Essay Four Part One: Formal Logic And Change

 

Visitors are encouraged to read this Essay in conjunction with Essay in conjunction with Essays Five and Six.

 

Technical Preliminaries

 

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Preface

 

As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary over thirty-five years ago.

 

The difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained here.

 

It is important to point out that a good 30% of my case against DM has been relegated to the End Notes. That has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more smoothly. This means that if readers want fully to appreciate my criticisms of DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have raised objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments, which I have then answered. [I explain why this tactic has been adopted in Essay One.]

 

If readers skip this material, then my response to any objections they might have will be missed, as will the extra evidence and argument. Since I have been debating this theory with comrades for well over 30 years, I have heard all the objections there are! [Many of the more recent on-line debates are listed here.]

 

I have endeavoured to keep this Essay as simple and straight-forward as possible, minimising the sort of technicalities normally found in modern logic, since -- sad though it is to have to say -- most dialecticians appear to know little or no logic. That can be seen from the crass things they say about it. Even Marxist Academics (who should know better!) are guilty in this regard; on that, see here. In which case, the indulgence (and patience!) of those trained in logic (who might read the material below) will be required.

 

Anyone who wants to read more substantial accounts of the sort of logic that forms a background to this Essay should consult the numerous books and articles referenced in the End Notes (as well as in other Essays published at this site).

 

It is also worth adding that phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius). They are intended to highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise, the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. Until recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run the system for the elite.**

 

However, that issue will become the central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is directed here, here, and here for more details.

 

[**Exactly how this applies to DM has been explained in several other Essays published at this site (especially here, here, and here). In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the argument (but in this case aimed at absolute beginners) here.]

 

Several readers have complained about the number of links I have added to these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply even to Essays that attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those who find such links do make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain topic fires your interest.

 

Others wonder why I have linked to familiar subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of recent Presidents of the USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of popular films, or certain words that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies', or any at all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them I will continue to provide.

 

Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links connect to web-pages that regularly change their URLs, or which vanish from the Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers informed me of any dead links they happen to notice.

 

In general, links to 'Haloscan' no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.

 

I have also linked to Woods and Grant's book, Reason in Revolt, many times in this Essay, but the link I used now only takes the reader to parts of the second edition instead of the entire book, as used to be the case. However, anyone who wants to access a complete version of that edition can now do so here. I haven't changed the scores of links to the old site that I have inserted in what follows since they used to take the reader to specific chapters of that book, but that faculty is no longer available.

 

Finally, finally: Formal Logic [FL] is a highly technical subject, but since the vast majority of revolutionaries know little of no FL (that isn't to put them down, one can know zero FL and still be an excellent revolutionary!) in what follows I have had to keep such complexities totally at bay. What little FL I have used has deliberately been kept simple and straightforward. Any technical terms I have used I have endeavoured to explain or provide links to where they are explained. If there is anything I have left obscure, unclear or unexplained, please let me know and I will do my best to rectify it.

 

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As of January 2024, this Essay is just over 127,000 words long; a much shorter summary of some of its main ideas can be accessed here.

 

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The material below does not represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.

 

[Latest Update: 16/01/24.]

 

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(1) Formal Logic [FL] Versus Dialectical Logic [DL]

 

(a) A 'Troubled' Relationship

 

(2) FL And Change

 

(a) Unfounded Allegations

 

(b) Validity And Truth

 

(3) FL Allegedly Uses 'Fixed' Definitions And Categories

 

(a) Variables And Change

 

(b) Static Terms Or Slippery Arguments?

 

(c) Change Of Denotation

 

(d) An Annoying Counter-Example

 

(e) Other Systems Of Logic Unknown To Dialecticians

 

(4) Conceptual Change

 

(a) 'Dialectical Change': Is It Conceptual Or Material?

 

(b) Conceptual Change -- Or Conceptual Distortion?

 

(c) Logic And Change

 

(d) Real Material Change

 

(5) Merely Academic?

 

(6) 'Unconscious' Dialecticians?

 

(a) Seriously?

 

(b) Russian Scientists' Disastrous, Conscious Application Of DM

 

(c) The 'Dialectical Biologist'

 

(7) Is DL A 'Higher From' Of Logic?

 

(a) Judge For Yourself

 

(b) The Inane Things Dialecticians Say About FL (In No Particular Order)

 

(i)       George Novack

 

(ii)      Clifford Conner

 

(iii)     Woods And Grant - 01

 

(iv)     Robin Clapp

 

(v)      Plekhanov

 

(vi)     Joseph Dietzgen

 

(vii)    John Molyneux

 

(viii)   Robin Hirsch

 

(ix)     Camilla Royle

 

(x)      Ernest Mandel

 

(xi)     David Hayden-Guest

 

(xii)    August Thalheimer

 

(xiii)   John Somerville

 

(xiv)   Ira Gollobin

 

(xv)    John Pickard

 

(xvi)    Fred Casey

 

(xvii)   Sean Sayers

 

(xviii)  Hyman Cohen

 

(xix)    Herbert Marcuse

 

(xx)     Henri Lefebvre

 

(xxi)    Erwin Marquit

 

(xxii)   Interlude 1 -- 'Dialectical Logic' Collapses Into Nonsense

 

(xxiii)  James Lawler

 

(xxiv)  Interlude 2 -- 'Dialectical Logic' Explodes

 

(xxv)   Woods And Grant 2

 

(xxvi)  R S Baghavan (under construction)

 

(xxvii)  Miscellaneous Internet Examples

 

(xxviii) Serial DM-Confusion

 

(c) Ordinary Language, 'Commonsense' And Change

 

(i)     Mistaken Assumptions

 

(ii)    Descent Into Hegelian Confusion

 

(iii)   Ordinary Language Isn't A Theory -- 1

 

(iv)   Ordinary Language Isn't A Theory -- 2 -- Nor Does It 'Assume' Things Are Static

 

(v)    Ordinary Language Different From 'Commonsense'

 

(vi)   Ordinary Language Isn't Ideological

 

(vii)  High Church Vs Low Church Dialectics

 

(viii) Low Church Dialectics

 

(ix)   High Church Dialectics

 

(8)   Was There Any Logic After Aristotle?

 

(9)   Explaining Change

 

(10) 'Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis' -- Debunked

 

(11) Conclusions

 

(12) Notes

 

(13) References

 

Summary Of My Main Objections To Dialectical Materialism

 

Abbreviations Used At This Site

 

Return To The Main Index Page

 

Contact Me

 

Formal Logic [FL] Vs Dialectical Logic [DL]

 

A 'Troubled' Relationship

 

The relationship between DL and FL hasn't been a happy one. Despite this, dialecticians in general take great pains to make it clear that while they don't reject FL, they regard its scope as seriously limited, especially in relation to motion and change. For example, John Rees commented as follows:

 

"[T]he dialectic is not an alternative to 'normal' scientific methods or formal logic. These methods are perfectly valid within certain limits…. [But] formal logic…has proved inadequate to deal with the 'more complicated and drawn out processes'." [Rees (1998), p.271. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Here, too, are Woods and Grant [henceforth, W&G]:

 

"The elementary rules of thought are taken for granted by most people. They are a familiar part of life, and are reflected in many proverbs, such as 'you can't have your cake and eat it' -- a most important lesson for any child to learn! At a certain point, these rules were written down and systematised. This is the origin of formal logic, for which Aristotle must take the credit, along with so many other things. This was most valuable, since without a knowledge of the elementary rules of logic, thought runs the risk of becoming incoherent. It is necessary to distinguish black from white, and know the difference between a true statement and one that is false. The value of formal logic is, therefore, not in question. The problem is that the categories of formal logic, drawn from quite a limited range of experience and observation, are really valid only within these limits. They do, in fact, cover a great deal of everyday phenomena, but are quite inadequate to deal with more complex processes, involving movement, turbulence, contradiction, and the change from quality to quality....

 

"Formal logic (which has acquired the force of popular prejudice in the form of 'common sense') equally holds good for a whole series of everyday experiences. However, the laws of formal logic, which set out from an essentially static view of things, inevitably break down when dealing with more complex, changing and contradictory phenomena. To use the language of chaos theory, the 'linear' equations of formal logic cannot cope with the turbulent processes which can be observed throughout nature, society and history. Only the dialectical method will suffice for this purpose...." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), p.83/pp.87-88; 94/99. Italic emphasis in the original; bold added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

And, here is Trotsky himself:

 

"The dialectic is neither fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics." [Trotsky (1971), p.63.]

 

However, in the next breath DM-theorists often proceed to depreciate -- or even ridicule -- FL:

 

"The old logic has fallen into Verachtung [disrepute]. It requires transformation.... The old, formal logic is exactly like a child's game, making pictures out of jig-saw pieces....

 

"In the old logic there is no transition, development (of concept and thought), there is not 'eines inneren, notwen-digen Zusammenhangs' [an inner, necessary connection] of all the parts and 'Übergang' [transition] of some parts into others." [Lenin (1961), pp.96-97. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

"A view that is often encountered among dialectical materialists is that formal logic is applicable to static situations, but since, in reality, nothing is static, formal logic is superseded by dialectical logic, which permits logical contradictions. Within the framework of this view, thought is the appropriation (in the mind) of the objectively existing material world, while dialectical logic, that is, dialectics taken as logic, must be considered to be the laws of thought (or correct thinking). Thus, in the approximation where things are viewed as static, formal logic becomes the laws of thought, equally in approximation. When, however, things are viewed in their motion, change, and development, dialectical logic becomes properly the laws of thought." [Marquit (1990), taken from here.]

 

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]

 

"Formal logic considers all things as motionless and changeless, each as separate from all others, isolated in itself. Dialectics is a higher form of thought, since it considers them also in their motion and in their interconnection.... The use of formal logic is limited, restricted. It is a restricted, inferior approach to phenomena. It is admissible so far as I can consider things as unchanged and rigidly demarcated from each other. Dialectics is a superior, more universal, more exact, and more profound approach to phenomena. As soon as I consider things as moved, as changeable, or in their reciprocal connection, I get nowhere with formal logic and I must turn to dialectics. I wish to add that the dialectics of both Plato and Aristotle had an idealistic character; that is, both assume that contradictions have their origin in the mind and that the contradictions in actual things derive from the mind. We materialistic dialecticians say that the contradictions in concepts are only a reflection of the motion of things." [Thalheimer (1936), p.97.]

 

"The introduction of symbols into logic does not carry us a single step further, for the very simple reason that they, in turn, must sooner or later be translated into words and concepts. They have the advantage of being a kind of shorthand, more convenient for some technical operations, computers and so on, but the content remains exactly as before. The bewildering array of mathematical symbols is accompanied by a truly Byzantine jargon, which seems deliberately designed to make logic inaccessible to ordinary mortals, just as the priest-castes of Egypt and Babylon used secret words and occult symbols to keep their knowledge to themselves. The only difference is that they actually did know things that were worth knowing, like the movements of the heavenly bodies, something which can't be said of modern logicians." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.97-98. This appears on p.102 in the 2nd edition. Bold emphasis added.]

 

These opinions concerning FL are now as widespread as they are endemic in DM-circles (see, for example, here). Nevertheless, puzzled readers will search long and hard -- and to no avail -- through books and articles on DM for any attempt to substantiate these sweeping generalisations with anything that even remotely resembles evidence, let alone a perfunctory argument in support of the allegations advanced by dialecticians concerning FL -- more specifically, that it is incapable of handling change.

 

However, W&G did come up with a rather weak attempt to substantiate the claim that FL deals solely with 'static' forms (this is in fact the one and only example I have encountered in over forty years studying DM where dialecticians even nod in the direction of trying to substantiate the rather wild things they say about FL):

 

"In an interesting article entitled The Origins of Inference, which appeared in the anthology Making Sense, on the child's construction of the world, Margaret Donaldson draws attention to one of the problems of ordinary logic -- its static character:

 

'Verbal reasoning commonly appears to be about 'states of affairs' -- the world seen as static, in a cross-section of time. And considered in this way the universe appears to contain no incompatibility: things just are as they are. That object over there is a tree; that cup is blue; that man is taller than that man. Of course these states of affairs preclude infinitely many others, but how do we come to be aware of this? How does the idea of incompatibility arise in our minds? Certainly not directly from our impressions of things-as-they-are.'

 

"The same book makes the valid point that the process of knowing is not passive, but active:

 

'We do not sit around passively waiting for the world to impress its 'reality' on us. Instead, as is now widely recognised, we get much of our most basic knowledge through taking action.' [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), p.84/p.88. Except for the first two titles, italic emphases can't be found in the original, but which nevertheless appear in the on-line version. Link added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. W&G are here quoting from Donaldson (1990), pp.98-99.]

 

Unfortunately, the first passage above appears to contradict the second; the first stresses the 'static' nature of reasoning while the second emphasises its active component.

 

It could be countered that the first quotation focuses on ordinary logic (which supposedly deals with static "states of affairs"), while the second emphasises the active nature of the search for knowledge. So, there is no conflict at all!

 

In fact, as pointed out below, ordinary reasoning makes use of countless verbs, adverbs and adjectives, so the idea that it is 'static' is bizarre. Furthermore, many of the nouns we use don't imply a 'static' view of the world, either. For example, anyone who thought our concept of a river implied that they were changeless, or that they didn't flow, would have simply drawn attention to their seriously flawed understanding not just of language, but also the world. Indeed, Heraclitus, the dialectical guru DM-fans endlessly quote, used the fact that rivers flow to argue for universal change! More-or-less the same can be said about our use of the following nouns: wind, hurricane, wave, tide, ripple, waterfall, thunder, lightning, runner, explosion, inflation, human being, cat, dog, rabbit, swift (the bird), cheetah... If anyone used these terms and thought they were talking about something static or changeless, they would also be advertising their own lack of comprehension of language and the world.

 

Moreover, anyone who argued one minute that:

 

"We do not sit around passively waiting for the world to impress its 'reality' on us. Instead, as is now widely recognised, we get much of our most basic knowledge through taking action",

 

but who then went on to claim that

 

"Verbal reasoning commonly appears to be about 'states of affairs' -- the world seen as static...",

 

would surely have some explaining to do. How is it possible to argue (consistently) one minute that "verbal reasoning" is somehow static while the search for knowledge isn't? If our reasoning were "static", how could the search for knowledge be "active"? Do we not "reason" while we search for knowledge? Do scientists and engineers not use language in their work? Donaldson certainly failed to explain this incongruity, and it seems to have sailed right over W&G's collective head, too.

 

[FL = Formal Logic; MFL = Modern FL; AFL = Aristotelian FL.]

 

Be this as it may, it might well be wondered what "ordinary logic" has to do with FL. W&G also failed to be clear about this and it isn't hard to see why: there is no connection. Anyone who reads through any textbook of MFL -- or who consults websites devoted to it, let alone AFL -- will soon discover that their content has absolutely nothing to do with "ordinary logic". As I pointed out over at Wikipedia (in response to an individual who claimed to be able to think in syllogisms and the formulae found in MFL):

 

Thanks for those thoughts, during the expression of which, by the way, you did not use even so much as one syllogism or a single wff [added on edit -- wff = well-formed formula -- RL] from Principia, but you will note that I in fact said this:

 

"Does anyone seriously think that people actually cogitate in syllogisms, or that they use the formal calculi found in Principia Mathematica when they reason?"

 

I did not speculate whether or not there were maverick individuals on the planet who might at least claim they think in syllogisms (a remarkably useless and inefficient way to think, anyway) or the calculi of Principia (but I retain a healthy scepticism that you actually think using symbols like this: ~[(P→Q)v(P→R)(P→(QvR))], or this ~[~(Ex)(Fx&~Gx)(x)(Fx→Gx)]), but whether "people" do this, i.e., the majority of the population. And if they don't, then logic can't express 'laws of thought', otherwise we'd all be at it, and we'd have been doing it for thousands of years before Russell and/or Aristotle were thought of.

 

But, and more importantly, even if everyone on the planet thought in syllogisms etc., that would still not make logic the study of the 'laws of thought' -- as I also pointed out:

 

"If logic were the science of what went on in people's heads (or the study of the 'laws of thought' -- added comment), then logicians would busy themselves with brain scans, surveys, psychometric tests, and the like. They certainly would not bother with all those useless theorems and proofs."

 

My comments still stand, therefore.

 

[See also my more detailed remarks in Note 5.]

 

Furthermore, as noted above, Donaldson and W&G ignored the thousands of verbs, adverbs, and adjectives we have in ordinary language, which alone show that 'ordinary logic', whatever it turns out to be, is the opposite of what they would have us believe about it. [Again, I have listed several dozen such words, here.]

 

More importantly, even though Donaldson wrote their book many years after logicians began to explore what has come to be known as Informal Logic [IF] -- a discipline that grew rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and which focuses on what might otherwise be called 'ordinary logic' -- she clearly neglected to take this significant development into account. Of course, that might be because Donaldson was only interested in how children learn to reason. However, at least in so far as IF deals exclusively with the reasoning strategies adopted by adult speakers, it still fails to support what Donaldson has to say about these supposedly 'static states of affairs'. As a result of their seriously limited research, W&G also failed to notice this, too.

 

Apart from that, W&G offer absolutely no evidence in support of the accusations they continually level against FL. But, that is just par for the course for these two; the accusations they level against FL remain consistently unsubstantiated, save for the above reference to Donaldson's similarly baseless assertions. What W&G have to say is not only demonstrably false, it is grossly inaccurate, too, as we will discover as the rest of this Essay unfolds. [See also, here.]

 

The same can be said -- but perhaps with even more justification -- about similar allegations advanced by other dialecticians, who quote even fewer (i.e., zero!) sources in support of their baseless claims.

 

Independently of the above, to reiterate: as far as DM-theorists are concerned, the real problem appears to be that even though FL works well enough in everyday contexts, it can't cope with motion and change, with "long drawn out processes", with development, or with the complex, 'contradictory' nature of reality. That is because, once again, it supposedly operates with a "static" view of the world; or, at least, it employs "fixed and immutable" concepts.

 

But, is there any truth at all in these oft repeated accusations?

 

As we are about to find out, when they are examined closely they bear zero resemblance to the truth.

 

FL And Change

 

Unfounded Allegations

 

In fact, as is well known, the criticisms DM-fans level against FL are an echo of Hegel own critique of the FL of his day, which was itself a garbled and bowdlerized version of AFL.1

 

The reasoning behind their approach was outlined by Rees:

 

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]

 

The claim that concepts aren't 'static', but develop and change, was central to Hegelian Idealism. Nevertheless, dialecticians are also keen to point out that even though their ideas have been derived from one of the most notorious examples of Absolute Idealism ever inflicted on humanity, their theory, DM, represents an inversion of that system, which has supposedly put the dialectic "back on its feet", preserving its "rational core". [I have questioned the validity of that claim, here.] This enables DM-theorists to offer a materialist account of 'change through contradiction', but only when it has been fully tested in practice.

 

Or, so we have been told.

 

Whatever merit these claims turn out to have (which is zero, as the rest of this Essay and Essay Eight Parts One, Two and Three will show), I propose to confine my attention in this part of the Essay to the idea that FL 'can't cope with change', because it supposedly relies on a "fixed" and "static" view of the world, and is somehow, or to some extent, one of the more important obstacles to a philosophical and scientific understanding of change. Again, to quote Rees:

 

"The reason why formal logic is often forced to abandon its own procedures in the face of the facts is that it attempts to analyze a living, evolving reality with static concepts. Formally things are defined statically, according to certain fixed properties -- colour, weight, size, and so on…. [This] is satisfactory only under conditions where the scale of change is not vital to our understanding…. But for more complex tasks in politics, history, and science generally, this will not do. Common sense and formal logic are agreed on static definitions…. But 'dialectical thinking analyzes all phenomena in their continuous change'….'" [Ibid., pp.272-73. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Rees is here quoting Trotsky (1971), p.65. (Rees has this as p.50, but that might be because he is using the Pathfinder edition, which I haven't consulted.)]

 

However, in line with other dialecticians (who advance similar allegations), Rees failed to substantiate these claims with quotations from, or even references to, a single ancient or modern logic text (and John has even blocked me on Twitter for having the temerity to point this out to him!).

 

Here, too, is Trotsky:

 

"Logic involves unchanging qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities. Dialectics is constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the reverse.... Dialectics is the logic of development. Logic (formal) is the dialectic of motionlessness." [Trotsky (1986), pp.87, 111. Paragraphs merged.]

 

In fact, and in relation to FL, DM-authors in general -- indeed, unanimously --, rely on little other than unsupported allegations like these, which they then copy off one another from generation to generation, without bothering to check their veracity. As we will also discover, every single one of them has failed to explain precisely how AFL, never mind MFL, is quite as handicapped as they contend -- save they merely repeat the same baseless assertions year in, year out.

 

And, they all appear to advance identical claims. [Irony intended.]

 

Little evidence of the Heraclitean Flux at work here!

 

[AFL = Aristotelian FL; MFL = Modern FL.]

 

Indeed, as is easy to show, the revolution that took place in logic nearly 150 years ago (that helped motivate the long overdue demise of AFL and its replacement with MFL -- and which was largely the result of Frege's pioneering work) has gone almost completely unnoticed by the vast majority of dialecticians.2 The old Aristotelian syllogistic, which DM-theorists seem to think still comprises the whole of FL, is now only of interest to antiquarians, historians of logic and traditionalists -- and, of course, dialecticians who remain sublimely unaware of these major developments. Here, again, are W&G:

 

"It is an astonishing fact that the basic laws of formal logic worked out by Aristotle have remained fundamentally unchanged for over two thousand years. In this period, we have witnessed a continuous process of change in all spheres of science, technology and human thought. And yet scientists have been content to continue to use essentially the same methodological tools that were used by the mediaeval School men in the days when science was still on the level of alchemy." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), p.89/p.93. Bold emphasis added. I have slightly qualified my comments about W&G on this topic in Note Two, link above.]

 

Here, too, is Trotsky (in an open letter to James Burnham):

 

"I know of two systems of logic worthy of attention: the logic of Aristotle (formal logic) and the logic of Hegel (the dialectic). Aristotelian logic takes as its starting point immutable objects and phenomena. The scientific thought of our epoch studies all phenomena in their origin, change and disintegration. Do you hold that the progress of the sciences, including Darwinism, Marxism, modern physics, chemistry, etc., has not influenced in any way the forms of our thought? In other words, do you hold that in a world where everything changes, the syllogism alone remains unchanging and eternal?... If you consider that the syllogism as immutable, i.e., has neither origin nor development, then it signifies that to you it is the product of divine revelation. But if you acknowledge that the logical forms of our thought develop in the process of our adaptation to nature, then please take the trouble to in form us just who following Aristotle analyzed and systematized the subsequent progress of logic. So long as you do not clarify this point, I shall take the liberty of asserting that to identify logic (the dialectic) with religion reveals utter ignorance and superficiality in the basic questions of human thought." [Trotsky (1971), pp.91-92. Bold emphases added.]

 

To which Burnham not unreasonably replied:

 

"You, however, serve up to us only a stale re-hash of Engels. The latest scientist admitted to your pages is -- Darwin; apart from Aristotle, the only 'logic worthy of attention' is that of -- Hegel, the century-dead arch-muddler of human thought. Comrade Trotsky, as we Americans ask: where have you been all these years? During the 125 years since Hegel wrote, science has progressed more than during the entire preceding history of mankind. During that same period, after 2300 years of stability, logic has undergone a revolutionary transformation: a transformation in which Hegel and his ideas have had an influence of exactly zero....

 

"In a most sarcastic vein, you keep asking me to 'take the trouble to inform us just who following Aristotle analysed and systematised the subsequent progress of logic', 'perhaps you will call my attention to those works which should supplant the system of dialectic materialism for the proletariat...' as if this demand were so obviously impossible of fulfillment (sic) that I must collapse like a pricked balloon before it. The sarcasm is misplaced, for the demand is the easiest in the world to fulfil. Do you wish me to prepare a reading list, Comrade Trotsky? It would be long, ranging from the work of the brilliant mathematicians and logicians of the middle of the last century to one climax in the monumental Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead (the historic turning point in modern logic), and then spreading out in many directions -- one of the most fruitful represented by the scientists, mathematicians and logicians now cooperating in the new Encyclopedia of Unified Science. For logic in its narrower sense, C. I. Lewis' Survey of Symbolic Logic is an excellent, though not easy, introduction. I am afraid, however, that in all of these works you will find scarcely a single reference to Hegelian (or Marxian) dialectics; nor will you in those of a single reputable contemporary scientist -- except the Soviet scientists, whose necks depend upon such references, or one or two Kremlin hangers-on, like J. B. S. Haldane, in other nations. The study of these works would be not uninteresting; but I am afraid that when we finished we would be not much nearer the solution of the question of the role of Russia in the war." [Trotsky (1971), pp.236-37. Burnham's response hasn't been published alongside the on-line edition of Trotsky (1971), but it has been posted as a separate entry at the James Burnham archive. Italic emphases are those in the published edition, but were omitted from the on-line version. Links added.]

 

Even worse, after another seventy years, DM-fans still refuse to be told; they remain fixated on the idea that FL began and ended with Aristotle!

 

Admittedly, throughout its history Logic has been conflated with a wide range of unrelated disciplines -- for example, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ontology, Theology, Psychology (including the so-called "Laws Of Thought"), Mathematics, and, indeed, Science itself. In such circumstances, it is understandable that the only legitimate role that FL can occupy -- the study of inference -- was all too easily lost. Unfortunately, that is just one more tradition DM-fans have been only too eager to emulate.3

 

Validity And Truth

 

One explanation for this sorry state of affairs is that DM-theorists have allowed themselves to be led astray by what turns out to be an elementary mistake -- an error novices often make --, that is, they confuse validity with truth. As will soon become apparent, the limitations DM-theorists attribute to FL arise out of their misidentification of rules of inference with logical, or even empirical, truths, but not from the supposed inability of FL to accommodate change.4

 

Unfortunately, this accusation is far easier to make than it is to substantiate. That in turn isn't because it is incorrect, or even because it is itself questionable, but because dialecticians rarely bother to explain exactly why they regard FL as defective -- that is, over and above merely asserting that assumed fact, copying it off one another, year after year, without making any attempt to justify or substantiate it.

 

Neither is it to claim that DM-theorists collectively fail to make the point that FL is defective because it supposedly deals with "static" forms, etc. Far from it, they all sing the same tune -- on that, see below. It is simply to underline the fact that they are content to rely on the mere repetition of this baseless accusation without ever bothering to check whether or not it is correct -- or, for that matter, without explaining what it could possibly mean.5

 

To be sure, the confusion of rules of inference with 'logical' or metaphysical 'truths' dates back to Aristotle himself (and arguably even further back, to Plato, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Anaximander and Anaximenes). And, it isn't hard to see why. If a theorist -- or, indeed, if practically everyone -- believes that everything was created by a 'deity' (or 'deities') of some sort, they won't find it too difficult also to believe that fundamental principles underpinning that 'creation' somehow express how 'the gods' actually went about creating all we see around us -- including their own capacity to think -- and therefore that their own thought processes were capable of reflecting how 'he'/'she'/'it'/'they' reasoned while so doing. This idea would then automatically connect 'correct thinking about reality, society and human cognition' with the divinely-constituted order that governs absolutely everything. Logic itself would then be seen as an indirect way of studying 'divine thought', but interpreted now as a sort of Super-Science supposedly capable of reflecting core principles underlying 'Reality Itself'/'Being'.

 

This general approach to 'philosophical knowledge' later came to be known as "Metaphysics".

 

However, when Logic is re-described as the study of 'how we actually think and reason', that only succeeds in conflating it with psychology and hence with science itself. In light of the foregoing, such moves originally aimed at connect Logic with how the 'deity' also 'thinks'. This meant that early on Logic became intimately linked with the search for 'ultimate truth, 'divine truth', not simply the study of inference (which role was largely sidelined until recently).

 

Furthermore, if only a select few are capable of 're-presenting' 'God's thoughts' (for instance, by studying Logic), why would they concern themselves with anything as menial as evidence? That is indeed how Hegel 'reasoned', except in his case such 'thoughts' were buried under several layers of gobbledygook -- for example, here dutifully echoed for us by Herbert Marcuse:

 

"The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973), pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting Hegel (1975), p.163, §112. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected; bold emphases added.]

 

[I have covered this topic in much more detail in Essay Three Part Two (here, here and here), where this overall attitude was traced back to an ancient, aristocratic view of 'philosophical knowledge' and with the theory that 'surface appearances' -- i.e., those that result from sense impressions caused by the material world, a world largely occupied by the great 'unwashed', which produces in them a 'superficial', 'un-philosophical' and 'uneducated' comprehension of 'reality' -- are fundamentally deficient/flawed, an idea later transmogrified into the Hegelian dogma that 'appearances' are 'contradicted' by 'underlying essence', a belief itself motivated by the Platonic idea that all 'true knowledge' must be based on the latter, not the former.]

 

As a result, those who had been (and still are) seduced by this almost hypnotic way of thinking and talking felt fully justified in imposing such ideas on 'reality' -- with no evidence to back them up (since, according to them, none was needed).

 

[Essay Seven Part One and Essay Two demonstrated this was also the case with DM-fans, who have been only too ready to copy Hegel (and Plato) in this regard, imposing their theory on the world.]

 

As Umberto Eco points out (in relation to the 'Western', Christian Tradition -- which, of course, drew heavily on Greek Philosophy and Religion):

 

"God spoke before all things, and said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names that he created them and gave them their ontological status.... In Genesis..., the Lord speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior illumination, in which God...expresses himself.... Clearly we are here in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of the nomothete, the name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Fast forward a score or more centuries and these ancient presuppositions re-surfaced in Hegel's work (which, ironically, was supposed to be presuppositionless!) where they now became a part of a mystical/ontological doctrine connected with what he took to be a series of 'self-developing' concepts -- which idea itself arose out of an egregious error committed over the nature of predication (a topic covered in detail in Essay Three Part One), further compounded by an even more serious blunder over the nature of the LOI.

 

[LOI = Law of identity.]

 

'Presuppositionless'? Attentive readers might be able to spot the 'non-existent presuppositions' (and Hegel's acceptance of the above traditional thought-forms) in the following passage:

 

"This objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind. Anaxagoras is praised as the man who first declared that Nous, thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic.

 

"What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.50-51, §§53-54. Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. I have reproduced the published version, since the on-line version differs from it; I have informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. They have now corrected the on-line version! Several paragraphs merged.]

 

In the above book alone, readers will find page-after-page of 'presuppositionless', dogmatic assertions like these. Hegel even manages to contradict himself (somewhat ironically, one feels) within the space of just two paragraphs, in the following quotation taken from his Shorter Logic:

 

"Philosophy misses an advantage enjoyed by the other sciences. It cannot like them rest the existence of its objects on the natural admissions of consciousness, nor can it assume that its method of cognition, either for starting or for continuing, is one already accepted. The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion. In both the object is Truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the Truth. Both in like manner go on to treat of the finite worlds of Nature and the human Mind, with their relation to each other and to their truth in God. Some acquaintance with its objects, therefore, philosophy may and even must presume, that and a certain interest in them to boot, were it for no other reason than this: that in point of time the mind makes general images of objects, long before it makes notions of them, and that it is only through these mental images, and by recourse to them, that the thinking mind rises to know and comprehend thinkingly.

 

"But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original acquaintance with them is thus discovered to be inadequate. We can assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a beginning at all." [Hegel (1975), p.3., §1. Bold emphases alone added; links in the on-line version.]

 

So, in one breath, Hegel says we can "assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically", but in the previous paragraph he has done just that, dogmatically asserting that the object of Philosophy is "Truth" and that "God and only God is Truth", that "the mind makes general images of objects long before it makes notions of them", all the while asserting that "philosophy may and even must presume" certain things about "objects", and that to make a start in Philosophy is to make an "assumption" (paragraph two)!

 

After having read that one may well wonder why anyone takes this bumbling fool seriously!

 

Well, WRP-theorist, the late Cliff Slaughter, certainly dis:

 

"Hegel insisted on a Logic which was not something separate from the reality which confronted man, a Logic which was identical with the richness and movement of all reality, a Logic which expressed the whole process of man's growing consciousness of reality, and not just a dry summary of formal principles of argument, reflecting only one brief phase in the definition of reality by thinking men." [Slaughter (1963), p.9.]

 

I suspect many will agree that that, too, looks like a pretty dogmatic set of pre-suppositions.

 

Be this as it may, when this ideologically-compromised 'ontological' interpretation of Logic is abandoned (or 'un-presupposed'), the temptation to identify it with science (i.e., with the "Laws of Thought", or even with 'absolute' or 'ultimate' truth) loses whatever superficial plausibility it might once seemed to have possessed. If Logic is solely concerned with the study of inference, then there is no good reason to saddle it with such inappropriate metaphysical baggage, and every reason not to. On the other hand, if there is indeed a link between that discipline and metaphysical, scientific or 'ultimate' truth -- as both legend, Hegel and DM-theorists would have us believe --, then that theory will need substantiating. It isn't enough just to assume or merely assert that such a connection exists (especially since it has easily confirmed links with mystical theology, as we have seen), which has generally been the case in Idealist and DM-circles ever since.

 

Despite this, the idea that 'fundamental truths about reality' may easily be discovered by an examination of how human beings think they reason is highly suspect in itself. But, like most things, much depends on what is supposed to follow from that assumption; and that in turn will depend on what it is taken to mean. As we will see, the many differing views that have been expressed on this topic sharply distinguish materialist theory from Idealist fantasy. Unfortunately, DM-theorists have so far shown themselves to be far more content to tail-end Traditional Philosophers by supposing (alongside Hegel) that logic functions like a sort of cosmic code-cracker, capable of revealing profound truths about (what would otherwise be) 'hidden aspects of reality' buried beneath 'appearances' -- aka the perennial search for all those elusive 'essences' -- than they have been with attempting to justify this entire approach with a single cogent supporting argument. In its place they have shown they prefer a heady mixture of dogmatic assertion and unsubstantiated presupposition (again, rather like Hegel). Nor have they been at all concerned to examine any of the motivating forces that gave rise to this class-compromised approach to Super-Knowledge, concocted over two thousand years ago in Ancient Greece by card-carrying ruling-class ideologues.6

 

[Concerning the other (ancient) dogma that language somehow 'reflects' the world, and that truths about it can be derived from words/thought alone, see Dyke (2007). However, the reader mustn't assume that I agree with Dyke's own metaphysical conclusions (or, indeed, with any metaphysical conclusions whatsoever). As Essay Twelve Part One shows, the opposite is in fact the case: I regard them all as non-sensical and incoherent.]

 

Of course, contemporary logicians are now much clearer about the distinction between rules of inference and logical truths than their counterparts were in the Ancient World -- or even in the Nineteenth Century. That fact alone means the criticisms DM-theorists level against FL are even more anachronistic and difficult to justify.6ao

 

Anyway, if materialists are to reject the mystical view of nature prevalent in Ancient Greece, which view is both implicit and explicit in Hegelian Ontology --, as surely they must --, then the idea that FL is just another branch psychology -- or physics, or even that it is the 'science of thought' -- becomes even more difficult to sustain.

 

Indeed, how is it possible for language to 'reflect' the logic of the world if the world has no logic to it? Which it couldn't have unless Nature were 'Mind', or the 'product of Mind'.

 

If the development of Nature isn't in fact a (disguised or camouflaged) development of 'Mind' (as Hegel supposed), how can concepts drawn from the development of 'Mind' apply to Nature, unless, once more, it were itself 'Mind', or the 'product of Mind'?

 

Of course, dialecticians have responded to this sort of challenge with an appeal to the RTK (i.e., the sophisticated version of that theory); but, as we will see (in Essay Three Part Five and Twelve Part Four), that, too, was an unwise move.

 

[RTK = Reflection Theory of Knowledge, to be covered in Essay Twelve Part Four.]

 

This means that if FL is solely concerned with the study of the inferential links between propositions and conclusions -- and isn't directly involved with their truth-values -- then the criticism that FL can't account for change becomes even more bizarre.

 

It is instructive to recall that since the Renaissance, 'western' society has (largely) learnt to separate religious fantasy from scientific knowledge, so that the sort of things that used to be said as a matter-of-course about science (for example, that it was the "systematic study of God's work", etc., etc.) look rather odd and anachronistic today (that is, to all but the incurably religious or the naively superstitious). In like manner, previous generations of logicians used to confuse logic not just with science, but with the "Laws of Thought", also as a matter-of-course; and they did so for theological and ideological reasons, too. In that case, one would have thought that avowed materialists (i.e., dialecticians) would be loathe to promote and then spread this ancient confusion.

 

Clearly, they aren't.

 

As will be argued at length later on at this site, only if it can be shown (and not simply presumed or even merely asserted) that nature has a rational structure, would it be plausible to suppose that there is any connection at all between the way human beings think they think and the underlying or inner constitution of nature. Short of that, the idea that there is such a link between the way we think we draw conclusions and fundamental aspects of 'reality' loses all credibility. Why should the way we knit premises and conclusions together mirror the structure of the universe? Why should our use of words have such profound 'ontological' implications, valid for all of space and time?

 

Did the rest of us miss a meeting?

 

It could be objected that if language is part of the world, it must have coded into it all sorts of things that are also part of, or which reflect aspects of, reality.6a

 

That response will be defused in Essay Twelve, where it will be shown that it depends on an implicit form of LIE. [A short summary of that Essay can be accessed here.] I have also said more in Note 6a (link above).

 

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]

 

Even to ask such questions is to answer them. In fact, there is no reason to suppose any of this is the case, other than class-compromised motives that stem from religious/ideological interests and commitments, which were simply taken for granted until relatively recently and which still appear to be thriving in DM-circles.

 

How is it possible that 'metaphysical truths' were only capable of being derived from, or expressed in, Indo-European languages, which is the only language family that has the required grammatical structure -- the subject-copula-predicate form -- that allows such moves? Was that group of humans blessed by the 'gods'? Are there really 'subjects', 'copulas' and 'predicates' out there in nature for just this language group to 'reflect'?

 

[Follow the first of the above links for more details.]

 

On the other hand, if it could be shown that the universe does have an underlying, 'rational' structure, the conclusion that nature is 'Mind' (or, that it was 'constituted by Mind') would be all the more difficult to resist. If all that is real is indeed 'rational', then the identification of rules of inference with the "laws of thought" and then with fundamental metaphysical truths about "Being Itself" would become nigh on irresistible.

 

As noted above: the History of Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism reveal that from such esoteric assumptions it is but a short step to the derivation of 'philosophical truth' from thought/language alone. Dogmatic, a priori theory-mongering and Idealism thus go hand-in-hand. If Nature is Ideal, then it would seem truths can legitimately follow from thought/language alone -- a point underlined by George Novack:

 

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17.]

 

In several other Essays posted at this site (for example, here and here) we will see that this is a step DM-theorists and metaphysicians of every stripe were only too eager to take -- and, many times over, too.

 

Nevertheless, there is precious little evidence to suggest that DM-theorists have ever given much thought to this specific implication of the belief that DL reflects the underlying structure of reality -- i.e., they have given little or no consideration to the idea that their 'logic' actually implies 'Reality is Ideal'. If logic does indeed reflect the structure of 'Being', then 'Being' must be 'Mind', after all.

 

[On this, see Essay Twelve Part Four (to be published in 2024) -- a partial summary of which can be accessed here.]

 

The above considerations further strengthen the suspicion that the much-vaunted materialist "inversion" -- supposedly inflicted on Hegel's system/'method' by early dialecticians -- was either illusory or merely formal. That in turn implies DM is simply a version of inverted Idealism, which still means it is a form of Idealism. If so, questions about the nature of Logic cannot but be related to the serious doubts raised at this site about the supposedly scientific status of 'dialectics'. In that case, if Logic is capable of revealing fundamental, scientific truths about nature -- as opposed to its only legitimate role in the systematic study of inference -- then it becomes much harder to resist the conclusion that DM is indeed just another form of Idealism that has yet to 'come out of the closet'.

 

Anyway, since the aim of this sub-section is to examine the specific allegations that DM-theorists level against FL, the above issues will be addressed more fully in other Essays posted at this site (for example, Essays Three Part One and Twelve Parts One and Four).

 

FL And "Static" Definitions

 

As it turns out, despite the dearth of evidence offered in support of the allegations examined in an earlier sub-section, there is good reason to question the perennial accusation advanced by dialecticians that FL deals only with "static" definitions, and hence that it can't cope with change.

 

Variables And Change

 

As we have seen, DM-theorists regularly advance the following, consistently unsupported, allegations about FL:

 

"The old logic has fallen into Verachtung [disrepute]. It requires transformation.... The old, formal logic is exactly like a child's game, making pictures out of jig-saw pieces.... In the old logic there is no transition, development (of concept and thought), there is not 'eines inneren, notwen-digen Zusammenhangs' [an inner, necessary connection] of all the parts and 'Übergang' [transition] of some parts into others." [Lenin (1961), pp.96-97. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]

 

"The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A' is equal to 'A'…. In reality 'A' is not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens -– they are quite different to each other. But one can object, the question is not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -– a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is true (sic) -– all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves." [Trotsky (1971), pp.63-64.]

 

"Logic involves unchanging qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities. Dialectics is constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the reverse." [Trotsky (1986), p.87.]

 

"It is necessary to acquire a concrete understanding of the object as an integral system, not as isolated fragments; with all its necessary interconnections, not torn out of context, like a butterfly pinned to a collector's board; in its life and movement, not as something lifeless and static. Such an approach is in open conflict with the so-called 'laws' of formal logic, the most absolute expression of dogmatic thought ever conceived, representing a kind of mental rigor mortis. But nature lives and breathes, and stubbornly resists the embraces of formalistic thinking. 'A' is not equal to 'A.' Subatomic particles are and are not. Linear processes end in chaos. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Quantity changes into quality. Evolution itself is not a gradual process, but interrupted by sudden leaps and catastrophes.... The problem is that the categories of formal logic, drawn from quite a limited range of experience and observation, are really valid only within these limits. They do, in fact, cover a great deal of everyday phenomena, but are quite inadequate to deal with more complex processes, involving movement, turbulence, contradiction, and the change from quality to quality." [Woods and Grant (2007), pp.86-88. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

 

"A view that is often encountered among dialectical materialists is that formal logic is applicable to static situations, but since, in reality, nothing is static, formal logic is superseded by dialectical logic, which permits logical contradictions. Within the framework of this view, thought is the appropriation (in the mind) of the objectively existing material world, while dialectical logic, that is, dialectics taken as logic, must be considered to be the laws of thought (or correct thinking). Thus, in the approximation where things are viewed as static, formal logic becomes the laws of thought, equally in approximation. When, however, things are viewed in their motion, change, and development, dialectical logic becomes properly the laws of thought." [Marquit (1990), quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The reason why formal logic is often forced to abandon its own procedures in the face of the facts is that it attempts to analyze a living, evolving reality with static concepts. Formally things are defined statically, according to certain fixed properties -- colour, weight, size, and so on…. [This] is satisfactory only under conditions where the scale of change is not vital to our understanding…. But for more complex tasks in politics, history, and science generally, this will not do. Common sense and formal logic are agreed on static definitions…. But 'dialectical thinking analyzes all phenomena in their continuous change….'" [Ibid., pp.272-73. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]

 

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.... If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A always equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971a), p.20. Paragraphs merged.]

 

"Formal Logic starts from the proposition that A is always equal to A. We know that this law of identity contains some measure of truth…. Now…when we go to reality and look for evidence of the truth of the proposition: A equals A…we find that the opposite of this axiom is far closer to the truth." [Ibid., pp.32-33.]

 

"Dialectics is the logic of change.... To understand the significance of this compare it with what is know as 'formal logic' (originally developed by Aristotle and usually thought of as the rules of sound thinking). The basic idea of formal logic is that something either is the case or is not the case, but that it can't be both at the same time. For example, the cat is on the mat or it is not on the mat. For many purposes formal logic is useful and necessary. But as soon as you take movement and change into account, it ceases to be adequate. A cat moving goes through a moment when it is in the process of passing onto the mat or in the process of passing off it -- when it is both on and off the mat. Dialectics is in advance of formal logic because it enables us to grasp this contradiction." [Molyneux (1987), pp.49-50. Paragraphs merged.]

 

"This matters because the dominant mode of thinking, based on the logic developed by Aristotle, is not founded on the principle of universal change, rather it deals with fixed states or 'things'. Its basic axioms are that A = A (a thing is equal to itself) and A does not = non-A (a thing is not equal to something other than itself), from which are derived sequences of sound reasoning known as syllogisms.... This formal logic was, and is, all well and good and very necessary for practical human affairs but it is limited -- it excludes change. Dialectical logic moves beyond formal logic by starting not with 'things' but with processes, processes of coming into being and passing out of being. The moment processes of change are fed into the equation it becomes necessary to deal with contradiction. If state A (e.g. day) changes into state B (night) it passes through a phase of A not being A or being both A and B (twilight)." [Molyneux, 'The Marxist Dialectic'. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]

 

"Dialectics, or the logic of motion, is distinct from formal or static logic. Formal logic is based on three fundamental laws:

 

"(a) The law of identity: A is equal to A; a thing is always equal to itself.

 

"(b) The law of contradiction: A is different from non-A; A can never equal non-A.

 

"(c) The law of exclusion: either A, or non-A; nothing can be neither A nor non-A.

 

"A moment's reflection will allow us to conclude that formal logic is characterised by the thought processes which consist of putting motion, change, into parenthesis. All the laws enumerated above are true, so long as we abstract from motion. A will remain A so long as it does not change. A is different from non-A so long as it is not transformed into its opposite. A and non-A exclude each other so long as there is no movement which combines A and non-A, etc. These laws are obviously insufficient if we consider the transformation of the chrysalid (sic) into the butterfly, the passage of the adolescent into the adult, the movement of life into death, the birth of a new species or a new social order, the combination of two cells into a new one, etc." [Mandel (1979), pp.160-61. Italics in the original. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The 'logic' that we have been discussing is very different from what commonly passes for logic, the formal logic which deals with syllogisms and is to be found in the text book. Formal logic is necessary for dealing with the abstractions which are formed in the first stage of thinking.... The essence of its technique is to keep apart, to prevent from confounding the distinctions which have been made. It is therefore based on a development of certain very fundamental principles about identity and contradiction, principles such as the famous 'law of the excluded middle' which states that a thing must be one thing (say 'A') or not that thing (say 'not A'). It can't be both 'A' and 'not A' at the same time. This logic, which may be termed the 'logic of common sense,' is perfectly justified and indeed essential within certain limits -- the same limits within which the abstractions it deals with are valid.  But just because it is based on taking these abstractions, for the time being, as absolute, and because it necessarily overlooks their inter-connections, and the development of one quality or thing into another, formal logic is unable to grasp the inner process of change, to show its dialectical character. For this we require dialectical logic...." [Guest (1939), pp.71-72. Italics in the original. Paragraphs merged.]

 

"Dialectics is a way of studying the phenomena of the world in a way that is quite a bit different than formal logic. Logic is undoubtedly very useful in many instances, but it has its limitations. Even the fundamental axioms of logic, which often seem intuitively obvious to western thinkers (e.g. A = A), only really hold when looking at the world at fixed moments in time." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless." [Rob Sewell. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The false reasoning which assumes that hard-and-fast, black-and-white categories are the only valid ones, and that therefore the existence of transitional and intermediate forms constitutes evidence that the categories don't exist, is called formal logic. The limitations of formal logic are illustrated by these analogies, as well as by the false arguments against the binary nature of sex put forward by the scientists in this discussion. Dialectical logic looks at things in motion, their origins, development, and eventual negation. Dialectics is the logic of evolution and revolution. It brings human thought into closer correspondence with the constant motion and transformations of things in the real world." [James Robb, quoted from here; accessed 16/12/18. Bold emphases added.]

 

Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that every single one of the above dialecticians failed to quote or cite any evidence that FL is guilty in the way they allege. [Any who think I might have misrepresented these individuals are invited to re-check the references I have given, as well as the dozens more cited elsewhere in this Essay and at this site.] What is more, DM-fans continue to assert such things despite being asked (repeatedly, and by yours truly!) to provide evidence and proof (here is just the latest example -- from May 2015 --, and here is my request for this comrade to provide the 'missing' evidence -- which, predictably, was simply ignored). [Unfortunately, these links are now dead!]

 

[FL = Formal Logic; AFL = Aristotelian FL.]

 

However, far from it being the case that FL depends on 'changeless categories', even traditional AFL employed variables to stand for propositions and predicates (i.e., general terms) long before they were used in mathematics. This fact alone shows that traditional AFL was no more incapable of handling change than is modern Mathematics.7

 

Here is what the late Professor Nidditch had to say about AFL:

 

"One has to give Aristotle great credit for being fully conscious of this [i.e., of the need for a general account of inference -- RL] and for seeing that the way to general laws is by the use of variables, that is letters which are signs for every and any thing whatever in a certain range of things: a range of qualities, substances, relations, numbers or of any other sort or form of existence.... If one keeps in mind that the Greeks were very uncertain about and very far from letting variables take the place of numbers or number words in algebra, which is why they made little headway in that branch of mathematics...then there will be less danger of Aristotle's invention of variables for use in Syllogistic being overlooked or undervalued. Because of this idea of his, logic was sent off from the very start on the right lines." [Nidditch (1998), pp.8-9. Italic emphasis in the original. Paragraphs merged.]

 

As Engels himself pointed out, the introduction of variables into Algebra allowed mathematicians to cope with change. That being the case, it is difficult to understand why DM-theorists believe that traditional FL can't cope with change, either. If mathematicians are fully able to depict change by their use of variables, why deny this of formal logicians who have employed the very same device for at least 2400 years?

 

Of course, it could always be argued that the variables that designate quantities in mathematics aren't at all the same as the variables that relate to concepts, properties or qualities employed in FL. That is undeniable, but not relevant. The point is that both sorts of variable allow for change, even if they do so in different ways.

 

[I will return to that specific point in the next sub-section.]

 

Static Terms -- Or Slippery Arguments?

 

Despite this, does the charge that FL can't cope with change itself hold water? In order to answer that question, consider one particular valid argument form taken from AFL:

 

L1: Premise 1: No As are B.

 

L2: Premise 2: All Cs are B.

 

L3: Ergo: No As are C.8

 

[Where "A", "B" and "C" can stand for noun phrases, such as "mammal", "mortal", or "rational". Where I use capital letters in the above way in this Essay I will highlight them in bold to distinguish them from the ordinary use of capital letters -- except where I am directly quoting DM-sources that don't do this.]

 

With respect to this argument schema, the only condition validity requires is the following: if, for a given interpretation (concerning that word, see the next but one paragraph), the premises are true then the conclusion is true. This is a necessary condition for validity, but it isn't sufficient. For it to be sufficient, another necessary condition must apply: the conclusion must follow from the premises by the rules of inference of that formal system.

 

This characterisation of validity isn't affected by the fact that schematic premises can't themselves be true or false -- plainly, since they are schematic sentences, not propositions. [Any who doubt this need only ask themselves "Is it true that all As are C?"] The point is that for any legitimate interpretation of these schematic sentences, if the premises are true, the conclusion is true -- again, providing the latter follows from the premises according to the aforementioned rules of inference. But, it will automatically follow from them if the original schematic argument is valid. Below, I have given an interpretation of the above syllogistic form, and it is one that validly argues from false premises to a true conclusion, a condition many novices find hard to accept. In this specific case, had the premises been true, the conclusion would be true. [A clear explanation of this counter-intuitive fact about validity, with many more examples, can be found here.]

 

It is also important to add that the word "Interpretation" doesn't mean the same in logic as it does in the vernacular; it relates to the legitimate substitution instances that result from the systematic replacement of variable letters with suitable words drawn from some lexicon or other (often these are taken from ordinary language, but they can also be from technical, scientific or mathematical languages), according to the syntax and the semantics of the formal system involved. "Legitimate" means "substitution instances that comply with the syntactic rules of the given system". So, for example, a Proper Name can't be substituted for a schematic predicate expression or propositional variable, nor vice versa.

 

[Semantics: what words or symbols are supposed to designate, refer to, signify, or mean -- rules that help us determine which sentences are true or are false. Syntax: formal or discursive rules that underlie the construction of legitimate strings of words in a formal or natural language.]

 

One interpretation of L1 that might illustrate this is the following:

 

L1a: Premise 1: No moving object is stationary.

 

L2a: Premise 2: All objects with zero velocity are stationary.

 

L3a: Ergo: No moving object has zero velocity.

 

[L1: Premise 1: No As are B.

 

L2: Premise 2: All Cs are B.

 

L3: Ergo: No As are C.]

 

[Certain stylistic modifications were required above in order to prevent the ordinary language interpretation from becoming somewhat stilted. It is also assumed that L1a-L3a relate to the same inertial frame.]

 

The above syllogism is valid, and would remain valid even if all motion ceased. But, it also copes with movement, and hence with change, as is clear from what it says.

 

And we don't have to employ what seem to be 'necessarily true' premises (or, indeed, use this particular argument form) to make the same point:

 

Premise 1: All human beings are aging.

 

Premise 2: All Londoners are human beings.

 

Ergo: All Londoners are aging.

 

[Premise 1: All As are B.

 

[Premise 2: All Cs are A.

 

[Ergo: All Cs are B.]

 

Admittedly, phrases like "aging" and "one with zero velocity" aren't of the sort that Aristotle himself would have countenanced in a syllogism, so far as I can determine. However, if we free Aristotle's logic from his metaphysics, the above inferences are clearly valid, based on a syllogistic form. Anyway, the term "aging" can easily be replaced by a bona fide universal term (such as "the class of aging animals"), to create the following stilted, but genuine, syllogism:

 

Premise 1: All human beings are members of the class of aging animals.

 

Premise 2: All Londoners are human beings.

 

Ergo: All Londoners are members of the class of aging animals.

 

[Except, of course, Aristotle would have employed "All men" in place of "All human beings".]

 

Finally, here is an (interpreted) argument that depends on change:

 

Premise 1: All rivers flow to the sea.

 

Premise 2: The Mississippi is a river.

 

Ergo: The Mississippi flows to the sea.

 

A couple of points are worth making about the above argument:

 

(a) In order for the conclusion to follow, the premises of an argument don't have to be true -- clearly Premise 1 is false.

 

(b) The above argument isn't of the classic syllogistic form, although it parallels it.

 

(c) Anyone who understands English will already know that rivers are changeable, and that they flow; this example alone shows that logic can not only cope with changeable 'concepts', it actually uses them. Hence, logic is capable of employing countless words that express change in a far more varied and complex form than anything Hegel (or his latter-day DM-epigones) imagined. [On that, see here.] I have listed several such words, here.

 

Here are two more examples:

 

Premise 1: All fires will release heat.

 

Premise 2: I have just lit a fire.

 

Ergo: That fire will release heat.

 

And:

 

Premise 1: All sound waves transmit energy.

 

Premise 2: Thunder is a sound wave.

 

Ergo: Thunder transmits energy.

 

The above examples are perhaps more akin to argument patterns found in IF, but that is also true of many interpretations of argument schemas drawn from FL.

 

To be sure, the above changes aren't of the sort that interest dialecticians, but, as I pointed out above, examples like this have only been given in order to refute the claim that FL can't cope with change. Combine this with the additional thought that dialectics can't cope with change anyway (on that, see here) and the alleged 'superiority of DL over FL turns into its own opposite.

 

[Which is yet another rather ironic 'dialectical' inversion.]

 

Someone could object that while the above examples might appear to cope with some of the changes we experience in nature and society, they ignore conceptual change, and as such show once again that FL is inferior to DL. I have dealt with conceptual change elsewhere in this Essay.

 

It could further be objected that this fails to show how FL can cope with complex or extended changes, or with interconnected development.

 

However, I have been studying DM for more years than I care to mention, but I have yet to see a single example of these 'complex drawn-out' changes that DM-fans continually bang on about. Perhaps the following example might allay their qualms:

 

Premise 1: All fertilised chicken eggs will hatch in about 21 days.

 

Premise 2: This egg is a fertilised egg.

 

Ergo: This egg will hatch in about 21 days.

 

[Premise 1: All As are B.

 

[Premise 2: All Cs are A.

 

[Ergo: All Cs are B.]

 

[Try saying any of the above in Hegel-speak.]

 

It wouldn't be difficult to replace eggs with tectonic plates that move slowly over millions of years, and in complex ways, too. How much more 'drawn-out' do DM-fans need? Of course, what the latter are looking for are changes expressed in 'dialectical' language, not the language of FL (or even IF). Well, they are welcome to that, especially since 'dialectical' language would in fact make change impossible; but the only point worth making here is that we can now see that both FL and IF can easily cope with 'drawn-out' change.

 

[IF = Informal Logic.]

 

Returning to the above schema:

 

L1: Premise 1: No As are B.

 

L2: Premise 2: All Cs are B.

 

L3: Ergo: No As are C.

 

In this rather uninspiring valid argument schema the conclusion follows from the premises no matter what legitimate substitution instances replace the variable letters. So, L3 follows from the premises no matter what. But, the argument pattern this schema expresses is transparent to change; that is, while it can cope with change, it takes no stance on it (since it is comprised of schematic sentences that are incapable of being assigned a truth-value until they have been interpreted). Some might regard this as a serious drawback, but it is no more a failing than it would be, say, for Electronics to take no stance on the evolution of Angiosperms -- even though electronic devices may be used to assist in their study. Otherwise, one might just as well complain that FL can't launder clothes or paint a wall. What FL supplies us with are the conceptual tools that enable scientists theorise about change, and much else besides. That is especially true in Mathematics.

 

As noted above, the possible truth-values of each of the above schematic sentences depend on the interpretation assigned to the variables (i.e., "A", "B" and "C"). The premises of L1 aren't actually about anything until they have been interpreted; before this they are neither true nor false (which is why I referred to possible truth-values). Not only that, but the indefinite number of ways there are of interpreting schematic letters like these means that it is possible for changeless and changeable items to feature in any of its concrete instances (indeed, as we have just seen).

 

[That was the point behind the observation made earlier that dialecticians and logical novices often confuse validity with truth; the above schema is valid, but its schematic propositions can't be true or false, for obvious reasons.]

 

Of course, when the method of truth-tables is used (in MFL), truth-values are assigned to such schemas, but, in that case, what is being considered are the truth-values of interpreted propositions, should any be assigned.

 

[I have given an elementary example of the use of truth tables, here.]

 

To illustrate further the absurdity of the idea that just because FL uses certain words or letters it can't handle change (or that it uses nothing but 'rigid' terms), consider this parallel argument:

 

(1) If x = 2 and f(x) = 2x + 1, then if y = f(x), y = 5.

 

(2) Therefore, x and y can never change or become any other number.

 

No one would be foolish enough to argue this way in mathematics since that would be to confuse variables with constants. But, if that is the case in mathematics, then DM-inspired allegations about the supposed limitations of FL are all the more bizarre -- to say the least.

 

Of course, and once more, it would be naïve to suppose that the above considerations address issues of concern to DM-theorists. As John Rees himself pointed out:

 

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition can't cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]

 

But, as a criticism of FL, this is entirely misguided. FL doesn't put anything in "boxes", and its practitioners don't deny change as a result.

 

[Sure, some logicians might have metaphysical reasons for denying change, but that can't be blamed on logic, any more than the belief in three persons in one 'god' (as part the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity) can be blamed on mathematics.]

 

Indeed, without an ability to reason discursively (along lines that have been systematised in FL -- and which have been explored more extensively in Informal Logic), dialecticians would themselves find it impossible to argue rationally.

 

[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]

 

For example, the argument above (from TAR) appears to draw certain conclusions from apparently 'fixed definitions' (or a 'fixed'/'relatively fixed' use) of certain words -- like "change" and "static" -- in order to make a point about change itself. If, however, Rees's argument is now deliberately and uncharitably mis-interpreted (that is, if we emulate the tactics used by dialecticians when they deliberately misconstrue FL), it would soon turn into a self-refutation. In that case, in order to point out the supposed limitations of FL, Rees found he had to use the very things he accused FL of employing -- i.e., "static" terms. Of course, if this unsympathetic way of reading Rees's book were correct, or even fair, it would mean that if he and other DM-theorists want to argue validly about the limitations of FL using "static" categories such as these, their arguments would self-destruct along these lines.

 

On the other hand, if dialecticians were to employ 'non-static categories' consistent with their own precepts, then that would rapidly undermine any conclusions they hoped to derive. That is because such categories (having no fixed meanings) would sanction no inferences, for it isn't possible to decide what follows from what if the meaning of the terms employed is indeterminate or is liable to change. So, while it is unwise of DM-theorists to criticize FL for employing supposedly changeless categories, it would be even more inept of them to do this while using terms whose meanings are apt to alter unpredictably. Hence, in practice, DM-theorists must either ignore their own principles and argue from 'fixed categories' about the limitations of FL, or they will have to construct a case against FL using 'slippery' terms, which would establish nothing at all.

 

Like it or not, rational criticism of FL can't succeed, or even proceed, if either tactic were adopted.9

 

Some might feel that there is a contradiction here between what was said earlier about variables that can stand for things that change, and the objection above to the effect that changeable terms would prevent a conclusion following from its premises. So, it could be objected that while the following had been claimed earlier about the variables used in FL:

 

RL1: "...the indefinite number of ways there are of interpreting schematic letters like those in L1 [re-quoted below -- RL] means that it is possible for changeless and changeable items to feature in any of its concrete instances...",

 

the following point was also made:

 

RL2: "If, on the other hand, dialecticians were to employ 'non-static categories' consistent with their own precepts, then that would rapidly undermine any conclusions they hoped to derive. That is because such categories (having no fixed meanings) would sanction no inferences, for it isn't possible to decide what follows from what if the meaning of the terms employed is indeterminate or is liable to change. So, while it is unwise of DM-theorists to criticize FL for employing supposedly changeless categories, it would be even more inept of them to do this while using terms whose meanings are apt to alter unpredictably. Hence, in practice, DM-theorists must either ignore their own principles and argue from 'fixed categories' about the limitations of FL, or they will have to construct a case against FL using 'slippery' terms, which would establish nothing at all."

 

One minute we are being told that these variables stand for things that can change, the next that the idea that they can change would undermine any conclusion DM-theorists wanted to derive. Which is it to be? Are these variables or are they constants? Do they change within the body of an argument, or do they remain 'fixed' as DM-theorists allege?

 

Of course, the point of RL2 was to bring out the imprecise nature of the allegations levelled by DM-fans. If the denotations of the terms used in FL change within an argument, then L1-L3 might just as well become:

 

L1b: Premise 1: No As are B.

 

L2b: Premise 2: All Cs are D.

 

L3b: Ergo: No Es are F.

 

[L1: Premise 1: No As are B.

 

L2: Premise 2: All Cs are B.

 

L3: Ergo: No As are C.]

 

Here, B changes into D in L2b, A into E, and C into F, and/or whatever they supposedly stand for in L3b, which means that L3b no longer follows from L1b or L2b (or even L1 and L2).

 

But this is to misread these variables. In order to make this clearer it might help if we translate L1-L3 into hypothetical form:

 

RL3: If it is the case that no A, or whatever they become, is whatever B is, or becomes, and if it is the case that all Cs, or whatever they become, are whatever B is, or becomes, then it is the case that no A, or whatever they become, is whatever C is, or becomes.

 

This shows that AFL can cope with change.

 

However, the point being made in RL2 (repeated below) is that the above constraints don't apply. The nondescript 'changes' referred to by DM-theorists mean that their arguments more closely resemble L1b-L3b, not RL3, and so the point made in RL2 still stands.

 

RL2: "If, on the other hand, dialecticians were to employ 'non-static categories' consistent with their own precepts, then that would rapidly undermine any conclusions they hoped to derive. That is because such categories (having no fixed meanings) would sanction no inferences, for it isn't possible to decide what follows from what if the meaning of the terms employed is indeterminate or is liable to change. So, while it is unwise of DM-theorists to criticize FL for employing supposedly changeless categories, it would be even more inept of them to do this while using terms whose meanings are apt to alter unpredictably. Hence, in practice, DM-theorists must either ignore their own principles and argue from 'fixed categories' about the limitations of FL, or they will have to construct a case against FL using 'slippery' terms, which would establish nothing at all."

 

[I am not suggesting that this is how Aristotle would have viewed any of this (in fact, he probably wouldn't!); L1-L3 have only been expanded to show that AFL can cope with change.]

 

Of course, concerning the examples of interpreted arguments given earlier, words like "river" or "fire" don't change their meaning in the course of an argument, but their meaning shows that logic can deal with concepts that express change in nature and society.

 

Finally it could be argued that the syllogism is a categorical, not a hypothetical, argument form (although Aristotle hinted at hypothetical syllogism when arguing from hypothesis, later developed into a system by Theophrastus (c.371-287 BCE) and Alexander of Aphrodisias fl.200CE) -- Kneale and Kneale (1962), pp.105, 110).

 

Indeed, but RL3 was only employed to make the point clear: that syllogisms can be interpreted so that they can cope easily with change.

 

Anyway, here is a categorical version of RL3 to show that it, too, can be interpreted along the same lines:

 

L1c: Premise 1: No As (or whatever they become) are Bs (or whatever they become).

 

L2c: Premise 2: All Cs (or whatever they become) are Bs (or whatever they become).

 

L3c: Ergo: No As (or whatever they become) are Cs (or whatever they become).

 

And, here is an interpretation that might make the point clearer still:

 

L1d: Premise 1: No salmon (or whatever they become) are mammals (or whatever they become).

 

L2d: Premise 2: All cats (or whatever they become) are mammals (or whatever they become).

 

L3d: Ergo: No salmon (or whatever they become) are cats (or whatever they become).

 

Now, it isn't to the point to argue that L1d and L2d might very well turn out to be false (if evolution takes, or had taken, an odd turn, for example), thus making L3d false. That is because it once again confuses truth/falsehood with validity. The hypothetical form in RL3 brings this out a little better: Whether or not L1 and L2 are false, if they were true, the conclusion would follow.

 

RL3: If it is the case that no A, or whatever they become, is whatever B is, or becomes, and if it is the case that all Cs, or whatever they become, are whatever B is, or becomes, then it is the case that no A, or whatever they become, is whatever C is, or becomes.

 

Again, another interpreted argument might show this to be so -- here using two unambiguously false premises that imply a true conclusion:

 

L1e: Premise 1: No roses are plants. [False]

 

L2e: Premise 2: All frogs are plants. [False]

 

L3e: Ergo: No roses are frogs. [True]

 

Change Of Denotation

 

The schematic letters employed earlier don't in fact possess "definitions" only interpretations; hence, questions about the 'fixity' of those 'definitions' or otherwise are entirely misplaced. The flexibility of interpretation permitted here -- even with respect to traditional schematic argument patterns, like the one given above -- enables change to be accommodated by the simple expedient of choosing appropriate substitution instances for each and every schema. Moves like this will have the effect of re-distributing truth-values among the constituent sentences without affecting the associated inference.

 

Unfortunately, even this might still fail to address the worry exercising DM-theorists, which seems to centre on the alleged superiority of DL over FL -- especially with respect to its alleged ability to depict complex change through 'internal contradiction'.

 

[DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

Admittedly, whatever one thinks of the ability or inability of classical FL to handle change, few question its intolerance of 'true contradictions'. However, since this section of the Essay is largely concerned with a narrow range of logical issues, I will postpone the examination of DM-theorists' appeal to 'dialectical change' through 'contradiction' until later Essays.10

 

An Annoying Counterexample

 

Nevertheless, a more effective way of rebutting the claim that FL can't handle change would be to provide a counterexample (in addition to those given earlier!). The example below is based on a very simple pattern drawn from MFL, which employs a valid argument form despite the changes it records when interpreted. This is in fact an example of the schema known as Modus Ponendo Ponens (MPP):

 

 

1     (1) PQ A. [Here, and in the next box, "A" stands for "Assumption".]

 

2     (2) P.       A.

 

1,2  (3) Q.       1, 2, MPP.11

 

 

In the above, the arrow stands for "If...then", so premise (1) reads "If P then Q". The following is therefore a legitimate interpretation of MPP:

 

 

1     (1) If atoms of 64Cu undergo beta decay then 64Ni atoms, positrons and neutrinos are formed.  A.

 

2     (2) Atoms of 64Cu undergo beta decay.  A.

 

1,2  (3) Therefore,  64Ni  atoms,  positrons and neutrinos are formed.   1, 2, MPP.

 

 

[The numbers, letters and terms used above have all been explained in Note 11.]

 

This simple interpretation of MPP (and one involving reasonably rapid change) is perhaps as good a counterexample as one could wish to find, which refutes the claim that FL can't handle change. Moreover, there are countless other inferences that MPP itself can instantiate, and many inferential forms other than MPP, all capable of depicting change equally well, when suitably interpreted.11a

 

This indicates that the accusations levelled by DM-theorists against MFL are even less accurate than those they direct at AFL. Of course, the example above will hardly satisfy dialecticians, since no "new content" has been added in the conclusion. Fortunately, that 'defect' is relatively easy to fix. Consider this valid, one premise argument:

 

Premise 1: All dialecticians are human beings.

 

Ergo: The refutation of a dialectician is the refutation of a human being.

 

Here, the conclusion 'contains' more than the premise, so new content has 'emerged', and, mercifully, with no 'dialectics' anywhere in sight. [And, which is perhaps an additional bonus, it depicts change to our dialectical friends, too!] This argument form is used in mathematics and the sciences all the time to derive results not available to those who are still super-glued to the old logic -- and, of course, DM-fans who are blissfully unaware of any of this.

 

However, dialecticians might still wonder if the changes depicted above are at all relevant to their concerns. They tell us that DL is superior in the way it accounts for social change; that is, it handles developments of far greater complexity than the above rather trivial examples could possibly countenance.

 

Nevertheless, those examples were simply aimed at countering the specific claim that FL can't handle change. In later Essays we will see that it is DL itself can't account for changes of any sort -- simple or complex, whether they occur in nature or society. In that case, no matter how poorly FL copes with change (if that is indeed the case), DL fares far, far worse. Even worse still, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

 

Other Systems Of FL

 

Of even greater significance is the fact that over the last hundred years or so theorists have developed several post-classical systems of logic, which include modal, temporal, deontic, imperative, epistemic and multiple-conclusion logics (among many others). Several of these systems sanction even more sophisticated depictions of change than are available in AFL, or even MFL (i.e., so-called 'Classical Logic').12

 

Conceptual Change

 

Notwithstanding all of this, the feeling may perhaps persist that the above examples still employ "fixed concepts" and "static definitions". Unfortunately, because DM-theorists seldom (if ever) provide examples of what they mean by a "fixed concept" -- or what they imagine formal logicians take these to be (rightly or wrongly) -- it isn't easy to make much sense of their complaints.12a

 

[I have responded to the obvious objection that dialectician have given such examples, in Note 12a (link above).]

 

However, there are several confusions that might lie behind, or, indeed, which might motivate, this odd belief in 'changeable', or even 'changeless', concepts.

 

Change In DM -- Is It Conceptual Or Material?

 

The first confusion revolves around DM-theorists' own concept of material change. They frequently depict it in terms that are uncomfortably reminiscent of the Hegelian doctrine, which holds that change is fundamentally conceptual. How else are we to interpret John Rees's words that any account of change must explain how: "…new content emerges from old conditions"? [Rees (1998), p.59.] How else are we to interpret the following comments by Lenin?

 

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Emphases in the original.]

 

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:]…internally contradictory tendencies…in this [totality]…and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing…is connected with every other…[this involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…." [Ibid., pp.221-22. Emphases in the original.]

 

Or, indeed, this from Trotsky?

 

"Cognizing thought begins with differentiation, with the instantaneous photograph, with the establishment of terms -- conceptions in which the separate moments of a process are placed from which the process as a whole escapes. These terms-conceptions, created by cognizing thought, are then transformed into its fetters. Dialectics removes these fetters, revealing the relativity of motionless concepts, their transition into each other. (S. Logik, I. 26-27)." [Trotsky (1986), p.97-98.]

 

[Or, the many other passages quoted here?]

 

Admittedly, Rees appealed to the 'materialist inversion' that has allegedly been imposed on Hegel's system (to turn it into "materialist dialectics", and hence put "back on its feet"), as, indeed, did Lenin and Trotsky. But, all three pointedly failed to explain how conceptual change is related to material change, upside down or 'the right way up'; or, indeed, how the one can become the other merely by the expedient of flipping them or the entire system upside-down. Precisely how is it possible for a concept, or a category, to change if neither of them is material? And it won't do to suggest that concepts, for example, change because the objects they 'reflect' change, since that would be to confuse concepts with objects, once more. Does the concept of colour, for example, change every time a leaf turns from green to brown? Or, a traffic light from red to green, and then back again? [In fact, in Essay Three Part One we saw that this approach to concepts represents a dead end. We will have occasion to examine it again in more detail presently.] Nor will it do to argue that concepts change because we reflect on them (that is, if we employ the 'sophisticated' version of the RTK, here), since that would be to treat concepts as objects, again.

 

It might be thought that concepts are somehow formed or are reflected 'in the head' as objects of "cognition". In that case, the question becomes: does the concept of colour change when, say, anyone thinks about a traffic light altering from red to green, and then back again? Indeed, does the concept of colour -- as a concept, once it had been, or might have been, apprehended by an individual apprehender -- change in such circumstances? But, how could anyone possibly tell whether or not it had? If we have lost touch with the old 'concept' of colour (since it will have changed), with what could anyone compare the new 'concept' of colour so that they were able to declare it had in fact changed? No good appealing to memory, since the concept itself has allegedly changed -- unless we are to suppose there are now two concepts of colour: one that has changed, and one (in the memory?) that hasn't. And how might that be ascertained or confirmed? Any response to the above that tried to argue that these concepts must have changed since everything does will have confirmed earlier allegations that this theory only appears to work because it has been imposed on nature and society -- or, here, on human cognition. In this case, it will have assumed, and then imposed on thought, a view of concepts that has yet to be proved.

 

Even worse, how might it be decided whether or not our memories hadn't also changed?

 

[That intriguing possibility will be left dangling for the time being. I return to it again, below.]

 

The problem now facing DM-theorists is how to explain 'mental objects' like this (i.e., 'images', 'reflections', or 'concepts' that are supposedly located in our heads, brains, or in 'consciousness') while successfully avoiding reductionism -- or, indeed, bourgeois individualism.12b

 

[RTK = Reflection Theory of Knowledge. The 'sophisticated' version involves the active input of human "cognition" and practice, as opposed to the 'naive' version which (apparently) doesn't -- and which merely stresses the passive 'subject' of perception or knowledge. Both theories will be criticised in Essays Three Part Six and Twelve Part Four.]

 

[It is worth pointing out here that I am not denying conceptual change, merely questioning what dialecticians could possibly mean by "fixed" compared with "developing" concepts.]

 

Furthermore, how might it be possible for changes that material objects undergo even to be recorded by our use of concepts? In DM-writings the impression is given that these two sorts of change are simply the same, or, at least, that one is a 'reflection' of the other. To be more honest, the impression is that little thought has actually gone into either sort of change -- that is, over and above the regurgitation of the obscure (and sanitised) ideas dialecticians have imported from Hegel's work.

 

[The word "sanitised" was used here because of the way that DM-theorists have appropriated the Christian/Hermetic concepts Hegel inflicted on his readers, but which they say they have flipped and are now 'the right way up', in order to render them 'consistent' with materialism. This ploy is reminiscent of the way that Christian theologians, for example, re-interpret the scientifically 'unacceptable' passages in the Book of Genesis as 'allegorical' or 'figurative', 'sanitising' them in order to render them 'consistent' with post-Enlightenment 'sensibilities' and modern science.]

 

It could be objected that the above comments ignore the dialectical relation between the "knower and the known", just as it fails to take note of the fact that our concepts change in accord with the development of material and social reality -- as well as in response to practice.

 

Admittedly, DM-theorists have made an attempt (of sorts) to explain the relationship between material and conceptual change along such lines, but, as noted earlier, they have invariably tried to do this by means of a detour into the RTK, buttressed by an appeal to practice -- both of these they then connect with a materialist analysis of the dialectical relationship between the abstract and the concrete. Since these topics are have been addressed in other Essays at this site, no more will be said about them here.

 

Conceptual Change -- Or Conceptual Distortion?

 

A second (perhaps hidden) source of confusion might be because conceptual change isn't at all easy to depict -- if we rely on Traditional Philosophy. Indeed, if it should emerge that conceptual change can't be pictured using traditional-, or even DM-terminology, then the alleged superiority of DL over FL would become even more difficult to sustain.

 

In order to motivate this unexpected turn of events a brief digression into a consideration of some of the problems involved in expressing conceptual change (along traditional lines) might be in order. Consider, therefore, the following sentence:

 

C1: Green has changed.

 

The word "green" in such circumstances would normally be understood as the Proper Name of an individual -- as opposed to signifying a concept. On the other hand, if it were made clear that C1 was actually speaking about the colour green itself, and not someone called "Green", it would probably be re-interpreted along the following lines:

 

C2: This patch of green has changed.

 

That is because little sense can be made of the idea that the concept green (expressed in C3 below) could have changed like this (for reasons that will be explored presently). In which case, C1 (re-interpreted as C2) would perhaps be understood as an allusion to a change in the colour of a material object, or part of an object -- but not to the concept green itself. That can be seen if the following sentence were substituted for C1:

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

Despite what C3 seems to say, the phrase "The concept green" is longer an expression for a concept; it is a singular term designating an object! Concept expressions are expressed by a specific use of general terms (often signified by the employment of the indefinite article). But, C3 transforms the supposed concept expression into one designating an object of some sort.

 

As noted earlier, if the concept itself had changed, or it were asserted that it had changed -- and we understood this concept to be a 'mental entity' of some sort, apprehended somehow by each individual (in their own way?) -- then it would be impossible to decide whether or not it had actually changed. With what could we (as individuals) compare our supposedly subjective apprehension of the concept green if it had indeed changed? All we would have is a fading memory of the 'old concept green', which, ex hypothesi, would also have changed! Otherwise, the concept green, as we 'individually apprehend it', won't actually have changed; any attempt to access the 'old concept green' will of necessity have to appeal to, or employ, the current apprehension of the concept green!

 

Hence, in order to access a memory of the 'old concept green' (labelled in G2 below, "greenn", which refers to the nth instantiation of 'the concept green', either in the memory or in some contemporaneous act of 'cognition'), something like the following would have to be 'cognised':

 

G1: My memory of the concept green1 is such and such, which tells me my current apprehension of the concept green2 has changed.

 

Or, more generally:

 

G2: My memory of the concept greenn is such and such, which tells me my current apprehension of the concept green(n+1) has changed. 

 

But if so, it is reasonably clear that in order for this to be of any use to the individual concerned, the concept greenn can't itself have changed, for if it had, then it wouldn't be possible to decide if it had indeed changed! Plainly, that is because it would no longer be the concept greenn, it would be the concept green(n+1) -- or maybe even the concept greenk, what the old concept greenn had changed into. Of course, that would simply have changed the subject, or the target, of this supposed 'mental concept search'. Unless, of course, the individual concerned had access to an even older 'concept of green' (or an even older memory of 'the concept green') that hadn't itself changed, pushing this 'search' one stage further back. In that case, the following would have to be the case:

 

G3: My memory of the concept green(n-1) is such and such, which tells me my past apprehension of the concept greenn has changed. 

 

And so on...

 

Of course, if that were so, there would be no such thing as "the concept green" to change, just a potentially infinite set of fading memories of something that now no longer resembled the 'current concept green' as apprehended by the said individual!

 

[The 'relative stability of language' response (that is, as it has been made by DM-theorists) has been batted out of the park here and here.]

 

Finally, if an individual's memory of the concept green hadn't changed, then there would be 'fixed and changeless concepts', after all -- namely one such for each colour, taste, smell...

 

[There are other, perhaps more fundamental reasons, explored in Essay Three Parts One and Two, that fatally undermine the theory which holds that we 'cognise' concepts individually, or even as individuals. They will be briefly covered again in what follows and in the End Notes associated with those comments.]  

 

Be this as it may, it now becomes difficult to decide precisely what "the concept green" actually designates -- at least not without completely misconstruing what C3 is apparently trying to say about 'the concept green' itself -- but only if we view concepts traditionally. As noted above, "the concept green" can't in fact pick out the concept it appears to designate since that would transform its supposed target (i.e., what the "the concept green" is said to signify -- that is, 'the concept green' itself) into an object -- now denoted by the definite description, "the concept green". Naturally, that would fatally compromise the distinction between concepts and objects, all the while failing to pick out the intended concept. As noted above, concepts are actually expressed by a specific use of general terms, but only when we aren't trying to refer to them!13

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

The paradoxical nature of sentences like C3 may perhaps be illustrated by a consideration of the following (where "ξ is a concept" is seemingly predicated of "The concept green"; the use of Greek letters  -- like "ξ" in "ξ is a concept" -- is explained here):

 

C4: The concept green is a concept.

 

If it is first of all stipulated that C4 is well-formed, then it looks like it is analytically true. In fact, and on the contrary, C4 is analytically false (if we also allow for the use of these two terms-of-art in this context for the purposes of argument -- i.e., "analytically true" and "analytically false")! That is because (once more) "the concept green" is a singular term, and as such it designates an object, not a concept!14

 

Alas, absurd sentences like C4 are to metaphysicians what carrots are to donkeys. So, beginning with linguistic monstrosities like C4, some theorists hastily conclude that language -- or 'thought' (or 'reality', or 'Being', or 'everything', or whatever) -- must be defective in some way, or must be 'contradictory', or must be paradoxical, or must be this, or must be that. That is because Traditional Philosophers imagine they can dictate to 'reality' what it must be like based solely on their idiosyncratic use of language (like that exemplified by C4).

 

With reasoning like this one might just as well argue that if a metre rule, say, had been manufactured incorrectly, then everything it has been used to measure must be defective, too! To be sure any subsequently recorded lengths will be incorrect, but the objects that had been measured will remain sublimely unaffected.

 

From linguistic sins such as these -- committed by our philosophical forebears -- much of subsequent Metaphysics has descended without modification by unnatural selection. Unfortunately, DM isn't the only deformed progeny of mutant syntax such as this.15

 

In that case, it isn't possible to specify how concepts change by means of sentences like C3; in such sentential contexts, the logical role of terms that supposedly signify concepts means they no longer function as concept expressions, or even as expressions signifying concepts.16

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

[It is important to add that I am not denying that concept expressions can be nominalised or particularised, or that we can't legitimately use expression like "The concept green", only that nothing metaphysically deep, paradoxical, or 'ontological' follows from this superficial linguistic transformation. Nor am I denying conceptual change!]

 

Of course, it could be objected that the mere fact that we can't express conceptual change in the manner suggested above doesn't mean that it doesn't happen or doesn't exist; after all, reality isn't constrained by the real or imagined limitations of language.

 

Maybe not, but if a 'development' like this can't be put into words without the sort of distortion outlined above following form it -- or, when it has been put into words, what it appears to say undermines what some individuals might imagine such expressions can be used to say about a concept -- then no coherent option has been presented for anyone to consider.

 

Not only that, but the above objection clearly trades on the supposition that there are indeed concepts in reality that can change; but that itself would be true only if reality were mind-like. No one supposes -- it is to be hoped(!) -- that actual concepts pre-dated the evolution of sentient life, or that they reside in a sort of 'limbo world', waiting to be thought about, and only then, do they begin to change (which seems to be Hegel's position -- that is, if it were possible to tell!).

 

On the other hand, if reality isn't mind-like (and which DM-fan wants to deny that?), then there are no concepts in nature for our minds to reflect. Or, rather, it makes no sense to suppose there are, without turning them into objects once more.

 

Alternatively, again, if it is claimed that the mind can and does reflect reality (howsoever that metaphor is fleshed out), and it employs concepts to that end, then it will end up distorting 'reality' by so doing. That is, it must actively distort it like this because there no concepts 'out there' for it to 'reflect'.

 

Others might refer to George Novack's argument (which unfortunately conflated Logical Positivism with Analytic Philosophy in general):

 

"Locke analysed, among other things, the function of precise terms in the process of knowledge. But, like Hobbes, he held that 'words are wise men's counters; they do not reckon by them; but they are the money of fools.' The logical positivists are 'foolish' in this sense. They think that words are more important for reasoning than the realities they represent. Instead of focusing on real things and relations and their conceptual reflections in the human mind, they limit themselves to dissecting the structure of sentences and focusing endlessly and fruitlessly over the multiple meanings of logical formulations and grammatical terms....

 

"It is useful and often necessary to eliminate unclarities and ambiguities from language to improve the functioning of that indispensable instrument of thought. But it is a paltry enterprise to convert this task into the paramount aim of philosophy. On the intellectual plane this is equivalent to reducing the process and purpose of material production to the sharpening and cleaning of a tool...." [Novack (1971b), pp.107-08. Links added.]

 

After a sideswipe at Wittgenstein (which wasn't based on anything the latter actually argued!), Novack continues:

 

"The logical positivists have created a modern scholasticism which threshes the empty husks of once valuable ideas and squabbles over the meanings and relations of terms apart from their connections with things in their development." [Ibid., p.108.]

 

Ignoring Novack's idiosyncratic understanding of Locke and Hobbes for the moment, when he originally wrote all this (in the late 1960s) Logical Positivism [LP] had been a dead duck for nigh on twenty years. Notwithstanding that, attentive readers will note that, true-to-form, Novack nowhere quotes or cites a single LP-er in support. Of course, it could be objected that Novack devoted an entire section on A J Ayer, a leading advocate of Logical Empiricism [LE] after Ayer abandoned LP sometime in the 1950s. [Ibid., pp.109-12 -- a whole three pages!] He also mentions Bertrand Russell and Rudolph Carnap, two more leading LP-ers of the first half of the twentieth century (except Russell was never an LP-er!). Novack then refers his readers to a book by that [Stalinist!] philosopher, Maurice Cornforth -- i.e., Cornforth (1965) -- for more details. But, he fails to quote Ayer, let alone Russell or Carnap, in support of his wild allegations! He also manages to conflate LP with LE!

 

Be that as it may, what about Novack's allegations themselves?

 

First of all, the LP-ers (many of whom were Marxists and socialists, an inconvenient fact also ignored by Novack) were concerned to rescue science from the clutches of the metaphysicians, as they saw things; so it is farcical to argue that:

 

"The logical positivists have created a modern scholasticism which threshes the empty husks of once valuable ideas and squabbles over the meanings and relations of terms apart from their connections with things in their development." [Novack (1965), p.108.]

 

The LP-ers weren't interested in analysing sentences or words for its own sake, but in understanding the logic of both technical and ordinary language the better to understand the nature of science. We now know the foundation of their entire approach was seriously misguided, but that doesn't excuse Novack's egregious misrepresentation of their laudable aims.

 

Second, it is rather odd that Novack believes that being clear about our use of important words -- the meaning of which DM-fans take for granted and on which they impose their own idiosyncratic understanding (such as "consciousness", "mind", "matter", "image", "contradiction", "negation", "opposite", "knowledge", "facts", "motion", "place", and even the verb "to be"!) -- is in any way different from what those words express about the world we live in and with which we interact. For example, clarity about how we use colour terms tells us about the nature of colour as we conceptualise it (and hence what colour is), which in turn sets conceptual boundaries not only to how much science can also tell us about it, but whether or not what they say is misguided. As I have argued in Essay Thirteen Part One:

 

[It] could be pointed out that colours are certainly material. However, such a response would be a mistake. Colour perception may have causal and/or material concomitants, but colours cannot be material. It could be argued that light has momentum (or, rather, "carries momentum"); that is undeniable, but colour isn't the same as light. We might ask "What momentum does red light carry?" but not "What momentum does red carry?"] Of course, colour isn't made out of anything not already coloured and it has no constituent parts (which aren't already coloured). So such a question would have no answer that wasn't viciously circular (i.e., it would be rather like saying matter is made of matter).

 

In that case, it is little use being told that a certain colour is F, or is G (where "F" and "G" go proxy for suitable reductive phrases or (compound) clauses, such as "energy of a certain wavelength", or "a disposition to excite in us certain perceptions"), for unless F and G contain or use terms drawn from the vocabulary of colour, we would be no further forward. Manifestly, "energy of a certain wavelength" has itself only been identified as causing the perception of colour because of the fact that we already perceive colour and have a specific vocabulary to match.

 

On the other hand, if F and G do contain or use words drawn from the vocabulary of colour, all such reductive definitions would be circular.

 

[Which is just another way of saying that we cannot get behind the vocabulary of colour without already presupposing a mastery of it.]

 

For example:

 

C1: The colour red is a neural event E whereby a subject sees red.

 

C2: The colour red is a neural event E whereby a subject reports seeing red.

 

C3: The colour violet is caused by light of wavelength of approximately 400nm hitting the retina creating a perception of violet.

 

Here, as seems clear, a prior understanding of the use of "red" or "violet" would inform the imputed scientific facts (and this would be the case for both subject and researcher), not the other way round. [The significance of that particular observation is explored in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

 

On this, see Stroud (2000).

 

Again, it could be objected that colour is actually made out of photons of different energies, or of light of different wavelengths. However, that response simply confuses the causal agent responsible for our colour perception with colour itself.

 

Once more, it might be objected that colour is caused by the interplay between light rays and the microstructure of atoms, or that colour is a dispositional property of material objects -- or perhaps even of perceivers themselves. Whether these claims are true (or not) won't be entered into here; but, once again, these responses confuse the causal agents and/or concomitants responsible for colour perception with colour itself. [These and other related topics are discussed at length in Wittgenstein (1980). Cf., Glock (1996), pp.81-84, Hacker (1987), Hanfling (2000), Harrison (1972, 1973), and McGinn (1991).]

 

As Professor Laurence Goldstein notes:

 

"Take blueness, for example. What enters our eyes -- the blue light -- is simply (objectively) electromagnetic radiation. Yet the electromagnetic radiation is not blue. Colour has at least three dimensions -- hue, brightness, and saturation -- and four of the hues -- red, green, yellow, and blue -- are primary, that is, visibly non-composite. There can be reddish blues, but no yellowish blues or reddish greens. Yet such characteristics of colour are not characteristic of electromagnetic radiation. For example, no unique wavelength can be identified with a unique hue, since identical colour experiences may be produced by different combinations of wavelength. So light of any particular wavelength cannot be identified with a colour, that is, light is not coloured.

 

"Blueness, then, is not a property of electromagnetic radiation. Perhaps it is a property possessed by blue objects, that is, a property that they possess whether or not anyone is looking at them. But are objects intrinsically coloured? There is a strong temptation to suppose that all the objects that we perceive as blue have something, for example a certain molecular surface structure, that makes them so. Yet, when we actually conduct a detailed analysis of the different kinds of blue things that we see, it soon becomes clear that this supposition is incorrect. The blueness of the sky is due to the scattering of white light by particles of a certain size, and the same cause is responsible for the blueness of the eyes of some Caucasians and of the facial skin of many monkeys. But the blue of a rainbow has quite a different cause from that of the blueness of certain stars. And what makes sapphire blue is quite different from what makes some birds blue, and both are different from what causes the blue of certain beetles." [Goldstein (1990), pp.185-86. Spelling altered to conform with UK English. Italic emphases in the original. Links added.]

 

Although, Professor Goldstein concludes that colour isn't an "objective property of things" (p.186), that observation isn't so much false as non-sensical. [On the status of such hyper-bold claims about 'things-in-themselves', see Essay Twelve Part One. Again, see Stroud (2000).]

 

Be this as it may, the point is that Professor Goldstein is right when he points out that electromagnetic radiation itself isn't coloured.

 

Some, like the above Professor, might claim that colours are 'mental' phenomena and exist only in conscious minds, not in the external world. But this, too, is an age-old mistake. Colours don't exist merely in the mind since (plainly!) they exist in the outside world; any theory that located colours exclusively in the minds of perceivers would clearly have misidentified them. So, when, for instance, a scientist describes Copper Sulphate crystals as blue, she is referring neither to the contents, nor to the state, of her mind/central nervous system. Anyone who thought otherwise would simply have called attention to their own misuse of language....

 

Nevertheless, we all already know what colour is (or, at least, competent speakers of the language already know) -- we learnt what it is when we were taught how to speak about it and how to interact with coloured objects. In fact, we must already understand what colour terms mean if we are to be informed by scientists what its physical concomitants and properties are supposed to be. We certainly couldn't be educated (or re-educated) by them concerning the physical nature of colour if no one understood what the word "colour" already meant.

 

That non-negotiable logico-linguistic constraint applies with equal force to scientists themselves; they too must grasp what ordinary colour terms mean (and they must do so in the same way that the rest of us do, or they won't be speaking about colour, but about 'colour') if they are to study the physical properties of the correct natural phenomenon successfully. Scientists (and/or sceptics) can only undermine the ordinary use of the word "colour" (if that is what they do) at the cost of making all they say about 'it' entirely vacuous. If colour isn't what we suppose it to be when we use the ordinary language of colour, then we must surely lose the solid ground upon which scientists sought to build a properly scientific explanation of 'it'.

 

This means that the claim that colour is a (dispositional) property of material objects cannot be the whole truth about it, in that it isn't all that colour is. And this "all" cannot be accommodated to any theory without a prior recourse to the ordinary language of colour....

 

Of course, it could be objected that the nature of colour is a scientific not a linguistic issue --, but this response would be equally misguided. As we will see here (in relation to the word "change"), it isn't up to scientists, philosophers or dialecticians to tell us what our colour words mean (and that constraint applies to the rest of our every day vocabulary, too). Any attempt to do so would plainly undermine the language used in any endeavour to do just that.

 

Again, it could be objected that this isn't something that can be settled by (or, indeed, brushed aside with) an appeal to the ordinary meaning of words. This is a scientific and/or a philosophical issue.

 

However, scientists, philosophers and/or dialecticians will have to use language in order to tell us what they take colour to be (i.e., if they are to address the right subject of their enquiries), and, plainly, in order to make a correct start they themselves will have to begin with terms drawn from the vernacular -- otherwise they would be addressing their comments at some other target, not colour.

 

Now, it is precisely here that any attempt to revise (or even tinker with) the vocabulary of colour that we already have will back-fire. Since the details underlying that observation have been worked-out in detail here, and because further discussion will take us too far from the main theme of this Essay, I will leave the reader to re-familiarise herself with that discussion (in the course of which, she will need to replace the word "change" with the colour terms of her choice).

 

Finally, Novack asserts, without proof, that Wittgenstein was an empiricist (Novack (1971b), p.109); he compounds this error a few pages later by adding the following:

 

"Since Bishop Berkeley set forth his subjective idealism and Hume his doubts about any rational proofs for the objective existence of causation and natural law, subjectivism and skepticism have tainted empiricism and its adherents. These features are exhibited in exaggerated form by contemporary logicians like Wittgenstein who do not believe that the world exists apart from their sensations and ideas about it. As Wittgenstein says 'The world is my world,' that is, reality is as I alone sense and interpret it." [Novack (1971b), pp.113-14. Links added.]

 

Leaving aside for the moment Novack's serious misrepresentation of Hume, his characterisation of Wittgenstein is about a wrong as anything could be. Novack's only 'evidence' for his claim that Wittgenstein was a subjective idealist is a brief comment that appeared near the end of his first book, the Tractatus (i.e., Wittgenstein (1972), 5.62, p.115). That short sentence is situated in a series of remarks about solipsism, which Novack ignores since it would have torpedoed his argument:

 

"This remark [i.e., from the previous paragraph: 'We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either...' -- RL] provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world....

 

"Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remain the reality co-ordinated with it." [Wittgenstein (1972), 5.62, 5.64, pp.115-17. (This links to a PDF of two parallel translations; I have used the one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness version.) Bold emphasis alone added, several paragraphs merged.]

 

In the Tractatus, what Wittgenstein meant by "said" was our use of indicative sentences that had a sense, that is propositions that were capable of being true or were capable of being false. In which case, when the implications of solipsism are worked out (but it is unclear how that could even happen if what a solipsist wants to say -- or "mean" -- isn't expressed in propositions like this) it coincides (i.e., it collapses into) "pure realism", and all that is left is "reality", which is what Novack would call "the objective world". The reason for Wittgenstein asserting this is connected with the entire logic of the Tractatus, which involves an attempt to show that our employment of fact-stating language isn't based on sensation, but on the logical possibilities such language expresses, so that when we try to say anything, plainly, we have to use language, and that is what commits us all to the same (possible) facts language is capable of expressing, the same logic, and hence to same "reality". The solipsism tries to say "the world is my world" (and Wittgenstein indicates he agrees with that intention, the solipsist is correct to say "the world is my world" since that is what the solipsist, not Wittgenstein, believes), but in so doing solipsism drops out of the picture. In the end what solipsists think they want to say can't actually be said without lapsing into "pure realism", the exact opposite of what they intended. The only way that the solipsist can avoid this is by saying nothing.

 

So, Novack couldn't be more wrong about Wittgenstein. [On this, see White (2006), easily the best introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus.]

 

Now, we saw in Essay Three Part One that the defective logic dialecticians inherited from Hegel (whereby they misconstrue of the "is" of predication as if it were an "is" of identity) was founded on an even more archaic confusion over the nature of predicate expressions, re-interpreted as the Proper Names of Abstract Particulars, which is what motivated this error -- i.e., the confusion of object-, with conceptual-, change.

 

Only if concepts are viewed as abstract objects of some sort (that exist in the 'mind', or 'somewhere in reality') does it become difficult not to conflate these two sorts of change.

 

So, no wonder then that dialecticians who take logical advice from Hegel end up talking about concepts developing, and berate the rest of us with tall tales about the 'limitations' of FL because it supposedly uses 'fixed concepts'!

 

We can now see where the real problem lies; it isn't with the 'fixed concepts of FL', but with the slippery jargon found in DL, which is in turn based on a crass syntactical error committed by a set of ruling-class hacks in Ancient Greece! And they did that because it was conducive to their world-view to re-configure reality conceptually, and hence represent it as 'Mind'-like, or the product of 'Mind'.

 

[Until Essay Twelve is published in full, there are a few brief explanations why I have alleged this here, here, and here. It is also worth pointing out that the above remarks won't be fully understood by anyone who hasn't read Essay Three Part One!]

 

In that case, it is still unclear what exactly is being proposed by those who speak about 'changing', or 'developing', concepts. Once more, this isn't to suggest that we can't make sense of conceptual change, or of general terms that express change in the vernacular (such as "river", "walk", "run", etc.). Far from it; it is an integral feature of our social life and our use of language. But, we certainly can't do so by using a philosophical theory that relies on an egregious distortion of the medium by means of which it is expressed, on a set of doctrines based on Ancient Greek and Hegelian Mysticism (upside down or 'the right way up').

 

[FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

Logic And Change

 

Despite the above, it is also possible to express conceptual change in FL by means of an ascent into Second Order Logic.

 

Now, this latest twist doesn't contradict the observation made in the previous sub-section (i.e., that what seem to be empirical truths about concepts can't be expressed in language -- it was in fact maintained that they can't be directly expressed by means of distorted sentences), since higher order logic is, among other things, a calculus that expresses rules of inference, not logical (or any other) truths.

 

In Second Order Logic, concept expressions become variables ranged over by Third Order Quantifiers, and so on.17

 

Even so, such systems only indirectly relate to the ordinary use of the words we have for change. Despite what some Philosophers and practically every DM-theorist claim, the vernacular is perfectly capable of expressing change -- and changes of almost unimaginable complexity, too. That is partly because (a) The word "change" is an ordinary language term itself, and (b) The vernacular was invented by those who interface with material reality in collective labour (etc.) on a daily basis -- i.e., workers. In fact, as will be demonstrated below, and in Essay Six, ordinary language is capable of expressing change far better than the obscure 'language' Hegel inflicted on his readers -- or, indeed, the vague and obscure terminology one finds in DM. The vernacular contains literally thousands of words that are capable of depicting change and development in almost limitless detail and complexity.17a

 

Real Material Change

 

Again, it could be objected that the above considerations concentrate on the linguistic expression of change. Whether or not it is possible to represent change in the vernacular isn't really relevant to the issues that exercise DM-theorists. Their focus is on real material change in nature and society, utilising ideas developed both out of, and tested in, practice in order to help terminate class society. That being the case, the above comments are academic, at best, misguided, at worst.

 

Or, so it could be maintained.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth noting yet again that the points raised earlier were specifically aimed at the DM-thesis that FL can't handle change, not at whether material change is or isn't different from any of our attempts to depict it. Hence, the above complaint is itself misplaced. Since FL systematises certain aspects of some of the inferences we make, or are able to make, in ordinary life -- formalising but a fraction of the discursive principles implicit in our capacity to reason, communicate and picture the world, truly or falsely -- a defence of FL (even if that is what I am doing here, which I am not; FL needs no defence) can't suddenly pretend that our expressive powers and the discursive tools by means of which we manage to communicate aren't relevant.

 

[Of course, IF is capable of expressing even more of the above inferences.]

 

Anyway, the DM-account of material change is analysed in detail in other Essays posted at this site (for example, Essays Five, Seven Part Three, Eight Parts One, Two and Three); there, it will be shown that dialecticians themselves are incapable of doing the very thing they find fault with in FL -- that is, accounting for, or even depicting, change!

 

A Purely Academic Issue?

 

At first sight, it might seem obvious that a logical system based on a static view of the world -- as is alleged of FL -- would have few if any practical consequences or applications. On the other hand, it would appear equally clear that a different logical system based on the opposite view of reality -- as is claimed of DL -- should have countless practical applications in science and technology.

 

Ironically, the exact opposite of this is the case: DL has no discernible practical or scientific applications and has featured in none of the advances in the natural or physical sciences (and arguably none even in the social sciences) -- ever. Worse still, DL has made no contribution to technological innovation or development.

 

[Some might object and point to the successful application of DL in Biology, for example. I shall bat that idea out the park later on in this Essay, alongside other alleged applications of DL -- in the next main section, for instance.]

 

In stark contrast, FL has played an key role in the development both of science and mathematics, and has featured in countless applications in technology and the applied sciences.18

 

Indeed, the development of computers is a particularly good example (among the many) of the impact of FL on science and technology. The origin of these machines goes back many centuries, but advances in control systems (in the textile industry in the 18th century) -- including the path-breaking work of Ada Lovelace, Lord Byron's daughter -- alongside the development of mathematical logic (post 1850), proved decisive. The invention of Boolean and Fregean Logic, the mathematical logic of Russell, Whitehead, Hilbert, Peano, von Neumann and Church, among many others -- along with the logico-mathematical work of Alan Turing -- all helped make possible the development of computer technology. FL not only contributed to the evolution of software and computer languages, the principles of Propositional Calculus govern the operation of all standard processors.19

 

In addition, there are many other examples of the practical applications of FL, ranging from Cybernetics to Code Theory, from Linguistics to Game Theory and Discrete Mathematics. The question is: Can DM-theorists point to a single successful application of DL in technology or the natural and physical sciences? The answer is reasonably plain: they can't. But that glaring failure becomes all the more revealing when it is remembered that dialecticians never tire of telling us that their 'logic' is superior to FL when it is applied to the material world.

 

This is perhaps one paradoxical mismatch between DM and recalcitrant reality that can't be solved by the simple expedient of "grasping" it.20

 

Naturally, DM-apologists will want to deny this (indeed, they do deny it!), but apart from claiming that scientists are all "unconscious dialecticians", their evidence in support of those denials peters out alarmingly quickly. [Again, on that, see the next main section.]

 

"Every individual is a dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic." [Trotsky (1971), pp.106-07. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

[I have commented at length on this unfortunate passage, which does Trotsky few favours, in Essay Seven Part One, here, here and here.]

 

Of course, should the claim that all scientists are "unconscious dialecticians" continue to be maintained, what is to stop Buddhists, for example, claiming that all scientists are "unconscious followers of The Eightfold Path"?

 

That is no joke; some already have! On this, see McFarlane (2003), and, of course, the fanciful writings of Fritjof Capra; except in his case, scientists are perhaps "conscious" Daoists! Cf., also Wilber (1984). A timely corrective to this contemporary drift toward 'scientific mysticism' can be found in Stenger (1995).

 

But, why don't we go the whole hog? Why not claim that scientists are "unconscious head-hunters" -- there is about as much evidence in support of that contention as there is that they are 'unconscious dialecticians'.

 

Finally, here is a video of a lecture given by a Marxist logician who, fortunately, knows what he is talking about -- Graham Priest explaining the importance of the Fregean revolution in Logic and Philosophy (I hasten to add that while I don't agree with everything Priest has to say, he does get all the broad brush strokes right):

 

 

Video One: Graham Priest On Frege's Revolution

In Logic And Philosophy

 

Would that other Marxists were as clued in as Priest.

 

'Unconscious' Dialecticians?

 

Seriously?

 

As we saw above, dialecticians have become so divorced from reality that some have even claimed that scientists are "unconscious dialecticians", and because of this they imagine that the spectacular success of science can be chalked up to DL! For example, George Novack refers his readers to a series of arguments advanced by the famous French Physicist, Jean-Pierre Vigier -- who was also a Dialectical Marxist -- in a public debate he had with Jean-Paul Sartre, in December 1961. In the course of their discussion, Vigier responded to the criticism that DM has no practical or scientific applications with the following comments (I am relying here on Novack's summary):

 

"The existentialist [Sartre -- RL] resents and rejects the rationalism and objectivity of science. It supposedly leads us away from real being, which is to be perpetually sought, though never reached, through the ever-renewed, ever-baffled effort of the individual consciousness to go beyond our human condition. The terrible destiny of the human race is like 'the desire of the moth for the star/the night for the morrow/the devotion to something afar/from the sphere of our sorrow'. So the exasperated existentialist Sartre flings as his trump card against the dialectics of nature the current crisis in science. 'There has never been, I believe, as grave a crisis as the present one in science', he cries to Vigier. 'So when you come to talk to us about your completed, formed, solid science and want to dissolve us in it, you'll understand our reserve.'

 

"Vigier calmly replies: 'Science progresses by means of crises in the same manner as history; that's what we call progress. Crises are the very foundation of progress.' And he concludes: 'The very practice of science, its progress, the very manner in which it is today passing from a static to a dynamic analysis of the world, that is precisely what is progressively elaborating the dialectic of nature under our very eyes.... The dialectic of nature is very simply the effort of the philosophy of our time...of the most encyclopaedic philosophy, that is, Marxism to apprehend the world and change it.'

 

"This ringing affirmation will appear bizarre to Anglo-American scientists who may respect Vigier for his work as a physicist. They summarily disqualify dialectical logic on the ground that, whatever its philosophical or political interest, it has no value in promoting any endeavour in natural science. If the method is valid, the anti-dialecticians say, then purposeful application by its proponents should prove capable of producing important new theories and practical results in other fields than the social. Marxists are challenged to cite instances where the dialectical method has actually led to new discoveries and not simply demonstrated after the fact that specific scientific findings conform with the generalisations of dialectical logic.

 

"The most splendid contribution of this kind in recent decades has been Oparin's theories on the origin of life, which are widely accepted and have stimulated fruitful work on the problems of biogenesis and genetics. The Soviet scientist's theory is based on the hypothesis that the random formation and interaction of increasingly complex molecules gave rise to the simplest forms of living matter, which then began to reproduce at the expense of the surrounding organic material.

 

"Oparin consciously employed such principles of materialist dialectics as the transformation of quantity into quality, the interruption of continuity (evolution by leaps), and the conversion of chance fluctuations into regular processes and definite properties of matter, to initiate an effective new line of approach to one of the central problems of science: How did inanimate nature generate life on earth? Such cases would undoubtedly multiply if more practicing scientists were better informed about the Marxist method of thought." [Novack (1978b), pp.245-46. I have used the on-line version here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; spelling modified to agree with UK English. Several typos corrected. Links added and some paragraphs merged.]

 

However, as we have seen in Essay Seven Part One, these 'dialectical laws' are so vague and imprecise (that is, where any sense can be made of them), that they can be bent and twisted to conform with practically any theory or scientific fact DM-fans find either expedient or convenient.

 

Even so, what truth is there in the claim that Oparin "consciously employed" DM-principles, whether or not they are valid?

 

In fact, upon reading the above comments, I promptly obtained a copy of Oparin's book -- Origin of Life -- but could find no dialectics in it, conscious or unconscious! Oparin mentions Engels only five times in the entire book [Oparin (1953), pp.31-33, 131, 136], dialectics and its 'laws' not once. And, even where he mentions Engels, it is only in connection with (i) His idea that proteins are important for life and (ii) His criticisms of spontaneous generation.

 

Having said that, W&G quote Oparin along these lines (using what must have been a different edition of The Origin of Life to the one I have consulted):

 

"This problem [of life's origins] has however always been the focus of a bitter conflict of ideas between two irreconcilable schools of philosophy -- the conflict between idealism and materialism.... A completely different prospect opens out before us if we try to approach a solution of the problem dialectically rather than metaphysically, on the basis of a study of the successive changes in matter which preceded the appearance of life and led to its emergence. Matter never remains at rest, it is constantly moving and developing and in this development it changes over from one form of motion to another and yet another, each more complicated and harmonious than the last. Life thus appears as a particular very complicated form of the motion of matter, arising as a new property at a definite stage in the general development of matter.

 

"As early as the end of the last century Frederick Engels indicated that a study of the history of the development of matter is by far the most hopeful line of approach to a solution of the problem of the origin of life. These ideas of Engels were not, however, reflected to a sufficient extent in the scientific thought of his time." [Oparin, quoted in Woods and Grant (1995), pp.239-40. (This appears on the same pages in the second edition.) Bold emphasis added; some paragraphs merged.]

 

Nevertheless, how the above considerations might have helped Oparin in his research is far from clear. How does knowing that matter is always in motion help anyone design an experiment to investigate how life might have evolved?

 

It could be argued that it is quite plain that DM prompted Oparin to investigate nature materialistically, but there is no evidence that that is so -- even though Oparin never said he was investigating it materialistically, but "approaching" it "dialectically". There were many other materialist theories that would, or could, have motivated him. We have also seen that DM is in fact the exact opposite of a materialist theory.

 

It could be countered that Oparin specifically mentions DM (which he does in other writings) and no other theory. Maybe so, but there were political reasons why Oparin and other Russian scientists felt constrained to refer to DM (on that, see below), so his words aren't conclusive proof. Moreover, European and Russian science had become increasingly materialist throughout the previous century, with materialism, for example, making its presence felt in the work of Nicholas Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), who helped found Narodism, and whose ideas would therefore have been well known to anyone associated with the Bolshevik Party or Russian socialism (for instance, Plekhanov and Herzen). Other Russian materialists included Dmitrii Pisarev (whose work influenced Ivan Pavlov as well as Lenin himself, whom he quotes in What Is To Be Done?), Nikolai Dobroliubov, Ivan Sechenov (named by Pavlov as the father of Russian Physiology). [On the history of materialism in Europe, see Lange (1925).]

 

Of course, the first point worth making is that while Novack is at pains elsewhere to distance his own brand of Trotskyist, 'superior', dynamic dialectics from the 'wooden, scholastic and lifeless' form that was allegedly on offer in Stalin's Russia (cf., p.232) -- even after The Great Teacher had passed away -- he seemed quite happy to quote the work of a card-carrying Stalinist scientist, and who was state apparatchik, no less, in support! [We have already seen him quote and agree with the 'wooden and lifeless' dialectic expressed by several communists in the same debate. Vigier was no Trotskyist!] Perhaps, then, Stalinist dialectics [SD] isn't quite so "ossified and scholastic" as Novack and other Trotskyists would have us believe. On the other hand, if SD is "ossified and scholastic", it can't have been of any use to Oparin in his research! Novack seems to want to have it both ways; but then that is what one has come to expect of DL-fans.

 

The second point worth making is that scientists in Stalin's Russia learnt rather quickly that if they didn't appeal (directly or indirectly) to the 'laws' of dialectics in their work (but only as those 'laws' had been interpreted by party hacks, particularly The Great Teacher Himself), then either their careers or they themselves soon disappeared (cf., Nikolai Vavilov). In which case, Oparin's "conscious employment" of DM was more of a conscious and understandable desire to save his own neck than it was an application of "conscious" dialectics. That suspicion is confirmed by the Wikipedia article about him:

 

"The Communist Party's official interpretation of Marxism, dialectical materialism, fit Oparin's speculation on the origins of life as 'a flow, an exchange, a dialectical unity'. This notion was re-enforced by Oparin's association with Lysenko." [Quoted from here. Accessed 08/07/2018. Bold added. Link in the original; some links omitted.]

 

Loren Graham, on the other hand, argues at length how influential DM was on Oparin's ideas and work, but concludes with this thought:

 

"To be sure, there is the possibility that these sections of his writings were merely responses to political pressures...." [Graham (1987), p.71. Bold emphasis added.]

 

However, Graham finally dismisses that as a reason since, in his opinion, Oparin's entire career reveals he had been consistently influenced by DM, even quoting him to this effect:

 

"Only dialectical materialism has found the correct routes to an understanding of life. According to dialectical materialism, life is a special form of the movement of matter which arises as a new quality at a definite stage in the historical movement of matter." [Ibid., p.71. These words of Oparin's were first published in 1953!]  

 

Even so, Graham failed to show how these 'laws' in any way informed his scientific work, as opposed to influencing how he interpreted it (hence his "Only dialectical materialism has found the correct routes to an understanding of life" -- emphasis added). That was also the case with Novack. Graham is uncharacteristically accommodating with Oparin; given the fact that the ideological straight-jacket imposed on all Russian thought and science lasted into the 1980s, Oparin's steadfast commitment to DM is easy to understand. He knew what would happen if he reneged on it.

 

Despite this, another commentator, Birstein, disagrees that Oparin adopted 'dialectics' merely to save his neck; he claims Oparin appropriated DM and supported Lysenko in order to advance his career:

 

"I strongly disagree with [those] who justified Oparin's behaviour [in supporting Lysenko -- RL] as the condition necessary for his survival.... In fact, nothing threatened Oparin's survival. He was an academic and director of the Institute of Biochemistry, which then was not directly involved in the study of genetics or evolutionary theory. He was not attacked by Lysenko or Prezent [a Lysenko supporter, DM-fanatic and self-styled 'philosopher' -- RL] in the press. He simply was an opportunist who saw his chance to advance his career in exchange for his support of Lysenko. Academician Schmalhausen, Professors Formozov and Sabinin, and 3000 other biologists, victims of the August 1948 Session, lost their professional jobs because of their integrity and moral principles and because they would not make compromises with their consciences." [Birstein (2001), p.289. Details of the above events can be found on pp.255-62. I hesitate to quote from this work because it is rabidly anti-Leninist. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Furthermore, we are all aware of the truly wonderful results Lysenko obtained when he tried to apply dialectics to Soviet agriculture, don't we? [On Lysenko, see below.] But, Birstein is right, nothing did threaten Oparin's life, and we know why: he towed the party line. Had he not done so, that wouldn't have been the case; his career would have nosedived, as would the prospects of him living long enough to receive his pension.

 

The third and perhaps more important point is that Novack nowhere tells us what these "quantities" and "qualities" are which Oparin is supposed to have taken into account. We have already seen that DM-fans are quite happy to make stuff up as they go along (especially with respect to this particular 'law'), using conveniently vague and malleable 'definitions' (or, what is more often the case, no definitions at all!) of "quality", as and when the need arises. Novack's lack of detail is no surprise, therefore.

 

Anyway, here is how Wikipedia summarises Oparin's work in this area:

 

"As early as 1922, he asserted the following tenets:

 

"1. There is no fundamental difference between a living organism and lifeless matter. The complex combination of manifestations and properties characteristic of life must have arisen as a part of the process of the evolution of matter.

 

"2. Taking into account the recent discovery of methane in the atmospheres of Jupiter and the other giant planets, Oparin suggested that the infant Earth had possessed a strongly reducing atmosphere, containing methane, ammonia, hydrogen, and water vapour. In his opinion, these were the raw materials for the evolution of life.

 

"3. In Oparin's formulation, there were first only simple solutions of organic matter, the behaviour of which was governed by the properties of their component atoms and the arrangement of these atoms into a molecular structure. Gradually though, he said, the resulting growth and increased complexity of molecules brought new properties into being and a new colloidal-chemical order developed as a successor to more simple relationships between and among organic chemicals. These newer properties were determined by the interactions of these more complex molecules.

 

"4. Oparin posited that this process brought biological orderliness into prominence. According to Oparin, competition, speed of cell growth, survival of the fittest, struggle for existence and, finally, natural selection determined the form of material organization characteristic of modern-day living things.

 

"Oparin outlined a way he thought that basic organic chemicals might have formed into microscopic localized systems, from which primitive living things could have developed. He cited work done by de Jong on coacervates and research by others, including himself, into organic chemicals which, in solution, might spontaneously form droplets and layers. Oparin suggested that different types of coacervates could have formed in the Earth's primordial ocean and been subject to a selection process that led, eventually, to life." [Quoted from here; accessed 09/10/2011; subsequent changes to the on-line text were incorporated on 05/06/2015. Spelling altered to conform with UK English. Links in the original.]

 

First, Point 1 above isn't unique to DM, so it can't be attributed to that theory. Neither are Points 2 and 4.

 

Second, we might be on firmer ground with Point 3. But, as noted above, this can't be viewed as an application of the 'Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality', either -- at least, not until we are told what these new 'qualities'/'properties' are. If they are the result of novel arrangements of the constituent atoms of each of the molecules involved (as the above seems to suggest), then that, too, can't be an example of Engels's 'Law' in action.  Here is what I have argued in Essay Seven Part One on this:

 

Engels...said the following:

 

"For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63. Bold emphasis added.]

 

In response, once more, it is worth pointing out that this makes a mockery of Engels's claim that such changes can only come about through the addition of matter and/or motion, and that it is "impossible" to alter a body "qualitatively" in any other way.

 

Notice that neither "rearranging constituent atoms" nor "rearranging matter and energy" make no appearance in the above passage. Even worse, this implies that "rearranging constituent atoms" and "rearranging matter and energy" can't have the desired effect on any of the bodies involved since it says: "it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Ibid., bold added.] So, if anything, Oparin was "consciously" failing to apply this 'Law', since these new molecular arrangements manifestly don't involve the addition of matter or energy. [Possible objections to this line-of-argument, including the claim that energy has been "added", were neutralised here.]

 

But, what about the claim that increased complexity results in the 'emergence' of new 'qualities"? I will deal with "emergent properties" in Essay Three Part Three.

 

Independently of that, what can be said about the following claim advanced by Vigier?

 

"Oparin consciously employed such principles of materialist dialectics as the transformation of quantity into quality, the interruption of continuity (evolution by leaps), and the conversion of chance fluctuations into regular processes and definite properties of matter, to initiate an effective new line of approach to one of the central problems of science: How did inanimate nature generate life on earth?" [Novack (1978b), p.246.]

 

But, where is the "interruption" of continuity here? Does Vigier imagine that, for example, nature gradually incorporates elementary particles into organic molecules until this amounts to the addition of a new atom, and thus a "leap"? Presumably not. On the other hand, maybe he thinks that atoms are added one at a time; if so, there is no continuity here, either, just discontinuity.

 

Here is what I have written on this (also taken from Essay Seven Part One, slightly edited), where I quoted several DM-theorists:

 

However, far more fatal is the observation that the Periodic Table doesn't in fact conform to Engels's 'Law'! To see why, we need to re-examine once again what Engels and others have actually said about this 'Law':

 

"With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. -- Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels (1976), pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state." [Hegel (1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"The 'nodal line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality... Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing without leaps." [Lenin (1961), p.123.  Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]

 

"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and not-Being." [Ibid., p.282. Bold emphases added.]

 

"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality. Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is transformed into something new." [Rees (2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

The argument here is plainly this: (a) Quantitative increase or decrease in matter or energy results in gradual change, and hence that (b) At a certain point, further increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a "leap", a sudden "qualitative" change.

 

But, this doesn't happen in the Periodic Table! Between each element there is no gradual increase in protons and electrons leading to a sudden change -- there are only sudden changes as these 'particles' are added! For example, as one proton and one electron are added to Hydrogen, it suddenly changes into Helium. Hydrogen doesn't slowly alter and then suddenly "leap" and become Helium. The same is true of every other element in the Table. In that case, one of the 'best' examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' this 'Law' in fact refutes it! There is no "interruption" in gradualness.

 

This is a more honest reading from the extant data, is it not? And not a single foisting anywhere in sight!

 

These comments also apply to the other examples drawn from Organic Chemistry [quoted by Engels (and Woods and Grant (1995), examined in Note 4, of Essay Seven Part One); cf., Engels (1954), pp.161-63 and (1976), pp.65-68].

 

So, between each of the organic molecules (to which DM-theorists refer) and the next in line there is no gradual increase in atoms leading to a sudden change -- once again, there are only sudden changes as atoms are added! For example, as one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen are added to Butyric Acid, it  suddenly changes into Valeric Acid. Butyric Acid doesn't slowly alter and then suddenly "leap" and become Valeric Acid. The same is true of every other molecule in similar organic series. In that case, another of the 'best' examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' their 'Law' in fact refutes it! There is no "interruption" in gradualness, here, either. Recall what Lenin said:

 

"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin (1961), p.282. Bold emphases added.]

 

In all these cases there is no continuity, only discontinuity. This means that the most widely-, and over-used example in the DM-book-of-tricks that supposedly illustrates this 'Law' doesn't in fact do so!

 

Once again, if Oparin did in fact make use of this particular idea, then, whatever else he was, he wasn't even a "conscious dialectician".

 

Another comrade who has also appealed to Oparin's work as an example of 'dialectics' in action is John Parrington:

 

"The 'decentralisation' of DNA's role within the cell raises important issues about how life arose in the first place. We know that the chemicals that make up living cells would soon be burned up in the earth's oxygenated atmosphere if they weren't contained within the protective enclosure of the cell. A major insight was supplied in the 1930s by the Russian scientist Oparin, whose dialectical way of thinking proved crucial. He argued that, originally, the earth's atmosphere must have been quite different from now. Instead of the present highly oxidising atmosphere, it must have been a reducing mixture of hydrogen, ammonia and methane, together with carbon dioxide, exactly the composition that the Galileo probe is now revealing on the surface of Titan, Jupiter's moon.

 

"The present day atmosphere is very different precisely because it is a by-product of life itself, in particular the photosynthesising work of plants. Following Oparin's work it was shown that the major building blocks of life could be created spontaneously in such conditions. However, major questions still remained. How did the living cell itself arise? And at what point did DNA appear on the scene? For those with a DNA centred view the answer is simple. DNA must have arisen first. But given what we have said about the reliance of DNA on the cellular environment, it seems hard to imagine how this could have been the case. In fact, it seems far more plausible, as Rose argues:

 

'[that the] presence of the cell membrane boundary, rather than replication, was the first crucial step in the development of life from non-life, for it is this that enables a critical mass of organic constituents to be assembled, making possible the establishment of an enzyme-catalysed metabolic web of reactions. Only subsequently could accurate replication based on nucleic acids have developed.' [Parrington is here quoting from Rose (2005), p.254 -- although Rose, wisely, nowhere mentions 'dialectics'. Parrington referenced the first edition of Rose's book; I have referenced the second edition. The page numbers are the same.]

 

"In fact, the creation of such a membrane and the concentration within it of the necessary chemical components is a process that can be mimicked experimentally today. In summary then, when DNA did finally arrive on the scene, it must have radically transformed the form of proto-life, but to do so there had to be the pre-existing cellular environment to receive it." [Parrington (1998), pp.111-12. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the original printed copy. Parrington has repeated this allegation in Parrington (2017).]

 

However, just like the others considered above, Parrington neglected to say what was so 'dialectical' about Oparin's work! One might be forgiven for concluding that for comrades like Parrington the word "dialectical" only applies to work that turned out to be correct in their eyes (except in this case we have no idea if this work is correct, or even remotely correct -- but see below).

 

It is worth noting that Fundamentalist Christians claim the same sorts of things for their belief in the literal truth of the Book of Genesis (as do Muslim literalists, too); indeed, even 'mainstream believers' attribute the advancement of science to 'divine guidance' or 'divine providence'. [On that, see here.] It seems that this is one straw that both wings of contemporary mysticism (i.e., in its religious and its 'dialectical' wings) appear only too eager to grasp -- for all the good it does them.

 

This is, naturally, quite apart from the fact that Oparin was wrong in almost everything he concluded about the origin of life. For example, contrary to Oparin, the early earth didn't have a reducing atmosphere. Concerning his notion that there were "complex coacervates" in the early formation of life, we read the following: "This hypothesis of colloidal assembly has largely been displaced by other concepts of life's origins." So, if he was using DM, it clearly led him astray. But, that it seems that that is what DM does all the time.

 

Dialecticians have been forced to invent the fantasy that scientists are 'unconscious dialecticians (but only when scientists are right!) since, of course, few human beings have ever heard of dialectics. Outwith of the old Communist Block (the states that have collapsed and those that have survived) it is reasonably certain that there aren't enough 'dialectical scientists' to fill an average-sized cinema.

 

But if, as we are constantly being told, scientists are stuck with the rusty old concepts that FL and IL have gifted them -- this fable is retailed countless times in RIRE, for instance; here are just a few of the places where W&G attempt to do this: pp.42, 67, 69, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 106, 107, 119, 132, 148, 152, 156, 234, 255, 354, 365, 387, 406; even John Rees has joined in -- cf., TAR, pp.3-4 --, how was it possible for human knowledge and technology to advance quite so dramatically over the last four centuries, for example? If, in practice, scientists actually use these 'decrepit, outmoded, formal categories', and science has advanced spectacularly as a result, doesn't that amount to a practical refutation of the idea that FL is inferior to DL?

 

Well, one would think so, but DL compromises the brains of those who have unwisely fallen under its spell, so it would be unwise to expect its hapless victims to be able to arrive at such a glaringly obvious conclusion.

 

[RIRE = Reason in Revolt, i.e., Woods and Grant (1995/2007); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]

 

On the other hand, is there a scrap of evidence to show that there is (or there has ever been) a single scientist who is (or who was) an "unconscious" dabbler in the Dialectical Black Arts? If there is any such evidence, DM-fans would be unwise to keep it to themselves any longer.

 

[The DM-appeal to Mendeleyev has been dealt with here. However, Novack claims [in Novack (1978), pp.254-55] that Ernst Mayr used DL in his work -- but he did so only on the basis of Mayr's ruminations about evolutionary novelty. Even so, this connection would have been news to Mayr! On this basis, we may perhaps be allowed to conclude that whenever Mayr referred to an animal's head, that was sufficient proof he was an 'unconscious head-hunter'!]

 

Russian Scientists' Disastrous Conscious Application Of DM

 

What of the few genuine examples where DM has been used (consciously) in science? If the work of Lysenko is anything to go by, we must surely conclude that it hasn't been a ringing success; Lysenko's theory held Soviet agriculture back for over 30 years.

 

[On Lysenko, see Birstein (2001), Graham (1973, 1987, 1993, 2016), Joravsky (1970), Lecourt (1977) [this links to a PDF], Medvedev (1969), Sheehan (1993), pp.220-28, 315-68, and Soyfer (1994). Also see, Werskey (1988), pp.292-304. For a different view, see Lewontin and Levins (1976), reprinted in DB, pp.163-96. Cf., also here.]

 

Of course, if and when things go wrong in non-Soviet, non-DM science, dialecticians manifestly fail to attribute that to "unconscious dialectics"; rather they put it down to "bourgeois logic", "formal thinking", or an unwise adherence to "commonsense", etc., etc. Which is odd given the fact that all the evidence suggests that logic (both Formal and discursive) has actually helped scientists refine and test their theories for centuries -- while there is none whatsoever that DL has featured anywhere at all -- except, of course, negatively in the case of Lysenko and Olga Lepeshinskaya (who was a personal friend of Lenin's), for example. [On that fraud, see below.]

 

Small wonder then that dialecticians also believe that appearances 'contradict underlying reality'; given the above, they would, wouldn't they? That particular Hegelian dogma has 'allowed' them to rationalise countless mismatches between DM and the facts. [On that, see Essay Nine Part Two.] This is, of course, an odd sort of thing for materialists to have to argue: if the material world contradicts, and continues to contradict, a certain idea, ignore reality and cling to the idea! To be sure, dialecticians consciously do that! And here is one of them actually doing it -- this is Herbert Marcuse, commenting on Hegel:

 

"The doctrine of Essence seeks to liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973), pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting Hegel (1975), p.163, §112. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions employed at this site. Minor typo corrected.]

 

"Prior to this formalisation, the experience of the divided world finds its logic in the Platonic dialectic. Here, the terms 'Being,' 'Non-being,' 'Movement,' 'the One and the Many,' 'Identity,' and 'Contradiction' are methodically kept open, ambiguous, not fully defined. They have an open horizon, an entire universe of meaning which is gradually structured in the process of communication itself, but which is never closed. The propositions are submitted, developed, and tested in a dialogue, in which the partner is led to question the normally unquestioned universe of experience and speech, and to enter a new dimension of discourse -- otherwise he is free and the discourse is addressed to his freedom. He is supposed to go beyond that which is given to him -- as the speaker, in his proposition, goes beyond the initial setting of the terms. These terms have many meanings because the conditions to which they refer have many sides, implications, and effects which cannot be insulated and stabilised. Their logical development responds to the process of reality, or Sache selbst ['thing itself' -- RL]. The laws of thought are laws of reality, or rather become the laws of reality if thought understands the truth of immediate experience as the appearance of another truth, which is that of the true Forms of reality -- of the Ideas. Thus there is contradiction rather than correspondence between dialectical thought and the given reality; the true judgment judges this reality not in its own terms, but in terms which envisage its subversion. And in this subversion, reality comes into its own truth.

 

"In the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are; consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence -- potentiality....

 

"This contradictory, two-dimensional style of thought is the inner form not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grips with reality. The propositions which define reality affirm as true something that is not (immediately) the case; thus they contradict that which is the case, and they deny its truth. The affirmative judgment contains a negation which disappears in the propositional form (S is p). For example, 'virtue is knowledge'; 'justice is that state in which everyone performs the function for which his nature is best suited'; 'the perfectly real is the perfectly knowable'; 'verum est id, quod est' ['the true is that which is' -- RL]; 'man is free'; 'the State is the reality of Reason.'

 

"If these propositions are to be true, then the copula 'is' states an 'ought,' a desideratum. It judges conditions in which virtue is not knowledge, in which men do not perform the function for which their nature best suits them, in which they are not free, etc. Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the proposition involves a process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is. The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the eyes of God, by nature, etc....

 

"Under the rule of formal logic, the notion of the conflict between essence and appearance is expendable if not meaningless; the material content is neutralised.... Existing as the living contradiction between essence and appearance, the objects of thought are of that 'inner negativity' which is the specific quality of their concept. The dialectical definition defines the movement of things from that which they are not to that which they are. The development of contradictory elements, which determines the structure of its object, also determines the structure of dialectical thought. The object of dialectical logic is neither the abstract, general form of objectivity, nor the abstract, general form of thought -- nor the data of immediate experience. Dialectical logic undoes the abstractions of formal logic and of transcendental philosophy, but it also denies the concreteness of immediate experience. To the extent to which this experience comes to rest with the things as they appear and happen to be, it is a limited and even false experience. It attains its truth if it has freed itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind the facts -- that is, if it understands its world as a historical universe, in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice of man. This practice (intellectual and material) is the reality in the data of experience; it is also the reality which dialectical logic comprehends." [Marcuse (1968), pp.110-17. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphases added. Spelling adjusted to conform to UK English. I have used the on-line text here, and have corrected any typographical errors I managed to spot. Some paragraphs merged.]

 

Marcuse nowhere criticises Hegel for this Idealist approach to knowledge; quite the reverse, he endorses it.

 

George Novack concurs:

 

"What distinguishes essence or essential reality from mere appearance? A thing is truly real if it is necessary, if its appearance truly corresponds to its essence, and only so long as it proves itself to be necessary. Hegel, being the most consistent idealist, sought the source of this necessity in the movement of the universal mind, in the Absolute Idea. Materialists, on the other hand, locate the roots of necessity in the objective world, in the material conditions and conflicting forces which create, sustain and destroy all things. But, from the purely logical standpoint, both schools of philosophy agree in connecting reality with necessity.

 

"Something acquires reality because the necessary conditions for its production and reproduction are objectively present and operative. It becomes more or less real in accordance with the changes in the external and internal circumstances of its development. It remains truly real only so long and insofar as it is necessary under the given conditions. Then, as conditions change, it loses its necessity and its reality and dissolves into mere appearance.

 

"Let us consider a few illustrations of this process, this contradiction between essence and appearance, resulting from the different forms assumed by matter in its motion. In the production of the plant, seed, bud, flower and fruit are all equally necessary phases or forms of its existence. Taken separately, each by itself, they are all equally real, equally necessary, equally rational phases of the plant's development.

 

"Yet each in turn becomes supplanted by the other and thereby becomes no less unnecessary and non-real. Each phase of the plant's manifestation appears as a reality and then is transformed in the course of development into an unreality or an appearance. This movement, triadic in this particular case, from unreality into reality and then back again to unreality, constitutes the essence, the inner movement behind all appearance. Appearance cannot be understood without an understanding of this process. It is this that determines whether any appearance in nature, society or in the mind is rational or non-rational." [Novack (1971a), pp.86-87. Bold emphases added.]

 

On the contrary, all the signs are that dialecticians are visible practitioners of self-delusion. So, on the one hand, we are told that dialectics is and always has been central to revolutionary practice, and that revolutionary cadres always were, and still are, not just choc full, they are positively over-flowing with conscious dialectics, while on the other we have witnessed little other than the failure of Dialectical Marxism to seize the masses, or even so much as lightly tap them on the shoulder.

 

Hence, if we are to believe this DM-fable, conscious dialectics seems to be associated with long-term failure, while 'unconscious' dialectics appears to be superglued to long-term success!

 

What conclusion should we draw from this? Perhaps the following: Every single revolutionary should emulate non-DM scientists and become consciously ignorant of DM.

 

Maybe then our movement will begin to experience some success.

 

Or, does that recommendation reveal yet another failure on my part to "understand" dialectics?

 

Furthermore, do any DM-fans regale us with the following salutary tale involving the 'dialectical ruminations' of Olga Lepeshinskaya?

 

"In the 1920s Lepeshinskaya discredited the work of her supervisor, Alexander Gurvitch, who investigated biophotons and mitogenic rays. She claimed that low doses of ultraviolet light were released by dying cells that had been treated with high doses of UV light. Later she claimed that cells could propagate by disintegration into granules which could generate new forms of cells, different from the parental cells. Also, crystals of inorganic matter could be converted into cells by adding nucleic acids. Further, she espoused spontaneous generation and the presence of a 'vital substance'. These claims were propagated as official dogma in the Soviet Union. A claim that soda baths fostered rejuvenation led to a temporary shortage of baking soda. She based her career on claims to observe de novo emergence of living cells from non-cellular materials, supporting such claims by fabricated proofs which were 'confirmed' by others eager to advance in the politicized scientific system. Actually, she filmed the death and subsequent decomposition of cells, then projected these films reversed.

 

"In May 22–24, 1950 at the special symposium 'Live Matter and Cell Development' for the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences that was supported by Stalin and chaired by Alexander Oparin, Lepeshinskaya gave the keynote speech, and her discoveries were celebrated as revolutionary by the invited audience. She was the recipient of the Stalin Prize for that year, and her ideas became mandatory instruction in biology. In 1952 a second conference took place to demonstrate 'using experimental methods' that the bourgeois Virchowian concept of cell development (only a living cell can produce another cell) was replaced by a 'new dialectical-materialistic theory on the origin of all living cells from non-living matter.' While her impact and dogmatic dominance have parallels to those of Lysenko, her claims were never officially renounced but just faded away.

 

"She involved her daughter Olga and her son-in-law Vladimir Kryukov in her work; in contrast, her husband, Panteleimon Lepechinsky, thought little of it. 'Don't you listen to her. She's totally ignorant about science and everything she's been saying is a lot of rubbish' he told a visitor...." [Wikipedia, accessed 09/10/2011. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphases added.]

 

Birstein added a few extra details:

 

"Academician Aleksandr Oparin (1894-1980) was another who gained significantly from the August 1948 Session. In 1949 he became secretary academician of the Biology Division instead of Academician Orbeli. In contrast to Prezent, he was a serious scientist and the author of a theory on the origin of life. The first version of his book Origin of Life was published in Russian in 1924, and the English edition that appeared in 1938 was widely read by Western scientists. He became corresponding member of the academy in 1939, academician in 1946, and director of the Bach Institute of Biochemistry in 1946. But from the 1940s-1960s, Oparin was more a Soviet official than a scientist. Besides his positions at the academy, in 1950 he was appointed a member of the International Council for Peace, and in 1952 and 1962, he was elected vice president of the International Federation of Scientists.

 

"During his years of power, Academician Oparin was an open pro-Lysenkoist. I have already mentioned his role in the tragic fate of Sabinin [pp.255-56 -- RL]. He became even more famous as a supporter of Olga Lepeshinskaya and her pseudotheory on 'the origin of cells from noncellular matter.'

 

"Lepeshinskaya (1871-1963), an old Bolshevik, a personal friend of Lenin, and an active Party functionary, started her biological studies in the 1920s, when she was over fifty years old. In the 1930s, she published a few papers on 'the origin of cells from non-cellular matter,' which were seriously criticised by many scientists, including Professor Koltsov [who was also an outspoken critic of Lysenko -- RL]. It was evident that all Lepeshinskaya's 'discoveries' were simply based on artefacts (i.e., artificial substances or structures formed during the preparation of microscopic slides) obtained because of poorly and nonprofessionally made histology preparations (she worked at home with her daughter, granddaughter, and daughter's husband, who assisted her)....

 

"Finally, with the help of another old Bolshevik, F. Petrov, in 1945 Lepeshinskaya managed to publish a monograph under the same title as her theory. It had a forward written by Lysenko and one of his closest co-workers, the VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences -- RL] academician Ivan Glushchenko. The book described Lepeshinskaya's experiments in which, for instance, red blood cells 'were developed' from yolk.

 

"After Lysenko's victory in 1946 and using her Party connections in the Central Committee, Lepeshinskaya initiated a joint meeting of the Academy Biology Division, the Medical Academy, and representatives of the Agricultural Academy. This meeting took place on May 22-24 1950. Academician Oparin presided over the commission that organized it. He formulated the goal of the meeting:

 

'The attempts to create living systems are possible...only in the Soviet Union. Such attempts are not possible anywhere in capitalist countries because of the ideological position.... I think that the goal of the meeting should be the criticism and destruction of...the last basics of Mendelism in our country, the Virchowian description of the cell theory [i.e., that a cell can be originated only from another cell].'

 

"Twenty-seven speakers praised Lepeshinskaya's alleged discovery.... Some of them were forced to speak by personal order from the Central Committee.

 

"The same year (1950), Lepeshinskaya received the highest Soviet award, the Stalin Prize. Two years later, in 1952, with the involvement of Oparin, a second joint conference of the Medial Academy and the Academy Biology Division on the problem of cell origin was organized. As Lepeshinskaya declared '[U]sing experimental methods...a new dialectical-materialist theory of the origin of all cells from non-living matter has been developed.'

 

"All this nonsense was stopped only after Stalin's death. However, Oparin continued to be an admirer of Lysenko. In 1954 he wrote:

 

'The August 1948 Session of the VASKhNIL and the joint session of the USSR Academy of Sciences...had a profound influence on the development of Soviet biological science. They were turning points after which all branches of biology in our country started to be developed on the basis of materialistic principles of the Michurinist biology and Pavlov's physiology.... Our duty is to continue to guard biological science from the influence of foreign reactionary concepts of Morganism and vitalism.'" [Birstein (2001), pp.260-62. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphases added.]

 

[See also Wetter (1958), pp.451-55, Soyfer (1994), pp.213-29, and Grant (2007), pp.277-80.]

 

As seems reasonably clear, all this pseudoscience was a direct result of a "conscious application" of DM. It is rather odd, therefore, to find that neither Vigier, Novack, nor Parrington mention Oparin's support for the 'dialectical science' promoted by Lepeshinskaya. Indeed, Lepeshinskaya isn't even mentioned -- even though she was a conscious DM-fan!

 

It could be objected that any theory can be misused -- and that includes FL. But FL isn't a theory any more than mathematics, biology or technology is a theory. It is a discipline.

 

But how is it possible to decide whether or not DM has ever been used correctly? After all, it 'allows' its acolytes to derive anything they find useful or expedient and its opposite (and that trick is often performed by the same individual, sometimes on the very same page, in the very same paragraph, or even the very same speech!). As we have seen, any 'difficulties' or internal contradictions that emerge in a political or economic theory generated by the alleged use of DM are glossed over by labelling them 'dialectical' (in a way that is reminiscent of Christians who, in the face of natural or man-made disasters, absolve 'God' by telling anyone who will listen that 'He' works in "mysterious ways"). So, if a DM-fan can't actually explain why something happens, they say it is 'dialectical' and that comment is somehow able to fill the explanatory gap. As one comrade commented about his time in the old Workers' Revolutionary Party (WRP), which operated at the extreme end of the 'Dialectical Thought Control and Manipulation' spectrum:

 

"[All this] was 'complimented' by the most abject philosophical philistinism and theoretically dissolute publication of Healy's very unremarkable 'Studies in Dialectical Materialism' which turned out to be an incomprehensible dog's dinner of convoluted mumbojumbo phrasemongering and terminological confusion. One comrade in Hull sarcastically recommended it as 'bedtime reading' when I told him I was having trouble sleeping. Because we didn't grasp it, we thought it was 'too advanced' for us. We didn't possess the 'supreme dialectical mind of a Gerry Healy'. As things turned out, when we looked at it as the fog started to lift, it was clear that we didn't understand it because it was unadulterated gobbledegook. Here again, we see a characteristic of cult-existence in which its leader was, momentarily at least, attributed powers which he really didn't hold. None of us understood the 'Studies' and so we were told to 'theoretically discipline ourselves' like a mental or intellectual form of self-flagellation or 'penance' found in physical form in some religious cults or sects...." [Quoted from here; accessed 09/10/2013. Quotation marks altered to conform with conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and link added.]

 

The word "dialectical" thus operates like magic wand or spell, capable of transforming confused thought into 'cutting edge science' -- but only in the minds of DM-'true believers'. It bamboozles the rest of humanity.

 

[Dozens of examples of the above phenomenon have been given in Essay Nine Part Two.]

 

The 'Dialectical Biologist' [DB]

 

Admittedly, a handful of 'dialectical biologists' have claimed that DM has played a crucial part in their study of living organisms -- for instance, the authors of DB, along with several notable members of the Communist Party from a few generations ago (e.g., Haldane, Levy and Bernal).

 

[See also, Lewontin and Levins (2007) -- as well as here. On these and other 'dialectical' scientists, see Roberts (1997), Sheehan (1993), and Werskey (1988). (I hesitate to list Roberts's book since his summary of Wittgenstein's ideas is lamentable, to say the least.)]

 

The authors of DB informed their readers that they consciously used DM in their work. However, in a debate between the present author and Richard Levins a few years ago, it became clear that he, like so many other DL-fans, had a very insecure grasp of FL. Would he, for example, be prepared to accept the biological opinions of a Creationist as authoritative? Why then should we accept criticisms of FL as in any way reliable when they are delivered by those who struggle with its basic concepts?

 

[DB = The Dialectical Biologist; i.e., Levins and Lewontin (1985); DL = Dialectical Logic; FL = Formal Logic.]

 

Without doubt, an appeal to organic wholes and interconnectedness makes some sort of sense in the Life Sciences, as well as in the study of social development. However, that admission doesn't mean we have to accept the entire DM-enchilada, and opt for Universal Holism, especially since it has yet to be shown that the universe is an organism or a even complex society. [On this, see Essay Eleven Parts One and Two.] Anyway, as will be demonstrated throughout the rest of this site, the concepts found in DL and DM are far too vague, confused and incoherent for them to play a useful role in any of the sciences. Hence, it is little wonder that conscious dialectics helped ruin Soviet Agriculture and Genetics, or, indeed, that subsequent dialecticians found they had to appeal to all those 'unconscious dialecticians' in non-Soviet science to help them undo the damage.

 

Nevertheless, the authors of DB advance a number of claims (which TAR quotes approvingly; e.g., on p.4) that require comment:

 

[1] Levins and Lewontin [L&L] maintain that something called the "Cartesian mode" [i.e., Cartesian Reductionism, CAR] has dominated post-Renaissance science. Unfortunately, they failed to substantiate the following claims and simply left them as a series of bald assertions:

 

"The dominant mode of analysis of the physical and biological world and by extension the social world...has been Cartesian reductionism. This Cartesian mode is characterised by four ontological commitments...:

 

"1. There is a natural set of units or parts of which any whole system is made.

 

"2. These units are homogeneous within themselves, at least in so far as they affect the whole of which they are the parts.

 

"3. The parts are ontologically prior to the whole; that is, the parts exist in isolation and come together to make wholes. The parts have intrinsic properties, which they possess in isolation and which they lend to the whole. In the simplest case the whole is nothing but the sum of its parts; more complex cases allow for interactions of the parts to produce added properties of the whole.

 

"4. Causes are separate from effects, causes being the properties of subjects, and effects the properties of objects. While causes may respond to information coming from the effects.... there is no ambiguity about which is causing subject and which is caused object...." [Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.269.]

 

The above claims are themselves framed in rather broad, general and somewhat vague terms. While it is undeniable that some philosophers and scientists adopted certain aspects of the world-view that L&L attribute to CAR, many either failed to adopt CAR, or they actively opposed it. Indeed, since the vast majority of the theorists who supposedly accepted and employed this mode-of-thought (if it is one) were Christians, they could hardly posit 'parts separate from wholes' given what that religion teaches them. Naturally, that conclusion (or, indeed, its opposite) depends on what one means by "separate". [On that, see below and here.] It is worth adding, however, that L&L cite no sources (primary or secondary) in support of the above -- and no wonder, since that would have ruined the rather neat picture they hoped to paint.

 

Admittedly, different forms of atomism were prominent in early modern science, but Atomic Theory and the belief in the existence of molecules wasn't universally accepted among scientists until after (i) The publication in 1905 of Einstein's work on Brownian motion and (ii) The work of Jean Baptiste Perrin, a decade later. [Cf., the remarks on this topic in Miller (1987), pp.470-82; a detailed history can be found in Nye (1972).] Also, worthy of note is the fact that classical Atomic Theory (propounded by Dalton) had to be rejected before these novel innovations became generally accepted.

 

[Cf., Laudan (1981). There is an illuminating discussion of these developments in Toulmin and Goodfield (1962), pp.193-305. See also Mason (1962), Brock (1992), Pullman (1998), and Pyle (1997).]

 

L&L also ignore the fact that up until about 150 years ago many scientists and philosophers -- those two disciplines weren't in fact ideologically or institutionally distinguished until the middle of the 19th century -- almost invariably understood the 'unity of the world' in theological, or even mystical, terms. Many of the pioneers of modern science and Philosophy openly accepted Hermetic, Rosicrucian, Alchemical, Occultist, Kabbalist, Neo-Pythagorean, NeoPlatonic and Teleological theories of the nature and origin of the world.

 

[L&L = Levins and Lewontin.]

 

[On this see: Bono (1995), Copenhaver (1990, 1998), Coudert (1995, 1999), Debus (1956, 1977, 1978, 1987, 1991), De León-Jones (1997), Dobbs (2002), Easlea (1980), Faivre (1994, 1995, 2000), Harkness (1999), Henry (1986), Hughes (1992), Katz (2005), Linden (2003), Lenoir (1982), McGuire (1967, 1968), McGuire and Rattansi (1966), Newman and Grafton (2001), Newman and Principe (2005), Pagel (1986), Principe (1998), Ross (1983a, 1998 -- unfortunately this link is now dead!), Shumaker (1972), Vickers (1984), Webster (1976, 1982), White (1999), and Yates (1991, 2001, 2004). See also here.]

 

As Leibniz expert, George MacDonald Ross, notes:

 

"During the middle of the seventeenth century, there was a growing consciousness of a divide between two rival and apparently incompatible world-views. On the one hand, there was the materialist, mechanist picture, according to which the world was to be understood exclusively in terms of particles of matter interacting with each other in accordance with the laws of motion. On the other hand, there was the spiritualist, occultist picture, according to which some or all natural phenomena were to be understood in terms of the sympathies and antipathies of spiritual beings acting purposefully. An important dimension of Leibniz's philosophy was his project of synthesising these two approaches through a new set of concepts which would do justice to the insights of each." [Ross (1983b). Unfortunately, this link is now dead. An expanded version of this passage can be accessed here.]

 

Moreover, the impact of Christianity on the development of 'Western Science' was no less profound; a particularly illuminating account of its influence can be found in Hooykaas (1973). The book on this is, of course, Webster (1976).

 

In fact, it is now clear that DM itself represents a return to an earlier, pre-enlightenment, enchanted view of nature and society. Given the fact that DM originated in, and developed out of, theories concocted by prominent Natürphilosophers (e.g., Schelling and Hegel), who themselves derived their ideas from previous generations of Hermetic Mystics (e.g., Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius, the shadowy figure, Hermes Trismegistus, John Scotus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Raymond Lull, Nicholas of Cusa, Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino, Giordano Bruno, Paracelsus, Valentin Weigel, Jacob Böhme, Emanuel Swedenborg, and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger), this isn't surprising. [Details can be found in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here). Several sources are cited below.]

 

Connected with the above, L&L omit any mention of the strong Organicist and Holistic traditions in early modern science (represented most notably in the work of people like Herder, Goethe, Schelling and Oken). Emerging out of the aforementioned Hermetic and Neo-Platonist philosophies of the Renaissance, this tradition helped give birth to Natürphilosophie, just as it inspired Vitalist and Romantic theories of 'Nature'. Indeed, this set of world-views dominated the Romantic Movement, from whom Hegel also derived inspiration. This alone casts doubt on L&L's simplistic and misleading picture of the development of science since the 17th century. Post-Renaissance scientific thought, therefore, was both Atomist and Organicist. [On this, see Holmes (2008).]

 

However, of much more interest and importance is the metaphysical thread that runs through science, as well as Traditional Philosophy -- the influence of which also casts DM in a compromising light, certainly more than the authors of DB might be prepared to admit. [The political context surrounding much of this will be covered in Essays Nine Part One, Twelve Parts One and Two, and Fourteen Parts One and Two; summaries here and here).]

 

Concerning the influence of Hermeticism on Hegel, see J White (1996), pp.36-43, and Magee (2008); the Introduction to the latter has been re-posted here. On Goethe, see Bortoft (1996), Naydler (1996) and Tantillo (2002). Cf., also Collingwood (1960) and Lovejoy (1964). [This links to a PDF.] On the Natürphilosophie of thinkers like Böhme, Schelling, Oken, Kielmeyer, and Goethe, see Benz (1983), Mason (1962), pp.349-62, O'Regan (1994), Richards (2002) and Tuveson (1982). On Oersted's influence on Engels, cf., Graham (1973), and Williams (1980). See also, Brown (1977), Harrington (1996), Horn (1997), and Weeks (1991, 1993). There is an excellent summary of the ideas of several of the above theorists -- alongside the extent of their influence on Hegel -- in Beiser (2005), pp.80-109; see also Heidelberger (1998). [Unfortunately, this link is now dead.]

 

To be fair, Rees also argued that a holistic view of nature on its own is insufficient to distinguish DM from other superficially similar, mystical systems of thought; however, he claimed that there was a way to tell the two apart:

 

"Here the key is to see all the different aspects of society and nature as interconnected. They are not separate, discrete processes which develop in isolation from each other. Mainstream sociological and scientific thought 'has bequeathed us the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, detached from the general context'. Much of our schooling today still follows this pattern -- the development of the arts is separated from that of the sciences, and 'technical' subjects are separated from languages, history and geography. Our newspapers and TV news programmes divide the world up in the same artificial way -- poverty levels and stock exchange news, wars and company profit figures, strikes and government policy, suicide statistics and the unemployment rate are all reported in their own little compartments as if they are only distantly related, if at all. A dialectical analysis tries to re-establish the real connections between these elements, 'to show internal connections'. It tries, in the jargon of dialectics, to see the world as 'a totality', 'a unity'.

 

"To see society and nature as an interconnected totality which is in a process of constant change still leaves one vital question unanswered. What makes this whole process develop? Why does it change? There are any number of religious and philosophical theories which try to answer this question by insisting that the motor of change lies outside the historical process -- with god, or in the unchanging pattern of human nature or in the eternal features of the human soul. Marx and Engels rejected these approaches as mystical and, literally, supernatural. They insisted that the processes which drove the development of nature and society forward must be internal contradictions, not supersensible entities like god, the soul or, as Hegel had argued, the general essence of human consciousness existing somewhere in the ether beyond the consciousness of actual living human beings." [Rees (1994), p.62.]

 

"Totality alone is not, however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation and a very practical view of the temporal hierarchy that goes with it. 'The Taoist tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin and yang'.... [Rees is here quoting DB, pp.274-75.]

 

"What unites all these explanations is that they see the totality as static. Beneath all the superficial bustle of the world lies an enduring, eternal truth: the unchanging face of God, the ceaseless search for the balance between yin and yang, or the timeless shapes, for good or ill, of human values. What they all lack is the notion of a totality as a process of change. And even where such systems grant the possibility of instability and change it is considered merely as the prelude to a restored equilibrium.... [Rees failed to notice that he had just contradicted himself; one minute none of these mystical systems admit of change; next some of them do! -- RL.]

 

"Change, development, instability, on the other hand, are the very conditions for which a dialectical approach is designed to account. The 'great merit' of the Hegelian system, wrote Engels, is that:

 

'[F]or the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development. From this point of view, the history of mankind no longer appeared as a wild whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally condemnable at the judgment seat of mature philosophic reason and which are best forgotten as quickly as possible, but as the process of evolution of man himself.'" [Rees (1998), p.6. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Rees is here quoting Engels (1892), p.408 -- that is, in the edition I have used.]

 

However, I have challenged Rees's claims, here, here, and here, where I have shown that numerous mystics also believed in (i) Totality, (ii) Change through forces analogous to contradictions, and (iii) The idea that 'God' is subject to change, and that 'He' is a process, too. [I have listed even more of the same in Appendix One to Essay Two.] Admittedly, not all of those immersed in such belief systems thought that change was caused by contradictions, but many argued that things were ruled by 'dialectically-connected' and 'inter-related opposites', distinguishable from Hegel and Engels's 'contradictions' in name alone. Nevertheless, Rees also failed to mention the important Organicist tradition in post-Renaissance science, nor did he alert his readers to the latter's influence on Schelling and Hegel (and hence on Engels).

 

Indeed, Rees failed to note that Hegel's mystical 'Totality' itself is suffused with change, motivated by 'contradictions', from top to bottom, inside and out, and that includes his 'Absolute', 'God'.

 

Furthermore, it is also clear that L&L themselves adopt a mildly revisionist view of Engels's work; in fact, they even tell us that "much of what he [Engels] wrote about [the physical world] seems quaint." [DB, p.279.] Despite this, they also equate contradictions with opposing forces [DB, p.280]; but, as Essay Eight Part Two shows, that was an unwise move on their part. Nevertheless, in their characterization of CAR, L&L pointedly failed to argue that the absence of an appeal to "contradictions" (to account for change) was one of its weaknesses. Perhaps this was an oversight, but it does tend to ruin the neat picture L&L and Rees sought to paint.

 

[2] DB counterposes DL to CAR as a superior method, at least in the Life Sciences -- and, by implication, throughout the rest of the sciences. However, as we will see in other Essays posted at this site, DL introduces into epistemology a far more pernicious brain virus: HEX.

 

[HEX = Hegelian Expansionism; this term is explained in Essay Ten Part One; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

Small wonder then that the vast majority of scientists (outwith the old Stalinist block and its 'fellow travellers') have completely ignored DL -- that is, if they have ever even heard of it!

 

[On Soviet Science, see Birstein (2001), Graham (1973, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2016), Joravsky (1961), Kojevnikov (2004), Krementsov (1997), Pollock (2006), Soyfer (1994), and Vucinich (1980, 2001).]

 

In his reply to Burnham, Trotsky commented on a related issue:

 

"In order to deal me a blow in the most vital spot Burnham informs me that in the university textbooks on logic that he deals with, the dialectic is not mentioned at all. He should have added that in the university courses on political economy Marx's labour theory of value is not mentioned either, or it is mentioned only under the sign of condemnation. And the main thing that should have been mentioned is that in the university textbook there is no mention, or only a condemnation, of historical materialism. In the courses in civil law there is no exposition, or only a condemnation, of the socialist attitude toward property forms, etc., etc.... From the fact that the dialectic is not mentioned in the university textbooks [it is essential] to draw some conclusions about the class nature of official scholarship -- its fear of revolution, the inability of bourgeois thought to go beyond the limits of empirical tasks, etc. For Burnham and his ilk the banning of Marxism from official scholarship suffices to disprove the scientific nature of Marxism." [Trotsky (1973), p.403.]

 

To be sure, there is deep seated prejudice against Marxism in academic circles (and elsewhere), but the reason DL isn't mentioned in logic textbooks can't simply be attributed to bourgeois hostility since Hegel was a quintessentially bourgeois philosopher -- whose work and ideas are, alas, experiencing a significant revival even among Analytic Philosophers of late (for reasons that will be explained in Essay Twelve). [On that, see for example, Redding (2007).] And yet, DL still fails to make it into logic textbooks -- that is, other than those that tout 'Dialethic'/'Dialetheic' [DiL] and 'Paraconsistent Logic' [PaL], which systems are openly based on Hegelian ideas -- but which are, arguably, also not based on them! [On that, see Note 1].

 

The reason for this is plain, and it is similar to the reason why Astrology doesn't make it into textbooks on Astronomy, or why Crystal Healing fails to be included in Medical textbooks -- DL isn't even logic.

 

Nevertheless, Rees refers his readers to several other theorists who have tried to find some sort of scientific role for DL to play. [Rees (1998), p.120; note 60.] Attempts like this -- to squeeze science into a dialectical boot it won't fit -- will be covered in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.

 

[On the allegation that David Bohm used DM in his work, see Essay Seven Part One.]

 

Finally, L&L offer their readers only sketchy details concerning exactly how DM has featured in their research; indeed, they are set at such a low intellectual level that would make both of them fail any of their undergraduates who turned in such fourth rate, superficial work.

 

[I will add more details on this topic in a future re-write of this Essay.]

 

DL -- A 'Higher Form' Of Logic?

 

Judge For Yourself

 

What then of the general boast that DL is a superior form of logic? Is there any way of confirming it? Perhaps there is; John Rees claims that DL doesn't reject FL, and neither is it:

 

"[A]n alternative to 'normal' scientific methods or formal logic…. Formal Logic, like Newtonian physics, has proved inadequate to deal with 'more complicated and drawn out processes.' So the dialectic stands in the same relation to formal logic as Newtonian physics stands to relativity theory or, as Trotsky puts it, as 'that between higher and lower mathematics'." [Rees (1998), p.271, quoting Trotsky (1971), p.63. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

If it can be shown that DL does all that Rees claims for it, then perhaps the 'academic' quibbles aired in this Essay can be set aside. Other material posted at this site is directed at examining these claims, and much more besides. However, a few rather awkward, initial problems need to be cleared first before the main feature can begin.

 

First of all, while it is clear that Relativity has largely superseded Newtonian Physics it isn't at all obvious that this was related to the latter's inability to deal with "drawn out processes". Still less clear is exactly what FL and DL have in common that makes Trotsky's analogy with higher and lower mathematics at all apposite. If anything, the opposite appears to be the case; DM-theorists are only too happy to begin their discussions of FL by pointing out that most of what they (but no one else) take to be its central tenets are in fact fundamentally defective. This includes the LOI, the LOC and the LEM (among others). [These allegations will be fully substantiated in the next subsection.]

 

Furthermore, although lower mathematics is clearly limited in scope, none of its precepts are defective and we certainly don't find professional mathematicians (or even amateurs) criticising it in any way from the outset because of that, quite unlike the attitude adopted toward FL by DM-theorists, who constantly excoriate it for limitations we have now shown are entirely baseless.

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

Secondly, and as will be demonstrated in Essays Five and Six, Trotsky's attempt to criticise the LOI and Engels's 'analysis' of motion collapse into incoherence with remarkable ease. In stark contrast, higher mathematics doesn't disintegrate when we pass beyond its 'lower' forms. In fact, far from being able to handle "more complicated and drawn out processes", DL has great difficulty even coping with an ordinary bag of sugar or the movement of the average cat on or off assorted mats!

 

Furthermore, higher and lower mathematics aren't inconsistent with each other. Hence, we don't find mathematicians correcting elementary addition, subtraction, multiplication or division, for example; nor do we find them expanding on the limitations of, say, the equal sign, the cube root function or methods used to solve simple linear equations. Admittedly, higher mathematics contains concepts and rules not found in lower mathematics, but there is no suggestion that the latter uses defective procedures, methods or symbols, or even that they are the exact opposite of what they are normally taken to be. Compare that with the sort of comments made by DL-enthusiasts concerning FL:

 

"Trotsky saw that it was the inadequacies and contradictions of formal logic that drove theorists toward dialectical formulations. Even those who pride themselves on a 'deductive method', which proceeds 'through a number of premises to the necessary conclusion,' frequently 'break the chain of syllogisms and, under the influence of purely empirical considerations, arrive at conclusions which have no connection with the previous logical chain.' Such ad hoc empirical adjustments to the conclusions of formal logic betray a 'primitive form of dialectical thinking.'" [Ibid., p.272. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Again, it is worth pointing out once more that fundamental criticisms of FL (like the above) advanced by DL-fans are never substantiated with examples taken from the work of a single logician.21 Add to this Lenin's remarks:

 

"The inaneness of these forms of formal logic makes them deserving of 'contempt' and 'derision'…. Hegel shrewdly adds [concerning the Syllogism]: 'Boredom immediately descends when such a syllogism is heard approaching.'" [Lenin (1961), pp.93, 177. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

It would be difficult to find a single mathematician who was as dismissive of lower mathematics as Lenin was of FL -- or any contemporary scientist, for that matter, who would be prepared to call Aristotle or Newton's work "inane" and fit only for "contempt" and "derision".22

 

Dialectical Inanities

 

[Readers should compare much of what follows with what Buddhists and Zen Buddhists have to say about the LOC and the LEM, posted here and here, for example.]

 

Returning now to the DM-fairytale that there are exactly three principles underlying FL: In fact, there are countless principles employed in MFL --, indeed, as many as there are authors prepared to invent and/or define them. But, as we are about see, this hoary old DM-fable isn't even true of AFL!

 

As noted several times, dialecticians who pontificate on this topic seldom (if ever) substantiate their fanciful attempts to re-write the history and foundations of FL with quotations from, or citations to, a single logic text (except those badly mis-titled books Hegel inflicted on the world). In fact, their lamentably weak effort to come to grips with FL bears an uncanny resemblance to the lame attempts made by Creationists to do the same with respect to Evolutionary Theory, in their literature and on their websites.

 

[FL = Formal Logic; MFL = Modern FL; AFL = Aristotelian FL; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction;  LOI = Law of Identity; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

 

Compare the above attitude with the following valid point made by John Molyneux:

 

"Marxist materialism is repeatedly attacked by the method of oversimplifying and caricaturing it to the point where it is obviously false...." [Molyneux (2012), p.36.]

 

As we are about to see, this is precisely what he and other DM-fans regularly do when they attempt to summarise, discuss or criticise FL!

 

Grossly inaccurate caricatures like this will only ever impress those who know nothing about logic, which, sad to say, appears to be the aim. On the other hand, those who know even a modicum of MFL (or, indeed, AFL) will see these attacks for what they are: ill-informed bluster. Those who don't know any logic will be led astray accordingly. Moreover, if my experience debating this topic on the Internet is anything to go by, benighted DM-fans refuse to be told, preferring instead to believe what Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin or Trotsky tell them about AFL, or, indeed, logic in general, again without a scintilla of supporting evidence. They are as impervious to correction as are rabid Donald Trump supporters or Fundamentalist Christians. Psychologists have a name for this debilitating condition: The Dunning-Kruger Effect.

 

This must surely be among the many 'explanations' there are for the fact that highly intelligent comrades (who are otherwise knowledgeable in science, economics, history, current affairs, politics, social theory, and even mathematics) continually publish comments about FL that are not only demonstrably incorrect, they aren't even coherent in their own terms -- as will be demonstrated presently.

 

[I examine several other reasons for this self-inflicted DM-ignorance in Essay Nine Parts One and Two.]

 

It is to be hoped that long exposure to DL hasn't completely destroyed these comrades' critical faculties, although, in what follows, it will become painfully clear that the case for the defence is considerably weakened by the publication of each new book or article on dialectics by DM-fans.

 

Below, I have reproduced just a few of the scores of crass things dialecticians have to say about AFL and FL, much of which is highly repetitive, anyway. It is to be hoped that having read through what follows, the conclusion that dialecticians simply copy their wild allegations off one another (many being almost identical, word-for-word) without bothering to check -- let alone devote much thought to what they have to say -- will also have occurred to the reader and not just the present writer.

 

Apologies are owed once again to the hardy souls who will have to wade through what follows for my having to inflict this sorry material on them -- but they can spare a thought for yours truly who has had to read this stuff, and much more like it, over and over again for the best part of forty years, in order to try to make some sort of sense of it. Recall, too, that the quotations reproduced below are only a tiny fraction of those that could have been posted. Finally, I have chosen examples from right across the political spectrum of parties, tendencies and individuals committed to some form of Dialectical Marxism -- i.e., from Stalinists and Maoists to Trotskyists and Libertarian Marxists, from academic Marxists to rank amateur revolutionary activists and internet bloggers. Whatever the sharp disagreements these groups or individuals have over concrete political questions, they all agree, almost to the letter, about the alleged nature and limitations of FL, and they all make the same mistakes while they are at it!

 

In no particular order:

 

[1] George Novack

 

A particularly egregious example of 'dialectical confusion' can be found in (Trotskyist) George Novack's woefully misconceived book on DL -- The Logic of Marxism:

 

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.... If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A always equals A, it can never equal non-A.

 

"This conclusion is made explicit in the second law of formal logic: the law of contradiction. The law of contradiction states: A is not non-A. This is no more than the negative formulation of the positive assertion expressed in the first law of formal logic. If A is A, it follows, according to formal thinking that A can't be non-A. Thus the second law of formal logic, the law of contradiction forms the essential supplement to the first law. Some examples: a man can't be inhuman; a democracy can't be undemocratic; a wageworker can't be a non-wageworker.

 

"The law of contradiction signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be different from itself. Difference and identity are, according to these two rules of formal logic, completely different, utterly disconnected, mutually exclusive characteristics of both things and thoughts. This mutually exclusive quality of things is expressly taken note of in the third law of formal logic. This is the law of the excluded middle. According to this law, everything is and must be either one of two mutually exclusive things. If A equals A, it can't equal non-A. A can't be part of two opposing classes at one and the same time. Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs confront each other, both can't be true or false. A is either B or it is not B. The correctness of one judgement invariably implies the incorrectness of its contrary, and vice versa." [Novack (1971a), pp.20-21. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

The LOI will be discussed in considerable detail in Essay Six, but the reader will note that Novack -- except in one instance (discussed below) -- nowhere attempts to substantiate these wild allegations with a single reference books or articles devoted to FL. To be sure, he paraphrases Aristotle from time to time, but it is just as plain that he grasped little of what he read (as we are about to see).

 

True to form, however, we are never told what the As he speaks about are, or what they stand for (why that is important with be discussed later), but Novack and all the rest considered below nowhere even consider the possibility that A might be identical with itself at t1 and then change while it is still identical with itself at t2 (t2 > t1) -- that is, A, whatever it is, is self-identical as it changes from moment to moment, even if it isn't identical with what it used to be! Humanity invented tensed verbs (alongside an associated vocabulary that includes adverbs and adjectives) to cope with such possibilities long before Aristotle even existed.

 

Nevertheless, we need to be clear about what Aristotle himself actually said:

 

"So it must be possible to deny whatever anyone has affirmed. Thus it is clear that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation. Let us call an affirmation and a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I speak of statements as opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing -- not homonymously, together with all other such conditions that we add to counter the troublesome objections of sophists....

 

"I call an affirmation and a negation contradictory opposites when what one signifies universally the other signifies not universally, e.g. every man is white -- not every man is white [i.e., some man is not white -- RL], no man is white -- some man is white. But I call the universal affirmation and the universal negation contrary opposites, e.g. every man is just -- no man is just. So these can't be true together, but their opposites may both be true with respect to the same thing, e.g. not every man is white -- some man is white.

 

"Of contradictory statements about a universal taken universally it is necessary for one or the other to be true or false; similarly if they are about particulars, e.g. Socrates is white -- Socrates is not white. But if they are about a universal not taken universally it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. For it is true to say at the same time that a man is white and that a man is not white, or that a man is noble and that a man is not noble.... This might seem absurd at first sight, because 'a man is not white' looks as if it signifies also at the same time that no man is white; this, however, does not signify the same, nor does it necessarily hold at the same time." [Aristotle (1984b), 7, 17-38, pp.27-28. Emphasis added. The on-line translation is different from the one I have used.]

 

In the above passage, Aristotle was alluding to an early version of his famous "Square of Opposition":

 

 

Figure One: The 'Square Of Opposition'

 

[On this, see Parsons (2017), as well as here.]

 

Readers will, I hope, notice the nascent sophistication apparent in Aristotle's first faltering attempts to say clearly how he intends to use certain words, and indeed, how they are used, just as they will no doubt take note of how little the musings of comrade Novack correspond with them. In fact, what Aristotle has to say about the LOC, for example, bears no relation to what Novack thinks Aristotle had to say. Aristotle nowhere uses identity, or lack of identity, to define a contradiction -- that is a fiction invented by post-Renaissance philosophers and logicians, an odd idea Hegel was only too happy to propagate; on that, see here.

 

Aristotle, again:

 

"So it must be possible to deny whatever anyone has affirmed. Thus it is clear that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every negation an opposite affirmation. Let us call an affirmation and a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I speak of statements as opposite when they affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing -- not homonymously, together with all other such conditions that we add to counter the troublesome objections of sophists....

 

"I call an affirmation and a negation contradictory opposites when what one signifies universally the other signifies not universally, e.g. every man is white -- not every man is white [i.e., some man is not white -- RL], no man is white -- some man is white. But I call the universal affirmation and the universal negation contrary opposites, e.g. every man is just -- no man is just. So these can't be true together, but their opposites may both be true with respect to the same thing, e.g. not every man is white -- some man is white." [Ibid.]

 

Novack:

 

"The law of contradiction signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be different from itself. Difference and identity are, according to these two rules of formal logic, completely different, utterly disconnected, mutually exclusive characteristics of both things and thoughts." [Loc cit.]

 

But, there is no reference to the LOI in Aristotle's work.

 

[On that, see my comments over at Wikipedia, here, where I have shown that the passages taken from Aristotle's work, to which some appeal in their attempt to show he did in fact use the LOI, don't in fact show this. Readers are referred there for more details. But, it is important to add that I have posted about half a dozen comments about this on the same page. So readers will need to scroll down to find them.]22a1

 

The original Wikipedia article -- which has been changed since I first quoted it -- asserted that no occurrence of the LOI could be found in anyone's work prior to that of Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century; however, the comments page asserts that the first instance of it occurs in John Locke.

 

However, we find the following comment in Hamilton's Logic (published in the mid-19th century):

 

"The law of Identity, I stated, was not explicated as a coordinate principle till a comparatively recent period. The earliest author in whom I have found this done, is Antonius Andreas, a scholar of Scotus, who flourished at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth century. The schoolman, in the fourth book of his Commentary of Aristotle's Metaphysics, -- a commentary which is full of the most ingenious and original views, -- not only asserts to the law of Identity a coördinate dignity with the law of Contradiction, but, against Aristotle, he maintains that the principle of Identity, and not the principle of Contradiction, is the one absolutely first. The formula in which Andreas expressed it was Ens est ens. [Being is being -- RL.] Subsequently to this author, the question concerning the relative priority of the two laws of Identity and of Contradiction became one much agitated in the schools; though there were also found some who asserted to the law of Excluded Middle this supreme rank." [Quoted from here (accessed 04/10/2014). I haven't yet been able to check this source directly. Bold emphasis and links added.]

 

The aforementioned editorial change to that Wikipedia article -- on this see Note 22a1 --  doesn't alter much, but it does attempt to pin-point a use of "identity" in Aristotle's work. This means that Aristotle didn't base his logic on the LOI, or even on the LOC, despite what generations of DM-theorists have tried to tell their readers.

 

Be this as it may, the aforementioned Wikipedia article quoted Aristotle as follows:

 

"Now 'why a thing is itself' is doubtless a meaningless inquiry; for the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident (e.g. that the moon is eclipsed) but the fact that a thing is itself is the single formula and the single cause to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musical musical, unless one were to say that each thing is inseparable from itself; and its being one just meant this. This, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question." [Aristotle (1984e), p.1643; Book VII, Part 17. Bold emphasis added. I have quoted a more recent translation than seems to have been used by the author of the Wikipedia article. The latter is available here; scroll down to Part 17. That is clearly the source the author of the said article used.]

 

So, far from basing his logic on 'identity', Aristotle seems quite dismissive of it!

 

Indeed, he appears to be making a totally different point, as I noted on the 'Talk' page over at Wikipedia:

 

And [this] quotation takes [the] 'law' out of context, for not only does Aristotle not mention 'identity', he specifically talks about predication (and since identity is a relation, he can't be talking about identity -- the conflation of relational with predicative expressions is more modern):

 

"Let us state what, i.e. what kind of thing, substance should be said to be, taking once more another starting-point; for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances. Since, then, substance is a principle and a cause, let us pursue it from this starting-point. The 'why' is always sought in this form -- 'why does one thing attach to some other?' For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire -- as we have said why the man is musical, or it is something else. Now 'why a thing is itself' is a meaningless inquiry (for (to give meaning to the question 'why') the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident -- e.g. that the moon is eclipsed -- but the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musician musical', unless one were to answer 'because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this'; this, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question). But we can inquire why man is an animal of such and such a nature. This, then, is plain, that we are not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable of something (that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing). E.g. why does it thunder? This is the same as 'why is sound produced in the clouds?' Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another. And why are these things, i.e. bricks and stones, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is the end, e.g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover; for this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being also." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]

 

There is, however, another site on the Internet that does manage to trace the history and origin of this 'Law' -- and it isn't to Aristotle --, but, in line with Hamilton, above, it traces the LOI to Medieval Roman Catholic Logicians. However, since that site is run by an overt fascist, I won't cite it. [A Google search will soon find it, though -- that is, if you can stomach the rest of the material you will find there!]

 

Now, it may be that Novack consulted a spectacularly bad logic text (and, alas, there are plenty of those about), or maybe none at all, and so just made things up. But, if he did, he wisely kept that shameful secret to himself.

 

[In fact, as we will see in Essay Twelve, Novack was relying largely on Hegel, and possibly also on a handful of traditional 18th or 19th Century logicians, who made similar mistakes. Readers are encouraged to read the rest of De Interpretatione; the above passage gives only a hint of the sophistication Aristotle attempted to bring to the subject all those years ago, something Hegel either failed to appreciate, or tried his best to undo. DM-fans have only succeeded in aggravating that backward step --, and, ironically, they have done so at a time when logic is far better understood than at any other period in history, progressive developments that have sailed over their ideologically-compromised heads.]

 

Now, as noted above, Aristotle says the opposite of what Novack attributes to FL:

 

"...For example, the negation of 'to be a man' is 'not to be a man', not 'to be a not-man', and the negation of 'to be a white man' is 'not to be a white man', not 'to be a not-white man'.... For it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be: such statements are not contradictories of one another...." [Aristotle (1984b), 12, 1-12, p.34. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

It is reasonably clear from this that Aristotle wouldn't have accepted Novack's particular use of non-A as the contradictory of A, for instance.

 

The sort of negation Aristotle is alluding to above (where he rejects expressions containing locutions like "not-man" as contradictories of those that contain "man") is called predicate-term negation. (On that, see here.) The failure to notice the difference between propositional negation, predicate negation and predicate-term negation (but more specifically the second two of these) has clearly confused dialecticians like Novack. Once again, such errors abound in the writings of DM-theorists. Aristotle drew attention to this distinction over two thousand ago! Now, it could be that DM-fans haven't had quite enough time to catch up, or for this 'hot-off-the-press-news' to sink in.

 

Logic has moved on considerably since Aristotle's day, as have mathematics and the sciences in general. No one today -- other than traditionalists -- would be happy with Aristotle's characterisation of contradictions, etc. However, it is nevertheless apparent from what Novack and the other DL-fans quoted below have to say that they are significantly less logically advanced than Aristotle was 2400 years ago! It is equally clear that Novack didn't consult Aristotle's writings before he simply made up the above comments, just as it is equally clear that the same can be said of the other DM-fans quoted in what follows. For example, Novack pointedly confused the LOI 'stated negatively' with the LOC:

 

"This conclusion is made explicit in the second law of formal logic: the law of contradiction. The law of contradiction states: A is not non-A. This is no more than the negative formulation of the positive assertion expressed in the first law of formal logic. If A is A, it follows, according to formal thinking that A can't be non-A. Thus the second law of formal logic, the law of contradiction forms the essential supplement to the first law. Some examples: a man can't be inhuman; a democracy can't be undemocratic; a wageworker can't be a non-wageworker.

 

"The law of contradiction signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be different from itself. Difference and identity are, according to these two rules of formal logic, completely different, utterly disconnected, mutually exclusive characteristics of both things and thoughts.

 

"This mutually exclusive quality of things is expressly taken note of in the third law of formal logic. This is the law of the excluded middle. According to this law, everything is and must be either one of two mutually exclusive things. If A equals A, it can't equal non-A. A can't be part of two opposing classes at one and the same time. Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs confront each other, both can't be true or false. A is either B or it is not B. The correctness of one judgement invariably implies the incorrectness of its contrary, and vice versa." [Novack (1971a), pp.20-21. Some paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]

 

As I have shown in Essay Eight Part Three (that material has been reposted below), there is no connection at all between the LOI "stated negatively" and the LOC. So, Novack has just made this up:

 

"The law of contradiction signifies the exclusion of difference from the essence of things and of thought about things. If A is necessarily always identical with itself, it can't be different from itself." [Ibid.]

 

The same comment applies to Novack's attempt to drag the LEM into this 'dialectical black hole'.

 

To be sure, Aristotle made many mistakes (on that, see here); for example, he often confused propositions with what he called "terms" (indeed, almost all the way through Prior Analytics), and he crossed effortlessly between talk about talk and talk about things, running both together at times; but he did at least try to be careful, even if not always crystal clear! As the late Peter Geach pointed out:

 

"[L]ogicians as distinguished as Aristotle and Russell have fallen into almost inextricable confusions, so that you just cannot tell whether a predicate is something within language [talk about talk -- RL] or something represented by means of language [talk about things -- RL]." [Geach (1968), pp.22-23 (this links in fact to the 3rd (1980) edition and so has different page numbers: pp.49-50.]

 

Aristotle was, after all, beginning virtually from scratch. Anyone who reads his work (and who doesn't rely on comrades like Novack to put them off) will soon see why Marx thought so highly of him.

 

Despite the above, Novack did at least attempt to support what he said in the following passage with a direct reference to Aristotle (his only one in the entire book, as far as I can determine):

 

"Let me cite an interesting example of this kind of thinking from Aristotle's writings. In his Posterior Analytics (Book 1; ch.33, p.158 -- this is in fact pp.146-47 in the edition I have used -- RL), Aristotle says that a man can't simultaneously apprehend first, that man is essentially animal, i.e., can't be other than animal -- and second, that man is not essentially animal, that is, may assume that he is other than animal. That is to say, a man is essentially a man and can never be thought of as not being a man." [Novack (1971a), p.21.]

 

Now, if we check what Aristotle actually said, we will soon see things aren't quite as Novack would have us believe (which is perhaps why Novack chose to paraphrase, but not quote, the passage in question):

 

"Similarly there is both knowledge and opinion of the same thing. For the one is of animal in such a way that it can't not be an animal, and the other in such a way that it can be -- e.g. if the one is just what is man, and the other of man but not of just what is man. For it is the same because man is the same, but the manner is not the same.

 

"It is also evident that it is not possible to opine and to understand the same thing at the same time. For one would at the same time hold the belief that the same thing can be otherwise and can't be otherwise, which is not possible. For in different men it is possible for there to be each of these attitudes with regard to the same thing, as has been said; but in the same man it is not possible even in this way; for he will at the same time hold a belief, e.g. that a man is just what is an animal (for this is what it was for it not to be possible for something not to be an animal), and that a man is not just what is an animal (for let that be what it is for it to be possible)." [Aristotle (1984d), Book 1, 33, 89a:34-89b:6, pp.146-47. Bold emphases added. Again, I have used a different translation to the one published on-line.]

 

Admittedly, this passage isn't the clearest that has ever been committed to paper, but it nowhere mentions "essence", and although it contains allusions to the LOC, it is couched in terms that make Novack's 'paraphrase' prejudicial, if not misleading, to say the least. The sections highlighted in bold bring that out. Hence, Aristotle's position was far more nuanced and complex than Novack acknowledged, but he was nevertheless happy to misrepresent him.

 

Finally, Aristotle had the following to say: "It is also evident that it is not possible to opine and to understand the same thing at the same time...". In relation to Novack, at least, I think we can agree with Aristotle on that one. Indeed, just like other DM-fans, Novack revealed that not only had he failed to grasp the basics of FL, but he was nevertheless quite happy to pontificate and "opine" about it as if he were an expert (indeed, just as The Dunning-Kruger Effect predicts).

 

Be this as it may, a measure of the sophistication modern logicians have brought to the subject can be judged from the content even of introductory textbooks on the Philosophy of Logic. For example, one such that takes a very 'Oxford' view of the subject is Wolfram (1989); a completely different slant can be found in Haack (1979). Dialecticians often label the attention to detail evident in books like this, "pedantry", but it is abundantly clear that their own relaxed, if not downright sloppy approach to what is a very difficult and complex discipline allows them to indulge in some easy, but quintessentially confused, 'thought'.

 

[Bertrand Russell once said: "Most people would rather die than think, in fact they do." He didn't have dialecticians in mind when he said that, but perhaps he should.]

 

More challenging material can be found in, say, Goble (2001), Jacquette (2002, 2006), Quine (1970) and Shapiro (2005). [This links to a PDF.]22a2

 

[2] Clifford Conner

 

As an excellent historian of science, one would expect Clifford Conner to have known better, but as an avowed pupil of George Novack, he plainly doesn't. In fact he seems only too happily to emulate the master, making all the usual mistakes -- except he is content to make do with only one basic law of FL:

 

"The central principle on which formal logic is built can be expressed in a simple formula that at first glance appears to be a self-evident truth 'A equals A'.... Beginning with this law you can derive all of formal logic. One important corollary is the law of exclude of middle. That is, if 'A equal B' is a true statement, then 'A is not equal to B' must be a false statement. A is either identical to B or it is not. It's one or the other; there is no middle ground." [Conner (1992), p.22. Link added and paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]

 

[The above comments appear in a section entitled Aristotle's Formal Logic, leaving the reader in no doubt that the author associated these confused musings with Aristotle's logic.]

 

As expected, Conner offered his readers no evidence at all in support of these allegations (we have already seen they can't be found in Aristotle), nor did he explain how the LEM can be derived from the LOI. Of course, if the LEM is valid, then what Connor says about it is indeed the case ("there is no middle ground"), but even then the LEM can't be a corollary of the LOI, since what he says follows only on the basis of both 'laws'. Neither takes precedence, and they aren't inter-derivable, either. [I explain why, below. I have summarised the argument here.]

 

Be this as it may, it would be interesting to see Conner attempt to derive all of FL from the LOI -- including disjunctive and conjunctive normal forms, to say nothing of consistency and completeness proofs. [On this, see Lemmon (1993), pp.75-91, 189-200, and Hunter (1996), pp.137-215.] If Connor managed to do that, he would be odds on favourite to win a Fields Medal:

 

"Beginning with this law you can derive all of formal logic. One important corollary is the law of exclude of middle. That is, if 'A equals B' is a true statement, then 'A is not equal to B' must be a false statement. A is either identical to B or it is not. It's one or the other; there is no middle ground." [Conner (1992), p.22. Link added.]

 

Earlier, Conner had defined the LOI as follows: "A is equal to A", but it has now morphed into "A equals B". It looks like Conner's definition isn't 'equal' to Conner's definition!

 

Compare this with Novack's earlier comment, which seems no less confused:

 

"This mutually exclusive quality of things is expressly taken note of in the third law of formal logic. This is the law of the excluded middle. According to this law, everything is and must be either one of two mutually exclusive things. If A equals A, it can't equal non-A. A can't be part of two opposing classes at one and the same time. Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs confront each other, both can't be true or false. A is either B or it is not B. The correctness of one judgement invariably implies the incorrectness of its contrary, and vice versa." [Novack (1971a), pp.20-21.]

 

"Both can't be true or false"? That must mean they are truth-valueless!

 

However, one minute, A is the name of an object -- which is its legitimate role in simple versions of the LOI --; we can see this when Novack tells us that "According to this law, everything is and must be either one of two mutually exclusive things.... A can't be part of two opposing classes at one and the same time". The next it stands for a proposition (i.e., a "statement") or even a "state of affairs"(!) -- which we can see when he says that "Wherever two opposing statements or states of affairs confront each other, both can't be true or false."

 

But, if A stands for a name, or an object, and then for a proposition, we end up with unvarnished nonsense: so while "Socrates is identical with Socrates" makes sense (even if DM-fans think the latter is both true and false at once -- i.e., if "A" stands for "Socrates", for example), "Socrates is true" and "Socrates is false" make no sense at all (if we take A to stand for something that could be true or could be false, i.e., if it stands for a proposition or indicative sentence). [I return to consider such 'innovative' DM-syntax and DM-semantics in more detail, below.]

 

As we will see throughout this site, when DM-theorists try to 'explain' their 'logic', the 'abbreviations' they use are as slippery as eels coated with olive oil.

 

Of course, anyone familiar with Aristotle's work -- or who bothers to check! -- will already know he never puts things this way. Indeed, I have been unable to find a sentence remotely like any of the above in his work. [E-mail me if you think differently.]

 

Finally, Conner rightly emphasises the importance of empirical over theoretical knowledge in his excellent book, in the following manner:

 

"As far as the kinds of activities that produce scientific knowledge, the primary focus in this book is on empirical as opposed to theoretical processes. It is my contention that the foundations of scientific knowledge owe far more to experiment and 'hands-on' trial-and-error procedures than to abstract thought.... [The privileging of theoretical over empirical knowledge is] a reflection...of the ancient prejudice that proclaims intellectual labour more honourable than manual labour." [Conner (2005), pp.11-12. Spelling adjusted to agree with UK English; italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Given the above, is it puzzling why Conner then accepts a theory (upside down or 'the right way up') that has been derived from that haven of intellectualism, Mystical German Idealism, in place of empirical knowledge that so easily refutes it.

 

[3] Woods And Grant  [W&G] -- 01

 

[Please take note of the comments I have now added to The Preface about links to W&G's book.]

 

Equally if not even more wide of the mark are W&G:

 

"According to formal logic, the whole is equal to the sum of its parts....

 

"Let us examine the matter more closely. The basic laws of formal logic are:

 

"1) The law of identity ('A' = 'A').

 

"2) The law of contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').

 

"3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')....

 

"The law of contradiction merely restates the law of identity in a negative form. The same is true of the law of the excluded middle. All we have is a repetition of the first line in different ways. The whole thing stands or falls on the basis of the law of identity ('A' = 'A'). At first sight this is incontrovertible, and, indeed, the source of all rational thought. It is the Holy of Holies of Logic, and not to be called into question. Yet called into question it was, and by one of the greatest minds of all time....

 

"Similarly with the law of the excluded middle, which asserts that it is necessary either to assert or deny, that a thing must be either black or white, either alive or dead, either 'A' or 'B'. It can't be both at the same time. For normal everyday purposes, we can take this to be true. Indeed, without such assumptions, clear and consistent thought would be impossible. Moreover, what appear to be insignificant errors in theory sooner or later make themselves felt in practice, often with disastrous results. In the same way, a hairline crack in the wing of a jumbo jet may seem insignificant, and, indeed, at low speeds may pass unnoticed. At very high speeds, however, this tiny error can provoke a catastrophe. In Anti-Dühring, Engels explains the deficiencies of the so-called law of the excluded middle:

 

'To the metaphysician,' wrote Engels, 'things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, fixed, rigid objects of investigation given once for all. He thinks in absolutely unmediated antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for "whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.'" [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.57, 91-93. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. This material now appears in the second edition, Woods and Grant (2007), pp.63, 95-98.]

 

In Essay Seven Part One, we will have occasion to note that Engels wasn't averse to drawing his own hard and fast antitheses -- for example, when he claimed that water exists either as a sold (ice), as a liquid (water), or a gas (steam), but not as a solid-liquid, or as a gas-liquid -- even when they change into one another where these 'fixed and rigid dichotomies' are supposed to break down. (What these two have to say about the LOI will be dealt with in Essay Six.) Again we see in the above the same slippery DM-abbreviations slide (those letter As again!) effortlessly between different denotations. One minute A is the name of an object, the next it stands for a proposition. Readers should keep this slide in mind as they proceed, since every DM-theorist covered in this main sub-section seems happy to allow them to slide all over the place -- if they do that will save me having to point this out every time they do it.

 

I have made several comments about the sophomoric errors in W&G's book, here, as well as at the end of this section, but for present purposes it is worth pointing out that (just like other DM-fans) these two comrades referenced zero evidence in support of their 'definitions'. To be sure, here and there they referred to a few ideas lifted from two introductory logic texts (i.e., one written many years ago by A. A. Luce, and another by Morris and Nagel), but they failed to reveal from which misguided textbook they retrieved these prize examples:

 

"1) The law of identity ('A' = 'A').

 

 "2) The law of contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').

 

 "3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')...." [Ibid., p.91. In the second edition, Woods and Grant (2007), this appears on p.95.]

 

Quite what the LOC has to do with whether A can or can't equal not-A, Woods and Grant failed to say. As we will also find is the case with Hegel (and as we discovered with Novack, above), these two have confused the LOC with the LOI "stated negatively"; however, the LOC concerns the truth-functional connection between a proposition and its negation; it doesn't relate to objects represented by A (that is, if that is what A stands for!), still less about "equality". As will be argued more fully below, the letter "A" in the LOI is a variable that stands for an object or the name thereof, so it can't feature in the LOC, which concerns propositions not objects.

 

[This topic is discussed extensively in Essay Eight Part Three (I have reposted some of that material below). On the LOC in general, see Horn (2006/2018). Unfortunately, Professor Horn alleges without textual support that the LOI was a foundational axiom for Aristotle's logic. I have e-mailed him about this (January 2009). For his reply, see Note 1. (Horn (2006) has been superseded by Horn (2018) -- same link.)]

 

Readers will note, too, that Aristotle, for example, can only be made to say such inane things if what he actually says (reproduced earlier) is ignored, or his words are altered so that they say the opposite of what he intended.

 

In that case, clearly, "Aristotle does not equal Aristotle", according to W&G! Hence, it looks like the important thing here isn't to interpret Aristotle, but to change him.

 

W&G aren't averse to making what seem to be otherwise irrelevant points; for example, this one:

 

"Moreover, what appear to be insignificant errors in theory sooner or later make themselves felt in practice, often with disastrous results. In the same way, a hairline crack in the wing of a jumbo jet may seem insignificant, and, indeed, at low speeds may pass unnoticed. At very high speeds, however, this tiny error can provoke a catastrophe." [Ibid.]

 

But, what catastrophe has ever resulted from the alleged misconstrual of the 'laws' of FL? W&G failed to say, but unperturbed by this omission they immediately deflect to faults that arise in metallurgy! As if a theory is anything like a crack in an aluminium wing! Well, even if they couldn't cite a single example from logic that might cause, or have caused, a 'catastrophe', we already know that DL led to a catastrophic decline in harvests in the former USSR, as soviet agriculturists tried to apply the batty DM-ideas promulgated by Lysenko.

 

Indeed, while W&G seemed happy to tell us that according to FL, "the whole is equal to the sum of its parts", what Aristotle in fact said was this:

 

"In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something beside the parts...." [Aristotle (1984e), p.1650. I have used the on-line version from here.]

 

"Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part." [Aristotle (1984i), p.1988. I have used to published version, not the on-line translation.]

 

Except for those whose brains haven't been colonised by 'dialectics', Aristotle's "the whole is prior to the parts" and "the whole is something beside the parts" isn't the same as "the whole is equal to the sum of its parts" (which we met earlier, from W&G's book). Perhaps W&G think that "prior to part" and "beside the parts" mean the same as "equal to the sum of the parts"?

 

Moreover, their characterisation of the LEM is no less risible. What, it may be wondered, has "A is not equal to B" got to do with whether, concerning proposition, p, either p is true or p is false -- or, in some versions of the LEM, p v ¬p ("¬" being the sign for negation)? Do these two honestly believe that an intellect of the stature of Aristotle believed that their version of the LEM was one of his foundational principles? [Indeed, the long passage from De Interpretatione given above explicitly contradicts what W&G assert.] Or even that there are any other logicians not the worse for drink or drugs who would accept this caricature of the LEM? No wonder they failed to quote a single logic text that supports their fictional 'version' of it.

 

Moreover, concerning the choice of colour that they give their readers (i.e., "a thing must be either black or white"), do they honestly think that logicians don't know that some things can be other colours -- red, green or sky blue --, and that such colours sometimes change? Or that while something is red (like a traffic light), it can't at the same time be green. If W&G think otherwise, they will only be a danger to themselves and other road users. Of course, DM-theorists say their theory is particularly applicable at the point of change. But, even at the point of change, a traffic light can't be red and green at the same time! Yes, sure, lights can be red and orange at the same time, but which logician has ever said otherwise? And we have already seen that if DM were true, change would be impossible, so we don't need lectures from DM-theorists either about logic or about change.

 

[I am, of course, referring here to UK traffic lights, but most lights across the planet work on similar principles and with the same colours.]

 

Of course, this depends on what they mean by:

 

 "a thing must be either black or white... It can't be both at the same time." [Loc cit.]

 

Do they think logicians have never seen something like this?

 

 

Figure Two: No One Has Ever Seen One Of These --

According To W&G

 

Is the above "a thing"? Is it red, blue, green, yellow, white and orange at the same time? What about this?

 

 

Figure Three: Not Cricket

 

These objects (and countless others) can be many colours at the same time, whether they change or not.

 

But, there is worse to come:

 

"Even the simplest judgement, as Hegel points out, contains a contradiction. 'Caesar is a man,' 'Fido is a dog,' 'the tree is green,' all state that the particular is the universal. Such sentences seem simple, but in fact are not. This is a closed book for formal logic, which remains determined to banish all contradictions not only from nature and society, but from thought and language itself. Propositional calculus sets out from exactly the same basic postulates as those worked out by Aristotle in the 4th century B.C., namely the law of identity, the law of (non-) contradiction, the law of excluded middle, to which is added the law of double negation. Instead of being written with normal letters, they are expressed in symbols thus:

 

"a) p = p

 

"b) p = ~p

 

"c) p V = ~p (sic)

 

"d) ~(p ~ p) (sic)

 

"All this looks very nice, but makes not the slightest difference to the content of the syllogism." [Ibid., pp.97-98. Unsurprisingly, after a supporter of this site pointed out the garbled nature of this passage, it has now been dropped from the Second Edition -- although it remains in place in the on-line version. Update July 2018: The above pig's ear has now been axed from the on-line version, too.]

 

This is what a)-d) translate as:

 

a) p is equal to p

 

b) p is equal to not-p

 

c) p or equals not-p (sic)

 

d) not both p not-p (sic)

 

Now, a) above would be syntactically viable if p stood for an object -- that is, it operated as a singular term (standing for a Proper Name or a Definite Description), but in logic this letter normally goes proxy for a proposition or indicative sentence. If in a), p does stand for a proposition -- which seems to be W&G's intention, since identity (which they mean by their use of an "=" sign) expresses a relation between objects or the names thereof -- then that would imply propositions are (i) objects of some sort or (ii) p is a singular term! But, propositions can't be objects or singular terms (why that is so, see here; I have also said more about this, below).

 

However, and connected with the previous point, in relation to b) it isn't clear what role the term, "not-", occupies. Is it an operator mapping a name onto a 'negative name' (whatever that is!), or is it an operator mapping a propositional variable onto its negation? If the latter were the case, then p can't be operating as a singular term, as it is in a). If the former were the case, if it is a name-operator, then it would be pertinent to ask W&G what "not-Socrates" could possibly mean -- turning b) into "Socrates is equal to not-Socrates". [Again, on that see below, as well as here.]

 

Even supposing some sense could be made out of those two, what sense can be made of c) or d)? If p stands for a name, then they would translate out as these prime examples of unvarnished nonsense:

 

c) Socrates or equals not-Socrates. (sic)

 

d) Not both Socrates not-Socrates. (sic)

 

c) and d) are just plain gibberish.

 

On the other hand, if p stands for a proposition (such as "Paris is the capital of France"), then the situation would, if anything, be even worse:

 

c) Paris is the capital of France or equals not-Paris is the capital of France. (sic)

 

d) Not both Paris is the capital of France not-Paris is the capital of France. (sic)

 

If this is the best DL-fans can do, the ruling-class will rest secure in their beds.

 

Furthermore, if p were an object (as opposed to it being the name of an object), it couldn't be used to say anything. This is precisely the mistake Hegel made, which error W&G seem happy to copy. [More on that here, and in detail in Essay Three Part One, Sections 5-9. Treating concepts as objects of some sort -- for example mental constructs, 'objects of thought', or ideas --, also means they can't be used to say anything. That was established in Essay Three Part One (link above).]

 

Clearly, these two comrades found these prize specimens of syntactical confusion in a logic text written nowhere on this planet -- which must mean they simply made them up!

 

[The above prime example of syntactic confusion has now been removed from the second edition of W&G's book -- probably because a supporter of this site e-mailed Alan Woods about it fifteen or so years ago. Having said that, Woods was also made aware of several other serious errors in RIRE, and they haven't been corrected. The above garbled syntax remains in the on-line version (or it did up until at least May 2016, the last time I checked). Update March 2018: It has now been removed!]

 

At any rate, this shows that they made no serious attempt to comprehend much of what they constantly deride. Witness the way they confuse the Propositional Calculus with Aristotelian Syllogistic. The former was invented by the Stoics (and then largely forgotten about, or lost, until the middle of the 19th century); Aristotle knew nothing about it since it was developed after he died, although he did comment on the Megarian School, which heavily influenced Stoic Logic. [Kneale and Kneale (1962), pp.113-76.]

 

About this period in the history of logic, we read the following:

 

"Aristotle's logic, especially his theory of the syllogism, has had an unparalleled influence on the history of Western thought. It did not always hold this position: in the Hellenistic period, Stoic logic, and in particular the work of Chrysippus [c.279-c.206 BCE -- RL], took pride of place. However, in later antiquity, following the work of Aristotelian Commentators, Aristotle's logic became dominant, and Aristotelian logic was what was transmitted to the Arabic and the Latin medieval traditions, while the works of Chrysippus have not survived." [Quoted from here, accessed 17/03/2020. Bold emphasis added.]

 

[Oddly enough, Stoic Logic was also known as "dialectic" logic (Kneale and Kneale (1962), p.113). It bears no relation to the pseudo-logic Hegel dreamt up.]

 

Of course, what W&G have to say about the contradictions allegedly implicit in simple predicative propositions is itself based on a 'novel' conception of grammar (which they also uncritically imported from Hegel, who in turn appropriated it from Medieval Logicians).

 

"Even the simplest judgement, as Hegel points out, contains a contradiction. 'Caesar is a man,' (W1 -- RL) 'Fido is a dog,' 'the tree is green,' all state that the particular is the universal." [Ibid.]

 

Sentences like W1 (i.e., "Caesar is a man") do not say 'the particular/individual is the universal', as these two -- and Lenin -- allege, and can only be made to say so by imposing on it a grammatical theory they all failed to justify. [Indeed, it can't be justified; on that see Essay Three Part One.] Even if, per impossible, W1 could be construed this way, W&G failed to explain why that is a contradiction, as opposed to it being a simple falsehood -- or, indeed, just plain, unvarnished nonsense. As Aristotle would have said, propositions like W1 tell us that manhood applies to Caesar, not that the "particular is the universal". And, even if this were a contradiction, we would expect these two elements (the particular/individual and the universal) to struggle with and the turn into each other -- as the DM-classics (and even W&G) tell us they must:

 

"The world of subatomic particles is in a state of constant movement and ferment, in which nothing is ever the same as itself. Particles are constantly changing into their opposites, so that it is impossible even to assert their identity at any given moment of time. Neutrons change into protons, and protons into neutrons in a ceaseless exchange of identity. [Is a proton really the opposite of a neutron? In fact, on p.67 (p.72 of the second edition), Woods and Grant tell us that the opposite of a proton is an antiproton! Moreover, protons are highly stable -- RL.]

 

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

 

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

 

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

 

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

 

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.45-47, 63-71. Bold emphases added.]

 

If this doesn't happen (as it plainly doesn't) with respect to "the particular/individual and the universal" then how can they be described as contradictory of one another? On the other hand, if they are contradictory of one another, then why don't they struggle with and then turn into one another, as even W&G assert they should. In DM-terms this makes no sense at all.

 

Exactly who W&G are seeking to influence with these blatant fibs and incoherent ideas is reasonably clear (i.e., anyone as ignorant of FL as they clearly are), but the fact that they have linked Marx's great name and reputation to this rubbish is something for which they should hang their heads in shame. The fact that they won't do that just about says it all.

 

[4] Robin Clapp

 

We also find something similar, but no less inventive, at the website run by the UK Socialist Party. Here is Robin Clapp (revealing that he, too, has confined his reading of logic to books about DM, all the while failing to consult a single logic textbook, which, of course, makes him an expert in the subject):

 

"The formal logician operates within the limitation of three laws:

 

"The Law of Identity -- where A is equal to A

 

"The Law of Contradiction -- where A can't be equal to non-A [This is a garbled version of Hegel's attempt to negate the LOI -- RL.]

 

"The Law of Excluded Middle -- where A must be equal to A, or must not be equal to A." [Quoted from here.]

 

It looks like the split in The Militant Tendency between W&G and what later became the Socialist Party hasn't noticeably improved either side's grasp of logic.

 

[The lack of any connection between the LOC and the supposed negation of the LOI has been exposed here. Other criticisms of this approach to logic were covered earlier and will be again, below.]

 

[5] Plekhanov

 

Not to be outdone in this respect, other comrades have vied to be crowned 'The Worst Expositor Of Traditional Logic Since Hegel'. Here is Plekhanov's impressive bid:

 

"The 'fundamental laws of thinking' are considered to be three in number: 1) The law of identity; 2) the law of contradiction, and 3) the law of the excluded middle. The law of identity...states that 'A is A' or 'A = A'. The law of contradiction... -- 'A is not A' -- is merely a negative form of the first law. [Again, this is a version of Hegel's attempt to negate the LOI -- RL.]

 

"According to the law of the excluded middle...two opposing judgements that are mutually exclusive can't both be wrong. Indeed, 'A is either B or non-B'. The truth of either of these two judgements necessarily means the falseness of the other, and vice versa. There is not, neither can there be, any middle." [Plekhanov (1908), pp.89-90. Italics in the original, several paragraphs merged. The online version translates this passage slightly differently.]

 

Once more, we aren't told what "A" or "B" stand for. Are they Proper Name or general noun surrogates; or are they propositional variables, or predicables? Are they objects, concepts or property tokens?

 

But, how does Plekhanov counter the above garbled ideas that he attributed to FL?

 

"Let us examine the matter from another angle. The motion of matter lies at the root of all natural phenomena. But what is motion? Here we have what seems to be a contradiction. If you are asked whether a body that is in motion is located at a particular place at a particular moment, you will be unable, however hard you try, to give an answer using [the above rules].... A moving body is at a particular place, and at the same time it is not there." [Ibid., p.90. Italics in the original, paragraphs merged.]

 

As we saw in Essay Five, these moves were unwise (no pun intended); there it became clear that the 'contradiction' that Plekhanov and many others say exists here is in fact no contradiction; motion isn't contradictory -- or, rather, it makes no sense to suppose it is. The reader is referred to that Essay for more details.

 

Even so, Plekhanov's own formulation of the LOC is fraught with problems: "A is not A" is merely the (alleged) negative form of his own ill-defined version of the LOI! He would be hard-pressed to find a logician (not the worse for some sort of mental disorder) who would recognise it as the LOC (not the least, once more, because it confuses -- à la Hegel -- objects, or the names thereof, with propositions). Small wonder then that Plekhanov (like other DM-fans) failed to refer his readers to a single logic text in order to substantiate these brazen examples of pure fiction.

 

[To be sure, Plekhanov elsewhere references Überweg's Logic, but not in support of this particular 'definition' of the LOC. We will see later that Hegel was the source of this rather odd idea: that the LOI "stated negatively" yields the LOC. Added on Edit: As far as I can determine, this error can be traced back at least to Leibniz, a vastly superior logician and philosopher, nonetheless! Hegel simply copied it uncritically.]

 

Moreover, it is equally clear that Plekhanov has confused the LEM with Aristotle's definition of contraries (see above), and then later with a semi-classical version of the LOC (that is, a version that conflated propositions with "judgements"). Whether the LEM allows for the sort of examples Plekhanov considers will depend on the examples chosen, as well as on how a proposition is characterised. [On this, see Geach (1972c).]

 

[Once again, readers should compare Aristotle's carefully worded (but difficult) prose with the sloppy language employed by Plekhanov.]

 

[6] Dietzgen

 

Here, too, is Joseph Dietzgen (quoting a certain Dr Friedrich Dittes):

 

"Modern philosophy, beginning with Bacon of Verulam and closing with Hegel, carries on a constant struggle with the Aristotlean (sic) logic. The product of this struggle, the outcome of philosophy, does not deny the old rules of traditional logic, but adds a new and decidedly higher circle of logical perception to the former ones. For the sake of better understanding it may be well to give to this circle a special title, the special name of 'theory of understanding,' which is sometimes called 'dialectics.' In order to demonstrate the essential contents of this philosophical product by an investigation of the fundamental laws of traditional logic and to explain it thereby, I refer once more to the teacher of elementary logic, Dittes.

 

"Under the caption of 'Principles of Judgment' he teaches: 'Since judging, like all thinking, aims at the perception of truth, the rules have been sought after by which this purpose might be accomplished. As universally applicable rules, as principles or laws of thought, the following four have been named:

 

'(1) The law of uniformity (identity).

 

'(2) The law of contradiction.

 

'(3) The law of the excluded third.

 

'(4) The law of adequate cause.'...

 

"The first principle, then, declares that A is A, or to speak mathematically (sic), every quantity is equal to itself. In plain English: a thing is what it is; no thing is what it is not.... The square is excluded from the conception of a circle, therefore the predicate 'square' must not be given to a circle. For the same reason a straight line must not be crooked, and a lie must not be true. Now this so-called law of thought may be well enough for household use, where nothing but known quantities are under consideration. A thing is what it is. Right is not left and one hundred is not one thousand. Whoever is named Peter or Paul remains Peter or Paul all his life. This, I say, is all right for household use.

 

"[The old logic] insists on its first, second and third law, on its identity, its law of contradiction and excluded third, which [sic] must be either straight or crooked, cold or warm and excludes all intermediary conceptions." [Dietzgen (1906), pp.385-89. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site; several paragraphs merged; link added.]

 

First of all, Dittes wasn't a logician; this is what Dietzgen himself had to say about him (and his non-logic textbook):

 

"Dr. Friedrich Dittes, director of the institute of pedagogy in Vienna, has published a School of Pedagogy, several editions of which have appeared, in which he gives much attention to logic. Dittes is a prominent pedagogue, well known through his writings. He confines himself in his School to teaching only that which is well established and accepted without a doubt. As a practical man who addresses himself mainly to teachers of primary grades, he would not place himself on the pinnacle of the outcome of philosophy, even if he could. He must confine himself to that which is well established, which is far removed from the disputes of the day. But it may here serve as a whetstone by the help of which we may give to the positive product of philosophy its latest and greatest sharpness." [Ibid., p.383. Bold emphasis and link alone added.]

 

Dietzgen then tells us that Dittes teaches "only that which is well established and accepted without a doubt...", and yet it is quite plain that Dittes has confused logic with psychology, as has Dietzgen (here is the latter):

 

"It is a cardinal error of ancient logic to regard perception as the ultimate source from which the human mind dips its knowledge. It is nature which is the ultimate source, and our perception is but the mediator of understanding. And its product, recognized truth, is not truth itself, but merely a formal picture of it. Universal nature is the arch fountain, is the eternal and imperishable truth itself, and our perception, like every other part of universal existence, is only an attribute, a particle of absolute nature. The human mind, with whose nature logic is dealing, is no more an independent thing than any other, but simply a phenomenon, a reflex or predicate of nature.... Now this so-called law of thought may be well enough for household use, where nothing but known quantities are under consideration. A thing is what it is. Right is not left and one hundred is not one thousand. Whoever is named Peter or Paul remains Peter or Paul all his life. This, I say, is all right for household use." [Ibid., pp.384-86. Bold emphases added.]

 

We also saw (above) Dittes argue as follows:

 

'Since judging, like all thinking, aims at the perception of truth, the rules have been sought after by which this purpose might be accomplished. As universally applicable rules, as principles or laws of thought, the following four have been named...." [Ibid., p.366. Bold emphasis added.]

 

It has already been pointed out that logic has nothing to do with the 'laws of thought' (even if there were any such 'laws').

 

Second, Dietzgen, like Dittes, thinks AFL is based on a handful of basic 'laws' (in this case they postulate four, not the usual three -- but what the 'law' of "adequate cause" has to do with logic they failed to explain). We have also seen that the idea that AFL (never mind MFL) requires three, or even four, basic 'laws' is a myth put about by those who have a much securer grasp on fantasy than they have on fact.

 

[AFL = Aristotelian Logic; MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]

 

Finally, is it really the case that Aristotle (let alone subsequent logicians) knew nothing of lukewarm water, or slightly curved (but not crooked) lines? Or even that people sometimes change their names? The above comment is odd in other ways, too --, for what else is warm but an intermediate state between hot and cold!? As usual, we find in the writings of DM-fans a series of half-formed, garbled 'thoughts' that have been subjected to little or no critical scrutiny -- or, in this case (over warm), they appear to be devoid of common sense. Even children know that warm is intermediate between hot and cold.

 

[7] John Molyneux

 

As perhaps part of a late entry in the International Competition To Find The Worst Summary Of FL On The Planet, submitted on behalf of the UK-SWP, this is how John Molyneux managed to impress the judges:

 

"Dialectics is the logic of change.... To understand the significance of this compare it with what is known as 'formal logic' (originally developed by Aristotle and usually thought of as the rules of sound thinking). The basic idea of formal logic is that something either is the case or is not the case, but that it can't be both at the same time. For example, the cat is on the mat or it is not on the mat. For many purposes formal logic is useful and necessary. But as soon as you take movement and change into account, it ceases to be adequate. A cat moving goes through a moment when it is in the process of passing onto the mat or in the process of passing off it -- when it is both on and off the mat. Dialectics is in advance of formal logic because it enables us to grasp this contradiction." [Molyneux (1987), pp.49-50. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Precisely how DL succeeds in helping anyone "grasp" this spurious contradiction Molyneux plainly left his readers to guess. But, what is so problematic, difficult, challenging, or even reactionary about a cat lying, sitting or sleeping partially on and partially off a mat? Clearly, if the said cat falls asleep half on, half off the said mat, we would still have the same alleged 'contradiction', but no motion. In which case, plainly, this 'contradiction' has nothing to do with the ambulatory habits of furry mammals. In fact, this is a direct result of the ambiguous language being used here (indeed, as I have demonstrated in Essay Five).

 

However, as we shall also see in the above Essay, DL can't even account for the motion of domestic pets, mat or no mat; Diamat or no Diamat. And, as far as their capacity to "grasp" 'contradictions' like this is concerned, dialecticians seem content merely to label these ambiguous states of affairs "contradictions", and then move on (no pun intended, once more). Exactly how this 'contradiction' helps Molyneux's readers "grasp" anything at all is left entirely mysterious. In what way does it help us comprehend motion to be told it is 'contradictory'?

 

But, don't even think to ask such impertinent questions, let alone complain, or you risk being accused of not "understanding" dialectics.

 

And, does Molyneux really believe that logicians and scientists (of the calibre of, say, Aristotle) failed to notice that things change? Really?

 

In fact, Aristotle himself tells us he certainly did notice they do:

 

"...A substance...is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual man -- one and the same -- becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good.... Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement will be false. Similarly with beliefs.... However, even if we were to grant this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are received. For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they are able to receive contraries. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in other case too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries.... [I]t is because the actual thing changes that the contrary comes to belong to them...." [Aristotle (1984f) 5, 4a:15-36, p.7. Italics in the original; bold emphases added, paragraphs merged. The on-line versions renders this passage slightly differently.]

 

Admittedly, Molyneux's book was meant to be an entry level introduction to this subject; when he raised that point with a former supporter of this site in private correspondence, he recommended that critics -- like those of us who post at this site, for instance -- should concentrate on the DM-classics, and ignore the writings of relatively minor figures like himself. As should now seem plain, the situation with the DM-classics is no better; in fact, in some respects, it is far worse.

 

However, the above passage at least scotches the myth that Aristotle's logic or his philosophy can't accommodate change. [See also Aristotle (1984f), pp.23-24, where he analyses six different types of change; this passage can be found here, but scroll down to Part 14.]

 

Unfortunately, Molyneux repeated these egregious misconceptions in an article posted at his blog several years later:

 

"This matters because the dominant mode of thinking, based on the logic developed by Aristotle, is not founded on the principle of universal change, rather it deals with fixed states or 'things'. Its basic axioms are that A = A (a thing is equal to itself) and A does not = non-A (a thing is not equal to something other than itself), from which are derived sequences of sound reasoning known as syllogisms." [The Marxist Dialectic.]

 

As is the case with others who say similar things, Molyneux failed to demonstrate how a single syllogism follows from these illusory principles.

 

["A thing is not equal to something other than itself"?!? What the dialectics does that mean? And, what precisely has it got to do with FL?]

 

As this Essay has shown, the above paragraph contains nearly as many errors as it does words. I have posted a suitable reply here (which, as we can now see when we read Molyneux (2012), sailed right over his head).

 

He went on to argue as follows:

 

"This formal logic was, and is, all well and good and very necessary for practical human affairs but it is limited -- it excludes change. Dialectical logic moves beyond formal logic by starting not with 'things' but with processes, processes of coming into being and passing out of being. The moment processes of change are fed into the equation it becomes necessary to deal with contradiction. If state A (e.g. day) changes into state B (night) it passes through a phase of A not being A or being both A and B (twilight)." [Ibid.]
 

But, twilight looks pretty much like a "state", too -- certainly as much a "state" as night and day are. Even so, twilight can't be a unity of twilight and not-twilight -- which should be the case if everything, including twilight, is supposed to be a UO of A and B (or even A and not-A). On the other hand, if it isn't a UO, then, according to the DM-classics, it can't change!

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

 

And, of course, if day is no longer day, but is twilight, then the above A (interpreted as "day" in Molyneux's example) isn't in fact A and not A, or even B, it is C (twilight). In which case, this state of affairs isn't "A and B", either, as Molyneux asserts -- it is "A and C"!

 

To be sure, Of course, it might be possible to circumvent this 'difficulty' by defining twilight as a combination of day and night, but that would make Molyneux's assertions stipulatively 'true', and would, as such, have been imposed on nature. Even worse, it would mean that twilight was a combination of two states, and hence must be a state itself!

 

As we will see in Essay Seven Part Three, none of this makes sense, even in DM-terms. Night doesn't "struggle" with day to produce twilight (as the DM-classics tell us must be the case), so exactly how this alleged 'contradiction' makes anything change is a DM-mystery. And, if this alleged 'contradiction' doesn't, or can't, cause change, how is it a 'dialectical contradiction' to begin with? That is, even if we knew what these odd 'entities' or processes -- these 'dialectical contradictions' -- are actually supposed to be!

 

Also worth asking is the following: What exactly is the 'internal opposite' of day that makes it change into night? Molyneux failed to say, and it isn't difficult to see why: day has no 'internal opposite'. Its alleged opposite is night, but that is manifestly external to day. So, unless we believe that the future can change the present (arguing perhaps that the fact that night is hours away allows it to 'back-cause' day to change into night!), Molyneux's own example can't be one of 'dialectical change'!

 

More problematic still: this doesn't even look like a 'dialectical contradiction'. No element in this example implies the existence of any other -- as they supposedly do in the relation between the proletariat and the capitalist class (an idea I have criticised here, anyway) -- such that one can't exist without the other, and such that they imply one another. But day can surely exist without night; had the rotational period of the Earth been different, one side would have pointed toward the Sun permanently, meaning that one half of the planet would experience nothing but day. In addition, had the Earth been illuminated by a binary star system, the entire planet would have experienced nothing but day. Admittedly, we wouldn't be around to witness any of this, but that has nothing to do with the facts on the ground. Day can exist without night, which would be impossible if this were a 'dialectical' relation.

 

Indeed, we read the following about "tidally-locked" planets:

 

"Tidal locking is the name given to the situation when an object's orbital period matches its rotational period. A great example of this is our own Moon. The moon takes 28 days to go around the Earth and 28 days to rotate once around it's axis. This results in the same face of the Moon always facing the Earth. We see other examples of this in our solar system and universe. An extreme example is the case of Pluto and Charon. Charon is such a large satellite compared to Pluto that they are tidally locked together. This means that Pluto only sees one face of Charon and vice versa. It is as if a rod connects two points on their surface. This results in a bizarre phenomenon where the moon Charon would always be in the same place in Pluto's night sky." [Quoted from here. Accessed 10/07/2018. Link added; paragraphs merged.]

 

So, we see that yet another example to which DM-fans appeal to illuminate their theory in fact refutes it. [No pun intended.]

 

Now, Aristotle certainly believed that during change something must remain the same -- for example, Aristotle (1984e), p.1595 -- but precisely what that "something" is, is subject to controversy among Aristotle scholars  But, he also claimed that:

 

"...since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also can't belong at the same time to the same thing.... If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in particular relation and one without qualification." [Aristotle (1984e) Book 4, 6, 1011b:15-23, p.1597. Again, the on-line translation renders this passage slightly differently.]

 

Here Aristotle acknowledges that contrary predicates can belong to a subject providing they attach to it "in particular relations"; presumably this means they could belong to parts of that subject separately (when, say, a metal poker is cold at one end, hot at another, or when a man is half wet, half dry, for instance), but not 'essentially'. Nevertheless, it is clear from this, as it is from Aristotle's other writings, that he continually switches back and forth without warning between talk about talk and talk about things. In so doing, he generates no little confusion himself, which is, of course, one of the reasons that over the last 150 years, modern logicians have had to re-think the entire subject from the ground floor up. But, even though Aristotle was himself a little confused in places, he was a model of clarity compared to Hegel and his dialectical groupies. [On that, see here.]

 

Alas, in subsequent writings, Molyneux failed to correct these serious mistakes (even though he has been informed of them several times!); if anything, he only succeeded in compounding his errors:

 

"Accompanying the development of practical human knowledge and science..., there was also developed (by Aristotle and his successors) a system of logic, i.e., rules of sound thinking. Logic was meant to tell you whether or not what you were saying, writing or thinking, made sense. A proposition that was logical was not necessarily true (in fact), but it had the possibility of being true. A proposition that was not logical, i.e., broke the rules of logic, could not possibly be true." [Molyneux (2012), p.43. Punctuation marks altered to conform the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

But, what does Aristotle himself tell us was the point of his logic? Wonder no more:

 

"First we must state the subject of the enquiry and what it is about: the subject is demonstration and it is about demonstrative understanding. Next we must determine what a proposition is, what a term is, and what a deduction is (and what sort of deduction is perfect and what is imperfect); and after that, what it is for one thing to be or not to be in another as a whole, and what we mean by being predicated of every or of no." [Aristotle (1984c), Book 1, 1 24:10-15, p.39.]

 

The on-line version renders the above passage as follows:

 

"We must first state the subject of our inquiry and the faculty to which it belongs: its subject is demonstration and the faculty that carries it out demonstrative science. We must next define a premise, a term, and a syllogism, and the nature of a perfect and of an imperfect syllogism; and after that, the inclusion or noninclusion of one term in another as in a whole, and what we mean by predicating one term of all, or none, of another." [Quoted from here.]

 

[By "demonstration" Aristotle meant "proof". (On that, see Lear (1980), p.1.)]

 

Not much there about logic being the study of what "makes sense". A bad start, for sure, but things only get worse:

 

"The basic principles of this Aristotelian or formal logic were the 'law of identity' and the 'law of non-contradiction'. The 'law of identity' stated, in symbolic terms, that A is equal to A, or an ounce of gold equals an ounce of gold, or, taking a unique object..., Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa is equal to Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa. The 'law of non-contradiction' stated that A cannot be equal to non-A, it makes no sense to say that an ounce of gold is not an ounce of gold or the Mona Lisa is not the Mona Lisa. On the basis of these apparently 'obvious' propositions a system of logic or sound reasoning was erected, exemplified by the syllogism." [Molyneux (2012), p.43. Quotation marks altered to conform the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original.] 

 

Once again, just like the other DM-fans exposed in this subsection, Molyneux neither quotes nor cites even so much as one sentence from Aristotle (or any other logic text) in support of these hackneyed accusations. As we have seen, the LOI was a Medieval invention, and the LOC doesn't concern what does or does not equal what. [See also below.]

 

As we also discovered earlier, Molyneux added this not unreasonable comment:

 

"Marxist materialism is repeatedly attacked by the method of oversimplifying and caricaturing it to the point where it is obviously false...." [Molyneux (2012), p.36.]

 

And yet this is precisely what he and other DM-fans regularly do when they attempt to summarise, discuss or criticise FL.

 

[I will add a few more comments about Molyneux's misguided book in a subsequent re-write of this Essay.]

 

[8] Robin Hirsch

 

Here is Robin Hirsch, who seems to know a little more logic than the vast majority of DM-fans:

 

"The Aristotelian syllogism was the first great system of formalising the laws of rational thought. At its heart there were three principles.

 

"The law of identity. For any object, x, we have x is x.
 

"The law of non-contradiction. Nothing is allowed to have the predicate P and simultaneously the predicate not-P.
 

"The law of excluded middle. Everything has either the predicate P or the predicate not-P.

 

"Here a predicate is any property that may or may not apply to an individual, e.g. 'mortality' is a predicate that applies to an individual, say Socrates." [Hirsch (2004).]

 

First of all, Hirsch confuses predicates (which are linguistic expressions) with what they supposedly express -- properties -- conflating talk about talk, (i.e., language about language) with talk about the world (a perennial error both in DM-, and Hegelian-circles, as we have seen). Moreover, predicates don't just express properties. Secondly, Hirsh's 'definition' of identity is in danger of confusing the "is" of predication with the "is" of identity. Third, his 'definition' of the LOC confuses what we are consistently able to say about something with what it is "allowed" to possess, conflating what we may assert with the possibilities on offer in the world. Are objects "allowed" -- or, rather, not "allowed" -- to possess certain properties? Who is doing all this 'not-allowing'? And how is all this "not-allowing" to be policed? By 'God'? By what we can say?

 

Fourth, what Hirsch says also falls foul of a point made earlier about Aristotle (slightly re-edited):

 

Aristotle allows contrary predicates to belong to a subject providing they attach to it "in particular relations":

 

"...since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also can't belong at the same time to the same thing.... If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in particular relation and one without qualification." [Aristotle (1984e) Book 4, 6, 1011b:15-23, p.1597. Again, the on-line translation renders this passage slightly differently.]

 

Here Aristotle acknowledges that contrary predicates can belong to a subject providing they attach to it "in particular relations"; presumably this means they could belong to parts of that subject separately (when, say, a metal poker is cold at one end, hot at another, or when a man is half wet, half dry, for instance), but not 'essentially'. Nevertheless, it is clear from this, as it is from Aristotle's other writings, that he continually switches back and forth without warning between talk about talk and talk about things. In so doing, he generates no little confusion himself, which is, of course, one of the reasons that over the last 150 years, modern logicians have had to re-think the entire subject from the ground floor up. But, even though Aristotle was himself a little confused in places, he was a model of clarity compared to Hegel and his dialectical groupies. [Quoted from here.]

 

It looks, therefore, like Hirsch has yet to draw the sort of distinctions that were plain even to Aristotle.

 

Finally, Hirsch's 'definition' of the LEM confuses the properties an object might possess with what we can say about it. Objects don't possess, or "have", or fail to possess, or fail to "have", predicates. Check your own person: how many predicates "have" you in your pockets, your bank account, the potting shed at the bottom of the garden, or the boot of your car? How many predicates "have" you on or even stuck to your hand? Go on, count them. Can't do it? Now, there's a big surprise. Compare that with the question "How many fingers have you got?" Given Hirsch's qualifications, these errors are as surprising as they are puzzling.

 

[9] Camilla Royle

 

Another comrade (from the UK-SWP), Camilla Royle, does her level best to maintain the honourable tradition, manfully continued by John Rees and John Molyneux, of getting AFL completely wrong:

 

"There are two ways to think about contradiction. In Aristotle's logic, saying that two statements are contradictory means that they oppose each other completely: logically the statements 'All blackbirds are black' and 'All blackbirds are white' cannot both be true. In contrast, capital's contradictions involve opposing forces or tendencies being present in the same process. Marx's assertion that commodities simultaneously embody both a use value and an exchange value is such a contradiction...." [Royle (2015), p.217. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Royle has plainly confused an inconsistency (i.e., two propositions which can't both be true, but which can both be false) with a contradiction. It is worth recalling that (even for Aristotle -- on that, see here) two proposition are contradictories just in case they can't both be true and they can't both be false. With respect to the example Royle herself considers, "All blackbirds are black" is itself false if "Some blackbirds aren't black" is true (i.e., if there is at least one blackbird that is white, or is some other colour than black), and "All blackbirds are white" is false if "Some blackbirds aren't white" is true (i.e., if there is at least one blackbird that is black, or is some other colour than white). Hence, "All blackbirds are black" and "All blackbirds are white" are both false if there is at least one blackbird that is some colour other than black or is some colour other white. In that case, Royle's two propositions aren't contradictories.

 

It isn't now to the point to object that no one has ever seen a non-black blackbird, since Royle herself referred to the proposition "All blackbirds are white". The point is that if NN asserts that all blackbirds are black and NM asserts there is one such bird that is white, irrespective of whether NM is lying, she would have contradicted NN since they can't both be right and they can't both be wrong. That isn't the case with "All blackbirds are black" and "All blackbirds are white"; while these two sentences can't both be true, they can both be false.

 

In that case, they are contraries not contradictories.

 

[For more on this clear distinction (clear at least to logicians), see Horn (2018).]

 

Quite apart from that, Royle doesn't explain why this is the case, either:

 

"In contrast, capital's contradictions involve opposing forces or tendencies being present in the same process. Marx's assertion that commodities simultaneously embody both a use value and an exchange value is such a contradiction...." [Loc cit.]

 

There would be a contradiction here if either of these had been the example she chose:

 

R1: Commodities embody use value and they don't.

 

R2: Commodities embody exchange value and they don't.

 

Clearly, she didn't mean either. If not, what did she mean? DM-fans seem quite incapable of telling us. Royle's own examples don't even look like contradictions. [As we have seen elsewhere, the only reason DM-fans employ the word "contradiction" in such circumstances is that it is traditional to do so, and its use serves to identify the individual concerned as 'one of us' -- so they aren't branded as apostates or heretics (aka 'Revisionists!") by the DM-Thought-Police.]

 

Even waving these seemingly 'academic niggles' to one side, what Royle says doesn't make sense even in DM-terms. Does use value really struggle with exchange value and change into it (as it should if this were a 'dialectical contradiction')? Does use value change into exchange value so that a commodity winds up with no use when it is exchanged? Hardly. In that case, what is the point of all this sub-Hegelian jargon if it fails to account for such phenomena, or if it implies something that not only doesn't, but can't happen? I.e., that use value can slug it out with exchange value and then change into it!

 

 

Figure Four: Use Value Slam Dunks Exchange Value

 

Not only is this an example of garbled AFL, it is garbled DL, too!

 

[10] Ernest Mandel

 

Next, we turn to the 'definitions' advanced by mega-Trotskyist, Ernest Mandel:

 

"Dialectics, or the logic of motion, is distinct from formal or static logic. Formal logic is based on three fundamental laws:

 

"(a) The law of identity: A is equal to A; a thing is always equal to itself.

 

"(b) The law of contradiction: A is different from non-A; A can never equal non-A.

 

"(c) The law of exclusion: either A, or non-A; nothing can be neither A nor non-A.

 

"A moment's reflection will allow us to conclude that formal logic is characterised by the thought processes which consist of putting motion, change, into parenthesis. All the laws enumerated above are true, so long as we abstract from motion. A will remain A so long as it does not change. A is different from non-A so long as it is not transformed into its opposite. A and non-A exclude each other so long as there is no movement which combines A and non-A, etc. These laws are obviously insufficient if we consider the transformation of the chrysalid (sic) into the butterfly, the passage of the adolescent into the adult, the movement of life into death, the birth of a new species or a new social order, the combination of two cells into a new one, etc." [Mandel (1979), pp.160-61. Italics in the original.]

 

As things have turned out, Mandel might have been better advised to devote more than a "moment's thought" to these knotty problems.

 

Once again, we aren't told from which spoil heap these 'logical gems' had been retrieved; but notice how similar they are to the 'definitions' we have already met, many times. To be sure, a mega-Orthodox comrade like Mandel would rightly feel peeved if an opponent of Marxism simply made stuff up like this about, say, Trotsky and his ideas. Apparently, it is perfectly acceptable for 'scientific socialists' to indulge in a little fabulation of their own.

 

[Detailed criticism of Mandel's more substantive claims can be found in Essays Five and Seven Part One.]

 

[11] David Hayden-Guest

 

From several generations ago this is what we find in David Hayden-Guest's 'textbook' on DM:

 

"The 'logic' that we have been discussing is very different from what commonly passes for logic, the formal logic which deals with syllogisms and is to be found in the text books. Formal logic is necessary for dealing with the abstractions which are formed in the first stage of thinking.... The essence of its technique is to keep apart, to prevent from confounding the distinctions which have been made. It is therefore based on a development of certain very fundamental principles about identity and contradiction, principles such as the famous 'law of the excluded middle' which states that a thing must be one thing (say 'A') or not that thing (say 'not A'). It can't be both 'A' and 'not A' at the same time.

 

"This logic, which may be termed the 'logic of common sense,' is perfectly justified and indeed essential within certain limits -- the same limits within which the abstractions it deals with are valid. But just because it is based on taking these abstractions, for the time being, as absolute, and because it necessarily overlooks their inter-connections, and the development of one quality or thing into another, formal logic is unable to grasp the inner process of change, to show its dialectical character. For this we require dialectical logic...." [Guest (1939), pp.71-72. Italics in the original.]

 

[I hesitate to criticise David Guest since he gave his life in Spain fighting fascism. Guest (1939) was put together from notes found after he died.]

 

Once again, we encounter yet more repetition, compounded by precious little -- or, rather, absolutely no -- substantiation. Notice, too, the odd idea that the LEM is once more about things, and not the logical, truth-functional connection between a proposition and its negation.

 

[12] August Thalheimer

 

We now read this from comrade Thalheimer, whose aim was clearly to show that whatever Trotskyists (like Mandel or Novack) could misconstrue he could garble even better:

 

"The science of the laws of thought, formal logic, reached its highest point with Aristotle.... The laws of logic are based on two main propositions. The first is that of identity or of self-conformity. The proposition very simply states: 'A is A,' that is every concept is equal to itself. A man is a man, a hen is a hen, a potato is a potato. This proposition forms one basis of logic. The second main proposition is the law of contradiction, or as it is also called, the law of excluded middle. This proposition states: 'A is either A or not A.' It can't be both at the same time. For example: Whatever is black is black; it can't at the same time be black and white. A thing -- to put it in general terms -- can't at the same time be itself and its opposite....

 

"Let us now examine the second basic law of thought, the law of contradiction. According to this law a thing cannot at the same time be itself and its opposite. A figure is either round or angular; a line is either straight or curved." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.88-93. Italics in the original. Paragraphs merged.]

 

To his credit, Thalheimer managed to get by with just two misrepresentations of AFL (but only by asserting two of them were the same, thereby torpedoing his criticisms if the LOI -- pp.89-92), all the while confusing a fictional version of the LOC with an illusory version of the LEM. [I have already criticised this sloppy DM-use of letter these As, and will return to do so again, below.]

 

But, we might ask: what has the LOI got to do with the equality of "concepts"? Isn't it about the alleged relation between an object and itself (like a hen and itself)? Furthermore, hasn't Thalheimer, like Trotsky, conflated equality and identity?

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

 

[13] John Somerville

 

Here is how John Somerville summed things up (and he should have known better!):

 

"The Aristotelian conception of the laws basic to correct thinking may be stated as follows:

 

"1. Law of Identity: Each existence is identical with itself. A is A.

 

"2. Law of Noncontradiction: Each existence is not different from itself. A is not non-A.

 

"3. Law of Excluded Middle: No existence can be both itself and different from itself. Any X is either A or non-A, but not both at once." [Somerville (1967), pp.44-45. Italics in the original.]

 

To be fair to Somerville, he did try to qualify the second of the three above points (in a footnote, on p.205), where he made some attempt to come to grips with the real Aristotle not the ersatz Aristotle of DM-lore (but, even then, his 'in depth' analysis was compressed into about a hundred words). However, the fact that it was tucked away right at the end of his book, when in the body of it he confuses "what is said" (which is how Aristotle expressed himself) with "each existence" (Somerville's odd rendition), tells us all we need to know about his concern for accuracy. Also worthy of note is Somerville's sloppy use of letters; one minute the letter, "A", appears to stand for an object of some sort (an "existence"), the next for what can be predicated of an object (that it is A or not-A). Just like all too many other DM-fans, his slovenly approach to syntax means his criticisms aren't worth the paper they were written on.

 

The above ideas appear in a slightly different form in an earlier work of his:

 

"The Law of Identity is usually expressed in the form, A is A. That is, each thing is identical with itself. The Law of Non-Contradiction states that A is not Non-A. That is, each thing is not different from itself. The Law of Excluded Middle states that X is either A or Non-A. That is, any third alternative or middle ground in addition to A and Non-A is excluded. The same thing cannot be both A (or itself) and Non-A (or different from itself) at the same time.... What they all say is that A is A and cannot be non-A at the same time." [Somerville (1946), p.183. Paragraphs merged.]  

 

We need only note here that Somerville simply copied Hegel's amateurish attempt to equate the LOI 'stated negatively' with the LOC, subjecting the latter's 'derivation' to no scrutiny at all. This shows that HCDs, just like LCDs, are logical incompetents and suffer from a serious case of self-inflicted ignorance concerning logic. That, of course, accounts for their fondness for Hegel, an Olympic Grade Competitor in the 'How To Screw-Up Logic' event. Again, one minute these As stand for objects or the names thereof (as in "A is A. That is, each thing is identical with itself") the next for what can predicated of some object (as in "X is either A or Non-A"). [On this, see below, and later in this Essay.]

 

If anything, Somerville subsequent attempt to characterise the 'laws' of FL is even worse:

 

"[I]f I am asked to give a true account of how something got to be what it is I will ultimately have to face the fact that a thing called A is continuously changing in all of its parts all of the time into non-A, which means it is non-A as well as A, which takes me beyond formal categories into dialectical categories." [Somerville (1968), p.68 -- this is actually the page reference of the 1974 reprint. Somerville says more-or-less the same (no pun intended), only at greater length, in Somerville (1946), p.184-85.]

 

Is Somerville serious? If "a thing" is "called A", then "A" is a Proper Name; "Karl Marx" is a Proper Name, for example. If Somerville is to be believed, this appears to mean that at any point in his life, Karl Marx was Karl Marx and non-Karl Marx(!) -- even though we still call him "Karl Marx" long after his death. Has a single DM-fan ever called Marx "non-Karl Marx"? Readers might like to check their copies of Marx's work (or those reproduced at the Marxist Internet Archive); there they will see that not one single book, article, essay, note, or review has ever been attributed to someone called "non-Karl Marx" -- nor yet "both Karl Marx and non-Karl Marx". Not even in his lifetime were his published works attributed to "Karl Marx and non-Karl Marx". And Engels wrote no letters to "non-Karl Marx", either, nor did he deliver a eulogy at the graveside of "non-Karl Marx".

 

We note yet again, that when it comes to practicalities, in the real world, DM isn't just useless, it is off-the-wall.

 

As we have seen many times, these 'dialectical' As enjoy a mercurial life all of their own; they change their denotation from moment-to-moment, oscillating between standing for Proper Names, predicate expressions, 'existences', properties, relations, relational expressions, 'objects', and much else besides. As noted earlier, in Somerville's 'logical' universe, on one interpretation of his prose, one minute "A" is a Proper Name, supposedly standing for some object or "thing" -- as in "a thing called A is continuously changing in all of its parts all of the time into non-A....", the next it stands for an "existence".

 

Surprisingly, Somerville's account is even more ridiculous than might at first sight seem -- why that is so has been explained here and here.

 

[14] Ira Gollobin

 

Here is Ira Gollobin's impressive contribution to dialectical confusion (which appears in what is perhaps one of the best books that have so far been written about DM -- that is, one of the best of the worst):

 

"Aristotle's formal logic is based on these principles of isolation and fixity; (1) identity (all A is A; whatever is, is); (2) contradiction (nothing is both A and non-A, nothing can both be and not be); (3) excluded middle (a thing is either A or non-A; everything must either be or not be)." [Gollobin (1986), p.106, footnote.]

 

While Gollobin's book is full of quotations and references (many of which are of dubious worth -- still less, relevance), he doesn't even attempt to substantiate the by-now-familiar DM-fibs that dialecticians tell about AFL. His use of the letter "A" is no less inconsistent; one minute it stands for a Proper Name (i.e., all A is A), the next for predicate expressions (i.e., a thing is either A or non-A). [More on this below.]

 

[15] John Pickard

 

Here is another Trotskyist, John Pickard, advancing similarly inaccurate and unsubstantiated allegations about FL:

 

"Dialectics is quite simply the logic of motion, or the logic of common sense to activists in the movement. We all know that things don't stand still, they change. But there is another form of logic which stands in contradiction to dialectics, which we call 'formal logic', which again is deeply embodied in capitalist society. It is perhaps necessary to begin by describing briefly what this method implies.

 

"Formal logic is based on what is known as the 'law of identity', which says that 'A' equals 'A' -- i.e. that things are what they are, and that they stand in definite relationships to each other. There are other derivative laws based on the law of identity; for example, if 'A' equals 'A', it follows that 'A' cannot equal 'B', nor 'C'.... Whereas the formal logician will say that 'A' equals 'A', the dialectician will say that 'A' does not necessarily equal 'A'. Or to take a practical example that Trotsky uses in his writings, one pound of sugar will not be precisely equal to another pound of sugar. It is a good enough approximation if you want to buy sugar in a shop, but if you look at it more carefully you will see that it's actually wrong." [John Pickard, quoted from here. Some paragraphs merged.]

 

At the risk of repetition, readers will no doubt have noticed that Pickard also failed to substantiate anything he accused FL of doing/not doing, just as he uncritically repeated Hegel's inaccurate depiction of the LOC as the LOI stated 'negatively'.

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]

 

[16] Fred Casey

 

From eighty odd years ago we find Fred Casey further advertising the fact that DM-fans struggle to grasp the simplest of ideas in logic (not because they are intellectually incapable, but because they unwisely look to that incompetent, Hegel, for advice):

 

"Before passing on to study the newer logic, which treats of thinking in relation to a constantly-changing universe, it may be as well to give some of the general laws of this rigid logic for the purposes of comparison. First, there is the law of identity, by which we say A is A; second, the law of contradiction which says that A is not B; and third, the law of excluded third which says that A is not part of B (sic!). According to the first of these rules, a thing is what it is; according to the second, no thing is what it is not; and according to the third, no thing is part of what it is not. As examples:

 

"A square is a square, a square is not a circle, nor is a square part of a circle. A straight line is straight, it is not crooked, nor is it part crooked. A moving thing is in motion, it is not still, nor is it partly still. Land is land, land is not water, nor is it partly water. A door that is shut is shut, it is not open, nor is it partly open." [Casey (1927), p.123. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

It is difficult to take this seriously. Concerning his third 'principle' (i.e., "A is not part of B"), does anyone think, did even Casey think, that a single logician in the last two thousand years believed it to be a logical law that, say, the Earth isn't part of the Solar System, or that cats aren't part of the animal kingdom? No wonder Casey quoted not one single logic text in support of these wild fantasies. This is in fact one of the worst examples of dialectical confusion I have ever seen (but it still isn't quite as bad as the nadir reached by the egregious gobbledygook W&G inflicted on their readers). What the LEM has got to do with whether or not 'a thing' is part of another 'thing' is a complete mystery. Casey can only have made this stuff up; he certainly didn't find it in a logic textbook published anywhere on this planet. Not even Hegel was this befuddled!

 

Even so, we see yet again the confused use of the letter "A", where it can stand for whatever takes a particular DM-theorist's fancy. For example, in Casey's first example, "A" stands for "A square", but by example two it suddenly becomes a little more malleable. It first of all stands for "A straight line" and then just "straight". In his third example, it changes from "A moving thing" to "in motion". His letter "B" fares no better. In his second example, "B" stands for "crooked", and "part of B" becomes "part crooked", when it should have been "part of crooked" -- given his own fabricated version of this 'law': "the law of excluded third which says that A is not part of B").

 

So, according to Casey's own characterisation of these 'laws', his last four examples should have read as follows (had he been bothered in the least with consistency):

 

"A straight line is a straight line, it is not crooked, nor is it part of crooked."

 

"A moving thing is a moving thing, it is not still, nor is it part of still."

 

"Land is land, land is not water, nor is it part of water."

 

"A door that is shut is a door that is shut, it is not open, nor is it part of open."

 

Throughout much of the rest of his book, Casey repeatedly tells us what does or does not belong to the "Old Logic" (by which he clearly means AFL and which he thinks still dominates the discipline -- p.37) without once substantiating his serial allegations.

 

However, it is now reasonably clear that the title of Casey's book, Thinking. An Introduction To Its History And Science, should perhaps have been, 'Thinking'. An Introduction To How Dialectics Screws With Your Head.

 

[17] Sean Sayers

 

From Academic Marxism, here is HCD-theorist, Sean Sayers:

 

"In Frege-Russell logic there are valid equivalents for the traditional Aristotelian logical laws: the law of identity (A = A), the law of excluded middle (A v ~A), and the law of non-contradiction (~(A & ~A)). For this reason, the Frege-Russell system is often referred to as 'standard logic'." [Sayers (1992); quoted from here.] 

 

The sloppy approach adopted by DM-theorists when it comes to all matters logical (exposed in this Essay) surfaces yet again in Sayers's article above. In the LOI, the letter "A" stands for singular terms (e.g., Proper Names or a Definite Descriptions) -- as such, it can't appear in the LEM or the LOC, which concern the truth-functional relationship between a proposition and its negation.

 

For example, if we interpret the letter "A" in Sayers's "(~(A & ~A))" as a Proper Name variable we end up with this monstrosity: "It is not the case that (Socrates and not Socrates)", which is unvarnished nonsense. Sayers will search long and hard (and to no avail) through Frege's work, or, indeed, Russell's -- or that of any other modern logician -- for a single example of such DM-inspired gibberish.

 

[If we are intent on being excessively charitable, Sayers probably meant to write, or should have written: "...the law of excluded middle (P v ~P), and the law of non-contradiction (~(P & ~P))", where "P" is a propositional variable. I have said more about these widespread DM-confusions below.]

 

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]

 

[18] Hyman Cohen

 

We find similar muddles in the work of another HCD, Hyman R Cohen (here criticising an article written by Mark Mussachia):

 

"Engels showed as early as his writing of Dialectics of Nature that he meant nothing more than this: the opposites he had in mind were simultaneously existing tendencies, existing in the one object or process, comprising its unity as a whole. Mussachia assumes that Engels made the error of believing that A and not-A must always be of the 'direct line' kind, otherwise he (Mussachia) would not be trying so hard to prove Engels wrong. But if he wants to use the Law of Non-Contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A) to deny that dialectically opposing tendencies can exist within one thing or process, then I must remind him of his previous argument about the Law of Identity which applies to complex things, in which he argued for a broader interpretation of the concept A = A. Engels had already shown that science had undermined the narrow 'old metaphysical' concept of the Identity Law. So, why cannot a given entity, A, have dialectically opposing elements constituting it, and still be a given A?" [Cohen (1980), p.119. Italic emphases in the original; quotations marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

As usual, Cohen fails to tell us what these As stand for -- are they name, predicate-, property-, relational-, or sentential-/propositional-variables? Admittedly, he does call A an "entity", but that is far too vague a term to do anything with.

 

Once again, in the LOI, A is a singular term (standing for Proper Names or Definite Descriptions), but it can't function that way in the LOC. In the latter, A is a propositional, sentential or predicate expression, but it can't be any of these in the LOI. [Why this is so was covered in detail in Essay Eight Part Three, but see also, below.]

 

Even so, as noted, in the final sentence, A now morphs into an entity! It is no longer a variable standing for an entity, nor yet its name, but the entity itself! It might be news to DM-fans, but entities feature neither in the LOI nor the LOC, only letters, variables, or in their more vernacular incarnations, linguistic expressions (singular terms in the former 'law', propositional expressions in the latter).

 

Perhaps worse still, we are told that A = A is a "concept", as opposed to a law -- and later that there is such a thing as the "concept of the Identity Law", which must mean that we have here the concept of a concept!

 

A few pages earlier A was a proposition (but note, not a propositional variable), and even a condition:

 

"[For Marxists] a contradiction [has the following nature]: the proposition A contradicts the proposition or condition not-A...." [Ibid., p.107.]

 

We aren't told how a condition can be contradicted by a proposition (do these two 'struggle' with, and then turn into, one another, as we have been told they must by the DM-classics), or why using the word "contradiction" is at all apt in relation to such conditions. We can only conclude from this that, for Cohen, the operator, "not-" (that is, if this is what that inscription is!) is capable of turning A into a condition! Since we have just been told that not-A is now a condition.

 

DM, vague and confused?

 

Whatever was I thinking!

 

[19] Herbert Marcuse

 

Here is yet another HCD -- no less a figure than Herbert Marcuse -- of course, following Hegel, again arguing that the LOC is the LOI 'stated negatively':

 

"Contradiction, or the concrete form of it we are discussing, the opposition, does not displace the actual identity of the thing, but produces this identity in the form of a process in which the potentialities of things unfold. The law of identity by which traditional logic is guided implies the so-called law of contradiction. A equals A only in so far as it is opposed to non-A, or, the identity of A results from and contains the contradiction. A does not contradict an external non-A, Hegel holds, but a non-A that belongs to the very identity of A; in other words, A is self-contradictory." [Marcuse (1973), p.124.]

 

[It could be argued that Marcuse is simply summarising Hegel, here -- maybe so, but he nowhere takes Hegel to task for these logical confusions -- once more, concerning the latter, see below.]

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction.]

 

[20] Henri Lefebvre

 

Not wanting to be left out of all this dialectical merriment, here is the doyen of French DM-fans (and many others besides), Henri Lefebvre:

 

"Formal Logic asserts: 'A is A'. Dialectical Logic is not saying 'A is not-A'…. It says: A is indeed A, but A is also not-A precisely so far as the proposition 'A is A' is not a tautology but has real content. A tree is a tree only by being such and such a tree, by bearing leaves, blossom and fruit, by passing through and preserving within itself those moments of its becoming...." [Lefebvre (1968), p.41.]

 

We will see below the utter confusion that results from saying things like this "A is indeed A, but A is also not-A".

 

[21] Erwin Marquit

 

Another, and much more sophisticated dialectician (who is probably also a card-carrying member of the HCD fraternity, and who should know better), is Erwin Marquit, who presents his readers with the following 'definition':

 

"The method of dealing with contradictions in two-valued logic conforms with the laws of classical logic: a thing can't be contrary to itself (law of noncontradiction) and a thing can't be both itself and contrary to itself at the same time in the same respect (law of excluded middle)." [Marquit (1982), p.76. (This article appeared earlier in Science & Society, which only goes to show that if that redoubtable journal employs a peer review system, it looks like it will pass for publication any old logical rubbish!)]

 

Marquit not only confuses contraries with contradictories, he commits many of the errors that have already been highlighted.

 

[22] DL Collapses Into Nonsense

 

As a result, it now turns out that it is impossible to decide -- or even say! -- what it is that DL actually commits its adherents to:

 

"The principles of difference: 'All things are different....' 'A is also not A....' And then -- Hegel says wittily -- it is said that there is no third. There is a third in this thesis itself. A itself is the third, for A can be both +A and -A. 'The Something thus is itself the third term which was supposed to be excluded.'" [Lenin (1961), pp.135-38. Italic emphases in the original; bold added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

"And it is just as impossible have one side of a contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891), p.496.]

 

"Let us now consider the matter from the standpoint of a higher doctrine of thought, from the standpoint of dialectics. Let us take the first law which we have developed as the foundation of logic: A is A. A thing is always the same thing. Without testing this law, let us consider another one which we have already mentioned, the law of Heraclitus which says 'Everything is in flux,' or 'One cannot ascend the same river twice.' Can we say that the river is always the same? No, the law of Heraclitus says the opposite. The river is at no moment the same. It is always changing. Thus one cannot twice nor, more exactly, even once ascend the same river. In short: the law 'A is A' in the last analysis is valid only if I assume that the thing does not change. As soon as I consider the thing in its change, then A is always A and something else; A is at the same time not-A. And this in the last analysis holds for all things and events." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.88-89. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"[I]f I am asked to give a true account of how something got to be what it is I will ultimately have to face the fact that a thing called A is continuously changing in all of its parts all of the time into non-A, which means it is non-A as well as A, which takes me beyond formal categories into dialectical categories." [Somerville (1968), p.68. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Formal Logic asserts: 'A is A'. Dialectical Logic is not saying 'A is not-A'…. It says: A is indeed A, but A is also not-A precisely so far as the proposition 'A is A' is not a tautology but has real content." [Lefebvre (1968), p.41. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"This law of identity of opposites, which so perplexes and horrifies addicts of formal logic, can be easily understood, not only when it is applied to actual processes of development and interrelations of events, but also when it is contrasted with the formal law of identity. It is logically true that A equals A, that John is John…. But it is far more profoundly true that A is also non-A. John is not simply John: John is a man. This correct proposition is not an affirmation of abstract identity, but an identification of opposites. The logical category or material class, mankind, with which John is one and the same is far more and other than John, the individual. Mankind is at the same time identical with, yet different from John." [Novack (1971a), p.92. Bold emphasis added.]

 

However, assuming for the purpose of argument that the collective DM-'analysis' of the LOC is correct, and it were true that "A is A and at the same time non-A", it turns out that it would be impossible for dialecticians even to begin to express their criticisms of their own garbled version of AFL. That is because it would be impossible to state the following:

 

B1: A is A and at the same time non-A.

 

If it were indeed true that "A is A and not A/non-A" or "A" is at the same time "non-A", then the first half of B1 would have to be re-written as:

 

B2: Non-A is non-A.

 

As each A is replaced by non-A -- since we have been assured that A is at the same time, non-A.

 

Or, more pointedly, the whole of B1 would become:

 

B3: Non-A is non-A and at the same time non-(non-A).

 

That is once more: if each A in B1 were replaced with what it is supposed at the same time to be (i.e., non-A), following the advice of DM-'logicians'. Plainly, B1 would 'dialectically disintegrate' into B3 -- or, perhaps even worse, into the following:

 

B3a: A and non-A is A and non-A and at the same time non-(A and non-A).

 

[In B3a, I have replaced each occurrence of A in B1 with A and non-A, since we have been told that each A is at the same time A and non-A.]

 

Depending on how radically we interpret the 'dialectical' re-write of the LOC.

 

The above disastrous outcome can only be rejected successfully by those who repudiate the DM-inspired version of the LOC (i.e., those who reject the dictum "A is at the same time non-A"), and thus who don't think that the first half of B1 is false, or maybe who don't think it is both false and true -- or even that, "It depends...".

 

B1: A is A and at the same time non-A.

 

Even worse still, if every A is at the same time non-A, then these two would surely follow from B3:

 

B4: Non-(non-A) is non-(non-A) and at the same time non-(non-(non-A)).

 

B5: Non-(non-(non-A)) is non-(non-(non-A)) and at the same time non-(non-(non-(non-A))).

 

[B3: Non-A is non-A and at the same time non-(non-A).]

 

And so on, as each successive A in B3, and then B4, is replaced with a non-A that dialecticians insist they at the same time are. Once more, this untoward result may only be forestalled by those who reject the DM-criticism of the LOC.

 

Or, even worse still:

 

B4a: A and non-A and non-(A and non-A) is A and non-A and non-(A and non-A) and at the same time non-(A and non-A and non-(A and non-A)).

 

[B3a: A and non-A is A and non-A and at the same time non-(A and non-A).]

 

And so on, replacing each A in B3a with A and non-A, once more.

 

[Incidentally, it won't do to claim that all these "non-"s cancel out (an odd notion in itself; on that see here), since if they were to do that we would have to reject the idea that each A was at the same time non-A. Thus, if each A were at the same time non-A, then, when we formed non-(non-A) from a non-A, in the above manner, and if this could be 'cancelled' back to A, the A in non-A would no longer be non-A, since those two "non-"s would, ex hypothesi, have cancelled, wiping out that non-A!]

 

As should now be apparent, the LOC has an annoying way of retaliating in a most un-dialectical manner when challenged. In which case, as noted above: it is impossible for dialecticians actually to say what they mean!

 

The same problems afflict other DM-inspired criticisms of 'laws' dialecticians claim to have found in textbooks of FL all the while unwisely keeping the evidence to themselves that supports those contentions -- which, of course, suggests that either there isn't any such evidence, or they opened not one textbook of FL before they decided they could pontificate about it.

 

In addition, as noted above, DM-theorists are all invariably unclear what the As in their versions of FL-'laws' are supposed to stand for. Based on the passages we have already seen, and on other quotations posted elsewhere at this site, it is plain that DM-theorists regularly confuse A with one or more of the following: propositions, propositional signs (i.e., indicative sentences), judgements, properties, qualities, words, objects, processes, predicates, predicate expressions, statements, terms, assertions, type-sentences, token-sentences, concepts, ideas, beliefs, thoughts, phrases, clauses, relations, relational expression, indexicals, places, times, names, 'entities' --, and, in the case of John Somerville, "existences" (i.e., perhaps everything in the universe!).

 

The significance of logical disorder of this order of magnitude lies not so much in the unmitigated confusion it creates, but in the fact that the vast majority of the DM-faithful haven't even noticed it!

 

And that includes HCDs!

 

Indeed, even when this unmitigated confusion is brought to their attention, they almost invariably complain about "pedantry, or reject such criticism as "semantics"!

 

Just as the Dunning-Kruger Effect predicts.

 

As has already been pointed out: 2400 years ago Aristotle was far clearer than all these 'dialectical logicians' put together -- and that was despite his own confusions.

 

But, are we really supposed to believe that this sub-Aristotelian, syntactic and semantic DM-rat's nest encapsulates ideas that lie at the very cutting edge of modern science and philosophy?

 

Now, anyone tempted to respond to the above on the lines that it gets the DM-view of contradictions (etc.) wrong, and that dialectical contradictions are really X, or they are in effect Y, or they are…whatever (readers can insert their own favourite DM-definition here -- label it, Z), need only reflect on the fact that according to the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC, that criticism itself must be X or Y, or even Z, while being at the same time not X or not Y, or not Z -- if we here interpret the As above as legitimate surrogates for X, Y, or Z -- since, if we abide by sound dialectical-principles, these letters can be interpreted in any which way we fancy.

 

Let's see those who peremptorily accuse careful logicians of "pedantry" and "semantics" try to squirm their way out of that one!

 

[In Essay Eight Part Three, we shall see that serious difficulties like this afflict, and thus neutralise, the best account there is (or, at least, the best account I have ever read) of the nature of 'dialectical contradictions', written by a fellow Marxist.]

 

In that case, the radically imprecise and thoroughly confused nature of the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC (which sees everything as X or Y, or even Z, and not X or not Y, or even not Z -- where each X or Y, or even Z is simply left undefined, so it can be anything dialecticians please) must itself be both a criticism and not a criticism of the LOC. That must itself be so unless, of course, criticisms are themselves exempt from their own criticism, and can't ever aspire to become one of these wishy-washy dialectical letter As.

 

Alas, this means that dialecticians' own criticism of the LOC must now self-destruct. For example, any attempt made by DM-fans to define the LOC must be a definition and not a definition -- if their own 'analysis' of the LOC and the LOI is invoked against any such attempt.

 

Hence, using "D" to stand for "the DM-'definition' of the LOC" (whatever that 'definition' turns out to be, and whatever it means, if we are ever told), it must be the case that D is at the same time non-D. Clearly, that would mean that the DM-inspired criticism of the LOC undermines its own definition of it!

 

It is at this point that even DL-fans might just begin to see how devilish Diabolical Logic really is.

 

[BAD = Buddhist Dialectics/Dialectician; MAD = Materialist Dialectics/Dialectician, both depending on context.]

 

However, long experience 'debating' with DM-fans, who think Hegel is the best thing since sliced Aristotle, suggests that it is unwise to underestimate their capacity to ignore anything they don't like or can't 'compute'. 'Debating' with those whose brains have been compromised by this Hermetic virus is like 'debating' with Buddhists -- except the latter are at least respectful and don't press the 'abuse torrent button' at the first opportunity. Nevertheless, in relation to both sets of mystics (the MAD and the BAD), whatever is thrown at them in argument simply doubles back and serves only to strengthen their case, since both glory in contradiction. The fact that the BAD-ies can tell us absolutely nothing about 'Nirvana' phases them not one iota (since it is 'Nothing'!), just as it scarcely registers with the MAD-ies that they can't tell anyone, least of all one another, what their "Totality" actually is.

 

And, it is little use pointing out to MAD-ies -- or BAD-ies -- that their belief in universal contradiction is self-contradictory, for to do so would be to feed this monster, lending it strength.

 

[This is especially true of MAD-ies who frequent Internet discussion boards -- a recent, extreme example of which can be found here; check out the abusive ramblings of one "Wangwei".]

 

Now, it could be objected once more that DM-theorists don't object to the use of the LOC, the LOI or the LEM in their proper area of application. As noted above, these FL-principles allegedly fall short when they face processes in the real world involving movement, change and development. This hackneyed DM-response will be tested to destruction in Essays Five, Six and Eight Parts One, Two and Three (where consideration will be given to Engels's 'analysis' of motion, Hegel and Trotsky's attempts to criticise the LOI -- including the peculiar idea that change is the result of 'internal contradictions').

 

In the meantime, it is worth reminding ourselves once again that these DM-inspired criticisms of FL are themselves material objects in their own right (i.e., they have to be written down or typed in ink, appear on a screen as pixels somewhere, or be propagated through the air as sound waves at some point, just as they would also have to be apprehended by very material human beings), and as such they are surely subject to change (that is, if everything is subject to change, as DM-fans assure us is the case). That being so, DM-inspired criticisms of FL "are never equal to themselves", too; hence, those criticisms must apply to each and every material copy of the 'dialectical' criticisms of FL. Indeed, if "A is A and at the same time non-A" is correct -- which means that letters (or whatever they refer to) are also "never equal to themselves" -- then sentences in books and articles on DM stand no chance; they are similarly composed of letters, and so must change! Unless, of course, sentences in books and articles on DM are the only things in the entire universe that don't change.

 

Hence, if DM-theorists are to be believed, no materially-expressed DM-criticism of the LOC is "equal to itself", each and every example of a DM-criticism of the LOC is at the same moment both "a criticism and not a criticism".

 

The rest follows as before...

 

The counter-argument to this (that dialecticians only need to appeal to the 'relative stability' of material objects and processes to make their point) has been neutralised in Essay Six. The other counter-argument -- i.e., that this ignores Hegel's use of identity to derive the alleged fact that everything is related to, or 'reflects', its 'own other', but not merely in connection with everything that it is 'not' --, has also been defused in Essays Seven Part Three and Eight Part Three.

 

[23] James Lawler

 

However, in an attempt perhaps to neutralise objections like those posted above, James Lawler argued as follows:

 

"Looking one step further into this matter, Hegel suggests that the relation of A to not-A is doubly negative. Identity is established (not immediately given) through a negative relation to not-A. A is itself in not being not-A. But this negative relation to not-A is itself negated. That is, the identity of A does not consist solely in its being not-A, there is a 'return' to A again -- which Hegel calls 'reflection.' Thus 'A is A' is not a tautologous (sic) repetition of A (as 'abstract understanding' would have it) but an affirmation that has been made possible only through a doubly negative movement, a 'negation of the negation.'" [Lawler (1982), p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

"It is necessary to ask, first of all, whether and in what sense the fact that A necessarily relates to what is not-A permits us to insert not-A in A. Hegel is quite explicit that this relation is not to be understood in such a way that the results would be the blurring of all identities in a single monistic being -- as he accuses Spinoza of doing: 'Substance, as the universal negative power, is as it were a dark shapeless abyss which engulfs all definite content as radically null, and produces from itself nothing that has a positive substance of its own.'" [Ibid., p.32, quoting Hegel (1975), §151, p.215, in the edition I have used, which seems to be different from Lawler's. Italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Quite how the quoted and incomprehensible passage from Hegel helps clear this up I will leave to those who are fluent Martian speakers to decide, but Lawler continues:

 

"If we grant that A's identity involves its necessary relation to what is not-A, and that this not-A is 'its own other' -- a definite other being and not any being whatsoever -- and that this relation to some definite other is necessary for the existence of A or is essential to the constitution of A (A's identity), it seems reasonable to look for some 'imprint' of this 'other' in A, so that in some sense not-A is internally constitutive of A.... In other words, to understand the internal nature of A it is necessary to study the determinate not-A not only as a necessary external condition but as 'reflected' in A. This is not to say that one should expect to find in A some direct and immediate duplication of not-A. The direct identity of A and not-A would constitute the annihilation of the beings involved." [Ibid., pp.32-33. Italic emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

We have already had occasion to note that dialecticians are hopelessly confused about the meaning of the sub-logical symbols they use, and Lawler is up there among the best in this regard, confusing these As one minute with propositions and sentences, the next with properties, predicates, 'beings', indexicals, relations and nominalised relational expressions, among many other things.

 

[24] Interlude 2 -- 'Dialectical Logic' Explodes

 

Exactly how Lawler's comments above are capable of preventing the logical explosion we witnessed earlier -- which follows from Hegel's brilliant insight that "A is identical with, but at the same time different from not-A" (I paraphrase!) -- is somewhat unclear. Even if it were correct that "A = not-A, but at the same time A ≠ not-A" (which is a slightly shorter version of "A is identical with, but at the same time different from not-A"), we would still obtain the following DM-bowl-of-spaghetti from B1 (modified):

 

B1: A is A and at the same time non-A.

 

B1b: A = A and at the same time not-A.

 

If we begin with the more 'orthodox' version suggested by Lawler, encapsulated by B1c, the situation is even worse:

 

B1c: A = A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A.

 

[Here, I am taking "A is A and at the same time A is not-A, and A is also not-not-A" to have the same 'dialectical' content as "A = A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A".]

 

If we take this part of the formula of 'genius' -- i.e., A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A, which we are assured it is 'dialectically' equal to A -- and substitute it for each A in B1c (but parsed by means of brackets to make it slightly 'easier' on the eye), we obtain the following monstrosity:

 

B6: (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A).

 

If we now do the same with B6, we end up with this bowl of 'dialectical' spaghetti:

 

B7: ((A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A)) = ((A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A)) and ((A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A)) = not-((A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A)) and ((A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A)) ≠ not-((A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) = not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) and (A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A) ≠ not-(A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A)).

 

[In the above, each A has been replaced successively by what Lawler assures it is identical with --, i.e., A and A = not-A and A ≠ not-A.]

 

 

 

Figure Five: Logic Before It Has Been

Given The DM-Makeover

 

 

Figure Six: Logic After A DM-Makeover

 

Alas, my computer might not have enough memory to complete B8!

 

[That pleasant task is left to readers who have more time on their hands than is perhaps good for them. And, good luck with B999!]

 

Of course, if we throw the full weight of DL at these sentences, the entire theory would inflate onto complete confusion even more rapidly, for if A is never equal to A, but is always equal to not-A, then no symbol can emerge unscathed. In which case, each and every word that DM-fans use to criticise FL must be subject to these crazy strictures. Consider B1, again:

 

B1: A is A and at the same time non-A.

 

The above soon 'dialectically' explodes into the following (if we replace each and every word with 'not-'/'non-that word' -- i.e., substituting "is is is and at the same time non-is" for "is"; "non is non and at the same time non-non" for "non; "the is the and at the same time non-the" for "the"; and so on -- leaving "B1", ":" and the final full-stop to fend for themselves --, yielding:

 

B1c: (A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(A is A and at the same time non-A)(and is and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A).

 

[I have added brackets again to make B1c slightly 'easier' on the eye. Each word and symbol in B1 has been replaced by what DM-fans assure they are the same as, as per the rule summarised in the last but one paragraph.]

 

And then have this complete dialectical disaster-area -- if the above replacements are substituted into B1c (divided into eight sub-sections for 'ease of reference', which will later be combined to yield B1d):

 

[1] (A is A and at the same time non-A) becomes [(A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(A is A and at the same time non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)]

 

[2] (is is is and at the same time non-is) becomes [(is is is and at the same time non-is)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-is is non-is and at the same time non-non-is)]

 

[3] (and is and and at the same time non-and) becomes [(and is and and at the same time non-and)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-and is non-and and at the same time non-non-and)]

 

[4] (at is at and at the same time non-at) becomes [(at is at and at the same time non-at)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-at is non-at and at the same time non-non-at)]

 

[5] (the is the and at the same time non-the) becomes [(the is the and at the same time non-the)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-the is non-the and at the same time non-non-the)]

 

[6] (same is same and at the same time non-same) becomes [(same is same and at the same time non-same)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-same is non-same and at the same time non-non-same)]

 

[7] (time is time and at the same time non-time) becomes [(time is time and at the same time non-time)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-time is non-time and at the same time non-non-time)]

 

[8] (non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A) becomes [(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-non-A is non-non-A and at the same time non-non-non-A)]

 

Yielding the following monstrosity (with square brackets inserted to make it slightly 'easier of the eye', if that were possible):

 

B1d: [(A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(A is A and at the same time non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)][(is is is and at the same time non-is)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-is is non-is and at the same time non-non-is)][(A is A and at the same time non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(A is A and at the same time non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)][(and is and and at the same time non-and)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-and is non-and and at the same time non-non-and)][(at is at and at the same time non-at)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-at is non-at and at the same time non-non-at)][(the is the and at the same time non-the)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-the is non-the and at the same time non-non-the)][(same is same and at the same time non-same)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-same is non-same and at the same time non-non-same)][(time is time and at the same time non-time)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-time is non-time and at the same time non-non-time)][(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)(is is is and at the same time non-is)(non-A is non-A and at the same time non-non-A)(and is and and at the same time non-and)(at is at and at the same time non-at)(the is the and at the same time non-the)(same is same and at the same time non-same)(time is time and at the same time non-time)(non-non-A is non-non-A and at the same time non-non-non-A)].

 

[Again, leaving "B1c", ":" and the final full-stop to fend for themselves.]

 

And so on...

 

The same fate must befall every word that DM-fans themselves use -- since, as we have noted, words are just as material as any letter A that either they or Hegel have ever contemplated. In which case, if we apply their own 'logic' to what they attempt to tell us, dialecticians will end up with unmitigated gibberish in place of sentences that might have seemed to make some sort of crazy sense before they had been 'dialectically-processed', leaving them in the unenviable position of not being able to communicate anything at all -- even to one another!

 

This is just an elaboration of a point Aristotle made 2400 years ago! If we hold a proposition and its contradictory true at the same time, rationality would soon fall apart. B7 and B1d above illustrate this prediction rather nicely.

 

And, it is no good complaining that this is unfair or ridiculous; dialecticians' sloppy use of ill-defined letter "A"s invites such parody.

 

So, Lawler's 'solution' would in fact represent a major step backward, even when compared with the implications of the crass 'definitions' concocted by lesser LCD souls.

 

[Lawler's attempt to derive, à la Hegel, a not-A from an A was demolished in Essay Eight Part Three. It is worth adding that in the midst of all of this DM-confusion, the distinction between not A (predicate negation) and not-A/non-A (predicate-term negation), has been ignored since Lawler and other DM-fans seem to be blithely unaware of it, even though Aristotle himself wasn't. More on that, here.]

 

[25] Woods And Grant 2

 

On a more general note, W&G advance several additional allegations about FL that reveal just how little they know about a subject they nevertheless seem happy to misrepresent and denigrate:

 

"It is an astonishing fact that the basic laws of formal logic worked out by Aristotle have remained fundamentally unchanged for over two thousand years." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.89. This appears on p.93 of the 2nd edition.]

 

This is so patently false that these two comrades have had to distort and ignore the significance of the major advances that have been made in logic since the 1850s to make their superficial criticisms even seem to 'work':

 

"In the 19th century, there were a number of attempts to bring logic up to date (George Boyle (sic), Ernst Schröder, Gotlob (sic) Frege, Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead). But, apart from the introduction of symbols, and a certain tidying up, there is no real change here. Great claims are made, for example by the linguistic philosophers, but there are not many grounds for them...." [Ibid., p.97. This appears on p.101 of the 2nd edition.]

 

We have already had occasion to take note of the many errors this passage contains -- for example, W&G confuse George Boole with a fictional character, George Boyle, and they also mis-spell Gottlob Frege's name. Admittedly, these are relatively minor issues but they highlight just how careless these two jokers are when it comes to FL. Add to that the following 'minor' detail: Russell and Whitehead's work in logic dates from the 20th century, not the 19th. Moreover, the fact that these two comrades can see no difference between the old logic of subject and predicate, and the newer logic of function and argument, quantifiers and predicates of different levels, of relations and sets, tensed and modal functors, etc., only serves to highlight further their self-imposed ignorance. And as we have seen, Aristotle also used symbols!

 

However, Traditional (Aristotelian) logic not only ignored complex inferences inexpressible in syllogisms -- and, it is worth reminding ourselves, The Syllogism is a remarkably inept, limited, and inefficient way of arguing; who on earth talks this way in everyday life? Which contemporary scientist or mathematician has ever used or ever uses a single syllogism? -- it failed to deal with relational expressions, quantifiers expressing multiple generality (the latter are used in mathematics all the time -- for example, "If every number has a successor, then there is no prime larger than every number"), internal and external negation, coupled with scope ambiguity. [This links to a PDF.] In relation to the latter distinction, consider the difference between the following:

 

F1: Not every event has a cause.

 

F2: Every event has no cause.

 

Clearly, F1 would be true if there was at least one event that had no cause, while F2 would be true if no event had a cause.

 

F3: Some dialecticians don't know the difference between external and internal negation.

 

F4: It isn't the case that some dialecticians know the difference between internal and external negation.

 

F4a: No dialectician knows the difference between internal and external negation.

 

F3 allows for the possibility that some dialecticians do know about this difference, while F4 and its equivalent, F4a, rule that out. Ordinary language allows for this distinction; MFL not only accommodates this readily and easily, it can also explain its truth-conditions (this is a much more straightforward explanation of that technical term).

 

[AFL = Aristotelian FL; MFL = Modern FL; FL = Formal Logic.]

 

While AFL certainly acknowledged the above distinctions, it was nevertheless seriously hampered as a result of the way that quantifier expressions had been interpreted because of a slavish adherence to Term Logic and the traditional grammar of subject and predicate, which not only crippled logic it held up its advance for well over two thousand years.

 

[On the origin of some of these confusions, see Barnes (2009). The impact of the new logic and why it assumed a crucially important role in the advancement of mathematics are detailed in Giaquinto (2004) and Grattan-Guinness (1970, 1997, 2000a, 2000b). See also Kitcher (1984), pp.227-71. On Frege's central importance in these developments, see Dummett (1981a), pp.665-84 and Gillies (1992a). On the general background, see Beaney (1996). Concerning the superiority of MFL over AFL, see Dummett (1981a), pp.8-33, Noonan (2001), pp.25-28, 39-43, as well as here. The power and novelty of Fregean Logic is brought out with admirable clarity by Geach (1961). See also, Zalta (2022).]

 

Wittgenstein himself underlined some of the confusions and limitations of the old logic in Wittgenstein (1913). Indeed, what Wittgenstein had to say about the work of one particular and traditional logic textbook (i.e., Coffey (1938a, 1938b)) might well have been aimed at our DM-brethren, with equal justification:

 

"In no branch of learning can an author disregard the results of honest research with so much impunity as he can in Philosophy and Logic. To this circumstance we owe the publication of such a book as Mr Coffey's Science of Logic: and only as a typical example of the work of many logicians of today does this book deserve consideration. The author's Logic is that of the scholastic philosophers, and he makes all their mistakes -- of course with the usual references to Aristotle. (Aristotle, whose name is taken so much in vain by our logicians, would turn in his grave if he knew that so many Logicians know no more about Logic today than he did 2,000 years ago). The author has not taken the slightest notice of the great work of the modern mathematical logicians -- work which has brought about an advance in Logic comparable only to that which made Astronomy out of Astrology, and Chemistry out of Alchemy.... The worst of such books is that they prejudice sensible people against the study of Logic." [Wittgenstein (1913), pp.2-3. Paragraphs merged.]

 

However, W&G continue, assiduously digging an ever deeper dialectical hole for themselves:

 

"Using a superficial and inexact analogy with physics, the so-called 'atomic method' developed by Russell and Wittgenstein (and later repudiated by the latter) tried to divide language into its 'atoms.' The basic atom of language is supposed to be the simple sentence, out of which compound sentences are constructed. Wittgenstein dreamed of developing a 'formal language' for every science -- physics, biology, even psychology. Sentences are subjected to a 'truth test' based on the old laws of identity, contradiction and the excluded middle. In reality, the basic method remains exactly the same. The 'truth value' is a question of 'either…or,' 'yes or no,' 'true or false.' The new logic is referred to as the propositional calculus. But the fact is that this system can't even deal with arguments formerly handled by the most basic (categorical) syllogism. The mountain has laboured, and brought forth a mouse." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.97. This appears on p.102 of the 2nd edition.]

 

Again, the numerous errors in this passage have been exposed here. However, W&G nowhere reference a single passage from Wittgenstein's work that supports the allegation that he wanted to set up "a 'formal language' for every science -- physics, biology, even psychology". In fact, these two have manifestly confused Wittgenstein with Rudolph Carnap and other members of the Vienna Circle. Nor do they show how or why the new logic can't handle syllogistic inferences, when it manifestly can. [On that, for example, see Lemmon (1993), pp.168-79.] To cap it all, they assert that Wittgenstein's work was somehow "based on the old laws of identity", when he in fact argued as follows:

 

"Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. Thus I do not write 'f(a,b).a = b', but 'f(a,a)' (or 'f(b,b)'); and not 'f(a,b).~a = b', but 'f(a,b)'....

 

[Wittgenstein explains what he is doing here: "Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of sign." (5.53, p.105.) -- RL.]

 

 "The identity-sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of conceptual notation." [Wittgenstein (1972), 5.5303-5.533, pp.106-07. (This links to a PDF of two parallel translations; I have used the one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness edition.) Paragraphs merged.]

 

"'A thing is identical with itself.' -- There is no finer example of a useless sentence.... It is as if in our imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted." [Wittgenstein (2009), §216, p.91e.]

 

"'a = a' is a perfectly useless proposition." [Wittgenstein (1976), p.283.]

 

"The law of identity, for example, seemed to be of fundamental importance. But now the proposition that this 'law' is nonsense has taken over this importance." [Wittgenstein (1993), p.169.]

 

We also read the following in a letter Wittgenstein sent to Bertrand Russell (dated October 1913):

 

"But just now I am so troubled with identity...." [Wittgenstein (1979), p.125. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

We also read this from a note dated 29/11/1914:

 

"I believe that it would be possible wholly to exclude the sign of identity from our notation and always to indicate identity merely by the identity of the signs.... By means of this notation the pseudo-proposition (x)x = a or the like would lose all appearance of justification." [Ibid., p.34e. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Moreover, Wittgenstein regarded contradictions, not as false, but as sinnloss -- senseless -- lacking truth conditions:

 

"Tautologies and contradictions lack sense (sinnloss)." [Wittgenstein (1972), p.69, 4.461. (This links to a PDF of two parallel translations; I have used the one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness edition. "Sense" is explained here.)]

 

Not finished, W&G continue:

 

"The introduction of symbols into logic does not carry us a single step further, for the very simple reason that they, in turn, must sooner or later be translated into words and concepts. They have the advantage of being a kind of shorthand, more convenient for some technical operations, computers and so on, but the content remains exactly as before. The bewildering array of mathematical symbols is accompanied by a truly Byzantine jargon, which seems deliberately designed to make logic inaccessible to ordinary mortals, just as the priest-castes of Egypt and Babylon used secret words and occult symbols to keep their knowledge to themselves. The only difference is that they actually did know things that were worth knowing, like the movements of the heavenly bodies, something which can't be said of modern logicians." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.97-98. This appears on p.102 of the 2nd edition.]

 

If the following were the case, "The introduction of symbols into logic does not carry us a single step further", then on a similar basis algebraists were misguided when they introduced symbols into mathematics. Furthermore, how many ordinary people understand algebra? Does that mean algebra is "elitist"? More revealingly, one feels, W&G's jibe (about the esoteric nature of modern logic) hides the fact that these two comrades clearly found even elementary Symbolic Logic far too difficult to grasp. [Exhibit A for the prosecution was posted earlier; add to that the many sophomoric mistakes they make throughout their chapter on 'logic'.]

 

To be sure, MFL is undeniably difficult. As I noted above, in my own study of University Mathematics and Postgraduate Logic, for example, I found that advanced Abstract Algebra (e.g., Group Theory) was far easier to follow than advanced MFL -- especially if we throw in the Philosophy of Logic, surely one of the most difficult subjects yet devised by the human brain! Of course, others might find the reverse is the case. But, that no more impugns MFL than it does, say, Group Theory, Lie Algebra, or Sturm-Liouville Theory (this links to a PDF).

 

Readers, however, will no doubt also have noticed how W&G managed to throw in a snide remark about the contrast between FL and certain un-named priests in the ancient world, whose knowledge we are told actually involved the mastery of "occult symbols" and a number of unspecified practicalities that meant they were (supposedly) superior to modern logicians, at least in this respect. This from comrades who sing the praises of a 'logical theory' (DL) which has no known practical applications (other than that of thoroughly confusing its acolytes and, of course, crippling Soviet Agriculture), but who nevertheless endlessly snipe at an entire discipline (FL) that has countless such applications.

 

And, as far as "Byzantine jargon" is concerned, anyone who reckons they can learn something (anything!) from Hegel's Logic has little room to point fingers at others for their excessive devotion to opaque jargon. The technical terms used in MFL are there for the same reason they are there in modern mathematics. No such basis exists for excusing the barrage of terminally obscure verbiage and tortured prose that confronts hapless readers of Hegel's Logic -- quite the reverse, as we shall see.

 

Unfortunately, there is more:

 

"Terms such 'monadic predicates,' 'quantifiers,' 'individual variables,' and so on and so forth, are designed to give the impression that formal logic is a science to be reckoned with, since it is quite unintelligible to most people. Sad to say, the scientific value of a body of beliefs is not directly proportionate to the obscurity of its language. If that were the case, every religious mystic in history would be as great a scientist as Newton, Darwin and Einstein, all rolled into one." [Ibid., p.98. This appears on pp.102-03 of the 2nd edition.]

 

The novel terminology employed by modern logicians was introduced simply because the old logic of subject and predicate failed to do justice to inferences we draw in everyday life, to say nothing of the complex proofs required by mathematicians. Moreover, W&G's reference to religious mystics is a little rich in view of the Hermetic writings from which they caught such a virulent dose of dialectics.

 

"In Moliere's comedy, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, M. Jourdain was surprised to be told that he had been talking prose all his life, without realising it. Modern logic merely repeats all the old categories, but throws in a few symbols and fancy-sounding terms, in order to hide the fact that absolutely nothing new is being said. Aristotle used 'monadic predicates' (expressions that attribute a property to an individual) a long time ago. No doubt, like M. Jourdain, he would have been delighted to discover that he had been using Monadic Predicates all the time, without knowing it. But it would not have made a scrap of difference to what he was actually doing. The use of new labels does not alter the contents of a jar of jam. Nor does the use of jargon enhance the validity of outworn forms of thought.

 

"The sad truth is that, in the 20th century formal logic has reached its limits. Every new advance of science deals it yet another blow. Despite all the formal changes, the basic laws remain the same. One thing is clear. The developments of formal logic over the past hundred years, first by propositional calculus (p.c.), then by lower predicate calculus (l.p.c.) has carried the subject to such a point of refinement that no further development is possible. We have reached the most comprehensive system of formal logic, so that any other additions will certainly not add anything new. Formal logic has said all that it has to say. If the truth were to be told, it reached this stage quite some time ago." [Ibid., pp.98-99. This appears on p.103 of the 2nd edition.]

 

I have been unable to find the term "monadic predicate" in Aristotle, but that doesn't mean he didn't use monadic predicates. But so what? Ancient mathematicians used concepts and abbreviations that are analogous to the symbols employed by modern mathematicians; does that mean that modern mathematics is full of "fancy-sounding terms", and thus fit only for ill-informed derision from a pair of ignoramuses? Or, that modern formalism is no advance over the terminology used in ancient mathematics?

 

And, of course, a monadic predicate (such as "ξ is a confused dialectician") can apply to more than one individual (as in "Anyone who reads RIRE, and believes everything they have read, will become a confused dialectician"); so it isn't true that 'monadic predicates' are expressions that "attribute a property to an individual". Plainly, in this case, it applies to anyone who reads and believes the contents of RIRE (which could be no one, or it could be thousands).

 

[A monadic predicate is a first order predicate which maps one singular term onto a proposition or indicative sentence. A dyadic predicate is a first order predicate that maps two singular terms onto a proposition or indicative sentence. A first order predicate is a predicate that maps singular terms onto propositions or indicative sentences. Singular terms involve Proper Names, Definite Descriptions and demonstrative pronouns. For an explanation of the use of Greek symbols (like ξ), see here and here, which also explain what "mapping" means.] 

 

The question whether or not MFL has been rendered partially obsolete by advances in science will be dealt with elsewhere at this site (however, see Harrison (1983, 1985) and Slater (2002) on the LEM and QM); but, as far as the allegation that MFL has reached the end of the line is concerned, only those who know nothing of the subject will think to assert this, or, indeed, believe it. Even a cursory look along the relevant shelves in a University Library will soon show how the subject is continuing to blossom --, as, indeed, will a quick Google search.

 

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

 

In fact, this by-now-familiar 'head in the sand' approach -- perfected by W&G, and who are not unique among DM-fans -- is reminiscent of the attitude to Galileo's work adopted by Roman Catholic Theologians: "Stick to Dogma -- and under no circumstances look down that telescope!"

 

One final W&G comment is worth quoting:

 

"Another type of syllogism is conditional in form (if...then), for example, 'If an animal is a tiger, it is a carnivore.' This is just another way of saying the same thing as the affirmative categorical statement, i.e., all tigers are carnivores. The same in relation to the negative form -- 'If it's a fish, it's not a mammal' is just another way of saying 'No fishes are mammals.' The formal difference conceals the fact that we have not really advanced a single step." [Ibid., p.86. This appears on p.90 of the 2nd edition. The italic emphasises appear in the on-line version, not the published editions.]

 

Alas, these comments seriously expose their self-inflicted ignorance; a hypothetical proposition -- such as: "If an animal is a tiger, it is a carnivore" -- isn't even an argument, so it can hardly be a syllogism. [I have dealt with "hypothetical syllogisms", here.]

 

On the other hand, if the above example were a conditionalised proposition (i.e., an argument that has been transformed into a conditional sentence), the original argument must have had a suppressed premise (as in, "No fish is a mammal", in connection with "If it's a fish, it's not a mammal"). Either way, these aren't syllogisms.

 

Nevertheless, W&G have clearly missed the point of hypothetical deductions in MFL (something that was in fact absent from AFL -- but not from Stoic Logic -- not that Aristotle was unaware of them). We can surely reason from premises whose truth-status is unknown to us (as scientists often do), in order to try to investigate phenomena and establish the truth-value of any propositions concerning them. Indeed, it is no less important for us to find out whether or not some of our beliefs are false, and we often do that by drawing out their consequences. This can't be done with categorical reasoning -- unless the hypothetical mode was being used implicitly or surreptitiously.

 

Hypothetical reasoning has always featured in the sciences (on that see, for example, Losee (2001)); these days this aspect of logic tends to be connected with the use of "thought experiments" --, but the two aren't the same -- and scientists employ IL all the time, where hypothetical reasoning is hardly controversial.

 

[IL = Informal Logic.]

 

["Thought experiments" have been employed by scientists for centuries in order to confirm, or refute, specific theories and hypotheses. Galileo was a past master in this regard, as was Einstein. On thought experiments, see the popular account in Cohen (2005). More scholarly studies can be found in Brown (1986, 1993, 2002, 2005, 2019), Häggqvist (1996), Horowitz and Massey (1991), McAllister (2005), Norton (1996, 2005) -- these link to PDFs --, and Sorensen (1992). Brown, however, adopts a rather Platonic view of "thought experiments", an approach rightly rejected by Norton, for example. Another quick Google search will reveal dozens of articles on this topic. See also, John Norton's page devoted to classic examples.]

 

But, we don't need to appeal to technical, or even arcane, aspects of the scientific method; W&G themselves engage in their own form of hypothetical 'reasoning'. They do this when they derive what they take to be false conclusions from premises which they attribute to what they call "formal" thought. They manifestly do not hold the latter propositions true; they merely reason from their assumed truth to what they then claim are obvious falsehoods implied by those assumed truths in order to show that the original assumptions must have been false, or were of limited applicability. They couldn't do this with a categorical argument, where the premises are known to be true, or known to be false.

 

[In saying this, the reader shouldn't assume that I am attributing to W&G a clear or coherent logical strategy, or even a clear set of thoughts, here; few of their arguments work (and many are aimed at targets that would give the phrase "straw man" a bad name, as we have seen). But, that isn't the point; they certainly intended to argue hypothetically, which is.]

 

[26] R S Baghavan

 

The DM-Echo-Chamber continues to resonate, and this time thanks to a contribution from a book that turns out to be a veritable monument to Confirmation Bias:

 

"Classical, Aristotelian logic takes as its fundamental premise the Law of Identity, the statement that a thing is identical with itself. Expressed in a formula: A is A. Its negative form, the Law of Contradiction states that a thing is never different from itself, that A is not and cannot be non-A. In combination, these laws give rise to a third, the Law of the Excluded Middle. Either A is B or it is non-B; it cannot be both.... In Hegel's dialectics A is A as well as non-A." [Baghavan (1987), pp.75-76. Paragraphs merged. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

As usual, Baghavan quoted not one single logic text in support of his wild allegations and blatant fibs. As we have also seen, not only did Aristotle know nothing of the LOI, the LOC can't be derived from the LOI, and all three laws do not form the basis of AFL. That is quite apart from the ridiculous 'definitions' Baghavan (and other DM-fans) pulled out of somewhere the sun does not shine.

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic.]

 

[27] Miscellaneous Internet Examples

 

Plenty more examples of the same wild allegations can be found right across the Internet; for example:

 

"Dialectics is a way of studying the phenomena of the world in a way that is quite a bit different than formal logic. Logic is undoubtedly very useful in many instances, but it has its limitations. Even the fundamental axioms of logic, which often seem intuitively obvious to western thinkers (e.g. A = A), only really hold when looking at the world at fixed moments in time." [Quoted from here.]

 

Here is yet another 'expert', who -- surprise! surprise! -- quotes not one single logic text, article or website in support:

 

"Dialectics may be termed the logic of change. Traditional logic -- from the Greek logos, meaning 'word' or 'reason' -- was originally formulated by Aristotle, and seeks to define laws for rational thought. Aristotelian logic contends that there are three laws of logic:

"1. A equals A (a thing is equal to itself);


"2. A does not equal not-A (a thing is not equal to something other than itself);


"3. There is no thing which is not either A or not-A (i.e. there is no indeterminate middle ground)." [Quoted from
here; accessed 08/06/2015.]
 

Here is yet another:

 

"That is to say that the either/or claim essential to some versions of formal logic (A v ~A, something is either one thing or the other [i.e. it is raining or it is not raining, it cannot be both at the same time]) is, while correct on one logical level, ultimately insufficient. Dialectical logic claims that things can be both either one thing or the other just as -- and this is dialectically important -- they can also and at the same time not be either one thing or the other (A & ~A). So either/or and also not either/or. While it is correct to assert that it cannot both be raining and not raining at the same time at a given moment, once we imagine the fact of raining in a larger process, then the logic of A v ~A, while in some ways correct, is also insufficient. Is the fact of sleet an instance of raining or not-raining?  Do we not say that sleet is both snow and rain at the same time?" [Quoted from here; accessed 18/08/2015.]

 

But that last point transfers attention to the following question: "Is it sleeting or not sleeting?" Or, indeed, an answer to the question they raise "Is the fact of sleet an instance of raining or not-raining?", namely, "Yes it is raining since sleet is a mixture of rain and snow!" So, we can have definite answers in such circumstances.

 

Once more, what is the point of this. In DM-terms it makes no sense. Is there a logical connection between rain and snow, such that one implies the other and one can't exist with the other (like the proletariat can't exist without the capitalist class, so we are told)? If that were the case, it couldn't ever rain without it also snowing, nor vice versa! In which case, what has contradiction got to do with this, be it 'dialectical', formal, or ordinary?

 

The LEM isn't so easily by-passed by those who think homespun 'logic' can become a legitimate or useful component of cutting edge science. Indeed, the LEM has a nasty way of hitting back at those who think it is clever to try to undermine it; on that, see here.

 

A quick Google search will reveal how wide this dialectical weed has spread:

 

http://uweb.superlink.net/~dialect/Logictheory.html

 

http://www.stanford.edu/~rhorn/a/topic/phil/artclTrapsOfFormalLogic.html

 

http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/logic2.htm

 

[Although the last author above is merely paraphrasing Somerville.]

 

Readers will find that these sites retail the same hoary old myths and wild fantasies, and are almost word for word copies of one another!

 

DM, repetitive?

 

The very idea!

 

But (having said that) as if to prove DM-fans aren't the least bit repetitive -- but, ironically, managing to do the exact opposite --, we have this from one of our US comrades:

 

"The philosophical underpinning of this pursuit of knowledge was grounded in the empirical method, which guided the scientific inquiry into the interactions conceived of as external to these discrete and now well-defined entities. The law of identity was critical to the project: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. Or stated in algebraic terms: A equals A. One corollary of the idea that A is always identical to A is that A can never equal not-A." [Eric Ruder, quoted from here. Accessed 21/11/2023. Bold emphasis added.]

 

No logic books are quoted or even cited in support (other than Hegel's, of course -- his word is all the 'evidence'/'proof' DM-fans need), and no attempt is made to prove the point from logic itself. [Indeed, I have shown how defective this Hegelian 'logic' is in Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

Here, though, is one of my favourite DM-examples:

 

"Note that Hegel uses the word contradiction to mean the conflict between two opposing sides. (page 431, Hegel's Science of Logic) He does not mean simply a logically contradictory statement such as, 'That object is a horse and a television.'" [Quoted from the 'Dialectics For Kids' website. Has anyone checked if this site is actually run by the same pranksters who publish The Onion?]

 

But, could the alleged contradiction, "That object is a horse and a television", be false? It is worth recalling once more that concerning two contradictory propositions (or clauses), they can't both be true and they can't both be false. DM-fans appear to be blithely unaware even of Aristotle's concept of a contradiction, let alone anything more recent! On the other hand, two propositions or clauses are inconsistent if they can't both be true, but could both be false (as is the case with the example quoted above -- "That object is a horse and a television."). As noted earlier, while dialecticians are quite happy to pontificate about logic, they seem not to know the first thing about it.

 

So, only if both of the following: "That object is a horse" and "That object is a television" couldn't be false would "That object is a horse and a television" be a contradiction. But, "That object is a horse" and "That object is a television" would both be false if, for instance, "That object is a cat" were true -- always assuming that "That object" picked out the same object in each case.

 

So, this odd example from that wacko website isn't even a contradiction!

 

It might be argued that the meaning of the word "horse" precludes it from being a television, but if that were the case "That object is a horse and a television" would be a misuse of language, and would thus be non-sensical, not contradictory.

 

Here's another egregious example, posted on Quora recently:

 

"The formal conception of a contradiction requires two things standing in opposition to one another. A single object is either this sort of thing or that sort of thing. It cannot be both, in the same way, at the same time. For instance, a ball. One and the same ball is either a white ball or a black ball. If a single ball were both black and white at one and the same time, there would be no contradiction because there is no (external) opposition between two things. The ball would not be black or white. It would be some shade of grey. In other words, the contradiction of one and the same object being both black and white would not be conceptualized as the unity of two opposed characteristics existing in one and the same object. A grey ball would simply be recognized as a completely separate entity unto itself, neither black nor white, capable of existing alongside both black and white balls." [Marshall Solomon, quoted from here, accessed 22/02/2021. Bold emphasis added. The highlighted words do not seem to make much sense. If anyone can make sense of them, please let me know.]

 

As we have seen, Aristotle himself dealt with such considerations over two thousand years ago, so it is instructive to note, yet again, that the above comrade quotes not one singe logic text in support of these wild fantasies. As if logicians don't know that grey is (sometimes) a combination of black and white in given proportions. Exactly why that would be a contradiction (even in DM-terms!) is also far from clear.

 

Anyway, as we have seen many times, what we might say about the condition of the said ball would be a contradiction if both of these couldn't be true (together) and couldn't be false (together): "This ball is black" and "This ball is white". While both can't be true (together) -- except we call this ball grey, but even then the ball would be neither black nor white! -- they can both be false, if the said ball was, say, red -- or, indeed, grey! So, "This ball is black and white" isn't a contradiction. That sentence merely expresses an inconsistency -- "This ball is black" and "This ball is white" are contraries, not contradictories.

 

"The contradictory character of the commodity-form does not follow this formal logic. One and the same object retains it contradictory character while expressing its (internal) opposition in a form of appearance different than either of its underlying oppositions. In terms of the example just given, and this example is suboptimal..., the grey ball would not be recognized as a unified separate object existing independently from black and white balls. Under the logic of the commodity-form, the appearances do not constitute a separate 'third thing' external to the 'first thing' (white ball) and 'second thing' (black ball). The grey ball retains the opposition of black and white within itself by become the necessary expression of this internal opposition, the form of appearance of a contradictory reality. Nonetheless, the internal opposition of black and white does not change our conscious experience of a grey ball as a unified independent object. This means the contradictory character of the commodity-form is obliterated in its mode of expression. In the appearances, the manner in which commodity world immediately presents itself to us, no opposition seems to exist." [Ibid.]

 

Once again, this comrade failed to explain how this is a 'formal contradiction' in the first place (when, of course, it isn't!), let alone a 'dialectical contradiction'. Do these colours struggle with and then change into each other, as the DM-classics tell us they must if they were 'dialectical'? Does the existence of one imply the existence of the other, like the proletariat supposedly implies the existence of the capitalist class (so we are told). Hardly.

 

[For several other serious muddles courtesy of the above comrade, check this out. I have also dealt with the logical confusions that Marx himself introduced into his discussion of the commodity, and the further mix-ups subsequent Marxists piled on top of even these, here.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

In practice, we see once again that dialecticians only succeed in shooting themselves in the foot they have firmly lodged in their collective mouth.

 

Finally, a more faithful and accurate account of the foundations of AFL can be found in Lear (1980).

 

[28] Serial Confusion

 

So, DM-fans variously define the LOI as "A = A", "A is equal to A", "A equals A" -- or even "A is A" (on all of these, see Essay Six). We have also seen that other DM-fans tell us that this 'law' implies that "A can't be other than A" (which is incorrect -- the LOI doesn't preclude change; again, on that see Essay Six). The LOC is similarly characterised as "A can't at the same time be A and not be A" -- or even "A can't be non-A" and "A equals A only in so far as it is opposed to non-A, or, the identity of A results from and contains the contradiction", which says more-or-less the same (no pun intended) --, and which is said to follow from the LOI (but, as usual, no proof is offered that it does). At the same time, the LEM is depicted rather loosely as "Everything must be A or not A"; or even worse, "A does not equal B"! In every case, dialecticians serially conflate objects (or the names thereof) with propositions -- alongside a host of other confusions, into the bargain.

 

The above confusions and muddles have been thoroughly dissected here, where I make the following points (slightly edited):

 

However, as noted above, the real problem here is that if the negative particle attaches to singular terms (i.e., Proper Names and Definite Descriptions) so that it is interpreted as an operator mapping singular terms onto 'negative' singular terms (whatever that means!), it can't also be a sentential operator mapping a sentence or proposition onto its negation, which is what it has to do in relation to the LEM and the  LOC.

 

That is:

 

P1: N*(A) º ¬*A.

 

Or even:

 

P2: N*(A) = ¬*A.

 

[Where "N*" is just such a general 'negative operator' (i.e.,  "Neg..."), "A" is a name variable again, "¬*" is the 'negative' particle in this modified logic, and "º" is the logical equivalence sign and stands for "if and only if". (I have used asterisks to highlight the radically non-standard nature of the symbols I have employed here.)]

 

Of course, given the above syntax, P3 is ill-formed, too. That is because neither N*(A) nor ¬*A are propositions, sentences, or clauses. [Negating a name on its own simply yields another Noun Phrase, not an indicative sentence or clause, while "º" can only operate on propositions, indicative sentences or clauses.] When actual names are inserted -- so that P1 yields, say, "Neg(Socrates) if and only if Not(Socrates)" -- it can be seen for what it is, unvarnished nonsense -- as "Neg(Socrates) is identical with Not(Socrates)" is, too.

 

[Henceforth, I will omit reference to clauses when I am making the above points; it should be assumed I intend include them unless otherwise stated.]

 

On the other hand, if the negative particle above is a sentential operator mapping a sentence or proposition onto its negation, then it can't also be an operator mapping names in the above manner.

 

P3: N(A) º ¬A.

 

Or,

 

P4: N(A) = ¬A.

 

[Where "N" is a negative operator ("Neg..."), "A" is now a propositional variable, and "¬" is the negative particle in standard logic (i.e., "It is not the case that..."), which maps a sentence onto its negation.]

 

But, in this case, P4 would be ill-formed, too, since "=" can only be flanked by singular terms, not propositions. Once more, if we insert actual sentences into P4, so that it yields, for example, *"Neg(Paris is in France) is identical to it is not the case that Paris is in France" we would see just as quickly that it is no less nonsensical.

 

P3, on the other hand, seems alright as it is; while "Neg(Paris is in France) if and only if it is not the case that Paris is in France" is certainly odd, it isn't nonsense, but that is only because N now works as a surrogate for sentential or propositional negation, ¬.

 

Once again, that is why it is so important to keep track of the denotation of each letter A that Hegel and Lawler used --, or rather, mis-used -- and why much was made of it earlier. [And why it is important to be clear about the precise logical role played by the negative particle.]

 

Recall, Hegel thought he could derive the LOC from the LOI by claiming that the LOI "stated negatively" is, or implies, the LOC. To that end, he argued that while the LOI is A = A, when stated (negatively) it is also "A can't at the same time be A and not A" -- or: "¬(A & ¬A)".

 

[Of course, there are other ways of expressing the 'negative form' of the LOI; for example, ¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)]. However, the latter form presents problems of its own; they have been explored here and in Note 2, of Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

But, as far as the LOC and the LEM are concerned, A can only stand for a proposition, a declarative, an indicative sentence, or even a statement (again, depending on one's philosophical logic) -- i.e., it goes proxy for expressions that are capable of being true or false.

 

By way of contrast, in the LOI, A goes proxy for a singular term; it isn't a propositional, or a sentential, variable. So, for example, "Caesar" -- a singular term -- on its own isn't capable of being true or false. Hence, if "¬" is taken to be a propositional or sentential operator, again, mapping truths onto falsehoods, or vice versa, ¬A would make no sense -- "It is not the case that Caesar" is, once more, nonsensical.

 

Alternatively, if A is a sentential or propositional variable, ¬(A & ¬A) would become "It is not the case that Caesar is identical with Caesar and Caesar is not identical with Caesar" (where, for instance, "A" stands for "Caesar is identical with Caesar", and not just "Caesar" on its own, as would be the case in the LOI), which seems to make sense -- but only if one is thinking of questioning the LOI.

 

The other form mentioned above -- i.e., ¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)] -- fares little better (even if it isn't patent nonsense), becoming, for example: "It is not the case that ((Caesar is identical with Caesar) and (Caesar is identical with not Caesar))" -- that is, if ¬ now appears to function as both a sentential, or a propositional, operator and an operator on singular terms! Who exactly is this "not Caesar" person? [I have considered this particular topic in more detail, here. That is quite apart from the fact that this example is susceptible to the fatal objection mentioned earlier.]

 

On the other hand, if ¬ operates on names, or singular terms, then ¬(A & ¬A) would make no sense, either. In that case, ¬(A & ¬A) would become "Not (Caesar and not Caesar)". But, what does that mean? It isn't even a proposition. "Not Caesar" isn't an expression that is capable of being true or false, nor is "Not (Caesar and not Caesar)". In which case, given this use of ¬, ¬(A & ¬A) can't be the LOC. "Not (Caesar and not Caesar)" isn't the LOC, nor is it even a contradiction; it is either plain gibberish or it isn't a proposition.

 

The other form (i.e., ¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)]) isn't much better since it pans out as: "Not ((Caesar is identical with Caesar) and (Caesar is identical with not Caesar))".

 

[This isn't to suggest that the negative particle can't attach to names (on that, see here), only that when it does, it assumes an entirely different role -- and hence it takes on a new meaning -- different from the role it occupies when it operates on sentences or propositions. Indeed, as we have seen, when the negative particle attaches to a name (in what appear to be relational expressions (e.g., "Paris is no Vienna", or "Brutus is not Caesar")), its role changes dramatically. The sentences just quoted become "Brutus is other than Caesar" and "Paris can't be compared with Vienna".]

 

The dilemma is now quite stark:

 

(1) If ¬ operates on names, or singular terms, and if A is a singular term variable, then A = A certainly seems to make sense. But, in that case, the 'negative form' of the LOI -- ¬(A & ¬A), or even ¬[(A = A) & (A = ¬A)] -- turns out to be plain and unvarnished nonsense when names are inserted once more: "Not (Caesar and not Caesar)", (or "Not ((Caesar is identical with Caesar) and (Caesar is identical with not Caesar))"!

 

(2) On the other hand, if ¬ operates on sentences or propositions, mapping them onto their negations, and if A is a sentential or propositional variable, then the LOI, (A = A), would become, for example: "Caesar is identical with Caesar is identical with Caesar is identical with Caesar" (interpreting A in "A is identical with A" as the proposition "Caesar is identical with Caesar", again, yielding  "Caesar is identical with Caesar is identical with Caesar is identical with Caesar"), which isn't the LOI! Recall that in option (2), A has to go proxy for a proposition or sentence (in this case "Caesar is identical with Caesar"), not a name.

 

Exception might be taken to the use of A to stand for the proposition "Caesar is identical with Caesar". DM-fans can't in fact lodge this objection since, as we have seen, according to them and their sloppy syntax/semantics, these As can be anything we please!

 

In that case, let us take any randomly selected proposition to replace each A in the LOI. That having been done, not much changes: "Paris is in France is identical to Paris is in France". (Interpreting the A here as "Paris is in France").

 

Remember this doesn't yield "'Paris is in France' is identical to 'Paris is in France'", but  "Paris is in France is identical to Paris is in France". Is anyone prepared to accept that as an example of the LOI?

 

[In case someone is prepared to so accept, I have considered that desperate (and unwise) move, here.]
 

So, Hegel was only able to 'derive' the LOC from the LOI by allowing A to slide effortlessly between two radically different semantic and syntactic roles: between (i) denoting singular terms and (ii) denoting propositions, 'judgements', or sentences (and, in fact, denoting a whole host of other things besides -- such as processes, concepts, relations, relational expressions, etc., etc. -- on that, see an earlier section of Essay Eight Part Three). But, as soon that has been done, the negative particle changes its meaning in the above manner -- that is, it changes from a sentential operator to a name modifier, and we end up with unvarnished nonsense, as we have seen.

 

Ordinary Language, 'Commonsense' And Change

 

Dialecticians' Mistaken Assumptions

 

Here is how I will cover this topic Essay Twelve Part Seven:

 

Concerning the alleged limitations of ordinary language, John Rees expressed himself as follows:

 

"Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes." [Rees (1998), p.45.]

 

The problem with this passage is that it gets things completely the wrong way round. It is in fact our use of ordinary language that enables us to speak about change, movement and development. Complex philosophical jargon (especially terminology invented by Hegel) is completely useless in this regard, since it is wooden, static and of indeterminate meaning, despite what Rees asserts.

 

[Any who think differently are invited to reveal precisely which set of Hegelian terms is able do what the words listed below (or their equivalent in German) already achieve for us, only better.]

 

As is well-known (at least by Marxists), human beings managed to progress because of their interaction with nature, later constrained by the class war and the development of the forces of and relations of production. In which case, ordinary language -- the result of collective labour -- couldn't fail to have invented a range of words with the logical and semantic multiplicity that allowed its users to speak about changes of almost limitless complexity, speed and duration.

 

This is no mere dogma; it is easily confirmed. Here is a greatly shortened list of ordinary words (restricted to modern English, but omitting simple and complex tensed participles and auxiliary verbs) that allow speakers to talk about changes of almost unbounded complexity, rapidity, or scope:

 

Vary, alter, adjust, adapt, amend, make, produce, revise, rework, advise, administer, allocate, improve, enhance, deteriorate, depreciate, edit, bend, straighten, weave, merge, dig, plough, cultivate, sow, reap, twist, curl, turn, tighten, fasten, loosen, relax, ease, tense up, slacken, fine tune, bind, wrap, pluck, carve, rip, tear, mend, perforate, repair, puncture, renovate, restore, damage, impair, scratch, diagnose, mutate, metamorphose, transmute, sharpen, hone, modify, modulate, develop, upgrade, appear, disappear, expand, contract, constrict, constrain, shrivel, widen, lock, unlock, swell, flow, glide, ring, differentiate, integrate, multiply, divide, add, subtract, simplify, complicate, partition, unite, amalgamate, fuse, mingle, disseminate, connect, entwine, unravel, link, brake, decelerate, accelerate, fast, slow, swift, rapid, hasty, protracted, lingering, brief, heat up, melt, freeze, harden, cool down, flash, shine, glow, drip, bounce, cascade, drop, pick up, fade, darken, wind, unwind, meander, peel, scrape, graze, file, scour, dislodge, is, was, will be, will have been, had, will have had, went, go, going, gone, return, lost, age, flood, swamp, overflow, precipitate, percolate, seep, tumble, plunge, dive, float, sink, plummet, mix, separate, cut, chop, crush, grind, shred, slice, dice, saw, sew, knit, spread, coalesce, congeal, fall, climb, rise, ascend, descend, slide, slip, roll, spin, revolve, circulate, bounce, oscillate, undulate, rotate, wave, splash, conjure, quick, quickly, slowly, instantaneously, suddenly, gradually, rapidly, briskly, hurriedly, absolutely, lively, hastily, inadvertently, accidentally,  carelessly, really, energetically, lethargically, snap, drink, quaff, eat, bite, devour, consume, swallow, gulp, gobble, chew, gnaw, digest, ingest, excrete, absorb, join, resign, part, sell, buy, acquire, prevent, block, avert, avoid, forestall, encourage, invite, appropriate, lose, find, search, pursue, hunt, track, explore, follow, cover, uncover, reveal, stretch, distend, depress, compress, lift, put down, fetch, take, bring, carry, win, ripen, germinate, conceive, gestate, abort, die, rot, perish, grow, decay, fold, empty, evacuate, drain, pour, fill, abduct, abandon, leave, abscond, many, more, less, fewer, steady, steadily, jerkily, intermittently, smoothly, awkwardly, expertly, very, extremely, exceedingly, intermittent, discontinuous, continuous, continual, emit, push, pull, drag, slide, jump, sit, stand, run, sprint, chase, amble, walk, hop, skip, slither, crawl, limp, swim, fly, hover, drown, submerge, immerse, break, abrogate, dismiss, collapse, shatter, split, interrupt, charge, retreat, assault, squash, adulterate, contaminate, purify, filter, clean, raze, crumble, erode, corrode, rust, flake, demolish, dismantle, pulverise, atomise, disintegrate, dismember, destroy, annihilate, extirpate, flatten, lengthen, shorten, elongate, crimple, inflate, deflate, terminate, finish, initiate, instigate, augment, replace, undo, redo, analyze, synthesise, articulate, disarticulate, reverse, repeal, abolish, enact, quash, throw, catch, hour, minute, second, instant, moment, momentary, invent, devise, teach, learn, innovate, forget, rescind, boil, freeze, thaw, cook, liquefy, solidify, congeal, neutralise, evaporate, condense, dissolve, process, mollify, pacify, calm down, excite, enrage, inflame, protest, object, challenge, confirm, deny, repudiate, reject, refute, expel, eject, repel, attract, remove, overthrow, expropriate, scatter, distribute, equalise, surround, gather, admit, acknowledge, hijack, assemble, attack, counter-attack, charge, repulse, defeat, strike, occupy, picket, barricade, revolt, riot, rally, march, demonstrate, mutiny, rebel, defy, resist, lead, campaign, educate, agitate, organise...

 

[In each case, where there is a noun form of a word its verb form has been listed (for instance, "object" as in "to object"). Moreover, where I have listed the word "ring", for example, I also intend cognates of the verb "to ring" -- like "ringing" and "rang". I have also omitted many nouns that imply change or development, such as "river", "runner", "wind", "lightning", "tide", "cloud", and "fire". Anyone who didn't know such words implied changing processes in the world -- that rivers flow, fires burn, runners run, tides ebb and flow or winds blow -- would thereby have advertised a lack of comprehension of English (or whatever language theirs happened to be), compounded by a dangerously defective knowledge of the world. So, not knowing that fires burn or rivers flow, for example, could endanger someone's life. In addition, several of the above also have verb forms, such as "fired" or "winding". Other nouns also imply growth and development, such as "tree", "flower", "mouse", "day",  "human being". Anyone who thought "human being", for instance, reflected a 'fixed and changeless' view of the world would probably be regarded as learning disabled. Either that or they would perhaps be viewed as if they were in the grip of an off-the-wall philosophical theory of some description.]

 

Naturally, it wouldn't be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally thousands of entries -- on that, see here and here --, all capable of depicting countless changes in limitless detail (especially if it is augmented with words drawn from mathematics, science and HM). It is only a myth put about by Hegel and DM-theorists (unwisely echoed by Rees, and others -- such as W&G) that ordinary language can't depict change adequately, since it is supposedly dominated by 'the abstract understanding', a brain module helpfully identified for us by Hegel without a scrap of supporting evidence, a brain scan or even the use of a consulting couch. By way of contrast, ordinary language performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that wasn't broken.

 

Dialecticians like Rees would have us believe that because of the alleged shortcomings of the vernacular only the most recondite and abstruse terminology -- concocted by Hegel, the meaning of much of which is still unclear, even to Hegel scholars! -- is capable of telling us what we already know, and have known for tens of thousands of years, that things change!

 

Indeed, we read the following (about ancient cosmology):

 

"Now, to understand the power of sacred cities and cosmic shrines we have to understand the power of the cosmos. The ancients recognised that there is really only one thing taking place in the universe, one expression of transcendental power, and that is change. Day transforms into night. Each night alters the shape of the moon. Seasons change. Seeds sprout into the light and gradually grow into mature plants that flower and blow to seed. Through metamorphosis, tadpoles become frogs, and caterpillars become moths. Our lives change.... The world changes.... Everything changes, but for the ancients, change occurred in an ordered and oriented world." [Krupp (1997), p.17. Paragraphs merged; bold emphases added.]

 

It is preposterous, therefore, to suppose that the ability to express change hadn't been incorporated into language many thousands of years before 'Being' inflicted Hegel and his crazy ideas on humanity.

 

Of course, as Rees himself implicitly concedes, Hegel's jargon has had to be 'translated' into 'ordinary-ish' sorts of words for the rest of us to be able to gain even a glimmering of the obscure message it supposedly conveys -- that was the point of Rees's précis of a key Hegelian 'deduction' that many other Hegel scholars have also 'translated' for us (and which will be discussed in detail Essay Twelve Part Five, summary here); cf., Rees (1998), pp.49-50 --, the aim of which was, apparently, to reveal that we can't possibly understand change without such assistance!

 

[Although an earlier version of this 'derivation' was published in Hegel (1977), Hegel's more 'mature' attempt to 'obtain' 'Nothing' from 'Being', and then 'Becoming' from the 'relation' between those two, appeared in Hegel (1999), pp.82-108. As noted above, just like Rees, others have tried to make this incomprehensible derivation 'comprehensible', for example: Burbidge (1995), pp.38-45; Carlson (2007), pp.9-53; Hartnack (1997), pp.11-19; Kaufmann (1978), pp.199-203; and Marcuse (1973) pp.129-34).]

 

But, if we already have ordinary terms (like those listed above) that enable us to talk about and comprehend change what need have we of Hegel's obscure terminology?

 

Conversely, if, according to Rees, ordinary language is inadequate when it is faced with the task of 'translating' Hegel's observations into something we can understand, then how would anyone be able to grasp what Hegel supposedly meant, or even determine whether he meant anything at all? Why translate Hegel into the vernacular if the latter can't cope?

 

On the other hand, if we are capable of comprehending Hegel's obscure ideas only when they have been rendered into ordinary-ish sorts of terms, why do we need his convoluted jargon to reveal to us what it now turns out our language was quite capable of expressing to begin with -- when (on this supposition) it must have been adequate enough for just such a successful re-casting of his ideas by commentators like Rees for the rest of us to grasp? After all, that is why they chose to translate it.

 

If ordinary language enables its users to capture what Hegel meant, in what way is the vernacular defective? Alternatively, if it can't do this, then how might we ever understand Hegel? In that case, if Hegel were correct, no one (including Hegel himself!) would be able to understand Hegel! That is because, ex hypothesi, his words would then be incapable of being translated in terms that anyone could comprehend.

 

Conversely, once more, if Hegel's words are translatable in terms we can understand, that must mean we already have the linguistic resources available to us to comprehend change perfectly well, thank you very much.

 

In which case, the following dilemma now faces Hegel-fans:

 

(a) If we suppose Hegel were correct (that ordinary terms can't adequately capture change), no one would be able to understand him; or,

 

(b) If we suppose Hegel were mistaken -- and we are capable of understanding him enough to be able to say even that much -- no one need bother, since the vernacular would in that case be perfectly adequate on its own.

 

Either way, Marxists would be well-advised to avoid that obscure bumbler like the plague.

 

Descent Into Confusion

 

It could be objected that it isn't necessary to translate Hegel into ordinary language in order to understand his work -- any more than it is necessary to understand, say, QM, by rendering it in everyday speech. In which case, the above comments are completely misguided.

 

[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

 

In response it is worth making the following points:

 

(1) If the above objection were valid, how would we be able to determine if anyone had ever understood Hegel? It would be no good pointing to the hundreds of books and articles devoted to his work any more than it would be to point to the even bigger pile of books and articles devoted to the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity -- an equally obscure dogma that grew out of the same Neoplatonic swamp that gave birth to Hegel's ideas -- as proof that that unintelligible theological doctrine is comprehensible, too. In fact, Hegel scholars are in effect little more than expert jargon regurgitators; that doesn't mean any of it makes the slightest sense.

 

(2) The word "understand" is already in ordinary language, and therefore subject to the same criteria we use to decide if anyone has actually understood something, or is just spouting empty verbiage. [On that, see here.]

 

(3) The analogy with QM is unfortunate in view of the fact that leading physicists themselves tell us that QM is incomprehensible.

 

"Those who are not shocked when they first come across quantum theory can't possibly have understood it." Niels Bohr

 

"If you are not completely confused by quantum mechanics, you do not understand it." John Wheeler

 

"Quantum mechanics makes absolutely no sense." Roger Penrose

 

"There was a time when the newspapers said that only twelve men understood the theory of relativity. I do not believe there ever was such a time. There might have been a time when only one man did, because he was the only guy who caught on, before he wrote his paper. But after people read the paper a lot of people understood the theory of relativity in some way or other, certainly more than twelve. On the other hand, I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics…. I am going to tell you what nature behaves like. If you will simply admit that maybe she does behave like this, you will find her a delightful, entrancing thing. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, 'but how can it be like that?' because you will get 'down the drain,' into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that." [Feynman (1992), p.129. Bold emphases added.]

 

 

Video Two: "Nobody Understands Quantum Mechanics"

 

Indeed, science itself is shot through with metaphor and analogy, which often makes it difficult to interpret literally. [I will say more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two. See also this quotation from physicist, David Peat. Several other points raised by the above objection will be dealt with below.]

 

The idea that ordinary language can't cope with rapid, slow or even protracted change may perhaps be summarised by the following sentence (which seems to capture something of what Rees had in mind -- those who think otherwise are encouraged to shelve their doubts for a few more paragraphs):

 

H1a: Ordinary language can't account for or depict change.

 

But, is H1a itself written in ordinary language? It certainly looks like it. If it is, it is pertinent to ask what the word "change" in H1a actually means.

 

If we, as ordinary speakers, do not understand this word, what precisely is it that Hegel and Rees are presuming to correct? We may only be educated if we know of what it is that we are ignorant -- that is, if we already know what change is so that we can at least say that the ordinary word "change" fails to match, by so much or so little, the ideal that others might hold out for it. But, ex hypothesi, we aren't supposed to know this since our language is allegedly inadequate in this area. [Several obvious objections to this line-of-argument will be considered presently.]

 

This shows that the argument here isn't just about language but about what it conveys to us; in this particular case, what our words convey about change. Indeed, if we want to study change, we may only get a handle on it by the use of words (albeit those that are connected in some way with material practice, etc.), like those listed above. Who on earth ever learnt to use such words by reading Hegel? Who has ever improved their use of such words in everyday life after reading Hegel?

 

Contrast H1 with the following:

 

H1b: Ordinary language can't account for or depict quantum phenomena.

 

The situation with regard to change isn't at all like the comprehension of QM, where advanced knowledge of Physics and Mathematics is essential. That is not the case with our use of words like those listed above. But, "change", as it features in H1a -- if H1a is indeed in the vernacular --, can't be an example of the technical use of language, unlike the complexities hinted at in H1b.

 

Of course, if H1a isn't in the vernacular, and if "change" is also being employed as a specialised term, then that technical use of "change" (call it "changet") will need to be explained in terms of the word "change" in the vernacular, or its cognates (call it "changev"), so that we might grasp what this more complex, technical but typographically identical, word "changet" actually means or implies. And, if that is so, the ordinary word "changev", or its cognates, would have to appear in any explanation of "changet", or we wouldn't be able to understand it. But, that would just take us back to where we were a few paragraphs ago. If we don't yet understand the ordinary word, "changev", then we certainly can't use it in order to have the technical version, "changet", explained to us. But, without such an elucidation, if we don't yet know what the technical term, "changet", means, H1a will remain incomprehensible until we do. That is because H1a would now contain at least one word (i.e., "changet") that, on this view, no one -- not one single human being -- yet understands. Unfortunately, this would mean that our knowledge can't be upgraded by means of H1a --, or, for that matter, by the use of any other sentence that employs this as-yet-to-be-explained word, "changet".

 

H1a: Ordinary language can't account for or depict change.

 

This would in turn imply that the 'dialectical' development of this word, or this 'concept', can't even begin, for, as yet, all that the aspiring dialectician would have available to her/him is this empty word (i.e., "changev"), which we have been led to believe we don't yet understand. For all the use it would be, that word might just as well have been "slithy tove":

 

H1c: Ordinary language can't account for or depict slithy tove.

 

At this point it could be objected that our use of ordinary terms helps us partially grasp the nature of change, but Hegel's language, or his method, provides the wherewithal for us to comprehend the concept 'dialectically', and 'scientifically' (or, indeed, it helps us grasp the real processes this concept reflects more fully -- that is, when his ideas have been put the 'right way up'), as it were. So, it isn't true that dialecticians don't understand the technical meaning of "change" (or its dialectical/speculative equivalent) applied to natural and social phenomena.

 

Perhaps then Rees and other DM-fans meant the following?

 

H2a: Ordinary language can't fully grasp change.

 

H2b: Special terminology, or a specially designed method, is required in order to enable our comprehension of change.

 

But, once again, what does the word "change" in H2a mean? Is it being used in the same way that we use the ordinary word "changev"? Or does it possess its own 'special', technical/dialectical sense (call it "changed"), which has yet to be explained? If it does mean the same as the ordinary term, then where does our common understanding of that word -- "changev" -- (or what it expresses), fall short?

 

Why do we need a theory to explain something we already understand?

 

On the other hand, if our common understanding of that word is defective -- if users don't understand it -- then H2a will be incomprehensible as it stands, since it contains at least one word (i.e., "change") that no one comprehends. Until we know the extent of our ignorance (or, indeed, where our ordinary understanding of this word falls short) -- or even what the subject of this query is actually about --, all the technical and dialectical terminology in the world will be of no use, even to dialecticians!

 

H2a: Ordinary language can't fully grasp change.

 

H2b: Special terminology, or a specially designed method, is required in order to enable our comprehension of change.

 

Alternatively, if the word "change" (or is it "changed"?) in H2a has its own 'special meaning', what is it? And, if it does have its own 'special meaning', what sort of criticism of ordinary language do H2a and H2b represent, especially if they aren't actually employing the vernacular term, "changev", but a technical alternative, "changed" or even "changet" (which are, as yet, devoid of any meaning, or at least any that has been explained to us)? Indeed, if in H2a the word "change" has a technical sense -- again, "changed" or even "changet" --, how can those words with their special meanings be used to criticise the ordinary word "changev" (or highlight its limitations) if "changev" isn't itself being used?

 

On the other hand again, if the word "change" and any terms associated with it have a special dialectical meaning --  "changed" -- how might that 'meaning' possibly help anyone correct, or clarify, the ordinary word, "changev", if we still don't understand "changev" or "changed"? And how might dialecticians explain to themselves, or even to one another, what the special 'dialectical meaning' of "changed" is if all they have available to them at the beginning of their investigation is the ordinary (and defective) word "changev", a word that no one as yet comprehends?

 

This side of a clear answer to these questions, H2a is as devoid of sense as H1a ever was.

 

H1a: Ordinary language can't account for or depict change.

 

In response it could be argued that H2a isn't about our understanding of the meaning of a word; it merely reminds us that ordinary language can't be expected to operate effectively outside its legitimate sphere of application (i.e., "beyond certain limits"). No one expects ordinary language to cope with complex issues found in, say, science and philosophy, or, indeed, in relation protracted and complex social change. This impugns neither commonsense nor the vernacular; it simply reminds us of their limitations.

 

H2a: Ordinary language can't fully grasp change.

 

Nevertheless, unless we are told in what way the ordinary word, "changev" -- as we now understand it --, falls short of whatever it is it is supposed to fall short of, a dialectical extension to our knowledge can't even begin. So, the complicated somersaults that dialecticians subsequently perform are irrelevant; given this view, we still don't know what the ordinary word, "changev", means -- or, if we do, we still don't know in what way it falls short of its supposed 'dialectical ideal', "changed".

 

In fact, if the meaning of the word "change" (in any of the above senses) is indeterminate, as it now stands, dialecticians can't even begin their warm up exercises, let alone impress us further with their complex gyrations. They can hardly correct our supposedly faltering grasp of the ordinary word, "changev", or its supposed 'limitations', without also having to use it. And just as soon as they do that, their sentences would be subject to the same unspecified shortcomings. It isn't possible to point out the limitations of the ordinary word, "changev", and then use it as if it had no such limitations. That in turn means that if it does have these 'limitations', they will be inherited by any sentence in which it is employed.

 

This shows that H2a is directly about our understanding of this word, for if the word "change" (as it is used in H2a -- repeated below) doesn't mean the sane as the ordinary word, "changev", then the meaning of H2a will itself be indeterminate. Hence, any criticism that H2a is used to make of the vernacular (howsoever nuanced that turns out to be) will now be devoid of content. And that is because it contains at least one word whose meaning isn't yet understood -- "change"!

 

Again, it could be objected that no one is claiming that the ordinary word, "changev", is understood by no one at all, only that it can't handle complex processes that occur in nature and society.

 

But, if our understanding of the word "changev" is even slightly defective (in the above areas), we certainly can't use it while pretending to correct it. We can't feign comprehension of a word for the sole purpose of revising its current (supposedly defective or limited) meaning. That isn't because this would be a difficult trick to pull off, it is because it is no more of an option than, say, pretending (to oneself) to forget the meaning of a word while actually using it meaningfully!

 

Conversely, if "changev" has no meaning (or if it is unclear what it means -- or, indeed, if we don't fully understand it), then, plainly, neither that word nor its meaning may be corrected by means of any sentence that also contains this 'suspect' word (as we saw in H2a). Once more, any attempt to do so must involve the use of this defective word, thus compromising any sentence in which it appears.

 

H2a: Ordinary language can't fully grasp change.

 

So, if it is true that our grasp of "changev" is defective (in any way at all), then those very same imperfections or limitations will be inherited by any sentence used by those who seek to correct, or reform, it -- such as H2a (or its preferred 'dialectical' equivalent). Clearly, in that case, prospective revisers of the vernacular would be in no position to comprehend what they themselves were trying to reform, since they would be in the same boat as the rest of us, using a word with unspecified shortcomings.

 

In reply, it is little use being told that "Changev has this or that shortcoming otherwise it is perfectly Ok in everyday contexts" since that sentence too contains a word that is of indeterminate meaning -- namely, "changev" -- vitiating this (nuanced) criticism. [I return to this attempt to specify this word's alleged shortcomings, below.]

 

On the other hand, if such hypothesised/prospective linguistic, or conceptual, 'reformers' in fact understand the generic word "change" differently from the rest of us, then any proposed modification to ordinary language would only apply to their own special use of this novel term -- i.e., to a word that is typographically identical to the ordinary word, "change" -- namely "changed" --, but which is itself still of undisclosed meaning --, but not to "changev", as it is used in ordinary language.

 

The claim here, therefore, is that with respect to the word "changev", it isn't possible for anyone even to begin to say in what way it fails to mean what it is ordinarily taken to mean -- or even by how much or how little it falls short of this --, let alone entertain the possibility that it might or might not mean whatever it now means, without using that word in any attempt to do just that.

 

As to the claim that the ordinary word "changev" can't cope with long, drawn-out processes, it is sufficient to point out that the use words found in the above list  (perhaps augmented with words drawn from mathematics and science) means that ordinary language is perfectly able to cope with changes of unlimited complexity or duration, and far better than anything Hegel came out with -- especially now we know that, if his theory were incorporated into Marxism, change would be impossible.

 

It could be argued that this would make the translation of foreign words into, say, English impossible. In addition, it would render dictionaries totally useless.

 

Neither of these objections is relevant. We translate foreign words into English using words we already understand, and which words to be translated are also understood by those who use that (foreign) language long before they were translated. In contrast, the above ruminations concern the use of a word in relation to which it isn't possible for anyone to point out its limitations without also using the same word in that very act. And, plainly, any sentence in which that word is used can't fail to inherit these unspecified limitations, making such sentences no less defective.

 

On the other hand, if sentences that use "changev" have a clear sense, then that word must be alright as it is, vitiating the whole exercise.

 

More-or-less the same comment applies to the use of dictionaries, the successful employment of which depends on its compilers defining words (a proportion of which might be unknown to many of its users) in terms we already understand. If, however, no one knows what "change" really means, or if it has unspecified shortcomings, then no one would know precisely what it was that was being corrected or re-defined, still less how to go about doing it. And that observation also applies to those who compile dictionaries. Such a word wouldn't appear in those dictionaries.

 

Consider an example taken from Essay Six: if someone wanted to know what "meskonator" meant, but could find no one who knew what it meant -- and there was no one who did know --, then, plainly, it wouldn't appear in a dictionary. If, on the other hand, someone claimed to know what this word meant, but they also let slip that there were unspecified 'difficulties' with their comprehension of this word, and could, or would, say no more, then that word would still fail to appear in a dictionary. Dictionaries typically contain words that human beings use, or have used, with comprehension.

 

[That isn't to suggest that everyone comprehends every single word in a dictionary -- but if no one understood a given 'word', not even the compilers, it wouldn't be listed. What would be the point? Has anyone found "meskonator" in a dictionary? [Let me know if you have.] In fact, a Google search will show that that 'word' is only to be found at this site, but nowhere else in the entire internet.]

 

Again, it could be objected that we correct each other regularly concerning the misuse of certain words -- indeed, correcting malapropisms depends on this. For instance:

 

"Mrs. Malaprop said, 'Illiterate him quite from your memory' (obliterate) and 'She's as headstrong as an allegory' (alligator)." [From here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

That wouldn't be possible if the above comments were the case.

 

Once more, that objection isn't relevant. If and when we correct one another, at least one party to that social interaction would have to understand the corrected words aright before the other was corrected. Or, in the case of malapropisms, someone would have to understand both words in order to correct someone else with the correct and appropriate word. The same is the case with Spoonerisms, only more so.

 

In the foregoing -- with respect to "change", and because of this theory, DM --, that isn't the case. We are given to believe that we have a defective understanding of "changev", and have yet to be given a clear explanation of "changed"!

 

Some might feel that my comments rely on the word "change" (or even "changev") having one and only one correct meaning; but that objection, too, is misguided. Howsoever many meanings this word has in ordinary language, no one would be able to use it in any sentence seeking to correct a specific use of it if every single one of its many meanings was defective in some as-yet-unspecified way. Or, perhaps less radically: no one would be able to do so even if that were the case merely with respect to a restricted sub-set of its relevant ordinary connotations -- i.e., those of concern to dialecticians.

 

Moreover, and worse, any attempt to specify what these alleged 'shortcomings' are can't work, either. Consider the following 'attempt' to revise, or correct, the word in question:

 

H3: "Change" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."

 

If so, then H3 should be re-written as follows:

 

H4: "Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."

 

[Any who think H4 is ridiculous are encouraged to shelve those concerns for a few more paragraphs. The point of using it will soon become clear.]

 

The replacement of the word "change" in H4 with what it allegedly means just creates an empty sentence (and the same would happen with respect to any of its cognates -- indeed, Hegelians and DM-theorists are free to replace the proposed 'dialectical meaning' of "change" offered above with whatever formula they deem fit, the result won't change (irony intended)).

 

[Incidentally, this argument (and those above) can be generalised to cover any and all attempts to 'correct' the vernacular.]

 

If it is now objected that the above example is unfair -- or even ridiculous --, then it behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary words for change (or what they relate to) fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short of -- without actually using the word "change" (or any of its synonyms or cognates) anywhere in that attempt.

 

That was the point of using the 'ridiculous' example recorded in H4. Objectors don't have to use the suggested replacement employed in H4 -- namely "Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality" they can insert whatever they feel is the equivalent of "change" in order to help puzzled onlookers get the point. Short of doing that -- i.e., short of indicating in what way our ordinary words for change fall short without actually using the word "change" -- such an objector's own use of this word (or one of its cognates, or even a favoured replacement) to express her/his objection (howsoever mild, attenuated, nuanced, or 'dialectically-motivated' it happens to be) will be subject to the very same unspecified shortcomings, and the objection itself would fail for lack of determinate content.

 

In that case, such an objector would find herself in a worse predicament than the rest of us supposedly are. That is because she will now be unclear, not just about our ordinary words for change, but about the application of her own non-standard, jargonised replacement for it, since she will necessarily be unclear about what they were supposed to be replacing or correcting!

 

It could be objected that this particular manoeuvre confuses use with mention; in H3 the word "change" isn't being used, merely mentioned, so its replacement with "Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality" (which is what that word is used to mean) is illegitimate.

 

H3: "Change" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."

 

Fair enough; in that case consider then the following:

 

H3a: Change doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.

 

H3a should perhaps then be re-written as follows:

 

H4a: Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.

 

Once more, if the word "change" in H3a (now used, not mentioned) actually means something else (or, the processes in reality it supposedly depicts aren't as we ordinarily take them to be), which would imply that we are all currently mistaken about its real meaning, then H3a must be meaningless, too -- or, at best, it must be of indeterminate sense. In that case, the only way that H3a could be made comprehensible would be to replace the meaningless term it contains (i.e., "change") with words that H3a tells us constitute its 'real meaning' -- illustrated in H4a. The result is, if anything, even worse.

 

Once more, it isn't possible to revise or adjust the meaning of "change" without using that very word itself (with its unspecified shortcomings), thus rendering any such sentence devoid of sense.

 

Again, that was the point of using the 'ridiculous' examples above.

 

It could be argued that the if foregoing argument were valid, that would mean we would be unable to correct inadequacies in the use of any word whatsoever. For example, someone might choose to say that the war in Iraq was "unfortunate". If the above conclusions were legitimate, no one would be able to point out that this particular word was totally inadequate in such a context.

 

Again, this is an irrelevant objection. The word "unfortunate" in the above counter-example isn't being criticised because it is inadequate in (possibly) all of its applications, only that it is the wrong word to use here. In this example, no one would be seeking to correct or revise the meaning of "unfortunate", nor suggest that it was universally inadequate, or that no one understood, or even fully understood, that word. Indeed, and to the contrary, it is easy to see that this word is inappropriate in this context because of what it already means.

 

This isn't how things are with any attempt to correct the meaning of the word "change". Indeed, if DM-theorists are to be believed, this word has unspecified and universal inadequacies, which 'shortcomings' must of necessity also feature in the very act of pointing this alleged fact out -- nullifying that criticism. And, as we have just seen, any attempt to specify its alleged shortcomings falls apart, too.

 

It could be countered that this isn't in fact the case with the use of "unfortunate"; someone could complain about its use along the following lines:

 

H5: "Unfortunate" is totally inadequate to capture the magnitude of the unmitigated disaster in Iraq.

 

Once more, the use of H5 would only work in the way intended if the above objector was appealing to the current meaning of this word (or, at least, one of its current meanings) to show it is inadequate just here, in this context, but who wasn't seeking to alter or revise it, as was the case with H3/H3a and "change". Once more, it is because "unfortunate" already means what it does that makes it inappropriate in this instance. The volunteered objector isn't suggesting we continue to use the same word with a new meaning attached to it, or even with a revised meaning, only that its current meaning renders is inadequate to the task it has been given.

 

H3: "Change" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."

 

H3a: Change doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.

 

It could be argued that that is precisely why H5 was introduced as a counter-example, because the current meaning of "change" is "inadequate to the task it has been given", namely in relation to dialectical change.

 

H5: "Unfortunate" is totally inadequate to capture the magnitude of the unmitigated disaster in Iraq.

 

However, with respect to "unfortunate" no one is claiming it is defective or inadequate in every way, only that it was the wrong word to use in this case because of the meaning it already has. Now, with respect to "change", no one is suggesting it is the wrong word to use, only that it was incapable (in some unspecified way) of depicting..., er..., change! But, that just takes us back to where we were several paragraphs back.

 

Again, it could be argued that the type of 'analysis' promoted in H3 and H4 could be applied to any word with equally ridiculous results. Consider, for example, the following:

 

H6: "Recidivist" means "a second offender; a habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms of imprisonment under habitual offender statutes."

 

H7: "A second offender; a habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms of imprisonment under habitual offender statutes" means "a second offender; a habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms of imprisonment under habitual offender statutes."

 

Transforming H6 into H7 shows how misguided the above argument is. The definition of any word can be reduced to absurdity if that definition is substituted for the word in question, as was attempted in H4.

 

Or, so this objection might proceed.

 

However, the difference here is that H6 doesn't seek to re-define the given word, or point out its 'real' meaning (the latter of which is supposed to be different from its accepted meaning), or even claim that no one knows its 'true' meaning, as was the case with respect to H3 and "change". Nor is it suggesting that "recidivist" is inadequate to the task in hand, unlike "change", because of some unspecified shortcomings. As noted earlier:

 

[I]t behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary words for change (or what they relate to) fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short of -- without actually using the word "change" (or any of its synonyms or cognates) anywhere in that attempt.

 

That wasn't the case with "recidivist".

 

On the other hand, had H6 instead been the following, the above objection might have had a point:

 

H8: "Recidivist" doesn't mean what we ordinarily take it to mean (i.e., "a second offender; a habitual criminal; often subject to extended terms of imprisonment under habitual offender statutes...."), it means "A, B and C".

 

Where "A, B and C" stands for the preferred replacement, or even the 'real meaning' of the term to be defined. In that case, we might conclude:

 

H9: "A, B and C" doesn't mean what we ordinarily take it to mean, it means "A, B and C".

 

In this case, the only way that H8 could be made comprehensible would be to replace the meaningless term -- or term with indeterminate meaning -- it contains (i.e., "recidivist") with words that H8 tells us constitute its 'real meaning' -- as illustrated in H9. In so far as H8 seeks to re-educate us about a word that we do not yet understand, it collapses into absurdity in H9. If we don't do this then we would be forced to use a word that no one understands (i.e., in this manufactured example "recidivist"), rendering H8 incomprehensible.

 

Recall, given this latest example (i.e., H8), it isn't the case that one, and only one, individual on the planet has failed to comprehend "recidivist" (just as it wasn't the case earlier that only one individual failed to comprehend "change"). If H8 is to work, not one single person on the planet would actually understand the given word.

 

[Naturally, H9 is absurd. But that is because no one in their left or right mind would try to tell us that the rest of us don't understand a given word, and that only they do.]

 

It might now be objected that this would undermine the use of stipulative definitions, or re-definitions, of certain words -- that is, definitions which establish by fiat the new meaning of words already in use, or even the meaning of newly introduced words -- neologisms.

 

Again, this response is misplaced. Stipulative definitions don't seek to re-define the meaning of ordinary words in their entirety, merely introduce a new meaning, or extend the old, which already have an accepted meaning. That isn't the case with H3. When someone introduces a new word, or they are re-defining a word already in use, they aren't telling us that up until now no one has understood, or fully understood, some term, or that the term that everyone has been using for years is defective (in some as yet unspecified way).

 

H3: "Change" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."

 

Once more, it could be objected that this would mean that language couldn't change, or that we wouldn't be able to understand any earlier uses of typographically similar words, perhaps those employed hundreds of years ago.

 

In fact, the second half of the above worry is simply a variation of the 'translation' objection fielded earlier. The reader is therefore referred back to it.

 

The first half of the above objection is, though, slightly more complex. Unfortunately, in that it uses the word "change" to make its point, it can hardly be advanced by anyone querying the universal applicability of that very word! Hence, until it is rephrased in a way that doesn't use this term (or any other related ordinary word for change), not much can be done with it.

 

Nevertheless, this account of the ordinary use of "change" (in this Essay) doesn't in fact rule out the evolution of language. To see this, consider the following:

 

H10: The word "XXX" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".

 

Now, H10 isn't the following:

 

H11: The word "XXX" does not mean, and has never meant, "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".

 

The argument being advanced in this Essay doesn't deny words meant different things in the past, or that they will do so in the future, only that whatever they legitimately once meant can't change, even if it later takes on a new meaning. So, if a word -- say, "XXX" -- meant something specific in the past -- "YYY", for example --, that past meaning, "YYY", plainly won't have changed, since, to state the obvious, the past doesn't change. So, if "XXX" meant "YYY" in and around, say, 1567, then nothing we now do, or can even try to do, will change that fact, or the meaning it had back then -- even if "XXX" later meant something different, or now means something different. Nor does it imply that no one understood, or fully understood, the old meaning of words like this back then.

 

However, the 'dialectical theory' being criticised here is in fact saying something far more radical. It is telling us that a specific word, "change" (and its related terms, now or in the past), never in the entire history of humanity captured what dialecticians would now like to tell us is the 'real meaning' of "change". Hence, the 'dialectical' view is in fact a more extreme version of H11.

 

H11a: The word "XXX" does not mean, and has never ever meant, "YYY"; it really means "ZZZ".

 

In response, it could be objected that despite this the approach adopted in this Essay still can't account for linguistic change. "Indeed," an objector might continue, "why can't we inflict some of Ms Lichtenstein's own moves on the above sentences?"

 

H12a: "XXX" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".

 

H12b: XXX used to mean YYY, but now it means ZZZ.

 

Perhaps along these lines, replacing "XXX"/XXX with "ZZZ"/ZZZ:

 

H12c: "ZZZ" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".

 

H12d: ZZZ used to mean YYY, but now it means ZZZ.

 

Which neatly mirror H3 and H4:

 

H3: "Change" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."

 

H4: "Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality" doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: "development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality."

 

Initially, in response to this latest criticism, it is worth pointing out that the more radical versions of H3 and H4 (i.e., H3a and H4a) were in the end the preferred alternatives, since they neutralised the 'use/mention objection':

 

H3a: Change doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.

 

H4a: Development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality doesn't mean what ordinary language would lead us to believe; it means: development over time as a result of internal contradictions understood as real material forces in a mediated totality.

 

This means that H12a is now irrelevant.

 

If, however, we modify H10 accordingly (as H13), my reply should become a little clearer:

 

H13: "XXX" used to mean YYY, but now it means ZZZ.

 

[H10: The word "XXX" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".]

 

An actual example here might help:

 

H14: "Lunatic" used to mean someone affected by the moon [Skeat (2005), p.351)], now it means they are insane.

 

Hence, given the view advanced here, the old word still means what it used to mean -- that is, when we read old manuscripts that employ this word, we don't replace the old meaning with what this word has now come to mean, we still read it with its old meaning in place. What we now have is a modern, typographically identical token of "lunatic" with a new meaning. But, no one is questioning that earlier meaning. No one is suggesting that several centuries ago people didn't mean by "lunatic" someone affected by the moon, or even that no one understood that word back then.

 

Now, if would-be critics want to revise a word in common use, all well and good; no problem with that. But this can't affect the ordinary meaning that that word currently has (or even once had). Such a revision would merely relate to this new, and typographically identical, word with its new, or extended, meaning.

 

On the contrary, no attempt could be made to undermine or question the meaning that a word already has without that revision itself descending into incoherence, or undermining itself, as we have seen.

 

So, neither H12c nor H12d is a relevant objection to the case being presented in this Essay.

 

H12c: "ZZZ" used to mean "YYY", but now it means "ZZZ".

 

H12d: ZZZ used to mean YYY, but now it means ZZZ.

 

It could be objected once more that this misses the point; a philosophical understanding of change -- which might have a role to play in the natural or the social, sciences on the lines advocated by dialecticians -- doesn't seek to replace ordinary language, which is quite adequate in its own sphere of application. It is aimed at augmenting our comprehension of natural and social development, for political or other purposes. The vernacular is inadequate only when we try to use it to account for complex processes in the natural or social world. That is where Hegel's ideas can be of genuine assistance (i.e., when the "rational core" of his system has been separated from its "mystical shell", put "the right way up", and then tested in practice).

 

Or, so this latest rebuttal might insist.

 

However, as we will see in other Essays posted at this site, not only is the above incorrect in general -- in that it is the conceptual wealth possessed by ordinary language which enables the comprehension of simple and complex changes in nature and society --, it is misguided in particular. That is because we are still in the dark over what it is that dialecticians are actually proposing, or what they are presuming to add to our understanding of a word neither they nor anyone one else yet fully comprehends, even according to them. Once more, if our (collective) understanding of the word "change" (or, indeed, any other drawn from the vernacular) is defective (in any way at all, and no matter how slight or nuanced that is), then any use of that word in an attempt to correct these unspecified defects (or even vaguely hint at them) must self-destruct, too.

 

Of course, it could be argued that there is no such thing as a "collective understanding" of this or any other word.

 

That complaint will be tackled head-on in Essay Thirteen Part Three. For present purposes, it is sufficient to point out that if that were the case, then dialecticians themselves would be even more in the dark over what they were effecting to revise or criticise, since they wouldn't now be able appeal to a standardised set of meanings -- commonly held -- that they are seeking to 'correct' or extend.

 

After all, Hegel himself had to appeal to the limitations of that mysterious 'faculty', "the abstract understanding", to motivate his own (egregiously defective) 'logic'. If there is no such thing as "the abstract understanding", then his theory can't even loop the first Hermetic loop. As should seem obvious: in order to criticise 'commonsense', or common understanding, or even allude to their shortcomings, it isn't a good idea to tell us there is no such thing to begin with!

 

Quite apart from that, we would surely be unwise to listen to dialecticians trying to extend our knowledge of 'change', nor yet to those regaling us with the 'superiority' of their 'theory' over any other, if  they have yet to succeed in explaining clearly to the rest of us a single one of their ideas (which, as I have shown in these Essays, they have so far failed to do), or, indeed, until they have repaired the gaping holes I have punched in Hegel's 'logic' elsewhere at this site (for example, here and here).

 

Howsoever limited ordinary language is -- or isn't --, when it is used in relation to HM, the latter makes eminent good sense. DM (with its obscure Hegelian jargon and radically defective 'logic', upside down or 'the right way up') has yet to come within a couple of parsecs of this minimal condition (and that comment applies to 'systematic' and 'academic' dialectics, too --, perhaps even more so).

 

In addition, but far worse, dialecticians can't account for change themselves.

 

Hence, their assistance in this respect is surplus to requirements. Indeed, if their help were ever to be accepted, DM would set back the scientific study of nature and society by at least two-and-a-half thousand years, since it represents a return to a mystical and enchanted view of natural and social development. We might as well ask Astronomers to take account of Astrology in their endeavour to understand the universe -- or medical doctors take up crystal gazing.

 

Small wonder then that Dialectical Marxism is to success what Donald Trump is to telling the truth. In that case, as far as rival (scientific or philosophical) theories are concerned (i.e., those that actually help us understand the world and how to change it), DM doesn't even make the bottom of the reserve list of likely candidates. We would be more inclined to accept 'Trump Thought' instead:

 

 

Video Three: Donald Trump Shows DM-Fans

How To Explain Stuff

 

HM, on the other hand, minus the Hegelian gobbledygook, is far more than merely adequate.

 

And that is why we can be confident that not even Hegel understood his own 'theory'. That isn't because it is difficult, nor yet because it employs specialised terminology (which is completely incomprehensible to untrained readers, and arguably even to trained readers, too). Nor is it because Hegel didn't use H3 (or anything like it). It is because as soon as any attempt is made -- by anyone, even a person of "genius" -- to correct ordinary language, or, as soon as the vernacular is dismissed as defective, or even slightly flawed, and its terms are held to be deficient when applied beyond "certain limits", requiring that they be "surpassed", by-passed or revised -- all meaning evaporates, and along with that goes comprehension. The systematic production of obscure jargon and endless verbiage, à la Hegel, doesn't imply there is anything there actually to understand, either, still less that Hegel understood his own work.

 

[A similar, but more detailed argument concerning what Hegel did or didn't understand about his own theory can be found here.]

 

To repeat, it isn't possible to pretend to understand an ordinary word like "change" and then claim that it is defective (whether or not "speculative reason" suggests, or even "demands", it). Either:

 

(i) That objector's understanding of this word is itself defective, and the ordinary term is alright as it is, or,

 

(ii) The ordinary word is defective and no one (including that objector) actually understands it, and so should stop using it.

 

In the second case, there would be nothing comprehensible left to modify; in the first, no one need bother.

 

Finally, of course, it might be possible to construct a technical definition of "change", perhaps along the following lines:

 

T1: Concerning object, B, let the set of true propositions/indicative sentences about B at time t1 be {P1, P2, P3,..., Pi,..., Pn}, where n is indefinitely large.

 

T2: Call that set, "Ω".

 

T3: For any object, B, B will have changed if at least one of those propositions, Pi at t2, is no longer true, but is false (t2 > t1).

 

T4: That is, at t2, Pi Ï Ω.

 

Unfortunately, the above 'definition' presents nearly as many problems as there are words in T1, which I won't enter into here (I will return to it in Essay Twelve Part Seven). Those problems become slightly less numerous if we switch from propositions/indicative sentences to properties. The only point I wish to make here is that howsoever we try to define "change", that won't affect the ordinary meaning(s) of that word, nor will it raise any doubts about the adequacy of its meaning(s) -- and for reasons outlined in this main subsection.

 

[I will say more about this in the above Essay.]

 

Ordinary Language Isn't A Theory -- 01

 

It might still be objected that ordinary language is obviously inadequate in scientific and technical contexts (let alone in Metaphysics), in which case, it needs reforming, supplementing or augmenting in some way, or to some extent.

 

And yet, science has managed to make significant progress over the last four hundred years without having to reform the vernacular, even if scientists have had to develop their own specialised and technical vocabulary (some of which has been drawn from the vernacular). The problem (if such it may be called) only surfaces when attempts are made to translate scientific concepts into ordinary language. Since there is no scientific need to do this (although there may be powerful ideological and economic reasons why some might want to do it, as will be argued in Essay Thirteen Part Two), the alleged clash between ordinary language and science is completely bogus.

 

Of course, no one is suggesting that ordinary language can be used in highly complex, theoretical areas of research (although, even technical scientific and mathematical papers have to use ordinary words at some point, and they certainly can't stray too far away from utilising ordinary grammar if they want to make sense), but that is no more a limitation on the vernacular than it is a defect of Das Kapital that it can't predict winning lottery ticket numbers.

 

Metaphysics (partly) arose out of the ancient belief that there were philosophical 'problems' about existence, 'reality' and humanity (etc.) that only expert (and socially 'superior') theorists were capable of solving -- or even understanding -- 'problems' which many later thought lay beyond the capacity of the sciences to handle.

 

Keith Thomas highlighted a similar tactic among 16th century magicians:

 

"It would be tempting to explain the long survival of magical practices by pointing out that they helped provide many professional wizards with a respectable livelihood. The example of the legal profession is a reminder that it is always possible for a substantial social group to support itself by proffering solutions to problems which they themselves have helped to manufacture. The cunning men and wise women had an undoubted interest in upholding the prestige of magical diagnosis and may by their mere existence have helped to prolong a mode of thinking which was already obsolescent." [Thomas (1972), p.295.]

 

Even though Thomas subsequently rejected this as an adequate explanation of this phenomenon, he notes that the 'special' skill these magicians arrogated to themselves (that is, the ability to solve 'problems' they had invented) provided them with a livelihood, a level of prestige and social standing that they wouldn't otherwise have enjoyed. Of course, with respect to superstition and magic, Marxists also take into account their origin in the alienated lives and beliefs of susceptible audiences -- the latter of which would have included, of course, many ordinary people.

 

Clearly, this isn't the case with Metaphysics, which was (and still is) practiced almost solely by rather more 'select' and 'exclusive' social classes. Hence, Thomas's reason for rejecting his own tentative explanation of the persistence of magical beliefs (i.e., that magicians provided a service which ordinary people actively sought) doesn't apply to Metaphysics. Moreover, his account explains neither the overwhelming influence of Metaphysics on almost every aspect of 'western' and 'eastern' thought over the last 2500 years (it is, indeed, a ruling idea), nor, indeed, the longevity and persistence of Traditional Philosophy (with precious little to show for it after all the time and effort spent on it --, so this pointless activity can't be justified on purely economic grounds). Of course, Thomas's comments weren't designed to do that.

 

However, one reason usually given for the prevalence, or the ubiquity, of metaphysical beliefs is that everyone (including ordinary folk) at some point in their lives has, or expresses, philosophical puzzles of some sort, or they ask these questions or they ponder such issues. This is supposed to show that philosophical problems enjoy universal appeal and legitimacy. Hence, the argument in support appears to be the following: if everyone thinks metaphysically (at some level at some point in their life), its existence can't be the result of its invention by an elite group of thinkers, as is alleged at this site.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth noting the following considerations in response:

 

(1) It is important to distinguish the confused and impromptu musings that many individuals indulge in from time to time on such things as the nature of space, time, 'God', 'good' and 'evil', the 'soul', or the purpose of human existence (i.e., 'the meaning of life'), from the systematic study of metaphysical questions by those who have the necessary means, leisure time, education and training so to do (i.e., professional philosophers, theorists, sponsored, patronised and wealthy 'amateurs').

 

(2) Contrary to the above supposition it isn't being suggested here that metaphysical beliefs were invented by the ruling-class (or their hangers-on), only that the systematic study of Metaphysics is the sole preserve of those who have (knowingly or not) consistently promoted a highly abstract, theoretical and ultimate view of 'reality', an approach which has invariably been conducive to the interests of the rich and powerful, or the interests of those who seek to replace them as the next ruling elite. [On that, see Essay Twelve -- summary available here.]

 

(3) The fact that ordinary people indulge in amateurish metaphysical musings from time to time no more makes Metaphysics a legitimate pursuit than it would do the same for religious and theological discourse. Ordinary people don't suddenly turn into theologians if they wonder whether there is a 'god', an 'after-life', or whether we have 'souls'. If and when they do so ponder, that still fails to legitimate Theology and religious belief. The same applies to Metaphysics. So, ordinary people don't become metaphysicians if they wonder what time really is or whether there is such a thing as truth.

 

(4) The widespread confusion that holds both groups in its thrall -- that is, professional metaphysicians and amateurs -- derives from two immediate sources: (a) The misconstrual of ordinary words as if they stood for the real relations between things, or, indeed, were those things themselves, and (b) As Marx noted, the systematic misuse and distortion of language, conflating linguistic rules with fundamental truths about 'reality'. [This approach to the nature and source of metaphysics is fully substantiated in Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

However, and independently of this, only 'professional metaphysicians' have an easily identifiable ideological motive for projecting these distorted linguistic forms onto the world as a fetishised reflection of social reality, expressed in, or by, a systematic theory or set of theories. This they do because: (i) Their philosophical theses mirror the world as they see it (i.e., a universe governed by hidden forces, concepts and "essences"), (ii) It assists in the 'legitimation' of class division, gross inequality, oppression and exploitation. [Historically, it is relatively easy to show that this has indeed been the case with most, if not all, metaphysical systems.] And (iii) These days this approach to 'genuine' philosophy is good for the CV. [Again, these topics will be expanded on in Essay Twelve.]

 

Lay metaphysicians, on the other hand, have no class-based motivation to fetishise their own language in like manner -- not the least because to do so would clash with the way they already employ the vernacular in their everyday lives.

 

In fact, if ordinary folk in their day-to-day activity were to emulate the approach adopted by metaphysicians, they would probably be regarded as psychotic, deranged or delusional. Which reminds one of the old joke:

 

NN: "The great questions of philosophy interest me: Who am I? What am I? Where am I?"

 

NM: "Sounds more like amnesia to me!"

 

Or:

 

MM: "Is this the Philosophy Department?"

 

MN: "If we knew the answer to that, we wouldn't be here!"

 

To be sure, the insular existence of professional metaphysicians mercifully protects them from themselves (as it were). It is only when they have to engage in everyday practical activities alongside the rest of us that their metaphysical theories look decidedly weird, if not completely ridiculous --, even to themselves --, as David Hume acknowledged:

 

"I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition, that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy." [Hume, Treatise, Book I Section VII. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Clearly, that is because it is in ordinary life that the alleged clash between philosophical musings and 'commonsense' actually surfaces -- i.e., "Where the rubber hits the road", as they say in the USA. When metaphysicians have to behave like 'ordinary folk' in the real world, their metaphysical fancies lose all credibility. Not one single sceptic or idealist (short of being suicidal) will fail to jump out of the way of a bus or a tram that is headed their way, preferring to pause and try to work out if that perception is 'real' or imaginary. Not one single philosophical materialist will treat his/her children or relatives as no more than a complex array of biological imperatives, chemical reactions or electrical impulses, a result of the interplay between natural selection and random mutation. Not one single scientific realist, or empiricist, will fail to respond to a red traffic light on the grounds that red is only a 'subjective experience'. Not one single metaphysician will turn up late to an interview because 'time is an illusion'. Not one single theist, who might fervently intone the belief that "God is on our side because our cause is just", will fail to take cover when fired at by the enemy -- although some believers can be found who have failed to do this, but only because they thought they were wearing a 'magic' vest.

 

In ordinary circumstances, this Philosophical 'Emperor' looks naked even to 'true believers'. [On this, see Cowley (1991).]

 

Small wonder then that Traditional Philosophy has solved not one single philosophical 'problem' in over 2500 years -- as Peter Hacker reminded us:

 

"For two and a half millennia some of the best minds in European culture have wrestled with the problems of philosophy. If one were to ask what knowledge has been achieved throughout these twenty-five centuries, what theories have been established (on the model of well-confirmed theories in the natural sciences), what laws have been discovered (on the model of the laws of physics and chemistry), or where one can find the corpus of philosophical propositions known to be true, silence must surely ensue. For there is no body of philosophical knowledge. There are no well-established philosophical theories or laws. And there are no philosophical handbooks on the model of handbooks of dynamics or of biochemistry. To be sure, it is tempting for contemporary philosophers, convinced they are hot on the trail of the truths and theories which so long evaded the grasp of their forefathers, to claim that philosophy has only just struggled out of its early stage into maturity.... We can at long last expect a flood of new, startling and satisfying results -- tomorrow.

 

"One can blow the Last Trumpet once, not once a century. In the seventeenth century Descartes thought he had discovered the definitive method for attaining philosophical truths; in the eighteenth century Kant believed that he had set metaphysics upon the true path of a science; in the nineteenth century Hegel convinced himself that he had brought the history of thought to its culmination; and Russell, early in the twentieth century, claimed that he had at last found the correct scientific method in philosophy, which would assure the subject the kind of steady progress that is attained by the natural sciences. One may well harbour doubts about further millenarian promises." [Hacker (2001), pp.322-23.]

 

[Some might think that several 'philosophical problems' have been solved by the natural sciences. That objection will be defused in Essay Thirteen Part Two. Others might think that it isn't in the purview of philosophy to 'solve problems'. Well, in that respect at least it has succeeded admirably. Otherwise, it is an open admission that Traditional Philosophy is indeed useless.]  

 

Since ordinary language has developed in an unplanned way over tens of thousands of years it can be imprecise and ambiguous, and it is manifestly 'non-scientific' (i.e., non-technical). Many ordinary terms are vague, and surface grammar encourages users to form, or to ruminate on the import of, potentially misleading expressions (but that comment only implicates the unwary, the unwise, or the obtuse), forgetting, albeit temporarily, that neither we nor they use the vernacular in such 'metaphysical' ways in ordinary life. As Wittgenstein pointed out:

 

"Why is philosophy such a complicated structure? After all, it should be completely simple if it is that ultimate thing, independent of all experience, that you make it out to be. Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking, hence its results must be simple, but its activity as complicated as the knots it unravels.

 

"Lichtenberg: 'Our entire philosophy is correction [sic] of the use of language, and therefore the correction of a philosophy -- of the most general philosophy.'... You ask why grammatical problems are so tough and seemingly ineradicable. -- Because they are connected with the oldest thought habits, i.e., with the oldest images that are engraved into our language itself (Lichtenberg)....

 

"Human beings are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i.e., grammatical, confusion. And freeing them from these presuppositions [amounts to?] extricating them from the immensely diverse associations they are caught up in. One must, as it were, regroup their entire language. -- But of course this language developed as it did because human beings had -- and have -- the tendency to think this way. Therefore extricating them only works with those who live in an instinctive state of dissatisfaction with language. 

 

"Language has the same traps ready for everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false paths. And thus we see one person after another walking down the same paths....

 

"One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really doesn't make any progress, that the same philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who say that don't understand the reason this must be so. The reason is that our language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. So long as there is a verb 'be' that seems to function like 'eat' and 'drink', so long as there are the adjectives 'identical', 'true', 'false', 'possible', so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of space, etc., etc. humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove.

 

"And this, by the way, satisfies a longing for the transcendental [an alternative version of the manuscript has 'supernatural' here -- RL], for in believing that they see the 'limit of human understanding' they of course believe that they can see beyond it.

 

"I read '...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of "Reality" than Plato got...'. What a strange state of affairs. How strange in that case that Plato could get that far in the first place! Or that after him we were not able to get further. Was it because Plato was so clever?" [Wittgenstein (2013), pp.311-12e. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged; link added. When Wittgenstein says that language has remained constant he isn't denying change; what he is referring to are its nominal, adjectival and verb forms, and the metaphors and analogies that cause perennial problems, those that puzzled Plato and still puzzle us today.]

 

However, this doesn't mean that ordinary language is defective. Far from it, ordinary language was founded on conventions and material practices that our species has shaped and re-shaped, developed and refined over tens of thousands of years, during which the vernacular functioned perfectly well as a means of communication. The vagaries of ordinary language enable its users to communicate effectively over a much wider range, and across a far broader and expansive subject area, than would otherwise be the case if it were overly precise.

 

When required, however, precision is relatively easy to achieve; indeed, at the risk of deliberate and determined pedantry, almost any degree of accuracy is attainable. It is also worth recalling that much of our mathematical vocabulary is already part of ordinary language (many of its terms initially arose out of the vernacular, anyway). In addition, the potentially misleading grammatical forms which the vernacular contains only succeed in confusing users when they attempt to reflect on language itself (which we/they are ill-equipped to do -- why that is so will be explored in Essays Twelve Part Seven and Thirteen Part Three). Typically, this doesn't happen when users employ the vernacular in everyday life; in the normal course of events, these potentially misleading grammatical forms don't interfere with communication, nor do they baffle ordinary speakers, since puzzles like these don't arise in such circumstances.

 

These considerations not only account for the vibrancy of ordinary language, they shed light on a source of many of the 'paradoxes' and philosophical 'problems' created by its misuse. While ordinary language couldn't function without the aforementioned features -- i.e., vagueness, ambiguity, metaphor, synonymy, antonymy, prosody, etc. --, but, they can also create confusion and misunderstanding if they aren't handled with due sensitivity; or, dare I say it, they aren't handled with no little common sense. Nevertheless, these features also lend to language sufficient space, enabling a seemingly limitless expansion of its expressive and communicative powers -- in the Arts, for example.

 

However, the downside of this is that it is all too easy to misconstrue ordinary language when users try to reflect on it theoretically -- i.e., when language "goes on holiday" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein). This occurs whenever the vernacular is employed in areas that are either far removed from, or are insulated against, everyday life --, or when its representational and communicational forms are conflated. As will be argued at length in Essay Twelve Part One, philosophical pseudo-problems arise out of, or because of, the mis-construal of rules of language as if they were Super-Empirical propositions, which are then taken to reflect substantive, even 'hidden' and 'essential', aspects of 'Reality' (or 'Being'). Forms of representation are thereby transmogrified into 'metaphysical truths', valid for all of space and time, and, because they are based on a familiar use of language (albeit distorted and misinterpreted), not on the facts, they seem impossible to doubt.

 

DM-theorists, for example, are guilty of doing exactly this in connection with their ham-fisted 'analyses' of the LOI and the LOC. Instead of viewing them as badly stated or misconstrued rules of language, they follow Traditional Theorists and regard them as Super-Truths, valid everywhere and everywhen. The only difference is that for dialecticians, while these 'laws' are still regarded as 'abstract truths', they are also said to be limited in scope, since they 'can't handle change and development'; they only apply to an 'unchanging world', and collapse into absurdity when faced with reality. So, they regard them as truths, not rules, albeit with limited applicability. In the course of which, DM-fans also confuse the use of the negative particle with a destructive/preservative process in nature and society (i.e., in relation to the NON). If language and logic are interpreted along these lines -- as some sort of code, or body of truths, which somehow reflects or expresses an underlying, hidden 'reality'/'essence' (when understood 'dialectically') -- its role becomes primarily representational, instead of being primarily a means of communication. The result of this traditional view of philosophical theory is the construction of yet another version of LIE -- indeed, as we saw in Essay Three Part One.

 

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; LOI = Law of identity'; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction; NON = The Negation of the Negation.]

 

[The substantiation and development of the above ideas constitutes one of the main themes of Essay Twelve (summary here). Other points connected with this topic have been aired in several Essays at this site. For example, the question whether language is a means of representation or of communication was handled in Essay Thirteen Part Three. There, it was shown that representational theories of language were invented by Traditional Theorists in the Ancient World who were concerned to argue that discourse (particularly the written word) is a secret code invented by 'the deity' that they alone were capable of understanding. That 'code' somehow maps-out, or even mirrors, fundamental, "essential" aspects of 'Being', inaccessible to the senses. This then 'allowed' them to claim that this 'secret code' -- translated into impenetrable jargon, and kept that way in order to exclude it from the prying eyes of the vast majority -- enabled them to re-present to themselves 'God's' thoughts. This then supplied their patrons (in the various ruling elites that history has inflicted on humanity) with an epistemological and ontological rationalisation of, and 'justification' for, the status quo, the content of which varied as each Mode of Production and form of the State required. In order to do this, Traditional Theorists had to depreciate and undermine 'commonsense', as well as the communitarian and communicational nature of language -- and hence they had to devalue the vernacular. That explains why practically every single Traditional Philosopher -- and now, almost without exception, DM-theorists -- denigrate and depreciate to a greater or lesser extent the ordinary language and common experience of the working class.]

 

Now, as far as the supposedly fraught relationship between the vernacular and philosophical-, or metaphysical-language is concerned, there can be no conflict -- that is, no more than there can be a genuine clash between, say, the nonsense rhymes of Edward Lear and ordinary discourse. That is because metaphysical language is non-sensical and incoherent.

 

Admittedly, ordinary language has changed in countless ways over the course of history. We are now capable of forming sentences and expressing thoughts that our ancestors couldn't. Doubtless this process will continue. But, ordinary language remains the highest, if not the final, court of appeal for human beings in their endeavour to understand anything.15 That is because its historically-, and socially-conditioned conventions -- by means of which we learn to apply it -- express and delimit our capacity to comprehend anything whatsoever.

 

The above claims might appear somewhat dogmatic, but that isn't so. It is based on the simple observation that words like "understand", "comprehend", "know" and "grasp" are already ordinary language terms, and they gain whatever meaning they have from the conventions and practices governing their current employment. They don't gain their meaning from technical, imaginary or ideal applications, nor do they derive meaning from abstractions that are only accessible to Traditional Philosophers -- or even Marxist intellectuals. Words like those mentioned above can't be challenged without that attempt itself collapsing into incoherence -- as was demonstrated earlier in connection with "change", and will be illustrated further elsewhere at this site with respect to several other ordinary terms.

 

The bottom line is that while scientists may quite legitimately introduce neologisms to suite their own aims and intentions, scientific language itself can't confront (or reform) ordinary language without undermining itself.

 

Moreover, ordinary language isn't a theory; it neither encapsulates a "folk ontology" nor a "folk metaphysics". It isn't identical with common sense -- even though it isn't unconnected with it.

 

Those seemingly dogmatic assertions will now be defended.

 

Ordinary Language Isn't A Theory -- 02 -- Nor Does It 'Assume' Things Are Static

 

Many revolutionaries and DM-theorists clearly believe that ordinary language is 'ideological', or that it encapsulates (at some level) a ruling-class or 'commonsense' view of 'reality', which in turn means that ordinary language is compromised by, or expresses, bourgeois ideology.

 

"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him, a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis, one to the other.

 

"At first sight, this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound commonsense. Only sound commonsense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It can't see the woods for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]

 

"Dialectic training of the mind, as necessary to a revolutionary fighter as finger exercises to a pianist, demands approaching all problems as processes and not as motionless categories. Whereas vulgar evolutionists, who limit themselves generally to recognizing evolution in only certain spheres, content themselves in all other questions with the banalities of 'common sense.'" [Trotsky (1971), p.70; bold emphasis added.]

 

"Voloshinov's starting point is the ideological nature of all signs, including language. He defines a sign as that which 'represents depicts or stands for something outside itself' (Voloshinov 1973:9). This correspondence is an essential feature of all signs…. Sign systems exist side by side with material reality, not independently of it.

 

"'A sign does not simply exist as a part of reality -- it reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore it may distort that reality or be true to it, or it may perceive it from a special point of view…every sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation…. The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is present too….' (1973:10…)

 

"The quality of signs to represent, to 'reflect and refract another reality', to interpret, is what gives them their conceptual potency and makes words the very stuff of ideology…." [Holborow (1999), p.25; quoting Voloshinov (1973), pp.9-10. I have destructively criticised this passage, and others like it, in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

 

"The word as an ideological sign par excellence. The ideological neutrality of the word....

 

"Any ideological product is not only itself a part of reality (natural or social), just as is any physical body, any instrument of production, or any product of consumption, it also, in contradistinction to these other phenomena, reflects and refracts another reality outside itself. Everything ideological possesses meaning: it represents, depicts or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words it is a sign. Without signs there is no ideology. A physical body equals itself, so to speak; it does not signify anything but wholly coincides with its particular, given nature. In this case there is no question of ideology.

 

"However, any physical body may be perceived as an image; for instance, the image of natural inertia and necessity embodied in that particular thing. Any artistic-symbolic image to which a particular physical object gives rise is already an ideological product. The physical object is converted into a sign. Without ceasing to be a part of material reality, such an object, to some degree, reflects and refracts another reality....

 

"Signs are particular, material things; and, as we have seen, any item of nature, technology, or consumption can become a sign, acquiring in the process a meaning that goes beyond its particularity. A sign does not simply exist as a part of reality -- it reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore it may distort that reality or be true to it, or it may perceive it from a special point of view. Every sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation (i.e., whether it is true, false, correct, fair, good, etc.). The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is present, too. Everything ideological possesses semiotic value.

 

"Every ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow, of reality, but is also itself a material segment of that very reality. Every phenomenon functioning as an ideological sign has some kind of material embodiment, whether is sound, physical mass, colour, movements of the body, or the like. In this sense, the reality of the sign is fully objective and lends itself to a unitary, monistic, objective method of study. A sign is a phenomenon of the external world. Both the sign itself and all the effects it produces (all those actions, reactions, and new signs it elicits in the surrounding social milieu) occur in outer experience....

 

"But nowhere does this semiotic quality and the continuous, comprehensive role of social communication as conditioning factor appear so clearly and fully expressed as in language. The word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence." [Voloshinov (1973), pp.9-13. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"[E]veryday commonsense thought was a mass of contradictions that could only be resolved by moving to progressively greater abstractions.... Hegel is also difficult for reasons that are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms and concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of which everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes…. It is the search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past commonsense definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998), pp.41-50. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]

 

Here, too, are Woods and Grant:

 

"The most common method of formal logic is that of deduction, which attempts to establish the truth of its conclusions by meeting two distinct conditions: a) the conclusion must really flow from the premises; and b) the premises themselves must be true. If both conditions are met, the argument is said to be valid. This is all very comforting. We are here in the familiar and reassuring realm of common sense. 'True or false?' 'Yes or no?' Our feet are firmly on the ground. We appear to be in possession of 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth'. There is not a lot more to be said. Or is there?.... (p.90; or p.94 in the second edition of RIRE)

 

"Formal logic (which has acquired the force of popular prejudice in the form of 'common sense') equally holds good for a whole series of everyday experiences. However, the laws of formal logic, which set out from an essentially static view of things, inevitably break down when dealing with more complex, changing and contradictory phenomena. To use the language of chaos theory, the 'linear' equations of formal logic cannot cope with the turbulent processes which can be observed throughout nature, society and history. Only the dialectical method will suffice for this purpose.... (p.94; or p.99 in the second edition)

 

"In the same way, if we ask, 'Is it night or day?' the answer will depend on where we are. In London it is day, but in Australia it is night. Day and night are relative notions, determined by our position on the globe. An object will appear bigger or smaller depending upon its distance from a given point of observation. 'Up' and 'down' are also relative notions, which changed when it was discovered that the world is round, not flat. Even to this day, it is hard for 'common sense' to accept that people in Australia can walk 'upside down'. Yet there is no contradiction if we understand that the notion of the vertical is not absolute but relative. For all practical purposes, we can take the earth's surface to be 'flat' and therefore all verticals to be parallel, when dealing for instance, with two houses in one town. But when dealing with far larger distances, involving the whole earth's surface, we find that the attempt to make use of an absolute vertical leads to absurdities and contradictions." (p.155, in both editions) [Woods and Grant (1995/2007); quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]

 

[We have already seen that W&G's claims about logic might as well have been written by Enid Blyton -- since they are entirely fictional. For example, they confuse valid arguments (where the premises don't have to be true) with sound arguments (where the premises have to be true). They compound these basic errors by further confusing FL with "common sense"! W&G also advance the bizarre (and unfounded) claim that "common sense" finds it difficult to accept that in Australia people walk upside down!]

 

[FL = Formal logic; W&G = Woods and Grant, authors of Woods and Grant (1995/2007).]

 

Despite the above, the vernacular isn't a theory, nor does it encapsulate one -- which means it isn't ideological, either --, since every empirical proposition expressible in ordinary language is pairable with its negation, and so can readily be contradicted in the vernacular. No theory could survive if that were to happen to all its empirical propositions. [That particular argument will be defended and then illustrated by a range of examples in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published in 2020.]

 

Here is John Rees again:

 

"Hegel is also difficult for reasons that are not the result of character and circumstance. His theories use terms and concepts that are unfamiliar because they go beyond the understanding of which everyday thought is capable. Ordinary language assumes that things and ideas are stable, that they are either 'this' or 'that'. And, within strict limits, these are perfectly reasonable assumptions. Yet the fundamental discovery of Hegel's dialectic was that things and ideas do change…. And they change because they embody conflicts which make them unstable…. It is to this end that Hegel deliberately chooses words that can embody dynamic processes…. It is the search to resolve…contradictions that pushes thought past commonsense definitions which see only separate stable entities." [Rees (1998), pp.41-50. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Contrary to what Rees asserts, ordinary language not only doesn't, it can't, assume anything. Plainly, it is human beings who assume things, and they do so by means of the language they use. Unless language had the capacity to allow for the possible truth or the possible falsehood of these assumptions, and that of their negations, no assuming could even begin. That is, of course, because assumptions can be correct as well as incorrect. [Admittedly, it could be argued that Rees was employing metonymy here. Maybe so, but the point still stands. Language isn't an autonomous system; it takes human beings to give it life.]

 

Moreover, the rich and diverse vocabulary available to ordinary speakers also allows for the assumption (but it is far more than this) that objects can and do change -- and in complex ways, too. Indeed, ordinary language enables its users to speak about and study a wide variety of changes in seemingly limitless detail. A long list of just some of the words available in the vernacular that enable this was given earlier.

 

Hence, and despite what Rees says, the sophisticated nature of ordinary language permits the formation of the following sentences that depict change with ease:

 

H78: This protest is increasing in size as we watch.

 

H79: That case is becoming too heavy for the children to carry.

 

H80: This venue is now too small for our meetings.

 

H81: This spider's web is beginning to disintegrate.

 

H82: This train is being re-painted.

 

H83: That light over there is defective; it keeps flickering.

 

H84: This is how to lose members rapidly: spout dialectics at them.

 

H85: This dispute is no longer about working conditions.

 

H86: This entire continent is moving closer to Asia.

 

H87: That is how to break an egg.

 

H88: This is how to change workers' minds.

 

H89: This π-bond breaks in less than 5 nanoseconds if the molecule is rapidly heated.

 

H90: In an instant the pickets had re-grouped ready for the next police charge.

 

Many of the above sentences are somewhat stilted because they have been deliberately tailored to use the words "this" and "that" (i.e., the form of words that Rees employed to caricature the vernacular), in order to show that "things and ideas" aren't "assumed" to be stable -- contrary to his assertion. However, the above list of examples at least demonstrates that even using Rees's implausible and highly restricted phraseology, ordinary language is capable of expressing material changes (especially if it is augmented with words drawn from science and mathematics), something Hegel's tortured prose can't emulate -- that is, not without raiding the vernacular, or aping the protocols of ordinary discourse, to assist it do just that.19

 

Even given this highly limited and constrained form of language, the above list of sentences can easily be extended. Of course, if the full range of words and phrases available to ordinary speakers were called upon (H90 being just one example of such), it would be possible to form an indefinitely large set of sentences of far greater sophistication than anything dreamt of in Hegel's work, picturing changes of every imaginable type.

 

This shows that ordinary language is capable of depicting (and thus permitting the explanation of) change in the real world far better than any philosophical theory yet devised.

 

Now, this isn't something that a sophisticated user of English (like John Rees) should have to have pointed out to him -- even though my having to do so is a sad reflection of the intellectual decay that 'dialectical thought' induces in those held in its thrall.20

 

Hence, it is a little rich of Rees proclaiming the superiority over the vernacular of the language employed in Hegel's work, and, indeed, in DM -- since, if 'true', DM would make change impossible.

 

Ordinary Language And 'Commonsense'

 

'Commonsense' is often confused with ordinary language. Unfortunately, the term "commonsense" is rather vague.22 Bertrand Russell once claimed "commonsense" encapsulated the "metaphysics of savages", but even he would have been hard-pressed to say what it was, let alone how he knew so much about it. We have already seen that W&G think it has something to do with FL -- and that those held in the grip of "commonsense" are somehow incapable of coming to terms with the idea that people in Australia supposedly walk 'upside down'!23

 

If the phrase has any clear meaning, it appears to denote an inchoate but changing set of beliefs and opinions that most (all?) human beings are supposed to possess, or to which they assent whether or not they are aware of it. [But, even that depends on who is telling the tale!] If this were so, it would mean that this set of beliefs must have been communicated telepathically from individual to individual, one generation or one community to the next, across the planet down the ages. How else are we to account for the alleged universality of 'commonsense'? And yet, at no point in life has a single human being ever been tutored in 'commonsense'; no one runs through a set of its canonical ideas at school, sat at their parents' feet, or even behind the bike sheds at break (recess) with their friends. Nobody studies 'commonsense' at college, nor do they take tests, sit exams in it or receive a diploma confirming their competence. That being the case, we should perhaps stop calling it "common".

 

One thing is reasonably clear about 'commonsense': it can't be all that common or we should all be experts at identifying its core ideas, or being able to say where they came from. But nobody seems able to do this -- at least, not with any consistency.23a

 

Moreover, if 'commonsense' is encapsulated in or by ordinary language, it is remarkably well hidden, for, as noted above, no one seems able to list its core ideas with any consistency, or even minimal concord. In that case, no society in history could possibly have reached agreement over what should be included among our 'commonsense' beliefs/'values' or, indeed, what should be left out. Hence, the belief that 'commonsense' today is the same as it was two thousand years ago (or even last week), and that it is identical across one or more cultures -- or even the opposite of that --, if correct, must be one of the best kept secrets in human history. If no one ever talks about this hypothetical set of beliefs and no one knows what it includes, it is no surprise that it remains a mystery how it is, or could be, propagated within or between populations, or how one generation could pass 'commonsense' on to the next. Is it in the water? In the 'ether'? Is it genetically encoded?

 

It could be countered that the everyday lives and surroundings we share (perhaps under capitalism) mean that we all come to accept certain beliefs about ourselves, those around us, our work and the nature of the society we inhabit.

 

But, if any of the above were the case, we would all possess the same, or largely the same, set of 'commonsense' beliefs; and yet, as far as can be ascertained, we don't. Or, rather, it seems that no one is able to say whether or not we all share the same set, since, as noted above, no one seems quite able to list the 'commonsense' beliefs held by everyone -- or, indeed, held even by themselves. [Readers are invited to try to list their own 'commonsense' beliefs -- and good luck with that!] Still less is it clear how 'commonsense' might be distinguished from what are simply widely-held beliefs. Of course, since we all live different lives in different countries in different generations (many in different classes), it is highly implausible to conclude we do share a common set of beliefs. But, even if that were so, is such a set of widely held beliefs the same as 'commonsense'?24

 

For example, is it a 'commonsense', or a widely held belief, that dogs have four legs? What about the belief that grass is green or that the sky is typically to be found above our heads? Even more problematic: how would it be possible to confirm the presence or existence of these beliefs and attitudes, or determine what they are, without biasing the result?

 

By that I mean the following: anyone who attempted to show that certain 'commonsense' beliefs were accepted by all or most human beings would have to appeal to evidence that was already 'contaminated' with these allegedly 'commonsense' beliefs themselves -- for instance, that there really are medium-sized objects in the world called "human beings", that there are such things as colours (so that, for example, any assertion that human beings believe there are colours isn't an empty idea in itself), or that there are edges, corners, surfaces and holes at large in the world (so that the words associated with each of these might possess or convey meaning), and so on. In short, if this evidence is to make sense to the rest of us (and, indeed, to anyone hoping to sell this tall story), then those appealing to it will have to take for granted many supposedly 'commonsense' ideas themselves.

 

And what questions, for example, could be asked of the subjects targeted by any such research? "Do you believe in tables and chairs?" "What noise do cows make?" "Is water wet or dry?" "Are fires hot or cold?" "Is this a dog or cat?" At which point one might just as well reach for Janet and John books.24b

 

Be this as it may, the sorts of beliefs that some appear to associate typically with 'commonsense' ideas include such things as ideological, metaphysical, religious, 'folk', mystical or superstitious notions. Again, the list of likely candidates varies according to who is telling the tale. For example, we find two comrades, in an otherwise excellent article on 'privilege theory', using this term to refer to how oppression manifests itself to most of us (I am inferring they mean most of us, here):

 

"In seeing the world through the prism of 'unearned advantages' [that is, advantages supposedly conferred on individuals because of their skin colour, sex, or the class they were born into -- RL] privilege theory reflects the common sense appearance of how oppression functions -- men on average do earn more than women; white people are proportionately less likely to be stopped by the police than black and Asian people. But to understand how oppression works, we have to look beneath the surface at how society functions and in whose interests. As Karl Marx argued: 'All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided'.... [The authors are here quoting Marx (1998), p.804.] Today, while it is true that the genuine growth in the desire for unity and the opportunities to generalise struggles remains, the rise of privilege theory as a common sense outlook on oppression risks resurrecting some of the same divisive moralism we hoped to have put behind us." [Choonara and Prasad (2014), pp.85-89. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

We have already seen other Marxists linking 'commonsense' with metaphysics, FL, 'vulgar evolutionism', ordinary language, changeless objects, and how people in Australia are viewed! Now it is connected with how we (all?) supposedly perceive oppression.

 

We also find the late Chris Harman, for example, trying to explain 'commonsense' in his summary of Gramsci's ideas about it:

 

"His starting point is that most people's ideas are shaped by a hotchpotch of differing and sometimes contradictory notions. These flow from the interaction between people's experiences and the prejudices of the society they live in. The hotchpotch is what is usually referred to as common sense. But in fact it makes it difficult for people to fully understand the forces shaping their lives and the possibilities of confronting them. Activists who say they do not need theory, and follow the dictates of common sense are, in reality, failing to take the effort to understand the world and their place in it." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

So, 'commonsense' is now a contradictory "hotchpotch" which somehow "flows" from the alleged interaction between experience and the prejudices that surround us all!

 

Here is Bertell Ollman with a very broad 'definition' of this troublesome notion (which he only succeeds in making even more troublesome!):

 

"Common sense is all that strikes us as being obviously true, such that to deny any part of it appears, at first sight, to involve us in speaking nonsense. In this work, I shall use 'common sense' as well to refer to that body of generally unquestioned knowledge and the equally unquestioned approach to knowledge which is common to the vast majority of scholars and laymen in Western capitalist societies." [Ollman (1976), p.5. In the published version this appears as a footnote to p.5, but in the on-line version it appears in footnote 6. Bold emphases added.]

 

However, what is "obviously true" to, say, a Quantum Physicist, a Brain Surgeon or a Civil Engineer isn't always the same as what is "obviously true" to a hospital porter, a miner or a car worker. It might be "obviously true" to a mathematician that while there is a greatest even prime number there is no greatest prime number as such, but is that "obviously true" to many others?  Furthermore, a "body of unquestioned knowledge" will contain entries that refer to things that actually change -- for example, the belief that rivers flow, fires burn and horses gallop --, contrary to what Engels and other DM-fans try to tell us about 'commonsense' -- i.e., that it 'assumes' things are 'static'. In fact, the vast majority of Marxists will accept the vast bulk of what is contained in the aforementioned "body of unquestioned knowledge". How many revolutionary socialists will question much that has been discovered over the last forty or fifty years -- and is now part of "unquestioned knowledge" -- in, say, medicine, biochemistry, engineering, electronics, computer science, or mathematics?

 

Ollman's 'definition' is so vague, broad, and indiscriminate that it is impossible to connect it with anything that other Marxists have said about 'commonsense'. In which case, his 'definition' can't even form part of Marxist commonsense about 'commonsense' -- since it isn't part of "generally unquestioned" (Marxist) knowledge.

 

We needn't labour this point any longer; it is now reasonably clear that the word "common" is misplaced here. In which case, one is tempted to say that the idea that there is such a thing as 'commonsense' must itself be a "scientistic folk belief", since it isn't based on a clear definition, let alone any clear evidence --, at least, as noted above, none that hasn't already been 'tainted' by, and expressed by means of, the sort of ideas some would already classify as 'commonsense'!

 

So, since nobody appears to know which beliefs are to be added to or left out of the favoured list, the word itself is something of a misnomer. If 'commonsense' had ever lived up to its billing, we would all be much clearer about its content. It would be, after all, eminently common.

 

Even so, almost invariably, the relationship between 'commonsense' (whatever it finally turns out to be!) and ordinary language is assumed to be reasonably obvious; indeed, the latter is supposed to contain or express the former. So clear and obvious is this link imagined to be, and so universally is this belief held, that no one (literally no one (!) -- as far as I have been able to ascertain) questions it. Even Wittgenstein seems at times to have made this mistake!

 

But, while no competent speaker is in much doubt about his or her own language, nobody seems to be able to say what 'commonsense' is, or what it encompasses. Even though not all of us enjoy a mastery of language equal to that of its most accomplished speakers or writers, no one (novice and skilled adept alike) seems to know exactly what 'commonsense' is. This is quite remarkable if the two are as intimately connected as we have been led to believe.

 

The case for identifying the two is no less questionable. Again, as noted above, ordinary language is supposed to contain, or express, 'commonsense' ideas. However, when pressed to fill in the details, those wishing to lump the two together are often reduced to making a few vague references to things like sunrise, solid objects, colour vision, the possession of two hands, an assortment of psychological or 'mental' dispositions and 'processes' we often attribute to ourselves and others, a set of perceptual conundrums, a handful of proverbs and 'wise' sayings, a few vague moral, political or ideological nostrums, as well as the odd superstition or two. [On that, see here.]

 

In fact, the haste to identify the two isn't just unwise, it is ideologically-motivated (as will be demonstrated in Essay Twelve, summary here).

 

On the other hand, had more than a moment's thought been devoted to this pseudo-identity, its absurdity would have been immediately apparent: if ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense', it would be impossible to gainsay any of the latter's alleged deliverances by means of ordinary language.

 

The plain fact is, we can. And relatively easily, too.

 

Not only are we able to deny some or all of the following: that tables are solid, that the sky is blue, that the earth is flat, round or cucumber-shaped, that NN believes (for most p) that p, that NM ψ-ies, that sticks bend in water, that Queen Elizabeth II is sovereign in Parliament, that water falls off a duck's back, that Rome was built in a day, that an apple a day will tend to reduce the number of visits from your doctor, that φ-ing is wrong, or, indeed, right (for any conventional φ), that Capitalism is fair, that human beings are 'naturally' selfish -- we can do so in every known language that possesses the relevant vocabulary. That is, of course, the whole point of the negative particle.25 If ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense', none of this would be possible.

 

[It is worth recalling that we can deny falsehoods just as we can deny truths, which is why a few from both categories were included in the above paragraph. "NN" and "NM" go proxy for (human) Proper Names; "p" is a propositional variable (standing for sentences such as "Grass is green" or "Water is wet"); "φ" is a noun-, or verb-phrase variable (standing for terms such as "murder", "scabbing", or "voting Tory"; "ψ" stands for 'psychological' verb phrases, such as "hopes", "intends", "thinks", sometimes qualified in the following manner "NN believes that...", etc.]

 

To be sure, many of the beliefs entertained by our ancestors we no longer hold, but as far as the connection between 'commonsense' and the vernacular is concerned, sentences drawn from the latter gain what sense they have because of conventions that have been established in and by social practices developed throughout human history. Although we can express beliefs in ordinary language, the sense of an indicative sentence expressing such beliefs doesn't arise from any of the beliefs we hold, nor from any we have inherited from the past. That is because beliefs themselves are dependent on language and thus on our capacity to articulate them accordingly. And we can be sure of that fact if language is social -- otherwise beliefs couldn't be expressed or communicated, let alone formed.26

 

Just as social practices themselves can't be altered individualistically (any more than the value of money can), the conventions underpinning language can't be revised at will by any single individual, or even by a group (except perhaps at the margins).27 The conventions implicit in our practices at any point in time, of course, change and grow in accord with the protocols of social development. They are, at basis, just another, perhaps more overt, expression of our "species being", and are therefore intimately connected with our interactions with the world, our relationships with one another, and the links we have with previous generations, albeit constrained, corrupted and deformed by class society.28

 

Hence, just as it would it be impossible for an individual to bury, hide, or incorporate a set of beliefs in ordinary language in order to form the backbone of 'commonsense', it would be equally impossible for a group to do so.

 

In that case, it really isn't up to a revolutionary, or party of revolutionaries (or anyone else, for that matter), to disparage such a vitally important expression of our collective (but changing and class-divided) humanity -- i.e., ordinary language. Whether revolutionaries do so or not is plainly up to them; the 'penalty' (if such it may be called) for even attempting to do it isn't always immediately obvious. However, anyone who tries to undermine the vernacular will soon find their ideas descending into the sort of incoherence we met above with the respect to the word "change" (and as will be further demonstrated in other Essays posted at this site in relation to different sets of words). In that case, attacking the vernacular isn't a viable option, since such a strategy will always backfire.

 

That means this isn't an ethical issue; it is logical and political. The latter half of that assertion will now be substantiated...

 

[The rest of this material will appear in Essay Twelve Part Seven, when it is published.]

 

Additional Notes

 

In what follows, several of the Endnotes which form part of Essay Twelve have been omitted, hence its rather odd numbering!

 

15. Of course, this will be controversial only to those who have already allowed Traditional Thought to dictate or distort their view of ordinary language -- even while they use it to express any such objections they might have to it.

 

So, since the use of ordinary language underpins our understanding of anything whatsoever, it is the court of last appeal --, which, while it isn't democratic (in one sense of that word -- we don't determine what something means by counting heads), it is in another: language is materially-grounded in the practices and social interaction of the vast majority -- i.e., in the everyday lives of those who, through their labour, continually interface with material reality and with one another, and who keep this world going. This means that there are aspects of ordinary language that can't be 'reformed' without automatically undermining our ability not only to comprehend anything at all, but to do anything whatsoever -- which is why, when it comes to practicalities, metaphysicians soon abandon their ornate and implausible fantasies. And that also helps explain why traditional (i.e., metaphysical) theorists' attempts to reconstruct 'reality' in the comfort of their own heads disintegrate so readily, and why they are fundamentally anti-democratic (in the obverse of the second sense of the phrase mentioned above -- since metaphysical theories have been and still are concocted by a vanishingly small minority, and weren't developed out of, nor were they a result of, collective labour and communal life). Not unconnected with this is how, in Dialectical Marxism, this endeavour to uncover nature's 'hidden secrets' is intertwined with substitutionist thinking. [On that, see Essay Nine Parts One and Two.]

 

Furthermore, many scientific concepts have themselves been derived from ordinary language by analogical and metaphorical extension (etc.). [On that, see Crosland (2006).]

 

Indeed, even though it is possible to comprehend a scientific theory without having to translate it into the vernacular, such an endeavour can't succeed in undermining the latter without fatally compromising that very attempt. [This slide into incoherence was illustrated above, but in more detail in Essay Three Part Two.]

 

....

 

19. Anyone who doubts this is welcome to attempt to express in 'Hegel-speak' what sentences H78-H90 manage to say quite easily without any such 'assistance'.

 

20. Max Eastman's comment springs to mind at this point:

 

"Hegelism (sic) is like a mental disease -- you cannot know what it is until you get it, and then you can't know because you've got it." [Eastman (1926), p.22.]

 

Those words were, of course, written when Eastman still regarded himself as a Leninist.

 

[I first encountered Eastman's books and articles after about five years into this project (i.e., in and around 2003). Some of the ideas expressed at this site had clearly been anticipated in his work, but only some. Anyone who objects to my quoting Max Eastman should check this out first, and then perhaps think again.]

 

....

 

22. It should be emphasised at this point that these comments aren't aimed at the ordinary phrase "common sense", merely at its philosophical and 'dialectical' employment highlighted in the main body of this Essay and at this site by a use of the term, "commonsense".

 

The original meaning of "common sense" (i.e., as Aristotle intended it) isn't relevant to the present discussion since its subsequent philosophical employment parted company with Aristotle's use long ago. There is very little material available on-line about Aristotle's use of this phrase, but Wikipedia summarises it quite well:

 

"[Common sense] is [a] capability of the animal soul...proposed by Aristotle, which enables different individual senses to collectively perceive the characteristics of physical things such as movement and size, which all physical things have in different combinations, allowing people and other animals to distinguish and identify physical things. This common sense is distinct from basic sensory perception and from human rational thinking, but cooperates with both." [Quoted from here: accessed 16/07/2018.]

 

Be this as it may, it seems that most commentators on the far-left think "commonsense" refers to a body of wildly held -- and more often than not reactionary or conservative -- beliefs, attitudes, values or opinions. However, and by way of contrast, in ordinary use "common sense" typically appears in sentences like the following:

 

C1: Use your common sense! Don't put your hand in the lion's cage!

 

C2: Have you no common sense? What on earth made you try to debate with a Nazi?

 

C3: It's just common sense. No one in their right mind would rummage around in a waste disposal unit while it is switched on.

 

C4: As the hurricane approaches the public are advised to listen to the advice given by the emergency services and use their common sense. Don't go for a walk along the promenade, for example!

 

C5: Where's your common sense? You can't feed your children nothing but junk food and sugary drinks!

 

Admittedly, the above examples depend to some extent on certain beliefs held about ourselves and the world around us, but the difficulty computer programmers have in reproducing human behaviour shows that this isn't just a matter of holding specific beliefs. Indeed, while some human beings are fully aware of certain well known facts, they still insist on acting in ways that will elicit comments like those above, in C1-C5. I am sure we have all met such individuals; the word "idiot" might well have been invented with them in mind.

 

To be sure, politicians often use the word "commonsense" to defend all manner of right-wing, reactionary and populist ideas -- but then they will say anything, won't they?

 

[The ideological use of "commonsense" is further examined below.]

 

23. As Michael Dummett pointed out [in Dummett (1979), pp.390-93], there is no such thing as "the commonsense" view of the world.

 

23a. If 'commonsense' beliefs were culturally 'relative', each generation would possess a different, or slightly different, set of 'commonsense' beliefs -- even if there were some overlap in places. In that case, of course, there would be no such thing as 'commonsense'. It would still be a mystery, however, how such beliefs could be passed on from one generation to the next, or between individuals, if no one has a clue what they are, or if no one agrees what they are.

 

It could be argued that the transmission of such ideas might take place at a non-conscious, or subconscious, level, as attitudes and 'values' were passed down the generations -- or as they might be randomly acquired during a lifetime -- perhaps as a result of socialisation, peer pressure, the mass media, or the education system, etc.

 

Even if that were so (but the idea itself will be questioned in Essay Three Part Seven), it would still be unclear exactly what was being 'passed on'. Indeed, no one -- researchers and their subjects alike -- seems capable of saying what this dubious inheritance is, over and above mentioning a few items from the vague lists alluded to earlier. Of course, in that case, this would be the very first field of scientific research -- should any such be commissioned -- where no one knew what they were talking about before they even began to work on it!

 

And, it is no use doing a survey. Either that survey's questions would bias the result, or the questions will be too vague to be of any use. [On what I mean by this, see here.]

 

That is quite apart from the fact that if these supposed beliefs were acquired in the random manner suggested, they wouldn't be all that common (except, perhaps, as the result of a giant fluke).

 

24. Again, since I don't accept the legitimacy of the philosophical use of this term, I won't try to solve this intractable problem for those who do.

 

24b. We are reminded at this point of the laughably easy 'cognitive competence' test set for Donald Trump in 2017. That was a very low bar.

 

25. The sophisticated use to which humans beings are capable of putting the negative particle (and its many conversational equivalents) is explored at length in Horn (1989/2001).

 

26. That controversial claim will be defended in Essay Thirteen Part Three.

 

27. Unless, of course, this is done in order to extend language. That aside, the abrogation of socially-sanctioned linguistic rules simply results in the production of incoherent non-sense. Naturally, that might be the aim of an aspiring abrogater -- intended, perhaps, for creative purposes, for effect, or to generate puzzlement and confusion. However, the creative extension of language explored by writers or poets (etc.) still has to make some sort of sense. Think of the work of James Joyce; he didn't just write total gibberish or randomly bash away at his typewriter.

 

Again, the above comments don't undermine the remarks made in the main body of this Essay. Those responsible for the development of language don't do so by undermining the use of words we already have. If anything, they extend language, creating novel uses for it, augmenting its vocabulary, creating new connections by means of metaphor, or analogy, etc.

 

[On imaginative or figurative extensions to language, see White (1996, 2010), and Guttenplan (2005). More on this in Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

 

28. Spelled out in detail this would provide some purchase for the word "material" --, at least, as that word is used in many of the Essays published at this site. That task will be attempted when this project has been completed.

 

The above ideas about ordinary language and common sense are developed and defended in the following: Baz (2012), Button, et al (1995), Cavell (1958, 1976 -- this links to a PDF), Cook (1979, 1980), Cowley (1991), Ebersole (1967, 1979a, 1979b), Hacker (1982a, 1982b, 1987, 2007, 2013), Hallett (2008), Hanfling (1984, 1989, 2000), Macdonald (1938), Ryle (1953, 1960, 1961, 1963 pp.67-72 -- these link to PDFs), and Stebbing (1958). It has to be said that, as far as can be ascertained, many of these authors also tend to confuse ordinary language with common sense. Or, at least, they fail to distinguish them as clearly as I have done. Coates (1996) also appears to conflate the two. See also Uschanov (2002), and his longer, on-line article.

 

The ruling-class and their ideologues have always denigrated the vernacular and the experience of ordinary working people. It is unedifying to see Marxists (like this commentator, if he is a Marxist!) doing likewise.

 

[More details about the above ruling-class tactic will be given in Essay Twelve Part Seven (a summary of which can be accessed here), but an excellent account can be found in Conner (2005).]

 

As far as the propensity of the 'lower orders' to embrace 'superstitious' beliefs is concerned (a phrase this commentator doesn't use, but his intentions are reasonably clear), exactly why we should pay any more attention to that phenomenon than we do to religious belief in general (if and when it holds ordinary folk in its thrall) is unclear. But, even if it were clear, its philosophical -- as opposed to its sociological, psychological, or political -- implications would still be open to question. As noted earlier, since we can in the vernacular assert the negation of every single ideological, racist, and superstitious belief, ordinary language and 'commonsense' can't be identical.

 

I now turn to that specific topic in the next sub-section.

 

Ordinary Language And Ideology

 

Again, this is how I will address this issue in Essay Twelve Part Seven (see also, here and here):

 

Admittedly, ordinary language may be used to express not just patent of falsehoods, but any number of offensive, reactionary, racist, sexist, homophobic, bigoted, xenophobic, and regressive opinions. But, doesn't it often express "false consciousness"? The vernacular can't in fact be affected by "false consciousness" -- and that isn't just because that notion was foreign to Marx himself; on that see here. Nor can it be "ideological" as such.

 

I will now defend these contentions.

 

Without doubt, everyday words can be used to give expression to all manner of backward, racist, sexist, homophobic, Islamophobic, xenophobic and ideologically-compromised ideas, but this isn't the fault of the medium in which these are expressed, any more than it is the fault of, say, a computer if it is used to post racist or sexist bile on a web page. Ideologically-contaminated beliefs expressed in ordinary language result either from its misuse or from the employment of specialised vocabularies borrowed from religious dogma, sexist belief-systems, reactionary ideologies, homophobic bigotry, racist and nationalist theories or superstitious ideas. This isn't to suggest that ordinary humans don't, or can't, speak in such regressive ways; offensive speech like this manifestly depends on those opinions being expressed in ordinary language even though it isn't dependent on that language as such. That particular claim might sound paradoxical, so I will attempt to clarify what I mean by it.

 

First of all, this defence of ordinary language isn't being advanced dogmatically. Every user of the vernacular knows it to be true since they know that for each and every sexist, racist, homophobic, xenophobic, and ideologically-compromised sentence expressible in ordinary language there exists its negation.

 

That is why socialists can assert such things as: "Blacks aren't inferior"; "Human beings aren't selfish"; "Wages aren't fair", "Women aren't sex objects", "Belief in the after-life is baseless", "LGBTQ+ individuals aren't perverts", "Muslims aren't terrorists", and still be understood -- even by those held in thrall to the ideas repudiated in this way but who might still hold the opposite view. If ordinary language were identical with 'commonsense' -- and if it were ideological (per se) in the way that some suggest -- you just couldn't say such things. We all know this to be true -- certainly, socialists should know this --, because in our practice we manage to deny, reject and challenge ideas like these every day.

 

So, as noted above, ordinary language might be used to express patent of falsehoods, as well as any number of offensive, reactionary and regressive of ideas; in order to express their contemptible thoughts, reactionary, racist, sexist, Islamophobic, or homophobic individuals might depend on ordinary language in order to give voice to their vile ideas or anti-socialist, anti-human opinions. However, the fact that socialists can reject all such ideas, using the very same medium -- the vernacular --, shows that ordinary language as such can't itself be associated with the expression of those ideas. Again, if it were, socialists wouldn't be able to do this.

 

In which case, it is more than a little puzzling why socialists fail to advance the opposite claim, namely the following: because we can with relative ease explain socialist ideas using the vernacular -- just as we can challenge the objectionable ideas mentioned above -- ordinary language is inherently progressive. Now, I'm not promoting that idea myself, merely asking why socialists are quite so quick to malign, or depreciate, the language of the working class, and assume that because there are regressive ideas expressible in the vernacular that that automatically condemns it, while at the same ignoring their own use of the vernacular to propagandise and agitate the working class, or promote progressive ideas in general. [On this, see Grant (n.d).]

 

In this regard, it is as ironic as it is inexcusable that there still are revolutionaries who, while they are only too ready to regale us with the alleged limitations of ordinary language -- on the grounds that it reflects "commodity fetishism", "false consciousness" or "formal/static thinking" --, while they are ready to that, they are also quite happy to accept (in whole or in part) impenetrably obscure ideas imported from the writings of a card-carrying, ruling-class hack like Hegel. Not only are his Idealist theories based on alienated thought-forms (i.e., Neoplatonism, Mystical Christianity and Hermeticism), his entire system was a direct result of the systematic fetishisation of language -- indeed, as Marx noted:

 

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement [alienation -- RL] of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases and link added.]

 

The aforementioned commentator also had the following to say:

 

"This project is inherently frustrating on so many levels, as Homer Simpson would say. On the one hand Rosa shows up the shameful ignorance of a century of Marxism-Leninism, marshalling in the process a prodigious array of sources on logic and mathematics, and also on the sciences, information that is urgently needed by her audience in view of the ignorance she contests. On the other, that so much energy should be invested to prove so little is tragic....

 

"Rosa occasionally acknowledges partial exceptions, but she has been so traumatized by the mountains of Trotskyist drivel she was force-fed, as well as its Stalinist counterpart, she rarely gets beyond that to see what else might be done or has been done with the dialectical tradition....

 

"Had Rosa not so precipitously dismissed 'academic Marxism', while copiously citing from other academics with expertise in mathematics, logic, and analytical philosophy, she would be better positioned to exploit their contributions as well as pinpoint their weaknesses. The whole history of critical theory is an excellent case in point, perhaps the best case. The Frankfurt School, their precursors, associates, and successors, all fell down on logic and mathematics. Nonetheless, they provided the tools to decipher the ideological phenomena of their time...."

 

The reason why so much has been 'wasted' on "so little" is that the political traditions to which the above commentator refers (which are dominated by different ideological currents within Dialectical Marxism itself) have actually helped damage to our movement from the get-go.

 

In contrast, Academic Marxism and 'Systematic Dialectics' have largely been ignored in these Essays since they are politically irrelevant, and have had zero impact on the class war (other perhaps than negative). [I have covered this topic in more detail, below.] Indeed, they are capable of damaging only the brains of those who still think these two disciplines have anything worthwhile to offer humanity (which fact those so afflicted are unlikely to appreciate for the reasons Max Eastman highlighted). They are welcome to wander down that political cul-de-sac. Count me out.

 

Far from being force-fed on an exclusive diet of Trotskyist and Stalinist 'drivel', I have also been studying Academic Marxist writings now for well over thirty-five years (indeed, at the time of writing this, the Bibliography to my thesis stretches to over 90 pages, containing references to over 3500 books and articles by Traditional Philosophers, LCDs, HCDs, Academic Marxists, and much else beside). To be sure, the 'academic' stream of dialectical gobbledygook isn't the 'low grade drivel' one encounters in certain Trotskyist or Stalinist texts, but it is, nevertheless, high grade drivel --, and politically inept drivel for all that. That is because it has been produced by those who, for all their expensive education, seem quite incapable of writing a clear sentence to save their lives.

 

[For example, I have exposed some of the high grade 'drivel' one finds in Marcuse (1968), here. Chomsky's comments on this are worth reading, too. See also, the examples of academic 'drivel', I have posted here. I have also exposed the radically defective nature of Michael Kosok's car crash of an attempt to 'formalise dialectical logic', here -- as well as expose Bertell Ollman's amateurish attempt to explain 'abstraction' in supposedly Marxist terms.]

 

The latest examples of this are: (1) My demonstration that Thomas Weston's recent attempt to find support for his belief that Marx accepted DM, based on the latter's comments about elliptical motion, etc., in Das Kapital is defective (throughout Essay Eight Part Two as well as here); (2) My detailed demolition of Katharina Dulckeit's endeavour to defend Hegel's transformation of the "is" of predication into an "is" of identity (here); (3) The same with James Lawler's attempt to do likewise (here and here); (4) My detailed criticisms of 'Critical Realism' and Roy Bhaskar's barely comprehensible ideas (here and here); (5) My exposé of Immanuel Kant's lame attempt to make sense of 'real negation', which also applies to Hegel's ham-fisted appropriation of this fractured concept (here); (6) My general take down of attempts made by LCDs and HCDs to show that Marx was heavily influenced by Hegel when he came to publish Das Kapital (here and here); (7) My reduction to absurdity of Hegel's misguided criticism of the LEM (here); (8) My demonstration that attempts made by dialecticians (especially those drawn from the HCD-tendency) to link everything to the mysterious "Totality" are entirely bogus, not least because (a) we have yet to be told what the "Totality" actually, is, (b) what all those universal "interconnections" are, and (c) precisely how 'the part makes the whole and the whole makes the part' (here and here); and finally, (9) My detailed proof that Wittgenstein wasn't a conservative mystic.

 

There will many more takedowns of the high grade drivel this commentator lionises published at this site before I am done.   

 

[LCD = Low Church Dialectician; HCD = High Church Dialectician -- on these, see below; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

 

Here is what I have written elsewhere about the two main, 'drivel'-producing wings of Dialectical Marxism (the low-grade and the high-grade):

 

High Church Vs Low Church Dialectics

 

There are in fact two main currents in Dialectical Marxism: 'Low Church' and 'High Church'. This distinction roughly corresponds with that between active revolutionaries and Academic Marxists -- of course, there is some overlap at the margin. Some academic Marxists are also activists.

 

However, the members of neither faction are seekers after truth, since, like Hegel, they have already found it. As Glenn Magee pointed out:

 

"Hegel is not a philosopher. He is no lover or seeker of wisdom -- he believes he has found it. Hegel writes in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 'To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of "love of knowing" and be actual knowledge -- that is what I have set before me' (Miller, 3; PC, 3). By the end of the Phenomenology, Hegel claims to have arrived at Absolute Knowledge, which he identifies with wisdom.

 

"Hegel's claim to have attained wisdom is completely contrary to the original Greek conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom, that is, the ongoing pursuit rather than the final possession of wisdom. His claim is, however, fully consistent with the ambitions of the Hermetic tradition, a current of thought that derives its name from the so-called Hermetica (or Corpus Hermeticum), a collection of Greek and Latin treatises and dialogues written in the first or second centuries A.D. and probably containing ideas that are far older. The legendary author of these works is Hermes Trismegistus ('Thrice-Greatest Hermes'). 'Hermeticism' denotes a broad tradition of thought that grew out of the 'writings of Hermes' and was expanded and developed through the infusion of various other traditions. Thus, alchemy, Kabbalism, Lullism, and the mysticism of Eckhart and Cusa -- to name just a few examples -- became intertwined with the Hermetic doctrines. (Indeed, Hermeticism is used by some authors simply to mean alchemy.) Hermeticism is also sometimes called theosophy, or esotericism; less precisely, it is often characterized as mysticism, or occultism." [Magee (2008), p.1. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Links and bold emphasis alone added.]

 

Much the same can be said about Marxist Dialecticians who hale from either of the above two denominations (whether they realise it or not).

 

Low Church Dialecticians [LCDs]

 

Comrades from this persuasion cleave to the original, unvarnished truth laid down in the sacred DM-texts (i.e., those written by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Mao). Many of these simple souls are highly proficient at quoting, or paraphrasing, endless passages from the Holy Books in answer to everything and anything, just like the faithful who bow to the East or who fill the Gospel Halls around the world. Their unquestioning faith is as impressive as it is un-Marxist.

 

[An excellent recent example of this affliction, which was in fact prompted by the current crisis in the UK-SWP, can be found here. In January 2013, I posted a mini-refutation of a DM-article of Trotsky's that had been republished at the latter site; my post was based on some of the points made in Essay Six), but as of March 2020 it is still 'waiting moderation'!]

 

[FL = Formal Logic.]

 

In general, LCDs are sublimely ignorant of FL. Now, on its own that is no hanging matter. However, such self-inflicted and woeful ignorance of FL doesn't prevent them from pontificating about it, nor regaling us with its alleged limitations at every turn -- accusations based on ideas they unwisely copied off Hegel, surely the George W Bush of Logic.

 

 

 

Figure Seven Advanced Logic Class At Camp Hegel

 

LCDs are by-and-large active revolutionaries, committed to 'building the party'. Ironically, however, they have unwisely conspired to do the exact opposite, which suicidal policy has helped keep their parties a few notches above microscopic because of the continual splits and expulsions they skilfully engineer. This is a rather fitting pragmatic contradiction that the 'Dialectical Deity' has visited upon these, the least of its slaves.

 

Of course, LCDs fail to see the irony in any of this (even after it has been pointed out to them -- I know, I have lost count of the number of times I have tried!), since they, too, haven't taken the lens caps off.

 

So, despite the fact that every last one of these myopic individuals continually strives to "build the party", after 140 years of such impressive 'building', few revolutionary groups can boast membership rolls that rise much above the risible. In fact, all we have witnessed since WW2, for example, is yet more fragmentation, but still no mass movement.

 

[Anyone who doubts this should look here, here, here and here -- or, now, here -- and then, perhaps, think again. Here, too, is a diagram of the main branches of, and links between, the leading US Trotskyist parties/tendencies.]

 

Has a single one of these individuals made this connection?

 

Are you kidding!?

 

You clearly don't 'understand' dialectics.

 

It seems that the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism and its core theory, DM, are the only two things in the entire universe that aren't 'interconnected'.

 

High Church Dialecticians [HCDs]

 

HCD Marxists are in general openly contemptuous of the 'sophomoric ideas' found in most of the DM-classics,. let alone the books and articles published by their lowly LCD-brethren (even though many of them seem to have a fondness for Engels's First 'Law') -- except, perhaps, Lenin's PN, since it is largely comprised of quotes from the Über-Guru Himself, Hegel.

 

[An excellent recent example of this elitist attitude can be found in Anderson (2007). Another, here and here.]

 

More often than not, HCDs reject the idea that the dialectic operates outwith the social sphere, in nature, sometimes inconsistently using the aforementioned First 'Law' to account for the evolutionary 'leap' that underpinned our development from ape-like ancestors -- which tactic allows them to claim that human history and development are therefore unique --, just as they are equally dismissive of simple LCD souls for their adherence to every last word found in the DM-classics. Apparently, they don't contain enough philosophical gobbledygook, sufficient Hegel, or a surfeit of post-Hegelian, 'Continental Philosophy'.31

 

[Anyone familiar with High Church Anglicanism will know exactly what I mean.]

 

HCDs are mercifully above such crudities; they prefer The Mother Lode -- straight from Hegel, Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks, or the writings of assorted latter day Hermeticists: György Lukács, Raya Dunayevskaya, CLR James, Tony Smith, Tom Sekine, Robert Albritton, Chris Arthur, Bertell Ollman, Judith Butler, Frederic Jameson, Roy Bhaskar, and, of late, The Wafflemeister Himself, Slavoj Zizek.

 

This heady dialectical brew is often fortified with several dollops of hardcore jargon drawn from that intellectual cocaine-den, otherwise known as French Philosophy -- including the work of luminaries such as: Alexandre Kojève, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Paul Sartre, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, Michael Foucault, Alain Badiou, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, and, perhaps, worst of all, the charlatan's charlatan, Jacques Lacan.

 

Or, maybe even obscure ideas derived from that conveyor belt of systematic confusion: the Frankfurt School -- i.e., the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor W Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Jürgen Habermas, among others.

 

[I have discussed Marcuse's somewhat dismissive attitude toward Wittgenstein and 'Ordinary Language Philosophy', here. In relation to this topic, see also my Essay, Was Wittgenstein a Leftist?]

 

Or, worse still, that haven of intellectual heroin: the work of Edmund Husserl, the Nazi, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer.

 

[Chomsky's penetrating thoughts on many of the above 'thinkers' can be accessed via Note 31a, along with several other sharp criticisms of this depressing detour into darkness.]

 

HCDs are generally but not exclusively academics, or they are itinerant 'intellectuals' and 'bloggers'. In common with many of those listed above, tortured prose is their forte, and pointless existence is their punishment. Almost any randomly-selected issue of, say, Radical Philosophy, or Historical Materialism, will provide ample confirmation of the baleful affect the ideas and prose of many of the above have had on left-wing 'intellectuals'.

 

Almost any randomly-selected issue of, say, Radical Philosophy, or Historical Materialism, will provide ample confirmation of the baleful influence of the ideas and prose of many of the above have had on left-wing 'intellectuals'.

 

[Here is yet another example to add to the chorus line of The Hallowed Society for the Production of Gobbledygook. Also, see my comments, here.]

 

 

Figure Eight: The Sisyphus College Recruitment Poster --

Aimed At HCDs Seeking A More Useful Existence

 

At least LCDs like to think their ideas are somehow relevant to the class struggle.

 

In contrast, High Church Dialectics is good only for the CV/Résumé.

 

The late Chris Harman expressed the above sentiments rather concisely a few years ago:

 

"There is a widespread myth that Marxism is difficult. It is a myth propagated by the enemies of socialism -- former Labour leader Harold Wilson boasted that he was never able to get beyond the first page of Marx's Capital. It is a myth also encouraged by a peculiar breed of academics who declare themselves to be 'Marxists': they deliberately cultivate obscure phrases and mystical expressions in order to give the impression that they possess a special knowledge denied to others." [Chris Harman, How Marxism Works, quoted from here. Bold emphasis and link added.]

 

Lenin concurred:

 

"The flaunting of high-sounding phrases is characteristic of the declassed petty-bourgeois intellectuals." ["Left-Wing" Childishness. Bold emphasis added. Unfortunately, Lenin didn't apply that valuable insight to what he found in Hegel's work.]

 

Plainly, the sanitised version of dialectics that HCDs inflict on their readers (purged of all those Engelsian 'crudities') isn't an "abomination" in the eyes of those sections of the bourgeoisie that administer Colleges and Universities --, or, indeed, those who publish academic books and journals.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Nevertheless, the ranks of both factions, HCD and LCD alike, are well-stocked with conservative-minded comrades happy to appropriate the a priori and dogmatic thought-forms of two-and-a-half millennia of boss-class ideology, seldom pausing to give any thought to the implications of such easily won knowledge -- 'knowledge' obtained without the help of a single experiment, and concocted in the comfort of each philosophically-compromised head. If knowledge of the world is a priori, and based solely on armchair speculation, reality must indeed be Ideal.

 

Some might object that the above is a caricature of 'dialectical thought'; they might even be tempted to argue that dialectics is based as much on evidence as it is on the practice and experience not just of the party, but humanity in general. Alas, that naive belief was put to the sword in Essays Two, Seven Part One, Ten Part One, as well as Part One of this Essay.

 

It is worth adding that there are notable exceptions to the above sweeping generalisations; some academic Marxists do actively engage with the class struggle. The point, however, is that the 'High Theory' they crank out is irrelevant in this regard. Indeed, I can't think of even one example of the work of a single academic Marxist that has had any impact on the class war -- except perhaps negatively. [Any who disagree with that rather severe indictment are invited to e-mail me with the details of any counter-examples they think I might have missed.]

 

To be sure, one or two comrades have tried to come up with a few examples of the (positive) practical applications of 'the dialectic'. Unfortunately for them, I have shown that they all fail -- on that, see here, here and here....

 

This has meant that the baleful influence of Hegelian Hermeticism becomes important at key historical junctures (i.e., those involving defeat or major set-back), since it acts as a materialist-sounding alternative to mainstream, Traditional Thought -- indeed, as we saw was the case with Lenin after the defeat of the 1905 Revolution in Russia, and again after the Second International caved in to nationalist warmongering at the beginning of WW1.

 

Dialectics (especially those parts that have been infected with the lethal HCD-strain) thus taps into thought-forms that have dominated intellectual life for over two thousand years, i.e., those that define the 'legitimate' boundaries of 'genuine' philosophy -- those that amount to little more than dogmatic thesis-mongering.

 

So, because of its thoroughly traditional nature, DM is able to appeal to the closet "god-builders" and dialectical mystics that revolutionary politics seems to attract -- and who, in general, appear to congregate at the top of this ever-growing pile of dialectical disasters.

 

Indeed, I will continue to ignore the vast bulk of the material churned out by HCDs just so long as it remains completely irrelevant to the class war. I suspect the Sun will cool first.

 

If this approach is regarded by the commentator as "tragic", that is his problem.

 

Moreover, I employ ideas and methods drawn from Analytic Philosophy and MFL since they are incomparably superior to the Hegelian gobbledygook upon which the vast majority of Academic Marxists dote. In addition, those methods (or, at least the ones I use) deliver clear results.

 

[MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]

 

Other things this commentator had to say have either been dealt with already at this site, or are, unfortunately, far too vague to do anything with.

 

Was There Logic After Aristotle?

 

As already noted, DM-theorists (but particularly those who are active revolutionaries -- the LCD-fraternity) almost invariably identify FL with AFL -- and, worse, with the bowdlerized version that was taught in the universities of the 18th century, and which was further mangled by Hegel in his two seriously misnamed books on 'logic'. DM-theorists from earlier generations (i.e., Engels, and possibly also Dietzgen) may perhaps be excused in this regard, since their writings largely pre-dated the revolution that took place in logic post-1870. Subsequent Marxists are not quite so easily exculpated.

 

[FL = Formal Logic; AFL = Aristotelian F; MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]

 

For example, we find Trotsky (who was otherwise reasonably up-to-date in his knowledge of the sciences) writing the following in his "Open Letter to Burnham", approximately sixty years after MFL was almost single-handedly invented by Frege, and approximately thirty years after Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica was published:

 

"I know of two systems of logic worthy of attention: the logic of Aristotle (formal logic) and the logic of Hegel (the dialectic). Aristotelian logic takes as its starting point immutable objects and phenomena…. [P]lease take the trouble to inform us just who following Aristotle analysed and systematized the subsequent progress of logic." [Trotsky (1971), pp.91-92.]22a

 

To which Burnham quite rightly replied (quoted more fully earlier in this Essay):

 

"[A]part from Aristotle, the only 'logic worthy of attention' is that of -- Hegel…. Comrade Trotsky, as we Americans ask: where have you been all these years? During the 125 years since Hegel wrote…[,] after 2300 years of stability, logic has undergone a revolutionary transformation…in which Hegel and his ideas have had an influence of exactly zero…. In a most sarcastic vein, you keep asking me to 'take the trouble to inform us just who following Aristotle analysed and systematized the subsequent progress of logic'…as if this demand were so obviously impossible of fulfilment that I must collapse like a pricked balloon before it…. Do you wish me to prepare a reading list, Comrade Trotsky? It would be long, ranging from the work of the brilliant mathematicians and logicians of the middle of the last century to…the monumental 'Principia Mathematica' of Russell and Whitehead…." [Burnham (1971), pp.236-37. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Unfortunately, wilful ignorance like this (displayed by virtually every dialectician) hasn't noticeably changed since Trotsky's day -- perhaps with the exception of the work of logicians like Graham Priest, of course, even though the 'contradictions' he claims to be able to see in the world aren't in fact 'dialectical contradictions' to begin with, as opposed to their being an expression of rather confused thought. Hence, we still find socialists of otherwise impeccable dialectical credentials repeating Trotsky's ill-informed opinions over and over again, still conflating FL and AFL, still clinging to the idée fixe that Aristotle was, is, and always will be, the last (and only) word on the subject -- but only after his ideas have been mangled beyond all recognition by the DM-faithful.

 

Worse still, and as we have seen, Dialectical Marxists compound their self-inflicted ignorance with an egregious failure to grasp what few degenerate ideas they mistakenly attribute to Aristotle!23

 

Explaining Change

 

Turning to specifics: according to its supporters, the superiority of DL over FL arises partly from its ability to explain change and partly from the understanding it affords of the contradictory nature of social development, thus assisting in the revolutionary transformation of the planet. This, it is claimed, FL can't provide.

 

However, not even mathematics can deliver a scientific account of change, even if it occupies a central role in the work of many scientists who can and do. Mathematical objects and structures of themselves have no causal impact on the material world; they nowhere appear in nature.24 And yet, this doesn't mean that mathematics is inferior to a 'higher' form of 'Dialectical Mathematics'. Exactly why DM-theorists use an analogous argument to denigrate FL is therefore rather puzzling, to say the least.

 

Of course, some dialecticians have attempted to underline the superiority of 'higher' over 'lower' mathematics, based, for example, on Engels's interpretation of Descartes's introduction of variables into Algebra, and on some rather obscure notes left by Marx concerning the nature of Differential Calculus.25

 

Nevertheless, DM-apologists are adamant that when their theory is combined with a detailed analysis of real material causes, it can deliver a scientific account of change. That idea is discussed at length in Essays Five, Seven Part Three, Eight Parts One, Two and Three, which is then systematically dismantled. Readers are directed there for more details.

 

Conclusions

 

The three main conclusions of this Essay are, therefore, that:

 

(a) FL can easily cope with change,

 

(b) Far from DL being a 'superior' form of logic, it can only be called logic by those with a rather odd sense of humour, and,

 

(c) DM itself can't actually explain change!

 

However, there is a concrete claim advanced by DM-theorists that hasn't been examined yet: the supposedly 'contradictory' nature of motion.

 

It is to that topic that I now turn.

 

Notes

 

1. Important, relevant aspects of Hegel's 'logic' have been taken apart here, here, here, here, and here -- more details will be added when the rest of Essay Twelve has been published (summaries here and here).

 

[FL = Formal Logic; AFL = Aristotelian FL.]

 

Nevertheless, not only do dialecticians tend to confuse FL with the garbled version of AFL taught in the Universities of Hegel's day (but see here), they disregard, ignore or downplay the path-breaking and significant advances that have been made in the study of Logic over the last 150 years. It is no exaggeration to say that well over 95% of FL is less than 170 years old, but you wouldn't conclude that if you confined your reading to books and articles written by DM-theorists. Quite the opposite in fact; naïve readers might be forgiven for concluding from what they find there that FL has stood still for over 2400 years. [See also Note 2.] This, from those who tell us everything is constantly changing!

 

These negative comments don't, however, apply to the work of Graham Priest. His attempt to rehabilitate the sort of 'logic' one finds in Hegel and Engels's work will be the main subject of a special Essay to be published at this site at a later date. In the meantime, readers are invited to consult Goldstein (1992, 2004), Slater (2002, 2007b, 2007c), and this review by expert logician, Hartry Field. Field has now published a book devoted to the classical paradoxes, where he was able to show that the Dialetheic and Paraconsistent logics that Priest favours can't even handle the paradoxes of truth, which had been one of the main motivators for this branch of non-standard logic -- i.e., Field (2008), pp.36-92.

 

On the subject of Hegel's (supposed) dismissal of, say, the LOC, see Hanna (1986) and Pippin (1978). The views of these two authors will also be critically examined in a later Essay. However, the best Hegelian account of this aspect of Hegel's work that I have read in the last 30 years [i.e., Hahn (2007)] will be examined in Essays Eight Part Three and Three Part One (here and here) -- where the best Marxist account of 'dialectical contradictions' can also be found [i.e., Lawler (1982)] has already been critically analysed. I have also criticised a slightly more recent attempt to defend Hegel in Dulckeit (1989). Anyway, it is arguable that Priest's 'contradictions' aren't even 'dialectical', whatever else they are.

 

On the LOC in general, see Horn (2006) -- although, I have e-mailed Professor Horn about his claim that the LOI can be found in Aristotle's work; he tells me he will now try to locate exactly where Aristotle's acknowledged this 'law'.

 

Update October 2009: Professor Horn has informed me by e-mail that the above article will be changed in the next update later this year. More on that here and here.

 

Update August 2011: The latest version of Professor Horn's article (i.e., Horn (2018)) now contains no reference to Aristotle's acceptance of the LOI.

 

I have just read Deborah Modrak's book on Aristotle (i.e., Modrak (2001)); she devotes an entire section to Aristotle's views on 'identity' -- pp.194-98. However, Modrak concentrates on Aristotle's views concerning sameness; identity itself is conspicuous by its absence. Certainly, there is no mention of the LOI.

 

The Kneales, however, quote two passages (one from Topics and one from De Sophistici Elenchi (On Sophistical Refutations)), which might seem to some to contradict the above claims. Here is the one from Topics:

 

"Whether two things are 'the same' or 'different', in the most literal of the meanings ascribed to 'sameness' (and we said that 'the same' applies in the most literal sense to what is numerically one), may be examined in the light of their inflexions and coordinates and opposites. For if justice be the same as courage, then too the just man is the same as the brave man, and 'justly' is the same as 'bravely'. Likewise, too, in the case of their opposites: for if two things be the same, their opposites also will be the same, in any of the recognized forms of opposition. For it is the same thing to take the opposite of the one or that of the other, seeing that they are the same. Again it may be examined in the light of those things which tend to produce or to destroy the things in question of their formation and destruction, and in general of any thing that is related in like manner to each. For where things are absolutely the same, their formations and destructions also are the same, and so are the things that tend to produce or to destroy them. Look and see also, in a case where one of two things is said to be something or other in a superlative degree, if the other of these alleged identical things can also be described by a superlative in the same respect. Thus Xenocrates argues that the happy life and the good life are the same, seeing that of all forms of life the good life is the most desirable and so also is the happy life: for 'the most desirable' and the greatest' apply but to one thing.' Likewise also in other cases of the kind. Each, however, of the two things termed 'greatest' or most desirable' must be numerically one: otherwise no proof will have been given that they are the same; for it does not follow because Peloponnesians and Spartans are the bravest of the Greeks, that Peloponnesians are the same as Spartans, seeing that 'Peloponnesian' is not any one person nor yet 'Spartan'; it only follows that the one must be included under the other as 'Spartans' are under 'Peloponnesians': for otherwise, if the one class be not included under the other, each will be better than the other. For then the Peloponnesians are bound to be better than the Spartans, seeing that the one class is not included under the other; for they are better than anybody else. Likewise also the Spartans must perforce be better than the Peloponnesians; for they too are better than anybody else; each then is better than the other! Clearly therefore what is styled 'best' and 'greatest' must be a single thing, if it is to be proved to be 'the same' as another. This also is why Xenocrates fails to prove his case: for the happy life is not numerically single, nor yet the good life, so that it does not follow that, because they are both the most desirable, they are therefore the same, but only that the one falls under the other.

"Again, look and see if, supposing the one to be the same as something, the other also is the same as it: for if they be not both the same as the same thing, clearly neither are they the same as one another. Moreover, examine them in the light of their accidents or of the things of which they are accidents: for any accident belonging to the one must belong also to the other, and if the one belong to anything as an accident, so must the other also. If in any of these respects there is a discrepancy, clearly they are not the same." [Aristotle (1984g), p.255. Links and bold emphases added. I have used the
on-line version
here, which renders this passage differently to the Kneales -- i.e., Kneale and Kneale (1978), p.42. Some paragraphs merged. By "accident" Aristotle means "non-essential property".]

 

The passage from De Sophistici Elenchi reads as follows:

 

"For only to things that are indistinguishable and one in substance does it seem that all the same attributes belong...." [Aristotle (1984h), p.305. Bold emphasis added.]

 

The on-line version reads more-or-less the same (no pun intended):

 

"For only to things that are indistinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed that all the same attributes belong...." [Quoted from here; Part 24.]

 

There are only three sentences in the above that could plausibly be linked to the LOI; I have highlighted them in bold. The first speaks about things being "absolutely the same" -- but, the more recent, published translation renders this as "...in the case where one of two things is said to be something or other in a superlative degree, if the other of these identical things can also be described by a superlative in the same respect" [Aristotle (1984g), p.255, section 152.5], which, although it uses the word "identity", neither employs, nor implies, the LOI. Aristotle, a quintessentially 'common sense' philosopher, is plainly employing different ordinary terms for sameness as much he can; indeed, as I have done in Essay Six. Furthermore, Aristotle then adds this thought:

 

"For where things are absolutely the same, their formations and destructions also are the same, and so are the things that tend to produce or to destroy them." [Loc cit.]

 

So, even though Aristotle peaks about things that are "absolutely the same", he also acknowledges that they change -- speaking about their "formations and destructions". In which case, he didn't connect absolute sameness (or even identity) with lack of change, contrary to what DM-fans claim.

 

The second and third highlighted passages certainly anticipate both the 'Indiscernibility of Identicals' and the 'Identity of Indiscernibles' -- even though Aristotle neither uses the word "identical" nor the LOI. Nevertheless, this is plainly the closest Aristotle came to enunciating that 'law', but it still isn't the LOI. Nowhere do we see "A is identical to A", or even "A = A", of DM-lore.

 

Indeed, Aristotle elsewhere derides anything that even remotely smacks of this 'law':

 

"Now 'why a thing is itself' is a meaningless inquiry (for -- to give meaning to the question 'why' -- the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident -- e.g., that the moon is eclipsed -- but the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musician musical, unless one were to answer 'because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this' this, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question)." [Metaphysics Book VII, Part 17. This can be found in Aristotle (1984e), p.1643. Bold emphases added.]

 

So, the LOI , features nowhere in his logic (again, contrary to the myth concocted by DM-fans), and any suggestion to the contrary has to face his dismissal of it as a "meaningless inquiry". Certainly, Aristotle discussed identity and sameness (and he did so several times); as one of the great Philosophers and as a pioneer logician, he would have been remiss if he didn't. But, there is nowhere in his work where he refers to this 'law', or to identity as a law. Nor is it a foundational principle of his logic, another fantasy of DM-lore.

 

[LOC = Law of Non-contradiction; LOI = Law of Identity; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

Update October 2014: I have just been made aware of the following comment, which appears in Hamilton's Logic:

 

"The law of Identity, I stated, was not explicated as a coordinate principle till a comparatively recent period. The earliest author in whom I have found this done, is Antonius Andreas, a scholar of Scotus, who flourished at the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth century. The schoolman, in the fourth book of his Commentary of Aristotle's Metaphysics, -- a commentary which is full of the most ingenious and original views, -- not only asserts to the law of Identity a coördinate dignity with the law of Contradiction, but, against Aristotle, he maintains that the principle of Identity, and not the principle of Contradiction, is the one absolutely first. The formula in which Andreas expressed it was Ens est ens. [Being is being -- RL.] Subsequently to this author, the question concerning the relative priority of the two laws of Identity and of Contradiction became one much agitated in the schools; though there were also found some who asserted to the law of Excluded Middle this supreme rank." [Quoted from here (accessed 04/10/2014; I haven't yet been able to check this source.) Bold emphasis and links added. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

2. These allegations will be substantiated presently.

 

W&G do, however, add a note (of sorts!) concerning the more recent developments in FL, but they then dismiss the latter in the following terms:

 

"In the 19th century, there were a number of attempts to bring logic up to date (George Boyle (sic), Ernst Schröder, Gotlob Frege (sic), Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead). But, apart from the introduction of symbols, and a certain tidying up, there is no real change here. Great claims are made, for example by the linguistic philosophers, but there are not many grounds for them. Semantics (which deals with the validity of an argument (sic)) was separated from syntax (which deals with the deductibility of the conclusions from axioms and premises (sic)). This is supposed to be something new, when, in reality, it is merely a re-hash of the old division, well known to the ancient Greeks, between logic and rhetoric. Modern logic is based on the logical relations among whole sentences. The centre of attention has moved away from the syllogism towards hypothetical and disjunctive arguments. This is hardly a breathtaking leap. One can begin with sentences (judgments) instead of syllogisms. Hegel did this in his Logic. Rather than a great revolution in thought, it is like re-shuffling cards in a pack." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), p.97/p.101.]

 

This paragraph alone tells us all we want to know about the sloppy 'research' W&G devoted to their 'thoughts' about MFL. Not only do they: (i) Confuse George Boyle, the Dean of Salisbury, with George Boole, the 19th century mathematician and logician, (ii) Spell Gottlob Frege's name incorrectly (these errors were brought to Alan Wood's attention by a supporter of this site a few years after the 1st edition RIRE came out, but they remain uncorrected in the 2nd edition!), (iii) Completely mischaracterise semantics and syntax. Semantics is only indirectly connected with the validity of an argument, and syntax doesn't directly concern "the deductibility of the conclusions from axioms and premises". Validity and deducibility both depend on the rules of inference adopted in or by each system of MFL. But, as seems plain from what they say, they think semantics and syntax are identical -- for what else is the study of validity other than seeing what is deducible from what? And (iv) They mistakenly conclude that "Modern logic is based on the logical relations among whole sentences", which will be news to those who even now still work on the Predicate Calculus. [This links to a PDF.]

 

[MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]

 

They also assert that "apart from the introduction of symbols, and a certain tidying up, there is no real change here.... Rather than a great revolution in thought, it is like re-shuffling cards in a pack." This shows how grossly ignorant these two are. Anyone who compares, say, this with this, and who thinks that little has changed, needs to book an urgent appointment with an Optician:

 

 

Video Four: Dialectical Myopia?

 

Some of the revolutionary advances made by modern logicians over the last 150 years will be outlined later in this Essay.

 

3. Again, these allegations will be substantiated in Note 4.

 

Of course, limiting FL solely to the study of inference is controversial in itself. DM-theorists believe that logic (properly so handled -- i.e., in its 'higher form', as DL) is a genuine branch of science, an intellectual tool or method enabling the investigation of the world, and which would thereby play its part in the transformation of society. However, as such, DL clearly forms an extension to Metaphysics -- although, of course, DM-theorists understand the word "metaphysics" in their own idiosyncratic way, and would, naturally, reject that assertion. Be this as it may, dialecticians certainly see DL as a source of knowledge, capable of uncovering fundamental aspects of reality, when used correctly and when tested in practice. That idea will be tackled head-on in Essay Twelve Part One, and later in the main body of this Essay.

 

Here, for example is Lenin:

 

"Logic is the science of cognition. It is the theory of knowledge…. The laws of logic are the reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.... [These] embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature." [Lenin (1961), p.182. Italics in the original.]

 

"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….

 

"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Ibid., pp.359-60. Emphases in the original.]

 

According to Lenin, logic reflects the "objective world"; because of that, dialecticians have issued themselves with a rather generous licence to derive fundamental truths, valid for all of space and time, from sentences like "John is a man", which tactic is itself a classic example of Super-Science in action. Contrast that with what George Novack had to say:

 

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

 

But that is precisely what Lenin (and Hegel) did.

 

However, and by way of contrast, when I speak about FL, I mean logic in the sense outlined in the main body of this Essay: that is, the systematic study of inference -- which is the view adopted by the vast majority of modern logicians. On that, see Note 4 and Note 5.

 

4. Validity is a formal 'property' of argument schemas (symbolic patterns), whereas truth is a 'property' of propositions. [The word "property" is in 'scare' quotes since it is being used technically, if not figuratively, here.] If the sole, legitimate role FL occupies is the study of inference, then, as such, it is only indirectly related to the 'search for truth'. Logic is therefore, at a stretch, a science in the wider (German) sense of the term -- that is, it is a systematic study focused on a given area of enquiry, which is, in this case, inference.

 

[The confusion of FL with science proper is discussed below, in Note 5.]

 

For a clear definition of validity, see, for example, Tomassi (1999), pp.2-19, or Priest (2000), pp.1-6.

 

5. In line with many others (alas, mostly those who know very little, if any, logic), DM-theorists labour under the widespread illusion that FL is the study of the "Laws of Thought", or it is the "Science of Cognition" -- that is, that it is one of the sciences proper. For example, here is Lenin:

 

"Logic is the science of cognition. It is the theory of knowledge…. The laws of logic are the reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.... [These] embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature." [Lenin (1961), p.182. Italics in the original.]

 

Here, too, is Engels:

 

"In every epoch, and therefore also in ours, theoretical thought is a historical product, which at different times assumes very different forms and, therewith, very different contents. The science of thought is therefore, like every other, a historical science, the science of the historical development of human thought. And this is of importance also for the practical application of thought in empirical fields. Because in the first place the theory of the laws of thought is by no means an 'eternal truth' established once and for all, as philistine reasoning imagines to be the case with the word 'logic'." [Engels (1954), p.43. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

"As soon as each special science is bound to make clear its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of things, a special science dealing with this totality is superfluous. That which still survives, independently, of all earlier philosophy is the science of thought and its laws -- formal logic and dialectics. Everything else is subsumed in the positive science of nature and history." [Engels (1976), p.31.]

 

And, here is Trotsky:

 

"Hegel himself viewed dialectics precisely as logic, as the science of the forms of human cognition.... What does logic express? The law of the external world or the law of consciousness? The question is posed dualistically [and] therefore not correctly [for] the laws of logic express the laws (rules, methods) of consciousness in its active relationship to the external world.... Thought operates by its own laws, which we can call the laws of logic...." [Trotsky (1986), pp.75, 87, 106. Trotsky is apparently referring to Hegel's Introduction to The Science of Logic (i.e., Hegel (1999), pp.43-64. Paragraphs merged.]

 

We also find George Novack defining logic as:

 

"…the science of the thought process. Logicians investigate the activities of the thought process which goes on in human heads and formulate the laws, forms and interrelations of those mental processes." [Novack (1971a), p.17.]

 

Here, too, is veteran communist philosopher, Maurice Cornforth:

 

"Whatever thoughts we think, and whatever language they are expressed in, they must satisfy the basic requirements of the reflection of reality in thought. These requirements give rise to the laws of thought, to principles of logic. For thoughts are reflections of the real world, and in the process of reflection, as Marx said, the material world is translated into forms of thought. The process of reflection and translation has its own laws -- the laws of thought, the principles of logic.... Logical principles are laws of thought, not laws of reality; they are not laws of material processes, but the laws of the reflection of material processes." [Cornforth (1963), pp.50-52. Paragraphs merged.]

 

There is much in the above with which I would want to take issue, but it will have to be shelved for now since my only concern here is to question the identification of logic with the "laws of thought".

 

Engels, Lenin, Trotsky Novack and Cornforth have clearly confused logic with some form of psychology. If logic were the science of what went on in people's heads, logicians would busy themselves with brain scans, surveys, psychometric tests and the like. They certainly wouldn't waste their time with all those useless definitions, theorems and proofs.

 

Do dialecticians seriously think that people actually cogitate in syllogisms? [As we will see, Trotsky certainly did!] Or, that they use the formal calculi found in Principia Mathematica when they reason? But, they must think this if they believe that logicians study how people actually think. [On this topic, see my comments over at Wikipedia, which have been re-posted here.]

 

So, not only does Trotsky imagine human beings think in syllogisms, he believes chickens do, too!

 

"The chicken knows that grain is in general useful, necessary and tasty. It recognises a given piece of grain as that grain -- of the wheat -- with which it is acquainted and hence draws a logical conclusion by means of its beak. The syllogism of Aristotle is only an articulated expression of those elementary mental conclusions which we observe at every step among animals." [Trotsky quoted in Woods and Grant (1995), p.89. A copy is available here (near the bottom of the page). In fact this comment is from Trotsky (1973), p.400.]

 

Unfortunately, Trotsky failed to say how he knew so much about the mental cogitations and logical skills of these Avian Aristotles -- or why, if animals have known these things for so long, it took a genius like Aristotle to 're-discover' them about two or three million years after 'we' evolved from a common ancestor with the Apes, or, indeed, countless million since 'we' branched off from our common ancestor with the birds!

 

Moreover, if chickens are such 'natural logicians', then perhaps among them there is a Feathered Frege, a Rooster Russell or even a Peano of the Poultry World?

 

 

Figure Nine: Aristotle, Frege, And Russell?

 

How far down the pecking order should we descend? If a chicken chooses seed on the basis of a syllogism, do toads select flies likewise? Do ticks opt for each passing deer this way, too? Perhaps locusts are no less logical and reason that if all fields are good to ravish, and this is a field, it too is good to ravish? [Except, of course, genuine syllogisms are categorical, and aren't the least bit hypothetical. Maybe then locusts have mastered Stoic Logic, which is partly hypothetical in form?] And what about the humble Hydra? Does it munch away at single-celled organisms having discovered these Aristotelian syllogisms hundreds of millions of years before even chickens happened upon them? What about e-coli? Does it select which mammalian gut to invade on this basis? And what about the flu virus? Maybe it reasons that all human noses are good, and then proceeds to infect yet another as a result? But, if all of these take place in nature, then the above organisms must all be natural logicians. If not, chickens aren't either. What is it that makes a chicken a 'logician' that prevents, say, a Dung Beetle from being one?

 

Of course, it could always be argued that 'quantity turns into quality', here, so that at some point in the development of evolutionary complexity new organisms finally emerged that were capable of applying some form of logic. That would mean that chickens would be capable of using logic while Dung Beetles wouldn't. Well, it would be good to see the evidence, or original research, which supports that novel approach to Zoology. But, as we have come to expect from DM-fans, there isn't any. [However, as we have seen in Essay Seven Part One, Engels's 'First Law' is far too vague and confused to supply Trotsky with any support at all.]

 

Anyway, in what sense can a chicken be said to know about "grain...in general"? Are they also expert Botanists? Newly hatched chickens will peck away at grain, too, having had no schooling in the time-honoured Protocols of Poultry Philosophy. Perhaps they received lessons inside the egg? Not so much 'home schooling' as 'egg schooling', so that when they pass their eggxams they are allowed to break out of their shells -- having learnt another syllogism about egg shells "in general", too -- and no doubt also one about syllogisms "in general", all the while.

 

Unfortunately, however, the syllogism is a seriously limited and clumsy form of reasoning. [On that, see here, and especially here.] In which case, one would have thought that chickens should have learnt to move on to master Stoic Logic, at least -- and then perhaps even aspects of Boolean Algebra.

 

On the basis of passages like these it isn't easy to defend the above dialecticians from the accusation that they haven't a clue what they are talking about, and that they prefer science fiction to science fact. Nevertheless, this view of Trotsky's is representative of opinion in many dialectical Trotskyist circles. Any who doubt this have only to read Trotskyist literature to see how uncritically the above fairy-tale has been swallowed hook, line and sinker by the faithful. This isn't to pick on fellow Trotskyists, Maoists are no less gullible when it comes to the words of Mao -- The Prophet Himself -- or, indeed, that of other DM-Gurus. Witness the nauseating adulation and religious fervour surrounding the Little Red Book and 'Mao Zedong Thought', not to mention Mao's Mangoes.

 

In their collective defence it is worth pointing out that DM-fans inherited this general idea from an ancient tradition in logic (which also influenced Leibniz, Kant and Hegel) -- that is, that 'logic' is a sub-branch of Philosophical Psychology and Ontology.

 

However, FL is no more the science of thought than Geometry is the science of where to stand, or the rules of Cricket/Baseball represent the science of ball hitting. Science is descriptive, explanatory and predictive. The theorems of FL are constitutive and normative.

 

This topic is extensively discussed in Shanker (1998), pp.63-120. Also, cf., Coffa (1991), pp.113-67, and Baker (1988), as well as the general comments in Button, et al (1995). Cf., also Brockhaus (1991), pp.65-106. [Again, see my comments over at Wikipedia on this topic -- which have been re-posted here.]

 

6. In Essay Fourteen I will examine the connections that exist between this way of thinking and a range of ancient religious and mystical 'world views'. The ideological impact on revolutionaries of these archaic intellectual pretentions will also be analysed in Essay Twelve (summary here), as well as Essay Nine Parts One and Two.

 

6ao. The clear distinction between assumptions and rules of inference (between propositions that can be true or false, and rules than can be neither) was neatly illustrated by Lewis Carroll over a century ago in his dialogue, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. A PDF of that classic paradox can be accessed here.

 

6a. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that it requires human beings to code anything, which further implies that this coding, if it exists, was:

 

(a) Intentionally inserted into language by an individual or group of individuals; or it was,

 

(b) Incorporated into language by a non-human 'mind' of some sort.

 

Option (b) directly implies a form of Idealism (for instance, LIE, as noted earlier). So does (a), but only indirectly. In Essay Twelve Parts One and Two, it will be shown just how and why that is the case. [I have also dealt with option (a) briefly again, below.]

 

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]

 

It could be countered that our minds work the way they do because it proved evolutionarily advantageous for our species. Individuals whose thoughts didn't mirror the world would find it difficult to survive and hence reproduce.

 

That is in fact a rather poor argument, which I will dispose of in Essay Thirteen Part Three. Again, for present purposes, all we need note is that even if that were the case, our thoughts need only 'mirror' the material world, not all those 'underlying essences'. How, for example, could the thoughts of our ancestors have 'mirrored' the hidden world of 'essences' -- a world only 'revealed' to us by the speculations of Traditional Philosophers and Mystics a few thousand years ago -- if they are, by definition, inaccessible to the senses? How could such invisible imponderables assist in our survival in any away at all?

 

It could be objected that a capacity to form abstract thoughts would enable humanity to grasp general ideas about nature, which would free them from the "immediacy of the present", allowing them to take some -- albeit limited -- control of their lives and their surroundings. That would definitely assist in their survival.

 

However, as argued at length in Essay Three Parts One and Two, abstraction in fact destroys generality. Hence, if our ancestors had access to these 'hidden essences' by means of a 'process of abstraction', that would have seriously reduced their chances of survival. [On our ancestors' alleged use of abstractions, see here.]

 

That is, of course, quite apart from the fact that it is bizarre in the extreme to claim that our ancestors, hundreds of thousands of years ago, were aware of these invisible 'essences' -- and thus coded them into language --, but which 'essences' were in fact conjured into existence only a few thousand years ago by a set of grammatical and logical verbal tricks concocted by Greek Philosophers! [On that, see Essay Three Part One, again, link above.]

 

[The verbal tricks performed by Ancient Greek Philosophers that 'allowed' them to invent such fanciful ideas are detailed in Barnes (2009), Havelock (1983), Kahn (1994, 2003), Lloyd (1971), and Seligman (1962) -- although, the latter authors don't characterise the aforementioned terminological gyrations in the pejorative way that I have! I will be dealing with this topic in more detail in Essay Twelve Part Two (summary here).]

 

This isn't to argue, either, that our ancestors didn't use general nouns, but general nouns aren't the same as the 'abstract general ideas' of Traditional Lore. Readers are directed to the above Essays (and the academic studies listed in the previous paragraph) for more details.

 

7. One has only to leaf through, say, Aristotle's Prior Analytics to see that this is no mere invention on my part.

 

A comprehensive history of Logic can be found in Kneale and Kneale (1978); the precipitous degeneration of Logic after Aristotle died is outlined in Peter Geach's article: 'History of the Corruptions of Logic' (i.e., Geach (1972b)). For Aristotle's use of variables, see Barnes (2009), pp.264-359.

 

8. There is an excellent account of Aristotelian Logic in Smith (2022). And there is an equally useful account of MFL (which is now confusingly called "Classical Logic") in Shapiro (2022). Readers should also consult Hirsch (2004), which, while deeply flawed itself, represents a major step in the right direction by a 'fan of the dialectic'. Having said, that, Hirsch isn't above committing a few basic errors of his own; on that, see here.

 

9. Naturally, this raises fundamental issues that lie right at the heart of this topic -- that is, whether or not concepts change over time as a result of inherent, 'internal', logical or 'rational' processes, or by some other means. This aspect of DL (incompatible as it is with the sort of HM that refuses to make any concessions to Hegelian mysticism) will be examined in Essay Fourteen Part Two.

 

[HM = Historical Materialism; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

This also raises questions about the relative stability of meaning in language. That topic is dealt with in more detail in Essay Six -- here and here. See also here.

 

10. On this topic, the reader should consult Essays Five, Six, Seven Part One, Eight Parts One, Two, and Three, as well as Eleven Part One.

 

11. In fact, MPP was known to the Stoics, circa 200 BCE. This Stop Press! Breaking News! has yet to penetrate the adamantine skulls of the majority of 'dialectical logicians'. It looks like 2300 years hasn't quite been long enough for them!

 

On Stoic Logic, see Kneale and Kneale (1978), pp.158-76, and Mates (1953).

 

In the argument in the main body of the Essay, "A" stands for "Assumption". The un-bracketed numbers relate to the premises used on each line to derive the conclusion at the end; the bracketed numerals are the line numbers. In this, I have partially followed Lemmon's method of presentation. Cf., Lemmon (1993).

 

An introduction to Natural Deduction (a system devised by Gerhard Gentzen) can be found in Lemmon (1993); a much more axiomatic approach to logic in Hunter (1996); more advanced logic is detailed in Bostock (1997) (this links to a PDF) and Mendelson (1979). For a more recent, comprehensive survey of modern mathematical logic, see Hinman (2005).

 

Unfortunately(!!), Gentzen was either a Nazi, or he entertained Nazi sympathies. [On this, also see here.] But this should no more affect our opinion of his work in logic than Hegel's political and social views affect how dialecticians regard his 'logic'.

 

11a. Again, care must be taken not to confuse interpretation in logic with interpretation in other disciplines --, or, indeed, in ordinary discourse. [On that, see here.]

 

It might be objected that the antecedent and consequent here aren't propositions -- that is, "Atoms of 64Cu undergo beta decay" and "64Ni atoms, positrons and neutrinos are formed" aren't actually capable of being true or false. That observation is partially correct, but the argument isn't beyond repair. However that repair would render the clauses involved highly stilted, if not unwieldy. The repaired version of the opening assumption would then read something like this:

 

A1: If an atom of 64Cu undergoes beta decay at t1, then an atom of 64Ni, k positrons and m neutrinos are formed at t2. [t2 > t1.]

 

[Where the temporal and numerical variables are also well defined.]

 

However, I rather think that A1 is scientifically uninteresting and possibly unverifiable; but that is no fault of logic.

 

12. Details about those other systems of Logic can be found in Goble (2001), Hughes and Cresswell (1996), Haack (1978, 1996), Hintikka (1962), Jacquette (2006), Prior (1957, 1967, 1968), Sider (2010), and Von Wright (1957, 1963). A general survey of some of the background issues raised by Classical and Non-Classical Logic can be found in Read (1994). In fact, Graham Priest (who is both an expert logician and a defender of certain aspects of dialectics) has written his own admirable introductions to FL, classical and post-classical; cf., Priest (2000, 2008). Also worth consulting are the following:

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-temporal

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-epistemic/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-manyvalued/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/

 

http://earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/nonstbib.htm

 

Despite this embarrassment of riches, freely available on the Internet, DM-fans steadfastly cling to their studied ignorance, happily maintaining a ground state of self imposed nescience, all the while pontificating about the alleged 'limitations' of FL as if they were latter-day Aristotles.

 

[Anyone who doubts this need only examine, say, Trotsky's lamentably weak, if not embarrassingly incompetent reply to James Burnham, in Trotsky (1971), pp.91-119, 196-97, 232-56 -- and then count the number of subsequent Trotskyists who mindlessly quote the master's words as if they had been brought down from off a mountain somewhere, engraved on stone tablets. See also, here and here.]

 

12a. Examples of the rather weak attempts made by DM-theorists to argue that FL uses 'fixed concepts' are examined below; but see also here.

 

Some might object that dialecticians refer to conceptual change in concepts like "freedom", "democracy", "justice" "equality", etc. But, as we will soon see, what has changed here isn't the concepts involved but the words used to express them. The word "justice" might have meant something different to someone in Ancient Greece, but their concept of justice hasn't changed. How could it? [Unless we believe that past still exists and is changing!] What has changed is our use of this word.

 

That shouldn't be taken to mean I think there was one and only one meaning of the word "justice" in Ancient Greece, or anywhere else for that matter. Far from it.

 

12b. Of course, as we will see, reductionism is generally 'refuted' by DM-fans by the expedient of simply rejecting it, with little attempt at explanation or even justification --, other than, perhaps, a quick reference to the Part/Whole 'dialectic' (destructively criticised in Essay Eleven Part Two).

 

The second consequence of the allegations advanced in the main body of this Essay about the 'dialectical theory of knowledge' (i.e., that it depends on some form of bourgeois individualism with a leftish-looking veneer tacked onto it) is passed over in silence by DM-theorists -- that is, they ignore this specific implication, not my criticisms; the latter are never even read. In fact, in my 35-year hike across this Dialectical Desert I have only ever encountered one author (Bertell Ollman) who even so much as recognised this implication of the 'dialectical theory of knowledge', and even then he merely kicked it into the long grass for 'future consideration' (which has yet to materialise, nearly twenty years later). [On that, see here.]

 

13. In what follows, when I am alluding to a concept (as opposed to employing a specific phrase expressing it), I will put any of the terms I use in 'scare' quotes --, e.g., 'the concept green'. When I mention a concept I will employ double quotation marks -- e.g., "the concept green". When I am not trying to say anything controversial, I will simply use, for example, the word "concept" without any quotation marks at all -- e.g., concept. When I actually employ a concept expression (as opposed to merely mentioning it), that should be clear from the actual words I use -- for example, "This leaf is green" (where the concept expression, "ξ is green", is buried in that sentence).

 

As I hope will be apparent, I am adopting (as well as adapting) a neo-Fregean understanding of concept expressions -- i.e., each one expresses a rule for the formation of certain sentences. As readers will now no doubt appreciate, this topic is a veritable minefield, so this section of the Essay will need to be re-written many times in order to make sure I don't fall into the very same traps I am trying to highlight and thus avoid!

 

The distinction between concepts and objects (or rather, the distinction between concept expressions and singular terms -- Proper Names and Definite Descriptions) -- is crucially important, otherwise a proposition will simply turn into a list, and hence fail to say anything.

 

[That topic was covered in extensive detail in Essay Three Part One (and will be again briefly in Note 14). Several of the issues raised here are outlined with admirable clarity in Gibson (2004), and at some length in Gaskin (2008). (However, Professor Gaskin's 'solution' to this pseudo-problem is no solution at all; I will say more about why that is so in a later Essay.) See also, Davidson (2005), pp.76-163, and Weiner (2004), pp.104-14.]

 

I have briefly explained why this approach has much to recommend it over the traditional understanding of 'concepts' -- which sees them either as (i) 'mental' or psychological entities/structures of some sort, or (ii) 'abstract particulars' that 'reside' in 'heaven', the 'mind' of some 'god', or, indeed, somewhere else (but don't ask where) -- on that, see here, here, and here.

 

Anyway, dialecticians themselves appear to require the above distinction, otherwise their theory would be little different from "crude materialism"; they need concepts to remain just what they are, concepts, and not morph into objects, or even the names thereof -- or they would risk losing their capacity to express generality. [Again, this was also explained in detail in Essay Three Part One (link above).]

 

Indeed, if concepts and objects were one and the same, there would appear to be no advantage -- indeed, there would be no point -- in seeking a conceptual account of change in, or to, material objects, for that would turn it into an abstract account of change experienced by what are in fact objects, not concepts. Only now it would be entirely unclear what these new 'objects' were (i.e., what these 'concepts-turned-into-objects' actually are), and how they could possibly account for anything.

 

Of course, as noted above, part of the problem here is that, following Kant and Hegel, concepts have tended to be viewed by DM-theorists as quasi-mental structures (images?), processes, or 'representations' of some sort -- the latter, in some cases, indistinguishable from the capacity we are all supposed to possess of being able to 'represent' to ourselves the "Universals" of traditional philosophical lore. Once more, that approach blurs the distinction between concepts and objects (or, indeed, the names thereof) -- so, a DM-concept in fact appears to be a peculiar sort of abstract (mental?) object.

 

[A brief account of the history of the introduction of this word (Begriff) into Philosophy (by Leibniz in the 17th century), can be found in Caygill (1995), pp.118-21. For Hegel's use of this word and its cognates, see Inwood (1992), pp.58-61. See also Tugendhat (1982).]

 

However, as far as the expression of conceptual change is concerned there seem to be only two straight-forward possibilities -- illustrated by C2 and C3, below. Neither looks at all promising:

 

C2: This patch of green has changed.

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

[1] It might seem that in C3 "The concept green" could be designating all green objects. On reflection, that is unlikely since C3 is specific in its reference to 'the concept green', not the objects that happen to instantiate, or which fall under, it. Even though all or most of the said objects could change, it would still leave the 'concept' itself unaffected. Indeed, all green things appear to change at some point, but if the 'concept' also changed, we wouldn't be able to express that fact in any obvious way (as indeed we saw in the main body of this Essay).

 

So much was at least clear to Plato, but he (or, at least, later Platonists) 'solved' this problem by turning general nouns (and much else besides) into the Proper Names of abstract particulars (i.e., in Plato's case, into what appear to be the Proper Names of the "Forms") -- or they employed other singular terms to designate them (such as "the Form of the Good"), which moves unfortunately only succeeded in destroying generality. [On this, also see Essay Six.]

 

In turn, this would mean that the phrase "the concept green" was no longer a general expression, but was a singular term, and hence it would no longer operate as a concept expression. Concept expressions are general in form; singular terms (manifestly) aren't. For DM-fans this problem was further complicated by the fact that they also seem to think that human beings cognise individuals (like Socrates, or Lenin) as concepts, too! That is because they conflate both of these items (i.e., representations of such individuals and 'concepts') and view them as 'mental' entities of some sort. To be sure, these 'mental entities' are supposed to 'reflect' objects and process in 'reality', but that is part of the problem since it places concepts and objects on the same level again.

 

[Whether or not terms like these can 'reflect' anything at all will be subjected to considerable doubt in Essay Thirteen Part One. For the complex ways that Ancient Greek Philosophers, Grammarians, and Logicians attempted to grapple with such knotty problems, see Barnes (2009), pp.93-167.]

 

[2] "The concept green" could refer to an 'abstraction' residing perhaps in some 'mind(s)' or in some brain(s), maybe as a 'collective idea' of green. Alternatively, these 'abstractions' could (i) somehow 'inhere' in all the objects that share the designated 'property', or the word itself could (ii) refer to whatever is supposed to 'inhere' in this concept -- that is, it could refer to the objects that are somehow 'collected together' by this concept, perhaps 'the set of all green objects'. But, again, "green" can't designate a 'collective idea of green', for there is no such thing. [Why that is so is explained at length in Essay Three Parts One and Two.] Even if there were such a 'collective idea', calling 'it' a concept would be inept since, ex hypothesi, 'it' would then be an 'object' (or the Proper Name thereof), or a collection of 'objects', not a concept. Moreover, if 'all green objects' shared this common property, designating it this way would only succeed in denying it that very role -- since 'The concept green' would be an object, or it would designate an object, not a general term, once more.

 

Of course, options [1] and [2] imply that it isn't concepts that change, but objects that instantiate them which do, vitiating the entire DM-exercise.

 

The problem here is that it isn't possible to state in empirical propositions (i.e., propositions that state matters of fact) -- or even indicative sentences that have any content --, the logical role that concept expressions occupy without distorting that very role itself. In fact, any attempt to do so destroys their capacity to function in the way that might have been imagined for them.

 

[This topic is connected with the main theme of Essay Twelve Part One -- which is that any attempt to construct a philosophical theory about how language 'latches onto the world', how it supposedly 'reflects' nature, underlying 'essence', 'the logical form of the world', or whatever, will always collapse into non-sense and then perhaps into incoherence. (The supporting argument has been summarised here.)]

 

While Frege was painfully aware of this 'difficulty', he couldn't account for it -- or, indeed, circumvent it. Wittgenstein, I think, 'solved' this 'problem' -- or, rather, he 'solved' it by dissolving it. [On that, see the references given below.]

 

The widespread 'dialectical illusion' that it is possible to refer to conceptual change (in, for example, the crude manner envisaged in TAR and other DM-texts) is perhaps motivated by (a) the transformation concept expressions undergo when they are located in new, but non-standard, sentential contexts and (b) as a result the role they occupy in such contexts is misconstrued.

 

For instance, this happens when an attempt is made to 'refer' to them directly, where they are designated by singular terms -- for example, as we saw in relation to C3:

 

C3a: This leaf used to be green.

 

C3:  The concept green has changed.

 

C3b: ξ is green at t1, but it isn't the case that ξ is green at t2 (t2 > t1).

 

C3c: Greenness has changed.

 

As the move from C3a to C3 shows, the idea that 'concepts' can change (in this crude DM-manner) rests on the nominalisation or the particularisation of concept expressions in C3 -- represented in expanded form in C3b. This happens when predicate expressions -- in this case, "ξ is green" in C3a -- are replaced by Proper Names -- in this case, "Greenness" in C3c --, or by a definite description -- "The concept green", in C3. These moves replace the general concept expression, "ξ is green", with a singular term, which then motivates the idea that because singular terms actually denote objects -- which can and do change -- these newly transformed words must also designate abstract objects (for instance, Hegelian 'concepts') that are subject to change in like manner.

 

[The use of Greek letters -- like "ξ" in "ξ is green" -- is explained here. Why expressions like "ξ is green" are general, not particular, is also explained there.]

 

[Particularisation: this changes general expressions -- such as "ξ is green" -- into singular terms (i.e., into a Proper Name or a Definite Description), which then supposedly designate Abstract Particulars. (It is important not to confuse particularisation with Hegel's use of "particular".) This isn't to suggest that the 'grammatical subject' of such sentences can only be represented by singular terms.]

 

How objects change or develop thereby becomes the pattern upon which conceptual change is modelled, and that is because, when an attempt is made to refer to, or denote, a 'concept' we are forced to nominalise, or particularise, the concept expression concerned. This linguistic slide is the false move that motivates the conflation of these two distinct types of change -- conceptual with objectual change.

 

In Essay Three Parts One and Two, we saw Ancient Greek theorists commit a series of errors like this over the nature and syntax of predicative propositions, which then gave birth to an entire family of philosophical pseudo-problems concerning the nature of 'Abstractions', 'Universals', 'Categories', 'Ideas', 'Forms' and 'Concepts' -- the ripples from which have been spreading out for the last 2400 years.

 

As Professor Havelock pointed out in relation to the linguistic gyrations performed by the so-called Presocratic Philosophers:

 

"As long as preserved communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is gods. Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas, mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be --  the copula of analytic statement.

 

"The history of early philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....

 

"Nevertheless, the Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference." [Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links added.]

 

Havelock then proceeded to show in detail that this is precisely what the Presocratics succeeded in doing: inventing abstract nouns, replacing verbs with these newly-minted nouns, and altering the verb "to be" in the required manner. As a result that verb was transformed into a noun -- "Being" -- that supposedly now referred to 'god', 'everything'. 'nature', 'reality', 'existence'..., or whatever took the fancy of whomsoever was telling the tale. Alternatively, it was left conveniently vague and mysterious, and in that state it has exercised a profound influence on Traditional Philosophers ever since -- most notably, Hegel and Heidegger. [On the latter, see Edwards (2004), Chapter Two. See also, Kahn (2003).]

 

So, 'abstract objects' like this were conjured into 'existence' simply because the distinction between concepts and objects had been obliterated -- again by means of yet another grotesque distortion of language. Indeed, just as Marx himself intimated:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

 

[While I'm not saying that Marx saw things this way, there were hints in the 1840s that he was moving in this direction. On that, see here and here.]

 

Metaphysicians have repeatedly made, and are still making, 'mistakes' like this, regularly falling prey to what might perhaps be called the "Nominalisation/Particularisation Fallacy". Those who have been misled in this way seem to think that if a clause (or phrase) can be nominalised, or particularised, then there must be something, visible or invisible, (a) in the 'mind', (b) 'spread out across' collections of objects in some as-yet-to-be-explained way, (c) in 'Platonic Heaven' or (d) 'in' the 'Mind of God' --, which answers to it.

 

[This misconception is clearly related to the 'Fido-Fido' fallacy, named such by Gilbert Ryle. On that, see Ryle (1949).]

 

So, on this basis it is concluded that 'the concept green' must exist (somewhere) because the expression supposedly designating it has been particularised by the use of that definite description. However, the above inferences were only ever justified by an appeal to linguistic dodges like this, which conjure into existence 'abstract objects' at the drop of a general noun.

 

As Professor Havelock pointed out, these ancient moves helped motivate the idea that because the ordinary use of language actually prevents such linguistic chicanery, a set of technical devices must be invented that enable it -- hence, words like "Form", "Concept", "Being", "Property", "Category", "Nothing" and "Becoming" were invented to order and pressed into metaphysical service. The supposed meaning of these vacuous neologisms then appeared to legitimate the derivation of profound 'philosophical' truths -- valid for all of space and time -- from words alone. In this way, the dogmatic speculations of socially-isolated thinkers -- divorced from the constraints communal life places on the use of language -- seemed capable of penetrating right into the heart of 'Being', way beyond anything allowed by misleading 'appearances', the 'banalities of commonsense', 'formal thinking' or 'the abstract understanding'. Hence, the only rationale supporting such moves was this terminological dodge, motivated as it was by an inept transformation of concept expressions into the Proper Names of Abstract Particulars.

 

In DM, this distorting approach to the vernacular resurfaces in the supposition that ordinary discourse must be "surpassed", or even by-passed, by the use of obscure jargon lifted from Hegel's Logic, which not only 'permits' such 'word magic', it positively insists on it.

 

So, instead of finding fault with the linguistic chicanery that originally spawned these 'abstractions' dialecticians assume that 'reality itself' must be 'contradictory'! So, DM-fans concluded that reality itself must be to blame, not the theory that had given life by this egregious distortion of language. Of course, that is about as sensible as blaming a patient for being ill not the virus that caused the disease. So, the transformation of general terms into the Proper Names of Abstract Particular doesn't avoid the problem, it creates it.

 

In Essay Three Part One we saw that Hegel adopted the Medieval Identity Theory of Predication (which 'allowed' him to re-interpret the "is" of predication as an "is" of identity) so that he could concoct his weird 'theory'.

 

Here is a highly compressed summary of this conjuring trick:

 

In sentences like the following:

 

S1: Blair is a man,

 

what we 'really' have is this:

 

S2: Blair is identical with Man/Manhood.

 

But, since Blair can't be identical with the Universal, Manhood, we must conclude that:

 

S3: Blair is not identical with Manhood.

 

Or, even:

 

S3a: Blair is a non-Man.

 

But, this also misrepresents Blair, so we are forced (by the 'development' of these 'concepts) to conclude that:

 

S4: Blair is not a non-man.

 

From such tortured 'logic' -- hey presto! -- the NON 'emerged' like a rabbit from a hat!

 

[I won't attempt to defend such moves (and that isn't because I think they can be defended!), since I am only concerned here to summarise this 'argument', the background to which can be found set out in much greater detail here, here and here.]

 

These verbal tricks suggested to those happy to perform them, or those content be bamboozled by them, that further adjustments would have to be made to the original 'concepts', 'indicating' that there was "movement" in them. Hence, and as a result, 'concepts' and objects were now said to possess "identity-in-difference", which idea formed the basis for, or even constituted, the 'internal motor' of universal development.

 

"Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphases added.]

 

"[B]ut contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Hegel (1999), p.439, §956. Bold emphasis added. These two passages are favourites, quoted by countless DM-fans -- and, of course, just like Hegel, they all neglect to substantiate them with evidence or anything remotely resembling a clear, or non-question-begging argument.]

 

So, these ersatz 'concepts' -- or, rather, these 'abstract particulars' -- seem to undergo change since they had been transformed so that they now resembled material objects, or the Proper Names thereof! [As we saw, these two were conflated, anyway.]

 

We can also see this happening in Hegel's confusion of the LOI with the LOC ("stated negatively" -- follow the previous link for more details), in the course of which he ran together concepts, objects, names, propositions, relations, relational expression, and judgements -- and a whole host of other things into the bargain. Unfortunately, Marxist dialecticians -- and that includes HCDs -- were only too happy to import these sub-logical Hermetic ideas into the workers' movement.

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory (to be explained in Essay Twelve Part Four, but see below); LIE = Linguistic Idealism; HCD = High Church Dialectician (that term explained here); DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist, depending on context]

 

In this way, DM, based on a simple verbal trick performed on a handful of ordinary words, was taken to reflect 'essential' features of 'reality' underlying the development of absolutely everything, the results of which were then imposed on reality.

 

[An epistemological version of this dodge -- called the RRT -- will be analysed in Essay Twelve Part Four (to be published sometime in 2021). One implication of this theory is that language is no longer held to reflect the world, the world is 'reconfigured' so that it reflects the distorted language that has just been imposed on it. This reverse reflection (this imposition) was an essential move in the construction of the virulent strain of DM-LIE that was imported from German Idealism two centuries ago, allegedly flipped over so that it was now 'the right way up'.]

 

We can see this, too, in Hegel's recklessly ambitious 'derivation' of 'Nothing' from 'Being', via 'Becoming', which is another verbal trick that only works if 'concepts' are treated as objects of some sort (indeed, as objects 'named' by words such as: "Being", "Becoming", and "Nothing").

 

[I have reproduced Hegel's 'argument' below; it was unwisely praised by Lenin and Trotsky, and will be destructively analysed in Essay Twelve Part Five (summary here), where we will see that "Being" and "Nothing" were deemed to be identical (in their difference) because both are supposedly devoid of 'qualities'. But, that implies they are capable of possessing 'qualities', they just don't have any. That in turn means they must be objects (which can have 'qualities'), not concepts (which can't).]

 

In the following, we can see something similar mesmerising Engels:

 

"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), p.457, and Marx and Engels (2004), pp.463-64. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

"Abstract identity (a = a; and negatively, a cannot be simultaneously equal and unequal to a) is likewise inapplicable in organic nature. The plant, the animal, every cell is at every moment of its life identical with itself and yet becoming distinct from itself.... The fact that identity contains difference within itself is expressed in every sentence, where the predicate is necessarily different from the subject; the lily is a plant, the rose is red, where, either in the subject or in the predicate there is something that is not covered by the predicate or the subject…. That from the outset identity with itself requires difference from everything else as its complement, is self-evident." [Engels (1954), pp.214-15. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

Engels clearly viewed concepts as objects. How else are we to interpret this comparison: "the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting." [Italic emphasis added. More on that, here.] This conflation can be seen, too, by the way Engels equated subjects and predicates, using the ubiquitous DM-model, a = a, whereby both predicate expressions and singular terms are represented (and hence equated) by the use of the same letter, "a".

 

Plainly, such creations of centuries of overactive imaginations -- these 'abstractions' -- can't undergo change in the material world, and that is why the above tendentious moves have had to be transferred to the 'hidden' world of 'the mind' where theorists can play around with them to their heart's content.

 

Indeed, this 'linguistic make-over' is so 'profound' it can, on its own, 'justify' the creation of an entire universe of self-developing 'concepts', conveniently hidden away from the gaze of ordinary folk. These 'concepts' 'exist' in this invisible world and, as we saw in Essay Three Part Two, are more real than the material world from which they had supposedly been 'abstracted'. We are told that this 'occult' world encapsulates the essence of the material world, at once both its architectonic and the beating heart that gives it life and drives development. That is why DM-theorists argue that without the 'dialectic', HM would be like a "clock without a spring":

 

"Trotsky's reply to theses argument [i.e., to those advanced by James Burnham -- RL] contains a convincing explanation of why the dialectic is an essential part of Marxism...:

 

'In the January 1939 issue of the New International a long article was published by comrades Burnham and Shachtman, "Intellectuals in Retreat". The article, while containing many correct ideas and apt political characterizations, was marred by a fundamental defect if not flaw. While polemicising against opponents who consider themselves -- without sufficient reason -- above all as proponents of "theory," the article deliberately did not elevate the problem to a theoretical height. It was absolutely necessary to explain why the American "radical" intellectuals accept Marxism without the dialectic (a clock without a spring). The secret is simple. In no other country has there been such rejection of the class struggle as in the land of "unlimited opportunity." The denial of social contradictions as the moving force of development led to the denial of the dialectic as the logic of contradictions in the domain of theoretical thought. Just as in the sphere of politics it was thought possible everybody could be convinced of the correctness of a "just" program by means of clever syllogisms and society could be reconstructed through "rational" measures. so in the sphere of theory it was accepted as proved that Aristotelian logic, lowered to the level of "common sense," was sufficient for the solution of all questions.' [Rees (1998), pp.270-71. Rees is here quoting Trotsky (1971), pp.56-57 (UK edition); I have restored a corrected version of the on-line edition, here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

"Trotsky once remarked that Marxist theory without dialectics was like a clock without a spring...." [Ken Tarbuck, quoted from here; accessed 23/05/2016.]

 

"In the autumn of 1939 he [Trotsky -- RL] was called upon to explain why several leading members of his own movement claimed that they accepted Marxism, but without the dialectic Trotsky tossed this impudent claim to one side by saying that that was in effect accepting 'a clock without a spring'. There are presently many such fraudulent groups, which while adhering to Trotskyism, hang on to the coat-tails of that New York group which tried to separate the dialectical method from Marxism 41 years ago." [Gerry Healy, quoted from here; accessed 23/06/2016. Bold emphasis in the original.]

 

"Marxism without the dialectic, Trotsky once said, is like a clock without a spring." [Permanent Revolution; quoted from here; accessed 23/05/2016. This links to a PDF.]

 

"While polemicising against opponents who consider themselves -- without sufficient reason -- above all as proponents of 'theory,' the article deliberately did not elevate the problem to a theoretical height. It was absolutely necessary to explain why the American 'radical' intellectuals accept Marxism without the dialectic (a clock without a spring)." [Trotsky (1971), p.56. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

As I noted in Essay Three Part Two:

 

In fact, the reverse appears to be far more likely. Indeed, this entire approach is plainly based on the ancient belief that material reality is insufficient of itself, that it isn't fully real, but is dependent on something that isn't material, and that nature requires the background operation of Ideal principles to make it work.

 

Even for dialectical materialists, matter (would you believe!) is far too crude and lifeless to do anything on its own (Engels even called matter an "abstraction"!) -- even if this is all that nature has to offer. Apparently, it needs a 'Logic' to make it tick. Well, we all know which religion is based on a belief in the Logos.

 

[Answer: the vast majority.]

 

And that explains why Lenin could declare that he preferred intelligent Idealism to "crude materialism".22

 

By nailing their colours to this ruling-class flagpole, dialecticians have unfortunately placed themselves on the side of the 'Gods'.

 

Diodorus Siculus is, I think, the originator of this trope:

 

"When the Gigantes about Pallene chose to begin war against the immortals, Herakles fought on the side of the gods, and slaying many of the Sons of Ge [or Gaia, the 'Earth Goddess' -- RL] he received the highest approbation. For Zeus gave the name of Olympian only to those gods who had fought by his side, in order that the courageous, by being adorned by so honourable a title, might be distinguished by this designation from the coward; and of those who were born of mortal women he considered only Dionysos and Herakles worthy of this name." [Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 4.15.1.]

 

This metaphor alludes to an image painted in Hesiod's Theogony (links at the end) and in Plato's Sophist, one of his more profound surviving works. Indeed, that work and two of his other dialogues -- Theaetetus (Plato (1997e)) and Parmenides (Plato (1997d)) -- are the principle collective source of much of subsequent Idealist theory.

 

The section reproduced below (from the Sophist) revolves around a conversation between an Eleatic "Stranger" (who appears to be a follower of Parmenides) and a character called "Theaetetus":

 

"Stranger. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being....

 

"...There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of essence.

 

"Theaetetus. How is that?

 

"Stranger. Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and trees; of these they lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body.

 

"Theaetetus. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

 

"Stranger. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict raging concerning these matters.

 

"Theaetetus. True.

 

"Stranger. Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

 

"Theaetetus. How shall we get it out of them?

 

"Stranger. With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?

 

"Theaetetus. What?

 

"Stranger. Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but seekers after truth." [Plato (1997b), pp.267-68, 246a-246d. I have used the on-line version here.]

 

[The battle itself is described in Hesiod's Theogony (lines 675-715), available here.]

 

Again, from this it is quite clear that Marxist Dialecticians are far closer to the Idealist 'Gods' than they are to the materialist Giants!

 

Which brings to mind once again this comment by Marx:

 

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement [alienation -- RL] of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphases and link added.]

 

As noted earlier, Hegel performed this conjuring trick on 'Being' to produce 'Nothing', and hence 'Becoming':

 

"Being is the indeterminate immediate; it is free from determinateness in relation to essence and also from any which it can possess within itself. This reflectionless being is being as it is immediately in its own self alone.

 

"Because it is indeterminate being, it lacks all quality; but in itself, the character of indeterminateness attaches to it only in contrast to what is determinate or qualitative. But determinate being stands in contrast to being in general, so that the very indeterminateness of the latter constitutes its quality. It will therefore be shown that the first being is in itself determinate, and therefore, secondly, that it passes over into determinate being -- is determinate being -- but that this latter as finite being sublates itself and passes over into the infinite relation of being to its own self, that is, thirdly, into being-for-self.

 

"Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.

 

"Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content -- undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being.

 

"Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being -- does not pass over but has passed over -- into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.82-83, §130-34. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that Hegel calls each of these 'concepts' an "it", and asserts that 'they' either can -- or they can't -- have 'qualities' or 'determinations' just like any other object, failing to notice that by so doing he had only succeeded in destroying their generality, nullifying the whole point of the exercise. [Hegel's 'argument' will be destructively criticised in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six.]

 

It could be argued that Hegel is talking about conceptual subordination, here, not object-concept subsumption. The former involves concept-to-concept predication, whereas the latter incorporates concept-to-object predication. [On this, see Redding (2007), pp.85-114.] The problem with that response is that Hegel strangled it even before it could take its first breath when he nominalised and particularised the 'concepts' involved -- again, for example, turning the verb "to be" into the Proper Noun, "Being", and then also treating "Nothing" and "Becoming" as Proper Nouns, not quantifiers.

 

This misguided syntactical 'research programme' (now 2400 or more years in the making) deliberately runs together the logical roles played by singular terms and general words/concept expressions. [Why this was a deliberate tactic, invented by ruling-class hacks in Ancient Greece, is explained in Essay Twelve (summary here).]

 

Be this as it may, for present purposes it is worth asking the following question: If these logical 'categories' (the singular and the general (not the plural) -- concepts and objects) are in the end 'identical', how would it be possible to depict or explain the correct functioning of either of them in indicative sentences? As was established in Essay Three Part One, names only function as names if they are articulated by other expressions that aren't names. Similarly with predicate-, or concept-expressions. If every word named something (concrete or abstract), we wouldn't be able to anything about anything. Language would fall apart.

 

Again, as was argued in Essay Three Part One, if sentences were comprised solely of names (or other singular terms), they would become lists. Lists can't be used to say anything true or false. As Gilbert Ryle pointed out many years ago (I have quoted this even though I don't necessarily agree with everything it says, especially its closing couple of sentences):

 

"The traditional doctrine of terms had required (confusedly enough) the analysis of proposition-expressing sentences into two, or with heart searchings, three or more 'terms'; and these terms were (erroneously) supposed all to be correlated with entities in the 'Fido'-Fido way. [I.e., just as 'Fido' names Fido the dog, so all words must name something or other -- RL.] But sentences are not just lists like 'Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,' or even like 'Socrates, mortality.' For they tell truths or falsehoods, which lists do not do. A sentence must include some expressions which are not terms, i.e. 'syncategorematic words' like 'is,' 'if,' 'not,' 'and,' 'all,' 'some,' 'a,' and so on. Such words are not meaningless, though they are not names, as all categorematic words were (erroneously) supposed to be. They are required for the construction of sentences. (Sometimes special grammatical constructions enable us to dispense with syncategorematic words.) Syncategorematic words were accordingly seen to be in a certain way auxiliary, somewhat like rivets which have no jobs unless there are girders to be riveted. I have not finished saying anything if I merely utter the word 'if' or 'is.' They are syntactically incomplete unless properly collocated with suitable expressions of other sorts. In contrast with them it was erroneously assumed that categorematic words are non-auxiliary or are syntactically complete without collocations with other syncategorematic or categorematic expressions, as though I have finished saying something when I say 'Fido,' 'he,' 'the first American pope' or 'jocular.' Russell's doctrine of incomplete symbols [i.e., expressions that are meaningful only in the context of a proposition, but which don't physically correspond to a constituent part of that proposition and can only be revealed by an analysis of it; I have given a simple example of one of these in Note 14, below -- RL] was a half-fledged attempt to re-allocate certain expressions from the categorematic to the syncategorematic family. It was half-fledged because it still assumed that there were or ought to be some syntactically complete categorematic expressions, some 'logically proper names' which would brook being said sans phrase. To call an expression 'incomplete' was erroneously supposed to be saying that it did not function like a name, as if the standard of completeness were set by names and not by sentences; in fact it is saying that it is only a fragment of a range of possible sentences. So ordinary proper names are (save perhaps in some of their vocative uses) as incomplete as any other sentence-fragments." [Ryle (1949), p.71. Italic emphases in the original; links added. (This links to a PDF.)]

 

Of course, this is just part of the reason why DM-'propositions' readily collapse into incoherence; the inept syntactical theory dialecticians imported from Hegel and Traditional Thought denies DM-sentences any sense by turning them into lists, preventing them from saying anything at all.

 

[However, Ryle is wrong about the incomplete nature of Proper Names. Nothing has been removed from a Proper Name that expresses a rule for its completion, allowing it to be mapped onto an indicative sentence, unlike, say "ξ is mortal". For how that works, see here, and Note 14.]

 

14. Of course, that depends on what is meant by the word "concept". Few deny concepts are expressed by general terms, but definite descriptions (like "The concept green") aren't general, they are singular. This highlights a 'problem' discussed briefly in Note 13; any attempt to talk about concepts this way destroys their generality (as we saw in Essay Three Part One).

 

Compare the following with C3:

 

[C3: The concept green has changed.]

 

C5: This leaf is green; next month it will be brown.

 

C5a: These leaves are green; next month they will be brown.

 

C5 succeeds in expressing change, in a perfectly ordinary sense of that word; plainly, that is because it speaks about an object undergoing it (or, in the case of C5a, as this applies to a collection of objects), not a concept.

 

In the first half of C5, the concept green is expressed by the use of the one-place predicable "ξ is green"**, which, when it is completed (as a rule of language) by the singular term -- "This leaf" -- maps it onto the first clause of C5: "This leaf is green".

 

[It could be objected that if the argument in this Essay were correct, the above sentence -- i.e., "The concept green is expressed by the use of the one-place predicable 'ξ is green'" -- would itself be ill-formed. Well, it certainly lacks a sense -- it can't be true and it can't be false -- but that isn't a problem for the case being presented here. That is because the 'offending' sentence** itself expresses (a badly-stated) rule -- in which case, it doesn't need to be true or false to be understood. (More on this in Essay Twelve Part One -- especially here.) And, it is 'badly-stated' only because of the constraints under which I am presently having to operate -- i.e., defending ordinary language in the face of those who seem determined to distort it, disparage or depreciate it (e.g., Traditional Theorists and DM-fans). The sentence marked with two red asterisks would perhaps be better expressed as follows: "We demonstrate our grasp of the language of colour words and concepts expressed by its associated vocabulary, such as 'green', by the rule-governed way we complete sentence stencils such as this 'ξ is green'." (Again, the use of Greek letters -- like "ξ" in "ξ is green" -- is explained here. It is further justified, here, and again, above. A predicable is an expression that is capable of being predicated; it expresses a predicate when it is so predicated.)]

 

By way of contrast, in C3 the phrase "The concept green" is a singular term, which can't express a rule, whereas "ξ is green" can. [Again, why that is so is also explained in Essay Three Part One.]

 

Nevertheless, "The concept green", acting now as a singular term (when coupled with the one-place predicable "ξ has changed"), is mapped onto a sentence like C3. But, because of this, C3 is no longer an ordinary sentence. Despite what it seems to say, it can't now be about 'the concept green' (since that concept is expressed by the use of sentence forming operators like "ξ is green", or by the way we use the word "green" in sentences like C5). "The concept green" can't do this because it is a singular term that can only designate an object, and concepts aren't objects (as we saw in Essay Three Part One -- link above). This means that C3 is a radically ill-formed sentence. While C5 itself succeeds quite uncontroversially in expressing change undergone by familiar everyday objects, C3 fails to depict anything at all because it is so radically malformed.

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

C5: This leaf is green; next month it will be brown.

 

Even if (per impossible) the phrase "The concept green" were capable of being used to designate anything (non-misleadingly), it couldn't serve as an archetype for the role that legitimate concept expressions occupy in sentences like C5. Once more, that is because a singular term (i.e., "The concept green") can't express a rule, which is what the ordinary use of "ξ is green" manages to do (when used in the above manner). So, in use, stencils like "ξ is green" represent an attempt to express the employment of such concepts, whereas "The concept green" can't.

 

Anyone who understands the convention expressed by a concept expression (like "ξ is green" -- i.e., they are able to form sentences by replacing "ξ" with singular term or other syntactically conformable subject expression) will have mastered a rule for the use of "green" in such contexts. It isn't being suggested here that language users actually have the stencil, "ξ is green", in mind when they utter sentences like C5 or that they can recite this rule; that stencil merely reveals a pattern in every sentence users are sensibly capable of forming from it. [Again, why that is so was explained in Essay Three Part One.]

 

So, "ξ is green", as it is used to generate sentences like C5, is the expression of a rule when it is given an ordinary linguistic form. Stencils like "ξ is green" merely assist our understanding of the patterns underlying the formation and use of such simple sentences. Nor does it mean that this is the only way that C5 can be analysed, or that we have to view our employment of words like this; but this way of explaining our use of such language brings out the rule-governed way we all form sentences like C5, and how we are able to understand one another.

 

One distinct advantage of picturing things like this is that it explains why a singular term such as "The concept green" can't express a rule, whereas "ξ is green" can. That is, of course, just a more formal way of making the point that description is different from naming, referring and designating -- which distinction remains valid no matter how we try to depict, analyse or formalise our use of language.

 

However, the stencil, "ξ is green", is nowhere to be found in C5. [Well can you see that Greek letter in C5?] The incomplete expression, "ξ is green", in fact expresses the common pattern behind every legitimate sentence that can be generated from it by the substitution of singular terms in place of the gap marker "ξ" -- as in, "This apple is green", "That lawn is green", "Your face is green. Have you just been reading Hegel?", etc. The rule-governed use of the template "ξ is green" allows for the formation of an indefinite number of sentences in like manner -- some true, some false -- again, even though it appears nowhere in any of its instances.

 

[As already noted, there are other ways of looking at such sentences, but none, I think, brings out the nature of the patterns underlying the rule-governed way we generate, and understand, indicative sentences like these -- or, at least, none that do so without falling onto the nominalisation, particularisation trap mentioned earlier. Or, indeed, none that so effectively undermine the idea that 'concepts' are 'private objects of cognition'. Some critics of this way of viewing incomplete expressions (like "ξ is green") claim that singular terms are also incomplete since they can't be used to say anything on their own. Maybe so, but the idea behind incomplete expressions like "ξ is green" is that they express a rule, unlike a singular term such as "Tony Blair" or "The 44th president of the USA". The incomplete nature of expressions like "ξ is green" express a rule (they are general in form); the incomplete nature of Proper Names or Definite Descriptions does not (they aren't general in form).]

 

Moreover, the singular term used in C3 (i.e., "The concept green") can't actually do what might have been intended for it -- that is, it can't depict a grammatical 'truth' about the role that the stencil "ξ is green" plays in the formation of C5 (or, indeed, the role of the verb phase, "is green", in C5).

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

C5: This leaf is green; next month it will be brown.

 

[This underlies a theme that runs through Wittgenstein's work, namely, we can't express by means of empirical propositions (i.e., propositions about matters of fact) how key logical features of language work -- which was the point behind the distinction between saying and showing (this links to a PDF), to which Wittgenstein drew attention in the Tractatus.]

 

However, that certainly wouldn't be, or have been, the intention of anyone who wanted to use a sentence like C3. In fact, the use of C3-type sentences (or even the more obscure, baroque examples that litter Traditional Philosophy and DM; their analysis in modern philosophical logic is another matter entirely) had originally been intended to facilitate or even justify the search for, and the discovery of, 'essences', nature's 'secrets', which supposedly lie beneath 'surface appearances', and which allegedly underpin 'reality', giving it 'substance'. So, if dialecticians want to say things like the following, they will end up saying nothing at all comprehensible (as we have seen, here):

 

"Thus, for instance, if I affirm: 'John is a Man' I affirm that 'John' is a particular specimen of the general (or 'universal') category 'Man'. I understand what 'John' is by subsuming him under (or 'identifying him with') the wider category 'Man'.

 

"Metaphysical reasoning proceeds on the tacit or explicit assumption that the general category 'Man' and the particular category 'John' exist independently of each other: that over and above all the Particular 'Johns' in creation…over and above all particular men, there exists somewhere -– and would exist if all particular men ceased to be, or had never been -– the general category 'Man.'

 

"…The dialectical method traverses this rigid metaphysic completely. The category 'Man' includes, certainly, all possible 'men.' But 'Man' and 'men', though distinct, separate, and separable logical categories, are only so as logical discriminations, as ways of looking at one and the same set of facts. 'Man' -- is -- all men, conceived from the standpoint of their generality -- that in which all men are alike. 'Men' is a conception of the same fact -- 'all men' -- but in respect of their multiplicity, the fact that no two of them are exactly alike. For dialectics, the particular and the general, the unique and the universal -- for all their logical opposition -- exist, in fact, in and by means of each other. The 'Johniness' of John does not exist, can't possibly be conceived as existing, apart from his 'manniness'. We know 'Man' only as the common characteristic of all particular men; and each particular man is identifiable, as a particular, by means of his variation from all other men -- from that generality 'Man' by means of which we classify 'all men' in one group.

 

"It is the recognition of this 'identity of all (logical pairs of) opposites,' and in the further recognition that all categories form, logically, a series from the Absolutely Universal to the Absolutely Unique -- (in each of which opposites its other is implicit) -– that the virtue of Hegel's logic consists….

 

"Let us now translate this into concrete terms. John is -- a man. Man is a category in which all men (John, and all the not-Johns) are conjoined. I begin to distinguish John from the not-Johns by observing those things in which he is not -- what the other men are. At the same time the fact that I have to begin upon the process of distinguishing implies…that, apart from his special distinguishing characteristics, John is identical with all the not-Johns who comprise the rest of the human race. Thus logically expressed, John is understood when he is most fully conceived as the 'identity' of John-in-special and not-John (i.e. all man) in general.

 

"…When I affirm that 'John is a man' I postulate the oppositional contrast between John and not-John and their coexistence (the negation of their mutual negation) all at once. Certainly as the logical process is worked in my mind I distinguish first one pole, then the other of the separation and then their conjunction. But all three relations -- or better still, the whole three-fold relation -- exists from the beginning and its existence is presupposed in the logical act…." [Jackson (1936), pp.103-06. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

That is because anyone enamoured of this way of talking will have to distort language in order to say what they imagine they might want to say. In the above, "The category 'Man'" can't tell us anything about the logical role played by "...is a man" (or, if you like, "ξ is a man") in a sentence like "John is a man". But, the bogus form of words employed above by comrade Jackson is typical of the way that DM-fans express themselves, and typical of the way that Traditional Theorists have also tried to expand on their theories over the last 2400+ years.

 

Hence, C3-type sentences attempt to tell us what it is that predicate expressions (or maybe even 'concepts') are supposed to refer to. In this particular case, C3 is trying to say that whatever it is that "...is green" (in, say, C5) supposedly denotes has itself changed.

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

C5: This leaf is green; next month it will be brown.

 

However, as we have seen, "...is green" isn't a referring expression; it isn't a singular term.

 

In that case, there is no "underlying reality" for it to point to or 'reflect'.

 

That is because:

 

(i) The idea that there is such an 'underlying reality' is the sole result of bogus linguistic moves like these -- or, rather, such moves were made in order to 'justify', post hoc, the dogma that there is just such an underlying 'reality'; and,

 

(ii) Concept expressions aren't referential -- as we saw in Essay Three Part One.

 

Moreover, this isn't the case because I am here asserting that there is no such thing as 'underlying reality' or 'essence', it is that language can't be forced into saying there are such things without lapsing into incoherence -- indeed, as Marx himself indicated, and as we have seen.

 

To put this another way: if, per impossible, there were any "essences" 'somewhere in reality' (howsoever they might be conceived), they can't be the referents of predicate expressions, since the latter aren't singular terms. They don't operate referentially; they are either descriptive, constitutive, or attributive.

 

[Naturally, these observations completely undermine the DM-theory of knowledge. More on that, here, and in the rest of Essay Three, when it is finally published.]

 

But -- to continue with this ancient metaphysical fantasy a little longer --, if "essences" were indeed fundamental, or even general, features of 'reality', then none of our general terms could be used to denote them. Again, that isn't just because general terms aren't denoting expressions. It is because any attempt to use them that way would transform such general words into singular terms, and that in turn would imply that the 'general features of reality' were in fact particulars (again, as we saw in Essay Three Part One). This would further imply that the world is fundamentally 'abstract', not material! It would indicate this at the same time as robbing language of its capacity to express generality -- once more, by turning predicate expressions into singular terms, and hence sentences into lists.

 

So, instead of reporting a change to a concept (as had been intended), C3-type sentences represent a bogus logico-grammatical transformation that has been imposed on concept expressions -- such as "ξ is green" --, changing them into singular terms that allegedly name, or designate, Abstract Particulars, such as 'The Concept Green', or 'The Form of Green'.

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

C5: This leaf is green; next month it will be brown.

 

Change and development in the material world (properly expressed in sentences like C5) will have in this way been neutered by the introduction of a series of spurious terms substituted for concept expressions (in 'propositions' like C3). As we have seen, movement in the material world can't be depicted this way, and that is what prevents dialecticians from expressing the very thing they had thought they could do -- speak about change in this way. Ordinary language stands in their way; no wonder they find they have to denigrate it.

 

So, by tinkering around with the capacity ordinary language already has for expressing change, dialecticians have only succeeded in producing vacuous strings of words.

 

This ancient philosophical farce was further compounded by theorists who tried to 'solve' the pseudo-problems this logical wrong-turn dumped in their lap in Ancient Greece. It is no surprise, then, that traditional conundrums like these have resisted all attempts to solve them for well over two thousand years. In fact, we are no nearer their 'solution' than Plato was over two millennia ago!

 

Unfortunately, there is no way out of this philosophical cul-de-sac. As soon as a concept expression is transformed into a singular term it ceases to express a concept; it now denotes an object, or pseudo-object (i.e., an 'abstract object'). Worse still, in so doing it misrepresents the role that ordinary, materially-grounded concept expressions (like "ξ is green") play in sentences like C5.

 

C3: The concept green has changed.

 

C5: This leaf is green; next month it will be brown.

 

Naturally, this means that no philosophical theory of conceptual change is possible -- and that includes the 'theory' that has been cobbled-together by advocates of the runt of the litter, DM.

 

[Of course, this doesn't mean that we can't make sense of conceptual change in other ways. How that might be achieved will be entered into in a later Essay. (Spoiler: we can track conceptual development and change by attending to the way that the use of certain words alters or develops over time.)]

 

For example, consider these attempts to state putative truths about a specific 'concept':

 

C6: The concept green is a concept.

 

C7: The concept green is a concept expression.

 

C8: "The concept green" is a concept expression.

 

C9: F is a concept expression.

 

C10: F is a concept.

 

C11: "F" is a concept expression.

 

C12: "F" is a concept.

 

[To be sure, several of the above blur the use/mention distinction, but that doesn't, I think, materially affect the points I wish to make.]

 

As we have seen, the apparently analytic 'truth' expressed by C6 is, if anything, analytically false, since "The concept green" no longer designates a concept, but an object! Hence, and paradoxically, C6 is 'true' just in case it is 'false'! [However, I would argue that C6 is ill-formed, so it can't be true and it can't be false.]

 

C6: The concept green is a concept.

 

C7 is perhaps even worse, for it suggests that a 'denoted object' is a linguistic expression! C8 is worse still: "The concept green" can't be a concept expression since it is a singular term, so it doesn't designate a concept. C9 and C10 are fake concept expressions; the letter "F" (as opposed to what it stands for) can't be a concept expression -- it is just a letter! If the letter "F" is used instead, as in C11 and C12, it becomes a singular term again, referring to whatever the key to this particular schema says it does.

 

C7: The concept green is a concept expression.

 

C8: "The concept green" is a concept expression.

 

C9: F is a concept expression.

 

C10: F is a concept.

 

C11: "F" is a concept expression.

 

C12: "F" is a concept.

 

Some might wonder: if the above were the case, how might we ever successfully construct an adequate logical syntax. But whatever we set-up, if and when we do, we aren't listing a set of truths, merely expressing rules for the use of certain symbols -- and these are rules that attempt to tell us what we all know anyway, since we all know how to use such expressions without a written rule telling us how to do it (that is because we all know how to use at least one natural language). The overwhelming majority of us use sentences like C5 every day of our lives without any such fuss.

 

C5: This leaf is green; next month it will be brown.

 

The locus classicus for the modern discussion of this topic is Frege (1892), upon which much of my own thinking has been based. [However, anyone not familiar with Frege's work will find that article of his rather difficult; they might be advised to begin with Geach (1961), Beaney (1996), and Noonan (2001).]

 

Further background to this topic can be found in Davidson (2005), pp.76-163, Dummett (1955, 1981a, 1981b), Fisk (1968), Gaskin (2008), Geach (1976), Gibson (2004), Jolley (2007), Potter and Ricketts (2010), Slater (2000) -- now reprinted in Slater (2002, 2007a) -- and Textor (2010). For an alternative view, see Kenny (1995) -- criticised in Slater (2000). For a brief but eminently clear exposition of the main issues involved, see Weiner (2004), pp.104-14. There is an excellent survey of where the debate is now situated (concerning the 'reference' of predicates, or even predicate expressions) -- or, at least where it was a few years ago -- in MacBride (2006). Having said that, MacBride doesn't consider the effect that the traditional view -- i.e., the idea that predicate expressions are referential -- has on the unity of the proposition (discussed at length in Essay Three Part One). But, of course, his article wasn't meant to do that.

 

15. Distorted language like this is what almost invariably motivates metaphysical speculation; indeed, much of Traditional Philosophy has been based on conceptual muddles such as these. [On that, see Essay Twelve Part One.] As Wittgenstein noted:

 

"Why is philosophy such a complicated structure? After all, it should be completely simple if it is that ultimate thing, independent of all experience, that you make it out to be. Philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking, hence its results must be simple, but its activity as complicated as the knots it unravels.

 

"Lichtenberg: 'Our entire philosophy is correction [sic] of the use of language, and therefore the correction of a philosophy -- of the most general philosophy.'... You ask why grammatical problems are so tough and seemingly ineradicable. -- Because they are connected with the oldest thought habits, i.e., with the oldest images that are engraved into our language itself (Lichtenberg)....

 

"Human beings are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i.e., grammatical, confusion. And freeing them from these presuppositions [amounts to?] extricating them from the immensely diverse associations they are caught up in. One must, as it were, regroup their entire language. -- But of course this language developed as it did because human beings had -- and have -- the tendency to think this way. Therefore extricating them only works with those who live in an instinctive state of dissatisfaction with language. 

 

"Language has the same traps ready for everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false paths. And thus we see one person after another walking down the same paths....

 

"One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really doesn't make any progress, that the same philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who say that don't understand the reason this must be so. The reason is that our language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. So long as there is a verb 'be' that seems to function like 'eat' and 'drink', so long as there are the adjectives 'identical', 'true', 'false', 'possible', so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of space, etc., etc. humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove.

 

"And this, by the way, satisfies a longing for the transcendental [an alternative version of the manuscript has 'supernatural' here -- RL], for in believing that they see the 'limit of human understanding' they of course believe that they can see beyond it.

 

"I read '...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of "Reality" than Plato got...'. What a strange state of affairs. How strange in that case that Plato could get that far in the first place! Or that after him we were not able to get further. Was it because Plato was so clever?" [Wittgenstein (2013), pp.311-12e. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged; link added. When Wittgenstein says that language has remained constant he isn't denying change; what he is referring to are its nominal, adjectival and verb forms, and the metaphors and analogies that cause perennial problems, those that puzzled Plato and still puzzle us today.]

 

[Examples of confusions like those mentioned by Wittgenstein have been exposed throughout this site. (This particular one was analysed in detail in Essay Three Part One. See also: Note 13 and Note 14, above.)]

 

This partly explains why ontological and epistemological fairy-tales -- fortified by the injection of yet more obscure jargon -- have had to be concocted in order to justify the invention of the 'objects' to which these specially-invented terms allegedly refer --, or which they supposedly 'reflected' -- such as: Forms, Universals, Ideas, Concepts, Categories, and the like.

 

Naturally, this means that 'Ontology' -- the entire discipline -- is completely bogus.

 

16. On this, see Note 13 and Note 14, above.

 

17. Higher-order Logic is outlined in Boolos and Jeffrey (1980), pp.197-207, and Enderton (1972), pp.268-89. See also, here.

 

17a. Nevertheless, one bemused commentator attempted to respond to this point (but without checking the detailed argument presented in Essay Twelve -- partially reproduced above), in the following manner:

 

"Now this is very odd. Ordinary people are just as metaphysical and superstitious as the educated, though there is evidence to indicate that special types of superstitious thinking may be endemic to certain classes. But clearly ordinary language, its richness notwithstanding, is inadequate as is, due to imprecision as well as its ideological content, including inappropriate metaphorical content. At the very least, why else would we need the apparatus of formal logic, mathematics, notational systems, technical terminology, ideology critique?" [More on this here and here. Bold added.]

 

[I have discussed the above topic in detail here.]

 

The reader will no doubt have noticed this commentator's himself used a couple of metaphors (highlighted in bold) in his bid to criticise ordinary language for doing just that! This can only mean that his criticism itself suffers from the same unspecified 'limitations' he claims to have found in the vernacular -- because his criticisms were unwisely written in ordinary language! Hence, if what he says about ordinary language is correct, no safe conclusions may be drawn from his words. Indeed, and as we saw in the main body of this Essay, clichéd attacks on the vernacular like this disintegrate alarmingly quickly, since they, too, suffer from these very same unspecified defects and limitations. This is the argumentative equivalent of sawing off the branch upon which one is sat.

 

Moreover, the above comments echo the hackneyed confusion of 'commonsense' -- or, even widely held everyday beliefs (disguised as "ideological content" and "superstitious beliefs") -- with ordinary language. In that case, they are worthless. As argued in detail in the main body of this Essay (link above), the fact that we can negate (i.e., assert the negation of) every indicative sentence that supposedly expresses a 'commonsense', a 'superstitious', or an ideological belief shows that ordinary language can't be identical with 'commonsense', 'superstition', or ideology, or we wouldn't be able to do it.

 

And, since this critic unfortunately gave no examples of the "ideological" contamination of ordinary language (with allegedly 'suspect beliefs'), not much can be made of that allegation, either.

 

18. The historical connection between FL and science is detailed throughout, for example, Losee (2001); similar links with mathematics can be found in Kneale and Kneale (1978), pp.379-742, with a brief survey in Nidditch (1998). There is a clear summary of the connection between Fregean FL and advances in mathematics in Beaney (1996), pp.1-117, 269-77. The best introductions to Frege are: Weiner (1990, 1999, 2004) and Noonan (2001); for the general background, see Giaquinto (2004). There is an excellent short introduction to Frege's life and work in Potter (2010), although anyone unfamiliar with modern logic might find that book rather tough going.

 

The relation between science and DM will be examined in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two (to be published sometime in 2020).

 

For a more illuminating discussion of the way that contradictions can be handled -- at least in Mathematics -- cf., Floyd (1995, 2000). For the same in science, see Harrison (1987).

 

19. Cf., Davis (2000), Hodges (1983), and Dyson (1997). The importance of Alonzo Church's work on the λ-Calculus can be judged by the fact that it underpins most programming languages.

 

W&G try to minimise these path-breaking developments with the following dismissive wave of the hand:

 

"There are two main branches of formal logic today -- propositional calculus and predicate calculus. They all proceed from axioms, which are assumed to be true 'in all possible worlds,' under all circumstances. The fundamental test remains freedom from contradiction. Anything contradictory is deemed to be 'not valid.' This has a certain application, for example, in computers, which are geared to a simple yes or no procedure. In reality, however, all such axioms are tautologies. These empty forms can be filled with almost any content. They are applied in a mechanical and external fashion to any subject. When it comes to simple linear processes, they do their work tolerably well. This is important, because a great many of the processes in nature and society do, in fact, work in this way. But when we come to more complex, contradictory, non-linear phenomena, the laws of formal logic break down. It immediately becomes evident that, far from being universal truths valid 'in all possible worlds,' they are, as Engels explained, quite limited in their application, and quickly find themselves out of their depth in a whole range of circumstances. Moreover, these are precisely the kind of circumstances which have occupied the attention of science, especially the most innovative parts of it, for most of the 20th century." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.99. This appears on pp.103-04 in the second edition.]

 

We will have occasion to examine these wildly inaccurate allegations later on, but apart from brushing modern logic under the carpet with a simple put-down, W&G offer their readers not one single example of a technological application of DL even though they try vainly to 'expose' the alleged limitations of FL.

 

And while we are on the subject, it is worth pointing out that these two have plainly confused falsehood with invalidity -- for instance, when they say "Anything contradictory is deemed to be 'not valid.'" Invalidity has nothing to do with contradiction; in fact, one rule (RAA) actually depends on contradiction.

 

Moreover, anyone who thinks that, say, QM threatens the status of the LEM would do well to read Harrison (1983, 1985), and then perhaps think again. In which case, "quantum logic" poses no threat to the LEM. It has merely forced us to reconsider what we should count as a scientific proposition. [For a different view, see Slater (2002), pp.177-79.]

 

[QM = Quantum Mechanics; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

 

Of course, computers have had what can only be described as a thoroughly revolutionary impact right across the planet over the last fifty or sixty years, and in more ways than can be described here -- all thanks to the Propositional Calculus.

 

However, DL possesses its own, perhaps less well appreciated practical impact: it has succeeded in confusing comrades like W&G!

 

[In addition to those examined throughout this Essay, W&G's baseless assertions will be systematically taken apart in Part Two of Essay Seven.]

 

20. Admittedly, this is a controversial claim -- but only in so far as some have thought to controvert it.

 

21. In fact, what Trotsky might have had in mind here is the way that certain systems of classical (modern) logic -- for example, the system constructed in Principia Mathematica -- appeal to non-logical principles in an inconsistent attempt to provide a logical foundation for Mathematics. In the case of Principia, for instance, the so-called "Axiom of Infinity" and the "Axiom of Reducibility" might match Trotsky's words. On the other hand, in view of the additional fact that Trotsky seems to have been almost totally ignorant of MFL, that supposition itself is highly questionable. Far more likely: he was merely repeating hear-say. It is entirely possible he got this idea from Jean Van Heijenoort, an expert logician.

 

Nevertheless, this criticism (if it is what Trotsky meant) only applies to foundational work in one branch of MFL connected with the so-called "Logicist" program. Whatever the limitations and failings turn out to be of Principia Mathematica (in particular), or of Logicism (in general), they don't necessarily affect other systems of MFL.

 

[On this, cf., Bostock (1997) (this links to a PDF), Hunter (1996) and Kneale and Kneale (1978), pp.435-742. On the failings of Logicism (or, at least, Frege's version of it), see Noonan (2001).]

 

In fact, it might soon prove possible to remove the serious obstacle that halted Frege's program in its tracks -- i.e., Russell's Paradox. Should this work-around materialise, that wouldn't mean that Logicism should once more be viewed as a viable option -- even though it isn't susceptible to the serious limitations it possesses that many think were exposed by Gödel's Theorem --, but it would mean that at least one reason why some DM-theorists reject MFL (or, rather, one reason they consider it valid only "within certain limits") will have vanished.

 

Recently, much work has gone into this area of the Philosophy of Mathematics, following on Crispin Wright's attempt to reconstruct Frege's system [Wright (1983)]. On this, see the following excellent review article: MacBride (2003); see also the discussion articles written by Ian Rumfitt, William Demopoulos and Gideon Rosen in Philosophical Books 44, July 2003, as well as the reply by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale in the same issue -- i.e., Rumfitt (2003), Demopoulos (2003), Rosen (2003), Hale and Wright (2003). Cf., also, Boolos (1998), Burgess and Rosen (1997), Demopoulos (1997), Dummett (1981a, 1981b, 1991, 1993, 1998a, 1998b), Hale (1987), Hale and Wright (2001), Heck (2011), Schirn (1998), Slater (2000, 2002), Teichmann (1992), Wright (1992, 1998a, 1998b). Cf., also the special edition of Dialectica 59, 2, 2005, which was entirely devoted to this aspect of Frege's work. A note of caution, though, has since been registered by Burgess (2005).

 

However, the most profound criticisms of Principia (and of Logicism in general) were advanced by Wittgenstein. The best discussion of this is Marion (1998). See also, Shanker (1987), Rodych (1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2002, 2018), and, in general, Hintikka (1996). In addition, cf., Floyd (forthcoming, 1 and 2). See also here.

 

22. Contemporary DM-fans find it all but impossible to resist the temptation to advance derogatory remarks about FL. Here is what comrades Woods and Grant [W&G] had to say:

 

"It is necessary to acquire a concrete understanding of the object as an integral system, not as isolated fragments; with all its necessary interconnections, not torn out of context, like a butterfly pinned to a collector's board; in its life and movement, not as something lifeless and static. Such an approach is in open conflict with the so-called 'laws' of formal logic, the most absolute expression of dogmatic thought ever conceived, representing a kind of mental rigor mortis. But nature lives and breathes, and stubbornly resists the embraces of formalistic thinking. 'A' is not equal to 'A.' Subatomic particles are and are not. Linear processes end in chaos. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Quantity changes into quality. Evolution itself is not a gradual process, but interrupted by sudden leaps and catastrophes. What can we do about it? Facts are stubborn things." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.82-83. This can be found on pp.86-87 in the second edition. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The subject and the predicate of the conclusion each occur in one of the premises, together with a third term (the middle) that is found in both premises, but not in the conclusion. The predicate of the conclusion is the major term; the premise in which it is contained is the major premise; the subject of the conclusion is the minor term; and the premise in which it is contained is the minor premise. For example,

 

a) All men are mortal. (Major premise)

 

b) Caesar is a man. (Minor premise)

 

c) Therefore, Caesar is mortal. (Conclusion).

 

"This is called an affirmative categorical statement. It gives the impression of being a logical chain of argument, in which each stage is derived inexorably from the previous one. But actually, this is not the case, because 'Caesar' is already included in 'all men.' Kant, like Hegel, regarded the syllogism (that 'tedious doctrine,' as he called it) with contempt. For him, it was 'nothing more than an artifice' in which the conclusions were already surreptitiously introduced into the premises to give a false appearance of reasoning." [Ibid., p.86. This appears on p.90 of the second edition. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

However, the example these two give of a syllogism isn't one that Aristotle would have recognised. The use of the 'Socrates'/'Caesar' example is in fact a widespread error; it is repeated in many bad old logic texts, as well as the writings of those who haven't studied Aristotle too carefully. He would have denied it was a legitimate syllogism in view of the fact that it has a particular middle premise which isn't governed by what we would now call a quantifier expression (i.e., "Some", "All", "Every", "No", etc.), but relates to a named individual.

 

And, as far as Kant's comment is concerned (and this particular error is almost as ubiquitous), there are many valid arguments where the conclusion isn't "contained" in the premises. [One example of this was given above. Several more can be found here.]

 

As noted earlier, W&G's book is full of errors like this (many of which remained in the Second Edition -- despite Alan Woods having been informed about them by a supporter of this site several years before the Second Edition was published), just as it is replete with countless snide remarks about FL -- a subject about which these two seem to know as much as they do about the whereabouts of Lord Lucan and Shergar. [On this, see Note 23.]

 

Finally, what FL has got to do with butterflies these two annoyingly kept to themselves. As we have seen, it is DM that struggles with change, not FL.

 

22a1. However, since this Essay was originally published a Wikipedia page to which I have just referred has been changed, but it can still be found here.

 

22a2. As we will see in Essay Six, the LOI doesn't preclude change. Moreover, in Essays Five, Seven Part Three and Eight Parts One, Two and Three, it will be shown that it is dialecticians themselves who can't account for motion or change. As far as Aristotle and change are concerned, see here.

 

22a. Trotsky repeated these obsolete ideas in his unpublished notebooks:

 

"Human thought has assimilated the cosmogony of Kant and LaPlace, the geology of Lyell, the biology of Darwin, the sociology of Marx, which analyse every existing thing in the process of its uninterrupted change, evolution, development, catastrophes, etc. But for formal logic the syllogism remains immutable; it does not appear as an instrument, a historical lever of our consciousness in the process of its adaptation to external nature with the aim of learning about nature in a word, not a concrete historical formation conditioned by the circumstances of time and place, including the structure of our consciousness, the scope of its experience, etc. On the contrary, the syllogism appears as a once-and-for-all-given form of comprehending external events. The syllogism stands above these events, above humanity itself and its consciousness, above matter, and is the eternal beginning, immutable and all-powerful, for it controls all our activity; in other words the syllogism is invested with all the attributes of God." [Trotsky (1973), pp.401-02.]

 

Alas, these comments were out-of-date sixty or seventy years before they were even committed to paper by Trotsky!

 

23. Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis Debunked

 

[This forms part of Note 23.]

 

Practically every book and article I have consulted on DM has included an egregious attempt to 'define' the so-called 'three laws' of FL. Why dialecticians imagine there are only three such laws is itself a mystery -- but it may have something to do with the mystical nature of the number three, which fantasy resurfaces in what many ill-informed dialecticians think is Hegel's method: "Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis". That idea is so widespread (indeed, the Tory commentator, Matthew Parris, in a recent (June 2015) debate on BBC TV with UK Labour Party activist, Owen Jones, declared his support for the 'Marxist' method, Thesis/Antithesis/Synthesis!), and has sunk so deep in the minds of sloppy, ill-informed teachers, commentators, bloggers, critics, researchers, amateur YouTube video producers, readers and viewers alike, that it will survive any and all attempts to correct it. Unfortunately, this confusion has recently been given a boost by the publication of Wheat (2012). [On the latter, see my comments here.]

 

Here is what Hegel expert Terry Pinkard had to say (in an interview) about this hackneyed 'triad':

 

"Britannica: One of the things most associated with Hegel's thought is the thesis/antithesis/synthesis scheme, the process by which reality unfolds and history progresses. But you claim this never appears in Hegel's work.

 

"Pinkard: This myth was started by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus. It appears in a history he wrote of recent German philosophy (published in the 1840s), in which he said, roughly, that Fichte's philosophy followed the model of thesis/antithesis/synthesis, but Hegel went further and cosmologized that notion, extending it to the entire universe. The book was widely read (apparently the young Marx was one of its readers), and the idea stuck. It's still touted in a lot of short encyclopedia entries about Hegel. Like many little encapsulations of thought, it has the virtue of being easy to understand and easy to summarize. It's just not very helpful in understanding Hegel's thought. It has also contributed to the lack of appreciation of Hegel in Anglophone philosophy. It's not too hard to point out all the places where it doesn't apply, dismiss it as a kind of dialectical trick, and then just go on to conclude that Hegel isn't worth reading at all." [Interview taken from here. Unfortunately, that link now appears to be dead!]

 

Add to that the following comments:

 

"Some say Hegel used the method of: thesis-antithesis-synthesis, and others deny this. Who is correct?

 

"The most vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.' [...] The actual texts of Hegel not only occasionally deviate from 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,' but show nothing of the sort. 'Dialectic' does not for Hegel mean 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.' Dialectic means that any 'ism' -- which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving 'the rest' to itself -- must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the 'World-itself.'

 

"Hermann Glockner's reliable Hegel Lexikon (4 volumes, Stuttgart, 1935) does not list the Fichtean terms 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' together. In all the twenty volumes of Hegel's 'complete works' he does not use this 'triad' once; nor does it occur in the eight volumes of Hegel texts, published for the first time in the twentieth Century. He refers to 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis' in the Preface of the Phenomenology of Mind, where he considers the possibility of this 'triplicity' as a method or logic of philosophy. According to the Hegel-legend one would expect Hegel to recommend this 'triplicity.' But, after saying that it was derived from Kant, he calls it a 'lifeless schema,' 'mere shadow' and concludes: 'The trick of wisdom of that sort is as quickly acquired as it is easy to practice. Its repetition, when once it is familiar, becomes as boring as the repetition of any bit of sleigh-of-hand once we see through it. The instrument for producing this monotonous formalism is no more difficult to handle than the palette of a painter, on which lie only two colours....' (Preface, Werke, II, 48-49).

 

"In the student notes, edited and published as History of Philosophy, Hegel mentions in the Kant chapter, the 'spiritless scheme of the triplicity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis' (geistloses Schema) by which the rhythm and movement of philosophic knowledge is artificially pre-scribed (vorgezeichnet).

 

"In the first important book about Hegel by his student, intimate friend and first biographer, Karl Rosenkranz (Hegels Leben, 1844), 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' are conspicuous by their absence. It seems Hegel was quite successful in hiding his alleged 'method' from one of his best students.

 

"The very important new Hegel literature of this century has altogether abandoned the legend. Theodor Haering's Hegels Wollen und Werk (2 vol., Teubner, 1929 and 1938) makes a careful study of Hegel's terminology and language and finds not a trace of 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis.' In the second volume there are a few lines (pp.118, 126) in which he repeats what Hegel in the above quotation had said himself, i.e., that this 'conventional slogan' is particularly unfortunate because it impedes the understanding of Hegelian texts. As long as readers think that they have to find 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' in Hegel they must find him obscure -- but what is obscure is not Hegel but their coloured glasses. Iwan Iljin's Hegel's Philosophie als kontemplative Gotteslehre (Bern, 1946) dismisses the 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' legend in the Preface as a childish game (Spielerei), which does not even reach the front-porch of Hegel's philosophy.

 

"Other significant works, like Hermann Glockner, Hegel (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1929), Theodor Steinbüchel, Das Grundproblem der Hegelschen Philosophie (Bonn, 1933), and Theodor Litt, Hegel: Eine Kritische Erneuerung (Heidelberg, 1953), Emerich Coreth, S.J., Das Dialektische Sein in Hegels Logik (Wien, 1952), and many others have simply disregarded the legend. In my own monographs on Hegel über Offenbarung, Kirche und Philosophie (Munich, 1939) and Hegel über Sittlichkeit und Geschichte (Reinhardt, 1940), I never found any 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis.' Richard Kroner, in his introduction to the English edition of selections from Hegel's Early Theological Writings, puts it mildly when he says: 'This new Logic is of necessity as dialectical as the movement of thinking itself.... But it is by no means the mere application of a monotonous trick that could be learned and repeated. It is not the mere imposition of an ever recurring pattern. It may appear so in the mind of some historians who catalogue the living trend of thought, but in reality it is ever changing, ever growing development; Hegel is nowhere pedantic in pressing concepts into a ready-made mold (sic). The theme of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis, like the motif of a musical composition, has many modulations and modifications. It is never "applied"; it is itself only a poor and not even helpful abstraction of what is really going on in Hegel's Logic.'

 

"Well, shall we keep this 'poor and not helpful abstraction' in our attic because 'some historians' have used it as their rocking-horse? We rather agree with the conclusion of Johannes Flügge: 'Dialectic is not the scheme of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis imputed to Hegel.'

 

"In an essay by Nicolai Hartmann on Aristoteles und Hegel, I find the following additional confirmation of all the other witnesses to the misinterpretation of Hegel's dialectic: 'It is a basically perverse opinion (grundverkehrte Ansicht) which sees the essence of dialectic in the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.' The legend was spread by Karl Marx whose interpretation of Hegel is distorted. It is Marxism superimposed on Hegel. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis, Marx says in Das Elend der Philosophie, is Hegel's purely logical formula for the movement of pure reason, and the whole system is engendered by this dialectical movement of thesis, antithesis, synthesis of all categories. This pure reason, he continues, is Mr. Hegel's own reason, and history becomes the history of his own philosophy, whereas in reality, thesis, antithesis, synthesis are the categories of economic movements. (Summary of Chapter II, Paragraph 1.) The few passages in Marx's writings that resemble philosophy are not his own. He practices the communistic habit of expropriation without compensation. Knowing this in general, I was also convinced that there must be a source for this 'thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,' and I finally discovered it.

 

"In the winter of 1835-36, a group of Kantians in Dresden called on Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, professor of philosophy at the University of Kiel, to lecture to them on the new philosophical movement after Kant. They were older, professional men who in their youth had been Kantians, and now wanted an orientation in a development which they distrusted; but they also wanted a confirmation of their own Kantianism. Professor Chalybäus did just those two things. His lectures appeared in 1837 under the title Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel, Zu näherer Verständigung des wissenschaftlichen Publikums mit der neuesten Schule. The book was very popular and appeared in three editions. In my copy of the third edition of 1843, Professor Chalybäus says (p.354): 'This is the first trilogy: the unity of Being, Nothing and Becoming...we have in this first methodical thesis, antithesis, and synthesis...an example or schema for all that follows.' This was for Chalybäus a brilliant hunch which he had not used previously and did not pursue afterwards in any way at all. But Karl Marx was at that time a student at the university of Berlin and a member of the Hegel Club where the famous book was discussed. He took the hunch and spread (it?) into a deadly, abstract machinery. Other left Hegelians, such as Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner, use 'thesis, antithesis, synthesis' just as little as Hegel.

 

"(Quoted from the article of Gustav E. Mueller: 'The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"', in Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume XIX, June 1958, Number 3, Page 411. The article is still as valid today as it was in 1958.)" [This can be found here. The comments between the brackets above are from the edited, published version. Quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; US spelling modified to UK English. The full article is Mueller (1958).]

 

This suggests that Marx and all subsequent Marxists who use, or reference, this 'schema' aren't reliable interpreters of Hegel. Having said that, it is arguable that Marx was being ironic and dismissive when he said the following in The Poverty of Philosophy.

 

"If we had M. Proudhon's intrepidity in the matter of Hegelianism we should say: it is distinguished in itself from itself. What does this mean? Impersonal reason, having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an object to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose itself, is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and composing itself -- position, opposition, composition. Or, to speak Greek -- we have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For those who do not know the Hegelian language, we shall give the ritual formula: affirmation, negation and negation of the negation. That is what language means. It is certainly not Hebrew (with due apologies to M. Proudhon); but it is the language of this pure reason, separate from the individual. Instead of the ordinary individual with his ordinary manner of speaking and thinking we have nothing but this ordinary manner purely and simply -- without the individual....

 

"So what is this absolute method? The abstraction of movement. What is the abstraction of movement? Movement in abstract condition. What is movement in abstract condition? The purely logical formula of movement or the movement of pure reason. Wherein does the movement of pure reason consist? In posing itself, opposing itself, composing itself; in formulating itself as thesis, antithesis, synthesis; or, yet, in affirming itself, negating itself, and negating its negation.

 

"How does reason manage to affirm itself, to pose itself in a definite category? That is the business of reason itself and of its apologists.

 

"But once it has managed to pose itself as a thesis, this thesis, this thought, opposed to itself, splits up into two contradictory thoughts – the positive and the negative, the yes and no. The struggle between these two antagonistic elements comprised in the antithesis constitutes the dialectical movement. The yes becoming no, the no becoming yes, the yes becoming both yes and no, the no becoming both no and yes, the contraries balance, neutralize, paralyze each other. The fusion of these two contradictory thoughts constitutes a new thought, which is the synthesis of them. This thought splits up once again into two contradictory thoughts, which in turn fuse into a new synthesis. Of this travail is born a group of thoughts. This group of thoughts follows the same dialectic movement as the simple category, and has a contradictory group as antithesis. Of these two groups of thoughts is born a new group of thoughts, which is the antithesis of them.

 

"Just as from the dialectic movement of the simple categories is born the group, so from the dialectic movement of the groups is born the series, and from the dialectic movement of the series is born the entire system.

 

"Apply this method to the categories of political economy and you have the logic and metaphysics of political economy, or, in other words, you have the economic categories that everybody knows, translated into a little-known language which makes them look as if they had never blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason; so much do these categories seem to engender one another, to be linked up and intertwined with one another by the very working of the dialectic movement. The reader must not get alarmed at these metaphysics with all their scaffolding of categories, groups, series, and systems. M. Proudhon, in spite of all the trouble he has taken to scale the heights of the system of contradictions, has never been able to raise himself above the first two rungs of simple thesis and antithesis; and even these he has mounted only twice, and on one of these two occasions he fell over backwards.

 

"Up to now we have expounded only the dialectics of Hegel. We shall see later how M. Proudhon has succeeded in reducing it to the meanest proportions. Thus, for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is happening in his own mind. Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the history of philosophy, of his own philosophy. There is no longer a 'history according to the order in time,' there is only 'the sequence of ideas in the understanding.' He thinks he is constructing the world by the movement of thought, whereas he is merely reconstructing systematically and classifying by the absolute method of thoughts which are in the minds of all." [Marx (1978), pp.98-102. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Link added.]

 

The above conclusion is clear from what Marx had to say about Hegel's 'dialectics'/'method', where it is clear that he is talking about his earlier remarks from the same section of this book:

 

"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction -- for we have here an abstraction, and not an analysis -- presents itself as a logical category? Is it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a body; that if you leave out of account the limits of this body, you soon have nothing but a space -– that if, finally, you leave out of account the dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the final abstraction the only substance left is the logical categories. Thus the metaphysicians, who in making these abstractions, think they are making analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their core -- these metaphysicians in turn are right in saying that things here below are embroideries of which the logical categories constitute the canvas. This is what distinguishes the philosopher from the Christian. The Christian, in spite of logic, has only one incarnation of the Logos; the philosopher has never finished with incarnations. If all that exists, all that lives on land, and under water, can be reduced by abstraction to a logical category -- if the whole real world can be drowned thus in a world of abstractions, in the world of logical categories -- who need be astonished at it?

 

"All that exists, all that lives on land and under water, exists and lives only by some kind of movement. Thus, the movement of history produces social relations; industrial movement gives us industrial products, etc.

 

"Just as by means of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition -- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement. If one finds in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has found in the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only explains all things, but also implies the movement of things.

 

"It is of this absolute method that Hegel speaks in these terms:

 

'Method is the absolute, unique, supreme, infinite force, which no object can resist; it is the tendency of reason to find itself again, to recognize itself in every object.' (Logic, Vol. III [p. 29])

 

"All things being reduced to a logical category, and every movement, every act of production, to method, it follows naturally that every aggregate of products and production, of objects and of movement, can be reduced to a form of applied metaphysics. What Hegel has done for religion, law, etc., M. Proudhon seeks to do for political economy." [Marx (1978), pp.99-100. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

And we can see from what Marx wrote in The Holy Family that it is the method of abstraction -- turning everything into a 'logical category' -- that "constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method", not the 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' triad:

 

"Now that Critical Criticism as the tranquillity of knowledge has 'made' all the mass-type 'antitheses its concern', has mastered all reality in the form of categories and dissolved all human activity into speculative dialectics, we shall see it produce the world again out of speculative dialectics. It goes without saying that if the miracles of the Critically speculative creation of the world are not to be 'desecrated', they can be presented to the profane mass only in the form of mysteries. Critical Criticism therefore appears in the incarnation of Vishnu-Szeliga ["Szeliga" was the pseudonym of a young Hegelian, Franz Zychlinski -- RL] as a mystery-monger....

 

"The mystery of the Critical presentation of the Mystéres de Paris is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction. Once Herr Szeliga has proclaimed that 'degeneracy within civilisation' and rightlessness in the state are 'mysteries', i.e., has dissolved them in the category 'mystery', he lets 'mystery' begin its speculative career. A few words will suffice to characterise speculative construction in general. Herr Szeliga's treatment of the Mystéres de Paris will give the application in detail.

 

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'. I therefore declare apples, pears, almonds, etc., to be mere forms of existence, modi, of 'Fruit'. My finite understanding supported by my senses does of course distinguish an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but my speculative reason declares these sensuous differences inessential and irrelevant. It sees in the apple the same as in the pear, and in the pear the same as in the almond, namely 'Fruit'. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -- 'Fruit'.

 

"By this method one attains no particular wealth of definition. The mineralogist whose whole science was limited to the statement that all minerals are really 'the Mineral' would be a mineralogist only in his imagination. For every mineral the speculative mineralogist says 'the Mineral', and his science is reduced to repeating this word as many times as there are real minerals.

 

"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction.

 

"The speculative philosopher therefore relinquishes the abstraction 'the Fruit', but in a speculative, mystical fashion -- with the appearance of not relinquishing it. Thus it is really only in appearance that he rises above his abstraction. He argues somewhat as follows:

 

"If apples, pears, almonds and strawberries are really nothing but 'the Substance', 'the Fruit', the question arises: Why does 'the Fruit' manifest itself to me sometimes as an apple, sometimes as a pear, sometimes as an almond? Why this semblance of diversity which so obviously contradicts my speculative conception of Unity, 'the Substance', 'the Fruit'?

 

"This, answers the speculative philosopher, is because 'the Fruit' is not dead, undifferentiated, motionless, but a living, self-differentiating, moving essence. The diversity of the ordinary fruits is significant not only for my sensuous understanding, but also for 'the Fruit' itself and for speculative reason. The different ordinary fruits are different manifestations of the life of the 'one Fruit'; they are crystallisations of 'the Fruit' itself. Thus in the apple 'the Fruit' gives itself an apple-like existence, in the pear a pear-like existence. We must therefore no longer say, as one might from the standpoint of the Substance: a pear is 'the Fruit', an apple is 'the Fruit', an almond is 'the Fruit', but rather 'the Fruit' presents itself as a pear, 'the Fruit' presents itself as an apple, 'the Fruit' presents itself as an almond; and the differences which distinguish apples, pears and almonds from one another are the self-differentiations of 'the Fruit' and make the particular fruits different members of the life-process of 'the Fruit'. Thus 'the Fruit' is no longer an empty undifferentiated unity; it is oneness as allness, as 'totality' of fruits, which constitute an 'organically linked series of members'. In every member of that series 'the Fruit' gives itself a more developed, more explicit existence, until finally, as the 'summary' of all fruits, it is at the same time the living unity which contains all those fruits dissolved in itself just as it produces them from within itself, just as, for instance, all the limbs of the body are constantly dissolved in and constantly produced out of the blood.

 

"We see that if the Christian religion knows only one Incarnation of God, speculative philosophy has as many incarnations as there are things, just as it has here in every fruit an incarnation of the Substance, of the Absolute Fruit. The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind. Hence what is delightful in this speculation is to rediscover all the real fruits there, but as fruits which have a higher mystical significance, which have grown out of the ether of your brain and not out of the material earth, which are incarnations of 'the Fruit', of the Absolute Subject. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.

 

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'. And in regard to every object the existence of which he expresses, he accomplishes an act of creation.

 

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'

 

"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975), pp.71-75. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added.]

 

If we reject this attempt to distance Marx from the hackneyed triad, then (according to Lenin) that can only mean that Marx didn't understand Das Kapital!
 

"It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!" [Lenin (1961), p.180. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

Naturally, this implies that understanding Hegel (even if that were possible) isn't integral to Marxism, or we would be faced with the ridiculous conclusion that Marx didn't understand the core text of Marxism -- Das Kapital!

 

24. On this, see here. Cf., also Note 25.

 

25. This idea was advanced, for example, in Engels (1954), p.258 and was discussed in more detail in Essay Seven Part One, here and here.

 

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--------, (2002), 'Wittgenstein On Gödel: The Newly Published Remarks', Erkenntnis 56, 3, pp.379-97.

 

--------, (2018), 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy Of Mathematics', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2018 Edition).

 

Rose, H., and Rose, S. (1976) (eds.), The Radicalisation Of Science. Ideology Of/In The Natural Sciences (Macmillan).

 

Rose, S. (2005), Lifelines. Life Beyond The Gene (Vintage, 2nd ed.)

 

Rosen, G. (2003), 'Platonism, SemiPlatonism And The Caesar Problem', Philosophical Books 44, 3, pp.229-44.

 

Ross, G. (1983a), 'Occultism And Philosophy In The Seventeenth Century', in Holland (1983), pp.95-115.

 

--------, (1983b), 'Leibniz: The Dialectical Immaterialist', BBC Radio Three Talk, 29/10/83. [This link no longer appears to work!]

 

--------, (1998), 'Occult Tendencies In The Seventeenth Century', in Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Reihe 5, 17. Jahrhundert, Band 1, ed. J-P. Schobinger (Schwabe, 1998), pp.196–224. [This link no longer appears to work, either!]

 

Royle, C. (2015), 'X-Ray Vision, A Review Of David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions And The End Of Capitalism', International Socialism 147, Summer 2015, pp.217-19.

 

Rumfitt, I. (2003), 'Singular Terms And Arithmetical Logicism', Philosophical Books 44, 3, pp.193-219.

 

Ryle, G. (1949), 'A Review Of Meaning And Necessity By Rudolf Carnap', Philosophy 24, pp.69-76, reprinted in Ryle (1971a), pp.225-35 as 'Discussion of Rudolph Carnap Meaning And Necessity'. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (1953), 'Ordinary Language', Philosophical Review 62, pp.167-86, reprinted in Ryle (1971b), pp.301-18. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (1960), Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press).

 

--------, (1961), 'Use, Usage And Meaning', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 35, pp.223-30, reprinted in Ryle (1971b), pp.407-14, and Lyas (1971), pp.54-60. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (1963), The Concept Of Mind (Penguin Books). The section referenced here (i.e., pp.67-72) has been reprinted in Lyas (1971), pp.45-53. [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (1971a), Collected Papers Volume One: Critical Essays (Barnes & Noble Inc.).

 

--------, (1971b), Collected Papers Volume Two: Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Barnes & Noble Inc.).

 

Sayers, S. (1992), 'Dialectic In Western Marxism', in Peng Yen-Han (1992).

 

Seligman, P. (1962), The Apeiron Of Anaximander. A Study In The Origin And Function Of Metaphysical Ideas (The Athlone Press).

 

Schirn, M. (1998) (ed.), The Philosophy Of Mathematics Today (Oxford University Press).

 

Shanker, S. (1987), Wittgenstein And The Turning-Point In The Philosophy Of Mathematics (State University of New York Press).

 

--------, (1998), Wittgenstein's Remarks On The Foundations Of Artificial Intelligence (Routledge).

 

Shapiro, S. (2005) (ed.), The Oxford Handbook Of Philosophy Of Mathematics And Logic (Oxford University Press). [This links to a PDF.]

 

--------, (2022), 'Classical Logic', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2022 Edition).

 

Sheehan, H. (1993), Marxism And The Philosophy Of Science. A Critical History (Humanities Press).

 

Shumaker, W. (1972), The Occult Sciences In The Renaissance (University of California Press).

 

Sider, T. (2010), Logic For Philosophy (Oxford University Press).

 

Skeat, W. (2005), An Etymological Dictionary Of The English Language (Dover Books).

 

Slater, H. (2000), 'Concept And Object In Frege', Minerva 4, reprinted in Slater (2007a), pp.99-112, and Slater (2002), pp.123-37.

 

--------, (2002), Logic Reformed (Peter Lang).

 

--------, (2004), 'Dialetheias Are Mental Confusions', translated into Rumanian by D. Gheorghiu, editor, with I. Lucica, Ex Falso Quodlibet, (Editura Tehnica, Bucharest). This has now been re-published as Slater (2007b); see also Slater (2007c).

 

--------, (2007a), The De-Mathematisation Of Logic (Polimetrica). [This book can be downloaded for personal use from here -- after you complete the on-line form.]

 

--------, (2007b), 'Dialetheias Are Mental Confusions', in Slater (2007a), pp.233-46. This can also be found in Béziau, Carnielli and Gabbay (2007), pp.457-66.

 

--------, (2007c), 'Response To Priest', in Béziau, Carnielli and Gabbay (2007), pp.475-76.

 

Slaughter, C. (1963), Lenin On Dialectics (New Park Publications).

 

Smith, R. (2022), 'Aristotle's Logic' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2022 Edition).

 

Somerville, J. (1946), Soviet Philosophy. A Study Of Theory And Practice (The Philosophical Library).

 

--------, (1967), The Philosophy Of Marxism (Random House). [Part of this book is available here.]

 

--------, (1968), 'Ontology, Logic, And Dialectical Materialism', International Philosophical Quarterly 8, pp.113-24; reprinted in Somerville and Parsons (1974), pp.57-70.

 

Somerville, J., and Parsons, H. (1974) (eds.), Dialogues On The Philosophy Of Marxism. From The Proceedings Of The Society For The Philosophical Study Of Dialectical Materialism (Greenwood Press). 

 

Sorensen, R. (1992), Thought Experiments (Oxford University Press).

 

Soyfer, V. (1994), Lysenko And The Tragedy Of Soviet Science (Rutgers University Press).

 

Stewart, J. (1996) (ed.), The Hegel Myths And Legends (Northwestern University Press).

 

Stebbing, L. (1958), Philosophy And The Physicists (Dover).

 

Stenger, V. (1995), The Unconscious Quantum. Metaphysics In Modern Physics And Cosmology (Prometheus Books).

 

Stroud, B. (2000), The Quest For Reality (Oxford University Press).

 

Tantillo, A. (2002), The Will To Create. Goethe's Philosophy Of Nature (University of Pittsburgh Press).

 

Teichmann, R. (1992), Abstract Entities (Macmillan).

 

Textor, M. (2010), 'Frege's Concept Paradox And The Mirroring Principle', Philosophical Quarterly 60, 238, pp.126-48.

 

Thalheimer, A. (1936), Introduction To Dialectical Materialism. The Marxist World-View (Covici Friede Publishers).

 

Thomas, K. (1973), Religion And The Decline Of Magic (Penguin Books).

 

Tomassi, P. (1999), Logic (Routledge).

 

Toulmin, S., and Goodfield, J. (1962), The Architecture Of Matter (Penguin Books).

 

Trotsky, L. (1971), In Defense Of Marxism (New Park Publications).

 

--------, (1973), The Writings Of Leon Trotsky (1939-40) (Pathfinder, 2nd ed.).

 

--------, (1986), Notebooks 1933-35 (Columbia University Press). [Parts of this book can be accessed here (this links to a PDF) and here.]

 

Tugendhat, E. (1982), Traditional And Analytic Philosophy (Cambridge University Press).

 

Tuveson, E. (1982), The Avatars Of Thrice Great Hermes. An Approach To Romanticism (Bucknell University Press).

 

Uschanov, T. (2002), 'Ernest Gellner's Criticisms Of Wittgenstein And Ordinary Language Philosophy', in Kitching and Pleasants (2002), pp.23-46. [A greatly expanded version of this paper is available here.]

 

Vickers, B. (1984) (ed.), Occult And Scientific Mentalities In The Renaissance (Cambridge University Press).

 

Voloshinov, V. (1973), Marxism And The Philosophy Of Language (Harvard University Press). [The first two chapters can be accessed here.]

 

Von Wright, G. (1957), Logical Studies (Routledge)

 

--------, (1963), Norm And Action (Routledge).

 

Vucinich, A. (1980), 'Soviet Physicists And Philosophers In The 1930s: Dynamics Of A Conflict', Isis 71, pp.236-50.

 

--------, (2001), Einstein And Soviet Ideology (Stanford University Press).

 

Webster, C. (1976), The Great Instauration (Duckworth).

 

--------, (1982), From Paracelsus To Newton: Magic And The Making Of Modern Science (Cambridge University Press).

 

Weeks, A. (1991), Boehme. An Intellectual Biography Of The Seventeenth-Century Philosopher And Mystic (State University of New York Press).

 

--------, (1993), German Mysticism From Hildegard Of Bingen To Ludwig Wittgenstein (State University of New York Press).

 

Weiner, J. (1990), Frege In Perspective (Cornell University Press).

 

--------, (1999), Frege (Oxford University Press).

 

--------, (2004), Frege Explained. From Arithmetic To Analytic Philosophy (Open Court); this is a revised edition of Weiner (1999).

 

Werskey, G. (1988), The Visible College. A Collective Biography Of British Scientists And Socialists Of The 1930s (Free Association Books).

 

Wetter, G. (1958), Dialectical Materialism. A Historical And Systematic Survey Of Philosophy In The Soviet Union (Routledge).

 

Wheat, L. (2012), Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics: What Only Marx And Tillich Understood (Prometheus Books).

 

White, J. (1996), Karl Marx And The Intellectual Origins Of Dialectical Materialism (Macmillan).

 

White, R. (1996), The Structure Of Metaphor (Blackwell).

 

--------, (2006), Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Continuum).

 

--------, (2010), Talking About God. The Concept Of Analogy And The Problem Of Religious Language (Ashgate Publishing).

 

White, R. (1999) (ed.), The Rosicrucian Enlightenment Revisited (Lindisfarne Books).

 

Wilber, K. (1984), Quantum Questions. Mystical Writings Of The World's Greatest Physicists (Shambhala).

 

Williams, L. (1980), The Origins Of Field Theory (University Press of America).

 

Wittgenstein, L. (1913), 'How Not To Do Logic: Review Of P. Coffey, The Science Of Logic', Cambridge Review 34, 853, p.351, reprinted in Wittgenstein (1993), pp.2-3.

 

--------, (1972), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Routledge, 2nd ed.). [This links to a PDF of two parallel translations. I have in general used the one on the right, the Pears and McGuinness edition.]

 

--------, (1976), Wittgenstein's Lectures On The Foundation Of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, edited by Cora Diamond (Harvester Press).

 

--------, (1979), Notebooks 1914-1916, edited by G. H. von Wright, and G. E. M. Anscombe, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).

 

--------, (1980), Remarks On Colour, edited by Elizabeth Anscombe, translated by Linda McAlister and Margarette Schättle (Blackwell).

 

--------, (1993), Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, edited by James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Hackett Publishing).

 

--------, (2009), Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, revised by Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Blackwell, 4th ed.).

 

--------, (2013), The Big Typescript: TS 213, edited and translated by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell).

 

Wolfram, S. (1989), Philosophical Logic (Routledge).

 

Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995), Reason In Revolt. Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications, 1st ed.).

 

--------, (2007), Reason In Revolt. Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications, 2nd ed.). [The on-line version now appears to be the second edition. Added on edit: It now looks like only parts of this book are available on-line at the original site. A mirror version of what appears to be the entire second edition can, however, be accessed here.]

 

Wright, C. (1983), Frege's Conception Of Numbers As Objects (Aberdeen University Press).

 

--------, (1992), Truth And Objectivity (Harvard University Press).

 

--------, (1998a), 'On The Harmless Impredicativity Of N= ("Hume's Principle")', in Schirn (1998), pp.339-68; reprinted in Hale and Wright (2001), pp.229-55.

 

--------, (1998b), 'Response To Dummett', in Schirn (1998), pp.389-405.

 

Yates, F. (1991), Giordano Bruno And The Hermetic Tradition (University of Chicago Press).

 

--------, (2001), The Occult Philosophy In The Elizabethan Age (Routledge).

 

--------, (2004), The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (Routledge).

 

Zalta, E. (2022), 'Gottlob Frege', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2022 Edition).

 

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