Essay Eleven Part One -- The "Totality": A Complete Mystery
Readers should take note of the fact that this Essay does not represent my final views on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
Apart from Essay Three Part Two, this has been the most difficult Essay to write so far. This is because so little has been published in the dialectical literature over the last 200 years that helps the bemused reader understand what dialecticians are referring to when they talk about their "Totality" -- as will soon become apparent to those who might think otherwise.
Hence, tackling this notion is rather like trying to swim in syrup; but even then, one would at least have something to struggle against.
Finally, it is worth pointing out up-front that in what follows I will not be discussing holist ideas applied to human social and economic development (unless, of course, these involve the use of Hegelian concepts), since that would introduce issues arising from Historical Materialism, a theory I fully accept.
Hence, both Parts of Essay Eleven are largely concerned with holist ideas applied to the natural world.
This Essay is just over 58,000 words long; a summary of some of its main ideas can be found here.
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections. [If your Firewall has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the "Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!]
(1) The Mystery Of The Totality
(b) 'God', The "Totality", And Negative Theology
(c) The "It's Everything" Gambit
(2) What Do The Dialectical Prophets Say?
(3) Where The Shoe Originally Pinched -- John Rees's Theory
(a) TAR Bottles It
(b) Putting The Part Before The Horse
(4) It's An Awful Job, But Someone Has To Do It
(d) A Fit-Up?
(f) The Elusive Membership List
(g) Ontological Blank Cheque For Scientists?
(h) 'Objectively' On, Then Off, The Cosmic List
(5) Universal Interconnection -- Fact Or Fancy?
(a) Precisely What Is interconnected With What?
(b) Interconnectionism Comes Apart At The Seams
(c) Maximal Interconnectionism
(d) Non-Maximal Interconnectionism
(6) The Epistemological Definition
(a) What Do We Know?
(b) Kant's Noumenon By Any Other Name
(7) The "Totality" -- Universal And A Priori
(a) Surely Not
(b) What Else Could A Totality Be?
(c) Is Dialectical Materialism A Conventionalist Theory?
(d) Is Dialectical Materialism A Metaphysical Theory, Then?
(e) Is Dialectical Materialism A Scientific Theory?
(f) Guilty As Charged -- Not A Scientific Theory
(a) Dialectics Collapses Yet Again
(b) Just A Method?
(9) Pick Your Mystic
(10) Dialectical Contradictions -- Different?
(11) The Dialecticians' Dilemma -- Again
(12) The 'Heraclitean Flux' -- Fact Or Fancy?
(13) Notes
(14) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
Hamlet Without The Prince
Imagine, if you will, Hamlet without the Prince, or at least without a single description of 'him' -- such as, whether 'he' is indeed a Prince, male or female, or even whether 'he' is a human being. Questions would rightly be asked about what that 'character's role could possibly be in a play supposedly about 'him', just as they would be asked about the competence/sanity of its author, William Shakespeare.
Fortunately, we need not indulge our fancies here.
But, imagine now, if you can, a theory that tells us among other things that: (1) It's the "world-view" of the proletariat, (2) It's the general theory of all that exists and how it changes, that (3) Everything is interconnected in something called the "Totality", and that (4) This notion is a centrally-important concept of that theory, to such an extent that nothing can be understood without it or independent of it.
Imagine, too, the unlikely event that every one of its theorists studiously refuses to say what this "Totality" actually is, or what its supposed "interconnections" are --, or even how they can still claim to know anything about this terminally obscure notion.
Imagine no more! For that theory is DIM, and those theorists are dialecticians --, and they are world champion prevaricators.
[DIM = Dialectical Marxism; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
If you still have doubts, I invite you to search through their writings (and for my sins, I have had to) -- even if you are the slightest bit interested, you will find precious little to help you decide what DIM is in fact about, for its most avid supporters have yet to tell anyone (least of all one another) what their mysterious "Totality" actually is.
So, this is not so much Hamlet without the Prince, as it is 'Hamlet' without the, er...well, what?
Indeed, over the last twenty years or I have made a point of asking the many DM-fans I know, or have met (personally, or on the internet), what they think the "Totality" is. Of those who can be bothered to reply, most are either slightly puzzled or somewhat miffed that I have even dared to ask such an impertinent question. Some responded with "Nature, what else?", but refused to say anymore (perhaps because, as we will soon discover, there is no more to be said). Others gestured airily toward the heavens and said "All that!", rather like parents who try to explain to little children where 'God' is with an "He's up there, in heaven", wafting their hands vaguely skywards. Still others confessed they did not know, but declared that they still believed in it, just like tiny children with hand-waving parents.
Some of a scientific frame-of-mind referred me to the "Big Bang", forgetting that this is a theory of origins; it tells us nothing about "everything", as we will also soon find out.
At this point, readers of a more kindly disposition might be tempted to respond: "This can't be so. Surely someone has specified clearly what the DM-"Totality" is. After all, dialecticians have had at least 150 years to come up with something!"
To be sure, a few of the DM-faithful have offered the world a handful of vague ideas, about this mysterious 'entity', the "Totality" --, but beyond that they have either sat on their hands or looked the other way.
I suspect these guys could prevaricate for their country.
Indeed, dialecticians are remarkably coy about the "Totality", and it is not difficult to see why: There isn't one.
Or rather: there is in fact no way of referring to whatever it is they think they want to refer to!
"God", The "Totality", And The Via Negativa
Just as it is impossible to say what 'God' is, it is impossible to say what the "Totality" is. This is not so much because of what either word might seem to mean, but because both are in fact meaningless (and this is so for remarkably similar reasons).
For believers, 'God' is unlike anything you or I or anyone else could possibly imagine or conceive. Anyone who thinks otherwise has simply latched onto an inferior sort of 'being', in whose name it would not be worth persecuting a single infidel.
Naturally, this means that the faithful have found it impossible to speak about 'God' except by using inappropriate metaphors.
More sophisticated theologians use analogies to help us understand. Unfortunately, even though some of the mediating terms they employ are well enough understood (such as "father", or "son"), the intentional target of all this analogising isn't. What precisely is being analogised?
Failing both, believers fall back on a via negativa -- so, for them, 'God' is not this, not that, not...
As that lapsed right wing atheist Anthony Flew once observed: in this way 'God' slowly dies "the death of a thousand qualifications"; in the end 'He' is in fact different from nothing at all.
[On this, see Flew (1963), p.97. Flew's 'sort-of conversion' (but see here) was based on flawed science, anyway.]
But, if we know nothing of 'God', how is the use of that word any different from employing, say, "slithy tove"? Save an appeal being made to a rather questionable tradition --, where the word "God" has been used to depict all manner of things, from money, the powers of nature, various Roman Emperors, and yes, even Eric Clapton --, what can the faithful point to, to explain this word to those who simply see before them three letters ("G", "o", and "d"), fixed on the page into an inky sort of Trinity?
Figure One: Is Clapton 'God'?
Figure Two: This Album Says 'Maybe'
In like manner, to what can the DM-faithful appeal in order to help us non-mystics comprehend their invisible Being?
As we will soon find out, this inverted DM-Deity -- the "Totality" -- also dies the death of a thousand qualifications; or rather, the death of a thousand prevarications.
At this point, some might be tempted to respond with the "Everything" ploy (as in "Sod it, it is perfectly clear what that the "Totality" is: it's everything!").
Unfortunately, that reply would be of no use either since it would simply prompt this further annoying question: "And what does that include?" And as we will also discover, there is no way to answer that query that will not sink DM in the mire one millimetre per second slower than it did Theology.
So, does this "everything" include all that exists now, or which has once existed, or which will one day exist, or that could exist, or that might have existed? Is it everything that has been thought about, not thought about, discovered, not discovered, found then lost (like Phlogiston), lost then found then lost again (like Democritus and then Dalton's indivisible atoms)? Does it include the 'Gods' of the entire Apache Nation (surely they are part of 'everything'..., or are they?) and the mythical beasts of yore?
[Who knows, scientists might unearth some of these mythical beasts one day? Look at the Coelacanth, glypheoid lobsters, jurodid beetles...]
Does the "Totality" include, or exclude, for example, the edge of the universe? Indeed, does the universe/'everything' have a boundary? If it doesn't, how can it be a totality (as opposed an open-ended infinite sort of ontological conglomeration)? On the other hand, if it has a boundary, is that boundary itself part of everything? If it isn't, it cannot be the boundary of everything, can it? [Otherwise it would have to be the boundary of itself!] Alternatively, once more, if it is the boundary of everything, then does this new ensemble (i.e., 'everything' plus its boundary) have a boundary, too, and does that, and that, and...?
[TOR = Theory of Relativity.]
Some might appeal to the TOR, pointing out that the universe is in fact finite and unbounded; this is the "Totality". I do not wish to question the TOR, but since we do not as yet know whether or not this theory applies to our universe, it can hardly feature our attempt to understand what the "Totality" is. [Anyway, as we will soon see, the TOR itself is no friend of DM.]
And to cap it all, there have been and still are DM-theorists who deny the universe is finite. [More on that below.]
As I aim to show as this Essay unfolds, even if it were possible to find answers to the above perplexing questions, our problems would only just be beginning, for as Russell's Paradox has taught us, unless we define "everything" very carefully (and, it is worth adding, completely arbitrarily) we will end up with a "Totality" that contains things it does not contain!
[A recent criticism of what is now known as "universally unrestricted quantification" can be found in Hellman (2006).]
Down this road, one suspects, lies our very own dialectical via negativa.
[At this point it is worth pointing out that we seem to be encountering the same sort of problems faced by the obscure metaphors the faithful use to depict 'God'.
Keep that worrying thought in mind as this Essay develops.]
On the other hand, even if we manage to define the "Totality" carefully, it would plainly be a creature of convention --, and like "God", a purely human invention.
No wonder DM-fans go quiet when asked about their 'God'..., er, their "Totality".
In their unenviable position, I think I would too.
Well, What Do The Dialectical Prophets Say?
The short answer is "Not a lot"; the long answer is "Er.., not a lot."
So, what do they say? Engels, as usual, writes much, but manages to say little:
"When we consider and reflect upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away....
"We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual, is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change, transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development." [Engels (1892), pp.405-08.]
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms, indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the last named. In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels (1954), p.70.]
So, no clearer then.
Is 'comrade' Stalin of any assistance?
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.
"The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena….
"The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being….
"Speaking of the materialist views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the rudiments of dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961), p.347.]" [Stalin (1941), pp.837-38, 845. I have used a different edition of Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks here.]
Unfortunately not.
What about Bukharin?
"I am now writing on paper with a pen. I thus impart pressures to the table; the table presses on the earth, calling forth a number of further changes. I move my hand, vibrate as I breathe, and these motions pass on in slight impulses ending Lord knows where. The fact that these may be but small changes does not change the essential nature of the matter. All things in the universe are connected with an indissoluble bond…." [Bukharin (1925), p.66.]
We need not labour the point.1 A few years ago, Martin Jay published an excellent book (called Marxism And Totality. The Adventures Of A Concept From Lukács To Habermas [Jay (1984)]), but in over 500 pages he studiously forgot to tell us what the title of his book was actually about!
To be sure, in Chapter One, Jay very usefully summarised classic and early modern Holist theories of nature and society, but those theories were themselves no less vague. Perhaps because he found little material in the DM-classics (or in the writings of 'systematic' and other academic dialecticians) to help him, Jay ducked the question whether Greek and early modern ideas of nature -- or of 'the Whole' -- were the same as, or were different from each other --, or, indeed, were the same as, or were different from the DM-"Totality".
How would anyone be able to tell?
For example, how is it be possible to decide whether Hegel's 'Whole' was the same as, say, Plato's? Or Plotinus's? Or Aristotle's? Or, those of the "Wholes" that feature in most mystical systems -- in fact, in all of them?
Now, if the use of certain words, which boast similar letters, were enough to identify the items so depicted, we would be able to conclude that, for example, Plato's "Forms" were the same as those complicated sheets of paper you have to fill in to get a driving licence or a credit card.
Does anyone have access to an identikit picture of the "Totality", allowing them to pick this mysterious object out in a Cosmic line-up? Has anyone seen its likeness in the sand, in the clouds, or on Mars --, as some claim to have of Jesus or Mary?
Indeed, precisely what is the criterion of identity for mystical Totalities?
Of course, this puzzle is not helped at all by the fact that none of the ancients were all that specific about their own "Totalities" -- neither were the aforementioned mystics, and for obvious reasons. After all, a crystal clear mystic would lose his/her licence to confuse.
But, of the bunch, the Dialectical Mystics are the most vague. Prevarication taken way beyond the call of duty?
The rest of Jay's book is devoted to expounding what various prolix and eminently incomprehensible DM-authors thought or did not think about history, society, and the economy as examples of 'sub-totalities'. However, as far as can be ascertained, the "Totality" itself is conspicuous by its universal absence from Jay's book, which is, of course, quite remarkable in itself. In fact it is decidedly odd -- just as odd in fact as if Darwin had forgotten to mention natural selection, or had omitted all talk of species in his masterpiece, On The Origin Of Species.
This is not to pick on Jay, since his book is an excellent guide in its own way -- a sort of Dialectician's Alice, as it were. To be sure, if anyone wants to know what DIMs think of social wholes (albeit, expressed in what looks like an obscure Venusian dialect), this is the book to consult.
Despite this, DIM is still missing its Prince of Denmark.
Some in the audience are getting restless.
They want their money back...
Where The Shoe Originally Pinched
This project began in 1998 as a lengthy review of John Rees's book The Algebra Of Revolution [Rees (1998a), or TAR], which, for all its faults, is widely influential in one of the most geographically-extensive Trotskyist Tendencies on the planet (the IST/SWP-UK). [Alas, Rees has now resigned from the SWP.] In that case, it is (was!) well-placed to do real harm. Moreover, since Rees is one of the most recent DM-authors to put the "Totality" at the centre of his thought --, it still seems reasonable to start with his account.
In view of the foregoing, it is no surprise therefore to find that even though Rees clearly believes that the "Totality" is a centrally-important DM-concept [Rees (1998a), pp.5-8], apart from a few rather vague gestures at defining this term, he never really tells us what it is!
One of the only attempts made by the author of TAR to explain this notion is the following:
"Totality refers to the insistence that the various seemingly separate elements of which the world is composed are in fact related to each other." [Rees (1998a), p.5.]
This passage does not appear to be worded correctly, for it tells us that the "Totality" is in fact an "insistence".
Can this be what "everything" is: an "insistence"?
Is this what the Big Bang ushered forth? An ever-expanding "insistence"?
However, interpreting this rather odd passage sympathetically, it seems to suggest that Rees intended the word "Totality" to be understood methodologically, which would in turn appear to indicate that the idea that nature is a unified whole is either a useful fiction or it merely serves as some sort of statement of intent.
Even so, we are not told what these alleged "relations" are that connect items within this "Totality", whether every item is connected with every other, or only with some -- or, indeed, in what way they are inter-linked. [More on this below.]
Unfortunately, there are few other clues in TAR that help the bemused reader understand the nature of this supposedly key DM-concept.
One of these is a passage that also tries to link the "Totality" with "universal interconnectedness", which is something we saw other DM-theorists (above) claim to be able to see in nature:
"[The] natural and social world [form] a single totality developing over time as a result of…internal contradictions….
"[N]ature is an interconnected system that developed for millions of years before humans." [Ibid., pp.285-86.]2
This appears to equate the "Totality" with (interconnected) nature, but as we shall soon see this is far too vague to be of much use to anyone other than a child.
Worse: this does not really distinguish DM from Hermeticism:
"Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines 'As above, so below.' This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is reflected.
"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies." [Magee (2001), p.13. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. More on this topic here.]2a
[HM = Historical Materialism.]
In an article on Engels, Rees added these comments:
"Here the key is to see all the different aspects of society and nature as interconnected. They are not separate, discrete processes which develop in isolation from each other. Mainstream sociological and scientific thought 'has bequeathed us the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, detached from the general context'. Much of our schooling today still follows this pattern -- he development of the arts is separated from that of the sciences, and 'technical' subjects are separated from languages, history and geography. Our newspapers and TV news programmes divide the world up in the same artificial way -- poverty levels and stock exchange news, wars and company profit figures, strikes and government policy, suicide statistics and the unemployment rate are all reported in their own little compartments as if they are only distantly related, if at all. A dialectical analysis tries to re-establish the real connections between these elements, 'to show internal connections'. It tries, in the jargon of dialectics, to see the world as 'a totality', 'a unity'.
"To see society and nature as an interconnected totality which is in a process of constant change still leaves one vital question unanswered. What makes this whole process develop? Why does it change? There are any number of religious and philosophical theories which try to answer this question by insisting that the motor of change lies outside the historical process--with god, or in the unchanging pattern of human nature or in the eternal features of the human soul. Marx and Engels rejected these approaches as mystical and, literally, supernatural. They insisted that the processes which drove the development of nature and society forward must be internal contradictions, not supersensible entities like god, the soul or, as Hegel had argued, the general essence of human consciousness existing somewhere in the ether beyond the consciousness of actual living human beings." [Rees (1994), p.62.]
However, we have already seen that little sense can be made of these 'contradictions' in nature and society (here, here, here, and here), but, with respect to the alleged social aspects of the "Totality", these are clearly situated in HM, discussion of which will largely be omitted from this Essay. Since I do not deny that HM relies on factors governing the whole of human history, there is nothing much for me to question in this regard.3
Nevertheless, one important aspect of Rees's use of this (as yet unexplained) concept is the relationship that he and other dialecticians claim exists between parts and wholes:
"In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the part is determined by its relationship with the other parts and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts…. In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of the parts but also that the parts become more than they are individually by being part of the whole…." [Ibid., p.5.]4
The problem with this is that it still does not tell us what the "Totality" is --, nor is it clear what the "parts" are, either.
As far as I can ascertain, this is practically all that Rees has to say about this allegedly important topic.5 Clearly, this creates serious problems from the start; the uninformed reader has as yet no idea what Rees (or any other DM-theorist) is referring to. As we have seen, one will look in vain in other DM-texts for further clarification.6
Putting The Part Before The Horse
Anyway, if, according to Rees, "the part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts", it would in fact be impossible for anyone to say exactly what this mysterious "whole" amounted to before they were clear about the nature of every single part.
In turn, it would be impossible to determine the nature of one of these parts before the entire whole has been comprehended.
Clearly, that means it would be impossible for anyone to grasp a single rudimentary fact about part or whole since no one would know anything about either before they knew everything about both.
As is well-known, this was just one of the epistemological holes into which Hegelian Idealism dropped itself.7
But, whatever steps Hegelians finally took (or still take) to haul themselves out of this bottomless pit -- whether successful or not --, they do not appear to be available to DM-theorists. This is because the latter must base their comments on evidence, not on conceptual chicanery. And yet, what sort of evidence could they appeal to that was not similarly compromised? Manifestly, since relevant evidence itself relates to --, and is comprised of --, such 'parts', then the nature of each 'part' that is constitutive of this evidence itself could not, on this view, be ascertained until the whole had been, and vice versa.
There thus seems to be no way of breaking into this Idealist circle: the status of any and all evidence would not be known/ascertained until the whole had been, and the nature of the whole could not be grasped as a material whole if there is no determinate physical evidence available to do this.8
In that case, the part undermines the whole just as the whole undermines the part.
This might explain why Rees was so cagey about the "Totality", and why his 'definition' was little more than a casual gesture: there is nothing that could have been said about this nebulous concept and its ghostly parts that would be consonant with a believable form of materialism.9
Nevertheless, even though it seems clear that nothing could be said about the "Totality", or its parts before everything was known about both, it's worth remembering that even an attempt to say something about either of these can't itself be done, since, ex hypothesi, nothing would be known about the parts (and hence the whole) until the end of an infinite epistemological journey:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"…[T]he concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Conrad Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), p.457. Bold emphasis added.]
"But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93. Bold emphases added.]
This, of course, is one of the least appreciated consequences of 'inverting' Hegelian Idealism: material reality may only be comprehended by beginning at the end!
Not even the Owl of Minerva would be identifiable until Epistemological Judgement Day, by which time who would there be left to care whether it flew or not? [More on this here.]
It's An Awful Job, But Someone Has to Do It
Consequently, in the absence of anything even remotely resembling a loose sort of characterisation (let alone a definition), we are forced to press the question DM-theorists consistently avoid: What exactly is the DM-"Totality"?
I propose to examine two possible approaches to this problem. The first introduces what I shall call the "Ontological Definition" of the "Totality" (because it involves a consideration of its likely contents list); the second I propose to call the "Epistemological Definition" (because it links this mysterious 'entity' to the current extent of human knowledge, experience and practice).
Since the next few sections are somewhat explorative, less committed readers might want to skip them and begin again here.
In response to the above, it could be objected that it is perfectly clear that the "Totality" includes everything in the Universe --, or everything in existence.
End of story.
But, not so fast! Does this "everything" include "Possible Worlds", which some philosophers and scientists believe are actual? [Cf., Lewis (1986). See also Divers (2002).]
Maybe not; but how do we know?
Be this at it may, the problem with this rather hasty response is that it is at once too vague and too generous.
Why that is so will now be explored.
The Polo Mint Totality: A Whole With A Hole In It
If the "Totality" includes everything that exists, several other questions automatically arise. For instance: Does the "Totality" comprise all that exists in the present, or does it include all that 'exists' in the past? Since DM-theorists seek an historical explanation of the development of class society (etc.), and because they think everything in nature and society is interconnected, it seems they must view both the past and the present as parts of their "Totality".
But, if, as seems to be the case, the past is no more, how can it be part of anything, let alone the "Totality"?10
On the other hand, if the "Totality" does include the past, that can only mean the "Totality" contains things that do, and things that do not, exist --, unless, that is, we are to suppose that things in the past still exist.
However, if the latter do not still exist, that implies that the "Totality" contains some things that 'exist' only as ideas about the past, entertained in the mind of someone stuck in the ephemeral present. If that is so, doesn't this now mean that the "Totality" is part material (the present), and part Ideal?
But, even if the above is misguided in some way, how is it possible for ideas of the past to be interconnected with everything that currently exists in the universe (as they are supposed to be in this "Totality")? Indeed, what was the past interconnected with before any ideas about it were formed --, i.e., before conscious life evolved?11
Furthermore, but more worryingly, any ideas we now have of the past plainly correspond with nothing at all, since the past does not exist for anything to correspond with 'it' (except yet more ideas about it). In that case, the "Totality" cannot even be objectively Ideal -- at least, not with respect to the past -- let alone material.
In that case, one half of the supposed correspondence relation between our ideas of the past and the past itself would not, on this interpretation of the DM-"Totality", exist, which must in turn mean there could be no 'objective' relationship between our ideas of the past and the past itself --, certainly not one of correspondence.
In order to avoid these insoluble problems, we might be tempted to restrict the "Totality" to things that exist only in the present, to objects and processes that enjoy contemporary material existence.
But, this option creates several serious problems of its own. For example, the "Totality" would then contain no historically significant events (or worse, no historical events at all), without which nothing that happens in the present would have taken place. Depicted this way, the "Totality" would surely become explanatorily useless, since an appeal would now have to be made to 'things' outside the "Totality" to account for things inside it!
Indeed, if the "Totality" were circumscribed in this way, it would become precariously ephemeral. This is because the present is of extremely limited duration. Thus, a very slender (if not terminally anorexic) "Totality" would be implied if this option were correct.
Is the DM-Totality therefore a Whole with a huge Hole in it -- or, is there no substance to it at all?
Figure Three: The Totality? All Hole, Little Substance?
Now, some readers might be forgiven their impatience at this point, for it could seem that the present author is putting words in the mouths of dialectical comrades. Unfortunately, speculation has been forced upon us because of the extremely limited information to be found in DM-writings about the "Totality", and the extreme reluctance of the said comrades to come clean.
Others might think that all this is yet more pedantry. On that, see here.
To continue: If the past, which now exists only as an idea (or better still, which now only 'exists' conceptually), is to be included as part of the Whole, then the vast bulk of the "Totality" must be Ideal. This is because, of course, the past is far longer than the present.
Several other rather surprising conclusions follow from this, and from the CTT --, a theory of truth widely accepted in DM-circles. [More on this in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two.]
If propositions about the past are true just in case they correspond with events in the past, then it would be impossible to declare them true. This is because there exists nothing with which they could correspond (other than yet more ideas), since the past is no more.
[CTT = Correspondence Theory of Truth.]
To be sure, we may draw true or false conclusions about the past from the evidence before us, but such evidence (of necessity) exists only in the present. Not only that, but whatever this evidence once related to plainly no longer exists, so it is difficult to see how such non-existents could form part of a correspondence relation with anything, in any obvious sense of that phrase -- over and above an obvious retreat into Idealism, that is.
In response to this it could be argued that the past is an objective feature of reality, hence the above conclusions are completely misguided.
And yet, the meaning of the term "objective" is itself highly unclear (as will be demonstrated in Essay Thirteen Part One), but whatever it does mean it would be of little help here, anyway. This is because it would still be unclear how anything (such as the past) could be "objective" if it does not exist. 'Objectivity', seemingly, has something to do with existence independent of the human mind, and yet we appear to have something here (the past) that does not exist except we form ideas about it; in which case, it's not independent of the mind, and so cannot be "objective".
Again, it could be argued that our beliefs about the past are true just in case they correspond with past events. The existence of the latter might in turn be confirmed or refuted by an appeal to evidence (in the form of documents, artefacts and assorted remains, etc.).
But, this does not alter the fact that the past no longer exists, nor does it change the fact that the confirmation of claims made about the past requires the use of contemporary objects and events -- that is, it necessitates the use of evidence situated in the present, consideration of which is albeit augmented by the use of past tense verbs. Naturally, this is because evidence (i.e., in the shape of the aforementioned documents, artefacts and assorted remains) clearly exists in the present. Without the help of a working time machine, we have no access to evidence from the past that is still located in the past.
Even then, and supposing for the moment we could 'visit' the past, it would still be evidence that exists in the then present (to us), as it was being examined --, in the past!
Truths about the present are quite unlike those about the past -- whatever we finally conclude about the nature of supporting evidence. This can be seen by the way we form sentences relevant to each: plainly, we use expressions with differentially tensed verbs. This is partly where the attempted rebuttal recorded above itself went wrong; it failed to explain -- as similar attempts must always fail without a use of suitably tensed verbs -- precisely what it is that contemporary propositions about the past are supposed to correspond with, if one half of the alleged relation does not now exist.12
To be sure, these serious difficulties do not just plague the CTT when it is applied to past events; the CTT collapses into some form of Idealism whatever time period is chosen for it (as will be demonstrated in Essays Three Part Four and Ten Part Two).
Philosophical 'problems' like this (concerning past, present and future) invariably arise out of an inappropriate interpretation of phrases like "the past", "the present" and "the future". It has thus seemed to some that if such expressions resemble names (or if they appear to be referring expressions), then they must designate/name something, which 'something' must therefore exist -- somewhere. A philosophical search is then initiated to locate these pseudo-entities, which are the creation of an over-active mind, compounded by a crass misuse of language.13
Plainly, if the past exists, we are forced to use the present tense to refer to it -- as has just been done in this very sentence. Naturally, if we interpret such words in a similarly crude manner, that would imply that the past was no longer in the past, but in the present(!) -- clearly implying that the past had in fact been misnamed, or mis-characterised.14
The depiction of the past in this way is thoroughly inappropriate, for it makes it look as if its existence were an empirical issue, resembling that of, say, Bigfoot -- only far more difficult to pin down.
If something exists we should at least (in theory) be able to hunt it down, even if we can't do so at present (no pun intended), or even from a distance. Unless we believe in time travel (a notion that arises precisely out of confusions like this -- more on that in a later Essay -- until then, see Dummett (1993b)), this is not possible.
Clearly, these terminological difficulties have arisen because of an inappropriate and misleading analogy, that drawn between space and time. This imagery suggests (clearly to some) that just as objects in space can be located somewhere, those in time can be located 'somewhen', with the latter being given a new slant by making it resemble spatial location, perhaps by means of a fourth axis tacked onto the Cartesian (or some other) co-ordinate system.15
Clearly, an analogy of this sort ought to sanction the following parallel argument: since some future-tense indicative sentences are true now, they must correspond with events which have yet to occur, but which must also now exist (present tense!) in a shadowy form in 'the Future'. Unfortunately, that would place these future events in the present too!
Naturally, this would mean that all events -- past, present and future -- must co-exist (present tense, again)!
As may readily be appreciated, this would 'solve' the problem by destroying time altogether.16 This sort of metaphysical scorched earth policy, of course, has no viable future -- or none worth mentioning in present company.17
The Elusive Membership List
In order to neutralise/side-step awkward questions like these, perhaps we should simply declare that the "Totality" incorporates everything that exists --, but a-temporally? However, that particular description is of little help since it's unclear what could exist in such a way -- except, perhaps, a 'Deity'.
[That, of course, would link the "Totality" even more closely to those earlier ruminations about "God".]
More specifically, we need a membership list; if we knew what we were talking about, the nature of this elusive "Totality" might become a little clearer.
To that end, it's worth asking whether the "Totality" includes all material objects, but excludes non-material abstractions -- like courage, generosity, justice and equality (etc.). But, as we saw in Essay Two and Essay Three Parts One and Two, DM-theorists have yet to tell us with what exactly such abstractions correspond.
So, it might be wise to throw these bogus creations of Greek grammar overboard now. And yet, that would scupper the 'dialectical' theory of knowledge. In that case, the DM-"Totality" must contain abstractions.
And do not ask where such abstractions reside. [In 'heaven' with 'God'?] Puzzled readers who ignore this advice should, therefore, contact they local DM-soothsayer, who, in response to such an impertinent enquiry, will once again wave his/her arms vaguely heavenward --, if we are lucky.
And, if you are a child, you will believe all you see and hear.
Moving on: what about scientific/theoretical entities, such as Quarks, Superstrings, Wormholes, energy, force, genes, species and genera? Do these belong to the "Totality" --, or not? Are mathematical concepts and objects -- such as, π, e, Matrices, Complex Numbers, Partial Derivatives, Banach Space, Hermite Polynomials, the Kronecker delta, Abelian Groups, Transfinite Cardinals (etc.) to be excluded or included?
Well then, what about the properties of objects that depend either on their disposition or on their relation to other bodies, such as size, velocity, weight, and hardness? Do these make the list? Shouldn't we then also add in the apparent properties of matter, such as solidity, liquidity, colour, smell, taste, and sound? But, according to some, these depend solely on their being perceived by sentient beings, which would mean that they are not 'objective' (even if they do seem to exercise some sort of causal influence on material bodies). Is that sufficient reason to strike them from the cosmic record, or not?
What then should we decide about genuine oddities such as corners, surfaces and shapes? These strange beings seem to disappear at the micro-level, and several even depend on the point of view of the observer. In that case, can they be part of an 'objective' "Totality"?18
But, what are we to conclude about those aspects of reality whose natures are even more obscure? For example, what are we to make of mathematical fictions like the average worker, the mean square velocity of gas molecules (in the Kinetic Theory of Gases), the probability of an event, Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient, the centre of mass of the Solar System and the moment of a force? Despite the fact that these are human constructs, some of them appear to exercise a significant causal influence on material objects. In which case, are they 'objective', 'subjective', both or neither?
What, though, are we to say of things whose status is far more problematic, such as vacua, mirages, illusions, holes, shadows, the 'Unconscious', mirror and lens images, para-reflections, the perspectival properties of bodies, phantom limbs (or the 'phantom perception' of false limbs), dreams, rainbows, fogbows, The Brocken Spectre, Heilgenschein, The Glory, The Bishop's Ring, Ice Halos, refractions, pains, hallucinations, memories and emotions? And what about things whose nature or existence is either dubious or highly problematic: Phlogiston, Caloric, the Ether, the mysterious powers of the echeneis fish (one widely believed by scientists to be able to halt the passage of ships) N Rays, Orgone, Bio-Energy and Polywater?19
If we disallow some or all of these, how can we consistently admit others that are themselves merely theoretical or are of a highly speculative nature (such as Superstrings, Spacetime, n-dimensional space, branched time zones, Axions, Branes and Black Holes), but which are -- even in comparison with several of the items listed above -- decidedly weird?
Are we to be catholic or exclusive in the way we draw up the membership list -- Bolshevik or Menshevik?
It could be argued that we should admit into the "Totality" all and only those entities that scientists acknowledge -- either now or in the future --, supported by the weight of evidence.
[This is, indeed, what John Somerville, for example, argues here. This comes from Somerville (1967), pp.3-32.]
But, the problem with this response is that it would present scientists with far too generous an ontological 'blank cheque', as it were. In fact, if this were the adopted policy, far too many things in the "Totality" would possess a rather precarious -- or even alarmingly fleeting -- 'existence'. In that case, just as soon as scientists changed their minds over the nature and existence of any of these ephemeral 'entities' (as they regularly do), their 'temporary residence permits' would have to be revoked.
In addition to several of the items already mentioned (which we might describe as 'virtual', or even 'honorary' members of the "Totality"), the following would possess (or would have possessed) only transient squatters' rights: indivisible atoms, the four forms of matter, entelechies, the fifth element, homunculi, the music of the spheres, the spheres themselves, mermaids, humours, cosmic vortices, substantial forms, effluvia, witches and demons.
As is well-known, scientists used to entertain the existence of some or all of these at one time.
Not only that, we can add to the list several items whose status is at present somewhat dubious, highly questionable, or which might become so soon: the Higgs Boson, 'selfish' genes, I.Q., race, Morphogenic Fields, so-called "homeopathic" phenomena, the "Placebo effect", the graviton, gravitational waves, tachyons, and Gaia.
Does the "Totality" have a sort of 'metaphysical revolving door' to cater for items such as these?20
Finally, what are we to say of the following theoretical entities/processes (whose material nature is problematic, or whose physical existence is decidedly questionable): singularities, elementary particles, electrons travelling backward in time, tetraneutrons, phase space, dark matter, dark energy, energy itself, "the Field", strange attractors, the magnetic monopole, gluinos, photinos, winos, binos, zinos, Cold Fusion, MACHOs and WIMPs?21
Either the existence of all of these should be entertained, or those that supposedly do not enjoy 'objectivity' should be filtered out, the rest left alone. But which ones are to be discarded and which retained -- and on what basis?
More importantly: which unfortunate comrade is going to chair the selection panel?22
Objectively On -- Then Off -- The Cosmic List
Worse still, what should we decide when scientists revise their ideas (as they continually do)? Would this mean that, (1) The "Totality" itself changes whenever the scientific community ceases to acknowledge the existence of certain formerly 'objective' objects? Or, would this not, (2) Show that scientists' beliefs about 'objectivity' have altered? In that case, would this not suggest that these some (all?) 'objective' ideas are really 'subjective'? And would this not cast a shadow over the 'objectivity' of science in general?
If so, is it still be possible to maintain the superior 'objectivity' of the new universal contents list if another 'ontological re-edit' is due to take place a few years down the line (once again, as invariably happens in science)?22aa
Conversely, if the other option were the case, wouldn't it mean that the actual content of the Totality depends on decisions made by fallible human beings?
So, for example, did the "Totality" change when early modern scientists decided that the "fifth element" no longer made it onto the bench?
But, if the decisions of scientists determine what constitutes an 'objective' members list, then the "Totality" itself must change with scientific fashion. Did it change again when astronomers concluded that the planet Vulcan was imaginary? Or, was that 'planet' suspended in a sort of 'objective/subjective limbo' world (subsisting away, perhaps, in a sort of Meinongian ante-chamber, somewhere?), while researchers finally made up their minds? Will the "Totality" alter once more if Superstrings are granted (or denied) 'objective existence' some day? [They have already been partially transmogrified into Branes!]
Is, therefore, the "Totality" an artefact of whim? Is it 'objective' in a 'subjective' sort of sense? Does it depend on who is on the Metaphysical Review Board? Is it selection-panel sensitive?
This is not a very promising start -- but, alas for DM-fans, it gets worse.
If we can't decide on what basis to include or exclude things from this avowedly contradictory "Totality", then perhaps it includes things that not only do not exist, but things that cannot exist?22a
This latest possibility now poses far more serious problems for any attempt to construct an Ontological Definition of the "Totality". This is because several DM-theses indicate that the 'perimeter fence' (as it were) encircling the "Totality" is full of holes.
In fact, the DM-Totality resembles a colander more than it does than it does a wok.
Figure Four: Is This The "Totality"?
While rival ontological systems operate with some sort of closed-border policy -- admitting the existence of certain things, but disallowing others -- it turns out that DM-theorists can't reject anything at all, since they openly admit (if not adamantly insist upon) the existence of contradictions -- and countless trillions of them (indeed, possibly hundreds, if not thousands, in each atom in the entire universe)!
Hence, the 'DM-boundary-fence' is not so much porous as non-existent. The "Totality", it seems, could contain anything, including impossible objects -- not just contradictory objects and processes, but mythical and imaginary ones, too. Maybe it includes four-edged hexagons, the round square, the golden mountain, unicorns, all the Olympian Gods, the end of the rainbow and the Adhedral Triangle?
Anyone tempted to respond here that the above list is absurd since it contains contradictory items, which can be ruled out in advance, should once more consult their local Dialectical Oracle before they jump to such hasty conclusions. In fact, given well-known DM-principles, it is not easy to see how any of the above (and more) may be rejected on such an a priori basis.
Thus, if the DM-"Totality" is to be rescued from oblivion, some way must be found to stop these, and countless other absurdities before they cross its irresponsibly porous boundary.
It could be objected here that this is just ridiculous; dialecticians only acknowledge the existence of contradictions that can be empirically verified. Hence, they do not countenance the actuality of such 'theoretical' contradictions, nor do they admit the mere existence of all 'contradictory', imaginary, and impossible objects.
But, this counter-claim is demonstrably incorrect, as we will soon see. And, even if DM-theorists do not admit that these entities actually exist, there is nothing in their 'logic' to rule them out.
Again, it could be argued that 'contradictory objects' are easily excluded because they are not material, and do not represent verifiable material forces.
But who says? How do we know that scientists might not one day discover weird things like these? They already have a few of their own to contend with; several of them were listed above.
[UO = Unity of Opposites; DL = Dialectical Logic; FL = Formal Logic.]
Worse still, as noted earlier: such possibilities cannot be ruled out by anyone wielding the wishy-washy and terminally obscure notions DL supplies its adepts. Because of those, DM-theorists openly admit the existence of countless billion contradictions, and other assorted impossibilities, right throughout the universe (the existence of most of which cannot be verified by empirical means). [On this, see below.]
In fact, if everything in existence is a UO (as Lenin claimed) then there should be as many contradictions in reality as there are elementary particles (possibly more). In that case, the above 'impossibilities' cannot be ruled out in advance of all the evidence having been considered, certainly not on 'principles' exclusive to DL.
Indeed, DM-theorists already acknowledge the actual existence of contradictory objects, processes and assorted impossibilities prior to all (or even most) of the evidence having been collected (and, in many cases, in abeyance of any evidence at all), since those who agree with Lenin and Hegel insist that everything, and every process, is, or contains, a UO.
If this is so, then for all even they know, the "Totality" could contain countless as-yet-undiscovered absurdities.
Furthermore, if Engels and Lenin are to be believed, an infinite amount of knowledge still awaits discovery. Hence, at any point in history (such as the present), humanity must be infinitely ignorant of the final contents of -- and of the principles governing -- the universe, or the "Totality" (if there is such a 'thing'). That being so, those who rely on DL are in no position to rule such absurdities out with anything other than almost infinite uncertainty. The only way these could be excluded would be on the back of an a priori appeal to principles exclusive to FL -- or indeed, to ordinary language --, and thus on the basis of rules that are incompatible with those found in DL. [On this, see Essay Four.]
As we have already seen (in connection with Engels's analysis of motion, and several other core DM-theses, here, here, here and here), DM-theorists already admit the existence of contradictory objects and events. Examples of these include the unity of opposite poles in a magnet, 'contradictory' opposing forces throughout nature, contradictory moving objects, contradictory numbers and mathematical concepts, seeds which negate themselves, the existence of actual infinities (that is, the existence of something which both terminates (so that it is a determinate existent) and which does not), the fundamentally contradictory nature of matter (in that it is both wave and particle, continuous and discontinuous, all at once), and contradictory cells (in that they are both alive and dead at the same time -- or teetering on both), and so on.
Once again, if Lenin is to be believed, reality is fundamentally contradictory; according to him everything is a UO. And, Lenin asserted this in the absence of any evidence at all.23
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"In mathematics: + and -. Differential and integral. In mechanics: action and reaction. In physics: positive and negative electricity. In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58. Original emphases removed, bold added.]
This means that DM-theorists cannot consistently exclude any of the contradictory and unlikely entities listed earlier solely on the basis of their contradictory natures. Theorists who postulate contradictions everywhere, but who suddenly become arbitrarily fastidious just when it suits their 'theory', should not be expected to be taken seriously.
But, what could be more contradictory than a "Totality" that admits among its denizens things that not only do not exist (like the past), but also those that cannot exist (like DM-abstractions, since if they exist they must be concrete)?
Unfortunately, once this metaphysical roller-coaster starts moving it takes something a little more substantial than DL to stop it.
If DM is not to be imposed on the world, but read from it -- as its supporters constantly intone -- then, as it now turns out, DM-advocates cannot consistently stipulate what their "Totality" does or does not contain ahead of an empirical investigation to that end.23a
Others might be able to do this, but they cannot.
This is their millstone; they should wear it with pride.
Hence any attempt to rule out of existence one or more of the contradictory/absurd objects listed above would trap DM-theorists between that millstone and yet another hard place: FL.
Now, those of us who are not wedded to such a crazy system of logic -- i.e., DL -- not only can, but do rule out of existence certain things because of principles expressed in FL and/or in ordinary language. And we are right to do so.
[In fact, it is better to say that it makes no sense to suppose such things exist. More on that here.]
On similar grounds, therefore, we may legitimately and consistently deny the veracity of the many DM-propositions that report the existence of 'contradictions' in nature.
However, this defence is unavailable to DM-theorists, who claim that humanity has to wait upon the deliverances of an infinite meander through epistemological space (and along the Yellow Brick Road to 'Absolute Knowledge'), before anyone was in a position to decide whether such propositions are fully true (or, whether they are true at all).
If so, dialecticians may not now complain about the allegation that their "Totality" might contain some or all of the odd things listed above -- the possible existence of which is predicated on the cavalier rejection of the protocols of FL and ordinary language.
The dilemma that DM-theorists now face is quite stark: either they continue to disdain FL -- the repudiation of which partially created this problem --, thus admitting the possible existence of all manner of contradictory objects, events and processes; or they reject the existence of such things (and abandon the idea that contradictions exist in nature) because of rules codified in FL and expressed discursively in ordinary language.24
What seems certain, however, is that the unwise rejection of core principles of FL has left the DM-"Totality" wide open to infestation by countless weird and wonderful 'entities', the elimination of which requires rapid inoculation with a belated dose of those very same FL-protocols, alongside the adoption of a believable/workable theory of knowledge.
Hence, as a result of yet another dialectical inversion, FL would be required to rescue DM-theorists from the contradictory "Totality" they rashly summoned into existence; a Whole that could include, for all we know -- or for all they know -- characters from Alice in Wonderland.
Interconnection -- Fact Or Fancy?
Precisely What Is Interconnected With What?
In addition to, but compounding the difficulties outlined above, there remains the unresolved problem concerning the exact nature and extent of the relations that are said to exist between the items in this nebulous DM-"Totality" --, should we ever find out what the latter is.
From what little we 'know', the "Totality" is supposed to be interconnected, contradictory and constantly changing (because of its countless UO's). Earlier we saw Lenin declare that:
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc...." [Lenin (1961), pp.221, 359-60. Emphases in the original.]
And how:
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Emphases in the original.]25
But, the nature and extent of these universal interconnections is still entirely unclear.
For instance: does every object/process in the "Totality" influence every other object/process instantaneously across vast expanses of space and time -- all the time -- equally or differentially? But how is either of these possible?
More importantly, how could any of this be confirmed?
Inter-connectionism Comes Apart At The Seams
Nevertheless, the DM-idea that everything in the universe is interconnected soon unravels upon closer examination.
To that end, it's worth asking exactly which parts of the Universe are inter-related, to what extent, and in what way?
Do these interconnections extend across all regions of space and time instantaneously, or is this true of only some? Or, is there some sort of time-delay affecting them? If there is, does this delay mean that the past, for instance, is currently interconnected with the present (as light travels across these vast distances, for example), or do these interconnections operate only between contemporaneous states of affairs (thereby ruling out such significant delays)?
On the other hand, does this imply that past events are (now) interconnected with other events belonging to the same or to different time zones? In that case, is, for example, the election of Tony Blair in 1997 still interconnected with the sinking of the Bismarck, the discovery of Gold in the Klondike, and the loss of the Crown Jewels in 1216? If not, which time zones are inter-linked and which aren't, and on what basis?
But, we know from certain theorems of Relativity that some parts of reality cannot be physically connected, let alone interconnected.
Conversely, in view of the fact that the past does not exist, shouldn't such connections across time zones be disallowed, anyway? This is plainly because it is impossible for anything to be connected (let alone be interconnected) with something that does not exist. But, in that case, if the past isn't connected (or interconnected) with the present, how would it be possible to give an historical account, say, of the origin of class society?
Of course, it's always possible to argue that there is in fact a causal chain of events connecting the past with the present. But, even if this were so, this cannot interconnect these two time zones -- the present may be connected but it cannot be interconnected with the past. Moreover, as we saw earlier, no single element in this causal chain, except perhaps the last, now exists. If so, how can such an insubstantial chain connect something that does exist (the present) with something that does not (the past)? At best, this would make this chain and its links Ideal, and thus not the least bit "objective".
Hence, if the past (which is non-existent) is connected to the present by an Ideal sort of causal link, then the "Totality" (so depicted) would be an Ideally connected 'Whole', but still not an interconnected 'Whole', still less a materially-connected whole.
[One is tempted to respond to hard-core DM-fans (who might at this point be heard to mutter through clenched teeth: "Of course these things are interconnected!") along the following lines: "And which minor deity informed you of that alleged fact?" --, a few seconds before reminding them that only Idealists impose such 'truths' on nature, something they themselves have sworn never to do.]
In order to assist our enquiry, and perhaps help resolve such problems, let us call the following "maximal-interconnectedness" (i.e., MIC):
[A] All events and processes in the "Totality" are always, and instantaneously, interconnected across every time zone.
Conversely, let us stipulate that a reduced version of the latter be called "non-maximal-interconnectedness" (i.e., NMIC):
[B] The "Totality" is interconnected, but not everything that has existed, or will, or now exits is always inter-linked instantaneously with everything else.
Taking The MIC
Considering MIC first. It is difficult to see how this option could possibly be true. If it were, then it would imply that every object, event and process in the entire history of the universe (and perhaps beyond?) is now and always will be interconnected to every other object, even and process across every time zone, constantly and instantaneously!
Taking three such objects/events at random: this would mean that, say, the median price of coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2003, the mean number of grains of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd of July 1742, the modal oscillation frequency of a handful of atoms of Helium in a small pocket of gas in The Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years distant, but exactly 25.3565678609844433453312 million years ago, are all interconnected with one another, instantaneously and always.
Indeed, if everything in reality is interconnected, then the above seemingly insignificant items would have to be taken into account in the scientific explanation of what might otherwise seem to be unrelated events. [Issues of relevance will be considered shortly.]
For example, if MIC were true then the taste of sugar, say, would have to have something to do with the angular velocity of both neighbouring and distant galaxies (at all times), and with the other three items mentioned above -- and with the smell of diesel, and with the mean weight of all Fiddler Crabs in the Southern Hemisphere eaten by predators on or before 17:02, June 15th 1247 (Julian Calendar), and the effect of Selenium Sulphide on the dandruff of Chelsea FC supporters who own Heritage Cherry Sunburst Gibson Les Paul guitars (2006 issue).
In fact, all of these (and gazillions more like them) would have to be taken into account by scientists trying to explain the demise of, say, the dinosaurs or the properties of Tungsten (and vice versa), if MIC were the case.
Figure Five: Is Bondi Beach Still Interconnected
With Napoleon's Left Foot?
Figure Six: Are Ageing Coffee Grinders Still In Touch With
The End Of The Last Ice Age, And Vice Versa?
Figure Seven: Is The Cartwheel Galaxy Still Interlinked
To Attila The Hun's Favourite Sword?
Figure Eight: Owned By A Chelsea FC Fan? But Is This Gibson Les Paul
Cherry Sunburst Guitar Still Interconnected With Julius Caesar's
Last Ever Glass Of Wine?
Figure Nine: Still Interlinked With The Origin
Of The Crab Nebula?
Some might object at this point that dialecticians do not hold such simple-minded and ridiculous views, and that the above ignores relative connectedness (and thus relevance). These appropriately vague notions will be examined presently.
In advance of that it is worth reminding ourselves, (1) That this sub-section is dealing with MIC, and (2) That all this speculation has been forced upon us because DM-fans have consistently failed/refused to say what their theory implies. In which case, this particular complaint is itself misguided. Furthermore, because MIC specifically postulates instantaneous influences, all the time, and across every region of space and time, inverse square law drop-off rates do not apply (that is, if this is what "relative connectedness" implies -- but once more, who can say?).
Moreover, since dialecticians suppose there to be such a link, even if the latter is relativised in the above manner, it is nonetheless still a link (albeit one that will supposedly have insignificant effects on much that is distantly connected with it), and it is that link that is still unclear.
[The idea that "internal relations" can decrease with distance (so that such 'remote effects' can be ignored as irrelevant) is subjected to close examination in Part Two of this Essay.]
But, even if these links are relativised, we still do not know how everything is interconnected. For example, and once again, how are objects and processes in the past interlinked with those in the present, or in the future?
To be sure, according to current theory, it takes many light years for the vanishingly small gravitational effects of distant objects to reach earth, but when they do reach us, they are now plainly in the present. So, what influences do extremely remote objects, some 10-12 billion light years away -- which objects might no longer exist -- have on the earth now? For sure, their light might have some effect, but for MIC to be true, these objects must influence earth instantaneously across immense distances -- and for this to be true in reverse.
Of course, it is quite clear that if DM-theorists were to assume that MIC were correct, it would be impossible to confirm their suppositions.
Where could anyone even begin?
More incredible still: whatever interconnections are imagined to exist between these events and those processes, they themselves could not change, and neither could the elements so linked. To see this, consider an earlier sentence:
M1: The median price of coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2033, the mean number of grains of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd of July 1742, the modal oscillation of a handful of atoms of Helium in a small pocket of gas in The Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years away, but exactly 25.3565678609844433453312 million years ago.
If it is now true that there are such inter-links between the three items mentioned above -- call this set MICA --, then since MICA has been relativised to and identified by means of the times so specified, it must always remain the same.
On the other hand, if it were incorrect to say this -- and MICA were susceptible to change -- then at any point in time it would be false to say that the said relation in M1 was MICA, and the items mentioned would not be so interconnected. But, if it is now true to say this of them, it must be true to say the same tomorrow (or at any time) about that set of relations today.
Recall, MIC connects everything to everything else throughout all of time, irrespective of whether it now exists, including the very words used to make this very point.
It could be argued that this implausible conclusion cannot apply here since dialecticians are committed to universal change. Hence, the above relation must change as the events it connects themselves alter.
But, is this a safe assumption to make given this view of MIC? In fact, MIC would plainly exclude DM-change. This is because, of course, the items in this triple relation do not now exist, and so cannot alter. Hence, MICA cannot change either.
So, since the events in question were time stamped to make them determinate, that means MICA cannot change, and neither can these events -- for that stamp identified one and all.
It is possible now to generalise the above analysis to take in every event and process in the entire universe, including those not now in existence (or otherwise, which thus clearly comprises all of 'reality'). Hence, if MIC were true, DM-change would be impossible. If every event in the past is now related to every event in the present and the future (MIC-style), none could alter -- or we lose all contact with our capacity to refer to them, and so to link them.
Of course, it is possible to argue that nature takes no heed of our capacity to refer to things, in which case the above argument implies that the present author must be an Idealist.
In response, it is worth reminding the reader once more that all this speculation has been forced upon us because dialecticians refuse to say what the "Totality" is, or be specific about the interconnections they say exist throughout nature. Hence, I'm not reporting my own beliefs! Now, if the universe is changeable (and who can doubt that), then one implication of the above argument is that not only would we not be able to describe it, we could not describe its DM-interconnections either. In that case, the above argument presents DM-theorists with a dilemma (if they accept MIC); either: (1) If the DM-universe is describable, then no change can occur, or (2) If the DM-universe can change, it cannot be described, given MIC. [More on this here.]
Now, Option 1) above is in fact the Block View of Time, only rather badly expressed.
A somewhat similar problem afflicts relativistic Physics: hence, if the universe is a four-dimensional 'object' (manifold) in Spacetime, then each 'event' would in effect be a proper part of an orthogonal three-dimensional 'slice' (i.e., a hyperplane) through that 'object'/manifold as it 'exists' in 4-space. In that case, change could not take place -- or, rather: at best, change would merely represent our subjective view of the world, meaning there would be no such thing as 'objective' change.
Of course, this just means that Relativity is no friend of DM; indeed the Big Bang (which is based on this theory) is its mortal enemy. So, when dialecticians refer us to the Big Bang to account for the "Totality" (and for interconnectedness), they are in fact drawing a viper to their breast. As was noted here, this is one reason why earlier generations of Marxists opposed, as some still oppose the revolutionary new Physics that emerged in the early 20th century.
However, let us suppose that 1) There is some way of avoiding all of the paradoxical conclusions listed above, and that 2) MIC is compatible with change. Even then MIC would still face formidable problems. For example, MIC would appear to imply the existence of instantaneous effects across vast expanses of space and time -- all the time --, and not least those between things that do not now exist and those that do. This in turn would require the existence of non-relativistic effects 'travelling' back and forth between such regions at unimaginably large superluminal velocities (leaving the 'warp' speeds of Star Trek standing). Either that, or this would have to involve (in most cases) inordinate time-delays for all relevant reciprocal influences to work, undermining MIC in the process.
Hence, it looks like MIC presents DM with far too many headaches. In that case, if DM is to be taken seriously, its theorists would be well-advised to avoid MIC like the plague.
So, because of this, I will consider MIC no more in this Essay; any dialecticians still enamoured of it are welcome to make of it what they can.
Even so, if such DM-theorists want to retain a commitment to MIC, they will have to abandon the idea that their theses are only acceptable if they have been confirmed in some practical way. This is because MIC is as impossible to verify as it is to believe.
Let us assume, therefore, that some form of NMIC is more acceptable to DM-theorists. To that end, we will still suppose that the "Totality" is interconnected, but add that not everything that has existed, or will, or now exits is always inter-linked with everything else, and not all are connected instantaneously.
However, NMIC is itself rather vague (the above characterisation is clearly my own offering -- once more forced upon me because the meagre and threadbare details offered up by DM-fans are about as useful as a chocolate fire-engine). The extent and nature of the alleged interconnections are entirely unclear, and it is not easy to see how this defect might be rectified -- except on an a priori basis.
Even if the opposite were the case, and NMIC was entirely perspicuous, it would still face serious problems of its own. For example, some of the aforementioned Helium atoms in the distant Galaxy (mentioned in M1, below) could have decayed by the time their vanishingly small effects had travelled very far -- in which case, those atoms, at least, would no longer exist for them to be interconnected with anything. Furthermore, the energy they released could fail to reach certain parts of the Universe because of absorption elsewhere. And what is true of them will be true of countless other processes.
M1: The median price of coffee grinders in Brazil on the first of June 2033, the mean number of grains of sand on Bondi beach between 10:00 and 10:01 am (local time) on the 2nd of July 1742, the modal oscillation of a handful of atoms of Helium in a small pocket of gas in The Cartwheel Galaxy some 500 million or so light years away, but exactly 25.3565678609844433453312 million years ago.
In addition, this option also faces the Light Cone problem (which was alluded to earlier): there are parts of nature that cannot now interact (if Special Relativity is to be believed).
Further questions force themselves upon us: do such 'travelling effects' influence other 'travelling effects' (even if they happen to be moving in opposite directions), and at all times? Does the energy from distant Galaxies travelling away from the Earth (never to interact with our planet -- that is, if we assume the universe is infinite and unbounded) have an effect on energy radiating from the Earth and similarly flowing in the opposite direction, away from those Galaxies? If not, how are these aspects of reality interconnected?
Is there some sort of hierarchy of levels within these interconnections, with some things affecting others more than they do the rest? Does an inverse square law operate here?
If so, has a single DM-theorist attempted to work out the mathematics of any of this?
Worse still, is there any evidence supporting the idea that most/every sub-atomic particle in the Universe is interconnected with most/every other, for most/all of time?
One possible response to the above would be to point out that all of nature is subject to the same laws since it originated in the "Big Bang" billions of years ago. That would seem to mean that everything in the universe is related "by birth and by law", as it were. Indeed, there are well-known theories in modern Physics that appear to support the idea that the entire Universe is interconnected because of its unique origin (etc.). But, even if these theories are accepted as correct (and thus if we suppose for a moment that scientists never change their minds -- but see below), that would still fail to imply that everything is now interconnected, or will always remain so. For that surmise itself to be correct, we should need argument and evidence. Certainly more than we have at present.
However, despite the fact that the aforementioned modern theories seem to lend support to the idea that certain aspects of nature are interconnected, the evidence in their favour is alarmingly thin.26
Incidentally, the above response (that everything arose from the "Big Bang") would fail to explain precisely which laws actually connect the aforementioned price of coffee grinders in Brazil to distant Helium atoms, let alone the number of grains of sand on beaches in the antipodes, mentioned in M1 above -- to say nothing of every other trivial event in the history of the universe --, or, worse, how such links might be verified, or confirmed in any meaningful way.
Nevertheless, and despite this, there are at least two comrades -- whose ideas will be examined elsewhere in this work -- who actually question the standard account of the origin of the universe: cf., Woods and Grant (1995).27
According to them, the Universe is infinite in size (both macroscopically and microscopically) and duration. But, if that were so, it would mean that most of reality could not be interconnected, because nothing would have a common origin -- although oddly enough these two comrades failed to spot that fatal corollary -- and hence the Universe could not be a "Totality", and possibly not even a "Totality".
Anyway, how Woods and Grant both know that the universe is infinite in extent and has no origin they forgot to say. In fact, they omitted the "careful empirical" work which substantiates their belief that the universe is infinite, as opposed to its being merely finite but very large, and very old. Indeed, like so many of the other things Woods and Grant say about nature, and as is the case with so many other DM-fans, they were quite happy to impose these semi-theological doctrines on reality.
Another possible reaction to the above might run along the lines that while we are at present ignorant of these interconnections, that does not imply there are none. The history of science has demonstrated that explanations of the Universe have always been couched in increasingly general terms, and that over time the laws scientists discover that countless objects, processes and events in nature are indeed interconnected in the way DM-theorists surmise. In fact, the development of knowledge shows that the more we find out about nature the more interconnections we discover.
However, this latest response does not even begin to tackle most of the problems raised above. For example, if interconnections within the Totality involve instantaneous effects across vast expanses, measured in billions of light years, several of the aforementioned scientific laws and principles would plainly be incorrect (namely, those that depend on Special Relativity). Worse still, as has already been noted, the universal existence of such effects could never be verified. So, based on the sort of principles mentioned earlier (relating to the allegedly non-negotiable pre-requisite that theories have to have empirical support), DM-theorists cannot consistently accept this up-beat view of things since (as has been pointed out several times) it could never be confirmed.
Indeed, Einstein called such an idea "spooky". Not only did it appear to violate certain tenets of Special Relativity, but it also seemed impossible to believe because of the absence of any conceivable causal explanation or intervening media.28
More worrying still, this latest reply is itself based on a metaphysical view of science. There are, of course, deep issues at stake here -- for example, those connected with how Scientific Realism itself should be interpreted, as well as those arising from the attempt to translate highly technical scientific theories into ordinary language, or, indeed, render them compatible with 'commonsense'. Some of these issues were discussed in Essay Eight Part Two, others will be dealt with in Essay Thirteen Part Two.
Quite apart from all this, even if a plausible version of interconnectedness were forthcoming, it would appear to be inconsistent with other DM-theses. If, according to dialecticians, change is internally-generated, and based on an inner conflict created by the UOs mentioned above, then it can't be externally-motivated, too. But, what else does the doctrine of universal interconnectedness amount to except an appeal to the existence of more complex and remote external causes/'mediations'? Hence, if universal interconnections exist, change could not be wholly internal to an object or system. On the other hand, if change were entirely the result of the conflict within objects, processes and systems, interconnectedness would only be local, at best -- it certainly would not be universal.
[This topic is more fully discussed in Essay Eight Part One, and will be again in Part Two of this Essay.]
In that case, if dialecticians are determined to cling on to a belief in this still-to-be-defined "Totality", with its universal interconnections, the doctrine that change is exclusively generated by 'internal contradictions' will have to be abandoned. Conversely, vice versa.
Either way, DM would suffer yet another body blow.
The Epistemological Definition
If any aspect of this maximally-interconnected "Totality" is to be rejected (along with the idea that every atom (past present and future) has a direct effect on every other, equally, instantaneously, and for all of time), then what interpretation can be put upon 'interconnectedness' that does not require an act of faith?
Unless we can fill in these details, faith seems to be the only option left open to loyal members of The Church of Dialectics that supports their Wholist view of reality.
That is because, as has already been pointed out, universal and omni-temporal interconnections are incapable of being empirically confirmed.
Now, this is where the "Epistemological Definition" could help beleaguered DM-fans find a solution that is conducive to a non-mystical view of the universe.
This alternative conception of the "Totality" re-directs attention away from speculation over ontologies and content lists, and re-focuses it on a consideration of what is known about the Whole as it is conceived at any point in history. Indeed, this seems to be the definition John Rees prefers; we saw him referring his readers to an "insistence" recorded above, and he later alluded to the "totality of human experience and knowledge", which might have something to do with the "Totality" itself. [Rees (1998a), pp.5, 236.] I will simply assume that it has.
Unfortunately, this switch of emphasis away from the object of knowledge onto our knowledge of 'it' only creates further serious problems for the DM-faithful.
Kant's NOUMENON By Any Other Name...
As seems reasonably clear, unless it is possible to say something (anything?) about the object of knowledge, claims about 'it' must be considered entirely empty. But, DM-theorists cannot (or will not) ante-up here; they have remained studiously unspecific about the supposed object of their claims for nigh on 150 years. And it looks like they intend to maintain this tight-lipped policy into the next 150. This Essay certainly won't budge them, even if they were to read it.
Why are they so reticent? Why do they refuse to tell the world the good news about their semi-divine "Totality"?
This, they say, is because they will be accused of imposing their ideas on nature. But, that reply is rather odd, since that is what they finally end up doing!
They tell us everything is a "Totality" (but will not tell us what that assertion involves) and then happily impose that ancient, mystical idea on nature!
Beyond alleging there is a vague sort of "dialectical unity" between the 'knower and the known', and apart from giving the whole shebang a quasi-religious title (viz., "The Totality"), it looks like there's little else they could say, and, as noted above, there is precious little they have said about their nebulous "Totality" -- even to one another!
An analogous predicament has plagued previous epistemologically-driven theories of nature -- whose advocates found they had to appeal (implicitly or explicitly) to an a priori or a posteriori ontology of some sort to bail them out. Without something like this to firm things up, still others have meandered off into a Phenomenalist swamp.
In fact, DM-classicists have merely gestured at a solution to this dilemma, half-opting for the first alternative by appealing to a vague and attenuated sort of ontology -- and one that is hopelessly compromised by Lenin's refusal to commit DM to any solid ideas, even about the nature of matter -- the whole sorry mess then hived-off into the sciences. We saw earlier that this was not a wise move, either.
As we will see (in Essay Thirteen Part One), DM-fans are completely unspecific about what they mean even by the word "matter"/"material". In the event, they opt for materialist-sounding theses that collapse alarmingly quickly into Idealism. Of course, they certainly intend their ontology to be materialist, but the asymptotic road to Dialectical Valhalla is paved with intentional, but no less ideal bricks upon which it is impossible to build anything even remotely secure.
Indeed, there does not appear to be a single DM-theorist on the planet (now or in the past) who is capable of telling us (or fellow adepts) what matter actually is, beyond its being merely an 'abstraction'.
Unfortunately, this puts dialecticians in the same position as theologians who likewise cannot tell us what 'God' actually is -- save they both offer us their own via negativa: i.e., 'God'(/matter) is not this, or not that, nor this, nor….
So, as noted above, without a clear idea what these shy materialists think matter is, their "Totality" is indeed like Hamlet without the…er, well what?
No surprise then to discover that this perennially equivocal approach to ontology means that the aforementioned dilemma -- involving a choice between an a priori or an a posteriori membership list -- re-surfaces in different forms elsewhere in DM.
On the one hand, DM-theorists maintain the pretence that they have not imposed their ideas on reality -- but have merely read them from it -- while on the other they phrase their ideas in terms that indicate that they have in fact done the exact opposite of this --, which plainly suggests that their ontology (if such it may be called) is a priori, after all.
[These allegations were substantiated in Essay Two; they will be examined in more detail in Essays Twelve (summary here) and Essay Thirteen Part One.]
Trapped inside a metaphysic that has no clear conception of the "Totality" (or of what it contains), and possessing an ontology that reifies the products of social interaction (language) as if they were fundamental aspects of reality, DM-theorists find themselves saddled with their own version of Kant's Noumenon.
If language is never adequate to the task of capturing final truths about the world (as we saw here and here), and if humanity is locked in an infinite/eternal "asymptotic" search for absolute truth (the nature of which must forever escape them), then 'knowledge' always remains 'infinitely incorrect'; 'infinitely' far from the truth, as it were.
In that case, and for all DM-theorists know, their quest for 'absolute' truth could be going in entirely the wrong direction! Given their theory, humanity is permanently and infinitely ignorant at each and every stage in its history about everything and anything. Hence the probability that the search for knowledge is progressing in the 'right' direction will always be vanishingly small (indeed, it must be 'infinitely' small) --, even if there were such a thing as "knowledge" (which on this theory, there couldn't be!).
On this account, humanity will always be infinitely far away from Absolute Truth, and hence infinitely ignorant. If DM-epistemology were correct, human beings would find it impossible to build a secure platform from which to launch a scientific search for knowledge, let alone approach truth 'asymptotically'. As we saw in Essay Three Part Six (yet to be published), the DM 'convergence' theory of knowledge readily collapses into scepticism. We also saw [in Essay Ten Part One] that an appeal to practice to shore-up the infinitely insubstantial sands upon which paper-thin DM-epistemology has been built (the same sand, incidentally, into which many a dialectical head has been inserted), was equally ill-advised.
Hence, the Epistemological Definition fatally compromises DM-theorists' claim that their theory is capable of revealing any knowledge whatsoever. Worse still, given this definition, the "Totality" turns out to be a pale-reflection -- not of the world -- but of Hegel's Absolute. [More on this in Part Two of this Essay.]
Thus, 'God' rears 'His' nonexistent head once more.
If the above accusations appear to be rather wild, a consideration of Engels's own description of the "Totality" should give pause:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35.]29
While Engels does not actually use the term here, his words clearly relate to the "Totality", only now expressed in quasi-mystical terms. Admittedly, this passage comes from notebooks, but it does reveal how close Engels came to overt Idealism in private.30
These conclusions are further substantiated by what follows.
The "Totality" -- Universal And A Priori
The way that DM-theorists refer to their "Totality" clearly reveals, despite protestations to the contrary, that they treat it as an a priori, dogmatic concept; indeed, as noted above, it is little more than a pale reflection of Hegel's Absolute.
The fact that this is not a baseless assertion can be seen from a consideration of the answers that might be given to the following questions:
(1) How do DM-theorists know that reality is restricted to just one "Totality"? Could there not be several? Leaving out of consideration sub-"Totalities" for now, might there not be countless intermingled or intercalated "Totalities"?31
(2) How do DM-theorists know that there aren't at least two "Totalities" (or even sub-"Totalities") which are completely unrelated to one another?
(3) If we confine our attention to the known Universe, how do dialecticians know that each and every part is interconnected with all the rest, all the time? Could there not be parts of nature that are totally unrelated to anything else, or connected to only relatively few other things? Why is either option so impossible?32
(4) What gives DM-theorists the confidence to "insist" in advance of all (or even most) of the evidence that what they say must be true of every last particle in the universe, and for all of time?
Beyond 'divine' revelation, there are only two approaches to 'knowledge' that would allow DM-theorists to answer the above in the way they do --, either: (A) DM is a metaphysical system, or (B) DM is a conventionalised theory, founded upon a standardised, definitional or stipulative use of certain words.
These allegations will strike some readers as somewhat controversial, so the rest of this section will be devoted to allaying such qualms.33
Well, What Else Could A "Totality" Be?
Question One: How do we even know that there is only one "Totality"?
One obvious response to this question -- indeed, it might even have occurred to the reader -- is: "Well, that's what the word "Totality" means. There can't be more than one Totality, by definition."
There are at least two ways of understanding this rejoinder, each of which corresponds to one or other of the two options (A or B) mentioned above:
(A) If the standard and loose DM-characterisation of the "Totality" means that this concept (if it is one) must be employed as a way of deciding what the contents of reality are (operating as a sort of metaphysical filter) --, or as a way of constituting a set of necessary or scientific truths about it --, then that would clearly make DM metaphysical. That is, it would confirm the suspicion that well before even a vanishingly small fraction of the evidence has been collected and assessed, the idea that 'everything' must be viewed along DM-lines --, i.e., as part of an interconnected unitary whole -- had already been decided upon, and that the remaining evidence must be shoe-horned into this view. But, what else would that amount to except a crude way of imposing a favoured structure on reality, one based solely on the meaning of a word (i.e., "Totality"), the very thing DM-theorists have always effected to disavow?
The fact that this is what seems to have happened -- and that it is not just a prejudice of the present author -- can be seen from the way that the above response alone suggests that all-embracing facts about the world have been derived from a loose definition of one word: "Totality" -- or, to be more honest, derived from a highly superficial gesture at a loose definition of it, inherited from previous generations of card-carrying mystics.
Even if it were the case that the "Totality" had been defined clearly, we would still require, at the very least, a convincing argument aimed at establishing the legitimacy of the derivation of this set of universal truths from a single word and/or its 'definition'.
Anyway, the provision of such an argument would automatically concede the point made earlier: that a particular view of nature had been imposed on it -- only now following upon a definition -- and not read from it, as had been advertised all along.
(B) On the other hand, if the word "Totality" is to be used as a "form of representation" (that is, as a formal way of interpreting experience and legitimating scientific-looking inferences) it would at least be clear that it was a conventionalist notion, after all.34
Of course, the first option would suggest that DM is just another form of LIE (which is itself based upon the systematic derivation of substantive truths about the world from the alleged meanings of a few words). The second alternative would indicate that DM more closely resembled science --, but only at a considerable cost.
This is because it would confirm the fact that DM was conventional.35
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism.]
As it turns out, DM-theorists adopt the second option when it suits them -- but in a way that collapses it back into the first. [That claim will be substantiated below, and throughout the rest of this site.]36
Is DM A Conventionalist Theory?
To be sure, there are many different types of Conventionalism. Less plausible versions are based on stipulation.37 Less implausible ones are more anthropological, and are founded on the many and varied material practices that have driven human social development.38
Perhaps DM is conventional in one of these senses? If so, the idea that reality forms a contradictory "Totality" would then be based on one of the following: (1) An agreement of some kind, (2) An implicit/explicit stipulation to some effect or other, or (3) Norms derived from material practices of some sort. Admittedly, the adoption of any one of these would simply confirm the fact that DM had not been read from the world (as had been claimed), but imposed on it. Naturally, that would account for the a priori nature of DM-theses, held true for all of reality and for all of time.
Unfortunately however, stipulative conventions are no more capable of being empirically true than are rules. A straightforward example of this sort of convention is the conversion rule: 1000kg = 1 tonne. Clearly, this type of convention is of little use to dialecticians, since, although it is correct to say that one tonne is one thousand kilograms (or rather that any object weighing 1000kg will automatically weigh 1 tonne, so that an empirical statement to that effect about some object or other would itself be true), this conventional fact does not derive from the 'nature' of the world (even though it is connected with it in other ways, via practice), nor has it been read from it. It is based on a series of agreements and stipulations made a couple of centuries ago. Hence, if this conversion rule is 'true', it is not empirically true. [In fact it is better to call it "practical" and "useful" rather than true.]
None but the radically confused would dream of checking this rule by measuring something; it cannot be tested in practice. Indeed, such rules tell us when a practical interface with the world has been carried out aright, according to the set/implicit criteria. [On this, see Polanyi (1962, 1983).]
Thus, if something is empirically true, stipulating it as true would be a waste of effort. On the other hand, if something is empirically false, a stipulation to that effect (or to the opposite effect) would be pointless.
Of course, in contrast to the above, social/anthropological conventions are more complex and they are not based on explicit agreement, but that does not affect the point being made.
Plainly, the truth-value of an empirical proposition depends on the way the world is. However, the fact that such propositions are capable of possessing truth-values (that is, the fact that they have truth-conditions) is a consequence of the conventionalised linguistic practices human beings have developed over the course of their history. How could it be otherwise?
As will be argued In Essay Twelve Part One, previous philosophical (and ideologically-motivated) attempts to give inappropriate linguistic expression to these conventions (alongside their subsequent misinterpretation as super-empirical truths about reality) gave birth Metaphysics in Ancient Greece. Because metaphysical propositions are based on just such a misconstrual and misrepresentation of the linguistic products of the social relations among human beings (as if they pictured or represented the real relation among things, or, indeed, as if they were those things themselves), they are incapable of being true or false.
Since they are incapable of being true or false (because they are based on misconstrued rules, and because they mistake a social from for reality itself), metaphysical theses are not just non-sensical, they are fetishised non-sense. In such a way, in traditional Philosophy, distorted and misconstrued language like this was then used by traditional theorists to determine the 'essential' nature and 'logical form' of reality.
DM-theorists bought into in this age-old confusion when they too began to misconstrue the nature of the theses they found in Hegel. Then, as now, dialecticians indulge in metaphysical speculation whenever they misinterpret the products of the social relations among human beings as if they were the real relations among things, misidentifying the anthropological source of our linguistic practices as if they were 'natural', based on "reflection" and "inner representation"/"images" (etc.) --, reified into objects and/or process of some sort by an incautious use of the word "consciousness".39
Nevertheless, the above re-interpretation of DM is clearly be unacceptable to its apologists since they claim that even though their theory may only be partially true, it is nonetheless an empirically valid and objective theory about the world and how to transform it, verified in practice.
So, despite the fact that it carries all the hallmarks of conventionalism -- in that its adherents are quite happy to "insist" (as we found in TAR), or "demand" (as we saw with Lenin) that this or that DM-thesis is true throughout nature for all of time, based only on a set of idiosyncratic inferences drawn from a few specially-selected words -- DM, it seems, cannot be conventional.40
The only other way to account for DM-theorists' habit of making a priori, dogmatic and universal claims about reality is that DM is a metaphysical theory. Of course, this begs the question over what the correct definition of Metaphysics is --; this topic is discussed extensively in Essay Twelve Part One.
However, given Engels's own rather loose 'definition' of the term, dialecticians are clear that DM is not metaphysical. On the contrary, they regard DM as a scientific/materialist theory of the world and how to change it.41
IS DM A Scientific Theory, Then?
So, it could be argued that DM is in fact a scientific theory.
But, if so, what are we to make of the numerous a priori and universal theses --, to say nothing of the many "insistences" and "demands" -- its adepts constantly impose on nature?
It could be replied that DM-theses merely hypothetical. This doesn't seem possible. Whatever else they are, DM-theses are not hypothetical; they do not even look hypothetical. They are worded in ways that cannot, under any stretch of the imagination, be interpreted as hypothetical. Even leaving aside all the many "demands", "unthinkable's" and "insistences", the use of "musts", "eternals", "impossibles" and "never anywhere's", DM-theses are described by dialecticians as "laws of cognition", "objective" and as the most "general laws" there are. [On this see Essay Two, especially here.] Hence, if these theses are "hypothetical", the meaning of "hypothetical" must have changed.
Here are few examples of DM-'hypotheses':
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature."
"The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa…[operates] in nature, in a manner fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or quantitative subtraction of matter or motion….
"Hence, it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion…. In this form, therefore, Hegel's mysterious principle appears not only quite rational but even rather obvious." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 211. Bold emphases added.]
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted….
"A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]
"According to Hegel, dialectics is the principle of all life…. [M]an has two qualities: first being alive, and secondly of also being mortal. But on closer examination it turns out that life itself bears in itself the germ of death, and that in general any phenomenon is contradictory, in the sense that it develops out of itself the elements which, sooner or later, will put an end to its existence and will transform it into its opposite. Everything flows, everything changes; and there is no force capable of holding back this constant flux, or arresting its eternal movement. There is no force capable of resisting the dialectics of phenomena….
"At a particular moment a moving body is at a particular spot, but at the same time it is outside it as well because, if it were only in that spot, it would, at least for that moment, become motionless. Every motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction, and as there is not a single phenomenon of nature in explaining which we do not have in the long run to appeal to motion, we have to agree with Hegel, who said that dialectics is the soul of any scientific cognition. And this applies not only to cognition of nature….
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite….
"When you apply the dialectical method to the study of phenomena, you need to remember that forms change eternally in consequence of the 'higher development of their content….'
"In the words of Engels, Hegel's merit consists in the fact that he was the first to regard all phenomena from the point of view of their development, from the point of view of their origin and destruction….
"[M]odern science confirms at every step the idea expressed with such genius by Hegel, that quantity passes into quality….
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other….
"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….
"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….
"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., [sic] with any proposition...: [like] John is a man…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs of the concept of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say John is a man…we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other….
"Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as a 'nucleus' ('cell') the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58, 359-60. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphases added.]
"Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)….
"[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth' is always concrete, never abstract, as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin (1921), pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added.]
"[A]ll bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never equal to themselves…. [T]he axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist…. For concepts there also exists 'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic…, but by the dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing…. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradiction, conflict and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc…." [Trotsky (1971), pp.64-66. Bold emphases added.]
"It must be recognized that the fundamental law of dialectics is the conversion of quantity into quality, for it gives [us] the general formula of all evolutionary processes -– of nature as well as of society.
"…The principle of the transformation of quantity into quality has universal significance, insofar as we view the entire universe -- without any exception -- as a product of formation and transformation….
"In these abstract formulas we have the most general laws (forms) of motion, change, the transformation of the stars of the heaven, of the earth, nature and human society.
"…Dialectics is the logic of development. It examines the world -- completely without exception -– not as a result of creation, of a sudden beginning, the realisation of a plan, but as a result of motion, of transformation. Everything that is became the way it is as a result of lawlike development." [Trotsky (1986), pp.88, 90, 96. Bold emphases added.]
"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end....
"...There is nothing that does not contain contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"Thus it is already clear that contradiction exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or ideological phenomena....
"...Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of the development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end...." [Mao (1961b), pp.311-18. Bold emphases added.]
Many more (no less dogmatic) quotations from the DM-classics, and from modern day dialecticians, can be found in Essay Two.
Even so, DM-theorists often claim that their theory deals with "real material forces" and not "static, abstract" entities, which means that their main concern is with the inter-relationship between concretely developing and historically-conditioned objects and processes within the "Totality" (even if abstractions have to be employed dialectically to assist them to that end). Moreover, such theorising is undertaken as part of a their strategy to further the revolutionary transformation of society.
On this view, objects and processes in the "Totality" are said to change as a result both of their contradictory natures and their interconnections with other objects and processes -- i.e., because of the antagonistic forces at work within the whole.42 But, as DM-theorists themselves frequently insist, this does not spare them the difficult task of constantly checking their ideas against experience, and testing them in practice.
Unfortunately, the above characterisation simply catapults DM back into the metaphysical camp once more. This is because its theorists insist that everything in the Totality is related to (or mediated by) by something/everything else (depending on the emphasis), subject to change through 'internal contradictions', and so on --, even before so much as a vanishingly small fraction of the evidence has been collected. This, of course, explains all the above DM-"insistences", "musts", "impossibles", "absolutes" and "demands" (etc.).
Naturally, if there were proof (and dialecticians were in possession it), such "insistences" wouldn't be needed.
In fact, if this were not so there would seem to be little point arguing, as TAR does:
"[W]hen we bring these terms [belonging to the Totality] into relation with each other their meaning is transformed…. In a dialectical system, the entire nature of the part is determined by its relationships with the other parts and so with the whole. The part makes the whole, and the whole makes the parts.
"In this analysis, it is not just the case that the whole is more than the sum of the parts but also that the parts become more that they are individually by being part of a whole….
"[F]or dialectical materialists the whole is more than the simple sum of its parts." [Rees (1998a), pp.5, 77.]
The reason for saying this is that if parts and wholes are in fact interdependent (in the manner suggested), then DM-theorists would have no choice but to regard their system as an a priori construct. This is because no amount of evidence could confirm the truth of the above passage (or the many other quotations above and found throughout the DM-cannon).
If the entire nature of the part is determined by the whole (and vice versa) then that fact could itself only be confirmed when humanity knew everything about everything. Only when the whole was known would the nature of any part be known. Short of that -- according to what this passage says -- no one could know the full truth about any of the parts. But, until they know that (which blessed state we were told will never come to pass), they could assert nothing about the whole -- even, for instance, that it was indeed a whole, or even a whole. [On this, see here, and Part Two of this Essay.]
Hence, when DM-theorists assert things about parts and wholes (even if these assertions are just 'partial' or 'relative' truths), they would have to have access to knowledge that only the postulated epistemological end-state could supply (i.e., the state which constitutes complete or absolute knowledge).
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks; i.e., Lenin (1961); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998a).]
Even to assert that there are such things as parts and wholes (or that knowledge is merely partial, or relative -- or whatever) would require complete knowledge. If the entire nature of the part -- including at least this part of the total picture, that is, this part here in this Essay (or in TAR, or in PN -- or wherever), written in words on this page/screen (or on any page/screen) about partial knowledge itself -- were determined by the whole (and vice versa), then we would not be able to assert even this partial truth (if such it be) until 'epistemological judgement day' had arrived, and all was revealed to the congregated DM-Elect.
On the other hand, if the idea that there are parts and wholes that completely inter-condition one another (etc.) is not itself a partial truth (and hence not subject to the above strictures), it must be an absolute truth, and clearly one whose status has been decided upon before every genuine partial truth had even been formulated, let alone apprehended. But, this would then refute the content of that very notion itself (i.e., that there are parts and wholes and that they condition one another completely). This is because, on this view, at least one part (i.e., this view of the whole, or this view that is dependent on the whole being true) would not itself be conditioned by all other parts, since, plainly, they do not yet exist as items of knowledge. Hence, the entire nature of at least one part (i.e., this one) would not be dependent on all other parts.
Once more, if this is denied -- and that would itself have to be done in abeyance of the infinite amount of evidence required to support that contrary view --, it would be clear that this denial will have been imposed on part and whole, but not derived from either. [More on this in Part Two of this Essay.]
In short, sweep-of-the-hand Wholism of this sort is just a disguised form of apriorism.
Be this as it may, and despite what DM-theorists claim, it is possible to show that DM-theses have neither been checked against the available evidence in anything like the manner claimed, nor have they been derived from it.
Consider a typical DM-example, taken from the opening sentence of TAR:
"The very possibility of human life is governed by contradictions." [Rees (1998a), p.1.]
Admittedly, Rees lists several examples of contradictions that he thought supported this claim (which, as we have seen, turn out not to be contradictions, after all; on this see here). However, the above general claim cannot be -- and in TAR certainly was not -- verified by a careful analysis of all of the evidence. Indeed, no matter how much evidence DM-theorists amassed it would still only represent a tiny fraction of all the facts necessary to justify such a generalisation about "the very possibility of human life" and what governs it. Moreover, as noted earlier, given DM-epistemology, the gap between any large finite body of knowledge and Absolute Knowledge is itself infinite.
And this is not just to pick on TAR, this epistemological gap is a universal feature of DM. This was established a posteriori here.
Nevertheless, the existence of such a yawning chasm of ignorance has not deterred dialecticians from advancing any number of "demands", "requirements" and "insistences" about all of reality, for all of time -- i.e., that it is unified, 'contradictory', interconnected, "mediated", and that every last particle of it is constantly changing. Most of these claims go way beyond what could reasonably be justified by an appeal even to a large finite body of evidence. As we shall see, some of them cannot be verified -- let alone tested.42a
In fact, claims like these function in a different way, and to a specific end: they allow those who propound them to stipulate or lay-down theoretical criteria delineating the approach they intend to take over the interpretation of nature and society. They form part of a fetishised "form of representation". [More on the latter later; until then, cf., Glock (1996), pp.129-35.]
[The political and contingent psychological motivations for this set of DM-manoeuvres are analysed in Essay Nine Part Two and Essay Twelve (summary here).]
Verdict -- Guilty As Charged: DM Is Not A Science
It could still be maintained that DM is a science, and its supporters use the latest results of research to support the claims they make.
Despite this counterclaim, the fact that DM is conventional in form -- but metaphysical in both intent and content, all the while failing to be a science -- can be seen by examining the way DM-advocates themselves relate their ideas to the natural world.
DM-theorists take it as read that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it, but they are nevertheless quite happy to insist that they know in advance what its most general characteristics must be.
As a matter of historical record, these general features were not derived by DM-theorists from a scientific examination of reality, nor were they a representative summary of the whole of human experience to date. They were in fact copied from Hegel, who inherited them from previous generations of mystics, who in turn invented these ideas at a time when there was hardly any evidence at all. Even so, the latter were happy to impose these "general features" on nature, just as DM-theorists are. [More on this in Essays Two and Fourteen Part One (summary here).]
Granted that DM-theorists claim that these ideas have been given a materialist flip (which inversion turns out to be about as genuine as a nine bob note --, or a 99 cent coin, if you are reading this in the US).43 In spite of this, it is clear that because these general concepts supposedly relate to the "Totality" for all of space and time, they cannot have been obtained by anything other than a priori means, whoever dreamt them up, or through howsoever many degrees they have allegedly been rotated.
Of course, it could always be argued that wider theoretical considerations determine the validity of the conclusions drawn by DM-theorists. Indeed, it could also be maintained that this is exactly how scientists themselves make use of universal laws, which are likewise thought to operate across all of time and space. In that sense, if this approach to nature is based on centuries of experience, knowledge and increasing 'abstraction' -- and if this is not a problem for scientists -- then it can't be one for dialecticians.
Or so it could be maintained.
However, leaving aside the obvious point (that this response undermines completely the claim that DM has not been imposed on nature (for it openly admits it!)), DM is not like any known or conceivable science. Although the criteria distinguishing science from pseudo-science are somewhat controversial, one thing is reasonably clear: scientists cannot claim that the world is contradictory -- in whole or in part.
This idea cannot be entertained -- not because of an assumed adherence to bourgeois ideology, nor as a result of an alleged excessive "tenderness" toward the world -- but because it would make scientific description and research impossible.44
A scientific theory that admitted reality was contradictory would lose its ability to explain the course of events in nature. This is because any theory that contemplated the existence of contradictions everywhere would make it impossible to distinguish confirmation from refutation. If an empirical proposition and its contradictory were both true then confirmation and refutation would be all of a piece.45
[The handful of options available to DM-fans seemingly capable of avoiding that fatal conclusion are closed-off in Note 45.]
To be sure, on its own this does not prove that DM is misconceived, but it does show that it is not a science. And, as we will soon see, it is not even remotely like a science. In fact, if DM were correct, then scientific research would be impossible -- and for the reasons just aired.46
Dialectics In Hot Water
DM is not even remotely like a science because its theoretical/empirical propositions actually say nothing at all (if they are taken as they are intended by their authors), quite unlike scientific/empirical propositions. The latter present certain material possibilities, automatically excluding others. For instance, consider the following simple example:
S1: Water boils at 100°C.
[Of course, propositions like S1 are usually these days expressed as universally quantified conditionals.]
Given the usual ceteris paribus clauses, the truth of S1 makes the following sentence false (and vice versa):
S2: It is not the case that water boils at 100°C.
If the aforementioned ceteris paribus clauses (such as "under normal conditions of pressure and solvent purity", etc.) are ignored, S2 would itself become true under other circumstances -- e.g., if the water in question contained impurities, or if the ambient pressure changed (etc.). But even then, what S2 expresses would still rule out the truth of S1. Against the required background conditions -- or even without them -- when S1 is true, S2 is false, and vice versa.47
Compare this with a typical 'proposition' taken from DM (or at least from Trotsky):
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and it does not weigh 1 kg.
Whatever background is supplied for it, because S3 rules nothing out, it actually says nothing. [Why that is so will be explained presently.]
The import of the above would not change even if S1 were replaced by a more specific example:
S4: This particular mass/body/volume interval of water boils at 100°C.
In that case, based on S4, the temptation might be to think that further qualifications could allow both S1 and S2 to be true at once, as in the following:
S5: Parts of this body of water boil at 100°C, and parts do not.
S6: The same body of water may boil at 99.999°C on one occasion, and at 100.001°C on another, and parts of it might do both or neither, at the same time.
S3: This bag of sugar weighs 1 kg and it does not weigh 1 kg.
Clearly, this is because the predicate "ξ boils at 100°C" is vague. However, whereas this is a fault of language -- which can be remedied to some extent by greater precision -- the status of S3 does not depend on such equivocation (i.e., as DM-theorists themselves see things). That explains why dialecticians would resist any attempt to correct S3 on linguistic grounds alone (even to the extent that they would accuse anyone who tried to do this of "pedantry"); they view what it says as a report of the objective features of a constantly changing world. But, this just means that the DM-inspired abrogation of certain linguistic conventions (in this case those expressed/formalised by the LOC) denies S3 a sense; this is because whatever occurs, it will both refute and confirm S3. Even though this fatal DM-defect is self-inflicted, it would still not be one of vagueness.
[LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]
It could be argued that despite this, isn't it the case that S6 is still true? And isn't "ξ weighs 1 Kg" vague, too? Indeed, but S6 can be resolved to some extent purely linguistically (as can this particular predicable; i.e., "ξ weighs 1 Kg"). No DM-fan would accept the same for S3.
And that is why anyone who sought to advance the above DM-response would no doubt also object to the way that most if not all of the alleged contradictions (which they claim exist in nature and society) have been analysed away on purely linguistic grounds in other Essays published at this site; for example, in Essays Four to Eight Part Three. For such potential objectors, these are not linguistic issues plain and simple. But, as we have also seen, dialecticians can only make such claims (if they do) because of their own sloppy use of language and logic -- rather like Hegel.
The Fetishism Of The Word
The Regular Collapse Into Absurdity Of DM-Theses
Nevertheless, this partly explains why several earlier attempts (here and here) to correct/improve Engels and Trotsky's formulations of DM-type 'propositions' failed whatever was done to them. They either collapsed into conventionalistic platitudes, or they fell apart as non-sense. This is not a fate that ordinary empirical/scientific propositions ever have to endure.
Consider another example: according to Trotsky (and with more apparent sophistication, according to Hegel) it is impossible to represent the LOI by means of true propositions concerning concrete reality; that is, he claimed it is never true that "A is equal to A". [Of course, this is a gross misrepresentation of Hegel. Nevertheless, his ideas fall apart for other reasons; more on this in Essay Twelve -- until then, see here.]
However, if Trotsky were right, it would in fact be impossible to deny the truth of this 'law', as he attempted to do. This is because if anyone knowingly denied that the LOI was true, they would first have to possess some understanding of what it states; they would have to know what would be the case if the LOI were true -- even if only so that they could then rule that possibility out (for "concrete reality").
Clearly, this is something that can be (and typically is) done with respect to empirical propositions (i.e., it is possible to specify in advance of knowing they are true what circumstances would make them true). But if the LOI never applies to anything concrete -- and could never so apply -- its denial would rule nothing out, and that would present us with no truth claims at all.
So, according to DM-theorists, the LOI can never be true (in "concrete reality"). Paradoxically, therefore, anyone who denies the LOI rejects nothing substantive -- for plainly such a denial would have to rule out the truth of whatever it was that was being rejected. But, if it is impossible to say in true propositions what the LOI proposes, then its 'denial' will achieve nothing at all. The whole charade is just an empty ritual.48
An appeal to the alleged defects of language (as part of an explanation as to why the above is the case) would be to no avail here, either. Even if it were to be maintained that our words for identity are only 'approximately' true -- or true only within "certain limits" -- that would not help. That is because, for this to work, we would still have to have some comprehension of the words contained in an expression of the LOI (even an approximation). In turn, this is because we would need to recognise those words as an approximation to genuine identity, as opposed to being an approximation perhaps to something completely different --, such as, say, courage, fortitude or cowardice. Hence, even dialecticians will need to have some grasp of genuine identity statements to know whether or not they were indeed approximations to it, and not something else.48a
This much was at least clear to Plato 2500 years ago (even if he drew all the wrong conclusions from it).49
Hence, DM-type propositions say nothing because they rule nothing (material) out, and hence nothing in.50
Of course, just like other linguistically competent human beings, DM-apologists understand perfectly well how to use words for identity –- such as, "similar", "equal", "equivalent", "same" and "identical" --, along with their qualifiers (e.g., "exactly", "precisely", "very", "nearly", and "almost"). A grasp of such terms comes from their employment in everyday life, not from a supposed 'law'. Nor does this facility arise from the 'negation', nor yet the double negation, of the LOI. [More on this here.] In fact, it is everyday facility with words for identity (etc.) that enables DM-theorists themselves to engage in the pretence that they think the LOI is false when it is applied to objects and events in concrete reality. They understand the LOI because they are language-users, and yet it is their subsequent misconstrual of socially-conditioned rules for the use of such words as empirical truths that ultimately misleads them.
In short: dialecticians mistake a social norm for reality itself, and then make a fetish of the result.
How and why this occurs will be explained in Essay Nine Parts One and Two, and Essay Twelve.
It is also worth pointing out that DM-theorists are not alone in doing this. Because the LOI itself says nothing (i.e., it has no empirical content, it's a misleading expression of a rule of language), and because of its status as a 'necessary truth' in traditional Philosophy, metaphysicians/theorists in general have also mistaken this social norm for reality itself. Viewed in this way, the LOI is supposed to reflect an 'industrial-strength' truth, as it were, which is supposed to apply to everything in existence, in so far as each object or process is allegedly related to itself. It thus appears to tell us how things are and must be, and how they cannot be conceived of otherwise.
Thus, a misconstrued feature of the way we use words for sameness and difference is transformed into a 'law' that 'allows' philosophers to uncover fundamental aspects nature by thought alone -- which is, of course, why they think the LOI can be declared true (a priori) independently of any state of the world.
Indeed, this is also why dialecticians pretend they can deny this 'law' is applicable to concrete reality by means of thought alone, -- that is, by an appeal to certain 'thought experiments' (a là Trotsky and/or Hegel).
These are just two sides of the same metaphysical coin.
Interpreted like this, the LOI seems to rule certain things in as 'necessarily true', others out as 'necessarily false'. Unfortunately, it is impossible to deny the 'truth' of the LOI in any language whatsoever -- i.e., one that has the required vocabulary -- without also having to use that very same 'law' (as a linguistic rule) in the very act of attempting to do just that!
We saw this in Essay Six, where it was shown that Trotsky had to rely on the identity of temporal instants in order to deny the absolute identity of certain bags of sugar --, i.e., so that he could refer to the same moment in time during which an object or process was not self-identical.
As should seem obvious, it is impossible to say what (1) the LOI rules out as 'false' -- and hence, (2) what it rules in as 'true'. As we have seen, trying to do either of these would be to misinterpret this rule as a super-empirical proposition that purports to tell us about fundamental features of reality (based on thought/language alone). If (2) above cannot be attempted without falling into just such confusion, then neither can (1) -- at least, not by means of empirical propositions. [Why this is so is explained in detail here.]
Now, it was argued in Essay Three Part One that this sort of 'problem' arose (in Ancient Greece) because philosophers attempted to conjure into existence abstruse concepts by means of a process of 'abstraction'. In this particular case, a universal and super-empirical 'law' (that is, one that is supposedly 'true' of every object in reality, in 'relation' to itself) was abstracted from the ordinary use of words for sameness and difference -- on this, see Essay Six.50aa
It is this false move that sets-up the 'necessary' truth this 'law' supposedly expresses. In this way, therefore, the ordinary application of everyday words for identity was transformed into a general thesis about the ultimate, abstract structure of reality -- or rather, the socialised rules governing the use of words were reified in written form as the LOI. It was this physical form which was then misconstrued as an expression of a super-empirical "truth of reason" which supposedly revealed fundamental aspects of reality, valid for all of space and time.
Dialecticians have bought into this fetishisation of the written word, making the opposite error of supposing this reified social norm is a 'law' that is only 'partially true' (or 'both true and not true', or completely false (depending on which DM-fan is telling the tale)) of everything concrete in reality.
Once again, these are just two sides of the same metaphysical coin.
However, in order to achieve either result (i.e., that which appertains to the 'truth' of the traditional 'law', and that which encapsulates its DM-'repudiation'/qualification), one specific semantic feature of language -- that is, an aspect of discourse which relates to truth or falsehood -- has to be promoted at the expense of another. In this case, truth has to be promoted at the expense of its logical twin, falsehood. Elsewhere it might be the other way round.
Traditionally, the LOI was allegedly aimed at accounting for the truth of an identity statement -- and only for its truth, since the LOI was a 'law of reason'. However, this move only succeeded in undermining the paired semantic foundations of empirical propositions. In the end, by emphasizing truth and ignoring falsehood, neither is catered for.
This is because empirical propositions (i.e., those pertaining to the facts of the matter) leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-values cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine their semantic status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood has been ascertained. [The reasoning behind these statements is detailed in Essay Twelve Part One.]
When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, when propositions are said to be "necessarily true", or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. In addition, such propositions lose any capacity they once seemed to have of expressing truth or falsehood -- they become non-sensical.
In order to see why this is so, consider the following sentence (M1) taken from Lenin's MEC. Because he maintained its truth, he would presumably have declared M2 necessarily false (if not "unthinkable"):
M1: Matter without motion is unthinkable.
M2: Matter can sometimes exist without motion.
Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare M2 necessarily (and always) false, the possibility of its truth must first be entertained. This is because, if the truth of M2 is to be permanently excluded by holding it as necessarily false (or "unthinkable"), then whatever would make it true has to be ruled out conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what M2 rules in so that he/she could comprehend what M1 was ruling out as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done if what M2 itself says is permanently ruled out by M1 on conceptual grounds.
Consequently, if a proposition like M2 is necessarily false, this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) cannot take place -- since it would be impossible to say (or to think) what could count as making M2 true.
However, because the truth of M2 cannot even be conceived, Lenin was in no position to say what was excluded by its rejection. If M2 can never be true, and never even thought to be true (because of M1), then it can never be thought not true (since, plainly, "not true" is semantically the same as "false").
Unfortunately, this prevents any account being given of what would make M2 false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, M2 would now be necessarily false if and only if it was not capable of being thought of as necessarily false!
Hence, while it might seem that M2 could be thought of as necessarily false if and only if what would make it true could at least be entertained so that it could then be ruled out as necessarily false, this is not so. According to Lenin, the conditions that would make M2 true cannot even be conceived, so this train of thought cannot be joined at any point. In that case, if the truth of M2 -- or the conditions under which it would be true -- cannot be conceived, then neither can its falsehood, for we would not then know what was being ruled out.
This means that whoever propounds such a thesis would have to know what a proposition using "matter without motion" rules in so that he/she knows exactly what it rules out as always and necessarily false. And yet, this is precisely what cannot be done if "matter without motion" is "unthinkable".
Such Super-Empirical theses thus collapse under the weight of their own defective use of language. They become non-sensical.
Which is why Marx said the following:
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
Once more: by emphasizing one semantic feature of language ('necessary' truth, or 'necessary' falsehood), both options become non-viable.
A similar fate awaits all such 'necessary' truths (and 'necessary' falsehoods) -- as will be demonstrated in detail in Essay Twelve Part One.
In this way, therefore, the 'necessary truth' the LOI supposedly expresses in fact undermines itself -- and because of this it fails even to be an empirical truth (nor yet an empirical falsehood). Just like the other pseudo-propositions of metaphysics, the above semantic antics deprive both this 'law' and its denial of all content. The original rule of language asserts noting true and nothing false of reality (for it is a socialised rule that encapsulates how we use certain words --, and, plainly, rules can neither be true nor false, only useful/practical or otherwise). Even though the LOI masquerades as a super-empirical proposition both in traditional philosophy and DM-circles, it too asserts nothing of the world (because it is merely a fetishised/ distorted rule).
The LOI lacks an empirical sense (i.e., it is empty of content) because it presents no truth conditions -- that is, it expresses no conditions that must obtain for it to be true, or for it to be false. [Of course, that is why traditional theorists thought they could derive the supposed 'necessary' truth this 'law' on purely conceptual and/or linguistic grounds, independently of any evidence.]50a
Empirical propositions are different in this respect: the semantic status of such propositions is sensitive to evidence -- truth and falsehood cannot simply be read-off from the words they contain. The latter have to face material reality to be declared one way or the other.
Misconstrued rules, like the LOI, thus become metaphysical by their misconstrual in the above way: their 'truth' can be read from the words they contain -- or so it seemed to the vast majority of traditional theorists.
Thus, metaphysicians throughout history have concentrated their efforts on devising theories about reality that could only be true, and never false. Unfortunately, by doing this, these theorists have in fact prevented their theories from being either, as we have seen.
In everyday life, the use of ordinary words for identity is not defective in the this way. The employment of such words is not based on super-empirical 'truths' about the world, but is based on socially-conditioned practices (which cannot be either true or false).
Another specialised feature of language (i.e., one that also expresses no truth-conditions) also underlies the LOC. As with the LOI, the LOC does not express a deep metaphysical truth about the world -- since it is not a truth to begin with. It encapsulates a rule of language/logic that expresses a convention for the use of the negative particle (based, once more, on social practices), which is impossible to abrogate without discourse degenerating into non-sense (or, as Aristotle himself noted, without communication and rationality breaking down).
Of course, DM-theorists have compounded this traditional error by construing the LOC, not as a 'rule', but as an abstraction that is always (or often) concretely false. Small wonder then that they have found it impossible to communicate their ideas clearly to anyone --, least of all to one another -- in over 150 years (as indeed Aristotle warned us 2400 years ago). [On this see Essays Four through Eight Part Three.]
In short, metaphysical theses masquerade as empirical propositions; by aping the latter, they purport to reveal truths about the world. However, they are promulgated by their inventors as if they expressed deeper and more profound universal verities, posing as super-empirical, necessary or industrial-strength truths. But, this is precisely what denies them any sense: in so far as they are based on a misconstrual of the rules we use to make sense of our surroundings, and of one another, they soon descend into non-sense, and are thus incapable of being either true or false.
And this is why DM cannot be a science: its 'propositions' do not just say nothing about the world, they say nothing at all about anything whatsoever. Because dialecticians misconstrue socialised linguistic rules -- which enable genuinely substantive truths about the world to be stated in empirical propositions --, for super-empirical truths, an error they then compound by employing impenetrable jargon derived from the mystical pseudo-knowledge found in Hegel's Logic, their theses are not just senseless, they are non-sensical, to boot.
DM: Just A Method?
If DM is neither conventional nor metaphysical -- and it's not a science -- then perhaps it is simply a method? However, few DM-theorists appear willing to accept such a deflationary conclusion.51
Pick Your Mystic
I began this Essay with some impertinent remarks about the obvious similarities that exist between the DM-"Totality" and 'God'. Now that we are nearing the end, we are in a better position to re-assert the same remarks, but without that initial and peremptory impertinence. Indeed, we can now see why they were fully justified.
Every mystical system of which we have any knowledge appealed to some form of Whole, or "Totality",52 -- often identified with 'God' --, to account for reality. [See, for example, here and here, but a complete list of examples would be endless.]
Traditionally, theorists soon found that it was impossible to relate each 'mortal soul' caught up in this metaphysical mangle to the 'infinite cause' of their existence (and thus to the "Totality") without either destroying the limited nature of the former (turning them into infinite beings too, or 'aspects' of 'God') -- or 'blaspheming' the latter (equating 'Him' with finite beings).
This artificially-induced 'difficulty' re-surfaced later in a different form as the "central problematic of German Idealism" (i.e., as part of the infamous "subject-object identity" quandary),53 which in turn reappeared in Engels, and later in Lenin's work as the following:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute… The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35. Bold emphasis added.]
"…[T]he concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Conrad Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975), p.457. Bold emphasis added.]
"But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to [any material object]; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world….
"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely…. [D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Lenin (1921), pp.92-93. Bold emphasis added.]
"To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with (sic) any proposition…. Here we already have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognized): the individual is the universal…. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical; the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or aspect, or the essence of) an individual." [Lenin (1961), p.359.]
And again as part of the following:
"The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being." [Engels (1888), p.593.]
Here, this same problematic surfaces in epistemological guise, but formulated in a way that sent the DM-'theory of knowledge' off on a 'wild-concept-chase' (analysed in more detail in Essay Three Parts One to Six). In MEC, Lenin tried to bridge the artificial gap that this ancient dichotomy had introduced in DM-epistemology, but it is obvious by the way he thrashed about aimlessly (these random moves are exposed in Essay Thirteen Part One) that he hadn't a clue how to go about it. Nor has anyone else since.
This unresolved 'problem' still dogs DM-epistemology, which is one reason why the writings of HCDs are impenetrably obscure, and those of LCDs are impressively superficial.
[MEC = Materialism And Empirio-Criticism (i.e., Lenin (1972); HCD = High Church Dialectician; LCD = Low Church Dialectician; follow the links above for an explanation.]
In a mystical system, not only is it impossible to comprehend either side of the ontological Grand Canyon that separates 'Being' from 'you-or-me-ing', it is even more difficult to re-connect them.
So, it seems that this smashed Cosmic Egg cannot be put back together again.
Figure Ten: The Central Problematic
Of German Idealism?
No wonder then that DM-theorists are so vague, confused and repetitive.
This whole motif is indeed one of the "ruling ideas" that have dominated human thought, East and West, North and South, for thousands of years; and it is one that Mystical Marxists have yet even to recognise, let alone cast aside.
This is how Marx depicted things:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65. Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]
Be this as it may, dialecticians reject the accusation that their system is mystical, in fact they become quite offended by such an allegation. This is partly because it is thrown at them so many times, partly because they claim to have neutralised the mystical influence of Hegel's system by up-ending it -- thus leaving behind only its "rational core" --, and partly because they see their theory as quintessentially scientific.
As these Essays show, the last two of the above reasons are so monumentally wide of the mark that the resulting gap makes the Grand Canyon look like a crack in a cosmic egg in comparison.
The first, of course, is their problem.
However, Rees does at least try to punch his way out of this mystical paper bag, as follows:
"Totality alone is not, however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation.... 'The Taoist tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.' [Quoting Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.274-75.]
"...What unites all these explanations is that they see the totality as static. Beneath all the superficial bustle of the world lies an enduring eternal truth, the unchanging face of God, the ceaseless search for balance between yin and yang.... What they lack is any notion of totality as a process of change. And even where such system grant the possibility of instability, it is considered merely a prelude to he restored equilibrium....
"But, even taken together, change and totality are not sufficient to define a dialectical system. In addition we have to provide some general indication of how such change originates....
"A dialectical approach seeks to find the cause of change within the system.... If change is internally generated it must be a result of contradiction, of instability and development as inherent properties of the system itself." [Rees (1998a), pp.6-7.]
But as we will see, there are countless mystical systems that appeal to the sorts of things Rees denies of them to account for change (Hegel's being the most obvious!), and which see the world as a process. A long list will be given in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here); until that is published, some of this material can be found here. [See also here.]
However, the opposite view to that presented by Rees is well summed up in this passage:
"The ancient Egyptians believed that a totality must consist of the union of opposites. A similar premise, that the interaction between yin (the female principle) and yang (the male principle) underlies the workings of the universe, is at the heart of much Chinese thinking. The idea has been central to Taoist philosophy from the fourth century B.C. to the present day and is still embraced by many Chinese who are not Taoists. Nor is the idea confined to the Egyptians and the Chinese. Peoples all over the world, in Eurasia, Africa and the Americas, have come to the conclusion that the cosmos is a combining of opposites and that one of the most important aspects of this dualism is the opposition between male and female." [Maybury-Lewis (1992), p.125. Bold emphases added.]
So, still in the paper bag, then...
Via Negativa -- Or Viagra?
We have now reached the bottom of the DM-barrel; but still no Hamlet.
Nevertheless, we do know a little more about what the "Totality" isn't -- chief among which is that it isn't at all clear what it is.
At best, this DM-non-hero has wilted under this relentless via negativa, and seemingly in need of some Viagra to revive his flagging fortunes.
Indeed, I rather think there is something rotten in the State of Dialectics.
----------oOo----------
But wait! Perhaps this is too quick? Maybe the above conclusions are a direct result of the present author trying to analyse dialectical theses, while ignoring the holistic and "mediated" nature of reality --, wherein all things are conditioned by everything else?
There is some truth in this counter-allegation --, but fortunately not much.
By the end of the next Part of this Essay, even this slender ray of dialectical hope will have been extinguished.
For in Part Two the DM-'non-Hamlet' (the "Totality") will be put out of its mediated misery, and executed.
May the non-existent deity have no mercy on its insubstantial soul.
1. The comments of other DM-luminaries on this topic are recorded below in Note 25. Of course, several of the latter declare that they cannot actually tell us what their core ideas are in this area since that would pin reality down, and make DM formalistic -- this coming from comrades who repeat endlessly the 'Three Laws' of dialectics, along with the other dialectical-mantras from their Holy Books, and who will not tolerate 'Revisionism'! --, even though they end up doing just that, as we have seen.
So, this excuse is as bogus as much else that is found in DIM.
[DIM = Dialectical Marxism/Marxist; HM = Historical Materialism.]
Georg Novack, for example, waxed indignant in his heroic struggle with the 'forces of unreason', which apparently (and unfairly) required him to tell them exactly what he believed. And yet, he was quite happy to demand of them the sorts things he denied that they could require of him in return: concrete details and clarity. [On this, see Novack (1971), pp.69-83. More comments on this topic will be added at a later date.]
Several of those who have read this far (and apparently no further) have complained that I haven't quoted more recent dialecticians on this topic. The reason for that is quite plain (indeed, I covered this very point in the main body of this Essay, here): search as I might, I couldn't find anyone more recent to quote who did not say more-or-less exactly what the DM-classicists opined. Sure, many had much to say about social wholes (but even then, we are still not told what precisely constitutes one of these social wholes), but as this form of holism is not being questioned here (since it is plainly part of HM, a theory I fully accept), it is hardly relevant to the aims of this Essay.
And since there are few books and articles on this nebulous theory that I haven't read, the mystery deepens.
2. Rees also had this to say:
"[N]ature forms a totality, which it must unless we depart from materialism completely and become believers in the supernatural…." [Rees (1998a), p.78.]
Alas, this doesn't add much to our knowledge of the "Totality", but it does confirm that Rees probably identifies it with nature. Or, rather, since he says that nature forms a totality, it is reasonable to assume he intends this to be the DM-"Totality". However, according to Rees, I cannot say whether nature forms the whole of the "Totality", or only part, since he does not.
2a. Of course, Rees has an answer to this:
"Totality alone is not, however, a sufficient definition of the dialectic. Many undialectical views of society make use of the idea of totality. The Catholic Church has its own mystical view of the all-embracing nature of God's creation and a very practical view of the temporal hierarchy that goes with it. 'The Taoist tradition in China shares with dialectics the emphasis on wholeness, the whole being maintained by the balance of opposites such as yin and yang.'... [Rees is here quoting Levins and Lewontin (1985), p.275.]
"What unites all these explanations is that they see the totality as static....What they lack is any notion of a totality as a process of change. And even where such systems grant the possibility of instability and change, it is considered merely as a prelude to a restored equilibrium....
"Change, development, instability, on the other hand, are the very conditions for which a dialectical approach is designed to account." [Rees (1998a), p.6.]
However, as we are about to see, there are mystical systems that view the world almost exactly as DM-theorists do: an unstable, developing and changing Whole constituted by countless 'unities of opposites'. For example, this is how the Kybalion (supposedly the third most important book of Hermetic Philosophy) puts things:
"CHAPTER X POLARITY Everything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled." -- The Kybalion.
"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle -- the Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,' and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree'; and that the 'universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything....
"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests; everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.
"The great Third Hermetic Principle -- the Principle of Vibration -- embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the Universe-that nothing is at rest-that everything moves, vibrates, and circles. This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.
"The Hermetic Teachings are that not only is everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences' between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL, in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter. Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes of vibration.
"Modern Science has proven that all that we call Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion. Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in matter and energy.
"In the first place, science teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same things-it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes. The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc., which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first can be found here; the second here. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
It's also worth recalling that Hegel (who was, of course, a Hermetic Philosopher par excellence), a Wholist with the best of them, also believed in change through contradiction (which fact, oddly enough, Rees seems to have forgotten!). [On this, see also here.]
[Several more examples of mystical systems like this can be found here. Many more will be given in Essay Fourteen Part One.]
So, the "Totality", change and contradiction are just as much at home in mystical Hermeticism as they are in DM -- which is hardly surprising given the fact that the latter emerged from the former.
Finally, we have also seen that contrary to what Rees asserts DM itself cannot cope with change!
3. This means that much of what appears in Jay (1984) is not relevant to this enquiry.
4. Of course, Rees is not the only one who advances such claims; on this, see Note 25.
It could be argued that this is unfair since Rees points out that these mystical systems do not appeal to "internal contradictions" to account for change, but this is not so. As we saw above (and here) rarely does a mystic fail to appeal to unities of opposites to account for change and stability.
5. Rees does however make several other comments about the "Totality" in later parts of TAR, but most of these relate either to the Epistemological Definition (discussed later), or to the social and historical ramifications of DM-Holism (which aspects I largely ignore in this work). Even so, these additional comments add little or nothing to our knowledge of the "Totality" in so far as it applies to the natural world.
Are Dialectical Contradictions Different?
However, even though dialecticians depict the "Totality" as internally 'contradictory', they do not in general regard flatly self-contradictory theories (or propositions) as true (or "fully true") -- as TAR itself acknowledges (e.g., p.235). Indeed, DM-fans are quite happy to regale us with the many internal/absurd contradictions they find in rival theories, which, in their eyes, are sufficient to condemn them.
For example, on p.84 of TAR, the Young Hegelians are criticized for being "self-contradictory", as are bourgeois ideologues in general (p.238). Even Kant himself is not spared (p.47). Similarly, Engels was not averse to rejecting certain theories on the same basis: cf., Engels (1976), pp.26, 63-65, 171, 247 and 324-25. Lenin also used this tactic: cf., Lenin (1972), pp.76, 94, 95, 97, 195, 256, 274, and 281. More recently, Tony Cliff, for instance, found he was able to dismiss the ideas put about by certain OTTs on the grounds that they were "contradictory"; cf., Cliff (1999), pp.28-30.
Similarly, Ted Grant latched onto the many "contradictions" he claimed could be found in Cliff's State Capitalist Theory:
"Any analysis of Russian society must start from that basis. Once Cliff admits that while capitalism is declining and decaying on a world scale, yet preserving a progressive role in Russia in relation to the development of the productive forces, then logically he would have to say that state capitalism is the next stage forward for society, or at least for the backward countries. Contradictorily, he shows that the Russian bourgeoisie was not capable of carrying through the role which was fulfilled by the bourgeoisie in the West and consequently the proletarian revolution took place....
"We have seen that if the law of value only applies because of the existence of capitalism in world economy, then it would only apply to those products exchanged on the world market. But Cliff argues two contradictory theses in relation to the Russian economy....
"Cliff gives two contradictory answers to these questions. On the one hand he agrees that it is the law of value on which all calculations and the movement of Russian society develops. On the other, he finds the law of value only operating as the result of pressure from the outside world although how he does not explain in any serious way....
"If one takes into account the fact that this follows the previously quoted passage in the same section where Engels defines capitalist mode of production (as social production, individual appropriation), we must conclude that Engels hopelessly contradicts himself, if we accept Cliff's conclusions." [Grant (1949), quoted from here. Bold emphases added.]
Even the Great Leader Himself was not above using this tactic (in criticism of Bukharin and Trotsky):
"What does all this show? It shows that the opposition has got entangled in contradictions. It has lost the capacity to think logically...." [Stalin (1927), p.78.]
In contrast, the very same individuals are remarkably forgiving of -- if not completely blind to -- the many contradictions that riddle DM. [There are in fact countless examples of this dialectical double standard; more will be added later.] [Cf., Schaff (1960).]
[TAR = The Algebra Of Revolution, or Rees (1998a); OTT = Orthodox Trotskyist Theorist.]
In fact, this is not quite right. As we discovered in Essay Nine Part Two, DM-contradictions are deployed whenever a dialectician wants to derive/justify a counter-intuitive (if not overtly counter-revolutionary) conclusion. In such cases, self-contradiction becomes something to be praised, if not gloried in. Witness Stalin:
"It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted here.]
Many more examples are given here.
Nevertheless, DM-theorists often distinguish between "absurd" or "insoluble" contradictions [e.g., Engels (1976), pp.154, 26, respectively] and their own superior, but mutant, "dialectical" strain.
And yet the only way to tell these apart seems to be that the former are to be found in rival theories, while the latter are integral to (their own version of) DM.
Moreover, DM-contradictions and are not only there to be used to rationalise political expediency, but they also serve as a handy way of distinguishing those who "understand" dialectics from those who do not, thus separating the sheep from the goats.
Of course, such DM-contractions have simply to be "grasped", or Nixoned, and the problems they introduce are meant to be quietly ignored. Not so with those of their rivals! They must trumpeted from the rooftops.
However, DM-advocates have yet to provide us with non-question-begging criteria (or any at all!) that distinguish theories that postulate the existence of contradictions everywhere from those that are flatly self-contradictory, and are thus to be rejected.
Indeed, Rees, for example, goes on to argue that superior theories are those that are "less internally contradictory" and "more internally coherent" than their inferior rivals [Rees (1998a), pp.235, 237], among other things. But this claim is made without any attempt to explain why it must be a defect for a rival theory to be self-contradictory when it is not a defect for DM-theorists to claim that reality itself is contradictory, with every object and process therein internally self-contradictory. If reality is contradictory, then any (even partially) true theory that reflected this state of affairs accurately should reproduce those contradictions in its theoretical and empirical content --, surely?
This predicament we might call the Dialectician's Dilemma. [DD]
In order to explain this further let us call those theories that are self-contradictory, "defective theories" (DTs, for short). Also, let us say (for the sake of argument) that DTs include all and only DM's rival theories. Conversely, let all and only those theories that adequately reflect the contradictory nature of reality (such as DM) be called "non-defective theories" (NDTs, henceforth). So, on this basis, DM is the one and only NDT; all the rest are DTs.
But paradoxically, an NDT must also be a DT! This is because, by accurately capturing the contradictory nature of the universe, an NDT must be self-contradictory at some point, or to some extent -- otherwise, it would not be able to mirror reality in all its contradictory glory -- and hence, it must be a DT!
In that case, there would be no good reason to reject any particular DT in favour of an NDT (on the basis, at least, that it was self-contradictory), since both DTs and NDTs must contain/internalise such contradictions. Hence, because of their commitment to DM, dialecticians would have no good reason to reject an alternative theory on grounds that it was a DT, since DM is itself a DT by being an NDT!
This is how Rees poses the problem:
"In a certain sense, of course, all truth is relative -- it is just that some theorists do not acknowledge this elementary fact. There is no final, faultless, criterion for truth which hovers, like god, outside the historical process. Neither is there any privileged scientific method which is not shaped by the contours of the society of which it is a part. All that exists are some theories which are less internally contradictory and have a greater explanatory power…. [I]f the truth is the totality, then it is the totality of working class experience, internationally and historically which gives access to the truth…. [A theory's] validity must be proven by its superior explanatory power -- [which means it is] more internally coherent, more widely applicable, capable of greater empirical verification -- in comparison with its competitors. Indeed, this is a condition of it entering the chain of historical forces as an effective power. It is a condition of it being 'proved in practice.' If it is not superior to other theories in this sense, it will not 'seize the masses,' will not become a material force, will not be realized in practice." [Rees (1998a), pp.235-37. Bold emphasis added.]
Clearly, Rees holds that the more accurate the theory, the fewer internal-contradictions it should contain. Thus, the 'more true' DM becomes the fewer contradictions it should either envisage or encompass -- hence the fewer it should picture as existing in nature! But, in doing that -- according to the DM-view of reality -- 'Materialist Dialectics' would become decreasingly true since, by eliminating its own contradictions, it would less faithfully reflect the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly litter the natural world.
This means that when fully true, an NDT like DM ought to depict no contradictions at all in reality! And yet by its own lights, in doing that, it would become completely false. Hence, such an NDT would become a DT once more (and in another sense): by failing to reflect the contradictions that dialecticians claim exist in reality!
On the other hand, if this were not so, and dialecticians should not eliminate any or all of the contradictions that exist in their theory, then DM would become/remain a DT, and thus ought to be rejected accordingly. Indeed, in that case, 'Materialist Dialectics' would have been killed-off by its own internal contradictions!
[This is, of course, a fitting and somewhat ironic end to a theory that declares that change can only come about through 'internal contradiction' -- including the suicide of a theory that says just that!]
On the other hand, if it is indeed a fact that reality is contradictory then no true theory should fail to reflect that fact. But, if a theory (and an NDT to boot) faithfully reflects the contradictions that exist in reality it would automatically become a DT; thus, in doing what it was 'designed' to do, an NDT (like DM) would become a DT for its pains, once more.
[Of course, it could always be argued that dialecticians do not hold that all the contradictions in a given theory should be eliminated -- although I have yet to read this particular counter-claim in a DM-text --, but if that were the case, as I noted here, the advancement of science would grind to a halt as a result.]
Conversely, once more, DTs would become NDTs in yet another sense, if their supporters removed the internal contradictions they contained.
In either case, the DM-thesis that reality is contradictory sends NDTs one way (into oblivion) and DTs the other!
This, then, is the DD.
[DD = Dialecticians' Dilemma; DT = Defective Theory; NDT = Non-Defective Theory.]
[The DD is outlined in more detail, but from a different angle, here. As we will see in Essay Thirteen Part Two (where DM-theorists' ideas about scientific change will be examined at length), a corollary of this dilemma is that the DM-account of scientific change is also fatally compromised.]
In fact, the full consequences of this dilemma (for dialecticians) are really quite disastrous -- as we are now about to find out.
DM-theorists claim that all true theories are converging on a final Absolute Truth (on this, see Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published), even if this end point will never actually be attained. If this is true, it is possible to show that DM is actually moving away from the goal of giving even a minimally-true picture of reality. In fact, given TAR's criterion for theoretical correctness, we are in a position to declare right now that reality is a 'contradiction-free' zone. This is because the truer the theory, the more it must conform with the claim that reality contains no contradictions. If it did not do this, it would be a DT, since it would contain contradictions which its supporters would have no good reason to remove. And, as TAR's criterion indicates, such a theory should be rejected as defective.
Alternatively, if we reject TAR's criterion, the result would be little different: if DM is supposed to retain its contradictions, it would be a DT, and must be rejected. In that case, the picture of reality it paints would be entirely incorrect; thus DM cannot be progressing toward 'the truth'.
In order to make these general points more concrete, consider an example: assume for the purposes of argument that motion is in fact contradictory. If so, no fully true theory could afford to admit this 'fact' for fear of becoming a DT thereby. Indeed, in order to avoid such an outcome, DM-theorists would have to abandon the idea that motion is contradictory, or risk their theory being classified as a DT. Hence, no NDT can afford to countenance the contradictory nature of motion.
Naturally, that just means that those who already reject Engels's analysis of motion are at this moment closer to the truth than he was -- or than his epigones are, or than Hegel was 200 years ago --, for such opponents already declare that motion is not contradictory (or in my case: already declare that such a supposition makes no sense).
Of course, anyone who does not like this particular DM-'contradiction' should substitute for it the one that Stalin found in the nature of the 'workers' state, or, indeed, an almost identical contradiction Ted Grant found there too:
"The whole contradiction, a contradiction within the society itself and not imposed arbitrarily -- is in the very concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If one considers the problem in the abstract, one can see that this is a contradictory phenomenon: the abolition of capitalism yet the continuation of classes. The proletariat does not disappear. It raises itself to the position of ruling class and abolishes the capitalist class. But in the intervening period it remains the working class. Therefore, surplus product in the form of surplus value is produced. It is the case today as it was under Lenin and Trotsky. We have only to pose the problem: what was the surplus value produced when Russia was still a workers' state -- though even then with bureaucratic deformations? What was the process by means of which surplus product before 1928 mysteriously became surplus value after 1928?..." [Grant (1949), pp.212-13. Bold Emphasis added.]
And supporters of Cliff's theory can substitute for it the following:
"Dialectical historical development, full of contradictions and surprises, brought it about that the first step the bureaucracy took with the subjective intention of hastening the building of 'socialism in one country' became the foundation of the building of state capitalism." [Cliff (1988), p.166.]
"State capitalism and a workers' state are two stages in the transition period from capitalism to socialism. State capitalism is the extreme opposite of socialism -- they are symmetrically opposed, and they are dialectically united with one another." [Ibid., p.174.]
A theory like this that justifies anything at all -- no matter how contradictory it might otherwise seem --, and its opposite, is naturally of great use to opportunists and counter-revolutionaries of every stripe; which is, of course, one reason why they defend it to the death -- of countless workers!
The only apparent way of avoiding these fatal defects would be to argue that no theory that truly reflects the contradictions that allegedly exist in reality would be self-contradictory, and thus become a DT as a result.
Fortunately, it is quite easy to show that this counter-claim is itself incorrect.
The argument substantiating that allegation begins with the following innocuous-looking observations:
D1: (a) If DM were correct then reality would contain contradictions. (b) DM postulates the existence of just such contradictions.
Just in case this appears to get things the wrong way round (in that it begins with theory and not with reality), we need only reflect on the fact that since we do not have direct access to reality, only an indirect route by way of increasingly less inadequate theories about it -- even according to DM-theorists --, this is a move dialecticians would have to make themselves. [Indeed, TAR itself appears to concede this point -- on page 63, paragraph 2.]
Anyway, even if an attempt were made to 'begin from reality' (whatever that means) -- presumably with the unmediated observation of a least one material contradiction in nature (as part of a sort of languageless, concept-free 'apperception'/'intuition'(??)) --, the conclusion would still follow, only perhaps even more quickly, as we will soon see.
From D1(b), we can obtain this:
D2: At least one of DM's postulates must contain -- or must imply -- a contradiction.
Consider the following schematic representation of one such:
D3: For at least one moving x, and at least one y, and for the relation R, for some time t, Rxy at t and ~Rxy at t.
[Here, "~" stands for negation.]
One interpretation of D3 (suitably colloquialised) could be the following:
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least one mat, and for the relation R (i.e., "ξ is on ζ"), for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and it is not on the mat at t.
Of course, D4 would normally be -- that is, by us dialectical infidels -- disambiguated to remove this apparent contradiction. And for good reason: no theory can live with contradictions.
We are about to see why.
If DM-theorists were correct (about the contradictory nature of reality), it would be possible to derive the following fatal conclusion:
D5: No DT is true and all DTs should be rejected. [Assumption.]
D6: A theory that contains a self-contradiction is a DT. [Definition.]
D7: TAR's theoretical structure holds D5 and D6 to be true.
D8: Assume that D5 and D6 are true.
D9: TAR also says that DM is true. Assume that TAR contains DM as part of its theoretical structure.
D10: Assume DM is true.
D11: DM contains postulates like D3.
D12: D3 is a self-contradiction.
D13: Therefore, DM contains at least one self-contradiction.
D14: Therefore, DM is a DT (by D6).
D15: Hence, DM is not true (by D5, D13 and D14).
D16: Therefore TAR contains a DT (by D9 and D14).
D17: TAR's theoretical structure holds a DT to be true, namely DM (by D9, D6, D7 and D16).
D18: Therefore, TAR holds true a DT which is both true and not true (by D5, D6, D7 and D17).
D19: Thus, TAR's theoretical structure contains a self-contradiction.
D20: Therefore, TAR's theoretical structure is defective, and hence its version of DM is a DT.
D21: TAR's version of DM should be rejected (by D5).
Admittedly, D5-D21 contain one or two vagaries, which can be cleared up by the addition of a few extra lines, or by the adoption of more precise wording (etc.). However, the outcome seems reasonably clear: TAR is correct to argue the case for DM just in case it is incorrect to do so. In fact, TAR became defective upon adopting DM.
The fact that TAR is a non-standard DM-text does not affect the argument; the author of TAR only has to hold true one DM-contradiction for the above argument to apply to him.
Of course, what goes for TAR, goes for any other DM-text that argues along similar lines: i.e., that reality is contradictory and that flatly contradictory theories are defective, and should be rejected.
Now, there are several ways of avoiding this fatal conclusion. One of these is to deny the validity of FL (used informally above). But, that would be a rather desperate move -- somewhat akin to a boss attacking the validity of arithmetic just because a strike vote went the 'wrong' way.
Another avoiding tactic would be to claim that the above considerations apply only to formal contradictions, and that since DM-theorists postulate only those contradictions that can be shown to exist 'objectively' -- i.e., 'material contradictions' -- DM is unaffected by the above criticism.
However, this counter-response will not work, either. Consider the following additional argument:
D22: DM postulates only material contradictions.
D23: D3, when true, is a material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth of D3, but only when instances of it can be shown to be true.
D25: But, even when instances of D3 are found to be true they all remain self-contradictions.
Naturally, this means that the rest of D5-D21 still follow.
Another obvious avoiding tactic would be to argue that DM-theorists hold that no theory/proposition is either fully true or completely false; all are closer approximations to the truth. Quite apart from the fact that no DM-theorist really assents to this crazy idea (on this, see below), the term "partial truth" is itself hopelessly vague (as will be demonstrated in a later Essay).
But, even if this were not so, the fact that less 'partially true' theories aim at removing contradictions (so that they become even less 'partially true') means that the above result still applies. This is because those who propound/accept progressively less 'partially true' theories certainly aim to remove contradictions from them (in order for them to become less 'partially true'). Hence, a maximally true theory would contain fewer -- perhaps no -- contradictions.
Incidentally, whatever they might say, few revolutionaries accept in practice the doctrine that there are no completely false theories/propositions. The following claims are completely false: (1) Concentrated Nitric Acid applied directly to unprotected skin dramatically improves the complexion; (2) Jews are an inferior race; (3) Capitalism is a genuine expression of human nature; (4) All women are happy with their oppression and are eager to be reminded of it constantly; (5) Imperialism is 100% progressive everywhere and at all times; (6) The Ku Klux Klan are leaders in the fight for Black Liberation; (7) Iraq contained more WMD than any other country in the history of the planet; (8) the earth is supported in empty space by a tortoise; (9) Hysteria is caused by a wandering womb; (10) Karl Marx was a Martian who copied all his best ideas from George W Bush, etc., etc.
I suspect that anyone who questioned the truth (1) would be hard pressed to find a single revolutionary who agreed with (2). Naturally, that makes the negation of (2) absolutely true for all revolutionaries.
On the other hand, if they disagreed with both sentences, they would thereby confirm the point at issue: if either of these sentences is completely wrong, then there is at least one sentence (namely that one) that is completely wrong. QED.
And, just in case this Essay attracts the attention of a brass-necked, hardcore Hegel fan who wants to claim one or more of the above are 'partially true', 'partially false', then they should consider this:
H1: There are absolutely no partial truths.
Now, is that partially true/false?
A retreat into the concrete bunker here (on the lines that the above claims are 'abstract', whereas "all truth is concrete", according to Hegel and Lenin), would be to no avail, either. This is because it would merely prompt the question: "Is the claim that all truth is concrete itself absolutely true?" If it is, then the point is lost. If it isn't then we can ignore it as an effective reply. [This quite apart from the fact that this Hegelian thesis is itself abstract!]
It could be argued that D22-D25 can be disassociated from D5-D21 by rejecting D23 or D25; that is, it could be claimed that DM-contradictions are different from those found in FL.
D22: DM postulates only material contradictions.
D23: D3, when true, is a material contradiction.
D24: DM postulates the truth of D3, but only when instances of it can be shown to be true.
D25: But, even when instances of D3 are found to be true they all remain self-contradictions.
But, this view could only be maintained by repudiating another DM-claim: that the superiority of DL over FL arises partly out of the former's capacity to account for change through contradiction. This idea would lose all its force if it were now clear that the contradictions countenanced in DL are of a completely different nature to those found in FL. In such an eventuality, there would be nothing common between the two systems for a comparison to latch onto. The much-touted superiority of DL over FL (with respect to contradictions) would then be about as accurate as would be an analogous claim that, say, Barclays Bank was a better bank than the Dogger Bank. [On this, see here.]
For sure, there are DM-theorists who say that neither they, nor Hegel, reject the LOC (but, on this see Essay Four, and here), and this is because they actually use FL-contradictions in their endeavour to show that there are real 'dialectical' contradictions in nature and society (thereby transcending the former in order to derive the latter). So the two sorts are organically-, or, perhaps, dialectically-connected. DM-contradictions are, indeed, merely 'concrete' versions of the abstractions found in FL.
Anyway, as we saw here, Hegel derived his 'contradictions' by confusing objects with predicates, propositions and a host of other things. So, the allegation that Hegel knew what he was talking about in this area would be about as accurate as a similar claim made about George W Bush on any randomly-chosen topic. Nevertheless, from what he actually wrote, Hegel certainly wanted to link his 'contradictions' with the misbegotten ones he thought he had found in the bowdlerised version of AFL he had been taught.
[AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]
Clearly, what DM-theorists need to show is that at least some of the contradictions countenanced by FL are derivable from, or depict real material contradictions -- otherwise there would be no good reason to call their own contradictions, "contradictions" (as opposed to calling them, say, "bananas") -- or for claiming that the former are just static or 'abstract' versions of the latter.
If so, the rejection of one or more of D1-D25 (on the grounds that they refer to/use totally different senses of the word "contradiction") would be to deny DM-theorists an important conceptual innovation they inherited from Hegel (who does not claim his 'contradictions' are of a new type, just a more 'scientific' (or 'concrete') sort): which is that contradictions in thought (FL-style) mirror real ones in the nature and society -- when verified, given a 'concrete' make-over, or flip to put them the "right way up". And since FL-contradictions are the formal equivalent of every conceivable contradiction (real or imagined), DM-theorists cannot afford to drive a wedge between them and their own 'material contradictions'. If they were to do this then they couldn't also maintain that thought mirrored the world, and then a central plank in DM-epistemology would disappear. As Lenin noted, commenting on an idea he found in Hegel:
"Hegel actually proved that the logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but the reflection of the objective world…. The laws of logic are the reflections of objective and subjective consciousness of man." [Lenin (1961), pp.180-81, 183.]
Anyway, D3 is just a formal version of the sorts of material contradictions found in DM (i.e., D4). Since D20 and D21 follow from D4, this latest counter-argument fails.
D3: For at least one x, and at least one y, and for the relation R, for some time t, Rxy at t and ~Rxy at t.
D4: For at least one moving cat, and at least one mat, and for the relation R (i.e., "ξ is on ζ"), for some time t, the cat is on the mat at t and the cat is not on the mat at t.
At this point, it is worth re-calling that the idea that nature is contradictory is not just a peripheral feature of DM, it's a core idea. It is a consequence both of the thesis that everything is a UO and of the part-whole relation. This is certainly how Rees sees things (see, for example, pp.4-10 of Rees (1998a) -- but compare that with this). [See also the comments made here.]
And, that is certainly how DM-classicists see things. [On that, see here.]
Hence, if DM is defective here, it is rotten to the core. Indeed, this is the rotten core of Hegel's whacko logic. No amount of spin can change that material fact.
The only other conceivable way to avoid this fatal result would be to find fault with one or more of the assumptions used in the argument above. However, a further examination of these would be tantamount to the present author doing DM-theorists' work for them. It's their corner, they can paint their own way out of it.
[Other factors associated with this topic were examined in Essay Seven, here, here and here.]
6. Several other DM-'characterisations' of the "Totality" have been posted in Note 25, below.
7. On this, see Rosen (1982), Chapter Two. Rosen's arguments will be developed in more detail in Part Two of this Essay.
8. It is worth recalling here that the (eminently reasonable) requirement that evidence should be presented in support of each and every DM-thesis is not my invention. Dialecticians themselves tell us that this is essential to prevent their theory from sliding into Idealism. [On this, see here and here.]
9. As should no doubt now be apparent, the "Totality" is none other than Hegel's Absolute in disguise. And a rather poor disguise it is, too --; in fact, it's little better than Clark Kent's.
Figure Eleven: Is Hegel's Absolute As
Well-Disguised As Superman?
10. Of course, this just scratches the surface of the 'problems' created by our attempt to understand time; those outlined here, for example, were first broached (as far as I know) by St Augustine in his Confessions [Book 11, 14:17-31:41; i.e., Augustine of Hippo (2004)]. On this, see Suter (1989b); the background can be found in Sorabji (1983).
Unfortunately, in this section, as in many other Essays, I am forced to use the 'metaphysical mode of speech'. This does not imply that I accept it makes any sense; in fact, it is being employed here precisely to assist in its own demise.
Sentences like: "The past does not exist", "The present does exist", or "The past is no more" appear to use phrases like "the past" or "the present" almost as if they were proper names or labels, which they are not. If they were proper names, it would be possible for someone, somewhere