This page might take several seconds to load because of the many YouTube videos embedded
in it. However, for some reason I can't
work out, Internet Explorer 11 will no longer play these videos. Certainly not on my computer!
As far as I can tell, they
play in other Browsers.
If you are using Internet Explorer 10
(or later), you might find some of the links I have used won't work properly
unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu); for IE11 select
'Compatibility View Settings' and then add this site
(anti-dialectics.co.uk). I have as yet no idea how
Microsoft's new browser,
Edge, will handle these links.
I have moved the Appendix to this Essay to a
new
location.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Apart from Essay Three
Part Two,
this has been one of the most difficult to write. That is partly because so
little has been published by dialecticians over the last 200 years that is of
any help for bemused readers in the endeavour to understand what
Dialectical Materialists mean by "the Totality",
as will soon become apparent to anyone is tempted to think otherwise
-- and who bothers to read this Essay.
In fact, tackling
this particular topic is rather like trying to swim through syrup -- but even then, one
would at least have something to struggle against. In the present case, with
respect to "the Totality", there is precious little. Dialecticians, of course,
have made a few rather vague gestures at explaining what "the Totality" is, but
beyond that, as we will see,
puzzled onlookers largely face largely blank pages, compounded by no little prevarication
and dissembling on the part of DM-theorists themselves.
However, in what follows
I
won't be considering
Holist explanations of human social and
economic development (unless, of course, this involves the use of
Hegelian concepts), since that would
introduce issues relevant to Historical Materialism [HM], a theory I largely
ignore in these Essays -- for reasons outlined
here.
In that case, both Parts of Essay Eleven are
largely concerned with Holist theories applied to the natural world.
Unfortunately, some
parts of this Essay are a little repetitive; I will endeavour to correct this
relatively
minor fault in future re-writes. Having said that,
books and articles
devoted to Dialectical Materialism [DM]
are themselves
highly repetitive,
so any criticism of them can scarcely avoid some form of repetition.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As is the case with all my
work, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on HM -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
nearly thirty years ago.
The
difference between
DM and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
It is also worth adding that a good 50% of my case
against DM has been relegated to the
End Notes.
This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more
smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate fully my case against
DM, they will need to consult this additional material. In many cases, I have qualified my
comments (often adding greater detail and additional supporting evidence); I
have even raised objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will
have perhaps occurred to the reader) to my own arguments -- which I have then answered.
I explain why I have adopted this tactic in
Essay One.
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any
objections they might have will be missed, as will this extra evidence,
qualifications and
argument.
Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for well over 25 years, I've heard all the
objections there are! [I have linked to many of the more recent on-line debates here.]
Finally,
phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed here,
here, and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially here,
here,
and here).
In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the
argument (but this time aimed at absolute beginners!)
here.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of October 2016, this
Essay is just over 97,500
words long -- approximately 40,000 words from the old Appendix have now been
moved to a new page, which I am currently
re-formatting --; a much shorter summary of some of the main ideas
expressed below can be
accessed
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
The material
below does not represent my final view of any of the issues
raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
The aim of Parts One and Two of this Essay
is to try to discover what DM-theorists mean by (1) "The Totality", (2)
'Universal Interconnection', and (3) The obscure but oft repeated thesis: "The
whole is greater than the sum of the parts; the parts make the whole and the
whole makes the parts" -- i.e, DM-Wholism.
The first two of the above will be
covered here, in Part One; the third will be tackled in
Part Two.
Imagine for a moment, if you will,
Hamlet without
its main character, the Prince, or at least without a single description of
'him' -- such as, whether 'he' is indeed a Prince, is male or female, or even if
'he' is a human being. Questions would rightly be asked about what role
this 'character' could possibly have in a play supposedly about 'him',
just as doubts would be raised about
the competence or even the sanity of its author,
William Shakespeare.
Fortunately, we needn't indulge in such
flights-of-fancy.
Imagine now, if youcan, a
theory which its supporters tell us is among other things: (1) The "world-view"
of the proletariat; (2) A completely general theory of everything in existence,
how it develops and changes, (or which is a 'method' aimed
to that end); (3) An explanation how
everything is interconnected with everything else in
something called "The Totality"; and that (4) "The Totality" is
itself a
centrally-important concept, to such an extent that nothing can be
fully understood without
reference to, or in connection with, it.
Consider, too, the following rather odd fact: every
single one of its theoristsstudiously refuses to saywhat
this "Totality" actually is, or what its supposed "interconnections" are --,
or even how they know so much (or, rather, so little) about this terminally
obscure 'object'/process.
Ponder no more! For that theory is
DM, those theorists are Dialectical Marxists, and they are world champion
prevaricators.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist
depending on the context.]
If you still harbour doubts, I invite you, dear
reader, to search
through their
writings (and, for my sins, I have had to do just that!). Even if you are the
slightest bit interested, you will find precious little to help you decide what
DM is in fact about, for its most avid supporters have yet to tell
anyone (least of all one another) what this mysterious "Totality" actually is!
So, this isn't so much Hamlet without the
Prince, it is Hamlet without the..., er..., well..., er..., what?
Indeed, over the last thirty years or so I have
made a point of asking the many DM-fans I know or have met (personally, or on
the Internet) what they think the "Totality" actually is. Of those who could be bothered to reply, most were either puzzled
(or
slightly annoyed) that Ieven thought to ask such an impertinent
question.
Some responded with "Nature, what else?", but refused to say any more (perhaps because, as we
will soon discover, there is no more to be said). Others gestured airily
toward the heavens, saying "All that!" -- rather like
those
parents who try to explain to
small children where 'God'
is with an "He's up there, in heaven", wafting their hands vaguely skywards.
Still others confessed they didn't know, but declared that
they still believed in it, just like those children with hand-waving parents.
Others of a more scientific frame-of-mind
referred me to the "Big Bang", forgetting that this is a theory of origins;
it tells us nothing about "everything", as we will also soon find out.
At this point, readers of a more kindly or
tolerant disposition might be tempted to respond:
"This can't be so! Surely someone has specified clearly what the DM-"Totality"
actually is. After all, dialecticians have had at least 150 years to come up with
something!"
To be sure, a handful of DM-theorists have
outlined a few vague
ideas about this mysterious 'entity' --, but beyond the bare bones they have either sat on their hands or nervously looked the other way.
I suspect these guys could prevaricate for their country.
Indeed, dialecticians are remarkably coy
about their "Totality", and it isn't difficult to see why: There
isn't one.
Or, rather: there is in fact no way of referring to
whatever it is they think they want to refer to as the "Totality"!
Just as it is impossible to say who or what
'God' is, it is no less difficult to say what the "Totality" is, either.
That isn't so much
because of what these two words might appear to mean, but because both are in fact
devoid of
meaning -- and this is so for remarkably similar reasons.
For believers, 'God' is unlike anything you
or I or anyone else could possibly imagine, conceive, or sensibly put into words.
Those tempted to think
otherwise have simply latched onto an inferior sort of 'being' in whose 'name' it
wouldn't be worth persecuting a single
infidel.
Naturally, this means that the faithful have
found it impossible to speak about 'God' without using inappropriate metaphors
and
misleading analogies;
theologians have for many centuries used linguistic tricks and
dodges like this in their vain endeavour to make 'God'-talk vaguely comprehensible. Unfortunately, even though some
of the mediating terms they have employed are well
enough understood (such as "father", or "son"), the intentional target of all this
analogising isn't. What precisely is being analogised?
The response? Yet more gobbledygook or deafening silence...
In fact, it is impossible to answer that question
without demoting 'God' so that 'He' is now on a level with 'His' alleged creation, for
if you have to compare 'God' to one of 'His' creatures in order to understand
'His' nature, 'He' can no longer be distinguished from them (except, perhaps, in
terms of 'His' magnitude, which would mean 'He' resembled, say, a
huge star when compared to a smaller one).
On the other hand, if 'He' is to be distinguished from 'His' supposed creation,
then any words used to describe 'His' inferior creation cannot be used to characterise 'Him' without implicating
'Him' in just such an ignominious
ontological
demotion.
The gap between the 'Divine' and the mundane
is infinite, so we are told, and any attempt to bridge it would be
tantamount to blasphemy, for it will either identify 'The Creation' with the
'Divine' or reduce the 'Divine' to the mundane.
Both approaches having failed, believers often fall
back on the time-honoured
via
negativa, beloved of Christian Mystics. For them, 'God' is not this, not that, not...
As that lapsed, right-wing
atheist, the late
Anthony Flew, once observed: in this way 'God' suffers "death
by a
thousand qualifications". In the end, it becomes impossible
to distinguish 'God' from nothing.01
But, if we know nothing whatsoever about 'God'
(except we demote 'Him' in the above manner),
if 'He' is indeed indistinguishable from 'nothing', how is the
use of "God" any different from employing, say, "Slithy
Tove"? Other than an appeal to a rather questionable tradition --,
wherein the word "God" has been attached to all manner of things (ranging
from money to natural powers and forces, from assorted Roman Emperors to..., yes...,
even
Eric Clapton) --, what can the faithful point
to in order to explain this word to those who simply see
before them on the page three perfectly ordinary letters ("G", "o", and "d")
knitted together into an inky sort of Trinity --, "God"?
Figure One: Is Clapton 'God'?
Figure Two: This Album Says
"Maybe!"
In like manner, to what can the DM-faithful appeal
in order to help us non-believers comprehend their own invisible, incomprehensible 'Being'?
As we will soon find out, this 'inverted' DM-Deity -- the "Totality" --
will also die the death of a thousand
qualifications.
Or, to be more honest, the death of a thousand prevarications...
At this point, some readers might be tempted to
respond with the "It's everything" ploy (as in "Damn it, it's perfectly clear what
that the Totality is: it's everything!").
Unfortunately, that reply is little help since it would simply prompt
the next question: "And what does that include?"
As we are about to discover as this Essay
unfolds, there is no way to answer that particular query that won't sink DM
one millimetre per
second slower than it has already sunk Theology.
For instance, does this "everything"
include (1) All that exists
now? or (2) All that has once existed? (3) All that will one day exist? (4) All
that could exist? or (5) All that might have existed? (6) Does it include everything that has been thought
about? (7) Not thought about? (8) Discovered? (9) Not discovered? (10) Found then lost (like
Phlogiston)? (11) Lost then found, then lost again (like
Democritus's
and then
Dalton's indivisible atoms)? (12) Does it
include the 'Gods'
of the Apache Nation -- surely they are part of 'everything'..., or are they? (13) The
mythical
beasts of yore? or (14) The entire lot?
Does the "Totality" include, for example, the edge of the universe? Indeed,
does
the universe/'everything'
have a boundary? If it doesn't, how can it
be a totality (as opposed an open-ended infinite sort of ontological
conglomeration)? On the other hand, if it has a boundary, is that
boundary itself part of 'everything'? If it isn't, it can't be the boundary of
'everything', can it? [Otherwise it would have to be the boundary of itself!]
Alternatively, once more, if it is the boundary of 'everything',
then does this new ensemble (i.e., 'everything' plus its boundary) have a
boundary, too, and does that, and that, and...?
At this point, the patience of some readers
might be way past 'running
on fumes', as it were. In which case, they are encouraged to switch to reserve power
since the point of all these rather odd questions will soon become apparent.
In fact, several more increasingly problematic, but
mercifully less annoying
questions will emerge to make those posed above seem rather trite and trivial in
comparison.
Some might direct our attention to the TOR, pointing out that the universe is in fact
finite and
unbounded. This is the "Totality", they might
tell us. Now, I don't wish to question the
TOR, but since we do not as yet know whether this mathematical aspect of the
TOR applies to our universe (i.e, that it is indeed finite and unbounded), it can hardly feature
in any attempt to understand what the "Totality" is.
[As physicist, Paul Davies,
once observed: "Cynics often say that there is speculation, speculation
squared, and cosmology."]
Anyway, as we will
soon see, the TOR itself is no friend of DM
(with or without the "Totality" thrown in).
To cap it all, there have been,
and still are, DM-theorists who
reject the idea that the universe is finite, and who deny, therefore, that it is bounded. [More on that below.]
Indeed, as I aim to show, even if it were
possible to find, or elicit, answers to these perplexing questions, our problems would only just be
beginning, for as
Russell's Paradox has taught us, unless we define "everything" with due care
(and, it is worth adding, completely arbitrarily) we will end up with a
"Totality" that contains things it doesn't contain!
[A recent criticism of what has come to be known as "universally
unrestricted quantification" can be found
in Hellman (2006).]
At this point, it is worth noting that
we are beginning to encounter the same sort of problems in connection with the
"Totality" that confront Believers-in-The-Almighty, who also employ obscure metaphors
and vague analogies to try to describe
the nature of 'God'. Keep that thought in mind as this
Essay unfolds.
So, down this road, one suspects, lies our very
own dialectical via negativa, as DM-theorists tell us time and again,
"No, the "Totality" does not include this, or that, or
this, or...".
On the other hand, even if DM-theorists managed to
define their "Totality" carefully, or even fully, it would plainly be a creature of
convention --, and, like "God", a human invention.
No wonder DM-fans fall silent when asked to fill
in the details about
their 'God'..., er, sorry, their "Totality".
Given the predicament they are in, I
think I would do likewise!
[I return to consider the "It's everything!"
ploy in much more detail,
below.]
The long
answer is "Well.., er.., not a lot, squared."
Well, what do they say? Engels, as usual, writes much, but manages to
say little that is of any use:
"When we consider and reflect
upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual
activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations
and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what,
where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes
away....
"We see, therefore, at first
the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the
background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the
things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but
intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by
Heraclitus: everything is and is
not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into
being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy
culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great
merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual,
is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change,
transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal
connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development."
[Engels (1892),
pp.405-08.]
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70.]
So, no clearer then.
Perhaps 'The Great Teacher', Stalin, will
prove to be of assistance?
"Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of
phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but
as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected
with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.
"The dialectical method
therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by
itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena….
"The dialectical method
therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the
standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the
standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into
being and going out of being….
"Speaking of the materialist
views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all
is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the rudiments of
dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961), p.347.]"
[Stalin (1941), pp.837-38, 845. I have used a different edition of Lenin's
Philosophical Notebooks here.]
Plainly not.
What about Bukharin?
"I am now writing on paper
with a pen. I thus impart pressures to the table; the table presses on the
earth, calling forth a number of further changes. I move my hand, vibrate as I
breathe, and these motions pass on in slight impulses ending Lord knows where.
The fact that these may be but small changes does not change the essential
nature of the matter. All things in the universe are connected with an
indissoluble bond…." [Bukharin (1925),
p.66.]
We needn't labour the point.1
There is little, to nothing, in the DM-classics to help the bemused reader
understand what dialecticians are banging on about when they talk about the
"Totality".
A few years ago,
Martin Jay published an excellent book
entitled Marxism And Totality. The
Adventures Of A Concept From Lukács To Habermas [i.e., Jay (1984)] -- but, in over
500 pages he studiously omitted to tell us what his book was
actually about!
To be sure, in Chapter One, Jay very
helpfully
summarised classic and early modern
Holist
theories of nature and society, but these theories are themselves no less vague.
Perhaps because he found little material in the DM-classics (or, indeed, in the
writings of 'systematic'
and other
academic dialecticians) to help him
explain this vague concept, Jay ducked the question
whether Ancient Greek and Early Modern theories of nature -- or, of 'the Whole' -- were the same
as, or were different from, one another --, or, indeed, were the same as, or were
different from, the DM-"Totality".
After all: how would anyone be able to
decide?
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
For instance, how would it be possible to
ascertain whether
or not Hegel's 'Whole' is the same as, or is different from, say,
Plato's?
[Especially given the fact that Hegel went out of his way to undermine the 'dread'
LOI, how could they be the same?] Or,
Plotinus's?
Or,
Aristotle's? Or,
any of the many and varied "Wholes" that
litter most
of the world's mystical belief systems?
Here, for example, is
Alan Watts
(on The Totality Of All Being):
Video One: Alan Watts --
A DM-Allie? Or A DM-Embarrassment?
Admittedly, those aforementioned mystics all use,
or have used, typographically similar-looking words (such as, "Being", "The
Whole", "The Totality", etc.), but, if the use of similar-looking words were enough to equate whatever they
supposedly depicted, we would surely be able
to conclude that, for example, Plato's "Forms"
were identical to those complicated, pre-printed sheets of paper you have to
complete in order to apply for a job, obtain a driving licence or secure a
credit card. Plainly, the use of typographically similar-looking words isn't
sufficient to identify the many 'Wholes' that Traditional Thinkers have
concocted
over the last two-and-a-half millennia.
After all, does anyone have access to an
Identikit picture
of the "Totality" that enables them to
pick this mysterious object out of a Cosmic
line-up
of likely candidates? Has anyone seen its likeness etched in the
sand, shaped in the
clouds, or formed on the surface of Mars -- in the way that some claim to
have spotted images of
Jesus or
The Virgin Mary in a
slice of toast or on a grape?
Indeed, precisely what is the
criterion of identity for mystical and/or 'dialectical'
"Totalities"?
Worse still: we don't even possess so much as a partial
description of a single "Totality", ancient or modern, to assist us in
this rather futile quest. Can you imagine trying to decide whether or not two
individuals -- say, Woodruff Durfendorfer and Arthur Farfenickle -- were the
same or were different if you were given no clear description to work with, no
picture to guide you, and no DNA to rely on? But even then you would at least have something to work with: the knowledge that they are
supposed to be human
beings. And yet, in relation to the various "Wholes" and "Totalities" that assorted mystics
have invented we don't even have this much to go on -- we
have no idea what kind of 'entity' we are dealing with, the existence and
identity of which we
are being asked
to contemplate. We have nothing at all to assist us. No good doing a Google search or consulting Wikipedia.
Of course, as noted above, this puzzle isn't
helped by the fact that not a single one of those ancient 'thinkers' was all that specific about
the nature and extent of his/her
particular "Whole" -- neither were the ancient (or modern) mystics,
and for obvious
reasons. After all, a crystal clear mysticwould lose his or her licence to
confuse.
But, in relation to the entire confusion
of obscure "Wholists", ancient and modern
-- "confusion" is the collective noun I have just invented for such Mystics and Wholists
--, the Dialectical Mystics are easily the vaguest,
most equivocal and evasive. Prevarication and obfuscation taken way beyond the call of duty.
The rest of
Jay's book is devoted to expounding what various
prolix and studiously incomprehensible dialecticians have or haven't
thought about history, society and the economy -- as possible examples of what can only be called,
'sub-totalities'. However, as far as can be ascertained, and except for the
opening chapter, the "Totality" itself
is conspicuous by its absence, which is, of course, quite remarkable in itself.
Indeed, it is decidedly odd, just as odd as it
would have been had Darwin forgotten to mention natural selection, or had
omitted all talk of species, past, present or future, from
On The Origin
Of Species.
This isn't to pick on Jay, since his book is
an excellent guide in its own way -- a sort of Dialectician's Alice, as it were. To be sure, if anyone wants to know
what Dialectical Marxists think about social wholes (albeit, expressed in what looks
for all the world like an obscure Venusian
dialect), this is the book to consult.
[HCD = High Church
Dialectician. That term is explained
here.]
Not even card-carrying HCDs seem able to tell
us what their "Totality" is. Here is
Alan Norrie (attempting to translate the
obscure Venusian dialect one finds in the late
Roy Bhaskar's work, into English):
"Totality, then, is the place
where different things are seen in their connection and are viewed as a whole."
[Norrie (2010), p.87. I return to Norrie's book in Essay Nine
Part
Two.]
Well, that clears things up, and no mistake! "Totality" is
the "place" where all the 'dialectical' action transpires, it seems. This
suggests that "Totality" for Norrie (and Bhaskar) is a methodological concept,
which, for all we know -- or, rather, for all that Norrie and Bhaskar know --
might be no more 'real' than the
Crystalline Spheres of medieval
astronomy -- or even the
Tooth Fairy, another 'methodological
device' to which those hand-waving parents (we
met earlier) sometimes appeal in order to 'explain' to their
offspring why infant teeth often vanish. [I turn to Bhaskar's work briefly,
below,
and in Essays Eight
Part Three, and Nine
Part Two, but more extensively in Essay
Thirteen
Part Three.]
In which case, Dialectical Marxism is still missing its
Prince of Denmark.
This
project began back in 1998 as an
extended
review of John Rees's book The Algebra Of Revolution [Rees (1998a), or
TAR], which, for all its faults, has proven to be widely influential in one of the most
geographically-extensive Trotskyist Tendencies on the planet (the
IST/UK-SWP).
[However, since this was first written, Rees has
resigned from the UK-SWP and now helps run Counterfire,
which means that his ideas are no longer
viewed
by the IST as ideologically sound; comrades who at one time lauded this book now
either do the opposite, or they simply ignore it!
An ironic fate for any book on dialectics to have to endure.] In that case,
his book is well placed to do real damage.
Anyway, since Rees is one of the most recent DM-authors to put the "Totality" right at the centre of his ideas, it
still seems a reasonably good place to start.
Unfortunately, as we will soon see, it doesn't
matter where we start, the superficial 'descriptions' of this mysterious entity
(advanced by DM-fans, drawn from all wings of Dialectical Marxism) turn out to
be thinner than an
anorexic flatworm!
Figure Three: Flatworm --
Rather Substantial In Comparison?
In view of the foregoing, it is no surprise
therefore to find that even though Rees clearly believes the "Totality" is a
centrally-important DM-concept [Rees (1998a), pp.5-8], or 'entity', apart from a few rather
vague gestures at defining this term, or describing this 'object', he never really tells us what
the "Totality" is!
One of
his few attempts to
explain this notion is the following:
"Totality refers to the
insistence that the various seemingly separate elements of which the world is
composed are in fact related to each other." [Rees (1998a), p.5.]
There seems to be something wrong with this passage
since it tells us that the "Totality" is in fact an
"insistence".
Can this be what "everything" is,
an
"insistence"?
Is this what the Big Bang ushered forth? An ever-expanding "insistence"?
Of course, if this rather odd passage were to
be interpreted muchless unsympathetically, it would seem to
suggest that Rees intends the
word "Totality" to be
understood methodologically, which would in turn imply that the idea that nature is a unified whole is
in fact either
(a) a useful fiction,
(b)
a regulative idea (i.e., it expresses a rule DM-theorists like Rees
utilise in order to help understand nature and society), or (c) it merely serves
as some sort of statement of theoretical intent.
Even so, we aren't told what the "relations"
Rees mentions actually are, even though they
are supposed to interconnect objects and processes in the "Totality", nor
whether every such object and process is interlinked with every other,
or only with some -- nor, indeed, specifically inwhat way they
are inter-related. [Much more on this below.]
Unfortunately, there are few other clues
apparent in TAR
that
help the bemused reader understand the nature of this key DM-concept.
One such hint appears in a passage that
attempts
to link the "Totality" with "universal interconnectedness"
itself, which is something other
DM-theorists also underline (on that see
here and
here):
"Lenin's worry is that
previous explanations of dialectics have simply shown that reality forms a
totality and that things which are assumed to be opposites are in reality
connected with one another. But they have not stressed that reality is a
contradictory totality or that it is the mutually antagonistic relationship
between the parts of the totality which are the motor force of its change and
development....
"[The] natural and
social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a result
of…internal contradictions….
"[N]ature is an interconnected system that developed
for millions of years before humans." [Ibid., pp.186, 285-86. Italic
emphasis in the original.]2
This appears to equate the "Totality" with
all of (interconnected) nature -- indeed, with all of "reality" -- but, as we
shall soon see, these terms are far too vague to be of much
usetoanyone other than a child.
Worse still: this doesn't really distinguish DM from,
for instance,
Mystical Hermeticism:
"Another parallel between
Hermeticismand Hegel is the doctrine of internal
relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to
use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything
in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This
principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called
Emerald Tabletof
Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines
'As above, so below.'
This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis
for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences
between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is
the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is
reflected.
"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies."
[Magee (2008),p.13. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. More on this topichere.]
Rees in fact had an answer to the allegation that
Mystics also have their own theories of, or ideas about, the "Totality":
"Totality alone is not,
however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of
society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own
mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation and a very practical
view of the temporal hierarchy that goes with it. 'The Taoist tradition in China
shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole being maintained by
the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.'... [Rees is here quoting Levins
and Lewontin (1985), p.275.]
"What unites all these
explanations is that they see the totality as static.... What they lack is any
notion of a totality as a process of change. And even where such systems grant
the possibility of instability and change, it is considered merely as a prelude
to a restored equilibrium....
"Change, development,
instability, on the other hand, are the very conditions for which a dialectical
approach is designed to account." [Rees (1998a), p.6.]
However, there are
dozens of
mystical systems that view the world almost exactly as DM-theorists do: an
unstable, developing and changing Whole (existing in states of permanent or
semi-impermanent change), constituted by countless 'unities of opposites'. For
example, this is how the
Kybalion
(reputably the third most important book of
Hermetic
Philosophy) puts things:
"'CHAPTER X POLARITYEverything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites;
like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different
in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be
reconciled.' -- The
Kybalion.
"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle
-- the
Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two
sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees
between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind
of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always
recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it
by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and
isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is
half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to
every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the
difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a
matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,'
and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in
degree'; and that the 'universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a
recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations
of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the
real nature of anything....
"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests;
everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.
"The great Third Hermetic Principle
-- the Principle
of Vibration -- embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the
Universe -- that nothing is at rest -- that everything moves, vibrates, and circles.
This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers
who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of
by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century
physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific
discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this
centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.
"The Hermetic Teachings are that
not only is
everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences'
between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to
the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL,
in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of
intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the
teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the
physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be
at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole
of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter.
Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes
of vibration.
"Modern Science has proven that all that we call
Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more
advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists
who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion.
Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in
matter and energy.
"In the first place, science
teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from
temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same
things -- it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and
vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle
to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes.
The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move
around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the
particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and
movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of
Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The
atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc.,
which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and
which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all
forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of
Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first passage can be
accessed
here; the second,
here.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"For everything must
be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise."
[Copenhaver (1995), p.32. Bold emphasis added.]
The on-line version renders this passage
slightly differently:
"For all things must
consist out of antithesis and contrariety; and this can otherwise not be."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
Moreover, the Hermetic 'God' isn't external
to the universe, but is immanent to it (and hence 'it' also changes), which is, of course, where Hegel found
this idea.
Here is Alan Watts again:
"Buddhist enlightenment consists simply in
knowing the secret of the unity of opposites -- the unity of the inner and outer
worlds....
"The principle is that all dualities and
opposites are not disjoined but polar; they do not encounter and confront one
another from afar; they exfoliate from a common centre. Ordinary thinking
conceals polarity and relativity because it employs terms, the terminals
or ends, the poles, neglecting what lies between them. The difference of front
and back, to be and not to be, hides their unity and mutuality." [Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases alone added.]
We also learn the following about the Hindu view of
'God':
"The three major gods of
Hinduism are
Brahma
(the creator; paradoxically of minor importance in actual practice -- possibly,
since his work is completed),
Vishnu (the preserver), and
Shiva
(the destroyer), each with a wife, to symbolize the androgyny of ultimate
reality. By theologians and educated Hindus in general, these gods and their
innumerable manifestations are viewed as pointing toward one transcendent
reality beyond existence and non-existence, the impersonal world-spirit
Brahman, the absolute unity of all opposites....
"Hindus envision the cosmic process as the growth
of one mighty organism, the self-actualization of divinity which contains within
itself all opposites." [Quoted from
here.
(This links to a PDF.)
Bold emphases added.]
And this about Sufist ideas:
"Sufism
is usually associated with Islam. It has developed
Bhakti
to a high point with erotic imagery symbolising
the unity of opposites.
The subtle anatomy and microcosm-macrocosm model also found in
Tantra
and
Taoism
is used by it, dressed in its own
symbols. Certain orders use ecstatic music and/or dance which reminds one of the Tantric
celebration of
the senses. Sometimes, the union of opposites is seen as a kind of gnosis. This
is similar to
Jnani Yoga." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphases
added.]
Furthermore, and as noted above, Hegel was, of course, a
Hermetic Philosopherpar excellence, a died-in-the-wool Wholist, who believed in
change through contradiction (which fact, oddly enough, Rees seems to have
forgotten!). [On this, see
here, and Note 4, below.]
Incidentally, it is worth adding that even
fascist mystics have embraced this ancient metaphysic:
"The cosmos operates through polarities, and
the interaction of these polarities causes change and evolution." [White
Order of Thule, quoted from
here. However, you might need to take a shower
if you
follow that link!]
Which is ironic in view of the fact that
Jewish
Mysticism also acknowledges the same metaphysic!
Finally, there is this revealing comment:
"The ancient Egyptians believed that
a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A similar premise, that the
interaction between yin (the female principle) and yang (the male principle)
underlies the workings of the universe, is at the heart of much Chinese
thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy from the fourth century
B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many Chinese who are not
Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the Chinese. Peoples all
over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, have come to the conclusion
that the cosmos is a combining of opposites...."[Maybury-Lewis
(1992), pp.125-26. Bold emphases added.]
It wouldn't be difficult to extend this list indefinitely until it became plain
that practically every Mystic who has ever walked the earth thought (or thinks)
'dialectically'.
What was that again about "the ideas of the ruling
class..."?
[A more comprehensive list of examples like
these -- drawn from mystical systems
across the planet -- can be found
here
and
here. Many more
will be given in Essay Fourteen Part One when it is published.]
So, the "Totality", change and contradiction
are just as much at home in Mystical Hermeticism (and other similar systems) as they are in DM -- which is hardly
surprising given the fact that the latter developed out of the former.
Be this as it may, in an article about Engels, Rees
added these thoughts:
"Here the key
is to see all the different aspects of society and nature as interconnected.
They are not separate, discrete processes which develop in isolation from each
other. Mainstream sociological and scientific thought 'has bequeathed us the
habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, detached from the
general context'. Much of our schooling today still follows this pattern -- the
development of the arts is separated from that of the sciences, and 'technical'
subjects are separated from languages, history and geography. Our newspapers and
TV news programmes divide the world up in the same artificial way -- poverty
levels and stock exchange news, wars and company profit figures, strikes and
government policy, suicide statistics and the unemployment rate are all reported
in their own little compartments as if they are only distantly related, if at
all. A dialectical analysis tries to re-establish the real connections between
these elements, 'to show internal connections'. It tries, in the jargon of
dialectics, to see the world as 'a totality', 'a unity'.
"To see society
and nature as an interconnected totality which is in a process of constant
change still leaves one vital question unanswered. What makes this whole process
develop? Why does it change? There are any number of religious and
philosophical theories which try to answer this question by insisting that the
motor of change lies outside the historical process -- with god, or in the
unchanging pattern of human nature or in the eternal features of the human soul.
Marx and Engels rejected these approaches as mystical and, literally,
supernatural. They insisted that the processes which drove the development of
nature and society forward must be internal contradictions, not
supersensible entities like god, the soul or, as Hegel had argued, the general
essence of human consciousness existing somewhere in the ether beyond the
consciousness of actual living human beings." [Rees
(1994), p.62.]
We have already seen that no sense can be
made of these 'contradictions' -- those that supposedly exist in nature and society (on
that, see
here,
here,
here, and
here).
Independently of this, the alleged social
aspects of the "Totality" are clearly part of HM, discussion of which will largely be omitted from this Essay. Since I do
not deny that HM relies on factors governing the whole of human history, there
is nothing much for me to question in this regard.3
[HM = Historical
Materialism.]
Nevertheless, one important aspect of Rees's
use of this (yet-to-be-explained) concept is the relationship that he and other
dialecticians
claim exists between parts and wholes:
"In a dialectical system, the
entire nature of the part is determined by its relationship with the other parts
and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts….
In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of
the parts but also that the parts become more than they are individually by
being part of the whole…." [Ibid., p.5.]4
The problem with this is that it still fails
to tell us what the "Totality" is, or what it encompasses --, nor is it clear what
its
"parts" are, either!
As far as can be ascertained, this is
practically all that Rees had to say about this supposedly important
topic.5
Clearly, this creates serious problems from the start; the 'uninitiated' have no
clear idea what Rees and what other DM-theorists areactually referring to,
or talking about. And,
as
we have seen, they will search in vain through other DM-texts for further
elucidation.
Naturally, this means that DM-theorists
themselves have no idea what they areactually referring to, or talking
about, either!6
Anyway, if,
according to Rees, "the part
makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts", it would in fact be impossible for
anyone to determine exactly what this mysterious "whole" amounted to before they were
clear about the nature of every single part of it.
Indeed,
Engels himself said as much (in unpublished preparatory material for his
book,
Anti-Dühring):
"Systematics impossible after
Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole,
but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic
emphases in the original.]
It is a pity, therefore, that Engels didn't
call this to mind when he, too, began to speculate and fill his work with
"figments" of his own (or rather, Hegel's) imagination. [Many of these
"figments" are itemised and then dissected in Essays Seven
Part One
and Eight
Part Three.]
Plainly, if the above neat saying about parts
and wholes were true, it would be impossible to determine the nature of any one
of the parts before the nature of entire whole had been
ascertained and comprehended.
Clearly, this means it is impossible for anyone
to grasp a single rudimentary fact about part or whole since no one would know
anything about either before they knew everything about both. [I
discuss this aspect of DM in much greater detail in
Part
Two, where I have responded to several obvious objections.]
As is well-known, this was just one of the
epistemological holes into which Hegelian Idealism dropped itself -- along with anyone gullible enough to give
credence to
anything Hegel ever wrote.7
But, whatever steps subsequent Hegelians finally took
(or might still take) in order to haul themselves out of this bottomless pit -- and whether
or not these were/are successful --, they don't appear to be available to DM-theorists. That is because they
at least must
base their comments on evidence, not on
conceptual chicanery -- indeed, as George Novack pointed out:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added. This echoes what Engels also had to
say, reproduced
below.]
And
yet, what sort of
evidence could DM-fans produce that hadn't already been compromised? Manifestly,
since relevant evidence itself relates to, and is comprised of such 'parts' --
i.e., it is comprised of, or expresses, certain supposed facts, which one must
assume are also part of the 'Whole'
(they are manifestly not external to the universe!)
--,
the nature of
each of the 'parts'/facts that constitutes this
evidence
itself couldn't, on this view, be ascertained or comprehended until the 'Whole' had been, nor vice versa.
In short: the import of any such 'evidence'
would be unclear until the nature of the 'Whole' had been ascertained, and, in
turn, the
nature of the 'Whole' would be unclear until the nature of each part/each fact
presented as evidence had already been ascertained/comprehended.
There seems to be no way of breaking into
this Idealist circle: the status of any and all evidence cannot be
known/ascertained until the 'Whole' had been, and the nature of the 'Whole'
cannot be grasped
as a material whole (or any other sort of whole) if no determinate physical evidence
is available, or comprehensible, in order to do just that.8
An appeal to 'approximate' or 'relative' truth
here would be to no avail, either, since the nature even of
'approximate' and 'relative' truth cannot be ascertained until the nature of the 'Whole' had been,
if the
above neat slogan is to be believed.
Nor would an appeal to a series of 'developing approximations' which are
supposedly closer to the 'Whole Truth' -- or closer even
to 'relative truth' -- be of any help. According to this theory, unless we knew
the entire truth about everything, no one would be in any position to know that these were
indeed even approximations -- or, for that matter, whether there was such a thing as 'The
Whole Truth', to begin with.
Unless we possess a clear idea of what would
count as 'Absolute Truth', or 'The Whole Truth' -- or we had access to one or
other --, we would
be in no position to declare that 'relative' truth had approximated to this Ideal. An
approximation only makes sense if we know with what it is that it
approximates; but, for us to know that, we would have to know what
constituted 'Absolute Truth'; according to DM-theorists, that is something we
will never know.
Again, as Engels pointed out:
"[T]he knowledge of this
system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic
emphases in the original.]
[More on this below.]
In that case, the obscure nature of each DM-part undermines the
DM-'Whole', just as the obscure nature of the DM-'Whole' undermines
each DM-part, the exact reverse
of what the
neat slogan attempts to tell us.
[Which is yet another ironic 'dialectical
inversion' for readers to ponder.]
This might explain why Rees was so
cagey about the "Totality", and why his 'definition' amounted to little more than a
throw-away, half-hearted gesture: there is nothing that could have been said
about this nebulous concept, or its obscure parts that would be consonant
either with a believable form of materialism, or which didn't
automatically undermine this theory itself, as we
have just seem.9
Nevertheless, even though it seems
clear that nothing could be said about the "Totality" or its parts before
everything was known about both it is also worth remembering that
(if DM is to be believed) it isn't possible
even to attempt to say anything truthful about anything, since,
ex hypothesi, nothing would be known about the parts (and hence
about the Whole)
until the end of an
infinite epistemological
meander:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"The reproaches you make
against the law of value apply to all concepts, regarded from the
standpoint of reality. The identity of thought and being, to express myself in
Hegelian fashion, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. But although a concept has the essential nature of a concept
and cannot therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from
which it must first be abstracted, it is still something more than a fiction,
unless you are going to declare all the results of thought fictions because
reality has to go a long way round before it corresponds to them, and even
then only corresponds to them with asymptotic approximation." [Engels to
Conrad Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphasis added. I have used the on-line version here, which
differs slightly from the published copy.]
"Systematics impossible after
Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole,
but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic
emphases in the original.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93. Bold emphases
alone added.]
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In
social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away
is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in
accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and
further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.
The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so
is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the
course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the
subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and
we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which
depart from concrete history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
An appeal to practice here would be to no
avail, either -- for reasons set out in Essay Ten
Part One.
This is, of course, one of the least appreciated consequences of
trying to 'invert' Hegelian Idealism:
material reality may only be 'comprehended' by beginning
at the end!
Hence, not even the
Owl of Minerva
would be securely identifiable until Epistemological Judgement Day has dawned, by
which time who would be left to care whether or not it flew?
In the absence of anything
even
remotely resembling a superficial characterisation (let alone a definition)
of this obscure DM-'object', the "Totality", we are forced to press the question
DM-theorists consistently avoid or deflect: What exactly is the DM-"Totality"?
I propose to examine two
possible approaches to this problem. The first introduces what I shall call the
"Ontological Definition" of the "Totality" (because it involves a consideration
of what might comprise a plausible contents list); the second I propose to call the "Epistemological
Definition" (since it aims to link this mysterious 'entity' to the
contemporaneous extent of
human knowledge, experience and practice).
[However, my use of the
word "definition" here is slightly misleading, and that is because the material below in no way
constitutes a definition! In my defence, I can only pass the blame on to
DM-theorists whose job this should have been, not mine!]
In response to the above, it could be
objected that it is perfectly clear that the "Totality" includes
everything in
the Universe --, or everything in existence.
Be this at it may, the problem with the hasty
"End of story" response above is that (a) It is somewhatvague
itself, and
(b) It isfar too generous.
How and why both of these apply will now be examined.
The
Polo Mint Totality: A Whole
With A Hole In The Middle
If the
"Totality" is supposed to include everything that exists,
several awkward questions
immediately
force themselves upon us.
For instance: Does the "Totality"
comprise (1) All
that exists in the present, (2) All
that 'exists', or which has existed, in the past, or (3) Both?
Since DM-theorists seek an historical explanation of the development of class
society (etc.), and because they think everything in nature and society is
interconnected, it seems they must accept option (3) above, and regard the past
and the present as part of the "Totality".
But, if (as seems to be the case) the past is no more, how can it be
part of anything, let alone the "Totality"? In what sense can
something that does not exist be a part of anything?10
More problematic, however, is the following
question implied by the above: If the "Totality" does include the past, that
must mean the "Totality" contains a host of things that don't actually exist
-- unless, that is, we are to suppose that things in the past still exist.
Moreover, if objects and processes in the past don't exist,
then the "Totality" must contain some
things that 'exist' only as ideas about the past entertained in the minds
of those stuck in the ephemeral present. And if that is so, it would
appear to mean that the "Totality" is part material and part
Ideal.
Even if the above conclusions are misguided
in some way, and it turns out that everything in the "Totality" is
interconnected, another question immediately poses itself: How is it possible for ideas
of the past
--
or even the past itself --
to be inter-linked with everything
that now exists? Indeed, what was the past interconnected with before
any ideas
about it were formed --, i.e.,
before conscious or sentient life evolved?
Now, while the past might be connected
with the present (we'll let that one slide for now), it cannot be
"interconnected" with it; that is, the present cannot be
back-connected with the past in any obvious sense (which it would have to be for the past and the
present to be interconnected and not just connected). But, if the past and the present aren't interconnected, and if the "Totality" contains
onlyinterconnected objects and processes, then plainly the past cannot be part of the
"Totality", after all!11
Furthermore, and more worryingly, any ideas we
now form, or which we now entertain, of the past
will plainly correspond with nothing at all, since the past doesn't exist
for anything to correspond with 'it' -- except, perhaps, with yet more ideas
about 'it'. Hence, the "Totality" cannot even be objectively Ideal
-- at least, not with respect to the past --, let alone material.
In that case, one half of the supposed
correspondence relation between our ideas of the past and the past itself
wouldn't (or couldn't) exist (or rather, couldn't obtain), if this interpretation of the DM-"Totality"
is correct. This
in turn would mean
that there could be no 'objective'
relationship between our ideas of the past and the past itself --, certainly not
one of correspondence.
In order to avoid these intractable problems,
we might be tempted to restrict the "Totality" to things that exist only in
the present, to objects and processes that enjoy contemporary material
existence, wherever they happen to be.
But, this option now generates several serious
problems of its own. For example, the "Totality" would contain no
historically significant events (or, worse still, no historical events at all!), without which nothing that
happens in the present will have taken place. Depicted this way, the "Totality"
would surely become explanatorily useless, since an appeal would now have
to be made to (Ideal) 'objects and processes' outside the "Totality" to account for
those
inside it!
Indeed, if the "Totality"
were circumscribed, or curtailed, in this way, it would become
precariously ephemeral.
That is because the present is of extremely limited duration (if it has
any duration at all). Thus, a very
slender (if not terminally anorexic) "Totality" would clearly be implied by this option,
whether or not it were correct.
Is the DM-Totality, therefore, a Whole with a
huge hole in it? Is there no substance to it at all?
Figure Four: The Totality? All
Hole, Little Substance?
Some readers might be forgiven their
impatience at this point, for it would seem that the present author is
putting words in the mouths of dialectical comrades (no pun involving Polo Mints intended).
Unfortunately, speculation
like this has been forced upon us because of the extremely limited information to be
found in DM-writings, even of the few that do manage to address the "Totality".
This is an informational
black hole the nature of
which is further compounded by
the dogged reluctance of dialecticians to come clean. [Apologies for that mixed
metaphor!]
Others might conclude that all this is
just another example of Ms Lichtenstein's pedantry. (On that, see
here.) That
complaint would,
of course, only serve to confirm an earlier allegation that when pressed on this
topic,
DM-fans become evasive.
Moreover, it would also demonstrate that
not even the aforementioned, but un-named, 'others' know what their "Totality" actually is
or contains!
To continue, and as noted above: If the past, which
now exists only as an idea (or better still, which now only 'exists'
conceptually -- perhapsin our use of language, or as part of our thoughts about it), is to be
included in the Whole, then the vast bulk of the "Totality" must be Ideal. That
is because, of course, the duration of the past is far longer than that of the
present (and possibly by countless orders of magnitude). In turn, that is
because, according to many, the present has no duration at all; as
Augustine pointed out, if it had any duration it would have its own temporal
parts, a 'before' and an 'after', a 'later' and an 'earlier'. That would, of course,
further imply that the present was in fact part past and part future.
[I
hasten to add that I
reject the above metaphysical argument (the
one derived from Augustine), but I can see no way that DM-fans will be able to
counter it.]
Several other rather surprising conclusions
now follow from this, and from the CTT -- a theory of truth widely accepted in
DM-circles. [More on this in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two when they
are published.]
If propositions about the past are true just in case they
correspond with events in the past, then it would surely be impossible to declare
them true. That is because, as noted above, there is nothing with which they could correspond
-- other than yet more ideas, or, indeed, more propositions about the past --,
since the past is no more.
To be sure, we may draw true or false
conclusions about the past from the evidence now before us, but such evidence (of
necessity) only exists, directly or indirectly, in the present. Moreover, whatever it was
that this
evidence once related to plainly no longer exists, so it is difficult to
see how such non-existents could form part of a correspondence relation
with anything whatsoever -- at least, in any obvious sense of that word -- that is, this side of a damaging retreat into Idealism,
once more.
In response, it could be argued that
the past is an objective feature of reality; hence the above conclusions
are completely misguided.
However, the meaning of the term "objective"
is itself at best hopelessly vague, at worst, terminally obscure -- that was demonstrated in Essay Thirteen
Part One
--, but, whatever it does mean (if anything),
it would be of little help, anyway. That is because it would still be unclear how anything (such
as the past) could be "objective" if it doesn't exist.
'Objectivity' --
according to Lenin,
at least -- has something to do with existence independent of the human mind,
and yet we appear to have something here (the past) that doesn'texist
except we form ideas about it.
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
In which case, the past isn't independent of
the mind (and, in Lenin's sense, it cannot be 'outside' the mind, either), and so it
cannot be "objective" -- if Lenin is to be believed.
Again,
it could be argued that
our beliefs about the past are true just in case they correspond with past
events. The existence of the latter might in turn be confirmed (or confuted) by
an appeal to evidence in the form of documents, artefacts and assorted remains,
etc.
But, this doesn't alter the fact that the past no longer
exists, nor
does it affect the fact that the confirmation of claims about the past requires
the use of contemporaneous objects and events -- that is, it necessitates the
use of evidence situated in the present, consideration of which is augmented by
a
judicious use of
past tense verbs. Naturally, that is because such evidence (i.e., in the shape of the aforementioned documents, artefacts and assorted remains)
clearly exists in the present. Without easy access to a working time
machine, we would have no body evidence from the past that is still located
there, in the
past!
Truths about the present are quite unlike
those about the past -- whatever we finally conclude about the
nature of any supporting evidence pertaining to one or both. This can be seen by the way we form sentences
relevant to each: we use expressions withdifferentially
tensed verbs. This is partly where the attempted rebuttal recorded
above
itself went astray: it failed to explain -- as similar attempts must always fail
to explain without the
use of suitably tensed verbs -- precisely with what it is that contemporary
propositions about the past are supposed to correspond if one half
of the alleged relation does not now exist.12
To be sure, these 'difficulties' don't just plague the
CTT when
the latter is applied to past events; the CTT
collapses into some form of Idealism whatever time frame is chosen for it (as will be
demonstrated in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two, when they are published).
Philosophical 'problems' like this (concerning past, present
and future)
invariably arise out of an inappropriate interpretation of phrases like "The past", "The
present" and "The future".12a It has thus seemed to some that if such expressions resemble,
or seem to operate as names (or
if they appear to be words that are, or can be used, referentially), then they must
designate or name something, which 'something' must therefore exist --,
er..., somewhere.
A philosophical search is then initiated to locate these pseudo-entities, which
are manifestly the creation of an over-active mind
bewitched by an egregious misuse of language.13
Plainly, if the past exists, we are forced to use the present tense to
refer to it -- as has just been done in this very sentence. Naturally, if
we interpret such words in a similarly crude manner, it would imply that the
past isno
longer in the past, but in the present(!), which would show that the past had in
fact been misnamed, or mis-characterised. [If this point is obscure to some, I have
given examples in Note 14.]14
The depiction of the past in this way
is thoroughly inappropriate, for it makes it seem that its existence is an
empirical issue, a search for which resembles the hunt for, say,
Bigfoot -- only far more
challenging.
If
something exists we should at least (in theory) be able to pin it down,
even if we cannot do so at present (no pun intended), or even if only from a distance.
Unless we accept the possibility of time travel (a notion that arises precisely out of
confusions like this -- more on that in a later Essay -- until then, see Dummett
(1993b)), this isn't a viable option.
Clearly, these terminological difficulties
have arisen because of an inappropriate and misleading analogy drawn between space and time. This imagery suggests
(tosome) that just as objects in space can be located
somewhere, those in time can be located somewhen, with the latter
term being
given a new slant by making location in time analogous to location in
space, perhaps by means of a fourth axis
tacked onto the Cartesian (or some other)
co-ordinate system.15
Clearly, an analogy of this sort ought to
sanction the following parallel argument: since some future-tense indicative
sentences are true now, they must correspondwith events which
have yet to occur, but which must also now exist in a shadowy form in
'the Future'. Unfortunately, that would situate such 'future events' in the present, too!
[Notice we also had to use the present tense to make this point.]
Naturally, this would mean that all events -- past, present and
future -- must co-exist (present tense, again)!
As may readily be appreciated, this would 'solve' the
problem by destroying time altogether.16
A metaphysical scorched earth policy like this plainly has no viable future
(no pun intended, once more) -- or none worth mentioning in present company.17
In order to neutralise, or side-step awkward
questions like these, we should perhaps simply declare that the "Totality"
incorporates everything that exists -- but, maybe, a-temporally?
However, that alternative is of little help since it is decidedly unclear what a-temporal
existence could possibly mean -- except, perhaps, the phrase itself might apply to a 'Deity' of some sort.
[That, of course, would link the "Totality"
even more closely to our
earlier ruminations about "God".]
However, here are the thoughts of a
fully paid-up member of the
HCD fraternity (in what is a remarkably
clear passage for this particular theorist):
"This [i.e., a
'transcendental' deduction for totality -- RL] seems relatively easy for social
life. Consider once more our paradigmatic book...in the library.... There is an
obvious sense in which the book, if recently published, existentially
presupposes all, or at least many, of the others, and the spatio-temporal
traditions which nurtured it.... That is to say it would have been impossible
without the others. Or consider the text itself. It is an internally related
totality. As are the elements of a language, or the ebb and flow of a
conversation, the sequential 'habitus' of a routine, the systematic
interdependencies of the global monetary system, a play, a sculpture, or an
experimental project oriented to the demediation of nature. Or consider simply a
musical tune, melody, beat or rhythm. Or reflect on the semantic structure of a
sentence, bound in a complex of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations (and
metaphoric and metonymic presuppositions). Or on its physical structure -- for
instance, the location of the spaces and punctuation marks within it. Not to
treat such entities as totalities is to violate norms of descriptive and
hermeneutic adequacy." [Bhaskar (1993),
pp.123-24.]
But,
what about "totalities" in nature? Bhaskar is far less clear (and decidedly less
confident -- the smokescreen of obscure jargon he throws up being a dead
give-away):
"First, it might be entered
that unless there were internal, and specifically dialectical contradictions...,
there would be no internal (radically negating) tendencies to change either for
individual things or for their types (including natural kinds) or, more
drastically, for the world as a whole, so that the emergence of, for example,
science would have been impossible. If my first argument turns on the
transcendental necessity of ontological change, my second turns on that of the
transcendental necessity for taxonomy in science. Thus it could be argued that
unless some explanatory significant things had properties which were
existentially essential to them, that is, such that they were not just
necessarily connected, but internally related, to them, scientific
classification, which depends on the possibility of real (as distinct from
merely nominal) definitions, would be impossible. Internal relationality, and
so the conceptual possibility of the analytic a posteriori, is bound to the
Leibnizian level of the identification of natural kinds, as natural necessity is
tied to the demonstration of explanatory adequacy in the dialectic of
explanatory and taxonomic knowledge in science.... For if classification is
justified only on the basis of superficial resemblance rather than real identity
of structure, then there is no rationale for the stratification of science. This
depends upon grasping suitably groomed structurata (sic) as tokens of real
structures, whose intransitive existence and transfactual efficacy is a
condition not only of science, but also of life." [Ibid.,
p.124.]
While
there are many things in the above passage with which one might want to take
issue (for example, 'internal relations', 'transcendental deductions' and
'natural kinds') -- they will be challenged elsewhere at this site --, just
as there are others that have been challenged in this and other Essays
(such as 'dialectical contradictions' and 'natural necessity'), the above
passage still fails tell us precisely what the DM-"Totality" actually is --
other than that it is (maybe) a regulative device aimed (perhaps) at maintaining
the morale of scientists. Be this as it may, Bhaskar is silent about the
mystical and theological origin of theories like this. [That might explain why he
finally unravelled as an open and honest mystic later
in life.]
So, maybe we need a membership list? If we knew what we were talking about, the nature of the elusive
"Totality" might become a little clearer.
To that end, it is worth posing questions
that DM-fans serially fail to ask: Does the "Totality" include
every material object? Or, does it exclude non-material
'abstractions' -- like courage, generosity, justice and equality?
[However, as we saw
in
Essay
Two and Essay Three Parts
One and
Two, DM-theorists have yet to
tell us exactly with what (in this universe) such 'abstractions' do in
fact correspond!]
So, it might be wise to throw these
spurious creations of
Ancient Greek Grammar (i.e., these 'abstractions') overboard. And yet doing that would scupper the 'dialectical theory of knowledge',
which relies heavily on 'abstraction'. The only
viable alternative for dialecticians, it would seem, is to suppose that the
DM-"Totality"
must contain abstractions, the natures of which are, alas, just as obscure
as
the "Totality" itself!
But, dear
reader, do
not
presume to ask where
such
abstractions reside or are to be found. [In 'heaven', with 'God'? In your head?
In objects and processes themselves?] Puzzled onlookers who
might be tempted to ignore
this sound advice should contact their local DM-Soothsayer,
who, in response to an impertinent enquiry such as this will once again wave his/her
arms vaguely heavenward -- if you are
lucky -- or, what is far more likely, accuse you of not "understanding" dialectics -- if you
aren't.
Even
worse, we have yet to be informed by
DM-theorists what matter is (except they tell us
that it, too,
is an
abstraction!). In which case, being told that the "Totality" contains,
or is comprised only of, material objects is no help at all, since that would
mean it contains only abstract objects!
[The word "theoretical" here doesn't imply
the present author doubts the existence of any of the above scientific
'entities', only that they are defined as parts of complex and (so we are told)
well-founded bodies of theory. Their natures are integral to the theories
to which they belong.]
Well then, what about the properties of
objects that depend either on their disposition or on their relation to other bodies,
such as size, velocity, weight, and hardness? Do these make the contents list? Shouldn't we then
also rope in the apparent properties of matter, such as solidity,
liquidity, colour, smell, taste, and sound? But, according to some, these depend solely
on their being perceived by sentient beings, which would mean that they aren't,
according to Lenin, 'objective' (even though they seem to exercise some sort
of causal influence on
other material bodies independently of our sensory modalities). Is that sufficient reason to strike them from the Cosmic
Roll Call, or not?
What then should we decide about genuine
oddities, such as corners, surfaces and shapes? These strange 'beings' seem to
disappear at the micro-level, and several even depend on the point of view of
the observer. In that case, can they really be part of an 'objective' "Totality"?18
But, what then are we to
conclude about those aspects of reality whose natures are even more obscure? For
example, what are we to make of mathematical fictions like the average worker,
the mean square velocity of (a body of) gas molecules (in, for instance, the
Kinetic
Theory of Gases), the probability of an event,
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient,
the Centre of Mass of the Solar System, or
the moment of a force?
Despite the fact that these are human constructs, some of them also appear to
exercise a significant causal influence on
material objects. In which case, are they 'objective', 'subjective', both or
neither?
If we disallow some, any or all of
these, how can we consistently admit others that are themselves merely
theoretical, or are of a highly speculative nature -- such as
Superstrings,
Spacetime,
n-dimensional space, branched
time zones,
Axions,
Branes and
Black
Holes --, but which are, even in comparison with several of the items
listed above, decidedly weird?
Are we to be catholic or
exclusive in the way we draw up the membership list -- Bolshevik or Menshevik?
It could be argued that we
should admit into the "Totality" all and only those entities that scientists
acknowledge -- either now or in the future --, supported by the
weight of evidence.19a
[This is, indeed, what John Somerville, for
example, argues
here. (This is Somerville (1967), pp.3-32.) John Molyneux appears to
agree; Molyneux (2012), pp.40-41.]
The problem with this response is that it
would present scientists with what amounted to rathertoo generousan ontological 'blank cheque',
as it were.19b In fact, if this were the adopted policy, far too many
(of what are assumed to be) objects and processes in the "Totality"
would possess a somewhat precarious -- if not alarmingly fleeting -- 'existence'.
Just as soon as scientists changed their minds over the
nature and existence of these ephemeral 'entities' (as they regularly do), their
'temporary
residence permits' would have to be revoked.
It is worth recalling that
Stephen
Hawkingonce laid a bet that the Higgs Boson would never be found. Even though he has now
conceded that he has lost the bet, it is still a little too early for anyone
finally to agree with
him.
Even worse, Physicists seem not to be able to
make their minds up whether or not the Higgs Boson explains all the mass in the
universe:
"So, the Higgs boson has been
discovered! That's good news. You may have also heard that the Higgs
gives mass to everything in the Universe, and that it's a field.
"The odd thing is that all
of these things are true, if not intuitive. There are some
attempts to explain it simply,
but as you can see, even the top ones are
not very clear. So let's give you something to
sink your teeth into: How do fundamental
particles, including the Higgs boson, get their mass?" [Quoted from
here. Emphases in the original.]
"But how did
the electrons and quarks that make up all the matter in the universe (for
technical reasons, perhaps except for
neutrinos) get their mass? That we still
don't know. But once we understand how the
Ws and the Z
gain their mass from
their interaction with the
Higgs field, we assume that we also know how
mass in general is created: through the same 'Higgs mechanism,' and that this
primeval cosmic event shortly after the Big Bang has thus created the mass of
the universe: electrons, quarks, stars, galaxies, planets, trees, animals, and
us." [Quoted from
here. Emphases in the original.]
"In all the
recent hoopla about the long-sought Higgs boson, you often hear it said that it
is responsible for the mass of the universe. This is not true. Assuming it
exists, the Higgs boson is actually responsible for only a small fraction of the
total mass of the universe.
"This is not to
say that the Higgs boson is not important. The main role of the Higgs in the
standard model of elementary particles is to provide for the
symmetry breaking
of the unified
electroweak force
by giving mass to the
weak bosons and splitting
the
electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces. It also gives mass to the other
elementary particles. If elementary particles did not have mass, they would all
be moving at the speed of light and never stick together to form stuff like
stars, cats, and you and me.
"The mass of
the universe, however, is not simply the sum of the masses of the elementary
particles that constitute matter. Einstein showed that the mass of a body is
equal to its
rest energy. If that body is not elementary but composed of parts,
then its rest energy as a whole will be the sum of all the energies of its
parts. This sum will include the
kinetic
and
potential
energies of the parts in
addition to their individual rest energies." [Quoted from
here. Links added to both of the above.]
Moreover, as is the case in other areas of science, the
temptation is to try to account for mass in terms of several inappropriate metaphors
-- for example,
referring to the "syrupy
Higgs Field":
"Our theory
says that matter, at a fundamental level, is made up of particles called
quarks
and
leptons. The quarks make up
protons, and protons make up atoms.
Mathematically, it's easy to build a theory where the quarks have no mass at
all, and in fact they may have been mass-less at the time of the Big Bang, when
they came into existence. But clearly they do have mass now. Why?
"In the 1960s,
Peter Higgs
[a British physicist] and others found a kind of mathematical trick
to explain it. We now imagine there is a field permeating all of space -- we
call it the Higgs field -- and as particles interact with that field, they
acquire mass. Think of it like a syrup that the particles have to push their way
through. So it's that interaction with the syrup that we see as mass. And the
Higgs boson is the 'unit' that makes up this Higgs field." [Physicist Robert
Orr, quoted from
here. Paragraphs merged to save space; quotation marks
altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Links added. Physics
Professor Jim Al-Khalili
also appeals to
this useless metaphor/analogy in
this BBC video, at about 08:30; he
also asserts several times that the Higgs gives mass to "every other particle"
--, for example, at 36:25 and 37:10.]
But, as seems obvious, a syrup would bring all movement to a
halt. So, the Higgs Field is nothing like a syrup. Nor are the following metaphors
much
use, either:
"A Higgs field
(named after a Scottish physicist
Peter Higgs)
is a field supposed to be responsible for the genesis of
inertial mass
(and,
because of
Einstein's equivalence principle,
gravitational mass). When the
universe is extremely hot, a Higgs field (which is supposed to have a certain
curve of potential energy; as regards the shape of this curve, there is no
unique consensus, except for a certain general feature, among the physicists)
exerts a wild influence; but we will neglect this here. Once the universe cools
down enough, below a certain temperature, the Higgs field assumes a certain
value (i.e. a value of the Higgs field) which corresponds to the lowest energy
level (i.e. the potential energy is zero, but the value of the Higgs field is
nonzero; this level may be called vacuum). And this energy level continues to
prevail throughout the whole universe (uniform, nonzero Higgs field).
"Now, suppose a
quark or
electron moves (supposed fundamental particles which make up
composite particles such as proton,
neutron, or various atoms) in this uniform
Higgs field. If that particle changes its velocity of movement, that is,
if it accelerates, then the Higgs field is supposed to exert a certain
amount of resistance or drag, and that is the origin of inertial mass. In
a slightly more precise terminology, inertial mass is generated by
interactions between a particle and the (nonzero) Higgs field. In a
nutshell, this is the origin of inertial mass. Of course, other kinds of
interaction, such as the
strong interaction (governed by the force of
gluons,
particles gluing quarks together into a proton, say) may contribute
significantly to the resulting mass. Moreover, the degree of resistance
(drag) of the Higgs field is different depending on the kinds of fundamental
particles, and this generates the difference between the mass of electron and
that of a quark." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphasis and links added.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
As we will see in Essay Eight Parts One and
Two (links below), a mathematical object like a field cannot exert "drag
forces" unless it has a physical presence of some sort and is thus
made of
something (but what?). Now, if that comment is itself mistaken in some
way, and a field is capable of exerting "drag forces" (but
how?), that
would simply push the problem further back. A mathematical object, so
characterised, would be comprised of, or be part of, a
scalar,
vector
or
tensor
field. But, mathematical structures like these have no physical presence and so
on their own can have no effect on anything
-- other than, of course, on those who might want to employ them to attempt to account for nature.
To be sure, we might
try to represent
each field by, for example,
lines of force,or by constructing a
tangent/slope field, etc. However, lines
of force are 'infinitely thin' and yet absolutely unbreakable -- and, even
worse, misrepresent the continuous nature of the field! On top of that, such
lines (or whatever a field is supposed to be composed of) must allow particles
to pass through them all the while remaining coherent themselves -- even
though they are in fact made ofnothing. Otherwise we
should have to appeal to forces of cohesion to account for the coherence of
these lines (or whatever a field is supposed to be composed of), and their capacity to resist motion,
as well as their
capacity to allow
permeability. Once again, this simply reproduces the same problem one stage further back,
for we should now have to account for these new 'cohesive forces', and so on.
Moreover, if the field is continuous in nature (and isn't made of discrete 'lines
of force', or whatever it is supposed to be composed of), it would seem to be even less capable of resisting motion (unless it were
in some way particulate -- however, on that option, see the links added below).
This is, of course, just a contemporary
version of a classical problem, which,
as Leibniz showed,
afflictsall forms of mechanical atomism (or, indeed, mathematical
atomism). Translating it into what
amounts to Bargain Basement Platonism (whereby, in modern Physics, the universe is viewed as fundamentally
mathematical) would plainly be no way forward.
[On this, see the comments posted
here,
here, and
here. Also see my
remarks over at Wikipedia,
here and
here.]
The question now is: Does the "Totality" have a sort of
'metaphysical
revolving door', or maybe an ethereal antechamber, to cater for ephemeral and
itinerant objects and processes such as these?
[The 'discovery' of the Higgs Boson --
or, whatever has been found -- only serves to underline this point.]20
Either the existence of
all of these should be entertained, or those that supposedly don't enjoy
'objectivity' should be filtered out, the rest put on hold or sent into 'limbo'. But, which are to be discarded and which retained?
And on what basis?21a
More importantly:
which unfortunate comrade is going to chair the Dialectical Selection Panel?22
Worse still, what should we decide when
scientists revise their ideas, or change their minds (as they continually do)? Would this mean
that (1)
The "Totality" itself changes whenever the scientific community
ceases to acknowledge, or even rejects, the existence of what had once
been considered to be 'objective' objects and processes? Or, would this: (2) Show that scientists' beliefs about
'objectivity' itself had altered? If one or both of these were the case, would this not in turn suggest:
(3) That some (perhaps all?) 'objective' ideas are really only 'subjective'? Wouldn't
this cast a shadow over the 'objectivity' of science itself?
In view of the above, is it possible
to maintain the superior 'objectivity' of any (current or universal) contents list
of the "Totality" if yet more 'ontological re-edits' are only to be expected a few years down the line
-- once again, as
invariably happens in science?22aa
Conversely, if option (1) were the case,
wouldn't that mean the actual contents list of the "Totality" depends on
decisions made by fallible human beings? Did the "Totality" change, for example,
when early modern scientists decided that the "fifth element" no longer made it
on to the bench? Or the Luminiferous Ether?
Recall, we have already seen
that Engels defined the "Totality"
in the following way (including in his version of it the now defunct Ether):
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]
But, if the decisions of scientists determine what constitutes
an
'objective' membership list, then the "Totality" itself must change in
line with scientific fashion.
Did it change again when scientists concluded that Phlogiston and the Planet
Vulcan (this
isn't the planet from Star Trek!) were imaginary?
Perhaps Vulcan was suspended in some form of
'objective/subjective limbo' world
(subsisting away in a sort of
Meinongian ante-chamber somewhere), while
researchers
finally made up their minds? Will the "Totality" mutate once more if,
someday,
Superstrings
are granted (or denied) 'objective existence'? [They have already
been partially transmogrified into
Branes, and the
background theory itself into
M-Theory!]
Is, therefore, the "Totality" an artefact of whim? Is it 'objective' in a 'subjective' sort of sense? Does
it depend on who is on the Metaphysical Review Board? Is it Selection Panel
sensitive?
This isn't a very
promising
start -- but, and alas for DM-fans, it gets worse.
If we can't decide on what basis to include or
exclude things from this avowedly contradictory "Totality", then perhaps it
includes things that not only do not exist, but things that cannot exist?22a
This latest possibility now poses far more
serious problems for any attempt to construct an Ontological Definition of the
"Totality". That is because several
DM-theses imply the 'perimeter fence' (as it were) encircling the
"Totality" is full of holes.
In fact, the DM-Totality more closely resembles a
colander
than it does a
wok.
Figure Five: Is This
The "Totality"? Maybe Not.
It Has Too Few Holes.
While rival ontological systems often operate
with some sort of closed-border policy -- admitting the existence of certain
things, disallowing others -- it turns out that DM-theorists can't reject
anything at all, since they openly admit (if not adamantly insist
upon) the existence of countless contradictions (as well as paradoxes) -- and
endless trillions of them -- indeed, possibly hundreds, if not thousands in
each and every atom in the entire universe!
Hence, the 'DM-boundary-fence' isn't so much porous as non-existent. It is about as
effective as the "perimeters" the cops regularly set up in
24,
the TV film series; the miscreants always manage to get through. The "Totality", it seems,
could contain anything, including impossible objects -- not just
contradictory objects and processes, but mythical and imaginary ones, too. Maybe
it includes four-edged hexagons, the round square, the golden mountain,
unicorns, the
Olympian Gods, the end of the rainbow, and
perhaps even the
Adhedral
Triangle?22b
Anyone tempted to respond that the above list
is absurd since it contains contradictory items, which can be ruled out in
advance, should once again consult their local DM-Soothsayer before they jump to
that hasty conclusion. In fact, given well-known DM-principles, it isn't easy to see how any of the above (and
many more besides) may be rejected on such a
peremptory, a priori basis.
Thus, if the DM-"Totality" is to be rescued
from oblivion, some way must be found to stop these and countless other
absurdities before they cross its recklessly permeable boundary.
It could be objected once again that this is
just ridiculous; dialecticians
onlyacknowledge the existence of contradictions that can be
empirically verified.Hence, they don't
countenance the actuality of 'theoretical' contradictions and assorted absurdities, nor do they admit the
mere existence of all 'contradictory', imaginary, and impossible objects.
But, this counter-claim is demonstrably incorrect, as we
will soon
see.
Anyway, even if it were the case that DM-theorists do not admit the existence of
such entities, there is
in fact nothing in their 'logic' that rules them out.
Again, it could be argued that 'contradictory
objects' are easily excluded because they aren't material, and do not represent
verifiable material forces.
But, who says? How do we know that scientists
might not one day discover weird things like these? They
already have rather too many of their own to contend with; several of
those were listed
above. Would anyone like to
tell them that electrons travelling 'backwards' in time are impossible, or that
'quantum objects' can't be in two places at once?
Even worse still, as noted earlier:
objects and processes like these cannot be ruled out by anyone wielding the terminally obscure notions DL supplies its adepts. Because of
that, DM-theorists openly admit the
existence of countless billion contradictions and other assorted 'impossibilities',
right throughout the entire universe (the existence of which cannot be
verified by empirical means, either). [On
that, see below.]
In fact, if everything in
existence were a UO (as the DM-classics tell us) then there should be at least as many contradictions
in reality as there are sub-atomic particles (and possibly more). Hence, the
aforementioned 'impossibilities' cannot be ruled out in advance of all the evidence
having been considered, certainly not as a result of 'principles' exclusive to DL.
Indeed,
DM-theorists already acknowledge the actual
existence of contradictory objects, processes and
assorted 'impossibilities'
prior to all (or even most) of the evidence having
been collected
(and, in many cases, in abeyance of
any
evidence
at all!), since those
who agree with Lenin and Hegel insist that
everythingand every process is, or
'contains'
a UO.
[The reason for the 'scare'
quotes around "contains" is explained in Essay Eight
Part One.]
If so, for all that even dialecticians know,
the "Totality" could contain countless as-yet-undiscovered
absurdities. And this is all the more so since DM-theorists themselves
already confuse
contradictions with absurdities,
alongside a host of other
oddities, to
boot.
Furthermore, if Engels and Lenin
are to be believed, an
infinite amount of knowledge still
awaits discovery.
Hence, at any point in history (such as the present), humanity must be
infinitely ignorant of the final contents of -- and the principles governing
-- the universe, or the "Totality" (that is, if there is such a 'thing'). That being
the case,
those who rely on DL are in no position to
rule such absurdities out with anything other than almost infinite uncertainty.
The only way such oddities could be excluded would
be
on the back ofan a priori appeal to
principles exclusive to FL -- or, indeed,
exclusive to ordinary language
--, and thus on the basis of rules that are incompatible
with those found in DL. [On that, see
Essay Four.]
As we have already seen (in connection
with
Engels's analysis of motion and
several other core DM-theses,
here,
here,
here,
here,
here and
here), DM-theorists already
acknowledge the existence of
contradictory objects and events. Examples include the unity of
opposite poles in a magnet, 'contradictory'
opposing forces throughout nature
(at both the macro-, and micro-level),
contradictory moving objects,
contradictory numbers
and mathematical concepts, seeds which negate themselves,
the existence of actual infinities (that is,
the existence of something which both terminates (so that it is a determinateexistent)
and which does not terminate),
the fundamentally contradictory nature of matter (in that it is both wave
and particle, continuous and discontinuous, all at once), and
contradictory cells (that are somehow alive and dead at the same time -- or
they are teetering on the edge of, or they are caught between, both), and
so on.
Once again, if Lenin is to be believed,
reality is fundamentally contradictory, and everything is a
UO.
And, Lenin asserted this in the absence of any evidence at all.23
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and
unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be
defined as
the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the
cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials',
one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of
dialectics….
"In
mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and
reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the
combination and dissociation of atoms….
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity
of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58. Original emphases removed, bold added.]
This means that DM-theorists
cannot consistently exclude any of the contradictory and unlikely entities
listed earlier solely on the basis of their assumed 'contradictory'
nature(s). Theorists who postulate the existence of contradictions everywhere,
but who suddenly become arbitrarily fastidious just when it suits them,
shouldn't expect
to be taken seriously.
But, what could be more contradictory than a
"Totality" that admits among its denizens things that not only do not exist (like
the past), but also those that cannot exist (like DM-abstractions, since
if they exist,
they must be concrete)?
Unfortunately, once this metaphysical roller-coaster starts moving it
takes something a little more substantial than DL to stop it.
If DM isn't to be
imposed
on the world, but read from it -- as its supporters constantly
intone -- then, as it now
turns out, DM-theorists cannot consistently stipulate what their "Totality" does or does not contain ahead
of an empirical investigation to that end.23a
Others might be able to do this, but they
can't.
This is their millstone; they should
wear it with pride.
Hence, any attempt to rule out of existence
one or more of the contradictory or absurd objects listed above would trap
DM-theorists between the above millstone and yet another hard place: FL.
Now, those of us who aren't, shall we say,
favourably disposed to this crazy system of 'logic' -- i.e., DL -- not only can, but do
rule out of existence certain things because of principles expressed in FL
and/or ordinary
language. And we are right to do so.
[In fact, it is better to
say that it makes no sense to suppose such things exist. More on that
here. On similar grounds,
therefore, we may
legitimately and consistently deny the legitimacy of DM-propositions that
report the existence of 'contradictions' in nature, for example.]
However,
as noted above, this defence is unavailable to DM-theorists who claim that humanity has to wait
upon the deliverances of an
infinite meander through epistemological space, along the
Yellow
Brick Road to 'Epistemological
Valhalla' that supposedly leads toward 'Absolute
Knowledge', before anyone would be in a position to decide whether such propositions
are 'fully true' -- or, indeed, whether they are
true at all.
If so,
dialecticians have no valid reason to complain about the allegation that their
"Totality" might contain some or all of the odd things listed above -- the
(possible) existence of which is predicated on their cavalier rejection of the
protocols of FL and ordinary language.
The dilemma now facing DM-theorists is
quite stark: either (1) They continue to disdain FL -- the repudiation
of which helped create this problem --, thus admitting the possible existence of all
manner of contradictory objects, events and processes --; or (2) They reject their
existence (and hence abandon the idea that contradictions exist
everywhere in
nature), because of rules codified in FL, and expressed discursively in ordinary language.24
What seems certain, however, is
that the unwise rejection of core FL-principles has left the DM-"Totality" wide
open to infestation by countless weird and wonderful 'entities', the elimination
of which requires rapid inoculation with a belated dose of those very same
FL-protocols, alongside the adoption of a
believable
and/or workable theory of
knowledge.
Hence, as a result of yet another
dialectical inversion, FL would now be required to rescue DM-theorists from the
contradictory "Totality" they rashly summoned into existence; a Whole that could
include, for all we know -- or,for all they know -- characters from
Alice in Wonderland and the nonsense rhymes of
Edward
Lear.24a
In addition to and compounding the
difficulties outlined above, there remains the unresolved problem of the exact nature and
extent of the relations that are alleged to exist between the objects and processes
in the nebulous DM-"Totality" --,
should we ever be told what the latter is, of course.
From what little we 'know', the
"Totality" is supposed to be interconnected, contradictory and constantly changing
(because of its countless
UOs).
Earlier we saw Lenin declare the following:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"To begin with what is the
simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other
kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already
we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective
connection in nature, etc...." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221,
359-60. Emphases in the
original.]
However, he was also disarmingly honest about where he obtained
these ideas:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the
dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of
concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word
dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence
of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the
transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of
notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to
nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions
all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in
a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.
Emphases in the original.]25
This means that Lenin derived these ideas, not from a scientific study of the universe,
butfrom a Christian Mystic.
[It is also worth noting that Hegel hasn't
gone down in history as a great experimental scientist, either.]
Be this as it may, the nature and extent of these
'universal interconnections' is still far from clear. For instance: does every object
and process in
the "Totality" influence every other object and process instantaneously
across vast expanses of space and time, all the time. Does each
object and process do this equally or
differentially? That is, do objects and processes on the far side of the universe
affect those on the Earth equally as much as, or less than those on this planet
affect one another, or as much the latter affect in return those on the far side
of the universe? As we will see in
Part Two, and
odd though this might seem, given the Hegelian doctrine of 'internal relations', the answer should be "equally as much",
in both directions!
Even more perplexing: how are
interconnections like this even possible?
More importantly, how might any of
this
be confirmed?
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy….
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Nevertheless, as with so
many other DM-theses, the idea
that everything in the universe is interconnected soon unravels when it is subjected
to close scrutiny. To that end, it is worth
asking: Exactly which parts of the Universe are inter-related, to what extent,
and in what way?
Do these interconnections extend across all
regions of space and time, instantaneously, or is this true only of some?
Is there
some sort of time-delay affecting them all --, or again, only some?
If so, does this 'delay' mean that the past, for instance, is currently
interconnected with the present -- perhaps by means of light and/or
gravitational waves, as one or other travel across these vast distances? Or, do these interconnections operate only between contemporaneous
states of affairs thereby ruling out significant delays like this? That is, are
only presently existing objects and processes interconnected?
On the other hand, does this
doctrine imply that events in the past are (now) interconnected with other events belonging to the
same, or different, time zones? In that case, is, say, the election of Tony Blair in
1997stillinterconnected with the sinking of the
Bismarck, the discovery
of Gold in the
Klondike, the loss of the
Crown Jewels in 1216, and the near extinction of life at the
end of the Permian? If not, which time zones are inter-linked and
which aren't? And on what basis? If they are still interconnected, preciselywhat is it that interlinks events that no longer exist? Does this
interconnecting 'force' (or 'energy', or whatever it is), which links objects
and processes that don't now exist, itself exist in the present? If not, how
can it link anything? If it does exist in the here-and-now, how is it
still able to connect events that don't?
Even supposing such questions could be answered
(should a single DM-supporter bother to do so), we would still be in the
dark as to how this 'force', this 'energy', or this 'we-know-not-what', actually manages to do the interconnecting.
Bemused readers will
search long and hard through DM-texts (and once more to no avail), as well as
those of others who seem to dote on this obscure 'theory', for any answers to these
and other awkward questions -- or, for any sign they are
even remotely aware of such problems.
Anyway, to spoil the fun: we already know (from certain principles of
Relativity)
that there are parts of the universe that can't (physically can't) be connected, let alone
interconnected.
Conversely, in view of the fact that the past doesn't exist, shouldn't such
connections across time zones be disallowed? That is because it
would seem to be impossible for anything to be connected (let alone
interconnected)
with something that doesn't exist. However, if the past isn't connected (or
interconnected) with the present, how would it be possible to give an historical
account, say, of the origin of class society, or of the demise of Feudalism?
Of course, it is always
possible to argue that there is a causal chain of events that connects
the past with the present. But, even if that were so, this supposed chain of causes
can't interconnect the past with the presentif one of them doesn't exist. To be sure, the present
might be
connected with the past (via such a causal chain, for instance), but it can't be interconnected
with it (anymore than you, dear reader, can be interconnected with The Battle of the Little Bighorn, or The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire),
in the sense that you are now back-linked to it. Either we acknowledge
this limitation or we admit to the existence of backward causation, and,
indeed, with objects and processes that no longer exist. Moreover, as we saw
earlier, no single element in this causal chain, except perhaps the last one, now
exists. If so, how can such an insubstantial chain of non-existent causes connect something that
does exist (the present) with something that does not (the past)? At best, this
would make this chain and those links Ideal, and thus not the least bit
"objective".
Hence, at the very
most, if the past is connected with the present by an Ideal sort of causal link, that
would make the "Totality" (so depicted) an Ideally connected 'Whole'.
Even then, it would still fail to be an interconnected 'Whole' -- still less a
physically-connected whole.
One is
tempted to respond to hard-core DM-fans (who might at this point be heard to mutter
through clenched teeth: "Of course such things are interconnected!")
along the following lines: "And which
minor deity informed you of that supposed fact?" --, a few seconds before
reminding them that only Idealists impose theses like this on nature, something
they themselves have sworn never to do. That was the point of quoting the
following
DM-worthies a few paragraphs back:
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy….
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
[Plenty more of the same
can be found in
Essay Two.]
However, in order to further our
enquiry, and perhaps help resolve such problems, let us call the following
thesis,
"Maximal-Interconnectedness" (or,
MIC):
MIC: [A] All events and processes
in the "Totality" are always and instantaneously interconnected across every time zone.
Conversely, let us stipulate
that an attenuated version of MIC be called "Non-Maximal-Interconnectedness"
(or, NMIC):
NMIC: [B] The
"Totality" is interconnected, but not everything that has existed, or
will exist, or now exits, is permanently inter-linked instantaneously with everything else.
Considering MIC
first: It is difficult to see how this option could possibly be true. If it were, then it
would imply that every object, event and process in the entire history of the universe
(and perhaps beyond?) is now, always has been, and always will be interconnected with every other
object, event and process across every time zone, permanently and instantaneously
-- whether or not they still exist!
Taking three such
objects or events at
random: it would mean that, say, the median price of coffee grinders
in Brazil on the first of June 2003, the mean number of grains of sand on
Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.356567860984443 million years ago, are all interconnected with
one another, permanently and instantaneously.
Indeed, if everything
in reality is interconnected, then the above seemingly insignificant
events and processes would have to be taken into account in the scientific explanation of what
might otherwise seem to be unrelated events, the
assassination of Abraham
Lincoln, for instance. Historians and scientists would have to include such considerations (as well as countless others) in any explanation they might have of
Lincoln's death. [Issues concerning 'relevance' will be considered presently.]
For example, if MIC
were true then the taste of sugar, say, would have to have something to do with
the angular velocity of stars in neighbouring and distant galaxies (at all times), and
with the other three items mentioned above -- as well as the smell of diesel
oil,
and the mean weight of all
Fiddler
Crabs in the Southern Hemisphere eaten by predators on or before 17:02
(local time), June
15th 1247 (Julian
Calendar), and with the effect of
Selenium Sulphide on the
dandruff of
Chelsea FC supporters who
own
Heritage Cherry Sunburst Gibson Les Paul guitars (2006 issue)
-- if there are
any(!).
In fact, all of these
(and gazillions more like them) would have to be taken into account by scientists
trying to explain the demise of, say, the
dinosaurs or the properties of
Tungsten
(and vice versa), if MIC were the case.
Figure Six: Is Bondi Beach
Still Interconnected
With Napoleon's Left Foot?
And Yours?
Figure Seven: Are Ageing
Coffee Grinders Still
Interlinked With
The End Of The Last Ice Age?
Figure Eight: Is The Cartwheel
Galaxy Still Interconnected
Last Ever Glass Of Wine
(Before And After It Was Quaffed)?
Figure Ten: Still
Interlinked With
The Origin Of The
Crab
Nebula?
Some might
object at this point that dialecticians do not hold such simple-minded and ridiculous
beliefs; not only that, but the
above comments ignore relative connectedness (and hence considerations of 'relevance').
[Once again, these
conveniently vague notions will also be examined
presently.]
In advance of that, it is
worth reminding ourselves that (1) This sub-section is dealing with MIC,
and that (2) Speculation like this has been forced
upon us
because DM-fans have consistently failed, or have refused to say beyond uttering vague
banalities, what their theory actually implies. Any who still object clearly
don't accept MIC, but the question still
remains: Is MIC what classical-DM implies?
In which case, the above DM-complaint is
itself misplaced.
Furthermore, because MICspecifically postulates instantaneous
influences, continually operating across every region of space and time,
inverse
square law drop-off rates
don't apply -- that is, if inverse square law drop off-rates are what "relative connectedness" implies.
But, once more, who can say? Certainly not DM-theorists. They have
retreated into a non-dialectical corner and have assumed a protracted, dogmatic sulk.
Moreover, even if interconnectedness were relativised in the above manner,
what it postulates are still links -- albeit
links that have, on this revised assumption, insignificant effects
on much that is distantly connected to them --, and it is those
links
themselves that remain obscure.
[The idea that "internal relations" decrease with distance (so that 'remote
effects' can be ignored as irrelevant) has been subjected to destructive examination in
Part Two of this
Essay. The reader is directed there for more details.]
Again, even if these links were to be relativised in
the above manner, that would still fail explain how everything
is in fact interconnected. For example, and once again: how are objects and processes in the past
inter-linked with those in the present,
or, indeed, with those supposedly still in the future? Are these causal links, or
are they something more esoteric?
To be sure, according to current theory, it takes many light years for the
vanishingly small gravitational effects of distant objects, for instance, to reach
our planet, but when they do reach us these effects are manifestly located in the present. The
question is: What
influence do extremely remote objects, some
10-12 billion
light years away -- which objects might no longer exist --, have
on the earth right now? Admittedly, light from these distant regions might have some effect
(or it will do so when it reaches us), but for MIC to be true, these
objects must influence earth instantaneously across immense distances even
beforethese physical effects arrive in our vicinity, and
for this to be true in reverse.
Of course, it is
reasonably
clear that if DM-theorists were to adopt
MIC, it would be impossible to confirm their theory.
Wherecould
one evenbegin?
More incredible still:
whatever interconnections are imagined to exist between events and processes,
the connections themselves
can't change and neither could the elements so
inter-linked.
To see
this, consider an
earlier sentence:
M1: The median price of
coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2003, the mean number of grains
of sand on
Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.356567860984443 million years ago...
If it is now true
that there are such interconnections between the above items --
call this set of connections, MICA
--, then since MICA
has been relativised to, and identified by means of, the times so specified, it
must always remain the same.
On the other hand, if it
were incorrect to say this -- and MICAweresusceptible to change -- then at any point in time it would be false to say that
the said relation expressed in M1 was MICA,
and the items mentioned wouldn't be so inter-linked.
But, if it is now true to say this of them, it must be true to say the same tomorrow
(or at any time) about that set of relations today.
Recall, MIC connects
everything to everything else, constantly and instantaneously throughout all of time, irrespective of whether it
now exists, including the very words used to make this very point.
It could be argued that
this implausible conclusion can't apply here since dialecticians are
committed to universal change. Hence, the above relation must change as the
events it connects themselves alter.
But, is this a safe assumption to make given this view
of MIC? In fact, MICexcludes DM-change. That
is because, of course, the items in this triple relation do not now
exist, and so can't change. In that case, MICA
can't change either, and neither can the relation between them.
So, since the events in
question were time-stamped to make them determinate, this means that MICA
can't change -- since a specific date-stamp identified
each element of that set.
If we
generalise the above analysis (to take into account every event and process in the entire universe,
including those not now in existence (otherwise, this widened set wouldn't comprise all of 'reality'),
we obtain the same result. Hence, if MIC were true, DM-change
would be impossible.
If every event in the past is now inter-related to every event in both the
present and the future (MIC-style), nothing could alter. Otherwise we
would lose all contact with our capacity to refer to them, and so link them.
Of course, it is possible to argue that the
above is thoroughly misguided since
nature takes no heed of our capacity to refer to such things, or of our ability to link
them. Hence, the above argument clearly implies Ms Lichtenstein is an Idealist.
In response, it is worth reminding the reader
once again that all this speculation has been forced upon us because
dialecticians refuse to say what the "Totality" is, or be specific about the
interconnections they say exist throughout nature. Hence, I'm not reporting
my own beliefs!
Now, if the universe is
changeable, then one implication of the above argument
is that not only would we not be able to describe it, we couldn't describe
these hypothetical
DM-interconnections either. In that case, the above argument presents
DM-theorists with the following dilemma (that is, assuming they accept MIC):
(1) If the DM-universe is describable, and
MIC is valid, then
no change could occur;
Or:
(2) If the DM-universe changes, it can't be described.
Option
(1) above
is in fact the
Block View of
Time, only rather badly expressed.
A somewhat
similar problem afflicts relativistic Physics: If the universe is a
four-dimensional 'object' (or, rather,
manifold)
in
Spacetime, then each 'event' would in effect be a
proper part
of an
orthogonal
three-dimensional 'slice' (i.e., a
hyperplane) through that 'object'/manifold as it is embedded in 4-space. In that case,
change couldn't take place -- or, rather change would,
at best, represent our subjective view of the world, meaning
there would be no such thing as 'objective' change.
[However, if
Special Relativity is to be believed,
there are problems constructing such a hyperplane through all points
simultaneously. If correct, that would make our view of the world even more
subjective and parochial. On that, see Saunders (2002).]
Of course, this just
means that Relativity is no friend of DM; indeed, the Big Bang itself (since it
is predicated on the latter theory) is its mortal enemy. So, when dialecticians
refer us to the Big Bang to account for the "Totality" and interconnectedness, they are in
fact drawing a viper to their collective bosom. As was noted
here, this is just one
reason why
earlier generations of Dialectical Marxists opposed, and some still oppose, the revolutionary new Physics that emerged in the
first few decades of the 20th century.
However, let us now suppose that:
(A) There is
some way of avoiding all of the paradoxical conclusions mentioned above;
And that,
(B) MICis compatible with change, after all.
Even then,
MIC
would still face formidable problems. For example, MIC
would appear to
imply
the existence of instantaneous effects across vast expanses of space and
time -- all the time --, not least
those
between things that do not now exist and those that do. This, in turn, would
require the existence of non-relativistic effects 'travelling' back and forth
between such regions at
unimaginably large
superluminal velocities (leaving the 'warp'
speeds of Star Trek gasping for breath). Either that, or this would have
to involve (in most cases) inordinate time-delays for all relevant reciprocal
influences to work, undermining MIC in the process. [Since, in that case,
many wouldn't in fact be interconnected.]
Hence, it
looks like MIC presents DM-fans with far too many dialectical-headaches. In that case,
if DM is to be taken seriously, its adherents would be well advised to
avoid MIC like the plague.
Because of that,
I will consider MIC
no more in this Essay (except, of course, in the next paragraph); any dialecticians still enamoured of it are welcome to
make what sense of it they can.
[Even so,
if such individuals want to retain some form of commitment to MIC, they
will have to abandon the idea that their theses are acceptable only if they have
been confirmed in some way. That is because MIC is as impossible to
verify as it is to believe.]
Let us assume, therefore, that some form of NMIC is more acceptable to DM-theorists.
To that end, it might be helpful continuing to suppose that the "Totality" is in
fact interconnected.
From earlier we saw that NMIC is the following:
[B] The
"Totality" is interconnected, but not everything that has existed, or
will exist, or now exits is permanently inter-linked, instantaneously with everything else.
However,
NMIC is itself rather vague (the above characterisation is clearly my own
offering, once more forced upon me because the meagre and threadbare details
offered up by DM-fans are about as useful as a chocolate oven glove). The extent
and nature of these interconnections are still unclear, and it isn't easy to see how this defect
can be rectified
--
except, perhaps, only on a dogmatic, a priori or
stipulative basis.
But, even if the opposite were
the case, and NMIC were entirely perspicuous, it would still face
serious problems of its own. For example, some of the aforementioned Helium atoms in
the distant Galaxy (mentioned in M1, above, reproduced below) could have decayed by the time their
vanishingly small effects had travelled very far -- in which case, those atoms, at
least, would no longer exist for them to be interconnected with anything.
Furthermore, the energy they released could fail to reach certain parts of the Universe
because of absorption elsewhere. And
what is true of them will be true of countless other objects and processes.
M1: The median price of
coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2003, the mean number of grains
of sand on
Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.356567860984443 million years ago...
In addition, NMIC also faces the
Light
Cone problem
(also alluded to earlier): there are parts
of nature that cannot now interact with one another (if Special Relativity is to be
believed).
Further questions force
themselves upon us: Do these hypothetical 'travelling effects' influence other 'travelling
effects' (even if
they happen to be moving in opposite directions), and at all times? Does the
energy from distant Galaxies travelling away from the Earth (never to
interact with our planet -- that is, if we assume the universe is infinite and
unbounded (and assuming it isn't absorbed somewhere, which means it won't affect
the earth, anyway)) have an effect on energy radiating from the Earth and similarly
moving in the opposite direction, away from those Galaxies? If not, how can
these particular aspects of nature be interconnected?
Is there some sort of
hierarchy of levels within and among these interconnections, with some things
affecting others more than they do the rest? Does an inverse square law operate
in this case?
More to the point: has a single DM-theorist attempted to work out the mathematics of any of this,
let alone consider any of the above questions?
Worse still, is there any evidence supporting the idea that
most, or even every
sub-atomic particle in the Universe are/is interconnected with most/every other for
most/all of time?
Of course, one possible response to
the above might involve pointing out that all of nature is subject to the same laws
because everything originated in the "Big Bang" billions of years ago. That
would seem to mean that everything in the universe is related "by birth and by
law", as it were, to everything else. Indeed, there are well-known theories in
Modern Physics that
appear to support the idea that the entire Universe is interconnected because of
its unique origin and what has come to be called "quantum entanglement". [However,
on the latter,
see Note 28.]
[DM-supporters who believe that the universe
is infinite (and thus that there was no "Big Bang") will plainly have a hard time
explaining how everything in an infinite universe could be connected, let alone
interconnected!]
But, even if these modern theories
were correct (and we supposed for
a moment that scientists never change their minds -- but see below), that would still
fail to show
that everything is nowinterconnected, or will always remain so. For that
conclusion itself to be correct we should need argument and evidence, certainly
more than has been offered so far -- which is precious little.
However, despite the fact
that the aforementioned theories in Modern Physics seem to lend support to the idea that certain
parts or aspects of nature are
interconnected, the evidence in their favour is alarmingly thin.26
Incidentally, the above
response (that everything arose from the "Big Bang") would fail to explain precisely whichlawsactually
connect the aforementioned price of coffee grinders in Brazil to remote atoms of Helium, let alone the number of grains of sand on beaches in the antipodes,
mentioned in M1 above -- to
say nothing of every other trivial event in the history of the universe --, or,
worse, how such
links might be confirmed in any meaningful way.
Nevertheless, and despite
this, there are several comrades -- whose ideas will be examined elsewhere
at this site -- who question the standard account of the origin of the
universe; for example, Michael Gimbel [Gimbel (2011)], and our old friends:
Woods and
Grant (1995/2007).27
According
to these comrades, the Universe is infinite in duration and size,
macroscopically and microscopically, stretching
on 'forever',
and is 'infinitely divisible' -- although Woods and Grant don't actually say this (but, Gimbel
does), as far as I am
aware, even though it appears to be an implication of the idea that the universe is infinite in extent
and intent. Again, if that were so, it would mean
that most of reality couldn'tbe interconnected since
nothing would have had a common origin; because on this view there was no
origin of the universe
-- although
oddly enough
these two comrades failed to spot this fatal
corollary of their theory -- and hence the Universe couldn't be a
"Totality".
[Imagine asking, say, a waitress to tell you what the
total bill for a meal is only to be told it is an "infinite bill"; it can have
no total. Some might object that this is an inapt analogy. Maybe it is, but
until we are told (with some clarity) what DM-fans mean by "Totality" it will
have to do.]
Anyway, exactly how these three
comrades
know that the universe is infinite in extent and had no
origin they forgot to say -- although, Gimble does offer his readers several
arguments in favour of this view, but his main reason appears to be that Engels and
Lenin held this idea, and it appears to run counter to this advice from Engels:
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing....
As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
In fact, these theories
don't "proceed...from facts", but from ideas inherited from
post-Renaissance
Hermeticism (where an 'infinite
universe' was viewed as a fitting analogy for 'god'; belief in
anything else would be to demean or downgrade the 'Creator' -- on this, see Bruno (1998), De León-Jones (1997),
Koyré (1957), Lovejoy (1964) and Yates (1991)),
just as they omitted the "careful empirical" work
which substantiates the belief that the universe is infinite -- as opposed to
its being
merely finite, but very large and very old. [Obvious, but it is worth
repeating: this is something that should be settled by research not dogma.]
Indeed, like so many of the other things
Woods and Grant say about nature (and, to a certain extent, this also applies to
Gimbel's
ex cathedrapronouncements) -- and, as is the case, too, with so many other DM-fans
-- they
seem quite happy to
impose these
quasi-theological doctrines on
reality.27a
Another possible reaction
to the above 'difficulties' might run along the following lines: While we are at
present ignorant of these interconnections, that doesn't imply there are none. The history of science has
shown that explanations of the Universe have always been framed in
increasingly general terms, and that over time the laws scientists
discover confirm the fact that countless objects and processes in nature
are indeed interconnected in the way that DM-theorists suppose. Indeed, the
development of scientific knowledge shows that the more we discover about nature the more
interconnections we find.
However, the above
response doesn't even begin to tackle the vast bulk of the problems raised earlier. For example, if
interconnections within the "Totality" involve instantaneous effects across
vast expanses -- measured in billions of light years --, several of the aforementioned
scientific laws and principles are plainly incorrect (namely, those
that depend on
Special Relativity). Worse still,
as has also been noted, the universal existence of such effects will never
be verified. How, for example, will it be possible to test the entanglement of
two photons sent on their way and then observed when they are a billion light
year apart? Who is going to be around to do the observing at such massive
separation distances (good luck with that one!), even assuming the human race
survives that long, and there is anyone around to care, or even to remember they
were supposed to keep track of them? So, based on the sort of DM-principles mentioned earlier (relating to
the allegedly non-negotiable pre-requisite that theories have to have empirical
support,
and mustn't be foisted on nature),
dialecticians themselves cannot
consistently accept this up-beat view of things since (as has been pointed out
several times) it cannot be confirmed, ever.
Indeed, Einstein called such an
idea "spooky". Not only did it appear to violate certain tenets of Special
Relativity, it also seemed impossible to believe -- because of the absence
of
(a) any conceivable causal explanation or (b) an intervening medium.28
More worrying still, this
latest (volunteered) reply is itself based on a metaphysical view of science. There are, of
course, deep issues at stake here -- for example, those connected with how
Scientific Realism
itself should be interpreted, as well as those arising from any attempt to translate
highly technical areas of science into ordinary
language --, or, indeed, render them compatible with 'commonsense', should
anyone want to do so. Some of
these issues were discussed in Essay Eight
Part Two, others will be dealt with in
Essay Thirteen Part Two (to be published in 2016).
Quite
apart from all this, even if a plausible version of interconnectedness were
forthcoming, it would still appear to be inconsistent with other DM-theses. For
example: if, according to
dialecticians,
all change is internally-driven and
based on inner conflicts allegedly initiated by the dynamic relation between constituent
UOs
present in an object or process, then it cannot also be externally-motivated. But, what else does the doctrine of universal interconnectedness amount to except an
appeal to the existence of more complex and remote external
causes/'mediations'? Hence, if universal interconnections exist, change cannot be wholly internal to an object or system. On the other hand, if
change were entirely the result of the conflict between the 'internal
opposites' within objects, processes
and systems, interconnectedness could only be local, at best -- it certainly
wouldn't be
universal.
[It is
worth pointing out that there is a fatal equivocation lying right at the heart
of the DM-idea that change is the result of 'internal contradictions'. On that
see
here,
here, and
here. This topic is
more fully
discussed in Essay Eight
Part One
(along with the idea that there is a 'dialectical' interplay between internal
and external 'contradictions'),
and will be dealt with again in
Part Two of this Essay.]
In that
case, if dialecticians are determined to cling to their belief in this yet-to-be-defined "Totality", along with its universal interconnections, the doctrine
that change is exclusively generated by 'internal contradictions' will have to
be abandoned. Conversely, vice versa.
Either way, DM would suffer yet another
serious body blow.
If any
aspect of this maximally-interconnected "Totality" is to be rejected
(along with the idea that every atom past present and future has a direct
effect on every other, instantaneously, for all of time across the entire
universe),
then what interpretation can be put upon 'interconnectedness' that doesn't
amount toa simple act of faith?
Unless we
can fill in the details, faith seems to be the only option available to loyal
acolytes of
The Church of Dialectics.
That is because, as has already been pointed out, universal and omni-temporal
interconnections are incapable of being confirmed.28a
Now,
this is where the "Epistemological Definition" might offer some
assistance to beleaguered DM-fans,
enabling them to find a solution to the above conundrums that is conducive to a
non-mystical
view of the universe.
Plainly,
this alternative conception of the "Totality" re-directs attention away from
speculative
Ontology (or
even perhaps the above 'contents list'), and re-focuses it
on other
areas -- on a consideration of what is
known about the Whole as it has been conceived, or might be conceived, at any point in history. Indeed, this seems to be the definition John Rees
prefers;
we saw him referring his readers to an "insistence" (recorded
above),
and he
later alluded to the "totality of human experience and knowledge", which
appears to have something to do with the "Totality", too. [Rees (1998a),
pp.5, 236.] In what follows I will simply assume it does.
Unfortunately, this switch of
emphasis away from the supposed object of knowledge onto our knowledge of 'it'
only creates further problems for the DM-faithful, should they choose to adopt it.
As seems reasonably clear, unless it is
possible to say something (anything?) about the object of
knowledge, claims about 'it' will be entirely empty. But,
DM-theorists cannot (or will not) ante-up here; beyond oft-repeated banalities, they have remained
studiously unspecific about the supposed object of their claims for nigh on 150 years.
And, it looks like they intend to maintain this tight-lipped policy into the next
150. This Essay certainly won't budge them, even if they bothered to read it!
Why are they so reticent? Why do they refuse to tell
the world the good news about their semi-divine "Totality"?
This, they say, is because they will be accused of imposing their ideas on nature.
But, that reply is rather odd, since that is what they finally end up doing!
They tell us that everything is a "Totality"
(but refrain from informing us what that assertion actually involves), and then happily impose that
ancient, mystical idea on nature, valid for all of space and time!
Beyond alleging there is a vague sort of
"dialectical unity" between the "knower and the known", and apart from giving
the whole shebang a quasi-religious label (viz., "The Totality"), it looks like
there's little else they could say, and, as noted above,
there is precious little they have said about this nebulous
"Totality" -- even to one another!
An
analogous predicament has plagued previous epistemologically-driven theories of
nature -- whose advocates found they had to appeal (implicitly or
explicitly) either to an a priori, or to an a posteriori, ontology of some sort
to bail them out.
Without something like this to firm things up,
still others have meandered off into a
Phenomenalist
quagmire.
In fact,
the DM-classicists merely gestured at a solution to the above dilemma -- i.e.,
either (a) they impose a specific ontology on nature or (b) they face re-classification as
a sub-branch of Phenomenalism, or even
Subjective Idealism
--
half-opting for the first alternative
by appealing to
a vague and attenuated sort of ontology -- and one that was hopelessly compromised by Lenin's
refusal to commit DM to any firm ideas in this area, even about the nature of matter!
-- the whole sorry mess hived-off into the
sciences.
We saw
earlier that
that wasn't a wise move, either.
As we will
see
(in Essay Thirteen
Part One), DM-fans are completely unspecific
about
what they mean -- even by the word "matter" or "material".
In the event, they utilise
materialist-sounding phrases that collapse alarmingly quickly into some
form of Idealism.
Of course, they certainly intend their ontology to
be materialist, but the
asymptotic road to
Dialectical
Nirvana, along which they are all trudging, is paved with intentional, but no less
ideal, bricks, upon which it is impossible to build anything even remotely
secure.
Indeed, there doesn't appear to be a single
DM-theorist on the planet (now or in the past) who is either willing or capable
of telling us (or even
her/his fellow adepts) what matter actually is, beyond describing it as an 'abstraction'!
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, this puts
dialecticians in the same bind as theologians, who similarly cannot tell us
anything about the nature of 'God' -- save both of them offer us their own
via
negativa: i.e., 'God'(/'matter') is not this, not that, not this, not…
So, without
a clear idea what these 'coy materialists' think matteris,
their "Totality" is indeed like
Hamlet without
the…, er..., well what?
It
is no surprise, therefore, to
discover that this perennially equivocal approach to ontology means that the
aforementioned dilemma -- involving a choice between an a priori, or an
a posteriori, membership list -- re-surfaces in several different forms elsewhere in
DM.
On the one hand, DM-theorists maintain the
pretence that they haven't imposed their ideas on reality, but have merely read
them from it; on the other, they phrase these ideas in terms which
reveal that they have foisted them on the world --, which
clearly suggests
their ontology (if such it may be called) is a priori, after all.
[These allegations were substantiated in
Essay Two; they will be examined in
more detail in Essay Twelve (summary
here)
and Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
Trapped inside a metaphysic that has no clear conception of the "Totality" (or of what it contains), and
possessing an ontology that reifies and then reconfigures the products of social interaction
(language) as fundamental aspects of reality (all those 'contradictions' and
'negations', for example), DM-theorists
find themselves saddled with their own version of Kant's
Noumenon.
If ordinary language
is inadequate to the task of capturing final truths about the world (a DM-thesis we saw confirmed
here and
here), and if humanity is
locked in an infinite/eternal "asymptotic" search for absolute truth (the
nature of which mustforever escape us), then human 'knowledge'
must always remain 'infinitely
incorrect' -- 'infinitely' far from the truth.
In that case, for
all that DM-theorists know, their quest for 'absolute' truth could be going in
entirely the wrong direction! Given their theory, humanity is and will be permanently
and infinitely ignorant of everything and anything at each and every stage in its history. Hence, the
probability that the search for knowledge is progressing in the 'right'
direction will always be vanishingly small (indeed, it must be 'infinitely' small)
--, even if there were such a thing as "knowledge" (which, given this theory, there
couldn't be!).
On this account, humanity will always be
infinitely removed from Absolute Truth, and hence infinitely ignorant.
If DM-epistemology were correct, human beings would find it impossible even to build a secure platform from which
to
launch a scientific search for knowledge, let alone approach truth
'asymptotically'. As we saw in Essay Ten
Part One, the DM 'convergence' theory of
knowledge readily collapses into
scepticism;
we also we saw that an appeal to
practice to shore-up the infinitely insubstantial sands upon which
DM-epistemology has been erected (the same sands, incidentally, into which many a dialectical head
has been inserted), was equally
ill-advised.
In fact, there might be
no such thing as 'Absolute Truth' for anyone to aim for, let alone
approach 'asymptotically'! Certainly neither Engels nor Lenin even so much as
attempted to show that there is such a thing (and neither did Hegel, in
relation to his 'Absolute'). Moreover, since human knowledge is
always infinitely far from 'The Truth' -- according to DM-theorists -- the claim
that there is such a thing as partial/relative truth has an infinitely high
probability of being mistaken, too.
Hence, the Epistemological Definition fatally
compromises DM-theorists' claim that their theory is capable of delivering
even partial and/or relative knowledge about anything, let alone the "Totality"
(should we ever be told what it is!).
The above accusations might appear to some to be rather wild, if not downright misleading
and impertinent; nevertheless, a consideration of
Engels's description of the "Totality" should give pause:
"'Fundamentally, we can know
only
the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in
raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity
and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the
finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is
knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition
of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.234-35.]29
Compare the above with the following:
"The identity of thinking and being, to use
Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and
does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which
it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a
fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because
reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it
only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon
manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in
this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels
(1975), pp.457-58, and Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphases alone added.]
While Engels doesn't actually use the
term here, his words clearly relate to the "Totality" (or, rather, to
our knowledge of 'it'), only now expressed in
quasi-mystical terms. Admittedly, these passages come from unpublished
sources, but they succeed in
revealing how close Engels came to overt Idealism in private.30
These 'impertinent' observations will be further
substantiated in what follows.
The language DM-theorists use in order to refer
to their "Totality" clearly reveals that despite
protestations to the
contrary they
regard it as an a priori concept/'object'/'process'. Indeed, as noted above, it is little
more than a pale reflection of Hegel's Absolute, and thus of 'God'.
The fact that this isn't a
baseless allegation can be seen from a consideration of the answers that might be
given to the following questions:
(1) How do DM-theorists know that
reality is restricted to just one "Totality"? Might there not be several?
Leaving out of consideration sub-"Totalities" for the present, might
there not be countless intermingled or intercalated "Totalities"? Indeed, how
exactly do
DM-theorists count "Totalities" so that they know they should stop at one?31
(2) Following on from (1), how do DM-theorists know
that there aren't at least two "Totalities" (or even sub-"Totalities") which are completely
unrelated to one another?
(3) If we now confine our attention to the
known Universe, how do dialecticians know that each and every part of
nature is
interconnected with all the rest, all the time? Might there not be parts of
the world that are totally unrelated to anything else, or which are connected to only
relatively few other objects and processes? Why is either option impossible?32
(4) What gives DM-theorists the confidence to
"insist" in advance of all (or even most) of the evidence has
been gathered that what they
say must be true of every last particle in the universe, and for all
of time?
Beyond 'divine' revelation, there are only two approaches to
'knowledge' that would allow DM-theorists to answer the above questions in the way that they
actually do: (A)
DM is a dogmatic, metaphysical theory, or (B) DM is a conventionalised theory founded upon a standardised,
definitional or
stipulative use of certain words.
Again, these allegations might strike some
readers as somewhat controversial, if not patently false, so the rest of this section will be devoted to
substantiating them.33
Question One: How Do We Know
That There Is
Only One "Totality"?
One obvious response to this question -- indeed, it might even have occurred to the reader
--
is: "Well,
that's what the word "Totality" means. There can't be more than
one Totality, by definition."
There are at least two ways of understanding
this rejoinder, each of which corresponds to one or other of the two Options,
A
or B, above:
(A) If the standard, 'official',
vague and loose
DM-characterisation of the
"Totality" means that this concept, or rule (if it is either
one of these) must be employed as a way of
deciding what the contents of reality are supposed to be (operating as a sort of methodological
filter or theoretical sieve) --, or as a way of constituting a set of necessary, or
even scientific truths
about it --, then that would clearly make DM metaphysical. That is
because this approach will have confused a rule or a concept with 'reality
itself'. Why that is so is explored at length in Essay Twelve
Part One
(summary
here).
Moreover, this
would confirm an earlier suspicion that well before even a
vanishingly small fraction of the evidence has been collected or assessed,
the idea that 'everything' must be viewed along DM-lines --, i.e., as part of an
interconnected unitary whole -- had already been decided upon, and that the
remaining evidence (such as it is) must be shoe-horned to fit this world view. But, what else
would this
amount to except a crude way of imposing a favoured structure on reality,
and one
based solely on the supposed meaning of a word (i.e., "Totality"), the very thing
DM-theorists have always effected to
disavow?
The fact
that this is what has happened -- and isn't just a prejudice
of the present author -- can be seen from the way that the
above volunteered response
suggests that
universally valid facts about the world can be, or have been derived from the meaning of a word:
"Totality" -- or, to be more honest, derived
from a highly superficial gesture at a loose 'definition'of it.
Even if the "Totality" had been defined clearly,
and we knew what DM-theorists were banging on about, we would still require, at
the very least, aconvincing argument justifying the derivation of a set of universal truths from a single word and/or its 'definition'.
Anyway, the provision of such an
argument would automatically concede the point made earlier: that a particular
view of the world had been imposed on nature -- and which was indeed based on a vague and imprecise
'sort of definition'
-- instead of having been read from it as had been advertised all along.
Of course, it isn't as if we
don't already know
where this idea came from; it was imported from
Christian and Hermetic
Mystics, who very helpfully "divined" this idea long before any evidence
to speak of was available.
(B) On the other hand, if the word
"Totality" (and its associated terminology) is to be used as a "form of representation"
-- that is, as a formal way
of interpreting experience and legitimating what appear to be a set of scientific inferences
-- it would at
least be clear that it was a creature of convention.34
Of course, the first of the above two Options
would suggest that DM is just another form of LIE (that is, it is just one part
of a family of doctrines based upon the idea that
substantive truths about the world
can be derived solely from the alleged meanings of words). The second
alternative would imply that DM appears superficially to resemble science, but only at considerable cost.
That is because, as noted above, it would confirm that DM is conventional,
after all.35
To be sure, there are
many different versions of
Conventionalism.
Less plausible varieties are based on
some form of
stipulation.37 Less implausible
versions are anthropological in origin,
and are thus founded on the many and varied material and collective practices that have helped
drive human social development.38
Perhaps DM is conventional in one of these
senses? If so, the idea that reality forms a contradictory "Totality"
could then only be based on one of the following: (1) An agreement of
some kind; (2) An implicit or explicit stipulation to that effect; or (3)
Norms derived from, or constitutive of (collective) material practices, of some sort.
Admittedly, the adoption of any one of these would simply confirm the fact that
DM hadn't been read from the world (as had been
claimed), but had been imposed on it.
That would certainly account
for the
dogmatic,
a priori nature of
DM-theses, supposedly true for all of space and time.
Unfortunately however, stipulative conventions are no more capable of being
empirically true than are rules. A straightforward example of this sort of
convention might be the
conversion rule: 1000kg = 1 tonne. Clearly, this type of convention is of little
use to dialecticians in this context, since, although it is correct
to say
that one tonne is one thousand kilograms (or, rather,
that
any object weighing 1000kg will automatically weigh 1 tonne, so that an
empirical statement to that effect about
some object or other would itself be true),
this
conventional
fact doesn't derive from the 'nature' of the world (even though it is connected
with it in other ways,
via practice),
nor has it been read from it. It is based on a
series of
agreements and stipulations introduced and adopted a couple of centuries ago.
Hence, if
this conversion rule is 'true', it isn't empirically true. [In fact, it
is better to call it "practical" or "useful" rather than true.
(I have said more about such rules,
here.)]
None but
the radically confused would dream of checking this rule by measuring something; it cannot be
tested in practice (although practice certainly tells us whether such rules
are practical and useful, or not, and the rule can obviously inform us if a
measurement has been converted correctly between units). Indeed, rules like this tell us when a practical interface
with the world has been carried out
properly according to the explicit (and/or the implicit) criteria for their
application. [On this, see Polanyi (1962,
1983).]
In that case, if something is
empirically true, stipulating it as true would be wasted effort. On
the other hand, if something is empirically false, a stipulation to that
effect (or its opposite) would be either pointless or misleading.
Of course,
in contrast to the above, social/anthropological conventions are more
complex and they (typically) aren't based on an explicit agreement, but that doesn't affect the point being made.
Plainly, the
truth-value of an
empirical proposition depends on the way the world happens to be. However, the fact that
such propositions are capable of possessing truth-values (i.e., the
fact that they have truth-conditions) is a consequence of the
conventionalised linguistic practices human beings have developed over the
course of their history. How could it be otherwise?
As will be argued In Essay Twelve
Part One,
previous philosophical
and
ideologically-motivated attempts to give inappropriatelinguistic expression to these
conventions-- along with their subsequent mis-interpretation as super-empirical truths about reality
-- gave birth
Metaphysics, first of all (in the 'West') in Ancient Greece.
[There were somewhat similar developments in the 'East' at or around the same
time.] Because metaphysical propositions are based on just such a misconstrual
and misrepresentation of the linguistic products of social relations (as if they pictured or represented the real relation among things,
or, indeed, as if they were those things themselves), they are incapable of being true
or false.38a
Since they are
incapable of being true or false (because they are based on a misconstrual of
linguistic rules as if they were factual propositions themselves, and because
they mistake what is a social form for reality itself), the theses that
metaphysicians concoct aren't just non-sensical, they
are fetishised
and
incoherent
non-sense. Furthermore, metaphysicians adopted this method of
enquiry
for
ideological reasons-- in order to uncover the 'essential' nature and 'logical form' of
'Reality' which the state (with all its inequality and class divisions) was
supposed to mirror -- which assumption was then imposed on nature.
DM-theorists buy into in this
ancient, ruling-class
approach to Philosophy when they, too,
misconstrue the nature of the theses Hegel bequeathed to those who unwisely took him
seriously -- and in the case of DM-theorists, whether or not this importation is upside down or 'the
right way up'. Dialecticians
indulge in metaphysical speculation whenever they misinterpret the products of
the social relations among human beings (i.e., certain words) as if they represented the real relations among
things -- or, were those things themselves --, an unfortunate intellectual
malady compounded by a misidentification of the origin of language as 'natural', based on "reflection", "inner representations",
and/or "images" (etc.)
--, reified now into 'mental' objects and/or processes (a view that is itself
the result of
an incautious, distorted use of
words like "consciousness", "thought", and "cognition").39
Nevertheless, this characterisation of
DM will clearly be unacceptable to its adherents, since they claim that even
though their theory may only be partially/relatively true, it is nonetheless an empirically
valid and objective theory about the world and how to transform it, verified in practice.
[Whether or not DM is merely a "method" will
be examined presently.]
So, despite the fact that
it carries all the hallmarks of Conventionalism -- in that its adherents are
quite happy to "insist", or
"demand"
that this or that DM-thesis is valid throughout nature, for all of time, based on a set of idiosyncratic
stipulations and inferences drawn from a set of specially-selected words/concepts -- DM, it seems, cannot be
a conventional theory.40
The only other way to account for
DM-theorists' habit of advancing a priori, dogmatic and universal claims about reality
is to conclude that DM is a metaphysical theory.
Of course,
this begs the
question concerning the 'correct' definition of
Metaphysics
--;
that particular topic is discussed in Essay
TwelvePart One.
However, given Engels's own rather loose
'definition' of the term, dialecticians are abundantly clear that DM isn't
metaphysical. On the contrary, they regard DM as a scientific, materialist theory
of the world and how to change it.41
So, it could be
argued that DM is in fact a scientific theory.
But, if that is so, what are we to make of the numerous
universal, a priori theses
--, to say nothing of the many "insistences" and "demands" -- its adepts constantly
impose on nature?
It could
be argued that
DM-theses are merely hypothetical. But, this doesn't seem to be even remotely plausible. Whatever else
they are, DM-theses aren't hypothetical; they don't even look
hypothetical. They are worded in ways that cannot under
any stretch of the imagination be interpreted as hypothetical. Even leaving
aside all the many aforementioned "demands", "unthinkables" and "insistences",
as well as the use of
"musts", "eternals", "impossibles" and "never anywhere"s
all over the place, DM-theses are described by
dialecticians themselves as "laws of cognition", "objective" and as the most "general laws"
there are. [On this see
Essay Two,
especially
here.]
Indeed,
if
DM-theses are simply "hypothetical", the meaning of "hypothetical" must have
changed.
Here are just few examples
of DM-'hypotheses':
Engels:
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature….
[T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature,
and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of
nature."
"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each
individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative
addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion….
"Hence, it is impossible to alter the
quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion…. In this
form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational
but even rather obvious." [Engels (1954), pp.211,
62. Bold emphases added.]
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter.
Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be
created; it can only be transmitted….
"A motionless state of matter therefore proves to
be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976),
p.74. Bold
emphases added.]
Plekhanov:
"According to Hegel, dialectics is the
principle of all life…. [M]an has two qualities: first being alive, and
secondly of also being mortal. But on closer examination it turns out that
life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that in general
any phenomenon is contradictory, in the sense that it develops out of
itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to its existence and
will transform it into its opposite. Everything flows, everything
changes; and there is no force capable of holding back this constant flux,
or arresting its eternal movement. There is no force capable of
resisting the dialectics of phenomena….
"At a particular moment a moving body is at a
particular spot, but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if it
were only in that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become motionless.
Every motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and as
there is not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do not
have in the long run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel,
who said that dialectics is the soul of any scientific cognition.
And this applies not only to cognition of nature….
"And so every phenomenon, by the
action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but
inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite….
"When you apply the dialectical method to the
study of phenomena, you need to remember that forms change eternally in consequence of the 'higher development of their content….'
"In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit
consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from
the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin
and destruction….
"[M]odern science confirms at every step
the idea expressed with such genius by Hegel, that quantity passes into
quality….
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added.]
Lenin:
"Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e.,
reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflectionof the eternal development of
the world.
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics
of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others."
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of
its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of
the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most
ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with
other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc.
Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity,
of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and
the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we
disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence
from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.110,
196-97,
221-22,
357-58, 359-60. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphases added.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)….
"[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is
always concrete, never abstract, as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added.]
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated
by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly
repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis
('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a
straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks
in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner
impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the
various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given
phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest,
indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a
connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of
motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the
ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases
added.]
Trotsky:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves…. [T]he
axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does
not change, that is, if it does not exist…. For concepts there also exists
'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic…, but by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything
is always changing….Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws:
change of quantity into quality, development through contradiction, conflict and
form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability,
etc…." [Trotsky (1971),
pp.64-66. Bold emphases added.]
"It must be recognized that the fundamental law
of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into quality, for it gives [us] the
general formula of all evolutionary processes -– of nature as well as of
society.
"…The principle of the transformation of quantity
into quality has universal significance, insofar as we view the entire
universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and
transformation….
"In these abstract formulas we have the most
general laws (forms) of motion, change, the transformation of the stars of the
heaven, of the earth, nature and human society.
"…Dialectics is the logic of development. It
examines the world -- completely without exception -– not as a
result of creation, of a sudden beginning, the realisation of a plan, but as a
result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became the way it
is as a result of lawlike development." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88, 90, 96. Bold
emphases added.]
Mao:
"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the
law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook,
the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand
the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations
with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as
their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its
movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of
contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the
process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process
of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to
end....
"...There is nothing that does not contain
contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"Thus it is already clear that contradiction
exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the simple
or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological
phenomena....
"...Contradiction is universal and absolute,
it is present in the process of the development of all things and permeates
every process from beginning to end...." [Mao (1961b),
pp.311-18. Bold
emphases added.]
Dozens more, no less dogmatic, quotations
from the DM-classics, and from more recent 'lesser' dialecticians, have been posted in
Essay Two.
Despite this, DM-theorists claim
that their theory deals with 'real material forces', as opposed to 'static', 'abstract'
entities, which means that their main concern is with the
inter-relationship between concretely developing and historically-conditioned
objects and processes within the
"Totality" (even if abstraction has to be employed (dialectically) to assist
them to
that end). Moreover, and once
again, such
theorising is undertaken as part of a strategy to further the
revolutionary transformation of society.
Given that view, objects and processes in the
"Totality" are said to change as a result both of their contradictory
nature and their interconnection with other objects and processes -- i.e., because of the antagonistic forces
at work within the whole.42
But, as DM-theorists themselves frequently insist, this doesn't spare them the difficult task of constantly
checking
their ideas against experience, testing them in practice.
Unfortunately, the above
characterisation simply catapults DM back into the metaphysical camp, once more.
That is because its theorists insist that everything in the "Totality" is related
to (or mediated by) by something -- or perhaps everything -- else (depending on the approach
adopted by the particular DM-theorist in question),
subject to change through 'internal contradiction', and so on --, even before so much as a vanishingly small
fraction of the evidence has been collected.
Once more, that explains all the above DM-"insistences", "musts",
"impossibles", "absolutes", and "demands"
along with those references to "laws of cognition" and "general laws".
Naturally, if
there were proof (and dialecticians were in possession of it), "insistences"
and "demands" wouldn't be needed.
In fact, if this weren't so there would seem
to be little point arguing as Rees does:
"[W]hen
we bring these terms [belonging to the Totality] into relation with each other
their meaning is transformed…. In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the
part is determined by its relationships with the other parts and so with the
whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts.
"In
this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of
the parts but also that the parts become more that they are individually by
being part of a whole….
"[F]or dialectical
materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998a),
pp.5, 77.]42a0
The
reason for saying this is that if parts and wholes are in fact interdependent
(in the manner suggested), then DM-theorists would have no choice but to
regard their system as an a priori construct. That is because no
amount of evidence could confirm the truth of the above passage (or the many
other quotations reproduced a few paragraphs back and which are also found throughout the DM-cannon).
If the entire nature of the
part is determined by the whole (and vice versa) then that fact could
itself only be confirmed when humanity knows everything about everything.
After all, only when the whole is
known would the nature of any part be understood.
Indeed, this is the
import of Lenin's words:
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of
comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity….
"[D]ialectical logic requires that an
object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel
sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object
as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its
purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Lenin
(1921), p.93.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
Short of this -- according to
what the above passages (as well as
these
and these) say -- no one would
or could know the full truth about anything. But, until
humanity knows that much (which blessed state we have just been told by Lenin will
never
come to pass), no one would be able to assert anything about the
whole -- even, for instance, that there is a whole, that it is indeed a whole, or even a whole
--,
with anything other than infinite uncertainty.
[On this, see
here, and
Part Two of this Essay.]
Hence, when
DM-theorists assert things about parts and wholes (even granting that these
assertions are only 'partial' or 'relative' truths), they would have
to have access to knowledge that only the postulated
epistemological end-state could ever deliver
(i.e.,
the state which constitutes complete or absolute knowledge). Again, short of
that, DM-theorists can't say with anything other than almost zero confidence that what they now have is
even'relative'/'partial'
knowledge.
That is because even
the assertion that thereare such thingsas parts and wholes (or that knowledge is
merely 'partial', or 'relative' -- or whatever) requires complete knowledge. If the entire
nature of the part -- including at least this part of the total picture,
that is, this part here in this Essay (or in TAR, or in PN -- or
anywhere else, for that matter), written in words (including what they seem to express) on this
page/screen (or on any page/screen) about 'partial knowledge' itself -- were determined by the whole (and vice versa),
then we would be in no position to assert even this 'partial' truth (if such it
be) until 'epistemological judgement day' had arrived, and all was revealed to
the congregated DM-Elect.
[PN = Philosophical
Notebooks; i.e., Lenin (1961); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e.,
Rees (1998a).]
On the
other hand, if the idea that there are parts and wholes that completely
inter-condition one another isn't itself a 'partial' truth (and
hence isn't subject to the above strictures), it must be an 'absolute'
truth, and clearly
one whose status has
been decided upon before every genuine 'partial' truth has been
formulated, let alone apprehended.
But, this would then refute the content of that very notion itself (i.e., that parts and wholes, and that they condition one another completely). That is
because, on this view, at least one part
(i.e.,
this
view of the whole, or this view that is dependent on the whole being 'true')
wouldn't itself be conditioned by all the other
parts, since, plainly, the latter do not yet exist as items of knowledge. Hence, the
entire nature of at least one part (i.e., this one, this 'absolute truth') wouldn't
be dependent on every other part.
Once
more, if this were to be denied -- and, if we accept DM-epistemology, that
rejection itself would have been advanced in abeyance of
the infinite amount of evidence required to support such a contrary opinion
--, it would be clear that that denial itself will have been imposed on part and
whole alike, not derived
from either. [More on this in
Part
Two of this Essay.]
In short, sweep-of-the-hand Wholism
(of
this sort) is just a disguised form of
apriorism.
And badly disguised it is, too.
Be this as
it may,
and
despite what DM-theorists mightmaintain, it is possible to show that DM-theses
haven't been checked against the available evidence in anything like the
manner claimed,
nor have these 'super-verities' been derived from this evidence, such as it
is.
Consider
a typical DM-assertion, taken from the
opening sentence of TAR:
"The very possibility of human
life is governed by contradictions." [Rees (1998a), p.1.]
[As we saw in
Essay Two,
DM-books and articles are full of sweeping assertions like this, most of whose
authors
help themselves to this word -- "contradiction" -- without once defining it.]
Admittedly, Rees lists several examples of
contradictions he thought supported this claim (which turn out not
to be contradictions to begin with; on that see
here).
However, the above (general) claim cannot be -- and in TAR certainly wasn't -- verified,
or supported, by a careful analysis of all the evidence (or even a
sizeable or representative proportion of it). Indeed,
no matter how much evidence DM-theorists amassed it would
still only represent a tiny fraction of all the facts necessary to
justify a generalisation about "the very possibility of human
life" and what governs it. Moreover, as noted
earlier, given
DM-epistemology, the gap between any large finite body of knowledge and Absolute
Knowledge is itself infinite.
And, this isn't to pick on TAR; this
yawning epistemological gap is a universal feature of the theses one finds
littering Dialectical Marxism. [That was established
a
posteriori,
here and
here.]
Nevertheless, the existence of this gaping chasm of infinite ignorance (that
is, if
DM-epistemology itself were true) hasn't
deterred dialecticians from advancing any number of "demands",
"requirements"
and "insistences"
about all of reality, for all of time -- i.e., that it is
unified, 'contradictory', interconnected,
"mediated", and that every last particle is constantly changing. The
vast majority of
these claims go way beyond what could
reasonably
be justified by an appeal even to a large finite body of evidence (certainly a
body far
in excess of what is available today, and vastly more still than DM-theorists
themselves either quote or reference, which is precious little).
As
we shall see, some of these theses cannot be verified, let alone tested
in practice.42a
In fact, claims like these clearly function in a
different way, and to a specific end: they 'allow' those who propound them to
stipulate, or lay-down, theoretical criteria delineating the approach they intend
to take with respect to their interpretation of specific aspects of nature and society. Indeed, as noted
above, they form part of a fetishised "form
of representation". [More on the latter, later; until then,
see Glock (1996), pp.129-35.]
[The political and/or contingent
psychological motivation for DM-manoeuvres like these are exposed in Essays Nine
Part Two and Twelve
(summary
here).]
It could still be insisted that DM is a
science, and that its supporters appropriate and use the latest results of research to support the claims
they make about nature and society, as well as the tactics they adopt in order
to change it.
Despite this counterclaim, the fact that DM is conventional
in form -- but metaphysical in both intent and content, all the while
failing to be a science -- can be seen by examining the way DM-advocates themselves
try to
relate their ideas to the natural and social world.
DM-theorists take it as read that the world
exists independently of our knowledge of it, but they are nevertheless quite
happy to insist that they know in advance what its most general characteristics
must be.
Indeed, this dogmatic approach began in the
'West', as far as we know, in
Ancient Greece, with
Heraclitus, who was happy to tell us what must be true of all of reality,
for all of time, based on what he
thought was true about stepping into a
river!
Moreover, as a matter
of historical record, these general features weren't
derived by DM-theorists from a scientific examination of reality,
nor are they now a representative summary of the whole of human experience.
As we have seen, they
were lifted from Hegel, who inherited them from previous generations of mystics
(like Heraclitus),
who in turn concocted them at a time when there was hardly any evidence at all!
Despite this, these mystics were happy to impose their ideas on nature,
just like DM-theorists.
[More on this in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).]
To be
sure, DM-theorists claim that these ideas have been given a materialist
flip (which inversion turns out to be about as genuine as a nine bob note --, or
a 61 cent coin, if you are reading this in the United States!).43Despite
this, because these
general concepts supposedly relate to the "Totality", for all of space and time,
they cannot have been obtained by anything other than a priori means,
whoever dreamt them up, or through howsoever many degrees they have supposedly
been rotated.
Of
course, it could always be objected that wider theoretical considerations
determine the validity of the conclusions drawn by DM-theorists. Indeed, it
could also be maintained that this is exactly how scientists themselves make use
of universal laws, which are likewise thought to operate across all of time and
space. In that sense, if this approach to nature is based on centuries of
experience, knowledge and increasing levels of 'abstraction' -- and if this
isn't a
problem for scientists -- then it can't be one for dialecticians, either.
Or, so
it could be argued.
However, leaving aside the
obvious point that this response undermines completely the claim that DM hasn't
been
imposed on nature (for it openly admits it!), DM
isn't like any known or conceivable
science. Although the criteria distinguishing science from pseudo-science are
somewhat controversial, one thing is reasonably clear: scientists cannot
claim that the world is contradictory --in whole or in part.
This
idea cannot be entertained -- not because of an assumed adherence to bourgeois
ideology, nor as a result of an alleged excessive "tenderness" toward the world
--
but because it would make scientific description and research impossible.44
A scientific theory that admits reality is contradictory would lose its ability
to explain anything. That is because any theory that
contemplated the existence of contradictions everywhere would make it impossible
to distinguish confirmation from refutation. If an empirical proposition and
its contradictory were both true, or could both be true, confirmation and refutation would be
all of a piece.45
[The handful of options available to DM-supporters
that might seem (to some) capable of avoiding or neutralising that fatal conclusion are closed-off in
Note 45.]
To be sure, on its own
this doesn't prove that DM is itself misconceived, but it does show that it can't bea science. And, as we will soon see, DM isn't even remotely like a science.
In fact, if DM were correct, scientific research would be impossible
-- and for the reasons just aired (and about to be aired some more).46
DM isn't even remotely like a
science because its theoretical and its empirical propositions actually say
nothing at all (if they are taken as they were intended by their authors), unlike
scientific/empirical propositions. The latter, however, present us with certain material
possibilities, automatically excluding others.
For instance, consider the
following rather straight-forward example:46a
S1: Water boils at 100°C.
[Of course, propositions like S1 are these
days usually expressed as universally
quantified conditionals.]
Given the usual
ceteris paribus
(i.e., "all things being equal")
clauses, the truth of S1 makes the following sentence false (and vice versa):
S2: It is not the case that
water boils at 100°C.
If the aforementioned ceteris paribus
clauses (such as "under normal conditions of pressure and solvent purity",
etc.) are ignored, S2 might become true under different circumstances -- e.g.,
if the water in question contained impurities, or if the ambient pressure
changed (etc.). But, even then, what S2 expresses would still rule out the truth
of S1. Against the required background conditions -- or even without them
-- when S1 is true, S2 is false, and when S1 is false, S2 is true.47
Compare this with a typical 'proposition'
taken from DM (or at least from
Trotsky's
version of it):
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and it
doesn't weigh 1 kg.
Or, for those who aren't
Trotskyists:
S3a: This moving object is
both here and not here at the same time.
Whatever background is supplied for
them, because S3 and S3a rule nothing out, they actually say nothing. [Why that is so will be
explained presently.]
The import of the above comments wouldn't
change even if S1 were replaced by a more specific example:
S4: This particular mass/body/volume
interval of water
boils at 100°C.
In that case, based on S4, the temptation
might be to think that further qualifications could allow both S1 and
S2 to be true at once, as in the following:
S5: Parts of this body of
water boil at 100°C, and parts of it do not. [Yielding what is called a "mixed
phase".]
S6: The same body of water may boil at
99.999°C on one occasion, and at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do
both or neither at the same time.
[S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and
it does not weigh 1 kg.
S3a: This moving object is
both here and not here at the same time.]
Clearly, that is because the predicate
"ξ boils at 100°C"
is vague.**
However, while this is an apparent fault of the language we have to use
in such circumstances -- which shortcoming can be remedied to
some extent by greater precision -- the
status of S3/S3a doesn't depend on such equivocation (that is, given the way
DM-theorists
themselves
see such things).
That explains why dialecticians would
resist any attempt to correct S3/S3a
on linguistic grounds alone
(even to the extent that they would accuse anyone who tried to do this of "pedantry", of indulging in "semantics"
--,
or maybe even of "sophistry" and "logic-chopping"). They view what it says as a report of the objective features of a constantly
changing world. But, this just means that the
dialectically-inspired flouting of
certain linguistic conventions (in this case those expressed or formalised by the
LOC) denies S3/S3a a
sense.
That is because whatever occurs
will both refute and confirm S3/S3a. Even though this fatal DM-defect is
self-inflicted, it still wouldn't be one of vagueness (again, as DM-fans see
such things).
[**The
use of Greek symbols like
"ξ"
is explained
here. If this presents a problem for any readers, just view the predicate as
"...boils at 100°C", or even
"x boils at 100°C".]
[LOC = Law of
Non-contradiction.]
It
could be argued:
despite this, isn't it the case that S6 is still true? And, isn't
"ξ weighs 1 Kg" vague, too? Indeed,
but S6 can be resolved to some extent purely linguistically
(as can this particular predicable; i.e.,
"ξ weighs 1 Kg").
No DM-fan would accept the same for S3/S3a.
S6: The same body of water may boil at
99.999°C on one occasion, and at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do
both or neither at the same time.
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and
it does not weigh 1 kg.
S3a: This moving object is
both here and not here at the same time.
And
that is why anyone
who sought to advance
the above DM-response would
no doubt
also
object to the way that most, if not all of the alleged contradictions --, which they claim
exist in nature and society -- have been analysed away on purely linguistic
grounds in other Essays published at this site; for example, in Essays Four to
Eight Part Three.
For such potential and/or prospective DM-objectors,
these aren'tlinguistic issues plain
and simple; they certainly do not view them this way. But, as we have also seen,
dialecticians can only make such claims because of their own
sloppy use of
language and
logic
-- indeed,
rather like Hegel
himself.
[I develop this argument further in the next
section.]
Nevertheless, this partly explains why
several earlier attempts (made
here and
here) to correct or improve Engels and
Trotsky's formulations of DM-type 'propositions' failed whatever was done
with,
or to, them. They either collapsed into banal or vacuous platitudes, or they fell
apart as
incoherentnon-sense.
This isn't a fate that ordinary empirical or scientific
propositions ever have to endure.
Consider another example: according to
Trotsky(and, with
more apparent sophistication, according to Hegel)
it is impossible to express the LOI
by means of true propositions that relate to
concrete reality; that is, he claimed it is never true that "A is
equal to A".
[Of course, this is a gross misrepresentation of
Hegel. Plainly, that is because Hegel beat about the non-dialectical bush a lot more,
to such an extent that it is impossible to decide exactly what he was trying to
do with, or what he was
attempting to conclude about, this 'law', a dialectical conundrum attested to by the further fact that not
even Hegel scholars can make their minds up about this! Nevertheless, his ideas fall apart for other reasons; more on this in Essay
Twelve -- until then, see
here
and
here.]
However, if
Trotsky were right, it would in fact be impossible to deny the truth of
the LOI, as he attempted to do, at least as it is supposed to apply to
'concrete' reality. That is because, if anyone knowingly denied that the
LOI was true (for whatever reason),
they would first have to possess some understanding of what it entailed; they would have to
know what would be the case if the LOI were true -- even if only so that
they could then rule that possibility out, as it applies to 'concrete' reality,
for instance.
Clearly, this is something
that can be (and typically is) done with respect to empirical
propositions (i.e., it is possible to specify in advance of knowing they are
true what circumstances would make
them true).47a
So, although A1 below is false, it is quite easy to describe what would make it true, namely the falsehood of A2
and/or A3.
A2: The Mississippi is longer
than, or equal in length to, the Potomac.
A3: The Mississippi is
2340 miles (3770 Km) long, while the Potomac is 405 miles (652 Km) long.
A4: Julius Caesar ate an
apple between 3:00 pm and 4:00 pm (local time) on the 5th of March, 55BC (Julian
Calendar).
Of course, no one knows whether or not A4
is/was true, but it
is quite easy to specify what would make it, or would have made it true --, and, indeed, what would make
it, or would have made it
false (even if we never find out which of these is the case, or even want to find out).
But, if the LOI never appliesto anything concrete -- and
never could
so apply -- its denial rules nothing out, and that presents us
with no truth
claims at all.
So, according to DM-theorists, the LOI can never be true
(or absolutely true in 'concrete' reality). Paradoxically,
therefore, anyone who repudiates the LOI in this way actually rejects nothing substantive -- for, plainly,
such a denial would have to rule out the truth of whatever it was that
was being rejected. But, if it is impossible to say in a true proposition what the LOI
proposes, then its 'denial' will achieve nothing at all. The whole charade is just an empty ritual.48
Moreover, we know that it is impossible to
say in true propositions what the LOI proposes (if Trotsky and Hegel are to
be believed)
since we were told:
"In reality 'A' is not
equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens
-- they are quite different to each other. But one can object, the question is
not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal
quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point;
in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -- a more delicate scale
always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is
equal to itself. Neither is true -- all bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves."
[Trotsky (1971),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
[Dozens
of other DM-theorists say the same sort of thing; on that see
Essay Six.]
So, if:
A5: A is
never equal to itself,
is true,
then A5 is never equal to itself, either. If one letter ("A") is never equal to
itself, a whole sentence stands no chance. In that case, what A5 says is
never equal to itself, either, and if that is so, nothing determinate can be
inferred
from it since we shouldn't know from moment to moment what A5 committed anyone to,
or was saying.
[Indeed, if A5 is true, then just as soon as it
what it was saying had been determined, that would have changed, too!]
Consequently, if we take A6 to
represent the LOI, it is impossible to say in true propositions what it
proposes -- again, if Trotsky and Hegel are right --, since A6 suffers from the same
defects as A5.
A6: A is equal to A.
[Several objections to this
line of reasoning are neutralised in
Note
48, but more fully in Essay Six.]
An appeal
to the alleged defects of language (as part of an explanation why
the above is the case) would be to no avail, either.
Even if it were the case that our words for identity were only "approximately true" -- or
"true only
within certain limits" --, that would still not help. That is because, for
this counter-claim to work, we would still have to have some comprehension
of the words contained in any expression of the LOI (even if only as an
approximation to it). In turn, that is because we would need to recognise those words
as expressing an approximation to genuine identity, as opposed to their
expressing an approximation perhaps to something completely different --,
such as courage, fortitude or cowardice, for example. Hence, even
dialecticians will need to have some grasp of genuine identity statements to
know whether or not these alleged approximations were indeed approximations to
'identity' -- that is, by how much or how far they fell short of absolute identity
itself --, and not
to something
else. Otherwise they wouldn't be approximations to absolute identity, but to
something entirely different (no pun intended).48a
This much
was at least clear to Plato 2500 years ago (even if he drew all the wrong
conclusions from it).49
Again, it could be objected that language is
"relatively stable" so the above comments are misguided. Here is what
I have
argued in response to this in Essay Six:
But, how could anyone
committed to this theory know whether or not language
is 'relatively stable'
-- especially if they also believe that everything is
in the grip of the
Heraclitean Flux?
In fact, as soon as language itself is implicated in this 'Flux', everything
semantically solid melts into thin air. In that case, it would be no good appealing to
evidence (drawn from dictionaries, textbooks, personal memory, common usage, etc.) in
support of the claim that language is 'relatively stable', for if everything is
changing thenso is the language in which this evidence is itself expressed, so are the
notebooks and/or primary data sheets from which it has been retrieved, and so are the memories
upon which all
of these depend. Given this way of looking at things, for all anyone knows, every single word could change its
meaning every fraction of a second (along with any and all memories of, or about, the objects
that seem familiar to us, like dictionaries, journals and textbooks)....
Indeed, as Plato himself recognised, the
Heraclitean Flux is no respecter of theories; in fact it completely mangles them.
This argument was developed in even more
detail in
Note 15
of Essay Six:
Again, it could be
argued that all Trotsky requires is
the relativestability of the words he used, which won't have changed
significantly during the short intervals involved.
Unfortunately, Trotsky holed that response well below the water line, declaring that:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour etc. They are never equal to themselves… But everything exists in time;
and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation….
Thus
the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it
does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Trotsky
(1971), p.64.]
In that case, since words, too, are
material objects, they must "change uninterruptedly" (as must their meanings).
If, according to Trotsky, no single letter "A" is immune,
second-to-second, from the Heraclitean Flux, words stand no chance. If so,
DM implies that there is no way of
knowing whether or not words (or their meanings) have changed dramatically, even while
they are being uttered -- including any of the words that might be used to
argue for or against either
possibility. [We saw earlier that
Voloshinov
seemed to hold this view.]
Consequently, the word "identity" (and its meaning) must
itself fail to be
self-identical at one and the same moment (if Trotsky is to be believed), since everything (including
every meaning, one supposes) is a unity of itself and its 'opposite' (its
"other",
according to Hegel
and Lenin).
Plainly, this implies that the word "identical" must also mean
and not
mean "not identical", at the
same time!
If this weren't the case, then dialecticians would have no way of
accounting for the change in meaning of the word "identity" itself, which,
according to
their own theory, has to change, and it can only do so because of
one or more of the following: (i) Its own 'internal
contradictions', (ii) The 'internal contradictions' of (or in) the meanings we attribute to it,
or (ii) A response to those in society-at-large (which we are told a reflected
in our language). So, given DM, unless "identical" now
means and does not mean "not identical" its meaning couldn't change.
Hence, if all things are
changing all the time, then that word must now mean and not mean "not identical".
The same argument
in turn applies to anyone who uses
this word -- by "identical" they, too, must mean and not mean "identical", as well as "not
identical".
Moreover, if DM is true, it isn't easy to see how the understanding of
these changed meanings and altered intentions could possibly be coordinated across an entire population
of dialecticians, let alone the wider population. Naturally, this would completely undermine inter-personal communication, which in turn
would prevent DM-theorists communicating their ideas to the rest of
humanity, or even to one another, since they would all mean something different
by their use of this, or, indeed, every word. Clearly, that would imply that no one would,
or could, "understand" dialectics -- not Hegel, not Marx, not Engels, not
Plekhanov, not Lenin, not Trotsky..., since the meaning of all its terms would
be subject to unspecified change and hence consequent indeterminacies. Moreover, given DM,
there is nothing that can be done to rectify the situation; any attempt to do
so would be subject to the tender mercies of the dread Heraclitean Mangle.
The only
way to avoid this ridiculous conclusion is to abandon the doctrine that all things change all the time
(as a result of their 'internal contradictions') --, or admit that some things remain
identical (namely, the word "identical" and its meaning), indefinitely. Either way, DM would
suffer
yet another body
blow.
Hence, in order to avoid the unremitting confusion
that this doctrine would introduce into DM itself, Trotsky needed the LOI to apply to his own
words (and their meanings, as a rule of language or of practice) while he was using them -- and, this would have to
have been the case for many years (possibly centuries thereafter,
too -- so that his supporters could understand him correctly (or at all)); specifically when he employed these
words to
question the application of the very samelaw to letter "A"s and
bags of sugar! [Irony intended.] Otherwise, all his words and their meanings could
be, for all he knew, non-self-identical from moment-to-moment. [His theory
implies this anyway.]
In addition,
anyone consulting his words today must be able to read them now with
their original meanings implied, or they wouldn't be able to agree with their intended
content, and hence with what Trotsky had attempted to argue. In that case, contemporary dialecticians who read Trotsky's words (or,
indeed,
Hegel's) must in effect take the argument against the material
application of the strict version of the LOI with a pinch of salt, or risk
failing to grasp the exact message Trotsky (or Hegel) had intended -- or,
perhaps, admitting that it can't be grasped by anyone if it were valid. For if
Trotsky and Hegel's words about change (etc.) were correct, then the message
they intended to convey wouldn't now be accessible, having changed in
untold ways over the years -- and possibly (probably!) even into its opposite! [Indeed,
definitely into its opposite, if we are to believe the
DM-classics.]
It could be objected that our words do infact remain relatively stable, so the above comments are entirely
misguided. However, if Hegel and Trotsky are right, then there would be
no way that either of them (or anyone else for that matter) could possibly tell
whether or not our words do in fact remain relatively stable. Indeed, if their
theory is correct, even the words in the previous sentence,
along with their
meanings, must have changed, too!
As should now seem obvious, if DM were true, there would be nothing to which
anyone
could appeal to ground a single safe thought. On the other hand, if there
were something upon which they could ground their thoughts, then Trotsky, Hegel
and Heraclitus must be mistaken, since, in that case, at least one thing would remain
unchanged long enough for it to be of any use -- namely whatever it is that we
can ground that thought upon. So, given the truth
of what Trotsky argued -- that nothing stays the same, and that all things
change uninterruptedly and are never equal to themselves, they are never self-identical
-- it doesn't look like there could be such a grounding.
An appeal to the same
memory of, for example, a given word and its use or its meaning would not only be to no avail, it would
in fact be
impossible. If
everything is changeable, and changing, memory itself can hardly escape
unscathed. Not even
Cartesian 'clear and distinct ideas' would be available to
anchor a single cognition on solid epistemological bedrock, for the words, concepts,
and ideas retrieved in order to formulate these comforting 'certainties' would be non-self-identical
from moment-to-moment, too, and thereby liable to continual change.
A moment's thought (no pun intended!) will
confirm that even the phrase "relatively stable" is no less subject to change,
too.
How can DM-theorists rule this out? Indeed, and once more, it is implied by their
theory. This must be so if everything changes all the time in the way
Heraclitus, Hegel, Lenin and
Trotsky imagined. And yet, it is the DM-doctrine of universal and constant
change that must be rejected to
save this theory from its own absurd implications, and easy self-refutation. But, the only viable way
to do that involves an invocation of
the LOI -- interpreted now as a ruleof language or practice, and not as a metaphysical,
or any other, truth.
Once again, DM-fans would have to appeal to
FL
and/or ordinary language to
rescue their theory from itself.
On the other hand, if it is indeed a fact that language is stable, then the
DM-account of change must be wrong (and for reasons rehearsed
above; see also
here and
here) -- since, at a minimum,
Awill equal A, even if only instantaneously, thus refuting Trotsky and
Hegel!
Hence, DM-type propositions say
nothing because they rule nothing (material) out, and hence nothing in.50
Of
course, as is the case with other linguistically competent human beings,
DM-apologists understand perfectly well how to use words for identity –-
such as, "similar", "equal", "equivalent", "same", and "identical" -- along with
their appropriate qualifiers (e.g., "exactly", "precisely", "very", "nearly", and "almost").
A grasp of such terms comes courtesy of their employment in everyday life, not from a
supposed 'law'. Nor does this facility arise from the 'negation', nor yet the
double 'negation' of the LOI. [More on this
here.] In fact, this everyday
facility with words for identity (etc.) is what enables DM-theorists
themselves to engage in the (often genuine) pretence that they think the LOI is
either false or only 'approximately true' when it is applied to objects and
processes in concrete reality. They understand the LOI because they are
language-users, and yet it is their subsequent misconstrual of the socially-conditioned rules for
the use of such words as empirical
truths that ultimately misleads them.
In
short: dialecticians mistake the misinterpreted content of a social norm for reality itself,
and then make a fetish of the result.
[How and why this occurs will be explained in Essay Nine Parts
One and
Two, and Essay
Twelve.]
It is
also worth pointing out that DM-theorists aren't alone in doing this. Because
the LOI itself says nothing (i.e., it has no empirical content since it is
a
misleading expression of a rule of language) -- and because of
its status in Traditional Philosophy where it had been viewed as a 'necessary truth'
--, metaphysicians and theorists
in general (and this includes Hegel) have also mistaken the supposed content of a social norm/rule for reality itself. Viewed
in this way, the LOI
was traditionally supposed to reflect an 'industrial-strength' truth, as it were, which applied to everything in existence
(in so far as each object or process is
allegedly related to itself in the way this 'Law' seems to indicate). It thus appears to tell us how things are and must
be, and how they cannot be conceived of otherwise.
Thus, the
misconstrual of the way we use words for sameness and difference was transmogrified into a 'Law'that
'allowed' philosophers to derive supposedly fundamental truths about 'reality' from thought,
or from words, alone
--
which is, of course, why
metaphysicians thought the LOI could be declared true (a priori) independently of any state of the world.
Indeed,
this is also why DM-theorists pretend they can deny the absolute truth of this 'law'
(when it is applied to
concrete reality) also by means of thought alone -- that is, by an appeal to certain
'thought experiments' (ŕ la
Trotsky
and/or ŕ la
Hegel),
and/or as a result of a series of verbal tricks.
These are just two sides of
the same tarnished metaphysical coin.
Interpreted like this,
the LOI
seems to rule certain things in as 'necessarily true'; others it appears to rule out as
'necessarily false'. Unfortunately,
it is impossible to deny successfully the 'truth' of the LOI
in any language whatsoever -- that is, in
those that possess
the required vocabulary -- without also
having to use that very same 'law'
(as a linguistic rule) in the very act of attempting to do just that!
Again, we saw
this in
Essay Six, where it was
shown that Trotsky had
to rely on the identity of temporal instants in order to deny the
absolute identity of bags of sugar
--,
i.e., he was forced to do this so he could refer to the same moment in time
during which an object or process wasn't self-identical!
Clearly,
it is impossible to say what (1) the LOI rules out as 'false' -- and hence,
(2) what it rules in as 'true'. As we have seen, trying to do either
of these would be to misinterpret this rule as a super-empirical
proposition that purports to inform us about fundamental features of reality. If option (2) cannot even be
attempted without falling into confusion, then neither can (1) -- at least,
not by means of empirical propositions.
[Why that is so is explained in detail
here;
the argument is summarised
here and
here.]
Now, as argued in Essay Three
Part One,
'problems' like these arose in Ancient Greece when philosophers attempted to
conjure into existence certain specific 'concepts' by means of a process of 'abstraction',
which in the end turned these 'concepts' into 'Abstract
Particulars'. In this
specific case, a universal and super-empirical 'Law' (that is, a 'Law'
supposedly 'true' of every object in reality as it relates to itself) was
'abstracted' from the ordinary use of words for sameness and difference.50aa
This
ancient, false step helped construct the 'necessary' truth this 'Law' supposedly expresses. In
this way, therefore, the ordinary application of everyday words for identity was
transformed into a general thesis about the ultimate, abstract structure
of reality -- or, rather, the socialised rules governing
the use of certain words were
reified and then expressed in written form as the LOI. It was this physical form which was
then misconstrued (by Hegel) as a super-empirical 'truth of
abstract reason', which
supposedly revealed fundamental aspects of reality, valid for all of space and time,
and which he attempted to criticise.
Dialecticians subsequently bought into this fetishisation
of the written word, making the opposite error of supposing this
reified social norm was a 'Law', which is only 'partially true' (or, which is 'both true and not
true' -- or, indeed, possibly completely false (depending on which DM-fan is recounting this
fairytale)) of
everything in reality that is 'concrete'.
Once again, these are but two
sides of the same bent metaphysical coin.
However, in order to establish either result
(i.e., that which (i) appertains to the 'truth' of the traditional 'Law' and that which
(ii) encapsulates its DM-'repudiation'/qualification), one specific
semantic feature of language relating to truth and falsehood has had to be promoted at the expense of another.
In this case, truth was promoted at the expense of its logical twin,
falsehood.
[With other metaphysical theses this might,
of course, be the other way round.]
Traditionally, the LOI was allegedly
aimed at accounting for the truth of identity statements -- and only
for their truth --, since the LOI was a 'law of reason'. However, this move only succeeded in undermining the paired semantic
foundations of empirical propositions. In the end, by emphasizing truth and ignoring
falsehood, both end up being compromised.
That is because empirical propositions (i.e.,
those pertaining to facts of the matter) leave
it open as to whether they are true or false -- which is why their truth-values
cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in
order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to
understand them before their truth or falsehood has been ascertained.
[The reasoning underlying these seemingly controversial statements can be found in Essay Twelve
Part One, again, summarised
here and
here.]
When this isn't the case -- i.e., when either
option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when propositions are said to be
"necessarily true", or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant.
As a result, such propositions lose the capacity they once seemed to have of
expressing truth or falsehood -- they become
non-sensical.
In order to see why this is so, consider the following sentence
(M1) taken from Lenin's
MEC. Because he maintained its truth, he would presumably have declared M2
necessarily false (if not "unthinkable"):
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare M2 necessarily (and always) false, the
possibility of its truth must first be entertained. That is
because, if the
truth of M2 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as
necessarily false (or "unthinkable"), then whatever would make it true has to be ruled out
conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what M2 rules in
(i.e., what makes it true)
so that they could comprehend what M1 was ruling out as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done
if what M2 itself says is permanently ruled out by M1 on conceptual grounds
alone.
Consequently, if a proposition like M2 is necessarily
false, this charade
(i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say
(or to think) what could count as making M2 true.
However, because the truth of M2 cannot even be conceived,
Lenin was in no position to say
what was excluded by its rejection
(by means of M1).
If M2 can never be true, and never even thought to be true (because of
M1), then it cannot be thought not true (since, plainly, "not true" is
semantically the same as "false").50ab
Unfortunately, this prevents any account being given of what would make M2
false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist,
M2 would now be necessarily false if and only if it wasn't capable of being
thought of as necessarily false!
Hence, while it might seem that
M2 could be thought of as necessarily false if and only if what
would make it true could at least be entertained, so that it could then
be ruled out as necessarily false, this isn't so. According to Lenin, the conditions that would make M2 true cannot even be conceived,
so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. In that case, if the truth of M2
-- or the conditions under which it would be true, or which would make it true -- cannot be conceived, then
neither can its falsehood, for we would not then know what was being ruled out.
This means that whoever propounds a thesis
like M1 would have to know what
a proposition using "matter without motion" (in this way) rules in so that
they knew exactly
what it rules out as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely
what cannot be done if the content of a proposition using "matter without motion"
(in this way) is "unthinkable".
Such Super-Empirical theses
thus collapse under the weight of their own defective use of language. They
become
non-sensical.
Which perhaps illustrates why Marx was right
to say the following:
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
[I am not suggesting that Marx saw things this
way, or would even have acknowledged the argument that precedes it, as in any way
representative of what he intended; clearly, that would be anachronistic. What I
am
arguing is that the above argument illustrates why Marx was right to say what he
did.]
Once more: by emphasizing one semantic
feature of language ('necessary' truth, or 'necessary' falsehood), both
options become non-viable.
A similar fate awaits all such 'necessary'
truths (or 'necessary' falsehoods) -- as will be demonstrated in
Essay Twelve
Part One.
In this
way, therefore, the 'necessary truth' the LOI supposedly expresses undermines
itself -- and because of this it fails even to be an empirical proposition
(true or false). Just like
the other pseudo-propositions that litter Metaphysics, the above semantic antics deprive both this 'law', and
its denial, of all content. The LOI (as it has been understood at this site)
asserts nothing true and
nothing false of reality (for
it is a linguistic rule that encapsulates how we use certain words --,
and rules can neither be true nor false, only useful or not, practical or
impractical).
The LOI lacks an empirical
sense because it
presents no truth conditions -- that is, it expresses no conditions that
must obtain for it to be true, or that must obtain for it to be false. [Of course, that is
why Traditional Theorists thought they could establish the supposed 'necessary' truth
of this 'law' on purely
conceptual and/or linguistic grounds, independently of any evidence,
independently of the way the world happened to be.]50a
Empirical
propositions are different in this respect: their semantic status is sensitive to
evidence; truth or falsehood cannot simply be read-off from the words
they contain. They have to face the facts in order to be declared one way or the
other. No amount of 'pure thought' will confirm their truth-value; so, it isn't
possible to ascertain the truth or the falsehood of, say, "The Nile is longer
than the Volga"
merely by thinking about it.
Linguistic rules -- or the
expression thereof, such as the
LOI or the
LOC -- become metaphysical when they are misconstrued in the above manner; i.e.,
when it is imagined that their actual or permanent truth-status can
be read off (solely) from the
words they contain -- which is how the vast majority of Traditional
Theorists (including dialecticians) have conceived them.
Thus, metaphysicians throughout history have concentrated their efforts on
devising theories about reality that could only be true (as they saw
things), and never
false. Unfortunately, by doing this, they have actually prevented
their theories from being either of these.
In everyday
life, our use of ordinary words for identity isn't defective in this
way.
The employment of such words isn't predicated on the existence of super-empirical 'truths' about the
world, but is based on
socially-conditioned practices (which
cannot be true or false, as we have seen).
This
specialised feature of language (i.e.,
in relation to which truth-conditions don't apply) also informs the LOC.
As is the case with the LOI, the LOC doesn't express a deep metaphysical truth about
the world -- since it isn't a true proposition to begin with. It
expresses a rule of
language and/or logic that formalises a social convention for the use of the negative particle,
which rule is impossible to abrogate without discourse degenerating into
incoherent non-sense -- or,
as Aristotle himself noted, without communication and rationality breaking down.
Of course,
DM-theorists have simply compounded the error of construing the LOC, not as a
'rule', but as an 'abstract truth' that is always (or often) concretelyfalse. Small
wonder then that over the last 150 years they have found it impossible to communicate their ideas
clearly to anyone --, least of all one another -- again, as
Aristotle forewarned 2400 years ago.
[On this see Essays Four through Eight Part Three.]
In short, metaphysical
theses masquerade as empirical propositions (often by their use of the
indicative mood); by aping the latter they purport to reveal
or express certain truths about the world. However, they are, or were, promulgated by their inventors as if
they expressed deeper, more profounduniversal verities, posing as super-empirical, necessary
or industrial strength truths about 'reality itself', or 'Being'. But, this is precisely what denies them
any sense: in so far as they are based on a misconstrual of the rules we use to
make sense of the world, and of one another, they rapidly collapse into
incoherent non-sense, and are hence incapable of being either true or false.
So, this is why DM cannot be a
science: its 'propositions' do not just say nothing about the world, they saynothing about anything (except, of course, indirectly about the gullibility
of those who imagine Hegel had anything useful to say). As is the case with the above
metaphysicians, dialecticians
misconstrue linguistic rules -- which enable
genuinely substantive truths about the world to be stated by means of empirical
propositions --, as if they were super-empirical truths, an
error they then compound
by employing
impenetrable jargon
lifted from the mystical logico-babble found in Hegel's Logic; as a
result,
their theses aren't just non-sensical, they are
incoherent non-sense.
If DM is neither conventional nor
metaphysical -- and it isn't a science -- then perhaps it is
simply a method? However, few DM-theorists appear willing to accept such a
deflationary conclusion.51
This is quite apart from the fact that if DM
(or 'Materialist Dialectics') were simply a method, it couldn't be "objective",
as Lenin inadvertently noted:
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
Plainly, a 'method' isn't "independent of man".
It could be objected that the dialectical
method enables those who use it correctly to ascertain objective truths about
the world. Quite apart from the fact that there is no objective way of deciding
whether or not the 'dialectical method' has been used "correctly" (or even if it
can be used "correctly"!) -- on that, see
here -- if DM is just a method, it is a particularly
useless one, since it would make
change impossible.
I
began this Essay with several impertinent remarks
about the obvious similarities that exist between the DM-"Totality" and 'God'.
Now that we are nearing the end
we are perhaps in a better position to re-assert those
remarks,
but without the initial and peremptory impertinences tacked on. In fact,
we can now see why those comments were fully justified.
Every mystical system of which we have any
knowledge has appealed in one form or another to a Whole, or a "Totality"52
-- often openly identified with 'God' --, to account for 'Reality', "Being",
and also even for change and development. [See, for example,
here and
here,
but a complete list of examples would be almost
endless. I have constructed two greatly shortened lists
here and
here.]
Be this
as it may,
Traditional Theorists soon found it impossible to relate, or to connect, each 'mortal soul'
caught up in the metaphysical machinery (they had just invented) to the supposedly 'infinite cause'
responsible
for their existence, and thus they found it impossible to relate them to their
own version of the "Totality" without either:
(a) Denying the limited nature of the former -- thereby turning each
'soul' into a infinite being, or perhaps an 'aspect'/'emanation' of, or from,
'God', or without (b) Demoting or downgrading the nature of 'God', equating 'Him'/'Her'/'It' with 'His'/'Her'/'Its' creation.
Hence, as a result, human being either become 'gods', or 'God' becomes human.
This
self-inflicted insoluble conundrum later re-surfaced in a
different form
as the "central problematic of German Idealism" (i.e., it reappeared as part of the
pseudo-problem, "subject-object identity". [Beiser (1993b, 2002).] We saw above that this
idea is also
central to Zen Buddhism),53
and this 'problematic' reappeared in Engels's,
and later
in Lenin and Mao's work, in the following
form:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"The reproaches you make
against the law of value apply to all concepts, regarded from the
standpoint of reality. The identity of thought and being, to express
myself in Hegelian fashion, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle
and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run
side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never
meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents
the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being
immediately its own concept. But although a concept has the essential nature of
a concept and cannot therefore prima facie directly coincide with
reality, from which it must first be abstracted, it is still something more than
a fiction, unless you are going to declare all the results of thought fictions
because reality has to go a long way round before it corresponds to them, and
even then only corresponds to them with asymptotic approximation." [Engels
to Conrad Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphasis added. I have used the on-line version here, which
differs slightly from the published copy.]
"The great basic
question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that
concerning the relation of thinking and being." [Engels
(1888), p.593.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93. Bold emphasis added.]
"To begin with what is
the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with (sic) any proposition…. Here we already have
dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the
universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the
universal) are identical; the individual exists only in the connection that
leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through
the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every
universal is (a fragment, or aspect, or the essence of) an individual." [Lenin
(1961),
p.359.]
"Knowledge
is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate,
not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the
formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws,
etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally,
approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing nature.... Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as
a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality,' he can only
eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a
scientific picture of the world...." [Ibid.,
p.182. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In
social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away
is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in
accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and
further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.
The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so
is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the
course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the
subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and
we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which
depart from concrete history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
In DM, this
"problematic" also re-surfaced in an epistemological form, but expressed in a way that sent the DM-'theory
of knowledge' off on a 'wild-concept-chase' (analysed in more detail in Essay
Three Parts One to Six). In
MEC,
Lenin tried (and failed) to bridge the artificial gap this ancient dichotomy
(i.e., "subject-object identity") had inflicted on DM-epistemology; but it is obvious by the way he
aimlessly thrashed
about that he hadn't a clue how
to resolve it. Nor has anyone since.
[Lenin's
rather
desperate moves were
exposed in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
This unresolved 'problem' still dogs
DM-epistemology, which is just one of the reasons why the writings of
HCDs, for example,
are impenetrably obscure (since it all the easier to hide the fact that you are
hoplessly lost if you bury that fact in incomprehensible gobbledygook), while those of
LCDs are
impressively
superficial.
[MEC = Materialism And
Empirio-Criticism (i.e., Lenin (1972); HCD = High Church Dialectician; LCD =
Low Church Dialectician; follow the above links for an explanation.]
In a mystical system, not only is it
impossible to comprehend either side of the 'Ontological Grand Canyon' that
now separates 'Being' from 'You-or-Me-ing', it is
even more difficult to re-connect them.
So, it seems that this smashed
Cosmic Egg
cannot be put back together again.
Figure Eleven: The Central
'Problematic'
Of German Idealism?
No wonder then that DM-theorists prevaricate
on this and other issues, and are so vague, confused
and repetitive.
[This might also form
part of the reason why
many of those who rise to
the 'top' of whatever Marxist party they
joined or had formed behave as if they were
minor deities and
were thus able to
treat their 'underlings' with dismissive contempt, and no little personal and
sexual abuse -- and why they feel they
are justified in concocting theories that reveal fundamental truths about reality, valid for all of space and time -- a
character trait which is in some cases made far worse by the 'god'-like power
they have over life
and death. This is just one more trait they share with assorted religious 'gurus',
also
known to abuse their followers because they declared themselves to be 'prophets' or
representatives of 'god' on earth, and who are also fond of the odd execution or
ten.]
This Wholist Metaphysic is indeed one
"ruling idea" that has dominated human thought, 'East' and 'West',
for over two thousand years, just as
it is a thought-form
that Dialectical Marxists have yet to
recognise for what it is,
let alone cast it aside.
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels(1970), pp.64-65. Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
Given the
above, it hard to resist the conclusion that this, and other areas of DM are
indeed part
of the "ruling ideas" about which Marx was speaking.
Be this as
it may, dialecticians certainly reject the accusation that their system is mystical; in
fact they become quite offended by it.
That is partly
because it has been thrown at them so many times, partly because they claim to have
neutralised the mystical influence Hegel's system brought in its train, by up-ending
it and leaving behind its "rational core",
and partly because they view their theory as quintessentially
scientific.
As these Essays have shown, the last two of the
above responses are so wide of the mark that the resulting gap makes the
Grand Canyon look like a tiny crack in a Cornish Pasty in comparison.
Figure Twelve: Half-Baked
Theory?
The first of the above responses is, of course, their problem; they
invited this accusation the day they began to take Hegel seriously (upside down, or 'the right
way up').
However,
Rees
does at least try extricate himself from this Hermetic Hole:
"Totality alone is not,
however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of
society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own
mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation.... 'The Taoist
tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole
being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.' [Quoting
Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.274-75.]
"...What unites all these
explanations is that they see the totality as static. Beneath all the
superficial bustle of the world lies an enduring eternal truth, the unchanging
face of God, the ceaseless search for balance between yin and yang.... What they
lack is any notion of totality as a process of change. And even where such
system grant the possibility of instability, it is considered merely a prelude
to he restored equilibrium....
"But, even taken together,
change and totality are not sufficient to define a dialectical system. In
addition we have to provide some general indication of how such change
originates....
"A dialectical approach seeks
to find the cause of change within the system.... If change is internally
generated it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development
as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998a), pp.6-7.]
But,
as we
have seen, there are countless
mystical systems that appeal to the sorts of things Rees denies of them in order
to account for change -- Hegel's
being the most obvious(!), and which see the world, and even 'god', as a process
of some sort. A long list
will be given in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here); until
that is published, some of this material can be found
here.
However, the opposite view to that
advanced by Rees is summarised for us in the following passage
(quoted earlier):
"The ancient
Egyptians believed that a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A
similar premise, that the interaction between yin (the female principle) and
yang (the male principle) underlies the workings of the universe, is at the
heart of much Chinese thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy
from the fourth century B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many
Chinese who are not Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the
Chinese. Peoples all over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas,
have come to the conclusion that the cosmos is a combining of opposites and
that one of the most important aspects of this dualism is the opposition between
male and female."
[Maybury-Lewis (1992), pp.125-26. Bold emphases added.]
Again: what was that about "the ideas of
the ruling-class..."?
We have now reached the last and desperate 'scraping stage',
right at the bottom of the DM-barrel, but still no DM-'Hamlet'.
Nevertheless, we do know a little more about what the "Totality"
isn't -- chief among which isthat it isn't at all clear what
it is.
At best, this 'DM-non-Hamlet' has failed
to make 'its' entrance
stage left, and in the face of the above via negativa, 'it' is seemingly in need of some Viagra to revive
his flagging fortunes.
But wait!
Perhaps this is too quick? Maybe the above conclusions are a
result of the present author trying to
analyse each dialectical thesis one-by-one, all the while ignoring the holistic and
"mediated"
nature
of reality,
wherein everything is conditioned by everything
else?
There is
some truth in this counter-allegation, but fortunately,not much.
By the
end of Part Two of this Essay, even this faint ray of dialectical hope
will have been extinguished.
There,
this 'DM-non-Hamlet' (the "Totality") will be put out of its mediated misery,
and then covered with a six foot deep soil blanket.
May the non-existent deity have no mercy on
its insubstantial soul...
1. The comments
of other DM-luminaries on this
particular topic have been reproduced in
Note
25, below.
Of course, several of the latter declare that
they cannot actually tell us what the "Totality" is since that
would pin reality down, rendering DM formalistic. However, as we have seen,
dialecticians in fact end up doing the exact opposite: tying nature down with
several DM-theses they are only too happy to impose on nature and society.
So, this latest excuse is as bogus as much
else found in Dialectical Marxism.
[HM = Historical Materialism.]
Georg Novack, for example, waxed
indignant in his heroic struggle against the 'forces of unreason', which apparently
(and unfairly) required him to
tell them exactly what he believed. [Of course, he stoutly resisted such
impertinences!] And yet, he was quite happy to demand
of them the
sorts things he denied that they were able to require of him in return: concrete
details and some level of clarity. [On this, see Novack
(1971), pp.69-83. Several more comments on this topic will be
added at a later date.]
Some of those who have made
it
this far (and apparently no further) have complained that I
haven't quoted more recent dialecticians on this topic. The reason for that
'omission' is
quite plain (indeed, I covered this very point in the main body of this Essay,
here): search as
hard as I might, I couldn't find
anyone, or any recent books and articles, to quote that didn't merely repeat more-or-less exactly what the
DM-classicists had to say about the "Totality" -- i.e., not a lot --
or who ignored this core 'concept'! Sure, many had much to say about social wholes
(but, even then, we still haven't been told precisely what constitutes a
social whole, either), but, as this form of holism isn't being questioned here (since it
is plainly part of HM, a scientific theory I fully accept), it is hardly relevant to the aims of this Essay.
Moreover, since there are few
books and articles on this nebulous theory (published in English) that I haven't read,
the mystery deepens. Certainly, these critics failed to point me in the
direction of more recent DM-works that cover this topic in any detail (or at all!).
"[N]ature forms a totality, which it must
unless we depart from materialism completely and become believers in the
supernatural…." [Rees (1998a), p.78. Italics in the original.]
Alas, this doesn't add much to our knowledge
(or lack of knowledge) of the
"Totality", but it does confirm the suspicion that Rees probably does
identify it with nature. Or,
rather, since he says that nature forms a totality, it is reasonable to
assume he intends this to be the DM-"Totality". Nevertheless, it is
still impossible to say
for sure whether or not Rees thinks nature forms the
whole of this "Totality", or only part of it --, since he doesn't, either.
3. This
means that much of what appears in Jay (1984), after the opening chapter, isn't relevant to the aims of this Essay,
or this site.
4. Of course, Rees isn't the only one to
advance such claims; on this, see
Note 25.
It might still be argued that this is unfair
since Rees points out that these mystical systems don't appeal to "internal
contradictions" in order to account for change, but that isn't so. As we saw
above
(and again,
here),
rarely does a
mystic fail to appeal to "unities of opposites" to account for change and
stability. Sure, they might not be called "contradictions" (however, in
Buddhism
and
Jewish
Mysticism
they are), but then again a rose by any other name...
On
contradictions in Buddhism, see this
on-line article (a PDF) by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest.
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
"In Buddhist logic, the
origin of every judgment and concept from data of our senses starts with the act
of running through the manifold of undetermined pure sensations first before we
fasten upon one point of that series of pure sensations, a point with regard to
which the rest will be divided in two.
"On the one side we have a
comparatively limited number of similar things, on the other the less limited
number of dissimilar ones. Both parts mutually represent the absence of each
other. Therefore, every [part/aspect? -- RL] of our conscious thought or
cognition thus represents a division into two parts. Thus, our cognition begins
with an act of dichotomy.
"As soon as our intellectual
eye begins to 'see', our thought is already beset with contradiction. Once our
thought has stopped running and has fixed upon an external point, to produce a
judgment said (sic), 'this is blue', we have already separated the universe of
discourse into two unequal halves, the part that is blue and the infinite part
that is non-blue.
"Both parts are relative to
each other. There is actually nothing blue in itself. The Law of Contradiction
is an expression of the fact that all cognition is dichotomizing and relative.
We can only cognize or determine a thing by opposing it to what it is not.
"Now, everything be it real
or imagined, is subject to the Law of Otherness also. Otherness and opposition
are realized as representing the negation of the similar. Differences and the
contraries cannot be conceived so long as the non-existence of the similar is
not realized. Otherness and opposition is the absence of the similar indirectly.
"Contradiction can be
conceived in its logical or dynamic forms. View[ed] logically it is a complete
mutual exclusion such as e.g., blue and non-blue. They can co-exist in close
proximity with each other without interference with each others' (sic) existence. This
mutual exclusion can also be referred to as the Law of Excluded Middle. In its
dynamic form, both the opposing parts are mutually endeavouring to oust one
another out of their mutual opposition. Light and darkness is such an example as
each is a complete negation of the other. They cannot peacefully co-exist in
close proximity with each other. They appear and disappear due to the totally of
causes. This is the Buddhist theory of causation. The Law of Excluded Middle
also fully applied here as well.
"In real phenomena, there is
always something in the middle. If light appears all of a sudden, there is
always an intermediate moment of twilight between darkness and light. This is
different in the case of logical opposition between light and non-light, the
opposition is complete without an intermediate twilight moment. Here, it can
also be mentioned that the
Theravada
tradition maintained that between pleasure and pain there is the third position
of Indifferent feeling in the middle. To the Buddhist logician, the last moment
of the series of darkness is the cause (in the sense of dependent origination)
of the first moment of light. Real causation belongs to a single moment only. On
the other hand, efficient opposition is between one set of moments (duration of
time) and another set which is constructed by our intellect. It is not ultimate
reality. It is constructed phenomena.
"The Laws of Contradiction is
one of the main tools used by the Buddhist logicians in establishing their
theory of Instantaneous Being, for Instantaneousness is the very essence of
every real thing. The logical law of contradiction does not apply to the
'Things-in[-]Themselves', as logic is thought and thought is imagination and not
ultimate reality. Ultimate reality in Buddhist philosophy is the reality of a
point instant. It is the efficiency of a point instant. There is no relation of
opposition between entities." [Aik Theng Chong,
The Buddhist Channel, May 31, 2011. Formatting and spelling
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Accessed 18/07/2011. Link
added.]
We can see from this that Buddhist thinkers
make nearly as
many mistakes about logic and philosophy as DM-fans. Be this as it may, anyone reading the
above can't fail to recognise the similarities between its line-of-thought and
much that passes for 'rational thought' in the Hegelian tradition. [On Hegel and Buddhism, see
Morton (ND).]
And here is what Ha Tai Kim had to say about Hegel
and
Zen Buddhism:
"The paradoxical nature of
Zen manifests itself in its ignoring of the law of contradiction. It does not
attempt to invalidate the law of contradiction, but ignores it only to
illuminate the law of identity. Thus the logical proposition of illogical Zen
is: 'A is not-A; therefore, A is A.' Zen believes that the true meaning of the
proposition 'A is A' will be realized only when 'A is not-A.' The Zen way of
thinking is to assert that to be itself is not to be itself, and also that I am
really I only by negating myself.
"The philosophical 'fun' of
contradiction manifested in the logic of illogical Zen seems to have two
intended purposes. First, Zen believes that the logical dissection of reality
will never bring about the unitive point of view, the only method by which
reality can be presented as it is. The unitive point of view achieved by the
intuitive method transcends not only subject and object but also all logical
categories, including affirmation and negation. Zen masters frequently resort to
the following pattern of argument: 'Do not call this a staff; if you do, it is
an affirmation; if you do not, it is a negation. Apart from affirmation and
negation say a word, quick, quick.' Zen aims at acquiring the pure experience in
which subject and object are not yet separated.
"The second purpose of Zen's
employment of this method may be detected from the fact that the logic of the
illogical accounts for many paradoxical problems of practical philosophy more
adequately than does ordinary logic. In a sense, it is a form of practical
reason; it is the logic of life. It is reasonable to say that 'living is dying'
(A is not-A), as existentialists seem to point out. A fine illustration of this
method is Jesus' pronouncement that 'He that findeth his life shall lose it, and
he that loseth his life shall find it' (Matt. 10:39). In the moral and religious
sphere, this method is frequently employed. Any idea of the good which is not
carefully scrutinized in the light of the practical and concrete situation
cannot really be called good; thus, we may say that 'good is not-good.' Only by
examining the idea of good to the ultimate extreme can we say that we understand
the idea. In order to understand fully the implications of a concept -- for
example, philanthropy -- we must allow room for reasonable doubt about the
concept, even stating that philanthropy is selfishness, that is, 'A is not-A.'
"The simple proposition 'A is
A' does not go beyond the socially accepted meaning of the term: it is limited,
and, therefore, infinite possibilities of the meaning of the term are excluded.
The proposition excludes all doubt and skepticism. However, in the proposition
'A is not-A' we can travel far beyond the limited and determined meaning of a
concept by placing it at the most extreme opposite. A is fully understood as A,
because A is scrutinized to the fullest degree, and all possible meanings of A
are exhaustively explored. This is precisely the meaning of Hegel's dictum that
'Truth is the whole.' By negating the very meaning of a concept, we are able to
move toward the apprehension of the whole. For both Zen and Hegel, the negative
method signifies that an affirmative concept contains within it the possibility
of a negative.
"We are surprised, at first,
to discover that the logic of the illogical in Zen is akin to Hegel's
dialectical method. But it is no surprise at all if we note that Hegel's
dialectical method is also the logic of life. The 'fun' of contradiction, or
'pretension' of the other, in the act of negating itself, is the comical
impersonation of which
Loewenberg speaks in describing Hegelian dialectic. 'The logic called
dialectical,' writes Loewenberg, 'is the logic of comedy par excellence. It is
the logic by which
ideas and beliefs are made to whip themselves, as it were, in
the process of exhibiting their internal contradictions.' It is the method
of the self-alienation of the Absolute in Hegel's philosophy. Even in his
legend, 'The Naked Boy,'
Eckhart
identifies the Naked Boy with God himself, 'who was having a bit of fun.' As
early as 1800, when Hegel wrote his
Fragment of a System, he knew that
the dialectical method was the logic of life, for he regarded life as the 'union
of union and nonunion.' Both Hegel and Zen thinkers assume the absolute
viewpoint to be the ground of unity between A and not-A, being and not-being.
The only difference is that the universal of universals in Hegel is the
Absolute, while in Zen it is Nothing, which is a sort of Absolute itself." [Kim
(1955),
pp.22-23. Accessed 18/07/2011. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and links added.]
So, and once again, Zen logicians appear to be about
as confused as Hegel was! Kim
clearly failed to notice that if this approach to 'logic' were valid, there
would be no such thing as
the "unitive point of view, the only method by which
reality can be presented as it is", since if it were correct to assert "A and not
A" then any method that attempted to show the world "as it is" must at the same
time show it as it isn't. How might we disentangle these two
contradictory views of 'reality' and decide which was which, which view
represents 'reality as it is' and which shows it as it isn't? As soon as we
decide it is "A", we also must decide (and not decide!) that "not A"
is correct (and incorrect!). Indeed, how on this basis might we decide which is the 'correct' method, for if this view is to be believed, the "unitary method" is also
(and it isn't also!) the "non-unitary method"! As Aristotle pointed out, down this
road all rational thought decays into irreducible confusion.
However, later in his paper, Kim makes the
mistake of attributing to Hegel ideas that can only be found in
Kant and
Fichte (concerning the notorious 'Thesis/Antithesis/Synthesis' triad). On
that, see
here.
[Again, the most comprehensive list of examples (of mystical systems that argue
along similar lines)
can be found
here.]
5. Rees does,
however, make several more comments
about the "Totality" later on in his book, but most of them either relate
to the Epistemological Definition (discussed
earlier), or to the social and historical ramifications of DM-Holism (which
topic,
once more, I largely ignore in this Essay). Even so, these additional comments add little or
nothing to our knowledge of the "Totality" as this term supposedly applies to the natural
or non-social world.
[TAR = The Algebra Of
Revolution, or Rees (1998a); OT = Orthodox Trotskyist.]
However, even though dialecticians depict the
"Totality" as internally 'contradictory', they don't in general regard flatly
self-contradictory theories (or propositions) as true (or "fully true") --
as TAR itself acknowledges, for instance on p.235. Indeed, DM-fans are
quite happy to regale us with the many internal or absurd contradictions they find
in rival theories or systems, which are, in their eyes, sufficient to condemn them.
For example, on p.84 of TAR, the
Young
Hegelians are criticized for being "self-contradictory", as are bourgeois
ideologues in general (p.238). Even Kant himself isn't spared (p.47) -- nor is
Kautsky (p.141). Similarly,
Engels wasn't averse to
rejecting certain theories on the same basis: cf., Engels (1976), pp.26,
63-65,
171,
247, and
324-25. Lenin also
took advantage of this tactic: cf., Lenin (1972), pp.76,94,
95, 97,
195,
256,
274, and
281. More recently,
Tony Cliff, for instance, found
he was able to dismiss the
ideas put about by certain
OTs on the basis that they were "contradictory";
cf., Cliff (1999), pp.28-30.
"Constantly beset with
innumerable contradictions, Khrushchov makes frequent changes in his
economic policies and often goes back on his own words, thus throwing the Soviet
national economy into a state of chaos. Khrushchov is truly an incorrigible
wastrel. He has squandered the grain reserves built up under Stalin and brought
great difficulties into the lives of the Soviet people. He has distorted and
violated the socialist principle of distribution of 'from each according to his
ability, to each according to his work', and enabled a handful of persons to
appropriate the fruits of the labour of the broad masses of the Soviet people.
These points alone are sufficient to prove that the road taken by Khrushchov
leads away from communism." ['Refutation
Of The
So-Called Party Of The Whole People' (1964), quoted
from
here.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
The late
Chris Harman
also found fault with
Ernest
Mandel's analysis of the former Soviet Union [fSU], alongside the latter's criticisms of
State Capitalist Theory, because of its many "contradictions":
"Yet even stranger is
Mandel's analysis, developed since, of the reasons for this post-war growth.
Apparently, it is because capitalism is undergoing a third 'industrial
revolution'. This has' (sic) been possible because 'during the "long period" of
stagnation of the capitalist world economy (1913-1940) a great "reserve" of
scientific and technological inventions had been built up, whose large-scale
productive application was delayed as a result of unfavourable economic
circumstances prevailing during that period'. The argument, however, is
simply contradictory. One moment these innovations are responsible for the
economic expansion: the next they were allowed to accumulate for 30 years
because there was no economic expansion. In that case, something other than the
innovations must be responsible for their present employment -- otherwise why
did they not cause expansion in the thirties? Mandel seems as incapable now as
when he wrote his book 10 years ago of identifying what this other cause might
be....
"The fashionable Marxists of
today are very like the revisionists of Kautsky's time (except that to protect
their left flank they usually claim that their 'improvement' of Marxism is a
version of the real thing). Mandel has not the method to refute them. Yet he
cannot deny the existence of some of the superficial phenomena to which they
point. And so he ends up half agreeing and half disagreeing with them. It is
this that leads to repeated self contradictions, to an underhand revision of
Marxism (as when in order to make concessions to the 'unequal-exchangists'
Mandel talks of value based upon 'labour' rather than socially necessary labour
time (p.345 & 351)) to absurd claims, and to random predictions....
"This leads him into all
sorts of contradictions. He writes that 'the bureaucratic layer monopolises
political power just as it does economic power'...and that 'The interests of the
mass of producers, the workers and peasants...are opposed to those of the
directors/managers...'.
"The Stalinist state
bourgeoisies of the East can no more escape from this violent, capitalist
dynamic than can the 'private' (more accurately, the state monopoly capitalist)
bourgeoisies of the West and Third World. That is what is so exciting about what
is happening in the USSR today. But to understand why, you have to move
beyond the vague, inconsistent, self contradictory formulations of Mandel,
and the best way to do so is to base yourself on Cliff's book." [Quoted from
here; accessed
15/08/2012. Bold emphases added.]
By way of contrast, Harman also found he could lionise the
contradictions envisaged in and by his own theory, which were somehow quite
acceptable!
"Once you miss these
interconnections, you miss the dynamic of the system; you can see the system in
the manner of the bourgeois economist as made up of the different components of
a smooth running machine, even a machine that is subject to accidental
breakdowns (in Mandelese 'conjunctural' crises). But you cannot grasp the
intrinsic contradictions of the system, contradictions based upon the way in
which the total system accumulates, with accumulation producing an aging of the
system, and the aging destroying the mainspring of the system's own dynamic.
"For Marx, the categories he
developed were significant because they enabled you to see the system as a
self-contradicting totality, which is in a permanent process of
transformation -- a transformation that must affect the very categories of
analysis themselves....
"Nor is Mandel right when he
claims that a new wave of innovations brought on steam by this accumulated
surplus, makes it possible to evade the inner contradictions of the system as
outlined by Marx. The notion of innovation, of the 'third technological
revolution' as being able to prevent the drive of the system towards crisis,
even for a limited period (25 years) is a notion introduced into Marxism for the
first time by Mandel. And it is nonsense. The classical Marxists had no doubt
that the effects of accelerated technological progress would be to increase
not diminish the contradictions of the system....
"Mandel just doesn't grasp
the contradictions in the arms economy. He accuses
Mike
Kidron of the 'truly astounding discovery that the arms economy is a factor
that slows down late capitalist growth.' But you only have to take a cursory
glance at the statistics for arms spending and economic growth to see that the
economies that have borne the greatest share of the arms burden have been those
with the worst growth records....
"What is true is that
capitalism is a continually developing system, with innovations and technical
progress taking place in some parts of the system before others. Elsewhere in
the system the old forms of 'tyranny inside the firm' -- the old methods of
capitalist planning -- then no longer correspond with what is needed to keep
abreast in the struggle for increased productivity. The law of value then
comes into contradiction with the existing forms of organisation of production.
"The contradiction between 'bureaucratic despotism' and the 'law of value'
occurs because society is subject to the law of value. Can this be true in the
USSR? Only if you accept that the USSR is a commodity producing society, a
variant of capitalism." [Quoted from
here; accessed
15/08/2012. Bold emphases added.]
Similarly,
Ted Grant
latched onto the many 'contradictions' he claimed could be found in Cliff's
State
Capitalist Theory:
"Any analysis of Russian
society must start from that basis. Once Cliff admits that while capitalism is
declining and decaying on a world scale, yet preserving a progressive role in
Russia in relation to the development of the productive forces, then logically
he would have to say that state capitalism is the next stage forward for
society, or at least for the backward countries. Contradictorily, he
shows that the Russian bourgeoisie was not capable of carrying through the role
which was fulfilled by the bourgeoisie in the West and consequently the
proletarian revolution took place....
"We have seen that if the law
of value only applies because of the existence of capitalism in world economy,
then it would only apply to those products exchanged on the world market.
But Cliff argues two contradictory theses in relation to the Russian
economy....
"Cliff gives two
contradictory answers to these questions. On the one hand he agrees that it
is the law of value on which all calculations and the movement of Russian
society develops. On the other, he finds the law of value only operating as the
result of pressure from the outside world although how he does not explain in
any serious way....
"If one takes into account
the fact that this follows the previously quoted passage in the same section
where Engels defines capitalist mode of production (as social production,
individual appropriation), we must conclude that Engels hopelessly
contradicts himself, if we accept Cliff's conclusions." [Grant (1949),
quoted from
here. Bold emphases added.]
"The section [on rising
population -- RL] starts well enough by pointing out the sobering reality that:
'Early in 2012 the world's population hit seven billion. The previous milestone,
six billion, was reached in 1999. Only slightly over two centuries ago the
world’s population was one billion. The rate of increase has been phenomenal;
readers who are over 45 have lived through the doubling of the Earth's
population'. (Page 188)
"The conclusion it draws from
these rather scary figures, however, is that this presents no problem at all for
the ecology of the planet! It is true that this conclusion is contradicted
(objectively contradicted) by the content of some of the later sections -- on
waste and on the water for example. The overall thesis, however, is that no
problem is posed by the current rate of increase or any figure it might
eventually reach. This to me is a serious departure from reality." [Quoted from
here; accessed 01/09/2014. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Although, I am far from sure what an
"objective" contradiction is.
The blurb at the Bookmarks website added these
thoughts:
"Martin Empson draws on a
Marxist understanding of history to grapple with the contradictory potential
of our relationship with our environment. In so doing he shows that human
action is key, both to the destruction of nature and to the possibility of a
sustainable solution to the ecological crises of the 21st century." [Quoted from
here; accessed 01/09/2014. Bold emphasis added.]
It isn't too clear whether this supposedly
"contradictory" relationship is a 'fault' of the theory itself or of
'reality'.
As we will soon see,
this tension (between a theory which postulates 'contradictions' everywhere in
nature and society and the reason DM-theorists give for abandoning a given
theory (because it is contradictory) in favour of a superior one) is in the end fatal to DM itself.
Even The Great Teacher Himself wasn't above
employing this tactic (in his criticism of Bukharin and Trotsky, among others):
"What does all this show? It
shows that the opposition has got entangled in contradictions. It has lost the
capacity to think logically...." [Stalin
(1927), p.78. Bold emphasis added.]
"If now, nearly two years after the
ideological struggle in the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at
the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it possible in his
reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) to dig
up the old and quite inadequate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written
in April 1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided
question of the victory of socialism in one country -- then this peculiar trick
of his only goes to show that he has got completely muddled on this question. To
drag the Party back after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the
Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a Plenum of the
Central Committee, means to become hopelessly entangled in contradictions,
to have no faith in the cause of building socialism, to abandon the path of
Lenin, and to acknowledge one's own defeat." [Quoted from
here, Section VI. Bold emphasis added.]
As we have seen, the very same individuals
are remarkably forgiving of -- if not completely blind to -- the many
contradictions that litter DM.
[There are countless examples of the above dialectical double standards; more will be added later. Cf., Schaff (1960).]
In fact, this isn't quite right. As we
discovered
in Essay Nine
Part Two,
DM-'contradictions' are often called into play whenever a dialectician wants to derive,
rationalise or justify an
opportunistic or
counter-intuitive (if not overtly counter-revolutionary) conclusion, or
course of action. In such cases,
self-contradiction becomes something to be welcomed, if not glorified. Witness
Stalin:
"It may be said that such a
presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same
'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand
for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the
strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and
strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state
power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of
state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is
'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully
reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political
Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B),
June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
[Many more examples of this convenient tactic
were cited
here.]
Nevertheless, DM-theorists distinguish
"absurd" or "insoluble" contradictions [e.g., Engels (1976), p.154
and p.26,
respectively] from their own superior, but mutant, "dialectical" cousins.
[My words, not theirs!]
And yet, the only way to tell these two
categories of 'contradiction' apart seems to be that the former litter rival
theories (often those formulated by DM-theorists from another, competitive
Marxist party), while the latter are integral to their own
preferred, pure-as-the-driven-snow version of DM!
Moreover, DM-'contradictions' aren't just
employed in order to rationalise political expediency, they also serve as a
handy way of distinguishing those who "understand" dialectics from those who
don't -- and who are then anathematised for their crass infidelity and bourgeois
prejudices -- this tactic clearly serving as a handy way of
separating the dialectical sheep from the 'formalist' goats.
Of course, mega-kosher DM-'contractions' have simply
to be "grasped" -- or
Nixoned
-- the problems
they bring in their train quietly ignored.
This brings us to a knotty problem that
threatens to undermine the entire 'dialectical project', if such it may be
called. DM-theorists have yet to provide us (or, indeed, their fellow believers) with non-question-begging criteria
(or any at all!) that can be used to help distinguish theories
that postulate the
existence of contradictions everywhere from those that are flatly
self-contradictory and are to be rejected because of that.
Indeed, Rees, for example, argues that
superior theories are those that are "less internally contradictory" and "more
internally coherent" than their inferior rivals [Rees (1998a), pp.235, 237
-- also,
see below], among
other things. But, this claim is
made without any attempt to explain why it must be a defect for a rival theory
to be self-contradictory when it isn't a defect for DM-theorists to
claim that reality itself is contradictory, with every object and process
in existence
internally self-contradictory into the bargain. If reality is indeed contradictory,
then any even 'partially true' theory that reflected this state of affairs
accurately should reproduce those contradictions as part of its theoretical and
empirical content, surely? Indeed, one would expect a self-contradictory
theory to reflect reality more accurately if reality is in fact contradictory itself --
wouldn't one?
In order to explain the implications of the DD, let us call those
theories that are unambiguously self-contradictory, "defective theories" (DTs, for short).
Also, let us say (for the sake of argument) that DTs include all DM's rival
theories, or, indeed, theories that attempt to 'refute' DM. Conversely, let
all and only those theories that adequately reflect the contradictory nature of reality (such
as DM) be called "non-defective theories" (NDTs, henceforth),
even if they are still only 'partially' or 'relatively' true.
So, on
this basis and in this respect, DM
is the one and only NDT; all the rest, the rival and oppositional theories, are DTs.
But,
paradoxically, an NDT must also be a DT! That is because, as a consequence
of accurately
capturing the supposedly contradictory nature of the universe, an NDT must become
self-contradictory at some point, or to some extent -- otherwise, it
wouldn't
be able to mirror reality in all its contradictory glory. Hence, such a theory must
be a DT, otherwise it would fail to reflect nature and society accurately!
In that case, there would be no good reason to reject any
given DT in favour of an NDT on the basis, at least, that the aforementioned DT is
self-contradictory, since both DTs and NDTs must contain, or must have internalised,
an unspecified number of
contradictions. So, because of their commitment to DM, dialecticians now have no good reason to reject an
alternative theory on grounds that it is a DT -- since DM is itself a DT in
virtue of its being
an NDT!
"In a certain sense, of
course, all truth is relative -- it is just that some theorists do not
acknowledge this elementary fact. There is no final, faultless, criterion for
truth which hovers, like god, outside the historical process. Neither is there
any privileged scientific method which is not shaped by the contours of the
society of which it is a part. All that exists are some theories which are less
internally contradictory and have a greater explanatory power…. [I]f the truth
is the totality, then it is the totality of working class experience,
internationally and historically which gives access to the truth…. [A theory's]
validity must be proven by its superior explanatory power -- [which means it is]
more internally coherent, more widely applicable, capable of greater empirical
verification -- in comparison with its competitors. Indeed, this is a condition
of it entering the chain of historical forces as an effective power. It is a
condition of it being 'proved in practice.' If it is not superior to other
theories in this sense, it will not 'seize the masses,' will not become a
material force, will not be realized in practice." [Rees (1998a), pp.235-37.
Bold emphasis added.]
Clearly, Rees holds that the more accurate the theory, the fewer
internal-contradictions it should contain. Thus, the 'more true' DM becomes the
fewer contradictions it should either envisage or encompass -- and hence,
in turn,
the fewer it should picture as existing in nature and society! But, in doing
that --
because of the 'DM-world-view' -- 'Materialist Dialectics' would become
decreasinglytrue since,
by eliminating its own contradictions, it
would less faithfully reflect the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly litter
the natural and social world.
This means that when fully true, an
NDT like
DM ought
to depict the fact that there are no contradictions at all in reality! And yet, by its own lights, in doing
that it
would become completely false. Hence, this particular NDT (i.e., DM) would become a DT once
more (and in another
sense): it would be defective by failing to reflect the contradictions that dialecticians claim exist
in nature and society!
On the other hand, if this weren't so,
and if Rees is mistaken and
dialecticians shouldn't try to eliminate any (or all) of the contradictions that
exist in their theory, then DM would become, or it would remain, a DT, and thus ought to be rejected accordingly
(since it would then contain an unspecified number of 'internal contradictions'
-- i.e., those that supposedly reflect the many that allegedly exist in nature
and society). Indeed, in that case, 'Materialist Dialectics' would have been killed-off by its own internal contradictions!
[This would, of course, represent a fitting and somewhat
ironic downfall of a theory that declares that change can only come about through 'internal
contradiction' -- including the demise of the theory that says just that!]
[Of course, it could always be argued that
dialecticians don't hold that all the contradictions in a given theory should
be eliminated -- although I have yet to read anything that supports this particular
counter-claim in a classic DM-text, or any other, for that matter --; but, if that were the case, as I
have noted
here, the
advancement of science would grind to a halt as a result. Moreover, if DM were
to have only some of its contradictions removed, it would still be
a DT.]
Conversely, once more, DTs would become
NDTs in yet another sense, should their supporters remove or attempt to remove the internal contradictions
they contain. In that case, the DT in question would have had its internal
contradictions eliminated and would thereby become an NDT, since it no longer
reflected 'objective' reality (that is, as DM-fans see things).
In either case, the DM-thesis that
reality is contradictory sends NDTs like DM one way (into oblivion), and DTs the other
(into the science textbooks)!
This, then, is the DD.
[DD = Dialecticians' Dilemma;
DT = Defective Theory; NDT = Non-Defective Theory; TAR = The Algebra of
Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998a).]
[The DD is outlined in more detail, but from a different
angle,
here. As we will see in Essay Thirteen Part
Two (where DM-theorists' ideas about scientific change will be examined in
greater detail), a corollary of this dilemma is that the DM-account of
scientific change has also been fatally compromised.]
In fact, the full consequences of this
dilemma (for dialecticians) are really quite disastrous -- as we are about to find out.
DM-theorists claim that all valid theories are
converging on a final Absolute Truth
(on this, see below), even if this end point will never actually be attained. If
so, it is possible to show that DM is actually going in the wrong direction,
moving away from the goal of giving what is even a minimally accurate 'picture of reality'. In fact, given
TAR's
criterion for
theoretical validity, we are in a position to declare -- rightnow
-- that 'reality' is in fact a 'contradiction-free' zone. That is because if DM is
to be believed, the truer the theory, the more it
must conform with the view that reality contains no contradictions. If the
theory in question failed to do this (perhaps because its supporters
flatly reject this criticism (and for no good reason)), it would be a DT, and that would be because it would contain internal contradictions. And, as TAR's criterion indicates, such a theory should be rejected as defective.
Alternatively, if we reject Rees's criterion
(for whatever reason), the result would be little different. As noted above, if
DM is supposed to retain its contradictions (in whole or in part), it would be a
DT, and must therefore be rejected. In that case, the 'picture of reality' it
painted would be completely false.
Either way, DM can't be progressing toward 'the truth',
'asymptotically' or otherwise.
In order to make these general points more
concrete, consider an example: let us suppose for the purposes of argument that motion
is in fact
contradictory.
Unfortunately, if that were so, no partially-, or fully-true theory
could afford to admit this 'fact' for fear it would thereby become a DT. Indeed, in order to
avoid being stuck with this a label, DM-theorists would have to abandon
the idea that motion is contradictory, or risk their theory being classified
as a DT. Hence, no NDT -- like DM -- can afford to countenance the supposedly contradictory nature of
motion.
Naturally, this just means that those who already reject Engels's analysis of
motion are (at this moment) closer to 'the truth' than he was -- or than his epigonesnow
are, or than Hegel was 200 years ago --, for these unnamed opponents already declare that motion isn't contradictory
(or, in my case:
already declare that such a supposition makes no sense).
Of course, those who don't accept -- or even
those who
reject -- this
particular DM-'contradiction' -- and who prefer to limit 'Materialist Dialectics'
to human social development -- should substitute for it
the one that Stalin claimed to have discovered
in the 'dialectical' nature of his 'Socialist' State --, or, indeed, an almost identical 'contradiction' to the one Ted Grant found there, too:
"The whole contradiction,
a contradiction within the society itself and not imposed arbitrarily --
is in the very concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If one
considers the problem in the abstract, one can see that this is a contradictory
phenomenon: the abolition of capitalism yet the continuation of classes. The
proletariat does not disappear. It raises itself to the position of ruling class
and abolishes the capitalist class. But in the intervening period it remains the
working class. Therefore, surplus product in the form of surplus value is
produced. It is the case today as it was under Lenin and Trotsky. We have only
to pose the problem: what was the surplus value produced when Russia was
still a workers' state -- though even then with bureaucratic deformations?
What was the process by means of which surplus product before 1928
mysteriously became surplus value after 1928?..." [Grant
(1949), pp.212-13. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Of course, supporters of
Cliff's theory can
substitute for the above, the following:
"Dialectical historical development,
full of
contradictions and surprises, brought it about that the first step the
bureaucracy took with the subjective intention of hastening the building of
'socialism in one country' became the foundation of the building of state
capitalism." [Cliff
(1988), p.166. Bold emphasis added.]
"State capitalism and a
workers' state are two stages in the transition period from capitalism to
socialism. State capitalism is the extreme opposite of socialism -- they are
symmetrically opposed, and they are dialectically united with one another."
[Ibid., p.174.]
A theory like DM -- that can be used to
'justify' anything
whatsoever, no matter how contradictory it might otherwise seem, and its
opposite (often this is done by the very same DM-fan, in the same
speech, book, or article, as we saw was the case with Stalin) -- is naturally going to be of great use to opportunists,
substitutionists and
'Marxist' counter-revolutionaries of every stripe; which is, of course, one reason why
its adepts defend DM to the death -- or, to be more honest, to the death of
countless
tens of thousands of workers!
The only apparent way of avoiding
these fatal defects would be to argue that no theory that truly reflects the
contradictions that allegedly exist in reality will be self-contradictory, transforming it
from a DT into an NDT as a result.
Fortunately, it is quite easy to show that this
counter-claim is itself misguided.
The argument substantiating the above
assertion
begins with the following innocuous-looking observation:
D1: (a) If DM is correct
then reality will contain contradictions. (b) DM postulates the existence of
just such contradictions.
Just in case this appears to get things the
wrong way round (in that it begins with theory and not with reality), we
need only reflect on the fact that since we don't have direct access to
'reality', only an indirect route by way of increasingly less inadequate
theories about it -- that is, according to DM-theorists themselves (this isn't my
theory, I hasten to add!) --, this is
a move dialecticians would have to make. [Indeed, TAR itself
appears to concede this point -- e.g., on page 63, paragraph 2. We saw Lenin do
something similar in Essay Three
Part One.]
Anyway, even if an attempt
were made to 'begin from reality' (whatever that means) -- presumably with the unmediated
observation of a least one material 'contradiction' in nature (as a result of some sort
of languageless, concept-free, 'apperception'/'intuition'/'image'(??)) --, the conclusion
would still follow, except perhaps even more quickly, as we will also soon see.
From D1(b), we can obtain this:
D2: At least one of DM's postulates must
contain -- or must imply -- a contradiction.
Consider the following schematic
representation of one such contradiction:
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, and for the relation R, for some time t,
Rxy at t and ~Rxy at t.
[Here, "~" stands for
negation, and in the vernacular, the negative particle "not", or "It
is not the case that...".]
One interpretation of D3 (partially and then
fully colloquialised) could be the following:
D4: For at least one moving cat,
and at least one mat, and for the relation R (i.e., "ξ
is on ζ"),
for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
Of course, D4 would normally be --
that is,
by us 'dialectical infidels' --
disambiguated to
remove this apparent
contradiction. And for good reason, too: no theory can live with contradictions.
We are about to see why.
[Reminder: DT = Defective
Theory.]
Let us again assume DM-theorists are correct about the
contradictory nature
of reality; in that case, it is now possible to derive the following fatal conclusion:
D5: No DT is true and all DTs
should be rejected. [Assumption.]
D6: A theory that contains a
self-contradiction is a DT. [Definition.]
D7: TAR's theoretical structure
holds that both D5 and D6 are true.
D8: Assume that D5 and D6
are
true.
D9: (a) TAR also says that DM is true.
(b) Assume that DM as an integral part of TAR's theoretical structure.
D10: Assume DM is true.
D11: DM contains postulates like D3
(or D4 and/or D4a).
D12: D3 (D4 and/or D4a) is a self-contradiction.
D13: Therefore, DM contains at least
one self-contradiction.
D14: Therefore, DM is a DT (by D6).
D15: Hence, DM isn't true (by D5,
D13 and D14).
D16: Therefore, TAR contains a DT (by
D9 and D14).
D17: Hence, TAR's
theoretical structure holds a
DT to be true, namely DM (by D9, D6, D7 and D16).
D18: Therefore, TAR holds true a DT
which
is both true and not true (by D5, D6, D7 and D17).
D19: Thus, TAR's theoretical
structure contains a self-contradiction (by D18).
D20: Therefore, TAR's theoretical
structure is defective, and hence its version of DM is a DT.
D21: TAR's version of DM should be
rejected (by D5).
Admittedly, D5-D21 contain one or
two vagaries, which can be cleared up by the addition of a few extra lines, or
by the adoption of more precise wording (etc.) -- for example, it might be
necessary to substitute "fully true" for "true", above (on that,
see below). However, the outcome seems
reasonably clear: TAR is correct to argue the case for DM just in case it is
incorrect for it to do so. In fact, TAR became defective upon adopting DM!
Now, the fact that TAR is a non-standard DM-text
doesn't affect the above argument; the author of TAR only has to hold true one
DM-contradiction for it to apply to him.
Of course, what goes for TAR, goes for any
other DM-text that argues along similar lines: i.e., that reality is
contradictory and that flatly contradictory theories are defective, and should be rejected.
Now, there seem to be only a handful of ways
that this fatal conclusion might be avoided. One of these is to deny the validity of
FL. But, that would be a rather desperate move -- somewhat
akin to a boss attacking the validity of arithmetic just because a strike vote
went the 'wrong' way. More to the point, FL hasn't been used above; the argument
in fact more closely resembles those found in
Informal Logic. Furthermore, even though D3, for example, is expressed in
semi-formal terms, D4a isn't.
Another way is to argue that according to
DM-theorists, no theory is every fully rejected, or completely false; science "spirals" in on the
truth:
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated
by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly
repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis
('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a
straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks
in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner
impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the
various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given
phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a
connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of
motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the
ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases
added.]
"Human knowledge is not (or
does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a
series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be
transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight
line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the
quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored
by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness,
woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness -- voilŕ the
epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscrutantism (= philosophical
idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless;
it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on
the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective,
absolute human knowledge." [Lenin (1961),
p.361. Italic emphases on the original.]
"What then is truth? It is
correspondence between ideas and objective reality.
"Such correspondence between
our ideas and reality is only gradually established, and then the correspondence
is often no more than partial or incomplete.... In such cases, we should not say
that our idea was false, but yet it would not be absolutely -- completely and in
all respects -- true. Truth, therefore, is not a property which an idea,
or a proposition, either possesses or does not possess; it may belong to an idea
to a certain degree, within certain limits, in certain respects....
"This characteristic of
truth...is very well known to science. The laws which science establishes
certainly reflect objective processes; they correspond to the real motion and
interconnection of things in the external world. Yet science has established few
laws which can claim to be absolute truths....
"...[M]any erroneous views in
science and philosophy, which have had to be, not modified, but rejected as
errors, concealed a certain truth which received in them an erroneous distorted
expression....
"We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression....
"Complete, full, absolute
truth -- the whole truth and nothing but the truth about everything -- is
something we can never attain. But it is something toward which we are always
approximating...
"...The correspondence is
never complete, exact, absolute. But it continually approaches yet is always
infinitely distant from that absolute limit as truth and knowledge continually
advance...." [Cornforth (1963), pp.135-45. Bold emphases added.]
It could be argued on the basis of the above
that DM-epistemology isn't nearly as crude as this Essay or this site suggests.
Scientific theory advances by spiralling in on the truth. In which case,
knowledge advances by preserving some of the (partial) truths contained in
earlier theories, incorporating them in a higher, more accurate theory. This
means that some contradictions from an earlier theory might very well be
reproduced in these more accurate theories (for example, the contradictory
nature of motion), which are then presented in a higher, more objective form. So, it isn't true that
dialecticians argue that all previous contradictions should be removed. What is
to be rejected and what retained will depend on the theorists concerned, and the
deliverances of practice.
This objection was in fact fielded
earlier. It has also
been pointed out that this still fails to distinguish those contradictions that
are the product of a DT from those that are a genuine 'reflection of reality'. Of
course, the theory that motion is contradictory is based solely on a 'though
experiment' -- or, rather, solely on word juggling disguised at a thought
experiment --, which is impossible to confirm. In that case, this aspect of DM
ought to be weeded out, if DM is to conform even to a very basic form of the scientific
method.
We have also seen (in Essay Ten
Part One) that science in
no way 'spirals' in on 'the truth'.
In addition to this
avoiding tactic, DM-theorists
(such as Lenin and Cornforth) argue that no theory or proposition is either fully true or
completely false; all in their own way are closer approximations to the truth,
or to 'partial/relative truth'. Quite apart from
the fact that no DM-theorist really assents to this crazy idea (on that, see below), the
term "partial truth" is itself hopelessly vague (as will be demonstrated in a later
Essay).
But, even if this weren't so, the fact that
those who assent to less
'partially true' theories aim (at least in theory) to remove certain contradictions (so that
the theory in question becomes even
less 'partially true'), means that the above result still applies. Hence, even given this way of thinking, a
maximally
true theory should contain fewer -- perhaps no -- contradictions.
Incidentally, whatever they might say,
few 'dialectical' revolutionaries accept in practice the doctrine that there are no completely false
theories and/or propositions. Here is Cornforth again:
"Just as truths are for the
most part only approximate and contain the possibility of being converted into
untruths, so are many errors found not to be absolute falsehoods but to contain
a germ of truth....
"We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression...."
[Cornforth (1963), pp.138-39.]
Despite this, it would be hard to find a "germ of truth" in
any of the following:
(1) Ten litres of concentrated
Nitric
Acid applied directly to unprotected human skin dramatically improves the
complexion.
(2) Jews, Eastern Europeans, Arabs, Asians and Africans belong to inferior,
sub-human races.
(3) Capitalism is a genuine expression of
unchanging human nature, which is selfish.
(4) All women are happy with their oppression
and are keen to be reminded of it daily.
(5) Imperialism is 100% progressive
everywhere and at all times, and always will be.
(6) The
Ku Klux Klan are
exemplary leaders in the fight for Black
Liberation.
(7) In 2002, Iraq manufactured and stored more
WMD than any other country in the
entire history of the
planet.
(8) The earth is supported by a giant tortoise,
on top of a giant locust, on top of a giant crab, on top of a...
(13) The world was created about 6000 years
ago from a bowl of custard by the
Flying Spaghetti Monster.
I suspect that anyone who questioned the
truth of, say, (1) would be
hard pressed to find a single revolutionary who agrees with (2).
Naturally, that makes the negation of (2) absolutely true for all revolutionaries.
On
the other hand, if they disagree with one or both of these sentences --
i.e., (1) and (2) -- as they should, they would thereby
confirm the point at issue: if either of these sentences is completely false,
then there is at least one sentence (namely that one) that is completely
false.
QED.
And, just in case this Essay attracts the
attention of a handful of brass-necked, Hardcore Hegel Honchos, who might want to claim one
or more of the above are 'partially true', 'partially false', then they should
perhaps consider the following:
H1: There are absolutely no partial truths.
Now, is that 'partially'
true?
Another way of avoiding the above conclusions would be
to claim that they apply only to formal
contradictions, and since DM-theorists postulate only those contradictions
that can be shown to exist 'objectively' -- i.e., 'material contradictions'
-- their theory is unaffected by the above criticism.
However, this counter-response fails, too. Consider the following additional argument:
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, and for the relation R, for some time t,
Rxy at t and ~Rxy at t.
D4: For at least one moving cat,
and at least one mat, and for the relation R (i.e., "ξ
is on ζ"),
for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
D22: DM postulates only
the existence of material contradictions.
D23: D3 (or D4/D4a), when true,
reflects just such a
material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth of D3
(D4/D4a),
but only when
instances can be shown to be the case.
D25: Hence, even when instances
of D3 (D4/D4a) are found to be the case, they remain self-contradictions.
This means that the rest of D5-D21 still
follows.
A retreat into the concrete bunker here (on
the lines that the above claims are 'abstract', whereas "all truth is concrete",
according to Hegel and Lenin), would be to no avail, either. That is because it
would immediately prompt the question: "Is the claim that all truth is concrete
itself absolutely true?" If it is, then the point is lost. If it isn't then we
can ignore it as an effective reply. [That is, of course, quite apart from the
fact that this Hegelian thesis is
abstract and hence can't itself be true (if what it says is true)!]
It could be argued that D22-D25 can be
disassociated from D5-D21 by rejecting D23 and/or D25; that is, it could be
objected
that DM-contradictions are
different from those found in
FL.
D22: DM postulates only the
existence of material contradictions.
D23: D3 (or D4/D4a), when
true, reflects just such a
material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth
of D3 (D4/D4a), but only when instances can be shown to be the case.
D25: Hence, even when instances
of D3 (D4/D4a) are found to be the case, they remain self-contradictions.
But, this view could only be maintained by repudiating another DM-thesis:
that the superiority of
DL over FL arises partly out of the former's capacity to
account for change through contradiction. This claim would lose all of its
force if it were now clear that the contradictions countenanced in DL were completely different
from those found in FL. In such an eventuality there would be nothing in common
between the two systems for a comparison to latch onto. The much-touted
superiority of DL over FL (at least with respect to contradictions) would then be about
as accurate as would be an analogous claim that, say, Barclays Bank is a better
bank than the
Dogger Bank. This is quite apart from
the fact that DM-contradictions arose out of Hegel's criticisms of AFL and the
LOC, and we have just seen that 'superior' theories, like DM, don't simply
reject or discard concepts drawn from earlier theories, they build on them. This
wouldn't be the case here if DL contradictions were completely different
from those found in FL (as DM-theorists see things).
Anyway, this is certainly not how Hegel viewed his 'contradictions'. [On that, see
here and
below.]
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; AFL = Aristotelian FL.]
To be
sure, there are DM-theorists who say that neither they nor Hegel reject the
LOC (but on this see Essay
Four, as well as
here),
since they actually use FL-contradictions in their endeavour to show that there are real
'dialectical' contradictions in nature and society (thereby transcending
these FL-contradictions in order to derive their more comprehensive DL-versions). So these
two 'varieties' of contradiction are
organically-, or, perhaps, 'dialectically'-connected. DM-contradictions are, indeed, merely 'concrete' versions
of the abstractions found in FL. As Trotsky noted:
"The dialectic is...a science
of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems
of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and
drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar
to that between higher and lower mathematics." [Trotsky (1971),
p.63.]
Hence, just like "lower mathematics" --, which treats with numbers,
and operations like
addition, multiplication and division, as well as employing well-known axioms/rules
(commutativity,
associativity, distribution,
etc.)
--, "higher
mathematics" does likewise. Numbers, as they feature in the former system are the same as those
that appear in the
latter, it is just that their use is extended much further, into such areas as
Rings,
Groups and
Fields. [On that, see
here.] This isn't, however, to suggest
that every single one of the above axioms/rules apply everywhere in 'higher'
mathematics; for example,
Abelian Groups aren't commutative, nor are
Matrices in general.
But,
no one suggests that the numbers studied in "lower mathematics" are different from those
that make their appearance in "higher mathematics". DL merely enriches our use of numbers, just as it enriches
our understanding of contradictions.
Or, so it might be claimed.
Anyway,
as we saw
here,
Hegel was only able to derive his 'contradictions' by confusing letters (or what they supposedly
designated: objects, relations and/or processes) with predicates, propositions,
concepts,
and a host of other things. [Naturally, this means that the allegation that Hegel knew what he was
talking about in this area is about as accurate as a similar claim made by, say,
George W Bush on any randomly-chosen
aspect of
High
Energy Physics, should he
choose to pass an opinion in this area.] Nevertheless, from what he
actually committed to paper, Hegel certainly wanted to link his
'contradictions' with their
misbegotten cousins which he thought he had located in the
bowdlerised version of
AFL he had been taught (as a student) and which he then criticised.
[However, having said
that, please note the caveats I have posted
here.]
Clearly, what DM-theorists need to show is that at least some of the contradictions countenanced by FL
are derivable from, or they depict, "real material contradictions" -- otherwise there
would be no good reason to call their own contradictions, "contradictions" (as
opposed to calling them, say, "bananas") -- or, indeed, for claiming that the former are
just static or 'abstract' versions of the latter.
If so, the rejection of one or more of D1-D25
(on the grounds that they refer to or use totally different senses of the word
"contradiction") would be to deny DM-theorists an important conceptual
innovation they inherited from Hegel (who, once more, doesn't claim his 'contradictions'
are of a new type, just a more 'scientific' or 'concrete' form), which is that
contradictions in thought (FL-style) mirror real ones in nature and society --
when verified, given a 'concrete' make-over, or flipped the "right way
up".
Since FL-contradictions are the formal
equivalent of every conceivable contradiction (real or imagined), DM-theorists
can't afford to drive a wedge between FL-contradictions and their own
DL-"material contradictions". If they were to do this, they couldn't also
maintain that thought mirrored the world, and a central plank in DM-epistemology
would collapse.
Indeed, this seems to be what Lenin was
trying to say:
"Hegel actually
proved that logical forms and laws are not an empty
shell, but the reflection of the objective world....
"The laws of logic are the
reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.180, 183.]
Anyway, D3 is just a formal
version of the sorts of material contradictions found in DM (i.e., D4/D4a). Since D20
and D21 follow from D4/D4a, this latest counter-argument itself fails.
D3: For at least one x, and at
least one y, and for the relation R, for some time t,
Rxy at t and ~Rxy at t.
D4: For at least one moving cat,
and at least one mat, and for the relation R (i.e., "ξ
is on ζ"),
for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
At this point, it is worth re-calling that
the thesis that nature is contradictory isn't a peripheral, minor,
or insignificant
aspect of DM; it is one of its core precepts, a consequence of (i) the
idea that everything is a
UO
and (ii) the part-whole
dialectic. This is certainly
how Rees sees things (see, for example, pp.4-10 of Rees (1998a) -- but compare that
with
this).
[See also the comments posted
here.]
And, it is certainly how DM-classicists,
like Lenin and Mao, for example, saw
things. [On that, see
here.]
Hence, if DM is
defective here, it is rotten to the core. To be sure, this is the rotten core of
Hegel's
sub-Aristotelian 'logic'. No amount of spin can change that material fact.
The only other conceivable way to avoid this
fatal defect would be to find fault with one or more of the assumptions
(implicitly or explicitly) used in
the argument above. However, further examination of those real or apparent assumptions would be
tantamount to the present author doing DM-theorists' work for them. This is their
hole, they can dig their own way out of it.
[Several other factors associated with this topic
were examined in Essay Seven Part One,
here,
here and
here.]
6.
Other DM-characterisations of the "Totality" -- or,
rather, other extremely vague gestures toward that end -- have been
quoted inNote 25, below.
7.
On this, see Rosen
(1982), Chapter Two. Rosen's arguments will be developed in more detail in
Part
Two of this Essay.
8. It
is worth recalling here that the (reasonable) requirement that
evidence should be presented in support of each and every DM-thesis isn't my invention. Dialecticians
themselves tell us
that this is an essential move to prevent their theory from sliding into Idealism. [On that, see
here,
here,
here, and
here.]
9.
It
should no doubt now be apparent that the
"Totality" is none other than Hegel's Absolute in disguise, or 'in drag'. And a
rather poor disguise it is, too. In fact, it is even less impressive than
Clark Kent's.
Figure Thirteen:
Is Hegel's 'Absolute' -- The DM-"Totality" -- As
'Well-Disguised' As
Superman?
10.
Of course, this just scratches at the surface of the 'problems' created by our
attempt to understand 'the nature of time', and what can be said to exist when.
For example, several of the questions that will be examined presently in the main
body of this Essay (no pun
intended) were first posed (as far
as we know) by
Augustine, in his Confessions [Book
XI, Sections 14:17-31:41; i.e., Augustine of Hippo (2004),
pp.230-45], although, some of his ideas were anticipated by the
Stoics.
[On this, see Sorabji (1983), pp.21-27. Also see Suter (1989b). The general background can be found in Sorabji,
op cit. See also, Note 14.]
Unfortunately,
as is the case with my comments in several other Essays, I am forced here to
employ the 'metaphysical mode of speech'
(of the sort one finds in Augustine's work, as well as the writings of the vast majority
of other Traditional Philosophers, for example). This doesn't imply that I accept
this jargon makes any sense; in fact, it is being
employed here precisely to assist in its
demise.
Sentences like: "The past does not exist", "The present does exist", or "The
past is no more" appear to use phrases like "The past" or "The present"
almost as if
they were Proper Names, or labels, that attach to, or which designate, certain specific temporal zones, which they aren't. If they were
Proper Names,
or operated like Proper Names, for example, it would be possible for someone, somewhere, somewhen to pick out their bearers
--, either
with a demonstrative (like "this" or "that"), by
ostension, or by means of an identifying
description (or even by means
of a combination one or more
of these devices)
-- or maybe even by referring to some sort of baptismal/dubbing ceremony (with the word
"baptismal" being used here in a non-religious sense!). But, it isn't.
[On this see,
Hanna and Harrison (2004); however, the latter should be read in conjunction with
Baker and Hacker (2005), pp.227-49.]
It
might be objected that it is surely possible to name things that don't exist,
and have never existed, for example, mythical and fabulous beasts of yore,
fictional characters, the many 'gods' that litter the worlds religions, and such
like. This is undeniable, but if the "The Past", "The Present", "The Future" are
to be viewed in a similar light, then that will only serve to confirm the conclusions
reached about them in this Essay -- at best, they are fictional labels
(i.e., they label fictional 'entities').
In
addition, it is important to note that an earlier paragraph mentioned descriptions, not definitions.
This doesn't mean, of course, that ostensive definitions (of named objects)
cannot be given, only that the stage-setting for these rituals is rather complex.
Anyway, it is difficult to see how such a 'definition' of "The past" or "The
future" might be
available without the automatic use of the present tense (as in, for
example: "This is the past..."). In cases like these, such identifying
descriptions might perhaps gain some purchase in conjunction with the use of
certain pictures
and photographs, or even by means of various stories that attempted to
illustrate how things used to be --
as one might teach a child, for example. [On Ostensive Definitions, see
Baker and Hacker (2005),
pp.81-106.]
Evensupposing this, if anyone took such
depictions to be literally true (i.e., for these stories, pictures or
photographs to be, or to pick out, the past), they
would either be deluding themselves or they would have been misled in some way.
In such circumstances, they might
mistakenly
imagine that the past was a drawing, a series of black and white images on glossy
paper, or a set of amusing tales of yore. Either that, or they might entertain the idea that the past exists somewhere now
-- in the present(?) -- in a manner similar to the items they had just been shown, the tales they
had been told, or the
'definition' they had been given, all of which employ the present tense.
The use of any other tense in such
circumstances would, of course, be
self-defeating. What sense, for example, could one make of: "The past was
this…"?
To be
sure, one can say things like: "This is how things were in the past", but even
then, the present tense of the verb "to be" (namely "is") would still
have been employed.
Other well-known problems afflict
attempts to 'define' the past in similar ways, since such 'definitions' are
forced to employ various forms of the present tense.
[The
objection that the verb "to be" here is tenseless will be
fielded in Note 14, below.]
On
the other hand, a sentence like the following: "This was how things were in the past",
doesn't use the present tense -- but then it doesn't imply 'the past'
(still) exists, either.
It
might now be objected that the above responses manifestly don't deal with "The present";
it might seem that this operates as some sort of Proper Name. But, what is it the Proper Name of?
What does it label? To what can anyone point that is or might be the referent of this term?
By the time that ceremony might be, or might have been, performed, 'it' (whatever it is)
will have gone.
It
could be argued that the present is always with us as a sort of a-temporal, or
even omni-temporal, now. But, this 'now' must be durationless, otherwise,
as
Augustine
pointed out, if it had any duration it would have its own temporal parts -- a
before and an after, a later and an earlier. That would in turn imply that the
present was part past and part future. And if that were so, an earlier question
would force itself upon us: What is this the Proper Name or label of? To what
can anyone point that is or might be the referent of this term? [I am not here
suggesting that all attempts to speak about the past are defective, only that
certain ways of speaking about it are misleading.]
Be
this as it may, if anyone wants to adopt, or even defend, this view of "The
present", they are welcome to it. Anyway, this thesis (if such it may be called)
is susceptible to the objections raised against any and metaphysical
theories, rehearsed in Essay Twelve
Part One.
Finally, it
could be argued that terms like "The past", or "The future" are
definite descriptions; if so, I'd have no objection to this
interpretation, since, just like fictional names/labels, definite descriptions
are often used in
relation to non-existents -- such as "The creator of the universe", "The next
President of the United States of America", or even "The individual who
succeeded in rendering DM perspicuous".
11.
More on this presently (again, no pun intended).
12.
That is, not unless the word "correspond" is given a new meaning, perhaps making
it analogous to the correspondence between fictional characters and/or events and the 'same' individuals
and/or events in the real world -- or the other way
round (as one might encounter, say, in a historical novel).
In that sense, of course, characters and/or
events do not
actually
correspond with the characters and/or events they seek to depict, or, plainly, the said work wouldn't be fictional!
It could be argued that in a novel about, for
example, Trotsky, the name "Trotsky" would correspond to Trotsky. And if, in that
novel, "Trotsky" is expelled from the former USSR, for instance, that would correspond to
what actually happened. But, this just re-duplicates the problem, for in
that case, both the individual and the described event no longer exist for
either of these to correspond with.
More importantly, if the aforementioned novel
is indeed a novel, it will depict, describe or feature many things Trotsky never
did or said -- otherwise it wouldn't be fiction, it would be a biography! So, if
it is a novel, it can't be
about Trotsky, but must be about 'Trotsky', a fictional character
with a typographically identical name. Indeed, if we now argue that Trotsky is
the individual who did, or experienced, E1,
E2,
E3,...,
En
(where n is indefinitely large, and "Ek"
is a noun or verb phrase (or clause) expressing some event in his life,
something he experienced, thought about, or which was true of him (etc.),
whether or not we now know about it or them) -- Leibniz might have called this
Trotsky's "complete individual concept" -- and the Proper Name "Trotsky" referred
to the human being who did or experienced all these things, then this fictional
'Trotsky' (logically) cannot refer to him.
"The nature of an individual
substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is
sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of
the subject to which this notion is attributed." [Leibniz, quoted from
here.]
12a.
Instead of looking at how we use the highly diverse language of time, theorists
more often than not attempt to regale
us
with their impromptu 'intuitions' about the 'real' meaning of phrases such as "The past", "The
future", or "The present", augmented (or not) by the alleged implications of the
TOR. Small wonder
then that they end up with 'paradoxical' or deeply puzzling results. [On that, see Note 13
andNote 14.]
13.
Ordinarily, we have no difficulty with using the vocabulary of time. Indeed, we
typically manage this every day -- using differentially tensed verbs,
augmented by temporal
and location-specific
adjectives,
adverbs and
prepositions.
However,
certain
nominalisations like "Time", "Past",
"Future" --, or even, "Present" -- and these are typical, for instance, in relation
to the so-called "A-series"
in the Philosophy of Time --
merely encourage the invention of spurious problems connected with something
called 'the nature of
time' (now irreversibly
reified into existence in this way). This happens when
what appear to be ordinary phrases like these are used with little sensitivity concerning our
everyday use of such terms, as is almost invariably the
case in this area of Traditional Thought.
It is no accident, therefore, to find that the "A-"
and "B-series" were invented by that Idealist (neo-Hegelian) Philosopher,
John
McTaggart.
A classic statement of the approach to the
analysis of pseudo-problems like these (adopted
at this site) can be found
in the opening sections of Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown Books and
Philosophical Investigations -- i.e., Wittgenstein (1969, 1958/2009). On this topic in
general, cf., Cook (1979), Read (2002, 2003,
2007),
Rundle (2009), Suter (1989), pp.157-70, and Westphal (1996, 2002). See also, Anscombe (1950).
14.
Notice that using even this locution requires the
employment
of the present tense, which, if crudely interpreted, might suggest that
the past is really a part of the present, only remarkably well hidden!
Now, the above interpretation might seem to
some to resemble the following aspect of
Augustine's theory of time:
"If future and past events
exist I want to know where they are. If I have not the strength to discover the
answer, at least I know that wherever they are, they are not there as future or
past, but as present. For if there also they are future, they
will not be there. If there also they are past, they are no longer there.
Therefore, wherever they are,
whatever they are, they do not exist except in the present....
"What is by now evident
and clear is that neither the future nor the past exist, and it is inexact
language to speak of three times -- past, present and future." [Augustine (2004),
Book XI, Sections 18:23, 20:26), pp.233, 235. The online translation is somewhat different.]
However, Augustine posed this 'problem' epistemologically and psychologistically, whereas I would
rather re-focus
discussion of time (as I do in this Essay) on how we
actually use tensed verbs (and other associated temporal vocabulary), refusing to theorise or advance an
'ontology' of any
sort.
It could be objected that some of the verbs employed
in these contexts are tenseless, which would mean that their
use carries no
implication that the past somehow exists in the present. But, even if this were
so
(and in such contexts, the verbs themselves cannot tell us what connotations
they carry),
it would be even less clear what a tenseless depiction of the past
actually amounted to. [I say more about this in Essay Thirteen
Part One.] How might this interpretation
of certain verbs work with a sentence such as: "This is the past", for
instance? That particular use of the verb "to be" doesn't look the least bit tenseless.
Of course, as we saw in Essay Three
Part One, in
predicative
propositions, where the word "is" functions as a mere
copula,
that copula can be paraphrased away, even if this results in some awkwardness. So:
[Where "F" stands for a noun or verb phrase.
Although there might be a few (not insurmountable) problems connected with 'use
and mention', here.]
While P2 is still apparently in the present
tense, it doesn't possess the same untoward implications.
On the other hand, if, according to
DL, the
"is" in P1 is really an
"is" of identity, then the above move
would no longer be available.
P3: The past is identical
with F.
P4:
The past = F.
P3 and P4 seem to be super-glued to the
present!
I won't speculate how DL-fans might handle
this awkward turn of events; they dropped themselves in that particular hole
when they began
listening to the
logical
advice doled out by that certified incompetent,
Hegel.
[It is important to note that the views
expressed here aren't in any way connected with the metaphysical doctrine that
currently goes under the name "Presentism". Indeed, my views express no theory at all. There is in fact no
single way to depict
time; the vernacular allows us to speak about it in countless different ways.
Speculation that there is only one 'real meaning' for certain words associated
with the language of time,
the supposed referents of which are what philosophers or scientists supposedly study (or intend to study), would amount
to the
imposition
of yet another a priori,
dogmatic scheme on nature, something DM-theorists, at least, affect to
disavow. Of course, if this
were so, and there were something called "the real meaning of the
language of time", the aforementioned theorists would be studying 'time', as
opposed to time
-- since in the
latter case, the word "time" has many different meanings or uses. In that case, the supposed 'problems' of time
(as opposed to the very real problems of 'time') won't have been
addressed.]
15.
The mis-analogy between space and time will be analysed in a later
Essay.
The similarly misleading analogy drawn between time and the structure of
the
Real Numbers
has already been
addressed,
here. There is an excellent discussion of the
temptation to reify space and time -- simply because we can represent
both of these by a combination of
Real Numbers
and
orthogonal axes
(in Mathematics and Physics, for instance) --, in Swartz (1991), pp.145-224. [I
hasten to add that I do not agree with everything Professor Swartz has to say!]
16. Aristotle
himself considered this 'problem' in his famous
Sea Battle Paradox.
[On
that, see Anscombe (1956).]
17. In order to prevent misunderstanding, it
should be emphasised here that
the Ideal nature of the past is neither being asserted nor denied in this
Essay. That is because both alternatives would form part of a metaphysical theory of this
subject matter, and as such they would both be
non-sensical
and
incoherent.
'Propositions' expressing either option
(i.e., the assertion, or even the denial, of the Ideal nature of time)
result from a misconstrual of ordinary forms of speech supposedly
capable of revealing
fundamental features of 'reality', when they are in fact incapable of being empirically
true or false, and so cannot picture the world in any meaningful sense. [Again,
on this, see Essay Twelve
Part One.]
However, what is beingmaintained
in this Essay is that
DM-theorists themselves cannot consistently deny that the past is Ideal
given their commitment both to the CTT and to the 'objectivity' of the claims
they make about the past.
[CTT = Correspondence
Theory of Truth.]
[Exactly why that is so will be postponed until the
CTT itself is discussed in more detail in Essay
Ten Part Two, alongside other classical definitions of truth.]
At this point, it is also worth
noting that the argument in this Essay bears no relation to recent and
fashionable
post-modernist (henceforth, PM) 'deconstructions' of historical
truth. In fact, the approach adopted here emphaticallyrefuses to deny there are historical truths,
nor does it question the occurrence of events in the past. What is being
questioned is the Metaphysical-Realist/Idealist slant imposed on one or both.
However, recent attempts made by certain
revolutionaries to underline the misguided nature of PM are themselves far from
convincing. For example, a view expressed by the late Chris Harman [in Harman (1998)]
was clearly influenced by
Richard Evans's
"Holocaust Argument" [HA], employed in order to
refute certain PM-theories of history. [That is, to deny the objectivity of the past is
tantamount to denying the Holocaust!] But, Harman's reliance on Evans's book is
ill-advised on philosophical grounds alone, if for no other reason. While Evans
was rightly critical of any account of the past that falls short of the highest academic
or scientific
standards, he also seemed happy to base his own philosophical objections
to PM on the most superficial refutation of it available to him (the HA). In
addition, the only
relevant philosophical argument was lifted from Paul Boghossian's review of the by-now-infamous "Sokal Hoax". Boghossian's
'demolition' is itself a rehash of the hackneyed "self-refutation"
argument (briefly examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two (not yet published)).
[Cf., Boghossian (1996), re-worked in
Boghossian (1998) and in more detail in Boghossian (2006); cf., Evans (1997),
pp.220-21. On this, see the extended responses to the above 'hoax' available
here.]
Now, whatever weaknesses the entire set of
PM-views of history possess, they aren't susceptible to the hackneyed,
superficial and often misguided criticisms levelled at them by revolutionaries,
whether or not these are 'backed-up' by references to Lenin's
philosophically-challenged and monumental waste of ink and paper: MEC.
[MEC = Materialism And
Empirio-Criticism; i.e., Lenin (1972)-- examined in detail in Essay ThirteenPart One.]
Alex Callinicos, on the other
hand, has published several extensive criticisms of PM -- for example,
Callinicos (1989, 1995, 1998). [Some of the issues Callinicos raises will be
considered in more detail in a later Essay.]
In addition,
Callinicos has summarised his objections
to PM and to what he calls "textualism" [(Callinicos (1998); these
criticisms are
somewhat similar to arguments that appear in
Callinicos (1987), pp.126-28.)], a view he
claims is associated with various PM-theories of history.
According to Callinicos, "textualism" involves an acceptance of the rather bizarre thesis
that there is "nothing outside the text" (henceforth, NOTT). Against this, he
argues that while it is trivially true that all representations of things in the
world are mediated by language, it doesn't follow that they are "constituted by
language". Unfortunately, Callinicos forgot to tell us what he meant by
this. What would it be for something to be "constituted by
language"? Plainly, we would need the answer to that question in order to understand
what it was that Callinicos's claim rules in, or, indeed, rules out. The problem is
that
it seems we
would have to do this without the use of language! Otherwise, we wouldn't know what it was
that language was operating on, or "constituting", independently of any use of language!
Now, Callinicos might have had in mind the idea
that objects and processes in the world are 'pre-linguistic', or
'extra-linguistic', but, if he did intend this, he might find it rather difficult to say what
that amounts to without yet another annoying use of language.
It could be argued that that is precisely the
point; while our representation of such things has to be linguistic
(by-and-large), that trivial fact surely has no effect or bearing on the nature of
the objects
and processes we seek to represent, which surely exist independently of language. However, quite apart from the fact
that even that point has to be made linguistically, it amounts to little
more than a flat denial of NOTT. It certainly doesn't show that PM is
incorrect in this regard -- plainlybecause it
begs the question.
In order to show that PM is misconceived from
beginning to end, it requires recourse to conceptual tools
considerably more powerful, reliable and useful than those that have themselves been imported from
the same ideologically-compromised source that gave rise to PM-theories in
the first place
-- i.e., Traditional Philosophy -- and, more specifically, French
'Philosophy'. In the present case, clearly,
these 'less reliable' tools are those that would be implicated in any attempt to
construct a
superior
philosophical 'theory' that sought to replace, or refute, PM. But, there is no
way that
non-sensical
and incoherent theories (like PM) can be refuted by the construction of yet more of the same.
[Clearly, in order to refute a theory (i.e., show it is false), a critic would
have to know what would make that theory true (and thereby what would make it
false); but that goal cannot be achieved by the use of yet another a non-sensical theory, let alone one that
is incoherent.] Hence, an entirely different approach is required; one
such will be aired in a later Essay, but the approach I will adopt was hinted at
earlier.
Nevertheless, Callinicos advanced three
counter-arguments (or counter-claims) to show that NOTT-type theories are
misguided:
(1) Human beings gain information
about the world by their physical interaction with it.
(2) Discourse isn't
autonomous; it is a social phenomenon integrated with other aspects of human interaction with
the world.
(3) Human beings do not
automatically and uncritically accept the deliverances of language; they sort
the latter into categories using criteria that help decide which are the "most
accurate" depictions of the world. Historians, for example, wouldn't check
sources, artefacts, archaeological data, and so on, if texts were hermetically
sealed against reality. [Callinicos (1998), p.178.]
It could even be argued that the above points
might equally well be directed at certain ideas or criticisms advanced in these Essays, and not just
those found in PM.
However, that, too, would be a
serious mistake.
Callinicos himself acknowledged that (1)
above allows for the fact that "information [has to be] articulated
linguistically" to make it accessible, but he failed to notice that this
concession undermined his overall position. I hasten to add, however,
that the extent
and validity
of that particular point itself depends on
what Callinicos meant by "information". If he meant "the content of an
empirical proposition", then (1) wouldn't count against anything expressed
in any of the Essays at this site. If,
on the other hand, he meant "pre-linguistic data", it would still be
impossible to assess his argument until that phrase itself had been explained or
clarified.
Exactly what "pre-linguistic data" amounts to, I haven't a clue -- and I rather
suspect Callinicos hasn't either. [The phrase "pre-linguistic data" is, of course,
mine, not Callinicos's.] Unfortunately, there is a way of understanding that
contentious phrase that undermines the Marxist understanding that language is a social
product --, a topic which will be discussed at greater length in Essays Twelve
Part One
and Thirteen
Part Three. Moreover, (1) appears to be about as
"trivially true" as the idea that knowledge is mediated by language. [On this
topic in general, see Hacker (1987).]
Point (2) above is unexceptionable and is
completely consistent with ideas presented in these Essays. Having said that, if
(2) were to be interpreted in a way that made it consistent with, or dependent
on, the above
allusion to
"pre-linguistic data", then that would actually render it inimical to HM,
and not just to PM -- as well as to the views expressed here. That is because it would
represent a serious challenge to the idea that language is a social
product,
which understanding is integral to HM. [Again, why this is so will be
covered in Essays Twelve
Part One
and Thirteen
Part Three.] Since
Callinicos neglected to tell us what he meant, it isn't easy to say much more
about it.
Finally, (3) isn't inconsistent with any of
the views advanced in these Essays, either. However, Callinicos might like to
reflect on the nature of the criteria he says we employ in order to modify or correct our
use of language. If these criteria are themselves socially-, and
linguistically-conditioned, then we are back where we started. But, if they
aren't, it is
difficult to see how social beings like us could ever have invented them, let
alone learnt how to use them.
18. On
surfaces,
see Stroll (1988), and Varzi (2013); on shapes, see Bennett (2012). Parts and Wholes will be considered in more detail in the
second half of this Essay.
19.
N rays were 'discovered' by
René Blondlot
at the turn of the century. Popular accounts of the rise and fall of this
formerly 'objective' entity can be found in Dewdney (1997), and in Friedlander
(1998). A more wide-ranging, but still popular study of similar scientific oddities
is
Gratzer (2000). See also Gardner (1957, 1989, 2000), Grant (2006, 2007, 2009), and Shermer (1997).
Details of the mysterious powers of the echeneis fish
can be found
here; this fable was accepted by philosophers and scientists well into the
early modern period. On that, see Easlea (1980).
The,
shall we say,
'darker' side of science -- where
fraud,
deception,
and regularly-occurring
hoaxes are often mitigated by a
Whiggish, post hoc
(after the event)
desire to re-write the history of science along more favourable lines, but which
'negatives aspects' are further compounded by issues connected with
profit, war, and social control, further aggravated by and
the internal
censorship
of new theories and hypotheses --, is only of tangential interest here. However, dialecticians
cannot afford to ignore this important area of the history of science for fear
that fraudulent and/or class-compromised items might somehow creep unnoticed
into their "Totality", which will later have to be unceremoniously evicted from it --
as we saw with, for instance, the
Piltdown Hoax. [More examples of fraud in science
can be found
here.]
On
social aspects of science, including fraud, error and enforced 'revision', see the following: Angell (2005), Barnes (1974, 1982, 1985, 1990), Barnes and Bloor (1982),
Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Biagioli
(1993), Bloor (1991), Broad and Wade (1982), Collins (1975, 1992, 1994, 1998,
1999, 2002, 2004), Collins and Pinch (1998, 2002), Conner (2005), Cooter (1984),
Crewdson (2003), Desmond (1989), Desmond and Moore (1992), Fara (2009), Feyerabend (1975,
1978, 1987, 1991, 1993, 2011), Forman (1971), Fritze (2009), Galison (1987, 2003), Geison (1995),
Gieryn (1999), Golinski (1992, 1998), Goldacre (2012), Goliszek, (2003), Gooding (1990),
Gooding and Pinch (1989), Goodstein
(2010), Grant (2006, 2007, 2009), Greenberg
(2001, 2007), Judson (2004), Kohn (1986), Latour (1987, 1988), Latour and Woolgar (1986), Lenoir
(1997), LeVay (2008), Longino (1990), MacKenzie (1981, 1993), Newton (1977), Park (2000),
Pickering (1984, 1995), Porter (1995), Principe, (1998), Redondi (1987),
Restivo (1983, 1992), Rudwick (1985),
Shapin (1979a, 1979b, 1981, 1982, 1994, 1996), Shapin and Schaffer (1985),
Waller (2002, 2004), Wallis (1979), and Youngson (1998).
On
some aspects of the psychology underlying all this, see Travis and Aronson
(2008).
See
also
here and
here.
On the manifest weaknesses of the 'peer review' system coupled with its failure to find or prevent fraud
(etc.), see Judson (2004), pp.244-86. See also
Broad and Wade (1982), as well as
here and
here.
[Although it should be noted that Goodstein (2010) quite effectively defends
Robert Millikan from several
of the
fraud accusations that have been levelled against him. [See also,
here.]
Even so, Goodstein also rejects (without explanation) the allegations others
have advanced against
Ptolemy,
Galileo,
Newton,
Dalton
and
Mendel
(p.44). Plainly, this isn't the place to enter into this complex debate (even
though DM-fans will have to do so or risk populating their "Totality" with what
could turn out to be fraudulent and/or bogus objects and processes); however, on Ptolemy, see
here,
here, and
here (the latter
page isn't too easy to read!). Cf., also Thurston (2002), and Rawlins (2003).]
Update September 2012: See also the long and detailed
Guardian newspaper article on the recent unmasking of widespread
fraud in psychological research -- most of which in fact passed the peer review
system.
Here
are the conclusions of a recent (June 2009) on-line report:
"Science Fraud
"As scientists, we like to think that
science is a bastion of virtue, untouched by science fraud. The
perception is that, other than
junk science,
science should be beyond reproach, unsullied by lies and propaganda.
Results should always be regarded as
valid
and completely
unbiased.
Unfortunately, human nature dictates that scientists are human and
are always going to be prone to bias and
error.
Most such mistakes are subconscious, and a result of looking too
hard for patterns that are not there.
"Unfortunately, there are a number of more sinister cases, where scientists
deliberately
fabricated results,
usually for personal fame. With the advent of corporate and politically funded
research grants, poor results are becoming more dictated by policy than by
scientific infallibility.
"Some
of the More Common Types of Science Fraud
"There are many types of science fraud, from minor manipulation of results or
incorrect causal connections to full-blown
fabrication
of results and
plagiarism
of the work of others.
There have been cases of researchers stealing the work of their students to
obtain all of the credit and kudos.
"There is a well-documented rumour of a scientific referee delaying the work of
a rival, to ensure that he received the acclaim and a Nobel award. These
allegations are often difficult to prove, as institutions often cover them up
and try to sweep science fraud under the carpet. Citations are one area of the
scientific
process
that is coming under increased
pressure, especially with the easy availability of information on the internet.
"A
citation,
or reference, is supposed to credit past research that influenced the current
research. Now, a
bibliography and list of works cited often becomes a
list to impress, readers assuming that the longer the list, the better the
paper....
"For those who remember, this South Korean announced, to a fanfare, that he had
successfully cloned a dog, and also had some success in human cloning. This
research was published, passed the tests and then he was subsequently suspected
of fraud and ethical violations. He withdrew the paper and, as yet, there is no
consensus as to whether the fraud was deliberate or the result of a badly
written paper.
"This is probably one of the most famous science frauds of all time, which
persisted for many years. A fossilized skull, apparently of the 'missing link'
between apes and humans, was discovered in a quarry in Piltdown, Sussex,
England. The find was taken to a distinguished palaeontologist,
Arthur Smith
Woodward, head of the Geological Department at the British Museum.
"He declared the find authentic, but almost straight away, questions were asked,
and it gradually came to light that it was made up from bones of at least 3
hominid species, including the jawbone of an Orang-utan with filed down teeth.
Poor Woodward was the victim in this fraud, and his otherwise notable career
became forgotten, his name forever linked with the fraud. The perpetrators
remain unknown, although the discoverer,
Charles Dawson
is suspected as an
attempt to find fame and fortune.
"Institutional Problem
"Institutions are often reluctant to discipline wrongdoers, ignoring it, quietly
shifting the fraudster to another department or even disciplining the wrongdoer.
Science has a problem that people are reluctant to risk losing their careers to
report
science fraud.
The problem is that it is difficult for
reviewers
to isolate flawed results without repeating the experiment themselves...."
[Quoted from
here,
accessed 28/08/2014. Several paragraphs merged to save space; spelling altered
to conform with UK English. Four links added.]
Although, the above article in the end defends the integrity and efficacy of the "peer review
system", other reports (referenced earlier) paint an entirely different picture.
Indeed, here is what The Guardian had to say about this:
"Accusations of fraud spur
a revolution in scientific publishing
"Three and a half centuries
after the first journal was published, post-publication peer
review is shaking up the old system.
"Scientific publishing may be on the
brink of a revolution fought, in part,
within the
chemistry
blogosphere. In the past few months it
has been the scene of debate about
whether the scientific publishing
practices initiated by members of the
Royal Society almost 350 years ago are
still fit for purpose. In 1665, when the
first scientific journal rolled off the
presses, it was the cutting edge of
science communication. The driving force
for
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society
(as it is still known) was the members'
desire to share their findings while
being assured that no one could
fraudulently claim credit for their
work.
"To
ensure quality, all articles underwent
peer review -- a process that is still
used by the thousands of journals that
fill academic libraries today. The
process is simple: authors submit their
findings to a journal and editors send
them out to be checked by the authors'
scientific peers. If those peers deem
the science to be valid then the journal
publishes the paper.
"But now
a system that was designed to share
knowledge and stop scientific fraud may
be suffering from the very same problems
that the pioneering publishers at the
Royal Society were trying to overcome,
namely fraud and poor communication. By
some estimates between
1% and 2% of papers now contain
fabricated data
and many more
are just plain wrong.
If papers have flaws then these might
get discussed in tea rooms and
conferences, but without an organised
way of communicating these
conversations, the wider world remains
ignorant of problems.
"There
have been murmurs in scientific circles
about these flaws in the publication
system for some time. But the issue blew
up earlier this year when bloggers
started reporting examples of suspicious
practices in otherwise reputable
journals. At first it was
just a report
of a throwaway comment accidentally left
in a paper's annex:
'Emma, please insert NMR data here!
where are they? and for this
compound, just make up an elemental
analysis....'
"Some
interpreted this as an academic inciting
his student to commit fraud. Or maybe it
was just an instruction to carry out a
particular experiment. It was certainly
sloppy practice by all concerned,
including the editors, peer reviewers
and co-authors, all of whom should have
spotted the errant sentence. But it is
not damning evidence of anything worse
than this.
"The
debate on the role of blogs and other
forms of social media in
'post-publication peer review' was now
out in the open. While not everyone was
happy with social media being used to
'out' dubious practices, saying the
situation had descended into
a witch hunt,
most were
more supportive.
"Ultimately the bloggers' actions were
vindicated, to the extent that all the
suspect papers have now been withdrawn
and investigations into scientific fraud
are under way. Nevertheless the debate
was largely confined to the blogosphere
-- until a few weeks ago when one of the
journals responsible for publishing the
supposedly photoshopped data, ACS Nano,
waded in with a highly critical
editorial aimed squarely at bloggers.
It was a naive attempt to squeeze the
social media genie back into the bottle
while simultaneously trying to curtail
free speech.
"The
article by the journal's editorial board
included 'instructions' on how suspected
fraud should be dealt with: 'When
plagiarism or data manipulation is
suspected, accusations should be
reported directly to the journal....'
"Then
they criticised the use of pseudonyms by
bloggers and commenters: 'We
strongly suggest that such comments
be made without the cloak of
anonymity....'
"This
seemed ironic since a central tenet of
the peer review process is the anonymity
of the reviewer, the point being that a
reviewer can write what they truly think
of a paper without fear of making
enemies or losing friends. Why then
should those who critique the paper
after publication not have the same
privilege?
"Finally
ACS Nano's editorial board threw some
crumbs to the bloggers:
'After we have made our decision,
all are welcome to comment on it in
any blog, even if they have
different opinions; this is their
privilege.'
"This is
where the revolutionary part comes in.
Spearheaded by
PubPeer, there
is now a site that allows anyone to
comment on any publications. This may
not seem like much in an age where
comment threads at the foot of news
articles are commonplace. However, all
but a few scientific publishers have
steadfastly resisted following suit.
PubPeer, which is becoming the
Reddit
of the science world, is attempting to
make post-publication commenting the
norm.
"It may
still be small fry, but bigger fish have
taken notice, most notably
PubMed, an
enormous and well used database of
medicine-related articles. When Pubmed,
last week, added a
commenting facility
to its database it gave organised
post-publication peer review a huge
boost. Given this facility to openly
discuss scientific papers, we could be
in for a brave new world where
scientists are no longer judged on the
content of their papers but also on the
comment threads that follow.
"Scientists had better grow thick skins,
quickly." [The
Guardian, 08/11/2013, accessed
28/08/2014. Several paragraphs merged to
save space; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. One link added.]
On the widespread fallibility of science, see
here, as well
as Appendix A. Indeed,
there is now a site called Retraction Watch,
where such errors can be corrected or withdrawn. Can fans of the DM-"Totality"
afford to ignore all of this?
On holes,
shadows (and the like), see Casati (2000), Casati and Varzi (1995,
1999,
2014), Lewis (1970), Sorensen (2008), and Varzi (1997,
2013). On
Polywater, see Ball (1999) and Van Brakel
(2000), pp.87-97. For
para-reflections see Sorensen (2003,
2008). On this topic in general, see Williams (2000), as well as
here.
It is also worth remembering that
Lenin himself
believed in the "objective" existence of the
Ether.
This was doubly unfortunate in view of the fact that (a) It was
rather badly-timed, situated as it was when this 'objective' entity was about to
fall through a
hole in the Whole, and
then off into (possible?) oblivion, and
(b) In MEC, it formed an integral part of Lenin's exposition of the "objectivity" of dialectics .
[Cf., Lenin (1972), pp.50,
312, 314,
329-31, etc.]
"That is why Engels gave the
example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical
materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is,
from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, etherand so onexist as objective realities outside the human mind or not?
The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and
they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as
they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to
organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the
concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but
objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it."
[Lenin (1972),
p.312.
Bold emphases added.]
Moreover, Lenin was still
invoking the Ether several years later, in PN!
"Thus the conjecture
about the ether has existed for thousands of years, remaining until now a
conjecture. But at the present time there are already a thousand times more
subsurface channels leading to a solution of the problem, to a
scientific determination of the ether." [Lenin (1961),
p.250. Emphases in the
original.]
This question forces itself upon us: Is the Ether an 'objective', or a
'subjective' part of the "Totality"? Since the scientists to whom Lenin refers
now almost "invariably" answer the first half
of his question in the
negative, it would seem that the "Totality" must be either be sensitive to their serially
fickle decisions, or has somehow lost a significant slice of its own fabric. Is
it perhaps the
Cheshire Cat
of Cosmology?
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks,
or Lenin (1961); MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, or Lenin (1972).]
Incidentally, Engels also appeared to accept the
'objective' existence of the Ether:
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added. See also, ibid.,
pp.286-87. In fact, the term appears
dozens of times throughout DN -- for example, pp.26-27, 110, 119-21, 243-44,
276, 293.]
If, back then, there had been a
Marxist Un-Dialectical Activities Committee established
and commissioned to decide what
the dialectical-contents of the "Totality" were supposed to be, it is to be hoped that Engels, Lenin and
Plekhanov were quietly left off the panel.
But, does all this mean that Lenin's
"Totality" is different from, say, John Rees's "Totality"? Or, Woods and Grant's?
Or Stalin's? Is it the 'same' as, or different from that of Engels and Plekhanov? Or, maybe Trotsky's? Or, has the
"Totality" itself changed over the last 80
years, divesting itself of the Ether and countless other formerly 'objective'
entities, replacing them with others possessed of equally insecure citizenship (such a 'Dark
Matter')? Has the "Totality" progressed since Engels's and Lenin's
ex
cathedra pronouncements? Or has it regressed?
Even odder still: At one time,
Marx showed great interest in the work
of
Pierre Trémaux,
a French architect who thought he could advance human knowledge by rejecting key
areas of
Darwinian evolutionary theory, alleging that the nature of the soil in a specific region
influenced speciation. Well, is this process part of the "Totality", even
though Marx himself later abandoned it (probably under the influence of a rare
flash of good sense fromEngels)? Or, did this rather un-Darwinian process only show its face in the
"Totality" for a few months -- as a sort of reverse Cheshire Cat
phenomenon -- while Marx was chewing things over? [On this, see Weikart (1998).]
In fact, the above comments are slightly
prejudicial; some of
Trémaux's ideas anticipated, for
example, the work of
Gould and Eldredge, among others. Since
this Essay was originally written, things seem to have changed once more, and
have in some circles swung in favour of Trémaux's
ideas. Are his ideas
about to be rehabilitated? Is the
"Totality" on the verge of changing its 'mind'? Or is it dithering
once more? Where is
The Marxist Un-Dialectical Activities
Committee when we need it!
An even more vexing question for STDs and MISTs
to consider is
the following:
Are
Lysenko's ideas (or, at least, to the
processes they
supposedly
related) part of the "Totality", or not? For the best part of thirty years,
Soviet (and later Chinese) scientists certainly accepted his ideas as Gospel
Truth. Is the "Totality"
now sensitive to sectarian splits in Marxism, with us Trotskyists displaying
'reactionary'
scepticism while our Stalinist and Maoist brethren plumbed impressive new depths of dialectical
gullibility?
[On this, see Grant (2007), Joravsky (1970), Medvedev
(1969), and Soyfer (1994). See also my comments on other aspects of 'dialectical
science' (including the decidedly odd
ideas of
Lenin's friend,
Olga
Lepeshinskaya)
in Essay Four
Part One.]
Are these genuine parts of the "Totality", or
are they merely
temporary residents or interlopers?
Hold the press! In view of the fact
that Epigenetic and vaguelyLamarckian theories are slowly regaining
favour in some circles, is Lysenko on the verge of being rehabilitated, too? On that, see
here.
Even odder still:
It now seems that
the Ether might
one day make a come-back. According to Cantor and Hodge:
"By 1951, however, we find an eminent
physicist,
P. A. M. Dirac, having to argue in the journal Nature (168:906-7)
that although Einstein's 1905 principle of relativity led, reasonably enough, to
the ether's generally being abandoned, with the new quantum electrodynamics we
may be, after all, 'rather forced to have an aether'.
"...[T]here have been, and
still are, many ether theories that, in principle, are perfectly compatible with
special relativity
and even
general relativity. Moreover, quantum theory has led to new conceptions of
ether, and not a few physicists have urged the necessity of some form of ether
theory." [Cantor and Hodge (1981), pp.ix, 53.]
These two authors even quote
Einstein and Dirac as
follows:
"More careful reflection
teaches us, however, that the special theory of relativity does not compel us to
deny ether. We may assume the existence of ether; only we must give up ascribing
a definite state of motion to it.... [There] is a weighty argument to be adduced
in favour of the ether hypothesis. To deny ether is ultimately to assume that
empty space has no physical qualities whatsoever. The fundamental facts of
mechanics do not harmonize with this view.... According to the general theory of
relativity space without ether is unthinkable; for in such space there would not
only be no propagation of light, but also no possibility of the existence of
standards of space and time (measuring rods and clocks), nor therefore any
space-time intervals in the physical sense". [Ibid., p.54, quoting Einstein
(1922a). I have not yet been able to check the latter reference.]
"Physical knowledge has
advanced very much since 1905, notably by the arrival of
quantum
mechanics, and the situation has again changed. If one examines the question
in the light of present-day knowledge, one finds that the aether is no longer
ruled out by relativity, and good reasons can now be advanced for postulating an
aether." [Ibid., p.54, quoting Dirac (1951). Again, I have not yet been able to
check this reference.]
[These facts are also reported
in the Wikipedia article on the
Luminiferous Aether.
On this in general, see
Kostro
(2000).]
Even the New Scientist is getting in
on the act; speaking about research into 'Dark Energy', it had this to say:
"Unfortunately, physicists
are having trouble finding a way to fit a
cosmological constant into their best
existing theories. 'A small non-zero dark energy is more difficult to explain
than zero,' says Sean Carroll, a cosmologist from the California Institute of
Technology in Pasadena. 'So we are driven to wilder ideas.'
"One of those wild ideas is
quintessence, which postulates the existence of a hitherto unsuspected quantum
field permeating the universe.... Because this implies that there would also be
a new fundamental force of nature, the idea set some physicists thinking:
instead of adding a new force, why not modify an old one? Perhaps there are
unexpected properties of gravity that appear over gargantuan distances that
Einstein's general relativity does not predict....
"By giving us detailed
measurements of the acceleration of different parts of the universe, the next
generation of surveys could reveal the nature of the dominant component of the
universe. Whatever it turns out to be, it will be big news. 'Dark energy
could be the ether of the 21st century,' says Carroll. Even if we explain it
away, we will learn something profound about the universe.
"It is a viewpoint shared by
cosmologists everywhere. 'We are definitely seeing something extra in the
universe, we just do not know how to interpret it yet,' says [Ofer
Lahav of University College London].
And that has given cosmologists a new sense of purpose. A seismic shift in our
understanding of the universe is coming. How soon it will arrive and from what
direction it will come -- that's still anyone's guess." [Clark (2007), pp.31-33.
Bold emphasis and links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Is the Ether, therefore, queuing up somewhere in
a sort of 'subsistence
anteroom', waiting for rehabilitation, almost as if it were a member of
an ethereal version of the
Chinese
Communist Party?
Perhaps it is, for an earlier edition of the New
Scientist reported the following:
"'Ether' returns in a bid to oust dark matter
"Zeeya Merali
"From his office window,
Glenn
Starkman
can see the site where
Albert Michelson and Edward Morley
carried out their famous 1887 experiment
that ruled out the presence of an all-pervading 'aether' in space, setting the
stage for Einstein's special theory of relativity. So it seems ironic that
Starkman, who is at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, is now
proposing a theory that would bring ether back into the reckoning. While this
would defy Einstein, Starkman's ether would do away with the need for
dark
matter.
"Nineteenth-century physicists believed that just as sound
waves move through air, light waves must move through an all-pervading physical
substance, which they called luminiferous ('light-bearing') ether. However, the
Michelson-Morley experiment failed to find any signs of ether, and 18 years
after that, Einstein's special relativity argued that light propagates through a
vacuum. The idea of ether was abandoned -- but not discarded altogether, it
seems.
"Starkman and colleagues Tom Zlosnik and
Pedro Ferreira
of the University of Oxford are now reincarnating the ether in a new form to
solve the puzzle of dark matter, the mysterious substance that was proposed to
explain why galaxies seem to contain much more mass than can be accounted for by
visible matter. They posit an ether that is a field, rather than a substance,
and which pervades space-time. 'If you removed everything else in the universe,
the ether would still be there,' says Zlosnik.
"This ether field isn't to do with light, but rather is
something that boosts the gravitational pull of stars and galaxies, making them
seem heavier, says Starkman. It does this by increasing the flexibility of
space-time itself.... 'We usually imagine space-time as a rubber sheet that's
warped by a massive object,' says Starkman. 'The ether makes that rubber sheet
more bendable in parts, so matter can seem to have a much bigger gravitational
effect than you would expect from its weight.' The team's calculations show that
this ether-induced gravity boost would explain the observed high velocities of
stars in galaxies, currently attributed to the presence of dark matter.
"This is not the first time that physicists have suggested
modifying gravity to do away with this unseen dark matter. The idea was
originally proposed by
Mordehai
Milgrom
while at Princeton University in the 1980s. He suggested that the
inverse-square law of gravity only applies where the acceleration caused by the
field is above a certain threshold, say
a0.
Below that value, the field dissipates more slowly, explaining the observed
extra gravity. 'It wasn't really a theory, it was a guess,' says cosmologist
Sean Carroll at the University of Chicago in Illinois.
"Then in 2004 this idea of modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND)
was reconciled with general relativity by
Jacob
Bekenstein at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel (New Scientist,
22 January 2005, p.10), making MOND a genuine contender in the eyes of some
physicists. 'Bekenstein's work was brilliant, but fiendishly complicated, using
many different and arbitrary fields and parameters,' says Ferreira. 'We felt
that something so complicated couldn't be the final theory.'
"Now Starkman's team has reproduced Bekenstein's results
using just one field -- the new ether (www.arxiv.org/astro-ph/0607411).
Even more tantalisingly, the calculations reveal a close relationship between
the threshold acceleration a0 -- which
depends on the ether -- and the rate at which the universe's expansion is
accelerating. Astronomers have attributed this acceleration to something called
dark energy, so in a sense the ether is related to this entity. 'That they have
found this connection is a truly profound thing,' says Bekenstein. The team is
now investigating how the ether might cause the universe's expansion to speed
up.
"Andreas
Albrecht, a cosmologist at the University of California, Davis, believes
that this ether model is worth investigating further. 'We've hit some really
profound problems with cosmology -- with dark matter and dark energy,' he says.
'That tells us we have to rethink fundamental physics and try something new.'
"Both Bekenstein and Albrecht say Starkman's team must now
carefully check whether the ether theory fits with the motions of planets within
our solar system, which are known to a high degree of accuracy, and also explain
what exactly this ether is. Ferreira agrees: 'The onus is definitely on us to
pin this theory down so it doesn't look like yet another fantastical
explanation,' he says.
"However, physicists may be reluctant to resurrect any
kind of ether because it contradicts special relativity by forming an absolute
frame of reference. 'Interestingly, this controversial aspect should make it
easy to test for experimentally,' says Carroll." [New
Scientist 2566, 25/08/06.
Several links added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
In fact, as we have seen, the existence of
the Ether
neither contradicts Einstein nor Relativity.
So, does this mean that the Ether both is and is not part of the
"Totality"? Perhaps its most 'contradictory' aspect, since it seems
consecutively to
exist and not to exist, or even both concurrently?
At any rate, as we have seen, the Ether
has a modern-day analogue --, somewhat disarmingly called by some "The Field", by
others merely "Space-Time" ("Space-Time
Substantivalism") --, and now even, perhaps, 'Dark Energy' as the above
articles hint? [On this, see
Granek (2001).]
[Views such as these present yet more
examples of the ubiquitous
reification of
'mathematical objects'
found in modern Physics. More on that in Essay Thirteen Parts
One and Two.
Even though
I disagree with his pro-DM stance, Malek (2011) is very good on this aspect of
the Idealism implicit modern Physics -- although, Malek, too, forgot to tell
his readers what the
"Totality" actually is!]
19a.
Anyone tempted to argue that evidence alone is decisive here should read the following,
and then perhaps think again:
"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to
Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence
available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong
support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern
would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early
corpuscularian chemistry to
Stahl'sphlogiston theory
to
Lavoisier's oxygen
chemistry to Daltonian
atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various
versions of
preformationism
to
epigenetic
theories of embryology; from the
caloric theory
of heat to later and ultimately contemporary
thermodynamic
theories; from
effluvial theories of electricity
and magnetism to theories of
the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from
humoral
imbalance
to
miasmatic
to
contagion
and ultimately germ theories of disease;
from 18th Century
corpuscular theories of light
to 19th
Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from
Hippocrates'spangenesis
to
Darwin's blending theory of inheritance
(and his own
'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to
Wiesmann's germ-plasm
theory and
Mendelian
and contemporary molecular genetics; from
Cuvier's
theory of functionally
integrated and necessarily static biological species or
Lamarck's autogenesis to
Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of
theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more
unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry
offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are
alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even
when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]
Update September 2012: We now read
the following in the New Scientist:
"Then in 1956,
Joe Hin Tjio
and
Albert
Levan tried a new technique for looking at cells. They counted over and over
until they were certain they could not be wrong. When they announced their
result, other researchers remarked that they had counted the same, but figured
they must have made a mistake. Tjio and Levan had counted only 46 chromosomes,
and they were right....
"It is obvious that scientific knowledge is continually
updated through new discoveries and the replication of studies, but until recent
years little attention had been paid to how fast this change occurs. In
particular, few had attempted to quantify how long it would take what we know at
any given moment to become untrue, or replaced with a closer approximation of
the truth.
"Among the first groups to measure this churning of
knowledge was a team of researchers at
Pitié-Salpętričre hospital in Paris, France. To get a handle on it,
Thierry Poynard and his colleagues chose to focus on
medical fields in which they specialised:
cirrhosis
and
hepatitis,
two areas related to liver diseases. They took nearly 500 articles in these
fields from over 50 years and gave them to a panel of experts to examine. Each
expert was charged with saying whether the paper was factual, out-of-date or
disproved (Annals
of Internal Medicine, vol 136, p.888).
"Through doing this, Poynard and his colleagues were able
to create a simple chart that showed the amount of factual content that had
persisted over the previous decades (see
diagram). They found something striking: a clear decay
in the number of papers that were still valid. Furthermore, it was possible to
get a clear measurement for the 'half-life' of facts in these fields by looking
at where the curve crosses 50 per cent on this chart: 45 years....
"We can't predict which individual papers will be
overturned, of course, just like we can't tell when individual radioactive atoms
will decay, but we can observe the aggregate and see that there are rules for
how a field changes over time. The cirrhosis and hepatitis results were nearly
identical to an earlier study that examined the overturning of information in
surgery. Two Australian surgeons found that half of the facts in that field also
become false every 45 years (The
Lancet, vol 350, p 1752)....
"To understand the decay in the truth of a paper, we can
measure how long it takes for people to stop citing the average paper in a
field. Whether it is no longer interesting, no longer relevant or has been
contradicted by new research, this paper is no longer a part of the living
scientific literature. The amount of time it takes for others to stop citing
half of the literature in a field is also a half-life of sorts.
"Through this we can begin to get rough estimates of the
half-lives of many fields. For example, a study of all the papers in the
Physical Review journals, a cluster of periodicals of great importance to
physicists, found that the half-life in physics is about 10 years (arxiv.org/abs/physics/0407137).
"Different publication formats can also have varied
half-lives. In 2008,
Rong Tang of Simmons College in Boston looked at
scholarly books in different fields and found that physics has a longer
half-life (13.7 years) than economics (9.4), which in turn outstays mathematics,
psychology and history (College
& Research Libraries, vol 69, p 356)....
"Extinct in a blink
"It's easy to mistakenly assume that some of the facts in
our heads are absolute, especially those learned in the textbooks of our youth
(see main story). As a child, I loved learning about dinosaurs. But I have since
discovered an incorrect fact that I had lived my childhood assuming was
accurate: the name Brontosaurus.
"The four-legged
saurischian,
with its long neck and tiny head, is iconic. And yet its name is actually
Apatosaurus.
Why? In 1978, two palaeontologists noticed that the skeleton used to identify
the Brontosaurus species had been graced with the skull of a different
plant-eating dinosaur. The body belonged to the Apatosaurus. The Brontosaurus
never existed.
"Since then, scientists have promoted the name change, and
it has gained some currency. Nevertheless, the Brontosaurus myth continues to
endure in popular knowledge and books -- no doubt aided by people who missed the
expiry of this fact." [Arbesman
(2012b), pp.37-39. Emphases in the original. Some links added. Quotation
marks and some formatting altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
[More details are given in Arbesman (2012a).]
However, it isn't easy to resist asking the
following question: how long will the above
conclusions remain 'true'?
Update April 2015: Not long, it seems!
The BBC now reports that Brontosaurus has made a dramatic come-back, and
within three years of its demise having been announced above.
"The iconic name Brontosaurus, once used
to describe a family of huge dinosaurs, has been resurrected after being killed
off more than a century ago. In 1903, scientists decided Brontosaurus was
a more complete specimen of a different dinosaur. But many more specimens of
plant-eating sauropod dinosaurs are now known, revealing Brontosaurus to
be different enough to warrant its own name. The results have been published in
the open access
journal PeerJ. The name
Brontosaurus goes back to the so-called Bone Wars of the late 1800s, when
rival fossil hunters Othniel Charles Marsh and Edward Drinker Cope raced new
dinosaur names into the scientific literature.
"In their quest for new
specimens, Marsh and Cope were drawn to the rich fossil beds of the American
west. Marsh's team found two long-necked sauropods. He named one Apatosaurus
ajax (Apatosaurus means 'deceptive lizard') and the second skeleton
Brontosaurus excelsus (Brontosaurus means 'noble thunder lizard').
Shortly after Marsh's death, a team from the Field Museum of Chicago found
another dinosaur skeleton similar to both Apatosaurus ajax and
Brontosaurus excelsus, but with features deemed intermediate between the
two. This led the scientists to conclude that Apatosaurus and
Brontosaurus were just different species within the same scientific genus.
Apatosaurus took precedence because it had been named first so,
Brontosaurus excelsus became Apatosaurus excelsus.
"But the name Brontosaurus
is still known by several generations of schoolchildren. It's not entirely clear
why the name stuck, but it may be to do with its origins in the Bone Wars, when
there was intense public interest in the discovery of new dinosaurs. It may also
be because of the evocative meaning: 'thunder lizard'.
"Now, Emanuel Tschopp from
the New University of Lisbon in Portugal and colleagues applied statistical
techniques to calculate the differences between species and genera of diplodocid
dinosaurs (the large-scale grouping that includes Apatosaurus as well as
other long-necked plant eaters). It is only with new finds of dinosaurs similar
to Apatosaurus and Brontosaurus in recent years that it became
possible to undertake a detailed investigation of how different they were.
"'Until very recently, the
claim that Brontosaurus was the same as Apatosaurus was completely
reasonable, based on the knowledge we had,' said Mr Tschopp. To their surprise,
Brontosaurus emerged from the analysis as a distinct dinosaur.
"The wrong skull
"'The differences we found
between Brontosaurus and Apatosaurus were at least as numerous as
the ones between other closely related genera, and much more than what you
normally find between species,' explained Roger Benson, a co-author from the
University of Oxford. Thus, the researchers argue that it is now possible to
resurrect Brontosaurus as a genus, different from Apatosaurus.
"Prof Paul Barrett, of
London's Natural History Museum, who was not involved in the research, told BBC
News: 'This paper is the most comprehensive study produced to date on the
evolution of Diplodocus and its closest relatives and sets out some
really interesting new ideas on how these animals are related, and how they
should be classified. The author finds a number of ways in which the original
specimens of Brontosaurus and Apatosaurus can be separated from
each other and uses these to resurrect Brontosaurus as a separate entity.
The conclusions seem entirely reasonable to me, as they are well argued and well
supported, and it will be interesting to see how quickly these suggestions
are adopted by the community.'
"Marsh's case was not helped
by making an incorrect reconstruction of Brontosaurus' skull because of
the limited material available at the time. He had assumed it was boxy, like
another long-necked dinosaur from the western US known as Camarasaurus.
But research in the 1970s showed that Apatosaurus -- and thus
'Brontosaurus' -- would have had a slender, horse-like skull. This gave rise
to a popular myth that 'Brontosaurus' was simply an Apatosaurus
with the wrong head." [Quoted from
here; accessed 07/04/2015. Several paragraphs merged to save space.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some
italic emphases added, since the original article used them inconsistently.
Minor spelling mistake corrected. Link in the original, although it now seems to be
broken!]
So, it rather looks like much of the
"Totality" (should we ever be told what it is) itself has a relatively
short half-life. In view of this, one can only wish
The Marxist Un-Dialectical Activities
Committee charged with deciding what the
"Totality" actually contains "good luck"! Any conclusions they might reach stand
a reasonably high probability of being rendered obsolete within a couple of generations.
The suggestion made earlier that the
DM-"Totality" should be fitted with a revolving door doesn't look like such a bad
idea now.
19b.
An excellent example of a DM-fan keen to tail-end what appears to be the latest
scientific fad is Mason (2012) -- especially Mason's 'Marxism,
Materialism and Particle Physics', which has been reprinted in the third
edition of his book. [Mason
(2012), pp.113-36.]
I will cite several examples in a
future re-write of this Essay.
20.
Much of the following material was written before the scientific community claimed to have found
the Higgs Boson. I have, however, commented on that discovery below --
here,
here and
here.
The elusive
Higgs Boson is at present just clinging onto
its
'existence'; cf., New Scientist, 08/12/01, pp.4-5. Of course, the
existence of the Higgs Boson
is merely theoretical (although
some Physicists not only deny it exists, they claim it cannot exist because
that eventuality depends on the
Klein-Gordon equation, which is, apparently,
fundamentally flawed); the implications of that particular observation will
also be explored in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
Earlier, we were being told (by some) that "Dark Energy"
might not exist, either: "Is Dark Energy a mirage?" asks Marcus Chown
in the New
Scientist (Volume 180, No. 2424, 06/12/03, pp.10-11). [See also, Chown (2003,
2004), and the BBC Horizon programme, "Is
Everything We Know About The Universe Wrong?" (broadcast in March
2010).]
In fact,
concerning both of the above theoretical entities, a Physicist had this to say
in a recent issue of the New Scientist:
"In your article on the search for the Higgs particle, it is implicitly assumed
that the Higgs exists
(24
July, p.8).
This hope is shared by many physicists, and it was one of the main motivations
for building the
Large Hadron Collider. However, a small group of physicists, myself
included, is challenging this view. Some have even gone so far as to bet
thousands of dollars that it doesn't exist (though
Stephen
Hawking has bet only $100).
"It is important to remember that the Higgs mechanism was invented in 1964 as a
'fix' to give mass to the particles called
vector
bosons, just as dark matter was suggested as a fix to explain the velocities
at which galaxies orbit each other in clusters. Neither of these entities has
been found." [R van Nieuwenhove,
New Scientist207, 2773, 14/08/2010, p.30. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Some links added.]
The above individual, who wrote that letter before
this particle was deemed to have been discovered, might still win his bet, for
recent research suggests that this particle hasn't actually been discovered! On
that see the
Appendix.
Is the "Totality", therefore, about to change -- depending on the result of this latest
example of scientific dithering? Must it, too, wait for the next issue of the New
Scientist, or of
Nature, or of Science Daily, before it is granted at least a temporary
residence permit for, and thus a legitimate entry Visa allowing it into, the mysterious "Totality"?
[More shady details
here.]
Now we are being told that
scientists have discovered a huge 'hole' in space [New Scientist
195, 2619, 01/09/07, p.7.], one billion light years across, which, they say, contains nothing at
all.
[Perhaps this is the part of the "Totality" that actually contains Hegel's 'Nothing'?
Have we at last found the origin of 'Becoming'?]
And, as if to pile yet more misery on believers in the
nebulous "Totality", add to the above the anomalous
recent results concerning the so-called "Placebo" and "homeopathic" effects, reported in the New Scientist recently. [Volume 185, 2491, 19/03/05,
pp.31-33.]
This relates to work done by a sceptical scientist in Belfast who, so the
story goes, set out to disprove
homeopathy,
but in a series of controlled experiments found that perhaps the reverse
conclusion was more warranted. According to the report,
these results have "profound implications". We are even told that we
may "have to rewrite physics
and chemistry." Is the "Totality" about to morph yet again? Or, will it fight
back and reject such 'New Age' impertinences -- perhaps, by means of death by a thousand
peer reviews?
Gravitational
waves, predicted by General Relativity, haven't yet
been
detected..., er,...,
or
have they? Well, as usual, that depends on who is telling the story.
On this, see Collins (1994, 1998, 1999,
2004), and Kennefick (2007). Are
there then two competing "Totalities": one in which these waves
have been
detected, and one in which they still remain elusive?
Or, are these two 'dialectically-united opposite' universes/"Totalities" in 'logical tension'
with one another?
Update March 2014:
The BBC published this breathless report on its News Website
about the aforementioned gravitational waves:
"Scientists
say they have extraordinary new evidence to
support a Big Bang Theory for the origin of
the Universe. Researchers believe they have
found the signal left in the sky by the
super-rapid expansion of space that must
have occurred just fractions of a second
after everything came into being. It takes
the form of a distinctive twist in the
oldest light detectable with telescopes.
The work will be scrutinised carefully,
but already there is talk of a Nobel.
"'This is
spectacular,' commented Prof Marc
Kamionkowski, from Johns Hopkins University.
'I've seen the research; the arguments are
persuasive, and the scientists involved are
among the most careful and conservative
people I know,' he told BBC News.
"The
breakthrough was announced by an American
team working on a project known as
BICEP2.
This has been using a telescope at the South
Pole to make detailed observations of a
small patch of sky. The aim has been to try
to find a residual marker for 'inflation'
-- the idea that the cosmos experienced an
exponential growth spurt in its first
trillionth, of a trillionth of a trillionth
of a second.
Gravitational waves from inflation put a distinctive twist
pattern in the polarisation of the CMB [Cosmic
Microwave Background -- RL]
"Theory holds that this would have taken the infant Universe from something
unimaginably small to something about the size of a marble. Space has continued
to expand for the nearly 14 billion years since.
"Inflation
was first proposed in the early 1980s to
explain some aspects of Big Bang Theory that
appeared to not quite add up, such as why
deep space looks broadly the same on all
sides of the sky. The contention was that a
very rapid expansion early on could have
smoothed out any unevenness. But inflation
came with a very specific prediction -- that
it would be associated with waves of
gravitational energy, and that these ripples
in the fabric of space would leave an
indelible mark on the oldest light in the
sky --
the famous Cosmic Microwave Background.
"The BICEP2
team says it has now identified that signal.
Scientists call it
B-mode polarisation. It is a
characteristic twist in the directional
properties of the CMB. Only the
gravitational waves moving through the
Universe in its inflationary phase could
have produced such a marker. It is a true
'smoking gun'.
"Speaking at
the press conference to announce the
results, Prof John Kovac of the
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics,
and a leader of the BICEP2 collaboration,
said: 'This is opening a window on what we
believe to be a new regime of physics -- the
physics of what happened in the first
unbelievably tiny fraction of a second in
the Universe.'
"'Completely
astounded'
"The signal
is reported to be quite a bit stronger than
many scientists had dared hope. This
simplifies matters, say experts. It means
the more exotic models for how inflation
worked are no longer tenable.
"The results
also constrain the energies involved -- at
10,000 trillion
gigaelectronvolts. This is consistent
with ideas for what is termed
Grand Unified Theory, the realm where
particle physicists believe three of the
four fundamental forces in nature can be
tied together. But by associating
gravitational waves with an epoch when
quantum effects were so dominant, scientists
are improving their prospects of one day
pulling the fourth force -- gravity itself
-- into a Theory of Everything.
"The
sensational nature of the discovery means
the BICEP2 data will be subjected to intense
peer review. It is possible for the
interaction of CMB light with dust in our
galaxy to produce a similar effect, but the
BICEP2 group says it has carefully checked
its data over the past three years to rule
out such a possibility. Other experiments
will now race to try to replicate the
findings.
"Prof Andrew
Jaffe from Imperial College London, UK,
works on a rival telescope called
POLARBEAR. He
commented: 'A lot of this is technology
driven. And the next generation of
experiments, like the next generation of
POLARBEAR,
SPIDER
and
EBEX,
and things like that, will have far more
detectors and will go after this signal and
hopefully drag out much more detail.'
"Assuming the
BICEP2 results are confirmed, a Nobel Prize
seems assured. Who this would go to is
difficult to say, but leading figures on the
BICEP2 project and the people who first
formulated inflationary theory would be in
the running.
"One of those
pioneers,
Prof Alan Guth
from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, told the BBC: 'I have been
completely astounded. I never believed when
we started that anybody would ever measure
the non-uniformities of the CMB, let alone
the polarisation, which is now what we are
seeing. I think it is absolutely amazing
that it can be measured and also absolutely
amazing that it can agree so well with
inflation and also the simplest models of
inflation -- nature did not have to be so
kind and the theory didn't have to be
right.'
"British
scientist Dr Jo Dunkley, who has been
searching through data from the
European Planck space telescope
for a B-mode signal, commented: 'I can't
tell you how exciting this is. Inflation
sounds like a crazy idea, but everything
that is important, everything we see today
-- the galaxies, the stars, the planets --
was imprinted at that moment, in less than a
trillionth of a second. If this is
confirmed, it's huge.'" [Quoted from
here;
accessed 28/03/2014. Several paragraphs
merged to save space. Quotations marks
altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Some links added.]
However, since inflation violates core principles
of the
TOR, this might
be a case of one step forward, ten back. [Naturally,
scientists deny this theory violates the TOR.] But,
will this odd idea be ditched like so much else
has been in the history of science?
How will that affect the mysterious "Totality"?
February 2015:
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that a recent comprehensive study has shown that
the above results were "mistaken". On that, see the
Appendix.
Over the next few years, I will be adding to the
Appendix
several more examples of 'mature science' being ditched as scientists continue
to change
their minds, or seem to dither. [Also see Note 21,Note 21a,
Note 22, and Note 22aa, below.]
21.
Once more, it is important to point out that the existence or nature of these entities isn't being questioned here.
The
point is that scientists themselves are sceptical of many of them (just
as they are wont to change their minds constantly -- see Note 19 and Note 20, above).
Incidentally,
"Tetraneutrons"
were reported in the New Scientist (Volume 185, No. 2491, 19/03/05,
pp.34-35), which also records renewed interest in "Cold Fusion",
p.37.
On recent work on the "magnetic monopole", see
here. On 'Red
Mercury', see Grant (2007), pp.130-32.
Update December 2009:
A team of US
scientists claim to have
detected 'Dark Matter' in the shape of
WIMPs.
Is it too early to tell if this is a genuine detection or just another false
alarm? [I hesitate to add links to more recent reports about this illusive 'form
of matter' since they seem to change
tack almost daily: "Dark Matter has been discovered..., er, no it hasn't....
Ah! Yes it has..., er..., oh, wait...".]
Update November 2012: Sure enough, the
aforementioned 'detection' proved to be yet another false alarm:
"Doubt cast on Fermi's dark matter smoking gun
"Lisa Grossman
"It was hailed as a smoking gun for
dark matter, raising hopes that we might finally
pinpoint the particle that is thought to make up 80 per cent of the mass in the
universe. But purported evidence of dark matter interactions in the centre of
our galaxy may not be as solid as hoped.
"Most physicists think dark matter is made of
weakly interacting massive particles, or WIMPs, which
only interact with normal matter via gravity. When two WIMPs meet, they should
annihilate and spew out new particles, including high-energy gamma rays.
"The
Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope searches for dark
matter by seeking these gamma rays. If it detects more gamma rays of a certain
energy than known sources can explain, that would be thought by many to be a
sign of WIMPs.
"'This kind of narrow, distinct feature is not really
predicted to come from any other process,' says Fermi team member Andrea Albert
of Ohio State University.
"That's why scientists were abuzz in April, when
Christoph
Weniger of the Max Planck Institute for Physics in
Munich, Germany, reported observing a spike in gamma rays at 130
gigaelectronvolts (GeV). These were coming from the Milky Way's centre and had
no obvious astrophysical source.
"While not a member of the Fermi team, Weniger was able to
analyse publicly available data from 3.5 years of telescope observations. Other
physicists looked at the same data and agreed that the signal was strong enough
not to be a random fluctuation. Either the telescope was behaving oddly, or it
was seeing dark matter particles with energies of 130 GeV.
"'If the latter is true, it would dwarf the Higgs boson
discovery,' wrote physics blogger Jester on his blog
Resonaances.
"The Fermi team remained quiet about the finding at the
time, but their reaction was hotly anticipated. In addition to having a full
four years' worth of data to analyse, the team also has access to an important
cross-check on any possible signal.
"Dark matter should pool at the galaxy's centre, with
negligible amounts surrounding Earth. What Earth does have, however, is a ring
of gamma rays produced when
cosmic rays
strike the atmosphere. If, when Fermi is
pointed at this ring, Weniger's 130 GeV gamma ray signal shows up there, it
suggests that it isn't a dark matter signal. 'It's a good place for a sanity
check,' says Albert.
"The team first had to reprocess their data from the
galactic centre to account for a glitch caused by a damaged instrument on the
telescope. That revealed that the signal had shifted from 130 to 135 GeV,
Albert told the Fourth International Fermi Symposium in Monterey,
California, on 2 November. What's more, that signal had faded to statistical
insignificance.
"'The feature's gotten a little smaller,' she says. 'It
hasn't gone away completely, but we do not see it to be very significant. At
this point, we have to cast doubt on this being a dark matter line.'
"The signal also showed up in the ring of gamma rays
around Earth, but it seems to account for only half of that detected from the
galactic centre, and there is no good way to explain why it is there. 'There is
nothing obvious, at least to me, that connects the galactic centre and the
[gamma-ray ring],' Weniger says.
"It could be that there is a fault with the Fermi team's
data processing methods, or that one line is false and the other is real. For
now, though, Weniger thinks there is still room for the line to be a dark matter
sign. 'It's difficult to get attached to a feature, because they come and go
often,' he says. 'But it could be the real thing. It could be the most exciting
discovery of the decade.'" [New
Scientist, 10/11/2012, p.15. Links in the original. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site; bold emphases added.
The on-line article has a different title to the published version.]
So, should an emergency meeting of
The Marxist Un-Dialectical Activities
Committee be called in order to decide whether or not Dark Matter is indeed part of
the "Totality"?
21a.
A recent article in Socialist Worker highlights the difficulties
DM-fans face over the
progress of science:
"Why
mass matters: the Higgs boson and particle physics
"Alice
Livingstone Boomla explains why we should care about the discovery of the Higgs
boson.
"Scientists have discovered a new particle -- which seems likely to be the
elusive Higgs boson. They have spent six decades trying to confirm what is
called the
Standard Model of particle physics. The Higgs boson is the last remaining
piece in the jigsaw of particles predicted by the theory.
"It has
unhelpfully become known as the God Particle. The hype around it fits into the
ideology of a quest for a
Theory of Everything -- an idea that carries almost theological significance
for some physicists.
"But it's
possible the discovery may not neatly confirm the theory, but expose its
contradictions and point towards new theories. The theory predicted the
existence of a large number of sub-atomic particles, only a few of which can be
observed in normal matter. Finding the others meant creating a 'particle soup'
through high-energy collisions in gigantic particle accelerators.
"Since
2000 it only remained to discover the Higgs boson, the particle which gives all
matter its mass. This was a mammoth task, because the Higgs boson was predicted
to decay too quickly to be observed directly. But we can see the particles it
decays into.
"Scientists compared the particles they expected to see if the Higgs boson had
been present with those they'd expect if it didn't exist. They have discovered a
new particle. And this new particle corresponds very closely to the predictions
for the Higgs boson. But it also appears to have some properties that don't
quite match.
"The
discovery points towards new theories and new hunts to embark on. For example
the theory of 'supersymmetry'
suggests that we may have found just one of five different Higgs bosons. That
gives the
Large Hadron Collider plenty to do before it shuts for a two year refit at
the end of this year.
"Revolutions
"Science
progresses through contradictions and revolutions. New evidence and new ideas
are constantly exposing contradictions within the theories that are widely
accepted. These contradictions open the door to overturning the old theory with
a new one that fits better -- until the cycle is repeated and a new scientific
revolution is needed to go beyond that theory in turn.
"The
Standard Model itself came out of an attempt to reconcile one of the fundamental
contradictions in 20th century physics -- between Einstein's theory of general
relativity and the strange new observations of quantum mechanics.
"It is
easy to fall into one of two traps. One is the narrow focus that scientists are
often pressured to take in order to prove the practical value of their research
for the purpose of funding. The other is the mysticism that saw even Stephen
Hawking argue that with the right theory scientists could know 'the mind of
God'.
"Frederick
Engels argued that 'Natural science developed in the midst of general revolution
and was itself thoroughly revolutionary'. [Quoting
Engels (1954), p.22 -- RL] The scientific breakthroughs of giants
like Galileo and Newton took place in the context of the rise of the capitalist
bourgeoisie against the old feudal order.
"New
social and productive forces raised new arguments. As Engels put it, although
'production owes to science...science owes infinitely more to production'.
[Quoting
Engels (1954), p.185 -- RL.]
"Today we
also see how capitalism can distort science and hold it back. Duplication of
effort between competing scientists, and between states, diverts resources. And
to get funding in universities, scientists have to look to research with obvious
profitable applications, or which fits in to the most fashionable theories. So
while we celebrate the new breakthroughs, we should also look forward to the
scientific revolutions that would be possible in a society based on cooperation
around human need." [Socialist
Worker, 2311, 14/07/2012, p.10.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.
Several paragraphs merged to save
space. Links added.]
[See also the
article on this subject in the
Appendix.]
Much of the above will be discussed in more
detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two (when it is published). However, anyone who
accepts DM must in the end disagree with the above conclusions about the development of science.
Here is why (this is an edited version of
a letter a supporter of this
site sent to Socialist Worker):
If nature is fundamentally contradictory, then dialecticians can't
in fact distinguish
those contradictions that reflect nature accurately from those that are simply
the product of a defective theory, the acceptance of which would hold up
scientific development.
On the other hand, if dialecticians think nature is fundamentally
contradictory (which they do), then why offer advice to physicists that they
should conduct more research to remove contradictions in a theory if that
theory reflects the fact that nature is contradictory? Surely, the more 'true' a
theory is the more it should reflect the contradictions they think exist in
nature. Hence, a 'true' theory should contain more contradictions than one that
isn't. But, if science progresses by removing such contradictions, then this
should produce theories that tell us that nature isn't contradictory, after all!
Alternatively, if scientists do not remove such contradictions, perhaps on the
grounds that a contradictory theory should reflect contradictory nature more
accurately (i.e., if they take the advice on offer from dialecticians),
then this would permanently hold up the progress of science.
We can call this The Dialecticians' Dilemma, for which there is no solution --
if, that is, we take advice on science and philosophy from Hegel and/or Engels.
[More details
here
and
here.]
They chose not to publish it. No prizes for guessing
why.
22.
By the way, if there is a
Marxist Un-Dialectical Activities Committee that decides on
such matters, it will need to convene reasonably quickly to decide whether or
not the
aforementioned
Higgs Boson
'objectively' exists. [On this topic, see the last three Notes, above] However, if this theoretical entity is no longer
to be considered 'objective' then the
Standard Model (already
under serious threat,
so we are told) cannot survive, and things like the
Higgs Field
will also need to be
tippexed out of the "Totality".
[Cf., New Scientist,
08/12/01, Leader Article, p.3.] Alternative, rival theories to the Standard Model have
already been constructed, and are waiting patiently in the wings to take over. [On this see
here,
here, and
here.] The problem is: which of these alternatives represents
or 'reflects' the 'objective' "Totality"?
Update June 2011: The BBC now reports the following:
"The head of the US' biggest particle
physics lab has appointed an expert committee to establish whether or not a new,
unanticipated sub-atomic particle has been detected by scientists. Such a discovery, hinted at by
experts in April, would mark one of the most radical changes to physics in
years. But separate science teams at the
Tevatron
accelerator are at loggerheads over the matter. The Tevatron is the US rival to
Europe's
Large Hadron Collider (LHC).
"The American machine is operated by
the
Fermi
National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) in Batavia, Illinois. Two separate multi-purpose detectors
-- or experiments -- analyse data from particle collisions at the Tevatron:
DZero and CDF. Each can cross-check the other team's
discoveries.
"The committee, set up by Fermilab
director Pier Oddone, will aim to resolve the differences between scientists
working on the CDF and DZero experiments. The panel members will 'compare
notes', aiming to determine the cause of the signal seen by CDF team members,
but not by DZero physicists. Professor Giovanni Punzi,
co-spokesperson for the CDF team, told BBC News: 'DZero did not confirm our
result, but it is not clear they reject it either. So we need to do more work
and look at more data.'
"He said the estimated size of the 'excess' -- the
possible signal of a new particle -- seen by CDF was affected by a large
statistical uncertainty. Because of this, he said, 'it is quite likely that the
disagreement [between the CDF and DZero analyses] is not nearly as large as it
appeared at first glance'.
"Comparing
notes
"The CDF team was analysing data from
collisions between protons and their anti-matter counterparts antiprotons. In
these collisions, particles known as
W bosons
are produced, along with a pair of 'jets' of other particles.
It was in these jets that the
unexpected 'bump' in the team's data
