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Firefox and Chrome reproduce them correctly.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Apart from Essay Three
Part Two,
this has been one of the most difficult to write. That is partly because so
little has been published by dialecticians themselves over the last 200 years that is of
any help understanding what
they mean by "the Totality" or "the Whole",
as will soon become apparent to anyone who is tempted to think otherwise
-- and, of course, those who bother to read this Essay! In fact, tackling
this particular topic is like what one imagines swimming through syrup must be
like -- but even then, one would at least have something to struggle against. With
respect to "the Totality" (and "the Whole") there is precious little.
Of course, some have made a few vague attempts at explaining what "the Totality"
(or "the Whole") is or involves, but
beyond that, as we will soon see,
the bemused reader faces what are in effect almost blank pages, a
theoretical desert made worse by no little prevarication
and dissembling on the part of dialecticians themselves.
However, it is important to point out up front
that in what follows
I
won't be considering
Holist
theories that attempt to account for human social and
economic development (unless, of course, they involve the use of Hegelian
concepts), since that would introduce issues relevant to Historical Materialism
[HM], a theory I largely ignore in these Essays (for reasons outlined
here).
In that case, both Parts of Essay Eleven are
largely, but not exclusively, devoted to a consideration of Holist theories applied to the natural world.
Unfortunately, parts of this Essay are a little repetitive; I have endeavoured to correct this
relatively
minor fault and will continue to do so in future re-writes. Having said that,
it is worth pointing out that books and articles
about Dialectical
Materialism [DM]
are themselves
highly repetitive,
so any criticism of them can hardly avoid a little of that, too.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As is the case with all my
work, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on HM -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
over thirty years ago.
The
difference between
DM and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
Several readers have complained about the number of
links I have included in these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult
to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they
believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply to
Essays that attempt to debunk that
very idea. However, to those who find these links do make these Essays
difficult to read I say this: ignore them, unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument in support of a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have added links to subjects
or issues that are part of common knowledge (such as recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, films, or certain words
that are in common use). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update these links when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared, I cannot possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
It is also worth adding that a good 50% of my case
against DM has been relegated to the
End Notes.
This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more
smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate fully my case against
DM, they will need to consult this additional material. In many cases, I have qualified my
comments (often adding greater detail and additional supporting evidence) to
those Notes. Indeed, I
have even raised objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will
have perhaps occurred to the reader) to my own arguments -- to which I have then
responded.
[I have explained why I have adopted this tactic in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my reply to any
objections they might have will be missed, as will this extra evidence,
qualifications and
argument.
Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for over thirty years, I've heard all the
objections there are! [I have linked to many of the more recent on-line debates here.]
Phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently, this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed here,
here, and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how that applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially here,
here,
and here). In addition
to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the argument
(but this time for absolute beginners!)
here.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of November 2021, this
Essay is just over 102,500 words long -- a block of approximately 40,000 words
from the old Appendix to this Essay has now been
moved to a new location, which I am currently
re-formatting. A much shorter summary of some of the main ideas expressed
below can be
accessed
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
The material
below does not represent my final view of any of the issues
raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
Parts One and Two of this Essay
will attempt to find out what DM-theorists mean by:
(1) "The Totality",
(2)
'Universal Interconnection', and,
(3) The obscure, but oft repeated thesis: "The
whole is greater than the sum of the parts; the parts make the whole and the
whole makes the parts" -- i.e., DM-Wholism.
The first two of the above will be
covered in Part One; the third will be tackled in
Part Two.
Imagine for a moment, if you will,
Hamlet without its main character, the
Prince, or at least without a single description of 'him' -- such as, whether
'he' is indeed a Prince, is male or female, or even if 'he' is a human being. In
such circumstances questions would rightly be asked about what role that 'character' could possibly have in a play supposedly about 'him',
just as doubts would be raised about
the competence, or even the sanity, of its author,
William Shakespeare.
Fortunately, we needn't indulge in such
flights-of-fancy.
Imagine now, if youcan, a
theory which its supporters tell us is among other things: (i) The "world-view"
of the proletariat; (ii) A completely general theory of everything in existence,
how it develops and changes -- or which is a 'method' aimed
to that end; (iii) An explanation of how
everything is interconnected with everything else in something
called "The Totality"; and that (iv) "The Totality" is
itself a
core concept, to such an extent that nothing can be
fully understood without
reference to, or in connection with, it.
Consider, too, the following additional fact: every
single one of its theoristsstudiously refuses to saywhat
this "Totality" actually is, or what its supposed "interconnections" are --,
or even how they know so much (or, as things turn out, so little) about this terminally
obscure 'object'/process.
Ponder no more! For that theory is
DM, those theorists are Dialectical Marxists, and they are world champion
prevaricators.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism/Materialist,
depending on the context.]
If you still harbour doubts, I invite you, dear
reader, to search
through their
writings -- and, for my sins, I have had to do just that for the last
thirty-five years! Even if you are the
slightest bit interested, you will find precious little there to help you decide what
DM is in fact about, for its most avid supporters have yet to tell
anyone (least of all each other) what this mysterious "Totality" actually is!
So, this isn't so much Hamlet without the
Prince, it is Hamlet without the..., er..., well..., er...
Indeed, over the last thirty-five years I have
made a point of asking the many DM-fans I know or have met (personally, or on
the Internet) what they think the "Totality" actually is. Of those who could be bothered to reply, most were either puzzled
(or
slightly annoyed) that Ieven thought to ask such an impertinent
question -- indeed, a question they imagined had a very clear and simple answer.
Some responded with "Nature, what else?", but refused to say any more (perhaps because, as we
will soon discover, there is no more to be said). Others gestured airily
toward the heavens, saying "All that!" -- rather like
parents who try to explain to
small children where 'God'
is supposed to be, with an "He's up there, in heaven", wafting their hands vaguely skywards.
Still others confessed they didn't know, but declared that
they still believed in it, just like those children with hand-waving parents.
Others of a more scientific frame-of-mind
referred me to the "Big Bang", forgetting that this is a theory of origins;
it tells us nothing about "everything", as we will also soon find out.
At this point, readers of a more kindly or
tolerant disposition might be tempted to respond:
"This can't be so! Surely someone has specified clearly what the DM-"Totality"
actually is. After all, dialecticians have had at least 150 years to come up with
something!"
To be sure, a handful of DM-theorists have
outlined a few vague
ideas about this mysterious 'entity' --, but beyond bare bones they have either sat on their hands or nervously looked the other way.
I suspect these guys could prevaricate for their country.
Indeed, dialecticians are remarkably coy
about their "Totality", and it isn't difficult to see why: There
isn't one.
Or, to be more specific: there is in fact no way of referring to
whatever it is they think they want to refer to as the "Totality".
Just as it is impossible to say who or what
'God' is, it is no less difficult to say what the "Totality" is.
That isn't so much
because of what those two words might appear to mean, it is because both are in fact
devoid of
meaning -- and that is so for remarkably similar reasons.
For believers, 'God' is unlike anything you
or I or anyone could possibly imagine, conceive, or sensibly put into words.
Those tempted to think
otherwise have simply latched onto an inferior sort of 'being' in whose 'name' it
wouldn't be worth persecuting a single
'infidel'.
Naturally, this means that the faithful have
found it impossible to speak about 'God' without using inappropriate metaphors
and
misleading analogies;
theologians have for many centuries used linguistic tricks and dodges like this
in their vain attempt to make 'God'-talk vaguely comprehensible. Unfortunately,
even though some of the mediating terms they have employed are well enough
understood (such as "father" and "son"), the intentional target of all this
analogising isn't. Precisely what is being analogised? The response from
believers? Yet more gobbledygook, or deafening silence...
In fact, it is impossible to answer questions
like these
without demoting 'God' to such an extent that 'He' would sink to the same level
of 'His' alleged creation. So, if you have to compare 'God' to one of 'His' creatures in order to
'understand'
'His' nature, 'He' can no longer be distinguished from them (except, perhaps, in
terms of 'His' magnitude, which would imply 'He' was like a
huge star when compared to a smaller one).
On the other hand, if 'He' is to be distinguished from 'His' supposed creation,
then any words used to describe 'His' inferior creation can't then be used to characterise 'Him' without implicating
'Him' in just such an ignominious
ontological
demotion.
If the gap between the 'Divine' and the mundane
is infinite, any attempt to bridge the divide would border on blasphemy
since it will either identify 'The Creation' with the
'Divine', or reduce the 'Divine' to the mundane.
Both approaches having failed, believers often fall
back on the time-honoured
via
negativa, beloved of Christian Mystics. For them, 'God' is not this, not that, not...
But, if we know nothing whatsoever about 'God'
(except we demote 'Him' in the above manner), and if 'He' is indeed indistinguishable from 'Nothing', how is the
use of the word "God" any different from, say, "Slithy
Tove"? Other than an appeal to a rather questionable tradition --,
wherein the word "God" has been attached to all manner of things (ranging
from money to natural powers and forces, from assorted Roman Emperors to..., yes...,
even
Eric Clapton) --, what can the faithful point
to in order to explain this word to those who simply see
before them on the page three perfectly ordinary letters ("G", "o", and "d")
knitted together into an inky sort of Trinity --, "God"?
Figure One: Is Clapton 'God'?
Figure Two: Some Think This Album Says
"Maybe!"
In like manner, to what can the DM-faithful
appeal in order to help non-believers comprehend their own invisible, incomprehensible 'Being'?
As we will soon find out, this 'inverted' DM-Deity -- the "Totality" --
will likewise die the death of a thousand
qualifications.
Or, to be more honest, the death of a thousand prevarications.
At this point, less patient readers might be tempted to
respond with the "It's everything" ploy -- as in "Damn it, it's perfectly clear what
that the Totality is, it's everything!".
Unfortunately, that reply is little help since it would simply prompt
the next question: "And what does that include?"
As we are about to discover (as this Essay
unfolds), there is no way to answer that question that fails to sink DM
one millimetre per
second slower than it has already sunk Theology.
For instance, does this "everything"
include: (a) All that exists
now? (b) All that has previously existed? (c) All that will one day exist? (d) All
that could exist? or (e) All that might have existed? Does it include
(f) Everything that has ever been thought
about? (g) Not thought about? (h) Discovered? (i) Not discovered? (j) Found then lost (like
Phlogiston)? (k) Lost then found, then lost again (like
Democritus's
and then
Dalton's indivisible atoms)? (l) Does it
include the 'Gods'
of the Apache Nation -- surely they are part of 'everything'..., or are they? (m) The
mythical
beasts of yore? or (n) The entire lot?
At this point, the patience of some readers might be
way past breaking point. In which case, they are encouraged to maintain their
composure a little longer
since the point of all these rather odd questions will soon become apparent.
In fact, several more increasingly problematic -- but
mercifully less annoying --
questions will surface that make those posed above seem rather trite and trivial in
comparison.
Some might direct our attention to the TOR, pointing out that the universe is in fact
finite and
unbounded. This is the "Totality", they might tell us.
Now, I don't wish to question the validity of the TOR, but since we don't as yet know
for certain whether this (mathematical) aspect of this theory actually applies to our universe (i.e, that it is indeed finite and unbounded), it can hardly feature
in any attempt to understand what the "Totality" is.
[As physicist, Paul Davies,
once observed: "Cynics often say that there is speculation, speculation
squared, and cosmology."]
Anyway, as we will
soon see, the TOR itself is no friend of DM.
To cap it all, there have been,
and still are, DM-theorists who
reject the idea that the universe is finite, and who deny, therefore, that it is bounded. [More on that below.]
Indeed, as I aim to show, even if it were possible
to find answers to these perplexing questions, our problems would only be
beginning, for as
Russell's Paradox has taught us, unless we define "everything" with due care
(and, it is worth adding, completely arbitrarily) we will end up with a
"Totality" that contains things it doesn't contain!
[A recent criticism of what has come to be known as "universally
unrestricted quantification" can be found
in Hellman (2006).]
At this point, it is worth noting that
we are beginning to face the same sort of problems in connection with the
"Totality" that confront Theists, who also employ obscure metaphors
and vague analogies to try to comprehend
the nature of 'God'.
[Keep that thought in mind as this
Essay unfolds.]
So, one suspects that down this road lies our very
own 'dialectical via negativa', as DM-theorists tell us time and again,
"No, the "Totality" does not include this, or that, or
this, or...".
Be that as it may, even if DM-theorists
managed to define the "Totality" carefully and satisfactorily, it would plainly be a creature of
convention --, and, like "God", a human invention.
No wonder DM-fans fall silent when they are asked to fill
in the details about
their 'God'..., er..., sorry..., their "Totality".
Given the predicament they're in, I
think I'd do likewise!
[I return to consider the vacuous "It's everything!"
gambit [IEG] in much more detail,
below.]
The long
answer is "Well..., er..., not a lot, squared."
Well, what do they say? Engels, as usual, writes much but manages to
say little of any use:
"When we consider and reflect
upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual
activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations
and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what,
where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes
away....
"We see, therefore, at first
the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the
background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the
things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but
intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by
Heraclitus: everything is and is
not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into
being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy
culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great
merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual,
is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change,
transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal
connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development."
[Engels (1892),
pp.405-08.]
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70.]
So, no clearer then.
[As should seen clear, the above is just a variant of the
IEG.]
Perhaps 'The Great Teacher', Stalin, has the answer?
"Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of
phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but
as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected
with, dependent on, and determined by, each other. The dialectical method
therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by
itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena…. The dialectical method
therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the
standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the
standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into
being and going out of being….
"Speaking of the materialist
views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all
is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the rudiments of
dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961), p.347.]"
[Stalin (1941), pp.837-38, 845. I have used a different edition of Lenin's
Philosophical Notebooks here. Several paragraphs merged.]
Plainly not.
What about Bukharin?
"I am now writing on paper
with a pen. I thus impart pressures to the table; the table presses on the
earth, calling forth a number of further changes. I move my hand, vibrate as I
breathe, and these motions pass on in slight impulses ending Lord knows where.
The fact that these may be but small changes does not change the essential
nature of the matter. All things in the universe are connected with an
indissoluble bond…." [Bukharin (1925),
p.66.]
We needn't labour the point.1
There is little, to nothing in the DM-classics that is of any help in the endeavour to understand what dialecticians are banging on about when they talk about the
"Totality".
A few years ago,
Martin Jay published an excellent book
entitled Marxism And Totality. The
Adventures Of A Concept From Lukács To Habermas [i.e., Jay (1984)], and yet, in over
500 pages, he studiously refused to tell us what his book was
actually about!
To be sure, in Chapter One, Jay very
helpfully
summarised classic and early modern
Holist
theories of nature and society, but these theories were themselves equally vague
and imprecise.
Maybe because he found little material in the DM-classics (or, indeed, in the
writings of 'systematic'
and other
academic dialecticians) to help him
explain this obscure concept, Jay ducked the question
whether Ancient Greek and Early Modern theories of nature -- or, of 'the Whole' -- were the same
as, or were different from, one another --, or, indeed, were the same as, or were
different from, the DM-"Totality" Itself.
After all: how would anyone be able to
decide?
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
For instance, how would it be possible to
ascertain whether
or not Hegel's 'Whole' is the same as, or is different from, say,
Plato's?
[Especially given the fact that Hegel went out of his way to undermine the
validity of the
LOI, how could they be the same?] Or,
Plotinus's?
Or,
Aristotle's? Or,
any of the many and varied "Wholes" that
litter most
of the world's mystical belief systems?
Here, for example, is
Alan Watts
(declaiming about The Totality Of All Being):
Video One: Alan Watts --
A DM-Allie? Or A DM-Embarrassment?
Are you, dear reader, any the wiser?
E-mail
me if you think are..., and don't forger to add an explanation.
Admittedly, those aforementioned mystics all use typographically similar-looking words (such as, "Being", "The
Whole", "The Totality", etc.), but, if the use of similar-looking words were enough to equate whatever they
supposedly depict, we would surely be able
to conclude that, for example, Plato's "Forms"
were identical to those complicated, pre-printed sheets of paper you have to
complete in order to apply for a job, obtain a driving licence or receive a
credit card. Plainly, the use of typographically similar-looking words isn't
sufficient to identify the many 'Wholes' that Traditional Thinkers have
concocted
over the last two-and-a-half thousand years. After all, is every 'god' the same?
Indeed, does anyone have access to an
Identikit picture
of the "Totality" that might help them identify this mysterious object
in a
line-up
of likely candidates? Has anyone seen its likeness etched in the
sand, shaped in the
clouds, or sculptured on the surface of Mars -- in the way that some claim to
have spotted images of
Jesus or
The Virgin Mary in a
slice of toast or on a grape?
Indeed, precisely what is the
criterion of identity for mystical or 'dialectical'
"Totalities"?
Worse still: we don't even possess so much as a partialdescription of a single "Totality", ancient or modern, to assist us in
this futile quest. Can you imagine trying to decide whether or not two
individuals -- say, Woodruff Durfendorfer and Arthur Farfenickle -- were the
same or were different if you were given no clear description to work with, no
picture to guide you, and no DNA to rely on? But even then you would at least have something to work with: the knowledge that they are
supposed to be human
beings. And yet, in relation to the various "Wholes" and "Totalities" that
assorted mystics have dreamt up we don't even have this much to go on. We
have no idea what kind of 'entity' we are dealing with, the existence and
identity of which we
are being asked
to contemplate. We have nothing to work with.
No good doing a Google search or consulting Wikipedia.
Of course, as noted above, this puzzle hasn't been helped by the fact that not a single one of those ancient 'thinkers' was all that specific about
the nature and extent of the "Whole" to which they referred; neither
were the aforementioned mystics,
and for obvious
reasons. After all, a crystal clear mysticwould lose his or her licence to
mystify.
But, in relation to the entire gaggle of "Wholists", ancient and modern, Dialectical Mystics are easily the vaguest,
most equivocal and evasive. Prevarication and obfuscation taken way beyond the call of duty.
The rest of
Martin
Jay's book was devoted to expounding what various
studiously vague dialecticians have or haven't thought about history,
society and the economy, as possible examples of what can only be
described as
'sub-totalities'. However, as far as can be ascertained, and except for its
opening chapter, the "Totality" itself
is conspicuous by its absence from the entire book, which is, of course, quite remarkable in itself.
Indeed, it is decidedly odd; just as odd as it
would have been had Darwin forgotten to mention natural selection, or had
omitted all talk of species, past, present or future, from
On The Origin
Of Species.
This isn't to pick on Jay, since his book is
an excellent guide in its own way -- a sort of Dialectician's Alice, as it were. To be sure, if anyone wants to know
what Dialectical Marxists think about social wholes (albeit, expressed in what looks
for all the world like an obscure non-human
dialect), this is the book to consult.
[HCD = High Church
Dialectician. That term is explained
here.]
Not even card-carrying HCDs seem able or
willing to tell
us what their "Totality" actually is. Here is
Alan Norrie (attempting to translate the
obscure Venusian
argot one finds in the late
Roy Bhaskar's work, into English):
"Totality, then, is the place
where different things are seen in their connection and are viewed as a whole."
[Norrie (2010), p.87. I return to Norrie's book in Essay Nine
Part
Two.]
Well, that clears things up, and no mistake! "Totality" is
the "place" where all the 'dialectical' action transpires, it seems. This
suggests that "Totality" for Norrie (and Bhaskar) is a methodological concept,
which, for all we know -- or, rather, for all Norrie and Bhaskar know --
might be no more 'real' than the
Crystalline Spheres of medieval
astronomy -- or even the
Tooth Fairy, which is another 'methodological
device' to which those hand-waving parents (we
met earlier) sometimes appeal in order to 'explain' why infant teeth often vanish to be replaced by a coin.
This
project began back in July 1998 as an
extended
review of John Rees's book The Algebra Of Revolution [Rees (1998a), or
TAR], which, for all its faults, has proven to be widely influential in one of the most
geographically-extensive Trotskyist Tendencies on the planet (the
IST/UK-SWP).
In that case, his book is well placed to do real harm.
[Several years after the above was first written, Rees
resigned from the UK-SWP and now helps run Counterfire,
which means his ideas are no longer
viewed
by the IST as ideologically sound. Comrades who at one time lauded this book now
either do the opposite, or they simply ignore it!
An ironic fate for any book on dialectics to have to face.]
Anyway, since Rees is one of the more recent
DM-authors to put the "Totality" right at the heart of his ideas, it seems a reasonably good place to start.
Unfortunately, as we will soon see, it doesn't
matter where we start, the superficial 'descriptions' of this mysterious entity
-- advanced by DM-fans, drawn from all wings of Dialectical Marxism -- turn out to
be thinner than an
anorexic flatworm!
Figure Three: A Flatworm --
Rather Substantial In Comparison
In view of the foregoing, it is no surprise
therefore to find that even though Rees clearly believes the "Totality" is a
centrally-important DM-concept [Rees (1998a), pp.5-8], or 'entity', apart from a
few rather vague gestures at defining the term, or describing this 'object', he never really tells us what
the "Totality" is!
One of
his few 'attempts' is the following:
"Totality refers to the
insistence that the various seemingly separate elements of which the world is
composed are in fact related to each other." [Rees (1998a), p.5.]
There seems to be something wrong with this passage
since it tells us that the "Totality" is in fact an
"insistence".
Can this be what "everything" is,
an
"insistence"?
Is this what the Big Bang ushered forth? An ever-expanding "insistence"?
Of course, if this rather odd passage were to
be interpreted farless unsympathetically, it would seem to
suggest that Rees intends the
word "Totality" to be
understood methodologically, which would in turn imply that the idea that nature is a unified whole is
either (i) A useful fiction,
(ii)A regulative idea (i.e., it expresses a rule DM-theorists like Rees
employ in order to help understand nature and society), or (iii) It merely works
as a statement of theoretical intent.
Even so, we aren't told what the "relations"
Rees mentions actually are, even though they
are supposed to interconnect objects and processes in the "Totality".
In fact, we remain in the dark
whether or not every object and process is interlinked with every other
--
or only with some -- nor, indeed, specifically inwhat way they
are inter-related. [Much more on this below.]
Unfortunately, there are few other clues
in Rees's book
that
help the bemused reader understand the nature of this supposedly keyDM-concept.
One such hint surfaces in a passage where Rees
attempts
to link the "Totality" with "universal interconnectedness"
itself, which is something other
DM-theorists also emphasise (on that see
here and
here):
"Lenin's worry is that
previous explanations of dialectics have simply shown that reality forms a
totality and that things which are assumed to be opposites are in reality
connected with one another. But they have not stressed that reality is a
contradictory totality or that it is the mutually antagonistic relationship
between the parts of the totality which are the motor force of its change and
development.... [The] natural and
social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a result
of…internal contradictions…. [N]ature is an interconnected system that developed
for millions of years before humans." [Ibid., pp.186, 285-86. Italic
emphasis in the original. Paragraphs merged.]2
This appears to equate the "Totality" with
all of nature -- indeed, with all of "reality" -- but, as we
will soon see, these terms are far too vague to be of much
usetoanyone other than a child.
Worse still: it doesn't really distinguish DM from,
for instance,
Mystical Hermeticism:
"Another parallel between
Hermeticismand Hegel is the doctrine of internal
relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to
use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything
in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This
principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called
Emerald Tabletof
Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines
'As above, so below.'
This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis
for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences
between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is
the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is
reflected.... The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies."
[Magee (2008),p.13. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. More on this topichere. Paragraphs merged.]
Rees in fact had an answer to the allegation that
Mystics also have their own theories of, or ideas about, the "Totality":
"Totality alone is not,
however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of
society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own
mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation and a very practical
view of the temporal hierarchy that goes with it. 'The Taoist tradition in China
shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole being maintained by
the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.'... [Rees is here quoting Levins
and Lewontin (1985), p.275.]
"What unites all these
explanations is that they see the totality as static.... What they lack is any
notion of a totality as a process of change. And even where such systems grant
the possibility of instability and change, it is considered merely as a prelude
to a restored equilibrium.... Change, development,
instability, on the other hand, are the very conditions for which a dialectical
approach is designed to account." [Rees (1998a), p.6. Paragraphs merged.]
However, there are
dozens of
mystical systems that view the world in almost exactly the same way as DM-theorists --
that is, as an
unstable, developing and changing Whole (which exists in states of permanent or
semi-impermanent change), constituted by countless 'unities of opposites'. This is how the
Kybalion
(reputably the third most important book of
Hermetic
Philosophy) puts things, for example:
"'CHAPTER X POLARITYEverything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites;
like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different
in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be
reconciled.' -- The
Kybalion.
"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle
-- the
Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two
sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees
between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind
of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always
recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it
by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and
isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is
half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to
every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the
difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a
matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,'
and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in
degree'; and that the 'universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a
recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations
of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the
real nature of anything....
"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests;
everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.
"The great Third Hermetic Principle
-- the Principle
of Vibration -- embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the
Universe -- that nothing is at rest -- that everything moves, vibrates, and circles.
This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers
who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of
by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century
physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific
discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this
centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.
"The Hermetic Teachings are that
not only is
everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences'
between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to
the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL,
in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of
intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the
teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the
physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be
at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole
of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter.
Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes
of vibration.
"Modern Science has proven that all that we call
Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more
advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists
who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion.
Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in
matter and energy.
"In the first place, science
teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from
temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same
things -- it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and
vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle
to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes.
The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move
around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the
particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and
movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of
Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The
atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc.,
which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and
which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all
forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of
Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first passage can be
accessed
here; the second,
here.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"For everything must
be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise."
[Copenhaver (1995), p.32. Bold emphasis added.]
The on-line version renders this passage
slightly differently:
"For all things must
consist out of antithesis and contrariety; and this can otherwise not be."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
Moreover, the Hermetic 'God' isn't external to the
universe, but is immanent, internal to it (and hence 'He'/'She'/'It' also
changes), which is, of course, where Hegel obtained the idea.
Here is Alan Watts again:
"Buddhist enlightenment consists simply in
knowing the secret of the unity of opposites -- the unity of the inner and outer
worlds.... The principle is that all dualities and
opposites are not disjoined but polar; they do not encounter and confront one
another from afar; they exfoliate from a common centre. Ordinary thinking
conceals polarity and relativity because it employs terms, the terminals
or ends, the poles, neglecting what lies between them. The difference of front
and back, to be and not to be, hides their unity and mutuality." [Quoted from
here.
Bold emphases alone added.
Paragraphs merged.]
We also learn the following about the Hindu view of
'God':
"The three major gods of
Hinduism are
Brahma
(the creator; paradoxically of minor importance in actual practice -- possibly,
since his work is completed),
Vishnu (the preserver), and
Shiva
(the destroyer), each with a wife, to symbolize the androgyny of ultimate
reality. By theologians and educated Hindus in general, these gods and their
innumerable manifestations are viewed as pointing toward one transcendent
reality beyond existence and non-existence, the impersonal world-spirit
Brahman, the absolute unity of all opposites.... Hindus envision the cosmic process as the growth
of one mighty organism, the self-actualization of divinity which contains within
itself all opposites." [Quoted from
here.
(This links to a PDF.)
Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
And this, about Sufist ideas:
"Sufism
is usually associated with Islam. It has developed
Bhakti
to a high point with erotic imagery symbolising
the unity of opposites.
The subtle anatomy and microcosm-macrocosm model also found in
Tantra
and
Taoism
is used by it, dressed in its own
symbols. Certain orders use ecstatic music and/or dance which reminds one of the Tantric
celebration of
the senses. Sometimes, the union of opposites is seen as a kind of gnosis. This
is similar to
Jnani Yoga." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphases
added.]
Furthermore, and as noted above, Hegel was
also a
Hermetic Philosopher, a died-in-the-wool Wholist, who believed in
change through contradiction (which fact, oddly enough, Rees seems to have
forgotten). [On this, see
here, and Note 4, below.]
Incidentally, it is worth adding that even
fascist mystics have embraced this ancient metaphysic:
"The cosmos operates through polarities, and
the interaction of these polarities causes change and evolution." [White
Order of Thule, quoted from
here. However, you might need to take a shower
if you
follow that link!]
Which is ironic in view of the fact that
Jewish
Mysticism also acknowledged the same metaphysic!
Finally, there is this revealing comment:
"The ancient Egyptians believed that
a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A similar premise, that the
interaction between yin (the female principle) and yang (the male principle)
underlies the workings of the universe, is at the heart of much Chinese
thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy from the fourth century
B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many Chinese who are not
Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the Chinese. Peoples all
over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, have come to the conclusion
that the cosmos is a combining of opposites...."[Maybury-Lewis
(1992), pp.125-26. Bold emphases added.]
It wouldn't be difficult to extend this list indefinitely until it became
clear
that practically every Mystic who has ever walked the earth thought (or thinks)
'dialectically' and believed in a 'contradictory "Totality"'.
[A more comprehensive list of examples like
these -- drawn from mystical systems
across the planet -- can be found
here
and
here. Many more
will be given in Essay Fourteen Part One when it is published.]
What was that again about "the ideas of the ruling
class..."?
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas,i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from
here. Bold
emphases added.]
So, the "Totality", change and contradiction
are just as much at home in Mystical Hermeticism (and other similar systems) as they are in DM -- which is hardly
surprising given the fact that the latter developed out of the former.
Be this as it may, in an article about Engels, Rees
added these thoughts:
"Here the key
is to see all the different aspects of society and nature as interconnected.
They are not separate, discrete processes which develop in isolation from each
other. Mainstream sociological and scientific thought 'has bequeathed us the
habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, detached from the
general context'. Much of our schooling today still follows this pattern -- the
development of the arts is separated from that of the sciences, and 'technical'
subjects are separated from languages, history and geography. Our newspapers and
TV news programmes divide the world up in the same artificial way -- poverty
levels and stock exchange news, wars and company profit figures, strikes and
government policy, suicide statistics and the unemployment rate are all reported
in their own little compartments as if they are only distantly related, if at
all. A dialectical analysis tries to re-establish the real connections between
these elements, 'to show internal connections'. It tries, in the jargon of
dialectics, to see the world as 'a totality', 'a unity'.
"To see society
and nature as an interconnected totality which is in a process of constant
change still leaves one vital question unanswered. What makes this whole process
develop? Why does it change? There are any number of religious and
philosophical theories which try to answer this question by insisting that the
motor of change lies outside the historical process -- with god, or in the
unchanging pattern of human nature or in the eternal features of the human soul.
Marx and Engels rejected these approaches as mystical and, literally,
supernatural. They insisted that the processes which drove the development of
nature and society forward must be internal contradictions, not
supersensible entities like god, the soul or, as Hegel had argued, the general
essence of human consciousness existing somewhere in the ether beyond the
consciousness of actual living human beings." [Rees
(1994), p.62.]
We have already seen that no sense can be
made of these 'contradictions' -- i.e., those that supposedly exist in nature and society (on
that, see
here,
here,
here, and
here).
Independently of that, the alleged social
aspects of the "Totality" are clearly part of HM, discussion of which will
largely be omitted from this Essay. Since I don't deny that HM relies on factors
governing the whole of human history, there is nothing much for me to question
in this regard.3
[HM = Historical
Materialism.]
Nevertheless, one important aspect of Rees's
use of this (yet-to-be-explained) concept is the relationship that he and other
dialecticians
claim exists between parts and wholes:
"In a dialectical system, the
entire nature of the part is determined by its relationship with the other parts
and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts….
In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of
the parts but also that the parts become more than they are individually by
being part of the whole…." [Ibid., p.5.]4
The problem with this is that it still fails
to tell us what the "Totality" is, or what it encompasses --, nor is it clear what
those
"parts" are, either!
As far as can be ascertained, this is
virtually all that Rees had to say about this supposedly important
topic, in
TAR (or, indeed, elsewhere).5
Clearly, this creates serious problems from the start; the 'uninitiated' have no
clear idea what Rees, or what other DM-theorists, areactually referring to,
or even talking about. And,
as
we have seen, they will search in vain through other DM-texts for further
elucidation.
Naturally, this means that DM-theorists
themselves have no idea what they areactually talking about!6
Anyway, if,
according to Rees, "the part
makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts", it would in fact be impossible for
anyone to determine exactly what this mysterious "whole" amounted to before they were
clear about the nature of every single part of it.
Indeed,
Engels himself said as much (in unpublished preparatory material for his
book,
Anti-Dühring):
"Systematics impossible after
Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole,
but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic
emphases in the original.]
It is a pity, therefore, that Engels didn't
call this to mind when he, too, began to speculate and fill his work with
"figments" of his own (or rather, Hegel's) imagination. [Many of these
"figments" have been dissected in Essays Seven
Part One
and Eight
Part Three.]
Plainly, if the above clichéd saying about
parts and wholes were true, it would be impossible to determine the nature of
any
of the parts before the nature of entire whole had been
ascertained and comprehended.
Clearly, this means it is impossible for anyone
to grasp a single rudimentary fact about part and whole since no one will know
anything about either before they know everything about both. [I
discuss this aspect of DM in much greater detail in
Part
Two, where I have also responded to several obvious objections.]
As is well-known, this was just one of the
epistemological holes into which Hegelian Idealism dropped itself, along with anyone gullible enough to give
credence to
anything Hegel ever said.7
But, whatever steps subsequent Hegelians
finally took (or might still take) in order to haul themselves out of this
bottomless pit -- and whether or not they are successful --, they don't appear to be available to DM-theorists. That is because
they,
at least, must
base their comments on evidence, not on
conceptual chicanery -- as George Novack pointed out:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added. This echoes what Engels also had to
say, reproduced
below.]
And
yet, what sort of
evidence can DM-fans produce that hasn't already been compromised in
the above manner? Manifestly,
since relevant evidence itself relates to, and is comprised of, such 'parts' --
i.e., it is comprised of, or expresses, certain supposed facts, which one must
assume are also part of the 'Whole'
(manifestly they aren't external to it!)
--,
the nature of
each of the 'parts'/facts that constitutes this
evidential base
itself couldn't, on this view, be ascertained or comprehended until the 'Whole' had been, nor vice versa.
In short: the meaning and significance of any such 'evidence'
would be unclear until the nature of the 'Whole' had been ascertained, and, in
turn, the
nature of the 'Whole' would be unclear until the nature of each part/each fact
presented as evidence had already been ascertained/comprehended.
There seems to be no way of breaking into
this Idealist circle: the status of any and all evidence can't be
known/ascertained until the 'Whole' had been, and the nature of the 'Whole'
can't be grasped
as a material whole (or any other sort of whole) if no determinate physical evidence
were available, or comprehensible, in order to do just that.8
An appeal to 'approximate' or 'relative' truth
here would be to no avail, either. That is because the nature and status even of
'approximate' and 'relative' truth can't be ascertained until the nature of the 'Whole' had been,
if the
above neat slogan is to be believed. Nor would an appeal to a
series of 'developing approximations' that are supposedly closer to the 'Whole
Truth' -- or closer even to 'relative truth' -- be of any help. According to
this theory, unless we know the entire truth about everything, no one would be
in any position to know that these were even approximations -- or, for that matter, whether there was such a thing as 'The
Whole Truth' --, to begin with!
Unless we possess a clear idea of what would
count as 'Absolute Truth', or 'The Whole Truth' -- or we had access to one or
both of these --, we would
be in no position to declare that 'relative' truth had approximated to this Ideal. An
approximation only makes sense if we know with what it is that it
approximates; but, for us to know that, we would have to know what
constituted 'Absolute Truth'. According to DM-theorists, that is something we
will never know.
Again, as Engels pointed out:
"[T]he knowledge of this
system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic
emphases in the original.]
[More on this below.]
In that case, the obscure nature of each DM-part undermines the
DM-'Whole', just as the obscure nature of the DM-'Whole' undermines
each DM-part, the exact reverse
of what the
neat slogan attempted to tell us.
[Which is yet another ironic 'dialectical
inversion' for readers to ponder.]
This might explain why Rees was so
cagey about the "Totality", and why his 'definition' amounted to little more than a
throw-away, half-hearted gesture: there is nothing that could have been said
about this nebulous concept, or its obscure parts that would be consonant
with a believable form of materialism, or, indeed, which didn't
automatically undermine this theory itself, as we
have just seem.9
Nevertheless, even though it seems
clear that nothing could be said about the "Totality" or its parts before
everything was known about both, it is also worth remembering that
if DM is to be believed, it isn't possible
even to attempt to say anything truthful about anything, since,
ex hypothesi, nothing would be known about the parts (and hence
about the Whole)
until the end of an
infinite epistemological
meander:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"The reproaches you make
against the law of value apply to all concepts, regarded from the
standpoint of reality. The identity of thought and being, to express myself in
Hegelian fashion, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. But although a concept has the essential nature of a concept
and cannot therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from
which it must first be abstracted, it is still something more than a fiction,
unless you are going to declare all the results of thought fictions because
reality has to go a long way round before it corresponds to them, and even
then only corresponds to them with asymptotic approximation." [Engels to
Conrad Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphasis added. I have used the on-line version here, which
differs slightly from the published copy.]
"Systematics impossible after
Hegel. The world clearly constitutes a single system, i.e., a coherent whole,
but the knowledge of this system presupposes a knowledge of all of nature
and history, which man will never attain. Hence he who makes systems must fill
in the countless gaps with figments of his own imagination, i.e., engage
in irrational fancies, ideologise." [Marx and Engels (1987), p.597. Italic
emphases in the original.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93. Bold emphases
alone added.]
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In
social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away
is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in
accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and
further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.
The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so
is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the
course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the
subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and
we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which
depart from concrete history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
An appeal to practice here would be to
no avail, either -- and that is for reasons set out in Essay Ten
Part One.
That is, of course, one of the least appreciated consequences of
trying to 'invert' Hegelian Idealism:
material reality may only be 'comprehended' by beginning
at the end!
Hence, not even the
Owl of Minerva
would be securely identifiable until Epistemological Judgement Day had dawned, by
which time who would be left to care whether or not it flew?
In the absence of anything
even
remotely resembling a superficial characterisation (let alone a definition)
of this obscure DM-'object' -- the "Totality" -- we are forced to press the question
DM-theorists consistently avoid, or which they prefer to deflect: What exactly is the DM-"Totality"?
I propose to examine two
possible approaches to this problem. The first introduces what I shall call the
"Ontological Definition" of the "Totality" (because it involves a consideration
of what might comprise a plausible contents list); the second I propose to call the "Epistemological
Definition" (since it aims to link this mysterious 'entity' with the
contemporaneous extent of
human knowledge, experience and practice).
[However, my use of the
word "definition" here is slightly misleading, and that is because the material below in no way
constitutes a definition! In my defence, I can only pass the blame on to
DM-theorists whose job this should have been, not mine!]
In response to the above, it could be
objected that it is perfectly clear that the "Totality" includes
everything in
the Universe --, or everything in existence.
Possibly not -- but how do we know? [No
pun intended.]
Be this as it may, the problem with the hasty
"End. Of. Story" response above is that (a) It is hoplessly vague
in itself, and
(b) It isfar too generous.
How and why both of these apply will now be explained.
The
'Polo Mint' Totality: A Whole
With A Gaping Hole In The Middle
If the
"Totality" is supposed to include everything that exists,
several awkward questions
immediately
force themselves to the surface.
For instance: Does the "Totality"
comprise (i) All
that exists in the present, (ii) All
that 'exists', or which has existed, in the past, or (iii) Both?
Since DM-theorists seek an historical explanation of the development of class
society (etc.), and because they think everything in nature and society is
interconnected, it seems they must accept option (iii), and regard the past
and the present as part of the "Totality".
But, if (as appears to be the case) the past is no more, how can it be
part of anything, let alone the "Totality"? In what sense can
something that does not exist be a part of anything?10
More problematic, however, is the following
question: If the "Totality" does include
the past, that must mean the "Totality" contains countless objects and processes that don't actually exist
-- unless, that is, we are supposed to believe that things in the past still exist...somewhere.
On the other hand, if objects and processes in the past don't exist,
then it looks like the "Totality" contains some
things that 'exist' only as ideas about the past entertained in the minds
of those who inhabit the ephemeral present. And if that is so, it would
appear to mean that the "Totality" is part material and part
Ideal.
Even if the above conclusions are misguided
in some way, and it turns out that everything in the "Totality" is
interconnected, another question immediately presents itself: How is it possible for ideas
of the past
--
or even the actual past itself --
how is it possible for them to be inter-linked with everything
that now exists? Indeed, what was the past interconnected with before
any ideas
about it had even been formed --, i.e.,
before sentient life evolved?
Now, while the past might be connected
with the present (we will let that option slide for now), it can't be
"inter-connected" with it. That is, the present can't be
back-connected with the past in any obvious sense (which it would have to be for the past and the
present to be inter-connected and not just connected). But, if the past and the present aren't inter-connected, and if the "Totality" contains
onlyinter-connected objects and processes, then plainly the past can't be part of the
"Totality", after all!11
[I say what I mean by "connection" and "inter-connection" in Note 11, link above.]
Furthermore, and more worryingly, any ideas we
now form, or which we now entertain, of the past
will plainly correspond with nothing at all, since the past doesn't exist
for anything to correspond with 'it' -- except, perhaps, with yet more ideas
about 'the past'. Hence, the "Totality" can't even be objectively Ideal
-- at least, not with respect to the past --, let alone material.
In that case, one half of the supposed
correspondence relation between our ideas of the past and the past itself
wouldn't (or couldn't) exist (or rather, couldn't obtain), if this interpretation of the DM-"Totality"
were correct. This
in turn would mean
that there could be no 'objective'
relationship between our ideas of the past and the past itself --, certainly not
one of correspondence.
In order to avoid these intractable problems,
we might be tempted to restrict the "Totality" to things that exist only in
the present, to objects and processes that enjoy contemporary material
existence, wherever they happen to be.
But, that option only generates serious
problems of its own. For example, the "Totality" would contain no
historically significant events (or, even worse still, no historical events at all!), without which nothing that
happens in the present will have taken place. Depicted this way, the "Totality"
would surely become explanatorily useless, since an appeal would now have
to be made to (Ideal) 'objects and processes' outside the "Totality" to account for
those
inside it!
Indeed, if the "Totality"
were circumscribed or curtailed in this way, it would become
precariously ephemeral.
That is because the present is of extremely limited duration (if it has
any duration at all). Thus, a very
slender (if not terminally anorexic) "Totality" would clearly be implied by this option,
whether or not it were correct.
Is the DM-Totality, therefore, a Whole with a
huge hole in it? Is there no substance to it at all?
Figure Four: The Totality -- All
Hole, Little Substance?
Some readers might be forgiven their
impatience at this point, for it would seem that the present author is
putting words in the mouths of Dialectical Marxists (no pun involving Polo Mints intended).
Unfortunately, speculation
like this has been forced upon us because of the extremely limited information to be
found in DM-writings, even of the few that do manage to address the "Totality".
This is an informational
black hole the nature and extent of which are further compounded by
the dogged reluctance of dialecticians to come clean.
[Apologies for that mixed
metaphor!]
Others might conclude that all this is
just another example of Ms Lichtenstein's pedantry. (On 'pedantry', see
here.) However, that
complaint would,
of course, only serve to confirm an earlier allegation that when pressed on this
topic,
DM-fans become evasive.
Moreover, it would also demonstrate that
not even the above DM-fans know what their "Totality" actually is,
or contains!
To continue, and as noted above: If the past, which
now exists only as an idea (or better still, which now only 'exists'
conceptually -- perhapsin our use of tensed verbs, etc., or as part of our thoughts about it), is to be
included in the Whole, then the vast bulk of the "Totality" must be Ideal. That
is because, of course, the duration of the past is far longer than that of the
present (possibly by countless orders of magnitude). In turn, that is
because, according to many, the present has no duration at all. As
Augustine pointed out, if it had any duration it would have its own temporal
parts, a 'before' and an 'after', a 'later' and an 'earlier'. That would,
naturally,
further imply that the present itself was in fact part past and part future.
[I
hasten to add that I
reject the above metaphysical argument (the
one derived from Augustine), but I can see no way that DM-fans will be able to
counter it.]
Several other rather surprising conclusions
now follow from this, and from the CTT -- a theory of truth widely accepted in
DM-circles. [More on this in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two when they
are published.]
If propositions about the past are true just in case they
correspond with events in the past, then it would surely be impossible to declare
them true. That is because, as noted above, there is nothing with which they could correspond
-- other than yet more ideas, or, indeed, yet more propositions about the past --,
since the past is no more.
To be sure, we may draw true or false
conclusions about the past from the evidence now before us, but such evidence (of
necessity) only exists, directly or indirectly, in the present. Moreover, whatever it was
that this
evidence once related to plainly no longer exists, so it is difficult to
see how such non-existents could form part of a correspondence relation
with anything whatsoever -- at least, not in any obvious sense of that word -- that is, this side of a damaging retreat into Idealism,
once more.
In response, it could be argued that
the past is an objective feature of reality; hence the above conclusions
are completely misguided.
However, the meaning of the term "objective"
is itself at best hopelessly vague, at worst, terminally obscure -- that was demonstrated in Essay Thirteen
Part One
--, but, whatever it does mean,
it would be of little help, anyway. That is because it would still be unclear how anything (such
as the past) could be "objective" if it doesn't exist.
'Objectivity' --
according to Lenin,
at least -- has something to do with existence independent of the human mind,
and yet we appear to have something here (the past) that doesn'texist
except we form ideas about it.
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
In which case, the past isn't independent of
the mind (and, in Lenin's sense, it can't be 'outside' the mind, either);
hence it can't be "objective" -- if Lenin is to be believed.
Again,
it could be argued that
our beliefs about the past are true just in case they correspond with past
events. The existence of the latter might in turn be confirmed (or confuted) by
an appeal to evidence in the form of documents, artefacts and assorted remains,
etc.
But, this doesn't alter the fact that the past no longer
exists, nor
does it affect the fact that the confirmation of propositions about the past requires
the use of contemporaneous objects and events -- that is, it necessitates the
use of evidence situated in the present, consideration of which is augmented by
a
judicious use of
past tense verbs. Naturally, that is because such evidence (i.e., in the shape of the aforementioned documents, artefacts and assorted remains)
clearly exists in the present. Without access to a working time
machine we would have no body of evidence from the past that is still located
there, in the
past!
Truths about the present are quite unlike
those about the past -- whatever we finally conclude about the
nature of any supporting evidence pertaining to one or both. This can be seen by the way we form sentences
relevant to each: we use expressions withdifferentially
tensed verbs. This is partly where the attempted rebuttal recorded
above
itself went astray: it failed to explain -- as similar attempts must always fail
to explain without the
use of suitably tensed verbs -- precisely with what it is that contemporary
propositions about the past are supposed to correspond if one half of
this hypothetical relation doesn't now exist.12
To be sure, these 'difficulties' don't just plague the
CTT when
that theory is applied to past events; the CTT
collapses into some form of Idealism whatever time frame is chosen for it (as will be
demonstrated in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two, when they are published).
Philosophical 'problems' like this (concerning past, present
and future)
invariably arise because of inappropriate interpretations of phrases like "The past", "The
present" and "The future".12a
It has thus seemed to some that if such expressions resemble, or seem to operate
as Proper Names (or they appear to be words that are, or can be used, referentially), then they must
designate or name something, which 'something' must therefore exist --,
er..., somewhere.
A philosophical search is then initiated to locate these pseudo-entities, which
are manifestly the creation of an over-active mind
bewitched by an egregious misuse of language.13
Plainly, if the past exists, we are forced to use the present tense to
refer to it -- as has just been done in this very sentence. Again, if
we were to interpret these words in such a crude manner, it would imply that the
past isno
longer in the past, but in the present, which would in turn show that the past had in
fact been misnamed, or mis-characterised.14
The depiction of the past in this way
is thoroughly inappropriate, for it now seems that its existence is an
empirical issue, a search for which resembles a hunt for
Bigfoot, only far more
challenging.
If
something exists we should at least, in theory, be able to pin it
down, even if we can't actually do so at present (no pun intended), or even if only from a distance,
as it were.
Unless we accept the possibility of time travel (a notion that arises out of
confusions just like this -- more on that in a later Essay -- until then, see Dummett
(1993b)), this isn't a viable option.
Clearly, these terminological difficulties
have arisen because of an inappropriate and misleading analogy drawn between space and time. This image suggests
(tosome) that just as objects in space can be located
somewhere, those in time can be located somewhen -- especially if
that
term is now
given a new meaning by making location in time analogous to location in
space, perhaps by means of a fourth axis
tacked onto the Cartesian (or some other)
co-ordinate system.15
Clearly, an analogy of this sort ought to
sanction the following parallel argument: since some future-tense indicative
sentences are true now, they must correspondwith events which
have yet to occur; the latter must also now exist in a shadowy form in
'The Future'. Unfortunately, that would situate such 'future events' in the present, too!
[Notice we also had to use the present tense to make
that point.]
Naturally, this would mean that all events -- past, present and
future -- must co-exist (present tense, again)!
As may readily be appreciated, this would 'solve' the
problem of time by completely destroying it.16
A metaphysical scorched earth policy like this plainly has no viable future
(no pun intended, once more).17
In order to neutralise, or side-step awkward
questions like these, we should perhaps simply declare that the "Totality"
incorporates everything that exists, a-temporally?
However, that alternative is of little help since it is decidedly unclear what a-temporal
existence could possibly mean (except, perhaps, the phrase itself might apply to a 'Deity' of some sort).
[That, of course, would link the DM-"Totality"
even more closely to our
earlier ruminations about "God".]
However, here are the thoughts of a
fully paid-up member of the
HCD fraternity (in what is a remarkably
clear passage for this particular theorist):
"This [i.e., a
'transcendental' deduction for totality -- RL] seems relatively easy for social
life. Consider once more our paradigmatic book...in the library.... There is an
obvious sense in which the book, if recently published, existentially
presupposes all, or at least many, of the others, and the spatio-temporal
traditions which nurtured it.... That is to say it would have been impossible
without the others. Or consider the text itself. It is an internally related
totality. As are the elements of a language, or the ebb and flow of a
conversation, the sequential 'habitus' of a routine, the systematic
interdependencies of the global monetary system, a play, a sculpture, or an
experimental project oriented to the demediation of nature. Or consider simply a
musical tune, melody, beat or rhythm. Or reflect on the semantic structure of a
sentence, bound in a complex of paradigmatic and
syntagmatic relations (and
metaphoric and
metonymic presuppositions). Or on its physical structure -- for
instance, the location of the spaces and punctuation marks within it. Not to
treat such entities as totalities is to violate norms of descriptive and
hermeneutic adequacy." [Bhaskar (1993),
pp.123-24.
Links added.]
But,
what about "totalities" in nature? Bhaskar is far less clear (and decidedly less
confident about the answer -- the smokescreen of obscure jargon he throws up is itself a dead
give-away):
"First, it might be entered
that unless there were internal, and specifically dialectical contradictions...,
there would be no internal (radically negating) tendencies to change either for
individual things or for their types (including natural kinds) or, more
drastically, for the world as a whole, so that the emergence of, for example,
science would have been impossible. If my first argument turns on the
transcendental necessity of ontological change, my second turns on that of the
transcendental necessity for taxonomy in science. Thus it could be argued that
unless some explanatory significant things had properties which were
existentially essential to them, that is, such that they were not just
necessarily connected, but internally related, to them, scientific
classification, which depends on the possibility of real (as distinct from
merely nominal) definitions, would be impossible. Internal relationality, and
so the conceptual possibility of the analytic
a posteriori, is bound to the
Leibnizian level of the identification of natural kinds, as natural necessity is
tied to the demonstration of explanatory adequacy in the dialectic of
explanatory and taxonomic knowledge in science.... For if classification is
justified only on the basis of superficial resemblance rather than real identity
of structure, then there is no rationale for the stratification of science. This
depends upon grasping suitably groomed structurata (sic) as tokens of real
structures, whose intransitive existence and transfactual efficacy is a
condition not only of science, but also of life." [Ibid.,
p.124.
Link added.]
There are many things in the above passage with which one might want to take
issue (for example, 'internal relations', 'transcendental deductions' and
'natural kinds' -- they will be scrutinised elsewhere at this site), just
as there are others that have been challenged in this and other Essays
(such as the precise nature of 'dialectical contradictions' and 'natural necessity'), the above
passage still fails tell us precisely what the DM-"Totality" actually is --
other than that it is (maybe) a regulative device aimed (perhaps?) at maintaining
the morale of scientists, and, of course, those who dote on gobbledygook like this.
So, maybe we need to construct a membership list? If we knew
exactly what we were supposed to talking about, the nature of the
elusive "Totality" might become a little clearer. Well, it can only help in our
quest if these issues are raised and we attempt to consider available possibilities.
To that end, it is worth posing questions
that DM-fans serially fail to ask: Does the "Totality" include
every material object? Or, does it exclude non-material
'abstractions' -- like courage, generosity, justice and equality?
[However, as we saw
in
Essays
Two and Three Parts
One and
Two, DM-theorists have yet to
tell us exactly with what (in this universe) such 'abstractions' do in
fact correspond! In Essay Twelve Part Four we will see how John Rees, for
example, unsuccessfully attempted to account for an abstraction like
friendship. ]
So, it might be wise to throw these
spurious creations of
Ancient Greek Grammar (i.e., all those 'abstractions') overboard. And yet doing that would scupper the
entire 'dialectical theory of knowledge',
which relies heavily on 'abstraction'. The only
viable alternative for dialecticians, it would seem, is to suppose that the
DM-"Totality"
must contain abstractions, the nature of which are, alas, as obscure
as
the "Totality" itself ever was!
But, dear
reader, do
not
presume to ask where
such
abstractions reside or are to be found. [In 'heaven', with 'God'? In your head?
In objects and processes themselves? Spread out over the set of all things to
which they apply, like some sort of metaphysical margarine?] Puzzled onlookers who might be tempted to
ignore such sound advice should contact their local DM-Soothsayer,
who, in response to impertinent enquiries like these will once again wave his/her
arms vaguely heavenward -- if you are
lucky -- or, and what is far more likely, accuse you of not "understanding" dialectics -- if you
aren't.
And, if
you are a child, you will believe
everything you are told.
Even
worse, we have yet to be informed by
DM-theorists, these erstwhile materialists, what matter is (except they
inform us
that it, too,
is an
abstraction!). In which case, being told that the "Totality" contains,
or is comprised only of, material objects is no help at all, since that would
mean it contains only abstractions!
[The word "theoretical" here doesn't
mean the present author doubts the existence of any of these scientific
'entities', only that they are defined parts of complex and (so we are told)
well-founded bodies of theory. So, their natures are integral to the theories
to which they belong.]
Well then, what about the properties of
objects that depend either on their disposition or on their relation to other bodies,
such as size, velocity, weight, and hardness? Do these make the Mega Inventory?
If so, shouldn't we
also rope in the apparent properties of matter, such as solidity,
liquidity, colour, smell, taste, and sound? But, according to some, these depend solely
on their being perceived by sentient beings, which would mean that they aren't
--
according to Lenin-- 'objective', even though they seem to exercise some sort of causal
influence on other material bodies independently of our sensory modalities. Is
that sufficient reason to strike them from the Cosmic Roll Call?
What then should we decide about genuine
oddities, such as corners, surfaces and shapes? These strange 'beings' seem
to disappear at the micro-level, and several even depend on the point of view of
the observer. In that case, can they really be part of an 'objective' "Totality"?18
But, what then are we to
conclude about those 'entities' whose natures are even more obscure? For
example, what are we to make of mathematical fictions like the average worker,
the mean square velocity of (a body of) gas molecules (as part, for instance, of the
Kinetic
Theory of Gases), the probability of an event,
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient,
the Centre of Mass of the Solar System, or
the moment of a force?
Despite the fact that these are human constructs, some of them also appear to
exercise a significant causal influence on
material objects. In which case, are they 'objective', 'subjective', both or
neither?
It could be countered that we
should admit into the "Totality" all and only those objects and
processes that scientists
acknowledge -- either now or in the future --, supported by the
weight of evidence.19a
[This is, indeed, what John Somerville, for example,
argued
here. (This is Somerville (1967), pp.3-32.) John Molyneux appears to
agree; Molyneux (2012), pp.40-41.]
The problem with this response is that it would gift
scientists with what amounts to a rather generous ontological 'blank cheque',
as it were.19b
In fact, if this policy were to be adopted by DM-supporters, far too many
of what are assumed to be objects and processes in the "Totality"
would possess a somewhat precarious -- if not alarmingly fleeting -- 'existence'.
Just as soon as scientists changed their minds over the
nature and existence of these ephemeral 'entities' (as they regularly do), their
'temporary
residence permits' would have to be revoked.
[Update July 2012: I will add a few
comments about the recent 'discovery' of a particle (or supposed particle) in
the energy range where the
Higgs Boson is presumed to
exist when it has
become a little clearer what exactly
has been found. (See also the
Appendix article on this topic.) More-or-less the same can be said about the
recent discovery of 'gravitational waves', the actual discovery of which
some physicists are
beginning to question.]
It is worth recalling that
Stephen
Hawkingonce laid a bet that the Higgs Boson would never be found. Even though he has now
conceded that he has lost the bet, it is still a little too early for anyone
finally to agree with
him. But, as we know only too well, scientists are fickle.
Even worse, Physicists seem not to be able to
make their minds up whether or not the Higgs Boson explains all the mass in the
universe:
"So, the Higgs boson has been
discovered! That's good news. You may have also heard that the Higgs
gives mass to everything in the Universe, and that it's a field.
The odd thing is that all
of these things are true, if not intuitive. There are some
attempts to explain it simply,
but as you can see, even the top ones are
not very clear. So let's give you something to
sink your teeth into: How do fundamental
particles, including the Higgs boson, get their mass?" [Quoted from
here. Emphases in the original.]
"But how did
the electrons and quarks that make up all the matter in the universe (for
technical reasons, perhaps except for
neutrinos) get their mass? That we still
don't know. But once we understand how the
Ws and the Z
gain their mass from
their interaction with the
Higgs field, we assume that we also know how
mass in general is created: through the same 'Higgs mechanism,' and that this
primeval cosmic event shortly after the Big Bang has thus created the mass of
the universe: electrons, quarks, stars, galaxies, planets, trees, animals, and
us." [Quoted from
here. Emphases in the original.]
"In all the
recent hoopla about the long-sought Higgs boson, you often hear it said that it
is responsible for the mass of the universe. This is not true. Assuming it
exists, the Higgs boson is actually responsible for only a small fraction of the
total mass of the universe.
"This is not to
say that the Higgs boson is not important. The main role of the Higgs in the
standard model of elementary particles is to provide for the
symmetry breaking
of the unified
electroweak force
by giving mass to the
weak bosons and splitting
the
electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces. It also gives mass to the other
elementary particles. If elementary particles did not have mass, they would all
be moving at the speed of light and never stick together to form stuff like
stars, cats, and you and me.
"The mass of
the universe, however, is not simply the sum of the masses of the elementary
particles that constitute matter. Einstein showed that the mass of a body is
equal to its
rest energy. If that body is not elementary but composed of parts,
then its rest energy as a whole will be the sum of all the energies of its
parts. This sum will include the
kinetic
and
potential
energies of the parts in
addition to their individual rest energies." [Quoted from
here. Links added to both of the above.
Some paragraphs merged.]
Moreover, as is the case in other areas of science, the
temptation here is to try to account for mass in terms of a number of inappropriate metaphors
-- for example,
referring to the "syrupy
Higgs Field":
"Our theory
says that matter, at a fundamental level, is made up of particles called
quarks
and
leptons. The quarks make up
protons, and protons make up atoms.
Mathematically, it's easy to build a theory where the quarks have no mass at
all, and in fact they may have been mass-less at the time of the Big Bang, when
they came into existence. But clearly they do have mass now. Why?
"In the 1960s,
Peter Higgs
[a British physicist] and others found a kind of mathematical trick
to explain it. We now imagine there is a field permeating all of space -- we
call it the Higgs field -- and as particles interact with that field, they
acquire mass. Think of it like a syrup that the particles have to push their way
through. So it's that interaction with the syrup that we see as mass. And the
Higgs boson is the 'unit' that makes up this Higgs field." [Physicist Robert
Orr, quoted from
here. Paragraphs merged; quotation marks
altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Links added. Physics
Professor Jim Al-Khalili
also appealed to
this useless metaphor/analogy in
this BBC video, at about 08:30; he
also asserts several times that the Higgs gives mass to "every other particle"
--, for example, at 36:25 and 37:10. If some of the earlier quoted passages are
accurate, this is incorrect.]
But, as should seem obvious, a syrup would bring all movement to a
halt. So,the Higgs Field is nothing like a syrup. Nor are the following metaphors
much
use, either:
"A Higgs field
(named after a Scottish physicist
Peter Higgs)
is a field supposed to be responsible for the genesis of
inertial mass
(and,
because of
Einstein's equivalence principle,
gravitational mass). When the
universe is extremely hot, a Higgs field (which is supposed to have a certain
curve of potential energy; as regards the shape of this curve, there is no
unique consensus, except for a certain general feature, among the physicists)
exerts a wild influence; but we will neglect this here. Once the universe cools
down enough, below a certain temperature, the Higgs field assumes a certain
value (i.e. a value of the Higgs field) which corresponds to the lowest energy
level (i.e. the potential energy is zero, but the value of the Higgs field is
nonzero; this level may be called vacuum). And this energy level continues to
prevail throughout the whole universe (uniform, nonzero Higgs field).
"Now, suppose a
quark or
electron moves (supposed fundamental particles which make up
composite particles such as proton,
neutron, or various atoms) in this uniform
Higgs field. If that particle changes its velocity of movement, that is,
if it accelerates, then the Higgs field is supposed to exert a certain
amount of resistance or drag, and that is the origin of inertial mass. In
a slightly more precise terminology, inertial mass is generated by
interactions between a particle and the (nonzero) Higgs field. In a
nutshell, this is the origin of inertial mass. Of course, other kinds of
interaction, such as the
strong interaction (governed by the force of
gluons,
particles gluing quarks together into a proton, say) may contribute
significantly to the resulting mass. Moreover, the degree of resistance
(drag) of the Higgs field is different depending on the kinds of fundamental
particles, and this generates the difference between the mass of electron and
that of a quark." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphasis and links added.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
As we will see in Essay Eight Parts One and
Two (links below), a mathematical object like a field can't exert "drag
forces" unless it enjoys physical presence of some sort and is
therefore
made of
something (but what?).
Now, if that comment is itself misguided in some
way, and a field is capable of exerting "drag forces" (but
how?), that
would simply push the problem further back. A mathematical object, so
characterised, would be comprised of, or would be part of a
scalar,
vector
or
tensor
field. But, mathematical structures like these have no physical presence and so
on their own can have no effect on anything
-- other than, of course, on those who might want to employ them to attempt to account for
the phenomena (objects and processes) in nature.
To be sure, we might
try to represent
each field by, for example,
lines of force,or by constructing a
tangent/slope field, etc. However, lines
of force are 'infinitely thin' and yet absolutely unbreakable -- and, even
worse, misrepresent the continuous nature of the field! On top of that, such
lines (or whatever a field is supposed to be composed of) must allow particles
to pass through, all the while remaining coherent themselves -- even
though they are in fact made ofnothing. Otherwise we
should have to appeal to forces of cohesion to account for the structural
integrity of
those lines themselves (or whatever a field is supposed to be composed of), and
their capacity to resist motion
as well as their
permeability. Once again, this just reproduces the same problem one stage further back,
for we should now have to account for these new 'cohesive forces', and so on, ad
infinitem.
Moreover, if the field is continuous in nature (and isn't made of discrete 'lines
of force' -- or whatever it is supposed to be composed of), it would be even less capable of resisting motion, unless it were
in some way particulate after all. [On that issue, follow the links posted below.]
This is, of course, just a contemporary
version of a classical problem, which,
as Leibniz noted,
afflictsall forms of mechanical atomism (or, indeed, mathematical
atomism). Translating it into what
amounts to a form of Bargain Basement Platonism (whereby, in modern Physics, the universe is viewed as fundamentally
mathematical) would plainly be counterproductive.
[On this, see the comments posted
here,
here, and
here. Also see my
remarks over at Wikipedia,
here and
here.]
The question now is: Does the "Totality"
possess a sort of
'metaphysical
revolving door' -- or maybe an ethereal antechamber -- to cater for ephemeral and
itinerant objects and processes such as these?
[The 'discovery' of the Higgs Boson and
'gravitational waves' --
or, whatever has been found -- only serves to underline this point.]20
Either the existence of
all of these should be entertained, or those that supposedly don't enjoy
'objective' existence should be filtered out, the rest put on hold or consigned to
scientific 'limbo'.
But, which are to be discarded, which retained?
And on what basis?21a
More importantly:
which unfortunate comrade is going to chair the Dialectical Selection Panel?22
Worse still, if we hive off decisions like these to
scientists, what should we say if and when they revise their theories, or change
their minds -- as they regularly do? Would this mean that (i) the "Totality"
itself changeswhenever the scientific community
ceases to acknowledge, or even rejects, the existence of what had once
been considered 'objective' objects and processes? Or, would it (ii) show that scientists' beliefs about 'objectivity' have
been revised? If one or both of these were the case, wouldn't this (iii) suggest that
some
(perhaps all?) 'objective' theories are really 'subjective'? Wouldn't that cast a long shadow over the 'objectivity' of science itself?
In view of the above, how is it possible
to maintain the superior 'objectivity' of a current contents list
of the "Totality" if more of these 'ontological re-edits' are only to be expected
(a few years down the line), once again, as
invariably happens in science?22aa
Conversely, if option (i) were the case,
wouldn't it mean the actual contents list of the "Totality" depends on
decisions made by fallible human beings? For example, did the "Totality" change when early modern scientists decided that the "fifth element" no longer made it
onto the bench? Or the Luminiferous Ether wasn't even listed in the squad?
Recall, we have already seen
that Engels defined the "Totality"
in the following way (and he, like Lenin, included the now defunct Ether as
one of its 'objective' denizens):
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]
But, if the decisions of scientists
determine what constitutes
an
'objective' membership list, then the "Totality" itself must change in
line with scientific fashion.
Did it change again when scientists concluded that Phlogiston and the Planet
Vulcan (that
isn't the planet on Star Trek!) were imaginary? Perhaps Vulcan was on hold
in some sort of 'objective'/'subjective' limbo world', subsisting in a
Meinongian ante-chamber somewhere, while
researchers
finally made up their minds? Will the "Totality" mutate once more if,
someday,
Superstrings
are granted (or denied) 'objective' existence? [Superstrings have already
been (partially) transmogrified into
Branes and the
background theory has itself has morphed into
M-Theory!]
Is, therefore, the "Totality" an artefact of whim,
caprice
and fashion? Is it 'objective' in a 'subjective' sort of sense? Does
it depend on who is on the Metaphysical Review Board? Is itSelection Panel
sensitive?
This isn't a very
promising
start -- but, and alas, it only gets worse.
If we can't decide on what basis to include
or even exclude objects and processes from this avowedly contradictory "Totality",
then perhaps it includes things that not only don't exist, but those that can't exist?22a
This latest (surprise) possibility now poses far more
serious problems for any attempt to construct an Ontological Definition of the
"Totality". That is because several
DM-theses imply the 'perimeter fence' (as it were) encircling the
"Totality" is full of holes.
Indeed, as we will see, the DM-Totality more closely resembles a
colander
than a
wok.
Figure Five:
An Apt Metaphor For
The "Totality"?
Of Course Not,
It Hasn't Enough Holes!
While rival ontological systems often operate
with some sort of closed-border policy -- admitting the existence of certain
things, disallowing others -- it turns out that DM-theorists can't reject
anything at all since they openly admit (if not insist
upon) the existence of countless 'contradictions' and paradoxes
as well as hundreds, if not thousands, in
every nanogram of matter in the entire universe!
Hence, the 'DM-boundary-fence' isn't so much porous as non-existent. So
it seems that the "Totality" could contain impossible objects -- not just
contradictory objects and processes, but mythical and imaginary ones, too. Maybe
it includes four-edged hexagons, the round square, the golden mountain,
unicorns, the
Olympian Gods, the end of the rainbow,
perhaps even the
Adhedral
Triangle?22b
Anyone tempted to respond that the above list is
absurd since it contains contradictory items, which can be ruled out in advance,
should once again consult their local DM-Soothsayer before they jump to that hasty conclusion. In fact, given well-known DM-principles, it isn't easy to see how any of the above (and
many more besides) may be so easily rejected.
Thus, if the DM-"Totality" is to be rescued
from oblivion, some way must be found of preventing these and countless other
absurdities cross its recklessly permeable boundary.
It could be objected at this point that this is
just ridiculous. Dialecticians
onlyacknowledge the existence of contradictions that can be
empirically verified.Hence, they don't
countenance the actuality of 'theoretical' contradictions and assorted absurdities
like the above, nor do they
countenance the
mere existence of all contradictory, imaginary, or impossible objects.
But, that counter-claim is demonstrably false, as we
will soon
see.
Anyway, even if it were the case that DM-theorists don't admit the mere existence of
such entities, there is
in fact nothing in their 'logic' that rules them out. DL is remarkably
accommodating.
Again, it could be argued that 'contradictory
objects' are easily excluded because they aren't material, and don't represent
verifiable material forces.
But, who says? How do we know that scientists
might not one day discover weird things like these? They
already have rather too many of their own to contend with; several of
those were listed
above. Would anyone like to
tell physicists that electrons travelling 'backwards' in time are impossible, or that
'quantum objects' can't be 'in two places at once'?
Even worse still, as noted earlier, objects
and processes like these can't be ruled out by anyone wielding the terminally obscure notions DL supplies its adepts. Because of
that, DM-theorists openly admit the
existence of countless billion contradictions, and other assorted 'impossibilities',
right across the entire universe (the existence of which can't be
confirmed by empirical means, either). [On
that, see below.]
In fact, if everything in
existence is in fact a UO (as the
DM-classics tell us) then there should
be at least as many contradictions in reality as there are sub-atomic particles
(and possibly more). Hence, the aforementioned 'impossibilities' can't be ruled out in advance of
all the evidence
having been considered, certainly not as a result of 'principles' exclusive to DL.
Indeed,
DM-theorists already acknowledge the actual
existence of contradictory objects, processes and
'impossibilities'
prior to all (or even most) of the evidence has
been collected--
and, in many cases, in abeyanceof
any
evidence
at all! --, let alone examined, since those
who agree with Lenin and Hegel insist that
everythingand every process is, or
'contains', a UO.
[The reason for the 'scare'
quotes around "contains" is explained in Essay Eight
Part One.]
If so, and for all that even dialecticians know,
the "Totality" could contain countless yet-to-be-discovered
absurdities. And that is all the more so since DM-theorists themselves
already confuse
contradictions with absurdities,
alongside a host of other
oddities, to
boot.
Furthermore, if Engels and Lenin
are to be believed, an
infinite amount of knowledge still
awaits discovery.
Hence, at any point in history (such as the present), humanity must be
infinitely ignorant of the final contents of -- or the principles governing
-- the universe, or even the "Totality" itself (that is, if there is such a 'thing'). That being
the case,
those who rely on DL are in no position to
rule such absurdities out with anything other than almost infinite uncertainty.
The only way such oddities could be excluded would
be
on the back ofan
a priori appeal to
principles exclusive to FL -- or, indeed,
exclusive to ordinary language
--, and thus on the basis of rules that are incompatible
with those found in DL. [On that, see
Essay Four.]
As we have already seen (in connection
with
Engels's analysis of motion and
several other core DM-theses,
here,
here,
here,
here,
here and
here), DM-theorists already
acknowledge the existence of
contradictory objects and events. Examples include the unity of
opposite poles in a magnet, 'contradictory'
opposing forces throughout nature
(at both the macro-, and the micro-level),
contradictory moving objects,
contradictory numbers
and mathematical concepts, seeds which negate themselves,
the existence of actual infinities (that is,
the existence of something which both terminates (so that it is a determinateexistent)
and which does not terminate),
the fundamentally contradictory nature of matter (in that it is both wave
and particle, continuous and discontinuous, all at once), and
contradictory cells (that are somehow alive and dead at the same time -- or
they are teetering on the edge of, or they are caught between, both), and
so on.
Once again, if Lenin is to be believed,
reality is fundamentally contradictory, and everything is a
UO.
And, Lenin asserted this in the absence of any evidence at all.23
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and
unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…. In brief, dialectics can be
defined as
the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the
cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials',
one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of
dialectics…. In
mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and
reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the
combination and dissociation of atoms….
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity
of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58. Original emphases removed, bold added.
Several paragraphs merged.]
This means that DM-theorists can't consistentlyexclude any of the contradictory and unlikely entities
listed earlier solely on the basis of their assumed 'contradictory'
nature(s). Theorists who postulate the existence of contradictions everywhere,
but who suddenly become arbitrarily fastidious whenever it suits them,
shouldn't expect
to be taken seriously.
But, what could be more contradictory than a
"Totality" that admits among its denizens things that not only do not exist (like
the past), but also those that can't exist -- like DM-abstractions, since
if they exist,
they must be concrete?
Unfortunately, once this metaphysical DM-juggernaut starts
rolling it
takes something a little more substantial than DL to stop it.
If DM isn't to be
imposed
on the world, but read from it -- as its supporters constantly
intone -- then, as it now
turns out, DM-theorists can't consistently stipulate what their
"Totality" does or doesn't contain ahead
of an empirical investigation to that end.23a
Others might be able to do it, but they
can't.
It's their millstone; they should
wear it with pride.
Hence, any attempt to rule out of existence
one or more of the contradictory or absurd objects listed above would trap
DM-theorists between that millstone and a familiar hard place, FL.
Now, those of us who aren't, shall we say,
favourably disposed to that misnamed system of 'logic' -- i.e., DL -- not only can, but do
rule out of existence certain things because of principles expressed in FL
and/or by ordinary
language. And we are right to do so.
[In fact, it is better to
say that it makes no sense to suppose such things exist. More on that
here.
In like manner we may
legitimately and consistently deny the legitimacy of DM-propositions that
report the existence of 'contradictions' in nature, too.]
However, as noted
above, that defence is unavailable to DM-theorists. That is because they are
committed to the view that that humanity must wait
upon the result of an
infinite meander through 'logical space', along the
Yellow
Brick Road to 'Epistemological
Valhalla' that supposedly leads adepts toward 'Absolute
Knowledge', before anyone is in any position to decide whether or not such propositions
were 'fully true' -- or, indeed, whether or not they are even
minimally true.
If so,
dialecticians have no good reason to complain about the allegation that their
"Totality" might contain some or all of the odd things listed above -- the
(possible) existence of which is based on their cavalier rejection of the
protocols of FL and ordinary language.
The dilemma now facing DM-theorists is
quite stark: either (a) They continue to disdain FL -- the repudiation
of which helped create this problem --, thus admitting the possible existence of all
manner of contradictory objects, events and processes --; or (b) They reject their
existence (and hence abandon the idea that contradictions and 'bourgeois
absurdities' exist
everywhere in
nature), because of rules codified in FL and expressed discursively in ordinary language.24
What seems certain, however, is
that the unwise rejection of core FL-principles has left the DM-"Totality" wide
open to infestation by countless weird and wonderful 'entities', the elimination
of which requires urgent inoculation with a dose of those very same
FL-protocols, alongside the adoption of a
believable and workable theory of
knowledge.
Hence, as a result of yet another
dialectical inversion, FL would now be required to rescue DM-theorists from the
contradictory "Totality" they rashly conjured into existence -- a
Whole that could include, for all we know, or,indeed, for all they know, characters from
Alice in Wonderland and the nonsense rhymes of
Edward
Lear.24a
In addition to and compounding the
difficulties outlined above, there remains the unresolved questions concerning the exact nature and
extent of the relations that are alleged to exist between the objects and processes
in the nebulous DM-"Totality" --,
should we ever be told what the latter is, of course.
From what little we 'know', the
"Totality" is supposed to be interconnected, contradictory and constantly changing
(because of its countless
UOs).
Earlier we saw Lenin declare the following:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"To begin with what is the
simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other
kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already
we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective
connection in nature, etc...." [Lenin (1961),
pp.221,
359-60. Emphases in the
original.]
However, he was also disarminglyhonest about where he obtained
these ideas:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the
dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of
concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word
dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence
of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the
transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of
notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to
nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions
all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in
a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.
Emphases in the original.]25
This means that Lenin derived these ideas, not from a scientific study of
nature,
but from a Christian Mystic.
Let that sink in.
[It is also worth reminding ourselves that Hegel hasn't
gone down in history as a great experimental or observational scientist, either.
Of course, that doesn't imply he was ignorant of the science of his day, only
that he was in no way an experimental or observational scientist.]
Be this as it may, the nature and extent of these
'universal interconnections' is still far from clear. For instance: does every object
and process in
the "Totality" influence every other object and process instantaneously
across vast expanses of space and time all the time. Does each
object and process do this equally or
differently? That is, do objects and processes on the far side of the universe
affect those here on Earth equally as much as, or less than, those on this planet
affect one another, or as much as the latter affect on the return journey those on the far side
of the universe? As we will see in
Part Two, given the Hegelian doctrine of 'internal relations', the answer should be "equally as much",
in both directions!
Even more perplexing: how are interconnections like
that even possible?
More importantly, how might any of
it
be confirmed?
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
But, isn't that what
DM-fans have been doing from day one
-- the day they first opened Hegel's 'Logic' and naively swallowed far more of it than
is good
for any human being?
Nevertheless, as with so
many other DM-theses, the idea
that everything in the universe is interconnected soon unravels when it is subjected
to the sort of scrutiny dialecticians eschew. To that end, it is worth
asking: Exactly which parts of the Universe are inter-related, to what extent,
and in what way?
Do these interconnections extend across all
regions of space and time, instantaneously, or is that true only of some?
Is there
some sort of time-delay affecting them all, or only some? If so, does this mean that the past, for instance, is currently
interconnected with the present -- perhaps by means of light, or
gravitational, waves, as one or other travel across such vast distances? Or, do these interconnections operate only between
contemporaneous
states of affairs, thereby ruling out some of those (possible) delays? That is, are
only presently existing objects and processes interconnected?
On the other hand, does this
doctrine imply that events in the past are (now) interconnected with other events belonging to the
same, or different, time zones? In that case, is, say, the election of Tony Blair in
1997stillinterconnected with the sinking of the
Bismarck, the discovery
of Gold in the
Klondike,
King John's loss of the
Crown Jewels in 1216, and the near extinction of life at the
end of the Permian? If not, which time zones are inter-linked and
which aren't? And on what basis? If they are still interconnected, precisely what is it that interlinks events that
no longer exist? Does this
interconnecting 'force' (or 'energy', or whatever it is) -- which links objects
and processes that don't now exist -- itself exist in the present? If not, how
is it able to it link anything? If it does exist in the here-and-now, how is it
able to connect objects and events that don't?
Even supposing such questions could be answered
(that is, should a single DM-supporter bother to do so, or bother even to consider
them), we would still be in the
dark as to how this 'force', this 'energy' -- or this 'we-know-not-what' -- actually manages to do
all this interconnecting.
Bemused readers will
search long and hard through DM-texts (and to no avail!), as well as
those written by religious mystics who also dote on this obscure 'theory'
(about their version of the "Totality"), for any answers to these and other
awkward questions or, indeed, for any sign they are even vaguely aware such
questions, such problems
exist.
Anyway, and to spoil the fun: we already know (from certain precepts enshrined
in
Relativity Theory -- i.e., so-called
"Light
Cones"),
that there are significant parts of the universe that can't (physically can't) be connected, let alone
interconnected:
"In attempting to diagram relativistic spacetimes,
one of the most important features to capture is the causal structure of the
spacetime. This structure specifies which events (that is, which points of space
and time) can be connected by trajectories that are slower than light, which
events can be connected by trajectories travelling at the speed of light, and
which events cannot be connected by anything travelling at or below light speed.
Events in the first group are said to be 'timelike related', because a physical
clock could travel from one event to the other. Events in the second group are
'lightlike related' because a light ray can travel from one to the other. Events
in the third group are 'spacelike related'. Given that it is physically
impossible (on the standard interpretation of relativity theory) for any causal
process to exceed the speed of light, these three possible ways of being
connected tell us whether one event is able to influence another." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 16/06/2022. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site; spelling modified to agree with UK English. Bold emphasis
added.]
Be this as it may, in view of the fact that the past doesn't exist, shouldn't such
connections across time zones be disallowed? That is because it
would seem impossible for anything to be connected (let alone
interconnected)
with something that doesn't exist. On the other hand, if the past isn't connected (or,
interconnected) with the present, how would it be possible to give an historical
account of, say, the origin of class society or the demise of Feudalism?
Of course, it is always
possible to argue that there is a causal chain of events that connects
the past with the present. But, even if that were so, this supposed chain of causes
can't interconnect the past with the presentif two of them don't exist.
-- the past and that causal chain. [More on that presently.]
To be sure, the present
might beconnected with the past (via such a causal chain, for instance, from past
to present), but it can't be interconnected
with it (anymore than you, dear reader, can be interconnected with The Battle of the Little Bighorn, or The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire),
in the sense that you would now be back-linked to it (from the present to
the past). Either we acknowledge
this limitation or we admit the existence of backward causation, and,
indeed, causal links travelling back in time to objects and processes that no longer exist.
However, no single element in
such causal chains, except perhaps the
very last one, now
exists. If that is so, how can such an insubstantial chain of non-existent causes connect something that
does exist (the present) with something that doesn't (the past)? At best,
that
would make this chain and those links Ideal, and hence not the least bit
"objective" -- or material.
So, at the very
most, if the past is connected with the present by what are in effect
'Ideal causal links', that
would make the "Totality" (so depicted) an Ideally connected 'Whole'.
Even then, it would still fail to be an interconnected 'Whole' -- still less a
physically-connected whole.
One is tempted
to respond to hard-core DM-fans (who might at this point be heard
muttering through clenched teeth: "Of course such things are interconnected!")
along the following lines: "Ok, so which minor deity informed you of that supposed
fact?" --, a few seconds before reminding them that only Idealists impose ideas like this on nature, something
they themselves have sworn never to do. That was the point of quoting the
following
DM-worthies a few paragraphs back:
"All three are developed by Hegel in his
idealist fashion as mere laws of thought: the first, in the first part
of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being; the second fills the
whole of the second and by far the most important part of his Logic,
the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures as the fundamental
law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake lies in the fact
that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not
deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous
treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance
with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite
stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954), p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
[Plenty more like the above
can be found in
Essay Two.]
Be this as it may once more, in order to further our
enquiry and perhaps help resolve 'problems' like the above, let us call the following
thesis,
"Maximal-Interconnectedness" (or,
MIC):
MIC: [A] All events and processes
in the "Totality" are always and instantaneously interconnected across every time zone.
Conversely, let us stipulate
that an attenuated version of MIC be called "Non-Maximal-Interconnectedness"
(or, NMIC):
NMIC: [B] The
"Totality" is interconnected, but not everything that has existed, or
will exist, or now exits, is permanently inter-linked instantaneously with everything else.
Considering MIC
first: It is difficult to see how this option could possibly be true. If it were, then it would
imply that every object, event and process in the entire history of the universe
(and perhaps beyond?) is now, always has been, and always will be interconnected
with every other object, event and process across every time zone, permanently
and instantaneously, whether or not they still exist!
Taking three such
objects or events at
random: it would mean that, say, the median price of coffee grinders
in Brazil on the first of June 2021, the mean number of grains of sand on
Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.356567860984443 million years ago, are all interconnected with
one another, permanently and instantaneously.
Indeed, if everything
in reality is interconnected, then the above seemingly insignificant
events and processes would have to be taken into account in the scientific explanation of what
might otherwise seem to be unrelated events, like the
assassination of Abraham
Lincoln, for instance. Historians and scientists would have to include such considerations (as well as countless others) in any explanation they might have of
Lincoln's death. [Issues concerning 'relevance' and diminishing effects will be considered presently.]
For example, if MIC
were true then the taste of sugar, say, would have to have something to do with
the angular velocity of stars in neighbouring and distant galaxies (at all times), and
with the three items mentioned above -- as well as the smell of diesel
oil,
and the mean weight of all
Fiddler
Crabs in the Southern Hemisphere eaten by predators on or before 17:02
(local time), June
15th 1247 (Julian
Calendar), and with the effect of
Selenium Sulphide on the
dandruff of
Chelsea FC supporters who
own
Heritage Cherry Sunburst Gibson Les Paul guitars (2006 issue)
-- if there are
any(!).
In fact, all of these
(and gazillions more like them) would have to be taken into account by scientists
trying to explain the demise of, say, the
dinosaurs or the properties of
Tungsten
(and vice versa), if MIC were the case.
Figure Six: Is Bondi Beach
Still Interconnected
With Napoleon's Left Foot?
And Yours?
Figure Seven: Are Ageing
Coffee Grinders Still
Interlinked With
The End Of The Last Ice Age?
Figure Eight: Is The Cartwheel
Galaxy Still Interconnected
Some might
object at this point that dialecticians do not hold such simple-minded and ridiculous
beliefs. Not only that, but the
above comments ignore relative connectedness, diminishing effects, and hence considerations of 'relevance'.
[Once again, these
conveniently vague notions will also be examined
presently.]
In advance of that, it is
worth reminding ourselves that (i) This sub-section is dealing with MIC,
and that (ii) Speculation like this has been forced
upon us
because DM-fans have consistently failed -- or have even refused -- to say, beyond vague
banalities, what their theory actually implies. Any who still object clearly
don't accept MIC; but the question remains, Is MIC what classical-DM implies?
In which case, the above DM-complaint is
itself misplaced.
Furthermore, because MICspecifically postulates instantaneous
influences, operating
continually across
all regions of space and time,
inverse
square law drop-off rates
don't apply -- that is, if inverse square law drop off-rates are what "relative connectedness" implies.
But, once more, who can say? Certainly not DM-theorists. They have
retreated into the corner, collectively sinking into what can only be called a
prolonged
'dialectical sulk'.
Moreover, even if interconnectedness were relativised in the above manner,
what it postulates would still be linked -- and it is the
links
themselves
that remain obscure.
[The idea that "internal relations" decrease with distance (so that 'remote
effects' can be ignored as irrelevant) has been subjected to destructive
analysis in
Part Two of this
Essay. The reader is directed there for more details.]
Again, even if these links were relativised in
the above manner, that would still fail to explain how everything
is in fact interconnected. For example, and once again: how are objects and processes in the past
inter-linked with those in the present,
or, indeed, with those that supposedly lie in the future? Are these causal links or
are they something more esoteric?
To be sure, according to current theory, it takes many light years for the
vanishingly small gravitational effects of distant objects, for instance, to reach
our planet, but when they do so reach us these effects are manifestly located in the present. The
question is: What
influence do extremely remote objects, some
10-12 billion
light years away -- which objects might no longer exist --, have
on the earth right now? Admittedly, light from these distant regions might have some effect
(or it will do so when it reaches us), but for MIC to be true, these
objects must influence the Earth instantaneously across immense distances even
beforethe aforementioned physical effects arrive in our vicinity --,
and for that to be true in reverse!
Of course, it is
reasonably
clear that if DM-theorists were to adopt
MIC, it would be impossible to confirm their theory.
Wherewould
one evenbegin?
More incredible still:
whatever interconnections are imagined to exist between events and processes,
the connections themselves
can't change and neither could the elements so
inter-linked.
To see
this, consider an
earlier sentence:
T1: The median price of
coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2021, the mean number of grains
of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.356567860984443 million years ago...
If it is now true
that there are such interconnections between the above items --
call this set of connections, MICA
--, then since MICA
has been relativised to, and identified by means of, the times so specified, it
must always remain the same.
On the other hand, if it
were incorrect to say that -- and MICAweresusceptible to change -- then at any point in time it would be false to say that
the said relation expressed in T1 was MICA,
and the items mentioned wouldn't be inter-linked in the way asserted.
But, if it is now true to say this of them, it must be true to say the
same tomorrow (or at any time) about this set of relations today.
Recall, MIC connects
everything to everything else, constantly and instantaneously throughout all of time, irrespective of whether it
now exists, including the very words used to make this very point.
It could be argued that
this implausible conclusion can't apply here since dialecticians are
committed to universal change. Hence, the above relation must change as the
events it connects themselves alter.
But, is that a safe
inference given this view
of MIC? On the contrary, it now seems plain that MICexcludes
DM-change. That is because, of course, the items in this triple relation don't now
exist, and so can't change. In that case, MICA
can't change either, and neither can the relation between them.
So, since the events in
question were time-stamped to make them determinate, this means that MICA
can't change -- since a specific date-stamp identified
each element of that set.
If we
generalise the above analysis (to take into account every event and process in the entire universe,
including those not now in existence (otherwise, this widened set wouldn't comprise all of 'reality'),
we would obtain the same result. Hence, if MIC were true, DM-change
would be impossible.
If every event in the past is now inter-related to every event in both the
present and the future (MIC-style), nothing could alter. Otherwise we
would lose all contact with our capacity to refer to them, and so link them. [It
won't do to argue that this is misguided since many of the objects concerned
do now exist; that is because MIC holds that even if many do exist,
they are inter-linked with countless more that don't.]
Of course, it is possible to complain that this is thoroughly misguided since
nature takes no heed of our capacity to refer to such things, or of our ability to link
them. In which case, the above argument clearly shows Ms Lichtenstein is an Idealist.
In response, it is worth reminding readers
once again that all this speculation has been forced upon us because
dialecticians refuse to say what the "Totality" is, let alone be specific about the
nature of the interconnections they say exist throughout nature. Hence, I'm not reporting
my own beliefs!
Now, if the universe is
changeable (not that I doubt it!), then one implication of the above argument
is that not only would we be unable to describe it, we couldn't describe
all those hypothetical
DM-interconnections without implying they were changeless. In that case, the above argument presents
DM-theorists with the following dilemma (that is, always assuming they accept MIC):
(1) If the DM-universe is describable, and
MIC is valid, then change can't happen;
Or:
(2) If the DM-universe changes, it can't be described.
Option
(1) above
is in fact the
Block View of
Time, only rather badly expressed.
A somewhat
similar problem afflicts relativistic Physics: If the universe is a
four-dimensional 'object' (or, rather,
amanifold)
in
Spacetime, then each 'event' would in effect be a
proper part of an
orthogonal
three-dimensional 'slice' (i.e., a
hyperplane) through that 'object'/manifold, embedded in 4-space. In that case,
change couldn't take place -- or, rather, it would,
at best, represent our subjective view of the world, meaning
there would be no such thing as 'objective' change.
[However, if
Special Relativity is
valid,
there appear to be problems constructing such a hyperplane through all points
simultaneously. If correct, that would make our view of the world even more
subjective and parochial. On that, see Saunders (2002).]
Of course, this just
means that Relativity is no friend of DM. Indeed, the 'Big Bang' itself (since it
is predicated on the Relativity) is its mortal enemy. So, when dialecticians
refer us to the 'Big Bang' to account for both the "Totality" and interconnectedness, they are in
fact drawing a viper to their collective bosom. As was noted
here,
that is just one
reason why
earlier generations of Dialectical Marxists opposed -- and some still oppose
-- the revolutionary new Physics that emerged in the
first few decades of the 20th century.
On the other hand, if these links are
objective, then they exist independently of our capacity to refer to them. And
if that is so, it means they still can't change. Call the set of such
links, whether or not we know of them, S. In that case, S can't
change or it would no longer link the time-stamped items it connects. Call the
set of elements that S connects, Ω, then Ω can't change,
either, since all its elements are time-stamped. This means that at the 'moment'
of the "Big Bang" (and possibly even before, if there was indeed a 'before'),
both S and Ω came into existence and have remained fixed in
Parmenidean Hell ever since -- if
MIC is the case.
However, let us now suppose that:
(a) There is
some way of avoiding all of the paradoxical conclusions mentioned above.
And
hence that,
(b) MICis compatible with change, after all.
Even then,
MIC
would still face formidable problems. For example, MIC
would appear to
imply
the existence of instantaneous effects across vast expanses of space and
time -- at all times --, not least
those
between things that do not now exist and those that do. That, in turn, would
require the existence of non-relativistic effects 'travelling' back and forth
between such regions at
unimaginably large
superluminal velocities (leaving the 'warp'
speeds of Star Trek gasping for breath). Either that, or it would have
to involve (in most cases) inordinate time-delays for all relevant reciprocal
influences to work, undermining MIC in the process. [Since, in that case,
many wouldn't in fact be interconnected.]
Hence, it
looks like MIC presents DM-fans with far too many serious dialectical-headaches. In that case,
if DM is to be taken seriously, its adherents would be well advised to
avoid MIC like the plague.
Because of that,
I will no longer consider MIC
in this Essay (except, of course, in the next paragraph and the End Notes!); any dialecticians still enamoured of it are welcome to
make of it what they can.
[Even so,
if such individuals want to retain some form of commitment to MIC, they
will have to abandon the idea that their theory is acceptable only if it
has
been confirmed in some way. That is because MIC is as impossible to
verify as it is to believe.]
Let us assume, therefore, that some form of NMIC
is more acceptable to DM-theorists.
From earlier we saw that NMIC asserted the following:
[B] The
"Totality" is interconnected, but not everything that has existed, or
will exist, or now exits, is permanently inter-linked, instantaneously with everything else.
However,
NMIC is itself rather vague (the above characterisation is clearly my own
offering, which has once more been forced upon us because the threadbare details
offered up by DM-fans are about as useful as a chocolate fire door). However, the extent
and nature of these interconnections are no less unclear, and it isn't
easy to see how that defect can be rectified, except, perhaps, on a dogmatic or
stipulative basis.
But, even if the opposite were
the case, and NMIC were entirely perspicuous, it would still face serious
problems of its own. For example, some of the aforementioned Helium atoms in the
distant Galaxy (mentioned in T1, reproduced below) could have decayed by the time their
vanishingly small effects had travelled very far -- in which case, those atoms, at
least, would no longer exist for them to be interconnected with anything.
Furthermore, the energy they released could fail to reach certain parts of the Universe
because of absorption elsewhere. And
what is true of them will be true of countless other objects and processes.
T1: The median price of
coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2021, the mean number of grains
of sand on
Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd
of July 1742, and the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of
Helium in a
small pocket of gas in
The
Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly
25.356567860984443 million years ago...
In addition, NMIC also faces the
Light
Cone problem
(also mentioned earlier): there are parts
of nature that can't now interact with one another (if Special Relativity is to be
believed).
Further questions force
themselves upon us: Do these hypothetical 'travelling effects' influence other
'travelling effects' (even if they happen to be moving in opposite directions
from the same source), at all times or for a limited time frame? Does the
energy from distant Galaxies travelling away from the Earth (never to
interact with our planet -- that is, if we assume the universe is infinite and
unbounded (and assuming it isn't absorbed somewhere, which means it won't affect
the earth, anyway)) have any effect on energy radiating from the Earth and similarly
moving in the opposite direction, away from those Galaxies? If not, how can
these particular aspects or parts of nature be interconnected?
Is there some sort of
hierarchy of levels within or among these interconnections, with some things
affecting others more than they do the rest? Does an inverse square law operate
in this case?
More to the point: has a single DM-theorist attempted to work out the mathematical
details of any of this,
let alone consider any of the above questions?
Worse still, is there any evidence
supporting the idea that every
sub-atomic particle in the Universe is interconnected with every other for
all, or even most, of time?
Of course, one possible response to
the above might involve pointing out that all of nature is subject to the same laws
because everything originated in the "Big Bang" billions of years ago. That
would appear to mean that everything in the universe is related "by birth and by
law", as it were, to everything else. Indeed, there are well-known theories in
Modern Physics that
seem to support the idea that the entire Universe is interconnected because of
its unique origin and because of what has come to be known as "quantum entanglement". [However,
on the latter,
see Note 28.]
[DM-supporters who believe that the universe
is infinite (and thus that there was no "Big Bang") will plainly have a hard time
explaining how everything in an infinite universe could be connected, let alone
interconnected!]
But, even if these modern theories
were correct (and we were to suppose for
a moment that scientists never change their minds -- but see below), that would still
fail to show
that everything is nowinterconnected, or will always remain so. For that
conclusion itself to be correct we should need argument and evidence, certainly
more than has been offered so far -- which is virtually zero!
However, despite the fact
that the aforementioned theories in Modern Physics seem to lend support to the idea that certain
parts of nature are
interconnected, the evidence in their favour is alarmingly thin.26
Incidentally, the above
response (that everything arose from the "Big Bang") would fail to explain precisely whichlawsactually
connect the aforementioned price of coffee grinders in Brazil to remote atoms of Helium, let alone the number of grains of sand on beaches in the antipodes,
mentioned in T1 above -- to
say nothing of every other trivial event in the history of the universe --, or,
worse, how such
links might be confirmed. [Not
to mention the Light Cone problem covered earlier!]
Despite
this, there are several comrades -- whose ideas will be examined elsewhere
at this site -- who question the standard account of the origin of the
universe; for example, Michael Gimbel [Gimbel (2011)], and our old friends:
Woods and
Grant (1995/2007) [W&G].27
According
to these comrades, the Universe is infinite both in duration and size,
macroscopically and microscopically, stretching
on 'forever',
and that it is 'infinitely divisible' -- although, as far as I can tell, W&G don't actually say
it is infinitely divisible (but, Gimbel
does), even though it appears to be an implication of the idea that the universe is infinite in extent
and intent. Be this as it may, if that were so, it would mean
that most of reality couldn'tbe interconnected since
nothing would have had a common origin -- plainly, because, on this view, there was no
origin of the universe
-- although oddly enough W&G failed to spot this
fatal
corollary of their theory. In which case, if the Universe is as they
say it is, it can't be a
"Totality".
[Imagine asking, say, a waitress to tell you what
the total bill for a meal is only to be informed that it is an "infinite bill".
If so, it can have
no total. Some might object that this is an inapt analogy. Maybe so, but
until we are told with some clarity what DM-fans mean by "Totality" it will
have to do.]
Anyway, exactly how these three
comrades
[i.e., Gimbel and W&G] know that the universe is infinite in extent and
had no origin they forgot to say -- although, Gimble does offer his readers
several arguments in favour of the idea, but his main reason appears to be that Engels and
Lenin believed it was. Nevertheless, this appears to run counter to the
following advice offered by Engels:
"The general results of the
investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence
are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions.
To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to
start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology,
an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing....
As
Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and
can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general
and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can
be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx
and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
In fact, DM-theories about an
infinite universe
manifestly don't "proceed...from facts", but from ideas inherited from
post-Renaissance
Hermeticism and Christian Mysticism, where an 'infinite
universe' was viewed as a fitting analogy for the 'infinite nature' of 'God'.
Belief in
anything else would be to demean, or downgrade, the 'deity' (on this, see Bruno (1998), De León-Jones (1997),
Koyré (1957),
Lovejoy (1964) (this links to a PDF), and Yates (1991)).
Their supporters, too, omitted the "careful empirical" work
necessary to substantiate the doctrine that the universe is indeed infinite
as opposed to being
merely finite but very large and very old.
An obvious point also worth
making here is the following: this is a question that should be settled by
scientific research not religious dogma (upside down of the 'right way
up').
Indeed, like so many of the other things
W&G say about nature (and, to a certain extent, this also applies to
Gimbel's
ex cathedrapronouncements) -- just as
it applies to other DM-fans -- they all
seem quite happy to
impose these
quasi-theological dogmas on
the Universe.27a
Another possible reaction
to the above 'difficulties' might run along the following lines:
R1: "Ok, while we might at
present be ignorant of these interconnections that doesn't imply there are none. The history of science has
shown that theories of the Universe have always been framed in
increasingly general terms, and that over time the laws scientists
discover confirm the fact that countless objects and processes in nature
are interconnected (in the way that DM-theorists suppose). Indeed, the
development of scientific knowledge shows that the more we discover about nature the more
interconnections we find."
However, that
response doesn't even begin to tackle the vast bulk of the problems raised earlier. For example, if
interconnections within the "Totality" involve instantaneous effects across
vast expanses -- measured in billions of light years --, several of the aforementioned
scientific laws and principles are plainly false (namely, those
that depend on
Special Relativity). Worse still,
as has also been noted, the universal existence of such effects will never,
and can never,
be confirmed. How, for example, would it be possible to test the entanglement of
two photons sent on their way, to be observed when they are a billion light
years apart? Who is going to be patient enough, or even alive long enough, to do the observing at such massive
separation distances, even assuming the human race
survives that long and there is anyone left to care or even to remember they
were supposed to keep track of them? So, based on the sort of DM-principles mentioned earlier (relating to
the allegedly non-negotiable pre-requisite that theories have to have empirical
support,
and mustn't be foisted on nature),
dialecticians themselves can't consistently accept the up-beat view of things
recorded in R1 above since (as has been pointed out several times) it won't ever
be confirmed. That is quite apart from the fact that we still don't know what
these interconnections are that stretch across such vast distances. Or, whether
they connect events and objects in the past with those in the present (which
they will have to do across such an immense intergalactic chasm).
Indeed,
Einstein called such
ideas "spooky". Not only did they appear to violate certain tenets of Special
Relativity, they also seem impossible to believe -- because of the absence
of:
(a) any conceivable causal explanation, and (b) an intervening medium.28
More worrying still, this
latest (volunteered) reply is itself based on a metaphysical view of science. There are, of
course, deep issues at stake here -- for example, those connected with how
Scientific Realism
itself should be interpreted, as well as those arising from any attempt to translate
the highly technical language of science into ordinary
terms --, or, indeed, render them compatible with 'commonsense', should
anyone want to do so. Some of
these issues were discussed in Essay Eight
Part Two, others will be dealt with in
Essay Thirteen Part Two (to be published in 2023). That is quite apart form the
fact that the theories concocted by the aforementioned Mystics were originally
completely general, so science is only just catching up!
Quite
apart from all that, even if a plausible version of interconnectedness were
forthcoming, it would still appear to be inconsistent with other DM-theses. For
example: if, according to
dialecticians,
all change is internally-driven and
based on inner conflicts allegedly initiated by the dynamic relation between constituent
UOs
present in all objects and processes, then it would seem that it can't also be externally-motivated. But, what else does the doctrine of universal interconnectedness amount to except an
appeal to the existence of more complex and remote external
causes or 'mediations'? Hence, if universal interconnections exist, change can't be wholly internal to an object or system. On the other hand, if
change were entirely the result of the conflict between the 'internal
opposites' within all objects, processes
and systems, interconnectedness could only be local, at best -- it certainly
wouldn't be
universal.
[It is
worth pointing out that there is a fatal equivocation lying right at the heart
of the DM-idea that change is the result of 'internal contradictions'. On that
see
here,
here, and
here. This topic is
discussed more fully in Essay Eight
Part One
(along with the idea that there is some sort of 'dialectical' interplay at work between internal
and external 'contradictions'),
and will be dealt with again in
Part Two of this Essay.]
In that
case, if dialecticians are determined to cling to their belief in this yet-to-be-defined "Totality" along with its universal interconnections, the doctrine
that change is exclusively generated by 'internal contradictions' will have to
be ditched. Conversely, vice versa.
Either way, DM would suffer yet another crippling body blow.
If any
aspect of this maximally-interconnected "Totality" is to be rejected
(along with the idea that every atom, past present and future, has a direct
effect on every other atom, instantaneously, for all of time across the entire
universe),
then what interpretation can be put upon 'interconnectedness' that doesn't
amount toan act of faith?
Unless the details
can be filled in, faith seems to be the only option available to loyal
adepts who congregate under the auspices of
The Church Of The Sacred Dialectic.
That is because, as has already been pointed out, universal and omni-temporal
interconnections are incapable of being confirmed.28a
This is where the "Epistemological Definition" might offer some
assistance to beleaguered DM-fans,
enabling them to find a solution (of sorts) to the above conundrum, and one that is conducive to a
non-mystical
view of the universe.
Plainly,
an epistemological approach to understanding the "Totality" will re-direct
attention from
attempt to cobble-together a speculative
Ontology (on the lines of the above 'contents list'),
and re-focus it
on other
areas, on a consideration of what is
known about the Whole as it has been conceived, or might be conceived, at any point in history. Indeed, this seems to be the definition John Rees
prefers;
we saw him referring his readers to an "insistence" (recorded
above),
and he
later alluded to the "totality of human experience and knowledge", which
appears to have something to do with the "Totality", too. [Rees (1998a),
pp.5, 236.] In what follows I will simply assume it does.
Unfortunately, as we are about to see, this switch of emphasis away
from the 'object' of knowledge onto what might be known about it only
succeeds in creating further problems for the DM-faithful, should they choose to adopt it.
As seems reasonably clear, unless it is
possible to say something (anything?) about the object of
knowledge, epistemologically motivated claims about 'it' will be entirely
spurious. So, if no one has a clue what a meskonator is, claims about the
"totality of human experience and knowledge" will be no help at all. Knowledge
about what? But, DM-theorists can't (or won't) ante-up, here.
Beyond oft-repeated banalities, they have remained
studiously unspecific about the nature of the supposed object of their claims for nigh on 150 years
(as indeed were centuries of mystics before them).
And, it looks like they intend to maintain this tight-lipped policy or another
150. This Essay certainly won't budge them, even if they bother to read it!
Why are they so reticent? Why do they refuse to tell
the world the glad tidings about their "Totality"?
In response, they tell us that that is because they will be accused of imposing their ideas on nature.
But, that reply is rather odd, since that is what they finally end up doing
with respect to the rest of DM!
For example, they tell us that everything is a "Totality"
(all the while refraining from informing us what that assertion actually involves
or implies), and then they happily impose that
ancient, mystical idea on nature, valid for all of space and time!
Beyond alleging there is a vague sort of
"dialectical unity" between the "knower and the known", and apart from giving
the whole shebang a quasi-religious label (viz., "The Totality"), it looks like
there is little else they could say --, and, as noted above,
there is precious little they have said about this nebulous
"Totality" -- even to one another!
An
analogous predicament has always plagued previous epistemologically-driven
theories of nature, whose advocates found they had to appeal (either implicitly or
explicitly) to an a priori or to an a posteriori ontology of some sort
to bail them out.
Lacking
a back-door ontology like this to firm things up,
still others have meandered off into a
Phenomenalist
quagmire.
In fact,
the DM-classicists merely gesture at a solution to the above dilemma. That is,
they either (a) concoct and then impose a specific ontology on nature or (b)
they face
the prospect that their theory is viewed as
a sub-branch of Phenomenalism -- or even
Subjective Idealism.
Some
half-heartedly opt for the first alternative
by appealing to
a vague and attenuated 'sort of ontology' -- one that was hopelessly compromised by Lenin's
refusal to commit DM to any firm ideas in this area, even about the nature of matter!
-- the whole sorry mess hived-off into the
sciences.
[Earlier
we saw that
that wasn't a wise move, either.]
As we will
see
(in Essay Thirteen
Part One),
DM-fans are totallyunspecific
about what they mean --
even by the word "matter" and "material".
In the end, they employ
materialist-sounding phrases that collapse alarmingly quickly into some
form of Idealism.
Of course, they certainly intend their ontology to
be materialist, but the
asymptotic road to
Dialectical
Nirvana along which they are all meandering is paved with intentional, but no less
ideal, bricks, upon which it is impossible to build anything secure.
Indeed, there doesn't appear to be a single
DM-theorist on the planet (now or in the past) who is either willing or capable
of telling us (or even
her/his fellow adepts) what matter actually is, beyond describing it as an 'abstraction'!
[Follow the "matter" link in the previous paragraph for more details.]
Unfortunately, this puts dialecticians in the same
bind as theologians, who similarly find they can't tell us anything about the
nature of 'God', save both of them offer up their own
via
negativa -- i.e., 'God'/'matter' is not this, not that, not this, not…
So, without
a clear idea what these 'coy materialists' think matteris,
their "Totality" is indeed like
Hamlet without
the…, er..., well what?
It
is no surprise, therefore, to
discover that this serially equivocal approach to ontology means that the
aforementioned dilemma -- involving a choice between an
a priori or an
a posteriori membership list -- re-surfaces in several different forms elsewhere in
DM.
On the one hand, DM-theorists maintain the
illusion that they haven't imposed their ideas on reality, but have merely "read
them from it"; on the other, the way these ideas are expressed
reveals they have indeed foisted them on the world. That alone reveals
their ontology (if such it may be called) is a priori, after all.
[These allegations were fully substantiated in
Essay Two; they will be examined in
more detail in Essay Twelve (summary
here)
and Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
DM-theorists have saddled themselves with a metaphysical
theory that offers them no clear conception of the "Totality" (or of what it contains).
Their theory also boasts an ontology that has reified and then reconfigured the products of social interaction
(language) as if they were fundamental aspects of reality (all those 'contradictions',
'opposites' and
'negations', for example), but their obvious incapacity to provide any further
means that they have also saddled themselves with their own version of Kant's
Noumenon. [On that, see Essay Ten
Part One.]
If ordinary language
is inadequate to the task of capturing final truths about the world (a DM-thesis we saw confirmed
here and
here), and if humanity is
locked in an infinite or eternal "asymptotic" search for absolute truth (the
nature of which must by definitionforever escape us), then human 'knowledge'
must always remain 'infinitely
incorrect', 'infinitely' far from 'the truth'.
In that case, for
all that DM-theorists know, their quest for 'absolute' truth could be going in
entirely the wrong direction! Given their theory, humanity is and will
always be infinitely ignorant of everything and anything at each and every stage in its history. Hence, the
probability that the search for knowledge is progressing in the 'right'
direction will always be vanishingly small (indeed, it is 'infinitely' small), even if there were such a thing as "knowledge" (which, given this theory, there
couldn't be!).
On this account, humanity will always be
infinitely far removed from 'Absolute Truth', and hence infinitely ignorant.
If DM-epistemology were correct, human beings must find it impossible to build a secure platform from which
to
launch a scientific search for knowledge, let alone approach truth
'asymptotically'. As we saw in Essay Ten
Part One, the DM 'convergence' theory of
knowledge readily collapses into
scepticism. No good appealing to
practice, either, since, if we are infinitely ignorant of everything, and
anything we attempt to conclude about practice has an infinite probability of
being wrong, that can't fail to be the case with the deliverances of
practice. So, an appeal to
practice to shore-up the infinitely insubstantial sands upon which
DM-epistemology has been built -- the same sands, incidentally, into which many a dialectical head
has been inserted --, was no less
ill-advised.
In fact, there might be
no such thing as 'Absolute Truth' for anyone to aim for, let alone
approach 'asymptotically'! Certainly, neither Engels nor Lenin even so much as
attempted to show that there was such a thing (and neither did Hegel, in
relation to his 'Absolute'). Indeed, any claim that there is such as thing as
'Absolute Truth' must also have an infinite probability of being false. And since human knowledge is
always infinitely far from 'The Truth' -- according to DM-theorists -- the claim
that there is even such a thing as partial or 'relative' truth has an infinitely high
probability of being mistaken, too.
Hence, the Epistemological Definition would fatally
compromise any and all claims that DM is capable of delivering
even partial or relative knowledge about anything, let alone the "Totality"
(that is, should we ever be told what that is!).
To some, the above allegations might appear to be
completely misguided, if not downright impertinent; nevertheless, a consideration of
Engels's description of the "Totality" might give them something to
think about:
"'Fundamentally, we can know
only
the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in
raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity
and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the
finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is
knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition
of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.234-35.]29
Compare the above with the following:
"The identity of thinking and being, to use
Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the
polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by
side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This
difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept
from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately
its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and
does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which
it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a
fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because
reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it
only asymptotically…. In other words, the unity of concept and phenomenon
manifests itself as an essentially infinite process, and that is what it is, in
this case as in all others." [Engels to Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels
(1975), pp.457-58, and Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphases alone added.]
While Engels doesn't actually use the
term here, his words clearly relate to the "Totality" (or, rather, to
our knowledge of 'it'), only now expressed in
quasi-mystical terms. Admittedly, these passages come from unpublished
writings, but they succeed in
revealing how close Engels came to overt Idealism in private.30
These 'impertinent' observations will be further
substantiated in what follows.
The language DM-theorists use when they refer
to the "Totality" clearly shows that, despite
protestations to the
contrary, they
regard it as an a priori concept, 'object', or 'process'. Indeed, as noted above, it is little
more than a pale reflection of Hegel's Absolute, and hence of 'God'.
The fact that this isn't a
baseless allegation can be seen from a consideration of the answers that might be
given to the following questions:
(1) How do DM-theorists know that
reality is restricted to just one "Totality"? Might there not be several?
Leaving out of consideration sub-"Totalities" for the present, might
there not be countless intermingled or intercalated "Totalities"? Indeed, how
exactly do
DM-theorists count "Totalities" so that they know to stop at
one?31
(2) Following on from question (1), how do DM-theorists know
that there aren't at least two "Totalities" (or even sub-"Totalities")
that are completely
unrelated to each other?
(3) If we now confine our attention to the
known Universe, how do dialecticians know that every part of
nature is
interconnected with all the rest, and all the time? Might there not be parts of
the world that are totally unrelated to anything else, or which are connected to only
relatively few other objects and processes? Why is neither option possible?32
(4) What gives DM-theorists the confidence to
"insist" in advance of all -- or even most -- of the evidence having
been examined, let alone gathered, that what they
say must be true of every last particle in the universe, and for all
of time?
Beyond 'divine' revelation, there are only two
possible approaches that would allow DM-theorists to answer the above questions in the way that they
actually do: (i)
DM is a dogmatic, metaphysical theory, or (ii) DM is a conventionalised theory founded upon a standardised,
definitional or
stipulative use of certain words.
Again, these allegations might strike some
readers as decidedly controversial, if not patently false, so the rest of this section will be devoted to
substantiating each of them.33
Question One: How Do We Know There Is
Only One "Totality"?
There is an obvious response to this question -- indeed, it might even have occurred to the reader
--
which is: "Well,
that's what the word "Totality" means. There can't be more than
one Totality, by definition."
There are at least two ways of understanding
this reply, each of which corresponds to one or other of
(i) and (ii), above:
(a) If the standard, 'official',
vague and loose
DM-characterisation of the
"Totality" means that this concept, or rule (if it is either
one of these) must be employed as a way of
deciding what reality contains (thus operating as a sort of methodological
or theoretical filter) --, or, indeed, as a way of constituting a set of necessary, or
even scientific truths
about it --, then that would clearly make DM metaphysical. That is
because this approach will have confused a rule or a concept with 'reality
itself'. Why that is so is explored at length in Essay Twelve
Part One
(summary
here).
Moreover, it
would confirm an earlier suspicion that well before even a
vanishingly small fraction of the evidence has been collected, let alone
analysed,
the idea that 'everything' must be viewed along DM-lines --, i.e., as part of an
interconnected unitary whole -- had already been decided upon, and that the
remaining evidence (such as it is) has been shoe-horned to fit this view of the
world. But, what else
would this
amount to except a crude way of imposing a favoured structure on reality,
and one
based solely on the supposed meaning of a word (i.e., "Totality"), the very thing
DM-theorists have always effected to
disavow?
The fact
that this is what has actually happened -- and isn't just the opinion
of the present author -- can be seen by the way that the
above volunteered response
suggests that universally valid facts about the world can be derived from the meaning of a word:
"Totality" -- or, to be more honest, derived
from a superficial gesture at providing even so much as a loose 'definition'of it.
Even if the "Totality" had been defined clearly,
and it was perfectly clear what DM-theorists were banging on about, at the very
least they would still
require aconvincing argument that justified the derivation of a set of universal truths from a single word
(or its 'definition').
In fact, such an argument would
automatically concede point made earlier: that a particular
view of the world had been imposed on nature, which view was itself based on a vague and imprecise
'sort of definition', instead of having been 'read from the world', as had been advertised all along.
Of course, it isn't as if we
don't already know
where this idea came from; its origin is no mystery. It was concocted by
Christian and Hermetic
Mystics, who very helpfully "divined" this idea long beforeany evidence
to speak of was available.
(b) On the other hand, if the word
"Totality" (and its associated jargon) is meant to be used as a "form of representation"
-- that is, as a formal way of interpreting experience and legitimating what
appear to be a set of scientific inferences -- this would at
least make it clear that DM was a creature of convention.34
Of course, the first of the above two options
would suggest that DM is just another form of LIE (that is, it is a member
of a family of doctrines all of which are based upon the belief that
substantive truths about the world,
valid for all space and time,
can be derived (solely) from the alleged meanings of certain words). The second
alternative would, naturally, imply that DM superficially resembled science, but only at considerable cost.
That is because, as noted above, it would confirm that DM is
based on a series of arbitrary conventions.35
There are
many different forms of
Conventionalism.
Less plausible versions tend to be based on arbitrary
stipulation.37
Less implausible versions are anthropological in origin, founded on the
wide range of social practices that have helped
drive human social evolution.38
Perhaps DM is conventional in one of those
senses? If so, the idea that reality forms a contradictory "Totality"
would then be based on one of the following: (i) An agreement of
some sort; (ii) An implicit or explicit stipulation; or (iii)
Norms derived from, or constitutive of, a range of social practices.
Admittedly, the adoption of any one of these would confirm the fact that
DM hadn't been read from the world (as had been
claimed), but had been imposed on it.
That would certainly account
for the
dogmatic nature of
DM and its 'laws', which are supposedly true for all of space and time.
Unfortunately, stipulative conventions are no more capable of being
empirically true than are rules. A straightforward example of
conventions like this is the metric system. But, the
conversion rule, 1000kg = 1 tonne is of little
use to dialecticians. Although it is correct
to say
that one tonne is one thousand kilograms (or, rather,
that
any object weighing 1000kg will automatically weigh 1 tonne, so that an
empirical statement to that effect about
some object or other would itself be true),
that
conventional
fact doesn't derive from the 'nature' of the world (even though it is connected
with it in other ways,
via practice),
nor has it been read from it. It is based on a
series of
agreements and stipulations introduced and adopted a couple of centuries ago.
Hence, if
this conversion rule is 'true', it isn't empirically true. In fact, it
is better to call it "practical" or "useful" rather than "true".
[I have said more about such rules,
here.]
None but
the radically confused would dream of checking the above rule by measuring something.
It can't be
tested in practice (although practice certainly tells us whether or not such rules
are practical or useful). This particular rule can obviously confirm whether or
not a
given measurement has been converted correctly between the relevant units, and rules like this tell us when a practical interface
with the world has been performed correctly
(and accurately), according to the explicit (or implicit) criteria for their
application. [On this, see Polanyi (1962,
1983).]
In that case, if something is empirically true,
stipulating it as true would plainly be so much wasted effort. If something is empirically false, a stipulation to that
effect (or, indeed, its opposite) would be also either pointless or misleading.
Of course, social conventions are far more
complex and many are nowhere near as precise. In addition, they aren't (typically) based on an explicit agreement, but that doesn't affect the point being made.
[On this, see Lewis (1969).]
Plainly, the
truth-value of
empirical propositions depends on the way the world happens to be. However, the fact that
such propositions are capable of possessing truth-values (i.e., the
fact that they have truth-conditions) is a consequence of the
conventionalised linguistic practices human beings have developed over the
course of their history. How could it be otherwise? This convention
didn't float down from 'Heaven'.
As will be argued In Essay Twelve
Part One,
previous philosophical
and
ideologically-motivated attempts to give inappropriatelinguistic expression to these
conventions-- along with their subsequent mis-interpretation as
super-empirical truths about reality
-- gave birth
to
Metaphysics, first of all (in the 'West') in Ancient Greece.
[There were analogous developments in the 'East' around the same
time.] Because metaphysical propositions are based on just such a misconstrual
-- misrepresenting the linguistic products of social interaction as if they represented the real relation
between things,
or, indeed, those things themselves --, they are incapable of being true
or false.38a
So, metaphysical propositions are
incapable of being true or false because (a) They are based on the misconstrual of
linguistic rules as if they were factual propositions themselves, and (b) They mistake what is a social form for reality itself.
A fetishism of communication that mirrors the
fetishism of commodities. Hence, metaphysical theories aren't just non-sensical they
are also fetishised,
incoherent
non-sense. As noted above, metaphysicians indulged in this
sleight-of-hand since they claimed it enabled them to
'uncover' the 'essential' nature and 'logical form' of
'Reality', which the state (with all its inequality and class divisions) was
supposed to mirror. The results were then imposed on nature
and society. This meant that if the
state itself mirrored the 'nature of reality', or 'the divine order', then that
would 'justify'
inequality, exploitation and oppression. Philosophy was thus situated on the
front-line in the defence of ruling-class power, alongside Theology:
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence
equally to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line
version, here. Bold emphasis and link added.]
DM-theorists have bought into this
ancient ruling-class
approach to Philosophy. They, too,
misconstrue the nature of the ideas Hegel concocted (upside down or 'the
right way up'). They indulge in metaphysical speculation whenever they
misinterpret the product of the social relations between human beings (i.e.,
language) as if it represented the real relations between things, or, indeed, those things themselves.
That intellectual
wrong-turn was further compounded by the misidentification of the origin and
nature of language as 'natural', based on "genetics", "reflection", "inner representations",
or "images", reified as 'mental processes' or 'objects' (a theory that was itself
the result of the distortion of
ordinary words like "consciousness", "thought", and "cognition").39
"The
philosophers have only to dissolve
their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order
to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that
they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases
alone added.]
Nevertheless, this characterisation of
DM will clearly be unacceptable to its proponents since they claim that even
though their theory may only be 'relatively true', it is not only empirically
valid and objective, it reflects the world itself, and has been
repeatedly 'verified in practice'.
[Whether or not DM is only a "method" will
be examined presently.]
So, despite the fact that
DM carries all the hallmarks of Conventionalism -- in that its adherents are
quite happy to "insist", or
"demand"
that this or that 'dialectical thesis' is valid for all of nature, for all of
time, based on a set of idiosyncratic
stipulations and speculative inferences that have been drawn from a set of
specially-selected words and concepts --, it seems that DM can't be
a conventional theory.40
The only other way to account for
DM-theorists' habit of advancing a priori, dogmatic and universal claims about reality
is to conclude that DM is a metaphysical theory.
Of course, that
begs
questions about the 'correct' definition of
Metaphysics;
that particular topic is discussed in Essay
TwelvePart One,
and readers are directed there for more details.
However, given Engels's own rather loose
'definition' of the term dialecticians insist that DM isn't
metaphysical. On the contrary, they regard their theory as a scientific, materialist theory
of nature and society, and how to change both.41
In which case, it could be
argued that DM is in fact a scientific theory.
But, if that were so, what should we make of the numerous
universal, a priori 'laws' and propositions --, to say nothing of the
many "insistences" and "demands" -- its adepts
regularly impose on the facts?
It could be
argued that DM-theories aren't dogmatic, they are merely hypothetical.
But, that isn't even remotely plausible. Not only are DM-theories not hypothetical, they don't even look
hypothetical. They are all expressed in ways that can't under
any stretch of the imagination be interpreted as hypothetical. Even leaving
aside all the many aforementioned "demands", "unthinkables" and "insistences",
as well as those "musts", "eternals", "impossibles" and "never anywhere"s
all over the place, DM-theses are described by
dialecticians themselves as "laws of cognition", "objective" and as the most "general laws". [On this see
Essay Two,
especially
here.]
Indeed,
if
DM-theses are simply "hypothetical", the meaning of "hypothetical" must have
changed.
Here are just few examples
of these DM-'hypotheses':
Engels
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature….
[T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature,
and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of
nature."
"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each
individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative
addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion….
"Hence, it is impossible to alter the
quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion…. In this
form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational
but even rather obvious." [Engels (1954), pp.211,
62. Bold emphases added.]
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter.
Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be
created; it can only be transmitted….
"A motionless state of matter therefore proves to
be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976),
p.74. Bold
emphases added.]
Plekhanov
"According to Hegel, dialectics is the
principle of all life…. [M]an has two qualities: first being alive, and
secondly of also being mortal. But on closer examination it turns out that
life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that in general
any phenomenon is contradictory, in the sense that it develops out of
itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to its existence and
will transform it into its opposite. Everything flows, everything
changes; and there is no force capable of holding back this constant flux,
or arresting its eternal movement. There is no force capable of
resisting the dialectics of phenomena….
"At a particular moment a moving body is at a
particular spot, but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if it
were only in that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become motionless.
Every motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and as
there is not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do not
have in the long run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel,
who said that dialectics is the soul of any scientific cognition.
And this applies not only to cognition of nature….
"And so every phenomenon, by the
action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but
inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite….
"When you apply the dialectical method to the
study of phenomena, you need to remember that forms change eternally in consequence of the 'higher development of their content….'
"In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit
consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from
the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin
and destruction….
"[M]odern science confirms at every step
the idea expressed with such genius by Hegel, that quantity passes into
quality….
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added.]
Lenin
"Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e.,
reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflectionof the eternal development of
the world.
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics
of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others."
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into
every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the
doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of
its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of
the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most
ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John
is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the
individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the
individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists
only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in
the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or
another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the
essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the
individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal,
etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with
other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc.
Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity,
of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and
the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we
disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence
from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and
must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of
dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human
knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.110,
196-97,
221-22,
357-58, 359-60. Italic emphases in the original;
bold emphases added.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)….
"[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is
always concrete, never abstract, as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added.]
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated
by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly
repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis
('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a
straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks
in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner
impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the
various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given
phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest,
indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a
connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of
motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the
ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases
added.]
Trotsky
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves…. [T]he
axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does
not change, that is, if it does not exist…. For concepts there also exists
'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic…, but by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything
is always changing….Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws:
change of quantity into quality, development through contradiction, conflict and
form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability,
etc…." [Trotsky (1971),
pp.64-66. Bold emphases added.]
"It must be recognized that the fundamental law
of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into quality, for it gives [us] the
general formula of all evolutionary processes -– of nature as well as of
society.
"…The principle of the transformation of quantity
into quality has universal significance, insofar as we view the entire
universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and
transformation….
"In these abstract formulas we have the most
general laws (forms) of motion, change, the transformation of the stars of the
heaven, of the earth, nature and human society.
"…Dialectics is the logic of development. It
examines the world -- completely without exception -– not as a
result of creation, of a sudden beginning, the realisation of a plan, but as a
result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became the way it
is as a result of lawlike development." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88, 90, 96. Bold
emphases added.]
Mao
"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the
law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook,
the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand
the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations
with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as
their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its
movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of
contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the
process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process
of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to
end....
"...There is nothing that does not contain
contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"Thus it is already clear that contradiction
exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the simple
or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological
phenomena....
"...Contradiction is universal and absolute,
it is present in the process of the development of all things and permeates
every process from beginning to end...." [Mao (1961b),
pp.311-18. Bold
emphases added.]
Several score (and that's no exaggeration!) equally dogmatic passages, taken from the DM-classics and more recent dialecticians,
have been quoted in
Essay Two.
Despite this, DM-theorists also claim
that their theory deals with 'real material forces' -- as opposed to 'static', 'abstract'
entities --, which means that their main concern is with the
inter-relationship between concretely developing and historically-conditioned
objects and processes within the
"Totality" (even if abstraction has to be employed (dialectically) to assist
them to
that end). Moreover, this plays an
integral part in a long-term strategy to further the
revolutionary transformation of society.
Moreover, objects and processes in the "Totality"
are said to change as a result of their contradictory
nature and their interconnection with other objects and processes -- i.e., because of the antagonistic forces
at work within the whole.42
But, as DM-theorists themselves insist, this doesn't spare them the difficult task of constantly
checking
their ideas against experience, testing them in practice.
Unfortunately, the above
characterisation simply casts DM back into the metaphysical camp.
That is because its theorists insist that everything in the "Totality" is related
to (or mediated by) by something -- or perhaps even everything -- else (depending on the approach
adopted by any given DM-theorist),
subject to change through 'internal contradiction', and so on. This they dobefore even so much as a vanishingly small
percentage of the evidence has been collected, let alone processed.
Once more, that explains the presence of all those DM-"insistences", "musts",
"impossibles", "absolutes", and "demands",
alongside the equally ubiquitous references to "laws of cognition" and "general laws".
This should go without saying: if
there were proof (and dialecticians were in possession of it), "insistences"
and "demands" wouldn't be needed.
In fact, if that weren't so, there would be little point arguing along similar lines to Rees:
"[W]hen
we bring these terms [belonging to the Totality] into relation with each other
their meaning is transformed…. In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the
part is determined by its relationships with the other parts and so with the
whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts. In
this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of
the parts but also that the parts become more that they are individually by
being part of a whole…. [F]or dialectical
materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998a),
pp.5, 77. Paragraphs merged.]42a0
That is because, if parts and wholes
were in fact interdependent
(in the manner suggested), then DM-theorists would have no choice but to
regard their system as an a priori construct. Plainly, no
amount of evidence could confirm the truth of the above passage (or the
content of the quotations reproduced a few paragraphs back lifted from the DM-canon).
If the entire nature of the
part is determined by the whole (and vice versa), then that fact could
itself only be confirmed when humanity knows everything about everything.
After all, only when the whole is
known would the nature of any part be understood.
Indeed, that appears to be the
import of Lenin's words:
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of
comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity…. [D]ialectical logic requires that an
object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel
sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object
as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its
purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Lenin
(1921), p.93.
Italic emphasis in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
Short of this -- according to
what the above passages (as well as
these
and these) say -- no one would
ever know the full truth about anything. But, until
humanity knows that much (which blessed state we have just been told by Lenin will
never
emerge), no one would be able to assert anything about the
whole -- even, for instance, that there is a whole, that it is indeed a whole, or even a whole
--,
with anything other than infinite uncertainty.
[On this, see
here and
Part Two of this Essay.]
Hence, when
DM-theorists assert things about parts and wholes (even granting that these
assertions are only 'partial' or 'relative' truths), they would have
to have access to knowledge that only the
hypothetical
epistemological end-state could ever deliver
(i.e.,
the state which constitutes complete or absolute knowledge). Again, short of
that, DM-theorists can't say with anything other than almost zero confidence that what they now have is
even 'relative' or 'partial'
knowledge.
That is because even
the assertion that thereare such thingsas parts and wholes (or that knowledge is
merely 'partial', or 'relative' -- or whatever) requires complete knowledge. If the entire
nature of the part -- including at least this part of the total picture,
that is, this part here in this Essay (or in TAR, or in PN
-- or anywhere else, for that matter), written in words (including what they
seem to express) on this page/screen (or any page/screen) about 'partial knowledge' itself -- were determined by the whole (and vice versa),
then we would be in no position to assert even this 'partial' truth (if such it
be) until 'epistemological judgement day' had arrived, and all was revealed to
the congregated DM-Elect.
[PN = Philosophical
Notebooks; i.e., Lenin (1961); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e.,
Rees (1998a).]
On the
other hand, if the idea that there are parts and wholes that completely
inter-condition one another isn't itself a 'partial' truth (and
hence isn't subject to the above strictures), it must be an 'absolute'
truth
whose status has
been decided upon before every genuine 'partial' truth has even been
formulated, let alone apprehended.
But, this would then refute the content of that very notion itself (i.e., that
there are parts and wholes and that they condition one another completely). That is
because, on this view, at least one part
(i.e.,
this
view of the whole, or this view that is dependent on the whole being 'true')
wouldn't itself be conditioned by all the other
parts, since, plainly, the latter do not yet exist as items of knowledge. Hence, the
entire nature of at least one part (i.e., this one, the above 'absolute truth') wouldn't
be dependent on every other part.
Once more, if
that were to be denied -- and, if we were to accept DM-epistemology --, that
rejection itself would have been advanced in abeyance of
the infinite amount of evidence required to support it. At that point it would be clear that that denial itself will have been imposed on part and
whole alike, not derived
from either. [There is much more on this in
Part
Two of this Essay.]
In short, sweep-of-the-hand Wholism
(like this) is just a disguised form of
dogmatic apriorism.
And poorly disguised it is, too.
Be this as
it may,
and
despite what DM-theorists mightmaintain, it is possible to show that DM-theses
haven't been checked against the available evidence in anything like the
manner claimed,
nor have these 'super-truths' been derived from this evidence, such as it
is.
For example,
consider a typical DM-assertion taken from the
opening sentence of TAR:
"The very possibility of human
life is governed by contradictions." [Rees (1998a), p.1.]
Admittedly, Rees lists several examples of
contradictions he thought supported this claim (which turn out not
to be contradictions; on that see
here).
However, the above (general) claim can't be -- and in TAR certainly wasn't -- supported by a careful analysis of all the evidence (or even a
sizeable or representative proportion of it). Indeed,
no matter how much evidence DM-theorists amassed it would
still only represent a tiny fraction of all the facts necessary to
justify a generalisation about "the very possibility of human
life" and what governs it. Moreover, as noted
earlier, given
DM-epistemology, the gap between any large finite body of knowledge and Absolute
Knowledge is itself infinite.
And, this isn't to pick on TAR; this
yawning epistemological gap is a universal feature of the propositions that
litter Dialectical Marxism. [That was established
here and
here.]
Nevertheless, the existence of this veritable chasm of infinite ignorance (that
is, if
DM-epistemology itself were true) hasn't
deterred dialecticians from advancing any number of "demands",
"requirements"
and "insistences"
about all of reality, for all of time -- i.e., that it is
unified, 'contradictory', interconnected,
"mediated", and that every last particle contained within is constantly changing. The
vast majority of
these claims go way beyond what could
reasonably
be justified by an appeal even to a large finite body of evidence (certainly
evidence far
in excess of what is available today, and vastly more than DM-theorists
themselves either quote or reference, which is precious little).
As we
shall see, many of these claims can't be confirmed, let alone tested
in practice.42a
In fact, theories like these function in a
different way and serve a specific end: they 'allow' those who propound them to
stipulate, or lay-down, theoretical criteria delineating the approach they
intend to take with respect to the interpretation of specific aspects of nature and society. Indeed, as noted
above, they form part of a fetishised "form
of representation". [More on the latter, later; until then,
see Glock (1996), pp.129-35.]
[The political and contingent psychological factors
that motivate DM-manoeuvres like these were exposed (in detail) in Essays Nine
Part Two and Twelve
(summary
here).]
It could still be argued that DM is a
science, and that its supporters appropriate and use the latest results of research to support the claims
they make about nature and society, which also includes the tactics they adopt in order
to change it.
Despite the above counterclaim, the fact that DM is conventional
in form -- but metaphysical in both intent and content, all the while
failing to be a science -- can be seen by examining the way DM-advocates themselves
try to
relate their ideas to the natural and social world.
DM-theorists take it as read that the world
exists independently of our knowledge of it, but they are nevertheless quite
happy to insist that they know in advance what its most general characteristics
must be.
Indeed, this dogmatic approach began in the
'West', as far as we know, in
Ancient Greece, with
Heraclitus, who was happy to tell us what must be true of all of reality,
for all of time, based on what he
thought was true about stepping into a
river!
"Heraclitus, along with
Parmenides, is probably the most
significant philosopher of ancient Greece until
Socrates
and
Plato; in fact,
Heraclitus's philosophy is perhaps even more fundamental in the formation of the
European mind than any other thinker in European history, including Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle. Why? Heraclitus, like Parmenides, postulated a
model of nature and the universe which created the foundation for all other
speculation on physics and metaphysics. The ideas that the universe is in constant change
and that there is an underlying order or reason to this change -- the
Logos -- form the
essential foundation of the European world view...."
[Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
Moreover, as a matter
of historical record, these general features weren't
derived by DM-theorists from a scientific examination of reality,
nor are they now a representative summary of the whole of human experience.
As we have seen, they
were borrowed from Hegel, who in turn inherited them from previous
generations of mystics (like Heraclitus), who concocted them at a time when there was hardly any evidence at all!
Despite this, these mystics were happy to impose their ideas on nature,
just like DM-theorists.
[There is more on this in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).]
DM-theorists
certainly claim that their ideas have been given a materialist
flip (which inversion turns out to be about as genuine as a nine bob note --, or
a 61 cent coin, if you are reading this in the United States!).43But,
because their general theories supposedly relate to the "Totality", for
all of space and time, they can't have been obtained by anything other than a priori means,
whoever dreamt them up, or through howsoever many degrees they have supposedly
been rotated.
Of
course, it could always be objected that wider theoretical considerations
determine the validity of the conclusions drawn by DM-theorists. Indeed, it
could also be maintained that this is exactly how scientists themselves make use
of universal laws, which are likewise thought to operate across all of time and
space. If this approach to nature is based on centuries of experience, knowledge
and increasing levels of 'abstraction' -- and if this
isn't a
problem for scientists -- then it can't be one for dialecticians, either.
Or, so
it could be argued.
However, leaving aside the
obvious point that this response undermines completely the claim that DM hasn't
been
imposed on nature (for it openly admits it!), DM
isn't like any known or conceivable
science. Although the criteria distinguishing science from pseudo-science are
somewhat controversial, one thing is reasonably clear: scientists can't
claim that the world is contradictory --in whole or in part.
That idea can't be entertained -- not because of an assumed adherence to bourgeois
ideology, nor as a result of an alleged excessive "tenderness" toward the world
--
but because it would make scientific research impossible.44
A scientific theory that admits reality is contradictory would lose its ability
to explain anything. That is because any theory that
contemplated the existence of contradictions everywhere would make it impossible
to distinguish confirmation from refutation. If an empirical proposition and
its contradictory were both true, or could both be true, confirmation and refutation would be
all of a piece.45
[The handful of options available to DM-supporters
that might seem (to some) capable of avoiding or neutralising that fatal conclusion
have been blocked in
Note 45.]
To be sure, on its own
that doesn't prove DM is itself misconceived, but it does show that it can't bea science. And, as we will soon see, DM isn't even remotely like a science.
In fact, if DM were correct, scientific knowledge would be impossible
-- and not just for the reasons outlined above, but also for those about to be aired
below.46
DM isn't remotely like a
science because its theoretical and its empirical propositions actually say
nothing at all (if they are taken as they were intended by their adherents),
unlike empirical, scientific propositions. The latter present us with material
possibilities, automatically excluding others.
For instance, consider the
following rather straight-forward example:46a
S1: Water boils at 100°C.
[Of course, propositions like S1 are these
days usually expressed as universally
quantified conditionals. I have omitted
that consideration for obvious reasons.]
Given the usual
ceteris paribus
clauses
(i.e., "all things being equal"), the truth of S1 makes the following sentence false (and vice versa):
S2: It is not the case that
water boils at 100°C.
If the aforementioned ceteris paribus
clauses (such as "under normal conditions of pressure and water
purity", etc.) are taken into account, S2 might become true under certain circumstances
-- for example, if the water in question contained impurities, or the ambient pressure
was either raised or lowered. But, even then, what S2 expresses would still rule out the truth
of S1. Against the required background conditions -- or even without them
-- when S1 is true, S2 is false, and when S1 is false, S2 is true.47
Compare this with a typical 'proposition'
taken from DM (or at least from
Trotsky's
version of it):
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and it
doesn't weigh 1 kg.
[Or, for those who aren't
Trotskyists:
S3a: This moving object is
both here and not here at the same time.]
Whatever background is supplied for
them, because S3 and S3a rule nothing out, they actually say nothing. [Why that is so will be
explained presently.]
The import of the above comments wouldn't
change even if S1 were replaced by a more specific example:
S4: This particular container of water
boils at 100°C.
In that case, based on S4, the temptation
might be to think that further qualifications could allow both S1 and S2
to be true at once -- for instance, the following:
S5: Parts of the water in this container boil at 100°C, and parts of it do not. [Yielding what is called a "mixed
phase".]
S6: The same container of water may boil at
99.999°C on one occasion, and boil at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do
both or neither at the same time.
[S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and
it does not weigh 1 kg.
S3a: This moving object is
both here and not here at the same time.]
Clearly, that is because the predicate
"ξ boils at 100°C"
is vague.**
However, while this is an apparent fault of the language we have to use
in such circumstances -- which shortcoming can be remedied to
some extent by greater precision -- the
status of S3/S3a doesn't depend on such equivocation (that is, given the way
DM-theorists
themselves
see such things).
That explains why dialecticians would
resist any attempt to correct S3/S3a
on linguistic grounds alone
(even to the extent that they would accuse anyone who did try to do this of "pedantry", of indulging in "semantics"
--,
or maybe even of "sophistry" and "logic-chopping"). They view what
S3/S3a say as a report of the objective features of a constantly
changing world. But, this just means that the
dialectically-inspired flouting of
certain linguistic conventions (in this case those expressed or formalised by the
LOC) denies S3/S3a a
sense.
That is because whatever occurs
will both refute and confirm S3/S3a. Even though this fatal DM-defect is
self-inflicted, it still wouldn't be one of vagueness (again, as DM-fans
view
such things).
[**The
use of Greek symbols like
"ξ"
is explained
here. If this presents a problem for any readers, just view this predicate
expression as
"...boils at 100°C", or even
"x boils at 100°C".]
[LOC = Law of
Non-contradiction.]
It
could be argued that
despite this, isn't it the case that S6 is still true? And, isn't
"ξ weighs 1 Kg" vague, too? Indeed,
but S6 can be resolved to some extent purely linguistically
(as can this particular predicable; i.e.,
"ξ weighs 1 Kg").
No DM-fan would accept the same for S3/S3a.
S6: The same container of water may boil at
99.999°C on one occasion, and at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do
both or neither at the same time.
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and
it does not weigh 1 kg.
S3a: This moving object is
both here and not here at the same time.
And
that is why anyone
who used or agreed with
the above proffered DM-response would
no doubt
also
object to the way that most, if not all of the alleged contradictions in nature
and society have been analysed away on purely linguistic
grounds in other Essays published at this site (for example, in Essays Four to
Eight Part Three).
For such potential and/or prospective DM-objectors,
these aren'tlinguistic issues plain
and simple; they certainly don't view them this way. But, as we have also seen,
dialecticians can only advance such claims because of their own
sloppy use of
language and
logic
-- indeed,
rather like Hegel
himself.
[I will develop this argument further in the next
section.]
Nevertheless, this partly explains why
several earlier attempts (made
here and
here) to
clarify, correct or improve Engels and
Trotsky's formulations of DM-style 'propositions' failed whatever
was done with them. They either collapsed into banal and vacuous platitudes, or they fell
apart as
incoherentnon-sense.
This isn't a fate that ordinary empirical or scientific
propositions ever have to endure.
Consider another example: according to
Trotsky(and, with
more apparent sophistication, according to Hegel)
it is impossible to express the LOI
by means of true propositions that relate to
concrete reality; that is, he claimed it is never true that "A is
equal to A".
[Of course, this is a gross misrepresentation of
Hegel. Plainly, that is because Hegel beat about the non-dialectical bush a lot more,
to such an extent that it is impossible to decide exactly what he was trying to
do with, or what he was
attempting to conclude about, this 'law', a dialectical conundrum attested to by the further fact that not
even Hegel scholars can make their minds up about what, if anything, he was
banging on about! Nevertheless, his ideas fall apart for other reasons; more on this in Essay
Twelve -- until then, see
here
and
here.]
However, if
Trotsky were right, it would in fact be impossible to deny the truth of
the LOI, as he attempted to do -- at least as it is supposed to apply to
'concrete' reality. That is because, if anyone denied that the
LOI was true (for whatever reason),
they would first have at least to possess some understanding of what it entailed; they would have to
know what would be the case if the LOI were true -- even if only so that
they could then rule that possibility out as it applies to 'concrete' reality,
for instance.
Clearly, the above is something
that can be (and typically is) done with empirical
propositions (i.e., it is possible to specify in advance of knowing they are
true what circumstances would make
them true).47a
So, although A1 below is false, it is quite easy to describe what would make it true, namely the falsehood of A2
or A3.
A2: The Mississippi is longer
than, or equal in length to, the Potomac.
A3: The Mississippi is
2340 miles (3770 Km) long, while the Potomac is 405 miles (652 Km) long.
A4: Julius Caesar ate an
apple between 3:00 pm and 4:00 pm (local time) on the 5th of March, 55BC (Julian
Calendar).
Of course, no one knows whether or not A4 is true, but it
is quite easy to specify what would make it, or would have made it, true --, and, indeed, what would make
it, or would have made it,
false (even if we never find out which of these is the case or even want to find out).
But, if the LOI never appliesto anything concrete,
anything in the world -- and
never could
so apply -- its denial would rule nothing out, and that presents us
with no truth
claims at all.
So, according to DM-theorists, the LOI can never be true
(or rather absolutely true in 'concrete' reality). Paradoxically,
therefore, anyone who repudiates the LOI in this way actually rejects nothing substantive -- for, plainly,
such a denial would have to rule out the truth of whatever it was that
was being rejected. But, if it is impossible to say in true propositions what the LOI
proposes, then its 'denial' will achieve nothing at all. The whole charade is just an empty ritual.48
Moreover, if Trotsky and Hegel are to
be believed, it is impossible to say in true propositions what the LOI
proposes, since we have been told the following:
"In reality 'A' is not
equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens
-- they are quite different to each other. But one can object, the question is
not the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal
quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point;
in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar -- a more delicate scale
always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is
equal to itself. Neither is true -- all bodies change uninterruptedly
in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves."
[Trotsky (1971),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
[Dozens
of other DM-theorists that say the same sort of thing have been quoted in
Essay Six.]
So, if:
A5: A is
never equal to itself,
were true,
then A5 is never equal to itself, either. If one letter (A) is never equal to
itself, a whole sentence stands no chance. In that case, what A5 says is
never equal to itself, either. And if that is so, nothing determinate can be
inferred
from it since we shouldn't know from moment to moment what A5 committed anyone to,
or was saying.
[Indeed, if A5 is true, then just as soon as it
what it was saying had been determined, that itself would have changed!]
Consequently, if we take A6 below to
represent the LOI, it is impossible to say in true propositions what it
proposes -- again, if Trotsky and Hegel are right --, since A6 suffers from the same
defects as A5.
A6: A is equal to A.
[Several objections to this
line of reasoning were neutralised in
Note
48, and more fully in Essay Six.]
An appeal
to the alleged defects of language (as part of an explanation why
the above is the case) would be to no avail, either.
Even if it were the case that our words for identity were only "approximately true" -- or
"true only
within certain limits" --, that would still not help. That is because, for
this counter-claim to work, we would still have to have some comprehension
of the words contained in any expression of the LOI (even if only as an
approximation to it). In turn, that is because we would need to recognise those words
as expressing an approximation to genuine identity, as opposed to
expressing an approximation perhaps to something completely different --,
such as courage, fortitude or cowardice, for example. Hence, even
dialecticians will need to have some grasp of genuine identity statements to
know whether or not these alleged approximations were indeed approximations to
identity -- that is, they would have to know by how much or by how little they fell short of
'absolute identity'
itself --, as opposed
to doing that in relation to something
else. Otherwise they wouldn't be an approximation of absolute identity, but to
something entirely different (no pun intended).48a
This much
was at least clear to Plato 2500 years ago (even if he drew all the wrong
conclusions from it).49
Again, it could be objected that language is
"relatively stable", so the above comments are misguided. Here is what
I have
argued in response to that riposte in Essay Six:
But, how could anyone
committed to this theory know whether or not language
is 'relatively stable'
-- especially if they also believe that everything is
in the grip of the
Heraclitean Flux?
In fact, as soon as language itself is implicated in this 'Flux', everything
that might seem semantically solid must melt into thin air. In that case, it would be no good appealing to
evidence (drawn from dictionaries, textbooks, personal memory, common usage, etc.) in
support of the claim that language is 'relatively stable', for if everything is
changing thenso is the language in which this evidence is itself expressed, so are the
notebooks and/or primary data sheets from which it has been retrieved, and so are the memories
upon which all
of these depend. Given this way of looking at things, for all anyone knows, every single word could change its
meaning every fraction of a second (along with any and all memories of, or about, the objects
that seem familiar to us, like dictionaries, journals and textbooks)....
Indeed, as Plato himself recognised, the
Heraclitean Flux is no respecter of theories; in fact it completely mangles them.
This argument was developed in even more
detail in
Note 15
of Essay Six:
Again, it could be
argued that all Trotsky requires is
the relativestability of the words he used, which won't have changed
significantly during the short intervals involved.
Unfortunately, Trotsky holed that response well below the water line, declaring that:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour etc. They are never equal to themselves… But everything exists in time;
and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation….
Thus
the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it
does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Trotsky
(1971), p.64.]
In that
case, since words, too, are material objects, they must "change uninterruptedly"
(as must their meanings) and are hence "never equal to themselves". If,
according to Trotsky, every letter "A" is subject, from moment-to-moment,
to the Heraclitean Flux, words stand no chance.
If so, not only does DM imply that there is no way of knowing whether or not
words (or their meanings) have changed dramatically, even while they are
being uttered -- including any of the words that might be used to argue
for or against either possibility -- but also that, whether we know it or
not, they have
changed the above way. [We saw earlier that
Voloshinov
seemed to hold this view.]
Consequently, the word "identity" (and its meaning) must
itself fail to be
self-identical at one and the same moment (if Trotsky is to be believed), since everything (including
every meaning, one supposes) is a unity of itself and its 'opposite' (its
"other",
according to Hegel
and Lenin).
Plainly, this implies that the word "identical" must also mean
and not
mean "not identical", at the
same time!
If this weren't the case, then dialecticians would have no way of
accounting for the change in meaning of the word "identity" itself, which,
according to
their own theory, has to change, and it can only do so because of
one or more of the following: (i) Its own 'internal
contradictions', (ii) The 'internal contradictions' of (or in) the meanings we attribute to it,
or (iii) A response to 'contradictions' in society-at-large (which we are told are reflected
in language). So, given DM, unless "identical" now
means and does not mean "not identical", its meaning couldn't change.
Hence, if all things are
changing all the time, then "identical" itself must now mean and not mean "not identical".
The same argument
in turn applies to anyone who uses
this word; by "identical" they, too, must mean and not mean "identical", as well as "not
identical".
Moreover, if DM is true, it isn't easy to see how the understanding of
these changed meanings and altered intentions could possibly be coordinated across an entire population
of dialecticians, let alone the wider community. Naturally, this would completely undermine inter-personal communication, which in turn
would prevent DM-theorists from communicating their ideas to the rest of
humanity, or even to one another, since they would all mean something different
by their use of this particular term, or, indeed, any word.
Clearly, that would imply that no one would
or could "understand" dialectics -- not Hegel, not Marx, not Engels, not
Plekhanov, not Lenin, not Trotsky..., since the meaning of every single one its terms would
be subject to unspecified changes, and hence consequent indeterminacies. Moreover, given DM,
there is nothing that can be done to rectify the situation; any attempt to do
so would also be subject to the tender mercies of the dread Heraclitean Mangle.
So,
such a 'rectification' would be both a 'rectification' and 'not a
rectification', at the same time!
The only way to avoid ridiculous conclusions
like these is to abandon the doctrine that all things change all the time
(as a result of their 'internal contradictions') --, or admit that some things remain
identical (namely, at least, the word "identical" and its meaning), indefinitely. Either way, DM would
suffer
yet another body
blow.
Hence, in order to avoid the unremitting confusion
that this doctrine would introduce into DM itself, Trotsky needed the LOI to apply to his own
words (and their meanings, as a rule of language or of practice) while he was using them -- and, this would have to
have been the case for many years (possibly centuries thereafter,
too -- so that his supporters could understand him correctly (or at all)); specifically when he employed these
words to
question the application of the very samelaw to letter "A"s and
bags of sugar! [Irony intended.] Otherwise, all his words and their meanings could
be, for all he knew, non-self-identical from moment-to-moment. [His theory
implies this anyway.]
In addition,
anyone consulting his words today must be able to read them now with
their original meanings intact, or they wouldn't be able to agree with their intended
content, and hence with what Trotsky had attempted to argue. In that case, contemporary dialecticians who read Trotsky's words (or,
indeed,
Hegel's) must in effect take their arguments against the
application of the strict version of the LOI with a pinch of salt, or risk
failing to grasp the exact message Trotsky (or Hegel) had intended -- or even,
perhaps, finally admit that what they had to say about identity and change can't be grasped by anyone
-- if
what they wanted to say were, per impossible, valid. For if
Trotsky and Hegel's words about change (etc.) were correct, then the message
they intended to convey wouldn't now be accessible, having changed in
untold ways over the years -- and possibly (probably!) even into its opposite! [Indeed,
definitely into its opposite, if we are to believe the
DM-classics.]
It could be objected that our words do infact remain relatively stable, so the above comments are entirely
misguided. However, if Hegel and Trotsky are right, then there would be
no way that either of them (or anyone else, for that matter) could possibly tell
whether or not our words have in fact remained relatively stable. Indeed, if
their theory were correct, even the words in the previous sentence,
along with their
meanings, will have changed!
As should now seem obvious, if DM were true, there would be nothing to which
anyone
could appeal on which to basea single safe thought. If Trotsky is
correct when he said the following (and the
other DM-theorists quoted earlier
are also to be believed) then there can't be:
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour etc. They are never equal to themselves… But everything exists in time;
and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation….
Thus
the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it
does not change, that is if it does not exist." [Ibid. Bold added.]
If nothing
in the entire universe -- including words (and their meanings) or thoughts -- is
ever "equal to" itself, then there could be no secure foundation for a single
DM-idea, let alone anything else.
On the other hand, if there
were something upon which DM-theorists could ground their thoughts, then Trotsky, Hegel
and Heraclitus must have been mistaken, since, in that case, at least
something would remain
unchanged long enough for it to be of any use -- namely whatever it is that we
can ground that thought upon. So, given the validity of Trotsky's argument -- that nothing stays the same, and that all things
change uninterruptedly and are never equal to themselves, they are never self-identical
-- it doesn't look like there could be such a grounding.
An appeal to the same
memory of, for example, a given word and its use or its meaning would not only be to no avail, it would
in fact be
impossible. If
everything is changing, then memory itself can hardly escape
unscathed. Not even
Cartesian 'clear and distinct ideas' would be available to
anchor a single DM-cognition on solid epistemological bedrock. The words, concepts,
or ideas retrieved in order to formulate these comforting 'Cartesian certainties' would
themselves be non-self-identical
from moment-to-moment, and thereby subject to continual change.
A moment's thought (no pun intended!) will
confirm that even the phrase "relatively stable" is no less subject to change
-- as is its meaning -- if we were to believe what
DM-theorists tell us.
How can they rule this out? Indeed, and once more, this is implied by their
own theory. That must be so if everything changes all the time in the way
Heraclitus, Hegel, Lenin,
Trotsky and all the rest imagined. And yet it is the DM-doctrine of constant,
universal
change that must be rejected to
save this theory from its own absurd implications, andeasy self-refutation. But, the only viable way
to do that involves an invocation of
the LOI -- interpreted now as a ruleof language or of practice, and not as a metaphysical,
or any other, truth.
Once again, DM-fans would have to appeal to FL
and/or ordinary language to
rescue their theory from itself.
Alternatively, if it is indeed a fact that language is stable, then the
DM-account of change must be wrong (and for reasons rehearsed above; see also
here and
here), since, at a minimum,
Awill equal A (even if only for few moments), thus refuting Trotsky,
Hegel and all the rest.
Hence, DM-type propositions say
nothing because they rule nothing (material) out, and hence they rule nothing in.50
Of
course, as is the case with other linguistically competent human beings,
DM-apologists understand perfectly well how to use words for identity –-
such as, "similar", "equal", "equivalent", "same", and "identical" -- along with
their appropriate qualifiers (e.g., "exactly", "precisely", "very", "nearly",
"approximately" and "almost").
A grasp of such terms arises courtesy of their employment in everyday life, not
from a supposed 'law'. Nor does this facility follow from the 'negation', nor
yet the double 'negation', of the LOI. [There is more on that
here.] In fact, this everyday
facility with words for identity (etc.) is what enables DM-theorists
themselves to engage in the (often genuine) pretence that they think the LOI is
either false or only 'approximately true' when it is applied to objects and
processes in concrete reality. They understand the LOI because they are
language-users, and yet it is their subsequent misconstrual of the socially-conditioned rules for
the use of such words as if they were empirical
truths that ultimately misleads them.
In
short: dialecticians mistake the misinterpreted content of a social norm for reality itself,
and then make a fetish of the result.
[How and why this occurs will be explained in Essays
Twelve and Nine Parts
One and
Two.]
It is
also worth adding that DM-theorists aren't alone in doing this. Because
the LOI itself says nothing (i.e., it has no empirical content since it is
a
misleading expression of a rule of language), and because of
its status in Traditional Philosophy where it had been viewed as a 'necessary truth',
metaphysicians and theorists in general (and that includes Hegel) have also misconstrued the supposed content of a social norm,
or rule, as if it represented reality itself. Viewed
this way, the LOI was traditionally supposed to reflect an 'industrial-strength'
truth, as it were, which applied to everything in existence (in so far as each
object or process is held to be related to itself in the way this 'Law' seems to
indicate). It thus appears to tell us how things are or must
be, and how they can't be conceived of otherwise.
Thus, a serial
misconstrual of the way we use words for sameness and difference was transformed into a 'Law'that
'allowed' philosophers to derive what they took to be fundamental truths about
'reality' from thought alone
--
which is, of course, why
metaphysicians believed that the LOI was true independently of any state of the world.
Indeed,
this is also why DM-theorists pretend they can also deny -- again, by thought alone
-- the absolutetruth of this 'law'
when it is applied to concrete reality -- that is, via an appeal to
various
'thought experiments' (à la
Trotskyor à la
Hegel),
or based on a series of verbal tricks.
These are just two sides of
the same counterfeit metaphysical coin.
When it is interpreted as a
'super-empirical law'
the LOI
seems to express a 'necessary truth', which DM-fans want to rule out as such
when it is applied to concrete reality. Unfortunately,
it is impossible successfully to deny the 'truth' of the LOI
in anylanguagewithout also
having to use that very same 'law'
(as a linguistic rule) in the very act of attempting to do just that!
Again, we saw
this in
Essay Six,
where Trotsky had
to rely on the identity of temporal instants in order to deny the
absolute identity of bags of sugar: he was forced to do this when he referred to the same moment in time
during which an object or process wasn't self-identical!
So,
it is impossible to say (a) what the LOI rules out as 'false', and
hence (b) what it rules in as 'true'.
[Why that is so is explained in detail
here;
the argument has also been summarised
here and
here.]
Now, as argued in Essay Three
Part One,
philosophical and logical 'problems' like these arose in Ancient Greece when
theorists attempted to
conjure into existence certain 'concepts' by means of a process of 'abstraction',
which in the end turned them into the Proper Names of 'Abstract
Particulars'. In this
specific case, a universal, super-empirical 'Law' was
'abstracted' from ordinary words we have for sameness and difference.50aa
In this way, the ordinary application of everyday words for identity was
transformed into a general theory about the ultimate structure of reality
-- or, perhaps better: in the Middle Ages, socially-sanctioned rules that governed
the use of certain words were
reified and then codified as the LOI. It was this physical form
of the 'law' which Hegel latched onto. misconstruing it as a super-empirical
'truth of abstract reason' that supposedly expressed a profound fact about the fundamental
nature of reality, valid for all of space and time, which he then attempted to criticise.
But if the LOI is simply a badly-stated rule of language, it can't be true or
false, it can only be useful or useless.
Dialecticians subsequently bought into this fetishisation
of the written word, making the opposite error of supposing this
reified social norm was a 'Law' that is only 'partially true' (or, which is 'both true and not
true') of
everything in 'concrete' reality.
However, according to tradition, in order to
establish either result (i.e., that (i) the LOI is a universally true law or
(ii) it is only approximately true when applied to the real world), one specific
semantic feature of language was promoted at the expense of another.
In this case, truth was underlined at the expense of its logical twin,
falsehood.
[Of course, in relation to other metaphysical theories
this might be the other way round.]
The LOI had traditionally been connected with the truth of identity statements -- and only
for their truth --, since it was a 'law of reason'. However, this move only succeeded in undermining the paired semantic
foundations of empirical propositions (truth and falsehood, again). In the end, by emphasizing truth and ignoring
falsehood, both wound up being compromised.
That is because empirical propositions (i.e.,
those pertaining to facts of the matter) leave it open as to whether they are
true or false -- which is why their truth-values can't simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in
order to determine their semantic status and why it is possible to
understand them before their truth or falsehood has been ascertained.
[The complex reasoning underlying these seemingly controversial statements can be found in Essay Twelve
Part One-- again, summarised
here and
here.]
When that isn't the case -- i.e., when either
option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when propositions are said to be
"necessarily true", or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant.
As a result, such propositions lose the capacity they once seemed to have of
expressing truth or falsehood -- they become
non-sensical.
In order to see why that is so, consider the following sentence
(M1) taken from Lenin's
MEC. Because he maintained its truth, he would presumably have declared M2
necessarily false (if not "unthinkable"):
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare M2 necessarily (and always) false, the
possibility of its truth must first be entertained. That is
because, if the
truth of M2 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as
necessarily false (or "unthinkable"), then whatever would make it true has to be ruled out
conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what M2 rules in
(i.e., what makes it true)
so that they could comprehend what M1 was ruling out as always and
necessarily false. And yet, that is precisely what can't be done
if what M2 itself says is permanently ruled out by M1 on conceptual grounds
alone.
Consequently, if a proposition like M2 is necessarily
false, this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) can't take place -- since it would be impossible to say
(or to think) what could count as making M2 true.
However, because the truth of M2 can't even be conceived,
Lenin was in no position to say
what was excluded by its rejection
(by means of M1).
If M2 can never be true, and never even thought to be true (because of
M1), then it can't be thought of as not true (here it is assumed that "not true" is
semantically the same as "false"). That assumption is controversial
according to some philosophers and logicians. I have said more in Note 50ab.50ab
Unfortunately, this prevents any account being given of what would make M2
false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Hence,
M2 would now be necessarily false if and only if it wasn't capable of being
thought of as necessarily false!
While it might seem that
M2 could be thought of as necessarily false if and only if what
would make it true could at least be entertained. That would seem to
allow it to be it ruled out as necessarily false, but that isn't so. According to Lenin, the conditions that would make M2 true
can't even be conceived, so this train of thought can't be joined at any
point. In that case, if the truth of M2 -- or the conditions under which it
would be true, or which would make it true -- can't be conceived, then
neither can its falsehood, for we would not then know what was being ruled out.
This means that whoever propounds a thesis
like M1 would have to know what
a proposition using "matter without motion" (in this way) rules in so that
they knew exactly
what it rules out as always and necessarily false. And yet, that is precisely
what can't be done if the content of a proposition using "matter without motion"
(in this way) is "unthinkable".
M1: Matter without motion is
unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes
exist without motion.
Super-Empirical theses
like these thus collapse under the weight of their own defective use of language. They
become
non-sensical.
Which perhaps illustrates why Marx and Engels were right
when they said the following:
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
[I am not suggesting that Marx saw things this
way, or would even have acknowledged my argument as persuasive, or, indeed. as in any way
representative of what he intended. Clearly, that would be anachronistic. What I
am
arguing is that the above argument illustrates why Marx was right to say what he
did.]
Once more: by limiting the LOI in this way --
emphasizing one semantic
feature of language ('necessary' truth, or 'necessary' falsehood) --, both
options became non-viable.
A similar fate awaits all such 'necessary'
truths (or 'necessary' falsehoods) -- as will be demonstrated in
Essay Twelve
Part One.
In this
way, therefore, the 'necessary truth' the LOI supposedly expressed undermined
itself; because of that it fails even to be an empirical proposition
(true or false). Just like
the other pseudo-propositions that litter Metaphysics, the above semantic moves
deprive this 'law' and
its denial of all content. The LOI (as it has been understood at this site)
asserts nothing true and
nothing false of reality (for
it is a badly stated linguistic rule that encapsulates how we use certain words --,
and rules can neither be true nor false, only useful or useless, practical or
impractical).
The LOI lacks an empirical
sense because it
presents no truth conditions -- that is, it expresses no conditions that
must obtain for it to be true, or that must obtain for it to be false. [Of course, that is
why Traditional Theorists thought they could establish the supposed 'necessary' truth
of this 'law' on purely
conceptual or linguistic grounds, independently of any evidence,
independent of the way the world happened to be.]50a
Empirical
propositions are different in this respect: their semantic status is sensitive to
evidence; their truth or falsehood can't simply be read-off from the words
they contain. They have to face the facts in order to be declared one way or the
other. No amount of 'pure thought' will confirm their truth-value. By way of
contrast, isn't
possible to ascertain the truth or the falsehood of, say, "The Nile is longer
than the Volga"
merely by thinking about it.
Linguistic rules -- such as the
LOI or the
LOC -- become metaphysical when they are misconstrued in the above manner; i.e.,
when it is imagined that their actual or permanent truth-status can
be read off (solely) from the
words they contain -- which is how the vast majority of Traditional
Theorists (including dialecticians) have conceived them.
Thus, metaphysicians throughout history have concentrated their efforts on
devising theories about reality that could only be true (as they saw
things), and never
false. Unfortunately, by doing this they have actually prevented
their theories from being either of these.
In everyday
life, our use of ordinary words for identity isn't defective in this
way;
it isn't predicated on the existence of any super-empirical 'truths' about the
world. The vernacular is based on
socially-, and historically-conditioned practices (which
can't be true or false, as we have seen).
This
aspect of language (i.e.,
which truth-conditions do or don't apply) also informs the LOC.
As is the case with the LOI, the LOC doesn't express a deep metaphysical truth about
the world -- since it isn't something that is capable of being true to begin with. It
expresses a rule of
language, and/or logic, that formalises a social convention for the use of the negative particle,
which is impossible to challenge without discourse degenerating into
incoherent non-sense -- or,
as Aristotle himself noted, without communication and rationality completely breaking down.
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction.]
Of course,
DM-theorists have simply compounded the above error -- i.e., construing the LOC, not as a
'rule', but as an 'abstract truth' that is always (or often) concretelyfalse. Small
wonder then that over the last 150 years they have found it impossible to communicate their ideas
clearly to anyone --, least of all one another -- again, as
Aristotle forewarned 2400 years ago.
[On this see Essays Four through Eight Part Three, and Note 5
of this Essay.]
In short, Traditional Metaphysical theories masquerade as
super-empirical propositions (as a result of their
employment of the
indicative mood); by aping the latter they purport to reveal,
or express, general truths about the world. However, they go further than this:
they express much deeper, more profounduniversal verities, posing as super-empirical, necessary,
or industrial strength truths about 'reality itself' -- or 'Being' -- valid
for all of space and time. But, that is precisely what denies them
any
sense: in so far as they are
based on a misconstrual of the rules we have when we try to understand, not just
the world, but one another, they soon collapse intoincoherent non-sense, and are hence incapable of being either true or false.
So, this is why DM can't be a
science (and why it doesn't even look like one): its 'propositions' don't just say nothing about the world, they saynothing about anything (except, of course, indirectly about the gullibility
of those who imagine Hegel had anything useful to say). They are therefore completely
vacuous. As is the case with the above
metaphysicians, dialecticians
also misconstrue linguistic rules -- which enable
genuinely substantive truths about the world to be stated by means of empirical
propositions --, as if they were super-empirical truths, an
error they then compound
by employing
impenetrable jargon
lifted from the mystical logico-babble that suffocates Hegel's Logic.
As a
result
their theories aren't just
non-sensical, they are
incoherent non-sense.
If, as dialecticians maintain, DM is neither conventional nor
metaphysical, then perhaps it is simply a method? However, few DM-theorists
who hold that DM is a science appear willing to accept such a
deflationary conclusion.51
That is quite apart from the fact that if DM
were simply a method, it couldn't be "objective",
as Lenin inadvertently noted:
"To be a materialist is to
acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To
acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind,
is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold
emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
Plainly, a 'method' isn't "independent of man".
It could be objected that the dialectical
method enables any who use it correctly to discover objective truths about
the world. Quite apart from the fact that there is no 'objective' way of deciding
whether or not the 'dialectical method' has been used "correctly" (or even if it can be used "correctly"!) -- on that, see
here -- if DM is just a method, it is a particularly
useless one, since it would make
change impossible.
Of course, this isn't how Engels, Lenin and
Trotsky viewed DM:
"And so, what is the negation of the negation? An
extremely general -- and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important --
law of development of nature, history, and thought; a law which, as we have
seen, holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics,
in history and in philosophy --
a law which even Herr Dühring, in spite of all his stubborn resistance, has
unwittingly and in his own way to follow.... Dialectics, however, is nothing
more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature,
human society and thought." [Engels (1976),
pp.179-80.
Bold emphases added.]
"Flexibility, applied objectively,
i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world."
[Lenin (1961),
p.110. Bold emphasis added.]
"The identity of opposites…is the
recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies
in allphenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the
knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in
their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a
unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This]
alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
The
unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle
of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin
(1961), pp.
357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Paragraphs merged.]
"It must be recognized that the
fundamental law of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into quality, for it
gives [us] the
general formula of all evolutionary processes -– of nature as well as of
society.… The principle of the transformation
of quantity into quality has universal significance, insofar as we view the
entire universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and
transformation…. In these abstract formulas we have the
most general laws (forms) of motion, change, the transformation of the stars of
the heaven, of the earth, nature and human society. …Dialectics is the logic of
development. It examines the world -- completely without exception
-– not as a result of creation, of a sudden beginning, the realisation of a
plan, but as a result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became
the way it is as a result of lawlike development." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88,
90, 96. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
I
began this Essay with several impertinent remarks
about the obvious similarities that exist between the DM-"Totality" and 'God'.
Now that we are nearing the end
we are perhaps in a better position to re-assess (and perhaps re-assert) those
comments,
but without the initial and peremptory impertinences tacked on. In fact,
we can now see why those comments were fully justified.
Every mystical system of which we have any
knowledge has appealed to a Whole, or a "Totality", in one form or
another
-- often openly identified with 'God' --, to account for 'Reality', "Being",
or even for change and development.52
[See, for example,
here and
here,
but a complete list of examples of this
phenomenon would make this Essay about ten thousand words longer. I have compiled two greatly truncated
such lists
here and
here.]
Be this
as it may,
Traditional Theorists soon found it impossible to relate or connect each 'soul'
caught in the metaphysical machinery to the supposedly 'infinite cause'
responsible
for their existence, just as they found it impossible to link them to their
own version of the "Totality" without:
(i) Denying the limited nature of the human soul -- thereby turning each into
an 'infinite being', or perhaps an 'aspect'/'emanation' of
'God', or,
(ii) Demoting or downgrading the 'Deity', equating 'Him'/'Her'/'It'
with each 'created being'.
Hence, as a result,
(iii) Human beings became 'gods', or,
(iv) 'God' became human.
This
self-inflicted conundrum later re-surfaced in a
different form
as the "central problematic of German Idealism" -- i.e., it reappeared as part of the
pseudo-problem of "subject-object identity" -- cf., Beiser (1993b, 2002). We saw
earlier that this idea was
central to Zen Buddhism,53
and how this 'problematic' reappeared in Engels, Lenin and Mao's, work in the following
form:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the
eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the
infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels
(1954),
pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"The reproaches you make
against the law of value apply to all concepts, regarded from the
standpoint of reality. The identity of thought and being, to express
myself in Hegelian fashion, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle
and the polygon. Or the two of them, the concept of a thing and its reality, run
side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never
meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents
the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being
immediately its own concept. But although a concept has the essential nature of
a concept and cannot therefore prima facie directly coincide with
reality, from which it must first be abstracted, it is still something more than
a fiction, unless you are going to declare all the results of thought fictions
because reality has to go a long way round before it corresponds to them, and
even then only corresponds to them with asymptotic approximation." [Engels
to Conrad Schmidt (12/03/1895), in Marx and Engels (2004),
pp.463-64. Bold emphasis added. I have used the on-line version here, which
differs slightly from the published copy.]
"The great basic
question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that
concerning the relation of thinking and being." [Engels
(1888), p.593.]
"But there are more than these two properties and
qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of
them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of
the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object
we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'.
That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical
logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in
'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in
respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds
especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding
world." [Lenin (1921),
pp.92-93. Bold emphasis added.]
"To begin with what is
the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with (sic) any proposition…. Here we already have
dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the
universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the
universal) are identical; the individual exists only in the connection that
leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through
the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every
universal is (a fragment, or aspect, or the essence of) an individual." [Lenin
(1961),
p.359.]
"Knowledge
is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not simple, not an immediate,
not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the
formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws,
etc., (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally,
approximately, the universal, law-governed character of eternally moving and
developing nature.... Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as
a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality,' he can only
eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a
scientific picture of the world...." [Ibid.,
p.182. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"Idealism and mechanical
materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach
between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from
practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by
scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies.
Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of
the universe, the development of each particular process is relative, and that
hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man's knowledge of a particular
process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total
of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an
objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the
development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements
of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In
social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away
is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing
away in human knowledge. As man's practice which changes objective reality in
accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and
further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.
The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so
is man's cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way
exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the
course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the
subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing ant doing, and
we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether 'Left' or Right, which
depart from concrete history." [Mao
(1961c), pp.307-08. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
In DM, this
"problematic" also re-surfaced in an epistemological form, but
formulated in such a way that it sent the DM-'theory
of knowledge' off on a 'wild-concept-chase' (analysed in more detail in Essay
Three Parts One to Six). In
MEC,
Lenin tried (and failed) to bridge the gaping hole this ancient dichotomy
(i.e., "subject-object identity") had inflicted on DM-epistemology, but it is obvious by the way he
aimlessly thrashed
about that he hadn't a clue how
to do it. Nor has anyone since.
[Lenin's
rather
desperate moves are
explored in Essay Thirteen
Part One.]
This unresolved 'problem' still dogs
DM-epistemology, which is just one of the reasons why the writings of
HCDs, for example,
are impenetrably obscure (since it is so much easier to hide the fact that you are
hoplessly lost if you bury everything you have to say in well of incomprehensible gobbledygook), while
the repetitive musings produced by
the
LCD
fraternity are
impressively
superficial.
[MEC = Materialism And
Empirio-Criticism (i.e., Lenin (1972); HCD = High Church Dialectician; LCD =
Low Church Dialectician; follow the above links for an explanation.]
In a mystical system, not only is it
impossible to comprehend either side of the 'Ontological Grand Canyon' that
now separates 'Being' from 'You-and-Me-ing', it is
even more difficult to re-connect them.
So, it seems that this smashed
Cosmic Egg
can't be put back together again.
Figure Eleven: The Central
'Problematic'
Of German Idealism?
No wonder then that DM-theorists prevaricate on this
and other issues, or are so vague, confused
and repetitive.
[This might
help explain why
many of those who rise to
the 'top' of each Marxist party behave as if they were
minor deities
of some sort, and
are thus able to
treat their 'underlings' with dismissive contempt and no little personal or
sexual abuse. It might also
explain why they feel justified in concocting theories that reveal profound
super-truths about reality, valid for all of space and time, a personality
disorder that was in some cases aggravated by the 'god'-like power
they have over life
and death (in the former Soviet Union, China, and N
Korea, for instance). This is another trait they share with various assorted
religious 'gurus', also known for their abuse of followers (because they have declared themselves to be 'prophets' or
representatives of 'god' on earth, which can be used to 'justify' anything, and who are also fond of
ordering the execution of 'infidels' and 'unbelievers'.]
The Wholist Metaphysic is indeed one
"ruling idea" that has dominated human thought 'East' and 'West'
for over two thousand years, just as
it is a thought-form
that Dialectical Marxists have yet to
recognise for what it is,
let alone reject it.
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society,
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means
of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the
means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas
of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other
things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers,
as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas
of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels(1970), pp.64-65. Quoted from
here.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Feuerbach's
great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence
equally to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line
version, here. Bold emphasis and link added.]
Given the
above, it hard to resist the conclusion that this and other areas of DM are
indeed part
of the "ruling ideas" about which Marx was speaking.
Be this as
it may, dialecticians certainly reject the accusation that their system is mystical; in
fact, they become quite offended by any such allegation.
That is partly
because it has been thrown at them so many times, partly because they claim to have
neutralised the mystical influence Hegel's system brought in its train (by up-ending
it and leaving behind its "rational core"),
and partly because they view their theory as quintessentially
scientific.
As these Essays have shown, the last two of the
above responses are so wide of the mark that the resulting gap makes the
Grand Canyon look like a tiny crack in a Cornish Pasty in comparison.
Figure Twelve: A Half-Baked
Theory?
The first of the above responses is, of course, their problem.
They
invited this accusation the day they began to take Hegel seriously (upside down,
or 'the right
way up').
However,
Rees
does at least try extricate himself from the Hermetic Hole into which DM
has dropped him:
"Totality alone is not,
however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of
society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own
mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation.... 'The Taoist
tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole
being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.' [Quoting
Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.274-75.]
"...What unites all these
explanations is that they see the totality as static. Beneath all the
superficial bustle of the world lies an enduring eternal truth, the unchanging
face of God, the ceaseless search for balance between yin and yang.... What they
lack is any notion of totality as a process of change. And even where such
system grant the possibility of instability, it is considered merely a prelude
to he restored equilibrium.... But, even taken together,
change and totality are not sufficient to define a dialectical system. In
addition we have to provide some general indication of how such change
originates.... A dialectical approach seeks
to find the cause of change within the system.... If change is internally
generated it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development
as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998a), pp.6-7.
Several paragraphs merged.]
But,
as we
have seen, there are countless
mystical systems that appeal to the sorts of things Rees denies of them in order
to account for change -- Hegel's
being the most obvious(!) --, and which see the world, and even 'god', as a process
of some sort. A long list
will be given in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here); until
that is published, some of this material can be found
here.
However, the opposite view to that
advanced by Rees is summarised for us in the following passage
(quoted earlier):
"The ancient
Egyptians believed that a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A
similar premise, that the interaction between yin (the female principle) and
yang (the male principle) underlies the workings of the universe, is at the
heart of much Chinese thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy
from the fourth century B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many
Chinese who are not Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the
Chinese. Peoples all over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas,
have come to the conclusion that the cosmos is a combining of opposites and
that one of the most important aspects of this dualism is the opposition between
male and female."
[Maybury-Lewis (1992), pp.125-26. Bold emphases added.]
For some inexplicable reason, the
sentence "The ideas of the ruling-class are in every epoch the ruling ideas"
comes to mind again...
We have now reached the last, desperate 'scraping stage'
right at the bottom of the DM-barrel -- but still no DM-'Hamlet'.
Nevertheless, we do know a little more about what the "Totality"
isn't -- chief among which isthis: thatit isn't at all clear what
it is!
At best, this 'DM-non-Hamlet' has failed
to make 'its' entrance
stage left, and in the face of the above via negativa, 'it' is seemingly in need of some Viagra to revive
his flagging fortunes.
But wait!
Perhaps this is a little too quick? Maybe the above conclusions are a
direct result of Ms Lichtenstein trying to
analyse each dialectical thesis one-by-one, all the while ignoring the holistic and
"mediated"
nature
of reality,
where everything is conditioned by everythingelse?
There is some
truth in that counter-allegation --, but fortunately,not much.
By the
end of Part Two of this Essay, even this faint ray of dialectical hope
will have been extinguished.
There,
this 'DM-non-Hamlet' (the "Totality") will be put out of its mediated misery, clothed in a soil blanket, at
placed least six foot closer to the earth's core.
May the non-existent deity have no mercy on
its insubstantial soul...
1. The comments
of other DM-luminaries on this
particular topic have been reproduced in
Note
25.
Of course, several of the latter declare
that they can't actually tell us what the "Totality" is since that
would pin reality down, rendering DM formalistic. However, as we have seen,
dialecticians in fact end up doing the exact opposite: tying nature down with
numerous DM-theses they are only too happy to impose on nature and society.
So, this latest excuse is as bogus as much
else found in Dialectical Marxism.
[HM = Historical Materialism.]
Georg Novack, for example, waxed
indignant in his heroic struggle against the 'forces of unreason', which apparently
(and unfairly) required him to
inform them exactly what it was that he believed. Of course, he stoutly
and bravely resisted such
a brazen impertinence! On the other hand, he was quite happy to demand
of them the
sorts things he denied that they should require of him in return: concrete
details blessed with at least an atom of clarity. [On this, see Novack (1971),
pp.69-83.]
Several of those who have
made it this far have complained that I
haven't quoted more recent dialecticians on this topic. The reason for that
'omission' is
easy to explain (indeed, I covered this very point in the main body of this Essay,
here): search as
hard as I might, I couldn't find
anyone or any recent books and articles to quote that didn't just repeat more-or-less exactly what the
DM-classicists had already said about the "Totality" -- i.e.,
not a lot --
or, indeed, who hadn't ignored the entire topic! Sure, many had much to say about social wholes,
but, as that form of holism isn't being questioned at this site (since it
is plainly part of HM, a scientific theory I fully accept), it is hardly relevant to the aims of this Essay.
Moreover, there are few
books and articles on this nebulous theory (published in English) that I haven't read,
so the mystery deepens. Certainly, these critics failed to point me in the
direction of more recent DM-works that cover this topic in any detail (or at all!).
"[N]ature forms a totality, which it must
unless we depart from materialism completely and become believers in the
supernatural…." [Rees (1998a), p.78. Italics in the original.]
Alas, that doesn't add much to our knowledge of the
"Totality", but it does confirm the suspicion that Rees probably
does identify it with nature. Or,
rather, since he says that nature forms a totality, it is reasonable to
infer that he intends this to be the DM-"Totality". Having said
that, it is
still impossible to conclude with any confidence whether or not Rees thinks nature forms the
whole of this "Totality" or only part of it, since he doesn't say.
3. This
means that much of what appears in Jay (1984) after the opening chapter isn't relevant to the aims of this Essay,
or this site.
4. Of course, Rees isn't the only one to
advance such claims; on this, see
Note 25.
It might countered that this is unfair
since Rees points out that these mystical systems don't appeal to "internal
contradictions" in order to account for change, but that isn't so. As we saw
above
(and again,
here),
rarely does a
mystic fail to appeal to UOs to account for change and
stability. Sure, they might not be called "contradictions" (however, in
Buddhism
and
Jewish
Mysticism
they are), but a rose by any other name...
On
"contradictions" in Buddhism, see this
on-line article by Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest (this
links to a PDF).
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; UO = Unity of Opposites.]
"In Buddhist logic, the
origin of every judgment and concept from data of our senses starts with the act
of running through the manifold of undetermined pure sensations first before we
fasten upon one point of that series of pure sensations, a point with regard to
which the rest will be divided in two. On the one side we have a
comparatively limited number of similar things, on the other the less limited
number of dissimilar ones. Both parts mutually represent the absence of each
other. Therefore, every [part/aspect? -- RL] of our conscious thought or
cognition thus represents a division into two parts. Thus, our cognition begins
with an act of dichotomy.
"As soon as our intellectual
eye begins to 'see', our thought is already beset with contradiction. Once our
thought has stopped running and has fixed upon an external point, to produce a
judgment said (sic), 'this is blue', we have already separated the universe of
discourse into two unequal halves, the part that is blue and the infinite part
that is non-blue. Both parts are relative to
each other. There is actually nothing blue in itself. The Law of Contradiction
is an expression of the fact that all cognition is dichotomizing and relative.
We can only cognize or determine a thing by opposing it to what it is not. Now, everything be it real
or imagined, is subject to the Law of Otherness also. Otherness and opposition
are realized as representing the negation of the similar. Differences and the
contraries cannot be conceived so long as the non-existence of the similar is
not realized. Otherness and opposition is the absence of the similar indirectly.
"Contradiction can be
conceived in its logical or dynamic forms. View[ed] logically it is a complete
mutual exclusion such as e.g., blue and non-blue. They can co-exist in close
proximity with each other without interference with each others' (sic) existence. This
mutual exclusion can also be referred to as the Law of Excluded Middle. In its
dynamic form, both the opposing parts are mutually endeavouring to oust one
another out of their mutual opposition. Light and darkness is such an example as
each is a complete negation of the other. They cannot peacefully co-exist in
close proximity with each other. They appear and disappear due to the totally of
causes. This is the Buddhist theory of causation. The Law of Excluded Middle
also fully applied here as well.
"In real phenomena, there is
always something in the middle. If light appears all of a sudden, there is
always an intermediate moment of twilight between darkness and light. This is
different in the case of logical opposition between light and non-light, the
opposition is complete without an intermediate twilight moment. Here, it can
also be mentioned that the
Theravada
tradition maintained that between pleasure and pain there is the third position
of Indifferent feeling in the middle. To the Buddhist logician, the last moment
of the series of darkness is the cause (in the sense of dependent origination)
of the first moment of light. Real causation belongs to a single moment only. On
the other hand, efficient opposition is between one set of moments (duration of
time) and another set which is constructed by our intellect. It is not ultimate
reality. It is constructed phenomena.
"The Laws of Contradiction is
one of the main tools used by the Buddhist logicians in establishing their
theory of Instantaneous Being, for Instantaneousness is the very essence of
every real thing. The logical law of contradiction does not apply to the
'Things-in[-]Themselves', as logic is thought and thought is imagination and not
ultimate reality. Ultimate reality in Buddhist philosophy is the reality of a
point instant. It is the efficiency of a point instant. There is no relation of
opposition between entities." [Aik Theng Chong,
The Buddhist Channel, May 31, 2011. Formatting and spelling
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Accessed 18/07/2011. Link
added; paragraphs merged.]
Be this as it may, anyone reading the
above surely can't fail to see the similarities between its line-of-thought and
much that passes for 'rational thought' in the Hegelian tradition. [On Hegel and Buddhism, see
Morton (ND).]
And here is what Ha Tai Kim had to say about Hegel
and
Zen Buddhism:
"The paradoxical nature of
Zen manifests itself in its ignoring of the law of contradiction. It does not
attempt to invalidate the law of contradiction, but ignores it only to
illuminate the law of identity. Thus the logical proposition of illogical Zen
is: 'A is not-A; therefore, A is A.' Zen believes that the true meaning of the
proposition 'A is A' will be realized only when 'A is not-A.' The Zen way of
thinking is to assert that to be itself is not to be itself, and also that I am
really I only by negating myself.
"The philosophical 'fun' of
contradiction manifested in the logic of illogical Zen seems to have two
intended purposes. First, Zen believes that the logical dissection of reality
will never bring about the unitive point of view, the only method by which
reality can be presented as it is. The unitive point of view achieved by the
intuitive method transcends not only subject and object but also all logical
categories, including affirmation and negation. Zen masters frequently resort to
the following pattern of argument: 'Do not call this a staff; if you do, it is
an affirmation; if you do not, it is a negation. Apart from affirmation and
negation say a word, quick, quick.' Zen aims at acquiring the pure experience in
which subject and object are not yet separated.
"The second purpose of Zen's
employment of this method may be detected from the fact that the logic of the
illogical accounts for many paradoxical problems of practical philosophy more
adequately than does ordinary logic. In a sense, it is a form of practical
reason; it is the logic of life. It is reasonable to say that 'living is dying'
(A is not-A), as existentialists seem to point out. A fine illustration of this
method is Jesus' pronouncement that 'He that findeth his life shall lose it, and
he that loseth his life shall find it' (Matt. 10:39). In the moral and religious
sphere, this method is frequently employed. Any idea of the good which is not
carefully scrutinized in the light of the practical and concrete situation
cannot really be called good; thus, we may say that 'good is not-good.' Only by
examining the idea of good to the ultimate extreme can we say that we understand
the idea. In order to understand fully the implications of a concept -- for
example, philanthropy -- we must allow room for reasonable doubt about the
concept, even stating that philanthropy is selfishness, that is, 'A is not-A.'
"The simple proposition 'A is
A' does not go beyond the socially accepted meaning of the term: it is limited,
and, therefore, infinite possibilities of the meaning of the term are excluded.
The proposition excludes all doubt and skepticism. However, in the proposition
'A is not-A' we can travel far beyond the limited and determined meaning of a
concept by placing it at the most extreme opposite. A is fully understood as A,
because A is scrutinized to the fullest degree, and all possible meanings of A
are exhaustively explored. This is precisely the meaning of Hegel's dictum that
'Truth is the whole.' By negating the very meaning of a concept, we are able to
move toward the apprehension of the whole. For both Zen and Hegel, the negative
method signifies that an affirmative concept contains within it the possibility
of a negative.
"We are surprised, at first,
to discover that the logic of the illogical in Zen is akin to Hegel's
dialectical method. But it is no surprise at all if we note that Hegel's
dialectical method is also the logic of life. The 'fun' of contradiction, or
'pretension' of the other, in the act of negating itself, is the comical
impersonation of which
Loewenberg speaks in describing Hegelian dialectic. 'The logic called
dialectical,' writes Loewenberg, 'is the logic of comedy par excellence. It is
the logic by which
ideas and beliefs are made to whip themselves, as it were, in
the process of exhibiting their internal contradictions.' It is the method
of the self-alienation of the Absolute in Hegel's philosophy. Even in his
legend, 'The Naked Boy,'
Eckhart
identifies the Naked Boy with God himself, 'who was having a bit of fun.' As
early as 1800, when Hegel wrote his
Fragment of a System, he knew that
the dialectical method was the logic of life, for he regarded life as the 'union
of union and nonunion.' Both Hegel and Zen thinkers assume the absolute
viewpoint to be the ground of unity between A and not-A, being and not-being.
The only difference is that the universal of universals in Hegel is the
Absolute, while in Zen it is Nothing, which is a sort of Absolute itself." [Kim
(1955),
pp.22-23. Accessed 18/07/2011. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases and links added.]
So, and once again, Zen logicians appear to
be as
confused as Hegel! Kim
clearly failed to notice that if this approach to 'logic' were valid, there
would be no such thing as
the "unitive point of view, the only method by which
reality can be presented as it is", since if it were correct to assert "A and not
A" then any method that attempted to show the world "as it is" must at the same
time show it as it isn't. How might we disentangle these two
contradictory views of 'reality' and decide which was which, which view
represents 'reality as it is' and which shows it as it isn't? As soon as we
decide it is A, we also must decide (and not decide!) that not A
is correct (and incorrect!). Indeed, how on that basis might we decide
which is even the 'correct' method, for if this view is to be believed, the "unitary
method" is also (and it isn't also!) the "non-unitary method"!
As Aristotle pointed out,
down that road all rational thought decays into irredeemable confusion.
However, later in his paper Kim commits the
serious mistake of attributing to Hegel ideas that can only be found in
Kant and
Fichte (concerning the notorious 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis' triad). On
that, see
here.
[Again, the most comprehensive list of examples of mystical systems that argue
along similar lines
can be found
here.]
5. Rees does,
however, make several more comments about the "Totality" later in his book, but most of them either relate
to the Epistemological Definition (discussed
here), or to the social and historical ramifications of DM-Holism (which
topic,
once more, I largely ignore in this Essay). However, he added the following to
an Essay written at more-or-less the same time:
"Take the notion of totality, for instance,
vital to the Marxist method because it insists on the interconnectedness
of the social process and provides a guide for relating the various different
aspects of the struggle together." [Rees (1998a), p.173. Bold emphasis added.]
So, here we have yet another "insistence". A
page or so later Rees adds this thought about revolutionary organisation:
"Building such an organisation is, therefore,
the forum and precondition for the development of Marxist theory which can in
Engels' words, not as a dogma, but as a guide to action." [Ibid., p.175.
Bold emphasis added.]
Again, what is an "insistence" if not a
nod in the direction of dogmatism?
Even so, these additional comments add little or
nothing to our knowledge of the "Totality", as this term supposedly applies to the
non-social world.
[TAR = The Algebra Of
Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998a); OT = Orthodox Trotskyist.]
Even though dialecticians depict the
"Totality" as internally 'contradictory', they don't in general regard flatly
self-contradictory theories (or propositions) as true (or "fully true") --
as TAR itself acknowledges, for instance on p.235. Indeed, DM-fans are
quite happy to regale us with the many internal or absurd contradictions they find
in rival theories, which are in their eyes sufficient to condemn them.
For example, on p.84 of TAR, the
Young
Hegelians are criticized for being "self-contradictory", as are
bourgeois ideologues in general (p.238). Even Kant himself isn't spared (p.47), nor is
Kautsky (p.141). Similarly,
Engels wasn't averse to
rejecting certain theories on the same basis: cf., Engels (1954), pp.
135,151,
163,
167; Engels (1976), pp.26,
63-65,
171,
247, and
324-25. Lenin also
took advantage of this tactic: cf., Lenin (1972), pp.76,94,
95, 97,
195,
256,
274, and
281. More recently,
Tony Cliff found
he was able to dismiss the
ideas spread by certain
OTs on the basis that they were "contradictory";
cf., Cliff (1999), pp.28-30.
Even Marx used this tactic, here speaking
about Proudhon:
"In other words, he [Proudhon] makes a
gratuitous assumption and, because actual development contradicts his fiction at
every turn, he concludes that there is a contradiction. He conceals the fact
that there is a contradiction only between his idées fixes [fixed idea]
and the real movement." [Marx
to Annenkov, 28/12/1846, in Marx (1982), p.100. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
Trotsky himself wasn't above using
this tactic to criticise Stalin, either:
"Now we can appraise Stalin's philosophical
thesis on the importance of theory.... This totally contradictory,
self-devouring thesis finds itself, on top of everything else, in total disarray
grammatically.... The lack of substance of that definition
[quoted by Trotsky earlier -- RL] and at the same time its
contradictory nature betray themselves if we simply ask ourselves, what is
Marxism?" [Trotsky (1981b), p.396). Bold emphases added; paragraphs
merged.]
"Constantly beset with
innumerable contradictions, Khrushchov (sic) makes frequent changes in his
economic policies and often goes back on his own words, thus throwing the Soviet
national economy into a state of chaos. Khrushchov (sic) is truly an incorrigible
wastrel. He has squandered the grain reserves built up under Stalin and brought
great difficulties into the lives of the Soviet people. He has distorted and
violated the socialist principle of distribution of 'from each according to his
ability, to each according to his work', and enabled a handful of persons to
appropriate the fruits of the labour of the broad masses of the Soviet people.
These points alone are sufficient to prove that the road taken by Khrushchov
(sic)
leads away from communism." ['Refutation
Of The
So-Called Party Of The Whole People' (1964), quoted
from
here.
Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
The late
Chris Harman
also found fault with
Ernest
Mandel's analysis of the former Soviet Union [fSU], alongside the latter's criticisms of
the theory of
State Capitalism because of its many "contradictions":
"Yet even stranger is
Mandel's analysis, developed since, of the reasons for this post-war growth.
Apparently, it is because capitalism is undergoing a third 'industrial
revolution'. This has' (sic) been possible because 'during the "long period" of
stagnation of the capitalist world economy (1913-1940) a great "reserve" of
scientific and technological inventions had been built up, whose large-scale
productive application was delayed as a result of unfavourable economic
circumstances prevailing during that period'. The argument, however, is
simply contradictory. One moment these innovations are responsible for the
economic expansion: the next they were allowed to accumulate for 30 years
because there was no economic expansion. In that case, something other than the
innovations must be responsible for their present employment -- otherwise why
did they not cause expansion in the thirties? Mandel seems as incapable now as
when he wrote his book 10 years ago of identifying what this other cause might
be....
"The fashionable Marxists of
today are very like the revisionists of Kautsky's time (except that to protect
their left flank they usually claim that their 'improvement' of Marxism is a
version of the real thing). Mandel has not the method to refute them. Yet he
cannot deny the existence of some of the superficial phenomena to which they
point. And so he ends up half agreeing and half disagreeing with them. It is
this that leads to repeated self contradictions, to an underhand revision of
Marxism (as when in order to make concessions to the 'unequal-exchangists'
Mandel talks of value based upon 'labour' rather than socially necessary labour
time (p.345 & 351)) to absurd claims, and to random predictions....
"This leads him into all
sorts of contradictions. He writes that 'the bureaucratic layer monopolises
political power just as it does economic power'...and that 'The interests of the
mass of producers, the workers and peasants...are opposed to those of the
directors/managers...'. The Stalinist state
bourgeoisies of the East can no more escape from this violent, capitalist
dynamic than can the 'private' (more accurately, the state monopoly capitalist)
bourgeoisies of the West and Third World. That is what is so exciting about what
is happening in the USSR today. But to understand why, you have to move
beyond the vague, inconsistent, self contradictory formulations of Mandel,
and the best way to do so is to base yourself on Cliff's book." [Quoted from
here; accessed
15/08/2012. Bold emphases added; some paragraphs merged.]
By way of contrast, Harman also found he could lionise the
contradictions envisaged in and by his own theory, which were somehow quite
acceptable!
"Once you miss these
interconnections, you miss the dynamic of the system; you can see the system in
the manner of the bourgeois economist as made up of the different components of
a smooth running machine, even a machine that is subject to accidental
breakdowns (in Mandelese 'conjunctural' crises). But you cannot grasp the
intrinsic contradictions of the system, contradictions based upon the way in
which the total system accumulates, with accumulation producing an aging of the
system, and the aging destroying the mainspring of the system's own dynamic. For Marx, the categories he
developed were significant because they enabled you to see the system as a
self-contradicting totality, which is in a permanent process of
transformation -- a transformation that must affect the very categories of
analysis themselves....
"Nor is Mandel right when he
claims that a new wave of innovations brought on steam by this accumulated
surplus, makes it possible to evade the inner contradictions of the system as
outlined by Marx. The notion of innovation, of the 'third technological
revolution' as being able to prevent the drive of the system towards crisis,
even for a limited period (25 years) is a notion introduced into Marxism for the
first time by Mandel. And it is nonsense. The classical Marxists had no doubt
that the effects of accelerated technological progress would be to increase
not diminish the contradictions of the system.... Mandel just doesn't grasp
the contradictions in the arms economy. He accuses
Mike
Kidron of the 'truly astounding discovery that the arms economy is a factor
that slows down late capitalist growth.' But you only have to take a cursory
glance at the statistics for arms spending and economic growth to see that the
economies that have borne the greatest share of the arms burden have been those
with the worst growth records....
"What is true is that
capitalism is a continually developing system, with innovations and technical
progress taking place in some parts of the system before others. Elsewhere in
the system the old forms of 'tyranny inside the firm' -- the old methods of
capitalist planning -- then no longer correspond with what is needed to keep
abreast in the struggle for increased productivity. The law of value then
comes into contradiction with the existing forms of organisation of production. The contradiction between 'bureaucratic despotism' and the 'law of value'
occurs because society is subject to the law of value. Can this be true in the
USSR? Only if you accept that the USSR is a commodity producing society, a
variant of capitalism." [Quoted from
here; accessed
15/08/2012. Bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]
Similarly,
Ted Grant
latched onto the many 'contradictions' he claimed could be found in Cliff's
State
Capitalist Theory:
"Any analysis of Russian
society must start from that basis. Once Cliff admits that while capitalism is
declining and decaying on a world scale, yet preserving a progressive role in
Russia in relation to the development of the productive forces, then logically
he would have to say that state capitalism is the next stage forward for
society, or at least for the backward countries. Contradictorily, he
shows that the Russian bourgeoisie was not capable of carrying through the role
which was fulfilled by the bourgeoisie in the West and consequently the
proletarian revolution took place....
"We have seen that if the law
of value only applies because of the existence of capitalism in world economy,
then it would only apply to those products exchanged on the world market.
But Cliff argues two contradictory theses in relation to the Russian
economy.... Cliff gives two
contradictory answers to these questions. On the one hand he agrees that it
is the law of value on which all calculations and the movement of Russian
society develops. On the other, he finds the law of value only operating as the
result of pressure from the outside world although how he does not explain in
any serious way....
"If one takes into account
the fact that this follows the previously quoted passage in the same section
where Engels defines capitalist mode of production (as social production,
individual appropriation), we must conclude that Engels hopelessly
contradicts himself, if we accept Cliff's conclusions." [Grant (1949),
quoted from
here. Bold emphases added.
Some paragraphs merged.]
"The section [on rising
population -- RL] starts well enough by pointing out the sobering reality that:
'Early in 2012 the world's population hit seven billion. The previous milestone,
six billion, was reached in 1999. Only slightly over two centuries ago the
world’s population was one billion. The rate of increase has been phenomenal;
readers who are over 45 have lived through the doubling of the Earth's
population'. (Page 188)
"The conclusion it draws from
these rather scary figures, however, is that this presents no problem at all for
the ecology of the planet! It is true that this conclusion is contradicted
(objectively contradicted) by the content of some of the later sections -- on
waste and on the water for example. The overall thesis, however, is that no
problem is posed by the current rate of increase or any figure it might
eventually reach. This to me is a serious departure from reality." [Quoted from
here; accessed 01/09/2014. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Although, I am far from sure what an
"objective" contradiction is. Perhaps he means, "I didn't make
this
up!"
The blurb at the Bookmarks website added these
thoughts:
"Martin Empson draws on a
Marxist understanding of history to grapple with the contradictory potential
of our relationship with our environment. In so doing he shows that human
action is key, both to the destruction of nature and to the possibility of a
sustainable solution to the ecological crises of the 21st century." [Quoted from
here; accessed 01/09/2014. Bold emphasis added.]
It isn't too clear whether this supposedly
"contradictory" relationship is a 'fault' of the theory or of
'reality' itself.
As we will soon see,
this tension between a theory which postulates 'contradictions' everywhere in
nature and society and the reason DM-theorists give for abandoning a rival
theory (because it is "contradictory") in favour of their superior
alternative (which is..., er..., also "contradictory") turns
out to be fatal to DM itself.
Even The Great Teacher -- Blessed Be His
Name -- wasn't
averse to
employing this tactic (in his criticism of Bukharin and Trotsky, among others):
"What does all this show? It
shows that the opposition has got entangled in contradictions. It has lost the
capacity to think logically...." [Stalin
(1927), p.78. Bold emphasis added.]
"If now, nearly two years after the
ideological struggle in the Party and after the resolution that was adopted at
the Fourteenth Party Conference (April 1925), Zinoviev finds it possible in his
reply to the discussion at the Fourteenth Party Congress (December 1925) to dig
up the old and quite inadequate formula contained in Stalin's pamphlet written
in April 1924, and to make it the basis for deciding the already decided
question of the victory of socialism in one country -- then this peculiar trick
of his only goes to show that he has got completely muddled on this question. To
drag the Party back after it has moved forward, to evade the resolution of the
Fourteenth Party Conference after it has been confirmed by a Plenum of the
Central Committee, means to become hopelessly entangled in contradictions,
to have no faith in the cause of building socialism, to abandon the path of
Lenin, and to acknowledge one's own defeat." [Quoted from
here, Section VI. Bold emphasis added.]
As we have seen, the very same individuals
are remarkably forgiving of -- if not completely blind to -- the many
contradictions that litter DM.
[There are countless examples of the above dialectical double standards,
but the above should suffice to make the point. Cf., Schaff (1960).]
In fact, there is more to this than the above
might suggest. As we
discovered
in Essay Nine
Part Two,
DM-'contradictions' are often called into play whenever a dialectician wants to derive,
rationalise or 'justify' an
opportunistic, or even counter-intuitive (if not overtly counter-revolutionary) conclusion, or
preferred course of action. In such cases,
self-contradiction becomes something to be welcomed, if not glorified. Witness
Stalin:
"It may be said that such a
presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same
'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand
for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the
strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and
strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state
power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of
state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is
'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully
reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political
Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B),
June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
[Several more examples of this convenient tactic
have been referenced
here.]
Nevertheless, DM-theorists make some attempt to distinguish
"absurd" or "insoluble" contradictions [e.g., Engels (1976), p.154
and p.26,
respectively] from their own superior, but mutant, "dialectical"
alter-ego.
[My words, not theirs!]
And yet, the only way to tell these two
varieties of 'contradiction' apart seems to be that the first sort fatally
compromise a given theory drawn from the work of a rival theorist, or competitor
Marxist party, while the second sort are integral to the pure-as-the-driven-snow
version of DM preferred by a favoured party or theory miraculously free from such fatal
defects -- even though they are full of contradictions, too!
Moreover, DM-'contradictions' aren't just
employed in order to rationalise political expediency, they also serve as a
handy way of distinguishing those who "understand" dialectics from those who
don't, who are then anathematised for their treacherous infidelity to the
'dialectic' and their (covert, or even overt) bourgeois 'tendencies', that tactic clearly serving as a handy way of
separating the dialectical sheep from the 'formalist' goats.
Of course, kosher DM-'contractions' have simply
to be "grasped" -- or
Nixoned
-- the problems
they bring in their train quietly swept under a rug.
Not so with the contradictions committed by their rivals or
their enemies!
This brings us to a knotty problem that
threatens to undermine the entire 'dialectical project', if such it may be
called. DM-theorists have yet to provide non-DM-fans (or, indeed, their fellow believers) with non-question-begging criteria
(or any at all!) that may be used to help distinguish theories
that postulate the
existence of contradictions everywhere from those that are flatly
self-contradictory and are to be rejected because of that.
Indeed, Rees, for example, argues that a superior
theory is "less internally contradictory" and "more internally coherent" than inferior rivals
[Rees (1998a), pp.235, 237 -- but
see also below], among other things. But,
that claim was advanced without any attempt to explain why it must be a defect for a rival theory
to be self-contradictory when it isn't a defect for DM-theorists to
claim that reality itself is contradictory, with every object and process
in existence
internally self-contradictory, to begin with. If reality is indeed
contradictory, then even 'partially true' theories that accurately reflected this supposed state of affairs
should reproduce those contradictions as part of their theoretical and/or
empirical content, won't they? Indeed, if reality is contradictory itself, a self-contradictory
theory should reflect reality more accurately than one that didn't
picture it that way, shouldn't it?
In order to draw out the implications of the DD, let us
label any theory that is unambiguously self-contradictory, a "defective theory" (DT, for short).
Also, for the sake of argument, let us say that DTs include each and every one
of DM's rivals, or, further, theories that attempt or might seek to 'refute' DM (if there are any
such) and which are 'contradictory' in the manner discussed in the
previous
section. Also for the sake of argument, let
all and only those theories that accurately and adequately reflect the contradictory nature of reality (such
as DM) be called "non-defective theories" (NDTs, henceforth),
even if they are still only 'partially' or 'relatively' true.
So, on that basis and in this respect, DM
would be the one and only NDT; all the rest, the rival and oppositional theories, are DTs.
But,
paradoxically, an NDT must also be a DT! That is because, if it accurately
captures the supposedly contradictory nature of nature and society, an NDT
(like DM) must
be or must have become
self-contradictory at some point and to some extent. If not, it
wouldn't
be able to mirror reality in all its contradictory glory. Hence, such a theory must
be an NDT and a DT at the same time, otherwise it would fail to reflect nature and society accurately!
In that case, there would be no good reason to
reject any given DT in favour of an NDT on the basis that the DT
in question is
self-contradictory, since both DTs and NDTs must contain, or must have internalised,
an unspecified number of
contradictions, those it has accurately reflected in nature and society. So, because of their commitment to DM, dialecticians
would now have no good reason to reject an alternative theory on grounds that it
is a DT since DM is itself a DT in
virtue of its being
an NDT!
"In a certain sense, of
course, all truth is relative -- it is just that some theorists do not
acknowledge this elementary fact. There is no final, faultless, criterion for
truth which hovers, like god, outside the historical process. Neither is there
any privileged scientific method which is not shaped by the contours of the
society of which it is a part. All that exists are some theories which are less
internally contradictory and have a greater explanatory power…. [I]f the truth
is the totality, then it is the totality of working class experience,
internationally and historically which gives access to the truth…. [A theory's]
validity must be proven by its superior explanatory power -- [which means it is]
more internally coherent, more widely applicable, capable of greater empirical
verification -- in comparison with its competitors. Indeed, this is a condition
of it entering the chain of historical forces as an effective power. It is a
condition of it being 'proved in practice.' If it is not superior to other
theories in this sense, it will not 'seize the masses,' will not become a
material force, will not be realized in practice." [Rees (1998a), pp.235-37.
Bold emphasis added.]
Clearly, Rees holds that the more accurate the theory the
fewer
internal-contradictions it should contain. if that is so then it would seem that the 'more true' DM became the
fewer contradictions it should either envisage, contain or encompass,
and hence
the fewer it should picture as existing in nature and society! But, by doing
that --
because of the 'DM-world-view' that reality at every level is suffused with
contradictions -- DM would become
decreasinglytrue. By eliminating its own contradictions, DM would less faithfully reflect the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly litter
the natural and social world!
This means that when fully true (even
if that blessed state is never achieved), an
NDT like
DM ought
to express the fact that there are no contradictions at all in reality!
In that 'end state', if it contained even one contradiction, it would
still be a DT, and for that very reason. So, for that NDT, for DM, to remain an
NDT in this 'end state' (even if it is never attained), it would have to contain no
contradictions, and hence reflect none in nature and society! And yet, by its own lights, in
so doing it
would become false, if, as DM-theorists maintain, nature and society are
full of 'contradictions. Hence, this particular NDT (i.e., DM) would become a DT
once more (and in another sense): it would be a DT by failing to reflect the contradictions that dialecticians claim exist
in nature and society!
On the other hand, if that weren't so,
if Rees is mistaken and
dialecticians shouldn't try to eliminate any (or all) of the contradictions that
bedevil in their theory, then DM would become, or it would remain, a DT, and ought to be rejected accordingly.
That is because it would then contain an unspecified number of 'internal
contradictions' -- i.e., those that supposedly reflect the many that allegedly
exist in nature and society. Indeed, in that case, DM would have been
suffocated by its own internal contradictions!
[That would represent a fitting and somewhat
ironic downfall of a theory that declares that change can only come about through 'internal
contradiction' -- including the demise of the theory that says just that! Of course, it could always be
objected that
dialecticians don't hold
that all the contradictions in a given theory should be eliminated -- although I
have yet to read anything that supports that particular
counter-claim in a classic DM-text, or any other for that matter --; but, if that were the case, as I
have noted
here, the
advancement of science would grind to a halt as a result. Moreover, if DM were
to have only some of its contradictions removed, it would still be
a DT.]
Conversely, once more: DTs would become
NDTs in yet another sense, if their proponents removed or attempt to remove the internal contradictions
they contain. In that case, the DT in question here (DM) would have had its internal
contradictions eliminated and would thereby become an NDT, since it no longer
reflected 'objective' reality.
In either case, the DM-thesis that reality is
contradictory sends NDTs like DM one way (into oblivion), and DTs the other, into the science textbooks!
This, then, is the DD.
[DD = Dialecticians' Dilemma;
DT = Defective Theory; NDT = Non-Defective Theory; TAR = The Algebra of
Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998a).]
[The DD is described in more detail, but from a different
angle,
here. As we will see in Essay Thirteen Part
Two (where DM-theorists' ideas about scientific change will be examined in
greater detail), a corollary of this dilemma is that the DM-account of
scientific change is also fatally compromised.]
In fact, the full consequences of the DD are really quite disastrous -- as we are about to find out.
[This is a continuation of Note 5, and
what it has to say depends on the results of the previous sub-section.]
DM-theorists claim that all valid theories are
converging
or 'spiralling' on Absolute Truth
(on that, see Note 30),
even if that end point will never actually be attained. If
so, it is possible to show that DM is actually going in the wrong direction,
moving away from the goal of delivering what is even a minimally accurate 'picture of reality'. In fact, given
TAR's
criterion for
theoretical validity, we are in a position to declare -- rightnow
-- that 'reality' is in fact a 'contradiction-free' zone. That is because if DM is
to be believed, the truer the theory, the more it
must conform with the statement that reality contains no contradictions. If the
theory in question failed to do this (perhaps because its supporters
flatly reject this criticism, and for no good reason), it would be a DT, and that would be because it would contain
internal contradictions. As TAR's criterion indicates, such a theory should be rejected as defective.
[DT = Defective Theory;
NDT = Non-Defective Theory (both were defined in the
previous sub-section);
DM = Dialectical materialism/Materialist, depending on context; TAR = The Algebra of
Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998a).]
Alternatively, if we reject Rees's criterion
(for whatever reason), the result would be little different. As noted above, if
DM is supposed to hang on to its contradictions (an example of one such will be
given presently), it would be a
DT and so must be rejected. In that case, the 'picture of reality' DM
paints would be completely false.
Either way, DM is a DT and so it can't be progressing toward 'the truth'
--,
'asymptotically', or otherwise. In fact, as we will see it is spiralling off
into oblivion.
In order to make these general points more
concrete, consider an example: let us suppose (for the purposes of argument) that motion
is in fact
contradictory.
Unfortunately, if that were so, no partially-, or fully-true theory could
afford to admit that presumed 'fact' for fear it would thereby become a DT. Indeed, in order to
avoid being saddled with this a label, DM-theorists would have to abandon
the idea that motion is contradictory, or risk their theory being classified
as a DT. Hence, no NDT -- like DM -- can afford to countenance the supposedly contradictory nature of
motion.
Naturally, this just means that those who already reject Engels's analysis of
motion are (at this moment) closer to 'the truth' than he was -- or, closer than his epigonesnow
are, or even than Hegel was 200 years ago --, for these unnamed opponents already declare that motion isn't contradictory
(or, in my case,
already declare that such a supposition makes no sense).
Of course, those who don't accept -- or even
those who
reject -- this
particular DM-'contradiction' -- and who prefer to limit 'Materialist Dialectics'
to human social development -- should substitute for it
the one that Stalin claimed to have discovered
in the 'dialectical' nature of his 'Socialist' State --, or, indeed, an almost identical 'contradiction' to the one Ted Grant found there, too:
"The whole contradiction,
a contradiction within the society itself and not imposed arbitrarily --
is in the very concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If one
considers the problem in the abstract, one can see that this is a contradictory
phenomenon: the abolition of capitalism yet the continuation of classes. The
proletariat does not disappear. It raises itself to the position of ruling class
and abolishes the capitalist class. But in the intervening period it remains the
working class. Therefore, surplus product in the form of surplus value is
produced. It is the case today as it was under Lenin and Trotsky. We have only
to pose the problem: what was the surplus value produced when Russia was
still a workers' state -- though even then with bureaucratic deformations?
What was the process by means of which surplus product before 1928
mysteriously became surplus value after 1928?..." [Grant
(1949), pp.212-13. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Of course, supporters of
Cliff's theory can
substitute for the above, the following:
"Dialectical historical development,
full of
contradictions and surprises, brought it about that the first step the
bureaucracy took with the subjective intention of hastening the building of
'socialism in one country' became the foundation of the building of state
capitalism." [Cliff
(1988), p.166. Bold emphasis added.]
"State capitalism and a
workers' state are two stages in the transition period from capitalism to
socialism. State capitalism is the extreme opposite of socialism -- they are
symmetrically opposed, and they are dialectically united with one another."
[Ibid., p.174.]
A theory like DM -- that can be used to
'justify' anything
whatsoever, no matter how contradictory it might otherwise seem, and its
opposite (often this is done by the very same theorist, in the same
speech, book, or article, as we saw was the case with Stalin) -- is naturally going to be of great use to opportunists,
substitutionists and
'Marxist' counter-revolutionaries of every stripe. That is, of course, just one
more reason why supporters defend DM to the death -- or, to be more honest, to the death of
countless
tens of thousands of workers!
The only apparent way of avoiding
these fatal defects would be to argue that no theory that truly reflects the
contradictions that allegedly exist in reality will be self-contradictory,
in this case changing DM
from being a DT and making it into an NDT, as a result.
Fortunately, it is quite easy to show that that
counter-claim is itself misguided.
The argument substantiating the above
assertion
begins with the following innocuous-looking observation:
D1: (a) If DM is correct
then reality will actually contain contradictions. (b) DM postulates the existence of
just such contradictions.
Just in case this appears to get things the
wrong way round (in that it begins with theory and not with reality), we
need only reflect on the fact that since we don't have direct access to
'reality', only an indirect route by way of increasingly less inadequate
theories about it -- that is, according to DM-theorists themselves (this isn't my
theory, I hasten to add!) --, this is
a move dialecticians would have to make. [Indeed, TAR itself
appears to have conceded this point -- e.g., on page 63, paragraph 2. We saw Lenin do
something similar in Essay Three
Part One.]
Anyway, even if an attempt
were made to 'begin from reality' (whatever that means) -- presumably with the unmediated
observation of a least one material 'contradiction' in nature (maybe as a result of some sort
of languageless, concept-free, 'apperception'/'intuition'/'image'(??)) --, the conclusion
would still follow, except perhaps even more quickly, as we are about to find
out.
From D1(b), we can obtain this:
D2: At least one of DM's postulates must
contain -- or must imply -- a contradiction.
[D1: (a) If DM is correct
then reality will actually contain contradictions. (b) DM postulates the existence of
just such contradictions.]
Consider the following schematic
representation of one of these contradictions:
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, for some time, t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t.
[Where "R" is a
relational expression, for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
[Here, "¬"
stands for negation, and in the vernacular for the negative particle "not"
-- or
more long-windedly, "It
is not the case that...".]
One interpretation of D3 (partially and then
fully colloquialised) could be the following:
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least
one mat,
for some time, t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
Of course, D4 would normally be --
that is,
by us 'dialectical infidels' --
disambiguated to
remove this apparent
contradiction. And for good reason, too: no theory can live with contradictions.
We are about to find out why.
[Reminder: DT = Defective
Theory.]
Again, let us assume that DM-theorists are correct about the
contradictory nature
of reality; in that case, it is now possible to derive the following fatal conclusion:
D5: No DT is true and all DTs
should be rejected. [Assumption.]
D6: A theory that contains a
self-contradiction is a DT. [Definition.]
D7: TAR's theoretical structure
holds that both D5 and D6 are true.
D8: Assume that D5 and D6
are
true.
D9: (a) TAR also says that DM is true.
(b) Assume that DM as an integral part of TAR's theoretical superstructure, that
it is a core part of TAR.
D10: Assume DM is true.
D11: DM contains postulates like D3
(or D4 and/or D4a).
D12: D3 (D4 and/or D4a) is a self-contradiction.
D13: Therefore, DM contains at least
one self-contradiction.
D14: Therefore, DM is a DT (by D6).
D15: Hence, DM isn't true (by D5,
D13 and D14).
D16: Therefore, TAR contains a DT (by
D9 and D14).
D17: Hence, TAR's
holds a
proven DT to be true, namely DM (by D9, D6, D7 and D16).
D18: Therefore, TAR holds true a DT
which
is both true and not true (by D5, D6, D7, D9a and D17).
D19: Thus, TAR's theoretical structure contains a self-contradiction (by D18).
D20: Therefore,
(a) TAR's theoretical
structure is defective, and hence (b) Its version of DM is a DT.
D21: TAR's version of DM should be
rejected (by D5).
Admittedly, D5-D21 contain one or two vagaries,
which can be cleared up by the addition of a few extra lines, or by the adoption
of more a precise formulation (etc.); for example, it might be
necessary to substitute "fully true" for "true", above (on that,
see below). However, the outcome seems
reasonably clear: TAR is correct to argue the case for DM just in case it is
incorrect for it to do so. In fact, TAR became defective upon adopting DM!
The fact that TAR is a non-standard DM-text
doesn't affect the above argument; the author of TAR only has to hold true one
DM-contradiction for it to apply to his book.
Of course, what goes for TAR, goes for any other
DM-text that argues along similar lines -- i.e., which holds that reality is
contradictory as well as the assumption that flatly contradictory theories are defective and should be rejected.
Now, there seem to be only a handful of ways
that this fatal conclusion might be avoided. One of these is to deny the validity
or applicability of
FL. But, that would be a rather desperate move -- somewhat
akin to a boss attacking the validity of arithmetic just because a strike vote
went the 'wrong' way. More to the point, FL hasn't been used above. The
argument in fact more closely resembles those studied by
Informal Logicians. Furthermore, even though D3, for example, is expressed in
semi-formal terms, D4a isn't.
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, for some time, t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t. [Where "R" is a
relational expression, for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
Another way would be to claim that (according to
DM-theorists) no theory is every fully rejected, or deemed completely false.
That is because science "spirals" in on the
truth:
"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated
by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly
repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis
('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a
straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks
in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner
impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the
various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given
phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a
connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of
motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the
ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases
added.]
"Human knowledge is not (or
does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a
series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be
transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight
line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the
quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored
by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness,
woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness -- voilà the
epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscrutantism (= philosophical
idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless;
it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on
the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective,
absolute human knowledge." [Lenin (1961),
p.361. Italic emphases on the original.]
"What then is truth? It is
correspondence between ideas and objective reality. Such correspondence between
our ideas and reality is only gradually established, and then the correspondence
is often no more than partial or incomplete.... In such cases, we should not say
that our idea was false, but yet it would not be absolutely -- completely and in
all respects -- true. Truth, therefore, is not a property which an idea,
or a proposition, either possesses or does not possess; it may belong to an idea
to a certain degree, within certain limits, in certain respects....
"This characteristic of
truth...is very well known to science. The laws which science establishes
certainly reflect objective processes; they correspond to the real motion and
interconnection of things in the external world. Yet science has established few
laws which can claim to be absolute truths.... [M]any erroneous views in
science and philosophy, which have had to be, not modified, but rejected as
errors, concealed a certain truth which received in them an erroneous distorted
expression....
"We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression.... Complete, full, absolute
truth -- the whole truth and nothing but the truth about everything -- is
something we can never attain. But it is something toward which we are always
approximating.... The correspondence is
never complete, exact, absolute. But it continually approaches yet is always
infinitely distant from that absolute limit as truth and knowledge continually
advance...." [Cornforth (1963), pp.135-45. Bold emphases added; several
paragraphs merged.]
Hence, it could be argued on the basis of the above
that DM-epistemology isn't nearly as crude as this Essay and this site suggest.
Scientific theory advances by spiralling in on the truth. In which case,
knowledge advances by preserving some of the (partial) truths contained in
earlier theories, incorporating them in a higher, more accurate theory. This
means that some contradictions from an earlier theory might very well be
reproduced in these more accurate theories (for example, the contradictory
nature of motion), which are then expressed in a higher, more objective form. So, it isn't true that
dialecticians argue that all previous contradictions should be removed. What is
to be rejected and what is to be retained will depend on the theorists concerned, and
on the
deliverances of practice.
Of course, the above objection is independent of the fact that
DM-fans (and Hegelians) have yet to produce anyevidence in support of the
idea that motion is contradictory; indeed, it is difficult to see
what
evidence couldbe offered in support. In that case, this ancient
idea can't form part of scientific knowledge. In fact, the theory that
motion is contradictory is solely based on a 'though
experiment' -- or, rather, it is solely based on word juggling disguised as a thought
experiment, as we saw in
Essay Five. In that case, this part of DM
ought to be ditched if DM is to conform even to its own rather basic
understanding of the scientific method. Anyway, the above objection was
neutralised
earlier,
and it has also
been pointed out that objections along these lines still fail to distinguish those contradictions that
are the product of a DT from those that are a genuine 'reflection of reality'.
We have also seen (in Essay Ten
Part One) that science in
no way 'spirals' in on 'the truth'.
In addition to the above
avoiding tactic, DM-theorists
(such as Lenin and Cornforth) also argue that no theory or proposition is either fully true or
completely false. All are in their own way closer approximations to the truth,
or, rather, to 'partial' or 'relative truth'.
Quite apart from
the fact that no DM-theorist really accepts this crazy idea (on that, see below), the
term "partial truth" is itself conveniently vague (as will be demonstrated in a later
Essay).
But, even if that weren't so, the fact that
those who assent to theories that are less
'partially true' (at least in theory -- no pun intended) aim to remove certain contradictions so that
the theory in question becomes even
less 'partially true', means that the above result still applies. Hence, even given this way of thinking, a
maximally
true theory should contain fewer, perhaps no contradictions at all.
Incidentally, whatever they might say,
few 'dialectical' revolutionaries accept in practice the doctrine that there are no completely false
theories or propositions. Here is Cornforth again:
"Just as truths are for the
most part only approximate and contain the possibility of being converted into
untruths, so are many errors found not to be absolute falsehoods but to contain
a germ of truth.... We should recognise, then,
that certain erroneous views, including idealist views, could represent, in
their time, a contribution to truth -- since they were, perhaps, the only ways
in which certain truths could first begin to come to expression...."
[Cornforth (1963), pp.138-39. Paragraphs merged.]
Despite what Cornforth says, it would be hard to find a "germ of truth" in
any of the following:
(1) Ten litres of concentrated
Nitric
Acid applied directly to unprotected human skin dramatically improves the
complexion if left there for three hours.
(2) Jews, Eastern Europeans, Romanies, Arabs, Asians and Africans
all belong to inferior,
sub-human races.
(3) Capitalism is a genuine expression of
eternally unchanging human nature, which is selfish.
(4) All women are happy with their oppression
and are keen to be reminded of it daily.
(5) Imperialism is 100% progressive
everywhere, at all times, and always will be.
(6) The
Ku Klux Klan and the
alt-right are
exemplary leaders in the fight for Black
Liberation and equality for Muslims.
(7) In 2002, Iraq manufactured and stored more
WMD than any other country in the
entire history of the
planet.
(8) The earth is supported by a giant tortoise,
on top of a giant locust, on top of a giant crab, on top of a...
(13) The world was created about 6000 years
ago from a bowl of custard by the
Flying Spaghetti Monster.
I suspect that anyone who questioned the
truth of, say, (1) would be
hard pressed to find a single revolutionary who agrees with (2).
Naturally, that makes the negation of (2) absolutely true (for all revolutionaries).
On
the other hand, if they disagree with one or both of these sentences --
i.e., (1) and (2) -- as they should, they would thereby
confirm the point at issue: if either one of these sentences is completely false,
then there is at least one sentence (namely that one) that is completely
false.
QED.
And, just in case this Essay attracts the
attention of a handful of brass-necked, Hardcore Hegel Honchos, who might want to claim one
or more of the above are 'partially true', 'partially false', then they should
perhaps consider the following:
H1: There are absolutely no partial truths.
Now, is that 'partially'
true?
Another way of avoiding the above conclusions would be
to claim that they only apply to formal
contradictions, and since DM-theorists only countenance those contradictions
that can be shown to exist 'objectively' -- i.e., 'material contradictions'
-- their theory is unaffected by the above criticisms.
However, that counter-response fails, too. Consider the following additional argument:
D3: For at least one
moving x, and at
least one y, for some time t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t.
[Where "R" is a
relational expression, for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least
one mat,
for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
D22: DM only postulates
the existence of material contradictions.
D23: D3 (or D4/D4a), when true,
reflects just such a
material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth of D3
(D4/D4a),
but only when
instances can be shown to be the case.
D25: Hence, even when instances
of D3 (D4/D4a) are found to be the case, they remain self-contradictions.
This means that the rest of D5-D21 still
follows.
A retreat into the concrete bunker here (on
the lines that the above claims are 'abstract', whereas "all truth is concrete",
according to Hegel and Lenin), would be to no avail, either. That is because it
would immediately prompt the question: "Is the claim that all truth is concrete
itself absolutely true?" If it is, then the point is lost. If it isn't,
we can ignore it as an effective reply. [That is, of course, quite apart from
the fact that this quasi-Hegelian thesis is itself
abstract and hence can't itself be true (that is, if what it says is true)!]
It could be argued that D22-D25 can be
disassociated from D5-D21 by rejecting either D23 or D25. That is, it could be
objected
that DM-contradictions are
different from those found in
FL.
D22: DM postulates only the
existence of material contradictions.
D23: D3 (or D4/D4a), when
true, reflects just such a
material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth
of D3 (D4/D4a), but only when instances can be shown to be the case.
D25: Hence, even when instances
of D3 (D4/D4a) are found to be the case, they remain self-contradictions.
But, this view
can only be maintained by repudiating another DM-thesis: the superiority of
DL over FL arises partly out of the former's capacity to
account for change through contradiction. That claim would lose all of its
force if it were now clear that the contradictions countenanced in DL were completely different
from those studied in and by FL. In such an eventuality there would be nothing in common
between the two systems for a comparison to latch onto. The much-touted
superiority of DL over FL (at least with respect to contradictions) would then be about
as accurate as would be an analogous claim that, say, Barclays Bank is a more
efficient
bank than the
Dogger Bank. This is quite apart from
the fact that DM-contradictions arose out of Hegel's criticisms of AFL and the
LOC, and we have just seen that 'superior' theories, like DM, don't simply
reject or discard concepts drawn from earlier theories, they build on them.
This wouldn't be the case here if DM-contradictions were completely different
from those found in FL (at least as DM-theorists see things).
Anyway, this is certainly not how Hegel viewed his 'contradictions'. [On that, see
here and
below.]
[LOC = Law of
Non-Contradiction; AFL = Aristotelian FL.]
To be
sure, there are DM-theorists who say that neither they nor Hegel reject the
LOC (but on that, see Essay
Four as well as
here),
since they actually use FL-contradictions in their attempt to show that there
are real 'dialectical contradictions' in nature and society (thereby
transcending those FL-contradictions in order to derive the more comprehensive DM-version
in each case). So these
two 'varieties' of contradiction are
organically-, or, perhaps even 'dialectically'-connected. DM-contradictions are, indeed, merely 'concrete' versions
of the abstractions found in FL. As Trotsky noted:
"The dialectic is...a science
of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems
of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and
drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar
to that between higher and lower mathematics." [Trotsky (1971),
p.63.]
Hence, just like "lower mathematics", which treats with numbers,
and operations such as
addition, multiplication and division, as well as utilising well-known axioms
and rules
(commutativity,
associativity, distribution,
etc.), "higher mathematics" does likewise. Numbers in the former system are the same as those
that are used in the
latter, it is just that that use is extended much further, into areas such as
Rings,
Groups and
Fields. [On that, see
here. That isn't, however, to suggest
that every single one of the above axioms or rules apply everywhere in 'higher'
mathematics; for example,
Abelian Groups aren't commutative, nor are
Matrices in general.]
But,
no one suggests that the numbers studied in "lower mathematics" are different from those
that make their appearance in "higher mathematics". DL merely enriches
and extends the use of numbers, just as it enriches
our understanding of contradictions.
Or, so it might be claimed.
Anyway,
as we saw
here,
Hegel was only able to derive his 'contradictions' by confusing letters (or what they supposedly
designate: objects, relations or processes) with predicates, propositions,
concepts,
and a host of other things. [Naturally, this means that the allegation that Hegel knew what he was
talking about in this area is about as accurate as a similar claim made by, say,
Donald Trump concerning
High
Energy Physics, should he
choose to pass such an opinion.] Nevertheless, from what he
actually committed to paper, Hegel certainly wanted to link his
'contradictions' with their misbegotten cousins he thought he had located in the
bowdlerised version of
AFL he had been taught (as a student), which he then criticised.
[However, having said
that, please note the caveats I have posted
here.]
Clearly, what DM-theorists need to show is that at least some
of the contradictions countenanced by FL are derivable from, or they depict,
"real material contradictions", otherwise there
would be no good reason to call their own contradictions, "contradictions" (as
opposed to calling them, say, "bananas") -- or, indeed, for claiming that the former are
just static or 'abstract' versions of the latter.
If so, the rejection of one or more of
D1-D25
(on the grounds that they refer to or use totally different senses of the word
"contradiction") would be to deny DM-theorists an important conceptual
innovation they inherited from Hegel (who, once more, doesn't claim his 'contradictions'
are of a new type, just a more 'scientific' or 'concrete' form), which is that
contradictions in thought (FL-style) mirror real ones in nature and society --
when verified, given a 'concrete' make-over, or flipped the "right way
up".
Since FL-contradictions are the formal
equivalent of every conceivable contradiction (real or imagined), DM-theorists
can't afford to drive a wedge between FL-contradictions and their own
DM-"material contradictions". If they were to do this, they couldn't also
maintain that thought mirrored the world, and a central plank in DM-epistemology
would implode.
Indeed, that seems to be what Lenin was
trying to say:
"Hegel actually
proved that logical forms and laws are not an empty
shell, but the reflection of the objective world.... The laws of logic are the
reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.180, 183.
Paragraphs merged.]
Anyway, D3 is merely a formal
version of the sorts of material contradictions found in DM (i.e., D4/D4a). Since
D20
and D21 follow from D4/D4a, this latest counter-argument itself fails.
D3: For at least one x, and at
least one y, for some time t,
Rxy at t and ¬Rxy at t. [Where "R" is a
relational expression, for example, "ξ
is on ζ".]
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least
one mat,
for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on
the mat at t.
D4a: For at least one moving
cat, and at least one mat, the cat is on the mat at one moment and the cat is
not on the mat at the very same moment.
At this point, it is worth recalling that
the theory that nature is contradictory isn't a peripheral, minor,
or insignificant
aspect of DM; it is one of its core precepts, a consequence of (i) the
idea that everything is a
UO
and (ii) the part-whole
dialectic. This is certainly
how Rees views this part of DM (see, for instance, pp.4-10 of Rees (1998a) -- but compare that
with
this).
[See also the comments posted
here.]
And, it is certainly how DM-classicists,
like Lenin and Mao, for example, saw
things. [On that, see
here.]
So, if DM is defective here, it is rotten to the core. To be sure, this is the rotten core of
Hegel's
sub-Aristotelian 'logic'. No amount of spin can change that material fact.
The only other conceivable way to avoid this
fatal defect would be to find fault with one or more of the assumptions
(implicitly or explicitly) used in
the argument above. However, further examination of those real or apparent assumptions would be
tantamount to the present author doing DM-theorists' work for them. This is their
hole; they should try to dig their own way out of it.
[Additional factors associated with this topic
were examined in Essay Seven Part One,
here,
here and
here.]
6.
Several other characterisations of the "Totality" -- or,
rather, several other extremely vague gestures toward that end -- have been
quoted inNote 25, below.
7.
On this, see Rosen
(1982), Chapter Two. Rosen's arguments will be developed in more detail in
Part
Two of this Essay.
8. It is worth recalling that the (entirely reasonable) requirement that
evidence should be presented in support of each and every DM-thesis isn't my invention. Dialecticians
themselves tell us
that this is an essential move to prevent their theory from lapsing into Idealism. [On that, see
here,
here,
here, and
here.]
9.
By now, it
should be abundantly clear that the
"Totality" is none other than Hegel's Absolute 'in drag'. And a
rather poor disguise it is, too. In fact, it is even less impressive than
Clark Kent's.
Figure Thirteen:
Is Hegel's 'Absolute' -- The DM-"Totality" -- As
'Well-Disguised' As
Superman?
10.
Of course, this just scratches at the surface of the 'problems' created by our
attempt to understand 'the nature of time', and what can be said to exist when.
For example, several of the questions that will be examined presently in the main
body of this Essay (no pun
intended) were first posed (as far
as we know) by
Augustine in his Confessions [Book
XI, Sections 14:17-31:41; i.e., Augustine of Hippo (2004),
pp.230-45], although, some of his ideas were anticipated by the
Stoics.
[On this, see Sorabji (1983), pp.21-27. Also see Suter (1989b). The general background can be found in Sorabji,
op cit. See also, Note 14.]
Unfortunately,
as is the case with what I have to say in many of the Essays published at this
site I am forced to
employ the 'metaphysical mode of speech'
(of the sort one finds in Augustine's work, as well as the writings of the vast
majority of Traditional Philosophers). This doesn't imply that I accept
this jargon makes any sense; in fact, it is being
employed here precisely to assist in its
demise.
Sentences like: "The past does not exist", "The present does exist", or "The
past is no more" appear to use phrases like "The past" or "The present"
almost as if
they were Proper Names, or labels, that attach to, or which designate, specific temporal zones, which they aren't. If they were
Proper Names,
or operated like Proper Names, for example, it would be possible for someone, somewhere, somewhen to pick out their bearers
--, either
with a demonstrative (like "this" or "that"), by
ostension, or by means of an identifying
description (or even by means
of a combination one or more
of these linguistic or extra-linguistic devices)
-- or maybe even by referring to some sort of baptismal or dubbing ceremony (with the word
"baptismal" being used here in a non-religious sense!). But, it isn't.
[On this see,
Hanna and Harrison (2004); however, the latter should be read in conjunction with
Baker and Hacker (2005), pp.227-49.]
It
might be objected that it is surely possible to name things that don't exist,
and have never existed -- for example, mythical and fabulous beasts of yore,
fictional characters, the many 'gods' that litter the worlds religions, etc.
That is undeniable, but if the "The Past", "The Present", "The Future" are to be
viewed in a similar light, that will only confirm the allegations advanced in this Essay:
at best, they resemble fictional labels
(i.e., they attach to things that don't exist).
In
addition, it is important to note that an earlier paragraph mentioned descriptions, not definitions.
This doesn't mean, of course, that ostensive definitions (of named objects)
can't be provided, only that the stage-setting for these rituals is rather complex.
Anyway, it is difficult to see how such a 'definition' of "The past" or "The
future" might be
available without the automatic use of the present tense (as in, for
example: "This is the past..."). In cases like these, such identifying
descriptions might perhaps gain some traction in conjunction with the use of
pictures
and photographs, or even by means of various stories that try to
illustrate how things used to be --
as one might teach a child, for example. [On Ostensive Definitions, see
Baker and Hacker (2005),
pp.81-106.]
Evensupposing all of that, if anyone took such
depictions to be literally true (i.e., they understood these stories, pictures or
photographs to be, or to pick out, the past), they
would either be deluding themselves or they would have been misled in some way.
In such circumstances, they might
mistakenly
imagine that the past was a drawing, a series of black and white images on glossy
paper, or a set of fabulous tales. Either that, or they might entertain the idea that the past
currently exists somewhere
-- in the present(?) -- in a manner similar to the items they had just been shown, the tales they
had been told, or the
'definitions' they had been given, all of which employ the present tense.
The use of any other tense in such
circumstances would, of course, be
self-defeating. What sense, for example, could be made of: "The past was
this…"?
To be
sure, one can say things like: "This is how things were in the past", but even
then the present tense of the verb "to be" (namely "is") would still
have been employed.
Other well-known problems afflict
attempts to 'define' the past in similar ways, since such 'definitions' are
forced to employ various forms of the present tense.
[The
objection that the verb "to be" here is tenseless will be
dealt with in Note 14, below.]
Of course, a sentence like the following, "This was how things were in the past",
doesn't use the present tense, but then it doesn't imply 'the past'
(still) exists, either.
It could be objected that the above responses
fail to deal with "The present". It might seem to some that this term operates as some sort of Proper Name, instead of a
definite description. But, what is it the Proper Name of?
What does it label? To what can anyone point, directly or indirectly, that is or might be the
referent of this term?
By the time that ceremony might have been, performed, 'it' (whatever 'it' is)
will have gone.
It
could be argued that the present is always with us as a sort of a-temporal, or
even omni-temporal, now. But, this 'now' must be durationless, otherwise,
as
Augustine
pointed out, if it had any duration it would have its own temporal parts -- a
before and an after, a later and an earlier. That would in turn imply that the
present was part past and part future. And if that were so, an earlier question
would force itself upon us: Exactly what is this the Proper Name or label of? To what
can anyone point that is or might be the referent of this term? [I am not here
suggesting that all attempts to speak about the past are defective, only that
certain ways of speaking about it can be, and are, misleading. Not am I
suggesting that some uses of "the present" imply duration -- as in "The present
Queen of England is over ninety years old". But even that use of the term "The
present Queen of England" doesn't refer to anything (in the way that a Proper
Name does), it is merely synonymous with "The current Queen of England", but no
one imagines "The current" names anything.]
Be
this as it may, if anyone wants to adopt, or even defend, this view of "The
present", they are welcome to it. Anyway, this thesis (if such it may be called)
is susceptible to the objections raised against any and all metaphysical
theories rehearsed in Essay Twelve
Part One (summarised
here and
here).
Finally, it
could be argued that terms like "The past", or "The future" are
definite descriptions; if so, I'd have
no objection to that
interpretation, since, just like fictional names and labels, definite descriptions
are often used in relation to non-existents -- such as "The creator of the
universe", "The next President of the United States of America", or even "The
individual who succeeds in rendering DM perspicuous".
11.
More on this presently (again, no pun intended).
It is no surprise, therefore, to discover that we
are never actually
told what it means for parts of the "Totality" to be "connected", let alone
"interconnected". So, until I am informed otherwise, I will continue
to interpret these terms
causally. That is, I take it that for part, event, or process, A, to be
"connected" to part, event, or process,
B, there must be some sort of cause or causal chain linking A to B -- but
not necessarily linking B to A. But, for them to be interconnected,
there must be some sort of cause or causal chain linking A to B andB
to A, in return. So, to state the obvious, while a lightning strike might
be the cause of a forest fire, the forest fire isn't the cause of the lightning
strike. Plainly, that would be an example of a connection between the two events,
but not an interconnection.
An example of an interconnection would be a
feed-back loop, but in that case
the elements in such a loop must co-exist. So, if there is a feedback loop
between A and B, both A and B must (i) co-exist in some
form or other -- even if such existence turns out to be ephemeral or intermittent
-- or (ii) exist in the same temporal frame (howsoever that is
conceived).
12.
That is, not unless the word "correspond" is given a new meaning, perhaps making
it analogous to the correspondence between fictional characters and events and
the 'same' individuals and events in the real world -- or the other way
round (as one might encounter, say, in a historical novel).
In that sense, of course, such characters and
events do not
actually
correspond with the characters and events they seek to depict --, or, plainly, the said work wouldn't be fictional!
It could be argued that in a novel about, for
example, Trotsky, the name "Trotsky" would correspond to Trotsky. And if, in that
novel, "Trotsky" is expelled from the former USSR, for instance, that would correspond to
what actually happened. But, this neat picture just re-duplicates the problem, for in
that case, both the individual and the described event no longer exist for
either of these to correspond with.
More importantly, if the aforementioned novel
is indeed a novel, it will depict, describe or feature many things Trotsky never
did or said -- otherwise it wouldn't be fiction, it would be a biography! So, if
it is a novel, it can't be
about Trotsky, but must be about 'Trotsky', a fictional character
with a typographically identical name who 'did' typographically (some of) the same things.
Indeed, if we now argue that Trotsky is
the individual who did, or experienced, E1,
E2,
E3,...,
En
(where n is indefinitely large, and Ek
is a noun or verb phrase (or clause) expressing some event in his life,
something he experienced, did, thought about, or was true of him (etc.),
whether or not we now know about them or it) -- Leibniz might have called this
Trotsky's "complete individual concept" -- and the Proper Name "Trotsky"
referred to the human being who did, or experienced, all these things, then this
fictional 'Trotsky' (logically) can't refer to him. That is because
'Trotsky' did, or experienced, none of these things. Fictional characters can't
do anything, they can only 'do' whatever the author invents for them.
"The nature of an individual
substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is
sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of
the subject to which this notion is attributed." [Leibniz, quoted from
here.]
"A notion that determines a certain
individual Adam must contain absolutely all his predicates, and it is
this complete notion that determines general considerations to the
individual.... So: I hold that every true proposition is
either immediate or mediate. An immediate proposition is one that is true by
itself, i.e., a proposition whose predicate is explicitly contained in its
subject; I call truths of this sort 'identical'. All other propositions are
mediate; a true proposition is mediate when its predicate is included virtually
in its subject, in such a way that analysis of the subject, or of both predicate
and subject, can ultimately reduce the proposition to an identical truth. That's
what Aristotle and the scholastics mean when they say 'the predicate is in the
subject'." [Leibniz to Arnauld, 1686, quoted from
here. See also
here.
Paragraphs merged.]
Does any of this mean we have to accept that the
above refers to an actual individual called "Adam", the alleged father of us
all?
It could be countered that no author of
fiction puts words in 'scare' quotes in the manner suggested -- for example, who
ever uses 'Trotsky', or 'do', in a novel or story? Of course not, those were my
terms; they were employed to make a philosophical point about what the word
"Trotsky" is capable of referring to in fiction, and what such characters are
capable of doing. Does anyone think that
Abraham Lincoln ever hunted vampires?
12a.
Instead of looking at how we use the highly complex language associated with time
in ordinary life, theorists
more often than not attempt to regale
us
with their impromptu 'intuitions' about the 'real' meaning of phrases like "The past", "The
future", or "The present", augmented (or not, as the case may be) by the alleged implications of the
TOR. Small wonder
then that they end up with 'paradoxical' and deeply puzzling results that
no one seems to understand. [On that, seeNote 13
andNote 14.]
'The passage shown below comes from Isaacson's Chapter One.
"The general theory of relativity…can be described by using another thought
experiment. Picture what it would be like to roll a bowling ball onto the
two-dimensional surface of a trampoline. Then roll some billiard balls. They
move toward the bowling ball not because it exerts some mysterious attraction
but because of the way it curves the trampoline fabric. Now imagine this
happening in the four-dimensional fabric of space and time."
'We'd have to call that passage bafflegab. No one has the slightest idea what
Isaacson means when he refers to "the four-dimensional fabric of space and
time." We all can picture that trampoline -- but none of us knows how to imagine
that "four-dimensional fabric!" Nor does Isaacson give us the tools to do so, or
notice that he has failed.' [This was quoted from
here -- RL.]
"Somerby is complaining about a big problem here. But it's not Isaacson's fault.
Or even the fault of science writers in general. It's a defect in the universe
itself. As it turns out, explaining the 'fabric' of spacetime isn't hard. Yes,
it's four-dimensional. But all this means is that you define it using four
numbers. If you described me via my age, weight, height, and IQ, that would be a
'four-dimensional' representation of
Kevin Drum. It's not a big deal. Now
suppose you want to describe an event. You need to specify where it happened and
when it happened. Take, for example, the airplane crashing into World Trade
Centre 1. It happened at 40.71º latitude, -74.01º longitude, and 6,371
kilometres (relative to the centre of the earth) at 13:46:30 GMT on 11 September
2001 (relative to the common era calendar). As an event in spacetime it's
represented by an ordered 4-tuple.
(40.71, -74.01, 6371, 2001.09.46:30)....
"This is all pretty simple. You might not know the mathematics for dealing with
arrays of four numbers at a time, but it's well developed. And if you combine
that with a few other concepts -- like the idea that the speed of light is
always constant -- you'll eventually end up with the theory of gravitational
attraction that's called general relativity. Unfortunately, 'eventually' is a
long way away. I can teach you to add and subtract, and 'eventually' that will
lead you to the theories of financial derivatives that we lovingly called rocket
science when they were helping the economy implode in 2008. I can teach you the
colour wheel and eventually you might become the next Rembrandt. I can teach you
to read and eventually you might tackle Kant or Wittgenstein.
"So what's a science writer to do? General relativity is a set of mathematical
equations. Plug in the numbers and it turns out to predict the way gravity works
with astonishing precision. But can someone who doesn't understand the math
picture in their head what those equations 'mean'? Well, what does a Rembrandt
mean to a blind person? What do derivatives mean to someone who doesn't
understand the
Black-Scholes model? What does Kant mean
to someone who's never studied philosophy? You can do your best to find some
kind of analogy that kinda sorta (sic) gets these ideas across, but none of them
will ever be simultaneously comprehensible and truly accurate to a layman.
"I
said earlier that this was a defect in the universe. Here's the defect: the
universe is hard! Humans have a hard time understanding it if they aren't
willing to study diligently. (And sometimes even if they are.) There's really no
way around this. In the case of science, there's no law that says the universe
has to work in ways that the overclocked ape homo sapiens can make
intuitive or visual sense of. You can read an article in Discover and get
a glimpse. A really talented writer can give you a slightly better glimpse. If
you get a PhD in physics you'll get an even better glimpse. You'll start to
grasp simultaneity,
light cones,
stress-energy tensors,
geodesics,
world lines,
Riemannian geometries, and
frame dragging. But will you ever truly
understand? Will you ever truly be able to picture it? Probably not. You might
eventually be able to manipulate the algebra deftly, but at a visceral level our
brains evolved to understand spear throwing and baby raising, not differential
equations or tensor analysis. Welcome to the universe...." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 22/08/2018. Links added;
several paragraphs merged; italics in the original; language modified to agree
with UK English; one abbreviation expanded. The
second half of this article is well
worth reading, too.]
Except for the odd idea that the universe itself is "hard", the above isn't a million miles away from the analysis developed at this site.
13.
Ordinarily, we have no difficulty with using the vocabulary of time. Indeed, we
typically manage to do so every day, using differentially tensed verbs,
augmented by temporal-,
and location-specific
adjectives,
adverbs and
prepositions.
However,
certain
nominalisations like "Time", "Past",
"Future" --, or even, "Present", and these are typical, for instance, in relation
to the so-called "A-series"
in the Philosophy of Time -- merely encourage the invention of spurious problems
connected with something called 'the nature of time' -- now irreversibly
reified into existence by the simple
trick of using a few words that resemble Proper Names, a favoured pastime
among those who dote on the vagaries and confusions of Traditional Thought.
It is no accident, therefore, to find that the "A-"
and "B-series" were invented by that Idealist (neo-Hegelian) Philosopher,
John
McTaggart.
A classic statement of the approach to the
analysis of pseudo-problems like these (that has been adopted
at this site) can be found
in the opening sections of Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown Books and
Philosophical Investigations -- i.e., Wittgenstein (1969, 1958/2009). On this topic in
general, cf., Cook (1979), Read (2002, 2003,
2007),
Rundle (2009), Suter (1989), pp.157-70, and Westphal (1996, 2002). See also, Anscombe (1950).
14.
Notice that using even this locution requires the
employment
of the present tense, which, if crudely interpreted, might suggest that
the past is really part of the present, only remarkably well hidden!
Now, the above interpretation might seem to
some to resemble the following aspect of
Augustine's theory of time:
"If future and past events
exist I want to know where they are. If I have not the strength to discover the
answer, at least I know that wherever they are, they are not there as future or
past, but as present. For if there also they are future, they
will not be there. If there also they are past, they are no longer there.
Therefore, wherever they are,
whatever they are, they do not exist except in the present.... What is by now evident
and clear is that neither the future nor the past exist, and it is inexact
language to speak of three times -- past, present and future." [Augustine (2004),
Book XI, Sections 18:23, 20:26), pp.233, 235. The online translation is somewhat different
from the published version. Paragraphs merged.]
However, Augustine posed this 'problem' epistemologically and psychologistically, whereas I would
rather re-focus
discussion of time (as I do in this Essay) on how we
ordinarily use tensed verbs (and other words draw from our temporal vocabulary), refusing to theorise or advance an
'ontology' of any
sort.
It could be objected that some of the verbs employed
in these contexts are tenseless,
which would mean that their use carries no implication that the past somehow
exists in the present. But, even if that were
so
(and in such contexts the verbs themselves can't tell us what connotations
they carry),
it would be even less clear what a tenseless depiction of the past
actually amounted to. [I say more about this in Essay Thirteen
Part One.] How might this interpretation
of certain verbs work with a sentence such as: "This is the past", for
instance? That particular use of the verb "to be" doesn't look the least bit tenseless.
Of course, as we saw in Essay Three
Part One, in
predicative
propositions, where the word "is" functions as a mere
copula,
that copula can be paraphrased away, even if this results in some awkwardness. So:
[Where "F" stands for a noun or verb phrase.
Although there might remain a few (not insurmountable) problems connected with 'use
and mention', here.]
While P2 is still apparently in the present
tense, it doesn't possess the same untoward implications.
On the other hand, if, according to
DL, the
"is" in P1 is really an
"is" of identity, then the above move
would no longer be available.
P3: The past is identical
with F.
P4:
The past = F.
But,
P3 and P4 still seem to be super-glued to the
present!
I won't speculate how DL-fans might handle
this awkward turn of events; they dropped themselves in that particular hole
when they began listening to
logical
advice doled out by that certified incompetent,
Hegel.
It is important to note that the views
expressed here aren't in any way connected with the metaphysical doctrine that
currently goes under the name "Presentism". Indeed, my views
represent no theory at all. There is in fact no
single way to depict
time. The vernacular allows us to speak about it in countless different ways.
We say things like the following:
"Time to go", "Time flies when you're enjoying
yourself", "One at a time, please!", "What time do you call this?", "We had a
great time on the picket line today!", "Procrastination
is the thief of time", "I've told you several times, tidy
your bedroom!", "Five times four is twenty",
"Time is money",
"I have no time for you today", "No time to lose, print the placards!", "The
referee blew for time", "The landlord called time", "There is still enough time
to call your mother", "We ran out of time, so we went home",
"Next time, don't forget to knock!", "It's long past
time management listened to the union", "The new train has cut the time for each
journey by a half", "You're wasting your time arguing with a fascist!", "Time
and tide wait for no man", "Time's up!", "Any time you're ready...",
"The reinforcements arrived just in time", "There was a time when I could have jumped that fence", etc., etc.
[Of course, I have limited myself to the use of the word "time" and ignored
other words we have in the vernacular to say similar things --, such as "I have
repeated told you to tidy your room!". "When you're ready...", "In future, don't
forget to knock!", etc.]
This wide
diversity of uses gives the lie to the idea that the word "time" has a 'real
meaning'. Indeed, speculation that there is only one 'real meaning' for words associated
with the language of time,
the presumed referents of which are what philosophers or scientists supposedly study (or intend to study) would amount
to the
imposition
of yet another a priori,
dogmatic scheme on nature/language, something DM-theorists, at least, affect to
disavow.
Of course, if that
were so, and there were something called "the real meaning of the
language of time", the aforementioned theorists would be studying 'time', as
opposed to time
-- since, in the
latter eventuality, the word "time" has many different meanings or uses,
as we have just seen. In that case, the supposed 'problems' of time
(as opposed to what appear to be very real problems associated with 'time') won't have been
addressed.
15.
The mis-analogy between space and time will be analysed in a later
Essay.
The similarly misleading analogy drawn between time and the structure of
the
Real Numbers
has already been
addressed,
here. There is an excellent discussion of the
temptation to reify space and time -- simply because we can represent
both of these by a combination of
Real Numbers
and
orthogonal axes (in Mathematics and
Physics, for instance) --, in Swartz (1991), pp.145-224. [I hasten to add that I
don't agree with everything Professor Swartz has to say!]
16. Aristotle
himself considered this 'problem' in his famous
Sea Battle Paradox.
[On
that, see Anscombe (1956).]
17. In order to
prevent misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that
the Ideal nature of the past is neither being asserted nor denied in this
Essay. That is because both of those alternatives would be metaphysical, and as such they
would be
non-sensicalandincoherent.
'Propositions' expressing either option
(i.e., the assertion, or even the denial, of the Ideal nature of time)
result from a misconstrual of ordinary forms of speech that are supposedly
capable of revealing
fundamental features of 'reality', when they are in fact incapable of being empirically
true or empirically false, and so can't picture the world in any way. [Again,
on that, see Essay Twelve
Part One.]
However, what is being
maintained in this Essay is that DM-theorists themselves can't consistently deny that the past is Ideal
given their commitment to the CTT and to the 'objectivity' of the claims
they make about the past.
[CTT = Correspondence
Theory of Truth.]
[Exactly why that is so will be postponed until the
CTT itself is discussed in more detail in Essay
Ten Part Two, alongside other classical definitions of truth.]
It is also worth pointing out that the
argument here bears no relation to recent and
fashionable
post-modernist [henceforth, PM] 'deconstructions' of historical
truth. In fact, the approach adopted here emphaticallyrefuses to deny there are historical truths,
nor does it question the occurrence of events in the past. What is being
questioned is the Metaphysical-Realist/Idealist slant imposed on one or both.
However, recent attempts made by a handful of
revolutionaries to underline the misguided nature of PM are themselves far from
convincing. For example, a view expressed by the late Chris Harman [in Harman (1998)]
was clearly influenced by
Richard Evans's
"Holocaust Argument" [HA], employed in order to
refute certain PM-theories of history. [That is, it was argued that to deny the objectivity of the past is
tantamount to denying the Holocaust!] But, Harman's reliance on Evans's book is
ill-advised on philosophical grounds alone, if for no other reason. While Evans
was rightly critical of any account of the past that falls short of the highest academic
or scientific
standards, he also seemed happy to base his own philosophical objections
to PM on the most superficial refutation of it available to him (the HA). In
addition, the only
relevant philosophical argument was lifted from Paul Boghossian's review of the by-now-infamous "Sokal Hoax". Boghossian's
'demolition' was itself a rehash of the hackneyed "self-refutation"
argument (briefly examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two (not yet published)).
[Cf., Boghossian (1996), re-worked in
Boghossian (1998) and in more detail in Boghossian (2006); cf., Evans (1997),
pp.220-21. On this, see the extended responses to the above 'hoax' available
here.]
Now, whatever weaknesses the entire set of
PM-theories of history possess, they aren't susceptible to the hackneyed,
superficial and often misconceived criticisms levelled at them by revolutionaries,
whether or not these are 'backed-up' by references to Lenin's
philosophically-challenged and monumental waste of ink and paper: MEC.
[MEC = Materialism And
Empirio-Criticism; i.e., Lenin (1972)-- examined in detail in Essay ThirteenPart One.]
Alex Callinicos, on the other
hand, has published several extensive criticisms of PM -- for example,
Callinicos (1989, 1995, 1998). [Some of the issues Callinicos raises will be
considered in more detail in a later Essay.]
In addition,
Callinicos has summarised his objections
to PM and to what he calls "textualism" [(Callinicos (1998); these
criticisms are
somewhat similar to arguments that appear in
Callinicos (1987), pp.126-28.)], a view he
claims is associated with various PM-theories of history.
According to Callinicos, "textualism" involves an acceptance of the rather bizarre thesis
that there is "nothing outside the text" (henceforth, NOTT). Against this, he
argues that while it is trivially true that all representations of things in the
world are mediated by language, it doesn't follow that they are "constituted by
language". Unfortunately, Callinicos forgot to tell us what he meant by
this. What would it be for something to be "constituted by
language"? Plainly, we would need the answer to that question in order to understand
what it was that Callinicos's claim rules in, or, indeed, rules out. The problem is
that
it seems we
would have to do this without the use of language! Otherwise, we wouldn't know what it was
that language was operating on, or "constituting", independently of
our own use of language to make this very point!
Now, Callinicos might have had in mind the idea
that objects and processes in the world are 'pre-linguistic', or
even 'extra-linguistic'. If so, he might find it difficult to say what
that amounts to without yet another annoying use of language.
It could be argued that this is precisely the
point. While our representation of the world has to be linguistic
(by-and-large), that trivial fact surely has no effect or bearing on the nature of
the objects
and processes we represent, which surely exist independently of language. However, quite apart from the fact
that eventhat point has to be made linguistically, it amounts to little
more than a flat denial of NOTT. It certainly doesn't show that PM is
incorrect (in this regard) -- plainlybecause it
begs the question.
In order to show that PM is misconceived from
beginning to end it we will need conceptual tools considerably more powerful and
reliable than those that have actually been imported from
the same ideologically-compromised source that gave rise to PM in
the first place
-- i.e., Traditional Philosophy, but, more specifically, French
'Philosophy'. With respect to PM, 'less reliable' tools drawn from
Traditional Thought will be integral to any attempt to
construct a
superior
philosophical 'theory' that sought to replace, or refute PM. But, there is no
way that
non-sensical
and incoherent theories (like PM) can be refuted by the construction of yet more of the same.
Clearly, in order to refute a theory (i.e., show it is false), a critic would
have to know what would make that theory true (and thereby what would make it
false). But that can't be achieved by the construction of yet another non-sensical theory, let alone one that
is also incoherent. In that case, an entirely different approach is required.
One
such will be aired in a later Essay, but the approach it will adopt was hinted at
earlier.
Nevertheless, Callinicos advanced three
counter-arguments (or, rather, counter-claims) to show that
NOTT-type theories are
misguided:
(1) Human beings gain information
about the world by their physical interaction with it.
(2) Discourse isn't
autonomous; it is a social phenomenon integrated in other aspects of human interaction with
the world.
(3) Human beings do not
automatically and uncritically accept the deliverances of language; they sort
them into different categories using criteria that help decide which are the "most
accurate" depictions of the world. Historians, for example, wouldn't check
sources, artefacts, archaeological data, and so on, if texts were hermetically
sealed against reality. [Callinicos (1998), p.178.]
It could even be argued that the above points
might equally well be directed at criticisms of
DM (and not just PM) advanced at this site.
However, that, too, would be a
serious error.
Callinicos himself acknowledged that Item (1) above
allows for the fact that "information [has to be] articulated linguistically" to
make it accessible, but he failed to notice that that
concession undermined his overall position.
I hasten to add, however,
that the extent
and validity
of that point itself depends on
what Callinicos meant by "information". If he meant "the content of an
empirical proposition", then Item (1) wouldn't count against any of the Essays
published at this site. If,
on the other hand, he meant "pre-linguistic data", his point would be
impossible to understand until that phrase itself had been explained.
Exactly what "pre-linguistic data" amounts to, I haven't a clue -- and I suspect Callinicos hasn't either. [The phrase "pre-linguistic data" is, of course,
mine, not Callinicos's.] Unfortunately, there is a way of understanding the
contentious phrase, "pre-linguistic data", that undermines the Marxist understanding
of language as a social
product --, a topic which will be discussed at greater length in Essays Twelve
Part One
and Thirteen
Part Three.
Finally, Item (1) appears to be about as
"trivially true" as the claim that knowledge is mediated by language. [On this
topic in general, see Hacker (1987).]
Item (2) above is unexceptionable and is
completely consistent with ideas presented at this site. Having said that, if
Item (2) were to be interpreted in a way that made it consistent with, or dependent
on, the above
allusion to
"pre-linguistic data", then that would render it inimical to
HM,
and not just PM -- as well as to the views expressed here. That is because it would
represent a serious challenge to the idea that language is a social
product,
which is integral to HM. [Again, why this is so will be
covered in Essays Twelve
Part One
and Thirteen
Part Three.] Since
Callinicos neglected to tell us what he meant by Item (2), it isn't easy to say much more
about it.
Finally, Item (3) isn't inconsistent with any of
the views advanced at this site, either. However, Callinicos might like to
reflect on the nature of the criteria he says we employ in order to modify or correct our
use of language. If these criteria are themselves socially-, and
linguistically-conditioned, then we are back where we started. But, if they
aren't, it is
difficult to see how social beings like us could ever have invented them, let
alone learnt how to use them.
18. On
surfaces,
see Stroll (1988), and Varzi (2013); on shapes, see Bennett (2012). Parts and Wholes will be considered in more detail in the
second half of this Essay.
19.
N rays were 'discovered' by
René Blondlot
at the turn of the previous century. Popular accounts of the rise and fall of this
formerly 'objective entity' can be found in Dewdney (1997) and Friedlander
(1998). A more wide-ranging, but still popular study of similar scientific oddities
is
Gratzer (2000). See also Gardner (1957, 1989, 2000), Grant (2006, 2007, 2009), and Shermer (1997).
Details of the mysterious powers of the echeneis fish
can be found
here; this fable was accepted by philosophers and scientists well into the
post-Renaissance period. On that, see Easlea (1980).
The,
shall we say,
'darker' side of science -- where
fraud,
deception
and regularly-occurring
hoaxes were (and still are) often mitigated by a
Whiggish, post hoc
(after the event) desire to re-write the history of science along more
favourable lines, but which 'negatives aspects' are further compounded by issues
connected with profit, war, and social control, further aggravated by the active
censorship
of new theories and hypotheses --, is, alas, only of tangential interest in the
present Essay.
However, dialecticians can't afford to ignore this important area of the History of
Science for fear that fraudulent or class-compromised items might somehow creep unnoticed
into their "Totality", but which will later have to be unceremoniously evicted --
as we saw, for instance, with the
Piltdown Hoax. [More examples of fraud in science
can be found
here.]
On
social aspects of science, including fraud, error and (enforced) 'revision', see the following: Angell (2005), Barnes (1974, 1982, 1985, 1990), Barnes and Bloor (1982),
Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996), Biagioli
(1993), Bloor (1991), Broad and Wade (1982), Collins (1975, 1992, 1994, 1998,
1999, 2002, 2004), Collins and Pinch (1998, 2002), Conner (2005), Cooter (1984),
Crewdson (2003), Desmond (1989), Desmond and Moore (1992), Fara (2009), Feyerabend (1975,
1978, 1987, 1991, 1993, 2011), Forman (1971), Fritze (2009), Galison (1987, 2003), Geison (1995),
Gieryn (1999), Golinski (1992, 1998), Goldacre (2012), Goliszek (2003), Gooding (1990),
Gooding and Pinch (1989), Goodstein
(2010), Grant (2006, 2007, 2009), Greenberg
(2001, 2007), Judson (2004), Kohn (1986), Latour (1987, 1988), Latour and Woolgar (1986), Lenoir
(1997), LeVay (2008), Longino (1990), MacKenzie (1981, 1993), Newton (1977), Park (2000),
Pickering (1984, 1995), Porter (1995), Principe (1998), Redondi (1987),
Restivo (1983, 1992), Rudwick (1985),
Shapin (1979a, 1979b, 1981, 1982, 1994, 1996), Shapin and Schaffer (1985),
Waller (2002, 2004), Wallis (1979), and Youngson (1998).
On
some aspects of the psychology underlying all this, see Travis and Aronson
(2008).
Also cf.,
here and
here.
On the manifest weaknesses of the 'peer review' system, coupled with its failure to find, or
even prevent, fraud
(etc.), see Judson (2004), pp.244-86. See also
Broad and Wade (1982), as well as
here and
here.
[Although it should be noted that Goodstein (2010) quite effectively defends
Robert Millikan from several
of the
fraud accusations that have been levelled against him. [See also,
here.]
Even so, Goodstein also rejects (without explanation) the allegations others
have advanced against
Ptolemy,
Galileo,
Newton,
Dalton
and
Mendel
(p.44). Plainly, this isn't the place to enter into this complex debate (even
though DM-fans will have to do so or risk populating their "Totality" with what
could turn out to be fraudulent or bogus objects and processes); however, on Ptolemy, see
here,
here, and
here (the latter
page isn't too easy to read!). Cf., also Thurston (2002), and Rawlins (2003).]
Update September 2012: See also the long and detailed
Guardian newspaper article on the recent unmasking of widespread
fraud in psychological research -- most of which successfully passed the peer review
system.
Here
are the conclusions of a recent (June 2009) on-line report (about fraud in
science):
"Science Fraud
"As scientists, we like to think that
science is a bastion of virtue, untouched by science fraud. The
perception is that, other than
junk science,
science should be beyond reproach, unsullied by lies and propaganda.
Results should always be regarded as
valid
and completely
unbiased.
Unfortunately, human nature dictates that scientists are human and
are always going to be prone to bias and
error.
Most such mistakes are subconscious, and a result of looking too
hard for patterns that are not there. Unfortunately, there are a number of more sinister cases, where scientists
deliberately
fabricated results,
usually for personal fame. With the advent of corporate and politically funded
research grants, poor results are becoming more dictated by policy than by
scientific infallibility.
"Some
of the More Common Types of Science Fraud
"There are many types of science fraud, from minor manipulation of results or
incorrect causal connections to full-blown
fabrication
of results and
plagiarism
of the work of others.
There have been cases of researchers stealing the work of their students to
obtain all of the credit and kudos. There is a well-documented rumour of a scientific referee delaying the work of
a rival, to ensure that he received the acclaim and a Nobel award. These
allegations are often difficult to prove, as institutions often cover them up
and try to sweep science fraud under the carpet. Citations are one area of the
scientific
process
that is coming under increased
pressure, especially with the easy availability of information on the internet. A
citation,
or reference, is supposed to credit past research that influenced the current
research. Now, a
bibliography and list of works cited often becomes a
list to impress, readers assuming that the longer the list, the better the
paper....
"For those who remember, this South Korean announced, to a fanfare, that he had
successfully cloned a dog, and also had some success in human cloning. This
research was published, passed the tests and then he was subsequently suspected
of fraud and ethical violations. He withdrew the paper and, as yet, there is no
consensus as to whether the fraud was deliberate or the result of a badly
written paper.
"This is probably one of the most famous science frauds of all time, which
persisted for many years. A fossilized skull, apparently of the 'missing link'
between apes and humans, was discovered in a quarry in Piltdown, Sussex,
England. The find was taken to a distinguished palaeontologist,
Arthur Smith
Woodward, head of the Geological Department at the British Museum. He declared the find authentic, but almost straight away, questions were asked,
and it gradually came to light that it was made up from bones of at least 3
hominid species, including the jawbone of an Orang-utan with filed down teeth.
Poor Woodward was the victim in this fraud, and his otherwise notable career
became forgotten, his name forever linked with the fraud. The perpetrators
remain unknown, although the discoverer,
Charles Dawson
is suspected as an
attempt to find fame and fortune.
"Institutional Problem
"Institutions are often reluctant to discipline wrongdoers, ignoring it, quietly
shifting the fraudster to another department or even disciplining the wrongdoer.
Science has a problem that people are reluctant to risk losing their careers to
report
science fraud.
The problem is that it is difficult for
reviewers
to isolate flawed results without repeating the experiment themselves...."
[Quoted from
here,
accessed 28/08/2014. Several paragraphs merged; spelling altered
to conform with UK English. Four links added.]
Although the above article in the end defends the integrity and efficacy of the "peer review
system", other reports (referenced earlier) paint an entirely different picture.
Indeed, here is what The Guardian had to say about this:
"Accusations of fraud spur
a revolution in scientific publishing
"Three and a half centuries
after the first journal was published, post-publication peer
review is shaking up the old system. Scientific publishing may be on the
brink of a revolution fought, in part,
within the
chemistry
blogosphere. In the past few months it
has been the scene of debate about
whether the scientific publishing
practices initiated by members of the
Royal Society almost 350 years ago are
still fit for purpose. In 1665, when the
first scientific journal rolled off the
presses, it was the cutting edge of
science communication. The driving force
for
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society
(as it is still known) was the members'
desire to share their findings while
being assured that no one could
fraudulently claim credit for their
work.
"To
ensure quality, all articles underwent
peer review -- a process that is still
used by the thousands of journals that
fill academic libraries today. The
process is simple: authors submit their
findings to a journal and editors send
them out to be checked by the authors'
scientific peers. If those peers deem
the science to be valid then the journal
publishes the paper. But now
a system that was designed to share
knowledge and stop scientific fraud may
be suffering from the very same problems
that the pioneering publishers at the
Royal Society were trying to overcome,
namely fraud and poor communication. By
some estimates between
1% and 2% of papers now contain
fabricated data
and many more
are just plain wrong.
If papers have flaws then these might
get discussed in tea rooms and
conferences, but without an organised
way of communicating these
conversations, the wider world remains
ignorant of problems.
"There
have been murmurs in scientific circles
about these flaws in the publication
system for some time. But the issue blew
up earlier this year when bloggers
started reporting examples of suspicious
practices in otherwise reputable
journals. At first it was
just a report
of a throwaway comment accidentally left
in a paper's annex:
'Emma, please insert NMR data here!
where are they? and for this
compound, just make up an elemental
analysis....' Some
interpreted this as an academic inciting
his student to commit fraud. Or maybe it
was just an instruction to carry out a
particular experiment. It was certainly
sloppy practice by all concerned,
including the editors, peer reviewers
and co-authors, all of whom should have
spotted the errant sentence. But it is
not damning evidence of anything worse
than this.
"Ultimately the bloggers' actions were
vindicated, to the extent that all the
suspect papers have now been withdrawn
and investigations into scientific fraud
are under way. Nevertheless the debate
was largely confined to the blogosphere
-- until a few weeks ago when one of the
journals responsible for publishing the
supposedly photoshopped data, ACS Nano,
waded in with a highly critical
editorial aimed squarely at bloggers.
It was a naive attempt to squeeze the
social media genie back into the bottle
while simultaneously trying to curtail
free speech. The
article by the journal's editorial board
included 'instructions' on how suspected
fraud should be dealt with: 'When
plagiarism or data manipulation is
suspected, accusations should be
reported directly to the journal....'
"Then
they criticised the use of pseudonyms by
bloggers and commenters: 'We
strongly suggest that such comments
be made without the cloak of
anonymity....' This
seemed ironic since a central tenet of
the peer review process is the anonymity
of the reviewer, the point being that a
reviewer can write what they truly think
of a paper without fear of making
enemies or losing friends. Why then
should those who critique the paper
after publication not have the same
privilege? Finally
ACS Nano's editorial board threw some
crumbs to the bloggers:
'After we have made our decision,
all are welcome to comment on it in
any blog, even if they have
different opinions; this is their
privilege.'
"This is
where the revolutionary part comes in.
Spearheaded by
PubPeer, there
is now a site that allows anyone to
comment on any publications. This may
not seem like much in an age where
comment threads at the foot of news
articles are commonplace. However, all
but a few scientific publishers have
steadfastly resisted following suit.
PubPeer, which is becoming the
Reddit
of the science world, is attempting to
make post-publication commenting the
norm. It may
still be small fry, but bigger fish have
taken notice, most notably
PubMed, an
enormous and well used database of
medicine-related articles. When Pubmed,
last week, added a
commenting facility
to its database it gave organised
post-publication peer review a huge
boost. Given this facility to openly
discuss scientific papers, we could be
in for a brave new world where
scientists are no longer judged on the
content of their papers but also on the
comment threads that follow.
Scientists had better grow thick skins,
quickly." [The
Guardian, 08/11/2013, accessed
28/08/2014. Several paragraphs merged; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. One link added.]
On the widespread fallibility of science, see
here, as well
as Appendix A. Indeed,
there is now a site called Retraction Watch,
where such errors may be corrected or withdrawn. Can fans of the DM-"Totality"
afford to ignore any of this? Maybe they need their own 'Retraction Watch'.
On holes,
shadows (and the like), see Casati (2000), Casati and Varzi (1995,
1999,
2019), Lewis (1970), Sorensen (2008), and Varzi (1997,
2013). On
Polywater, see Ball (1999) and Van Brakel
(2000), pp.87-97. For
para-reflections, see Sorensen (2003,
2008). On this topic in general, see Williams (2000), as well as
here.
It is also worth remembering that
Lenin himself
believed in the "objective" existence of the
Ether.
This was doubly unfortunate in view of the fact that (a) This admission was
rather badly-timed, situated as it was when this 'objective' entity was about to
fall through a
hole
in the Whole and off into (possible?) oblivion, and (b) In MEC, it formed the
(early) core of Lenin's exposition of the "objectivity" of dialectics!
[Cf., Lenin (1972), pp.50,
312, 314,
329-31, etc.]
"That is why Engels gave the
example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical
materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is,
from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, etherand so onexist as objective realities outside the human mind or not?
The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and
they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as
they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to
organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the
concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but
objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it."
[Lenin (1972),
p.312.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
Moreover, Lenin was still
invoking the Ether several years later, in PN!
"Thus the conjecture
about the ether has existed for thousands of years, remaining until now a
conjecture. But at the present time there are already a thousand times more
subsurface channels leading to a solution of the problem, to a
scientific determination of the ether." [Lenin (1961),
p.250. Second bold emphasis added; other
emphases in the original.]
The following question forces itself upon us: Is the Ether an 'objective'
part of the "Totality", or is it merely 'subjective'? Since the scientists
(to whom Lenin refers)
now almost "invariably" answer the first half
of that question in the
negative, it would seem the "Totality" must either be sensitive to their serially
fickle decisions, or it has somehow lost a significant slice of its own
'objective' fabric. Is
it perhaps the
Cheshire Cat
of Cosmology?
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks,
or Lenin (1961); MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, or Lenin (1972).]
Incidentally, Engels also appeared to accept the
'objective' existence of the Ether:
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added. See also, ibid.,
pp.286-87. In fact, the term appears
dozens of times throughout DN -- for example, pp.26-27, 110, 119-21, 243-44,
276, 293.]
If, back then, there had been a
Marxist Un-Dialectical Activities Committee
commissioned to decide what the dialectical-contents of the
"Totality" were supposed to be, it is to be hoped that Engels, Lenin and
Plekhanov would have been quietly left off the panel.
But, does all this mean that Lenin's
"Totality" is different from, say, John Rees's "Totality"? Or, Woods and Grant's?
Or Stalin's? Is it the 'same' as, or different from Engels and Plekhanov's? Or, maybe Trotsky's? Or, has the
"Totality" itself changed over the last 80
years, divesting itself of the Ether and countless formerly 'objective'
entities, replacing them with others possessed of equally insecure citizenship
rights -- such as, maybe, 'Dark
Matter'?
"For decades, astronomers, physicists and cosmologists have
theorized that the universe is filled with an exotic material called 'dark
matter' that explains the stranger gravitational behaviour of galaxies and
galaxy clusters. Dark matter, according to mathematical models, makes up
three-quarters of all the matter in the universe. But it's never been seen or
fully explained. And while dark matter has become the prevailing theory to
explain one of the bigger mysteries of the universe, some scientists have looked
for alternative explanations for why galaxies act the way they do.
"Now, an international team of scientists says it has found new
evidence that perhaps dark matter doesn't really exist after all. In research published
in November in the Astrophysical Journal,
the scientists report tiny discrepancies in the orbital speeds of distant stars
that they think reveals a faint gravitational effect -- and one that could put
an end to the prevailing ideas of dark matter. The study suggests an incomplete
scientific understanding of gravity is behind what appears to be the
gravitational strength of galaxies and galaxy clusters, rather than vast clouds
of dark matter. That might mean pure mathematics, and not invisible matter,
could explain why galaxies behave as they do, said study co-author Stacy
McGaugh, who heads the astronomy department at Case Western Reserve University
in Cleveland.
"The new research reports that signs of a faint gravitational
tide, known as the 'external field effect' or EFE, can be observed statistically
in the orbital speeds of stars in more than 150 galaxies. The authors say the
effect cannot be explained by dark matter theories, but it's predicted by what's
known as the modified Newtonian dynamics theory, or MOND. 'What we're really
saying is that there is absolutely evidence for a discrepancy,' McGaugh said.
'What you see is not what you get, if all you know about is Newton and
Einstein.' Astronomers long assumed that stars orbited the centers of galaxies
at speeds predicted by the theory of gravity formulated by the English physicist
and mathematician Isaac Newton more than 300 years ago. Newton based his theory
that objects attract each other with a force varying according to their mass on
observations of the orbits of the planets. With refinements from the theories of
the German-born physicist Albert Einstein in the 20th century, it remains
astonishingly accurate.
"But observations of the
Coma cluster of galaxies
in the 1930s by Swiss astronomer
Fritz Zwicky,
then working at the California Institute of Technology, found it was subject to
larger-than-expected gravitational forces -- an effect he attributed to 'dunkel
(kalt) materie,' which is German for 'dark (cold) material.' When the American
astronomers
Vera Rubin
and Kent Ford
found anomalies in the orbits of stars in galaxies in the 1970s, many scientists
theorized they were caused by masses of invisible 'dark matter' within and
around galaxies, and the idea has dominated astrophysics ever since.
"By some estimates, dark matter makes up about 85 percent of all
the matter in the universe. It's said to interact with light and visible matter
only through gravity, and it explains the observed anomalies in distant
galaxies. But it's never been seen, and so far no one has fully explained what
it might be, althoughdark
matter candidates include
weakly interacting massive particles, or WIMPS,primordial
black holes andneutrinos.
MOND was formulated in the 1980s by an Israeli physicist, Mordehai Milgrom,
to explain the observed discrepancies without dark matter. It proposes that
gravity causes a very small acceleration, not predicted by Newton and Einstein,
at such low levels that it can only be seen in galaxy-size objects; and it would
mean the explanation of dark matter is not needed.
"So far, MOND has survived several scientific tests -- although
many scientists say it cannot explain observations of theBullet
cluster of
colliding galaxies, for example. McGaugh admits that MOND is a minority view in
astrophysics, and that most scientists favor the existence of dark matter -- an
idea he favoured himself, until he began to change his mind about 25 years ago.
'I
once would have said the same things: it's absolutely proven that there’s dark
matter, don't worry about it,' he said. But many of the predictions of MOND have
been seen in astronomical observations, and the latest
research is
one more piece of evidence for it, he said. 'MOND is the only theory that has
succeeded in this way,' McGaugh said. 'It is the only theory that has routinely
had all predictions come true.'
"The new research raises 'a very interesting issue,' saidMatthias
Bartelmann,
a professor of theoretical astrophysics at Heidelberg University in Germany, who
was not involved in the study. 'Can
dark matter be explained by a different law of gravity? It would be most
important for cosmology as well as particle physics if it could,' he said in an
email. He has doubts, however, that the 'external field effect' reported in the
new research is truly a unique prediction of MOND, and that it cannot be
explained by some competing theories. And since MOND theory was formulated to
account for the rotational discrepancies in galaxies, testing it on galaxies
would be expected to return convincing results; instead, MOND needed to be
tested successfully on other objects, such as galaxy clusters, he said." [Quoted
from
here, accessed 27/06/2022. Quotation
marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site.
Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Several links added; many paragraphs
merged.]
Video Four: Dark Matter -- The
Situation Has Changed
Video Five: Is Dark Matter Real?
[This is a video of a webinar;
Hossenfelder's talk begins at about 08:10,
and is highly technical in
places.]
Even the New Scientist is getting in
on the act. Speaking about research into 'Dark Energy', it had this to say:
"Unfortunately, physicists
are having trouble finding a way to fit a
cosmological constant into their best
existing theories. 'A small non-zero dark energy is more difficult to explain
than zero,' says
Sean Carroll, a cosmologist from the California Institute of
Technology in Pasadena. 'So we are driven to wilder ideas.' One of those wild ideas is
quintessence, which postulates the existence of a hitherto unsuspected quantum
field permeating the universe.... Because this implies that there would also be
a new fundamental force of nature, the idea set some physicists thinking:
instead of adding a new force, why not modify an old one? Perhaps there are
unexpected properties of gravity that appear over gargantuan distances that
Einstein's general relativity does not predict....
"By giving us detailed
measurements of the acceleration of different parts of the universe, the next
generation of surveys could reveal the nature of the dominant component of the
universe. Whatever it turns out to be, it will be big news. 'Dark energy
could be the ether of the 21st century,' says Carroll. Even if we explain it
away, we will learn something profound about the universe. It is a viewpoint shared by
cosmologists everywhere. 'We are definitely seeing something extra in the
universe, we just do not know how to interpret it yet,' says [Ofer
Lahav of University College London].
And that has given cosmologists a new sense of purpose. A seismic shift in our
understanding of the universe is coming. How soon it will arrive and from what
direction it will come -- that's still anyone's guess." [Clark (2007), pp.31-33.
Bold emphases and links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
If so, is the Ether queuing up somewhere, in
a sort of 'subsistence
anteroom', waiting for rehabilitation, almost as if it were a member of
an ethereal version of the
Chinese
Communist Party?
Perhaps it is, for an earlier edition of the New
Scientist reported the following:
"'Ether' returns in a bid to oust dark matter
"Zeeya Merali
"From his office window,
Glenn
Starkman
can see the site where
Albert Michelson and Edward Morley
carried out their famous 1887 experiment
that ruled out the presence of an all-pervading 'aether' in space, setting the
stage for Einstein's special theory of relativity. So it seems ironic that
Starkman, who is at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, is now
proposing a theory that would bring ether back into the reckoning. While this
would defy Einstein, Starkman's ether would do away with the need for
dark
matter. Nineteenth-century physicists believed that just as sound
waves move through air, light waves must move through an all-pervading physical
substance, which they called luminiferous ('light-bearing') ether. However, the
Michelson-Morley experiment failed to find any signs of ether, and 18 years
after that, Einstein's special relativity argued that light propagates through a
vacuum. The idea of ether was abandoned -- but not discarded altogether, it
seems.
"Starkman and colleagues Tom Zlosnik and
Pedro Ferreira
of the University of Oxford are now reincarnating the ether in a new form to
solve the puzzle of dark matter, the mysterious substance that was proposed to
explain why galaxies seem to contain much more mass than can be accounted for by
visible matter. They posit an ether that is a field, rather than a substance,
and which pervades space-time. 'If you removed everything else in the universe,
the ether would still be there,' says Zlosnik.
"This ether field isn't to do with light, but rather is
something that boosts the gravitational pull of stars and galaxies, making them
seem heavier, says Starkman. It does this by increasing the flexibility of
space-time itself.... 'We usually imagine space-time as a rubber sheet that's
warped by a massive object,' says Starkman. 'The ether makes that rubber sheet
more bendable in parts, so matter can seem to have a much bigger gravitational
effect than you would expect from its weight.' The team's calculations show that
this ether-induced gravity boost would explain the observed high velocities of
stars in galaxies, currently attributed to the presence of dark matter.
"This is not the first time that physicists have suggested
modifying gravity to do away with this unseen dark matter. The idea was
originally proposed by
Mordehai
Milgrom
while at Princeton University in the 1980s. He suggested that the
inverse-square law of gravity only applies where the acceleration caused by the
field is above a certain threshold, say
a0.
Below that value, the field dissipates more slowly, explaining the observed
extra gravity. 'It wasn't really a theory, it was a guess,' says cosmologist
Sean Carroll at the University of Chicago in Illinois.
Then in 2004 this idea of modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND)
was reconciled with general relativity by
Jacob
Bekenstein at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel (New Scientist,
22 January 2005, p.10), making MOND a genuine contender in the eyes of some
physicists. 'Bekenstein's work was brilliant, but fiendishly complicated, using
many different and arbitrary fields and parameters,' says Ferreira. 'We felt
that something so complicated couldn't be the final theory.'
"Now Starkman's team has reproduced Bekenstein's results
using just one field -- the new ether (www.arxiv.org/astro-ph/0607411).
Even more tantalisingly, the calculations reveal a close relationship between
the threshold acceleration a0 -- which
depends on the ether -- and the rate at which the universe's expansion is
accelerating. Astronomers have attributed this acceleration to something called
dark energy, so in a sense the ether is related to this entity. 'That they have
found this connection is a truly profound thing,' says Bekenstein. The team is
now investigating how the ether might cause the universe's expansion to speed
up.
"Andreas
Albrecht, a cosmologist at the University of California, Davis, believes
that this ether model is worth investigating further. 'We've hit some really
profound problems with cosmology -- with dark matter and dark energy,' he says.
'That tells us we have to rethink fundamental physics and try something new.' Both Bekenstein and Albrecht say Starkman's team must now
carefully check whether the ether theory fits with the motions of planets within
our solar system, which are known to a high degree of accuracy, and also explain
what exactly this ether is. Ferreira agrees: 'The onus is definitely on us to
pin this theory down so it doesn't look like yet another fantastical
explanation,' he says.
"However, physicists may be reluctant to resurrect any
kind of ether because it contradicts special relativity by forming an absolute
frame of reference. 'Interestingly, this controversial aspect should make it
easy to test for experimentally,' says Carroll." [New
Scientist 2566, 25/08/06.
Several links added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
In fact, as we have seen, the existence of the Ether contradicts
neither Einstein nor Relativity.
So, does this mean that the Ether both is and isn't part of the
"Totality", perhaps its most 'contradictory' denizen? It seems
consecutively to
exist and not exist as fashion among physicists changes. Or does it both exist
and not concurrently?
At any rate, as we have seen, the Ether
has a modern-day analogue --, somewhat disarmingly called by some "The Field", by
others merely "Space-Time" ("Space-Time
Substantivalism") --, and now even, perhaps, 'Dark Energy', as the above
articles hint. [On this, see
Granek (2001).]
Independently of the above, it looks like that
the Ether
itself might
make a come-back. According to Cantor and Hodge:
"By 1951, however, we find an eminent
physicist,
P. A. M. Dirac, having to argue in the journal Nature (168:906-7)
that although Einstein's 1905 principle of relativity led, reasonably enough, to
the ether's generally being abandoned, with the new quantum electrodynamics we
may be, after all, 'rather forced to have an aether'.... [T]here have been, and
still are, many ether theories that, in principle, are perfectly compatible with
special relativity
and even
general relativity. Moreover, quantum theory has led to new conceptions of
ether, and not a few physicists have urged the necessity of some form of ether
theory." [Cantor and Hodge (1981), pp.ix, 53. Paragraphs merged]
These two authors even quote
Einstein and Dirac, as
follows:
"More careful reflection teaches us, however,
that the special theory of relativity does not compel us to deny ether. We may
assume the existence of ether; only we must give up ascribing a definite state
of motion to it.... [There] is a weighty argument to be adduced in favour of the
ether hypothesis. To deny ether is ultimately to assume that empty space has no
physical qualities whatsoever. The fundamental facts of mechanics do not
harmonize with this view.... According to the general theory of relativity space
without ether is unthinkable; for in such space there would not only be no
propagation of light, but also no possibility of the existence of standards of
space and time (measuring rods and clocks), nor therefore any space-time
intervals in the physical sense". [Ibid., p.54, quoting Einstein (1922a).]
"Physical knowledge has
advanced very much since 1905, notably by the arrival of
quantum
mechanics, and the situation has again changed. If one examines the question
in the light of present-day knowledge, one finds that the aether is no longer
ruled out by relativity, and good reasons can now be advanced for postulating an
aether." [Ibid., p.54, quoting Dirac (1951). I have not yet been able to
check this reference.]
[These facts
were also reported
in the Wikipedia article on the
Luminiferous Aether.
On this in general, see
Kostro
(2000).]
In that case, has the "Totality" progressed since Engels's and Lenin's
ex
cathedra pronouncements? Or has it regressed?
Views like the above underline how far the
reification of
'mathematical objects' has gone, which is
now virtually universal in modern Physics. [There is more on this in Essay Thirteen Parts
One
and Two.] Even though I disagree with the pro-DM stance adopted in Malek (2011),
what it has to say about this new form of Idealism implicit (or, in some cases,
explicit) in modern Physics is nevertheless worth consulting. [Unfortunately, however, Malek also forgot to tell
his readers what the
"Totality" actually is!]
Even odder still: At one time,
Marx showed great interest in the work
of
Pierre Trémaux,
a French architect who thought he could advance human knowledge by rejecting key
areas of Darwinian evolutionary theory, alleging that the nature of the soil in a specific region
influenced speciation. Well, is that process part of the "Totality"
-- even
though Marx himself later abandoned Trémaux's theory (probably under the
influence of a rare flash of good sense coming in fromEngels)? Or, did that rather un-Darwinian process only show its face in the
"Totality" for a few short months -- as a sort of 'reverse Cheshire Cat
phenomenon' -- while Marx was chewing things over? [On this, see Weikart (1998).]
In fact, as things have turned out, the above
remarks now seem both premature and prejudicial; that is because some of
Trémaux's ideas appear to have anticipated the work of
Gould and Eldredge, among others.
Moreover, since
this Essay was originally written, it looks like the situation has changed once more and
have in some circles swung back in favour of Trémaux. So, are his ideas
about to be rehabilitated? Is the
"Totality" on the verge of 'changing its mind'? Or is it perhaps dithering?
Where is
The Marxist Un-Dialectical Activities
Committeewhen we need it!
An even more vexing question for STDs and MISTs
to consider is
the perhaps following:
Are
Lysenko's ideas (or, at least, the
processes to which they
supposedly
related) part of the "Totality", or not? For the best part of thirty years,
Soviet (and later Chinese) scientists certainly accepted his ideas as Gospel
Truth. Is the "Totality"
therefore sensitive to sectarian splits in Marxism, with us Trotskyists displaying
'reactionary'
scepticism (toward Lysenkoism) while our Stalinist and Maoist brethren plumbed new depths of dialectical
gullibility?
[On this, see Grant (2007), Joravsky (1970), Medvedev
(1969), and Soyfer (1994). See also my comments on other aspects of 'dialectical
science' (including the decidedly odd
ideas of
Lenin's friend,
Olga
Lepeshinskaya)
in Essay Four
Part One.]
Are the above genuine parts of the "Totality", or
are they merely temporary residents/itinerant interlopers?
In view of the fact
that Epigenetic and vaguelyLamarckian theories are gradually regaining
favour in some areas of genetics, is Lysenkoism on the verge of being rehabilitated, too? [On that, see
here.]
19a.
Anyone tempted to argue that evidence alone is decisive here should read the following,
and then perhaps think again:
"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to
Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence
available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong
support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern
would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early
corpuscularian chemistry to
Stahl'sphlogiston theory
to
Lavoisier's oxygen
chemistry to Daltonian
atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various
versions of
preformationism
to
epigenetic
theories of embryology; from the
caloric theory
of heat to later and ultimately contemporary
thermodynamic
theories; from
effluvial theories of electricity
and magnetism to theories of
the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from
humoral
imbalance
to
miasmatic
to
contagion
and ultimately germ theories of disease;
from 18th Century
corpuscular theories of light
to 19th
Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from
Hippocrates'spangenesis
to
Darwin's blending theory of inheritance
(and his own
'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to
Wiesmann's germ-plasm
theory and
Mendelian
and contemporary molecular genetics; from
Cuvier's
theory of functionally
integrated and necessarily static biological species or
Lamarck's autogenesis to
Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of
theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more
unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry
offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are
alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even
when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]
Update September 2012: We now read
the following in the New Scientist:
"Then in 1956,
Joe Hin Tjio
and
Albert
Levan tried a new technique for looking at cells. They counted over and over
until they were certain they could not be wrong. When they announced their
result, other researchers remarked that they had counted the same, but figured
they must have made a mistake. Tjio and Levan had counted only 46 chromosomes,
and they were right.... It is obvious that scientific knowledge is continually
updated through new discoveries and the replication of studies, but until recent
years little attention had been paid to how fast this change occurs. In
particular, few had attempted to quantify how long it would take what we know at
any given moment to become untrue, or replaced with a closer approximation of
the truth.
"Among the first groups to measure this churning of
knowledge was a team of researchers at
Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital in Paris, France. To get a handle on it,
Thierry Poynard and his colleagues chose to focus on
medical fields in which they specialised:
cirrhosis
and
hepatitis,
two areas related to liver diseases. They took nearly 500 articles in these
fields from over 50 years and gave them to a panel of experts to examine. Each
expert was charged with saying whether the paper was factual, out-of-date or
disproved (Annals
of Internal Medicine, vol 136, p.888).
Through doing this, Poynard and his colleagues were able
to create a simple chart that showed the amount of factual content that had
persisted over the previous decades (see
diagram). They found something striking: a clear decay
in the number of papers that were still valid. Furthermore, it was possible to
get a clear measurement for the 'half-life' of facts in these fields by looking
at where the curve crosses 50 per cent on this chart: 45 years....
"We can't predict which individual papers will be
overturned, of course, just like we can't tell when individual radioactive atoms
will decay, but we can observe the aggregate and see that there are rules for
how a field changes over time. The cirrhosis and hepatitis results were nearly
identical to an earlier study that examined the overturning of information in
surgery. Two Australian surgeons found that half of the facts in that field also
become false every 45 years (The
Lancet, vol 350, p 1752).... To understand the decay in the truth of a paper, we can
measure how long it takes for people to stop citing the average paper in a
field. Whether it is no longer interesting, no longer relevant or has been
contradicted by new research, this paper is no longer a part of the living
scientific literature. The amount of time it takes for others to stop citing
half of the literature in a field is also a half-life of sorts.
"Through this we can begin to get rough estimates of the
half-lives of many fields. For example, a study of all the papers in the
Physical Review journals, a cluster of periodicals of great importance to
physicists, found that the half-life in physics is about 10 years (arxiv.org/abs/physics/0407137).
Different publication formats can also have varied
half-lives. In 2008,
Rong Tang of Simmons College in Boston looked at
scholarly books in different fields and found that physics has a longer
half-life (13.7 years) than economics (9.4), which in turn outstays mathematics,
psychology and history (College
& Research Libraries, vol 69, p 356)....
"Extinct in a blink
"It's easy to mistakenly assume that some of the facts in
our heads are absolute, especially those learned in the textbooks of our youth
(see main story). As a child, I loved learning about dinosaurs. But I have since
discovered an incorrect fact that I had lived my childhood assuming was
accurate: the name Brontosaurus. The four-legged
saurischian,
with its long neck and tiny head, is iconic. And yet its name is actually
Apatosaurus.
Why? In 1978, two palaeontologists noticed that the skeleton used to identify
the Brontosaurus species had been graced with the skull of a different
plant-eating dinosaur. The body belonged to the Apatosaurus. The Brontosaurus
never existed.
"Since then, scientists have promoted the name change, and
it has gained some currency. Nevertheless, the Brontosaurus myth continues to
endure in popular knowledge and books -- no doubt aided by people who missed the
expiry of this fact." [Arbesman
(2012b), pp.37-39. Emphases in the original. Some links added. Quotation
marks and some formatting altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Several paragraphs merged.]
[More details are given in Arbesman (2012a).]
However, it is difficult to resist asking the
following question: How long will the above
conclusions remain 'true'?
Update April 2015: Not long, it seems!
The BBC now reports that Brontosaurus has made a dramatic come-back, all
within three years of its demise having been announced.
"The iconic name Brontosaurus, once used
to describe a family of huge dinosaurs, has been resurrected after being killed
off more than a century ago. In 1903, scientists decided Brontosaurus was
a more complete specimen of a different dinosaur. But many more specimens of
plant-eating sauropod dinosaurs are now known, revealing Brontosaurus to
be different enough to warrant its own name. The results have been published in
the open access
journal PeerJ. The name
Brontosaurus goes back to the so-called Bone Wars of the late 1800s, when
rival fossil hunters Othniel Charles Marsh and Edward Drinker Cope raced new
dinosaur names into the scientific literature.
"In their quest for new
specimens, Marsh and Cope were drawn to the rich fossil beds of the American
west. Marsh's team found two long-necked sauropods. He named one Apatosaurus
ajax (Apatosaurus means 'deceptive lizard') and the second skeleton
Brontosaurus excelsus (Brontosaurus means 'noble thunder lizard').
Shortly after Marsh's death, a team from the Field Museum of Chicago found
another dinosaur skeleton similar to both Apatosaurus ajax and
Brontosaurus excelsus, but with features deemed intermediate between the
two. This led the scientists to conclude that Apatosaurus and
Brontosaurus were just different species within the same scientific genus.
Apatosaurus took precedence because it had been named first so,
Brontosaurus excelsus became Apatosaurus excelsus.
"But the name Brontosaurus
is still known by several generations of schoolchildren. It's not entirely clear
why the name stuck, but it may be to do with its origins in the Bone Wars, when
there was intense public interest in the discovery of new dinosaurs. It may also
be because of the evocative meaning: 'thunder lizard'. Now, Emanuel Tschopp from
the New University of Lisbon in Portugal and colleagues applied statistical
techniques to calculate the differences between species and genera of diplodocid
dinosaurs (the large-scale grouping that includes Apatosaurus as well as
other long-necked plant eaters). It is only with new finds of dinosaurs similar
to Apatosaurus and Brontosaurus in recent years that it became
possible to undertake a detailed investigation of how different they were. 'Until very recently, the
claim that Brontosaurus was the same as Apatosaurus was completely
reasonable, based on the knowledge we had,' said Mr Tschopp. To their surprise,
Brontosaurus emerged from the analysis as a distinct dinosaur.
"The wrong skull
"'The differences we found
between Brontosaurus and Apatosaurus were at least as numerous as
the ones between other closely related genera, and much more than what you
normally find between species,' explained Roger Benson, a co-author from the
University of Oxford. Thus, the researchers argue that it is now possible to
resurrect Brontosaurus as a genus, different from Apatosaurus.
"Prof Paul Barrett, of
London's Natural History Museum, who was not involved in the research, told BBC
News: 'This paper is the most comprehensive study produced to date on the
evolution of Diplodocus and its closest relatives and sets out some
really interesting new ideas on how these animals are related, and how they
should be classified. The author finds a number of ways in which the original
specimens of Brontosaurus and Apatosaurus can be separated from
each other and uses these to resurrect Brontosaurus as a separate entity.
The conclusions seem entirely reasonable to me, as they are well argued and well
supported, and it will be interesting to see how quickly these suggest
