what Dietzgen himself had to
say about him (and his non-logic textbook):
"Dr. Friedrich Dittes, director of the
institute of
pedagogy in Vienna, has published a School of Pedagogy, several
editions of which have appeared, in which he gives much attention to logic.
Dittes is a prominent pedagogue, well known through his writings. He
confines himself in his School to teaching only that which is well
established and accepted without a doubt. As a practical man who addresses
himself mainly to teachers of primary grades, he would not place himself on the
pinnacle of the outcome of philosophy, even if he could. He must confine himself
to that which is well established, which is far removed from the disputes of the
day. But it may here serve as a whetstone by the help of which we may give to
the positive product of philosophy its latest and greatest sharpness." [Ibid.,
p.383. Bold emphasis and link alone added.]
Dietzgen then tells us that Dittes teaches
"only that which is well established and
accepted without a doubt...", and yet it is quite plain that Dittes has confused
logic with psychology, as has Dietzgen (here is the latter):
"It is a cardinal error of ancient logic to
regard perception as the ultimate source from which the human mind dips its
knowledge. It is nature which is the ultimate source, and our perception is but
the mediator of understanding. And its product, recognized truth, is not truth
itself, but merely a formal picture of it. Universal nature is the arch
fountain, is the eternal and imperishable truth itself, and our perception, like
every other part of universal existence, is only an attribute, a particle of
absolute nature. The human mind, with whose nature logic is dealing, is
no more an independent thing than any other, but simply a phenomenon, a reflex
or predicate of nature....
Now this so-called law of thought may be well enough for household use,
where nothing but known quantities are under consideration. A thing is what it
is. Right is not left and one hundred is not one thousand. Whoever is named
Peter or Paul remains Peter or Paul all his life. This, I say, is all right for
household use." [Ibid.,
pp.384-86. Bold emphases added.]
We
also saw (above) Dittes argue as follows:
'Since judging, like all
thinking, aims at the perception of truth, the rules have been sought after by
which this purpose might be accomplished. As universally applicable rules, as
principles or laws of thought, the following four have been named...." [Ibid.,
p.386. Bold emphasis added.]
It
has already been pointed out that
logic has nothing to do with the 'laws of thought' (even if there were any such
'laws').
Second, Dietzgen, like Dittes, thinks AFL is based on a handful of basic 'laws'
(in this case they postulate four, not the usual three -- but what the
'law' of "adequate cause" has to do with logic they failed to
explain). We have also seen that the idea that AFL (never mind MFL) requires
three, or even four, basic 'laws' is a myth put about by those who have a much securer
grasp on fantasy than they have on fact.
[AFL = Aristotelian Logic;
MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]
Finally, is it really the case that Aristotle
(let alone subsequent logicians)
knew nothing of lukewarm water, or slightly curved (but not crooked) lines?
Or even that people sometimes change their names? The above comment is odd in other ways, too --, for what else is warm but an
intermediate state between hot and cold!? As usual, we find in the
writings of DM-fans a series of half-formed, garbled 'thoughts' that have been
subjected to little or no critical scrutiny -- or, in this case (over warm),
they appear to be devoid of common sense. Even children know that warm is
intermediate between hot and cold.
As perhaps part of a late entry in the International Competition To Find The Worst Summary Of FL
On The Planet, submitted on behalf of the UK-SWP, this is how
John Molyneux
managed to impress the judges:
"Dialectics is the logic of
change.... To understand the
significance of this compare it with what is known as 'formal logic' (originally
developed by Aristotle and usually thought of as the rules of sound thinking).
The basic idea of formal logic is that something either is the case or is not
the case, but that it can't be both at the same time. For example, the cat is on
the mat or it is not on the mat. For many purposes formal
logic is useful and necessary. But as soon as you take movement and change into
account, it ceases to be adequate. A cat moving goes through a moment when it is
in the process of passing onto the mat or in the process of passing off it --
when it is both on and off the mat. Dialectics is in advance of formal logic
because it enables us to grasp this contradiction." [Molyneux (1987), pp.49-50.
Paragraphs merged.]
Precisely
how DL succeeds in
helping anyone "grasp" this spurious contradiction
Molyneux plainly left his readers to guess. But, what is so problematic, difficult, challenging, or even reactionary
about a cat lying, sitting or sleeping partially on and partially off a mat?
Clearly, if the said cat falls asleep half on, half off the said mat,
we would still have the same alleged 'contradiction', but no motion. In which
case, plainly, this
'contradiction' has nothing to do with the ambulatory habits of furry mammals.
In fact, this is a direct result of the ambiguous language being used here
(indeed, as I have demonstrated in
Essay Five).
However,
as we shall also see in the above Essay, DLcan't even account for the motion of domestic
pets, mat or no mat; Diamat or no Diamat. And, as far as their capacity to "grasp"
'contradictions' like this is concerned, dialecticians seem
content merely to
label these
ambiguous states of affairs "contradictions", and then move on (no pun
intended, once more). Exactly how this
'contradiction' helps Molyneux's readers
"grasp" anything at all is left entirely mysterious. In what way does it help us
comprehend motion to be
told it is 'contradictory'?
But, don't
even think to ask such impertinent questions, let alone complain, or you risk being
accused of not "understanding" dialectics.
And, does
Molyneux really believe that logicians and scientists (of the calibre of, say, Aristotle)
failed to
notice that things change? Really?
In fact, Aristotle
himself tells us he certainly did notice they do:
"...A substance...is able to
receive contraries. For example, an individual man -- one and the same --
becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and
good.... Suppose, for example,
that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this
same statement will be false. Similarly with beliefs.... However, even if we
were to grant this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are
received. For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they
are able to receive contraries. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark
instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in
other case too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to
receive contraries.... [I]t is because the actual thing changes that the
contrary comes to belong to them...." [Aristotle (1984f)
5, 4a:15-36, p.7.Italics in the original; bold emphases added, paragraphs merged. The on-line versions
renders this passage slightly differently.]
Admittedly, Molyneux's book was meant to be an entry level introduction to this
subject; when he raised that
point with a former supporter of this site in private correspondence, he
recommended that critics -- like those of us who post at this site, for instance
-- should concentrate on the DM-classics, and ignore the writings of relatively
minor figures like himself. As should now seem plain, the situation with the
DM-classics is no better; in fact, in some respects, it is far worse.
However,
the above passage at least scotches the myth that Aristotle's logic or his
philosophy can't
accommodate change. [See also Aristotle (1984f), pp.23-24, where he analyses six
different types of change; this passage can be found
here, but scroll down to
Part 14.]
Unfortunately, Molyneux repeated these egregious misconceptions in an article
posted at his blog several years later:
"This matters because the
dominant mode of thinking, based on the logic developed by Aristotle, is not
founded on the principle of universal change, rather it deals with fixed states
or 'things'. Its basic axioms are that A = A (a thing is equal to itself) and A
does not = non-A (a thing is not equal to something other than itself), from
which are derived sequences of sound reasoning known as syllogisms." [The
Marxist Dialectic.]
As is the case with others who say similar things,
Molyneux failed to demonstrate howa single syllogism follows from these illusory
principles.
["A
thing is not equal to something other than itself"?!?
What the dialectics does that mean? And, what precisely has it got to do with
FL?]
As this Essay has shown, the above paragraph
contains nearly as many errors as it does words. I have posted a suitable reply
here (which, as we can
now see when we read Molyneux
(2012), sailed right over his head).
He went on to argue as follows:
"This formal logic was, and
is, all well and good and very necessary for practical human affairs but it is
limited -- it excludes change. Dialectical logic moves beyond formal logic by
starting not with 'things' but with processes, processes of coming into being
and passing out of being. The moment processes of change are fed into the
equation it becomes necessary to deal with contradiction. If state A (e.g. day)
changes into state B (night) it passes through a phase of A not being A or being
both A and B (twilight)." [Ibid.]
But, twilight looks pretty much like a
"state", too -- certainly as much a "state" as night and day are. Even so,
twilight can't be a unity of twilight and not-twilight -- which should be the case if
everything, including twilight,
is
supposed to be a UO of A and B (or even
A and not-A). On the other hand, if it isn't a UO,
then, according to the DM-classics,
it can't change!
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
And, of course, if day is no
longer day, but is twilight, then the above A (interpreted as "day" in
Molyneux's example) isn't in fact A and not A, or even B, it is C (twilight).
In which
case,
this state of affairs isn't "A and B", either, as Molyneux asserts -- it is "A and
C"!
To be sure, Of course,
it might be possible to circumvent this 'difficulty' by defining twilight as a combination of day and night,
but that would make Molyneux's assertions stipulatively 'true', and would,
as such, have been imposed on nature.
Even worse, it would mean that twilight was a combination of two states, and
hence must be a state itself!
As we will see in Essay Seven
Part Three,
none of this makes sense, even in DM-terms. Night doesn't "struggle" with day
to produce twilight (as the
DM-classics tell us must be the case),
Also worth asking is the
following: What
exactly is the 'internal opposite' of day that makes it change into night?
Molyneux failed to say, and it isn't difficult to see why:
day has no 'internal opposite'. Its alleged
opposite is night, but that is manifestly external to day. So, unless we believe
that the future can change the present (arguing perhaps that the fact that night is
hours away allows it to 'back-cause' day to change into night!), Molyneux's
own example can't be one of 'dialectical change'!
More problematic still:
this doesn't even look like a 'dialectical contradiction'. No element in
this example implies the existence of any other -- as they supposedly do in the
relation between the proletariat and the capitalist class (an idea I have
criticised
here,
anyway)
-- such that one can't exist without the other, and such that they imply one
another. But day can surely exist without
night; had the rotational period of the Earth been different, one side would
have pointed toward the Sun permanently, meaning that one half of the planet
would experience nothing but day. In addition, had the Earth been illuminated by
a binary star system, the entire planet would have experienced nothing but day.
Admittedly, we wouldn't be around to witness any of this, but that has nothing
to do with the facts on the ground. Day can exist without night, which
would be impossible if this were a 'dialectical' relation.
Indeed, we read the following
about "tidally-locked" planets:
"Tidal locking is the name
given to the situation when an object's orbital period matches its rotational
period. A great example of this is our own Moon. The moon takes 28 days to go
around the Earth and 28 days to rotate once around it's axis. This results in
the same face of the Moon always facing the Earth. We see other examples of this
in our solar system and universe.
An extreme example is the case of Pluto and
Charon. Charon is such
a large satellite compared to Pluto that they are tidally locked together. This
means that Pluto only sees one face of Charon and vice versa. It is as if a rod
connects two points on their surface. This results in a bizarre phenomenon where
the moon Charon would always be in the same place in Pluto's night sky." [Quoted
from
here. Accessed
10/07/2018. Link added; paragraphs merged.]
So,
we see that yet another example to which DM-fans appeal to illuminate their theory in fact refutes it.
[No pun intended.]
Now, Aristotle certainly believed that during change
something must remain the same -- for example, Aristotle (1984e), p.1595
-- but precisely what that "something" is, is subject to controversy among
Aristotle scholars But, he
also claimed that:
"...since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of
the same thing, obviously contraries also can't belong at the same time to the
same thing.... If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same
time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the
same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in
particular relation and one without qualification." [Aristotle (1984e)
Book 4, 6, 1011b:15-23, p.1597. Again, the on-line translation renders this
passage slightly differently.]
Here Aristotle acknowledges
that
contrary predicates can belong to a subject providing they attach to it "in
particular relations"; presumably this means they could belong to parts of that
subject separately (when, say, a metal poker is cold at one end, hot at another,
or when a man is half wet, half dry, for instance), but not 'essentially'.
Nevertheless, it is clear from this, as it is from
Aristotle's other writings, that he continually switches back and forth without
warning between
talk about talk and talk about things. In so
doing, he generates no little confusion himself, which is, of course, one of the
reasons that over the last 150 years, modern logicians
have had to re-think the entire subject from the ground floor up. But, even
though Aristotle was himself a little confused in places, he was a model of clarity
compared to Hegel and his dialectical groupies. [On that, see
here.]
Alas, in subsequent
writings,
Molyneux failed to correct these serious mistakes
(even though he has been informed of them several times!); if anything, he
only succeeded in
compounding his errors:
"Accompanying the development
of practical human knowledge and science..., there was also developed (by
Aristotle and his successors) a system of logic, i.e., rules of sound thinking.
Logic was meant to tell you whether or not what you were saying, writing or
thinking, made sense. A proposition that was logical was not necessarily true
(in fact), but it had the possibility of being true. A proposition that was not
logical, i.e., broke the rules of logic, could not possibly be true." [Molyneux
(2012), p.43. Punctuation marks altered to conform the conventions adopted
at this site.]
But, what does Aristotle himself tell us
was
the point of his logic? Wonder no more:
"First we must state the
subject of the enquiry and what it is about: the subject is demonstration and it
is about demonstrative understanding. Next we must determine what a proposition
is, what a term is, and what a deduction is (and what sort of deduction is
perfect and what is imperfect); and after that, what it is for one thing to be
or not to be in another as a whole, and what we mean by being predicated of
every or of no." [Aristotle (1984c), Book 1, 1 24:10-15, p.39.]
The on-line version renders
the above passage as
follows:
"We must first state the
subject of our inquiry and the faculty to which it belongs: its subject is
demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrative science. We must
next define a premise, a term, and a syllogism, and the nature of a perfect and
of an imperfect syllogism; and after that, the inclusion or noninclusion of one
term in another as in a whole, and what we mean by predicating one term of all,
or none, of another." [Quoted from
here.]
[By "demonstration" Aristotle
meant "proof". (On that, see Lear (1980), p.1.)]
Not much there about logic
being the study of what "makes sense". A bad start, for sure, but things only get
worse:
"The basic principles of this
Aristotelian or formal logic were the 'law of identity' and the 'law of
non-contradiction'. The 'law of identity' stated, in symbolic terms, that A is
equal to A, or an ounce of gold equals an ounce of gold, or, taking a
unique object..., Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa is equal to Leonardo da
Vinci's Mona Lisa. The 'law of non-contradiction' stated that A cannot be
equal to non-A, it makes no sense to say that an ounce of gold is not an ounce
of gold or the Mona Lisa is not the Mona Lisa. On the basis of
these apparently 'obvious' propositions a system of logic or sound reasoning was
erected, exemplified by the syllogism." [Molyneux (2012), p.43. Quotation marks
altered to conform the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases
in the original.]
As we also discovered earlier, Molyneux
added this not unreasonable comment:
"Marxist materialism is
repeatedly attacked by the method of oversimplifying and caricaturing it to the
point where it is obviously false...." [Molyneux (2012), p.36.]
And yet this is precisely
what he and other DM-fans regularly do when they attempt to summarise, discuss
or criticise FL.
[I will add a few more
comments about Molyneux's misguided book in a subsequent re-write of this Essay.]
Here is
Robin Hirsch, who seems to know a little more logic
than the vast majority of DM-fans:
"The Aristotelian syllogism
was the first great system of formalising the laws of rational thought. At its
heart there were three principles.
"The law of identity. For any
object, x, we have x is x.
"The law of
non-contradiction. Nothing is allowed to have the predicate P and simultaneously
the predicate not-P.
"The law of excluded middle.
Everything has either the predicate P or the predicate not-P.
"Here a predicate is any
property that may or may not apply to an individual, e.g. 'mortality' is a
predicate that applies to an individual, say Socrates." [Hirsch
(2004).]
First of all,
Hirsch confuses
predicates (which are linguistic expressions) with what they
supposedly express -- properties -- conflating talk about talk, (i.e.,
language about language) with talk about the world (a perennial error
both in DM-,
and Hegelian-circles,
as we have seen). Moreover, predicates don't just express properties. Secondly, Hirsh's 'definition' of identity is in danger of confusing the
"is" of
predication with the "is" of identity. Third, his 'definition' of the
LOC confuses what we are consistently
able to say about something with what it is "allowed" to possess, conflating what
we may assert with the possibilities on offer in the world. Are objects "allowed"
-- or, rather, not "allowed" -- to possess certain properties? Who is doing all
this 'not-allowing'? And how is all this "not-allowing" to be policed? By 'God'?
By what we can say?
Fourth, what Hirsch says also falls
foul of a point made earlier about Aristotle (slightly re-edited):
Aristotle allows contrary predicates to belong to a subject providing they
attach to it "in particular relations":
"
...since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of
the same thing, obviously contraries also can't belong at the same time to the
same thing.... If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same
time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the
same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in
particular relation and one without qualification." [Aristotle (1984e)
Book 4, 6, 1011b:15-23, p.1597. Again, the on-line translation renders this
passage slightly differently.]
Here Aristotle acknowledges
that
contrary predicates can belong to a subject providing they attach to it "in
particular relations"; presumably this means they could belong to parts of that
subject separately (when, say, a metal poker is cold at one end, hot at another,
or when a man is half wet, half dry, for instance), but not 'essentially'.
Nevertheless, it is clear from this, as it is from
Aristotle's other writings, that he continually switches back and forth without
warning between talk about talk and talk about things. In so
doing, he generates no little confusion himself, which is, of course, one of the
reasons that over the last 150 years, modern logicians
have had to re-think the entire subject from the ground floor up. But, even
though Aristotle was himself a little confused in places, he was a model of clarity
compared to Hegel and his dialectical groupies.
[Quoted from
here.]
It looks, therefore, like
Hirsch has yet to draw the sort of distinctions that were plain even to
Aristotle.
Finally, Hirsch's
'definition' of the LEM confuses the properties an object might possess with what we can say
about it. Objects don't possess, or "have", or fail to possess, or fail to
"have", predicates. Check your own person: how many predicates "have" you in
your pockets, your bank account, the potting shed at the bottom of the garden, or the boot of your car? How many predicates
"have" you on or even stuck to your hand? Go on, count them. Can't do it?
Now, there's a big surprise. Compare that with the question "How many
fingers have you got?" Given
Hirsch's
qualifications, these errors are as surprising as they are puzzling.
Another comrade (from the
UK-SWP), Camilla Royle, does her level best to maintain the honourable
tradition, manfully continued by John Rees and John Molyneux, of getting AFL completely wrong:
"There
are two ways to think about contradiction. In Aristotle's logic, saying that two
statements are contradictory means that they oppose each other completely:
logically the statements 'All blackbirds are black' and 'All blackbirds are
white' cannot both be true. In contrast, capital's contradictions involve
opposing forces or tendencies being present in the same process. Marx's
assertion that commodities simultaneously embody both a use value and an
exchange value is such a contradiction...." [Royle
(2015), p.217. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
Royle has plainly confused an
inconsistency (i.e., two propositions which can't both be true, but which
can both be false) with a contradiction. It is worth recalling that (even for
Aristotle -- on that, see here)
two proposition are contradictories just in case they can't both be true and they
can't both be false. With respect to the example Royle herself considers, "All
blackbirds are black" is itself false if "Some blackbirds aren't black" is true (i.e.,
if there is at least one blackbird that is white, or is some other colour
than black),
and "All blackbirds are white" is false if "Some blackbirds aren't white" is
true (i.e., if there is at least one blackbird that is black, or is some other colour
than white). Hence, "All blackbirds are black"
and "All blackbirds are white"
are both false if there is at least one blackbird that is some colour other than black or
is some colour other white. In that case, Royle's two
propositions aren't contradictories.
It isn't now to the point to object that
no one has ever seen a non-black blackbird, since Royle herself referred to the
proposition "All blackbirds are white". The point is that if NN
asserts
that all blackbirds are black and NM asserts there is one such bird
that is white, irrespective of whether NM is lying, she would have
contradicted NN since they can't both be right and they can't both be
wrong. That isn't the case with "All blackbirds are black" and "All blackbirds
are white"; while these two sentences can't both be true, they can both be false.
In that case, they are
contraries not contradictories.
[For
more on this clear distinction (clear at least to logicians), see
Horn (2024).]
Quite apart from that, Royle
doesn't explain why this is the case, either:
"In contrast, capital's
contradictions involve opposing forces or tendencies being present in the same
process. Marx's assertion that commodities simultaneously embody both a use
value and an exchange value is such a contradiction...." [Loc cit.]
There would be a
contradiction here if either of these had been the example she chose:
R1: Commodities embody use
value and they don't.
R2: Commodities embody
exchange value and they don't.
Clearly, she didn't mean
either. If not, what did she mean?
DM-fans
seem quite incapable of telling us. Royle's own examples don't even look
like contradictions. [As we have seen
elsewhere,
the only reason DM-fans employ the word "contradiction" in such
circumstances is that it istraditional to do
so, and its use serves to identify the individual concerned as 'one of us'
-- so they aren't
branded as apostates or heretics (aka 'Revisionists!")by
the DM-Thought-Police.]
Even waving these seemingly
'academic niggles' to one side, what Royle says doesn't make sense even in DM-terms. Does
use value really struggle with exchange value and change into it (as
it should if this were a 'dialectical contradiction')? Does use value
change into exchange value so that a commodity winds up with no use when it is
exchanged? Hardly. In that case, what is the point of all this sub-Hegelian jargon
if it fails to account for such phenomena, or if it implies something that not only
doesn't, but can't
happen? I.e., that use value can slug it out with exchange value and then change
into it!
Figure Four: Use Value Slam Dunks
Exchange Value
Not only is this an example
of garbled
AFL, it is garbled
DL,
too!
Next, we
turn to the 'definitions' advanced by
mega-Trotskyist,
Ernest Mandel:
"Dialectics, or the logic of motion, is distinct from formal or static logic.
Formal logic is based on three fundamental laws:
"(a) The
law of identity: A is equal to A; a thing is always equal to itself.
"(b) The
law of contradiction: A is different from non-A; A can never equal non-A.
"(c) The
law of exclusion: either A, or non-A; nothing can be neither A nor non-A.
"A
moment's reflection will allow us to conclude that formal logic is characterised
by the thought processes which consist of putting motion, change, into
parenthesis. All the laws enumerated above are true, so long as we abstract
from motion. A will remain A so long as it does not change. A is different
from non-A so long as it is not transformed into its opposite. A and non-A
exclude each other so long as there is no movement which combines A and
non-A, etc. These laws are obviously insufficient if we consider the
transformation of the chrysalid (sic) into the butterfly, the passage of the
adolescent into the adult, the movement of life into death, the birth
of a new species or a new social order, the combination of two cells into
a new one, etc." [Mandel (1979), pp.160-61. Italics in the original.]
As things have turned out,
Mandel might have been better advised to devote more than a "moment's thought" to these
knotty problems.
Once again, we aren't told from which
spoil
heap these 'logical gems' had been retrieved; but notice how similar they
are to the 'definitions' we have already met, many times. To be sure, a mega-Orthodox
comrade like Mandel would rightly feel peeved if an opponent of Marxism simply
made stuff up like this about, say, Trotsky and his ideas. Apparently, it is
perfectly acceptable for 'scientific socialists'
to indulge in a little fabulation of their own.
[Detailed criticism of Mandel's more substantive claims can be found in Essays
Five
and Seven Part
One.]
From several generations ago this is what we find in
David Hayden-Guest's
'textbook' on DM:
"The 'logic' that we have
been discussing is very different from what commonly passes for logic, the formal logic which deals with syllogisms and is to be found in the text
books. Formal logic is necessary for dealing with the abstractions which
are formed in the first stage of thinking....
The essence of its technique is to
keep apart, to prevent from confounding the distinctions which have been
made. It is therefore based on a development of certain very fundamental
principles about identity and contradiction, principles such as
the famous 'law of the excluded middle' which states that a thing must be one
thing (say 'A') or not that thing (say 'not A'). It can't be both 'A' and 'not
A' at the same time.
"This logic, which may be
termed the 'logic of common sense,' is perfectly justified and indeed essential
within certain limits -- the same limits within which the abstractions it deals
with are valid. But just because it is based on taking these abstractions,
for the time being, as absolute, and because it necessarily overlooks their
inter-connections, and the development of one quality or thing into another,
formal logic is unable to grasp the inner process of change, to show its
dialectical character. For this we require dialectical logic...." [Guest (1939),
pp.71-72. Italics in the original.]
[I hesitate to criticise
David Guest since he gave his life in Spain fighting fascism. Guest (1939) was
put together from notes found after he died.]
Once again, we encounter yet
more repetition, compounded by precious little -- or, rather, absolutely no -- substantiation. Notice, too, the
odd idea that the LEM is once more about
things, and not the logical,
truth-functional connection between a proposition and its
negation.
We now read this from comrade
Thalheimer,
whose
aim was clearly to show that whatever Trotskyists (like Mandel or Novack)
could misconstrue he could
garble even better:
"The science of the laws of
thought, formal logic, reached its highest point with Aristotle....
The laws of logic are based
on two main propositions. The first is that of identity or of self-conformity.
The proposition very simply states: 'A is A,' that is every concept is equal to
itself. A man is a man, a hen is a hen, a potato is a potato.
This proposition
forms one basis of logic. The second main proposition is the law of
contradiction, or as it is also called, the law of excluded middle. This
proposition states: 'A is either A or not A.' It can't be both at the same
time. For example: Whatever is black is black; it can't at the same time be
black and white. A thing -- to put it in general terms -- can't at the same
time be itself and its opposite....
"Let us now examine the second basic law of
thought, the law of contradiction. According to this law a thing cannot at the
same time be itself and its opposite. A figure is either round or angular; a
line is either straight or curved."
[Thalheimer (1936), pp.88-93.
Italics in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
To his credit, Thalheimer
managed to get by
with just
two
misrepresentations of AFL
(but only by asserting two of them were the same, thereby torpedoing his
criticisms if the LOI --
pp.89-92), all the while confusing a fictional version of the LOC with an
illusory version of the LEM. [I have already criticised this sloppy DM-use of
letter these As, and will return to do so again,
below.]
But, we might ask: what has the LOI got to do with the equality of
"concepts"? Isn't it about the alleged relation between an object and
itself (like a hen and itself)? Furthermore, hasn't Thalheimer, like Trotsky,
conflated equality and identity?
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
Here is how
John Somerville summed things up
(and he should have known better!):
"The Aristotelian conception
of the laws basic to correct thinking may be stated as follows:
"1. Law of Identity: Each
existence is identical with itself. A is A.
"2. Law of
Noncontradiction: Each existence is not different from itself. A is not non-A.
"3. Law of Excluded Middle:
No existence can be both itself and different from itself. Any X is either A or
non-A, but not both at once." [Somerville (1967), pp.44-45. Italics in the
original.]
To be fair to Somerville, he did try to
qualify the second of the three above points (in a footnote, on p.205), where he made some attempt to
come to grips with the real Aristotle not the
ersatz Aristotle of DM-lore
(but,
even then, his 'in depth' analysis wascompressed
into about a
hundred
words).
However, the fact that it was
tucked away right at the end of his book, when in the body of it he confuses
"what is said" (which is how Aristotle expressed himself) with "each existence"
(Somerville's odd rendition), tells us all we need to know about his concern for
accuracy. Also worthy of note is Somerville's sloppy use of letters; one minute
the letter, "A", appears to
stand for an object of some sort (an "existence"), the next for what can be
predicated of an object (that it is A or not-A). Just like all too many other
DM-fans, his slovenly approach to syntax means his criticisms aren't worth the
paper they were written on.
The above ideas appear in a slightly
different form in an earlier work of his:
"The Law of Identity is
usually expressed in the form, A is A. That is, each thing is identical with
itself. The Law of Non-Contradiction states that A is not Non-A. That is, each
thing is not different from itself. The Law of Excluded Middle states that X is
either A or Non-A. That is, any third alternative or middle ground in addition
to A and Non-A is excluded. The same thing cannot be both A (or itself) and
Non-A (or different from itself) at the same time.... What they all say is
that A is A and cannot be non-A at the same time." [Somerville (1946), p.183.
Paragraphs merged.]
We
need only
note here that Somerville simply copied Hegel's
amateurish attempt to equate the LOI 'stated
negatively' with the LOC,
subjecting the latter's 'derivation' tono scrutiny at all. This shows that
HCDs,
just like
LCDs,
are logical incompetents and suffer from a serious case of self-inflicted ignorance
concerning logic. That, of course, accounts
for their fondness for Hegel, an
Olympic Grade Competitor in the 'How To Screw-Up Logic' event. Again, one
minute these As stand for objects or the names thereof (as in
"A is A. That
is, each thing is identical with itself") the next for what can predicated of
some object (as in "X is either A or Non-A"). [On this, see
below, and later in this Essay.]
If anything, Somerville
subsequent
attempt to characterise the 'laws' of FL is even worse:
"[I]f I am asked to give a
true account of how something got to be what it is I will ultimately have to
face the fact that a thing called A is continuously changing in all of its parts
all of the time into non-A, which means it is non-A as well as A, which takes me
beyond formal categories into dialectical categories." [Somerville (1968), p.68
-- this is actually the page reference of the 1974 reprint. Somerville says
more-or-less the same (no pun intended), only at greater length, in Somerville
(1946), p.184-85.]
Is Somerville serious?
If "a thing" is "called A", then "A" is a Proper
Name; "Karl Marx" is a
Proper Name, for example. If Somerville is to be believed, this appears to mean that at any point in his life, Karl Marx was Karl
Marx and non-Karl Marx(!) -- even though we still call him "Karl Marx"
long after his death. Has a single DM-fan ever called Marx "non-Karl Marx"?
Readers might like to check their copies of Marx's work (or those reproduced at
the Marxist
Internet Archive); there they will see that not one single book, article,
essay,
note, or review has ever been attributed to someone called "non-Karl Marx" -- nor yet "both Karl Marx
and non-Karl Marx". Not even in his lifetime were his published works
attributed to "Karl Marx and non-Karl Marx". And Engels wrote no
letters to "non-Karl Marx", either, nor did he deliver a eulogy at the graveside of
"non-Karl Marx".
We note yet again, that when
it comes to practicalities, in the real world, DM isn't just useless, it isoff-the-wall.
As we have
seen many
times, these 'dialectical' As enjoy a mercurial
life all of their
own; they change their denotation from moment-to-moment, oscillating between
standing for Proper Names, predicate expressions, 'existences', properties, relations,
relational expressions, 'objects',
and much else besides. As noted earlier, in Somerville's 'logical' universe, on one interpretation
of his prose, one minute "A" is a Proper Name, supposedly standing
for some object or "thing" -- as in "a thing called A is continuously changing in all of
its parts all of the time into non-A....", the next it stands for an
"existence".
Surprisingly, Somerville's account is even more ridiculous
than might at first sight seem -- why that is so has been explained
here and
here.
Here is
Ira Gollobin's impressive contribution to dialectical
confusion (which appears in what is perhaps
one of the best books that have so far
been written about DM -- that is,
one of the best of the worst):
"Aristotle's formal logic is
based on these principles of isolation and fixity; (1) identity (all A is A;
whatever is, is); (2) contradiction (nothing is both A and non-A, nothing can
both be and not be); (3) excluded middle (a thing is either A or non-A;
everything must either be or not be)." [Gollobin (1986), p.106, footnote.]
While Gollobin's book is
full of quotations and references (many of which are of dubious worth --
still less, relevance), he
doesn't even attempt to substantiate the by-now-familiar DM-fibs that
dialecticians tell about AFL.
His use of the letter "A" is no less inconsistent; one minute it stands
for a Proper Name (i.e., all A is A), the next for predicate
expressions (i.e.,
a thing is either A or
non-A). [More on this below.]
Here is another Trotskyist,
John Pickard, advancing similarly inaccurate and
unsubstantiated allegations about FL:
"Dialectics is quite simply
the logic of motion, or the logic of common sense to activists in the movement.
We all know that things don't stand still, they change. But there is another
form of logic which stands in contradiction to dialectics, which we call 'formal
logic', which again is deeply embodied in capitalist society. It is perhaps
necessary to begin by describing briefly what this method implies.
"Formal logic is based on
what is known as the 'law of identity', which says that 'A' equals 'A' -- i.e.
that things are what they are, and that they stand in definite relationships to
each other. There are other derivative laws based on the law of identity; for
example, if 'A' equals 'A', it follows that 'A' cannot equal 'B', nor 'C'.... Whereas the formal logician
will say that 'A' equals 'A', the dialectician will say that 'A' does not
necessarily equal 'A'. Or to take a practical example that Trotsky uses in his
writings, one pound of sugar will not be precisely equal to another pound of
sugar. It is a good enough approximation if you want to buy sugar in a shop, but
if you look at it more carefully you will see that it's actually wrong."
[John Pickard, quoted
from
here. Some paragraphs merged.]
At the risk of repetition, readers will no doubt have
noticed that Pickard also failed to substantiate anything he accused FL of
doing/not doing, just as he uncritically repeated Hegel's inaccurate depiction
of the LOC as the LOI stated 'negatively'.
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction.]
From eighty odd years ago we
find
Fred
Casey
further advertising the fact that DM-fans struggle to grasp the simplest of ideas in
logic (not because they are intellectually incapable, but because they unwisely look to
that incompetent, Hegel, for advice):
"Before passing on to study
the newer logic, which treats of thinking in relation to a constantly-changing
universe, it may be as well to give some of the general laws of this rigid logic
for the purposes of comparison. First, there is the law of identity, by which we
say A is A; second, the law of contradiction which says that A is not B; and
third, the law of excluded third which says that A is not part of B (sic!).
According to the first of these rules, a thing is what it is; according to the
second, no thing is what it is not; and according to the third, no thing is
part of what it is not. As examples:
"A square is a square, a
square is not a circle, nor is a square part of a circle. A straight line is straight,
it is not crooked, nor is it part crooked. A moving thing is in
motion, it is not still, nor is it partly still. Land is land, land is not
water, nor is it partly water. A door that is shut is shut,
it is not open, nor is it partly open." [Casey (1927), p.123. Several paragraphs
merged.]
It is difficult to take this
seriously. Concerning his third 'principle' (i.e.,
"A is not part of B"),
does anyone think, did even Casey think, that a single
logician in the last two thousand years believed it to be a logical law that,
say, the Earth isn't part of the Solar System, or that cats aren't part of the
animal kingdom? No wonder Casey quoted not one single logic text in
support of these wild fantasies. This is in fact one of the
worst examples of dialectical confusion I have ever seen (but it still isn't quite as
bad as the nadir reached by the egregious
gobbledygook W&G inflicted on their readers). What the LEM has got
to do with whether or not 'a thing' is part of another 'thing' is a complete
mystery. Casey can only have made this stuff up; he certainly didn't find
it in a logic textbook published anywhere on this planet. Not even Hegel was
this befuddled!
Even so, we see yet again the
confused use of the letter "A", where it can stand for whatever takes a particular
DM-theorist's fancy. For example, in Casey's first example, "A" stands for
"A square", but by example two it suddenly becomes a little more
malleable. It first of all stands for "A straight line" and then just "straight". In his third example,
it changes from "A moving thing" to "in motion". His letter "B" fares no better.
In his second example, "B" stands for "crooked", and "part of
B" becomes
"part crooked", when it should have been "part of crooked" -- given his own
fabricated version of this 'law':
"the law of excluded third which says
that A is not part of B").
So, according to Casey's own
characterisation of these 'laws', his last four examples should haveread
as follows (had he been bothered in the least with consistency):
"A straight line is a
straight line, it is not crooked, nor is it part of crooked."
"
A
moving thing is a moving thing, it is not still, nor is it part of still."
"Land is land, land is not
water, nor is it part of water."
"A door that is shut is a
door that is shut, it is not open, nor is it part of open."
Throughout much of the rest
of his book, Casey repeatedly tells us what does or does not belong to the "Old
Logic" (by which he clearly means
AFL and which he
thinks still dominates the discipline -- p.37) without once substantiating his
serial allegations.
However, it is now reasonably clear
that the title of Casey's book, Thinking. An Introduction To Its History And
Science, should perhaps have been, 'Thinking'. An Introduction
To How Dialectics Screws With Your Head.
From Academic Marxism,
here is
HCD-theorist,
Sean Sayers:
"In Frege-Russell logic there are valid
equivalents for the traditional Aristotelian logical laws: the law of identity
(A = A), the law of excluded middle (A v ~A), and the law of non-contradiction
(~(A & ~A)). For this reason, the Frege-Russell system is often referred to as
'standard logic'." [Sayers (1992); quoted from
here.]
The sloppy approach
adopted by DM-theorists when it comes to all matters logical (exposed in this
Essay) surfaces yet again in Sayers's article above.
In the LOI, the letter "A"
stands for singular terms (e.g., Proper Names or a
Definite Descriptions) -- as such, it can't
appear in the LEM or the LOC, which concern the
truth-functional
relationship between a proposition and its negation.
For
example, if we interpret the letter "A" in Sayers's
"(~(A & ~A))"
as a Proper Name variable we end up with this monstrosity: "It is not the case that (Socrates and not Socrates)",
which is unvarnished nonsense. Sayers will search long
and hard (and to no avail) through Frege's work, or, indeed, Russell's -- or that
of any other modern logician -- for a single example of such DM-inspired gibberish.
[If we are intent on
being excessively charitable,
Sayers probably meant to write, or should have written:
"...the law of excluded middle (P v ~P), and the law of non-contradiction (~(P &
~P))", where "P" is a propositional variable. I have said more about these widespread DM-confusions
below.]
[LEM = Law of Excluded
Middle; LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]
We find similar
muddles
in the work of another HCD, Hyman R Cohen (here criticising an article written
by Mark Mussachia):
"Engels
showed as early as his writing of Dialectics of Nature that he meant
nothing more than this: the opposites he had in mind were simultaneously
existing tendencies, existing in the one object or process, comprising its unity
as a whole. Mussachia assumes that Engels made the error of believing that A
and not-A must always be of the 'direct line' kind, otherwise he (Mussachia)
would not be trying so hard to prove Engels wrong. But if he wants to use the
Law of Non-Contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A) to deny
that dialectically opposing tendencies can exist within one thing or process,
then I must remind him of his previous argument about the Law of Identity which
applies to complex things, in which he argued for a broader interpretation of
the concept A = A. Engels had already shown that science had
undermined the narrow 'old metaphysical' concept of the Identity Law. So, why
cannot a given entity, A, have dialectically opposing elements
constituting it, and still be a given A?" [Cohen (1980), p.119. Italic
emphases in the original; quotations marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
As usual, Cohen fails
to tell us what these As stand for -- are they name, predicate-, property-,
relational-, or sentential-/propositional-variables? Admittedly, he does call
A an "entity", but that is far too vague a term to do anything with.
Once again, in the LOI, A
is a singular term (standing for Proper Names or Definite Descriptions), but it
can't function that way in the LOC. In the latter, A is a propositional, sentential or predicate
expression, but it can't be
any of these in the LOI. [Why this is so was covered in detail in Essay
Eight Part Three, but
see also, below.]
Even so, as noted, in the final
sentence, A now
morphs into an entity! It is no longer a variable standing for an entity, nor yet
its name, but the entity itself! It might be news to DM-fans, but
entities feature neither in the LOI nor the LOC, only letters, variables, or in
their more vernacular incarnations, linguistic expressions (singular terms in the
former 'law', propositional expressions in the latter).
Perhaps worse still, we are
told that A = A
is a "concept", as opposed to a law -- and later that there is such a thing as the
"concept of the Identity Law", which must mean that we have here the concept
of a concept!
A few pages earlier A
was a proposition
(but note, not a propositional variable), and even a condition:
"[For Marxists] a
contradiction [has the following nature]: the proposition A contradicts
the proposition or condition not-A...." [Ibid., p.107.]
We aren't told how a condition can be
contradicted by a proposition (do these two 'struggle' with, and then turn
into, one another,
as we have been told they must by the DM-classics), or why using the word "contradiction" is at all
apt in relation to such conditions.We can only conclude
from this
that, for Cohen, the operator, "not-" (that is, if this is what that
inscriptionis!) is capable of turning A into a condition! Since we
have just been told that not-A is now
a condition.
Here is yet another HCD
-- no less a
figure than Herbert Marcuse -- of course, following Hegel, again arguing that the LOC is the
LOI 'stated negatively':
"Contradiction, or the
concrete form of it we are discussing, the opposition, does not displace the
actual identity of the thing, but produces this identity in the form of a
process in which the potentialities of things unfold. The law of identity by
which traditional logic is guided implies the so-called law of contradiction. A
equals A only in so far as it is opposed to non-A, or, the identity of A results
from and contains the contradiction. A does not contradict an external non-A,
Hegel holds, but a non-A that belongs to the very identity of A; in other words,
A is self-contradictory." [Marcuse (1973), p.124.]
[It could be argued that Marcuse is
simply summarising Hegel, here -- maybe so, but he nowhere takes Hegel to task
for these logical confusions -- once more, concerning the latter, see
below.]
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]
Not
wanting to be left out of all this dialectical merriment,
here is the
doyen of French DM-fans (and
many others besides), Henri Lefebvre:
"Formal Logic asserts:
'A is A'.
Dialectical Logic is not saying 'A is not-A'…. It says: A is indeed A, but A is
also not-A precisely so far as the proposition 'A is A' is not a tautology but
has real content. A tree is a tree only by being such and such a tree, by
bearing leaves, blossom and fruit, by passing through and preserving within
itself those moments of its becoming...." [Lefebvre (1968), p.41.]
We
will see below the
utter confusion that results from saying things like this "A
is indeed A, but A is also not-A".
Another, and much more
sophisticated dialectician (who is probably also a card-carrying member of the
HCD fraternity,
and who should know better), is Erwin Marquit, who presents his readers with the following 'definition':
"The method of dealing with
contradictions in two-valued logic conforms with the laws of classical logic: a
thing can't be contrary to itself (law of noncontradiction) and a thing can't
be both itself and contrary to itself at the same time in the same respect (law
of excluded middle)." [Marquit (1982), p.76. (This article appeared earlier in
Science & Society,
which only goes to show that if that redoubtable journal employs a peer
review system,
it looks like it will pass for publication any old logical rubbish!)]
Marquit not only confuses contraries with
contradictories, he commits many of the errors that have already been
highlighted.
As a result, it now turns
out that it is impossible to decide -- or evensay! -- what it is that DL
actually commits its adherents to:
"The principles of difference:
'All things are different....' 'A is also not A....' And then -- Hegel says
wittily -- it is said that there is no third. There is a third in this thesis
itself. A itself is the third, for A can be both +A
and -A. 'The Something thus is itself the third term which was
supposed to be excluded.'" [Lenin (1961), pp.135-38.
Italic emphases in the original; bold added. Paragraphs merged.]
"And it is just as impossible have one side of a
contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in
one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891), p.496.]
"Let us
now consider the matter from the standpoint of a higher doctrine of thought,
from the standpoint of dialectics. Let us take the first law which we have
developed as the foundation of logic: A is A. A thing is always the same thing.
Without testing this law, let us consider another one which we have already
mentioned, the law of Heraclitus which says 'Everything is in flux,' or 'One
cannot ascend the same river twice.' Can we say that the river is always the
same? No, the law of Heraclitus says the opposite. The river is at no moment the
same. It is always changing. Thus one cannot twice nor, more exactly, even once
ascend the same river. In short: the law 'A is A' in the last analysis is valid
only if I assume that the thing does not change. As soon as I consider the thing
in its change, then A is always A and something else; A is at the same time
not-A. And this in the last analysis holds for all things and events." [Thalheimer (1936),
pp.88-89.
Bold emphasis added.]
"[I]f I am asked to give a true
account of how something got to be what it is I will ultimately have to face the
fact that a thing called A is continuously changing in all of its parts all of
the time into non-A, which means it is non-A as well as A, which takes me beyond
formal categories into dialectical categories." [Somerville (1968), p.68.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Formal Logic asserts:
'A is A'.
Dialectical Logic is not saying 'A is not-A'…. It says: A is indeed A, but A is
also not-A precisely so far as the proposition 'A is A' is not a tautology but
has real content." [Lefebvre (1968), p.41.
Bold emphasis added.]
"This law of identity of opposites, which so perplexes and
horrifies addicts of formal logic, can be easily understood, not only when it is
applied to actual processes of development and interrelations of events, but
also when it is contrasted with the formal law of identity. It is logically true
that A equals A, that John is John…. But it is far more profoundly true that A
is also non-A. John is not simply John: John is a man. This correct proposition
is not an affirmation of abstract identity, but an identification of opposites.
The logical category or material class, mankind, with which John is one and the
same is far more and other than John, the individual. Mankind is at the same
time identical with, yet different from John." [Novack (1971a), p.92.
Bold emphasis added.]
However, assuming for the purpose of
argument that
the collective DM-'analysis' of the
LOC
is correct, and
it were true that "A is
Aand
at the same time non-A", it turns out that it would be impossible for dialecticians
even to begin to express their criticismsof their own garbled
version of
AFL.
That is
because it would be impossible to state the following:
B1:
A is A and at the same time non-A.
If
it were indeed true that "A is A and not A/non-A"
or "A" is at thesame time "non-A", then
the first half of B1 would have
to be re-written as:
B2:
Non-A is non-A.
As each A is replaced
by non-A -- since we have been assured that Ais at the same
time, non-A.
Or, more pointedly, the
whole of B1 would become:
B3:
Non-A is non-A and at the same time non-(non-A).
That is once more: if each A in B1
were replaced with what it is supposed at the
same time to be (i.e., non-A), following the advice of
DM-'logicians'. Plainly,
B1 would 'dialectically disintegrate' into B3 -- or, perhaps even worse, into the following:
B3a:
A and non-A is A and non-A and at the same time non-(A and non-A).
[In B3a, I have replaced each occurrence of
A in B1 with A and non-A, since we have been told that each
A is at the same timeA and non-A.]
Depending on how radically we interpret the 'dialectical' re-write of the LOC.
The
above disastrous outcome can only be rejected successfullyby those whorepudiate the
DM-inspired version of the LOC (i.e., those who reject the dictum "A is
at the same time
non-A"),
and thus who don't think that
the first half of B1 is false, or maybe
who don't think it is both false and true -- or even that, "It depends...".
B1:
A is A and at the same time non-A.
Even worse still,
if every Aisat the same time non-A, then these
two would surely follow from B3:
B4:Non-(non-A)
is non-(non-A)
and at the same time non-(non-(non-A)).
B5: Non-(non-(non-A))
is non-(non-(non-A))
and at the same time non-(non-(non-(non-A))).
[B3:
Non-A is non-A and at the same time non-(non-A).]
And so on, as each successive
A in B3, and then B4, is replaced with a non-A
that dialecticians insist they at the same time are. Once more, this
untoward result may only be forestalled by those who reject the DM-criticism of
the LOC.
Or, even worse still:
B4a:
A
and non-A
and non-(A
and non-A)
is A and non-A
and non-(A
and non-A)
and at the same time non-(A
and non-A
and non-(A
and non-A)).
[B3a:
A and non-A is A and non-A and at the same time non-(A and non-A).]
And so on, replacing each
A in B3a with A and non-A, once more.
[Incidentally, it won't do to claim that all these "non-"s cancel out (an odd notion in itself; on that see
here), since if they
were to do that we would have to reject the idea that each A was
at the same time
non-A. Thus, if each A were at the same time non-A, then, when we formed
non-(non-A) from a non-A, in the above manner, and if this could
be 'cancelled' back to A, the A in non-A would no longer be non-A,
since those two "non-"s would, ex hypothesi, have cancelled, wiping out that non-A!]
As should now
be apparent, the LOC has an annoying way of retaliating in a most
un-dialectical manner when challenged. In which case, as noted above: it is impossible for dialecticians
actually to say what they mean!
The same problems afflict other
DM-inspired criticisms of 'laws' dialecticians claim to have found in
textbooks of FL all the while unwisely keeping the evidence to themselves that supports
those
contentions -- which, of course,
suggests that either there isn't any such evidence, or they opened not one textbook of FL
before they decided they could pontificate about it.
In addition, as
noted above, DM-theorists are
allinvariablyunclear what the As in their versions of FL-'laws' are
supposed to stand for. Based on the passages we have already seen, and on
other quotations posted
elsewhere at this site,
it is plain that DM-theorists regularly confuse A with one or more of the following: propositions,
propositional signs (i.e., indicative sentences), judgements, properties,
qualities, words, objects, processes, predicates, predicate expressions, statements, terms, assertions,
type-sentences,
token-sentences, concepts, ideas, beliefs, thoughts, phrases, clauses,
relations, relational expression,
indexicals, places, times,
names, 'entities' --, and, in the case of John Somerville, "existences" (i.e.,
perhaps everything
in the universe!).
The significance of logical disorder of thisorder of magnitude lies not so much in the unmitigated confusion it creates,
but in the fact that the vast majority of the DM-faithfulhaven't even
noticed it!
Indeed,
even
when this unmitigated confusion is brought to their attention, they almost
invariably
complain about "pedantry,
or reject such criticism as "semantics"!
As has already been pointed out: 2400 years ago Aristotle was far clearer than
all these 'dialectical logicians' put together -- and that was despite
his own confusions.
But, are we really supposed to believe that this sub-Aristotelian,
syntactic and semantic DM-rat's nest encapsulates ideas that lie at the very cutting edge of modern science
and philosophy?
Now, anyone tempted
to respond to the above on the lines that it gets the DM-view of contradictions
(etc.) wrong, and that dialectical contradictions are really X, or they are in
effect Y, or they are…whatever (readers can insert their own
favourite DM-definition here -- label it, Z), need only reflect on the fact that
according to the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC, that criticism itself must be
X or Y, or even Z, while being at the same timenotX or notY, or not Z
-- if we here interpret the As above as legitimate surrogates for X, Y, or Z --
since,
if we abide by sound
dialectical-principles,
these letters can be interpreted in any which way we fancy.
Let's
see those who peremptorily accuse careful
logicians of "pedantry" and "semantics" try to squirm their way out of that
one!
[In
Essay Eight
Part
Three, we shall see that serious difficulties
like this afflict, and thus neutralise, the
best account there is (or, at least, the best account I have ever read) of the
nature of 'dialectical contradictions', written by a fellow Marxist.]
In that
case,
the radically imprecise and thoroughly confused nature of the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC (which
sees everything as X or Y, or even Z, and
not X or not Y, or even not Z -- where each X or
Y, or even Z is
simply left undefined, so it can be anything dialecticians please) must itself be
both a criticism and not a criticism of the LOC. That must itself be so unless,
of course, criticisms are themselves exempt from their own criticism, and can't ever aspire to become one of these wishy-washy dialectical
letter As.
Alas, this means that dialecticians' own criticism
of the LOC must now self-destruct. For example, any attempt made by
DM-fans to define the LOC must be a definition and not a
definition -- if their own 'analysis' of the LOC and the LOI is
invoked against any such attempt.
Hence, using
"D" to stand for "the DM-'definition' of the LOC" (whatever that 'definition'
turns out to be,
and whatever it means, if we are ever told), it must be the case that D
is at the same time non-D. Clearly, that would mean that the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC
undermines its own definition of it!
It is at this point that even DL-fans might just
begin to see how devilish Diabolical Logic really is.
However, long experience 'debating' with
DM-fans, who think Hegel is the best thing since sliced Aristotle, suggests that
it is unwise to underestimate their capacity to ignore anything they don't
like or can't 'compute'.
'Debating' with those
whose brains have been compromised by this
Hermetic virus is like 'debating' with
Buddhists -- except the latter are at least respectful and don't press the
'abuse torrent button' at the first opportunity. Nevertheless,
in relation to both sets of
mystics (the MAD and the BAD), whatever is thrown at them in argument simply
doubles back and serves only to
strengthen their case, since both glory in contradiction. The fact that the BAD-ies can tell us absolutely nothing about 'Nirvana'
phases them not one iota (since it is 'Nothing'!), just as it scarcely
registers with the MAD-ies that they can't tell anyone, least of all one
another, what their "Totality"
actually is.
And, it is little use pointing out to MAD-ies -- or
BAD-ies -- that their belief in universal
contradiction is self-contradictory,
for to do so would be to feed this monster, lending it strength.
[This is
especially true of
MAD-ies
who frequent Internet
discussion boards -- a recent, extreme example of which can be found
here; check out the abusive ramblings of
one "Wangwei".]
Now, it could be objected once more that DM-theorists don't object to the use
of the LOC, the LOI or
the LEM in their proper area of application. As noted above, these
FL-principles allegedly fall short when they face processes in the real
world involving movement, change and development.
This hackneyed DM-response will
be tested to destruction in Essays
Five,
Six and Eight
Parts
One,
Two
and Three (where consideration
will be given to Engels's 'analysis' of motion, Hegel and Trotsky's attempts to
criticise the LOI -- including the peculiar idea that
change is the result of 'internal contradictions').
In the meantime, it is worth reminding
ourselves once again that these DM-inspired criticisms of FL are themselves
material objects in their own right (i.e., they have to be written
down or typed in ink, appear on a screen as pixels somewhere, or be propagated through the air as sound waves at some point,
just as
they would also have to be apprehended by very material human beings), and as such they are surely subject to change (that
is, if
everything is subject to change, as DM-fans assure us is the case). That being
so,
DM-inspired criticisms of FL "are never equal to themselves",
too; hence, those criticisms must apply to each
and every
material copy of the 'dialectical' criticisms of FL.
Indeed, if "A
is A and at the same time non-A"
is correct -- which means that letters (or whatever they refer to) are also
"never equal to themselves" -- then sentences in books and articles on DM stand no chance;
they
are similarly composed of letters, and so must change! Unless, of course, sentences in books and articles on
DM are the only things in the entire universe that don't change.
Hence,
if DM-theorists are to be believed, no
materially-expressed DM-criticism of the LOC is "equal to itself", each
and every example of
a DM-criticism
of the LOC is at the same moment both "a criticism and not a criticism".
The
rest follows as before...
The counter-argument to this (that dialecticians only need to appeal to the
'relative stability' of material objects and processes to make their point) has been
neutralised in
Essay Six. The other
counter-argument -- i.e., that this ignores Hegel's use of identity to derive the
alleged fact that everything is
related to, or 'reflects', its 'own other', but not merely in connection with everything
that it is 'not' --, has also been defused in Essays Seven Part
Three and Eight
Part Three.
However, in an attempt perhaps to
neutralise objections like those posted above, James Lawler argued as
follows:
"Looking one
step further into this matter, Hegel suggests that the relation of A to
not-A is doubly negative. Identity is established (not immediately given)
through a negative relation to not-A. A is itself in not being
not-A.
But this negative relation to not-A is itself negated. That
is, the identity of A does not consist solely in its being not-A,
there is a 'return' to A again -- which Hegel calls 'reflection.' Thus 'A
is A' is not a tautologous (sic) repetition of A (as 'abstract
understanding' would have it) but an affirmation that has been made possible
only through a doubly negative movement, a 'negation of the negation.'" [Lawler
(1982),
p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]
"It is necessary to ask,
first of all, whether and in what sense the fact that A necessarily
relates to what is not-A permits us to insert not-A in A.
Hegel is quite explicit that this relation is not to be understood in such a way
that the results would be the blurring of all identities in a single monistic
being -- as he accuses Spinoza of doing: 'Substance, as the universal negative
power, is as it were a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite content as
radically null, and produces from itself nothing that has a positive substance
of its own.'" [Ibid., p.32, quoting
Hegel (1975),
§151, p.215, in the edition
I have used, which seems to be different from Lawler's. Italic emphases
in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
Quite how the quoted and
incomprehensible passage from Hegel helps clear this up I will leave to those
who are fluent Martian speakers to decide, but
Lawler continues:
"If we grant that A's
identity involves its necessary relation to what is not-A, and that this
not-A is 'its own other' -- a definite other being and not any being
whatsoever -- and that this relation to some definite other is necessary for the
existence of A or is essential to the constitution of A (A's
identity), it seems reasonable to look for some 'imprint' of this 'other' in
A, so that in some sense not-A is internally constitutive of A....
In other words, to understand the internal nature of A it is necessary to
study the determinate not-A not only as a necessary external condition
but as 'reflected' in A. This is not to say that one should expect to
find in A some direct and immediate duplication of not-A. The
direct identity of A and not-A would constitute the annihilation
of the beings involved." [Ibid., pp.32-33. Italic emphases in the
original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
, confusing these As
one minute with propositions and sentences, the next with properties,
predicates, 'beings', indexicals, relations and nominalised relational
expressions, among many other things.
Exactly how Lawler's comments
above are capable of preventing the
logical
explosion we
witnessed
earlier -- which follows from Hegel's brilliant insight that "A is identical
with, but at the same time different from not-A" (I paraphrase!) -- is somewhat unclear. Even if it were correct that "A = not-A, but at the same time
A ≠
not-A" (which is a slightly shorter version of "A is identical with, but
at the same time different from not-A"), we would still obtain the following
DM-bowl-of-spaghetti from B1 (modified):
B1:
A is A and at the same time non-A.
B1b:
A = A and at the same time not-A.
If we begin with the
more 'orthodox' version suggested by Lawler, encapsulated by B1c, the situation is even worse:
B1c:
A = A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A.
[Here, I am taking "A is
A and
at the same time A is not-A, and A is also not-not-A" to have the same
'dialectical' content as "A =
A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A".
]
If we take this part of the
formula of 'genius' -- i.e., A and A = not-A and
A ≠ not-A, which we are assured it is 'dialectically' equal
to A -- and substitute it for each A in B1c (but parsed
by means of brackets to make it slightly 'easier' on the eye), we obtain the following monstrosity:
B6: (A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) = (A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) =
not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A).
If we
now do the same with B6, we end up with this bowl of 'dialectical'
spaghetti:
B7:
((A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)) = ((A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)
and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) = not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) ≠ not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)) and ((A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) = not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)
and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) ≠ not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)) =
not-((A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) =
not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) ≠ not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)) and ((A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) = not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) ≠ not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)) ≠ not-((A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) = not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A) and
(A and A = not-A and
A ≠
not-A) ≠ not-(A and
A = not-A and A ≠
not-A)).
[In the above, each A
has been replaced successively by what Lawler assures it is identical with --,
i.e., A and A = not-A and A ≠
not-A.]
Figure Five: Logic
Before It Has Been
Given The DM-Makeover
Figure Six: Logic After
A DM-Makeover
Alas
,
my computer might not have enough memory to complete B8!
[That pleasant task is left
to readers who have more time on their hands than is perhaps good for them.
And, good luck with B999!]
Of course, if we throw the
full weight of DL at these sentences, the entire theory would inflate
onto complete confusion even more rapidly, for if A is never equal to A, but is always equal to not-A, then
no symbol can emerge unscathed. In which case, each and every word that
DM-fans use to criticise FL must be subject to these crazy strictures. Consider
B1, again:
B1:
A is A and at the same time non-A.
The above soon
'dialectically' explodes into the following (if we replace each and every word
with 'not-'/'non-that word' -- i.e., substituting "is is is and at the same time
non-is" for "is"; "non is non and at the same time non-non" for "non; "the is
the and at the same time non-the" for "the"; and so on -- leaving "B1", ":" and the final full-stop
to fend for themselves --, yielding:
B1c: (A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(A
is A and at the same time non-A)(and is and at the same time non-and)(at
is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same
is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time
non-time)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A).
[I
have added brackets again to make B1c slightly 'easier' on the eye. Each word
and symbol in B1 has been replaced by what DM-fans assure they are the same as,
as per the rule summarised in the last but one paragraph.]
And then have this
complete dialectical
disaster-area -- if the above replacements are substituted into B1c (divided
into eight sub-sections for 'ease of reference', which will later be combined to
yield B1d):
[1] (A is A and at the same time non-A) becomes [(A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(A is A and at the same time non-A)(and
is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the
is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time
non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-A is non-A
and at the same time non-non-A)]
[2] (is is is and at the same time non-is) becomes [(is is is and at the same time non-is)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(and is and
and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the
and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time
is time and at the same time non-time)(non-is is non-is and at the same time
non-non-is)]
[3] (and is and and at the same time non-and) becomes [(and is and and at the same time non-and)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(and is and
and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the
and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time
is time and at the same time non-time)(non-and is non-and and at the same time
non-non-and)]
[4] (at is at and at the same time non-at) becomes [(at is at and at the same time non-at)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(and is and
and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the
and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time
is time and at the same time non-time)(non-at is non-at and at the same time
non-non-at)]
[5] (the is the and at the same time non-the) becomes [(the is the and at the
same time non-the)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(the is the and at the
same time non-the)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the
is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time
non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-the is non-the and at
the same time non-non-the)]
[6] (same is same and at the same time non-same) becomes [(same is same and at
the same time non-same)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(same is same and
at the same time non-same)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and
at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same
and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time
non-time)(non-same is non-same and at the same time non-non-same)]
[7] (time is time and at the same time non-time) becomes [(time is time and at
the same time non-time)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(time is time and
at the same time non-time)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and
at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same
and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time
non-time)(non-time is non-time and at the same time non-non-time)]
[8] (non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A) becomes
[(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)(is is is
and at the same time non-is)(non-A is non-A and at the same time
non-non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the
is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time
non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-non-A is
non-non-A and at the same time non-non-non-A)]
Yielding the following monstrosity (with square brackets inserted to make it
slightly 'easier of the eye', if that were possible):
B1d:
[(A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(A
is A and at the same time non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at
is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same
is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time
non-time)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)][(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(is is is
and at the same time non-is)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at
and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is
same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time
non-time)(non-is is non-is and at the same time non-non-is)][(A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(A is A and at the same time non-A)(and
is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the
is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time
non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-A is non-A
and at the same time non-non-A)][(and is and and at the same time non-and)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(and is and
and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the
and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time
is time and at the same time non-time)(non-and is non-and and at the same time
non-non-and)][(at is at and at the same time non-at)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(at
is at and at the same time non-at)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at
is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same
is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time
non-time)(non-at is non-at and at the same time non-non-at)][(the is the and at
the same time non-the)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(the is the and at
the same time non-the)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the
is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time
non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-the is non-the and at
the same time non-non-the)][(same is same and at the same time non-same)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(and
is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the
is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time
non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-same is non-same and
at the same time non-non-same)][(time is time and at the same time non-time)(is is
is and at the same time non-is)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(and
is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the
is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time
non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-time is non-time and
at the same time non-non-time)][(non-A is non-A and at the same
time non-non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(non-A is
non-A and at the same time non-non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at
is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same
is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time
non-time)(non-non-A is non-non-A and at the same time non-non-non-A)].
[Again,
l
eaving
"B1c", ":" and the final full-stop to fend for themselves.]
And so on...
The same fate must
befall every word that DM-fans themselves use -- since, as we have noted,
words
are just as material as any letter A that either they or Hegel have ever
contemplated. In which case, if we apply their own 'logic' to what they attempt to tell us, dialecticians will end up
with unmitigated gibberish in place of sentences that might have seemed to make some sort of
crazy sense before they had been 'dialectically-processed', leaving them
in the unenviable position of not being able to communicate anything at all --
even to one another!
This is
just an elaboration of a point Aristotle made 2400 years ago! If we hold a proposition and its contradictory true
at the same time, rationality would
soon fall apart. B7 and B1d above illustrate this prediction rather nicely.
And, it is no good complaining that this is
unfair or ridiculous; dialecticians' sloppy use of ill-defined letter "A"s invites such parody.
So, Lawler's 'solution'
would in fact represent a major
step backward, even when compared with the
implications of the crass
'definitions' concocted by lesser
LCD
souls.
[Lawler's attempt to derive,
à
la Hegel, a not-A from an A
was
demolished in
Essay Eight Part Three.
It is worth adding that
in the midst of all of this DM-confusion, the distinction between not A
(predicate negation)
and not-A/non-A
(predicate-term negation), has been ignored since Lawler and other DM-fans seem
to be blithely unaware of it, even though Aristotle himself wasn't. More on that,
here.]
On a more general note,
W&G advance
several additional allegations about FL that reveal just how little they know
about
a subject they nevertheless seem happy to misrepresent and denigrate:
"It
is an astonishing fact that the basic laws of formal logic worked out by
Aristotle have remained fundamentally unchanged for over two thousand years."
[Woods and Grant (1995),
p.89.
This appears on p.93 of the 2nd
edition.]
This is so patently false
that these two comrades have had to distort and ignore the significance of the major advances
that have been made in logic
since the 1850s to make their superficial criticisms even seem to 'work':
"In
the 19th century, there were a number of attempts to bring logic up to date
(George Boyle (sic),
Ernst Schröder, Gotlob (sic)
Frege,
Bertrand Russell and
A.
N. Whitehead). But, apart from the introduction of
symbols,
and a certain
tidying up, there is no real change here. Great claims are made, for example by
the linguistic philosophers, but there are not many grounds for them...."
[Ibid.,
p.97.
This appears on p.101 of the 2nd
edition.]
We have
already had occasion to
take note of the
many errors this
passage contains -- for example, W&G confuse
George Boole with a
fictional character, George Boyle, and they also mis-spell Gottlob Frege's
name. Admittedly,
these are relatively minor issues but they
highlight just how careless these two jokers are when it comes to
FL. Add to that the following 'minor' detail: Russell and Whitehead's work in logic dates from the 20th
century, not the 19th.
Moreover, the fact that these two comrades can see no difference between the old logic of subject and predicate,
and the newer logic of function and argument, quantifiers and predicates of
different levels, of relations and sets, tensed and modal functors, etc., only
serves to
highlight further their self-imposed ignorance.
And as we have seen,
Aristotle also used symbols!
However, Traditional
(Aristotelian) logic
not only ignored complex inferences inexpressible in syllogisms -- and, it is
worth reminding ourselves, The Syllogism is a remarkably inept,
limited,
and inefficient
way of arguing; who on earth talks this way in everyday life? Which contemporary
scientist or mathematician has ever used or ever uses a single syllogism? -- it failed to deal with relational
expressions, quantifiers expressing multiple generality
(the latter are used in mathematics all the time -- for example, "If every number has
a successor, then there is no prime larger than every number"),
internal and external negation, coupled with scope ambiguity
.
[This
links to a PDF.]
In relation to the latter distinction, consider the difference between the
following:
F1:
Not every event has a cause.
F2:
Every event has no cause.
Clearly, F1 would be true if there was at least one event that had no cause,
while F2 would be true if no event had a cause.
F3:
Some dialecticians don't know the difference between external and internal
negation.
F4:
It isn't the case that some dialecticians know the difference between internal
and external negation.
F4a:
No dialectician knows the difference between internal and external negation.
F3
allows for the possibility that some dialecticians do know about this
difference, while F4 and its equivalent, F4a, rule that out. Ordinary language
allows for this distinction; MFL not only accommodates this readily and easily,
it can also explain its
truth-conditions (this
is a much more straightforward explanation of that technical term).
While
AFL
certainly acknowledged the above distinctions, it
was nevertheless seriously hampered as a result of the way that quantifier expressions had been interpreted
because of a slavish adherence to
Term Logic
and the traditional
grammar of subject and predicate,
which
not only crippled logic it held up its advance for well over two
thousand years.
[On the origin of some of
these confusions, see Barnes (2009). The impact of the new logic and why it
assumed a crucially important role in the advancement of mathematics are detailed in
Giaquinto (2004) and
Grattan-Guinness (1970, 1997, 2000a, 2000b). See also Kitcher (1984), pp.227-71. On Frege's
central importance in these developments, see Dummett
(1981a), pp.665-84 and Gillies (1992a).
On the general background, see Beaney (1996). Concerning the superiority of MFL
over AFL, see Dummett (1981a), pp.8-33, Noonan (2001), pp.25-28, 39-43, as well
as
here.
The power and novelty of Fregean Logic is brought out with admirable clarity by Geach (1961). See also,
Zalta (2022).]
Wittgenstein himself underlined some of the confusions and limitations of the old logic in
Wittgenstein (1913).
Indeed, what Wittgenstein had to say about the work of one particular and
traditional logic
textbook (i.e., Coffey
(1938a, 1938b)) might well have been aimed at our DM-brethren, with equal
justification:
"In no branch of learning can
an author disregard the results of honest research with so much impunity as he
can in Philosophy and Logic. To this circumstance we owe the publication of such
a book as Mr Coffey's
Science of Logic: and only as a typical example of the work of many
logicians of today does this book deserve consideration. The author's Logic is
that of the scholastic philosophers, and he makes all their mistakes -- of
course with the usual references to Aristotle. (Aristotle, whose name is taken
so much in vain by our logicians, would turn in his grave if he knew that so
many Logicians know no more about Logic today than he did 2,000 years ago). The
author has not taken the slightest notice of the great work of the modern
mathematical logicians -- work which has brought about an advance in Logic
comparable only to that which made Astronomy out of Astrology, and Chemistry out
of Alchemy.... The worst of such books is
that they prejudice sensible people against the study of Logic." [Wittgenstein
(1913),
pp.2-3. Paragraphs
merged.]
However, W&G continue,
assiduously digging an ever deeper dialectical hole for themselves:
"Using a superficial and inexact analogy
with physics, the so-called 'atomic
method' developed by Russell and Wittgenstein (and later repudiated
by the latter) tried to divide language into its 'atoms.' The basic atom of
language is supposed to be the simple sentence, out of which compound sentences
are constructed. Wittgenstein dreamed of developing a 'formal language' for
every science -- physics, biology, even psychology. Sentences are subjected to a
'truth test'
based on the old laws of identity,
contradiction and the excluded middle.
In reality, the basic method remains exactly the same. The 'truth
value' is
a question of 'either…or,' 'yes or no,' 'true or false.'
The new logic is referred to as the propositional calculus. But the fact is that this system can't even
deal with arguments formerly handled by the most basic (categorical) syllogism.
The mountain has laboured, and brought forth a mouse." [Woods
and Grant (1995),
p.97.
This appears on p.102 of the 2nd
edition.]
Again, the numerous errors in this passage have been
exposed
here. However, W&G nowhere
reference a single passage from Wittgenstein's work that supports the allegation that he
wanted to set up "a
'formal language' for every science -- physics, biology, even psychology".
In fact, these two have manifestly confused Wittgenstein with
Rudolph Carnap and other members of the
Vienna
Circle. Nor do they show how or why the new logic can't handle syllogistic inferences, when it
manifestly can. [On that, for example, see
Lemmon (1993), pp.168-79.] To cap it
all, they assert that Wittgenstein's work was somehow
"based on the old laws of identity",
when he in fact argued as follows:
"Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and
to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.
Thus I do not write 'f(a,b).a = b', but 'f(a,a)' (or
'f(b,b)'); and not 'f(a,b).~a =
b', but 'f(a,b)'....
[Wittgenstein explains what he is doing here:
"Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for
identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of sign." (5.53,
p.105.) -- RL.]
"The identity-sign, therefore, is not an
essential constituent of conceptual notation." [Wittgenstein (1972),
5.5303-5.533, pp.106-07.
(This links to a PDF of two parallel
translations; I have used the one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness
edition.) Paragraphs merged.]
"'A thing is identical with itself.' -- There
is no finer example of a useless sentence.... It is as if in our imagination we
put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted." [Wittgenstein (2009),
§216, p.91e.]
"'a = a' is a perfectly useless proposition."
[Wittgenstein (1976), p.283.]
"The law of identity, for example, seemed to
be of fundamental importance. But now the proposition that this 'law' is
nonsense has taken over this importance." [Wittgenstein (1993), p.169.]
We also read the following in
a letter Wittgenstein sent to Bertrand Russell (dated October 1913):
"But
just now I am so troubled with identity...." [Wittgenstein (1979), p.125.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
We also read
this from a note dated 29/11/1914:
"I
believe that it would be possible wholly to exclude the sign of identity from
our notation and always to indicate identity merely by the identity of the
signs.... By
means of this notation the pseudo-proposition (x)x = a or the like would lose
all appearance of justification." [Ibid., p.34e. Paragraphs merged.]
Moreover, Wittgenstein regarded contradictions, not as false, but as sinnloss
-- senseless -- lacking
truth conditions:
"Tautologies and contradictions lack sense (sinnloss)." [Wittgenstein (1972),
p.69,
4.461. (This links to a PDF of two parallel translations; I have used the
one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness edition. "Sense" is explained
here.)]
Not finished, W&G
continue:
"The introduction of symbols into logic
does not carry us a single step further, for the very simple reason that they,
in turn, must sooner or later be translated into words and concepts. They have
the advantage of being a kind of shorthand, more convenient for some technical
operations, computers and so on, but the content remains exactly as before. The
bewildering array of mathematical symbols is accompanied by a truly Byzantine
jargon, which seems deliberately designed to make logic inaccessible to ordinary
mortals, just as the priest-castes of Egypt and Babylon used secret words and
occult symbols to keep their knowledge to themselves. The only difference is that they actually did
know things that were worth knowing, like the movements of the heavenly bodies,
something which can't be said of modern logicians."
[Woods
and Grant (1995),
pp.97-98.
This appears on p.102 of the 2nd
edition.]
If the following were the case,
"The introduction of symbols into logic
does not carry us a single step further", then on
a similar basis algebraists were misguided when they introduced symbols into mathematics.
Furthermore, how many ordinary people understand algebra? Does that mean algebra is
"elitist"? More revealingly, one feels, W&G's jibe (about the esoteric nature of modern
logic) hides the fact that these two comrades clearly found even elementary
Symbolic Logic
far too difficult to grasp. [Exhibit A for the prosecution was posted
earlier; add to that the many sophomoric
mistakes they make throughout their chapter on 'logic'.]
To be sure,
MFL is undeniably difficult. As I noted above, in my own study of University Mathematics and
Postgraduate Logic, for example, I found that advanced Abstract Algebra (e.g., Group Theory)
was far easier to follow than advanced MFL -- especially if we
throw in the Philosophy of Logic,
surely one of the most difficult subjects yet devised by the human
brain! Of course, others might find the reverse is the case. But, that no
more impugns MFL than it does, say, Group Theory,
Lie Algebra, or
Sturm-Liouville Theory (this links to a PDF).
Readers, however, will no
doubt also have
noticed how W&G managed to throw in a snide remark about the contrast
between FL and certain un-named priests in the ancient world, whose knowledge
we are told actually involved the mastery of "occult symbols" and a number of unspecified
practicalities that meant they were (supposedly) superior to modern logicians,
at least in this respect. This
from comrades who sing the praises of a 'logical theory' (DL) which has no
known practical applications (other than that of thoroughly confusing
its acolytes and, of course, crippling Soviet Agriculture),
but
who nevertheless endlessly snipe at an entire discipline (FL) that has
countless such applications.
And, as far as "Byzantine
jargon" is concerned, anyone who reckons they can learn something (anything!)
from Hegel's Logic has little room to point fingers at others for their excessive devotion to opaque jargon. The technical terms
used in
MFL are there for the same reason they are there in modern mathematics. No such
basis
exists for excusing the barrage of terminally obscure verbiage and
tortured prose that confronts hapless readers of Hegel's Logic -- quite the reverse, as we shall see.
Unfortunately, there is more:
"Terms
such 'monadic predicates,' 'quantifiers,' 'individual variables,' and so on and
so forth, are designed to give the impression that formal logic is a science to
be reckoned with, since it is quite unintelligible to most people. Sad to say,
the scientific value of a body of beliefs is not directly proportionate to the
obscurity of its language. If that were the case, every religious mystic in
history would be as great a scientist as Newton, Darwin and Einstein, all rolled
into one." [Ibid.,
p.98.
This appears on pp.102-03 of the 2nd
edition.]
The novel terminology employed
by modern logicians was
introduced simply because the old logic of subject and predicate failed to do justice
to inferences we draw in everyday life, to say nothing of the complex
proofs required by mathematicians. Moreover, W&G's reference to religious
mystics is a little rich in view of the
Hermetic writings from which they
caught such a virulent dose of dialectics.
"In
Moliere's comedy, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, M. Jourdain was surprised to be told
that he had been talking prose all his life, without realising it.
Modern logic merely repeats all the old categories, but throws in a few symbols
and fancy-sounding terms, in order to hide the fact that absolutely nothing new
is being said. Aristotle used 'monadic
predicates' (expressions that attribute a property to an individual)
a long time ago. No doubt, like M. Jourdain, he would have been delighted to
discover that he had been using Monadic Predicates all the time, without knowing
it. But it would not have made a scrap of difference to what he was actually
doing. The use of new labels does not alter the contents of a jar of jam. Nor
does the use of jargon enhance the validity of outworn forms of thought.
"The sad
truth is that, in the 20th century formal logic has reached its limits. Every
new advance of science deals it yet another blow. Despite all the formal
changes, the basic laws remain the same. One thing is clear. The developments of
formal logic over the past hundred years, first by propositional calculus
(p.c.), then by lower predicate calculus (l.p.c.) has carried the subject to
such a point of refinement that no further development is possible. We have
reached the most comprehensive system of formal logic, so that any other
additions will certainly not add anything new. Formal logic has said all that it
has to say. If the truth were to be told, it reached this stage quite some time
ago." [Ibid.,
pp.98-99. This appears on p.103 of the 2nd
edition.]
I have been unable to find the term "monadic
predicate" in Aristotle, but that doesn't mean he didn't use monadic
predicates. But so what? Ancient mathematicians used concepts and abbreviations
that are analogous to the symbols employed by modern mathematicians; does that
mean that modern mathematics is full of "fancy-sounding terms", and
thus fit only for
ill-informed derision from a pair of ignoramuses? Or, that modern formalism is no advance over
the terminology used in ancient mathematics?
And, of course, a monadic predicate (such as
"ξ is a confused dialectician") can apply to more than one individual (as in
"Anyone who reads
RIRE,
and believes everything they have read, will become a confused dialectician"); so it isn't true that 'monadic predicates' are
expressions that "attribute a property to an individual". Plainly, in
this case, it
applies to anyone who reads and believes the contents of RIRE (which could be
no one, or it could be thousands).
[A
monadic predicate is a
first order predicate which maps one singular term onto a proposition or
indicative sentence. A dyadic predicate is a first order predicate that maps
two singular terms onto a proposition or indicative sentence. A first order
predicate is a predicate that maps singular terms onto propositions or
indicative sentences. Singular terms involve Proper Names,
Definite Descriptions and
demonstrative pronouns.
For an explanation of the use of Greek symbols (like ξ), see
here and here,
which also explain what "mapping" means.]
The question whether or not
MFL has been rendered partially obsolete by advances in science will be dealt with elsewhere at this
site (however, see Harrison (1983, 1985) and Slater (2002) on the LEM and QM);
but, as far
as the allegation that MFL has reached the end of the line is concerned, only
those who know nothing of the subject will think to assert this, or, indeed,
believe it. Even a cursory look along
the relevant shelves in a University Library will soon show how the subject is continuing to
blossom --, as, indeed, will a quick Google search.
[LEM = Law of Excluded
Middle; QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
In fact, this by-now-familiar 'head in the sand' approach
-- perfected by W&G, and who are not unique among DM-fans -- is reminiscent of the
attitude to
Galileo's work
adopted by Roman Catholic
Theologians: "Stick to Dogma
-- and under no
circumstances look down that telescope!"
One final W&G comment is worth
quoting:
"Another type of syllogism is
conditional in form (if...then), for example, 'If an animal is a tiger, it is a
carnivore.' This is just another way of saying the
same thing as the affirmative categorical statement,
i.e., all tigers are carnivores. The same in relation to the negative form -- 'If
it's a fish, it's not a mammal' is just another way of saying 'No
fishes are mammals.' The formal difference conceals the fact that we have
not really advanced a single step." [Ibid.,
p.86.
This appears on p.90 of the 2nd
edition. The italic emphasises appear in the on-line version, not the
published editions.]
Alas, these comments seriously expose their
self-inflicted ignorance; a hypothetical proposition -- such as:
"If an animal is a tiger, it is a carnivore"
-- isn't even an argument, so it can hardly be a syllogism. [I have dealt
with "hypothetical syllogisms",
here.]
On the other hand, if the above example were a
conditionalised proposition (i.e., an argument that has
been transformed into a conditional sentence),
the original argument must have had a suppressed premise (as in, "No fish is a
mammal", in connection with "If
it's a fish, it's not a mammal"). Either way, these aren'tsyllogisms.
Nevertheless, W&G have
clearly missed the point of hypothetical deductions in MFL (something
that was in fact absent from AFL -- but not
from
Stoic Logic
-- not that Aristotle was unaware of them).
We can surely reason from premises whose truth-status is unknown to us (as
scientists often do), in order to try to investigate phenomena and establish
the truth-value of any propositions concerning them. Indeed,
it is no less important for us to find out whether or not some of our beliefs
are false, and we often do that by drawing out their consequences.
This can't be done with categorical reasoning -- unless the hypothetical
mode was being used implicitly or surreptitiously.
Hypothetical reasoning has
always featured in the sciences (on that see, for example, Losee (2001)); these
days this aspect of logic tends to be connected with the use of "thought
experiments" --, but the two aren't the same -- and scientists employ IL
all the time, where hypothetical reasoning is hardly controversial.
["Thought experiments" have been
employed by scientists for centuries in order to confirm, or refute, specific
theories and hypotheses. Galileo was a past master in this regard, as was Einstein.
On thought
experiments, see the popular account in Cohen (2005). More scholarly
studies can be found in Brown (1986, 1993, 2002, 2005,
2023),
Häggqvist (1996),
Horowitz and Massey
(1991),
McAllister (2005),
Norton (1996,
2005)
-- these link to PDFs --, and Sorensen (1992).
Brown, however, adopts a rather Platonic view of "thought experiments",
an approach
rightly rejected by Norton, for example. Another quick Google search will reveal
dozens of articles on this topic. See also,
John Norton's
page devoted to classic examples.]
But, we don't need to appeal to
technical, or even arcane,
aspects of the scientific method; W&G themselves engage in their own
form of hypothetical 'reasoning'. They do this when they derive what they take
to be false conclusions from premises which they attribute to what they call
"formal" thought. They manifestly do not hold the latter propositions true; they merely
reason from their assumed truth to what they then claim are obvious falsehoods
implied by those assumed truths in order to show that the original assumptions
must have been false, or were of limited applicability. They couldn't do this with a categorical argument, where the premises are known to
be true, or known to be false.
[In saying this, the reader
shouldn't assume
that I am attributing to W&G a clear or coherent logical strategy, or
even a clear set of thoughts, here; few of their arguments work (and many are aimed at targets that would give
the phrase "straw man" a bad name, as we have seen). But, that isn't the point; they certainly
intended to argue hypothetically, which
is.]
The DM-Echo-Chamber continues to
resonate, and this time thanks to a contribution from a book that turns out to
be a veritable monument to
Confirmation Bias:
"Classical, Aristotelian logic takes
as its fundamental premise the Law of Identity, the statement that a
thing is identical with itself. Expressed in a formula: A is A. Its negative
form, the Law of Contradiction states that a thing is never different
from itself, that A is not and cannot be non-A. In combination, these laws give
rise to a third, the Law of the Excluded Middle. Either A is B or it is
non-B; it cannot be both.... In Hegel's dialectics A is A as well as non-A."
[Baghavan (1987), pp.75-76. Paragraphs merged. Italic emphases in the
original.]
As usual, Baghavan quoted not one
single logic text in support of his wild allegations and blatant fibs. As we
have also seen, not only did Aristotle know nothing of the LOI, the LOC can't be
derived from the LOI, and all three laws do not form the basis of AFL. That is
quite apart from the ridiculous 'definitions' Baghavan (and other DM-fans)
pulled out of somewhere the sun does not shine.
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law
of Non-Contradiction; AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic.]
Plenty more examples of the
same wild allegations can be found right across the Internet; for example:
"Dialectics is a way of
studying the phenomena of the world in a way that is quite a bit different than
formal logic. Logic is undoubtedly very useful in many instances, but it has its
limitations. Even the fundamental axioms of logic, which often seem intuitively
obvious to western thinkers (e.g. A = A), only really hold when looking at the
world at fixed moments in time." [Quoted from
here.]
Here
is yet another 'expert', who -- surprise! surprise! -- quotes not one single
logic text, article or website in support:
"Dialectics may be termed the
logic of change. Traditional logic -- from the Greek logos, meaning
'word' or 'reason' -- was originally formulated by Aristotle, and seeks to
define laws for rational thought. Aristotelian logic contends that there are
three laws of logic:
"1. A equals A (a thing is equal to itself);
"2. A does not equal not-A (a thing is not equal to something other than
itself);
"3. There is no thing which is not either A or not-A (i.e. there is no
indeterminate middle ground)." [Quoted from
here; accessed 08/06/2015.]
Here is yet another:
"That is to say that the
either/or claim essential to some versions of formal logic (A v ~A, something is
either one thing or the other [i.e. it is raining or it is not raining, it
cannot be both at the same time]) is, while correct on one logical level,
ultimately insufficient. Dialectical logic claims that things can be both either
one thing or the other just as -- and this is dialectically important -- they
can also and at the same time not be either one thing or the other (A & ~A). So
either/or and also not either/or. While it is correct to assert that it cannot
both be raining and not raining at the same time at a given moment, once we
imagine the fact of raining in a larger process, then the logic of A v ~A, while
in some ways correct, is also insufficient. Is the fact of sleet an instance of
raining or not-raining? Do we not say that sleet is both snow and rain at the
same time?" [Quoted from
here; accessed 18/08/2015.]
But that last point transfers
attention to the following question: "Is it sleeting or not sleeting?" Or,
indeed, an answer to the question they raise "Is the fact of sleet an instance
of raining or not-raining?", namely, "Yes it is raining
since sleet is a mixture of rain and snow!" So, we can have definite
answers in such circumstances.
Once more, what is the point of this. In
DM-terms it makes no sense. Is there a logical connection between rain and snow,
such that one implies the other and one can't exist with the other (like the
proletariat can't exist without the capitalist class, so we are told)? If that
were the case, it couldn't ever rain without it also snowing, nor vice versa!
In which case, what has contradiction got to do with this, be it
'dialectical', formal, or ordinary?
The
LEM isn't so easily
by-passed by those who think homespun 'logic' can become a legitimate or useful
component of cutting edge science.
Indeed, the LEM has a nasty way of hitting back at those who think it is clever to
try to undermine it; on that, see
here.
A quick Google search
will reveal how wide this dialectical weed has spread:
[Although the last author
above is merely
paraphrasing Somerville.]
Readers will find that these sites retail the same hoary old myths and
wild fantasies, and are almost word for word copies of one another!
DM, repetitive?
The very idea!
But (having
said that) as if to prove DM-fans aren't the least bit repetitive -- but,
ironically, managing to do the exact opposite --, we have this from one
of our US comrades:
"The philosophical underpinning of this pursuit of knowledge was
grounded in the empirical method, which guided the scientific inquiry into the
interactions conceived of as external
to these
discrete and now well-defined entities. The law of identity was critical to the
project:
A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. Or stated in algebraic
terms: A equals A. One corollary of the idea that A is always identical to A is
that A can never equal not-A."
[Eric Ruder, quoted from
here. Accessed 21/11/2023. Bold emphasis added.]
No logic
books are quoted or even cited in support (other than Hegel's, of course -- his
word is all the 'evidence'/'proof' DM-fans need), and no attempt is made to
prove the point from logic itself. [Indeed, I have shown how defective this
Hegelian 'logic' is in Essay Eight
Part Three.]
Here, though, is one of my favourite
DM-examples:
"Note that Hegel uses the
word contradiction to mean the conflict between two opposing sides. (page 431,
Hegel's Science of Logic) He does not mean simply a logically
contradictory statement such as, 'That object is a horse and a television.'"
[Quoted from the 'Dialectics
For Kids' website.
Has anyone checked if this site is actually run by the same pranksters who
publish The Onion?]
But, could the alleged
contradiction, "That object is a
horse and a television", be false? It is worth recalling once
more that concerning two contradictory propositions (or clauses), they can't both be true and
they can't both be false. DM-fans appear to be blithely unaware
even of Aristotle's concept of a contradiction,
let alone anything more recent! On the other hand, two
propositions or clauses are inconsistent if they can't both be true, but
could both be false (as is the case with the example quoted above --
"That object is a horse and a television.").
As noted earlier,
while dialecticians are quite happy to pontificate about logic, they seem not to know the first thing about
it.
So, only if both of the following: "That object is
a horse" and "That object is a television" couldn't be false
would "That object is a horse and a television" be a contradiction. But, "That
object is a horse" and "That object is a television" would both be false if, for instance, "That object is a cat" were true
-- always assuming that "That object" picked out the same object in each case.
So, this odd example from
that wacko website isn't even a contradiction!
It might be argued that the meaning of the word
"horse" precludes it from being a television, but if that were the case "That object is a horse and a
television" would be a misuse of language, and would thus be
non-sensical,
not contradictory.
Here's another egregious example, posted on Quora
recently:
"The formal conception of a contradiction requires two things standing in
opposition to one another.
A single object is either this sort of thing or that sort of thing. It cannot be
both, in the same way, at the same time. For instance, a ball. One and the same
ball is either a white ball or a black ball.
If a single ball were both black and white at one and the same time, there would
be no contradiction because there is no (external) opposition between two
things. The ball would not be black or white. It would be some shade of grey.
In other words, the contradiction of one and the same object being both black
and white would not be conceptualized as the unity of two opposed
characteristics existing in one and the same object. A grey ball would simply be
recognized as a completely separate entity unto itself, neither black nor white,
capable of existing alongside both black and white balls." [Marshall Solomon,
quoted from
here, accessed 22/02/2021. Bold emphasis added.
The highlighted words do not seem to make much sense.
If anyone can make sense of them, please
let me know.]
As we have seen,
Aristotle himself dealt with such considerations over two thousand years ago, so
it is instructive to note, yet again, that the above comrade quotes not one
singe logic text in support of these wild fantasies. As if logicians don't
know that grey is (sometimes) a combination of black and white in given
proportions. Exactly why that would be a contradiction (even in DM-terms!)
is also far from clear.
Anyway, as we have seen many times, what we might say about the condition of the
said ball would be a contradiction if both of these couldn't be true
(together) and couldn't be false (together): "This ball is black" and
"This ball is white". While both can't be true (together) -- except we
call this ball grey, but even then the ball would be neither black nor white! --
they can both be false, if the said ball was, say, red -- or, indeed,
grey! So, "This ball is black and white" isn't a contradiction. That sentence
merely expresses an inconsistency -- "This ball is black" and "This ball
is white" are contraries, not contradictories.
"The contradictory character of the commodity-form does not
follow this formal logic. One and the same object retains it contradictory
character while expressing its (internal) opposition in a form
of appearance different
than either of its underlying oppositions. In terms of the example just given,
and this example is suboptimal..., the grey ball would not be recognized as a
unified separate object existing independently from black and white balls. Under
the logic of the commodity-form, the appearances do not constitute a separate
'third thing' external to the 'first thing' (white ball) and 'second thing'
(black ball).
The grey ball retains the opposition of black and white within itself by become
the necessary expression of this internal opposition, the form
of appearance of
a contradictory reality. Nonetheless,
the internal opposition of black and white does not change our conscious
experience of a grey ball as a unified independent object. This means the
contradictory character of the commodity-form is obliterated in its mode of
expression. In the appearances, the manner in which commodity world immediately
presents itself to us, no opposition seems to exist." [Ibid.]
Once
again, this comrade failed to explain how this is a 'formal contradiction' in
the first place (when, of course, it isn't!), let alone a 'dialectical contradiction'. Do
these colours struggle with and then change into each other, as the
DM-classics tell us they must if they were 'dialectical'? Does the existence
of one imply the existence of the other, like the proletariat supposedly implies
the existence of the capitalist class (so we are told). Hardly.
[For
several other serious muddles courtesy of the above comrade,
check this
out. I have also dealt with the logical confusions that Marxhimself
introduced into his discussion of the commodity, and the further mix-ups
subsequent Marxists piled on top of even these,
here.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
In
practice, we see once again that dialecticians only succeed in shooting
themselves
in the foot they have firmly lodged in
their collective mouth.
Finally, a more faithful and accurate account of the foundations of AFL can be
found in Lear (1980).
the LOI as "A = A", "A is equal to
A",
"A equals A" -- or even "A is A"
(on all of these, see
Essay Six). We
have also seen that other DM-fans tell us that this 'law' implies that "A can't be other than A"
(which is incorrect -- the LOI doesn't preclude change; again, on that see Essay
Six). The LOC is similarly characterised as "A can't at the
same time be A and not be A" -- or even "A can't be non-A" and
"A equals A only in so far as
it is opposed to non-A, or, the identity of A results from and contains the
contradiction",
which says more-or-less the same (no pun intended) --, and which is said to
follow from the LOI (but, as usual, no proof is offered that it does). At the same time, the LEM is
depicted rather loosely as "Everything must be A or not A"; or even worse, "A
does not equal B"! In every case, dialecticians serially conflate objects (or
the names thereof) with
propositions -- alongside a host of other confusions, into the bargain.
The above confusions and muddles
have been thoroughly dissected
here,
where I make the following points (slightly edited):
However, as noted above, the real problem here is that if the
negative particle attaches to singular terms (i.e., Proper Names and
Definite Descriptions) so that it is
interpreted as an operator mapping singular terms onto 'negative' singular
terms (whatever that means!), it can't also be a sentential operator mapping a
sentence or proposition onto its negation, which is what it has to do in
relation to the
LEM and
the
LOC.
That is:
P1: N*(A)
º
¬*A.
Or even:
P2: N*(A)=¬*A.
[Where "N*" is just such a general 'negative operator'
(i.e., "Neg..."), "A" is a name variable again, "¬*" is the 'negative' particle in this modified logic,
and "º"
is the logical equivalence sign and stands for "if and only if". (I have used asterisks to
highlight the radically non-standard nature of the symbols I have employed here.)]
Of
course, given the above syntax, P3 is ill-formed, too. That is because neitherN*(A)nor¬*A are propositions, sentences, or clauses.
[Negating a name on its own simply yields another Noun Phrase, not an indicative
sentence or clause, while "º
"
can only operate on propositions, indicative sentences or clauses.] When actual names are
inserted -- so that P1 yields, say, "Neg(Socrates) if
and only if Not(Socrates)" -- it can be seen for what it is, unvarnished
nonsense --
as "Neg(Socrates) is identical with Not(Socrates)" is, too.
[Henceforth, I will omit reference to clauses when I am making the above points;
it should be assumed I intend include them unless otherwise stated.]
On the other hand, if the negative particle
above is a
sentential operator mapping a sentence or proposition onto its negation, then
it can't also be an operator mapping names in the above manner.
P3: N(A)
º¬A.
Or,
P4: N(A)= ¬A.
[Where "N" is a negative operator
("Neg..."), "A" is now a propositional
variable, and "¬" is the negative particle in standard logic
(i.e., "It is not the case that..."), which maps a sentence onto its negation.]
But, in this case,P4 would be ill-formed, too, since "=" can only be flanked by singular terms,
not propositions. Once more, if we insert actual sentences into P4, so that
it yields, for example, *"Neg(Paris is in France) is identical to it is not the case that Paris
is in France" we would see just as quickly that it is no less nonsensical.
P3,
on the other hand, seems alright as it is; while "Neg(Paris is in
France) if and only if it is not the case that Paris is in France" is
certainly odd, it isn't nonsense,
but that is only because N
now works as a surrogate for sentential or propositional negation, ¬.
Once
again, that is why it is so important to keep track of the denotation of each
letter A that Hegel and Lawler used --,
or rather, mis-used-- and why much was made of it
earlier. [And why
it is important to be clear about the precise logical role played by the negative particle.]
Recall, Hegel thought he
could derive the LOC from the LOI by claiming that the LOI "stated negatively"
is, or implies, the LOC. To that end, he argued that while the LOI is A = A, when stated (negatively) it is also "A
can't at the
same time be A and not A" -- or: "¬(A & ¬A)".
[Of course, there are
other ways of expressing the 'negative form' of the LOI; for example, ¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)]. However, the latter form presents
problems of its
own; they have been explored
here and in
Note 2, of Essay Eight Part Three.]
But, as far as
the LOC and the LEM are concerned, A can only stand for a proposition,
a
declarative,
an
indicative sentence, or even a statement (again, depending on one's philosophical logic)
-- i.e., it goes proxy for expressions that are capable of being true or false.
By
way of contrast, in the LOI, A goes proxy for a singular term; it isn't a
propositional, or a sentential, variable. So,
for example, "Caesar" -- a singular term -- on its own isn't capable of being true or false.
Hence, if
"¬" is taken to be a propositional or sentential operator, again,
mapping truths onto
falsehoods, or vice versa,¬A would make
no sense --
"It is not the case that Caesar" is, once more, nonsensical.
Alternatively, if A is a sentential or propositional
variable, ¬(A & ¬A) would become "It is not the case that Caesar is identical with Caesar and Caesar is
not identical with Caesar" (where, for instance, "A" stands for
"Caesar is identical with Caesar", and not just "Caesar" on its own, as would be
the case in the LOI), which seems to make sense -- but only if one is
thinking of questioning the LOI.
The other form mentioned above
-- i.e.,
¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)] --
fares little better (even if it isn't patent nonsense), becoming, for
example: "It is not the case that ((Caesar is identical with Caesar) and (Caesar
is identical with not Caesar))" --
that is, if ¬
now appears to function as both a sentential, or a propositional, operator and
an operator on singular terms!
Who exactly is this "not Caesar" person? [I have considered this
particular topic in more detail,
here. That is
quite apart from the fact that this example is susceptible to the fatal
objection mentioned earlier.]
On the other hand, if ¬ operates on names, or singular terms, then
¬(A & ¬A)
would make no sense, either. In that case, ¬(A & ¬A) would become "Not (Caesar
and not Caesar)". But, what does that mean? It isn't even a proposition. "Not Caesar" isn't an expression that is capable
of being true or false, nor is "Not (Caesar and not Caesar)". In which case, given this use of
¬, ¬(A & ¬A) can't be the LOC. "Not (Caesar and not Caesar)"
isn't the LOC, nor is it even a contradiction; it is either plain gibberish or it isn't a proposition.
The
other form (i.e., ¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)]) isn't much better since it pans out as: "Not ((Caesar is identical with Caesar) and (Caesar is identical with not Caesar))".
[This isn't to suggest that the negative particle can't attach to
names (on that, see
here),
only that when it does, it assumes an entirely different role -- and
hence it takes on a new meaning -- different from the role it occupies when it
operates on sentences or propositions. Indeed, as we have
seen, when the
negative particle attaches to a name (in what appear to be relational expressions
(e.g., "Paris is no Vienna", or "Brutus is not Caesar")), its role changes
dramatically. The sentences just quoted become "Brutus is other than Caesar" and
"Paris can't be compared with Vienna".]
The dilemma is now quite stark:
(1)
If ¬ operates on names, or singular terms, and if A is a
singular term variable, then A = A certainly seems to make
sense. But, in that case, the 'negative form' of the LOI -- ¬(A & ¬A), or even
¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)] -- turns out to be plain and unvarnished nonsense
when names are inserted once more: "Not
(Caesar and not Caesar)", (or "Not ((Caesar is identical with Caesar) and (Caesar is identical with not
Caesar))"!
(2)
On the other hand, if ¬ operates on sentences or propositions, mapping
them onto their negations, and if A is a
sentential or propositional variable, then the LOI, (A = A), would
become, for example: "Caesar is identical with Caesar is identical with Caesar
is identical with Caesar" (interpreting A in "A is identical with
A" as the
proposition "Caesar is identical with Caesar", again, yielding
"Caesar is identical with Caesar is identical with Caesar is identical with
Caesar"), which isn't the LOI!
Recall that in option (2), A has to go proxy for a proposition
or sentence (in this case "Caesar is identical with Caesar"), not a name.
Exception might be taken to
the use of A to stand for the
proposition "Caesar is identical with Caesar".
DM-fans can't
in fact lodge this objection since, as we have seen,
according to them and their sloppy
syntax/semantics,
these As can be anything we
please!
In that case, let us
take any randomly selected proposition to replace each A in the LOI. That
having been done, not much changes: "Paris is in France is identical to Paris is
in France". (Interpreting the A here as
"Paris is in France").
Remember this doesn't yield "'Paris is in
France' is identical to 'Paris is in France'", but "Paris is in France is
identical to Paris is in France". Is anyone prepared to accept that as an example of the
LOI?
[In case someone is prepared to so accept, I
have considered that
desperate (and unwise)
move,
here.]
So, Hegel was
only able to 'derive' the LOC from the LOI by allowing A
to slide effortlessly between two radically different semantic and syntactic roles:
between (i) denoting singular terms and (ii) denoting propositions, 'judgements', or sentences
(and, in fact, denoting a whole host of other things besides -- such as processes, concepts,
relations, relational expressions, etc., etc. -- on that, see an
earlier section of Essay Eight Part Three).
But, as soon that has been done, the
negative particle changes its meaning in the above manner -- that is, it changes
from a sentential operator to a name modifier, and we end up with unvarnished nonsense,
as we have seen.
"Ordinary language assumes
that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And,
within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the
fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change….
And they change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is
to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic
processes." [Rees (1998), p.45.]
The problem with this passage is that
it gets
things completely the wrong way round. It is in fact our use of ordinary
language that enables us to speak about change, movement and development. Complex
philosophical jargon (especially terminology invented by Hegel) is completely useless in this regard, since it
is wooden, static and of indeterminate meaning, despite what Rees asserts.
[Any who think differently are invited to reveal precisely which set
of Hegelian
terms is able do what the words listed below (or their equivalent in German)
already achieve for us, only better.]
As is well-known (at least by Marxists),
human beings managed to progress because of their interaction with nature and
their consequent development of the forces and relations of production, both constrained by the class war. In which case, ordinary language
-- the result of collective labour --
couldn't fail to
have a range of words with the logical and semantic multiplicity that
allowed its users to
speak about changes of almost limitless complexity, rapidity and duration.
This is no mere dogma; it is easily confirmed. Here is
a greatlyshortened list of ordinary words (restricted to modernEnglish, but omitting simple and complex
tensed participles and
auxiliary
verbs) that allow speakers to talk about changes of almost unbounded
complexity, swiftness and scope:
[In each case, where there is
a noun form of a word its verb form
has been listed (for instance, "object" as in "to object"). Moreover, where I
have listed the word "ring", for example, I also intend cognates of
the verb "to ring"
-- like "ringing" and "rang". I have also omitted
many nouns that imply change or development, such as "river", "runner", "wind",
"lightning", "tide", "cloud" and "fire".
Anyone who didn't know such words implied changing processes in the world --
that rivers flow, fires burn, runners run, tides ebb and flow or winds blow -- would
simply have advertised their lack of comprehension of English (or whatever language theirs happened to be),
compounded by a seriously defective, possibly even dangerous, knowledge of the world. So, not knowing that fires burn or rivers flow, for example,
could endanger someone's life. In addition, several of the above also have verb forms,
such as "fired" or "winding". Other nouns also imply growth and development,
such as "tree", "flower", "mouse", "day", "human being". Anyone who
thought "human being", for instance, reflected a 'fixed and changeless' view of
the world would probably be regarded as suffering from some sort of learning
disability. Either that or they would perhaps be thought in the grip of a rather
odd
philosophical theory of some description.]
Naturally, it
wouldn't be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally thousands
of entries -- on that, see
here and
here --, all capable of depicting countless changes in
limitless detail (especially if it is augmented with words drawn from mathematics,
science and
HM).
It is only a myth put about by Hegel and DM-theorists (unwisely echoed by
Rees and others -- such as W&G)
that ordinary language can't depict change adequately, since it is
supposedly dominated by 'the abstract understanding', a brain module helpfully identified
for us by Hegel without a scrap of supporting evidence, a brain scan or even the
use of a consulting couch. By way of contrast,
ordinary language
performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably
obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that wasn't broken.
Dialecticians
like Rees would have us
believe that because of the alleged shortcomings of the vernacular only the
most recondite
and abstruse terminology concocted by Hegel -- the meaning of much
of which is still unclear, even to Hegel scholars! -- is capable of telling us what
we already know, and have known for tens of thousands of years, that
things change!
Indeed, we read the following (about
ancient cosmology):
"Now, to understand the power of sacred cities and cosmic
shrines we have to understand the power of the cosmos. The ancients recognised
that there is really only one thing taking place in the universe, one expression
of transcendental power, and that is change. Day transforms into night. Each
night alters the shape of the moon. Seasons change. Seeds sprout into the light
and gradually grow into mature plants that flower and blow to seed. Through
metamorphosis, tadpoles become frogs, and caterpillars become moths. Our lives
change.... The world changes.... Everything changes, but for the ancients,
change occurred in an ordered and oriented world." [Krupp (1997), p.17.
Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]
It is preposterous, therefore, to suppose that the
ability to express change hadn't been incorporated into language many thousands
of years before 'Being' inflicted Hegel and his crazy ideas on humanity.
Of course, as Rees himself implicitly concedes,
Hegel's jargon has had to be 'translated' into 'ordinary-ish' sorts of words
for the rest of us to be able to gain even a
glimmering of the obscure
message it supposedly conveys -- that was the point of Rees's précis of a
key
Hegelian 'deduction', which many other Hegel scholars have also
'translated' for us (and which will be discussed in detail Essay Twelve Part
Five, summary
here); cf., Rees (1998), pp.49-50 --, the aim of which
was, apparently, to reveal that we can't
possibly understand change without such assistance!
[Although an earlier version of this 'derivation' was
published in Hegel (1977), Hegel's more 'mature' attempt to 'obtain' 'Nothing' from 'Being',
and then 'Becoming' from the 'relation' between those two, appeared in Hegel
(1999),
pp.82-108. As noted above, just like Rees, others have tried to make this incomprehensible
derivation 'comprehensible', for example: Burbidge (1995), pp.38-45; Carlson
(2007), pp.9-53; Hartnack (1997), pp.11-19; Kaufmann (1978), pp.199-203; and
Marcuse (1973)
But, if we already have
ordinary terms (like those listed above) that enable us to talk about and
comprehend change, what need is there for Hegel's
obscure terminology?
Conversely,
if, according to Rees, ordinary language is inadequate when it is faced with the
task of 'translating' Hegel's observations into something we can understand,
then how
would anyone be able to grasp what Hegel supposedly meant, or even
determine whether he meant anything
at all? Why translate Hegel into the vernacular if the latter can't cope?
On the other hand, if we are
capable ofcomprehending Hegel's obscure ideas only when they have been
rendered into ordinary-ish sorts of terms, why do we need his convoluted
jargon to reveal to us what it now turns out our language was quite capable of expressing
to begin with -- when (on this supposition)
it must have been adequate enough for just such a successful re-casting of
these very ideas (by commentators like Rees) for the rest of us to grasp? After all, that
is why they chose to translate it.
If ordinary language enables its users
to capture what Hegel meant, in what way is the vernacular defective? Alternatively, if it can't do this, then how might we ever understand Hegel?
In that case, if Hegel
were correct, no one (including Hegel himself!) would be able to
understand Hegel! That is because, ex hypothesi, his words would then be
incapable of being translatedin terms that anyone could comprehend.
Conversely, once
more, if Hegel's words are translatable in terms we can understand, that
must mean we
already have the linguistic resources available to us to comprehend change
perfectly well, thank you very much.
In which case, the following dilemma now
faces Hegel-fans:
(a) If we suppose Hegel were
correct (that ordinary terms can't adequately capture change), no one would be able to understand
Hegel; or,
(b) If we suppose Hegel were
mistaken -- and we are capable of understanding him enough to be able to say eventhat much --
no one need bother, since the vernacular would in that case be perfectly adequate
on its own.
Either way, Marxists
would be well-advised to avoid this obscure waffler like the plague.
It could be objected
that it isn't necessary to translate Hegel into ordinary language in order to
understand his work -- any more than it is necessary to understand, say, QM, by
rendering it in everyday
speech. In which case, the above
comments are completely misguided.
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
In response it is worth
making the following points:
(1) If the
above objection were valid, how would we be able to determine if anyone had ever understood Hegel? It
would be no good pointing to the hundreds of books and articles devoted to his
work
any more than it would be to point to the even bigger pile of books and articles
devoted to the Christian
Doctrine of the Trinity -- an equally obscure dogma that grew out of the
same
Neoplatonicswamp
that gave birth to Hegel's ideas -- as proof that that unintelligible theological
doctrine is comprehensible, too. In fact, Hegel scholars are in effect
little more than expertjargon regurgitators; that doesn't mean any
of it makes the slightest
sense.
(2) The word
"understand" is already in ordinary language, and therefore subject to
the same criteria we use to decide if anyone has actually understood something,
or is just spouting empty verbiage. [On that, see
here.]
(3) The
analogy with QM is unfortunate in view of the fact that leading physicists
themselves tell us that QM is
incomprehensible.
"Those who are not shocked
when they first come across quantum theory can't possibly have understood it." Niels Bohr
"If you are not completely
confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand it." John Wheeler
"Quantum mechanics makes
absolutely no sense." Roger
Penrose
"There was a time when the
newspapers said that only twelve men understood the theory of relativity. I do
not believe there ever was such a time. There might have been a time when only
one man did, because he was the only guy who caught on, before he wrote his
paper. But after people read the paper a lot of people understood the theory of
relativity in some way or other, certainly more than twelve. On the other
hand, I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics…. I
am going to tell you what nature behaves like. If you will simply admit that
maybe she does behave like this, you will find her a delightful, entrancing
thing. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, 'but how
can it be like that?' because you will get 'down the drain,' into a blind alley
from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that."
[Feynman
(1992), p.129. Bold emphases added.]
Video Two: "Nobody
Understands Quantum Mechanics"
Indeed, science itself is shot through with metaphor and analogy,
which often makes it difficult to interpret literally. [I will say more
about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two. See also
this quotation
from physicist, David Peat. Several other points raised by
the
above
objection will be dealt
with below.]
The idea that ordinary
language can't cope with rapid, slow or even protracted change may perhaps be
summarised by the following sentence (which seems to capture something of what
Rees had in mind -- those who think otherwise are encouraged to shelve their doubts for a few more paragraphs):
H1a: Ordinary language can't account for or depict
change.
But, is H1a itself written in
ordinary language? It certainly looks like it. If it is, it is pertinent to ask
what the word "change" in H1a actually means.
If we, as ordinary speakers,
do not understand this word, what precisely is it that Hegel and Rees are
presuming to correct? We may only be educated
if we know of what it is that we are ignorant -- that is, if we alreadyknow what change is
so that we can at least say that the ordinary word "change" fails to match,
by so much or so little, the ideal that others
might hold out for it. But, ex
hypothesi, we aren't supposed to know this since our language is allegedly inadequate in this area.
[Several obvious objections to this line-of-argument will be considered presently.]
This shows that the argument
here isn't just about language but about what it conveys to us; in this
particular case, what our words convey about change. Indeed, if we want to study
change, we may only get a handle on it by the use of words (albeit those that
are connected in some way with material practice, etc.), like those listed
above. Who on earth ever learnt
to use such words by reading Hegel?
Who has ever improved their use of such words in everyday life after reading
Hegel?
Contrast H1 with the following:
H1b: Ordinary language can't account
for or depict quantum phenomena.
T
he
situation with regard to change isn't at all like the comprehension of
QM, where
advanced knowledge of Physics and Mathematics is essential. That is not the case
with our use of words like those listed above. But,
"change", as it features in H1a -- if H1a is
indeed in
the vernacular --, can't be an example of the technical use of language, unlike
the complexities hinted at in H1b.
Of course, if H1a isn't in the
vernacular, and if "change" is also being employed as a specialised
term, then that technical use of "change" (call it "changet") will need to be
explained in terms of the
word "change" in the vernacular, or its cognates (call it "changev"), so that we might grasp what this
more complex, technical but typographically identical, word "changet" actually means
or implies.
And, if that is so, the ordinary word "changev",
or its cognates, would have to
appear in any explanation of "changet", or we wouldn't be able to understand it. But, that would just take us back
to where we were a few paragraphs ago. If we don't yet understand the ordinary word,
"changev", then we certainly can't use it in order to have the technical
version, "changet",
explained to us. But, without such an elucidation, if we don't yet know what the
technical term, "changet", means, H1a will remain incomprehensible
until we do. That is because
H1a would now contain at least one word (i.e., "changet") that,
on this view, no one -- not one single human being -- yet understands.
Unfortunately, this would mean that our knowledge can't be upgraded by means of H1a
--, or, for that matter, by the use ofany other sentence that employs
this as-yet-to-be-explained word, "changet".
H1a: Ordinary language can't account for or depict
change.
This
would in turn
imply that the 'dialectical' development of this word, or this 'concept', can't even begin,
for, as yet, all that the aspiring dialectician would have available to her/him
is this empty word (i.e.,
"changev"), which we have been led to believe we don't
yet understand. For all the use it would be, that word might just as well have been "slithy tove":
H1c: Ordinary language can't
account for or depict slithy tove.
At this point it could be objected
that our use of ordinary terms helps us partially grasp the nature of
change, but Hegel's language, or his method, provides the wherewithal for us to
comprehend the concept 'dialectically', and 'scientifically' (or, indeed, it
helps us grasp the real processes this concept reflects more fully -- that is,
when his ideas have been put the 'right way up'), as it were. So, it isn't true
that dialecticians don't understand the technical meaning of "change" (or its
dialectical/speculative equivalent) applied to natural and social phenomena.
Perhaps then Rees and other DM-fans meant the
following?
H2a: Ordinary language can't
fully grasp change.
H2b: Special terminology, or
a specially designed method, is required
in order to
enable our comprehension of change.
But, once again, what does
the word "change" in H2a mean? Is it being used in the same way that we use the
ordinary word "changev"? Or does it possess its own 'special', technical/dialectical sense
(call it
"changed"),
which has yet to be explained? If it does mean the same as the
ordinary term, then where does our common understanding of that word --
"changev"
-- (or
what it expresses), fall short?
Why do we need a theory to explain something we
already understand?
On the other hand, if our
common understanding of that word is
defective -- if users don't understand it -- then H2a will be incomprehensible as
it stands, since it contains at least one word
(i.e., "change") that no one comprehends.
Until we know the extent of our ignorance (or, indeed, where our ordinary
understanding of this word falls short) -- or even what the subject of this
query is actually
about --, all the technical and dialectical terminology in the world will be of no use, even to dialecticians!
H2a: Ordinary language can't
fully grasp change.
H2b: Special terminology, or
a specially designed method, is required
in order to
enable our comprehension of change.
Alternatively, if the word
"change" (or is it "changed"?) in H2a has its own 'special meaning', what is it? And, if it
does have its own 'special meaning', what sort of criticism of ordinary language
do H2a and H2b represent, especially if they aren't actually employing the vernacular term,
"changev", but a technical alternative,
"changed"
or even "changet"
(which are, as yet, devoid of any meaning, or at least any that has been explained to us)? Indeed, if in H2a the word "change" has
a technical sense -- again, "changed"
or even "changet"
--, how can those words with their special meanings be used to
criticise the ordinary word
"changev"
(or highlight its limitations) if
"changev"isn't itself being used?
On the other hand
again, if the word "change"
and any terms associated with it have a special dialectical
meaning -- "changed"
-- how might that 'meaning' possibly help anyone correct, or clarify, the ordinary
word,
"changev",if we still don't understand
"changev"
or "changed"?
And how might
dialecticians explain to themselves, or even to one another, what the special 'dialectical meaning'
of "changed"
is
if all they have available to them at the beginning of their investigation is the
ordinary (and defective) word
"changev", a
word that no one as yet comprehends?
This side of a
clear answer to these questions, H2a is as devoid of sense as H1a ever was.
H1a: Ordinary language can't account for or depict
change.
In response it could
be argued that H2a isn't about our understanding of the meaning of a
word; it merely reminds us that ordinary language can't be expected to operate
effectively outside its legitimate sphere of application (i.e., "beyond certain
limits"). No one expects ordinary language to cope with complex issues found in,
say, science and philosophy,
or, indeed, in relation protracted and complex social change. This impugns neither commonsense
nor the vernacular; it simply
reminds us of their limitations.
H2a: Ordinary language can't
fully grasp change.
Nevertheless, unless we are
told in what way the ordinary word,
"changev"
-- as we now understand it
--, falls short of whatever it is it is supposed to fall short of, a dialectical extension to our knowledge can't even begin.
So, the complicated somersaults that dialecticians subsequently perform are
irrelevant; given this view, we still don't know what the ordinary word,
"changev",
means -- or, if we do, we still don't know in what way it falls short of its
supposed 'dialectical ideal',
"changed".
In fact, if the meaning of
the word "change"
(in any of the above senses) is indeterminate, as it now stands, dialecticians can't even begin their
warm up exercises, let alone impress us further with their complex
gyrations. They can hardly correct our supposedly faltering grasp of the
ordinary word,
"changev", or its supposed 'limitations', without also having to use it. And just as soon
as they do that, their sentences would be subject to the same unspecified shortcomings.
It isn't possible to point out the limitations of the ordinary word,
"changev",
and
then use itas if it had no such limitations. That in turn means that if it does
have these 'limitations', they will be inherited by any sentence in which it is
employed.
This shows that H2a is
directly about our understanding of this word, for if
the word "change" (as it is used in H2a -- repeated below) doesn't mean
the sane as the ordinary word,
"changev", then the meaning of H2a
will itself be indeterminate. Hence, any
criticism that H2a is used to make of the vernacular (howsoever nuanced that turns out to
be) will now be devoid of content. And that is
because it contains at least one word whose meaning isn't yet understood --
"change"!
Again, it could be objected that no one is claiming that the ordinary word,
"changev", is understood by no one at all, only
that it can't handle complex processes that occur in nature and society.
But, if our understanding of the word
"changev" is even slightly defective (in the above areas), we certainly can't
use it while pretending to correct it. We can't feign comprehension of a
word for the sole purpose of revising its current (supposedly defective or limited)
meaning. That isn't because this would be a difficult trick to pull off, it is because
it is no more of an option
than, say, pretending (to oneself) to forget the meaning of a word while actually using
it meaningfully!
Conversely, if
"changev" has no meaning (or if it is unclear what it means -- or, indeed, if we
don't fully understand it), then, plainly, neither that word nor its meaning may
be corrected by means of any sentence that also contains this 'suspect' word (as
we saw in H2a). Once more, any attempt to do so must involve the use
of this defective word, thus compromising any sentence in which it
appears.
H2a: Ordinary language can't
fully grasp change.
So, if it is true that our
grasp of
"changev" is defective (in any way at all), then those very same
imperfections or limitations will be inherited by any sentence used by those who
seek to correct, or reform, it -- such as H2a (or its preferred 'dialectical'
equivalent). Clearly, in that case,
prospective revisers of the vernacular would be in no position to comprehend what
they themselves were
trying to reform, since they would be in the same boat as the rest of us,
using a word with unspecified shortcomings.
In reply, it is little use being told
that "Changev
has this or that shortcoming otherwise it is perfectly Ok in everyday contexts"
since that sentence too contains a word that is of indeterminate meaning --
namely, "changev"
-- vitiating this (nuanced) criticism. [I return to this attempt to
specify this word's alleged shortcomings,
below.]
On the other hand, if such
hypothesised/prospective linguistic, or conceptual, 'reformers' in fact
understand
the generic word "change"differently from the
rest of us, then any proposed modification to ordinary language would
onlyapply to their own special use of this novel term -- i.e., to a word that is
typographically identical to the ordinary word,
"change"
-- namely
"changed"
--, but which is itself
still of undisclosed
meaning --, but not to
"changev", as it is used in ordinary language.
The claim here, therefore, is
that with respect to the word
"changev", it isn't possible for anyone even to begin
to say in what way it fails to mean what it is ordinarily taken to mean -- or even
by how much or how little it falls short of this --, let alone entertain the possibility that it
might or might not mean whatever it now means, without using that word in any
attempt to do just that.
As to the claim that the
ordinary word
"changev" can't cope with long, drawn-out processes, it is
sufficient to point out that the use words found in the
above list (perhaps augmented
with words drawn from mathematics and science) means that ordinary language is perfectly able
to cope with changes of unlimited complexity or duration, and far better than anything
Hegel came out with -- especially now we know that, if his theory were
incorporated into Marxism,
change would be impossible.
It could be argued that this would make the translation of foreign words into,
say, English impossible. In addition, it would render dictionaries totally useless.
Neither of these objections
is relevant. We translate foreign words into English using words we
already understand, and which words to be translated are also understood by
those who use that (foreign) language long before they were translated. In contrast, the above ruminations concern the use
of a word in relation to
which it isn't possible for anyone to point out its limitations without also
using the same word in that
very act. And, plainly, any sentence in which that word is
used can't fail to
inherit these
unspecified limitations,
making such sentences no less defective.
On the other hand, if sentences that use
"changev" have a clear sense, then that word must
be alright as it is,
vitiating
the whole exercise.
More-or-less the same
comment applies
to the use of dictionaries, the
successful employment of which depends on its compilers
defining words (a proportion of which might be unknown to many of its users) in terms we already understand.
If, however, no one knows what "change"
really
means, or if it has unspecified shortcomings, then no one would know
precisely what it was that was being corrected or re-defined, still less how to go about doing
it. And that observation also applies to those who compile dictionaries. Such
a word wouldn't
appear in those dictionaries.
Consider an example taken
from Essay Six: if
someone wanted to know what "meskonator" meant, but could find no one who knew
what it meant -- and
there was no one who did know --, then, plainly, it wouldn't appear in a
dictionary. If, on the other hand, someone claimed to know what this word meant,
but they also let slip that there were unspecified 'difficulties' with their
comprehension of this word, and could, or would, say no more, then that word would still
fail to appear in a dictionary. Dictionaries typically contain words that human
beings use, or have used, with comprehension.
[That isn't to suggest that everyone comprehends every single word in a
dictionary -- but if no oneunderstood a given 'word', not even
the compilers, it wouldn't be listed. What would be the point? Has anyone found
"meskonator" in a dictionary? [Let me know
if you have.] In fact, a Google search will show that that 'word' is only
to be found at this site, but nowhere else in the entire internet.]
Again, it could be objected that we correct each other regularly
concerning the misuse of certain words -- indeed, correcting
malapropisms depends on this. For instance:
"Mrs.
Malaprop said, 'Illiterate him quite from your memory' (obliterate) and
'She's as headstrong as an allegory' (alligator)." [From
here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
That wouldn't be possible if the above comments were
the case.
Once more, that objection
isn't relevant. If and when we correct one another, at least one party to that social
interaction would have to understand the corrected words aright
before the other was corrected.
Or, in the case of malapropisms, someone would have to understand both words
in order to correct someone else with the correct and appropriate word. The same
is the case with
Spoonerisms, only more so.
In the foregoing -- with respect to "change", and because of this theory, DM
--,
that isn't
the case. We are given to believe that we have a defective understanding of
"changev",
and have yet to be given a clear explanation of "changed"!
Some
might feel that my comments rely on the word "change" (or even
"changev") having one and only one
correct meaning; but that objection, too, is
misguided.
Howsoever many meanings this word has in ordinary language, no one would be able
to use it in any sentence seeking to
correct a specific use of it if every single one of its many meanings
was defective in
some as-yet-unspecified way. Or, perhaps less radically: no one would be able to
do so even if that were the case
merely with respect to
a restricted sub-set of its
relevant ordinary
connotations
-- i.e., those of concern to dialecticians.
Consider the following 'attempt' to revise,
or correct, the word in question:
H3: "Change"
doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means:
"development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real
material forces in a mediated totality."
If so, then H3 should be re-written
as follows:
H4:
"Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real
material forces in a mediated totality" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe;
it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions
understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."
[Any who think H4
is ridiculous are encouraged to shelve those concerns for a few more paragraphs.
The
point of using it will soon become clear.]
The replacement of the word
"change" in H4 with what it allegedly means just creates an empty
sentence (and the same would happen with respect to any of its cognates --
indeed, Hegelians and DM-theorists are free to replace the proposed 'dialectical meaning' of "change"
offered above with whatever formula they deem fit, the result won't change (irony intended)).
[Incidentally, this argument
(and those above) can be generalised to cover any and
all attempts to 'correct' the vernacular.]
If it is now objected that the above
example is
unfair -- or even ridiculous --, then it behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary
words for change (or what they relate to) fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short
of -- without actually using the word "change" (or any of its synonyms
or cognates)
anywhere in that attempt.
That was the point of
using the 'ridiculous' example recorded in H4. Objectors don't have to use the
suggested replacement employed in H4 -- namely "Development over time as a
result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a
mediated totality" they can insert whatever they feel is the equivalent of
"change" in order to help puzzled onlookers get the point. Short of doing that --
i.e., short of indicating in what way our ordinary words for change
fall short without actually using the word "change" --
such an objector's own
use of this word (or one of its cognates, or even a favoured replacement) to express her/his objection (howsoever
mild, attenuated, nuanced, or 'dialectically-motivated' it happens to be) will be subject to the very same
unspecified shortcomings, and the objection itself would fail for lack of
determinate content.
In that case, such
an objector would find herself in a worse predicament than the rest of us
supposedly are.
That is because she will now be unclear, not just about our
ordinary words for change, but about the application of her own
non-standard, jargonised replacement for it, since she will
necessarily be unclear
about what they were supposed to be replacing or correcting!
It could be objected that this particular manoeuvre confuses
use with mention; in H3
the word "change" isn't being used, merely mentioned, so its replacement with "Development over time as a
result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality" (which is what that word is used to mean) is illegitimate.
H3: "Change" doesn't mean
what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over
time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces
in a mediated totality."
Fair enough; in that case consider then the following:
H3a: Change doesn't mean
what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time
as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.
H3a should perhaps then be re-written
as follows:
H4a: Development over time as
a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a
mediated totality doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe;
it means: development over time as a result of internal contradictions
understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.
Once more, if the word "change"
in H3a (now
used, not mentioned) actually means something else (or, the
processes in reality it supposedly depicts aren't as we ordinarily take them to
be), which would imply that we are all currently mistaken about its real meaning, then
H3a must be meaningless, too -- or, at best, it must be of indeterminate sense. In that case,
the only way that H3a
could be made comprehensible would be to replace the
meaningless term it contains (i.e., "change") with words that H3a
tells us
constitute its 'real meaning' -- illustrated in H4a. The result is, if anything,
even worse.
Once more, it isn't possible to revise or adjust the meaning of "change" without
using that very word itself (with its unspecified shortcomings), thus rendering
any such sentence devoid of sense.
Again, that was the point of using the 'ridiculous' examples above.
It could be argued
that the if foregoing argument were valid, that would mean we would be unable to correct inadequacies in the use of
any
word whatsoever. For example, someone might choose to say that the war in Iraq
was
"unfortunate". If the above conclusions were legitimate, no one would be able to point
out that this particular word was totally inadequate in such a context.
Again, this is an irrelevant
objection. The word "unfortunate" in the above counter-example isn't
being criticised because it is inadequate in (possibly) all of its applications, only that
it is the wrong word to use here. In this example, no one would be seeking to
correct or revise the meaning of "unfortunate", nor suggest that it was
universally inadequate, or that no one understood, or even fully understood,
that word. Indeed, and to the contrary, it is easy to see that this word is inappropriate
in this context because of
what it already means.
This isn't how things are
with any attempt to correct the meaning of the word "change". Indeed, if DM-theorists are
to be believed, this word has unspecified and universal inadequacies, which 'shortcomings' must of
necessity
also feature in the very act of pointing this alleged fact out -- nullifying that criticism.
And, as we have just seen, any attempt to specify its alleged shortcomings falls
apart, too.
It could be countered that
this isn't in fact the case with the use of "unfortunate"; someone could
complain about its use along the following lines:
H5:
"Unfortunate" is totally inadequate to capture the magnitude of the unmitigated
disaster in Iraq.
Once more, the use of H5
would only work in the way intended if the above objector was appealing to the
current meaning of this word (or, at least, one of its current meanings) to show it is inadequate just here,
in this context, but who wasn't seeking to alter or revise it, as
was the case with H3/H3a and "change". Once more, it is because
"unfortunate"
already means what it does that makes it inappropriate in this instance.
The
volunteered objector isn't
suggesting we continue to use the same word with a new meaning attached
to it, or even with a revised meaning, only that
its current meaning renders is inadequate to the task it has been
given.
H3: "Change"
doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means:
"development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real
material forces in a mediated totality."
H3a: Change doesn't mean
what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time
as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.
It could be
argued that that is precisely why H5 was introduced as a
counter-example, because the current meaning of "change"
is "inadequate to the
task it has been given", namely in relation to dialectical
change.
H5:
"Unfortunate" is totally inadequate to capture the magnitude of the unmitigated
disaster in Iraq.
However, with respect
to "unfortunate" no one is claiming it is defective or
inadequate in every way, only
that it was the wrong word to use in this case because of the meaning it
already has. Now, with respect to "change", no one is suggesting it is the
wrong word to use, only that it was incapable (in some unspecified way)
of depicting..., er..., change! But, that just takes us back
to where we were several paragraphs back.
Again, it could be argued
that the type of 'analysis' promoted in H3 and H4 could be applied to any word
with equally ridiculous results. Consider, for example, the following:
H6: "Recidivist"
means "a second offender; a habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms
of imprisonment under habitual offender statutes."
H7: "A
second offender; a habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms of
imprisonment under habitual offender statutes" means "a second offender; a
habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms of imprisonment under
habitual offender statutes."
Transforming H6 into H7 shows
how misguided the above argument is. The definition of any word can be
reduced to absurdity if that definition is substituted for the word in question,
as was attempted in H4.
Or, so this objection
might proceed.
However, the difference here
is that H6 doesn't
seek to re-define the given word, or point out its 'real' meaning (the latter
of which is supposed
to be different from its accepted meaning), or even claim that no one
knows its 'true' meaning, as was the case with respect to
H3 and "change". Nor is it suggesting that "recidivist" is
inadequate to the task in hand, unlike "change", because of some unspecified
shortcomings. As noted earlier:
[I]t
behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary words for change (or
what they relate to) fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short of
-- without actually using the word "change" (or any of its synonyms
or cognates)
anywhere in that attempt.
That wasn't the case with
"recidivist".
On the other hand, had
H6 instead been the following, the above objection might have had a point:
H8: "Recidivist" doesn't mean what we ordinarily take it to mean (i.e., "a second
offender; a habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms of imprisonment
under habitual offender statutes...."), it means "A, B and C".
Where "A, B and
C"
stands for the preferred replacement, or even the 'real meaning' of the term to
be defined.
In that case, we might conclude:
H9:
"A, B and C" doesn't mean what we ordinarily take it to mean, it means
"A, B and C".
In this case, the only way
that H8
could be made comprehensible would be to replace the
meaningless term -- or term with indeterminate meaning -- it contains (i.e., "recidivist") with words that H8
tells us
constitute its 'real meaning' -- as illustrated in H9. In
so far as H8 seeks to re-educate us about a word that we do not yet understand,
it
collapses into absurdity in H9. If we don't do this then we would be forced to
use a word that no one understands (i.e., in this manufactured example
"recidivist"), rendering H8 incomprehensible.
Recall, given this latest
example (i.e., H8),
it isn't the case that one, and only one, individual on the planet has failed to comprehend "recidivist"
(just as it wasn't the case earlier that only one individual failed to
comprehend "change"). If H8 is to work, not one single person on
the planet would actually understand the given word.
[Naturally, H9 is absurd. But
that is because no one in their left or right mind would try to tell us that the
rest of us don't understand a given word, and thatonly they do.]
It might now be objected that this would undermine
the use of
stipulative definitions,
or re-definitions, of certain words -- that is,
definitions which establish by fiat the new meaning of words already in use, or
even the meaning of newly introduced words --
neologisms.
Again, this response is
misplaced. Stipulative definitions don't seek to re-define the meaning of ordinary words in their
entirety, merely introduce a new meaning, or extend the old, which
already have an accepted meaning. That isn't the
case with H3. When someone introduces a new word, or they are re-defining a word
already in use, they aren't telling us that up until now no one has understood,
or fully understood, some term, or that the term that everyone has been using
for years is defective (in some as yet unspecified way).
H3: "Change" doesn't mean
what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over
time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces
in a mediated totality."
Once more, it could be
objected that this would mean that language couldn't change, or that we wouldn't be able to understand
any earlier uses of typographically similar words, perhaps those employed hundreds of years
ago.
In fact, the second half of the above
worry is simply
a variation of the 'translation' objection fielded earlier. The reader is
therefore referred back
to it.
The first half of the above
objection is, though, slightly more complex. Unfortunately, in that it uses the
word "change" to make its point, it can hardly be advanced by anyone querying
the universal applicability of that very word! Hence, until it is rephrased in a
way that doesn't use this term (or any other related
ordinary word for change), not much can be done with it.
Nevertheless, this account of
the ordinary use of "change" (in this Essay) doesn't in fact rule out the evolution of language. To see this, consider the
following:
H10: The word "XXX" used to mean
"YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".
Now, H10 isn't the
following:
H11: The word "XXX" does not mean,
and has never meant, "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".
The argument being advanced
in this Essay doesn't deny words meant different things in the past, or that
they will do so in the
future, only that whatever they legitimately once meant can't change,
even if it later takes on a new meaning. So, if a word -- say, "XXX" -- meant something specific in the past --
"YYY", for example --, that past meaning, "YYY", plainly won't have changed,
since, to state the obvious, the past doesn't change. So, if "XXX" meant "YYY" in
and around, say, 1567, then
nothing we now do, or can even try to do, will change that fact, or the meaning
it had back then -- even if
"XXX" later meant something different, or now means
something different. Nor does it imply that no one understood, or fully understood, the old
meaning of words like this back then.
However, the 'dialectical
theory' being criticised here is in fact
saying something far more radical. It is telling us that a specific word, "change" (and
its related terms, now or in the past), never
in the entire history of humanity captured what dialecticians would now like to tell us
is the 'real meaning' of "change". Hence, the 'dialectical' view is in fact a
more extreme version of H11.
H11a: The word "XXX" does not mean,
and has never ever meant, "YYY"; it really means "ZZZ".
In response, it could be objected that despite this the
approach adopted in this Essay still can't account for linguistic change. "Indeed,"
an objector might continue, "why
can't we inflict some of Ms Lichtenstein's own moves on the above
sentences?"
H12a: "XXX" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".
H12b: XXX used to mean YYY, but now it means
ZZZ.
Perhaps along these lines,
replacing "XXX"/XXX with "ZZZ"/ZZZ:
H12c: "ZZZ" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".
H12d: ZZZ used to mean YYY, but now it means
ZZZ.
Which neatly mirror H3 and H4:
H3: "Change" doesn't mean what ordinary
language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result
of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in
a mediated totality."
H4: "Development over time as
a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a
mediated totality" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe;
it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions
understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."
Initially, in response to this latest criticism, it is worth pointing out that the more radical
versions of H3 and H4 (i.e.,
H3a and H4a) were in the end the preferred alternatives, since they
neutralised the 'use/mention objection':
H3a: Change doesn't mean what ordinary
language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time as a result
of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.
H4a: Development over time as
a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a
mediated totality doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe;
it means: development over time as a result of internal contradictions
understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.
This means that H12a is now irrelevant.
If, however, we modify H10 accordingly
(as H13), my
reply should
become a little clearer:
H13: "XXX" used to mean YYY, but now it means ZZZ.
[H10:
The word "XXX" used to mean
"YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".]
An actual example here might
help:
H14: "Lunatic"
used to mean someone affected by the moon [Skeat (2005), p.351)], now it means
they are insane.
Hence, given the view advanced here, the
old word
still means what it used to mean -- that is, when we read old manuscripts
that employ this word, we don't replace the old meaning with what this word has
now come to mean, we still read it with its old meaning in place. What we
now
have is a modern, typographically
identical token of "lunatic" with a new meaning. But, no one is questioning that earlier
meaning. No one is suggesting that several centuries ago people didn't mean by "lunatic" someone affected by the moon,
or even that no one understood that word back then.
Now, if would-be
critics want to revise a word in common use, all well and good; no
problem with that. But this
can't affect the ordinary meaning that that word currently has (or even once had). Such a revision would
merely relate to this new, and typographically identical,
word with its new, or extended, meaning.
On the contrary, no attempt
could be
made to undermine or question the meaning that a word already has without
that revision itself descending into incoherence, or undermining itself, as we have seen.
So, neither H12c nor H12d is a relevant objection to the
case being presented in this Essay.
H12c: "ZZZ" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".
H12d: ZZZ used to mean YYY, but now it means
ZZZ.
It could be objected once
more that this misses the point; a philosophical understanding of change
-- which might have a role to play in the natural or the social, sciences on the
lines advocated by dialecticians -- doesn't seek to replace ordinary language, which is quite adequate
in its own sphere of application. It is aimed at augmenting our comprehension of
natural and social development, for political or other purposes. The
vernacular is inadequate only when we try to use it to account for complex
processes in the natural or social world. That is where Hegel's ideas can
be of genuine assistance (i.e., when the "rational core" of his system has been separated from
its "mystical shell", put "the right way up", and then tested in practice).
Or, so this
latest rebuttal might insist.
However, as we will see in
other Essays posted at this site, not only is the above incorrect in general --
in that it is the conceptual wealth possessed by ordinary language which enables
the comprehension of simple and complex changes in nature and
society --, it is misguided in particular. That is because we are
still in the dark over what it is that dialecticians are actually proposing,
or what they are presuming to add to our understanding of a word neither they
nor anyone one else yet fully comprehends, even according to them. Once
more, if our (collective) understanding of the word "change" (or, indeed, any other
drawn from the vernacular) is defective (in any
way at all, and no matter how slight or nuanced that is), then
any use of that word in an attempt to correct these unspecified defects (or
even vaguely hint at them) must self-destruct, too.
Of course, it could be argued that there is no such thing as a "collective
understanding" of this or any other word.
That complaint will be tackled head-on
in Essay Thirteen
Part Three. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to point out that if that were the case, then dialecticians themselves would
be even more in the dark over what they were effecting to revise or criticise,
since they wouldn't now be able appeal to a standardised
set of meanings -- commonly held -- that they are seeking to 'correct' or extend.
After all, Hegel himself had to appeal to the
limitations of that mysterious 'faculty', "the abstract understanding", to motivate his own (egregiously defective) 'logic'. If there
is no such thing as "the abstract understanding", then his theory can't even loop the first
Hermetic loop. As
should seem obvious: in order to
criticise 'commonsense', or common understanding, or even allude to their
shortcomings, it isn't a good idea to tell
us there is no such thing to begin with!
Quite apart from that, we
would surely be unwise to listen to dialecticians trying to extend our knowledge
of 'change',
nor yet to those regaling
us with the 'superiority' of their 'theory' over any other, if they have yet to succeed in
explaining clearly to the rest of us a single one of their ideas (which,
as I have shown in these Essays, they have so far failed to do), or, indeed, until they have repaired the
gaping holes I have punched in Hegel's 'logic' elsewhere at this site (for example,
here
and
here).
Howsoever limited ordinary
language is -- or isn't --, when
it is used in relation to HM,
the latter makes eminent good sense. DM (with its obscure Hegelian
jargon and radically defective 'logic', upside
down or 'the right way up')
has yet to come within a couple of
parsecs of
this minimal condition
(and that comment applies to
'systematic'
and 'academic' dialectics, too --, perhaps even
more so).
Hence, their
assistance in this respect is surplus to requirements. Indeed, if
their help were ever to be accepted, DM would set back the scientific study of
nature and society by at least two-and-a-half thousand years, since it
represents a return to a
mystical and enchanted view of natural and social
development. We might as well ask Astronomers to take account of Astrology in their
endeavour to understand the universe -- or medical doctors take up crystal
gazing.
Small wonder then that Dialectical Marxism is to
success what
Donald Trump is to
telling the truth.
In that case, as far as rival (scientific
or philosophical) theories are concerned (i.e., those that actually help us understand the world and how to
change it), DM doesn't even make the
bottom of the reserve list of likely candidates. We would be more inclined
to accept 'Trump Thought' instead:
Video Three: Donald Trump
Shows DM-Fans
How To Explain Stuff
HM, on the other
hand, minus the Hegelian
gobbledygook, is far more than merely adequate.
And that is why we can be
confident that not even Hegel understood his own 'theory'. That
isn't because it is difficult, nor yet because it employs specialised
terminology (which is completely incomprehensible to untrained readers, and
arguably even to trained readers, too). Nor
is it because Hegel didn't use H3 (or anything like it). It is because as soon as any attempt is
made -- by anyone, even a person of "genius" -- to correct ordinary
language, or,
as soon as the vernacular is dismissed as defective, or even slightly
flawed, and its terms are held to be deficient when applied beyond "certain
limits", requiring that they be "surpassed", by-passed or revised --
all meaning
evaporates, and along with that goes comprehension. The systematic
production of obscure jargon and endless verbiage, à la Hegel, doesn't
imply there is anything there actually to understand, either, still less
that Hegel understood his own work.
[A similar, but more detailed
argument concerning what Hegel did or didn't understand about his own theory can
be found
here.]
To repeat, it isn't possible
to pretend to understand an ordinary word like "change" and then claim that it
is defective
(whether or not "speculative reason" suggests, or even "demands",
it). Either:
(i) That objector's understanding of this word is itself defective, and the ordinary term is
alright as it is, or,
(ii) The ordinary word is defective and no one (including
that objector) actually understands it, and so should stop using it.
In the second case,
there would be nothing comprehensible left to modify; in the first, no one need
bother.
Finally, of course,
it might be possible to construct a technical definition of "change",
perhaps along the following lines:
T1: Concerning
object, B, let the set of true propositions/indicative sentences
about B at time t1
be {P1,
P2,
P3,...,
Pi,...,
Pn},
where n is indefinitely large.
T2: Call that set, "Ω".
T3: For any object,
B, B will have changed if at least one of those
propositions, Pi
at
t2, is no longer true, but is false
(t2
> t1).
T4: That is, at t2,
PiÏ Ω.
Unfortunately, the
above 'definition' presents nearly as many problems as there are words
in T1, which I won't enter into here (I will return to it in Essay
Twelve Part Seven). Those problems become slightly less numerous if we
switch from propositions/indicative sentences to properties. The only
point I wish to make here is that howsoever we try to define "change",
that won't affect the ordinary meaning(s) of that word, nor will it
raise any doubts about the adequacy of its meaning(s) -- and for reasons
outlined in this main subsection.
It
might still be objected that ordinary language is obviously inadequate
in scientific and technical contexts (let alone in Metaphysics),
in which case, it needs reforming, supplementing or augmenting
in some way, or to some extent.
And yet, science has managed to make significant progress over the last
four hundred years without having to reform the vernacular, even if
scientists have had to develop their own specialised and technical
vocabulary (some of which has been drawn from the
vernacular). The problem (if such it may be called) only
surfaces when attempts are made
to translate scientific concepts into ordinary language. Since there
is no scientific need to do this (although there may be
powerful ideological and economic reasons why some might want to
do it, as will be argued in Essay Thirteen Part Two), the alleged clash
between ordinary language and science is completely bogus.
Of course, no one is
suggesting that ordinary language can be used in highly complex,
theoretical areas of research (although, even technical scientific
and mathematical papers have to use ordinary words at some point, and
they certainly can't stray too far away from utilising ordinary grammar
if they want to make sense), but that is no more a limitation on the
vernacular than it is a defect of Das Kapital that it can't
predict winning lottery ticket numbers.
Metaphysics (partly) arose
out of the ancient belief that there were philosophical 'problems' about
existence, 'reality' and humanity (etc.) that only
expert (and socially 'superior') theorists were capable of solving -- or even understanding
-- 'problems' which many later thought lay beyond the capacity of the sciences to
handle.
Keith Thomas highlighted a similar tactic among 16th
century magicians:
"It would be tempting to
explain the long survival of magical practices by pointing out that they helped
provide many professional wizards with a respectable livelihood. The example of
the legal profession is a reminder that it is always possible for a substantial
social group to support itself by proffering solutions to problems which they
themselves have helped to manufacture. The cunning men and wise women had an
undoubted interest in upholding the prestige of magical diagnosis and may by
their mere existence have helped to prolong a mode of thinking which was already
obsolescent." [Thomas (1972), p.295.]
Even though Thomas
subsequently
rejected this as an adequate explanation of this phenomenon, he notes that the
'special' skill these magicians
arrogated to themselves (that is, the ability to
solve 'problems' they had invented) provided them with a
livelihood, a level of prestige and social standing that they wouldn't otherwise have enjoyed. Of course, with respect to
superstition and magic, Marxists also take into account their origin in the alienated lives and beliefs of
susceptible audiences -- the latter of which would have included, of course, many ordinary
people.
Clearly, this isn't the case
with Metaphysics, which was (and still
is) practiced almost solely by rather more 'select' and 'exclusive' social
classes. Hence,
Thomas's reason for rejecting his own tentative explanation of the persistence
of magical beliefs (i.e., that magicians provided a service which
ordinary people actively sought) doesn't apply to Metaphysics. Moreover,
his account explains neither the overwhelming influence of Metaphysics on
almost every aspect of 'western' and 'eastern' thought over the last 2500 years (it is, indeed, a
ruling
idea), nor,
indeed,
the longevity and persistence of Traditional Philosophy (with precious little to show for it
after all the time and effort
spent on it --, so
this pointless activity can't be justified on
purely economic grounds). Of course, Thomas's comments weren't designed to
do that.
However, one reason usually given for
the prevalence, or the ubiquity, of metaphysical beliefs is that everyone (including
ordinary folk) at some point in their lives has, or expresses, philosophical
puzzles of some sort, or they ask
these questions or they ponder such issues. This is supposed to show that philosophical problems
enjoy universal appeal and legitimacy. Hence, the argument in support appears to
be the following: if everyone
thinks metaphysically (at some level at some point in their life), its existence can't be the result of its invention by an
elite group of thinkers, as is alleged at this site.
Nevertheless, it is worth
noting the following considerations in response:
(1)It
is important to distinguish the confused and impromptu musings
that many individuals indulge
in from time to time on
such things as the nature of space, time, 'God', 'good' and 'evil', the 'soul',
or the purpose of human existence (i.e., 'the meaning of life'), from the systematic
study of metaphysical questions by those who have the necessary means, leisure
time, education and training so to do (i.e., professional philosophers,
theorists, sponsored, patronised and wealthy 'amateurs').
(2) Contrary
to the above supposition it
isn't being suggested here that metaphysical beliefs were invented by
the ruling-class (or their hangers-on), only that the systematic study of Metaphysics is the sole
preserve of those who have (knowingly or not) consistently promoted a highly
abstract, theoretical and ultimate view of
'reality', an approach which has invariably been conducive to the interests of the rich
and powerful, or the interests of those who seek to replace them as the next
ruling elite. [On that, see
Essay
Twelve -- summary available
here.]
(3) The fact that ordinary
people indulge in amateurish metaphysical musings from time to time no more
makes Metaphysics a legitimate pursuit than it would do the same for religious
and theological discourse. Ordinary people don't suddenly turn into theologians
if they wonder whether there is a 'god', an 'after-life', or whether we have
'souls'.
If and when they do so ponder, that still
fails to legitimate Theology and religious belief.
The same
applies to Metaphysics. So, ordinary people don't become metaphysicians if they
wonder what time really is or whether there is such a thing as truth.
(4)
The
widespread confusion that holds both groups in its thrall -- that is, professional
metaphysicians and amateurs -- derives from two immediate sources:
(a) The misconstrual of ordinary words as if they stood for the real relations between things, or,
indeed, were those
things themselves, and (b) As Marx noted, the
systematic misuse
and distortion of language, conflating linguistic rules with fundamental
truths about 'reality'.
[This approach
to the nature and source of metaphysics is fully substantiated in Essay Twelve
Part One.]
However, and
independently of this, only 'professional metaphysicians' have an
easily identifiable ideological
motive for projecting these distorted linguistic forms onto the world as a fetishised
reflection of social reality, expressed in, or by, a systematic theory or set of
theories. This they
do because:
(i) Their philosophical theses mirror the world as they see it (i.e., a universe
governed by hidden forces, concepts and "essences"), (ii) It assists in the
'legitimation' of class division, gross inequality, oppression and exploitation. [Historically, it is
relatively easy to show that this has indeed been the case with
most, if not all, metaphysical systems.] And (iii) These days this approach to
'genuine' philosophy is good for the CV. [Again, these topics will be expanded on
in Essay Twelve.]
Lay
metaphysicians, on the other hand, have no class-based motivation to fetishise
their own language in like manner -- not the
least because to do so would clash with the way they already employ the
vernacular in their everyday lives.
In fact, if
ordinary folk
in their day-to-day
activity were to emulate the
approach adopted by metaphysicians, they would probably
be regarded as psychotic, deranged or delusional. Which reminds one of the old
joke:
NN: "The great questions of
philosophy interest me: Who am I? What am I? Where am I?"
NM: "Sounds more like
amnesia to me!"
Or:
MM: "Is this the Philosophy Department?"
MN: "If we knew
the
answer to
that, we
wouldn't be here!"
To be
sure,
the insular existence of professional metaphysicians mercifully protects them
from themselves (as it were). It is only when they
have to engage in everyday practical activities alongside the rest of us that
their metaphysical theories look decidedly weird, if not completely ridiculous
--, even to themselves --, as
David
Hume
acknowledged:
"I dine, I play a game of
backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or
four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so
cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into
them any farther.
Here then I find myself
absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other
people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural
propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this
indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of
my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the
fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of
reasoning and philosophy." [Hume,
Treatise, Book I Section VII. Paragraphs
merged.]
Clearly, that is because it
is in ordinary life that the alleged
clash between philosophical musings and 'commonsense' actually surfaces -- i.e.,
"Where the rubber hits the road", as they say in the USA. When metaphysicians
have to behave like 'ordinary folk' in the real world, their metaphysical
fancies lose all credibility. Not one single sceptic or idealist (short of being
suicidal) will fail to jump out of the way of a bus or a tram that is headed
their way, preferring to pause and try to work out if that perception is 'real'
or imaginary. Not one single philosophical materialist will treat his/her
children or relatives as no more than a complex array of biological imperatives,
chemical reactions or electrical impulses, a result of the interplay between natural selection and random mutation. Not one single scientific
realist, or empiricist, will fail to respond to a red traffic light on the grounds that
red is only a 'subjective experience'. Not one single metaphysician will turn up
late to an interview because 'time is an illusion'. Not one single theist, who
might fervently intone the belief that "God is on our side because our cause is just", will fail
to take cover when fired at by the enemy -- although some believers can be
found who have failed to do this, but only because they thought they were
wearing a
'magic' vest.
Small
wonder then that Traditional Philosophy has solved not one single
philosophical 'problem' in
over 2500 years -- as Peter Hacker reminded us:
"For two and a half millennia some of the best minds in
European culture have wrestled with the problems of philosophy. If one were to
ask what knowledge has been achieved throughout these twenty-five centuries,
what theories have been established (on the model of well-confirmed theories in
the natural sciences), what laws have been discovered (on the model of the laws
of physics and chemistry), or where one can find the corpus of philosophical
propositions known to be true, silence must surely ensue. For there is no body of
philosophical knowledge. There are no well-established philosophical theories or
laws. And there are no philosophical handbooks on the model of handbooks of
dynamics or of biochemistry. To be sure, it is tempting for contemporary
philosophers, convinced they are hot on the trail of the truths and theories
which so long evaded the grasp of their forefathers, to claim that philosophy
has only just struggled out of its early stage into maturity.... We can at long
last expect a flood of new, startling and satisfying results -- tomorrow.
"One can blow the Last Trumpet once, not once a
century. In the seventeenth century Descartes thought he had discovered the
definitive method for attaining philosophical truths; in the eighteenth century
Kant believed that he had set metaphysics upon the true path of a science; in
the nineteenth century Hegel convinced himself that he had brought the history
of thought to its culmination; and Russell, early in the twentieth century,
claimed that he had at last found the correct scientific method in philosophy,
which would assure the subject the kind of steady progress that is attained by
the natural sciences. One may well harbour doubts about further millenarian
promises." [Hacker (2001), pp.322-23.]
[Some
might think that several 'philosophical problems' have been solved by the natural
sciences. That objection will be defused in Essay Thirteen Part Two. Others might
think that it isn't in the purview of philosophy to 'solve problems'. Well, in
that respect at least it has succeeded admirably. Otherwise, it is an open
admission that Traditional Philosophy is indeed useless.]
Since ordinary language has
developed in an unplanned way over tens of thousands of years it can be
imprecise and ambiguous, and it is manifestly 'non-scientific' (i.e.,
non-technical). Many ordinary terms are vague, and surface grammar encourages users to form, or
to ruminate on the import of,
potentially misleading expressions (but that comment only implicates the unwary, the
unwise, or the obtuse), forgetting, albeit temporarily, that neither we nor they use
the vernacular in such 'metaphysical' ways in ordinary life. As Wittgenstein
pointed out:
"Why is philosophy such a complicated
structure? After all, it should be completely simple if it is that ultimate
thing, independent of all experience, that you make it out to be. Philosophy
unravels the knots in our thinking, hence its results must be simple, but its
activity as complicated as the knots it unravels.
"Lichtenberg:
'Our entire philosophy is correction [sic] of the use of language, and therefore
the correction of a philosophy -- of the most general philosophy.'... You ask why grammatical problems are so
tough and seemingly ineradicable. -- Because they are connected with the oldest
thought habits, i.e., with the oldest images that are engraved into our language
itself (Lichtenberg)....
"Human beings are deeply imbedded in
philosophical, i.e., grammatical, confusion. And freeing them from these
presuppositions [amounts to?] extricating them from the immensely diverse
associations they are caught up in. One must, as it were, regroup their entire
language. -- But of course this language developed as it did because human
beings had -- and have -- the tendency to think this way. Therefore
extricating them only works with those who live in an instinctive state of
dissatisfaction with language.
"Language has the
same traps ready for everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false
paths. And thus we see one person after another walking down the same paths....
"One keeps hearing
the remark that philosophy really doesn't make any progress, that the same
philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who
say that don't understand the reason this must be so. The reason is that our
language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same
questions. So long as there is a verb 'be' that seems to function like 'eat' and
'drink', so long as there are the adjectives 'identical', 'true', 'false',
'possible', so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of
space, etc., etc. humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious
difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove.
"And this, by the
way, satisfies a longing for the transcendental [an alternative version of the
manuscript has 'supernatural' here -- RL], for in believing that they see the
'limit of human understanding' they of course believe that they can see beyond
it.
"I read
'...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of "Reality" than Plato got...'.
What a strange state of affairs. How strange in that case that Plato could get
that far in the first place! Or that after him we were not able to get further.
Was it because Plato was so
clever?" [Wittgenstein (2013), pp.311-12e. Italic emphases in the
original; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at
this site. Several paragraphs merged; link added. When Wittgenstein says that
language has remained constant he isn't denying change; what he is referring to
are its nominal, adjectival and verb forms, and the metaphors and
analogies that cause perennial problems, those that puzzled Plato and still
puzzle us today.]
However, this doesn't
mean that ordinary language is defective. Far from it, ordinary
language was founded on conventions and material practices that our species has
shaped and re-shaped, developed and refined over tens of thousands of years, during which the vernacular functioned
perfectly well as a means of communication. The vagaries of ordinary language
enable its users to communicate effectively over a much wider range, and across a
far broader and expansive subject area, than would otherwise be the case if it were overly precise.
When required, however,
precision is relatively easy to achieve; indeed, at the risk of deliberate and
determined pedantry, almost any degree of accuracy is attainable. It is also
worth recalling that much of our mathematical vocabulary is already part of
ordinary language (many of its terms initially arose out of the vernacular, anyway). In addition, the
potentially misleading grammatical forms which the vernacular contains only
succeed in confusing users when they attempt to reflect on language itself (which
we/they are ill-equipped to do -- why that is so will be explored in
Essays Twelve Part Seven and Thirteen
Part Three).
Typically, this doesn't happen when users employ the vernacular in everyday life;
in the normal course of events, these potentially misleading grammatical forms
don't interfere with communication, nor do they baffle
ordinary speakers, since puzzles like these don't arise in such circumstances.
These considerations not only
account for the vibrancy of ordinary language, they shed light on a source of
many of the 'paradoxes' and philosophical 'problems' created by its misuse.
While ordinary language couldn't function without the aforementioned features --
i.e., vagueness,
ambiguity, metaphor, synonymy, antonymy,
prosody,
etc. --, but, they can also create confusion and misunderstanding if they aren't handled with due sensitivity; or, dare I say
it, they aren't handled with no little common sense. Nevertheless, these
features also lend to language sufficient
space, enabling a seemingly limitless expansion of its expressive and
communicative powers -- in the Arts, for example.
However, the downside of this
is that it is all too easy to misconstrue ordinary language when users
try to reflect on it theoretically -- i.e., when language "goes on
holiday" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein). This occurs whenever the vernacular is
employed in areas that are either far removed from, or are insulated against,
everyday life --, or when its representational and communicational forms are
conflated.
As will
be argued at length in
Essay Twelve
Part One, philosophical
pseudo-problems arise out of, or because of, the mis-construal
of
rules of language as
if they were
Super-Empirical propositions, which are then taken to reflect substantive,
even 'hidden' and 'essential', aspects of
'Reality' (or 'Being'). Forms of representation are thereby transmogrified into 'metaphysical truths',
valid for all of space and time, and, because they are based on a familiar use
of language (albeit distorted and misinterpreted), not on the facts, they
seem impossible to doubt.
DM-theorists, for
example,
are guilty of doing exactly this in connection with
their ham-fisted 'analyses' of the LOI and the LOC. Instead of viewing
them as badly stated or misconstrued rules of language, they
follow Traditional Theorists and regard them as Super-Truths, valid
everywhere and everywhen. The only difference is that for dialecticians, while these 'laws' are
still regarded as 'abstract truths', they are also said to be limited
in scope, since they 'can't handle change and
development'; they only apply to an 'unchanging world', and collapse into absurdity
when faced with reality. So, they regard them as truths, not rules, albeit with
limited applicability. In the course of which, DM-fans
also
confuse the use of the negative particle with a destructive/preservative process in
nature and society (i.e., in relation to the NON). If
language and logic are interpreted along these lines -- as some sort of code, or
body of truths, which somehow
reflects or expresses an underlying, hidden 'reality'/'essence' (when understood 'dialectically') -- its
role becomes
primarily representational, instead of being primarily a means of
communication. The result of this traditional view of philosophical theory is the construction of
yet another version of LIE -- indeed, as we saw in Essay Three
Part One.
[LIE =
Linguistic
Idealism; LOI = Law of identity'; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction;
NON = The Negation of the Negation.]
[The substantiation and
development of the above ideas constitutes one of the main themes of Essay Twelve
(summary
here). Other
points connected with this
topic have been aired in several Essays at this site. For example, the
question whether language
is a means of representation or of communication was handled in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.
There, it
was shown that representational theories of language
were invented by Traditional Theorists in the Ancient World who were concerned to argue that discourse (particularly
the writtenword) is
a secret code invented by 'the deity' that they alone were capable of understanding.
That 'code' somehow maps-out, or even mirrors, fundamental,
"essential" aspects of 'Being',
inaccessible to the senses. This then 'allowed' them to claim that this 'secret code'
-- translated into impenetrable jargon, and kept that way in order to exclude
it from the
prying eyes of the vast majority -- enabled them to re-present to themselves 'God's' thoughts.
This then supplied their patrons (in the
various ruling elites that history has inflicted on humanity) with an epistemological and ontological rationalisation
of, and 'justification' for, the status quo, the content of which varied
as each Mode of Production and form
of the State
required. In order to
do this, Traditional Theorists had to
depreciate and
undermine 'commonsense', as
well as the communitarian and
communicational nature of language
-- and hence they had to devalue the
vernacular. That explains why practically every single Traditional Philosopher
--
and now, almost without exception, DM-theorists -- denigrate and depreciate
to a greater or lesser extent the
ordinary language
and common experience of the working class.]
Now, as
far as the supposedly fraught relationship between the vernacular and philosophical-, or metaphysical-language is concerned,
there can be no conflict --
that is, no more than there can be a genuine clash between, say, the nonsense
rhymes of
Edward Lear
and ordinary discourse. That is because metaphysical language is non-sensical
and incoherent.
Admittedly, ordinary language has changed in countless ways over the course of
history. We are now capable of forming sentences and expressing thoughts that
our ancestors couldn't. Doubtless this process will
continue. But, ordinary language remains the highest, if not the final, court of
appeal for human beings in their endeavour to understand anything.15
That is because its historically-, and socially-conditioned conventions -- by
means of which we learn to apply it -- express and delimit our capacity to comprehend anything
whatsoever.
The above
claims might appear somewhat dogmatic, but that isn't so. It is based on the
simple observation that words like "understand", "comprehend", "know" and
"grasp" are already ordinary language terms, and they gain whatever meaning
they
have from the conventions and practices governing their current employment. They
don't gain their meaning from technical, imaginary or ideal
applications, nor do they derive meaning from
abstractions that are only accessible to Traditional Philosophers -- or
even Marxist intellectuals. Words like those mentioned above can't be challenged
without that attempt itself collapsing into incoherence -- as was
demonstrated earlier in connection with "change", and will
be illustrated further elsewhere at this site with respect to several other ordinary terms.
The bottom line is that while scientists may quite legitimately introduce
neologisms to suite
their own aims and intentions, scientific language itself can't confront (or reform) ordinary
language without
undermining itself.
Moreover,
ordinary language isn't a theory; it neither encapsulates a "folk
ontology" nor a "folk metaphysics". It isn't identical with common sense
-- even though it
isn't unconnected with it.
Those seemingly dogmatic assertions will now be
defended.
Many
revolutionaries
and DM-theorists clearly believe that ordinary language is 'ideological', or
that it encapsulates (at some level) a ruling-class or 'commonsense' view of
'reality', which in turn means that ordinary language is compromised by, or expresses, bourgeois ideology.
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental
reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and
apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is
"yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For
him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be
itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another;
cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.
"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to
us very luminous,because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only
sound commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own
four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide
world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and
necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the
nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a
limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in
insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets
the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets
the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their
motion. It can't see the woods for the trees." [Engels
(1976), p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphases added.]
"Dialectic training of the mind, as
necessary to a revolutionary fighter as finger exercises to a pianist, demands
approaching all problems as processes and not as motionless categories. Whereas vulgar evolutionists, who limit themselves generally to recognizing
evolution in only certain spheres, content themselves in all other questions
with the banalities of 'common sense.'" [Trotsky
(1971), p.70; bold emphasis added.]
"Voloshinov's starting point is the
ideological nature of all signs, including language. He defines a sign as
that which 'represents depicts or stands for something outside itself'
(Voloshinov 1973:9). This correspondence is an essential feature of all signs….
Sign systems exist side by side with material reality, not independently of it.
"'A sign does not simply
exist as a part of reality -- it reflects and refracts another reality.
Therefore it may distort that reality or be true to it, or it may perceive it
from a special point of view…every sign is subject to the criteria of
ideological evaluation…. The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of
signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is
present too….' (1973:10…)
"The quality of signs to represent, to
'reflect and refract
another reality', to interpret, is what gives them their conceptual potency and
makes words the very stuff of ideology…." [Holborow (1999), p.25; quoting
Voloshinov (1973), pp.9-10. I have destructively criticised this passage, and
others like it, in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
"The word as an ideological sign par excellence. The ideological
neutrality of the word....
"Any ideological product is
not only itself a part of reality (natural or social), just as is any physical
body, any instrument of production, or any product of consumption, it also, in
contradistinction to these other phenomena, reflects and refracts another
reality outside itself. Everything ideological possesses meaning: it
represents, depicts or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words
it is a sign. Without signs there is no ideology. A physical body
equals itself, so to speak; it does not signify anything but wholly coincides
with its particular, given nature. In this case there is no question of
ideology.
"However, any physical body
may be perceived as an image; for instance, the image of natural inertia and
necessity embodied in that particular thing. Any artistic-symbolic image to
which a particular physical object gives rise is already an ideological product.
The physical object is converted into a sign. Without ceasing to be a part of
material reality, such an object, to some degree, reflects and refracts another
reality....
"Signs are particular,
material things; and, as we have seen, any item of nature, technology, or
consumption can become a sign, acquiring in the process a meaning that goes
beyond its particularity. A sign does not simply exist
as a part of reality -- it reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore it
may distort that reality or be true to it, or it may perceive it from a special
point of view. Every sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation
(i.e., whether it is true, false, correct, fair, good, etc.). The domain of
ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one another.
Wherever a sign is present, ideology is present, too. Everything ideological
possesses semiotic value.
"Every
ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow, of reality, but is also
itself a material segment of that very reality.
Every phenomenon functioning as an ideological sign has some kind of material
embodiment, whether is sound, physical mass, colour, movements of the body, or
the like. In this sense, the reality of the sign is fully objective and lends
itself to a unitary, monistic, objective method of study. A sign is a phenomenon
of the external world. Both the sign itself and all the effects it produces (all
those actions, reactions, and new signs it elicits in the surrounding social
milieu) occur in outer experience....
"But
nowhere does this semiotic quality and the continuous, comprehensive role of
social communication as conditioning factor appear so clearly and fully
expressed as in language. The
word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence."
[Voloshinov
(1973), pp.9-13.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[E]veryday
commonsense thought was a mass of contradictions that could only be resolved by
moving to progressively greater abstractions.... Hegel is also difficult for reasons that
are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms and
concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of which
everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are
stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these
are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of
Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change
because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that
Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes…. It is the
search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past commonsense
definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998), pp.41-50. Bold
emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
Here, too, are Woods and Grant:
"The
most common method of formal logic is that of deduction, which attempts to
establish the truth of its conclusions by meeting two distinct conditions: a)
the conclusion must really flow from the premises; and b) the premises
themselves must be true. If both conditions are met, the argument is said to be
valid. This is all very comforting. We are here in the familiar and
reassuring realm of common sense. 'True or false?' 'Yes or no?' Our feet are
firmly on the ground. We appear to be in possession of 'the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth'. There is not a lot more to be said. Or is
there?.... (p.90;
or p.94 in the second edition of
RIRE)
"Formal logic (which
has acquired the force of popular prejudice in the form of 'common sense')
equally holds good for a whole series of everyday experiences. However, the laws
of formal logic, which set out from an essentially static view of things,
inevitably break down when dealing with more complex, changing and contradictory
phenomena. To use the language of chaos theory, the 'linear' equations of
formal logic cannot cope with the turbulent processes which can be observed
throughout nature, society and history. Only the dialectical method will suffice
for this purpose.... (p.94;
or p.99 in the second edition)
"In the same way, if we ask,
'Is it night or day?' the answer will depend on where we are. In London it is
day, but in Australia it is night. Day and night are relative notions,
determined by our position on the globe. An object will appear bigger or smaller
depending upon its distance from a given point of observation. 'Up' and 'down'
are also relative notions, which changed when it was discovered that the world
is round, not flat. Even to this day, it is hard for 'common sense' to accept
that people in Australia can walk 'upside down'. Yet there is no
contradiction if we understand that the notion of the vertical is not absolute
but relative. For all practical purposes, we can take the earth's surface to be
'flat' and therefore all verticals to be parallel, when dealing for instance,
with two houses in one town. But when dealing with far larger distances,
involving the whole earth's surface, we find that the attempt to make use of an
absolute vertical leads to absurdities and contradictions." (p.155,
in both editions) [Woods
and Grant (1995/2007); quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
[We have already seen that
W&G's claimsabout logic might as well have
been written by
Enid Blyton-- since they are entirely fictional. For example, they confuse valid arguments
(where the premises don't have to be true) with sound arguments
(where the premises have to be true). They compound these basic errors by
further confusing FL with "common sense"! W&G also advance the bizarre (and
unfounded) claim that "common sense" finds it difficult to accept that in
Australia people walk upside down!]
[FL = Formal logic; W&G =
Woods and Grant, authors of Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]
Despite the
above, the vernacular
isn't a theory, nor does it encapsulate one -- which means it isn't
ideological, either --, since every empirical proposition expressible in ordinary
language is pairable with its negation, and so can readily be contradicted in the
vernacular. No theory could survive if that were to happen to all its
empirical propositions. [That particular argument will be defended and then illustrated
by a range of
examples in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published in 2020.]
Here is John Rees again:
"Hegel is also difficult for reasons that
are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms and
concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of which
everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are
stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these
are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of
Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change
because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that
Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes…. It is the
search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past commonsense
definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998), pp.41-50. Bold
emphasis added.]
Contrary
to what Rees asserts, ordinary
language not only doesn't, it can't assume anything. Plainly, it is human beings who assume
things, and they do so by means of the language they use. Unless language had the
capacity to allow for the possible truth or the possible falsehood of
these assumptions, and that of their negations, no assuming could even begin. That is, of course,
because assumptions can be correct as well as incorrect. [Admittedly, it could be
argued that Rees was employing
metonymy here. Maybe so, but the point still stands. Language isn't an
autonomous system; it takes human beings to give it life.]
Moreover,
the rich and diverse vocabulary available to ordinary speakers also allows for the assumption
(but it is far more than just this!)
that objects can and do change -- and in complex ways, too. Indeed, ordinary
language enables its users to speak about and study a wide variety of changes in seemingly limitless detail. A long list of just some of the words
available in the vernacular that enable this was given
earlier.
Hence, and despite what Rees says, the sophisticated nature of ordinary
language permits the formation of the following sentences that depict
change with ease:
H78:
This protest is increasing in size as we watch.
H79: That case is becoming
too heavy for the children to carry.
H80: This venue is now
too small for our meetings.
H81: This spider's web
is beginning to disintegrate.
H82: This train
is being re-painted.
H83: That light over there is
defective; it keeps flickering.
H84: This is how to
lose members rapidly: spout dialectics at them.
H85: This dispute is
no longer about working conditions.
H86: This entire continent is
moving closer to Asia.
H87: That is how to
break an egg.
H88: This is how to
change workers' minds.
H89: This
π-bond breaks
in less than 5 nanoseconds if the molecule is rapidly heated.
H90: In an instant the
pickets had re-grouped ready for the next police charge.
Many of
the above sentences are somewhat stilted because they have been deliberately
tailored to use the words "this" and "that" (i.e., the form of words that Rees
employed to caricature the vernacular), in order to show that "things and ideas"
aren't "assumed" to be stable -- contrary to his assertion. However, the
above list of examples at
least demonstrates that even using Rees's implausible and highly
restricted phraseology, ordinary language is capable of expressing
material changes (especially if it is augmented with words drawn from science
and mathematics), something Hegel's tortured prose can't emulate -- that is, not
without raiding the vernacular, or aping the protocols of ordinary discourse, to assist it do just
that.19
Even
given this highly limited and constrained form of language, the above list of sentences can
easily be extended. Of course, if the full range of words and phrases available to
ordinary speakers were called upon (H90 being just one such example),
it would be possible to form an indefinitely large set of sentences of far
greater sophistication than anything dreamt of in Hegel's work, picturing changes of every imaginable type.
This shows
that ordinary language is capable of depicting (and thus permitting the explanation
of) change in the
real world far better than any philosophical theory yet devised.
Now, this isn't
something that a sophisticated user of English (like John Rees) should have to have
pointed out to him -- even though my having to do so is a sad reflection of
the intellectual decay that 'dialectical thought' induces in those held in its thrall.20
Hence, it is a little rich of Rees
proclaiming the superiority over the vernacular
of language
employed by Hegel -- and later, DM -- since, it now transpires that if, per
impossible, DM were 'true', change would be impossible.
'Commonsense' is often confused with ordinary language. Unfortunately, the term
"commonsense" is rather vague.22 Bertrand Russell once claimed
"commonsense"
encapsulated the "metaphysics of
savages", but even he would have been hard-pressed to say what it was, let alone how he knew so much about it.
We have already seen that W&G think it has
something to do with FL
-- and that those held in the grip of "commonsense" are
somehow incapable of coming to terms with the idea that people in Australia
supposedly walk 'upside down'!23
If the
phrase has any clear meaning, it appears to denote an
inchoate but changing set of beliefs and opinions that most (all?) human beings are supposed to possess, or to
which they assent whether or not they are aware of it. [But, even that
depends on who is telling the tale!] If this were so, it would
mean that this set of beliefs
must have been communicated telepathically from individual to individual,
one generation or one community to the next, across the planet down the
ages. How else are we to account for the alleged universality of
'commonsense'? And yet, at no point in life has a single human being ever been
tutored in 'commonsense'; no one runs through a set of its canonical ideas at school,
sat at their
parents' feet, or even behind the bike sheds at break (recess) with their friends. Nobody studies
'commonsense' at college, nor do they take tests, sit exams in it or receive a diploma
confirming their
competence. That being the case, we should perhaps stop calling it "common".
One thing is
reasonably clear about 'commonsense': it
can't be all
that common or we should all be experts at identifying its core ideas, or
being able to say
where they came from. But nobody seems able to do this -- at least, not with any
consistency.23a
Moreover, if
'commonsense' is encapsulated in or by ordinary language, it is remarkably
well hidden, for, as noted above, no one seems able to list its core ideas
with any consistency, or even minimal concord. In that case, no society in history could possibly have reached
agreement over what should be included among our 'commonsense' beliefs/'values'
or, indeed, what should be left out. Hence,
the belief that 'commonsense' today is the same as it was two thousand years ago
(or even last week), and that it is identical across one or more cultures --
or even the opposite of that --, if correct, must be one of
the best kept secrets in human history. If no one ever talks about this
hypothetical set of beliefs and no one knows
what it includes, it is no surprise that it remains a mystery how it is, or could be,
propagated within or between populations, or how one generation could pass
'commonsense' on to the next. Is it in the
water? In the 'ether'? Is it genetically encoded?
It could be countered that
the everyday lives and surroundings we share (perhaps under capitalism) mean that we all come
to accept certain beliefs about ourselves, those around us, our work and the
nature of the society we inhabit.
But,
if any of the above were the case, we would all possess the same,
or largely the same, set of 'commonsense' beliefs; and
yet, as far as can be ascertained, we don't. Or, rather,
it seems that no one is
able to say whether or not we all share the same set, since, as noted
above, no one seems quite able to list the 'commonsense' beliefs held by
everyone
-- or, indeed, held even by themselves. [Readers are invited to try to list their own
'commonsense' beliefs
-- and good luck with that!] Still less is it clear how 'commonsense' might be
distinguished from what are simply widely-held beliefs. Of course, since
we all live different lives in different countries in different generations
(many in different classes), it
is highly implausible to conclude we do share a common set of beliefs.
But, even if that were so, is such a set of widely held beliefs the same as 'commonsense'?24
For example, is it a
'commonsense', or a widely held belief, that dogs have four legs? What
about the belief that grass is green or that the sky is typically to be found above our heads?
Even more problematic: how would it be possible to confirm the presence or existence of these beliefs
and attitudes, or determine what they are, without biasing the result?
By that I mean the following: anyone who attempted to show that certain 'commonsense' beliefs
were
accepted by all or most human beings would have to appeal to evidence that was
already
'contaminated' with these allegedly 'commonsense' beliefs themselves -- for
instance, that there really are medium-sized objects in the world called "human
beings", that there are such things as colours (so that, for example, any
assertion that human beings believe there are colours isn't an empty idea in
itself), or that there are
edges, corners, surfaces and holes at large in the world (so that the words
associated with each of these might possess or convey meaning), and so on. In short, if
this evidence is to make sense to the rest of us (and, indeed, to anyone hoping
to sell this
tall story), then those appealing to it will have to take for granted many supposedly 'commonsense' ideas
themselves.
And what questions, for example, could be asked of the subjects targeted by any such research? "Do you believe in
tables and chairs?" "What noise do cows make?" "Is water wet or dry?" "Are fires
hot or cold?" "Is this a dog or cat?" At which point one might just as well
reach for Janet and
John books.24b
Be this as it may, the sorts of beliefs
that some
appear to associate typically with 'commonsense' ideas include such things as
ideological, metaphysical, religious, 'folk', mystical or superstitious notions. Again, the list of likely candidates varies according to
who is telling the tale. For example, we find two comrades, in an
otherwise excellent article on 'privilege theory', using this term to refer to
how oppression manifests itself to most of us (I am inferring they mean most of us, here):
"In seeing the world through the prism of 'unearned advantages' [that is,
advantages supposedly conferred on individuals because of their skin colour,
sex, or the class they were born into -- RL]
privilege theory reflects the common sense appearance of how oppression
functions
-- men on average do earn more than women; white people are proportionately less
likely to be stopped by the police than black and Asian people. But to
understand how oppression works, we have to look beneath the surface at how
society functions and in whose interests. As Karl Marx argued: 'All science
would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things
directly coincided'.... [The authors are here quoting
Marx (1998), p.804.]
Today, while it is true that
the genuine growth in the desire for unity and the opportunities to generalise
struggles remains, the rise of privilege theory as a common sense outlook on
oppression risks resurrecting some of the same divisive moralism we hoped to
have put behind us." [Choonara and Prasad (2014), pp.85-89. Bold emphases
added. Paragraphs merged.]
We have
already seen other Marxists
linking 'commonsense' with metaphysics,
FL, 'vulgar
evolutionism', ordinary language, changeless objects, and how people in
Australia are viewed! Now it is connected with how we (all?) supposedly perceive
oppression.
We also find the late
Chris Harman, for
example, trying to explain 'commonsense' in his summary of
Gramsci's ideas about
it:
"His starting point is that
most people's ideas are shaped by a hotchpotch of differing and sometimes
contradictory notions. These flow from the interaction between people's
experiences and the prejudices of the society they live in. The hotchpotch is
what is usually referred to as common sense. But in fact it makes it
difficult for people to fully understand the forces shaping their lives and the
possibilities of confronting them. Activists who say they do not need theory,
and follow the dictates of common sense are, in reality, failing to take the
effort to understand the world and their place in it." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphasis added.]
So, 'commonsense' is now a
contradictory "hotchpotch" which somehow "flows" from the alleged interaction
between experience and the prejudices that surround us all!
Here is Bertell Ollman with a
very broad 'definition' of this troublesome notion (which he only succeeds in
making even more troublesome!):
"Common sense is all that strikes us as being obviously true,
such that to deny any part of it appears, at first sight, to involve us in
speaking nonsense. In this work, I shall use 'common sense' as well to refer to
that
body of generally unquestioned knowledge
and the equally unquestioned approach to knowledge which is common to the vast
majority of scholars and laymen in Western capitalist societies."
[Ollman (1976),
p.5. In the published version this appears as a footnote to p.5, but in the
on-line version it appears in footnote 6. Bold emphases added.]
However, what is "obviously
true" to, say, a Quantum Physicist, a Brain Surgeon or a Civil Engineer isn't
always the same as what is "obviously true" to a hospital porter, a miner or a
car worker. It might be "obviously true" to a mathematician that while there is
a greatest even prime number there is no greatest prime number as such, but is
that "obviously true" to many others? Furthermore, a "body of unquestioned
knowledge" will contain entries that refer to things that actually change
-- for example,
the belief that rivers flow, fires burn and horses gallop --, contrary to what
Engels and other DM-fans try to tell us about 'commonsense' -- i.e., that it
'assumes' things are
'static'. In fact, the vast majority of Marxists will accept the vast
bulk of what is
contained in the aforementioned "body of unquestioned knowledge". How many
revolutionary socialists will question much that has been discovered over the
last forty or fifty years -- and is now part of "unquestioned knowledge" -- in,
say, medicine, biochemistry, engineering, electronics, computer science, or mathematics?
Ollman's 'definition' is so
vague, broad, and indiscriminate that it is impossible to connect it with
anything that other Marxists have said about 'commonsense'. In which case, his
'definition' can't even form part of Marxist commonsense about 'commonsense' -- since
it isn't part of "generally unquestioned" (Marxist) knowledge.
We needn't labour this point any longer; it is
now reasonably clear that the word "common" is misplaced here. In which
case, one is tempted to say that the idea that there is such a thing as
'commonsense' must itself be a "scientistic folk belief", since
it isn't based on a clear definition, let alone any clear evidence --, at
least, as noted above, none that hasn't
already been 'tainted' by, and expressed by means of, the sort of ideas some would
already classify as 'commonsense'!
So, since nobody appears to know which beliefs are to be added to or
left out of the favoured list,
the word itself is something of a misnomer. If 'commonsense' had ever lived up
to its billing, we would all be much clearer about its content. It would
be, after all, eminently common.
Even so,
almost invariably, the relationship between 'commonsense' (whatever it finally turns out
to be!) and ordinary language
is assumed to be reasonably obvious; indeed, the latter is supposed to
contain or express the former. So clear and obvious is this link
imagined to be, and so universally is this belief held, that no one (literally
no one (!) -- as far as I have been able to ascertain) questions it. Even
Wittgenstein seems at times to have made this mistake!
But, while no competent
speaker
is in much doubt about his or her own language, nobody seems to be able to
say what 'commonsense' is, or what it encompasses. Even though not all of us enjoy a mastery of language equal to that of its most
accomplished speakers or writers, no one (novice and skilled adeptalike) seems to know
exactly what 'commonsense' is. This is quite remarkable if the two are as intimately
connected as we have been led to believe.
The case
for identifying the two is no less questionable. Again, as noted above,
ordinary language is supposed to contain, or express, 'commonsense' ideas.
However, when pressed to fill in the details, those wishing to lump the two together
are often reduced to making a few vague references to
things like sunrise, solid objects, colour
vision, the possession of two hands, an assortment of psychological or 'mental'
dispositions and 'processes' we often attribute to ourselves and others, a set
of perceptual conundrums, a handful of proverbs and 'wise' sayings, a few vague
moral, political or ideological nostrums, as well as the odd superstition or
two. [On that, see
here.]
In fact, the haste to identify the two isn't just unwise, it is ideologically-motivated (as will be
demonstrated in Essay Twelve, summary
here).
On the
other hand, had more than a moment's thought been devoted to this
pseudo-identity, its absurdity would have been immediately apparent: if
ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense', it would be
impossible to gainsay any of the latter's alleged deliverancesby means of
ordinary language.
The plain fact is, we can. And
relatively easily,
too.
Not only
are we able to deny some or all of the following: that tables are solid, that the sky is blue, that the
earth is flat, round or cucumber-shaped, that NN believes (for most p) that
p,
that NMψ-ies, that sticks bend in water, that Queen Elizabeth II is sovereign in Parliament, that water falls off a duck's back, that Rome was built in a day,
that an apple a day will tend to reduce the number of visits from your doctor, that
φ-ing is wrong, or, indeed, right (for any conventional φ),
that Capitalism is fair, that human beings are 'naturally' selfish -- we
can do so in every known language that possesses the relevant
vocabulary. That is, of course, the whole point of the negative particle.25
If ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense', none of this
would be
possible.
[It is worth recalling that
we can deny falsehoods just as we can deny truths, which is why a few from both
categories were included in the above
paragraph. "NN" and "NM"
go proxy for (human) Proper Names; "p" is a propositional variable (standing for sentences such as "Grass is
green" or "Water is wet"); "φ"
is a noun-, or verb-phrase variable (standing for terms such as "murder",
"scabbing", or "voting Tory"; "ψ"
stands for 'psychological' verb phrases, such as "hopes", "intends", "thinks",
sometimes qualified in the following manner "NN believes that...",
etc.]
To be sure, many of the beliefs entertained by our ancestors we no longer hold,
but as far as the connection between 'commonsense' and the vernacular is
concerned, sentences drawn from the latter
gain what sense they have because of conventions that have been established in
and by social practices developed throughout human history. Although we can express
beliefs in ordinary language, the sense of an indicative sentence expressing
such beliefs doesn't arise from any of
the beliefs we hold, nor from any we have inherited from the past.
That is because beliefs themselves are dependent on language and thus on our
capacity to articulate them
accordingly. And we can be sure of that fact if language is social --
otherwise beliefs couldn't be expressed or communicated, let alone formed.26
Just as
social practices themselves can't be altered individualistically (any more than
the value of money can), the conventions underpinning language can't be revised at will
by any single
individual, or even by a group (except perhaps at the margins).27
The conventions implicit in our practices at any point in time, of course,
change and grow in accord with the protocols of social development. They are, at basis, just
another, perhaps more overt,
expression of our "species
being", and are therefore
intimately connected with our interactions with the world, our relationships with one
another, and the links we have with previous generations, albeit constrained, corrupted and
deformed by class society.28
Hence,
just as it would it be impossible for an individual to bury, hide, or incorporate
a set of beliefs in ordinary language in order to form the backbone of
'commonsense', it would be equally impossible for a group to do so.
In that
case, it really isn't up to a revolutionary, or party of revolutionaries (or
anyone else, for that matter), to disparage such a vitally important expression
of our collective (but changing and class-divided) humanity -- i.e., ordinary
language. Whether
revolutionaries do so
or not
is plainly up to them; the 'penalty' (if such it may be called)
for even attempting to do
it isn't always immediately obvious. However, anyone who tries to undermine the vernacular will soon find their ideas descending into
the sort of incoherence we met above with the respect to the word
"change" (and as will be further demonstrated in other Essays posted at this
site in relation to different sets of words). In that case, attacking the vernacular isn't a viable option,
since such a strategy will always backfire.
That means
this isn't an ethical issue; it is logical and political. The latter half of that assertion will now
be substantiated...
[The rest of this material will appear in Essay Twelve Part Seven, when it is published.]
Additional Notes
In what follows, several of the Endnotes
which form part of Essay Twelve have been
omitted, hence its rather odd numbering!
15.Of course, this will be controversial only
to those who have already allowed Traditional Thought to dictate or distort their view of
ordinary language -- even while they use it to express any such objections they
might have to
it.
So, since the use of ordinary language
underpins our understanding of anything whatsoever, it is the court
of last appeal --, which, while it isn't democratic (in one sense of that word -- we don't determine
what something means by counting heads), it is in another: language is
materially-grounded in the practices and social interaction of the vast majority -- i.e., in the
everyday lives of those who, through their
labour, continually interface with material reality and with one another, and
who keep this world going. This means that
there are aspects of
ordinary language that can't be 'reformed' without automatically undermining
our ability not only to comprehend anything at all, but to do anything
whatsoever
-- which is why, when it comes to practicalities, metaphysicians soon abandon
their ornate and implausible fantasies. And that also helps explain why traditional (i.e.,
metaphysical) theorists' attempts to reconstruct 'reality' in the comfort of
their own heads disintegrate so
readily, and why they are fundamentally anti-democratic (in the obverse
of the second sense of the phrase mentioned above -- since
metaphysical theories
have been and still are concocted by a vanishingly small minority, and weren't developed out of, nor were they a result of, collective labour
and communal life).
Not unconnected with this is how, in Dialectical Marxism, this
endeavour to uncover nature's 'hidden secrets' is
intertwined with substitutionist thinking. [On that, see
Essay Nine Parts
One
and
Two.]
Furthermore, many scientific concepts
have themselves been derived from ordinary language by analogical and
metaphorical extension (etc.). [On that, see
Crosland (2006).]
Indeed, even though it is
possible to comprehend a scientific theory without having to translate
it into the vernacular, such an endeavour can't succeed in undermining the
latter without
fatally compromising that
very attempt. [This slide into incoherence was illustrated above,
but in
more detail in Essay Three
Part Two.]
....
19.Anyone who doubts this is welcome to
attempt to express in 'Hegel-speak' what sentences
H78-H90 manage to say quite
easily without any such 'assistance'.
"Hegelism (sic) is like a
mental disease -- you cannot know what it is until you get it, and then you can't
know because you've got it." [Eastman
(1926), p.22.]
Those words were, of course,
written when Eastman still regarded himself as a Leninist.
[I first encountered
Eastman's books and articles after about five years into this project (i.e., in
and around 2003).
Some of the ideas expressed at this site had clearly been
anticipated in his work, but only some.Anyone who objects to my quoting Max Eastman
should check this
out first, and then perhaps think again.]
....
22.
It should be emphasised at this point that these comments aren't aimed at the ordinary phrase "common sense",
merely at its philosophical and 'dialectical' employment highlighted in the main
body of this Essay and at
this site by a use of the term, "commonsense".
The original meaning of "common sense"
(i.e., as Aristotle intended it) isn't relevant to the present discussion since
its subsequent
philosophical employment parted company with Aristotle's use long
ago. There is very little material available on-line about Aristotle's use of this
phrase, but
Wikipedia summarises it quite well:
"[Common sense] is [a] capability
of the animal soul...proposed by Aristotle, which enables different individual
senses to collectively perceive the characteristics of physical things such as
movement and size, which all physical things have in different combinations,
allowing people and other animals to distinguish and identify physical things.
This common sense is distinct from basic sensory perception and from human
rational thinking, but cooperates with both." [Quoted from
here:
accessed 16/07/2018.]
Be this as it may, it seems
that most commentators on the far-left think "commonsense" refers to a body of
wildly held -- and more often than not reactionary or conservative -- beliefs,
attitudes, values or
opinions. However, and by way of contrast, in
ordinary use "common sense" typically appears in sentences like the following:
C1: Use your common sense! Don't put your hand in the lion's cage!
C2: Have you no common sense? What on earth made you try to debate with a Nazi?
C3: It's just common sense. No one in their right mind would rummage around in a
waste disposal unit while it is switched on.
C4: As the hurricane
approaches the public are advised to listen to the advice given by the emergency
services and use their common sense. Don't go for a walk along the promenade,
for example!
C5: Where's your common
sense? You can't feed your children nothing but junk food and sugary drinks!
Admittedly, the above
examples depend
to some extent on certain beliefs held about ourselves and the world around us,
but the difficulty computer programmers have in reproducing human behaviour
shows that this isn't just a matter of holding specific beliefs. Indeed,
while some human beings are fully aware of
certain well known facts, they still insist on acting in ways that will elicit comments like those
above, in C1-C5. I am
sure we have all met such individuals; the word "idiot" might well have been
invented with them in mind.
To be sure, politicians often use
the word "commonsense" to defend all manner of right-wing, reactionary and
populist ideas -- but then they will
say anything, won't they?
[The ideological use of
"commonsense"
is further examined below.]
23.
As Michael Dummett pointed out [in
Dummett (1979), pp.390-93], there
is no such thing as "the commonsense" view of the world.
23a. If 'commonsense' beliefs were
culturally 'relative', each generation would possess a different, or slightly
different, set of 'commonsense' beliefs -- even if there were some overlap in
places. In that case, of course, there would be no such thing as
'commonsense'. It would still be a mystery, however, how such beliefs could be
passed on from one generation to the next, or between individuals, if no one
has a clue what they are, or if no one agrees what they are.
It could be argued that the
transmission of such ideas might take place at a
non-conscious, or subconscious, level, as attitudes and 'values' were passed down the generations
--
or as they might be randomly acquired during a lifetime -- perhaps as a result of
socialisation,
peer pressure, the
mass media, or the education system, etc.
Even
if that were so (but the idea itself will be questioned
in Essay Three Part Seven), it would still be unclear exactly what was being
'passed on'. Indeed, no one -- researchers and their subjects alike -- seems capable
of saying what this dubious inheritance is, over and above mentioning a few
items from the
vague lists alluded to
earlier.
Of course, in that case, this would be the very first field of scientific research -- should any
such be commissioned -- where no one knew what they were
talking about before they even began to work on it!
And, it is no use doing a
survey. Either that survey's questions would bias the result, or the questions
will be too vague to be of any use. [On what I mean by this, see
here.]
That is quite apart from the
fact that if these supposed beliefs were acquired in the random manner suggested, they
wouldn't be all that common (except, perhaps, as the result of a giant
fluke).
24.Again, since I don't accept the
legitimacy of the
philosophical use of this term, I won't try to solve this intractable
problem for those who do.
We are reminded at this point of the
laughably easy 'cognitive
competence' test set for Donald Trump in 2017. That was a very low bar.
25.The sophisticated use to which
humans beings are capable of putting the negative particle (and its many
conversational equivalents) is
explored at length in
Horn (1989/2001).
26.That controversial claim will
be
defended in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.
27.Unless, of course, this is done
in order to
extend language. That aside, the abrogation of socially-sanctioned linguistic rules
simply results in
the production of
incoherent non-sense. Naturally, that might be the aim of an aspiring abrogater
-- intended, perhaps, for creative purposes, for effect, or
to generate puzzlement and confusion. However, the creative extension of
language explored by writers or poets (etc.) still has to make some
sort of sense. Think of the work of
James Joyce; he didn't just write total
gibberish or randomly bash away at his typewriter.
Again, the above comments
don't undermine
the remarks made in the main body of this Essay. Those responsible for the
development of language don't do so by undermining the use of words we
already have. If anything, they extend language, creating novel uses for it,
augmenting its vocabulary, creating new connections by means of metaphor,
or analogy, etc.
[On imaginative or figurative extensions to language, see White (1996, 2010), and
Guttenplan (2005). More on this in
Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
28.Spelled out
in detail this would provide some purchase for the word "material" --, at
least, as that word is used in many of the Essays published at this site.
That task will be attempted when this project has been completed.
The above ideas about ordinary language and
common sense are developed and defended in
the following:
Baz (2012),
Button, et al (1995),
Cavell (1958,
1976 -- this links to a PDF), Cook (1979, 1980), Cowley (1991), Ebersole (1967,
1979a, 1979b), Hacker (1982a, 1982b, 1987, 2007, 2013), Hallett (2008), Hanfling
(1984, 1989, 2000), Macdonald (1938), Ryle (1953, 1960,
1961,
1963 pp.67-72 -- these link to PDFs), and
Stebbing (1958). It
has to be said that, as far as can be ascertained, many of these authors
also tend to confuse ordinary language with common sense. Or, at least, they
fail to distinguish
them
as clearly as I have done. Coates (1996) also appears to
conflate the two. See also Uschanov (2002), and his longer, on-line
article.
The ruling-class and their
ideologues have always denigrated
the vernacular and the experience of ordinary working people. It is
unedifying to see Marxists (like this
commentator,
if he is a Marxist!) doing likewise.
[More details
about the above ruling-class tactic will be given in Essay Twelve Part Seven (a summary of which can be
accessed
here),
but an excellent account can be found in Conner (2005).]
As far as the propensity of the 'lower
orders' to embrace 'superstitious' beliefs is concerned (a phrase this
commentator
doesn't use, but his intentions are reasonably clear), exactly why we should pay any more
attention to that phenomenon than we do to religious belief in general
(if and when it holds ordinary folk in its thrall) is
unclear. But, even if it were clear, its philosophical -- as
opposed to its sociological, psychological, or political -- implications would
still be open to question. As noted earlier, since we can
in the vernacular assert the negation of every single ideological, racist, and superstitious
belief, ordinary language and 'commonsense' can't be identical.
I now turn to that specific topic in the next sub-section.
Again, this is how I will address this issue in
Essay Twelve Part Seven (see also,
here and
here):
Admittedly, ordinary
language may be used to express not just patent of falsehoods, but any number of
offensive, reactionary, racist, sexist, homophobic, bigoted, xenophobic, and regressive
opinions.
But, doesn't it often express "false consciousness"? The vernacular can't in fact be affected by "false
consciousness" -- and that isn't just because that notion was
foreign to Marx himself; on that see
here. Nor can it be
"ideological" as such.
I will now defend these
contentions.
Without doubt, everyday
words can be used to give expression to all manner of backward, racist, sexist,
homophobic, Islamophobic, xenophobic and
ideologically-compromised ideas, but this isn't
the fault of the medium in which these are expressed, any more than it is the
fault of, say, a computer if it is used to post racist or sexist bile on a web page.
Ideologically-contaminated beliefs expressed in ordinary language result either
from its misuse or from the employment of specialised vocabularies borrowed from
religious dogma, sexist belief-systems, reactionary ideologies, homophobic bigotry, racist
and nationalist theories
or
superstitious ideas. This isn't to suggest that ordinary humans don't,
or can't, speak in such regressive ways; offensive speech like this manifestly depends on those
opinions
being expressed in ordinary language even though it isn't dependent on that language as
such. That particular claim might sound paradoxical, so I will attempt to
clarify what I mean by it.
First of all, this defence of
ordinary language isn't being advanced dogmatically. Every user of the
vernacular knows it to be true since they know that for each and every sexist,
racist, homophobic, xenophobic, and ideologically-compromised sentence expressible in ordinary language
there exists its negation.
That is why socialists can
assert such things as: "Blacks aren't inferior"; "Human beings aren't selfish";
"Wages aren't fair", "Women aren't sex objects", "Belief in the after-life is
baseless", "LGBTQ+ individuals aren't perverts", "Muslims aren't
terrorists", and still be understood --
even by those held in thrall to the ideas repudiated in this way but who might
still hold the
opposite view. If ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense' --
and if it were ideological (per se) in the way that some suggest -- you
just couldn't say such things. We all know this to be true -- certainly,
socialists should know this --, because in our practice we manage to deny,
reject and challenge ideas like these every day.
So, as noted above,
ordinary language might be used to express patent of falsehoods, as well as
any number of offensive, reactionary and regressive of ideas; in order to express
their contemptible thoughts, reactionary, racist, sexist, Islamophobic, or
homophobic individuals might depend on ordinary language in order to give voice
to their vile ideas or anti-socialist, anti-human
opinions. However, the fact that socialists can reject all such ideas, using the very
same medium -- the vernacular --, shows that ordinary language as such can't itself be associated with
the expression of those
ideas. Again, if it were, socialists wouldn't be able to do this.
In which case, it is more
than a little
puzzling why
socialists fail to advance the opposite claim, namely the following: because we can with
relative ease explain socialist ideas using the vernacular -- just as we can
challenge the objectionable ideas mentioned above -- ordinary language is
inherently progressive. Now, I'm not promoting that idea myself,
merely asking why socialists are quite so quick to malign, or depreciate, the
language of the working class, and assume that because there are regressive
ideas expressible in the vernacular that that automatically condemns it, while
at the same ignoring their own use of the vernacular to propagandise and
agitate the working class, or promote progressive ideas in general. [On this, see
Grant (n.d).]
In this regard, it is as
ironic as it is inexcusable that there still are revolutionaries who, while they are
only too ready to regale us with the alleged limitations of ordinary language --
on the grounds that it reflects "commodity fetishism", "false consciousness" or
"formal/static thinking" --, while they are ready to that, they are
also quite happy to accept (in whole or in part)
impenetrably obscure ideas lifted from the writings of a card-carrying, ruling-class
hack like Hegel. Not only are
his theories based on alienated thought-forms (i.e.,
Neoplatonism, Mystical Christianity and
Hermeticism),
his Absolute Idealism was a direct result of the systematic fetishisation of language -- indeed,
as Marx noted:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement [alienation -- RL] of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases
and link added.]
The aforementioned
commentator also had
the following to say:
"This project is
inherently frustrating on so many levels, as Homer Simpson would say. On the one
hand Rosa
shows up the shameful ignorance of a century of Marxism-Leninism, marshalling in
the process a prodigious array of sources on logic and mathematics, and also on
the sciences, information that is urgently needed by her audience in view of the
ignorance she contests. On the other, that so much energy should be invested to
prove so little is tragic....
"Rosa occasionally
acknowledges partial exceptions, but she has been so traumatized by the
mountains of Trotskyist drivel she was force-fed, as well as its Stalinist
counterpart, she rarely gets beyond that to see what else might be done or has
been done with the dialectical tradition....
"Had Rosa not so
precipitously dismissed 'academic Marxism', while copiously citing from other
academics with expertise in mathematics, logic, and analytical philosophy, she
would be better positioned to exploit their contributions as well as pinpoint
their weaknesses. The whole history of critical theory is an excellent case in
point, perhaps the best case. The
Frankfurt School,
their precursors, associates, and successors, all fell down on logic and
mathematics. Nonetheless, they provided the tools to decipher the ideological
phenomena of their time...."
The reason why so much has been 'wasted' on "so little" is that the political
traditions to which the above commentator refers (which are
dominated by different ideological currents within Dialectical Marxism itself) have actually
helped
damage to our
movement from the get-go.
In contrast, Academic
Marxism and 'Systematic
Dialectics'
have largely been ignored in these Essays since they are politically irrelevant,
and have had zero impact on the class war (other perhaps than negative).
[I have covered this topic in more detail,
below.] Indeed, they are capable of damaging only the brains of those who still think
these two disciplines have anything worthwhile to offer humanity (which fact those so afflicted
are unlikely
to appreciate for the reasons
Max Eastman
highlighted). They are welcome to wander down that political cul-de-sac.
Count me out.
Far from being force-fed on an exclusive diet
of Trotskyist and Stalinist 'drivel', I have also been studying Academic Marxist
writings now for well over thirty-five years (indeed, at the time of writing this, the
Bibliography to my thesis stretches to over 90 pages, containing references to
over 3500 books and articles by Traditional Philosophers,
LCDs,
HCDs,
Academic Marxists, and
much else beside). To be sure, the 'academic' stream of dialectical gobbledygook isn't the 'low grade drivel' one encounters in certain Trotskyist
or Stalinist
texts, but it is, nevertheless, high grade drivel --, and politically inept drivel
for all that. That is becauseit has been produced by those who, for all their expensive education,
seem quite incapable of writing a clear sentence to save their lives.
The latest examples of this
are: (1) My demonstration that Thomas Weston's recent attempt to find support
for his belief that Marx accepted DM, based on the latter's comments about
elliptical motion, etc., in Das Kapital is defective (throughout Essay
Eight Part Two as well as
here); (2) My detailed
demolition of Katharina Dulckeit's endeavour to defend Hegel's transformation of
the "is" of predication into an "is" of identity (here);
(3) The same with James Lawler's attempt to do likewise (here
and
here); (4) My detailed criticisms of 'Critical Realism' and Roy Bhaskar's
barely comprehensible ideas (here
and here); (5) My
exposé of Immanuel Kant's lame attempt to make sense of 'real negation',
which also applies to Hegel's ham-fisted appropriation of this fractured concept
(here);
(6) My general take down of attempts made by LCDs and HCDs to show that Marx was
heavily influenced by Hegel when he came to publish Das Kapital (here
and here); (7) My
reduction to absurdity of Hegel's misguided criticism of the LEM (here);
(8) My demonstration that attempts made by dialecticians (especially those
drawn from the HCD-tendency) to link everything to the mysterious "Totality"
are
entirely bogus, not least because (a) we have yet to be told what the "Totality"
actually, is, (b) what all those universal "interconnections" are, and
(c) precisely how
'the part makes the whole and the whole makes the part' (here
and here); and finally, (9) My
detailed proof that
Wittgenstein wasn't a conservative mystic.
There will many more
takedowns of the high grade drivel this commentator lionises published at this site before I am
done.
[LCD = Low Church
Dialectician; HCD = High Church Dialectician -- on these, see below; LEM = Law
of Excluded Middle.]
Here is what I have written
elsewhere
about the two main, 'drivel'-producing wings of
Dialectical Marxism (the low-grade and the high-grade):
There are in fact two
main currents in Dialectical Marxism:
'Low
Church'
and 'High
Church'. This distinction roughly corresponds with that between active
revolutionaries and Academic Marxists -- of course, there is some
overlap at the margin.
Some academic Marxists are also activists.
However, the members of neither faction are seekers after truth,
since, like Hegel, they have already found it. As Glenn Magee pointed out:
"Hegel is not a philosopher.
He is no lover or seeker of wisdom -- he believes he has found it. Hegel writes
in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 'To help bring philosophy
closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of "love
of knowing" and be actual knowledge -- that is what I have set before me'
(Miller, 3; PC, 3). By the end of the
Phenomenology, Hegel claims to have
arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with wisdom.
"Hegel's claim to have
attained wisdom is completely contrary to the original Greek conception of
philosophy as the love of wisdom, that is, the ongoing pursuit rather than the
final possession of wisdom. His claim is, however, fully consistent with the
ambitions of the
Hermetic
tradition, a current of thought that derives its name
from the so-called
Hermetica
(or
Corpus Hermeticum), a collection
of Greek and Latin treatises and dialogues written in the first or second
centuries A.D. and probably containing ideas that are far older. The legendary
author of these works is
Hermes Trismegistus ('Thrice-Greatest Hermes').
'Hermeticism' denotes a broad tradition of thought that grew out of the
'writings of Hermes' and was expanded and developed through the infusion of
various other traditions. Thus,
alchemy,
Kabbalism,
Lullism, and the mysticism
of
Eckhart and
Cusa
-- to name just a few examples
-- became intertwined with the
Hermetic doctrines. (Indeed, Hermeticism is used by some authors simply to mean
alchemy.) Hermeticism is also sometimes called
theosophy, or
esotericism; less
precisely, it is often characterized as mysticism, or
occultism."
[Magee (2008), p.1. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links and bold
emphasis alone added.]
Much the same can be said about Marxist
Dialecticians who hale from either of the above two denominations (whether they realise it or not).
Comrades from this
persuasion
cleave to the original, unvarnished truth laid down in the sacred DM-texts
(i.e., those written by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Mao).
Many of these simple souls are highly proficient at quoting, or paraphrasing, endless passages from the
Holy Books in answer to everything and anything, just like the faithful who bow to the East or who fill the
Gospel
Halls around the world. Their unquestioning faith is as impressive as it is
un-Marxist.
[An excellent recent
example of this affliction, which was in fact prompted by the current crisis in the UK-SWP,
can be found
here. In January 2013, I posted a
mini-refutation of a DM-article of Trotsky's that had been republished at the latter site; my
post was based on some of the points made in
Essay Six), but as of
March 2020 it is still 'waiting moderation'!]
[FL = Formal Logic.]
In general, LCDs are
sublimely ignorant of
FL. Now, on its own that is no hanging matter.
However, such self-inflicted and woeful ignorance of FL doesn't prevent them from pontificating about
it,
nor regaling us with
its alleged limitations
at every
turn -- accusations
based on ideas they unwisely copied off
Hegel, surely the
George W Bush of Logic.
Figure Seven Advanced
Logic Class At Camp Hegel
LCDs are by-and-large active
revolutionaries,
committed to 'building the party'. Ironically, however, they have
unwisely
conspired to do the exact opposite, which suicidal policy has helped keep their parties
a few notches above microscopic because of the continual splits and expulsions they skilfully engineer. This is a rather fitting
pragmatic contradiction that the 'Dialectical Deity' has visited upon these, the
least of its slaves.
Of course, LCDs
fail to see the irony in
any of this (even
after it has been pointed out to them -- I know, I have lost count of the number of
times I have tried!), since they, too,
haven't taken the lens caps off.
So, despite the fact that every last one of these
myopic individuals
continually strives to "build the party", after 140 years of
such impressive 'building', few revolutionary groups
can boast membership rolls
that rise much above the
risible. In fact, all we have witnessed since WW2,
for example,
is yet more fragmentation, but still no mass movement.
[Anyone who doubts this should look
here,
here,
here and
here
-- or, now,
here -- and then, perhaps, think again.
Here, too, is a diagram of the main branches of, and links between, the leading US
Trotskyist parties/tendencies.]
Has a
single one of these individuals made this connection?
Are
you kidding!?
You clearly don't 'understand' dialectics.
It seems that the
long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism and its core theory, DM,
are the only two things in the entire universe that aren't
'interconnected'.
HCD Marxists
are in
general openly contemptuous
of the 'sophomoric ideas' found in most of the DM-classics --, let alone books
and articles published by their lowly
LCD-brethren (even though many of
them seem to have a fondness for
Engels's First 'Law')
--
except, perhaps, Lenin's
PN, since it is
largely comprised of quotes from the Über-Guru Himself, Hegel.
[An excellent recent example of this elitist
attitude can be found in Anderson (2007). Another two,
here and
here.]
More often than
not, HCDs reject the idea that 'the dialectic' applies to nature,
sometimes inconsistently using the aforementioned First 'Law' to account for the
evolutionary 'leap' that underpinned our development from ape-like ancestors, which tactic allows them to
claim that human history and development are therefore unique. Just as they are
equally dismissive of simple
LCD souls for their adherence to every last
word found in the DM-classics. Apparently, the
latter do not contain enough philosophical gobbledygook, sufficient Hegel, or a
surfeit of post-Hegelian 'Continental Philosophy' for their liking.31
[Chomsky's penetrating thoughts on many of the above 'thinkers' can be accessed
via Note 31a,
along with several other sharp criticisms of this depressing detour into
darkness.]
HCDs are generally but not exclusively academics, or
they are itinerant 'intellectuals' and 'bloggers'.
In common with many of those listed above, tortured prose
is their
forteand pointless existence is their punishment.
Almost any randomly-selected issue of, say, Radical Philosophy
or Historical
Materialism will provide ample confirmation of the baleful
affect
the ideas and prose of many of the above theorists have had on
left-wing 'intellectuals'.
[This
is yet another example to add to the roll-call of The Hallowed
Society for the Production
of Gobbledygook. (Also, see my comments,
here.)]
Figure Eight: The
Sisyphus
College Recruitment Poster --
Aimed At HCDs
Seeking A More Useful Existence
At least LCDs like to
think their ideas are somehow relevant to the class
struggle. In
contrast, High Church Dialectics
is only good for the CV/Résumé.
The
late Chris
Harman expressed similar sentiments rather concisely a few years ago:
"There is a widespread myth that Marxism is
difficult. It is a myth propagated by the enemies of socialism -- former Labour
leader
Harold Wilson boasted that he was never able to get beyond the first page of
Marx's Capital. It is a myth also encouraged by a peculiar breed of academics
who declare themselves to be 'Marxists': they deliberately cultivate obscure
phrases and mystical expressions in order to give the impression that they
possess a special knowledge denied to others." [Chris Harman, How Marxism
Works, quoted from
here. Bold emphasis and link added.]
Lenin concurred:
"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases
is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing"
Childishness. Bold emphasis added. Unfortunately, Lenin didn't apply that
valuable insight to what he found in Hegel's work.]
Plainly,
the sanitised
version of
dialectics that HCDs inflict on their readers (purged of
all those Engelsian 'crudities') isn't
an "abomination"
in the eyes of those sections of the
bourgeoisie that administer Colleges and Universities --, or, indeed,
those who publish
academic books and journals.
Some
might object that the above is a caricature of 'dialectical thought'; they
might even be tempted to argue that dialectics is based
as much on evidence as it is on the practice and experience not just of the party,
but humanity
in general. Alas, that
naive belief
was put to the sword in Essays Two,
Seven Part One, Ten
Part One, as well as
Part One of this Essay.
It is
worth adding that there are notable exceptions to the above sweeping generalisations.
Some academic
Marxists do actively engage with the class struggle. The point, however, is that the
'High Theory' they crank out is irrelevant in this regard. Indeed, I can't think of
a single
example of the work of an academic Marxist that has had any impact on the class
war, except perhaps negatively. [Any who disagree with that severe indictment are invited to
email me with the details of any
counter-examples they think I might have missed.]
To be
sure, one or two
comrades have tried to come up with a few examples of the (positive) practical applications of
'the dialectic'. Unfortunately for them, I have shown that they all fail -- on
that, see
here,
here, and here.
This has meant that the baleful influence of
Hegelian Hermeticism
becomes important at key historical junctures (i.e., those involving defeat
or major set-back), since it acts as a materialist-soundingalternative
to mainstream, Traditional Thought -- indeed, as we saw was the case with Lenin
after the defeat of the 1905 Revolution in Russia,
and again after the Second International caved in to nationalist warmongering at the beginning of
WW1.
Dialectics (especially those parts that have been
traduced by the lethal HCD-strain) thus taps into thought-forms that have dominated
intellectual life for over two thousand years, i.e., those that define the
'legitimate' boundaries of 'genuine' philosophy -- those that
amount to little more than dogmatic thesis-mongering.
So, because of its
thoroughly traditional nature, DM is able to appeal to the closet "god-builders"
and dialectical mystics that revolutionary politics seems to attract -- and
who, in general, appear to congregate at the top of this ever-growing pile of
dialectical disasters.
Indeed, I will continue to ignore the vast
bulk of the material churned out by HCDs just so long as it remains completely irrelevant
to the class war. I suspect the Sun will cool first.
If this approach is
regarded by the
commentator as "tragic", that is his problem.
Moreover, I employ ideas and
methods drawn from Analytic Philosophy and
MFL since they are incomparably superior to the Hegelian gobbledygook
upon which the vast majority of
Academic Marxists dote. In addition, those methods (or, at least the ones I use) deliver clear results.
[MFL = Modern Formal
Logic.]
Other things this commentator
had to say have
either been dealt with
already at this site, or are,
unfortunately, far too vague to do anything with.
As already
noted, DM-theorists (but particularly those who are active
revolutionaries -- the LCD-fraternity) almost invariably identify FL with AFL -- and, worse, with the
bowdlerized
version that was taught in the universities of the 18th
century, and which was further mangled by Hegel in his two seriously misnamed books on
'logic'. DM-theorists
from earlier
generations (i.e., Engels, and possibly also Dietzgen)
may perhaps be excused in this regard, since their writings largely pre-dated
the revolution that took place in logic post-1870.
Subsequent
Marxists are not quite so easily exculpated.
For example, we find Trotsky (who was otherwise reasonably
up-to-date in his knowledge of the sciences) writing the following in his "Open
Letter to Burnham", approximately sixty years after MFL was almost
single-handedly invented by
Frege, and approximately thirty years after Russell and Whitehead's
Principia
Mathematica was published:
"I know of two systems
of logic worthy of attention: the logic of Aristotle (formal logic) and the
logic of Hegel (the dialectic). Aristotelian logic takes as its starting point
immutable objects and phenomena…. [P]lease take the trouble to inform us just
who following Aristotle analysed and systematized the subsequent progress of
logic." [Trotsky (1971),
pp.91-92.]22a
"[A]part
from Aristotle, the only 'logic worthy of attention' is that of -- Hegel….
Comrade Trotsky, as we Americans ask: where have you been all these years?
During the 125 years since Hegel wrote…[,] after 2300 years of stability, logic
has undergone a revolutionary transformation…in which Hegel and his ideas have
had an influence of exactly zero….
In a most sarcastic vein,
you keep asking me to 'take the trouble to inform us just who following
Aristotle analysed and systematized the subsequent progress of logic'…as if this
demand were so obviously impossible of fulfilment that I must collapse like a
pricked balloon before it…. Do you wish me to prepare a reading list, Comrade
Trotsky? It would be long, ranging from the work of the brilliant mathematicians
and logicians of the middle of the last century to…the monumental 'Principia
Mathematica' of Russell and Whitehead…." [Burnham (1971),
pp.236-37.
Paragraphs merged.]
Unfortunately, wilful ignorance like this (displayed by virtually every dialectician) hasn't noticeably changed since
Trotsky's day -- perhaps with the exception of the work of logicians like
Graham Priest,
of course, even though the 'contradictions' he claims to be able to see in the
world aren't in fact 'dialectical contradictions' to begin with, as opposed to
their being an expression of rather confused thought. Hence,
we still find socialists of otherwise impeccable dialectical
credentials repeating Trotsky's ill-informed opinions over and over again, still
conflating FL and AFL, still clinging to the
idée fixe that Aristotle was, is, and always
will be, the last (and only) word on the subject -- but only after his ideas have
been mangled beyond all recognition by the DM-faithful.
Worse still,
and as we have seen,
Dialectical Marxists compound their self-inflicted ignorance with an egregious failure to grasp what few degenerate ideas they mistakenly attribute to Aristotle!23
Turning to specifics: according to its
supporters, the superiority of
DL over
FL arises partly from its ability to explain
change and partly from the understanding it affords of the contradictory nature
of social development, thus assisting in the revolutionary
transformation of the planet. This, it is claimed, FL can't provide.
However, not even
mathematics can deliver a scientific account of change, even if it
occupies a central role in the work of many scientists who can and do. Mathematical objects
and structures of
themselves have no causal impact on
the material world; they nowhere appear in nature.24
And yet, this doesn't mean that mathematics is inferior to a 'higher' form of
'Dialectical Mathematics'. Exactly why DM-theorists use an analogous argument to
denigrate FL is therefore rather puzzling, to say the least.
Of course, some dialecticians have attempted to underline
the superiority of 'higher' over 'lower'
mathematics, based, for example, on Engels's interpretation of Descartes's
introduction of variables into Algebra, and on some rather
obscure notes left by Marx concerning the nature of
Differential Calculus.25
Nevertheless,
DM-apologists are adamant that when their theory is combined with a detailed analysis of
real material
causes, it can deliver a scientific account of change. That idea is
discussed at length in Essays Five,
Seven Part Three, Eight
Parts One,
Two and
Three,
which is then systematically
dismantled. Readers are directed there for more details.
1.
Important, relevant aspects of Hegel's 'logic' have been taken
apart here,
here,
here,
here, and
here -- more
details will be added
when the rest of Essay Twelve has been published (summaries
here and
here).
[FL = Formal Logic; AFL = Aristotelian FL.]
Nevertheless, not only
do dialecticians tend to
confuse FL with the garbled version of AFL taught in the Universities of
Hegel's day (but see
here), they
disregard, ignore or downplay the path-breaking and significant advances that have
been made in the study of Logic over the last 150 years. It is no exaggeration to say that well
over 95% of FL is less than 170 years old, but you wouldn't conclude that
if you confined your reading to books and articles written by DM-theorists. Quite the opposite in fact; naïve readers might be
forgiven for concluding from what they find there that FL
has stood still for
over
2400 years. [See also Note 2.] This,from those who tell us
everything is constantly changing!
These negative comments
don't, however, apply to the work of
Graham Priest. His attempt to rehabilitate the sort of
'logic' one finds in Hegel and Engels's work will be the main subject of a special Essay to be
published at this site at a later date. In the meantime, readers are invited to consult
Goldstein (1992, 2004), Slater (2002, 2007b, 2007c), and
this review
by expert logician, Hartry
Field. Field has now published a book devoted to the
classical
paradoxes, where
he was able to show
that the
Dialetheic and
Paraconsistent logics that Priest favours can't even handle the
paradoxes of
truth, which had been one of the main motivators for this branch of
non-standard logic -- i.e., Field (2008), pp.36-92.
On the subject of Hegel's (supposed) dismissal of, say,
the LOC, see Hanna
(1986) and Pippin (1978). The views of these two authors will also be critically
examined in a later Essay. However, the best Hegelian account of this
aspect of Hegel's work that I have read in the last 30 years [i.e., Hahn (2007)]
will be examined in Essays Eight Part
Three and Three Part One (here
and here) -- where the best Marxist account
of 'dialectical contradictions' can also be found [i.e., Lawler (1982)] has already
been critically analysed. I
have also criticised a slightly more recent attempt to defend Hegel in
Dulckeit (1989). Anyway, it is arguable that Priest's 'contradictions'
aren't even 'dialectical', whatever else
they are.
On the LOC in general, see
Horn (2006) -- although, I have e-mailed Professor Horn about his claim that
the LOIcan be found in Aristotle's work; he tells me he will now try to locate
exactly where Aristotle's acknowledged this 'law'.
Update October 2009:
Professor Horn has informed me by e-mail that the above article will be changed in the next update later this
year. More on that
here and
here.
Update December 2024: The latest version
of Professor Horn's article (i.e.,
Horn
(2024)) now contains no reference to Aristotle's
acceptance of the LOI.
I have just read Deborah Modrak's book on
Aristotle (i.e., Modrak (2001)); she devotes an entire section to Aristotle's
views on 'identity' -- pp.194-98. However, Modrak concentrates on Aristotle's
views concerning sameness; identity itself is conspicuous by its absence. Certainly,
there is no mention of the LOI.
The Kneales, however, quote two passages
(one from Topics and one from De Sophistici Elenchi (On Sophistical
Refutations)), which might seem to some to contradict the above claims. Here is
the one from Topics:
"Whether
two things are 'the same' or 'different', in the most literal of the meanings
ascribed to 'sameness' (and we said that 'the same' applies in the most literal
sense to what is numerically one), may be examined in the light of their
inflexions and coordinates and opposites. For if justice be the same as courage,
then too the just man is the same as the brave man, and 'justly' is the same as
'bravely'. Likewise, too, in the case of their opposites: for if two things be
the same, their opposites also will be the same, in any of the recognized forms
of opposition. For it is the same thing to take the opposite of the one or that
of the other, seeing that they are the same. Again it may be examined in the
light of those things which tend to produce or to destroy the things in question
of their formation and destruction, and in general of any thing that is related
in like manner to each. For where things are absolutely the same, their
formations and destructions also are the same, and so are the things that tend
to produce or to destroy them. Look and see also, in a case where one of two
things is said to be something or other in a superlative degree, if the other of
these alleged identical things can also be described by a superlative in the
same respect. Thus
Xenocrates
argues that the happy life and the good life are the same, seeing that of all
forms of life the good life is the most desirable and so also is the happy life:
for 'the most desirable' and the greatest' apply but to one thing.' Likewise
also in other cases of the kind. Each, however, of the two things termed
'greatest' or most desirable' must be numerically one: otherwise no proof will
have been given that they are the same; for it does not follow because
Peloponnesians and
Spartans are
the bravest of the Greeks, that Peloponnesians are the same as Spartans, seeing
that 'Peloponnesian' is not any one person nor yet 'Spartan'; it only follows
that the one must be included under the other as 'Spartans' are under
'Peloponnesians': for otherwise, if the one class be not included under the
other, each will be better than the other. For then the Peloponnesians are bound
to be better than the Spartans, seeing that the one class is not included under
the other; for they are better than anybody else. Likewise also the Spartans
must perforce be better than the Peloponnesians; for they too are better than
anybody else; each then is better than the other! Clearly therefore what is
styled 'best' and 'greatest' must be a single thing, if it is to be proved to be
'the same' as another. This also is why Xenocrates fails to prove his case: for
the happy life is not numerically single, nor yet the good life, so that it does
not follow that, because they are both the most desirable, they are therefore
the same, but only that the one falls under the other.
"Again, look and see if, supposing the one to be the same as something, the
other also is the same as it: for if they be not both the same as the same
thing, clearly neither are they the same as one another. Moreover, examine them in the light of their accidents or of the things of
which they are accidents: for any accident belonging to the one must belong also
to the other, and if the one belong to anything as an accident, so must the
other also. If in any of these respects there is a discrepancy, clearly they
are not the same." [Aristotle (1984g), p.255. Links and bold emphases
added. I have used the
on-line version here, which renders this passage differently to the Kneales -- i.e., Kneale and Kneale (1978), p.42.
Some paragraphs merged. By "accident" Aristotle means "non-essential property".]
The passage from De Sophistici Elenchi
reads as follows:
"For only to things that
are indistinguishable and one in substance does it seem that all the same
attributes belong...." [Aristotle (1984h), p.305. Bold emphasis added.]
The on-line version reads more-or-less the same
(no pun intended):
"For only to things
that are indistinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed that all
the same attributes belong...." [Quoted from
here; Part 24.]
There are only three sentences in the above
that could plausibly be linked to the LOI; I have
highlighted them in bold. The first speaks about things being "absolutely
the same" -- but, the more recent, published translation renders this as "...in the
case where one of two things is said to be something or other in a superlative
degree, if the other of these identical things can also be described by a
superlative in the same respect" [Aristotle
(1984g), p.255,
section 152.5], which, although it uses the word "identity", neither
employs, nor implies, the LOI. Aristotle, a quintessentially 'common sense'
philosopher, is plainly employing different ordinary terms for sameness as much he
can; indeed, as I have done in
Essay Six.
Furthermore, Aristotle then adds this thought:
"For where things are absolutely the same, their
formations and destructions also are the same, and so are the things that tend
to produce or to destroy them." [Loc cit.]
So, even though Aristotle
peaks about things that are "absolutely the same", he also acknowledges that
they change -- speaking about their "formations and destructions". In which
case, he didn't connect absolute sameness (or even identity) with lack of
change, contrary to what DM-fans claim.
The second and third highlighted passages
certainly anticipate both the 'Indiscernibility
of Identicals' and the 'Identity
of Indiscernibles' -- even though Aristotle neither uses the word
"identical" nor the LOI. Nevertheless, this is plainly the closest Aristotle came to
enunciating that 'law', but it still isn't the LOI. Nowhere do we see "A is
identical to A", or even "A = A", of DM-lore.
Indeed,
Aristotle elsewhere derides
anything that even remotely smacks of this 'law':
"Now 'why a thing is itself' is a meaningless
inquiry (for -- to give meaning to the question 'why' -- the fact or the
existence of the thing must already be evident -- e.g., that the moon is
eclipsed -- but the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason and the
single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as why the man is man,
or the musician musical, unless one were to answer 'because each thing is
inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this'this, however, is
common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question)."
[MetaphysicsBook VII, Part 17.
This can be found in Aristotle (1984e), p.1643. Bold emphases added.]
So, the LOI , features nowhere in his logic (again, contrary to the myth concocted by
DM-fans), and any suggestion to the contrary has to face his dismissal of it
as a "meaningless inquiry". Certainly, Aristotle discussed identity and sameness (and he
did so several times); as one of the great Philosophers and as a pioneer
logician, he would have been remiss if he didn't. But, there is nowhere in his
work where he refers to this 'law', or to identity as a law. Nor is it a
foundational principle of his logic, another fantasy of DM-lore.
[LOC = Law of
Non-contradiction; LOI = Law
of Identity; DL = Dialectical Logic.]
Update October 2014:
I have just been made aware of the following comment, which appears in
Hamilton's Logic:
"The law of Identity, I
stated, was not explicated as a coordinate principle till a comparatively recent
period. The earliest author in whom I have found this done, isAntonius
Andreas, a scholar of
Scotus,
who flourished at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth
century. The schoolman, in the fourth book of his Commentary of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, -- a commentary which is full of the most ingenious and
original views, -- not only asserts to the law of Identity a coördinate dignity
with the law of Contradiction, but, against Aristotle, he maintains that the
principle of Identity, and not the principle of Contradiction, is the one
absolutely first. The formula in which Andreas expressed it was Ens est ens.
[Being is being -- RL.] Subsequently to this author, the question concerning the
relative priority of the two laws of Identity and of Contradiction became one
much agitated in the schools; though there were also found some who asserted to
the law of Excluded Middle this supreme rank." [Quoted from
here (accessed 04/10/2014; I haven't yet been able to check this source.)
Bold emphasis and links added. Italic emphases in the original.]
W&G do, however,
add a note (of
sorts!) concerning the more recent developments in FL, but they then dismiss the
latter in the following
terms:
"In the 19th century, there
were a number of attempts to bring logic up to date (George Boyle (sic), Ernst
Schröder, Gotlob Frege (sic), Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead). But, apart
from the introduction of symbols, and a certain tidying up, there is no real
change here. Great claims are made, for example by the linguistic philosophers,
but there are not many grounds for them. Semantics (which deals with the
validity of an argument (sic)) was separated from syntax (which deals with the
deductibility of the conclusions from axioms and premises (sic)). This is
supposed to be something new, when, in reality, it is merely a re-hash of the
old division, well known to the ancient Greeks, between logic and rhetoric.
Modern logic is based on the logical relations among whole sentences. The centre
of attention has moved away from the syllogism towards hypothetical and
disjunctive arguments. This is hardly a breathtaking leap. One can begin with
sentences (judgments) instead of syllogisms. Hegel did this in his Logic. Rather
than a great revolution in thought, it is like re-shuffling cards in a pack." [Woods
and Grant (1995/2007), p.97/p.101.]
This paragraph alone tells us
all we want to know about the sloppy 'research' W&G devoted to their
'thoughts' about MFL. Not only do they: (i) Confuse
George
Boyle, the Dean of Salisbury, with
George Boole,
the 19th
century mathematician and logician, (ii) Spell Gottlob Frege's name incorrectly
(these errors were brought to Alan Wood's attention by a supporter of this site
a few years
after the 1st
edition RIRE came out,
but they remain uncorrected in the 2nd
edition!), (iii) Completely mischaracterise
semantics and
syntax.
Semantics is only indirectly connected with the validity of an argument, and
syntax doesn't directly concern "the deductibility of the conclusions from axioms and premises".
Validity and deducibility both depend on the rules of inference adopted in or by each
system of MFL. But, as seems plain from what they say, they think semantics and syntax are identical -- for what else is the study of validity other than seeing
what is deducible from what? And (iv) They mistakenly conclude that "Modern
logic is based on the logical relations among whole sentences", which will be
news to those who even now still work on the
Predicate Calculus. [This links to a PDF.]
[MFL = Modern Formal
Logic.]
They also assert that
"apart from the
introduction of symbols, and a certain tidying up, there is no real change
here.... Rather than a great revolution in thought, it is like re-shuffling
cards in a pack." This shows how grossly ignorant these two are. Anyone who
compares, say,
this with
this, and who thinks that little has changed, needs to book an urgent
appointment with an Optician:
Video Four: Dialectical
Myopia?
Some of the revolutionary
advances made by modern logicians over the last 150 years will be outlined
later in this
Essay.
3.
Again, these allegations will be
substantiated in Note 4 (directly below).
Of course, limiting FL solely to the study of
inference is controversial in itself. DM-theorists believe that logic (properly so handled
-- i.e., in its 'higher form', as DL)
is a genuine branch of science, an intellectual tool or method enabling the
investigation of the world,
and
which would thereby play its part in the transformation of society. However, as such, DL clearly forms an extension to Metaphysics -- although, of course,
DM-theorists understand the word "metaphysics" in their own idiosyncratic
way, and would, naturally,
reject that assertion. Be this as it may, dialecticians certainly see DL as
a source of
knowledge, capable of uncovering fundamental aspects of reality, when used
correctly and when tested in practice. That idea will be tackled head-on in
Essay Twelve Part One, and later
in the main body of this Essay.
Here, for example is Lenin:
"Logic is the science of
cognition. It is the theory of knowledge…. The laws of logic are the reflections
of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.... [These] embrace
conditionally, approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally
moving and developing nature."
[Lenin (1961),
p.182. Italics in the original.]
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common,
etc., [sic] with anyproposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here
we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual
is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed
to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection
that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and
through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal.
Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual.
Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every
individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual
is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals
(things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements,
the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature,
etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and
the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes
as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and
counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a
'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and
thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general."
[Ibid.,
pp.359-60.
Emphases in the original.]
According to Lenin, logic
reflects the "objective world"; because of that, dialecticians have
issued
themselves with a rather generous licence to derive fundamental truths, valid for all of space and time, from
sentences like "John is a man", which
tactic is itself a classic example of
Super-Science in action. Contrast that with what
George Novack had to say:
"A consistent materialism cannot
proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason,
intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source.
Idealisms may do this." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
But that is precisely what
Lenin (and Hegel) did.
However,
and by way of contrast, when I speak about
FL, I mean logic in the sense
outlined in the main body of this Essay: that is, the systematic study of inference -- which is
the view adopted by the vast majority of modern logicians. On that, see Note 4 and
Note 5.
4.
Validity is a formal 'property' of argument
schemas (symbolic patterns), whereas truth is a 'property' of propositions. [The word "property" is
in 'scare' quotes since it is being used technically, if not
figuratively, here.] If the sole, legitimate role FL occupies is the study of
inference, then, as such, it is only indirectly related to the 'search for
truth'. Logic is therefore, at a stretch, a science in the wider (German)
sense of the term -- that is, it is a systematic study focused on a given area of enquiry, which is, in
this case, inference.
[The confusion of FL with science proper is discussed below, in Note 5.]
For a clear definition of validity, see, for
example, Tomassi (1999), pp.2-19, or Priest (2000), pp.1-6.
5.
In line with many others (alas, mostly those who know very little, if any, logic),
DM-theorists labour under the widespread illusion
that FL is the study of the "Laws of Thought", or it is the "Science of
Cognition" -- that is, that it is one of the sciences proper. For example,
here is Lenin:
"Logic is the science of
cognition. It is the theory of knowledge…. The laws of logic are the reflections
of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.... [These] embrace
conditionally, approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally
moving and developing nature."
[Lenin (1961),
p.182. Italics in the original.]
Here,
too, is Engels:
"In every epoch, and
therefore also in ours, theoretical thought is a historical product, which at
different times assumes very different forms and, therewith, very different
contents. The science of thought is therefore, like every other, a historical
science, the science of the historical development of human thought. And this is
of importance also for the practical application of thought in empirical fields.
Because in the first place the theory of the laws of thought is by no means an
'eternal truth' established once and for all, as philistine reasoning imagines
to be the case with the word 'logic'." [Engels
(1954), p.43. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"As soon as each special
science is bound to make clear its position in the great totality of things and
of our knowledge of things, a special science dealing with this totality is
superfluous. That which still survives, independently, of all earlier philosophy
is the science of thought and its laws -- formal logic and dialectics.
Everything else is subsumed in the positive science of nature and history." [Engels
(1976), p.31.]
And, here is Trotsky:
"Hegel himself viewed
dialectics precisely as logic, as the science of the forms of human
cognition.... What does logic express? The
law of the external world or the law of consciousness? The question is posed
dualistically [and] therefore not correctly [for] the laws of logic express the
laws (rules, methods) of consciousness in its active relationship to the
external world....
Thought operates by its own
laws, which we can call the laws of logic...." [Trotsky (1986), pp.75, 87, 106.
Trotsky is apparently referring to Hegel's Introduction to The Science
of Logic (i.e., Hegel (1999),
pp.43-64.
Paragraphs merged.]
We also find
George Novack defining logic as:
"…the science of the thought
process. Logicians investigate the activities of the thought process which goes
on in human heads and formulate the laws, forms and interrelations of those
mental processes." [Novack (1971a), p.17.]
Here, too, is veteran communist philosopher, Maurice Cornforth:
"Whatever thoughts we think,
and whatever language they are expressed in, they must satisfy the basic
requirements of the reflection of reality in thought. These requirements give
rise to the laws of thought, to principles of logic. For thoughts are
reflections of the real world, and in the process of reflection, as Marx
said, the material world is translated into forms of thought. The process of
reflection and translation has its own laws -- the laws of thought, the
principles of logic.... Logical
principles are laws of thought, not laws of reality; they are not laws of
material processes, but the laws of the reflection of material processes."
[Cornforth (1963), pp.50-52. Paragraphs merged.]
There is much in the above
with which I would want to take issue, but it will have to be shelved for now
since my only concern here is to question the identification of logic with the
"laws of thought".
Engels, Lenin, Trotsky Novack and Cornforth have clearly confused logic with some form of psychology. If logic
were the science of what went on in people's heads, logicians would busy
themselves with brain scans, surveys, psychometric tests and the like. They
certainly wouldn't waste their time with all those useless
definitions, theorems and proofs.
Do dialecticians seriously think that people
actually cogitate in syllogisms? [As we will see, Trotsky certainly did!] Or, that they use the formal calculi found in
Principia Mathematica when they
reason? But, they must think this if they
believe that logicians study how people actually think. [On this topic,
see my comments over at Wikipedia, which have been re-posted
here. See also
Essay Three
Part Two, for several more quotations along the above lines.]
So, not only does Trotsky
imagine human
beings think in syllogisms, he believes chickens do, too!
"The
chicken knows that grain is in general useful, necessary and tasty. It
recognises a given piece of grain as that grain -- of the wheat -- with which it
is acquainted and hence draws a logical conclusion by means of its beak. The
syllogism of Aristotle is only an articulated expression of those elementary
mental conclusions which we observe at every step among animals." [Trotsky
quoted in Woods and Grant (1995), p.89. A copy is available
here (near the bottom of the page). In fact this comment is from Trotsky (1973),
p.400.]
Unfortunately, Trotsky failed
to say how he knew so much about the mental cogitations and logical skills of these Avian Aristotles -- or why, if animals have known these things for so long,
it took a genius like Aristotle to 're-discover' them about two or three million years after
'we' evolved from a common ancestor with the Apes, or, indeed, countless million since 'we' branched off from
our common
ancestor with the birds!
Moreover, if chickens are
such 'natural logicians', then perhaps among them there is a Feathered Frege, a
Rooster Russell or even a
Peano of the Poultry World?
Figure Nine: Aristotle,
Frege, And Russell?
How far down the
pecking order should we descend? If a chicken chooses seed on the basis of a
syllogism, do toads select flies
likewise? Do ticks opt for each passing deer this way, too? Perhaps locusts
are no less logical and reason that if all fields are good to ravish, and this
is a field, it too is good to ravish? [Except, of course, genuine syllogisms are
categorical, and aren't the least bit hypothetical. Maybe then locusts have
mastered
Stoic
Logic, which is partly hypothetical in form?] And what about the humble
Hydra?
Does it munch away at single-celled organisms having discovered these
Aristotelian syllogisms hundreds of millions of years before even chickens happened upon them? What about
e-coli? Does it
select which mammalian gut to invade on this basis? And what
about the flu virus? Maybe it reasons that all human noses are good, and then
proceeds to infect yet another as a result? But, if all of these take place in nature,
then the above organisms must all be natural logicians. If not, chickens
aren't either. What is it that makes a chicken a 'logician' that prevents, say,
a Dung Beetle
from being one?
Of course, it could always be argued that
'quantity turns into quality', here, so that at some point in the development of
evolutionary complexity new organisms finally emerged that were capable of applying some form of
logic. That would mean that chickens would be capable of using logic
while Dung Beetles wouldn't. Well, it would be good to see the evidence, or original
research, which supports that novel approach to Zoology. But, as we have come to
expect from DM-fans, there isn't any. [However, as we have seen in Essay
Seven Part One, Engels's 'First Law'
is far too vague and confused to supply Trotsky with any support at all.]
Anyway, in what sense can a chicken be said to know
about "grain...in general"? Are they also expert Botanists? Newly
hatched chickens will peck away at grain, too, having had no schooling in the
time-honoured Protocols of Poultry Philosophy. Perhaps they received lessons inside the egg?
Not so much 'home schooling' as 'egg schooling', so that when they pass
their eggxams they are allowed to break out of their
shells -- having learnt another syllogism about egg shells "in general", too
-- and
no doubt also one about syllogisms "in general", all the while.
Unfortunately, however, the syllogism
is a seriously limited and clumsy form of reasoning. [On that, see
here, and
especially here.] In which
case, one would have thought that chickens should have learnt to move on to master
Stoic Logic, at least -- and then perhaps even aspects of
Boolean Algebra.
On the basis of passages like these it isn't
easy to defend the above dialecticians from the accusation that they haven't a
clue what they are talking about, and that they prefer science fiction to
science fact. Nevertheless, this view of Trotsky's is representative of opinion in
many dialectical Trotskyist circles. Any who doubt this have only
to read Trotskyist literature to see how uncritically the above fairy-tale has
been swallowed hook, line and sinker by the faithful. This isn't to pick on
fellow Trotskyists, Maoists are no less gullible when it comes to the words of
Mao -- The Prophet Himself -- or, indeed, that of other DM-Gurus. Witness the
nauseating adulation
and religious fervour surrounding the
Little Red Book and 'Mao
Zedong Thought', not to mention
Mao's Mangoes.
In their collective defence
it is worth pointing out that DM-fans inherited this general idea from an ancient tradition in
logic (which also influenced Leibniz, Kant and Hegel) -- that is, that 'logic' is a sub-branch
of
Philosophical Psychology and Ontology.
However, FL is no more the science of thought than Geometry is the science of
where to stand, or the rules of Cricket/Baseball
represent the science of ball hitting.
Science is descriptive, explanatory and predictive. The theorems of FL are
constitutive and normative.
This
topic is extensively discussed in Shanker (1998), pp.63-120. Also, cf., Coffa (1991),
pp.113-67, and Baker (1988), as well as the general comments in Button, et al
(1995). Cf., also Brockhaus (1991), pp.65-106. [Again, see
my comments over at Wikipedia on this topic --
which have been re-posted
here.]
6.In Essay Fourteen I will examine the
connections that exist between this way of thinking and a range of ancient religious and mystical
'world views'. The ideological impact on revolutionaries of these archaic intellectual
pretentions will also be analysed in Essay Twelve (summary here),
as well as Essay Nine Parts One
and Two.
6ao. The clear distinction between assumptions
and rules of inference (between propositions that can be true or false,
and rules than can be neither) was neatly illustrated by
Lewis
Carroll over a century ago in his dialogue,
What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.
A PDF of that classic paradox can be accessed
here.
6a.For present purposes it is sufficient to point out that it
requires human beings to code anything, which further implies that this
linguistic-coding, if it exists, was:
(a) Intentionally inserted into language by an individual or group
of individuals; or it was,
(b) Incorporated into language by a non-human
'mind' of some sort.
Option (b) directly implies a form of Idealism (for
instance, LIE, as noted earlier). So does (a), but only indirectly. In Essay Twelve Parts
One and Two, it will be shown
just how and why that is the case. [I have also dealt with Option (a) briefly
again,
below.]
It could be countered that
our minds work the way they do because it proved to be evolutionarily advantageous
for our species. Individuals whose thoughts didn't mirror the world would find it
difficult to survive and hence reproduce.
That is in fact a rather poor argument,
which I will dispose of in Essay Thirteen
Part Three. But, for present
purposes once more, all we need note is that even if the above were the case, our thoughts need
only 'mirror' the material world, not mysterious 'underlying essences'. How,
for example, could the thoughts of our ancestors have 'mirrored' this
hidden world of 'essences' -- a world only
'revealed' to us by
the speculations of Traditional Philosophers
and Mystics a few
thousand years ago -- if they are, by definition, inaccessible to the senses? How could such
invisible imponderables assist in our survival in any way?
It could be objected that
a capacity to form abstract thoughts would enable humanity to grasp general ideas
about nature, which would free them from the "immediacy of the present",
allowing them to take some -- albeit limited -- control of their lives and their
surroundings. That would
definitely assist in their survival.
However, as argued at length
in Essay Three Parts One and Two (links above), abstraction
destroys generality. Hence, if our ancestors had access to these 'hidden
essences' by means of a 'process of abstraction', that would have seriously reduced
their chances of survival. [On our ancestors' alleged use of abstractions, see
here.]
That is, of course, quite
apart from the fact that it is bizarre in the extreme to claim that our
ancestors, hundreds of thousands of years ago, were aware of these invisible
'essences' -- and thus coded them into language --, but which 'essences' were in fact
conjured into existence only a few thousand years ago by a set of
grammatical and logical verbal tricks concocted by Ancient Greek Philosophers!
[On that, see Essay Three Part One, again, link above.]
[The verbal tricks performed by the above philosophers, which 'allowed' them to invent
such fanciful theories, are detailed in
Barnes (2009),
Havelock (1983), Kahn (1994, 2003), Lloyd (1971), and Seligman (1962) --
although, these authors don't characterise the aforementioned terminological gyrations in the pejorative way I have! I
will be dealing with this topic in more detail in Essay Twelve Part Two (summary
here).]
This isn't to argue, either, that our
ancestors didn't use general nouns, but general nouns aren't the same as the
'abstract general ideas' of Traditional Lore. Readers are directed to the
above Essays (and the academic studies listed in the previous paragraph) for more details.
7.
One has only to leaf through, say, Aristotle's
Prior Analytics to see
that this is no mere invention on my part.
A comprehensive history of Logic can be found in Kneale and Kneale (1978); the
precipitous degeneration of Logic after Aristotle died is outlined in Peter Geach's article: 'History
of the Corruptions of Logic' (i.e., Geach (1972b)). For Aristotle's use of
variables, see Barnes (2009), pp.264-359.
8.
There is an excellent account of Aristotelian
Logic in
Smith (2022). And there is an equally useful account of
MFL (which
is now
confusingly called "Classical Logic") in
Shapiro and Kissel (2022). Readers should also consult
Hirsch (2004), which, while deeply flawed itself, represents a major step in the right
direction by a 'fan of the dialectic'. Having said, that, Hirsch isn't above
committing a few basic errors of his own; on that, see
here.
9.
Naturally, this raises fundamental issues that
lie right at the heart of this topic -- that is, whether or not concepts change over time as
a result of inherent, 'internal', logical or 'rational' processes, or by
some other means. This aspect of
DL
(incompatible as it is with the sort of HM that refuses to make any concessions to
Hegelian mysticism) will be examined in Essay Fourteen Part Two.
This also raises questions about the relative
stability of meaning in language. That topic is dealt with in more detail in
Essay Six --
here
and
here. See also
here.
11.In fact, MPP was known to the
Stoics, circa 200 BCE. This Stop
Press! Breaking News!
has yet to penetrate the adamantine skulls of the majority of 'dialectical
logicians'. It looks like 2300 years hasn't quite been long enough for them!
On
Stoic Logic, see Kneale and Kneale (1978),
pp.158-76, and Mates (1953).
In the argument in the main body of the Essay, "A" stands for "Assumption". The
un-bracketed numbers relate to the premises used on each line to derive the
conclusion at the end; the bracketed numerals are the line numbers. In this, I
have partially followed Lemmon's method of presentation. Cf.,
Lemmon (1993).
An introduction to
Natural Deduction (a
system devised by
Gerhard Gentzen) can be found in
Lemmon (1993); a
much more axiomatic approach to logic in Hunter (1996); more advanced logic is
detailed in
Bostock (1997)
(this links to a PDF) and Mendelson (1979). For a more recent, comprehensive
survey of modern mathematical logic, see Hinman (2005).
Unfortunately(!!), Gentzen was either a Nazi, or he
entertained
Nazi sympathies. [On this, also see
here.] But this should no more affect our opinion of his work in logic than
Hegel's political and social views affect how dialecticians regard his 'logic'.
11a.Again, care must be taken not to confuse interpretation in logic with interpretation in
other disciplines --, or, indeed, in ordinary discourse. [On that, see
here.]
It might be objected that the antecedent and
consequent here aren't propositions -- that is, "Atoms
of 64Cu
undergo beta decay"
and "64Ni
atoms, positrons and neutrinos are formed"
aren't actually capable of being true or false. That observation is partially correct, but the argument isn't
beyond repair. However that repair would render the clauses involved highly
stilted, if not unwieldy. The repaired version of the opening assumption would
then read something like this:
A1: If an atom of
64Cu
undergoes beta decay at t1, then an atom of 64Ni,
k positrons and m neutrinos are formed
at t2.
[t2
> t1.]
[Where the temporal and numerical variables
are also well defined.]
However, I rather think that A1 is scientifically
uninteresting and possibly unverifiable; but that is no fault of logic.
12.Details
about those other systems of
Logic can be found in Goble (2001), Hughes and Cresswell (1996), Haack (1978, 1996), Hintikka
(1962), Jacquette (2006),
Prior (1957, 1967, 1968),
Sider (2010), and Von Wright (1957, 1963). A general survey
of some of the background issues raised by Classical and Non-Classical Logic can
be found in Read (1994). In fact, Graham Priest (who is both an expert logician
and a defender of
certain aspects of dialectics) has written his own admirable
introductions to FL, classical and post-classical; cf., Priest (2000, 2008). Also worth consulting are the following:
Despite this
embarrassment of riches, freely
available on the Internet, DM-fans steadfastly cling to their
studied ignorance, happily maintaining a ground state of self imposed
nescience,
all the while pontificating about the alleged 'limitations' of FL as if they
were latter-day
Aristotles.
[Anyone who doubts this need only examine, say, Trotsky's lamentably
weak, if not embarrassingly incompetent reply to
James
Burnham, in Trotsky (1971),
pp.91-119,
196-97,
232-56 -- and then count the number of subsequent
Trotskyists who mindlessly quote the master's words as if they had been brought down
from off
a mountain somewhere, engraved on
stone tablets. See also, here
and here.]
12a.Examples of the rather weak attempts made by
DM-theorists to argue that FL uses 'fixed concepts' are examined
below; but see also
here.
Some might object that
dialecticians refer to conceptual change in concepts like "freedom",
"democracy", "justice" "equality", etc. But, as we will soon see, what has
changed here isn't the concepts involved but the words used to express them. The
word "justice" might have meant something different to someone in Ancient
Greece, but their concept of justice hasn't changed. How could it? [Unless we
believe that past still exists and is changing!] What has changed is our use of
this word.
That shouldn't be taken to
mean I think there was one and only one meaning of the word "justice" in
Ancient Greece, or anywhere else for that matter. Far from it.
12b.
Of course, as we will
see,
reductionism is generally 'refuted' by DM-fans by the expedient of
simply rejecting it, with little attempt at explanation or even justification
--, other than, perhaps, a quick reference to the Part/Whole 'dialectic' (destructively criticised in Essay Eleven
Part Two).
The second
consequence of the allegations advanced in the main body of this Essay about the 'dialectical theory of knowledge' (i.e., that it depends on some form
ofbourgeois individualismwith a leftish-looking veneer tacked onto it)
is passed over in silence by DM-theorists -- that is, they ignore this
specific implication, not my criticisms; the latter are never even read. In fact, in my 35-year hike
across this Dialectical Desert I
have only ever encountered one author (Bertell
Ollman) who even so much as recognised this implication of
the 'dialectical theory of knowledge', and even then he merely kicked it into
the long grass for 'future consideration' (which has yet to materialise,
nearly twenty years later). [On that, see
here.]
13.
In what follows, when I am alluding to a concept
(as opposed to employing a specific phrase expressing it), I will put any of the
terms I use in 'scare' quotes --, e.g., 'the concept green'. When I
mention a concept I will employ double quotation marks -- e.g., "the concept green".
When I am not trying to say anything controversial, I will simply use, for
example, the word "concept" without any quotation marks at all --
e.g., concept. When I actually employ a concept expression (as opposed to
merely
mentioning it), that should be clear from the actual words I use --
for example, "This leaf is
green" (where the concept expression, "ξ
is green", is buried in that sentence).
[It should also be noted that in
general in this Essay (and at this site), unless I am interpreting passages from
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (i.e., Wittgenstein (1972)), I am using the word
"expression" (and its cognates) in a non-technical sense.]
As I hope will be apparent, I am adopting (as well as adapting) a neo-Fregean understanding of
concept expressions -- i.e., each one expresses a rule for the formation of
certain sentences. As readers will now no doubt appreciate, this
topic is a veritable minefield, so this section of the Essay will need to be
re-written many times in order to make sure I don't fall into the very same traps I am trying to highlight
and thus avoid!
The distinction between
concepts
and objects (or rather, the distinction between concept expressions and singular
terms -- Proper Names and
Definite Descriptions) -- is crucially important, otherwise a proposition
will simply turn into a list, and hence
fail to say anything.
[That
topic was covered in extensive detail in Essay Three
Part One (and
will be again briefly in
Note 14).
Several of the issues raised here are outlined with admirable clarity in Gibson
(2004), and at some length in Gaskin (2008). (However, Professor Gaskin's 'solution'
to this pseudo-problem is no solution at all; I will say more about why that is so in a later Essay.) See also,
Davidson (2005), pp.76-163, and Weiner (2004), pp.104-14. However, in what
follows my ideas have been heavily influenced by the following two authors: Long
(1969, 1976, 1982, 1984) and Geach (1961,
1976,
1980). Having said
that, no one should assume from this that these authors would agree with
everything contained in this Essay (or anything at all at this site!),
or, indeed, with each other. Nor should anyone assume that I have interpreted
their work, or used their ideas, correctly. Readers will have to make their own
minds up on that score.]
I have briefly explained why this approach has much to
recommend it over the traditional understanding of 'concepts' -- which sees them
either as (i) 'mental' or psychological entities/structures of some sort, or (ii) 'abstract
particulars' that 'reside' in 'heaven', the 'mind' of some 'god', or,
indeed, somewhere else (but don't ask where) -- on that, see here,
here, and
here.
Anyway, dialecticians themselves appear to
require the above distinction, otherwise their theory
would be little different from "crude materialism". They need concepts
to remain just what they are, concepts, and not morph into objects, or even the names thereof
-- or
they would risk losing their capacity to
express generality. [Again, this was also explained in detail in Essay Three Part One
(link above).]
Indeed, if concepts and objects were one and
the same, there would appear to be no advantage -- indeed, there would be no point
-- in seeking a conceptual
account of change in, or to, material objects, for that would turn it into an
abstract account of change experienced by what are, in effect, objects, not concepts.
Only now it would be entirely
unclear what these new 'objects' were (i.e., what these 'concepts-turned-into-objects'
actually are), and how they could
possibly account for anything.
Of course,
as noted above, part of the problem here is that,
following Kant and Hegel, concepts have tended to be viewed by DM-theorists as
quasi-mental structures -- i.e., as images, processes, or 'representations' of some
sort -- the
latter, in some cases, now becoming indistinguishable from the capacity we are all supposed
to possess of being able to 'represent' to ourselves the "Universals"
of traditional philosophical lore.
Once more, that approach blurs the distinction between concepts and objects (or, indeed, the names
thereof). Hence, a DM-'concept' appears to be a peculiar sort of abstract
(mental?) object.
[A brief account of the history of the
introduction of this word (Begriff) into Philosophy (by Leibniz in
the 17th
century), can be found in Caygill (1995), pp.118-21. For Hegel's use
of this word and its cognates, see Inwood (1992), pp.58-61. See also Tugendhat
(1982).]
However, as far asthe expression of conceptual change is concerned there seem to be only
two (straight-forward) possibilities -- illustrated by C2 and C3, below. Neither looks at all
promising:
C2: This patch of
green has changed.
C3: The concept
green has changed.
[1] It might be thought that in C3 "The concept
green" is meant to designate all green objects. But, on reflection,
that seems unlikely
since C3 is specific in its reference to 'the concept green', not
the objects that happen to instantiate, or which fall under, it. Even though all or most of the
said objects could change, that would still leave the 'concept' itself
unaffected. Indeed, all green things appear to change at some point, but if the
'concept' itself also changed, we wouldn't be able to express that fact in any obvious way
(as indeed we saw in the main body of this Essay).
So much was at least clear to
Plato, but he
(or, at least, later Platonists) 'solved' this problem by turning general nouns
(and much else besides) into the Proper Names of
abstract particulars (i.e.,
in Plato's case, into what appear to be the Proper Names of what he called the
"Forms")
--
or they employed other singular terms in order to designate them (such as "the Form of the
Good"), which unfortunately only succeeded in
destroying generality. [On that,
also see
Essay Six.]
In turn, this would mean that the phrase "the concept green" was no longer a general
expression, but was now a singular term, and as such it would no longer operate as a
concept expression! The latter are general in form (or, rather, their use
means their form is general); singular terms (manifestly) aren't.
For DM-theorists this problem was further complicated by the fact that they also
seem to think that human beings cognise individuals (like Socrates or Lenin) as
concepts, too! That is because they conflate both of these factors (i.e.,
representations of individuals and 'concepts' themselves), and thereby view them
both as 'mental' entities of some
sort. Of course, these 'mental entities' are supposed to 'reflect' objects and
process in 'reality', but that is part of the problem since it places concepts and
objects on the same level again.
[Whether or not terms like these can 'reflect'
anything at all will be subjected to
considerable doubt in Essay Thirteen
Part One.
For the complex ways that Ancient Greek Philosophers,
Grammarians, and Logicians
attempted to grapple with such knotty problems, see Barnes
(2009), pp.93-167.]
[2] "The concept green" could refer to an 'abstraction'
residing perhaps in some 'mind(s)' or in some brain(s), maybe as a 'collective idea of
green'. Alternatively, these 'abstractions' could (i) somehow 'inhere' in all the
objects that share the designated 'property'; or the word itself could (ii) refer to whatever
is supposed to 'inhere' or 'exhibit' this concept -- that is, it could refer to the
objects that are somehow 'collected together' by this concept, perhaps 'the set
of all green objects'. But, again, "green" can't designate a
'collective idea of green', for there is no such thing. [Why that is so is explained at length in Essay Three
Parts One
and Two.]
Even if there
were
such a 'collective idea', calling 'it' a concept would be inept since, ex hypothesi, 'it' would then
either be an 'object'
(or the Proper Name thereof) or
a collection of 'objects', not a concept! Moreover, if 'all green objects'
shared this common property, designating it this way would only
succeed in denying it that very role --
since 'The concept green' would now be an object, or it would designate an object,
not a general term once more.
Of course, options
[1] and [2] imply that it isn't concepts that change, but objects that
instantiate them which do, vitiating the entire DM-exercise.
The problem here is that it isn't possible to state in
empirical propositions (i.e., propositions that state matters of fact) -- or even
indicative sentences that have any content --,
the logical role
that concept expressions
occupy without distorting that very role. In fact, any attempt to do so destroys their
capacity to function in the way that might have been imagined for them.
[This
topic is
connected with the main theme of Essay Twelve Part One -- which is that any
attempt to construct a philosophical theory about how language 'latches
onto the world', how it supposedly 'reflects' nature, or the underlying 'essence',
or 'the logical form of the
world', or whatever, will always collapse into
non-sense, and then perhaps into
incoherence.
(The argument supporting those contentions has been summarised
here.)]
While Frege was painfully aware of this 'difficulty', he couldn't account for it
-- or, indeed, circumvent it. Wittgenstein, I
think, 'solved' this 'problem' -- or, rather, he 'solved' it by dissolving it. [On that, see the references
given
below.]
The
widespread 'dialectical illusion' that it is possible to refer to conceptual change (in, for example, the crude manner
envisaged in TAR and other DM-texts) is
perhaps motivated by (a) the transformation
concept expressions undergo when they are located in new, but
non-standard, sentential contexts and (b) the role they occupy in
such contexts, which is thereby misconstrued.
For instance, this happens when an attempt is
made to 'refer' to concept expressions directly, where they are designated by singular terms -- for example, as we saw in
relation to C3:
C3a: This leaf used to be
green.
C3: The concept
green has changed.
C3b:
ξ is
green at t1,
but
it isn't the case that ξ
is green
at t2
(t2
> t1).
C3c: Greenness has changed.
As the move from C3a to C3 shows, the
idea that 'concepts'
can change (in this crude DM-manner) rests on the nominalisation
or theparticularisationof the concept expression
in C3 -- represented in an expanded form in
C3b. This
happens when predicate expressions -- in this case, "ξ is green", in
C3a -- are replaced by Proper Names -- in this case, "Greenness" in C3c --, or by
a definite description
-- e.g., "The concept
green", in C3 itself. These moves replace the general concept expression, "ξ
is green", with a singular term, which then motivates the idea that because singular terms
actually denote objects -- which can
and dochange
-- these newly transformed words must also designate
abstract objects (for instance, Hegelian 'concepts') that are subject to change
in like manner.
[The use of Greek letters -- like "ξ" in "ξ
is green" -- is explained
here. Why expressions like "ξ
is green" are general, not particular, is also explained there.]
[Particularisation: this
changes general expressions -- such as
"ξ is green"
-- into singular terms (i.e., into a Proper Name or a
Definite Description), which then supposedly designate
Abstract
Particulars. (It is important not to confuse particularisation
with Hegel's use of "particular".)
This isn't to suggest that the 'grammatical subject' of such sentences can only
be
represented by
singular terms.]
Howobjects
change or develop thereby becomes the pattern upon which conceptual change is
now modelled, and that is because,
when an attempt is made to refer to, or denote, a 'concept' we are forced to
nominalise, or particularise, the concept expression concerned. This linguistic slide
lies behind the false move that motivates the conflation of two distinct
types of change -- conceptual with objectual change.
In Essay Three
Parts
One
and Two, we saw Ancient Greek
theorists commit a series of 'errors' like this concerning the nature and syntax of
predicative propositions, which then gave birth to an entire family of philosophical pseudo-problems
concerning the nature of 'Abstractions', 'Universals', 'Categories', 'Ideas',
'Forms' and 'Concepts' -- the ripples from which have been spreading
out now for the
last 2400 years.
As Professor Havelock pointed out
in relation to the linguistic gyrations performed by the so-called
Presocratic Philosophers:
"As long as preserved
communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained
only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is
gods.
Hesiod
takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great
story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of
gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas,
mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a
style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the
manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of
events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the
Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated
philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking
was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could
describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter,
body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity,
quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of
abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of
doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour
of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms
systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished
by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic
statement.
"The history of early
philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary
was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own
language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....
"Nevertheless, the
Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They
had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of
orally memorised speech, in particular the language of
Homer and
Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and
manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had
the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a
cosmic rather than a particular reference."
[Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with
UK English. Links added.]
Havelock then proceeds to show in detail that
this is precisely what the Presocratics succeeded in doing:
inventing abstract nouns, replacing verbs with these newly-minted nouns, and
also altering the verb "to be" in the required manner. As a result that verb was transformed into a noun
-- "Being" -- that supposedly now referred to 'god', 'everything',
'nature', 'reality', 'existence'..., or whatever took the fancy of whomsoever
was weaving the tale. Alternatively, these moves were left conveniently vague and mysterious,
and in that state the results have exercised
a profound influence on Traditional Philosophers ever since -- but, most notably Hegel and Heidegger.
[On the latter, see
Edwards (2004), Chapter Two. See also, Kahn (2003).]
So, 'abstract objects' like
this
were conjured into 'existence' simply because the distinction
between concepts and objects had been obliterated -- again by means of
yet another grotesque distortion of language, just as Marx himself intimated:
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world,
and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
[While I'm not saying that Marx saw
things this way, there were hints in the 1840s that he was moving in
this direction. On that, see
here and
here.]
Metaphysicians have repeatedly made, and are still making, 'mistakes' like this,
regularly falling prey to what might perhaps be called the "Nominalisation/Particularisation Fallacy". Those
who have been misled
in this way
seem to think that if a clause (or phrase) can be nominalised, or particularised,
then there must be something, visible or invisible: (a) In the
'mind', (b) 'Spread out across' a collection of objects in some
as-yet-to-be-explained way, (c)
In 'Platonic Heaven' or (d) 'In' the 'Mind of God' --, which must answer
to it.
So,
on this basis it was often concluded that 'the concept green' must exist (somewhere)
because an expression supposedly designating it has been particularised by the
use of a definite description. However, the above inferences wereonly ever justified by an appeal to linguistic dodges like this,
which conjure
into existence 'abstract objects' at the drop of a general noun, verb or
adjective.
As Professor Havelock pointed out, these ancient moves helped motivate the idea that
because the ordinary use of
language actually prevents such linguistic chicanery, a set of technical
devices must be invented specifically in order to enable it -- hence, words like "Form",
"Concept", "Being", "Property", "Category", "Nothing" and "Becoming"
were invented to
order and pressed into metaphysical service. The supposed meaning of these
vacuous neologisms
then
appeared to
legitimate the derivation of profound 'philosophical truths' -- valid for all of space and time
--
from words alone. In this way,
the dogmatic speculations of socially-isolated thinkers -- divorced from the constraints
communal life places on the
use of language -- seemed capable of penetrating right into the heart of
'Being', way beyond anything that is allowed by misleading 'appearances', the
'banalities of commonsense', 'formal thinking' or 'the abstract understanding'.
Hence, the only
rationale supporting such moves was a terminological dodge, motivated as it was by an inept transformation of concept
expressions into the
Proper Names of Abstract Particulars.
In DM, this
ancient, Aristocratic approach to the
vernacular resurfaces in the supposition that ordinary discourse must be "surpassed",
or even by-passed, by the use of
obscure jargon lifted from Hegel's Logic, which not only
'permits' such
'word magic',
it positively insists on it.
So, instead offinding faultwith the linguistic
chicanery
that originally spawned these 'abstractions', dialecticians assume that
'reality itself' must be 'contradictory'! Hence, DM-theorists
concluded that ordinary language must be to blame, not the theory that had given life by
its egregious distortion.
Of course, that is about as sensible as blaming a patient for being ill not the
virus that caused the disease. So, the transformation of general terms into the Proper
Names of Abstract Particular doesn't avoid the problem, it
created it.
In Essay Three Part One
we saw that
Hegel adopted the Medieval Identity Theory of Predication (which
'allowed' him to re-interpret the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity)
so that he could concoct his weird 'theory'.
Here is a highly compressed summary of his conjuring trick:
In
sentences like the following:
S1: Blair is a man,
what
we 'really' have is this:
S2: Blair is identical with
Man/Manhood.
But,
since Blair can't be identical with the Universal, Manhood, we must conclude
that:
S3: Blair is not identical
with Manhood.
Or,
even that:
S3a: Blair is a non-Man.
But,
this also misrepresents Blair, so we are forced (by the 'development' of these
'concepts) to conclude that:
S4: Blair is not a non-man.
From such tortured 'logic' -- hey presto! -- the
NON 'emerged' like a rabbit from a hat!
[I
won't attempt to defend such moves (and that isn't because I think they
can
be defended!), since I am only concerned here to summarise this 'argument', the background to
which can be found
set out in much greater detail
here,
here and
here.]
These verbal tricks suggested to those happy to perform them, or those content be
bamboozled by them, that further adjustments would have to be made to the
original 'concepts', 'indicating' that there was "movement" in them.
Hence, and as a result, 'concepts' and objects were now said to possess "identity-in-difference", which
idea
formed the basis for, or even constituted, the'internal motor' ofuniversal development!So much from so little!
"Contradiction is the very
moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that
contradiction is unthinkable." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence, §119.
Bold emphases added.]
"[B]ut contradiction is the
root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a
contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Hegel (1999),
p.439,
§956.
Bold emphasis added. These two passages are favourites, quoted by countless
DM-fans -- and, of course, just like Hegel, they all neglect to substantiate them with
evidence or anything remotely resembling a clear, or
non-question-begging argument.]
In that case, viewed this way, these
ersatz 'concepts' -- or, rather, these 'abstract
particulars' -- seem
to undergo change since they had transformed (by a few word magic tricks) so
they now resembled material objects, or the Proper Names thereof! [As we saw,
those two were
conflated, anyway.]
We can
also see this happening in
Hegel's confusion
of the LOI with the LOC ("stated negatively" -- follow the previous
link for more details), in the course of which he ran together concepts,
objects, names, propositions, relations, relational expression, and judgements
-- and a whole host of other things into the bargain. Unfortunately, Marxist
dialecticians -- and that includes
HCDs
-- were only too happy to import these
sub-logicalHermetic ideas into the workers'
movement.
[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded
Middle; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory (to be explained in Essay Twelve Part
Four -- until then, see
here); LIE =
Linguistic Idealism;
HCD = High Church Dialectician (that
term explained
here);
DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on context]
In this way, DM, based on
verbal tricks like these
performed on a handful of ordinary words, was taken to reflect 'essential' features of
'reality' -- underlying the development of absolutely everything --, the results of
which were then
imposed on reality.
[An epistemological version of
this dodge -- called the RRT -- will be analysed in Essay Twelve Part Four (to
be published sometime in 2025). One implication of this theory is that
language is no longer held to reflect the
world, the world is 'reconfigured' so that it reflects the distorted language that has just been imposed on it. This
'reverse reflection' (this imposition) was an essential move in the
construction
of the virulent strain of LIE that was imported into Marxism from
German Idealism
two centuries ago, allegedly flipped over so that it was now 'the right way up'.]
We can see this, too, in Hegel's
recklessly ambitious 'derivation'
of 'Nothing' from 'Being', via 'Becoming', which is another verbal trick that only works if 'concepts'
are treated as objects of some sort (indeed, as objects 'named' by words such as: "Being", "Becoming", and "Nothing").
[I have reproduced Hegel's 'argument'
below; it was unwisely
praised by Lenin and Trotsky, and will be destructively analysed in Essay Twelve Part Five (summary
here),
where we will see that "Being" and "Nothing" were deemed to be identical (in
their difference) because both are supposedly devoid of 'qualities'.
But, that implies they are capable of possessing 'qualities' -- they just
don't have any. That in turn means they must be objects (which can
have 'qualities'), not concepts (which can't).]
In the following, we can see something similar mesmerising Engels:
"The identity of thinking and
being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the
circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its
reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but
never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which
prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality
from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential
nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly
coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it
is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of
thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously,
and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Schmidt
(12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), p.457, and
Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Abstract
identity (a = a; and negatively, a cannot be
simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in
organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life
identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself....
The fact that identity contains difference within itself is
expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from
the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose isred,
where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not
covered by the predicate or the subject…. That from the outset identity with
itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is
self-evident." [Engels (1954),
pp.214-15.
Italic emphases in the original.]
Engels clearly viewed concepts as objects.
How else are we to interpret this comparison: "the
concept of a thing and its
reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but
never meeting." [Italic
emphasis added. More on that, here.]
This conflation can be seen, too, by the way Engels equated subjects and
predicates, using the ubiquitous DM-model, a = a, whereby both
predicate expressions and singular terms are represented (and hence equated) by
the use of the same letter, "a".
Plainly, these creations of centuries of overactive imaginations -- i.e., 'abstractions'
-- can't undergo change in the material world, and that is
why the above tendentious moves have had to be translocated to the 'hidden' world of
'the
mind' where theorists can play around with them to their heart's content.
Indeed, this 'linguistic
make-over' is so 'profound' it can, on its own, 'justify' the creation of an entire universe of
self-developing 'concepts', conveniently hidden away from the gaze of ordinary folk. These
'concepts'
'exist' in
this invisible world and, as we saw in
Essay Three
Part Two,
are more real
than the material world from which they had supposedly been 'abstracted'.
We are told that this
'occult' world
encapsulates the essence of the material world, which is at once both its
architectonic and a beating heart
that gives it life, driving development.
That is why DM-theorists argue that without the 'dialectic',
HM would be like
a
"clock without a spring":
"Trotsky's reply to theses
argument [i.e., to those advanced by James Burnham -- RL] contains a convincing
explanation of why the dialectic is an essential part of Marxism...:
'In
the January 1939 issue of the
New International
a long article was published by comrades Burnham and Shachtman,
"Intellectuals in Retreat". The article,
while containing many correct ideas and apt political characterizations, was
marred by a fundamental defect if not flaw. While polemicising against opponents
who consider themselves -- without sufficient reason -- above all as proponents
of "theory," the article deliberately did not elevate the problem to a
theoretical height. It was absolutely necessary to explain why the American
"radical" intellectuals accept Marxism without the dialectic (a clock without a
spring). The secret is simple. In no other country has there been such rejection
of the class struggle as in the land of "unlimited opportunity." The denial of
social contradictions as the moving force of development led to the denial of
the dialectic as the logic of contradictions in the domain of theoretical
thought. Just as in the sphere of politics it was thought possible everybody
could be convinced of the correctness of a "just" program by means of clever
syllogisms and society could be reconstructed through "rational" measures. so in
the sphere of theory it was accepted as proved that Aristotelian logic, lowered
to the level of "common sense," was sufficient for the solution of all
questions.' [Rees (1998), pp.270-71. Rees is here quoting Trotsky (1971),
pp.56-57 (UK edition); I have restored a corrected version of the on-line
edition, here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
"Trotsky once remarked that
Marxist theory without dialectics was like a clock without a spring...." [Ken
Tarbuck, quoted from
here;
accessed 23/05/2016.]
"In the
autumn of 1939 he [Trotsky -- RL] was called upon to explain why several leading
members of his own movement claimed that they accepted Marxism, but
withoutthe dialectic Trotsky tossed this
impudent claim to one side by saying that that was in effect accepting 'a clock
without a spring'. There are presently many such fraudulent groups, which while
adhering to Trotskyism, hang on to the coat-tails of that New York group which
tried to separate the dialectical method from Marxism 41 years ago." [Gerry
Healy, quoted from
here;
accessed 23/06/2016. Bold emphasis in the original.]
"Marxism without the dialectic,
Trotsky once said, is like a clock without a spring." [Permanent
Revolution; quoted from
here; accessed 23/05/2016. This links to a PDF.]
"While polemicising against
opponents who consider themselves -- without sufficient reason -- above all as
proponents of 'theory,' the article deliberately did not elevate the problem to
a theoretical height. It was absolutely necessary to explain why the American
'radical' intellectuals accept Marxism without the dialectic (a clock without
a spring)." [Trotsky
(1971), p.56. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.]
Traditional theories concerning the origin and nature of Abstract General Ideas all
shared the belief that 'the mind' was somehow capable of ascending from
particulars (given in experience) to the general (not so given) -- or, perhaps
the other way round (depending on which Idealist was telling the tale):
'the mind' was supposedly capable of 'ascertaining' general 'concepts' by unifying
particulars under an 'objective law', or by means of something called
an "apprehension". The first alternative envisioned this taking place as 'the mind' progressively disregarded
the
unique ("accidental" or "inessential") properties and predicates
(these two terms/concepts now irreversibly conflated) belonging to particulars given in
experience. The second had 'the mind' searching for wider connections in order to 'uncover',
or expose, the hidden 'essences' that
lay behind 'appearances'.
That alone
should have prompted anyone who at least claimed to be
materialists to pause for more than just a moment. What on earth could be so
materialist about a theory that has to withdraw from the material into the
Ideal, or which had to disregard multiple features of the material world in such an irresponsible and peremptory manner, in order to
'advance
knowledge'?
The pay-off,
so we have been led to believe, was the greater 'explanatory power and
understanding' both approaches
supposedly enabled. But, if the latter is gained at the expense of populating the world with nearly
as many 'abstractions' as there are material bodies, and which, paradoxically, turn out to be
'more real' than those material bodies themselves(!) -- since these 'abstractions' are required
in order to explain
the nature and behaviour of objects and process in 'reality', not the other way round --
one wonders what sort of victory has been won over
Idealism. One would have thought the word "capitulation" was more
appropriate. At best, it would represent a 'victory'
of the same order, perhaps, as that of the Church over 'sin', 'crime' and war --
or, that of Social Democracy over Capitalism. This question becomes all the
more ironic when it is recalled that dialectics is incapable of explaining
anything (which the reader will, I am sure, increasingly appreciate as the Essays
published at this site unfold), a
disconcerting outcome further compounded by the additional fact that Dialectical
Marxism has been such an abject, long-term failure.
[Those two features aren't, of course, unrelated.]
In
fact, the opposite outcome looks far more likely (which is yet another rather
fitting 'dialectical inversion'' for readers to ponder). That is because this entire approach
is based on the ancient, Idealist dogma that the material world is somehow insufficient to itself, that it isn't
fully real, and that it 'essentially' depends on something that is
'real', which has therefore to be immaterial for the material world to be 'real',
an idea that itself depends on the
mystical dogma that the universe requires an underlying superstructure of Ideal
Principles to make it work, if not allow it to exist or even keep it in
existence.
The result is that DM-theorists (would you
credit it!)
also believe that matter is far too crude and
lifeless to do anything on its own (recall:
Engels, taking his lead from Hegel, actually called matter an "abstraction"!)
-- even though this appears to be all that nature has to
offer. According to these Idealists (and their enablers in
Dialectical Marxism), nature also requires a 'Logic' of some sort to make it
tick, give it life and even lend
it 'substance'.
"Contradiction
is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it
contains a contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity."
[Hegel (1999),
p.439, §956.
Bold emphasis added.]
"So long as we consider things at rest and
lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in
them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in
their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we
immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a
contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and
processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force...." [Engels
(1976),
pp.152-53.
Bold emphases added.]
"Dialectics…prevails
throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself
everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the
opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954),
p.211.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of
nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?)
conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase,
as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a
unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation). In the first conception of
motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive,
remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject,
etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to
knowledge of the source of 'self'-movement. The first conception is lifeless,
pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new. The
unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The
struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and
motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58. Bold emphases
alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Paragraphs merged.]
"The law of contradiction in things,
that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist
dialectics.... As opposed to the metaphysical world
outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to
understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its
relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be
seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in
its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.... The universality or absoluteness of
contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in
the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the
process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from
beginning to end....There is nothing that does not
contain contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist.... Thus it is already clear that
contradiction exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the
simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or
ideological phenomena.... Contradiction is universal and
absolute, it is present in the process of the development of all things and
permeates every process from beginning to end...." [Mao (1937),
pp.311-18. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
Well, we all know which
religion is based on anthropomorphisms like these -- and, on a belief in
The Logos.
Spoiler: apparently, in one form or another,
the
vast majority! We have already seen this from the Gospel of John:
"In the beginning was the Word [λόγος
--
logos],
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.He was with God in the beginning.Through him all things were made; without him nothing
was made that has been made.
In him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind." [John
1:1-4. Bold emphasis added.]
And this
also helps explain why Lenin could declare
that he preferred intelligent Idealism to "crude materialism".
Plainly, he hadn't fully shaken off the regressive influence of the sort of
Christian Mysticism that had been forced down his throat as a child (his family was
Russian Orthodox, into which faith Lenin had been baptised and inducted):
"Intelligent idealism is
closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead
of intelligent; (sic) metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of
stupid." [Lenin (1961),
p.274. Bold emphasis added.
(I explain
why he said this, here.)]
From this, it is quite clear that
Lenin meant "Dialectical idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than
crude materialism...".22
Many other dialecticians quote this
passage, always approvingly -- for example,
here,
here,
here,
here and
here (the last of
these links to a PDF).
By nailing their colours to this (class-compromised)
mast, DM-fans have
unfortunately placed themselves
'on the side
of the 'Gods'.
Diodorus Siculus is, I think, the originator of that particular trope:
"When the
Gigantes
about
Pallene
chose to begin war against the immortals,
Herakles
fought on the side of the gods, and slaying many of the Sons of
Ge
[or Gaia, the 'Earth Goddess' -- RL]
he received the highest approbation. For
Zeus
gave the
name of
Olympian only to those gods who had fought by his side, in order that the
courageous, by being adorned by so honourable a title, might be distinguished by
this designation from the coward; and of those who were born of mortal women he
considered only
Dionysos
and
Herakles worthy of this name." [Diodorus
Siculus, Library of History 4.15.1.]
That
metaphor alludes to an image painted
in
Hesiod's
Theogony (links at the end),
later put to use by Plato in his dialogue,
Sophist (i.e., Plato 1997b), which is one of his more profound surviving works. Indeed, the
Sophist and two of his other dialogues -- Theaetetus (Plato
(1997e)) and
Parmenides (Plato
(1997d)) -- are the principle source of much of subsequent Idealism.
The following excerpt from the Sophist reports on a conversation between an
Eleatic
"Stranger" (who appears to be a follower of
Parmenides)
and a character called "Theaetetus":
"Stranger. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who
treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed
to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all,
that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of
not-being....
"...There
appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are
fighting with one another about the nature of essence.
"Theaetetus. How is that?
"Stranger.
Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to
earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and trees; of these they
lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or
handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if
any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him,
and will hear of nothing but body.
"Theaetetus. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they
are.
"Stranger.
And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from
above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of
certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists,
which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little
bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and
motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict
raging concerning these matters.
"Theaetetus. True.
"Stranger.
Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call
essence.
"Theaetetus. How shall we get it out of them?
"Stranger.
With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty,
for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or
rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag
everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?
"Theaetetus. What?
"Stranger.
Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us
imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in
accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth
having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is
acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but
seekers after truth." [Plato
(1997b), pp.267-68, 246a-246d. I have used the on-line version here.
Bold emphases added.]
[As noted earlier, this battle is
described in
Hesiod's
Theogony (lines 675-715), a copy of which is available
here.]
Again: from this it is quite clear that
Marxist Dialecticians are far closer to the 'Idealist Gods'
than they are to the
'Materialist Giants'!
Clearly, that
further explains why
DM-theorists insist matter is just an 'abstraction'.
They
are, if nothing else, consistent team-players -- alas, for the wrong team!
Which
brings to mind once again one of Marx's comments:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement [alienation -- RL] of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases
and link added.]
"Being is
the indeterminate immediate; it is free from determinateness in
relation to essence and also from any which it can possess within
itself. This reflectionless being is being as it is
immediately in its own self alone.
"Because it is indeterminate being, it
lacks all quality; but in itself, the character of indeterminateness
attaches to it only in contrast to what is determinate or qualitative.
But determinate being stands in contrast to being in general, so that
the very indeterminateness of the latter constitutes its quality. It will
therefore be shown that the first being is in itself determinate, and
therefore, secondly, that it passes over into determinate being
-- is determinate being -- but that this latter as finite being
sublates itself and passes over into the infinite relation of being to its own
self, that is, thirdly, into being-for-self.
"Being, pure being, without
any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to
itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity
within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in
its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be
distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is
pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited
in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting
itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only
this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing,
and neither more nor less than nothing.
"Nothing, pure nothing: it is
simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination
and content -- undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as intuiting or
thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or
nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has,
therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished and thus nothing is
(exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and
thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being.
Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather
absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being.
"Pure Being
and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is
neither being nor nothing, but that being -- does not pass over but has passed
over -- into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they
are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the
same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and
inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its
opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate
vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both
are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved
itself." [Hegel (1999),
pp.82-83, §130-34. Italic emphases in the original.]
Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed
that Hegel calls each of these 'concepts' an "it", and asserts that 'they' either can
-- or they can't -- have 'qualities' or 'determinations', just like any other object, failing to
notice that by so doing he had only succeeded in destroying their generality, nullifying the
whole point of the exercise. [Hegel's 'argument' will be destructively criticised in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six.]
It could be argued that Hegel is talking
about conceptual subordination, here, not object-concept subsumption.
The former involves concept-to-concept predication, whereas the latter
incorporates concept-to-object predication. [On this, see Redding (2007),
pp.85-114.] The problem with that response is that Hegel strangled iteven before
it could take its first breath when he nominalised and particularised the 'concepts'
involved -- again, for example,
turning
the verb "to be" into the Proper Noun, "Being",
also treating "Nothing" and "Becoming" as Proper Nouns, not
quantifiers.
This misguided syntactical 'research programme'
(now 2400 or more years in the making)
deliberately runs together the logical roles occupied by singular terms and general
words/concept expressions. [Why this was a deliberate tactic,
invented by ruling-class hacks in Ancient Greece, is explained in Essay
Twelve (summary here).]
Be this as it may, for present purposes it is worth asking the following
question: If these logical 'categories' (the singular and the general (not the
plural) --
concepts and objects) are in the end 'identical', how would it be possible to
depict or explain the correct functioning of either of them in indicative
sentences? As was established in Essay Three
Part One, names
only function as
names if they are articulated by other expressions that aren't names.
Similarly with predicate-/concept-expressions. If every word named
something (concrete or abstract), we wouldn't be able to say anything about
anything. Language would fall
apart.
Again, as was argued in Essay Three
Part One, if sentences were comprised solely of names (or
other singular terms), they would be lists. Lists can't be used to
say anything true or false. As
Gilbert Ryle
pointed out many years ago (I have quoted this even though I don't necessarily agree with
everything it says, especially its closing couple of sentences):
"The traditional doctrine of terms had required
(confusedly enough) the analysis of proposition-expressing sentences into two,
or with heart searchings, three or more 'terms'; and these terms were
(erroneously) supposed all to be correlated with entities in the 'Fido'-Fido
way. [I.e., just as 'Fido' names Fido the dog, so all words must name
something or other -- RL.] But sentences are not just lists like 'Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle,' or even like 'Socrates, mortality.' For they tell truths or
falsehoods, which lists do not do. A sentence must include some expressions
which are not terms, i.e. 'syncategorematic words' like 'is,' 'if,' 'not,'
'and,' 'all,' 'some,' 'a,' and so on. Such words are not meaningless, though
they are not names, as all
categorematic words were (erroneously) supposed to be.
They are required for the construction of sentences. (Sometimes special
grammatical constructions enable us to dispense with syncategorematic words.)
Syncategorematic words were accordingly seen to be in a certain way auxiliary,
somewhat like rivets which have no jobs unless there are girders to be riveted.
I have not finished saying anything if I merely utter the word 'if' or 'is.'
They are syntactically incomplete unless properly collocated with suitable
expressions of other sorts. In contrast with them it was erroneously assumed
that categorematic words are non-auxiliary or are syntactically complete without
collocations with other syncategorematic or categorematic expressions, as though
I have finished saying something when I say 'Fido,' 'he,' 'the first American
pope' or 'jocular.' Russell's doctrine of
incomplete symbols [i.e., expressions that are meaningful only in the
context of a proposition, but which don't physically correspond to a constituent
part of that proposition and can only be revealed by an analysis of it; I have given a simple
example of one of these in Note 14, below -- RL] was a half-fledged attempt
to re-allocate certain expressions from the categorematic to the
syncategorematic family. It was half-fledged because it still assumed that there
were or ought to be some syntactically complete categorematic expressions, some
'logically
proper names' which would brook being said
sans phrase. To call an expression 'incomplete'
was erroneously supposed to be saying that it did not function like a name, as
if the standard of completeness were set by names and not by sentences; in fact
it is saying that it is only a fragment of a range of possible sentences. So
ordinary proper names are (save perhaps in some of their
vocative
uses) as incomplete as any other sentence-fragments." [Ryle
(1949), p.71. Italic emphases in the original;
links added. (This links to a PDF.)]
Of course, this is just part
of the reason why
DM-'propositions' readily collapse into
incoherence; the inept syntactical
theory dialecticians borrowed from Hegel
and Traditional Thought
denies DM-sentences any sense,
and it does so by turning
them into lists,
preventing them from saying anything at all.
[However, Ryle is wrong about the incomplete
nature of Proper Names. Nothing has been removed from a Proper Name that
expresses a rule for its completion, allowing it to be mapped onto an indicative
sentence, unlike, say "ξ is mortal". For how that works, see
here,
and Note 14.]
14.Of course, that depends on what is meant by the word
"concept". Few deny concepts are expressed by
general terms, but definite
descriptions (like "The concept green") aren't general, they are singular.
This
highlights a 'problem' discussed briefly in Note 13; any attempt to talk about concepts this way
destroys their generality (indeed, as we saw in Essay Three
Part One).
Compare the following with C3:
[C3: The concept green has changed.]
C5: This leaf is
green; next month it will be brown.
C5a: These leaves are green; next month
they will be brown.
C5 succeeds in expressing change, in a perfectly legitimate and ordinary way; plainly, that is because it
speaks about an object undergoing change(or,
in the case of C5a,
applied to a collection of objects), not a concept.
In the first half
of C5, the concept green is expressed by the use of the one-place
predicable "ξ is green"**,
which, when it is completed by the singular term -- "This leaf"
-- maps it onto the first
clause of C5, yielding: "This leaf is green".
[It could be objected that if the
argument in this Essay were correct, the above sentence -- i.e., "The concept
green is expressed by the use of the one-place predicable 'ξ is green'" -- would itself be ill-formed. Well, it
certainly lacks a sense -- it can't be true and it can't be false -- but
that isn't a
problem for the case being presented here. That is because the 'offending'
sentence**itself expresses (a badly-stated) rule -- in which case, it doesn't need to be
true or false to be understood. (There is more on this in Essay Twelve
Part One --
especially
here.)
And, it is 'badly-stated' only because of the constraints under which I am
presently having to operate -- i.e., defending ordinary language in the face of those who
seem determined to distort, disparage or depreciate it (e.g., Traditional
Theorists and DM-fans). The sentence marked with two red asterisks would
perhaps be better expressed as follows: "We demonstrate our grasp of the
language of colour
words, and concepts expressed by any associated vocabulary, such as 'green', by
the rule-governed way we complete sentence stencils such as this 'ξ is green'."
(Again,
the use of Greek letters -- like "ξ" in "ξ
is green" -- is explained
here. It is further justified,
here, and again,
above.
A predicable
is an expression that is capable of being predicated; it expresses a predicate when it is so
predicated. Compare its use to "breakable".)]
By way of contrast, in C3 the phrase "The concept green"
is a singular term, which can't express a rule, whereas "ξ is
green" can. [Again, why that is so is also explained in Essay Three
Part One.]
Nevertheless, "The concept green",
acting now as a singular term (when coupled with the one-place predicable "ξ has
changed"), can be mapped onto a sentence like C3. But, because of this,
C3 is no longer an ordinary sentence. Despite what it seems to say, it can't now be
about 'the concept green' (since that concept is expressed by the use of
sentence forming operators like
"ξ is green",
or by the way we use the word "green" in sentences like C5).
"The concept green" can't do this because it is a singular term thatcan only designate an object,
and concepts aren't objects(as we saw in Essay Three Part One -- link
above).
This means that C3 is a radically ill-formed sentence. While C5 itself
succeeds quite uncontroversially in expressing change undergone by familiar,
everyday objects, C3 fails to depict anything at all because it is
so radically malformed.
C3: The concept green has changed.
C5: This leaf is
green; next month it will be brown.
Evenif (per
impossible) the phrase "The concept green" were capable of being
used (non-misleadingly) to designate something, it couldn't serve as an archetype for the role that legitimate
concept expressions occupy in sentences like C5. Once more, that is because a
singular term (e.g., "The concept green") can't
express a rule, which is what the ordinary use of "ξ is green"
manages to do (when used in the above manner). So, in use, stencils like "ξ
is green" represent an attempt to express the application of such concepts, whereas "The concept green"
can't.
Anyone who understands the convention
expressed by a concept expression (like "ξ is green" -- i.e.,
they manage to do this if they are able to form sentences like C5 by replacing "ξ" with singular
term or other syntactically conformable subject expression) will have mastered a rule for the use of "green", in such
a context.
However, it isn't being suggested here that language users actually have the stencil, "ξ
is green", in mind when they utter sentences like C5, or that they can recite
this rule (or anything like it); that stencil merely reveals a pattern in every sentence users are
sensibly capable of forming from it. [Again, why that is so
was explained in Essay Three
Part One.] Compare this with the skill the vast
majority of humans succeed in mastering: being able to walk. Even so, few are
able to explain exactly how they manage to do this, beyond saying they
just put one foot in front of the other.
So, "ξ
is green", as it is used to generate sentences like C5, is the expression of a
rule when it assume its ordinary linguistic form. Stencils like "ξ
is green" merely assist our understanding of the
patterns underlying the formation and use of such simple sentences. This doesn't
mean, either, that this is the
only way
that C5 may be analysed, or even that we have to view our employment of words
like this. But this way of explaining our use of such stencils brings out the rule-governed
way we all form sentences like C5, and how we are able to understand one another
-- and grasp sentences we have never heard before.
[For example, it is a pretty safe
bet that none of my readers have ever encountered this sentence before: "Muhammad
Ali's favourite colour is green", which has been formed by completing the
stencil
"ξ
is green"
with the singular term (a noun phrase in this instance), "Muhammad Ali's
favourite colour". The truth or falsehood of this sentence doesn't have to be
known for it to be understood. Anyone who knows how the use the stencil in
question will understand this sentence (providing they know who Muhammad Ali is
-- hence the link!), since they use such linguistic devices every day of their
lives. Remember, the knowledge and use of such linguistic devices doesn't have
to be conscious (although, as is the case with all intentional behaviour, the
actual utterance of sentences manifestly is), any more than an ambulatory
human being has to be conscious of the biomechanics and physiology of walking to
be able to walk! These stencils record the common patterns in our speech, and
thereby provide a clue as to how we manage to utter and understand novel
sentences that have (perhaps) never been said by anyone before, ever -- as
well as those uttered and heard every day.]
One distinct advantage of picturing
familiar aspects of language in this way is that it helps explain why a singular term
-- such as "The concept
green" -- can't express a rule, whereas "ξ is green" can. That is, of course, just a
more formal way of
making the point that description is different from naming,referring and designating --
which distinction remains valid no matter how we try to depict, analyse or formalise
our use of words.
However, the stencil, "ξ is
green", is nowhere to be found in C5. [Well can you see that Greek
letter in C5?] As noted above, the incomplete expression, "ξ
is green", expresses the
common pattern behind every legitimate sentence that can be
generated
from it by the substitution of singular terms (or other conformable phrases) in place of the gap marker "ξ" -- as in, "This apple is green", "That lawn is green", "Your
face
is green. Have you just been reading Hegel?", etc. The rule-governed use of the template "ξ
is green" allows for the formation of an indefinite number of sentences
in like manner -- some true, some false -- again, even though it appears
nowhere in any of its
instances.
[As already noted, there are other ways of looking at such
sentences, but none, I think, brings out the nature of the patterns underlying the
rule-governed way we generate, and understand, indicative sentences like
these -- or, at least, none that do
so
without falling onto the nominalisation, particularisation trap mentioned earlier.
Or, indeed, none other that so effectively undermines the idea that 'concepts' are 'private objects of
cognition'. Some critics of this way of viewing incomplete expressions (like
"ξ is
green")
claim that singular terms are also incomplete since they can't be used to say
anything on their own. Maybe so, but the idea behind incomplete expressions like
"ξ is
green" is that they express a rule, unlike a singular term such as "Tony
Blair" or "The 44th president of the USA". The incomplete nature of
expressions like
"ξ is
green" express a rule (in use, they are general in form); the incomplete
nature of Proper Names or Definite Descriptions doesn't express a rule (since they aren't general in form).
Does this mean there are no rules for the use of such singular terms (in the
formation of sentences)?
No, their use is given by the rules have for the use of stencils. There are
other, social rules we have for the use of singular terms, but they so not
directly affect the formation of sentences. I don't propose to say any more
about this topic here since it will take us too far away from the main theme of
this Essay. On names in general, see Linsky (1977), as well as Baker and
Hacker (2005), pp.113-28, 227-49. See also Hanna and Harrison (2004), pp.63-158.
However, I cite the latter work with an added caveat: its authors have adopted
the misguided 'Causal
Theory' of names. In spite of this, it has many valuable things to say
on this and related topics.]
Moreover, the singular term used
in C3 (i.e., "The concept green") can't actually do what might have
been intended
for it -- that is,
it can't depict a grammatical 'truth' about the role that the stencil "ξ is
green" plays in the formation of C5 (or, indeed, the role of the verb phase, "is green", in C5).
C3: The concept green has changed.
C5: This leaf is
green; next month it will be brown.
[This underlies a theme that runs through
Wittgenstein's work, namely, we
can't express by means of
empirical propositions (i.e., propositions about matters of fact) how key
logical features of language work -- which was the point behind the distinction between
saying and showing (this links to a PDF),
to which Wittgenstein drew attention in the
Tractatus.]
However, that certainly wouldn't be, or wouldn't have been, the intention of
anyone who wanted to use a sentence like C3. In fact, the use of C3-type sentences
(or even the more obscure,
baroque examples that litter Traditional Philosophy
and
DM; their
analysis in modern philosophical logic is an entirely different matter) had
originally been intended to facilitate, or even justify, the search for, and the discovery
of, 'essences', nature's 'secrets', which supposedly lie beneath 'surface
appearances', and which allegedly underpin 'reality', giving it 'substance'. So,
if dialecticians want to come out with remarks like the following, they will end up saying
nothing at all comprehensible (as we have seen,
here):
"Thus, for instance, if I affirm: 'John is a Man' I affirm that
'John' is a particular specimen of the general (or 'universal') category 'Man'.
I understand what 'John' is by subsuming him under (or
'identifying him with') the wider category 'Man'. Metaphysical reasoning proceeds on the tacit or
explicit assumption that the general category 'Man' and the particular category
'John' exist independently of each other: that over and above all the Particular
'Johns' in creation…over and above all particular men, there exists somewhere --
and would exist if all particular men ceased to be, or had never been -- the
general category 'Man.'
"…The dialectical method traverses this rigid metaphysic
completely. The category 'Man' includes, certainly, all possible 'men.' But
'Man' and 'men', though distinct, separate, and separable logical categories,
are only so as logical discriminations, as ways of looking at one
and the same set of facts. 'Man' -- is -- all men, conceived from
the standpoint of their generality -- that in which all men are
alike. 'Men' is a conception of the same fact -- 'all men' -- but in respect
of their multiplicity, the fact that no two of them are exactly alike. For
dialectics, the particular and the general, the unique and the universal -- for
all their logical opposition -- exist, in fact, in and by means of
each other. The 'Johniness' of John does not exist, can't possibly be
conceived as existing, apart from his 'manniness'. We know 'Man' only as the
common characteristic of all particular men; and each particular man is
identifiable, as a particular, by means of his variation from all other
men -- from that generality 'Man' by means of which we classify 'all men' in one
group.
"It is the recognition of this 'identity of all (logical
pairs of) opposites,' and in the further recognition that all categories
form, logically, a series from the Absolutely Universal to the Absolutely Unique
-- (in each of which opposites its other is implicit) -- that the virtue of
Hegel's logic consists…. Let us now translate this into concrete terms. John is
-- a man.
Man is a category in which all men (John, and all the not-Johns)
are conjoined. I begin to distinguish John from the not-Johns by
observing those things in which he is not --what the other men are.
At the same time the fact that I have to begin upon the process of
distinguishing implies…that, apart from his special distinguishing
characteristics, John is identical with all the not-Johns who comprise
the rest of the human race. Thus logically expressed, John is understood
when he is most fully conceived as the 'identity' of John-in-special and not-John
(i.e. all man) in general.…When I affirm that 'John is a man' I postulate the oppositional
contrast between John and not-John and their coexistence (the negation of
their mutual negation) all at once. Certainly as the logical process is
worked in my min d I distinguish first one pole, then the other of the
separation and then their conjunction. But all three relations -- or
better still, the whole three-fold relation -- exists from the
beginning and its existence is presupposed in the logical act…." [Jackson
(1936), pp.103-06. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Italic emphases in the original. Several paragraphs merged.]
That is because
anyone enamoured of this way of talking will
have to distort language in order to say what they imagine they might
want
to say. In the above, "The category 'Man'" can't tell us anything about the
logical role played by
"...is a man" (or, if you like, "ξ is a man") in
a sentence like "John
is a man". But, the bogus
form of words employed above by comrade Jackson is typical of the way that DM-fans express
themselves, just as it is typical of the way
that Traditional Theorists have also tried to expand on their theories over the last 2400+ years.
Hence,
C3-type sentences attempt to tell us what it is that predicate expressions (or maybe even
'concepts') are supposed to referto. In this particular case, C3 is trying to say that whatever it is that "...is green"
(in, say, C5) supposedly denotes has itself changed.
C3: The concept green has changed.
C5: This leaf is
green; next month it will be brown.
However, as we have seen, "...is green" isn't a referring expression;
it isn't a singular term.
In that case, there is no "underlying reality" for it to point to,
"represent" or 'reflect'.
That is because:
(i) The idea that there is such an 'underlying reality' was
the sole result of bogus linguistic moves (like these) -- or, rather,
they were
made in order to 'justify', post hoc,
the dogma that there is an invisible world of 'essences' underpinning 'reality'; and,
(ii) Concept
expressions aren't referential
-- as we saw in Essay Three
Part One.
Moreover, the above isn't the case justbecause it is being
asserted by the present author that there is
no such thing as 'underlying reality' or 'essence', it is because language can't be
forced into saying there are such things without lapsing into incoherence --
indeed, as
Marx himself
indicated, and as we have now seen.
To put this another way: if, per impossible, there were any "essences" 'somewhere in reality' (howsoever
they might be conceived), they can't
be the referents
of predicate expressions,
since the latter aren't singular terms. They don't operate referentially; they
are either descriptive, constitutive, or attributive.
[Naturally, these observations completely
undermine the DM-theory of knowledge. More on that, here, and
in the rest of Essay Three, when it is finally published.]
But -- to continue with this ancient metaphysical fantasy
a little longer --, if "essences" were indeed fundamental, or
even general, features of 'reality', then none of our general
terms could be used to denote them. Again, that isn't just because general
terms aren't denoting expressions. It is because any attempt to use them that
way would transform such general words into singular terms, which would mean the 'general features of reality' were in fact
particulars (again, as we saw
in Essay Three
Part One).
This would further imply
that the world is fundamentally 'abstract', not material! It would indicate this at the
same time as robbing language of its capacity to express generality -- once more, by turning
predicate expressions into singular terms, and hence sentences into lists.
So, instead of reporting a change to a concept (as had been
intended -- recall we are truing to get a handle on conceptual change
using the traditional methods DM-fans inherited from Hegel), C3-type sentences represent a bogus logico-grammatical
transformation that has been imposed on concept
expressions -- such as "ξ is green" --, changing them into singular terms
that allegedly name, or designate,
Abstract Particulars, such as 'The Concept Green', or 'The Form of Green'.
Conceptual change was therefore reduced to a form of objectual change, and
torpedoed as a result!
C3: The concept green has changed.
C5: This leaf is
green; next month it will be brown.
Change and development in the material world (properly expressed in sentences like C5)
will have in this way been neutered by the introduction of a series of spurious
terms substituted for concept expressions (in
'propositions' like C3). As we have seen, movement in the material world
can't be
depicted this way, and that is what prevents dialecticians from
expressing the very thing
they had thought they could do -- i.e., theorise change in this way. Ordinary
language stands in their way; no wonder they find they have to denigrate the
vernacular.
So, by tinkering around with the capacity
ordinary language already has for expressing change, dialecticians
have only succeeded in producing
vacuous strings of words.
This philosophical fantasy was further compounded by theorists who tried to
'solve' the pseudoproblems
this ancient logical wrong-turn dumped in their lap. It is no surprise,
then, that traditional conundrums like these have resisted all attempts to solve them for well over two thousand years.
In fact, we are no nearer a 'solution' than Plato was over two millennia
ago!
Unfortunately, there is no way out of this
intellectual cul-de-sac. As soon as a concept expression is transformed into a singular term
it ceases to express a concept; it now denotes an object,
or pseudo-object (i.e., an 'abstract object'). Worse still, in so doing
it misrepresents
the role that ordinary, materially-grounded concept expressions (like "ξ
is green") play in
sentences like C5.
C3: The concept green has changed.
C5: This leaf is
green; next month it will be brown.
Naturally, this means that no
philosophical theory of conceptual change is possible -- and that includes the 'theory'
that has been cobbled-together by those who promote the runt of the
litter, DM.
[Of
course, this doesn't mean that we can't make sense of conceptual change
in other ways. How that might be achieved will be entered into in a later Essay. (Spoiler: we
can track conceptual developmentand change by attending to the way that the use
of certain words alters or develops over time. Rather obvious, isn't it?)]
For example, consider these attempts to state putative truths about
a specific 'concept':
C6: The concept green is a concept.
C7: The concept green is a concept expression.
C8: "The concept green" is a concept expression.
C9:
F
is a concept expression.
C10: F
is a concept.
C11:
"F"
is a concept expression.
C12: "F"
is a concept.
[Admittedly, several of the above
blur the
use/mention distinction, but that doesn't, I think, materially affect the
points I wish to make.]
As we have seen, the apparently
analytic 'truth'
expressed by C6 is, if anything, analytically 'false', since
"The concept green"
no longer designates a concept, but an object! Hence, and
paradoxically, C6 is 'true' just in case it is 'false'! [However, I would argue
that C6 is ill-formed, so it can't be true and it can't be false.]
C6: The concept green is a concept.
C7 is perhaps even worse, for it suggests that a
'denoted object' is a linguistic expression! C8 is, if anything, worse still: "The
concept green" can't be a concept expression since it is a singular term,
so it doesn't designate a concept. C9
and C10 are fake concept expressions; the letter "F" (as opposed to
what it stands for) can't be a concept expression -- it is just a letter! If the letter "F" is used
instead, as in C11 and C12, it becomes a singular
term again, referring to whatever the key to this particular schema says it
does.
C7: The concept green is a concept expression.
C8: "The concept green" is a concept expression.
C9:
F
is a concept expression.
C10: F
is a concept.
C11:
"F"
is a concept expression.
C12: "F"
is a concept.
Some might ask the following: if the above were the
case, how might we ever
successfully construct an
workable
logical syntax. But, whatever we set-up, if and when we do, we aren't listing a set of truths,
merely expressing rules for the use of certain symbols -- and these are rules
that attempt to tell us what we all know anyway, since we all know how to use
such expressions without a written rule telling us how to do it (that is because
we all know how to use at least one natural language). The overwhelming majority of us use sentences
like C5 every day of our lives without any such fuss.
C5: This leaf is green; next month it
will be brown.
The locus
classicus for the modern discussion of this topic is
Frege
(1892) -- this links to a PDF --, upon which much of my own thinking has been based.
[However, anyone not familiar with Frege's work will find that article of his rather
difficult; they might be advised to begin with Geach (1961), Beaney (1996), and
Noonan (2001).]
Furtherbackground to this topic can be found in
Davidson (2005), pp.76-163, Dummett (1955, 1981a, 1981b), Fisk (1968), Gaskin
(2008),
Geach (1961,
1976,
1980),
Gibson (2004), Long (1969, 1976, 1982, 1984), Jolley (2007), Potter and Ricketts (2010),
Slater (2000)
--
now reprinted in Slater (2002, 2007a) -- and Textor (2010). For an alternative
view, see Kenny (1995) -- criticised in Slater (2000). For a brief but eminently clear exposition of the main issues involved, see Weiner (2004), pp.104-14. There is an excellent
survey of where the debate is now situated (concerning the 'reference' of predicates,
or even predicate expressions), or, at least where it was a few years ago, in MacBride (2008). Having said that, MacBride doesn't consider the effect that the traditional view --
i.e., the idea that predicate
expressions are referential
-- has on the unity of
the proposition (discussed at length in Essay Three
Part One).
But, of course, his article wasn't meant to do that.
15.Distorted
language like this is what almost invariably motivates metaphysical speculation; indeed, much of
Traditional Philosophy has been based on conceptual muddles such as these. [On
that, see Essay Twelve Part One.]
As Wittgenstein noted:
"Why is philosophy such a complicated
structure? After all, it should be completely simple if it is that ultimate
thing, independent of all experience, that you make it out to be. Philosophy
unravels the knots in our thinking, hence its results must be simple, but its
activity as complicated as the knots it unravels.
"Lichtenberg:
'Our entire philosophy is correction [sic] of the use of language, and therefore
the correction of a philosophy -- of the most general philosophy.'... You ask why grammatical problems are so
tough and seemingly ineradicable. -- Because they are connected with the oldest
thought habits, i.e., with the oldest images that are engraved into our language
itself (Lichtenberg)....
"Human beings are deeply imbedded in
philosophical, i.e., grammatical, confusion. And freeing them from these
presuppositions [amounts to?] extricating them from the immensely diverse
associations they are caught up in. One must, as it were, regroup their entire
language. -- But of course this language developed as it did because human
beings had -- and have -- the tendency to think this way. Therefore
extricating them only works with those who live in an instinctive state of
dissatisfaction with language.
"Language has the
same traps ready for everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false
paths. And thus we see one person after another walking down the same paths....
"One keeps hearing
the remark that philosophy really doesn't make any progress, that the same
philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who
say that don't understand the reason this must be so. The reason is that our
language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same
questions. So long as there is a verb 'be' that seems to function like 'eat' and
'drink', so long as there are the adjectives 'identical', 'true', 'false',
'possible', so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of
space, etc., etc. humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious
difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove.
"And this, by the
way, satisfies a longing for the transcendental [an alternative version of the
manuscript has 'supernatural' here -- RL], for in believing that they see the
'limit of human understanding' they of course believe that they can see beyond
it.
"I read
'...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of "Reality" than Plato got...'.
What a strange state of affairs. How strange in that case that Plato could get
that far in the first place! Or that after him we were not able to get further.
Was it because Plato was so
clever?" [Wittgenstein (2013), pp.311-12e. Italic emphases in the
original; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at
this site. Several paragraphs merged; link added. When Wittgenstein says that
language has remained constant he isn't denying change; what he is referring to
are its nominal, adjectival and verb forms, and the metaphors and
analogies that cause perennial problems, those that puzzled Plato and still
puzzle us today.]
[Examples of confusions like those mentioned by
Wittgenstein have been exposed throughout this site. (This particular one was analysed in detail in
Essay Three
Part One. See also:
Note 13
andNote 14, above.)]
This partly explains why ontological and
epistemological fairy-tales -- fortified by the injection of yet more obscure
jargon -- have had to be concocted in order to justify the invention of the
'objects' to which these specially-invented terms allegedly refer --, or which they
supposedly 'reflected' --
such as:
Forms,
Universals,
Ideas, Concepts, Categories, and the like.
Naturally, this means that 'Ontology'
-- the entire discipline -- is
completely bogus.
17.Higher-order Logic
is outlined in
Boolos and Jeffrey (1980), pp.197-207, and Enderton (1972), pp.268-89. See also,
here.
17a.Nevertheless, one bemused
commentatorattempted to respond to this point (but without checking
the
detailed argument presented in Essay
Twelve -- partially reproduced
above), in the following manner:
"Now
this is very odd. Ordinary people are just as metaphysical and superstitious
as the educated, though there is evidence to indicate that special types of
superstitious thinking may be endemic to certain classes. But clearly ordinary
language, its richness notwithstanding, is inadequate as is, due to imprecision
as well as its ideological content, including inappropriate metaphorical
content. At the very least, why else would we need the apparatus of formal
logic, mathematics, notational systems, technical terminology, ideology
critique?" [More on this here and
here. Bold added.]
[I have discussed the above topic in detail
here.]
The reader will no doubt have noticed this
commentator's himself used a couple of metaphors (highlighted in bold) in his
bid to criticise ordinary language for doing just that! This can only mean that
his criticism itself suffers from the same unspecified 'limitations' he claims
to have found in the vernacular -- because
his criticisms wereunwisely written in ordinary language!
Hence, if what he says about ordinary language is correct, no safe conclusions may be drawn from
his words. Indeed, and as we saw in the
main body of this Essay,
clichéd attacks on the vernacular like this disintegrate alarmingly quickly, since they, too, suffer from these very same unspecified
defects and limitations. This is the argumentative equivalent of sawing off the
branch upon which one is sat.
Moreover,
the above comments echo the hackneyed confusion of
'commonsense' -- or, even widely held everyday beliefs (disguised as "ideological content" and
"superstitious beliefs") -- with ordinary language. In that case, they are worthless.
As argued in detail in the main body of this Essay (link above), the fact that we can negate (i.e., assert the negation of) every indicative sentence
that supposedly expresses a 'commonsense', a 'superstitious', or an ideological
belief shows that ordinary language can't be identical with 'commonsense',
'superstition', or ideology, or we wouldn't be
able to do it.
And,
since this critic unfortunately gave no examples of the
"ideological" contamination of ordinary language (with allegedly 'suspect
beliefs'), not
much can be made of that allegation, either.
18.The historical connection
between FL and science is detailed throughout, for
example, Losee (2001); similar links with mathematics can be found in Kneale
and Kneale (1978), pp.379-742, with a brief survey in Nidditch (1998). There is
a clear summary of the connection between Fregean FL and advances in mathematics
in Beaney (1996), pp.1-117, 269-77. The best introductions to Frege are: Weiner (1990, 1999, 2004) and Noonan (2001); for
the general background, see Giaquinto (2004). There is an excellent short
introduction to Frege's life and work in Potter (2010), although anyone
unfamiliar with modern logic might find that book rather tough going.
The relation between science
and DM will be examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two (to be
published sometime in 2020).
For a more illuminating
discussion of the way that contradictions can be handled -- at least in
Mathematics -- cf., Floyd (1995, 2000). For the same in science, see Harrison
(1987).
19. Cf.,
Davis (2000), Hodges (1983), and
Dyson (1997). The importance of Alonzo Church's work on the
λ-Calculus can be judged by the fact that it underpins most programming
languages.
W&G try to minimise these
path-breaking developments with
the following dismissive wave of the hand:
"There are two main branches
of formal logic today --
propositional calculus
and
predicate calculus. They all
proceed from axioms, which are assumed to be true 'in
all possible worlds,' under all circumstances. The fundamental test remains
freedom from contradiction. Anything contradictory is deemed to be
'not valid.' This has a certain application,
for example, in computers, which are geared to a simple yes or no
procedure. In reality, however, all such axioms are tautologies. These empty
forms can be filled with almost any content. They are applied in a mechanical
and external fashion to any subject. When it comes to simple linear processes,
they do their work tolerably well. This is important, because a great many of
the processes in nature and society do, in fact, work in this way. But when we
come to more complex, contradictory, non-linear phenomena, the laws of formal
logic break down. It immediately becomes evident that, far from being universal
truths valid 'in all possible worlds,' they are, as Engels explained, quite
limited in their application, and quickly find themselves out of their depth in
a whole range of circumstances. Moreover, these are precisely the kind of
circumstances which have occupied the attention of science, especially the most
innovative parts of it, for most of the 20th century." [Woods
and Grant
(1995), p.99. This appears on
pp.103-04 in the second edition.]
We will have occasion to
examine these wildly inaccurate allegations later on, but apart from brushing modern logic
under the carpet with a simple put-down, W&G offer their readers
not
one single example of a technological application of DL even though they try vainly to
'expose' the alleged limitations of FL.
And while we are on the
subject, it is worth pointing out that
these two have plainly confused falsehood with invalidity -- for
instance, when they say
"Anything
contradictory is deemed to be
'not valid.'"
Invalidity has nothing to do with contradiction; in fact, one rule (RAA)
actually depends
on contradiction.
Moreover, anyone who thinks that, say,
QM threatens the status of the LEM would do well to read Harrison (1983, 1985), and
then perhaps think again.
In which case, "quantum
logic" poses no threat to the LEM. It has merely forced us to reconsider
what we should count as a scientificproposition. [For a different view, see Slater
(2002), pp.177-79.]
[QM = Quantum Mechanics;
LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
Of course, computers have had
what can only be described as a thoroughly revolutionary impact right across the planet over the last fifty or sixty years,
and
in more ways than can be described here -- all thanks to the Propositional Calculus.
However, DL possesses its own, perhaps less well appreciated
practical
impact: it has succeeded in confusing comrades like W&G!
[In addition to those
examined
throughout this Essay, W&G's
baseless assertions will be systematically taken apart in Part Two of Essay Seven.]
20.
Admittedly, this is a controversial claim -- but only in so far as some have
thought to controvert it.
21.
In fact,
what Trotsky might have had in mind here is the way that certain systems of classical
(modern) logic -- for example, the system constructed in
Principia Mathematica
--
appeal to non-logical principles in an inconsistent attempt to
provide a logical foundation for Mathematics. In the case of Principia,
for instance, the so-called "Axiom of Infinity" and the "Axiom of Reducibility"
might match Trotsky's words. On the other hand, in view of the additional fact that
Trotsky seems to have been almost totally ignorant of
MFL, that supposition itself
is highly
questionable. Far more likely: he was merely repeating hear-say. It is
entirely possible he got this idea from
Jean
Van Heijenoort,
an expert logician.
Nevertheless, this criticism (if it
is what Trotsky meant) only applies to foundational work in one
branch of MFL connected with the so-called "Logicist" program.
Whatever the limitations and failings
turn out to be
of PrincipiaMathematica (in particular), or
of Logicism (in general), they don't necessarily affect other systems of MFL.
[On this, cf.,
Bostock (1997)
(this links to a PDF), Hunter (1996) and Kneale and Kneale (1978),
pp.435-742. On the failings of Logicism (or, at least, Frege's version of it), see
Noonan (2001).]
In fact, it might soon
prove possible to remove the serious obstacle that halted Frege's program in its tracks -- i.e.,
Russell's
Paradox. Should this work-around materialise, that wouldn't
mean that Logicism should once more be viewed as a viable option -- even though it isn't susceptible to the
serious limitations
it possesses that many
think were exposed
by
Gödel's Theorem --, but it would mean that
at least one reason why
some DM-theorists reject MFL (or, rather, one reason they consider it valid only
"within certain limits") will have vanished.
Recently, much work has gone into this area
of the Philosophy of Mathematics, following
on Crispin Wright's attempt to reconstruct Frege's system [Wright (1983)]. On
this, see the following excellent review article: MacBride (2003); see also the discussion articles
written by Ian
Rumfitt, William Demopoulos and Gideon Rosen in Philosophical Books44,
July 2003, as well as the reply by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale in the
same issue -- i.e., Rumfitt (2003), Demopoulos (2003), Rosen (2003), Hale and Wright
(2003). Cf., also, Boolos (1998), Burgess and Rosen (1997), Demopoulos (1997),
Dummett (1981a, 1981b, 1991, 1993, 1998a, 1998b), Hale (1987), Hale and Wright
(2001), Heck (2011), Schirn (1998), Slater (2000, 2002), Teichmann (1992), Wright (1992, 1998a, 1998b).
Cf., also the special edition of Dialectica 59, 2, 2005,
which was entirely devoted to this aspect of Frege's work. A note of caution,
though, has since been registered by Burgess (2005).
However, the most profound criticisms of Principia
(and of Logicism in general) were advanced by
Wittgenstein.
The best discussion of this is Marion (1998). See also,
Shanker (1987),
Rodych (1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2002,
2018), and, in general, Hintikka (1996). In addition, cf., Floyd (forthcoming,
1 and 2).
See also here.
22.ContemporaryDM-fans find it
all but impossible
to resist the temptation to advance
derogatory remarks about FL. Here is what comrades
Woods and Grant
[W&G] had to say:
"It
is necessary to acquire a concrete understanding of the object as an integral
system, not as isolated fragments; with all its necessary interconnections, not
torn out of context, like a butterfly pinned to a collector's board; in its life
and movement, not as something lifeless and static. Such an approach is in open conflict with the
so-called 'laws' of formal logic, the most absolute expression of dogmatic
thought ever conceived, representing a kind of mental rigor mortis. But nature
lives and breathes, and stubbornly resists the embraces of formalistic thinking.
'A' is not equal to 'A.'
Subatomic particles are and are not. Linear processes end in chaos. The whole is
greater than the sum of its parts. Quantity changes into quality. Evolution
itself is not a gradual process, but interrupted by sudden leaps and
catastrophes. What can we do about it? Facts are stubborn things." [Woods and
Grant (1995),
pp.82-83.
This can be found on pp.86-87 in the second edition. Bold emphasis added.]
"The
subject and the predicate of the conclusion each occur in one of the premises,
together with a third term (the middle) that is found in both premises, but not
in the conclusion. The predicate of the conclusion is themajor term; the
premise in which it is contained is the major premise; the subject of the
conclusion is the minor term; and the premise in which it is contained is
the
minor premise. For example,
a) All
men are mortal. (Major premise)
b) Caesar
is a man. (Minor premise)
c)
Therefore, Caesar is mortal. (Conclusion).
"This
is called an affirmative categorical statement. It gives the impression of being
a logical chain of argument, in which each stage is derived inexorably from the
previous one. But actually, this is not the case, because 'Caesar' is already
included in 'all men.'
Kant, like Hegel, regarded the syllogism (that 'tedious doctrine,' as he
called it) with contempt. For him, it was 'nothing more than an artifice'
in which the conclusions were already surreptitiously introduced into the
premises to give a false appearance of reasoning." [Ibid.,
p.86.
This appears on p.90 of the second edition. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the
conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original.]
However, the example these
two give of a syllogism isn't one that Aristotle would have recognised. The use of
the 'Socrates'/'Caesar'
example is in fact a widespread error; it is repeated in many bad old logic texts,
as well as the
writings of those who haven't studied Aristotle too carefully. He would have denied it was a legitimate syllogism in view of the fact that it has a
particular middle premise which isn't governed by what we would now call
a quantifier
expression (i.e., "Some", "All", "Every", "No", etc.), but
relates to a named individual.
And, as far as Kant's comment
is concerned (and this particular error is almost as ubiquitous), there are many valid
arguments where the conclusion isn't "contained" in the premises. [One
example of this was
given above. Several more can
be found here.]
As noted earlier, W&G's book
is full of errors like this (many of which remained in the Second Edition
-- despite Alan Woods
having been informed about them by a supporter of this site several years before
the Second Edition was published),
just as it is replete with countless
snide
remarks about FL --
a subject about which these two seem to know as much as they do
about the
whereabouts of
Lord Lucan and
Shergar.
[On this, see Note 23.]
Finally, what FL has got to do with butterflies these two annoyingly kept to
themselves. As we have seen, it is DM
that struggles with change, not FL.
22a1.
However, since this Essay was
originally published a Wikipedia page to which I
have just referred has been changed, but it can still be found
here.
22a2.
As we will see in
Essay Six,
the LOI doesn't preclude change. Moreover, in Essays
Five,
Seven Part Three
and Eight Parts One,
Two and
Three, it will be shown
that it is dialecticians themselves who can't account for motion or change. As far as Aristotle and
change are concerned, see
here.
22a. Trotsky repeated these
obsolete ideas in his unpublished notebooks:
"Human thought has
assimilated the
cosmogony of Kant
and
LaPlace, the geology of
Lyell,
the biology of Darwin, the sociology of Marx, which analyse every existing thing
in the process of its uninterrupted change, evolution, development,
catastrophes, etc. But for formal logic the syllogism remains immutable; it does
not appear as an instrument, a historical lever of our consciousness in the
process of its adaptation to external nature with the aim of learning about
nature in a word, not a concrete historical formation conditioned by the
circumstances of time and place, including the structure of our consciousness,
the scope of its experience, etc. On the contrary, the syllogism appears as a
once-and-for-all-given form of comprehending external events. The syllogism
stands above these events, above humanity itself and its consciousness, above
matter, and is the eternal beginning, immutable and all-powerful, for it
controls all our activity; in other words the syllogism is invested with all the
attributes of God." [Trotsky (1973),
pp.401-02.]
Alas, these comments were
out-of-date sixty or seventy years before they were even committed to
paper by Trotsky!
Practically every book and article I have consulted on DM has included an
egregious attempt to 'define' the so-called 'three laws' of FL. Why dialecticians
imagine there are only
three such laws is itself a mystery -- but it may have something to
do with the
mystical nature of the number three,
which fantasy resurfaces in what many ill-informed dialecticians think is
Hegel's method: "Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis". That idea is so widespread (indeed, the Tory commentator,
Matthew
Parris, in a recent (June 2015) debate on BBC TV with UK Labour Party
activist,
Owen
Jones, declared his support for the 'Marxist' method,
Thesis/Antithesis/Synthesis!), and has sunk so deep in the minds of sloppy,
ill-informed teachers,
commentators, bloggers, critics, researchers, amateur YouTube video producers,
readers and viewers alike, that it will survive any and all attempts
to correct it. Unfortunately, this confusion has recently been given a boost by the publication of
Wheat (2012).
[On the latter, see my comments
here.]
H
ere is what Hegel expert
Terry Pinkard had to say
(in an interview)
about
this hackneyed 'triad':
"Britannica:
One of the things most associated with Hegel's thought is the
thesis/antithesis/synthesis scheme, the process by which reality unfolds and
history progresses. But you claim this never appears in Hegel's work.
"Pinkard: This myth
was started by
Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus. It appears in a history he wrote of
recent German philosophy (published in the 1840s), in which he said, roughly,
that
Fichte's
philosophy followed the model of thesis/antithesis/synthesis, but
Hegel went further and cosmologized that notion, extending it to the entire
universe. The book was widely read (apparently the young Marx was one of its
readers), and the idea stuck. It's still touted in a lot of short encyclopedia
entries about Hegel. Like many little encapsulations of thought, it has the
virtue of being easy to understand and easy to summarize. It's just not very
helpful in understanding Hegel's thought. It has also contributed to the lack of
appreciation of Hegel in Anglophone philosophy. It's not too hard to point out
all the places where it doesn't apply, dismiss it as a kind of dialectical
trick, and then just go on to conclude that Hegel isn't worth reading at all."
[Interview
taken from
here.
Unfortunately, that link now appears to be dead!]
Add to that the following comments:
"Some say Hegel used the method of:
thesis-antithesis-synthesis, and others deny this. Who is correct?
"The most
vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in 'thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis.' [...] The actual texts of Hegel not only
occasionally deviate from 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,' but show nothing
of the sort. 'Dialectic' does not for Hegel mean 'thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis.' Dialectic means that any 'ism' -- which has
a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving 'the rest' to itself
-- must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose
problem is reality as such, the 'World-itself.'
"Hermann Glockner's reliable Hegel
Lexikon (4 volumes, Stuttgart, 1935) does not list the Fichtean terms
'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' together. In all the twenty volumes of Hegel's
'complete works' he does not use this 'triad' once; nor does it occur in the
eight volumes of Hegel texts, published for the first time in the twentieth
Century. He refers to 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis' in the Preface of the
Phenomenology of Mind, where he considers the possibility of this
'triplicity' as a method or logic of philosophy. According to the Hegel-legend
one would expect Hegel to recommend this 'triplicity.' But, after saying that it
was derived from Kant, he calls it a 'lifeless schema,' 'mere shadow' and
concludes: 'The trick of wisdom of that sort is as quickly acquired as it is
easy to practice. Its repetition, when once it is familiar, becomes as boring as
the repetition of any bit of sleigh-of-hand once we see through it. The
instrument for producing this monotonous formalism is no more difficult to
handle than the palette of a painter, on which lie only two colours....'
(Preface, Werke, II, 48-49).
"In the student notes, edited and
published as History of Philosophy, Hegel mentions in the Kant chapter,
the 'spiritless scheme of the triplicity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis' (geistloses
Schema) by which the rhythm and movement of philosophic knowledge is
artificially pre-scribed (vorgezeichnet).
"In the first important book about
Hegel by his student, intimate friend and first biographer,
Karl Rosenkranz (Hegels
Leben, 1844), 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' are conspicuous by their
absence. It seems Hegel was quite successful in hiding his alleged 'method' from
one of his best students.
"The very important new Hegel
literature of this century has altogether abandoned the legend. Theodor
Haering's Hegels Wollen und Werk (2 vol., Teubner, 1929 and 1938) makes a
careful study of Hegel's terminology and language and finds not a trace of
'thesis, antithesis, synthesis.' In the second volume there are a few lines
(pp.118, 126) in which he repeats what Hegel in the above quotation had said
himself, i.e., that this 'conventional slogan' is particularly unfortunate
because it impedes the understanding of Hegelian texts. As long as readers think
that they have to find 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' in Hegel they must find
him obscure -- but what is obscure is not Hegel but their coloured glasses. Iwan
Iljin's Hegel's Philosophie als kontemplative Gotteslehre (Bern, 1946)
dismisses the 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' legend in the Preface as a
childish game (Spielerei), which does not even reach the front-porch of
Hegel's philosophy.
"Other significant works, like Hermann
Glockner, Hegel (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1929), Theodor Steinbüchel, Das
Grundproblem der Hegelschen Philosophie (Bonn, 1933), and Theodor Litt,
Hegel: Eine Kritische Erneuerung (Heidelberg, 1953), Emerich Coreth, S.J.,
Das Dialektische Sein in Hegels Logik (Wien, 1952), and many others have
simply disregarded the legend. In my own monographs on Hegel über
Offenbarung, Kirche und Philosophie (Munich, 1939) and Hegel über
Sittlichkeit und Geschichte (Reinhardt, 1940), I never found any 'thesis,
antithesis, synthesis.' Richard Kroner, in his introduction to the English
edition of selections from Hegel's Early Theological Writings, puts it
mildly when he says: 'This new Logic is of necessity as dialectical as the
movement of thinking itself.... But it is by no means the mere application of a
monotonous trick that could be learned and repeated. It is not the mere
imposition of an ever recurring pattern. It may appear so in the mind of some
historians who catalogue the living trend of thought, but in reality it is ever
changing, ever growing development; Hegel is nowhere pedantic in pressing
concepts into a ready-made mold (sic). The theme of thesis, anti-thesis, and
synthesis, like the motif of a musical composition, has many modulations and
modifications. It is never "applied"; it is itself only a poor and not even
helpful abstraction of what is really going on in Hegel's Logic.'
"Well, shall we keep this 'poor and not
helpful abstraction' in our attic because 'some historians' have used it as
their rocking-horse? We rather agree with the conclusion of Johannes Flügge:
'Dialectic is not the scheme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis imputed to
Hegel.'
"In an essay by Nicolai Hartmann on
Aristoteles und Hegel, I find the following additional confirmation of all
the other witnesses to the misinterpretation of Hegel's dialectic: 'It is a
basically perverse opinion (grundverkehrte Ansicht) which sees the
essence of dialectic in the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.' The
legend was spread by Karl Marx whose interpretation of Hegel is distorted.
It is Marxism superimposed on Hegel. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis, Marx says in
Das Elend der Philosophie, is Hegel's purely logical formula for the
movement of pure reason, and the whole system is engendered by this dialectical
movement of thesis, antithesis, synthesis of all categories. This pure reason,
he continues, is Mr. Hegel's own reason, and history becomes the history of his
own philosophy, whereas in reality, thesis, antithesis, synthesis are the
categories of economic movements. (Summary of Chapter II, Paragraph 1.) The few
passages in Marx's writings that resemble philosophy are not his own. He
practices the communistic habit of expropriation without compensation. Knowing
this in general, I was also convinced that there must be a source for this
'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,' and I finally discovered it.
"In the winter of 1835-36, a
group of Kantians in Dresden called on Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, professor of
philosophy at the University of Kiel, to lecture to them on the new
philosophical movement after Kant. They were older, professional men who in their youth had been
Kantians, and now wanted an orientation in a development which they distrusted;
but they also wanted a confirmation of their own Kantianism. Professor Chalybäus
did just those two things. His lectures appeared in 1837 under the title
Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, Zu
näherer Verständigung des wissenschaftlichen Publikums mit der neuesten Schule.
The book was very popular and appeared in three editions. In my copy of the
third edition of 1843, Professor Chalybäus says (p.354): 'This is the first
trilogy: the unity of Being, Nothing and Becoming...we have in this first
methodical thesis, antithesis, and synthesis...an example or schema for all that
follows.' This was for Chalybäus a brilliant hunch which he had not used
previously and did not pursue afterwards in any way at all. But Karl Marx was
at that time a student at the university of Berlin and a member of the Hegel
Club where the famous book was discussed. He took the hunch and spread (it?) into a
deadly, abstract machinery. Other left Hegelians, such as
Arnold Ruge,
Ludwig
Feuerbach,
Max Stirner, use 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' just as little as
Hegel.
"(Quoted
from the article of Gustav E. Mueller: 'The Hegel Legend of
"Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"', in Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume
XIX, June 1958, Number 3, Page 411. The article is still as valid today as it
was in 1958.)" [This can be found
here. The comments between the brackets
above are
from the edited, published version. Quotation marks have been
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; US spelling
modified to UK English. The full article is Mueller
(1958).]
This suggests that Marx and
all subsequent Marxists who use, or reference, this 'schema' aren't reliable interpreters of
Hegel. Having said that, it is arguable that Marx was being ironic and
dismissive when he said the following in The Poverty of
Philosophy.
"If we had M.
Proudhon's intrepidity in the matter of Hegelianism we should say: it is
distinguished in itself from itself. What does this mean? Impersonal reason,
having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an object
to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose itself,
is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and
composing itself -- position, opposition, composition. Or, to speak Greek -- we
have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For those who do not know the Hegelian
language, we shall give the ritual formula: affirmation, negation and negation
of the negation. That is what language means. It is certainly not Hebrew (with
due apologies to M. Proudhon); but it is the language of this pure reason,
separate from the individual. Instead of the ordinary individual with his
ordinary manner of speaking and thinking we have nothing but this ordinary
manner purely and simply -- without the individual....
"So what is this absolute
method? The abstraction of movement. What is the abstraction of movement?
Movement in abstract condition. What is movement in abstract condition? The
purely logical formula of movement or the movement of pure reason. Wherein does
the movement of pure reason consist? In posing itself, opposing itself,
composing itself; in formulating itself as thesis, antithesis, synthesis; or,
yet, in affirming itself, negating itself, and negating its negation.
"How does reason manage to
affirm itself, to pose itself in a definite category? That is the business of
reason itself and of its apologists.
"But once it has managed to
pose itself as a thesis, this thesis, this thought, opposed to itself, splits up
into two contradictory thoughts – the positive and the negative, the yes and no.
The struggle between these two antagonistic elements comprised in the antithesis
constitutes the dialectical movement. The yes becoming no, the no becoming yes,
the yes becoming both yes and no, the no becoming both no and yes, the
contraries balance, neutralize, paralyze each other. The fusion of these two
contradictory thoughts constitutes a new thought, which is the synthesis of
them. This thought splits up once again into two contradictory thoughts, which
in turn fuse into a new synthesis. Of this travail is born a group of thoughts.
This group of thoughts follows the same dialectic movement as the simple
category, and has a contradictory group as antithesis. Of these two groups of
thoughts is born a new group of thoughts, which is the antithesis of them.
"Just as from the dialectic
movement of the simple categories is born the group, so from the dialectic
movement of the groups is born the series, and from the dialectic movement of
the series is born the entire system.
"Apply this method to the
categories of political economy and you have the logic and metaphysics of
political economy, or, in other words, you have the economic categories that
everybody knows, translated into a little-known language which makes them look
as if they had never blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason; so much do
these categories seem to engender one another, to be linked up and intertwined
with one another by the very working of the dialectic movement. The reader must
not get alarmed at these metaphysics with all their scaffolding of categories,
groups, series, and systems. M. Proudhon, in spite of all the trouble he has
taken to scale the heights of the system of contradictions, has never been able
to raise himself above the first two rungs of simple thesis and antithesis; and
even these he has mounted only twice, and on one of these two occasions he fell
over backwards.
"Up to now we have expounded
only the dialectics of Hegel. We shall see later how M. Proudhon has succeeded
in reducing it to the meanest proportions. Thus, for Hegel, all that has
happened and is still happening is only just what is happening in his own mind.
Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the history of philosophy, of his
own philosophy. There is no longer a 'history according to the order in time,'
there is only 'the sequence of ideas in the understanding.' He thinks he is
constructing the world by the movement of thought, whereas he is merely
reconstructing systematically and classifying by the absolute method of thoughts
which are in the minds of all." [Marx
(1978), pp.98-102. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Link added.]
The above conclusion is clear
from what Marx
had to say about Hegel's 'dialectics'/'method', where it is clear that he is talking about his earlier
remarks from the same section of this book:
"Is it surprising that everything, in the final
abstraction -- for we have here an abstraction, and not an analysis -- presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you
let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house,
leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form
that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that if you leave out
of account the limits of this body, you soon have nothing but a space -– that
if, finally, you leave out of account the dimensions of this space, there is
absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract
thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or
things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction the only substance
left is the logical categories. Thus the metaphysicians, who in making these
abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach
themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the
point of penetrating to their core -- these metaphysicians in turn are
right in saying that things here below are embroideries of which the logical
categories constitute the canvas. This is what distinguishes the philosopher
from the Christian. The Christian, in spite of logic, has only one incarnation
of the Logos; the philosopher has never finished with incarnations. If
all that exists, all that lives on land, and under water, can be reduced by
abstraction to a logical category -- if the whole real world can be drowned thus
in a world of abstractions, in the world of logical categories -- who need be
astonished at it?
"All that exists, all that
lives on land and under water, exists and lives only by some kind of movement.
Thus, the movement of history produces social relations; industrial movement
gives us industrial products, etc.
"Just as by means of abstraction we have transformed
everything into a logical category, so one has only to make an abstraction of
every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in
its abstract condition -- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of
movement. If one finds in logical categories the substance of all things, one
imagines one has found in the logical formula of movement the absolute
method, which not only explains all things, but also implies the movement
of things.
"It is of this absolute method that Hegel speaks in these terms:
'Method is the absolute,
unique, supreme, infinite force, which no object can resist; it is the tendency
of reason to find itself again, to recognize itself in every object.' (Logic,
Vol. III [p. 29])
"All things being reduced to a logical category, and every movement, every act
of production, to method, it follows naturally that every aggregate of products
and production, of objects and of movement, can be reduced to a form of applied
metaphysics. What Hegel has done for religion, law, etc., M. Proudhon seeks to
do for political economy." [Marx (1978),
pp.99-100.
Italic emphases in the
original.]
And we can see from what Marx
wrote in The Holy Family that it is the method of abstraction -- turning
everything into a 'logical category' -- that
"constitutes the essential character of Hegel's
method", not the 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' triad:
"Now that Critical
Criticism as the tranquillity of knowledge has 'made' all the mass-type
'antitheses its concern', has mastered all reality in the form of
categories and dissolved all human activity into speculative dialectics, we
shall see it produce the world again out of speculative dialectics. It goes
without saying that if the miracles of the Critically speculative creation of
the world are not to be 'desecrated', they can be presented to the profane mass
only in the form of mysteries. Critical Criticism therefore appears in
the incarnation of Vishnu-Szeliga ["Szeliga"
was thepseudonym of a young
Hegelian, Franz Zychlinski -- RL] as a mystery-monger....
"The
mystery of the Critical presentation of the Mystéres de Paris is the
mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction. Once Herr
Szeliga has proclaimed that 'degeneracy within civilisation' and rightlessness
in the state are 'mysteries', i.e., has dissolved them in the category 'mystery',
he lets 'mystery' begin its speculative career. A few words will
suffice to characterise speculative construction in general. Herr
Szeliga's treatment of the Mystéres de Paris will give the application
in detail.
"If from real apples, pears,
strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further
and imagine
that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity
existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple,
etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring
that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the
almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the
apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence,
perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and
then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'. I therefore
declare apples, pears, almonds, etc., to be mere forms of existence, modi,
of 'Fruit'. My finite understanding supported by my senses does of
course distinguish an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but
my speculative reason declares these sensuous differences inessential and
irrelevant. It sees in the apple the same as in the pear, and in the
pear the same as in the almond, namely 'Fruit'. Particular real fruits
are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -- 'Fruit'.
"By
this method one attains no particular wealth of definition. The
mineralogist whose whole science was limited to the statement that all minerals
are really 'the Mineral' would be a mineralogist only in his
imagination. For every mineral the speculative mineralogist says 'the
Mineral', and his science is reduced to repeating this word as many times as
there are real minerals.
"Having reduced the different
real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit',
speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow
to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the
diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as
hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is
easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to
arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the
abstraction.
"The speculative philosopher
therefore relinquishes the abstraction 'the Fruit', but in a
speculative, mystical fashion -- with the appearance of not
relinquishing it. Thus it is really only in appearance that he rises above his
abstraction. He argues somewhat as follows:
"If apples, pears, almonds
and strawberries are really nothing but 'the Substance', 'the
Fruit', the question arises: Why does 'the Fruit' manifest itself to me
sometimes as an apple, sometimes as a pear, sometimes as an almond? Why this
semblance of diversity which so obviously contradicts my speculative
conception of Unity, 'the Substance', 'the Fruit'?
"This, answers the
speculative philosopher, is because 'the Fruit' is not dead,
undifferentiated, motionless, but a living, self-differentiating, moving
essence. The diversity of the ordinary fruits is significant not only for my
sensuous understanding, but also for 'the Fruit' itself and for
speculative reason. The different ordinary fruits are different manifestations
of the life of the 'one Fruit'; they are crystallisations of 'the
Fruit' itself. Thus in the apple 'the Fruit' gives itself an apple-like
existence, in the pear a pear-like existence. We must therefore no longer say,
as one might from the standpoint of the Substance: a pear is 'the
Fruit', an apple is 'the Fruit', an almond is 'the Fruit', but
rather 'the Fruit' presents itself as a pear, 'the Fruit'
presents itself as an apple, 'the Fruit' presents itself as an almond;
and the differences which distinguish apples, pears and almonds from one another
are the self-differentiations of 'the Fruit' and make the particular
fruits different members of the life-process of 'the Fruit'. Thus 'the
Fruit' is no longer an empty undifferentiated unity; it is oneness as
allness, as 'totality' of fruits, which constitute an 'organically
linked series of members'. In every member of that series 'the
Fruit' gives itself a more developed, more explicit existence, until finally, as
the 'summary' of all fruits, it is at the same time the living
unity which contains all those fruits dissolved in itself just as it
produces them from within itself, just as, for instance, all the limbs of the
body are constantly dissolved in and constantly produced out of the blood.
"We see that if the
Christian religion knows only one Incarnation of God, speculative
philosophy has as many incarnations as there are things, just as it has here in
every fruit an incarnation of the Substance, of the Absolute Fruit. The main
interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real
ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears,
almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we
rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples,
semblances
of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for
they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of
the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind.
Hence what is delightful in this speculation is to rediscover all the real
fruits there, but as fruits which have a higher mystical significance, which
have grown out of the ether of your brain and not out of the material earth,
which are incarnations of 'the Fruit', of the Absolute Subject.
When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the
mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the
contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into
sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of
'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the
mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the
Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses,
for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond.
Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their
natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which
gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute
Fruit'.
"The ordinary man does not
think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples
and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative
way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by
producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the
unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'. And in regard to every object the
existence of which he expresses, he accomplishes an act of creation.
"It goes without saying that
the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by
presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist
in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the
names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to
abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by
which he passes
from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity
of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
"In the speculative way of
speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject,
as an
inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension
constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx
and Engels
(1975), pp.71-75. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added.]
If we reject this attempt to
distance Marx from the hackneyed triad, then (according to Lenin) that
can only mean that Marx
didn't understand Das Kapital!
"It is impossible
completely to
understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having
thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently,
half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961),
p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]
Naturally, this implies that understanding
Hegel (even if that werepossible) isn't integral to
Marxism, or we would be faced with the ridiculous conclusion that Marx didn't understand
the core text of Marxism -- Das Kapital!
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White, J. (1996), Karl Marx And The Intellectual Origins Of Dialectical
Materialism (Macmillan).
White, R. (1996), The Structure Of
Metaphor (Blackwell).
--------, (1972),
Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness
(Routledge, 2nd ed.).
[This links to a PDF of two parallel translations. I have in general used the
one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness edition.]
--------, (1976), Wittgenstein's Lectures
On The Foundation Of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, edited by Cora Diamond (Harvester
Press).
--------, (1979), Notebooks 1914-1916,
edited by G. H. von Wright, and G. E. M. Anscombe, translated by G. E. M.
Anscombe (Blackwell, 2nd
ed.).
--------, (1980), Remarks On Colour,
edited by Elizabeth Anscombe, translated by Linda McAlister and Margarette
Schättle
(Blackwell).
--------, (1993), Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951,
edited by James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Hackett Publishing).
--------, (2009), Philosophical
Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, revised by Peter Hacker
and Joachim
Schulte (Blackwell, 4th
ed.).
--------,
(2013), The Big Typescript: TS 213, edited and translated by C. G.
Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell).
Wolfram, S. (1989), Philosophical Logic (Routledge).
Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995),
Reason In Revolt. Marxism And
Modern Science (Wellred Publications, 1st
ed.).
--------, (2007),
Reason In Revolt. Marxism And
Modern Science
(Wellred Publications,
2nd ed.).
[The on-line version now appears to be the second edition. Added on edit:
It now looks like only parts of this book are available on-line at the
original site. A mirror version of what appears to be the entire second edition
can, however, be accessed
here.]
Wright, C. (1983),
Frege's Conception Of Numbers As Objects (Aberdeen University
Press).
--------, (1992), Truth And Objectivity (Harvard
University Press).
--------, (1998a), 'On The Harmless Impredicativity Of N= ("Hume's
Principle")', in Schirn (1998), pp.339-68; reprinted in Hale and Wright
(2001), pp.229-55.
--------, (1998b), 'Response To Dummett', in Schirn (1998), pp.389-405.
Yates, F. (1991), Giordano Bruno And The Hermetic Tradition (University
of Chicago Press).
--------, (2001), The Occult Philosophy In The Elizabethan Age (Routledge).
--------, (2004), The Rosicrucian
Enlightenment (Routledge).
Zalta, E. (2022), 'Gottlob Frege',
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2022 Edition).
