Essay Eight Part Two: Why Opposing Forces Can't Be 'Contradictions'
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In what follows, I have taken the results of Essay Eight Part One -- Change Through 'Internal Contradiction' -- for granted.
It is worth pointing out that a good 50% of my case against Dialectical Materialism [DM] has been relegated to the End Notes. Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence is to be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate fully my case against DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have added numerous qualifications, clarifications, and considerably more detail to what I have to say in the main body. In addition, I have raised several objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments, which I have then answered. [I explain why I have adopted this tactic in Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any qualms or objections readers might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments and clarifications.
[Since I have been debating this theory with comrades for over 25 years, I have heard all the objections there are! Many of the more recent debates are listed here.]
Finally, phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" used at this site (in connection with Philosophy) are not meant to imply that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius). They are meant to highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. However, this will become the central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is directed here, here, and here, for further details.
As of March 2013, this Essay is just under 81,500 words long; a summary of some its main ideas can be accessed here.
This Essay does not represent my final view on any of the issues raised. It is merely 'work in progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier sections.
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(a) Introduction
(b) Gravity Is Annoyingly Undialectical
(a) Are Forces Merely 'Dialectical Figures Of Speech'?
(b) Are 'Contradictions' Merely Mathematical Models?
(c) Are They Properties Of Totalities?
(3) What Exactly Do Forces 'Contradict'?
(a) Different Types Of Force Couples
(c) First Attempts At Clarification
(d) AR-Forces
(a) Literal Forces In Opposition
(b) The Revenge Of The Non-Existent
(c) Prevention And Its Discontents
(d) A Balanced Account Of Prevention?
(e) S&M?
(f) Hole To Let
(g) Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth
(5) Real Material Contradictions -- Or Are They?
(b) John Rees And Concrete Forces
(c) The Impertinent Explanation
(f) Not What The System Ordered
(g) An Apparent Contradiction At Last!
(6) Last Rites
(a) Dialectics In ER
(c) Dialectics And The Revival Of Teleology
(d) Coup De Grace
(e) For Dialecticians, Truth Is Indeed The Hole -- And It's Six Foot Deep
(8) Contradictions In Das Kapital?
(9) Notes
(10) References
Abbreviations Used At This Site
In this Part of Essay Eight, I intend to substantiate a claim made in Part One, which was that it isn't possible to equate 'contradictions' with 'opposing forces', either literally or figuratively. Hence, I aim to sever forever the link that most dialecticians believe exists between forces and 'contradictions'.
In Part Three, I will pose, and then answer the question: What sense, if any, can be made of the term "dialectical contradiction"?
[Spoiler Alert: none at all.]
Be this as it may, Marxist dialecticians frequently assert that 'contradictions' (in nature or society) may be understood as, or modelled by, the inter-relationship between "opposing forces". These forces allegedly condition one another, operating either in equilibrium or in disequilibrium, depending on the prevailing circumstances (and on who is telling the tale). But, dialecticians also tell us that this account is only valid if it is backed-up in each case by careful, scientific analysis -- with the results having been thoroughly tested in some form of practice.1
Citations like those listed in Note 1 -- which make this point -- can be multiplied almost indefinitely. To be sure, such passages are often accompanied by extensive qualifications, depending on the context, but the overall message is reasonably clear.2
Nevertheless, my concern here is not so much with whether these passages are consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has (ever) been made to substantiate the sweeping statements they contain (with adequate evidence3 -- or any at all!), but with whether the idea that forces can be used to model, illustrate or explain contradictions makes any sense.
Gravity Is Annoyingly Undialectical
As we will see, the identification of forces with contradictions is thoroughly misguided.4 There are several obvious initial difficulties with the whole idea. For example, if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are hence 'contradictory' -- there would clearly have to be at least two of them, with both operating and in opposition for that to be the case. But, when we consider one of the most important and general examples of motion found in the universe -- the orbital trajectory of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in classical Physics, at least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in question toward the centre of mass of the system. So, if classical Physics is correct, it isn't easy to see how such forces could be viewed as 'contradictions'.5
Even post-classical Physics offers little comfort to DM-theorists. There, such motion is either a function of the topology of Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been edited out of the picture), or it is the result of a body being situated in a tensor, vector and/or scalar field, in as many dimensions of phase space as are deemed necessary.6
And, this isn't just the case with gravity; as physicist Max Jammer notes:
"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....
"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]6a
Even comrades Woods and Grant acknowledge this fact:
"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]
However, and despite what these two say, it is reasonably clear that a mere "relation" between two bodies is incapable of making one or both of them move, unless there were a force there (or something else consequent on that relation -- such as a time-based trajectory along a "world-line", perhaps?) to bring it about.6b
Unfortunately, this now means that most (if not all) of the bulk motion in the universe can't be accounted for by DM (that is, if such motion (or change in motion) is viewed as the result of 'contradictions' interpreted as opposing forces). Plainly, if there is only one force present (or perhaps none at all!), there can't be any dialectical 'contradictions' to begin with.
Hence, it would seem that DM can't explain much -- if any -- of the bulk motion found in nature.
[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Admittedly, Engels made a weak attempt to solve the orbital 'problem' by inventing a repulsive force, which he implausibly identified with "heat"; this fanciful notion is discussed in Note 7.7
John Molyneux has also weighed in with this comment:
"If anything (a grain of sand, a mountain, a tree, a fish, a human, a society) gives the appearance of stability and permanence it is because it constitutes a particular moment in a longer process of change. That moment constitutes a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change -- a unity of opposites; much as the earth's, or any planet's, orbit around the sun represents a balance between the force of gravity pulling it into the sun and the momentum which would send it flying off into space." [Molyneux (2012), pp.44-45.]
However, if Relativity is correct, there is no force of gravity; but even supposing there is such a force, in Molyneux's scheme of things it isn't balanced by an opposing force, just "momentum", which can in no way be seen as a, or even the, 'dialectical opposite' of the force of gravity. [The significance of that particular comment (i.e., why there has to be a unique opposite for each object or process -- something Hegel and Lenin called its "other") is explained here.] But even if this attempt to foist dialectics on nature could be made to work, and "momentum" was a/the 'dialectical opposite' of the force of gravity, this aspect of Molyneux's theory:
"That moment constitutes a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change -- a unity of opposites...." [Ibid]
still wouldn't apply. What are the 'opposing' forces internal to the earth that make it orbit the sun? Or, those internal to the sun that make the earth orbit it? Molyneux is surprisingly quiet about them if they exist.
Of course, it could be replied that these opposites are internal to the sun-earth pair, or perhaps even the solar system itself. But, as we have seen, there are no opposing forces here either! Nor are there united 'opposites'. And even if there were, which of them is providing:
"a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change...." [Ibid.]
Is gravity the cause of change, or is it opposing it? Is "momentum" opposing change, or creating it? Is their 'dialectical union' doing one or the other?
As usual (in books and articles on DM), we are presented with less than half-formed thoughts and musings, which do not even conform to the theory they are supposed to 'illustrate'!
Is This An Apt Analogy?
Are Forces Merely 'Dialectical Figures Of Speech'?
In view of the above, it might be wise to interpret "opposing forces" as figurative 'contradictions' -- or, maybe, the other way round, interpreting 'contradictions' as figurative "forces". Either or both of these could then form part of an analogical or perhaps metaphorical (but non-literal) depiction of nature and society. Alternatively, forces could be described as 'contradictions' as a sort of shorthand, which would then enable the modelling of different types of accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right. Indeed, Engels seems to have had this in mind in the quotation below, where he argues that attraction and repulsion should not be regarded as forces, but as simple forms of motion. This retreat was perhaps recommended to him by his admission that the concept "force" was derived from ancient animistic/mystical views of nature, hence its use in DM could smack of anthropomorphism:8
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Ibid., p.82. Bold emphasis added.]
However, this revision has two untoward consequences Engels appears not to have noticed:
(1) It makes his version of DM look even more positivistic that it already seems (at least in DN). If the appeal to forces in nature is no more than a shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then forces will have no real counterpart in nature. The whole idea would then be little more than a "useful fiction", introduced to account for the phenomena instrumentally. This would make the identification of forces with contradictions even more problematic (as will be demonstrated below); plainly, and once again: if there are no forces, there can be no DM-'contradictions'.
[DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954); UO = Unity of Opposites.]
(2) Given this re-write of the word "force", the contradictory relationship between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative motion. [Woods and Grant seem to be thinking along these lines, as we saw earlier.]
Unfortunately, in that case, there would be no interconnection between such bodies -- which is an essential factor required by other DM-theses. This seems to mean that causal interactions of this sort are externally-motivated, not mediated by forces, and thus can't be internally inter-conditioned. On this account, the 'unity-in-opposition' between antagonistic elements of the Totality will have been broken; the thesis that change is the result of 'internal contradictions' would then be left without any sort of internal, mediating factors. [This confusion was analysed in detail in Part One.]
Not even the relative motion between bodies travelling in opposite directions could supply a credible dialectical connection here, should there be an interaction. Clearly, this would fail to capture the "internal relations" that DM-theorists claim exist between such bodies. Once more, objects behaving like this wouldn't be internally interrelated (as part or parts of a UO), since the connection or mediation between moving bodies would clearly be missing. Hence, any subsequent interaction would be difficult to account for dialectically, which would not be good news for dialecticians, to state the obvious.9
As already noted, with events and processes sealed-off from each other in this way DM would begin to resemble CAR and 'crude materialism' all the more. Indeed, if this is how DM is supposed to be interpreted, it would differ from 'crude mechanical materialism' in name only.
Of course, even if Engels's version of DM could account for motion occurring along a certain line of action -- but in diametrically opposed directions --, it would be of little help because most of the bulk motion in the universe is not of this sort; it is either orbital motion under the action of a central force, or movement along a geodesic (depending on which version of modern Physics one attends to). In fact, as we will see, matter in general moves in complex ways which are difficult if not impossible to depict in such crude oppositional terms.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
Like it or not, DM-theorists need real material forces acting between bodies so that the "Totality" has the holistic/mediated integrity we are told it requires. A theoretical fiction is no use at all. Forces must exist, and reference to them as 'contradictions', 'internally-related' to one another, must be concrete and literal.10
Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as 'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by dialecticians that they are offering an 'objective' account of nature. It's not at all easy to see how figurative language could fill the gaps in an explanation of objects and processes in the material world, any more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:
"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun." [Romeo
and Juliet, Act Two, Scene Two.]
Or, at least, no more than would describing a man as a "pig" imply he has a curly tail and is a potential source of bacon.
Despite this, in view of the above difficulties -- and in addition to those that will be detailed below --, interpreting forces figuratively might prove to be the only viable way that contradictions could be regarded as 'forces', even if this compromises DM's avowedly 'objective' picture of reality.11
Of course, if this view of the nature of forces were adopted by dialecticians, it would be difficult to distinguish their theory from Instrumentalism or Conventionalism.
On the other hand, it's not easy to see how 'figurative forces' could account for anything; what sort of explanation would it be to say that contradictions -- already suspiciously figurative themselves -- can be modelled by forces, which are figures of speech to begin with? Describing a man as, say, a "pig" might perhaps account for his crude behaviour (but not on the basis of his anatomy or physiology as a literal pig), but the utility of this metaphor would be virtually nil if it were now admitted that the word "man" was figurative too. Unlike iterated negations, multiple tropes do not undo each other.
Nevertheless, even if this proved to be an acceptable resolution of Engels's problem, it would still fail to provide DM-theorists with a viable way out of their difficulties. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation of DM-'contradictions' with forces in nature or society can't work. This is so for several reasons.
Contradictions As Mathematical Models?
The first of these is connected with the way that forces are already represented in Mathematics and Physics, for example, which doesn't appear to be even remotely appropriate for use in depicting contradictions as literal forces. Consider the following:
(A) Forces often operate according to an inverse square law. It isn't easy to see how the same could be true of contradictions. Presumably, two objects, states of affairs or processes contradict each other in nature or society or they do not.12 Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a contradiction could operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its oppositional elements were doubled. Do bosses really become more conciliatory if workers walk away from them? Or if the local trade union offices are located in a distant town? Does wealth cause less conflict if the rich move their money to the Cayman Islands? Do appearances 'contradict' reality any the more, or less, if someone uses a microscope, or presses his/her face against the surface of an object?13
Indeed, little sense can be made either of the idea that there is a literal separation distance between components of DM-'contradictions' -- for instance, that there is, or could be, a separation distance between Capital and Labour, or that there might be one such between the "forces and relations of production", or even one between a body and itself as it moves in a 'contradictory' sort of way. What could it possibly mean to suggest, for example, that the "contradiction between use value and exchange value" changes if these two items are further apart? Clearly, these two 'entities' can't be separated (except perhaps in thought), but even if they could, they would still be just as contradictory as they were before (one presumes?). And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote magnitude unaffected by such changes.
Sure, dialecticians speak about the "contradictions" in the capitalist system "intensifying", but that isn't because the 'separation distance' between the classes has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists in fact mean by "intensification" here (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions" become more obvious, intractable, or crisis-ridden), they certainly do not mean it in the same way that physicists mean it when they talk about, say, the strength of a force field intensifying. Nor is there any mathematics involved. So, while a technician, say, might be dispatched to measure the intensity of forces in the earth's crust prior to an earthquake as part of a genuine scientific research programme, no one, it seems, has ever been asked to do the same with these "intensifying" 'dialectical contradictions'. They (or at least their 'strength') appear to be permanently locked in subjective space, stubbornly impervious to scientific investigation.
(B) Forces in nature can be represented by vectors, the use of which is governed by well-understood rules. As such, for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added, subtracted and multiplied (to give inner, vector or scalar triple products, and the like) -- and by means of which diverse quantities, such as areas, volumes, field densities, boundary fluxes (etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors may be parallel or orthogonal to one another, or to previously defined axes, just as they can be decomposed into their components and projected onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can also be used to identify and classify the mathematical properties of various manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined in a given vector space, providing it with a base and spanning set. Modulii can be ascertained for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can also be calculated or determined. Furthermore, matrices can be employed to represent vectors more efficiently, their determinants and inverses thus ascertained. The ordinary and partial derivatives of vectors can be calculated, and they can be integrated (as part of line, surface or volume integrals), and so on.
It is difficult to see how any of these (and a many others) could possibly be true of a single DM-'contradiction' interpreted (literally or metaphorically) as a force. What, for example, is the angle between the 'contradictions' mentioned on the opening pages of TAR:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction….
"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line?
"The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]
And, what is the cross product of the following 'contradictions' (mentioned in Socialist Worker)?
"Elvis's career illuminated a contradiction at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism needs to generate profits in order to survive. But to suck profit out of workers it also needs an ideology to ensure that workers know their place in society...." [Ian Birchall, Socialist Worker, 14/08/07.]
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.
"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting "you're breaking the law" to the strikers....
"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence.
"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, "Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out."
"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Simon Basketter, Socialist Worker, 01/09/07.]13a
Is it possible to find the inner product of the 'contradiction' between freedom and necessity? Is there an eigenvector applicable to the 'contradiction' between 'appearance' and 'underlying essence'? Is there any way of specifying the extent to which bosses and workers -- Capital and Labour -- contradict one another, individually or as a class? If so, what is the modulus of the 'contradiction' between boss NN and worker MM (or that between the classes to which they belong)? Is the 'contradiction' between ice and water orthogonal to…, well what?
But, what of the div, curl and grad of the 'contradiction' between a grain of barley and the plant that grows from it? Can we ascertain the Jacobian for the contradictory relationship between wealth and poverty? Is the 'contradiction', between "John" and his "manhood" normal to a given direction or manifold?
In her otherwise excellent book, Lindsey German says the following:
"The Working class has to have a party to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle by an organised minority…." [German (1996), p.87.]
But, if contradictions were literal forces, we would be able to ascertain, say, the i, j and k components of "the contradiction between [the] potential revolutionary role [of the working-class] and its actual situation", differentiate them, and find out how quickly the said link was changing, and in what direction.14 The fact that we can't do this -- and no sane Marxist has ever even so much as attempted to do it (nor yet even theorised about the possibility for doing this) -- suggests perhaps that in practice not even DM-fans think this analogy is at all apt, or, indeed, all that literal.
Hence, if 'contradictions' could be interpreted literally as forces, it would be possible to construct a vector algebra depicting them in nature and as part of the class struggle. Do we possess such a 'Vector Algebra of Revolution'? Has anyone ever bothered to construct one? Given the title of his book, the author of TAR was strangely silent on this issue.14a
The second reason why this is an inappropriate way to depict 'contradictions' arises from a consideration of the sort of response that could be made to the objections outlined above; it could be claimed that it's the inter-relationship between contradictory forces that explains change, and hence that it is only within a network of forces situated in a Totality of some sort that the contradictory inter-play between them becomes clear. Indeed, it could be argued that the above interpretation of contradictions (which pictures them as seemingly isolated entities) completely misconstrues both their role in DM and their operation in nature and society.
This volunteered objection was in fact considered in Part One of this Essay -- but from a slightly different angle (no pun intended) -- where it was pointed out that there is a serious ambiguity in DM/'Materialist Dialectics' on this issue. That is because DM-theorists are unclear whether 'contradictions' are (1) internal to objects and processes (causing them to change as a result of an internal dynamic), or whether they (2) merely arise externally between objects (as they form part of a mediated system, group of systems or processes), or (3) if it is just our description of objects and processes which is 'contradictory' (this resulting from our partial knowledge of reality, etc.), or (4) if it's a combination of all three -- or indeed (5) whether something else is true of these elusive DM-'contradictions'. This confusion is compounded by the fact that, in the hands of DM-theorists, the meaning of "internal" oscillates uncontrollably between "spatially internal" and "logically internal".
And, as we also saw in Part One, while each of these options faces serious difficulties of its own, they all fail to explain change -- since they merely re-describe it, and they do so in a thoroughly obscure manner -- which is why these alternatives fall apart so easily when they are examined closely (as we will soon see is also the case with respect to forces and 'contradictions').
In response, it could be argued that the problem with the sort of analysis of dialectical systems presented in these Essays is that it attempts to 'objectify' contradictions (i.e., it endeavours to make objects out of them). Hence, it could be countered that in Materialist Dialectics it's not 'objects' that are subject to contradictions -- or which contain them, or which are them --, but systems/totalities in change that reveal their inner contradictions, and which motivate development. In that case, it could be maintained that contradictions are properties of systems/totalities in the process of change, not of 'objects' as such.
In reply to these volunteered DM-responses it is worth asking where this leaves forces if contradictions are no longer to be viewed as 'objects' or as 'object-like'. Forces presumably have a physical form of some sort; they are not just relations, are they? In addition, this response makes a mockery of many things the DM-classicists say about change. For example, here is Lenin:
"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Italic emphasis added.]
Many more similar quotations can be found in Part One of this Essay.
But, even if forces were just relations, it's far from easy to see what it is that could possibly physically relate objects and processes in nature and society, that is, over and above a few Hegelian 'concepts' of suspicious provenance and even more dubious content.
Indeed, in all this, it seems that the idea that objects change because of an 'inner dynamic' has been lost sight of again. If objects change only because of a set of external forces -- albeit, which forces are internal to a "Totality", mediated, or not, by the yet-to-be-explained 'influence' of that "Totality" --, this can only mean that "external" has now become the new "internal". In that case, "internal contradictions" are in effect those which an object merely experiences in its external relations with other objects and processes (which are internal to the "Totality"). But, once more: what is the point of arguing that change is "internally-motivated" if external mediation is the only show in town, and forces are merely "relations"?
[As we will see in Essay Four Part Two, when it is published, these "relations" are 'logical' anyway, and no less bogus for all that.]
In addition, the proffered DM-response outlined a few paragraphs back fails to resolve the problems mentioned earlier. First of all, as we will also see in Essay Eleven Part One, there is good reason to question the nature of the nebulous DM-"Totality" -- or, to be more honest, there would be if we knew what 'it' was (and there was some sign that dialecticians themselves knew what 'it' was!). Its re-appearance here can only cloud the issues, therefore.
Secondly, even if a clear account of the "Totality" were forthcoming, this way of depicting forces would still not work. If contradictions are properties of totalities -- and not of their parts -- then the parts could not change, since, on this account, contradictions would not belong to them, but to the whole, taken as a whole. In that case, while the whole might change, it would do so only as a result of the rearrangement of its changeless parts. Given this way of thinking, the "Totality" (or, indeed, any sub-system of the "Totality") would be composed of (1) infinitely small changeless elementary particles, or it (they) would be composed of (2) infinitely complex (further) sub-systems, which enjoyed no interconnections themselves. [The reader is referred back to Part One for a more detailed explanation of this point.]
Again, it could be objected that a Totality is constituted by its own internal contradictory processes; that is precisely what a Totality is -- a contradictory, differentiated unity. The account given above seems to want to separate the parts from the whole.
However, this reply will still not do, for on that basis it would now seem that it is part and whole which are contradictory (and in a manner that is still unclear). And yet, such parts can't be contradictory in the same way that wholes are. That is because, on this account, parts mutually condition one another; this, presumably, is the nature of their mediated 'unity in contradiction'. However, the "Totality" is related to nothing else that could condition it. So, if the "Totality" is a contradictory whole, then it would have to be so in a new and-as-yet-unspecified sense.
In fact, as seems obvious from what little DM-theorists themselves have said about the "Totality", it looks like 'it' must be an Unconditioned Absolute. It certainly can't be conditioned from the 'outside', otherwise it would not be the Whole. If, on the other hand, it were conditioned from the 'outside', an infinite 'exgress' (inflation -- i.e., the opposite of an infinite regress) would be implied, for, plainly, we should want to know if and how this 'external' object/process (about which we know even less) was itself conditioned, and by what -- and so on. But we have been here already...
And it seems these observations must apply otherwise, for the "Totality" to be contradictory, it would have to 'contradict' its parts. [Ex hypothesi it would have to do this anyway, since there is nothing else for it to condition.] Moreover these parts must then contradict each other in turn in the same way, after all. [The opposite supposition will be considered presently.]
And yet, if the "Totality" is composed solely of its parts (unless it is "more than the sum of its parts" -- that Wholist cliché is exposed for what it is, a dead end, in Essay Eleven Part Two), the contradiction between the "Totality" and its parts must be (1) The same as the contradiction between each of the aforementioned parts, or it must be (2) More than that between its parts (since, as we have just seen, dialecticians believe that the whole is more than the sum of its parts).15
As far as (1) is concerned, it seems that the "Totality" must drop out of the picture as a sort of shorthand for the sum total of parts in contradictory change -- thus becoming a mere fiction, only this time a useless one.16
On the other hand, if (2) were the case, we would be owed an explanation of the alleged 'contradiction' between that 'more' and this 'less' -- i.e., between this 'more-of-a-"Totality"' and its 'lesser parts'. But, as things stand, we have no idea whether this new 'contradictory' relation between whole and part is the same as that which operates between the parts, or if it is different.
[Anyone impatient with this nit-picking should re-direct their complaints to their local Dialectical Magus; such pedantry is forced upon us because even now, after more than 140 years, we still have no idea what these 'forces' are, how they can possibly 'contradict' one another, or what the mysterious "Totality" is. The first two of these allegations will be substantiated as this Essay unfolds; the third will be considered in detail in Essay Eleven Part One.]
However, independently of the above 'difficulties', this 'theory' still faces other serious problems. If the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts is the same as (and no more than) that which exists between the parts, then manifestly the whole would not then be more than the sum of the parts (in at least this respect), since the whole would in that case be the entire 'contradictory' ensemble, all of whose elements (whole and part) operate alike. But, this would be contrary to the DM-hypothesis that wholes (whether these are wholes made of 'contradictory' parts or not) are more than the sum of their parts, whose natures (including the nature of their "internal contradictions") are said to be determined entirely by (while not being reducible to) the nature of their parts and the interconnection between these parts. Conversely, if the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts were not the same as that between the parts, then we would still have an unexplained type of 'contradiction': that which exists between a mysterious whole that is "more than the sum of the parts" and those parts themselves.17
Anyway, the idea that the whole 'contradicts' the parts in the same way that the parts 'contradict' one another does not appear to be a viable option for DM-theorists. The parts relate to each other by "mediation", apparently; but how can the part-whole relation be one of "mediation"? The mutually 'contradictory' nature of the parts in development constitutes the whole; if now the whole has its own 'contradictory' relation with the parts over and above this (if, as we are told, it is more than the sum of the parts), then this new 'contradictory' relation can't be one of part on part. But, if it isn't, then what is it?
Hence, as noted in Part One of this Essay, it seems that a literal interpretation of 'contradictions' as forces lapses either into some form of CAR, or it inflates alarmingly into HEX and/or AIDS. Conversely, if the identification of forces with contradictions is merely figurative, then DM would be indistinguishable from, say, metaphysical poetry.
[HEX = Hegelian Expansionism; AIDS = Absolute Idealism; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
Notwithstanding all this, in order to examine this issue more thoroughly, let us suppose that some sort of solution to all the above 'difficulties' can be found -- by someone, at some point, somehow.
However, even if we assumed this, the analogy between forces and contradictions would still not work.
The substantiation of the above claim brings this discussion to the third reason for questioning the connection between forces and 'contradictions'.
Different Types Of Force Couples
In a physical system there may be several different combinations of interacting attractive and/or repulsive forces. If we abbreviate "attractive" and "repulsive" to "A" and "R", respectively, there appear to be only three types of combinations of just two of these: "AA-", "AR-" and "RR-forces".18
Many of the quotations given in Note 1 seem to imply that only AR-forces are 'contradictory' in DM. This sort of combination will be examined later. However, AA- and RR-forces were not explicitly ruled out, and in a thoroughgoing analysis of every conceivable option available to DM-theorists, they clearly need to be considered. Hence, it is to these that I now turn.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how an AA-force could be interpreted as a unity of opposites -- let alone as 'contradictory'. They are the same type of force, so they can hardly be opposites. But, such forces abound in nature. For example, as noted earlier, the centre of gravity of any conglomeration of matter in the universe is the result of countless such AA-forces. Plainly, in systems like this, kinematic (or rather dynamic) changes are caused by non-opposites. So, when, say, a planet is in the process of formation, particles begin to gravitate together under the operation of forces of mutual attraction --, i.e., these aforementioned non-opposites.19
Similarly, it is not easy to see how RR-forces could be interpreted as 'contradictory' -- or even as opposites -- , either, and yet these are also found throughout nature. For example, intra-atomic forces of repulsion prevent nuclei from approaching one another.20
One objection to the above immediately springs to mind: it ignores the fact that such forces operate in the manner they do because they work in opposition to one another -- that is, they do so in ways that bring them into, or out of equilibrium. However, this response in fact concerns forces acting as AR-couples, which option will be examined later. It can't therefore assist us in our attempt to analyse AA- and RR-forces.
Despite this, even if it were true that A-forces are opposites of each other, in order for them still to be regarded as 'contradictory' they could not also be regarded as the opposite of R-forces -- unless, that is, A-forces are now permitted to have two sorts of "opposites": other A- and other R-forces. But, in that case, this would make a mockery of the notion that there are "polar opposites" at work here in natural systems of forces (implicated in change, equilibria and in 'contradictions'):
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
It is difficult to see how a particular A-force could be the "polar opposite" of another A-force while at the same time being the polar opposite of an R-force -- i.e., how A- and R-forces could have two "polar opposites" without altering the meaning of the phrase "polar opposite". Even then, if the meaning of "polar opposite" were adapted to neutralise this 'difficulty', it would succeed in doing that only because of a subjective linguistic adjustment. In that case, any 'truths' that sprang into existence as a result would plainly be a by-product of yet another piece of terminological juggling, and not because of the way the world happens to be (which would mean, of course, that dialectics had been read into nature).21
However, there are dialecticians who claim that objects and processes possess many "opposites"; for example Gollobin (1986), p.122 (but even he says these are "paired").
Of course, this whole metaphysic originated in the twisted 'logic' that one finds in Hegel's work, who posited a unique opposite (an "other") for each and every item implicated in change, in order to forestall the criticism that if everything changes into 'what-it-is-not' (i.e., its 'opposite'), then, since everything else in the universe is 'what-it-is-not' to any given object or process, every object/process would change into that anything-else-whatsoever. [On this, see here.]
In which case, instead of growing into barley plants, seeds, for example, could turn into volcanoes, unexploded bombs, Stalin's moustache or your left hand, and much else besides.
[In Part Three of this Essay we will see that Hegel had to abandon the idea that objects and processes were somehow linked to a logical(?), or unique, 'opposite'/"other". In Essay Seven Part One, it will be shown that this concession fatally damages Hegel's attempt to respond to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation (reposted below).]
But, if objects and processes are allowed to have many (and possibly an infinite number of) 'opposites' -- all of which they could change into --, that would further demolish Hegel's already crumbling system, which postulates that everything is paired with its own unique "other". Naturally, if true, this idea would mean that the Empire State Building, for instance, could change into, say, a T Rex, and the Pacific Ocean could develop into George W Bush, and a host of other things into the bargain. Since this sort of thing does not happen, so far as we know, we must conclude that:
(1) Hegel was right: objects and processes have only one unique "other", which is either:
(a) Dialectically/logically 'internal' to that object or process, which would in turn mean that no object or process could turn into this unique 'other' since the latter already exists, or,
(b1) 'External' to that object or process, meaning that the cause of change can't be internal to objects and processes -- or perhaps even,
(b2) 'external' to that object or process, which object or process turns into that 'other', meaning that change can't have been caused by that 'other' -- and the whole point of accepting this 'logical' exercise will now have vanished;
Or:
(2) Forces have only one opposite, not many.21a
Nevertheless, it could be argued that in this context the word "opposite" really means "oppositional". This change of emphasis now underlines the active inter-relation that exists between forces rather than their passive interconnection, which is something the above discussion seems to have ignored. Hence, it could seem perfectly natural to speak of RR- or AA-forces as contradictory in this sense --, i.e., in the sense that all and only those forces that are oppositional (i.e., which engage in, or are part of some sort of "struggle") should be classed as contradictory.
Or, so it might be claimed.
However, this latest revision seems to be inconsistent with the claims made in several of the passages quoted in Note 1. These appear to suggest that only certain forces were to be regarded as inseparable from matter. Others indicated that forces were merely the consequence of the complex inter-play between quanta of energy (or of motion). For example, Engels claimed that:
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
Once again, this seems to lose sight of internally-connected oppositionality, since Engels appears to edit out of the picture the dialectical interrelation between forces, replacing it/them with mere "forms of motion".
Now, "forms of motion" are not in any obvious way interconnected if the relevant forces are edited out. But, DM requires bodies in motion to be inter-related; that is why intermediary forces seem to be so useful. Forces and 'contradictions' were clearly supposed to assume just such a role --, i.e., forming part of the 'connective tissue' of reality, as it were. If they are now re-classified as little more than "useful fictions" -- i.e., as relative "forms of motion" --, there would seem to be nothing physical left in nature to act as either the bearer, or the mediator of these interconnections. Without a material substrate, 'contradictions' could only operate on bodies or processes magically, or, perhaps supernaturally, it would seem.
Ignoring again for the present the above serious difficulties, perhaps the above objection means something like the following:
F1: All and only those forces that are oppositional -- or are implicated in struggle -- are contradictory.
But, if F1 were true, motion itself couldn't be regarded as a product of 'contradictory forces' -- unless we confine our attention solely to accelerated motion -- since, ex hypothesi, no net forces operate in cases where there is no acceleration (in post-Aristotelian Physics, that is). Even then, accelerated motion (under gravity, say) is subject to only one force (or, rather, one resultant force) in classical Physics, and none at all in relativistic Physics.
At best, therefore, taking a classical view, most of the accelerated motion in the universe (which covers, as far as we know, all of the bulk, non-rectilinear movement in nature) is the product of only one force. Given F1, it's not easy to see how such motion could be viewed as part of a 'contradictory' Totality, if the 'classical view' is correct. So, if F1 does indeed express what DM-theorists mean, then most (perhaps all) of the motion in nature could not have been induced, caused, changed or sustained by a set of DM-'contradictions'. With that observation, much of classical DM falls apart.22
It could be objected to this that, as a matter of fact, all motion in the universe is the result of a disequilibrium between oppositional forces; that is precisely what a resultant force is. In that case, therefore, bodies would move (or their state of motion would change) because of just such an imbalance between forces. Hence, for example, the planets -- which move in apparently steady orbits around the Sun -- actually have their trajectories determined by resultant forces internal to the Solar System, the Galaxy and beyond, all of which are induced by complex inter-relating systems of forces.
Or, so it could be argued, once more.
This objection will be considered in more detail later, but for present purposes it's sufficient to point out that it's difficult to see how such forces could be regarded as oppositional. Presumably, these forces do not affect each other; they simply change whatever motion is already present in the system. At best, then, such forces would only oppose the impressed motion already apparent -- which motion would itself have been the result of still other forces operating earlier in the system. This can be seen from the fact that if the moving bodies in question had not been in the said 'force field', these forces would have had nothing on which they could act. In 'empty space', plainly, we would see no new motion.23 Forces without bodies to operate on do not interfere with each other, as far as we know -- unless they are themselves regarded as particulate somehow (or are carried by particles), which would, of course, mean they weren't forces but bodies to begin with.24
Classically, forces seem to work only on bodies by altering their motion. In which case, the supposed opposition is not between bodies, nor is it between bodies and forces, nor even between forces and forces -- it is between forces and the (already) impressed motion of bodies in the system. But, this picture is difficult to square with the idea that there is a UO at work here -- nor does it seem to tally with the claim that dialectically polar opposites ultimately induce all motion and change. This is because (once more) forces do not oppose each other; they oppose or augment whatever motion is already present in the system, however it was caused.
In short, on this 'revised' view, the term "contradiction" would not apply to opposing forces (i.e., to forces that oppose one another), nor to bodies; on the contrary, 'contradictions' would connect forces with movement already present. But, as yet, no DM-theorist has given any clear sense to the idea that a force could 'contradict' the impressed motion in a system. And rightly so; there are no opposites here for a DM-'contradiction' to latch onto. How could a force be the 'opposite' of a change of place?
It could be objected that as a matter of fact forces in nature oppose (in the sense of change) motion. Indeed, it could be argued that dialecticians examine forces as they actually operate in nature (as opposed to those abstracted from it); such opposites objectively exist and can't be analysed away.
This much will not be disputed here (even if its wording might). But, in what way can this set-up be said to involve the interconnection of opposites? And, what sense can be given to the idea that motion in one direction is the opposite of a force that affects it? Certainly they are not unified opposites (i.e., opposites on the same type, so they are not logically connected, in the Hegelian sense of this word).
At best, the force concerned might tend to produce an opposite motion (or change in motion, perhaps) to that which has already been impressed (or even none at all). But, to describe force and motion as "opposites" would appear to make about as much sense as claiming that "left" was the opposite of "television", even if as a matter of fact someone moved a television to the left. Their actual linkage in reality has nothing to do with whether it is sensible to describe such items as unified opposites, or even as oppositional. These terms are categorically different -- as are "force" and "motion". Hence, it is not a question of whether or not DM-theorists are dealing with 'objective' facts; it's whether asking why this objection can only be made to work by mis-describing things.25
Only those who feel confident that they can provide a clear sense to the idea that forces and motion are opposites may reject the above objection with anything more than a wave of the hand. Moreover, as we will see, forces often augment motion, they do not always "oppose" it; indeed, most of the bulk motion in the universe is of this sort, as was pointed out earlier.26
However, even if this could be done, it would still be bad news for DM. That is because any other allegedly oppositional force in the system could not then also be the opposite of the original pairing between this force and that motion. And that in turn would mean that systems of opposing forces could not function in DM as is currently supposed. In that case, it wouldn't be forces that opposed one another (as had originally been claimed); in such a set-up, forces would oppose impressed motion (not other forces), and the idea that change was the result of systematically inter-related forces would have to be abandoned.
As should now seem obvious, each item in a complex ensemble of this sort would have to be viewed as the opposite of every other. Given such an arrangement, any moving body would have countless 'opposites' (i.e., any other forces and/or moving bodies in the system).27 This would put a strain on the meaning of the word "opposite", once more, which would remain until the meaning of that word had been altered accordingly, so that several items could be regarded as the "opposite" of any one or more others. Under such circumstances, as we have already seen, the notion of a polar opposite would lose its key role in DM. In fact, it would become meaningless if everything possessed innumerable "polar opposites". [This is quite apart from the fact that this would undermine the DM-theory of change.]
Not only that, as we have also seen several times, given such ad hoc linguistic tinkering, dialectics would apply to nature and society only because of a new and subjectively applied linguistic convention.
Unfortunately, this jellyfish-of-a-theory can't be squeezed anywhere without some of it slipping through our fingers somewhere else. What had been touted all along as a grand theory that could explain change as a consequence of the 'contradictory' nature of reality -- or, as the result of the interplay between opposite forces -- on this interpretation now seems to amount to little more than a few vague ideas about the relation between a force and the impressed motion in a system, and now fatally implicated with the admission that the DM-Totality is a mediated system of forces only because the definition of a "polar opposite" had been 'adjusted' accordingly. If this is what DM-theorists mean when they asserted their impressive sounding 'dialectical' theses then it seems that their theory can only be rescued by making reality Ideal -- i.e., making its 'truth' sensitive to such ad hoc linguistic 'surgery'.
However, even if the above objections are incorrect in some way, in DM-terms, none of it makes any sense, since none of these opposites (force and motion) could turn into one another, as the DM-classics say they should:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62. Bold emphasis added.]
"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Engels (1976) p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Bold emphasis added.]
"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]…. [Ibid., pp.221-22. Last set of parentheses in the original; bold emphasis added.]
"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead,
rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one
another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is
that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or
rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given
conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are
referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete
transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves
into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the
mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is
absolute." [Mao (1937),
pp.340-42. Bold emphases added.]
[Plenty more of the same here.]
Force does not change into movement, nor does movement change into force.
Someone could object that indeed they do change into one another (perhaps via an exchange of energy, or as part of an equal and opposite reaction, etc.).
But, if that were so, another problem would immediately assert itself. If force F were to turn into new movement M, then the one would follow upon the other: F would create M at a later instant in time, otherwise it could not turn into it. Plainly, if M already exists, F could not turn into it. Unfortunately, in that case, F and M can't 'struggle' with one another, for the two would not exist simultaneously in order for this to happen. If, on the other hand, F were to change as a result of some as yet unspecified factor, say F*, then F*, not M, would now to be the opposite of F, and F would turn into F*, not into M.
Alternatively, consider force F and movement M, the first supposedly opposing, or 'contradicting' the second -- perhaps F is the reaction force of a body that has just collided with another moving body. It could be argued that in this case the motion M of the second body produced the reaction F, and the reaction F then alters the motion M.
To that end, let us imagine two bodies, A and B, in collision. Let the motion of both be MA1 and MB1, respectively, before the collision, and MA2 and MB2 after. Further, let the reaction force produced in each body be FA and FB. Hence, MA1 produces FB and MB1 produces FA. In turn FA then produces MB2 and FB then produces MA2. But, according to the DM-classics, an object or process turns into that with which it 'struggles', its dialectical 'opposite'. So, since MA1 turns into MA2 it must have 'struggled' with it. The same applies to MA1 and MA2. But this can't happen since neither of MA2 and MB2 exist yet for MA1 and MB1 to 'struggle' with! If they did, MA1 and MB1 could not change into them.
On the other hand, if FA 'struggles' with MB1, then, according to the DM-classics, it must change into it. The same applies to FB and MA1. But, MB1 changes into MB2 not FA and MA1 changes into MA2 not FB. Once more, we hit the same brick wall.
Even worse, there is an equal and opposite reaction force in both A and B, namely RA and RB, produced by FA and FB, respectively. That is: RA = -FA and RB = -FB. Exactly how these are supposed to fit into the 'dialectical' picture is even less clear. DM-fans are invited to play around with them as much as they like, the result will be no less disconcerting.
Howsoever we try to re-package this badly formulated 'theory', none of it seems to make any sense.
[This is just a particular example of a more general, but fatal defect that lies right at the heart of the DM-'theory' of change, exposed in much more detail here. Nevertheless, this point can be generalised, as it will be below, to show that no two (or more) forces could 'contradict' one another in the way that dialecticians imagine.]
Nevertheless, in order to examine every possible alternative, I propose to analyse this option in more detail. To that end, I will offer a clarification of what it might mean.
First Attempts At Clarification
Perhaps, then the following re-write might succeed in repairing this part of DM, at the same time as avoiding undermining the thesis that UOs operate everywhere in nature:
F2: A UO involves the opposition between a force P1 and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has produced (or would have produced) in a body B (had P1 never existed). The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this struggle.
F2 appears to link the operation of one force (P1) with that of another set of forces (Q). However, it's difficult to distinguish what F2 says about these two from the vector resultant of two forces if we subjected this system to the usual mathematical analysis. If so, the word "struggle" would amount to little more than an anthropomorphic re-write of the functional relations that exist within the vector calculus, only now applied to just one force, the resultant. In that case, if and when P1 and Q interact, they will produce just one resultant force R, which would alone induce the recorded change in motion.28
But, if at is so, a contradiction between forces can't arise: if there is only one force operating in the system, no contradiction can arise. In that case, F2 threatens to undermine this interpretation of DM by killing it for want of forces.29
This failure suggests we should reconsider an option left unexplored earlier; i.e., the one which argued that forces are the only legitimate candidates to be placed in such oppositional couples, but not the motion they change/induce -- contrary to what Engels seems to have believed when he tried to replace forces with relative motion.
On this view, forces are 'contradictory' only of other forces, and not of bodies or of already impressed motion in the system. The following might, therefore, bring out more clearly this latest alternative:
F3: Given a body B, and a system of forces P, comprising n vectors p1-pn operating on B, a resultant force vector R represents the outcome of the struggle between these n contradictory force vectors. In this, R need not be fixed, but could itself be subject to countless changes as body B moves under the influence of P, which would also change accordingly.
One immediate problem with this is that the specification of the forces belonging to P depends on the choice of co-ordinate system and inertial frame.30 This indicates that the representation of forces as 'contradictions' is perhaps more convention-sensitive that it is reality-driven -- which would mean, of course, that 'dialectical contradictions' are no more 'objective' than, say, latitude and longitude are.
However, even if this latest difficulty is put to one side, it's still worth asking whether any sense can be made of F3.
As noted above, F3 seems to bring us back full circle to the idea that forces -- not bodies, or the motion of bodies -- are mutually 'contradictory'. And yet, as we have just seen, it is not possible to depict AA- and RR-forces as 'contradictory', unless their effects are involved in some way.
Unfortunately, as we have noted several times, if "force" is just a convenient shorthand for relative motion, it would mean that this part of DM was more consistent with a CAR-like picture of reality -- in so far as elements of the "Totality" would now be externally- (not internally-) related to one another.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]
To repeat: it is not easy to see how the motion of one body could be internally-related to that of others without re-introducing the idea that bodies exercise an effect on one another independently of how they are moving -- and while that might subsequently affect their movement, it wouldn't internally-link such bodies. And yet, this is precisely the difficulty that exercised traditional philosophers as part of the classical metaphysical problem of the nature of forces; DM has merely reproduced it in an obscure form.31
Perhaps the slide into CAR may be prevented by the following re-wording of F3:
F4: Given a system of forces P, comprising n vectors p1-pn, a resultant force vector R represents the outcome of the struggle between these n force vectors.
F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.
F5 is clearly one aspect of the thesis that the whole determines the nature of its parts, and vice versa. Hence, F4 and F5 appear to restore the dialectical unity that earlier paragraphs seem to have sundered.
Unfortunately, this just brings us back in full circle to a consideration of the relationship between the "Totality" and its parts. This is because F5 introduces its own pernicious version of HEX, for it seems impossible (on this account) to determine whether or not anything is 'contradictory' unless the nature of the whole was ascertained first. But, since the latter is always changing, no element in this 'cosmic wild-goose chase' will ever be hunted down and trapped, as it were. We encountered this dilemma in several forms in other Essays at this site; on this see, for example, here and here.
The most relevant aspect of this latest quandary centres on the idea (voiced by some dialecticians) that as scientific understanding grows, the 'contradictions' that now plague our knowledge of the world ought to diminish. Presumably, this must mean that, in the limit (i.e., in an ideal state where human beings possess (in theory) the Absolute Truth about everything), there would be no contradictions at all in or between scientific theories. But, in order to be true, a theory must faithfully reflect the world (given the traditional account of scientific theories). This can only mean that the world itself can't contain any contradictions, otherwise they would be reflected in theory (which we have just discounted). In its turn, this appears to mean that even if humanity never actually reaches this blessed state, we can in the here-and-now make that very inference: the Absolute truth is that not only is the world not contradictory, the motion of bodies and the operation of forces isn't either.32
In fact, this predictive proposition must be true now, for if it were not now true that there were no 'contradictions' in the ultimate future state of our knowledge of the "Totality" then either the DM-view of the limit of knowledge (as ideally contradiction-free) must be wrong, or the DM-belief that humanity is converging on that limit is incorrect, since there is no such limit.33
Again, if this is what dialecticians mean by 'contradictory forces',34 then nothing may be so described until everything has been so described. But, this reverses the dialectical picture, for, as we have just seen, some DM-theorists appear to believe that things only look 'contradictory' because we do not possess the Big Picture, an Absolute view of reality, and that if we were ever to attain to such a synoptic view, 'contradictions' would disappear (or largely disappear -- the story gets a little vague on this point). Here, in contrast, the idea seems to be that we may only depict forces in nature as absolutely 'contradictory' after the dialectical bell on judgement day has finally tolled. But, the problem with this is that we may only do so when all (or most) 'contradictions' have been resolved! Paradoxically, this means that 'objectively' these 'contradiction' both exist and they do not -- or, we do not know whether they do!
So, one horn of this dilemma suggests that 'dialectical contradictions' don't exist -- and if they don't, they can have nothing to do with change. The other suggests we can't now assert that they do exist (since we are not in possession of Absolute Knowledge), so we can't now claim to know whether they cause change.35
At any rate, to return to the main theme, if AA-, and RR-forces are mutually oppositional, change would still be caused by resultant forces. But, as we saw in Essay Seven, this scenario is just as easy to interpret as 'tautological', rather than as 'contradictory' -- that is, if we insist on viewing nature in such anthropomorphic/animistic terms.
Of course, if we resist such primitivism, as we should, then both descriptors (i.e., "contradictory" and "tautological") should be fed into the 'obsolete-concept-shredder'. [More on that here.]
Perhaps, then, it would be wise to draw a veil over this self-imposed dialectical impasse, and turn to a more likely source of DM-'contradictions': AR-force couples.
In the previous section, it became clear that little sense can be made of AA- or RR-forces being equated with 'dialectical contradictions', and this turned out to have nothing to do with the difficulty of seeing whether such couples contained opposites or not -- which they manifestly don't. An A-force is not the opposite of another A-force; the same is true R-forces, too.
However, a prima facie case could be made for regarding AR-force couples as the polar opposites that DM-theorists require in order to depict 'contradictions' in DM and HM.
Unfortunately, as we will see, this slender straw once clutched soon turns into a millstone, drowning this doomed 'theory'. Quite apart from the considerations outlined above, no clear sense can be made of the idea that AR-forces can model 'contradictions', anywhere or anyhow.36
An initial serious difficulty this idea faces is that AR-couples do not appear to operate in nature in quite the manner this handy prefix seems to suggest: i.e., as AR-forces.
Consider a straightforward case: the accumulation of matter that formed the stars, planets and their moons (etc.). Here, R-forces (operating at the nuclear level) apparently prevent(ed) (for a time) the catastrophic collapse of these growing masses into 'singularities' by balancing-out the A-forces that presumably set the whole thing in motion.
The problem with these R-forces is that, while they look as though they oppose any other A-forces in the system, they aren't their polar opposites (in the way that, say, the North and South poles of a magnet are said to be) -- that is, they are not opposite manifestations of the same force type. So, the inter-atomic forces preventing the above collapse are not the same type of force as the gravitational forces that initiated the process.37 While a case might be made for depicting North and South poles of a magnet as polar opposite magnetic forces (or perhaps as 'creating' them -- but on this see below), gravitational and nuclear forces are not 'interpenetrated' opposites of the same type, and so can't, it seems, 'contradict' each other.
However, even if they were opposites of the same type, these forces change the motion of bodies; they do not directly confront each other as opposing forces. Admittedly, they can be represented in a vector calculus, but we have already seen that this translation is of little assistance to DM -- that is because the relevant forces disappear, to be replaced by a single resultant force which causes all the action.
It could be argued that these initial difficulties can be neutralised if emphasis is placed once more on the oppositional nature of AR-forces, as a way of explaining change.
Unfortunately, this detour is no more successful than it was when it was considered above in relation to AA- and RR-forces.
Even if this further difficulty is shelved for now, it would still be difficult to see how AR-forces could be interpreted literally (or figuratively) as 'contradictions' (especially in HM). This is because of the way in which they can combine and augment one another.
For example, consider, two forces operating in diametrically opposite directions tangentially placed around a rotating body. These two forces -- although 'opposites' at their point of action -- exercise a combined and augmented effect on the angular acceleration of that body, thus ceasing to be oppositional.38
This is a familiar feature of force vectors. In some instances, they seem to 'oppose', in others they appear to 'augment' one another, while in still others they look like they do both at once.39
Cases like these illustrate that forces are not rigidly fixed as permanent opposites, nor are they always oppositional, even when they are classified as opposites. Hence, it's difficult to see how regarding forces only as polar oppositional pairs could accommodate this property of natural forces.40 In that case, this is unwelcome news, for little sense can be given in DM to the idea that opposites can switch in this way.41
It could be objected here is a gross distortion since the above phenomena are actually consistent with DM. Dialecticians themselves reject the idea that there are fixed and unchanging forces in nature. Hence, the recognition that forces can change and operate in 'opposite directions' is one of DM's strengths, not one of its weaknesses.
Or, so it could be maintained.
However, this volunteered reply does achieve one thing: it helps focus on what has been a recurring problem throughout the Essays posted at this site: DM is so vague and equivocal that it is impossible to say exactly what its consequences are, or even if it has any. The claim that 'contradictions' in nature must be understood as opposing forces has under close examination turned out to mean that such forces might not actually oppose each other -- indeed, according to Engels, the concept of a force could simply be a convenient shorthand for the complex relative motion of bodies. Now, it seems that even this is incorrect, for oppositional forces may actually augment one another, but only if they are not now viewed as shorthand for the relative motion of bodies.
It is thus impossible to decide which DM-type forces are genuine opposites (or, indeed, which are polar opposites, if any are), or distinguish any that are from those that aren't. But, if every force can work in any manner whatsoever, then it becomes deeply mysterious why only some are depicted as opposites. And, what has become of the AR-typology Engels regarded as fundamental?
Given such vague and ambiguous terminology, little meaning may be given to a single DM-concept in this area; still less to the idea that DM force 'laws' operate anywhere in nature.
Imagine a Chemist, say, who identified an element as having just so many protons in its nucleus, except it didn't really have this number, and these alleged protons weren't really protons, and the element rarely if ever had a nucleus, and anyway it wasn't an element in the first place. Suppose further that this chemist claimed that she knew what she was talking about (even if no one else did) because she was an expert player of the 'Nixon Card', and thus skilled in the art of "grasping contradictions", which unfortunate lack of 'flexibility' prevents her critics from seeing the truth as she sees it.
Few, I think, would take her seriously.
Unfortunately, such discursive and theoretical 'contradictions' are grist to the DM-mill, but this is not something about which dialecticians should feel proud. For if Capitalists, say, (as a social force) can indeed operate in such a contradictory manner, who is to say whether a revolution is necessary to overthrow them? Perhaps -- as result of a 'dialectical inversion' -- the class enemy could become the strongest ally of the working class? In such a topsy-turvy dialectical universe anything might happen. Capitalism might disappear by being reformed away; Imperialists could assist in the abolition of injustice; the Nazi's might one day help create 'racial' harmony; and the Ku Klux Klan could wind up advancing the struggle for Black Liberation. Who knows? The boss-classes might even overthrow themselves!42
If it's a central postulate of the theory that 'contradictions' are oppositional forces, and that these can change in 'contradictory' ways to become 'non-oppositional', then reformism, centrism, class collaboration (and the prospect of having the Fascists (etc.) as allies) can't be ruled out. On the other hand, if these possibilities are to be rejected (as surely they must), then the importation of such 'contradictory' DM-ideas into HM must be resisted no less forcefully.
In fact, as we will see in Essay Nine Part Two, this is indeed how class collaborationists have argued: the allegedly 'contradictory' nature of the Guomindang, for example, 'allowed' the CCP to 'justify' forming alliances with them. As we will also see, this contradictory theory can be, and has been used to defend practically anything at all, and its opposite, in the same breath -- often by the same dialectician.
Of course, it could be pointed out that forces operate in history in more complex ways than those that work in nature, so the above analogy with natural forces (and the KKK, etc.) is inapt -- especially if it's applied in the crude manner illustrated above. Unfortunately, if this rebuttal were itself successful then it would be misleading to describe natural and social forces as 'contradictory', for if the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' is inapt, it's inapt. End of story. Of course, that admission would amount to the abandonment of this unhelpful analogy in its entirety: that 'contradictions' may be depicted as oppositional forces.43
Nevertheless, even if all of the above points turn out to be misguided in some way, there are other, more fundamental reasons for ruling-out the identification of opposing forces with 'contradictions'.
It is to these that I now turn.
'Literal Forces' In Opposition
Most of the above criticisms were aimed at demonstrating that the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' was seriously misguided. Despite this, it could be argued that this does not affect the view that the identification of forces with 'contradictions' is in fact literal, not figurative.
However, it's worth remarking that despite its centrally-important role in DM, and as far as can be ascertained, the precise details of the literal connection between forces and 'contradictions' have never been worked-out by dialecticians. One reason for this might be that they consider this identification to be so obvious that the specifics either do not matter or they are deemed trivial.
On the other hand, it could turn out that nothing could have been said in this regard that was aimed at defending this DM-thesis, which would more obviously explain the long-term and deafening silence. As will soon become clear, the latter indeed seems to be the case: this omission is not the least bit surprising, for the imagined connection between forces and 'contradictions' turns out to be entirely illusory.
In order to substantiate this claim, it might help if we back-tracked a little. Part of the argument in favour of the identification of forces and contradictions appears to depend on an analogy drawn between literal contradictions and conflict (which view, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), is a throw-back to ancient and animistic beliefs about the origin of social and natural conflict in the activities of various 'gods' and/or other personified forces at work behind the scenes, or beneath 'appearances').
Mere contradictions are ostensively verbal wrangles, which can look oppositional. When one person asserts "p", and another person denies it (or asserts "not p", where "p" stands for a spoken token indicative sentence), then at the level of discourse at least some sort of opposition seems to be implied (but on that, see here). So, analogously, it seems that a 'contradiction' in nature signals the existence of real material opposition -- but, alas, only to those who are happy to fetishise social relations as if they represent real relations in the non-social world.
Clearly, DM-theorists view material 'contradictions' as their primary concern when compared with the secondary examples that feature in verbal wrangles. [These are not really of interest to DM-fans.] Even so, this idea is no less analogical, for we were certainly aware of the latter sort of contradiction well before we were informed of the former (by Hegel). In that case, the argument must have proceeded from the social to the natural world, which is indeed what the history of the subject reveals: Hegelian and/or 'Materialist Dialectics' did not exist in pre-historic times (or even before the 18th century), but people have been arguing and contradicting one another for tens of thousands of years. Hence, social interaction has plainly been projected analogically onto nature --, DM-theorists have relied on an analogy drawn between the way human beings argue (and/or fight) and the way conflict appears in the natural and social world. Unfortunately, this makes the literal interpretation of forces as 'contradictions' unavoidably dependent on analogical and figurative language, leaving the non-believer with no clue what literal meaning could possibly be attributed to this way of picturing conflict in nature and society. Even to this day, we still lack the material grounding DM requires.
Now we certainly have a clear grasp of the use of contradictions in language and (arguably also in) logic, but we have none at all when it comes to those that allegedly occur in nature -- or, as we will see, in society.
Nevertheless, this would at least account for the figurative way that contradictions continually appear in DM (and are seriously overused in HM), and why dialecticians regularly conflate social with material forms.44
Once more, even if we ignore this latest problem, one thing is clear: for DM-theorists verbal contradictions represent perhaps the least significant type of opposition. Changes in nature and society are (for them) the result of much more fundamental 'contradictions' than those occasioned by the mere gainsaying of another person's words. In many cases, discursive contradictions might turn out be a 'reflection' of more basic conflicts in the real world, and it is the latter that are of interest to DM-theorists.
However, once this 'neat' picture is examined a little more closely much of it falls apart.
The Revenge Of The Non-Existent
As has already been noted, DM-theorists have so far failed to provide a clear account of the precise nature of the connection between 'contradictions' and opposing forces. In that case, once again, one will have to be supplied for them.45
Presumably, when DM-theorists claim that 'contradictions' are represented in nature by opposing forces they have something like the following in mind (if they but knew it):
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.46
[Here, the content of C1 could include any other local or distant forces and processes operating in the system; alternatively, the forces themselves may even be 'edited out' on the lines envisaged by Engels (as a sort of shorthand for relative motion, etc.). In addition, all the internal "mediations" between these forces and/or events in the Totality (T) may also be incorporated into the picture. Other 'dialectical' caveats could, of course, be stirred into the mix, as seems necessary and/or appropriate.]
It's worth emphasising at this point that P1 or P2 must operate 'independently' in C1.47 This seems to be an essential assumption to make so that sets E1 and E2 may be determinate themselves.
[Anyway, this 'independence' need not suggest a CAR-like scenario since it could form part of the 'dialectical development' of new forces and processes as C1 and the rest of T develop. Naturally, this simplifying assumption could be modified at a later stage, as the need arises.]
The first problem with the above account centres on the term "opposites", in F9. Something a little more precise than merely an "opposite" seems to be required here in order for DL to surpass FL in its ability to account for change, etc.48
Unfortunately, the difficulty here lies in seeing whether even this minimal condition is actually implied by F6-F9, and whether the rather weak concept of an "opposite" is capable of bearing all the weight that is usually put on it.
However, quite independently of these annoying niggles, far more problematic is the fact that given F6-F9, it would be impossible to say what the 'contradictory' state-of-affairs here is meant to be.
That is because F6-F9 imply that E1 and E2 do not in fact obtain together, for if just one of P1 or P2 is in fact operative, then just one of E1 or E2 will be instantiated.
Clearly, in such circumstances there could be no 'contradiction' -- even given the loose DM-notion of one -- since, at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction would not actually exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented from occurring by the operation of either one of P1 or P2!49
I will examine later the question whether E1 and E2, even though 'opposites', can legitimately be described as 'contradictory'. In what follows, I will simply assume that they are.50
Prevention And Its Discontents
Despite this, it could be claimed that the following propositions are all that DM really requires:
F10: P1 prevents E2, and P2 prevents E1.
F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.
F12: Therefore, P1 and P2 contradict each other's effects.
If this is so, then plainly P1 and P2 do not actually contradict each other, just each other's effects. In that case, it's not too clear whether or not DM-theorists who are keen to maintain the orthodox view that forces contradict each other will want to embrace F10-F12 too enthusiastically.
In addition, it has already been conceded (for the purposes of the argument) that E1 and E2 are 'contradictories'. But, it now appears from the above, and from F10-F12, that not only does E1 'contradict' E2, but also that P1 'contradicts' E2, and P2 'contradicts' E1, as well. I shall return to consider these added complications, later.
However, there appears to be no good reason for accepting F11, and every reason for rejecting it. Consider the following scenario -- aimed at illustrating why F11 is unacceptable (even given the truth of other DM-theses):
F13: NN saved child MM from drowning.
F14: NN prevented the drowning.
F15: So, NN contradicted the drowning (by F11).
[F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.]
The problem here lies not so much with the non-standard use of language these sentences contain, but with the fact that if a drowning (or if anything) is prevented from happening then it never actually took place. In that case, if the said incident did not happen it could not have been 'contradicted' by any of the forces or events doing the preventing, since there would be no 'it' for anything to contradict. Unless we are prepared to envisage forces 'contradicting' things that do not exist, or we allow them to 'contradict' unrealised possibilities -- or even 'contradict' ideas (perhaps those in the mind of NN above) --, the word "contradiction" can gain no grip here, even in DM-terms.
Of course, it could be objected that this hypothetical action did indeed contradict the said drowning by stopping it from happening. But, to repeat, the said drowning was prevented, hence it did not take place, so it never existed to be contradicted.
One obvious fall-back position for dialecticians to occupy would be to argue that the actions mentioned above halted a series of events that would have led to the said drowning. In that sense, those actions contradicted that series of events. This objection will be looked at more closely later, and presently, below.
However, just in case this latest counter-example is considered prejudicial, or contentious (in that it doesn't deal with real forces, or with the sort of forces DM-theorists are interested in), then perhaps the following considerations might prove more acceptable. Let us begin with this obvious sentence:
F16: Any process that is prevented from occurring does not exist (or take place).51
It's clear that while F16 is a truism, it seems to ignore extended events and processes, so it might not be acceptable as a clarification of the 'contradictions' that are of interest to DM-theorists. Consider, then, the following emendations:
F17: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F18: Events E1-En form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.
F19: Let P2 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or do not take place.
It's quite plain from this that because of the operation of P2, certain events failed to materialise. But, that simply generalises the point made in the drowning example above. Even if it were assumed that the vague notion of a 'contradiction' employed by DM-theorists is viable, it's difficult to see how something could 'contradict' something else if the latter does not exist/take place (and perhaps never will). Hence, in the example above, if P2 halted certain unspecified elements of the series of events that would have led to the said drowning, then those prevented events never happened, and so did not exist, and so can't have been 'contradicted'.
This objection appears to be fatal to DM; if anything, forces actually prevent 'contradictions' from arising, and so can't be equated with what they thwart.
So, far from forces being DM-friendly, they appear to be among its very worst enemies.
In that case, if this fatal weakness is to be neutralised, a new and more consistent account of the relationship between 'contradictions' and forces must be found.52
A More Balanced Account Of Prevention?
In order to construct a more viable account, we need to return to a difficulty we met earlier, which was put to one side temporarily: the claim that forces (not forces and effects, or simply effects) are directly contradictory to one another. Consider then the following:
F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.
Again, this perhaps puts too much weight on the term "prevent"; it could prompt F21 to self-destruct just as fast as F17-20 did, for if one of these forces fails to operate (it having been prevented), no 'contradiction' could ensue.
[Whether or not the actual act of prevention is what constitutes the 'contradiction' here will be considered below, here and in Note 55.]
But, perhaps this conclusion is just a little too hasty. For example, both of the above forces could still exist even if one ceased to operate in an F21-style scenario, and no problem need arise because of that since no appeal would have been made to the non-existent effects of either one of them.
This means that even though one of P1 or P2 might have been prevented from acting, they could both still exist in some form or other. If so, F21 might appear to be the viable option that dialecticians require. One further advantage here would be that F21 connects forces directly with 'contradictions', rather than linking 'contradictions' to the effects of forces. Could this be the lifeline that DM requires?
Alas, upon closer examination, this lifeline soon turns into a noose.
The fatal consequences this option presents DM-theorists become apparent when we attempt to unravel what it means for a force to be 'prevented' from operating.
Despite disclaimers, it seems that if a force no longer operates, it no longer exists. Perhaps the problem lies not so much with the precise physical form that forces take (which form, even to this day, is mysterious in itself), but with the fact that the word "operate" is ambiguous. Consider the following examples of forces that are capable of being rendered inoperative:
F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate when worker NN threw the switch.
F23: An aerofoil produces the lift necessary to keep an aeroplane in the air provided that there is sufficient relative velocity between that aerofoil and the ambient medium to prevent the force of gravity from operating normally, pulling the aircraft to the ground.
In F22, the relevant force simply ceased to exist (or it was converted back into another force, 'potential' force, or form of energy, etc.) when the switch had been thrown. But, in F23, a second force (lift) 'cancels out' the effects of the first force (gravity) -- which, of course, still exists (perhaps as part of the resultant force in the system).
Could F21 now be interpreted along lines similar to those suggested in F23? This way of viewing the relation between P1 and P2 would see them both as still existing, even while they counterbalanced each other. In which case, it might prove helpful to re-write F21 in the following manner:
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.53
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]
Now, F24 does not seem to face any of the existential problems that F21 encountered since the relevant forces actually co-exist, counterbalancing each other. Perhaps then we have a clear statement of what DM-theorists require?
Alas not.
A new difficulty arises once we ask why only counterbalancing forces should be considered 'contradictory'. This is relevant since F24 simply restricts our attention to situations where there is an equilibrium between forces, and ignores dis-equilibria.54 But surely, it's largely as a result of the latter that change occurs (certainly changes of the sort that interest dialecticians) -- meaning that 'contradictions' should be connected with these rather than with equilibria. If so, F24 must be re-written in the following way:
F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.
Unfortunately, F25 can't now provide the clarity that was missing from previous attempts to explicate this part of DM. That is because F25 fails to distinguish between equilibria and disequilibria. F24 seemed to express a clear definition of 'contradictory' forces, but in order to make it applicable to the real world, F25 had to be recruited in support, completely undermining F24. F25 informs us that forces are 'contradictory' whether or not F24 is true. Worse still, F25 could be true even when F24 is false:
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.
Hence, if the following were true:
F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.
F25 would be true, but F24 would be false (and/or vice versa).
Now, anyone reading these three sentences (and taking them for an accurate exposition of this part of DM) would rightly complain that nothing had actually been explained, since there is nothing about the relationship between the forces mentioned that indicates what the overall theory is committed to.
In response, others could argue that this latest problem is not only spurious, it's solely the result of the phrase "only if" in F24. Its removal should eliminate the difficulty.
Unfortunately, the removal of the "only if" in F24 would plunge the theory back into all the existential problems it had been introduced to eradicate. This can be seen if we try to re-word F24 in the following manner:
F27: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.
Although F27 might look acceptable, it is merely a sufficient condition; hence, it does not rule out the following:
F28: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.54a
[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]
But, F28 is just a resurrected version of F21, which we found did not rule out F22, and thus non-existent forces. What was required here instead was a description of 'contradictory' forces that does not imply that one of the forces operating ceased to exist as a result of the action of any other forces in the system. And we also required an account that does not rely on forces merely 'contradicting' the effects of other forces -- because of the serious difficulties that particular alternative encountered earlier.
That is why an appeal had to be made to forces that counterbalance one another, since (clearly) they must exist to do this -- hence, the "only if" had to be introduced, making this a necessary condition. But, as we discovered, this more restricted version ruled out forces that did not counterbalance one another, which DM seems to need; reintroducing these at a later stage simply ruined this neat picture.
Unfortunately, F24 and F26 seem to divorce 'contradictions' from equilibria, since the presence or absence of the latter is in no way affected by the former.
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.
This means that if F24 and F26 reflect the real nature of things, then 'contradictions' are in fact unrelated to the balancing effects of forces. As paradoxical as this might seem, DM-theorists must deny the truth of the conjunction of F24 and F26 if they want to maintain their belief that there is a connection between forces, 'contradictions', equilibria and disequilibria in nature and society. Alas, in order to account for the 'contradictory' nature of reality, DM-theorists can't afford to do this. For, as soon as F24 and F26 are adopted, DM ceases to be explanatory; but the minute these two are rejected, this attempt to understand the nature of DM-forces collapses.
Nevertheless, this annoying conclusion might appear to some to be a little too hasty and contrived. And yet, with so little in the writings of DM-theorists to guide us, how could anyone decide if the above attempt to understand DM is misleading and/or prejudicial? Indeed, how could dialecticians themselves arrive at a clear decision on this score without some form of theoretical innovation, an option that has so far been complete anathema to the 'Orthodox' (who are only too happy to wave the 'Revisionism' card)?
Nevertheless, if we adhere to the requirement that 'contradictions' explain change -- when pictured as opposing forces (that is, if we give 'contradictions' some sort of materialist bite) --, then this theory must self-destruct, by the above argument. That's because the theory maintains that forces are 'contradictory' whether what its theorists claim about them is true or not (if this is indeed what they claim, or what this theory implies!).
Naturally, all this is independent of the far more fundamental question whether the idea that 'contradictory' forces are capable of counterbalancing each other can itself be explicated without referring to the sort of 'prevented', or 'non-existent' effects we met earlier. If it can't, this latest detour would prove to be yet another dead end, since 'prevented' effects do not exist to be contradicted. On the other hand, if this theory can be explained without referring to such effects, then it would be difficult to say what impact such a scenario could possibly have in the real world. How could such forces be described as "material" if they had no effect on anything material --, except, that is, on those seemingly insubstantial 'non-existent' effects?
Well, this is another dialectical hole DM-fans can dig themselves out of. I am merely content to remind them that it is a hole, it's very deep, and it's one of their own making.
Perhaps even this is too hasty. Maybe we should begin again.
To that end, it might help to re-examine a passage from Cornforth, quoted in Part One of this Essay:
"The unity of opposites in a contradiction is characterised by a definite relation of superiority-inferiority, or of domination, between the opposites. For example, in a physical unity of attraction and repulsion, certain elements of attraction or repulsion may be dominant in relation to others. The unity is such that one side dominates the other -- or, in certain cases, they may be equal.
"Any qualitative state of a process corresponds to a definite relation of domination. Thus, the solid, liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic of the molecules of bodies....
"Domination relationships are obviously, by their very nature, impermanent and apt to change, even though in some cases they remain unchanged for a long time. If the relationship takes the form of equality or balance, such balance is by nature unstable, for their is a struggle of opposites within it which is apt to lead to the domination of one over the other....
"The outcome of the working out of contradictions is, then, a change in the domination relation characteristic of the initial unity of opposites. Such a change constitutes a change in the nature of a thing, a change from one state to another, a change from one thing to another, a change entailing not merely some external alteration but a change in the internal character and laws of motion of a thing." [Cornforth (1976), pp.97-98.]
Now, the above argument might appear to work when applied to human social systems, where agents (individually or in groups) can 'upset' any number of 'balanced' situations, and who do not need too much in the way of external motivation to do so (although, in order to be able to say even this much with any clarity, the reader will note that Cornforth found he found he didn't need to use any of the obscure jargon invented by Hegel). However, when this theory is applied to nature as a whole it can't work. Consider the following:
F29: Let FD be a set of force 'elements' in a 'dominant' relation to FS, which is 'submissive' accordingly (i.e., FD > FS), and let both operate in system S, however defined.
F30: Now, for this relation to change so that a qualitative transformation occurs in the overall system S, one or both of FD and FS will have to change first.
F31: If the change occurs in FD it will have to do so because of the latter's own 'internal contradictions', otherwise the theory must fail at least here. [The same applies to FS, or indeed to both taken severally or collectively.]
F32: But, if that is so, then the same analysis will apply one more level down, as it were: whatever causes FD to change will have to be the result of further dominance/submissive relations inside/internal to FD itself. In turn, the pre-conditions noted in F31 will also apply at, or to these 'lower level' relations; they must change because of their own 'internal contradictions'.
F33: Either this continues forever, or it will halt at some point.
F34: If it halts at some point, then there must be fundamental units that do not change through 'internal contradictions', and so the theory fails. [These fundamental units can have no effect on each other, for reasons spelt-out in detail in Part One of this Essay.]
F35: If this process continues forever, then there would be nothing to condition anything internal to anything else, just more and more layers, tailing off to infinity (i.e., to "who knows where?"). DM would thus have its own "bad infinity". [We saw that this was a non-viable option in Part One, too.]
F36: All this is independent of whether or not an external cause (or causes) initiated these internal changes in FD or FS. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to Cornforth), external causes can't bring about the internal qualitative changes required (again, according to Cornforth). The latter must be internally-generated in the last analysis.
It looks, therefore, like this 'theory' can't be rescued in this way.
Hole To Let -- Previous Occupant Self-Destructed
Howsoever we try, there seems to be no way of rescuing this self-destructing theory -- killed-off by its own internal obscurities.
In short: if a force prevents something from happening it can't contradict it; once prevented, the latter does not exist.55
On the other hand, if forces affect one another externally (as they seem to), then change can't be the result of 'internal contradictions'. Alternatively, if they have internal effects on one another (in some as-yet-unspecified way), and they change as a result of their own 'internal contradictions', then either they are composed of simple units that do not change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing internal to them can condition anything else 'internally', for there would be no such thing.
Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth -- Or Is It Too Few?
It could be objected that the above results have been deliberately tailored/skewed to fit a desired end: to malign DM come what may -- the choice of F24 being a prime example.
In that case, a much better way of representing the oppositional and contradictory nature forces might be the following:
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.
[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]
This means that the 'contradictory' relation between two or more forces would operate along a sort of continuum -- as it were -- with no fixed relation between them. The account given earlier clearly makes the link between 'contradictory' forces an "either-or", all-or-nothing, sort of affair.
Or so a counter-argument might go.56
At this point, an example from mechanics might help illustrate the complex relationship that is intended here: un-damped simple harmonic motion. [This link requires JAVA -- or try here if you have no JAVA installed.]
Consider a particle set in motion under the operation of two forces, such that its acceleration is proportional to its displacement from the point of equilibrium, and directed toward that point. Since the acceleration of this particle changes in proportion to its position, the net force operating on it must also change accordingly. This is due to the fact that the resultant force in this system is the vector sum of these two distinct but changing forces, which at the equilibrium point counterbalance one another, but at any other point they either augment or partially cancel each other out, depending on the physics of the situation. Because these two forces work in opposite directions and cause the impressed acceleration (achieving this by their 'dialectical interaction',-- let us say for now) we appear to have here an example of F37-type motion.
In this highly simplified picture of just one type of motion, the forces present in the system appear to 'contradict' one another in complex but changing ways, as DM seems to require. But, if this scenario actually does illustrate F24- (or F37-) type 'contradictions' then several untoward consequences follow:
(1) This analogy would mean that 'contradictions' (like forces) operate on a continuum. Hence, at any point along the path of the above particle the net force operating isn't equal to the net force at another point (in any one cycle). Hence, given a certain displacement, the modulus of the net force might be, say, only 1% of its maximum, at another it would be, say, 99% of it -- while at a symmetrical location past the point of equilibrium, the same would be true but in an opposite sense. Even so, it's not easy to see how such a picture may be fitted seamlessly into the DM-view of 'contradictions', and as we saw above, such a model would have unacceptable consequences in HM (involving, for example, the Nazis fighting racism!).
(2) This trope depends on forces being viewed as basic units of reality, as opposed to the product of the relations between bodies in motion.
[Recall that the latter option appears to have been one that Engels himself preferred when he spoke of relative velocities replacing forces. However, if the term "force" is just a shorthand for relative motion (or if it depends on the presence of a "field"), then, as we have also seen, the 'dialectical' unity of nature would be thrown into question. On that basis, the links between bodies and processes would be external, whereas DM requires them to be 'internal', with the existence of forces providing the 'connective tissue' of reality, as it were. If forces themselves depend on bodies in relative motion, then reality must be discrete, not continuous.]
But, DM-theorists have yet to tell us what the physical nature of a single force is. Physicists themselves have ceased to use this word (except as a sort of shorthand, as noted above). If forces have no physical nature, can they be part of material reality? How could such 'useful fictions' feature in a materialist account of nature?
(3) This neat picture, tailor-made for F37, obscures the complexity that occurs in nature. Even so, it's not easy to see how such a tidy model could cope with systems of forces, which, given this view, indicate that several things must be 'contradicted' all at once by countless others, or, indeed, which suggest that bodies and/or processes could have innumerable 'contradictories'. That would, of course, divorce DM-type 'contradictions' completely both from FL-contradictions and Hegelian 'contradictions'. While this might not be totally unacceptable to some, it would mean that the former sort of contradiction would be even more tenuously linked to the latter (or even with contradictions that appear in the vernacular). In that case, the meaning of the word "contradiction" when it's used in DM would be even more obscure than it already is. In addition, it would imply that any object or process in nature had more than one opposite at any point in time. The word "opposite" would cease to have any clear meaning, too. But, we have been here several times already.
Despite these niggling problems, it might be felt that F37 suitably modified could still capture essential features of the 'contradictory' nature of forces.
In order to investigate this alternative more closely, let us imagine that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57
F38: Let the first force be F1, and the second, F2.
F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.
F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.
F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0. [t3 > t2 > t1.]
[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.]
F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the system in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where no net force exists.
But, as we saw earlier, we face immediate problems with this way of depicting forces -- those encountered above in relation to the inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects like these -- such as, forces represented by vectors.
Ignoring this 'problem' too, it's worth pointing out once again that F40 in fact implies that there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only one force -- the resultant -- at work. On that basis, F37 would collapse for want of forces. No contradiction seems possible if only one force -- the resultant -- is present; still less if no forces are at work (as in F40).
It could be objected here that in the above, both of the original forces (F1 and F2) still exist, since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in the system (as they do in F39 and F41).
The problem with this reply is that it's not easy to see how the two original forces may also be said to exist alongside this third force -- the resultant --, whether the latter is zero or not. If they do exist in this way, we would plainly have three forces in the system, not one, or two.
This would, of course, create energy out of nowhere.58
To be sure, as part of our way of calculating resultants, we apply some mathematics to the relevant components, but that doesn't mean that nature does the same -- if it did, that would clearly imply nature was Mind, or the product of Mind! No one, it is to be hoped(!), thinks that in nature there are three forces here where once there were only two. And yet, it is this third force that does all the work.
Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or that between the forces and relations of production), say, produces a resultant third social force, the nature of which has to this day remained not only completely obscure, but totally unrecognised. Since, based on this model, all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this "third force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the utmost urgency!59
Moreover, on this view, forces are 'contradictory' when and only when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is triadic), but it would in fact sink the theory faster than a lead-lined diving suit sinks a diver. This is because change would then be a result not of contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.
And, as we have seen already, it's just as easy to depict such a set-up as 'tautologious' as it is to picture it as 'contradictory' -- even though both descriptors rightly belong in the 'mystical-concept-crusher' as hopelessly anthropomorphic.
Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of forces with 'contradictions' seems to be as misconceived as anything could be. When interpreted metaphorically, it turns out to be inappropriate (if not paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally, it crumbles into incoherence and inconsistency.
In order to avoid these difficulties we need to return to an alternative that was considered briefly, earlier -- one that could provide DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions'. However, before this alternative is aired, it's necessary to counter an objection that should by now have occurred to the reader:
This whole analysis is abstract and fails to consider "real material forces".59a
'Real' Contradictions
As noted above, considerations like these would stretch the patience of most dialecticians. Indeed, they would probably be the first to point out that this Essay fails to consider real material and empirically verifiable contradictions, and by this they generally (but not exclusively) mean the 'contradictions' that feature in HM, and which help account for the dynamic we see in class society.
However, it's worth pointing out that many of the examples considered earlier were typically concrete, and undeniably material!
Nevertheless, if no sense can be made of 'contradictory forces' in nature (as we have seen), then that automatically throws into question their appearance in HM.
Now, as is easy to demonstrate, revolutionaries seriously overuse the word "contradiction" in their endeavour to depict not just capitalism, but the class war in general. In fact, comrades seldom bother to justify their almost neurotically profligate application of this word to everything and anything they attempt to analyse.59b Indeed, it seems to operate almost as a sort of talisman, which serves merely to identify each user to others of like mind as belonging to the same 'speech community' (with its own unique jargon, defining an 'in-group', excluding those of the 'out-group'), rather than acting as a concept which genuinely applies in each and every case -- or in any case -- or, indeed, which in the end means anything at all.
[Why they do this will be revealed in Essay Nine Part Two and Essay Fourteen Part Two (when it's published).]
But, perhaps this, too, is unfair?
In order to substantiate the above allegations, therefore, it might be wise to consider a few examples of the "real material contradictions" which supposedly underpin and drive social development.60
[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998); HM = Historical Materialism.]
TAR, for example, opens with several apposite and well-observed examples of the irrational and destructive nature of Capitalism. As John Rees correctly points out, while life expectancy, for instance, has increased dramatically over the last century or so (even in the poorest regions of the planet), forces have grown alongside to countermand or undermine these developments:
"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction….
"Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line?
"The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2.]
First of all, it needs emphasising that in what follows the validity of the above comparisons will not be questioned -- nor will the explanation given by Rees for these and other intolerable features of Capitalism. The sole aim here is to ascertain what if anything he (or any one else, for that matter) means by calling these irrationalities "contradictions", and why he and other dialecticians insist on linking this word with material forces in nature and society.
Of course, a trite and impertinent answer here would be that DM-theorists use the word "contradiction" simply because it is part of the 'Marxist tradition' to do so (and hence it helps define a dialectical 'in group', as noted earlier). From the record, it is reasonably clear that the use of this word is only part of 'Materialist Dialectics' because of contingent events in the lives of Marx and Engels (i.e., those related to when and where they were born, in which class they found themselves, and how they were educated).
Hence, as fate would have it, the view of the world adopted by these two was conditioned by their own "social being" -- to use Marx's term.
In fact, had Hegel died of Cholera 45 years earlier than he actually did, does anyone really think we would be using this term?60a
However, because of the towering authority that Marx and Engels have assumed since, all subsequent dialecticians have been constrained to think and reason along similar lines. They have to use this obscure vocabulary or risk being be accused of 'Revisionism', branded 'anti-Marxist', and perhaps suffer expulsion, political isolation -- or worse. [Or, of course, face the same sort of ritual abuse with which I am constantly targetted.]
In short, it is quite clear that revolutionaries (like Rees) use such obscure Hegelian terms because prominent comrades did, and they are merely conforming to tradition.
Naturally, the impertinent nature of this 'trite' explanation will not win over many dialecticians -- but since a less impertinent one stands no chance either, there is little to lose from advancing it here.
In that case, there is a pressing need to try to find a better reason why hard-headed materialists should want to anthropomorphise nature and society in this manner, using terms drawn from Mystical Christianity as part of what is supposed to be a materialist theory.
Unfortunately, as we will soon find out, there isn't in fact a better explanation why confirmed materialists have allowed themselves to be conned into accepting Hermetic jargon like this, employing it indiscriminately, as we have seen.
We have also seen that every attempt to render viable the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' fall apart, hence, it should come as no surprise to see the very same thing happen when we examine the use of "contradiction" in HM.
To spoil the ending: the result will be that, apart from the ideological and political motivations mentioned below, the impertinent reason is the only one left standing.
[The political background to all this is detailed in Essay Nine Part Two, and more generally in Essay Twelve (summary here), where I also examine the social and class background of the originators of this theory, in order to link them with the reason why they were pre-disposed to adopted this world-view. (In fact, there are political and ideological reasons over and above the impertinent excuse offered above for the use of this word. They are also explored in Essay Nine Part Two, here.)]
The underlying cause of the many absurdities found in Capitalism is, as TAR rightly points out, the complex, changing interplay between the "material productive forces of society" and the ambient "relations of production". [Ibid., p.2, quoting Marx.] That account of the driving force of capitalism (but, interpreted humanistically, in terms of the class struggle), I fully accept.
However, this brings us no closer to understanding what it is about opposing (social) forces that merits calling them "contradictions". Why turn a clear deployment of an ordinary word, drawn from the vernacular, into an obscure doctrine peppered with impenetrable jargon lifted from mystical Idealism (such as "determinate negation", "identity of opposites", "negation of the negation", "mediate", and the like), which use undermines the capacity we have to explain change, anyway?
In HM, we can certainly make sense of the term "force" -- and even of "opposing" and "struggle" --; but what is there to gain by calling these "contradictions"?61
Some might regard this as a harmless use of a word, but, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), in this case there is no such thing, just as there is no such thing as a neutral use of the word "oppression". We will also see in Essay Nine Part Two that this particular word 'allows' DM-fans to impose contradictory policies, strategies and theses on the party faithful in order to 'justify', among other things, class collaboration, mass murder, splits and expulsions, based on the idea that if reality is contradictory, the Party should be, too.
[An excellent example of this is the way that Trotsky used dialectics to justify the revolutionary defence of the former USSR (on the basis of its contradictory nature as 'degenerated workers' state', in which workers exercised no power and were systematically oppressed and exploited), and hence the murderous invasion of Finland. Another is the way that Ted Grant, for instance, used 'Materialist Dialectics' to construct his confused and contradictory theory, 'Proletarian Bonapartism' (sic), which then 'allowed' him to rationalise the substitution of the Maoist ruling-class for the Chinese working class -- a topic I have debated here. (This link will fall dead soon.)]
So, these mystical concepts aren't simply 'innocent bystanders'; their use has helped turn Dialectical Marxism into a spectacularly unsuccessful disaster area.
Nevertheless, the relevant part of the argument in TAR appears to be the following:
F42: Capitalism seems to offer unprecedented possibilities for human development.
F43: But, in reality Capitalism delivers only partial or faltering progress.
F44: Alongside this progress we have witnessed major regression.
F45: Thus, Capitalism actually delivers a mixture of progress and regression.
For Rees, the "contradiction" appears to be based on the fact that Capitalism holds out certain possibilities, which it either can't fully deliver, or can't provide at all; almost invariably the opposite of what it promises actually unfolds.
Rees clearly believes that the involvement of opposites is important here: instead of peace we find war; in the place of prosperity we find poverty (where it need not be); the growth in human need is not catered for by the incessant search for profit; the waste of human potential conflicts with the increased capacity society has for augmenting and satisfying its members needs, and so on. 'Contradictions' seem to arise either from the incongruity that exists between what might be expected of Capitalism (by those who do not understand its nature, presumably) and what it actually delivers --, or from the yawning gap that exists between its potential to satisfy human need and its obvious inability to do so. In that case, forces that seem capable of freeing humanity from want seem to be inextricably combined with others that only succeed in intensifying it.
However, these by-now-familiar observations leave the import of the alleged equation between forces and 'contradictions' still unclear. In order to clarify Rees's point we perhaps need to consider various plausible interpretations of what he might have meant.
There appear to be several distinct possibilities:
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.
F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A as well as B and C.
Doubtless there are many other combinations that could be imagined along similar lines, but they would, I think, be elaborations on these six possibilities. I propose, therefore, to examine each of these in turn, beginning, naturally, with the first.
The first option was:
F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.
But, F46 presents us with a scenario we have met already; it resembles several earlier unsuccessful attempts to solve this overall problem. As we discovered above, whatever forces there are in the system that actually produce "not A", no contradiction can arise between "A" and "not A" because "A" itself does not exist, since only "not A" will have been actualised in place of "A". Nor can any forces which are at work in the system contradict what they themselves actually produce (viz., "not A" in this case) --, especially if whatever they 'offer' does not exist.
F46 is of no use, therefore, in our search to find a viable way of equating forces and 'contradictions' in HM.
An Apparent Contradiction -- At Last!
The second alternative went as follows:
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.
This seems to be a little more promising since "A and not A" certainly looks like a genuine contradiction. However, because F48 appears to depict contradictory outcomes it can't illuminate the alleged contradictory connection between forces in society and nature that exist prior to their emergence. This is because F48 is manifestly not about the forces themselves, but about their results.
So, even here, we do not seem to have contradictory forces.61a
Nevertheless, this section is aimed at considering the last few remaining options left open to DM-theorists to make their ideas comprehensible, so F48 will not be abandoned just yet.
In fact, F48 corresponds to a relation depicted abstractly in an earlier section (i.e., that between E1 and E2, in F6 to F9, above, reproduced below) -- but interpreted here concretely (if schematically). Hence, it looks like we might at last have found a genuine interpretation of E1 and E2 that is undeniably 'contradictory'.
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
Unfortunately, this appearance is illusory since the conjunction of "A" and "not A" can't be considered contradictory until it is clear what interpretation is to be given to the schematic letter "A".
It's worth recalling at this point that we are looking for a literal interpretation of the term "contradiction" which will allow DL to surpass FL -- not a metaphorical or analogical use of this word -- still less one that possesses a secondary or derivative sense (or even the 'special' DM-sense that has yet to be explained). As should be obvious, this search is of the utmost importance if we are to rescue from oblivion the idea that forces and 'contradictions' may be equated objectively -- and not, for instance, poetically.
Clearly, there are several different ways of reading the expression "A and not A"; some of these will be contradictions, others not.
In what follows, I shall employ a further example taken from TAR (quoted above), which seems to many DM-theorists to be a genuine contradiction (i.e., between wealth and poverty). In that case, this involves interpreting "A" as "wealth", and "not A" as "not wealth" (it clearly can't be "not poverty"!). In that case, "A and not A" would cash out as "wealth and not wealth".62
Unfortunately, the problem with this way of taking "A and not A" is that it actually creates a phrase and not a clause, indicative sentence or proposition.63 As such, it can't be a literal contradiction.
[Most DM-fans miss this point since their knowledge of logic rivals even that of George W Bush. This, of course, does not stop them pontificating on the subject.]
The only apparent way to situate this phrasal conjunction in a propositional context would be to interpret it a little more loosely -- perhaps along the following lines:
F52: Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.64
As such, F52 is a paraphrase of:
F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not wealth.
Or perhaps even:
F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not wealth for others.65
Again, F53 itself is short for:
F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism produces not wealth for others.
None of these look at all promising; they are not only stylistic monstrosities, their import is rather unclear. Anyway, F53 and F53a aren't contradictory -- that is, no more than, say, a bottle would be contradictory if it supplied drink for some but not for others, or any more than the claim that "forces are contradictory" would itself be 'contradictory' if it convinced some but not others. No one would think they had been contradicted if they asserted that a certain factory, say, produced several batches of defective Widgets, and someone else clamed it also produced some that were not defective.66
Anyway, F52a is far too vague as it stands -- it is certainly no more of a 'contradiction' than F53 and F53a are, and probably for the same reason. If sentences like these have no clear meaning they can't possibly assist in an attempt to clarify DM. Hence, a further widening of the interpretation of "A and not A" is called for if we are to gain a clear view of the implications of F47. Perhaps the following will do?
F54: Capitalism produces capitalists who are wealthy and workers who are not wealthy.
As was the case with F53 and F53a, F54 isn't even a contradiction. Again, anyone asserting the first clause of F54 who was then confronted with the second would not feel that they had been contradicted -- this is plainly because the first clause is about Capitalists, while the second is about workers. To be contradictory F55 would have to be:
F55: Capitalism produces worker W1 (or Capitalist C1), who is both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.
But, quite apart from the fact that no one would assent to, or even want to assert F55, it possesses no clear sense. The situation would be no better if it were re-written as:
F55a: Capitalism produces a set of workers W (or Capitalists C), who are both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.
It's reasonably certain that Rees meant neither F55 nor F55a. [If he had intended either, it would be unclear what he could possibly have meant by one or both.] At best, F55 and F55a might be re-interpreted in a comparative sort of way, as follows:
F55b: Capitalism produces a set of workers W that is both wealthy (in comparison to a set of peasants P) and not wealthy (in comparison to a set of Capitalists C), at the same time and in the same respect.
But, F55b is no more contradictory than this would be:
F55c: John Rees wrote a book that is both long (when compared with a weekday print copy of The Independent) and not long (when compared with Das Kapital).
The observation that TAR is both long compared to The Independent and short compared to Das Kapital is not, one imagines, what most DM-theorists mean by "contradiction". If it were, their theory would be based on linguistic naivety, and little else. That, of course, is the whole point of the phrase "and in the same respect", tacked on the end of several of the above propositions. Consequently, it looks like F47 can't be shoe-horned into this particular dialectical boot after all.
More problematic: is either of these options going to turn into the other?
In the above example, is W going to turn into C, and C into W? Indeed, is wealth going to turn into poverty? But, if these were 'genuine' 'dialectical opposites'/'contradictions', they most surely will.66a
Further attempts to interpret "A and not A" can be extended almost indefinitely. DM-enthusiasts are welcome to play around with them as much as they like, the end result will be no different. There are no literally true contradictions that can be manufactured out of "A and not A", where these relate to the same person, persons, groups, forces, etc., in the same respect.
In addition to the reasons given above, that's because, if such a 'contradiction' were held true, it would cease to be a literal contradiction. As indicated in Essay Five, if and when such a 'contradiction' were encountered, it would normally be viewed as (1) figurative or (2) based on an ambiguity of some sort. There is no way around this convention this side of altering the meaning of the word "contradiction". And, even this would be of little help to DM-enthusiasts since that would 'solve' the problem by means of yet more subjective, question-begging, ad hoc linguistic reform.67
In that case, perhaps F48 is the reading we are searching for?
F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.
Unfortunately, as we have seen several times already, since A does not exist -- Capitalism not having delivered it --, it can't 'contradict' B. This means that F48 is not a viable reading of Rees's intentions, either. Even if B 'contradicted' forces and/or processes which were already present, that would just return us to where we were when we considered several examples earlier, such as this (but substituting the word "society" for "nature"):
F6a: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in society.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
Yet another dialectical dead-end, it seems, for here we have even more non-existents 'contradicted' by existents.
Does, therefore, F49 provide DM with a lifeline?
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we would have the following:
F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.68
However, there are several problems with this paraphrase. One of these concerns the supposition that capitalism actually does offer wealth. Admittedly, for propaganda purposes, its ideologues often claim it does -- but who believes them? Certainly, blatant lies like this can't serve as part of a socialist analysis.69
Perhaps then we should re-interpret F49 in the following manner?
F57: Capitalism develops productive forces capable of delivering wealth to all, but it actually delivers wealth to a minority, and poverty to most of the rest, where wealth and poverty are opposites.
However, in F57 we are confronted with a subtle change in the way that the "A" of F49 has been interpreted in the opening clause: it now stands for something like the "capacity to develop productive forces capable of delivering wealth". But in the last clause it simply stands for "wealth", as before. Hence, F57 is actually equivalent to the following:
F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.
Or perhaps:
F49b: Capitalism develops D (which has the potential to produce B), but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.
Here, the 'contradiction' would seem to be that between either (1) Capitalism's capacity to deliver wealth and its actual deliverance of poverty, or (2) The wealth it delivers to some and the poverty it delivers to the rest.
In the first case, clearly we don't have a contradiction. That's because, as we have just seen, a capacity is an unrealised potentiality, and as such it can't contradict something which does exist -- no more than, say, a woman's un-actualised capacity to play the flute contradicts her actualised skill with the piano, or even her actualised state of living without a flute -- or, indeed, of not being able to play the flute while she has to make do with a piano.
The second option above is no contradiction either, however much it offends our sensibilities. (2) is no more a contradiction than, say, £10,000 ($20,000) in one pocket contradicts £0.01 ($0.02) in another, or no more than a £5 ($10) note in a millionaire's wallet (assuming this is all she has on her at the time) contradicts the £1000 ($2000) in a worker's pocket (who has just won a compensation claim, say) -- even if these two are sat next to each other at a UK Labour Party rally. To call these "contradictions" would be bizarre -- even on DM-terms. [Are they 'struggling' with each other? Do these turn into one another?]70
As we saw earlier, anyone who thought otherwise would be openly advertising their own linguistic naivety, if not perversity -- but not advancing the cause of science.
In any case, as we have also seen, there can be no literal contradiction between something that does not exist (i.e., the prospect of wealth under Capitalism, where this is meant to be wealth for all) and something that does exist (i.e., the mixed fortunes of the people who have to endure conditions as they are).
Despite this, it might still be felt that the situation is not as bad as the above makes out; the emphasis in F49 is on what Capitalism actually delivers, not on what it genuinely (or otherwise) offers. If "wealth" and "poverty" are real opposites, F49 could still serve in the way DM-theorists intend -- or, so it might seem.
Again, this rather desperate alternative reading diverts attention away from allegedly 'contradictory forces' and onto their effects. In that case, the nature of the direct relation between whatever forces managed to produce these effects is still obscure, and not the least bit contradictory.
Nevertheless, even when we consider such effects, a nagging question remains: just what is so contradictory about wealth and poverty existing side by side? Admittedly, to any socialist, this state of affairs is as intolerable as it is indefensible, but there still does not seem to be a literal contradiction involved here. True, this state of affairs may be paradoxical (but not to a Marxist); even so, the presence of one of these alleged opposites does not entail that an assertion that the other opposite also obtains is false, as it would have to do if a literal contradiction were intended.71
If, on the other hand, we wish to re-define the word "contradiction" so that it becomes the equivalent of "paradox", "unjust", "something contrary to expectations", "deplorable" (and so on), all well and good. But that would merely concede the point being made in these Essays that social reality is only 'contradictory' because of linguistic tinkering to that end, and the claim that DM-'contradictions' (in HM) are literal would have to be abandoned. Seen in this way, DM-'contradictions' would at best either be figurative, or they would depend on the use of a word ("contradiction") that has been 'redefined' in order to produce the right result.72
On the other hand, if the word "contradiction" possesses a special, literal DM-sense, which allows for its legitimate use here, then DM-theorists have yet to say what it is.
In response, it could be argued that one such sense is that their use of the word "contradiction" implies opposition and/or tension. But, even though "wealth" and "poverty" are opposites in the ordinary sense, they do not seem to oppose each other in an active way, as one would expect they should if they genuinely illustrated the validity of the equation of 'contradictions' with forces. Admittedly, poverty acts as brake on development of the productive forces at certain points in history (warping the development of those who have to endure it, etc.), it stokes up resentment, class hatred and foments struggle. But, over and above the influence these states of affairs have on human agents, these lifeless concepts appear to have no active connection with one another. Sure enough, the material situations they express might indeed create tension in those who have to endure them, but none of the latter would describe what they feel by using the word "contradiction", unless, of course, a fast-talking DM-fan had sold them on the idea. In ordinary language the word can't be given such a meaning without altering the sense it already has.73
Furthermore, if this set of consequences is meant to be taken as a new gloss on F49 (by way of illustrating the alleged 'contradiction' between E1- and E2-type events discussed earlier) then it too reduces to the claim that it's the effects of effects that are 'contradictory', and not the original effects themselves. Down this road there lies, I fear, yet another "bad infinity" --, which ends "who knows where?"
F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.
The second difficulty with this reading is that although wealth and poverty are genuine opposites (again, in the ordinary sense), they do not appear to be classic examples of dialectical-UOs (even if we knew what these are!). To be sure, under Capitalism the wealth of one class is connected with the poverty of others, but this is a familiar causal connection. They are not internally-, or logically-related in reality, despite claims to the contrary. That this is so can be seen from that fact that were this not the case, we would find we could not agree (with Engels) that under Capitalism poverty exists "where it need not be".
If there were a 'dialectical' (or "internal") "unity in difference" connecting poverty and wealth (like that which dialecticians allege between, say, the north and south poles of a magnet, or that between Capitalist and Worker (as classes), then we couldn't argue that socialism will eliminate one at the same time as abolishing the other. But, the whole point of a socialist society is that all should become as wealthy as the productive forces will allow. If there were a logical link between these two states (poverty and wealth) then they would be inseparable in all modes of production and we would have to temper our slogans somewhat. We might then have to point out that in eradicating poverty, workers would be eradicating wealth, too. That we do not so argue -- we actually claim the opposite that socialism can produce wealth for all -- indicates that the relation between wealth and poverty is not a logical (or internal) connection, but causal.
Of course, it could be argued that there is an internal/logical link between "wealth and poverty under capitalism". This objection will be dealt with below, and in Note 74.74
The basic problem here, of course, revolves around the anthropomorphism implicit in the idea that concepts can enter into struggle with one another. This mystification appears as part of the belief that because wealth and poverty are opposites they are actively oppositional and cause struggles, of themselves. On this account, it's the opposite nature of concepts that creates struggle, whereas in reality it is clearly material conditions that cause it. Only by confusing a causal with a conceptual connection can DM even seem to gain some grip -- that is, if this is what dialecticians mean! But, as we have seen, this idea is just one more consequence of LIE and the RRT (defined in Essay Twelve -- and which was a conclusion of Part One of this Essay).75
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]
The animated DM-contrast that is imagined to exist between dead concepts like these seems plausible only because they are viewed as the idealised equivalents of the real relations between human beings, reified in an inappropriate metaphysical/linguistic form. Human beings give life to the concepts they use, but under circumstances not always of their own choosing, doing so as a result of their practical activity, modified by ambient class and social relations. The reverse does not happen; 'concepts' do not give life to human relations -- although their use by human agents can affect the roles they play in life (and they certainly do modify the ideas that individuals from antagonistic classes form of their own material interests, etc.). Unless we suppose concepts are agents in their own right (in a sort of inverted Hegelian form, wherein perhaps they walk the earth in place of human beings), they can't 'reflect' things that human beings haven't already sanctioned for them, and by means of the above constraints. History is after all the result of the class war, not a consequence of the struggle between concepts.
As should seem obvious, the above comments are based on theoretical considerations drawn from HM, but that is precisely where this scientific theory can provide the interpretative sophistication which DM and/or 'Materialist Dialectics' obscures and inverts in an idealised/fetishised form.76
This shows, once again, that the inversion DM-theorists say they have inflicted on Hegel was at best merely formal, at worst, illusory.
Their theory can only 'work' in an Ideal/mystical universe.
In that case, the only options left open are F50 and F51. They were:
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.
F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A, as well as B and C.
However, since these two are clearly variations upon F48 and F49, they do not appear to be viable alternatives. DM-apologists are welcome to make of them what they can.
Because dialecticians have so far neglected to explain with any clarity, or in any detail, what it means to equate forces in nature and society with 'contradictions', I have been forced to offer my own attempts at clarification (no pun intended). All have so far failed. In this last main section I will endeavour to offer what I think is the only viable interpretation of the link between forces and 'contradictions'.
Dialectics In ER
We have seen that the concepts DM-theorists have drawn from Hermetic Philosophy have failed them badly when any attempt is made to apply them to, or connect them with the forces operating in nature and society. In that case, the impertinent answer to the question why hard-nosed revolutionaries continue to use such mystical terms in HM (offered earlier) is the only one left in the ring: dialecticians use obscure jargon like this simply because it's traditional to do so.
This means that this part of DM (already under intensive care in the Emergency Resuscitation Ward) is now ready to be measured for its pine overcoat and lowered 6 feet closer to the Earth's core.
A Last Desperate Attempt
However, before we call for a Hermetic High Priest to read DM its last mystical rites, we should, I think, make one last desperate attempt to resuscitate this moribund 'theory'.
In fact, we are now in a position to reconsider several earlier abandoned alternatives in an attempt to rescue this part of DM from its long overdue burial.
Below, I present another re-interpretation of the alleged connection between forces and 'contradictions', which is based on F6-F9, above:
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity, let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
To these we can add the following:
F58: Force P1 contradicts P2 in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (either internally, or with one another).
Unfortunately, this latest re-interpretation can't work, either. That is because if one or both of E1 and E2 do not exist (as a result of the operation of P1 and P2) there can be no contradiction. As we have seen several times already, F58 would imply a 'contradiction' between sets of events that do not co-exist.77
It looks, therefore, like this particular interpretative seam has been thoroughly worked-out; there's no gold in it, only slag. Indeed, what little 'gold' there was, mined by Hegel & Co., unfortunately turned out to be nothing Iron Pyrites.
We need to find a new approach to save this rapidly fading 'theory' from being sent to the knackers yard.
DM And The Revival Of Teleology
The last remaining escape route left open to DM-theorists relies on yet another interpretation which was postponed from earlier, wherein 'contradictions' were said to exist between the effects of forces (or between forces and the effects of other forces), rather than between forces themselves. One such alternative involved taking Engels's suggestion seriously that forces should be edited out of the picture, leaving behind only the relative motion between bodies to give some content to the idea that 'contradictions' can cause change.
However, the first of these had to be abandoned because it meant that forces 'contradicted' prevented effects, implicating this part of the theory with the idea that forces could 'contradict' non-existent entities. The second appeared to undermine the dialectical unity of nature.
Nevertheless, I now propose to examine a re-vamped version of the first of these alternatives, one aimed at circumventing the difficulties noted above.
The good news is that this new option solves the problem created by the second alternative.
The bad news is that it introduces far worse difficulties of its own.
The aforementioned earlier attempt was based on the following:
F17: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F18: Events E1-En form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.
F19: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or take place.
["T" stands for "The Totality".]
As we saw above, an existing force P1 appears to 'contradict' a non-existent event (or series of events), which rendered this interpretation useless. The following re-vamped version is aimed at fixing this bug:
F59: Event E consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events E1-En.
F60: Events E1-En form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.
F61: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.
F62: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist (or will never exist), or take place.
F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.
Since, an expectation can exist alongside the realisation that it has been thwarted (in some cases), this appears to solve the problem.
However, F63 is clearly of little assistance since, not only would be inapplicable throughout the Universe at all times, it does not even record a contradiction.
[That is because the propositions expressed are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p", as required -- where "p" is, say, "Ek has been prevented", and "q" is, say, "Ek was expected" --, when what was required was "Ek has been prevented and "Ek has not been prevented", etc.]
Now, F63 could be altered to circumvent this difficulty.77a
F64: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that depict the dispositional properties of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.
One immediate problem with F64 is that it's not at all clear what the "dispositional properties" of forces are. Objects certainly have dispositional properties as a result of their microstructure and of their relationship with other bodies -- if, that is, the term "dispositional" read in a traditional manner. [More on that in a later Essay.]
Even so, since forces are not obviously bodies (although they can apparently be carried by them -- if we accept certain aspects parts of modern Physics --, but even then this is apparently cashed out in terms of transferred momentum, i.e., along neo-Engelsian lines),78 the ascription of dispositions to forces themselves perhaps amounts to a disguised reference to the affect forces could or would have on such bodies in certain circumstances. In that case, we would have here an explanation of contradictions that appealed to the effect of effects, yet again.
[Anyway, F64 does not even record a contradiction since the propositions it expresses are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p", once more.]
Nevertheless, perhaps F64 can be re-jigged -- maybe along the following lines:
F65: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that depict the normal operation of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.
Unfortunately, not only does F65 fail to record a contradiction (since, yet again, the propositions it expresses to are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p"), what it says brings us back once more to a consideration of the inter-relationship between forces as a way of understanding 'contradictions', as opposed to the present model, which sought to interpret 'contradictions' as the relationship between forces and the effects of other forces.
Anyway, F65 is of little use: if the normal operation of Pn is prevented (so that it does not take place) there would be nothing for P1 to 'contradict'. This annoying but recurring fact is precisely what prompted the current consideration of the actual effects of forces, since they do exist -- as opposed to the prevented effects of forces, or even forces which cease to operate, which don't.
It now seems that unless we can specify how the effects of forces can 'contradict' other forces (or other effects), this part of DM will be as good as dead -- but not yet buried. Maybe the following option will help revive it:
F66: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that express the operation of Pn, such that the presence of E1 (the effect of P1) excludes some or all of E2-En.
However, this is no use, either, since it matters not how effectively some or all of E2-En are excluded; E1 may only 'contradict' that which exists, and, ex hypothesi, once excluded, effects E2-En would no longer be around to be 'contradicted'.
The next suggestion constitutes, in my view, the only way to keep this dangerously ill part of DM alive:
F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.
[However, F67 will need to be re-written in a 'propositional' form, but since that would make this example even more unwieldy than it already is, that task has been left to the reader.]
The good news is that since aims can exist where results and effects do not, we seem at last to have a genuine 'contradiction'.
The bad news is that this belated tonic soon turns into yet another dose of strychnine. That is because, of course, not only does F67 not record a contradiction (for reasons given several times already -- the propositions it expresses to are of the form "p and q", not "p and not p"), we can't attribute aims to forces unless we wish to introduce teleology and anthropomorphism back into nature and society.
F67 can therefore only apply to forces under the control of human agents -- or to their animistically projected counterparts in reality -- that is, if we genuinely want to go down that route and regard nature in such a mystical light.
It is therefore no surprise that the only interpretation that appears to render this part of DM viable is one that reveals the anthropomorphism implicit in the concepts its theorists have imported from Hegel and mystical Hermeticism.
Alternatively, it's equally unsurprising that this is the only option that underlines the reading that works in HM, one that puts forces under human control.79
Unfortunately, this now means that F67 can't help revive the DM-cadaver.
It was noted earlier that there is a general problem that afflicts any attempt to identify forces with 'contradictions' -- i.e., if these are viewed as dialectically-united 'opposites'. In connection with that, we have also seen that DM-classicists have argued that such opposites all turn into one another. But, is it even plausible to suppose forces can do this? Is it credible that a gravitational force, say, can turn into a magnetic force, or into an electrical force? Do all R-type forces turn into A-type forces? Where in Physics is it postulated that gravity can become a repulsive force?
Undoubtedly, electricity and magnetism are inter-linked in modern Physics (and are in fact manifestations of one of the four fundamental forces in nature), but they do not struggle with one another, and neither do the particles on which they depend. Such forces, so we are told, are "carried" by exchange particles, but they aren't an expression of a 'struggle' going on between particles.
To be sure, magnetic fields are reversible, as are electrical fields, but this is not true of all fields (even though all four forces can change in many different ways), but it is far from clear that this is because of any 'struggle' going on between them, either. For example, the origin of the reversal of the Earth's magnetic field may lie deep inside its core, or, perhaps, inside the crust --, or it may even have an external cause (with one set of theorists blaming meteor impact); scientists aren't sure. But, not one single Geophysicist, to my knowledge, is investigating the alleged 'contradiction' between North and South to find its cause.
If that is so, then even if it should out that all the objections aired in this Essay are misguided in some way, the 'dialectical' equation of forces and contradictions doesn't work even in its own terms!
Do the Relations of Production really turn into the Forces of Production?
They should do if the DM-classics are to be believed.
For Dialectics, Truth Is Indeed The Hole -- And it's Six foot Deep
Since there appears to be no way that DM-'contradictions' can be given a literal or figurative interpretation as forces (opposing or otherwise) that survives close scrutiny -- when applied in nature or society, in abstract or in concrete form --, this part of DM can at last be given a decent burial.
Indeed, we can even call its time of death: August 27th, 1770.
Send no flowers.80
1. For example, Engels declared:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter…. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or another form of motion…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter…. Each separate movement strives toward equilibrium, and the total motion puts an end to the equilibrium.... [Engels (1976), pp.74-77.]
"So long as we consider things at rest and lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force...." [Ibid., pp.152-53.]
"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…. [This is] the negation of the negation…. [which is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Ibid., pp.179-80.]
"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable…go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…. [T]he transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature -- mechanical force and its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy -- are different forms of manifestation of universal motion…. [W]e have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on the whole…by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself." [Engels (1888), pp.609-11.]
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.]
"All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else…. Hence, all attraction and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another…. Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on each other, that the separation and opposition of these poles exist only within their mutual connection and union...." [Ibid., p.72.]
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance...." [Ibid., p.82.]
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature...." [Ibid., p.211.]
"[A]ttraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that the true theory of matter must assign a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a theory of matter based on mere attraction is false…. Equilibrium is inseparable from motion…. All equilibrium is only relative and temporary…. Motion of the heavenly bodies [is an] approximate equilibrium of attraction and repulsion in motion." [Ibid., pp.243-46.]
This is how Bukharin put things:
"[T]he world consists of forces, acting many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of 'rest', i.e., their actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces, immediately the ‘internal contradictions’ will be revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the 'conflict,' the 'contradiction,' i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in various directions, determines the motion of the system…." [Bukharin (1925), p.74.]
And here are Lenin's thoughts:
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]
Comrade Cornforth argued as follows:
"If we consider the real, complex movements and interconnections of real complex things, then we find that contradictory tendencies can and do exist in them. For example, if the forces operating in a body combine tendencies of attraction and of repulsion, that is a real contradiction…. [C]ontradiction is the driving force of change…. [O]nly the presence of contradictions in a process…provides the internal conditions making change necessary…. The real universe is…full of contradictions –- the contradictions of attraction and repulsion studied by physics…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-95.]
The author of TAR had this to say:
"The conservatism of Hegel's system is thus buried in his notion of contradiction. Contradictions in Hegel are merely intellectual contradictions to be resolved by merely intellectual methods…. The dialectic is therefore only a pseudo-dialectic; its contradictions are never those of opposed material forces capable of doing real damage or of effecting real progress…. Marx was, however, obliged to transform completely the terms of the dialectic when he altered its starting point from abstract concepts to real material forces…. The contradictions are no longer simply between concepts but between real, material forces…. Marx and Engels's dialectic is utterly different from Hegel's. It starts from real, material, empirically verifiable contradictions." [Rees (1998), pp.67-69, 83.]
Woods and Grant put things as follows:
"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....
"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....
"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....
"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....
"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls.
"Attraction and Repulsion
"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest. At the base of the atom are immense forces of attraction and repulsion....
"Engels points out the universal role of attraction and repulsion:
"'All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else. Otherwise in time one side would get the preponderance over the other and then motion would finally cease. Hence all attractions and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another. Thus the law of the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion is expressed in the form that each movement of attraction in the universe must have as its complement an equivalent movement of repulsion and vice versa; or, as ancient philosophy -- long before the natural-scientific formulation of the law of conservation of force or energy -- expressed it: the sum of all attractions in the universe is equal to the sum of all repulsions.'
"In Engels' day, the prevailing idea of motion was derived from classical mechanics, where motion is imparted from an external force which overcomes the force of inertia. Engels was quite scathing about the very expression 'force,' which he considered one-sided and insufficient to describe the real processes of nature. 'All natural processes,' he wrote, 'are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world, and further from terrestrial mechanics, implies that only one part is active, operative, the other part being passive, receptive.'
"Engels was far in advance of his time in being highly critical of this notion, which had already been attacked by Hegel. In his History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks that 'It is better (to say) that a magnet has a soul (as Thales expresses it) than that it has an attractive force; force is a kind of property that, separate from matter, is put forward as a kind of predicate -- while soul, on the other hand, is this movement itself, identical with the nature of matter.' This remark of Hegel, approvingly quoted by Engels, contains a profound idea -- that motion and energy are inherent to matter. Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 71-72. Their reference (38) is to Engels (1955), pp.95-96, 110. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
It is interesting to note that Woods and Grant blithely record Engels's approving reference to Hegel's depiction of magnets as having 'souls' while failing to notice its mystical implications. How could this notion -- i.e., 'having a soul' -- be given a 'materialist spin', aimed at putting Hegel's theory back on its feet/'the right way up'? Presumably a soul is a soul, upside down or not.
We have already noted that one on-line dictionary 'defines' contradiction in somewhat similar terms, but since that is has already been commented upon, no more will be said about it here.
[This forms part of Note 1.]
Even so, several dialecticians have tried to argue that there are indeed 'true contradictions' in reality. By far and away the most sophisticated of these is Graham Priest. However, it is far from clear whether the 'contradictions' he considers are indeed 'dialectical' -- that is, should we ever be told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is!
[Priest's work will be considered in more detail in an Additional Essay to be posted at this site at a future date. In the meantime, the reader should consult this.]
Despite this, veteran communist theoretician, Maurice Cornforth, attempted to argue that there are 'true contradictions'. He did this as part of an argument intended to demonstrate that contradictions actually 'exist' in the natural and social world -- contrary to the view endorsed at this site that a contradiction (in its simplest form in logic) is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, which has nothing to do with 'what exists':
"The contradiction in things is a very familiar state of affairs. There is nothing in the least abstruse about it, and it is often referred to in everyday conversations. For example, we speak of a man as having a 'contradictory' character, or as being 'a mass of contradictions'…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-93.]
In which case, presumably, when we describe someone as a "bit of a puzzle" Cornforth thinks we mean that he or she can be purchased in a magic store or toy shop. Or that when we read this:
"All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances" [William Shakespeare, As You Like It, 2/7.]
we should all try and remember our lines and our stage cues, pay heed to the director, make sure the audience can hear us, and ignore the reviews.
Clearly, Cornforth has never heard of metaphor.
[Why this is not a literal use of "contradiction" is considered below, and throughout this Essay. Moreover, we will soon see that "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradict", or even "contradiction".]
It is worth recalling that Hegel attempted to show that logical contradictions, and not so much ordinary contradictions, were far too one-sided and limited. His sense of this word was, therefore, intended to transcend the former. (As far as I am aware, he was silent about the latter.) Now, DM-theorists might not aim to use "contradiction" in the same way as Hegel -- whether or not these have been turned "the right way up" or left upside down --, but, if that were so, their 'contradictions' wouldn't transcend those that appear in FL. Naturally, that would make their criticisms of FL rather empty, since they wouldn't be addressing the same concept. Nevertheless, they certainly intend to transcend FL-contradictions, and that is why I have largely concentrated on the latter in this Essay.
However, it is also clear (from the examples they give) that comrades like Cornforth, and the others considered below, focus on what are plainly ordinary contradictions (as opposed to FL-contradictions, or even 'dialectical contradictions') when they try to show that there are 'true contradictions', or that 'contradictions' exist. It is clear, too, why they do this: FL-contradictions are totally uninteresting. Who, for example, is going to get excited about the following (these in fact appeared in a letter sent to Socialist Review a few years back by a supporter of this site):
A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate and there isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).
A2: Capitalism is governed by a blind competitive market and it isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).
In debate, DM-fans are often genuinely surprised to see examples of FL-contradictions like these, or more formal examples listed here. From this it is plain that they are totally unaware of such contradictions, and when they see them they reject them as examples of what they intend when they use this word. [Here (in the comments section at the bottom,) is a recent example of this. When confronted with an FL-contradiction, the comrade with whom I was debating -- Mike Rosen -- denied that this was what he meant. He wanted to show that there was a perfectly ordinary use of this word that picked out what Marx (etc.) meant. And yet none of his examples were 'dialectical contradictions', either, which rendered the whole exercise rather futile, as I pointed out to him. There are plenty more examples of this sort of thing in the debates recorded here. See also, Note 61a.]
On the one hand, whatever else DM-'contradictions' are supposed to be, they appear to be totally unrelated to FL-contradictions, and so can hardly surpass them. On the other, they have to be related to FL-contradictions, otherwise dialecticians will have to drop the pretence that DL is superior to FL.
In that case, in what follows, I will continue to refer to FL-contradictions in my criticism of DL-'contradictions'. If DM-fans mean something different by their use of this word, they should tell us -- and for the first time in over 150 years -- what that is.
[There is more on this here and here.]
However, Cornforth concedes that describing someone as "contradictory" involves a reference to their dispositions (or "tendencies"):
"This means that [they evince] opposed tendencies in [their] behaviour, such as gentleness and brutality, recklessness and cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice." [Cornforth (1976), p.93.]
This automatically prevents these examples of his from being literal contradictions. But Cornforth seems not to have noticed this.
Be this as it may, if this is meant to commit Cornforth to a dispositional account of contradictions, then much of classic DM would become obsolete as a result. The fact that someone might have, say, a disposition to be brave in certain circumstances, but cowardly in others, in no way suggests he/she can be both of these at once. [Indeed, what would that amount to? Standing one's ground while running away?] What is open to question is whether the simultaneous actualisation of these dispositions (in certain states or performances) may be expressed by means of true propositions (and without ambiguity).
Indeed, the fact that an iron bar, for example, can be red hot at one end and icy cold at the other at the same time is not a contradiction (even though, plainly, an iron bar is at any time disposed to be either of these at all times) -- but no one supposes (it is to be hoped!) that such a bar could actually be red hot and freezing cold all over at the same time.
[To be sure, the supposition that the entire bar could be both of these at the same time might be thought by some to be a contradictory supposition; and yet even this would merely be an inconsistency, since both could be false if the said bar were in fact merely warm.]
Anyway, as noted above, the emotions Cornforth considers are expressed by contrary suppositions and as such are inconsistent, not contradictory. For example, if NN was said to be both angry and calm at the same time, that would only be a contradiction if it couldn't be false to assert NN was both. But, it would be false to assert both if NN were slightly agitated (in which state NN would be neither angry nor calm), for instance.
So, even if both of these states were actualisable at the same time (which is, of course, a rather difficult scenario to imagine), this would still fail to be a contradiction!
On the other hand, if NN could be described (without ambiguity) as follows:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger,
we might have a genuine contradiction here. But, it is unlikely that Cornforth meant what he said to be taken this way --, and it is even more doubtful whether he would have been able to say under what conditions he, or anyone else, for that matter, would or could hold N1 true -- or under what conditions he/they could attribute to NN such odd actualisations.
Consider the following more precise example:
N2: At time t, NN is angry with MM for lying to her at t, and not angry with MM for lying to her at t.
Or, perhaps even more precisely:
N2a: At times t1 and t2, NN is angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1. [t2 > t1]
Or, in ordinary terms:
N2a1: NN is angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday and not angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday.
[Naturally, there are several other possibilities allowed for in logic and ordinary language, such as the following:
N2b: At time t1, NN is angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1.
Or, in ordinary (if somewhat stilted) terms, again:
N2b1: NN is currently angry with MM for lying to her just now and currently not angry with MM for lying to her just now.]
Someone could object that it is possible to have mixed emotions at one and the same time. Perhaps, then, they might mean the following (confining our attention to N2, not N2a or N2b, for simplicity's sake):
N3: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she understands the pressures on MM when he lied).
In that case, N3 is really this:
N4: At time t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.
Here, we have two different actions/states (involving different objects of this particular emotion -- the ambiguity mentioned above): anger at MM because it was a violation of trust (i.e., "φ-ing"), and lack of anger at MM because of extenuating circumstances (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was added earlier:
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.
[Greek letters like "φ" and "ψ" are used in FL to help distinguish action- or state-predicates (like "walks", "sits", or "has refuted DM") from others (such as, "is a man" or "is a confused dialectician").]
As soon as we fill in the details concerning the nature of the emotion involved, we can see that we have two different objects of the said anger, or two different states/actions, and hence no contradiction.
To be sure, someone might still object, but they will (like Cornforth, or Mr G) find it hard to say what the content of that objection amounts to without ignoring/editing out of the picture some object or other of the said anger/emotion, thus misrepresenting the intended situation.
[Which is, perhaps, why DM-fans do not like precision (i.e., they reject 'pedantry'); any attempt to state precisely what they mean would in fact undermine rather too many of the doctrines they unwisely inherited from Hegel -- as we can now see happening with these 'contradictions']
In fact, by his use of the word "tendencies", Cornforth himself seems half ready to concede this point. But, not even he would want to describe the same action (performed by the same person) as, say, literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (without equivocation). While it is possible to ascribe contrary properties to the same object (e.g., one part of the aforementioned iron bar could be hot while another part is cold, as we have seen), a 'contradiction' may only be extracted from such familiar facts by someone who has never heard of ambiguity -- or, who is terminally confused. No one would think they had been contradicted by someone who asserted that the far end of an iron bar was red hot just after they themselves had asserted the near end was ice cold. Nor would they think they'd been contradicted if someone had said they were angry today, but calm the day before -- or indeed they were angry and calm about different things.
Anyway, as noted above, any description of the same action (that asserted it was literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (in the same respect and without equivocation)) would merely be an inconsistency -- since both alternatives would be false if the said act was in fact neutral (i.e., if it was neither gentle nor brutal).
[The disintegration of the Communist Block finally caught up with Cornforth; in one of his last works [Cornforth (1980)], he systematically retracted most of the theses he had once declared were cornerstones of the "world view of the proletariat".]
Another benighted comrade has remained undeterred by such contradictory antics, and has vainly tried to defend the employment of this obscure notion (i.e., "dialectical contradiction") by appealing to (yes, you guessed it!) an everyday use of "contradiction", in connection with contradictory behaviour, when it is not at all clear that the examples he himself considered are themselves 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with.
Even so, what does he mean by "contradictory behaviour"? Perhaps someone who stands and sits all at once? [Or, maybe who has a tendency to do this? (Do what? Stand and sit all at once?) Or, who threatens to do one or both? (But what sort of threat would this be if it is impossible to carry out?) Or, perhaps someone who goes on strike and refuses to go on strike at the same time?
We aren't told. As usual, DM-fans offer their bemused readers less than half-formed thoughts.
This benighted comrade also tried to argue along similar lines in a 'debate' with me over the recent UK Prison Workers' Strike:
"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it.
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Now, in relation to the aforementioned strike, this benighted comrade seems to have meant workers who support the state one minute, but act against it the next (or who hold what appear to be inconsistent beliefs about one or both). But, put this way, this isn't even a contradiction (ordinary, or otherwise)! On the other hand, if these workers both supported and didn't support this strike at the same time (without ambiguity), that would have been a contradiction, but he plainly didn't mean this.
Of course, as we have seen, contraries are not contradictions, and "contradictory" is not the same as "contradiction". As indicated earlier, concerning two contrary propositions, both can't be true, but they can both be false (i.e., in this case, they would merely be inconsistent with one another).
For example, the contraries "All swans are white" and "No swan is white" can't both be true (in a non-empty domain), but they could both be false -- for instance, if either or both of "Some swan is not white", or "Some swan is white" were true. But, two contradictory propositions can't both be true and they can't both be false, at once. Again, dialecticians invariably ignore such "pedantic" details.
Moreover, if someone were presented with these two propositions: "All swans are white" and "Some swan is not white" they will have been presented with two contradictory propositions, but this would only be a contradiction if they were conjoined to give: "All swans are white and some swan is not white". "Contradictory" applies to propositions or clauses that can be conjoined to form a contradiction (or which can be used to contradict someone), whether or not they are so conjoined, or so used. "Contradictory" also applies to states and performances (among other things), which, if expressed in propositions or clauses, can also be conjoined to yield a contradiction, whether or not they are so conjoined. In the same way, a drug can be described as hallucinatory; that is, it has the potential to cause hallucinations whether or not it does so, or is used to do so. Or, it can apply to imperatives which undo one another, or would do so, if acted upon. [There are analogous distinctions that also apply to "contradict" and "contradiction". See also here.]
Now, in relation to the August 2007 UK Prison Officers' strike, this comrade seems to have meant workers who support the state one minute, but act against it the next (or who hold what appear to be inconsistent beliefs about one or both). But, put this way, this isn't even a contradiction (ordinary, or otherwise)! On the other hand, if these workers both supported and didn't support this strike at the same time (without ambiguity), that would have been a contradiction, but he plainly didn't mean this.
In fact, there was a rather good example of this sort of 'dialectical confusion' in Simon Basketter's recent article in Socialist Worker:
"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers.
"It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to the strikers....
"Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence.
"Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.'
"Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest."
Once more, what is the 'contradiction' here? Maybe, it has something to do with the following:
P1: Prison officers uphold the law.
P2: This either results from, or leads them into holding right-wing ideas.
P3: But, this strike has forced some to defy and/or disrespect the law.
P4: However, later, when some prisoners protested, the same officers rushed back to work to control them.
Now, I have already commented on the loose, indeterminate and often indiscriminate way that dialecticians like to use "contradiction", but even given such conceptual profligacy, what precisely is the contradiction here?
Let us try again (using "NN" this time to stand for the name of a randomly selected prison guard who thinks and acts along the above lines, and "L1" to stand for a law he/she rejects, or opposes, even if only temporarily):
P5: NN upholds the law.
P6: NN has adopted a number of right-wing ideas.
P7: One day, as a result of the strike, NN says "Screw law L1!" [No pun intended.]
P8: Later that day he acts in support of a totally different law.
Once more, where's the contradiction?
Now, if NN had said, "Screw all laws!" we might be able to cobble-together an inconsistency here (such as "Screw all laws!" (i.e., "All laws ought to be screwed!") and "No laws ought to be screwed!"), but not even that is implied by the above story.
In fact, a contradiction in this case could be formed from be something like: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed." Or, perhaps: "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed."
To be sure, people say all sorts of odd things, and it is relatively easy to utter contradictory sentences. Who has ever denied that! [Look, I have just posted two contradictory sets of propositions in the previous paragraph.] The question is, can both be held true, or held false (or, in this case, advocated and repudiated as a moral or political code), at the same time and in same respect? Well, did anyone from Socialist Worker try to ascertain from the aforementioned prison guards if any of them would have both assented to and rejected the following at the same time: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should not be screwed", or, "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed"? Apparently not.
Indeed, if NN had assented to "No laws should be screwed", we could safely infer from his later strike action that he no longer held it true. Plainly, as a result of the strike he must have come to accept the following alternative in its place: "I now think there is at least one law (namely, law L1) that should be screwed".
[And this would still be the case even if tomorrow NN went back to holding his former beliefs about every law. Dialecticians, least of all, shouldn't need reminding that people and things change!]
Unless, that is, we think NN holds this odd belief: "I do not believe that there is at least one law that should be screwed and I also believe there is at least one law that should be screwed." Or, perhaps "Screw L1 and do not screw L1!"
Even so, it is also reasonably clear that we could only attribute schizoid beliefs like this to NN if he were about to go insane, or had suffered a blow to the head. We certainly couldn't rely on such a confused character to help win a strike -- nor could we depend on him to report his genuine beliefs with any accuracy, either! He/she is just as likely to tell us: "Yes I believe this and I do not...". Would Socialist Worker have even quoted such a confused individual? Hardly.
[No wonder 'dialectical reasoning' has been described as a form of "mental confusion".]
Elsewhere in my Essays, I allege that dialectics is based on little other than Hegel's egregious logical blunders (on their feet, the 'right way' up --, or, upside down --, it matters not), but I also added that DM-fans often base their assertions on half-formed thoughts, seriously garbled caricatures of logic (formal and discursive) and laughably thin evidence (which is why I have branded it Mickey Mouse Science).
Simon Basketter's obscure claims amply confirm these allegations.
But, let us re-examine what the benighted comrade had to say to see if anything useful can be extracted from it.
"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also
have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's
behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in
relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted
yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some
enquiry we have about it.
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by
what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Considering this first:
"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."
Well, who can blame theorists for wanting to use old words in new ways? But, the above examples seem to be framed in ordinary language already. So why then the following claim?
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
Of course, these examples relate to what humans beings do or can think, so they aren't much use in showing how there are or can be 'true contradictions' in nature.
Now this benighted comrade might not have noticed (but it was staring him in the face in the example I gave, and in the ones he listed) that contradictions can relate to the inner workings of one proposition just as they can apply to the connection between several propositions at once, both in ordinary language and in logic. In which case, neither the complexities of logic nor the confused state of his thought-processes can be used to defend him from his self-inflicted errors -- for he himself provided his own counterexamples!
Considering this first:
"Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."
Unfortunately, this is far too vague to do much with. Perhaps this benighted comrade meant something like the following:
D1: The measured distance to star YY is 4.8 million light years.
D2: The measured distance to star YY is 4.3 million light years.
But, these do not contradict one another, since the true distance to star YY could be 4.5 million light years, making both D1 and D2 false.
And, it is irrelevant whether the true distance to star YY is actually 4.8 or even 4.3 million light years. The fact is that it might not be, or might not have been, either of these.
It is worth recalling that if this were a genuine contradiction, D1 and D2 couldn't both be true and couldn't both be false at once (whether or not one of them was either of these). At best, therefore, D1 and D2 are inconsistent. So, even if D1 were true, it is still the case that both D1 and D2 couldn't both be true, but could both be false, at once. This couldn't happen if they were contradictories -- unlike the following two, which are:
D3: The measured distance to star YY is 4.8 million light years.
D4: It isn't the case that the measured distance to star YY is 4.8 million light years.
Now, these two have to have opposite truth values (assuming, of course, that there is such a star); they both can't be true and they both can't be false. Given what we mean by "star", YY has to be some distance or other from the earth. One or other of D3 and D4 has to be true. Either YY is 4.8 million light years from earth or it isn't (or the meaning of the words used has changed, or the star has ceased to exist, etc., etc.).
To be sure, an inconsistency here might imply a contradiction, but it is far from clear if this benighted comrade meant this. But, even if he did, who has ever denied two propositions can contradict one another (if conjoined)? [Look, I have posted two of these above!] The point is, they can't both be true and they can't both be false at once.
DM-fans seem to want them both to be true -- but that would automatically prevent them from being contradictory, or from forming a contradiction.
Now, this comrade might have meant that raw data (not in a propositional context or form) could contradict some theory or other. Perhaps then he meant this:
D5: 4.8 million light years.
D6: 4.3 million light years.
But, neither of these is capable of being true or false since they aren't even indicative sentences. **And, if that is so, they can't contradict anything (since to do so, they'd both have to be capable of being true or false). Moreover, as soon as a (sentential) context is given them, they would merely be inconsistent, once more.
But, couldn't D3 and D4, or D5 and D6 contradict the predictions of some theory/enquiry or other? Perhaps this:
D7: Theory T predicts that star YY is 5.7 million light years away.
And yet, the proposition "YY is 5.7 million light years away" is merely inconsistent with D3 and D4, if they are put in a propositional context, that is. So, we don't have a contradiction even here.
[They have to be put in such a context or the point made above (**) would kick in.]
So, until this benighted comrade supplies us with clearer details about what he meant, little more can be done with his comments.
[I will however, be looking in detail at how data can 'contradict' a scientific theory, and the confused things DM-fans have said about this, in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
Be this as it may, is it possible, therefore, for an individual to have contradictory interests or goals in a relationship, as this comrades asserts? Perhaps by this the benighted comrade meant the following (for simplicity's sake, I will concentrate on potential or actual interests an individual might have; the argument can easily be extended to cover goals -- that detail will be left to the reader):
B1: NM has interest A in relationship R.
B2: It is not the case that NM has interest A in relationship R.
This would appear to be a genuine contradiction (if B1 and B2 are conjoined -- always assuming they both applied simultaneously and with no equivocation):
B2a: NM has interest A in relationship R and it is not case that NM has interest A in relationship R.
But, did Mr G mean this?
Apparently not. Well, what about the following?
B3: NM has interest A in relationship R.
B4: NM has interest B in relationship R.
B5: Interest A in relationship R contradicts interest B in relationship R.
But, if we are talking about literal contradictions here (and not the loose and ill-defined 'dialectical contradictions' we have come to know and loathe) then A and B in relationship R can only contradict one another if they are expressed in propositions (or in clauses), as indicated in B5a-B7:
B5a: Interest A contradicts interest B.
B6: "A" stands for "I, NM, must love my partner".
B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I, NM, must love my partner".
It is hard to see how anything could be called an interest (as opposed to it being a vague sort of 'non-linguistic feeling') unless it were expressed in this way.
The question is can anyone assent to such conflicting interests all at once? Well, as we saw with NN above, people can assent to all manner of odd ideas and feelings, so there is nothing to prevent B6 and B7 from forming the content of someone's overall intentional/emotional make-up.
However, before we hastily slap the 'contradiction' label on, it is plain that this alleged contradiction can be disambiguated along the lines attempted above (in relation to N3 and N4, reproduced again below) -- providing we supply plausible background details (ignoring, however, the complexities mentioned in N2a and N2b). That is because people do not just have interests simpliciter any more than they just have emotions simpliciter. [For something to be an emotion it has to be object directed; so, we are angry with someone or something, fearful of something or someone, in love with someone or something, etc. Of course, an individual could just be in a fearful state, with no object of that fear, but that would be enough to diagnose him/her as (acutely or chronically) mentally disturbed and/or ill. This wouldn't count as a genuine emotion, otherwise mental disturbance would not have been diagnosed. We can tell the difference between a genuine emotion and a mental disorder by the fact that the latter do not have clear objects.] As with most things connected with intentional behaviour, such things are goal-, or object-directed (which is why we use transitive verbs to characterise them). We'd not be able to make sense of someone who was just in love, but with no one or nothing in particular.
N3: At time t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she understands the pressures on MM when he lied).
N4: At time t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.
[The reader is directed back here for an explanation of these symbols.]
Hence, in this case, we would have something like the following (in an abbreviated, even if slightly stilted, form for clarity's sake):
N3c: NN feels she must love MM because of his caring for her, and NN feels she must not love MM for sleeping with her best friend.
[I have left N3c in a slightly stilted form so that it is clear what is being said.]
In that case, N3c is in fact this:
N5: NN feels she must love MM for φ-ing, and not love MM for ψ-ing.
As before, we have in effect two different objects of NN's love: his caring for her (i.e., "φ-ing") and his violation of her trust (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was added earlier (now re-written as N1a):
N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.
N1a: NN both loves and does not love MM at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that love.
Plainly, in N5, we have here two different objects of the said love, and thus no contradiction -- or, at least, no more than there would be here:
N6: NN saw MM in the distance with her binoculars.
N7: NN saw MN in the distance with her binoculars.
Here we have two different objects of NN's sight, MM and MN. If anyone thought these two propositions were contradictory, it would indicate they were the victim of serious linguistic confusion, not the author of a breakthrough in the science of optics.
It could be argued that the above express the cause of those emotions, or whatever occasioned them, not their objects. In fact, it isn't too clear that this is a distinction with a difference, any more than these are:
N8: MM in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.
N7: MN in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.
So, whatever the cause happens to be, the aforementioned emotions had different objects, and so aren't contradictory.
Of course, if this benighted comrade meant something other than this, he should perhaps learn to be a little clearer.
However, it might be objected that it is reasonably obvious that the contradiction here is this:
B7a: NN: "I must love my partner and it's not the case that I must love my partner".
Once more, it is far from clear how this qualifies as a 'dialectical contradiction' -- that is, should we ever be told what one of these is. [Do they turn into one another, as the DM-classics tell us they should? And even if they did, how could anyone tell!]
Ignoring this minor niggle for now, it is undeniable that human beings experience conflicting emotions like this all the time, but when faced with B7a, the normal reaction would be to respond with: "Er..., what on earth do you mean by that?", and we'd be surprised if NN found it impossible to say why she felt this way. We'd certainly expect some form of disambiguation or clarification of what she meant, perhaps along the lines expressed in N3a:
N3a: NN feels she must love MM because of his caring for her, and NN feels she must not love MM for sleeping with her best friend.
If so, and once more, no contradiction would be implied.
But, even if B7a were an unambiguous contradiction, that would simply confirm the fact that contradictions in ordinary language and in logic are built around the content of propositions, and the logical links we hold between them -- undermining this benighted comrade's point:
"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"
The question now is, has anyone ever held the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true or both false at the same time? Or anything like them? Perhaps they have (who can say?), but how that shows that there are in fact 'true contradictions' in nature and society is still somewhat unclear.
B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".
B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I must love my partner".
[B5: Interest A in relationship R contradicts interest B in relationship R.]
As should seem obvious, the fact that someone believes (or holds) something to be true or believes something to be false does not automatically make it true or make it false!
[Once again, it is worth recalling here that two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once. So, if someone does assent to two contradictory propositions, then they must believe both can be true or both can be false. (That is they must deny the following: Two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once.) But, that would just mean they had misunderstood the word "contradiction". We certainly can't build a new science of human behaviour on the basis of confusions like this.]
However, it could be argued that because NN holds the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true -- when coupled with the fact that NN is an individual who exists in the real world --, that shows that it is at least possible to assert the existence of true contradictions. Once this possibility is allowed, the objections set out in this Essay can be seen for what they are: empty rhetoric.
Or, so it might be claimed.
Indeed, an argument somewhat like this was rehearsed by Roy Edgley a few years back:
"Since thought and theory are also part of reality and thus real objects that can be thought about, contradictions in thought, though not true of reality, certainly exist in reality; and it is only because they do exist in reality that they can be the object of criticism -- criticism for failing to be true of reality. Moreover, it is because two contradictory theories can't both be true that each bears a critical relation to the other: instantiated in actual thought this relation of logical opposition is in fact a critical relation of real opposition, Kant notwithstanding. It is no less logical opposition and no more simply natural 'conflict of forces' for taking the form of real historical and social struggle." [Edgley (1979), pp.24-25. Italic emphases in the original.]
The following would presumably be one such contradiction (although Edgley himself was apparently interested in more overtly scientific propositions), and one such existential claim:
B8: Let "p" be "I must love my partner and it is not the case that I must love my partner".
B9: In so far as "p" exists, contradictions exist in reality.
As Edgley admits, while a proposition like p would not actually be true, it would still exist, and hence contradictions certainly exist (at this minimal level, at least). To be sure, it's an entirely different matter whether or not p is true; I will return to consider this option later. But, what about the claim that this argument shows that contradictions at least exist? Well certainly those words exit, but that is no more illuminating than the following would be:
B10: Let "G" = "God".
B11 In so far as G exists, God exists in reality.
The question would still remain as to whether there is a 'God' or not.
[As those who know their logic will also know, Edgley has confused a propositional sign with a proposition (and perhaps also use with mention). B10 and B11 partially bring this out.]
Someone might object: the above argument in fact confirms that the word "God" exists just as Edgley's argument shows that contradictions exist.
Well, all it shows is that a propositional sign exists, but who has ever denied that? Put another way, Edgley's argument is no more illuminating than would be an argument aimed at showing 'God' exists, but which instead showed that the word "God" exists!
Once more, no one has ever questioned the existence of inscriptions of contradictions (indeed, these Essays contain scores of them), but that sheds no light at all on the claim that there are 'real contradictions' in nature and society. If the mere thought of a contradiction, or its actual inscription on the page (or screen), were enough to show that DM-contradictions exist in the real world, then we should have to admit that there were 'real tautologies', too. But worse, we should have to accept LIE, that is, the doctrine that solely from thought, or from words alone, substantive ontological conclusions (as opposed to trivial linguistic/inscriptional conclusions) may be deduced. [More on that in Essay Twelve.]
[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; FL = Formal Logic.]
But, signs and inscriptions do not have such existential implications; plainly, if they did we should all have to believe in The Tooth Fairy and Bigfoot.
Edgley goes on to argue:
"Though a system of thought that is contradictory can't be true of its real object, this isomorphic relation between the structure of a society's thought and the structure of its material life thus gives sense to the idea that such thought is true to that material life: in being contradictory it 'reflects', and so discloses, though its content does not explicitly assert, the contradictory structure of the material life of that society." [Ibid., p.25. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Unfortunately, theorists are often careless over their use of the word "isomorphic"; how, it might be wondered, can a set of words be isomorphic to items in the world they do not in any way resemble, some of which are abstract common nouns, and many of which don't occupy a referential role to begin with?
Putting this to one side for now, we may further wonder how Edgley knows this is indeed an "isomorphism" if none of his contradictions are true of capitalism, as he concedes. And his claim that this theory is "true to" capitalism is far from clear; how something can be "true to", but not "true of" a social system is something Edgley failed to explain.
Now, Edgley asserts that these linguistic contradictions (or at least the more theoretical examples to which he refers) are a "reflection" of "real oppositions" in society. That claim is partly defused below, and will be further laid to rest throughout this Essay. [See also here.]
Independently of this, Edgley makes a serious mistake (one that all DM-fans seem to commit): confusing contradictions in FL with what might or might not exist. As noted above, and in Essay Four Part One, FL makes no existential claims. To be sure, logicians as individuals may make such claims, but logic itself is neutral in this regard (since logic is not an agent, and is capable of making no assertions). While it is true that certain logical systems might need an ontology (or even a model) in order to work, even there, contradictions do not make existential claims; the background 'ontology' does that.
To repeat: in its simplest form a contradiction in logic is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, such that both can't both be true and both can't be false at once. So, the fact that inscriptions of contradictions exist has no bearing on this logical principle. Furthermore, FL does not rule out the existence of contradictions, since FL is not a science, nor is it an agent. It neither rules in nor rules out the existence of anything. [In fact, in the construction of indirect proofs, logicians and mathematicians use contradictions all the time!] The study of logic, in this respect, revolves around the truth-functional implications that hold between a proposition and its negation. It isn't about existence in any shape or form.
In that case, contradictions can't "reflect" anything, for they represent just one form of the disintegration of the expressive power of language.
[The fact that there are many different definitions of "contradiction" in FL and Philosophical Logic is discussed in Essay Eight Part Three. More on this here, here and in Essay Twelve Part One.]
But, wait! The benighted comrade mentioned earlier has a powerful ally, none other than that outright charlatan, Freud:
"Perhaps someone is in the midst of an unhappy love affair and says
'I love him
but I also hate him'. It's not just the statement but the feeling which is a
contradiction surely? If Freud is held to describe the human individual not as a
unified subject but a bundle of contradictory drives and desires, might one not
imagine contradictory drives (if not desires) in a particular social system?
"Can I not have contradictory emotions about a subject, situation or person (I
know I do about all sorts of things!)."
Thus, on the back of some egregious Freudian Pseudo-science, this comrade is content to build his 'case'.
But, is there anything in these fraudulent Freudian fancies (even if we put to one side all the lies, deceit, client abuse, intellectual bullying, cocaine-induced fantasy, paranoia, and fabricated evidence that marked Freud's career)?
Well, once more, can people have contradictory emotions? Perhaps these will suffice:
B12: NN hates Blair.
B13: It is not the case that NN hates Blair.
However, I rather think that this comrade didn't mean a contradiction like this. Perhaps he intended the following?
B14: NN both hates and loves Blair.
This is entirely possible, if unusual (but it can surely be disambiguated along the lines examined above).
However, it is worth noting that love and hate are not contradictory (when put in a propositional context), unless, say, hating someone implies not loving them; but, as the above quotation shows, it doesn't imply this! [That must be so unless by "contradiction" we mean something entirely different; if so, what?]
Moreover, we have already seen that B14 is not even a contradiction, since it could be false -- that is, if NN were indifferent to Blair.
Nevertheless, (1) The reader will need to re-read the caveats posted here, and (2) Note that in order to give content to this idea (if it is what was meant, or if these ideas mean anything at all), we had to use a propositional context to make things clear, once more.
This rather makes a mess then of the following rather rash assertions:
"I'm just very puzzled about what it means to restrict the meaning of the term contradiction to a rule of formal logic. It's always been the least compelling of your arguments it seems to me. I don't understand the linguistic scandal that is supposed to be involved in talking about the human subject as a 'bundle of contradictory drives and desires' or talking about the capitalist system as encompassing contradictory tendencies (how TRPF [the tendency of the rate of profit to fall -- RL] is held to operate inside a concrete capitalist social formation for example)....
"I don't see how there can be anything ipso facto absurd or meaningless about such statements to anyone familiar with ordinary language." [Bold emphasis added.]
No "scandal" here at all; this comrade's badly thought-out examples themselves imply the above conclusions -- that is, when we try to make sense of them. Even he had to use propositions to inform us of these Freudian foibles.
[Supposedly contradictory drives and emotions were disambiguated above. The alleged 'contradictions' in capitalism are dealt with here, and here. Finally, I have already pointed out, just as I pointed this out to this comrade, my concerns aren't solely with FL-contradictions.]
Now, it could be argued that certain brain states or underlying psychological and/or social forces are what lie behind the contradictory emotions/tendencies that exercised this benighted comrade, and it is here that the contradiction lies. [This seems to be what motivated Professor Edgley's comments above.]
Unfortunately, the thesis that there are such things as 'contradictory forces' has been laid to rest in this Essay; but, the overall idea is susceptible to the next series of objections, anyway.
[The argument below also applies to the claim that there might be certain brain states/process and/or psychological 'drives' -- and/or social forces/tendencies -- at work, of which we are as yet unaware, that constitute such 'material contradictions', or which cause/'mediate' them. These could even be those mythical Freudian fancies mentioned above.]
Let us, therefore, call "F" the brain state/process and/or psychological 'drive' and/or social force/tendency that results in, 'mediates', or from which "emerges", the following:
B15: NN loves Tony Blair.
Or, in the first person:
B15a: I, NN, love Tony Blair.
Let us also label "F*" as the brain state/process and/or psychological 'drive' and/or social force/tendency that results in, 'mediates', or from which "emerges", the following:
B16: NN hates Tony Blair.
Or, in the first person:
B16a: I, NN, hate Tony Blair.
So, "F" stands for the social or psychological force (etc.) that 'mediates' (etc.) "NN loves Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent), and "F*" stands for the social force (etc.) which 'mediates' (etc.) "NN hates Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent).
Let us further assume that F 'contradicts' F*, i.e., that they are 'dialectically-united opposites'.
Now, given these assumptions, not even this will work!
[Of course, if they aren't 'dialectically-united opposites' to begin with (or, if there can be no such things as 'dialectically-united opposites'), then the above comrade's objection fails by default.]
According to the DM-classics -- -- where we are told that all things change into their opposites, and that they do so because of a "struggle" between those opposites -- F must change into F*, and vice versa. But, F can't change into F* since F* already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this theory, F couldn't change, for there would be no opposite to 'struggle' with to make it do just that!
And, it is no good propelling F** into the future so that it now becomes what F* will change into, since F* will do no such thing unless F** is already there to make it happen!
Now, it could be objected that love can surely turn into hate, and vice versa. Indeed, it can, but the whole point of introducing F and F* was to show that if and when that happens, dialectics cannot account for it -- and for the above reasons!
[For those interested, this argument is developed in greater detail here, where 'social contradictions' are also analysed.]
Finally, the following represents an (edited version of an) exchange between myself and a far more reasonable comrade (whose name has been withheld):
Comrade M (commenting on the dialectical use of the word "contradiction"): I mean what most people mean -- conflict, inner tension...
Rosa: Do they really? Give me one sentence drawn from ordinary language (the vehicle most people do in fact use, so what you say should appear there, somewhere) where such an interpretation could be put on the word "contradiction" -- i.e., one not infected with the sort of idealist guff you read in Hegel. An idealist will have no problem with asserting such things; if reality is Mind it can surely argue with itself. Not so a materialist who bases his/her science on the language of ordinary workers (ordinary language).
But, even then, why call such things "contradictions"? What link does this use have with the "gain-saying" of someone, which is what the word usually means? How is a conflict in society a contradiction?
Sure, you can re-define the word to mean whatever you like, but if we all did that we could re-define anything to mean anything, and we'd lose touch with meaning altogether.
Apart from that, you'd be forcing a view onto reality (contrary to what 'dialecticians' tell us they never do), not reading one from it. Linguistic Idealism -- as I asserted in those parts of my work I sent you -- would then automatically have raised its ideal head. Society would be 'contradictory', not because it really was so, but because we have re-defined it to be so. A linguistic dodge would have created a few empirical 'truths'; this is science on the cheap...
Comrade M: Rosa said: "Give me one sentence..." Okay, what about "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!" Or "That's a contradiction in terms".
Suppose someone says "military intelligence" is a contradiction in terms. What they mean is that there is a conflict or a tension between the first and the second word, thus conjugated.
At any rate, you are berating a new convert. I can't be expected to know everything at once, much less know it as wisely as the central committee (you).
Rosa: First, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is either a misnomer or a rhetorical device. Why? Well, since contradiction has to do with truth and falsehood as much as it has to do with "gain-saying", and since one term on its own can't be true or false (only sentences and clauses can be), and since single words do not say anything, no term can contradict another.
In that case, "contradiction in terms" means something like "incompatible phrase(s)", as in "round square". Now, "AB is round and it is square" would only be a contradiction if "AB is round" were taken to mean "AB is not square", but then you would not now have a contradiction in terms, just a sentential contradiction with no "conflict (or) inner tension" anywhere in sight.
And, if the above conclusion were rejected (for some reason), you still would not have a "contradiction in terms" that expressed some sort of "conflict (or) inner tension", since, once more, words can't conflict (or be tense, or be in tension), because they are not agents. Moreover, anyone who uttered a "contradiction in terms" would not necessarily be in "conflict (or) inner tension", just confused. And even if they weren't confused, the "contradiction in terms" they uttered would not necessarily indicate "conflict (or) inner tension"; it could be a sign of all manner of things (ranging from lack of clarity, through puzzlement, to playfulness).
As to the idea that such a phrase could indicate the presence of "conflict (or) inner tension" I have no doubt, but if a "contradiction in terms" meant that a "conflict (or) inner tension" had to be present, it would mean this, not merely could mean this, just as the truth of "not p" would mean the falsehood of "p" (as opposed to merely "not p" could mean the falsehood of "p"). So they can't be synonymous, as you allege.
[Apologies for the prolixity of that paragraph, but logic is a pain in the dictionary!]
But, even if this were not so, "contradiction" here would not mean "conflict (or) inner tension", but "gainsaying oneself or another", which could be true without an inner conflict being implied. It might be a joke, an attempt to puzzle, part of a game, a mistake… The possibilities are endless. The attempt to squeeze this into an idealist boot can only succeed if the almost endless possibilities allowed for by ordinary language are ignored.
As for "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!", the verb "to contradict" in this command (it isn't in fact a proposition, so it can't itself be a contradiction, literally speaking -- not that you suggested it was) clearly means "gain-say". No quibble there. But, if it meant "conflict, inner tension", you would have:
"Don't you conflict/inner tension me you little bastard!", which is meaningless.
Even if we were to edit this to:
"Don't you conflict with me you little bastard!",
it would not mean the same as:
"Don't you contradict me you little bastard!"
One can conflict with someone without contradicting them, and vice versa (e.g., two friends could contradict each other (out of fun) without conflicting with each other, say). Hence these can't mean the same.
However "Don't you inner tension with me you little bastard!" can't be beaten into shape at all.
2. Engels, for example, went to great lengths to qualify what he meant by "force". Cf., Engels (1954), pp.69-86.
3. This was established in Essay Two.
Nevertheless, as we saw there, assertions like those listed in Note 1 function as a "form of representation", not as a summary of the available evidence. In many cases, such broad generalisations are made on the basis of little or no evidence at all. For example:
"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211.]
"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…[is] the negation of the negation…. [This is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976), pp.179-80.]
Now, Engels was quite happy to call such sketchy, half-formed sub-hypotheses, "laws" even though they were based solely on a superficial examination of a limited range of examples -- all specially selected and highly simplified --, drawn from the science of his day. And, even then, they are often badly-described or misconstrued. No wonder I have called this Mickey Mouse Science.
[Their role as a "form of representation" will be outlined in the section dealing with the RRT, in Essay Twelve Part Four.]
[RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]
[The phrase "form of representation" is taken from Wittgenstein; a brief outline of its meaning can be found in Glock (1996), pp.129-35. We will see Engels employing one of these in Note 7, below.
Also, follow the link to "norm of representation" given in Note 25.]
4. However, in one of these quotations, Engels seems to question the identification of contradictions with forces:
"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion….
"It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]
Even though Engels elaborated on this theme in the succeeding pages of DN, this passage alone totally undermines the equation of forces with contradictions. [Of course, this quotation was taken from unpublished notebooks, so it might not have represented Engels's more considered views.]
[DN = Dialectics of Nature; i.e., Engels (1954).]
Nevertheless, this re-interpretation of the term "force" as a sort of shorthand for "simple forms of motion" is in fact in line with more modern approaches to the nature of force, which sees is an expression of the exchange of momentum. Even so, this 'revised view' has serious consequences for DM that Engels appears not to have noticed. Several of these are examined in the main body of this Essay, and below in Note 25.
5. Admittedly, this is a highly simplified picture, for even in such circumstances there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body -- the resultant motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting in the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of the orbiting body, motion isn't the result of two different sorts of forces -- those of attraction and repulsion -- but a consequence of just one resultant force. Hence, orbital motion (at least) is produced by the action of one force only (in Classical Physics) -- with only one force, there can be no 'contradiction'. Now, since orbital motion encompasses most of the bulk motion in the universe, most movement in nature can't be the result of any sort of 'contradiction'.
Furthermore, any secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the system), which happens to be superimposed on the primary action, only serves to complicate the picture, it doesn't alter it. This extra activity might also be the result of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces (in Classical Physics, once more), which admittedly affect the said resultant. While they might change that resultant, they do not turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic and several other options are examined again in more detail here.]
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the motion of such a body around another is determined by the operation of the two forces of attraction that pass between them: body A attracts body B, and vice versa.
Even so, it is difficult to see how two attractive forces could be regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories' (nor yet how they are supposed to be 'struggling'). Anyway, Engels himself argues that oppositional forces are those of attraction and repulsion, despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in nature these seem to have little or no part to play. Not only that, but the motion of, say, planet A around, say, star B, is caused by forces originating in B, not A. While, the forces originating in A may affect B, they do not affect A itself, or its motion around B.
It could be argued once more that the interconnected and reciprocal chain of effects in play between A and B shows that such forces are dialectically-linked. Hence, on this view, B would affect A's motion while A reciprocates; this in turn alters B's motion, which must then affect A's, and so on. But even here, these attractive forces do not confront each other as oppositional or as contradictory. At best, such forces affect the motion of the two bodies in tandem, which motion in turn then affects any other forces in play, and so on. In fact, they appear to augment one another. On that basis, if we insist on anthropomorphising nature, should we not say (and with more justification) that such forces aren't in fact contradictory, they are tautological? [On this, see Note 38, below. See also Note 6b.]
Anyway, and once more, these forces do not turn into each other, which either means that they aren't 'dialectical opposites', or the DM-classics were wrong.
6. Again this simplifies the picture considerably, but the point is still valid. Even if it could be shown that gravity is a property either of matter (as a result, perhaps, of the activities of the by now legendary "graviton"), of Spacetime, or of something else, 'motion' through the latter would still not be a function of attractive and repulsive forces. [On this, see Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi. However, it is also worth pointing that this view has recently been challenged in Wilson (2007). More on that below.]
[In the previous paragraph, the word "motion" is in 'scare' quotes, since it is a moot point whether anything actually moves in four-dimensional Spacetime.]
6a. This, of course, is not how things are pictured in school or college Physics textbooks, where "force" is still used for heuristic purposes. But, as Jammer notes, in higher Physics, "force" has been edited out of the picture, replaced by exchange particles.
This is re-iterated by Nobel Laureate, Professor Wilczek:
"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.
"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote
"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Quoted from here.]
[The above now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38.]
This view has been criticised quite effectively in Wilson (2007). More details on this will be added here at a later date.
However, there are versions of classical theory (for example, Newton-Cartan Theory) in which the force of gravity can be "geometrised" away. On this, see Malament (2012), Manchak (2012),and Trautman (1965).
6b. Despite this, it could be argued that it is the relation between bodies that determines subsequent changes in motion, and this supports the idea that there is a contradiction here. But, in relativistic physics, it is the 'relation' between a body and the gravitational field in which it finds itself that changes its motion, and once this is admitted we have left far behind the idea that there are "contradictory forces" at work in any meaningful sense of the term.
Once more, it could be countered that there is still a relation between bodies here, since the more massive body will deform the gravitational field that surrounds it, thus changing the motion of the second body. Maybe so, but how this is a 'contradiction' has yet to be explained. There seems to be no "struggle" here (or are we to imagine that bodies 'struggle' with tensor fields -- i.e., with mathematical structures?), nor is one term transformed into its opposite (as we were assured they must by the dialectical classics). There is no 'unity' or 'identity in opposition' here; one body just happens to be in the deformed results of another's field, and moves along the geodesics there. Once again: if anything, and if we absolutely have to use a metaphor here, because of the regular and smooth (non-developmental) nature of the motion, this is much more like a 'dialectical tautology'.
7. For example, see Engels (1954), pp.73-80. I pick up this topic again, here and here.
Nevertheless, it is far from clear what Engels was driving at in these passages. If he meant to say that heat operates as a repulsive force then that would have been a desperate and unconvincing move. Not only do cold bodies have satellites (e.g., Neptune), hot bodies swallow matter up all the time. It is possible that Engels simply copied this idea from several theorists who wrote in the previous century. [Hesse (1961), Williams (1980).]
Admittedly, Engels also considered other repulsive forces that could operate in a planetary system, but his ideas were not just speculative and fanciful, they were clearly ad hoc. I can find no evidence that anyone else (DM-fan or otherwise) has followed up on -- or developed -- any of these ideas in any way in the intervening years.
For example, Engels appeals to the original repulsive properties of the "individual particles of the gaseous sphere" from which the Solar System was formed (as a result of "contraction"), to account for its origin by means of an "interplay of attraction and repulsion." [Engels (1954), pp.73-74.]
It would be difficult to find a better example than this of how the 'dialectical method' has been imposed on nature, not deduced from the phenomena. And we can say this with some confidence. Even if this 'theory' weren't so obviously fanciful, it certainly could not have been deduced from the phenomena since the alleged incidents took place billions of years ago. Admittedly, there might have been theoretical considerations that recommended this 'hypothesis' to Engels as a tentative 'explanation' of how the Solar System could have formed -- although even that is questionable since Engels explicitly based his ideas on the old Kant-Laplace model, itself nearly 100 years old at the time --, but even granted all this, Engels's account is superficial, impressionistic and lacks both mathematical and evidential support. It was clearly motivated by his desire to find some force -- any force -- to counterbalance gravity just because DM requires it, not because the phenomena dictate it. This is a classic example of Engels using the ideas he inherited from Hegel as a "form of representation", and a confused one at that.
To be sure, such formal devices are used all the time in science; Engels however turned this one into a metaphysical thesis.
[The difference between Metaphysics and science will be outlined in Essay Thirteen Part Two. On Metaphysics and DM, see Essay Twelve Part One.]
Indeed, Einstein himself was not above inventing forces to suit the requirements of his theory (the same was true of Newton, too), introducing "the cosmological constant" to account for the fact that the Universe hasn't collapsed in on itself. [Cf., Lerner (1992), pp.131-32.] There are countless examples of this sort of move in the history of science. Thomas Kuhn called these "paradigms". [On this, see Kuhn (1970, 1996), and Sharrock and Read (2002).]
Incidentally, an appeal to so-called 'centrifugal forces' (a bogus notion found in Classical Physics) won't save Engels's theory either, since such forces do not 'exist'. If anything they result from the application of a misleading shorthand for the way that rectilinear motion would tend to be re-asserted if forces responsible for centripetal acceleration cease to operate, subjectively experienced in certain rotating systems.
8. In that case, for once, Engels's views would appear to be consistent with modern Physics (as indicated by Max Jammer)!
Engels also noted the anthropomorphic origin of this concept (something Woods and Grant, for example, failed to spot -- even though they quoted this passage!):
"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Engels (1954), p.82. Bold emphasis added.]
On the animistic/anthropomorphic origin of the concept of force, see Hesse (1961), Jammer (1999), and Agassi (1968), who references Francis Bacon's Novum Organum (Book One: Aphorisms; Aphorisms XXXVII-LXVIII) as a locus classicus of this point.
DM-theorists are not alone in finding their ideas embarrassed by an over-ambitious use of anthropomorphic concepts; the theses of metaphysically-motivated Philosophers and scientists have been similarly compromised for many centuries. The ideological origin of this phenomenon is discussed in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here, and here).
9. Of course, not all objects that collide would be moving in opposite directions; many would be on a trajectory inclined at some angle or other to those of the rest. Many would move in the same direction, only at different speeds. It isn't easy to see how any of these can be seen as 'contradictory'.
Classical problems associated with the 'ontology of interaction' will be posted here at a later date. However, there is an outline of these issues in Note 24. See also Note 6a. This was also discussed in Essay Eight Part One.
10. It could be argued that forces are 'abstractions' constructed to assist in the scientific study of nature. But, when viewed this way the concept "force" becomes little more than a "useful fiction", only now situated in a metaphorical universe all of its own somewhere between genuine fictions (such as ghosts and apparitions) and mathematical fictions (like the centre of mass of the Galactic System to which our Galaxy belongs, the Virgo Supercluster). In that case, naturally, the 'objective' status of forces would be fatally compromised. They would have no physical counterpart, meaning that the real material correlates of DM-'contradictions' would be non-existent. I'm not sure many DM-fans will want to pursue this option too far.
All this is quite apart from the fact that if forces were abstractions, no two individuals would agree about them. This was established in Essay Three Part One.
11. Once more, this isn't a problem confined solely to DM-circles; scientific theories are shot-through with metaphor, and scientists use analogical reasoning all the time.
On the nature and use of metaphor and analogy in the sciences, cf., Baake (2003), Brown (2003), Benjamin, et al (1987), Guttenplan (2005), Hesse (1966), Ortony (1993), and White (1996, 2010). [Several of the above base their ideas on Max Black's work in this area, which is destructively criticised in White (1996).]
However, there is as yet no satisfactory treatment of the content, role and significance of figurative language in science. Unfortunately, given the ubiquity of such language, this means that the precise nature of scientific knowledge is poorly understood. [I hope to say more on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two when it is published.]
12. This might be one particular use of the LEM that DM-fans would be wise not to question. If objects, states of affairs and processes were held to be both non-contradictory and contradictory at the same time, little sense could be made of the theory even before it was examined.
[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]
Nevertheless, as with any application of the 'laws' of FL (but I prefer to called them rules) to complex situations, some sensitivity is required. In that case, it could be argued that DM is only committed to the view that parts of one system/process 'contradict' parts of another, while still others do not.
To be perfectly honest, it is impossible to give a clear answer to this volunteered response since DM is far too vague and sketchy for anyone (supporter or critic) to decide whether or not this is a legitimate reading. Perhaps it is both and neither at the same time?
Nevertheless, dialecticians do in fact speak about contradictions "growing", "intensifying", and "lessening" -- or, even of them being "resolved". But, this is clearly a subjective opinion since we are supplied with no units by which these supposed changes (to 'contradictions' themselves) can be measured, and no data to support such contentions; nor do DM-fans even so much as attempt to quantify them in any way (which, on its own, is a rather odd thing for an alleged science to omit).
However, if DM-apologists ever do decide to invent a unit here, we might make some progress. May I suggest, therefore, the 'Neg'?
So, one Neg could be defined as that strength/level/intensity of contradiction necessary to make either a stick (of arbitrary size) look bent in water, an object (again of arbitrary dimensions) look smaller as it recedes from the viewer, or maybe even that level of contradiction required to make at least one capitalist/employer look fair to a randomly chosen worker (albeit, 'confused' by 'commonsense').
In that case, a Nanoneg would be enough to make an electron move, and a Piconeg would allow it simultaneously to be a wave and a particle. Extending this, a Millineg would be strong enough to move a millipede. [The reader can decide for herself what a Centineg would be capable of setting in motion.] A Decineg would be sufficient to depict a formal contradiction in logic, while a Decaneg (colloquially, "A Blair", now "A Cameron") would be enough to spin a pack of capitalist lies (about the affordability of, say, pensions) or endorse at least one 'dodgy' Iraq dossier.
Perhaps then, a Hecto(r)neg would be sufficient to set off a factional dispute in yet another dialectically-distracted Trotskyist/Communist/Maoist sect, while the class war itself would need a Kiloneg to initiate a strike, a Meganeg to motivate a huge anti-war movement, and a Giganeg to prompt a proletarian insurrection. Moving up the scale, a Teraneg would be enough to keep the Earth in orbit around the Sun, and, of course, a Yottaneg sufficient to kick-start the 'Big Bang'.
We could even introduce a special unit to measure the contradictory stench created in the nostrils of most working-class people by the oppression, mass murder, counter-revolutionary antics, or sectarian in-fighting this misbegotten theory has motivated Dialectical Marxists to engage in throughout the twentieth century: the Rottaneg.
All we would need then is an intrepid dialectician (perhaps one of those who claims to be able to derive fundamental scientific truths from thought alone by simply juggling with obscure Hegelian jargon, upside down or the 'right way up') to invent a "Negometer" (and they could surely do this if they stopped wasting time writing yet another identical version of DM/'Materialist Dialectics', perhaps by just cutting and pasting large sections from the 'classics' -- as has usually been the case up to now) to measure these super-scientific 'dialectical contradictions'. That done, Mystical Marxism might at least begin to look precise and scientific for a change. After all, if Scientologists have their E Meter, DM should at least have a Negometer.
[To be honest, I would have suggested the "Con" here, instead of the "Neg" as a suitable unit with which to measure the strength of DM-'contradictions', but when I typed "Megacon" into an earlier version of the above that seemed to me to be a little too obvious -- and a mite too facetious.
Compare the above comments with the suggestions made about dialectical "nodes"/"leaps", here.]
13. This, of course, assumes that 'contradictions' have metaphorical 'geometric centres' and possess figurative 'separation radii'. Well, maybe they can be photographed, weighed and given new paint job, too?
Cheap debating points? Perhaps so; but if all parts of nature (animate and inanimate, macroscopic or microscopic) behave as if they can argue with each other -- which is how things are depicted in DM, when it pictures them as 'contradicting' this or that, bickering all the time (that is, if the word "contradict" is understood literally) --, the cheap shot above is hardly worth mentioning in comparison. DM takes the piss out of itself; it needs little help from me.
13a. Indeed, when asked to explain why this is a 'contradiction', Ian Birchall [aka 'Grim and Dim' -- his choice of pseudonym, not mine -- and I am not 'outing' a comrade here!] failed to respond. However, in a later thread he made another unsuccessful attempt to reply, as did a few other confused comrades. [Unfortunately, Haloscan has been reorganised, and these links no longer take you to the exact post in question, just the thread in which they appear. However, the reader is encouraged to read this lengthy exchange on this topic; my thoughts on the 'arguments' of one of the egregious participants in this debate ('JohnG') can be found here and here, and now in a revised form above, in Note One. In general on this comrade, see here.
Unfortunately, the same always seems to happen whenever I ask dialecticians to explain why these are 'contradictions' -- even knowledgeable comrades soon begin to flounder!
Concerning what I consider the best (Marxist) response ever given to this question, see here.
February 2009 update, another attempt can be found here. [In fact, the owner of the former site (a Marxist economist) deleted my replies, since he found it far too problematic to defend his use of "contradiction").]
Autumn 2009 update, another attempt -- involving academic dialecticians), which began here (halfway down the page) and continued here, here, here, here, here, and here -- was no less unsuccessful.
December 2011 update: here's another discussion (in the comments section), mainly between myself and Mike Rosen, on the nature of these obscure 'contradictions'. (Don't forget to organise the posts 'Newest First'.)
Several more examples of this DM-tendency to label anything and everything as "contradictory" can be found here, and in Note 14.
Indeed, a recent (March 2013) example illustrates this cavalier attitude to the use of this word:
"In the Communist Manifesto Marx makes two contradictory assertions: 1. The ruling ideas in any epoch are the ideas of the ruling class. 2. The emancipation of the working class is the act of the working class itself." ['Mark' quoted from here, p.24. Italic emphasis in the original. In fact, Marx said this: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas...".]
But, why is this a contradiction? We aren't told. Even so, it isn't hard to guess a possible answer -- as Tony Cliff points out:
"The fact that the working class needs a party or parties is in itself a proof of the cleavages in the working class. The more backward culturally, the weaker the organisation and self-administration of the workers generally, the greater will be the intellectual cleavage between the class and its Marxist party. From this unevenness in the working class flows the great danger of an autonomous development of the party and its machine till it becomes, instead of the servant of the class, its master. This unevenness is a main source of the danger of 'substitutionism'...." [Cliff (1960), p.126.]
In other words, the working class can't emancipate itself since it is dominated by boss-class ideology, and yet it must emancipate itself if socialism is to be won. Indeed, as 'Mark' went on to point out:
"When workers fight back they find that some of the ideas once held, ruling class ideas, are challenged in the very process of struggle. Workers discover they can make speeches and organise solidarity. Racist or sexist ideas are challenged as people unite and fight back together. People change their ideas in struggle. Consciousness is contradictory.
"Those fighting back make up the vanguard of the class. The uneven nature of the class struggle across the class means we need a revolutionary party, one that orients on those engaged in struggle, the 'vanguard' of the class. Unevenness in the Party, as well as the need to totally reject ruling class ideology, means we need a central leadership in the Party." ['Mark' quoted from here, p.24.]
Hence, the "self-emancipation of the working class" can only happen with the intervention of the party, which is somehow capable of freeing itself of bourgeois ideology -- or, rather its "central leadership" is capable of doing this -- while the working class isn't! Of course, in struggle, as 'Mark' points out, workers change their ideas, but nowhere does this comrade suggest that they can free themselves completely of boss-class ideology. If they could, there'd be no need for a party!
Well, this conundrum is ironic in view of the fact that Bolshevik-style parties -- and especially their "central leaderships" -- have themselves been dominated by 23-carat gold, diamond studded, boss-class thought-forms (upside down or 'the right way up') for over a century, as these Essays have amply demonstrated.
But, and once more, why is what 'Mark' said above a contradiction as opposed to an impossibility? Again, we are left in the dark.
14. It could be objected that social contradictions were never meant to be interpreted in this crude and inappropriate manner, as vectors (etc.). Maybe not, but this section of the Essay is trying to make some sort of sense of the equation of forces with contradictions, and forces certainly can be represented by vectors. If it isn't possible to represent social forces in this way, then all well and good. But, in that case, we are still no nearer understanding what these allegedly 'social contradictions' are, or in what way they can be described as, or be illustrated by, forces.
Also in doubt is how something that actually exists (i.e., the current state of the working class) can 'contradict', in a 'dialectical' sense (involving forces), something that does not (i.e., the proletariat's potential revolutionary role). As we have seen, dialecticians constantly use the word "contradiction" in inappropriate circumstances to depict things that seem quirky, odd, paradoxical, contrary to expectations, and so on -- almost as the mood takes them. [See, for instance, here.]
However, what Lindsey German might have had in mind in the quoted passage is that there is a seeming contradiction in revolutionary theory, which on the one hand depicts the proletariat as the revolutionary class, while on the other we actually see that this class is often quiescent, or compliant (or relatively so) for long periods. But, this is no more a contradiction than it would be if, say, we heard that a heavy object near to the surface of the earth did not actually fall to the ground. As soon as we learnt that this heavy object was maintained in place by pillars, cables or magnets the phenomenon would puzzle us no more.
The moral here is that no law in Physics is 'true' on its own; all are hedged about by all manner of ceteris paribus (i.e., "all things being equal") clauses. [On this, see Cartwright (1983). However, there is a forceful rebuttal to this way of seeing things here. See also, Earman et al (2002), and van Brakel (2000), pp.151-69. Naturally, it would be out of place to pursue this issue in this Essay, so this topic will be discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
In that case, and analogously, as soon as we know what is holding the working class back, this puzzle also disappears.
Hence, German's worry about overcoming this 'contradiction' can now be shelved -- there isn't one.
Naturally, that does not mean that socialists should just let things drift, fail to intervene, or, indeed, sit back and wait for workers to organise themselves, but since this is to stray into areas covered by HM, no more will be said about it here.
14a. It could be argued that in so far as forces in nature can be represented as vectors, then contradictions can be, too. This option will be considered below.
15. E.g., Rees (1998), pp.5-8.
16. It may be felt that this completely misconstrues the relation between parts and wholes in DM (wherein "the whole is more than the sum of the parts", etc.). However, this dubious dialectical doctrine is examined in extensive detail in Essay Eleven Part Two, where it is shown to be no less confused than other DM-theses.
17. Of course, it could be argued that this objectifies the Totality once more, thereby distorting it. But, if the Totality is not a kind of object (even if it is a changing 'object'), how can 'it' have any relation to 'its' parts, and how could 'contradictions' be properties of 'it'?
It could be objected that the Totality is in fact a process, and hence it would be an 'it' (or a sort of 'it') in that sense. Naturally, the answer to these (and other) questions concerning this mysterious entity/process (the "Totality") will have to be put to one side until DM-advocates tell us (if ever) what (if anything) they think 'it' is.
[They might find a few useful ideas (consistent with much else in DM) here.]
Despite this, it could be further objected that abstract reasoning like this demonstrates nothing since DM is concerned with verifiable, concrete material contradictions, which occur in the real world. That response is examined here and here.
18. Naturally, this assumes that these relations are symmetrical -- that is, that AR = RA, which seems reasonable enough. Another simplifying assumption is that these forces are binary systems -- that is, the discussion in this Essay concentrates exclusively on force-couples. It is reasonably clear, I take it, that this contraction does not materially affect the conclusions drawn. Anyway, further complications will be introduced and examined later.
In addition, most of the comments in this part of the Essay have been deliberately restricted to the use of DM-terminology, the employment of which does not imply I either accept its validity or that it even makes any sort of sense.
Naturally, a comprehensive scientific account of the concept of force would have to include modern ideas about gravity, the strong nuclear, weak and electroweak forces, etc. [As I noted earlier, forces are now explicated by means a reference to exchange particles.]
However, it is possible that as science develops reference to forces (even in school Physics) will progressively disappear; cf., Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi (quoted earlier). In that eventuality, if DM-theorists maintain their adherence to the doctrine that forces give 'contradictions' a material grounding of some sort, their theory would become 'unscientific' by default. Either that, or they will have to abandon talk about the 'objective' nature of forces and join with Engels in regarding them as shorthand for relative motion. Of course, forces would then not just be "useful fictions", they'd be useless fictitious.
Should this scientific development fail to materialise (i.e., the editing out of all forces from nature), it would be interesting to see how DM-theorists might try to harmonise their attraction/repulsion scenario with successful attempts to unify the four fundamental forces in a Grand Unification Theory (or even in Superstring/M Theory, etc.). It might finally kill-off informed talk in DM-circles about the existence of 'contradictory' forces in nature.
Clearly, if there is only one force, it can hardly 'contradict' itself.
19. This is, of course, to adopt the vocabulary of Classical Physics.
[However, no inference should be drawn from this about the present author's views concerning the 'ontological' status of forces. As noted elsewhere, this terminology is only being employed here in order to expose the confusions that abound in DM. It is up to scientists to tell us what the world contains, not Philosophers --, and definitely not RL.]
Nevertheless, with respect to the comments in the main body of this Essay, it is assumed that R-forces prevent the collapse of accumulated matter into a 'singularity' under the action of local AA-force couples. [However, if the gravitational field is strong enough, this will happen. Physicists get around this fatal flaw in their theory with a handful of ad hoc mathematical dodges. That alone suggests these theories are incomplete.]
Clearly, this just complicates the point, without altering it. In such a scenario, we would have an ARA-system-of-forces, which would be even more difficult to interpret as 'contradictory'. As pointed out in the main body of this Essay, the meaning of the word "opposite" would have to be altered so that systems of forces could have any number of 'opposites'. If so, such 'contradictions' would be artefacts of an arbitrary choice of words, not 'objective' realities. [Moreover, if the DM-theory of change is to survive, there has to be only one 'opposite', and that 'opposite' has to be dialectically-, not accidentally-related to its own 'opposite', too. On that, see here.]
Moreover, and once again, given the classical picture, motion itself is in fact altered by the operation of a single resultant force. This is even more difficult to square with the idea that forces are 'contradictions'. [More on this later, too.]
20. This simple picture is, of course, ruined by the complexities found in nature. However, the more complications there are, the less applicable DM-concepts seem to be. In this case, we would have here an RARA-system-of-forces. Again, a choice would now have to be made whether we should widen the meaning of the word "opposite" to accommodate DM, or change DM in order to accommodate reality. [To date, DM-theorists have generally preferred the former over the latter.]
Since AR-forces are discussed below, I will postpone comment on them until then.
21. This need not be as serious a problem as is indicated in the main body of this Essay. As pointed out elsewhere, scientists do this sort of thing all the time. Unfortunately, this is bad news for DM since it confirms the view that science is a conventionalised social practice, and further substantiates the claim made here that metaphysical theses arise from a misconstrual of conventionalised linguistic forms as if they were fundamental aspects of reality. In short, the conventions we use to represent the world are confused with material truths about it.
This is about as crass an error as, say, an assumption that reality itself must have an edge to it simply because every photograph or painting has one.
[This topic is examined in detail In Essay Twelve Part One. and in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
21a. Or, perhaps even:
(3) This way of looking at the world is as crazy as it looks!
[This is examined more extensively in the Essay Eight Part Three.]
22. It might be felt that this Essay is so heavily biased against any way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions' that scientific facts and theories are continually being twisted or slanted prejudicially against DM -- this latest allegation being just another example. Surely -- it could be argued -- accelerated motion in the real world is the result of several forces operating on a body; the ensuing motion simply follows as their oppositional effect.
This volunteered response will be examined presently in the main body of this Essay.
23. Once more, it could be objected that there is no such thing as "empty space". But even if this were so, and the objects referred to in the main body of this Essay were not situated in the said force field, any forces present would still not operate on each other, but only on any bodies in that system (if there were any). Hence, forces seem to affect bodies not each other. See Note 24, too, on this.
24. It could be argued that force fields do in fact interact, and they certainly alter one another. That, too, will be examined presently.
This is, of course, the source of the classical 'ontological problem' concerning the exact nature of forces, and it is partly why it is so difficult to understand their nature. Indeed, the detection of forces seems to depend only on the effects they have on bodies, or on instruments (or, rather, a 'force' seems to be little more than the way scientists depict or measure certain relationships between bodies -- as Engels, in a more sober mood, pointed out; on this, see Note 4) -- or on other fields.
However, if forces are viewed as particulate (that is, if certain particles are viewed as the 'bearers' of forces), this problem will simply reappear at a lower level, and we would be no further forward -- a fact Leibniz was, I think, among the first to recognise. [On that, see here, here, here and here.]
Hence, this sort of confrontation between forces could only take place if they were particulate in some way -- that is, if they registered some sort of resistance to one another (i.e., if they are impenetrable to some extent). If, on the other hand, they aren't particulate, it is hard to see how they could interact in any way, let alone 'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no impenetrability that enables them to exert forces of any sort (except, of course, as part of a figurative extension of particulate interaction, after all).
[This has been questioned in Smith (2007). More on that presently.]
But, there are well-known classical problems associated with the idea that forces are particulate (these are referenced here) -- not the least of which is the observation that if forces were particulate then they could only interact if they exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of reaction, and so on, which hold them together and give them some sort of coherence), so that they could act on other particulates (and thus resist disintegration) -- initiating an infinite regress. That is, in order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another, we would need to appeal to yet more forces internal to bodies to stop, say, one body penetrating the other, or to prevent distortions tearing such bodies apart when they collide. But, if the forces internal to bodies are in turn also particulate (as it seems they must be), we would thus need further forces to account for the internal coherence of these new (and smaller) 'force-particles', and so on. Alternatively, if these 'internal forces' are continuous (i.e., non-particulate), they would be incapable of sustaining inner coherence (once again, since they would have no rigidity).
In the end nothing would be accounted for since at each level there would be nothing to provide the required resistance/coherence.
So, it seems that reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies explains nothing. It also implies that particles can't 'contradict' one another without exerting non-particulate forces on one another -- which would mean, once again, that such entities were incapable of exerting forces, having no rigidity to do so, etc., etc.
Unfortunately, even exchange particles (in QM) would succeed in exerting forces only if there were reaction forces internal to bodies that were themselves the result of rigidity, cohesion, contact (etc.), to stop the force carrier particle passing right through the target particle. Of course, physicists these days appeal to fields, energy gradients, Feynman diagrams, and the like (and reject such mechanistic notions), but if these fields and particles are continuous, too, the above problems simply re-emerge at a new level. On the other hand, if they are particulate, after all, this merry-go-round just takes another spin around the metaphysical dance floor.
[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]
Of course, it could be objected that the above adopts an out-dated mechanistic view of interaction, and is thus completely misguided. However, the 'modern' mathematical approach surrenders the possibility of giving a causal, or physical account of forces -- or, at least, an explanation that does not itself depend on a figurative use of the sort of verbs we employ in everyday life to give a material account of why things happen in the everyday world (such as "push", "move", "resist", "deflect", "interact", and the like).
So, if a particle is seen as a carrier of a force, and that force can be given no physical content, but is still regarded as being capable of making things happen, deflecting particles from their line of action (etc.), then the aforementioned verbs must themselves lose contact with the meaning of typographically identical everyday verbs when they are used to talk about macro-phenomena.
Now, there is no problem with this -- providing we are aware of it and don't make the mistake of interpreting such verbs literally or reading them in their everyday sense. Even so, such an account would only be merely descriptive, not explanatory. Differential Equations, Hamiltonians and vectors can't make anything move, or alter the path of a single particle. To be sure, we can describe such phenomena using mathematical language and concepts, thus enabling us to 'balance the books of nature', as it were. But, the downside here is that mathematical models can't explain why anything actually happens in the physical world. [Of course, this depends on what one means by "explanation". I will say more on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two. However, for more recent qualms in this area, see Note 30.]
Perhaps, this helps explain Engels's own suspicion of forces; ontologically, they appear to be deeply mysterious, if not animistic. He is not alone. [Other relevant aspects of the nature of forces are discussed here.]
Clued-in physicists seem already to be aware of this (i.e., that this presents problems with the language they use). Here is David Peat:
"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as Lee Smolin's The Trouble with Physics and Peter Woit's Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that string theory, the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use Stephen Hawking's words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.
"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.'
"At first sight that seems strange. What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result.
"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of 1925, when the young Werner Heisenberg worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values.
"Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.
"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts.
"This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.
"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist Michael Green a few years after he and John Schwartz published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory mainstream. Green remarked that when Einstein was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply in philosophy.
"In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.
"The American quantum theorist David Bohm embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably hindered.
"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role....
"Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat (2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
Now, I do not want to suggest for one moment that I agree with the above comments about the nature of language (or even about scientific language), but they certainly indicate that (some) leading scientists themselves are aware there's a problem.
[To be sure, Peat follows Bohm and suggests we need to learn from native American languages, which seem to have rather odd grammars; but it is to be wondered how a culture that has produced no science or technology of any note has much to teach one that has (in this regard).]
On this, see also Essay Eleven Part One.
25. Admittedly, when viewed as vectors, velocities, accelerations and forces can, in some circumstances, be represented as 'opposites', but this is given within vector algebra and follows from certain definitions. However, unless we are prepared to admit all the absurdities outlined earlier (arguing, for instance, that vectors 'struggle' among themselves) this approach can't lend any support to DM.
In addition, as will be argued below, mathematics can in no way be regarded as an abstraction from reality. And, of course, as noted above, most vectors are not opposites at all. Many augment, while many others operate at various angles to one another.
[In fact, this topic is connected with "real negations", a concept introduced by Kant. I will say more about this in Note 56 below. However, other issues related to this will be examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two. Finally, this is connected with the idea that change (in motion) is caused by resultant forces, discussed in more detail here.]
To be sure, when forces are represented as vectors they can produce accelerations that appear to 'oppose' impressed motion already in the system. Ignoring for the present the fact that the use of such language is arguably anthropomorphic, here we would be linking items drawn from the same category (i.e., vectors connected with movement), which clearly makes sense. In this way, forces could be replaced with relative accelerations (by means of Newton's Second Law, etc.). But, even then, an acceleration in an opposite direction does not oppose the original velocity; an acceleration (in vector algebra, which is what we are speaking of here!) just is a description of that changing velocity, it does not produce it or create it. Even in reality, accelerations are not disembodied beings that inhabit the material world, throwing their weight about, bullying velocities to do their bidding. They just are changing velocities --, no more, no less. And the latter, too, simply represent the rate of change in displacement.
However, in vector algebra no sense can be made of the addition (or subtraction) of force and velocity vectors, unless this is mediated by the Second Law (etc.), once more. Even then, the relation between acceleration and velocity vectors has to be established by well-known equations. The various physical quantities represented by these equations can only be linked by means of such translations, which set up analogies between categorically different items (but in a dimensionally consistent fashion). That is one reason why no sense can be given to 'equations' such as the following:
(1) F = -v
(2) a = kv
[Where "F" stands for "force", "v" for "final velocity", "a" for "acceleration", and "k" is a constant of proportionality.]
Equations like these would be regarded as dimensionally incoherent (unless further dimensions had been built into the 'constant' (but now variable) "k"). Compare these with the next set of examples:
(3) s = ut + ½at2
(4) a = -w2s
(5) F = -mw2s
[Where "s" represents displacement, "u" is the initial velocity, "t" is time, "w" is the angular speed, and "m" is the mass.]
In Classical Physics, by means of translational/analogical equations like these (or, perhaps to make the same point more clearly, by the use of algebraic rules that enable inferences involving physical quantities, in which forces appear as part of a "norm of representation"), we can convert forces into accelerations, compare magnitudes, and thus account for motion (etc.).
Unfortunately, this is of little help to DM-theorists, either, since the translation of forces into relative accelerations would mean that forces are indeed "useful fictions", once more, which would re-introduce all the difficulties noted earlier, and again, below.
[This is not a problem for the account presented here, for reasons expressed in the previous paragraph but one.]
However, even if the above comments are rejected for some reason, this would still lend little support to dialecticians, for such representations are not oppositional; they do not slug it out on the page, screen or whiteboard. And, manifestly, they don't turn into one another (as we are told they should by DM-classicists).
Hence, if two ('opposite') forces (F and G, inclined at θo to the x axis in R2, say) are in equilibrium and are resolved (into their i and j components), and then equated as follows:
|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ = 0
|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ = 0
no one would suppose (it is to be hoped!) that these symbols are locked in a life-or-death conflict, and will one day change into each other.
Naturally, the above conclusions are not affected in any way if these forces are not in equilibrium:
|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ > 0
|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ < 0
and/or: |F| sinθ - |G| sinθ > 0
|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ < 0
And it would be little use arguing that while it is true that the above representations may be lifeless (and thus incapable of struggling, and turning into one another), what they actually represent in the real world can, and do, struggle. That is because the above considerations were solely aimed at undermining the idea that the vector calculus is 'dialectical'. The allegedly 'dialectical' nature of forces in reality, represented by the above symbols, is an entirely separate claim, which is systematically demolished throughout the rest of this Part of Essay Eight (and here). [On the allegedly 'dialectical' nature of the 'Higher Mathematics' and/or the Calculus in general, see here.]
Readers may be puzzled by the use of the word "analogical" in an earlier paragraph. The use of this word is connected both with the history of the development of mathematical language in this area, and with the way we make sense of such equations. More particularly, this change in terminology sprang out of the reservations expressed by ancient Greek mathematicians over the relationship between so-called "incommensurables" (i.e., physical quantities from different categories, which could find no common noun or predicate that allowed them to be 'co-measured'), and how these difficulties were resolved by European mathematicians in the High Middle Ages. Following on the development of market economies in Feudal society, the artificial barriers between these categories were progressively eroded as new grammars ('concepts') were introduced by merchants and traders to help account for the economics of exchange of quantities drawn from different categories. Since these had to be co-measured (to balance the books), the mathematics was adjusted accordingly.
Hence, these new concepts were introduced by mathematicians and bankers (etc.) so that formerly incommensurable quantities could be compared analogically -- enabling, for example, the calculation of the exchange value of various commodities. As a spin-off, these conceptual innovations (when they were incorporated into the physics of the day) allowed theorists to move beyond earlier 'commonsense' approaches to motion encapsulated in Aristotelian Physics, enabling the foundations of modern mechanics to be laid.
This emphasis on the analogical nature of modern algebraic forms depicting motion follows from an approach to mathematical development that sees the latter as conditioned by contingent historico-economic factors, and which bases this exclusively on actual material and social relations. This view of mathematical innovation also helps undermine the idea that mathematics is concerned with 'abstractions' centred around the study of an Ideal world that supposedly exists anterior to the physical universe. It thus helps neutralise yet another core DM-thesis: that scientific development is predicated on the ability of theorists to 'abstract' certain concepts into existence. [Abstractionism has already been destructively analysed here and here.]
There is a detailed discussion of these issues in Hadden (1988, 1994), upon which much of the above is based. Hadden's pioneering work is only prevented from being Marxist classic by the absence of a clear account of the nature and role of language, and of the logic of analogical reasoning.
[However, in view of the fact that the logic of analogy has not advanced much since Aristotle's day (although it has proliferated extensively in detail), this is hardly Hadden's fault. On what has been achieved in this area, see White (2010). White's book is in fact a pioneering study, only slightly spoilt by the author's attempt to use his very clear insights to try to make sense of talk about 'god'.]
Hadden's conclusions are themselves a development of ideas found in Borkenau (1987), Fleck (1979) and Grossmann (1987). Cf., also Sohn-Rethel (1978).
Clagett (1959) contains many of the original medieval sources. See also Zilsel (2000), and the more detailed account in Kaye (1998).
In that case, the admission that forces can be edited out of the picture (so that relative acceleration and motion may be regarded as opposites) might succeed in winning this particular battle, but only at the cost of losing the war. Once again, that's because it would imply the universe was much more CAR-like than DM-theorists are prepared to admit. On this account, any reference to a DM-UO would be little more than a confusing way of referring to relative acceleration/velocity. The connection between events could then only be explicated in one of two ways:
(1) By an appeal to the topology of Spacetime, or:
(2) By a detailed analysis of the vector and scalar fields in which the said processes were taking place.
[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism/Reductionist; UO = Unity of Opposites.]
In either case, the connection between events/processes would not be governed by any sort of physical mediation between them (and/or the rest of the "Totality") -- as DM requires -- since, on this view, moving bodies (with or without opposite velocities (or accelerations)) would have no internal connection with any other bodies in motion.
At least an appeal to forces has the merit of appearing to supply a sort of mediating link between bodies in motion/change, which DM requires. Forces seem to be able to connect the latter in dialectical union -- but, of course, only because a literalist interpretation of forces like this depends on a prior endorsement of an animistic view of nature.
So, any attempt to edit forces out of the picture would result in the disappearance of the dialectical 'connective-tissue' of reality (as it were); and with that DM would become indistinguishable from the mechanical materialism (i.e., CAR) it sought to replace.
As noted in the main body of this Essay, DM-theorists require forces to be part of the ontological fabric of the universe (which is why they become rather defensive, if not emotional, when the existence of forces is questioned -- except, even when they are told, they tend to ignore the fact that Engels did precisely this!). Their theory needs a world suffused with anthropomorphic concepts like these -- those that are themselves the result of the fetishisation of the products of social interaction as if they were real objects/processes in nature. This is, of course, just another poisonous spin-off of the alleged 'inversion' of Hegelian AIDS.
[Why that is so was explained here, here, here and here.]
Hence, whether DM-fans acknowledge it or not, the language they use suggests that objects/processes in nature are quasi-intelligent, and engaged in what can only be described as some sort of mystical conversation/shouting match with other objects/processes, as they 'contradict' and 'negate' one another.
[AIDS = Absolute Idealism; DN = Dialectics of Nature.]
As has already been pointed out, in parts of DN, Engels pictured motion in dynamic terms, portraying it as simply the transfer of energy. [Engels (1954), pp.69-102.] This seems to connect his comments with more recent theories of motion, depicted by the use of vector and/or scalar fields, or even with the laws of Thermodynamics -- or perhaps even with concepts derived from non-Euclidean Spacetime (where talk is no longer of forces) --, constructed a generation or so after he died. But, once again, such a re-write of DM would mean that familiar DM-concepts (such as "contradiction", "polar opposite", "UO", "internal relation", etc.) would become about as obsolete as "natural place", "substantial form", "accident" and "substance" are now --, notions that once featured heavily in ancient scientific/metaphysical theories.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, say, an energy gradient (depicted as a scalar field) could be interpreted as 'contradictory' in any way at all, even though gradients like this often feature in modern theories of motion. Well, no more perhaps than, say, a ladder should be regarded as contradictory if someone fell off of it.
Far worse: it is even more difficult to regard states of affairs involving vector and scalar fields, the geodesics of Spacetime -- or even the strings of Superstring Theory/M-theory -- as part of a material universe. If everything in nature is just a complex array of energy gradients, vector fields and differential curvatures in Spacetime -- spruced up with a few probability density functions -- there would seem to be no place left for anything that even looks remotely material. Given this 'modern' mathematical account of reality, matter itself becomes a "useless fiction", too, explanatory of nothing at all. Small wonder then that Lenin was highly suspicious of the Idealism implicit in the Physics of his day (even if he had no answer to it). [On that, see Essay Thirteen Part One.]
Quite apart from all this, the 'ontological status' of 'energy' itself is highly problematic -- and this situation is unlikely ever to change. [On that, see here.] Energetics is thus no friend of DM/'Materialist Dialectics'.
Of course, in DM-writings, a clear definition of "matter" is about as easy to find as duck's tooth -- as we will also see in Essay Thirteen Part One.
26. Those who still think that forces can oppose motion, and therefore contradict it, should consult the arguments constructed in Note 25 above, and presently in the main body of this Essay, where this idea is laid to rest.
However, it is worth pointing out that if such individuals were correct, the idea that forces 'contradict' one another will have already gone out of the non-dialectical window. Plainly, if forces oppose motion, they can't oppose each other. [Unless, of course, we agree with Engels that "force" should be replaced by "relative motion".]
27. In which case, it might be wondered whether only those bodies that approach each other along the same line of action (wherein the angle between their trajectories is 180°), or which operate in a force field (where the lines of action of that field are similarly orientated at 180°) are to be counted as opposites.
If not, will any angle (other than 90 degrees) do? Plainly, since forces and velocities are vectors, they can be resolved to get around this difficulty.
Even so, any solution sought along these lines would clearly be conventional, since the components of vectors do not exist in nature in any meaningful sense; they are just calculating devices that help us make sense of motion. On this see Note 24 and Note 25 above, and Note 30, below.
28. Anyone who thinks that the vector calculus is a description of reality would be suffering from the same sort of confusion as someone who thought that the weather, say, is just the wavy lines and/or tangent fields on a map (which show, for example, wind direction and speed), because the weather forecast on TV uses them. [On this see Note 25, above and Note 40, below.]
29. This section of the Essay might be dismissed as just one more unsympathetic reading of yet another artificially-manufactured set of DM-theses. Perhaps so, but the reader will find that dialecticians themselves consistently fail to examine their own theory in anything like the detail attempted here, despite the fact that DM/'Materialist Dialectics' is supposed to represent the best, if not the very epitome of scientific thought. The present Essay, in contrast, has endeavoured to set-out in more detail than has ever been attempted before the implications of this particular DM-thesis; as such, it ventures into entirely unexplored territory. Hence, it is impossible to say whether or not this misrepresents DM -- indeed, dialecticians themselves would be hard-pressed to decide among themselves whether or not this is the case. For one thing, they can't even decide what matter is! [As Essay Thirteen Part One seeks to show, their 'materialism' is rather like Hamlet without the Prince!]
In addition, it is worth pointing out yet again that F2 was motivated by the idea that forces contradict impressed motion. Unfortunately, since change in motion is the consequence of just one resultant force (when analysed classically), the alleged 'contradiction' between two forces simply disappears.
F2: A UO involves the opposition between a force P1 and the impressed motion that another force or set of forces, Q, has produced (or would have produced) in a body B (had P1 never existed). The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this struggle.
It would take an especially alert and eagle-eyed dialectician, therefore, to spot 'contradictory' forces in a system where there is only one force responsible for the said change in motion!
Worse still, F2 postulates a 'contradiction' between a force and the motion that is (or might be) produced as the counterfactual result of the action of other forces, but since some or all of the latter's effects won't have been actualised (having been prevented from occurring by P1), the alleged 'contradiction' here contains only one real term.
Even the most avid DM-fan might find it difficult to visualise (let alone explain) a 'contradiction' between something that is real and something that is unreal (in that it never existed, and was prevented from existing): i.e., the motion that would have occurred if the impeding force P1 above had not acted.
30. Admittedly, some vectors are invariant under certain transformations, but the physical interpretation of the operation of forces is not a given; it is set by convention.
On this, cf., Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976).
[Ellis (1976) was written in response to Hunt and Suchting (1969). See also Hanson (1965a, 1965b), and Jammer (1999).]
Mysteriously, however, Ellis has backtracked on his earlier views (for what appear to be instrumentalist reasons); cf., Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter (1988), and the response to this in Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi.
The difficulty with finding a physical analogue for a vector space (and worse: for any tensor extension to it) is examined in Cartwright (1983), pp.54-73; see also Hesse (1961). A recent challenge has been mounted to this way of seeing forces, in Jones (2007); on this see Note 6a.
31. On this, see Note 24, Note25 and Note 30 above.
32. This was discussed in more detail in the sections devoted to something I have called the Dialecticians' Dilemma. See also here.
33. On this, see, for example, here.
So, either: (1) there is no limit toward which knowledge is converging, (2) it must be the case that as knowledge advances, external reality alters accordingly, or (3) it is now true to say that, in the limit, the world contains no contradictions at all.
Plainly, unless we are Idealists, (2) can't be true. We are not to suppose (it is to be hoped!) that our knowledge of the world alters the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly power the whole of reality, so that as the former grows the latter slowly disappear. But if not, then as (3 puts it, it must now be true that absolute knowledge of the world (even if we never attain to it) implies that nature is not contradictory. A complete knowledge of reality will have removed all the contradictions from our thought. It doesn't matter if we will never reach this blessed state, the very possibility of complete knowledge means that nature itself must be a contradiction-free zone. [However, on that see here.]
Of course, it may be incorrect to assume that dialecticians believe that as science advances all contradictions will be resolved -- even though it isn't easy to see how they could consistently deny this. Faced with a new contradiction -- and if they are committed to the view that science can only advance if it overcomes/resolves contradictions in knowledge -- dialecticians must believe it can be resolved. Otherwise they will have to admit that science can't advance beyond a certain point. But they deny this, too. In that case, they must either believe that (4) there is no limit to scientific advance or that (5) there is a limit to it (perhaps because there are irresolvable contradictions in nature). But, if they also believe that there is no limit to scientific advance, then they must believe both that (6) there is no limit to scientific advance and (7) there is a limit. But, the combination of (6) and (7) is itself a contradiction, and it lies right at the heart of DM (if this line of reasoning is correct). Of course, this means that DM itself can only advance if this contradiction is resolved. Hence, either (8) DM can't advance or (9) dialecticians must hold that all contradictions are resolvable.
But, if that is the case, there are no objective 'contradictions' in reality.
So, in terms of DM's own theses, it would seem that nature can't be fundamentally contradictory!
Again, the only apparent way of avoiding this dilemma (that is, in the form in which it appears here, at least) is to deny either that (A) Science advances by resolving all contradictions, or that (B) Absolute Truth 'exists'.
However, the denial of option (A) would mean that there is a non-Absolute limit to knowledge, after all. In which case, the DM-thesis that human knowledge is unlimited would have to be abandoned. It would also leave dialecticians with no way of being able to decide which of the allegedly irresolvable contradictions their theory throws up is an 'objective' feature of reality or the by-product of their own imperfect theory, which could be resolved if only we had more knowledge. Nature does not label them for us!
The rejection of (B) would introduce other intractable problems since it would remove the limit toward which DM-fans suppose human knowledge is progressing, and with that would go the idea that there is an 'objective' reality (out there) for us to know (even if we never fully attain to it).
Naturally, these observations take into account the fact that the universe might be 'infinite' (a view held by some DM-theorists) and constantly changing. But, neither factor affects the idea that there must now be a set of truths (possibly infinite) about reality toward which human knowledge is asymptotically converging (even if that set itself grows over time) -- that is, if Engels and Lenin are correct when they said:
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35.]
"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them (sic), the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept (sic) and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), p.457.]
"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object." [Lenin (1961), p.195.]
"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -– provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Ibid., p.171. Emphases in the original.]
Of course, if there is no such set, no such limit, then Engels's metaphor is defective, and Lenin was mistaken -- there is no 'objective truth'.
However, in this regard, Woods and Grant quote a revealing passage from DN:
"The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and that consequently too in the final analysis they can't be in contradiction to one another in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.349; quoting this source.]
To be sure, the above passage was not included in the 'official' version of AD, but it suggests strongly that Engels believed that the 'objective' world must be free from contradictions, or at least free from contradiction with, or in, our thoughts about nature --, the latter of which views, it must be admitted, it is impossible to distinguish from the former.
So, to take just one example: if any randomly-selected dialectician were to think that motion is 'contradictory', then that subjective thought can't itself be in contradiction with 'objective' reality (and thus with 'objective' thought, one presumes, even if this blessed state is never attained). And yet, if our knowledge is to advance, even this 'contradiction' (i.e., the alleged 'contradiction' in motion) must resolved, and thus removed. After all, it too might be one that we could resolve if only we knew more or we tried harder.
[But, as we saw in Essay Five, it isn't even a contradiction!]
Naturally, that doesn't commit Engels to the view that reality is in the limit a contradiction-free zone, but if science can only advance by resolving contradictions in our subjective theories (so that they become progressively more 'objective'), the conclusion (given above) seems inescapable: In the limit, human knowledge of the world must picture nature as progressively, if not totally, free from contradictions.
However, in the absence of any clear indication from Engels that he genuinely believed this, little more can be asserted here with any confidence.
One suspects that because the DM-classics are silent on this topic, modern-day dialecticians will not be able to decide among themselves on this -- without being branded 'Revisionists', sparking perhaps yet another dialectical dog fight.
34. As noted above, it is entirely possible that this isn't what DM-fans really mean by 'contradictory forces'; but then again it's equally doubtful whether they have ever subjected their own theory to this level of scrutiny so that they're in a position to accept or reject this interpretation. Hence, as things now stand it would be pointless asking a DM-adept for an answer to this question.
[And good luck with that one! Personal experience suggests that anyone foolish enough to ask a DM-fan to devote even so much as one second to this topic will face no little personal abuse, misrepresentation, and scatological hostility, at best. (Here's just the latest example.)
Compare this slipshod attitude with the care and attention, and the level of detail entered into, when Marxists analyse concepts drawn from HM, such as the forces and relations of production, ideology or the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.]
35. It is worth repeating here that these assertions are aimed neither at affirming nor denying the truth of DM-theorists' claims about the Totality, or its supposedly 'contradictory' parts, since both options are metaphysical. [The reasons for saying that will take up most of Essay Twelve Part One, and Essay Eleven Parts One and Two.] As pointed out earlier, the intention here is simply to make patent the latent non-sense they contain.
Moreover, an appeal to 'relative truth' would be of little help, either; surprising as it might seem, that notion was (inadvertently) torpedoed by Lenin.
36. As we saw earlier, these 'difficulties' revolve around the question whether it is a force's effects, the relative motion between objects, or the interrelationship between bodies, which are supposed to be 'contradictory'.
37. This is so on Hegelian/Aristotelian grounds.
So, even though male and female, hot and cold are 'opposites', a male dog is not the opposite of a female flower, and a hot forehead is not the opposite of a cold furnace. Such contrasts can only work as opposites if they apply to the same substantival. Hence, on this view, a male dog would be the opposite of a female dog, a hot furnace the opposite of a cold one, and so on. Logical connections of this sort are essential if these opposites are to count as 'interpenetrated'. Or, so the story goes... [On substantivals, see here.]
Naturally, this undermines much of what dialecticians themselves say about UOs; but since this ground was covered in Essay Seven, no more will be said about it here.
38. Here we appear to have another ironic, "dialectical inversion"; in this case, the said forces would not 'contradict', they'd augment, one another -- even though they are still supposed to be 'opposites'. Perhaps then we should call such ensembles "dialectical tautologies"?
On that basis, therefore, we might be able to construct an entirely new -- and, it must be admitted, wholly insincere -- theory of universal harmony. This is especially so if we recall that forces naturally combine to form resultants, and opposites more often than not attract rather than repel (on this, see Note 40 and here), both of which phenomena are connected with motion and change. As a result of such an 'inversion' -- putting DM 'back on its heels', as it were -- change could then be seen as an expression of cooperation, not conflict. And, we could even re-introduce the idea of an 'imminent deity' (a suitable -- but equally obscure -- analogue of the DM-'Totality') to give this novel theory the unity and cohesion it requires, claiming all the while that these ideas have not been imposed on nature, merely read from it.
Since this 'theory' is based on a more realistic appraisal of the interplay between forces, who could object? We could even call this 'theory' "Anihalectics" (in that it eliminates dialectics). Any subsequent 'contradictions' implied by this 'theory' could, of course, be Nixoned away, along classic DM-lines.
[We could even declare, with equal pomposity, that anyone who disagrees with this new theory just does not "understand" Anihalectics, ending all discussion.]
On the positive side, this 'theory' enjoys much more evidential support than the average DM-thesis does (given that resultant forces govern every example of change in motion in the entire universe, so far as we know).
On the negative side, however, this 'theory' means that class collaboration and harmony will usher in the 'revolution'. [We saw that this was an implication of DM, anyway, here and here.]
Anyone critical of the above (wholly insincere, fanciful and off-the-wall) 'theory' should now direct an equally censorious finger toward DM/'Materialist Dialectics', and for the same reason.
39. Even so, and once again, howsoever it is imagined that forces actually do combine, change is not initiated by contradictory forces, but by the above (annoyingly 'harmonious') resultants.
40. Engels himself regarded the two poles of a magnet as a clear example of the unity of AR-opposites in nature (something else he lifted from Hegel, and which has been parroted down the ages by countless 'highly original' DM-clones). [Cf., Engels (1954), p.72, and Hegel.]
[AR = Attraction and Repulsion.]
The alleged 'unity' in this case appears to revolve around the fact that the North and South poles of a magnet can't exist independently of each other, and their 'opposite' nature is shown by the affect they have on bodies and upon each other.
[Of course, if the legendary magnetic monopole is ever discovered (as it seems it has been!), this classic DM-example will go the same way as the crystalline spheres.]
However, upon closer examination, it is clear that the relationship between the poles of a magnet is in fact an example of an AA- and/or RR-, but not AR-opposite. That is because in this case, non-opposites, or like poles, repel each other (i.e., two Norths or two Souths). On the other hand, opposites attract (i.e., a North and a South). Consequently, in the way that these poles inter-relate, magnets are in fact AA- or RR-type forces. A moment's thought will confirm this: since when do magnets attract and repel one another at the same time?
In that case, it now turns out that the magnet is hardly a paradigm example of an AR-force -- united in opposition --, as DM-lore would have us believe.
Mysteriously, DM-theorists en masse have failed to notice this serious flaw in one of their key examples.
So much for the claim that DM-theses have been read from -- but not projected onto -- the facts.
[Incidentally, the same comments apply to electrical, and thus sub-atomic, phenomena in general (like charges repel, unlike charges attract). This means that much of the (sub-atomic) dialectical 'evidence' in, say, Woods and Grant (1995) is seriously misguided. More on this in Essay Seven Part Two (when it is published).]
It could be objected to this that, while it might be true that two unlike poles are examples of an AA-force type, their continued motion toward one another will be prevented at some point by structural forces within the magnets themselves, and these force couples would operate in an AR-manner. In that case, R-forces operating between approaching atoms of the material from which the magnets are made will prevent these opposite poles closing in on one another, counteracting the A-forces that brought them together. This therefore implies that the relation between the poles of a magnet is indeed that of an AR-couple -- or, so an objector might claim.
Even so, this means that, as magnetic opposites, these poles would still not be AR-UOs. To be sure, other forces might come into play, but that does not affect that salient point. In which case, these new forces and magnetic forces wouldn't be opposites of the same Aristotelian/Hegelian type (as noted above).
Despite this, the above objection would reduce the oppositional relationship between the forces originating in these magnets to the effect that these poles had on motion (since the latter manifestly these opposite forces do not affect each other, only the relative motion induced by each force). Hence, the two poles would not be inter-related directly to each other as opposite AR-forces; they would just oppose any motion that either or both of them had induced in the system. We have already had occasion to dismiss this view as inimical to DM.
In which case, the inter-atomic forces governing the operation of AA-, RR-, or even AR-couples, actually oppose, limit or augment whatever motion is already present in the system -- or they restrict the freedom of bodies to move once set in motion. But, they still do not seem to oppose each other as force upon force. Again, this is probably one reason why Engels toyed with a positivistic re-interpretation of forces (in DN, as pointed out above in Note 4), since no physical sense can be given to any such relation between forces (as was also noted earlier) -- that is, over and above seeing it as an obscure way of attempting to depict the relative motion between bodies.
Of course, it could be argued that the force field of each pole does in fact affect that of the other; so the above claims are incorrect. But, these force fields are merely the expression of the motion of, or the motion induced in, measuring instruments (or, indeed, in scattered iron filings) placed near the said poles, so the above claims are not incorrect. Such forces are, as Engels argued, a shorthand for relative motion.
On the other hand, if by "force field" we mean the mathematical objects of theory, they can't affect one another, for they are not material. [This was discussed in more detail in Note 25, and will be again, below.]
Anyway, the nature of the UO here clearly depends on what is meant by the terms "opposite" and "unity". North and South poles are not united in the sense that they are one (as DM-theorists would be the first to point out), they are connected in the sense that they 'depend' on each other. But, this 'dependence' is causal not logical; magnetic properties are the result of the vector configuration of the 'motion' and 'spin' of certain electrons. There is nothing in nature that logically forces this interrelation on these poles. Indeed, the idea that such a configuration represents a UO is misguided, since the 'forces' involved are the consequence of a vector field, which is no more 'contradictory' than your front and back are. [And, as we have already seen, it isn't easy to see how vectors can be regarded as 'contradictions' (or, indeed, as UOs).]
Moreover, in ferromagnetic substances, the magnetic field is built up by the cooperative alignment of individual magnetic moments (perhaps illustrating the fundamentally cooperative nature of reality once again, created by those helpful 'dialectical tautologies' we met earlier).
Certainly, given Engels's use of the term "force" (whether interpreted realistically, or positivistically as a "useful fiction"), this is a rather poor example of a UO, anyway; it is consequent upon a particular sort of mathematical analysis (i.e., it is based on the alignment of electrons, which orient the vector field that aligns the direction of the magnetic field). Calling this a UO would be to substitute an obscure metaphor in the place of a clear mathematical description, for no extra explanatory gain.
[Of course, there is no UO here anyway, since the field in question is the result of one sort of particle, the electron, which is a single charged elementary object (or wave?) that is not itself a UO. (This has already been commented upon here.)]
Naturally, this deflationary approach will satisfy few DM-fans since it depends on a non-standard view of the nature of mathematical 'objects' (i.e., vectors, matrices, manifolds, dimensions, abstract spaces, etc.). In opposition to this, it could be argued that mathematics in fact represents what is really out there in the world, since it has been abstracted from nature by human beings as part of their practical activity. This means that mathematics presents us with an 'abstract' reflection of reality.
[Chapter 16 of Woods and Grant (1995) contains a classic (but nonetheless confused) version of this idea. Because of its influence, I will be devoting a special Essay to this book, which will be posted at this site (as Essay Seven Part Two) in the next year or so.]
However, this interpretation of mathematics is seriously mistaken. Mathematics can't be a description of the world (nor an 'abstraction' from it) for reasons rehearsed in Essay Three Parts One and Two, and in Essay Thirteen Part One. Mathematics is based on systems of concepts that are not causally linked. Nor do the concepts that mathematicians construct exercise any sort of causal influence on material bodies (nor do they 'correspond' to anything in reality that could conceivably so behave) -- unlike other material bodies/processes that can and do. [On that, see here and here.]
Mathematical propositions and theorems yield neither an abstract nor a concrete picture of reality. That is because they aren't pictures to begin with, nor can they be. They express rules for the manipulation of certain symbols that licence inferences we make about objects and processes in nature. At best, they set up complex analogies that assist in our understanding of objects, events and processes in the material world.
The development of Field Theory since Maxwell's day does not alter this picture in any way at all. Vector and scalar fields are mathematical structures that not only enable scientists to model nature, they assist in the derivation and interpretation of the empirical consequences of their hypotheses. To imagine otherwise (i.e., to suppose that mathematics is an abstract description/picture of the world) would reduce its structures to absurdity. For example, it would imply that, say, a vector field -- in reality -- is actually composed of a set of infinitely thin and infinitely strong wire-like curves, or curve segments (of mysterious composition and provenance), but which are not actually made of anything. Or, that a scalar field is actually an invisible array of real numbers 'floating' in (abstract?) space -- or, worse still, that it is an infinite n-dimensional set of dimensionless connected, dense but disjoint points --, and so on.
We might picture, say, a mathematical point as a infinitely small dot if that helps us make appropriate inferences, but a dot has a shape (circular to normal vision, irregular under a microscope); but no mathematical dot has a shape, circumference, radius, or centre. What then can a mathematical point possibly share with anything in the universe? What could mathematical points, lines or surfaces be abstracted from, or be a generalisation of, if they share absolutely nothing with material points, lines, and surfaces?
Of course, at this point (no pun intended), abstractionists go rather quiet. They have in fact nothing to work with. If abstractionism were true, no two mathematicians would or could agree with one another; indeed, they could dispense with all those useless definitions, theorems, lemmas and proofs, and just brain scan one another.
[On Maxwell, cf., Buchwald (1985); on mathematics as it features in Physics, see Morrison (2000), pp.62-108. In addition, the last chapter of Harré and Madden (1976) is also relevant.
Other literature on this topic was listed here. In addition to the links posted above, more will be said about the nature of mathematics and 'mathematical objects' in later Essays (for example, here). See also here.]
41. This could be regarded as a serious interpretive error -- given the fact that change is central to DM. But, the point being made in the main body of this Essay is specifically targeted at the DM-notion that all change is a consequence of the interplay between polar opposites. Clearly, if these alleged polar opposites can combine in some way to augment one another, the term "opposite" can't fail to lose its dialectical bite. If change can occur as a result of 'opposites' that do not really work as 'opposites' (still less as "polar" opposites) then this particular dialectical 'law' stands in some danger of violating a dialectical equivalent of the metaphysical Trades Description Act.
If this picture is now extended to take in HM, and if, for example, we consider the operation of "opposing" forces in the class struggle, it isn't easy to see how, say, one social force could switch around in the way that forces in nature can. Is it possible, therefore, for the capitalist class to swap sides in the class struggle (as a class force -- not as individual members of that class) to augment workers' battles in the latter's interests and on their terms? Admittedly, the detailed structure of -- and processes within -- the class war are complex; elements from each side may detach themselves (or be detached), and can work against their own (misperceived) class interests (on a temporary or even semi-permanent basis), but that is not something upon which revolutionaries can or should rely -- still less ought they to trust in its outcome. If they did, it would clearly encourage reformism and centrism (let alone court defeat). Even at the margin (where whole class forces are not involved), switches are sporadic.
But, such things occur all the time in nature. Hence, this crude analogy relating opposite forces to 'contradictions' lifted from DM is useless, at best, when applied in HM.
42. It is worth recalling here how Stalinists used to 'justify' the frequent changes in tactics in the 1930s on the basis that this was a 'dialectical' requirement (nay, virtue). Hence, a 'dialectical' pact with Hitler made eminent good sense. Not only that, but anyone who disagreed with this randomly applied, chaotic logic clearly showed they did not "understand" dialectics. The above treaty was as good an example of a UO as one could wish to find. Who could complain -- except those with "bourgeois" prejudices motivated by an antiquated reliance on FL? [On this topic in general, see Essay Nine Part Two.]
[Well, perhaps only those without an excessive "tenderness" toward pacts with Nazis!]
All manner of similarly incongruous and counter-revolutionary 'opposites' have be justified by this theory. [For instance, John Rees attempted to justify the "united front of a special kind" that the UK-SWP ventured into a few years back using the UO argument.] That is because DM so contradictory it can sanction any conclusion whatsoever, no matter how contradictory it might appear to be, and its opposite (and this is often by the same individual or party). Hence, it is of great use to opportunists and sectarians alike. [Details can be found in Essay Nine Part Two and Essay Ten Part One.]
43. Is this a second 'dialectical tautology'?
44. This insurmountable obstacle blocks the path of all forms of Metaphysical Realism; this isn't just a problem for DM-theorists. More on that in Essay Twelve Part One and Essay Thirteen Part Two (when it is published).
45. Admittedly, this could be a complete distortion of DM, but, as we have seen many times (in earlier Essays), over the last hundred years or so dialecticians have been so preoccupied with an almost word-for-word repetition of DM-theses that have been handed down to them by the dialectical classicists that they have neglected to think about their content with any care, depth or clarity.
However, there is very little in classical DM-texts to help dialecticians themselves in this regard, so even they would be hard-pressed deciding whether or not this analysis represents a distortion.
Once again, DM-apologists are invited to produce their own clear account of the precise nature of the link between forces and 'contradictions' -- making this part of DM/'Materialist Dialectics' perspicuous for the very first time in its history.
Neutral bystanders won't, however, be holding their breath...
46. Of course, this initial attempt at clarification is unclear itself. We should normally want to distinguish the opposition between force P1 and P2 from that between events E1 and E2, or indeed any combination of all four. These sorts of complications will be examined in what follows (in fact, some of them were analysed earlier).
47. Admittedly, this qualification runs foul of the idea that everything in the Totality is interrelated, but we can avoid that consequence by modifying the stated condition to "relative independence". Naturally, this would mean that several other comments in the text (originally aimed at trying to make this part of dialectics clear) would become vague by default. However, as will readily be appreciated, a 'theory' like this -- beset as it is by an internally generated fog, a condition further aggravated by its supporters who insist on lobbing metaphysical smoke bombs at it -- will always resist attempts to dispel the Stygian gloom in which it is permanently engulfed.
48. I have omitted representing E1 and E2 propositionally since I want to concentrate on real material opposites, rather than their linguistic correlates.
Nevertheless, it is worth recalling, once again, that in FL two contradictory propositions can't both be true at once and can't both be false at once. One implication of this is that the claim that two allegedly contradictory states of affairs could both exist at the same time (expressed by two supposedly true 'contradictory' propositions) must rest either on a mis-description, or on an un-discharged ambiguity --, and, of course, on the projection of logical categories onto nature. This was analysed in more detail in an earlier section, in Essay Five, and will be examined again in Note 67 and Essay Eight Part Three.
49. Of course, this conclusion (that at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction would not actually exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented from occurring by the operation of either one of P1 or P2) depends on the odd Hegelian idea that contradictions somehow exist. If that doctrine is abandoned, then DM falls apart anyway.
F6: Let force P1 oppose force P2 in configuration C1 in nature.
F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).
F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.
F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.
However, it could be argued that the disjunction of the effects of P1 and P2 (as in "E1 or E2") distorts the picture somewhat. Indeed, it could be maintained that what is missing here is an account of how P2 interacts with E1, which interaction would be dialectical. [One variation of this theme will be considered presently in the main body of this Essay, others later on (for example, in Note 55).]
Indeed, what has not been taken account of in this Essay is the fact that the alterations induced in E1 by these interactions would mean that the theory that change comes about through contradictions (modelled by material forces) could still gain some sort of grip.
Hence, it could be argued that the contradiction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes, say, E1a. In that case, we would have real terms for the 'contradiction' to reflect, or to which it could refer, and thus we would have a concrete example of change through 'internal contradiction'.
Or, so it could be maintained.
But, plainly, this would only be the case because a decision has already been made to describe these forces as "contradictory", when it has not yet been established whether this is an accurate, or even an appropriate way to depict the relationship between them.
Nevertheless, and ignoring even this point, as has been underlined already, what actually happens here is that the resultant of these two forces produces the said change. If so, and once more, calling this a change motivated by a 'dialectical tautology' would be far more accurate. [This option and others are considered again below.]
Moreover, even if the DM-objection volunteered above were correct in some way -- wherein the interaction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes E1a --, this would be of little use to dialecticians. That is because, in this case, E1 itself will have been altered externally, and so change here would not have been the result of E1's own 'internal contradictions'.
Worse still, if this is to be the model for all DM-change, then no change at all could be 'internally-generated'. We saw this problem recur throughout Part One of this Essay, where no matter how we tried to re-package this theory, the result was always the same: if all things are "self-moving", then the universe must be populated either by eternally changeless simples, or by non-interacting systems. On the other hand, if systems of forces change the objects internal to that system, then, plainly, those objects can't be "self-moving". The volunteered response above simply reproduces this in a more abstract form.
Anyway, this 'difficulty' will be tackled presently in the main body of this Essay, and in more detail below (once again, in Note 55).
50. It could be objected that forces actually make things happen, as opposed to preventing them. But even then, this would happen because only one force 'wins out', as it were: the resultant. Furthermore, making something happen is even less easy to interpret as a 'contradiction' than opposing or preventing something is. In that case, once more, calling this a "tautology" would be more appropriate.
Anyway, the analysis in the main body of this Essay is based on the idea that one of P1 or P2 brings about own event set as opposed to initiating the other set. So, even here, such forces do "make things happen".
Finally, it is rather odd claiming in one breath that forces do not prevent things, and in the next asserting that forces oppose one another! [On this, see the next sub-section.]
51. The terminology used here is not what I should prefer, but tinkering with it will not make the conclusion any clearer. The following is, perhaps, a little more 'correct':
F16a: Anything that is prevented from occurring does not happen.
But, F16a is just a discursive tautology (although I should prefer to call it a "grammatical remark", since it expresses a linguistic convention, or a rule for the use of certain words).
52. It needs pointing out (once again!) that this 'new' account of the connection between forces and contradictions (given in the main body of this Essay) is only offered tentatively since DM-theorists are, once again, hopelessly unclear in this area.
53. The phrasing of F24 might be considered prejudicial -- F24a perhaps being preferable:
F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.
F24a: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.
This option will be considered presently, in the main body of the Essay (as F27).
54. We saw in the passages listed at the beginning of this Essay that several DM-authors regard disequilibria in nature and society as important as corresponding equilibria, and in need of explanation.
54a. To see this, compare it with the following:
S1: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the M1.
But, as a sufficient condition, S1 does not rule out S2 or S3:
S2: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the A1.
S3: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the M40.
Since there are many different ways to travel to most cities -- even though none of them is necessary, they could all be sufficient --, none is unique in this regard. So, S1-S3 are sufficient, but not necessary, conditions. If there were one and only one way to get to London, that would be a necessary condition. [Often these are accompanied by an "only if", etc. The Wikipedia article on this topic is not a model of clarity, however. The Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article is better, but much more complicated. This is perhaps the best article for those new to logic.]
The verb phrase "All things being equal" (also called a ceteris paribus clause) is required since it is assumed that other adventitious events do not prevent NN reaching her destination, such as a crash, a car breakdown, a phone call cancelling the trip, etc., etc. If this is allowed, then S1-S3 are sufficient conditions, otherwise they aren't -- simply travelling along a road does not guarantee you'll get to where you are going!
There are in fact suppressed ceteris paribus clauses in most of the attempts I have made to render this part of DM clear. I have left them out in order to reduce their complexity.
55. However, some may still object and claim that if a force prevents something coming into being/happening, it must have contradicted it.
Let us say, therefore, that:
T1: If event Ei, at time t, belonging to process A (normally comprising sub-events E1-En), is prevented from becoming Ei+1, at t+1 by force P, then Ei will have been contradicted by P.
Hence, it could be argued that in this sense it is clear that forces prevent the effects of other forces from being realised by contradicting certain events, stopping them from occurring.
But, even here, forces still don't 'contradict' one another (as force on force), they merely prevent the events 'controlled' by other forces from happening. So, this can't help us understand how forces actually 'contradict' each other.
Nevertheless, let us examine this objection in more detail so that every possibility is catered for.
Consider then the following:
T2: Let there be an event set E, consisting of sub-events E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force P not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
T3: Had these events carried on as 'normal', Ei would have been followed by Ei+1, but as things turned out, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented it.
T4: Hence, P contradicted Ei+1.
However, since Ei+1 never existed, it can't have been 'contradicted' by P (unless, once more, we assume that a force can 'contradict' non-existent objects, events and processes). Moreover, since P did not prevent Ei, it can't have 'contradicted' it, either.
We thus hit the same brick wall.
Consider now this variant on T3:
T5: P contradicted Ei by stopping it producing Ei+1.
But, this is no good either. That's because events are not like eggs, which produce other egg producers (i.e., chickens!). If so, events themselves can hardly be prevented from producing other events if they don't produce them in the first place.
In that case, perhaps the following revision will do:
T6: P contradicted Ei by stopping Ei+1 following on from Ei.
But, yet again, the alleged 'contradiction' amounts to the prevention of something that does not now exist (and never did). If forces can only 'contradict' something by preventing and/or stopping non-existent objects/process/events from taking place, then all the above problems still apply.
It could be argued that if the chain of events above is replaced by a series of causes and their effects, the contradiction will become obvious -- perhaps along these lines:
T7: Let there be an event set E, consisting of sub-events E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force P not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
T8: In the 'normal run of things', let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.
T9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.
T10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.
There are several problems with the above: (1) If this were the case, then DM-fans will have to drop their claim that forces contradict each other; (2) Force P and event Ei aren't 'internally related' -- how can a force be 'internally related' to an event? So, whatever else this is, it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction'; (3) Even if it were, P and event Ei would have to turn into one another, if the DM-classics are to be believed.
Imagine a more concrete scenario: a fire started by a match in some tinder dry grass in a forest. All things being equal, the resulting and growing conflagration will be maintained by (1) The organic material in the tinder dry grass, (2) The heat of the fire already burning and (3) The oxygen in the surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the grass with a fire broom before it grows too big, putting it out. Plainly the force of the blow from the fire broom deprived the conflagration of enough oxygen to quell the blaze. So, one cause (the supply of oxygen) was prevented by the force of the broom from further causing a series of damaging events. But, does the blow from the broom turn into the oxygen? Or, into the organic material comprising tinder dry grass? And yet, it ought to if the DM-classics are to be believed.
[Anyone interested can read the doomed attempts of one comrade to defend the DM-theory of change in the face of objections like these, here.]
However, the biggest problem with the above DM-volunteered response is filling in the details.
Consider also a match used to light a trail of gunpowder. The match sets off a series of chemical reactions that pass along that trail, each of which causes the next in line. Call this series of causes C1-Cn. Let us further imagine that some force (say, a violent thunder storm S, which either blows the trail of gunpowder away, or which drenches it with a downpour) stops this series of causes at the Ci-th stage, preventing the next event/cause, Ci+1, from happening.
In that case, could we not say that S contradicted Ci?
However, problems (1)-(3) above still apply -- which would involve, for example, a thunder storm turning into a chemical reaction in gunpowder, and vice versa!
In fact, the idea that causes necessitate their effects (whether or not the latter are causes themselves), upon which the above depends, is itself predicated upon an anthropomorphic view of nature. Since I consider this in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three, I will say no more about it here.
Exactly why this view of causation depends on necessitation is connected with the points raised in Essay Seven Part One (about Kant and Hegel's response to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation). There, it was demonstrated that in order to defuse Hume's attack, Hegel had to find a dialectical/logical, and therefore necessary link between a cause and its effects:
Hume had argued that there is no logical or conceptual connection between cause and effect. This struck right at the heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume was radically mistaken. Kant had attempted to provide a reply, but his solution banished causation into the Noumenon, about which we can know nothing. That was totally unacceptable to Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect. He found it in (1) Spinoza's claim that every determination is also a negation (which, by the way, neither theorist even attempted to justify), and (2) in his argument that the LOI stated negatively implied the LOC (which it doesn't).
Based on this, he was 'able' to argue that for any concept A,
"determinate
negation" implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A.
Now, this 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development in it, as
A
transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A, and this provided him with the
logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it
doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into --
not-A -- is logically connected with A and is a rational
consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that
for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it),
not-A, its 'internal opposite'. Hegel had to do this since
everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A
could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't have introduced this limiting factor.
From this, the "unity of opposites" was born. So, the link between cause and effect was now given by this 'logical' unity, and change was the result of the interaction between these logically-linked "opposites".
Plainly, this paired unique opposite, not-A, is essential to Hegel's theory, otherwise, he could provide no explanation why A should be followed by a unique not-A and not just any old not-A -- say, B, or, indeed, something else, C, for example.
Now, since B and C (and an indefinite number of other objects and processes) are all manifestly not-A, Hegel had to find some way of eliminating these, and all the rest, as candidates for the development of A, otherwise he would have no effective answer to Hume.
[Hume, of course, would not have denied that A changed into "what it is not", into not-A, he would merely have added that this can't provide the conceptual link that rationalists require unless all the other (potentially infinite) not-As could be ruled out in some way. He concluded that it is only a habit of the mind that prompts us to expect A to change into what we have always, or have in general, experienced before. There is no logical link, however, between A and what it changes into since there is no contradiction in supposing A to change into B or C, or indeed something else.]
Hence, Hegel introduced this unique "other" with which each object and process was conceptually linked -- a unique "other" that was internally connected with A --, something he claimed could be derived by 'determinate negation' from A. [How he in fact derived this "other" will be examined in Essay Twelve Part Five, but a DM-'explanation' -- and criticism of it -- can be found in Essay Eight Part Three.]
This special not-A was now this unique "other" of A. Without it his reply to Hume falls flat.
Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Marxist dialecticians) bought into this spurious 'logic' (possibly unaware of the above 'rationale'), and attempted to give it a 'materialist make-over'. And that's why this Hegelian theory (albeit "put back on its feet") is integral to classical DM; it supplied Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.
[There is a far better way to neutralise Hume's criticisms, and those of more recent Humeans, that doesn't make change impossible. More details will be given in Essay Three Part Five. Until then, the reader is directed toward Hacker (2007), and Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
And here is Lenin's acknowledgement of this principle:
"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Lenin (1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
"But the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentially contained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961), p.225, quoting Hegel (1999), pp.833-34, §1795. Emphases in the original.]
Lenin wrote in the margin:
"This is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961), p.225.]
It is worth quoting the whole passage from Hegel's Logic (much of which Lenin approvingly copied out in the above Notebooks -- pp.225-28):
"Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated -- contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists of such.
"Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simple determination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its predicate; for example, the finite is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgment it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form of the positive judgment, is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the negative judgment, would at least have to be added as well. In the judgment the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a proposition.
"The second determination, the negative or mediated, is at the same time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a relation or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself. Because the first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and consequently is also only implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in it the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgment, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation." [Hegel (1999), pp.833-35, §§1795-1798. Bold emphases alone added. I have used the on-line version here, correcting a few minor typos.]
The most relevant and important part of which is this:
"It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself." [Ibid. Bold emphases alone added.]
This "reflection", as Hegel elsewhere calls it, of the "other in its own self", a unique "other", provides the logical link Hegel required. Any other "other" would be "indifferent", and not the logical reflection he sought. It is from this that 'dialectical contradictions' arise, as Hegel notes. Hence, Lenin was absolutely right, this "other" is essential for "understanding" dialectics -- except he forgot to mention that dialectics is in fact incomprehensible and unworkable as a result!
In which case, any attempt to (1) Eliminate the idea that change results from a 'struggle of opposites', (2) Deny that things change into these 'opposites', or (3) Reject the idea that these 'opposites' are internally-related as one "other" to another specific "other", will leave DM-fans with no answer to Hume, and thus with no viable theory of change.
[For Hegel's comments on Hume, see Hegel (1995b), pp.369-75.]
So, Hegel's theory (coupled with the part-whole dialectic), was at least a theory of causation and of the course of history, and the above dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into DM. It allowed them to argue that, among other things, history isn't accidental -- i.e., it isn't just one thing after another -- it has a logic to it. Hence, Hegel's 'logical' theory enabled them to argue, for example, that capitalism must give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to nothing else. Hume's criticisms -- or, rather, more recent versions of them (which, combined with contemporary versions of Adam Smith's economic theory (Smith was a friend collaborator of Hume's) in essence feature in much of modern economic theory and philosophy, and thus in criticisms of Marx's economics and politics) -- are a direct threat to this idea. If these critics are right, we can't predict what the class struggle will produce. Or rather, if Hume is right, the course of history is contingent, not necessary, not "rational".
As far as I can tell, very few dialecticians have discussed this aspect of their theory. The only ones that seem to do this (that I have come across in over 25 years of looking) are Ruben (1979), Lawler (1982), and Fisk (1973, 1979) -- although, as we will see in Note 70, Meikle (1979) also depends in large part on this notion. [I will examine Fisk's arguments, which are by far the most sophisticated I have seen, in a later re-write of this Essay, and in other Essays. Lawler's analysis is the subject of Essay Eight Part Three.]
Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is precisely this which makes the entire theory unworkable, as points (1)-(3) above showed.
How this is connected with my reply to the above proffered response will now be explained. Here's that response again:
T7: Let there be an event set E, consisting of sub-events E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force P not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
T8: In the 'normal run of things', let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.
T9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.
T10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.
The first point that needs making is that for this to be a 'dialectical contradiction', P and Ei must be "internally-connected opposites"; indeed, P must be the "other" of Ei. But, P and Ei are of logically different types, so they can't be "internally-related opposites". So, this response falls at the first hurdle!
[This depends, of course, on what dialecticians mean by "internally-related opposite" -- but we have already seen they oscillate between a spatial and a logical interpretation of this notion.]
But, even if they were so related, point (3) above would then apply.
Moreover, as we saw in detail here, if, in the normal course of things, Ei is to cause or to change into Ei+1, they too must be opposites (which means that P can't be the opposite of either of them, after all!), and they must 'struggle' with each other. But, they can't do this since Ei+1 doesn't exist yet! [Unless we suppose that it exists before it exists!]
On the other hand, if Ei+1 already exists, so that Ei could 'struggle' with it, and thus cause, or change into, Ei+1, Ei couldn't in fact do this, since Ei+1 already exists! In that case, Ei would no longer be the cause of Ei+1 and so P couldn't have prevented it from causing Ei+1, meaning that this supposed contradiction disappears!
[Either way, change would be impossible.]
Of course, there is a clause missing from T7-T10 above -- namely, T11:
T7: Let there be an event set E, consisting of sub-events E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force P not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.
T8: In the 'normal run of things', let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.
T9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.
T10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.
T11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set S, comprised of sub-events S1-Sn.
T11 must be so otherwise, at the Ei-th stage we must suppose that Ei is no longer part of the causal structure of the world, and ceases to have an effect on anything around it.
Consider again the concrete scenario examined earlier:
A fire is started by a match in some tinder dry grass in a forest. All things being equal, the resulting and growing conflagration will be maintained by (1) The organic material in the tinder dry grass, (2) The heat of the fire already burning and (3) The oxygen in the surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the grass with a fire broom before it grows too big, putting it out. Plainly the force of the blow from the fire broom deprived the conflagration of enough oxygen to quell the blaze....
No one supposes that if this fire is put out, the grass that was burning, and is now out, disappears from the physical world or ceases to have a causal effect on anything ever again. It too will initiate another series of events, depicted schematically by T11.
But, if that is so, Ei will now be the dialectical opposite of S1, its new 'unique other', which would mean that Ei's earlier 'unique other' -- Ei+1 -- will have been deposed, making a mockery of Hegel's argument that each object or process has a 'unique other'. [But we have already seen this was a defective idea, anyway.]
Even so, what has not been made clear yet is how this is connected with my reply to the proffered response outlined earlier. Given the fact that causes E1-En aren't accidentally linked in the DM-scheme-of-things, but are connected by a necessary law of some sort, Ei itself isn't just plain-and-simple Ei. In fact, each of causes E1-En is identified by what it is not, its 'other'. [This was the whole point of "determinate negation" in Hegel's theory, as we saw above.]
[NON = Negation of the Negation.]
So, Ei isn't just Ei, it is also not-Ei (since, by 'determinate negation', Ei is also identical with what it is not -- why that is so is explained here, but more briefly here), which is also Ei+1. That is, Ei+1 is also not-Ei, its Hegelian 'other'. But, by the NON, Ei is also not-not-Ei -- and hence Ei is not-itself, and thus not-itself by 'reflection' -- this is in fact what supposedly causes Ei to develop -- the lack of identity between itself and its concept; this is reflected in what it becomes, Ei+1.
This means that Ei is identical with Ei+1 in an identity-in-difference sort of way, and this is what links these two together logically. So, Ei is not now just Ei, it is also, "Ei that causes Ei+1" (except, perhaps, this needs translating back into something a little more Hegelian -- maybe along these lines).
These moves now provide the necessary link between a cause and its effect -- or between a cause and whatever comes next in this (necessary) causal sequence. Since Hegel 'proved' this logically, he plainly did not feel it needed confirming from experience. Even if we couldn't observe these 'necessary' links (and how could we? This is what provides the superficial plausibility of Hume's attack on rationalist accounts of causation), we know they are there since Hegel had shown they must exist -- a perfect, a priori 'answer' to Hume (and, indeed, Kant).
And that's why P 'contradicts' Ei: P is not just affecting Ei, it is changing it from "Ei that causes Ei+1" into "Ei that causes S1" (or Ei that does not cause Ei+1):
T11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set S, comprised of sub-events S1-Sn.
So, this is now true: "It isn't the case that it's Ei that causes Ei+1", which is the contradictory of "It is the case that it is Ei that causes Ei+1".
[I am well aware that the above is unsatisfactory as it stands, since P can't 'contradict' Ei by altering it in the above manner, but this is the only way I can make sense of the idea that P could conceivably 'contradict' Ei. If anyone can make sense of this in any other way, please enlighten me.]
But, if there are no necessary links here (and we have seen why there can't be any in Essays Seven Part One and Twelve Part One), then P can't affect Ei in this way, since, in that eventuality, it isn't the case that it is "Ei that causes Ei+1". And that is because there is no such defining condition for Ei and hence no such thing as "Ei that causes Ei+1", to begin with. In short, because of the incoherencies of "determinate negation", this entire way of viewing 'contradictions' falls apart. [But, the real problem lies much deeper than this, as we will see in a later Essay.]
Of course, in an Ideal Universe this 'theory' might work (I'll pass no comment on it here, but, as we'll see in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six, this 'theory' in fact collapses faster than a portfolio of Enron shares).
However, in the real world, where we are told that change results from a 'struggle' of opposites, and where everything changes into its opposite, this theory can't work, as we have seen.
So, P can't 'contradict' anything...
At this point, it could be objected that this entire approach to 'events' and 'forces' is totally misguided since it atomises them, putting them in rigid categories, compartmentalising and thus fragmenting the fluid nature of reality. Dialectics, in comparison, deals with the unified, fluid nature of the world, which means it depicts interaction like these in a totally different, albeit contradictory, light. Hence, the above analysis is completely misguided.
Or, so it could be maintained.
But, unless and until DM-apologists tell us what it is they do intend -- or what, for example, the "fluid nature of reality" is (or worse, what this odd metaphor could possibly mean) --, then that objection is itself devoid of content (since it contains several empty terms). Anyway, this objection is neutralised here.
[The allegedly 'fluid nature of reality' will be examined in more detail in a later re-write of Essay Eight Part Three.]
Once again, faced with the above, there's a simple solution staring us in the face: dialecticians should tell us what, if anything, they mean by their use of such obscure and incoherent Hermetic jargon.
56. Admittedly, this is to use dialectical-terminology (of obscure meaning and even more dubious provenance); it doesn't imply I accept that any of it makes the slightest bit of sense.
In fact, all this is a faint echo of Kant's novel analysis of "real negation" [Kant (1763, 1998)], which we met in Essay Seven Part One.
I will add some thoughts on this in the next re-write of this Essay.
57. Of course, in an analysis of situations where the smallest angle between these two forces lies between 0°and 90°, or between 90°and 180°, the components of these forces would be put into the required relation.
Unfortunately, the prospects for a realist/metaphysical account of forces (given such an analysis) do not look at all promising. Indeed, it is worth asking: Are the components of such forces in effect merely shadow forces -- that is, are they just mathematical fictions? Are they genuine forces at all? And how might we tell these apart?
Does anyone think that these components actually exist? If they don't exist, how can splitting forces into non-existent components help us in any way? On the other hand, if they do exist, and we can split such forces in a potentially infinite number of ways (as we rotate the relevant axes, or move into other coordinate systems), then do all of these components exist?
In fact, as is recommended in this and other Essays at this site, it is best to regard such mathematical devices as rules we use to make sense of and manipulate nature (for our own purposes); that being done, the above 'difficulties' simply vanish.
[This topic is discussed in more detail in Note 24, Note 25, Note 27 and Note 30.]
58. Hegelians might not object too much at this point, since they are by now inured to the hypnotic influence of this use of language (and this sort of Word Magic), their master having conjured 'Nothing' out of 'Being', and then 'Becoming' out of both (miraculously 'deriving' all three from a quirky re-write of a diminutive, reified verb) --, but genuine materialists might want to pause here and see this 'derivation' for what it is: Idealist word-juggling at its best -- as, indeed, George Novack inadvertently pointed out:
"A consistent materialism can't proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
And as Engels himself pointed out, too, in relation to Dühring's 'system':
"The general results of the investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
Even so, this latest twist once again brings into question the 'ontological' status of forces, and whether 'resultant forces' actually exist. On this, see the comments and links in Note 57 above.
59. How have revolutionaries managed to overlook this 'third force' for so long?
It might be felt that this view of forces is overly simplistic; in HM, social forces are far too complex to be represented as vectors, which means that the criticisms aired here are once again completely misguided.
In response to this, it is worth recalling once again that the analysis in the main body of this Essay was forced upon us (no pun intended) because DM-theorists have so far failed to say what they mean (if anything) when they try to equate 'dialectical contradictions' (in nature or society) with opposing forces. Dialecticians are quite happy to declare that such 'contradictory' forces operate everywhere in the universe, and they do this in abeyance of such an account (which means that these theorists are acting almost totally in the dark).
Is this not yet another example of them foisting dialectics on nature and society?
[It is worth reminding the reader here that the existence of forces in HM is not being questioned by the present author (nor will it be), just the assumption that they can be equated with 'contradictions'; but see Note 61, below.]
Apart from merely conforming to tradition, as was argued here, DM-theorists appear to employ the phrase "contradictory forces" in order to provide their theory with a scientific-looking façade, linking it with Physics, perhaps.
Otherwise, why use it?
If this allegation is correct, it would be disingenuous of DM-supporters to complain that the analogy given in the main body of this Essay does not apply to social forces. If the word "force" wasn't meant to be taken in its usual scientific sense (as a vector), such an analogy would, indeed, be inapt. But, in that case, the exact import of the word "force" (as it appears in DM) would be unclear, too. If it isn't being employed in the way that physicists use it, what other scientific way is there?
Anyway, as far as the complexity of social forces is concerned, the counter-argument (mentioned above) itself fails to address the problem of the identification of forces with 'contradictions' in nature and society. If it is impossible to give a clear sense to an avowedly simplified picture of forces as 'contradictions' (i.e., as they seem to operate in nature), a more complex one applied elsewhere stands no chance.
As has been pointed on many occasions at this site, if dialecticians object to any of the comments made in this Essay, there is a simple remedy: they should say clearly, and for the first time ever, what they mean when they try to equate forces with 'contradictions'.
59a. Anyway, we have been considering real material forces since the beginning of this Essay! After all, what are gravity, magnetism and other fundamental forces if not real and material? What we haven't fully done yet (but see here) is consider forces at work in class society; but that's all.
59b. Here are just a few examples: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 -- with a particularly crass list of alleged instances, here (which link will take the reader to a site called "Dialectics For Kids", so it can perhaps be forgiven somewhat). [Several more were given earlier.] Readers should also check out several egregious examples presented in that (rather poor) film, Half Nelson, a movie not unconnected with the aforementioned site.
[December 2011: See also my recent debate with Mike Rosen (in the 'Comments' section at the bottom; organise these "Newest First").]
Here's another recent example:
"The current debate over stem cells provides a very good illustration of the contradictions inherent within capitalism. On the one hand it is capable of generating amazing new technologies.
"However, the amount of money flowing into stem cell research is still miniscule compared to that being used for developing new ways to kill people.
"A recent report concluded that while stem cell research was pioneered in this country, lack of funding was compromising the ability of British scientists to keep things moving forward in this area.
"Meanwhile, as the leader of the richest country on earth talks about the sanctity of a ball of cells, in Iraq the most sophisticated weapon systems are being used to murder real, living human beings." [Parrington (2007), p.9.]
On the contrary, this illustrates the by-now-familiar fact that dialecticians (like Parrington here) are only too ready confuse 'contradictions' with paradoxical, irrational or unexpected events, as I alleged in Essay Five.
Even in DM-terms, this makes no sense. Does either 'half' of the above 'contradiction' struggle against the other? Does the one turn into the other (which they should do, if the dialectical classics are to be believed?). Is George W Bush and/or the rest of his class about to 'develop' into a bunch of under-funded scientists/new equipment, and/or vice versa?
If not, where's the 'dialectical contradiction' here?
60. Several more examples of alleged 'real material forces' and/or 'contradictions' (such as those between the forces and relations of production, and between use and exchange value) will be considered below, in Note 70. See also here.
60a. Those who do so think might perhaps like to tell the rest of us from where else they would have derived this word? Who else used it in this way? [Other than mystics, that is.]
61. If this notion is to assume a viable role in HM, it must be understood analogically. The details of my own interpretation of such a key concept within HM will have to wait on another occasion.
In the main body of this Essay, however, I am simply questioning the literal and metaphorical application of the word "contradiction" to situations that occur in HM and DM.
61a. It could be objected that there are forces in capitalism that produce such opposites, and those forces can therefore be described as contradictory. For example, competition forces individual capitalists to accumulate capital, but this accumulation has a tendency to reduce the rate of profit for the whole capitalist class. So, here we have one tendency imposed on individual units in the system (in order to maintain or increase their own share of profit), which, when actualised, produces the opposite result for the entire class. In seeking to increase profit, profit is eroded.
Maybe so, but in what way is this a 'contradiction'? It would be if this were the case:
P1: Individual capitalists seek to increase profit and they do not.
Or this:
P2: Profit rises and does not rise at the same time and in the same respect.
But, no sane Marxist would argue like this.
Of course, DM-fans might be using use the word "contradiction" in a new and-as-yet-unexplained sense. If so, what is it? [On this, see here.]
It is worth emphasising at this point that I am not objecting to this new use of "contradiction". [On this, see Note 72.] DM-fans can use words as they see fit. But, when they do so, they can't also claim to be using such words in their old senses, and hence, with respect to "contradiction", they can't also use it to justify claims about the 'contradictory' nature of the former Soviet Union, either -- where this word is now being used in its more ordinary and familiar sense. And, if that is so, this new use of "contradiction" will bear no relation to its use in FL and ordinary language, which in turn means that DL fails to 'surpass' FL and 'common sense'. [I go into this in more detail here. See also here, and here.] Not that ordinary language is the same as 'common sense'.
DM-fans can't have it both ways. If their use of this word is indeed new, then 'dialectical contradictions' (whatever they are) can't be a superior form of logical contradiction, as Hegel and all subsequent dialecticians have claimed.
[FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]
62. The negation of wealth might appear to be poverty, but this is so in only a very loose and figurative sort of sense. Recall that something could fail to be wealth without automatically becoming a cause of, or being identical with, poverty. Naturally, this is because the two words have a complex set of application conditions. So, for example, £10,000 ($20,000) (invested as capital, or held in notes) does not constitute wealth in and of itself, and the lack of it does not automatically amount to poverty, either. Both options obviously depend on the surrounding circumstances (historical and social). Of course, in Marxist economic theory, wealth is associated with use-values. [This is not being denied here. Notwithstanding this, it is unclear whether or not the introduction of this technicality would alter things in any noticeable way. On that, see Note 70.]
Some might want to interject that the contradiction is between the forces that create wealth and those that produce poverty -- or, perhaps, the contradictions inherent in the processes that operate in this way. Furthermore, these social forces are inextricably interlinked, and work in opposite directions. [On this, see Note 61a, above.]
But, why call these "contradictions"? The only apparent reason seems to be that this word has been imported from Hegel, who in turn based his use of this word on some highly dubious 'logic'. [More on that in Essay Eight Part Three.]
However, this is covered more thoroughly here and here.
63. We encountered similar problems over the simplistic interpretation of schematic letters (such as "A" and "not A") earlier, in connection with Trotsky's criticism of the LOI (i.e., in Essay Six), and in an extended analysis of DL and FL (in Essay Four). There, it was demonstrated that the logic of even these apparently simple-looking schematic letters can be rather complex.
I have also ignored the couplet "A and non-A" here, which has a different logic, even though dialecticians do not appear to be aware of the difference between this use and "A and not A". [On that, see here.] I have done this because: (1) This use of predicate-term negation (as this use of "non-" is called) is not in general at all colloquial and (2) It is even less easy to derive a contradiction from this form of negation. This will be explored at greater length in Essay Twelve. Anyway, the comments in the main body of this Essay aren't affected by this distinction.
It is also worth adding that it is only the sloppy way these letters have been employed by dialecticians (beginning, of course, with Hegel) that 'allows' DM to get off the ground. [More on that here.]
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
64. Unfortunately, F52 requires the use of somewhat stilted language if it is to remain literal. The "poverty" reading will, anyway, be adopted presently in connection with F49.
A detailed analysis of the alleged 'contradiction' between use-value and exchange-value can be found in Note 70, below. See also here.
65. F52a has to be interpreted this way otherwise it might suggest that Capitalism had in fact made the very same person (or groups of people) both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time. Not even Mad Dog Dialecticians will want to accept that odd interpretation!
66. This would, of course, be a contradiction if the first person had said "There are no defective Widgets" while the second said "There are some defective Widgets", or the first had said "Every Widget is defective!" and the second "Some Widgets aren't defective", but these aren't the examples at issue here, since there is no way these can be viewed as interpretations of "A and not A".
[Since Aristotle's time, logicians have recognised that (in a non-empty universe) "Every F is G" is the contradictory of "Some F is not G", and "No F is G" is the contradictory of "Some F is G". Both can't be true and both can't be false at the same time; they both have opposite truth values.]
Someone might object that these are rather trite examples, and not the sort of contradictions with which dialecticians are concerned. Maybe so, but since the nature of the 'contradictions' they do in fact intend is left permanently vague, they will have to do until such objectors manage to say clearly, and for the first time ever, what they do mean by their odd use of this word. Moreover, if this idea won't work with such allegedly 'trite' example, it stands no chance with more complex events/processes.
However, on this, see here, here and Note 70 below.
66a. On this, see here and here.
67. Linguistic tinkering like this simply creates 'contradictions' by fiat when what's required is an example of a real material contradiction -- not a reified linguistic expression for one, hastily cobbled-together just to save the theory.
Nevertheless, some might want to argue that the claim advanced in the main body of this Essay (i.e., that contradictions would normally be regarded as figurative or ambiguous, if held 'true') is controversial, and yet it is based on how we would respond now when faced with a contradiction in ordinary life. So, it is controversial only in the sense that some have thought to controvert it.
[There is a partial explanation of the background to this approach (derived from Wittgenstein), here.]
Naturally, this means that the observation in the main body of this Essay is not a consequence of the present author having been 'corrupted' by Analytic Philosophy; on the contrary, it is informed by the way workers themselves speak, and how anyone not suffering from 'dialectics' talks when they operate in the real world. Indeed, it is based on the way DM-theorists themselves would have to speak in order to make themselves understood in every day life.
Nevertheless, the following comments will test the patience of any dialecticians who have made it this far; they will no doubt regard the examples of contradictions given below as discursive, but not dialectical contradictions. That worry will be allayed here, where examples of just such 'contradictions' (advanced by DM-theorists themselves) will be considered. The only point of the following argument is to illustrate how we might proceed if anyone were to utter a contradiction in every day life.
In that case, in order to illustrate how we would handle such 'contradictions' now, consider how worker NN would respond if she were faced with the following:
C1: Boss BB: "NN, you are being paid £7.50 an hour and not being paid £7.50 an hour."
[Of course, no one (not the worse for drink or drugs) speaks like this, but, other than the examples considered here, it isn't easy to quote instances where ordinary human beings utter 'true contradictions', or intend to utter them.]
At first sight, C1 would in all likelihood be interpreted as a joke of some sort, a slip of the tongue, or a mistake. If the boss insisted that none of these were the case, then the only way to proceed would be to ask what on earth this boss meant by the sentence quoted in C1.
In that event, the explication of the sentence quoted in C1 might involve interpreting the word "paid" in one of three ways:
(1) It could indicate what NN was going to earn, regardless of whether or not she will ever receive the money. Hence, in a round-about sort of way, the sentence quoted in C1 could be alluding to the effect of taxation and other deductions on NN's pay. It might even refer to the boss's intention to pay the worker in 'kind'. Or:
(2) It could mean that although the money had been earned, it would not actually be paid to NN for some reason. It might be withheld as a part of the boss's attempt to victimise her for helping to lead a successful strike, for example. Or:
(3) It could mean that although NN will be paid at the stated rate, the true value of her contribution to production can't be measured in cash terms. Hence, it might suggest that BB intends to reward NN with more than mere money (or maybe with none at all) -- but, with his/her 'highest esteem', etc. A clue to this way of viewing the sentence quoted in C1 would be the inflection in the boss's voice -- a note of sarcasm, perhaps.
[Of course, there might be other ways of interpreting C1, but the above seem the most obvious to me.]
However, 'contradictions' like these would never be regarded as literally true, for as soon as NN here was actually paid the said money the second half of the sentence quoted in C1 would become false. Hence, such a conjunction of a falsehood with a truth could never become literally true (short of altering the meaning of the words in C1, or those used to assert that it was true -- or, of course, without altering the meaning of "literal"). We would not be able to make sense of anyone who thought that this sort of eventuality could arise (save in the ways indicated above, etc.). Certainly, without the alternatives outlined (or, perhaps, others), no worker (or anyone else, for that matter) would be able to understand the sentence quoted in C1.
This brings us back to a difficulty DM-theorists must always face if they persist in regarding 'contradictions' as true, or they continue to use the word "contradiction" in the loose and indiscriminate way they have done for generations (where one minute they sort of half mean the word in its ordinary- (or even its FL-) sense, the next they sort of half mean it in this new and as-yet-unexplained DL-sense. When we bring this word back to its ordinary sense, any propositions containing this word -- if they are still regarded as true -- could only ever be understood in a non-standard way, and then disambiguated along similar lines.
And, why we should want to do that was explained by Marx himself:
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
If, on the other hand, the word "contradiction" is meant to be taken in a special or technical (but as-yet-unspecified) sense, DM-theorists risk being misunderstood at every turn (with their ideas failing to communicate anything determinate) -- especially if they hope to depict the sorts of situations in the material world that are familiar to ordinary people/workers. And that risk will remain until DM-apologists make it clear (and for the first time ever) what they mean by their odd use of this word in such contexts.
This means that in practice, when faced with sentences like C1, DM-theorists would also interpret the alleged "contradictions" they contain in the standard way, in line with the vast majority of ordinary human beings (and hence paraphrase them away). Despite dialectics, few DM-fans would understand the words attributed to the fictional boss in C1 as literally true. In fact, only the most useless trade union rep in history would allow such a boss to get away with the nonsense reported in C1. Representing and/or defending the material interests of the working-class certainly does not mean that we just let bosses off the hook by adopting/accepting ways of speaking that have been invented by mystics and idealists, should they choose to do so.
C1: Boss: "NN, you are being paid £7.50 an hour and not being paid £7.50 an hour."
However, socialists who are normally alert to the dangers of class collaboration when these surface elsewhere, seem only too happy to allow ordinary material language to suffer from contamination of this sort when it comes to Philosophy.
Even if the word "contradiction" were intended to be taken literally, DM-theorists themselves would not be able to say what in nature or society a 'true contradiction' could depict without helping themselves to yet more figurative language.
If (per impossible) this could be done, then the word "literal" would have to be taken non-literally!
In Essay Five, we saw attempts to unravel the confusions that plagued Engels's account of motion continually fail. It turned out that it was impossible to make sense of what Engels could have meant by what he actually said if his words were taken literally.
So, it is small wonder then that DM-theorists have remained unclear and equivocal about core DM-theses like this for over a hundred years; there is in fact nothing that anyone could say, or could have said, to make the incomprehensible comprehensible. Just like the mysteries of Transubstantiation and the Incarnation of Christ, DM-theses resist all attempts at clarification.
At this point, DM-apologists might be tempted to complain about the continual use of contradictions drawn from FL to make points against their use of "dialectical contradiction". The obvious response to this is (once again) to request a clear explanation of what a "dialectical contradiction" itself amounts to so that those making this complaint could themselves convince critics that they actually do mean something (anything?) by this phrase, as opposed to using empty strings of words for over a hundred years just because it is traditional to do so.
Until then, the volunteered complaint located at the beginning of the previous paragraph would itself be devoid of meaning since it contains a meaningless phrase -- i.e., "dialectical contradiction".
Finally, the claim that there are literally true contradictions (advanced by philosophers like Graham Priest) will be examined in a later Essay. [However, it is a moot point whether the examples and paradoxes he considers are, or ever could be called, "dialectical".]
Until then the reader is directed toward the following: Goldstein (1992, 2004), Slater (2002, 2007b, 2007c), and this review, by Hartry Field.
Field has now published a book on the paradoxes, where he is able to show that the Dialetheic and Paraconsistent Logic Priest favours can't even handle the paradoxes of truth, which had in fact been one of the main motivators for this branch of non-standard logic -- i.e., Field (2008), pp.36-92.
[An entire sub-section on 'dialectical contradictions' that used to appear here has now been moved to form Essay Eight Part Three.]
68. But, are opposites always contradictory? At this moment I am sat in front of my computer looking at the house opposite. Is my house therefore in some sort of 'struggle' with that house? Or, indeed, am I in struggle with it?
Unfair? Perhaps so. Dialecticians will be the first to point out that the sorts of opposites they regard as contradictory are those that are involved in a dialectical union of some sort (as UOs). Since my house and the one opposite are not so linked (and neither am I), they are not therefore in 'struggle'.
Well, how do we know? Clearly we do not. Nature often surprises us. [Anyway, isn't everything interconnected in DM?]
However, consider the opposite sides of a polygon (and one that has been carefully drawn on paper, so this isn't an abstract example). An equilateral triangle has two opposite sides; do they 'contradict' one another? Are they both battling against the third side, and/or with each other? But, here, these sides are physically and logically/'internally' linked. Even so, they refuse to contradict one another. With more complex manifolds, these 'difficulties' only multiply.
But, perhaps this set of counter-examples isn't relevant since the items involved aren't dialectically-logically linked.
It seems then that only certain logical connections in reality are allowed to be, or to constitute, a DM-UO, which means that objects and processes that are merely empirically- or which are formally-connected, can't be so categorised.
However, on an empirical basis, since no house has yet been observed to be engaged in a life-and-death struggle with another across the way, can they be ruled-out as UOs? Who can say? And yet, who has ever actually witnessed a set of use values slugging it out with a set of exchange values? So, empirical niceties like these can't be crucially important. We are thus still in the dark.
Some might object to the banal examples considered in this Essay. But Hegelian opposites look pretty banal (and so are those outlined in most DM-texts (magnets, male and female, up and down, seeds negating plants, etc.)) -- and they don't work, even in their own terms.
Oddly enough, and by sheer coincidence I'm sure, 'dialectical opposites' turn out to be (by-and-large) the kind of 'opposites' dreamt-up by Idealist Philosophers thousands of years ago. Now, since this doctrine is central to Hermeticism, that should be enough to malign it in the eyes of anyone concerned to remain consistent with atheistic materialism:
"For everything must be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise." [Copenhaver (1995), p.38. Bold emphasis added.]
[In fact, pointing out such mystical connections has no effect on dialecticians; why that is so is examined in Essay Nine Part Two.]
To test this claim, readers should now try to spot the difference (over and above a few superficial, stylistics variations) between these:
"CHAPTER X POLARITY 'Everything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled.' -- The Kybalion.
"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle -- the Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,' and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree'; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything
"Light and Darkness are poles of the same thing, with many degrees between them. The musical scale is the same-starting with 'C' you moved upward until you reach another 'C,' and so on, the differences between the two ends of the board being the same, with many degrees between the two extremes. The scale of colour is the same -- higher and lower vibrations being the only difference between high violet and low red. Large and Small are relative. So are Noise and Quiet; Hard and Soft follow the rule. Likewise Sharp and Dull. Positive and Negative are two poles of the same thing, with countless degrees between them....
"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests; everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.
"The great Third Hermetic Principle-the Principle of Vibration-embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the Universe-that nothing is at rest-that everything moves, vibrates, and circles. This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.
"The Hermetic Teachings are that not only is everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences' between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL, in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter. Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes of vibration.
"Modern Science has proven that all that we call Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion. Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in matter and energy.
"In the first place, science teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same things-it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes. The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc., which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first is posted here; the second here. Spelling altered to conform to UK English. For more quotations along the same lines from other mystical systems, see here.]
Compare the above with the following:
"The Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites
"Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic co-existence of opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life and motion. That was already understood by Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.) two and a half thousand years ago. It is even present in embryo in certain Oriental religions, as in the idea of the ying (sic) and yang in China, and in Buddhism. Dialectics appears here in a mystified form, which nonetheless reflects an intuition of the workings of nature. The Hindu religion contains the germ of a dialectical idea, when it poses the three phases of creation (Brahma), maintenance or order (Vishnu) and destruction or disorder (Shiva). In his interesting book on the mathematics of chaos, Ian Stewart points out that the difference between the gods Shiva, 'the Untamed,' and Vishnu is not the antagonism between good and evil, but that the two principles of harmony and discord together underlie the whole of existence....
"In Heraclitus, all this was in the nature of an inspired guess. Now this hypothesis has been confirmed by a huge amount of examples. The unity of opposites lies at the heart of the atom, and the entire universe is made up of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. The matter was very well put by R. P. Feynman: 'All things, even ourselves, are made of fine-grained, enormously strongly interacting plus and minus parts, all neatly balanced out....'
"The question is: how does it happen that a plus and a minus are 'neatly balanced out?' This is a contradictory idea! In elementary mathematics, a plus and a minus do not 'balance out.' They negate each other. Modern physics has uncovered the tremendous forces which lie at the heart of the atom. Why do the contradictory forces of electrons and protons not cancel each other out? Why do atoms not merely fly apart? The current explanation refers to the 'strong force' which holds the atom together. But the fact remains that the unity of opposites lies at the basis of all reality.
"Within the nucleus of an atom, there are two opposing forces, attraction and repulsion. On the one hand, there are electrical repulsions which, if unrestrained, would violently tear the nucleus apart. On the other hand, there are powerful forces of attraction which bind the nuclear particles to each other. This force of attraction, however, has its limits, beyond which it is unable to hold things together. The forces of attraction, unlike repulsion, have a very short reach. In a small nucleus they can keep the forces of disruption in check. But in a large nucleus, the forces of repulsion can't be easily dominated....
"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the 'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion; north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and anti-matter; male and female in biology; odd and even in mathematics; even the concept of 'left and right handedness' in relation to the spin of subatomic particles. There is a certain symmetry, in which contradictory tendencies, to quote Feynman, 'balance themselves out,' or, to use the more poetical expression of Heraclitus, 'agree with each other by differing like the opposing tensions of the strings and bow of a musical instrument.' There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract....
"Moreover, everything is in a permanent relation with other things. Even over vast distances, we are affected by light, radiation, gravity. Undetected by our senses, there is a process of interaction, which causes a continual series of changes. Ultra-violet light is able to 'evaporate' electrons from metal surfaces in much the same way as the sun’s rays evaporate water from the ocean. Banesh Hoffmann states: 'It is still a strange and awe-inspiring thought, that you and I are thus rhythmically exchanging particles with one another, and with the earth and the beasts of the earth, and the sun and the moon and the stars, to the uttermost galaxy....'
"The phenomenon of oppositeness exists in physics, where, for example, every particle has its anti-particle (electron and positron, proton and anti-proton, etc.). These are not merely different, but opposites in the most literal sense of the word, being identical in every respect, except one: they have opposite electrical charges -- positive and negative. Incidentally, it is a matter of indifference which one is characterised as negative and which positive. The important thing is the relationship between them....
"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter.
"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.64-68; posted here.]
"'Everything Flows'
"Everything is in a constant state of motion, from neutrinos to super-clusters. The earth itself is constantly moving, rotating around the sun once a year, and rotating on its own axis once a day. The sun, in turn, revolves on its axis once in 26 days and, together with all the other stars in our galaxy, travels once around the galaxy in 230 million years. It is probable that still larger structures (clusters of galaxies) also have some kind of overall rotational motion. This seems to be a characteristic of matter right down to the atomic level, where the atoms which make up molecules rotate about each other at varying rates. Inside the atom, electrons rotate around the nucleus at enormous speeds....
"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based upon contradiction. Whereas traditional formal logic seeks to banish contradiction, dialectical thought embraces it. Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites...." [Ibid, pp.45-47; posted here. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that the same sort of Mickey Mouse Science is prominent in both the Hermetic tract and the Dialectical Mantra (intoned by comrades Woods and Grant).
Even so, in DM-texts there is still no attempt to explain with any clarity what it could possibly mean to suggest that opposites could contradict one another. For example, who taught them to speak?
Unfair again? Not so -- unless dialecticians mean by their use of "contradiction" something else, which they have so far kept to themselves. [On this, see here, Note 67, above, and Essay Eight Part Three.]
[There is more on this in Essay Seven Part One. See also the discussion of Kant's concept of "real negation", here.]
69. The following might be regarded as a more viable alternative:
A1: Capitalism has the potential to offer wealth to all but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.
[F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.]
In fact, this alternative was considered in the main body of this Essay -- it is just a variant on F49a. An unrealised potential can't contradict anything since it does not exist as an actualised option. So, even if true, A1 would be of no help in understanding what DM-theorists mean by their equation of forces with 'contradictions' in HM.
Someone could argue, for example, that the fact that there will be a sea battle tomorrow is contradicted by the fact that there won't (to use Aristotle's example). Neither of these events are actual, but that does not stop them from contradicting one another.
Certainly, these two propositions are contradictory (who has ever denied that?), but the question is can both be true? [The reader is referred back to my earlier discussion of the distinction between "contradictory" and "contradiction".]
Maybe not, but DM-enthusiasts regard their 'contradictions' as real material forces (or, they are a consequence of them -- DM-fans are somewhat unclear about this, as we have seen), and the latter can only 'contradict' (in their sense of the word) whatever they can materially interact with, which plainly means that such factors have to co-exist, ruling out the above as an effective response, as, indeed, Mao noted:
"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above, there would be no 'below') without 'below', there would be no 'above'. Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, these would be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty) without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'how opposites can be ... identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity. [Mao (1937), p.338. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
And, as Gollobin also points out:
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
The proletariat can hardly contradict the capitalist class if one of these ceases to exist! Same with the forces and relations of production --, and, indeed, with forces of attraction and repulsion.
Hence, while propositions about unrealised potentialities (and tendencies) might contradict one another (in the sense that they can't both become true, or both become false), in DM-terms, an unrealised potential (or tendency) can't 'contradict' something that has already been actualised.
While it is possible to speak about contradictory tendencies in an object or process, the point of referring to these as "contradictory" is that they can't both be actualised at once. So, for example, while it is possible for one end of an iron bar to cool down while the other end heats up at the same time, it isn't possible for the same section of that bar to do both at once.
[On the alleged 'contradictory tendencies' in capitalism, see here, here, here, here, and here.]
70. If, say, an abundance of money in one pocket (or even a large horde of "use values" in, for example, a lock-up somewhere) did, per impossible, manage to 'contradict' another empty (lock-up), locally or remotely, this would make no sense even in DM-terms. Presumably, since such lifeless objects have no effect on one another they could effect no changes, nor could they develop into each other (as DM-'contradictions' and UOs are all supposed to do).
So, even in DM-terms, it is unclear what sense it makes to say that such things are "contradictory".
Contradictions In Das Kapital?
[This forms part of Note 70.]
However, Scott Meikle argues that there is indeed some sort of sense to be made of this. Meikle's case revolves around a short and relatively clear account of the alleged 'contradiction' between use-value and exchange-value, or more pointedly, between the "relative form" and the "equivalent form" of value that Marx discusses in Chapter One, Volume One, of Das Kapital.
Now, I do not want to enter into whether or not Meikle's interpretation of Marx is accurate; my concern here is merely to see if his analysis can show us how and why these are indeed good examples of "dialectical contradictions". And since it is typical of the way that many Dialectical Marxists argue, an examination of his comments will help illustrate where many of them go wrong.
[Of course, in doing this I am well aware that many will take issue over Meikle's interpretation of Marx, or with some of the more detailed points he raises -- or, indeed, with his entire approach. I will however be looking at the work of others who have tried to make sense of a 'dialectical' interpretation of Das Kapital (with "dialectical" understood in its post-Hegelian, not its classical, sense) in later re-writes of this Essay. Until then, readers are redirected to the discussions here and here.]
Here is how Meikle makes the point:
"All the contradictions of capitalist commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....
"The simple form of value itself contains the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value.... [Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'
"This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]
But, what evidence and/or argument is there to show that these are indeed "polar opposites", let alone 'dialectically-united' opposites? And why call this a "contradiction"? Like so many others, Meikle forgot to say.
Nevertheless, as we will see in Essay Eight Part Three, this way of talking is based solely on Hegel's egregious misconstrual of the 'negative form' of the LOI. In that case, what has Meikle got to offer the bemused reader that stands some chance of repairing the gaping holes Hegel left in this misbegotten 'theory'?
Apparently, only this:
"Marx's absolutely fundamental (Hegelian) idea [is] that the two poles united in an opposition necessitate one another ('belong to and mutually condition each other')...." [Ibid., p.19.]
But, what precisely is the source of this necessitation? Well, after a brief discussion of Quine's ill-considered views on logical 'necessity' (which analysis, it is worth pointing out, confuses logical 'necessity' with extremely well-confirmed empirical truth), Meikle rejects the idea that the source of 'necessity' can be found in logic as such.
"So, 'logical necessity' does not promise to account for the necessity that unites opposites within a contradiction. The unity of use-value and exchange-value within the commodity is certainly not something which, despite all necessitation between the two poles, may be abrogated (on Quine's conventionalist account). Not, that is, without 'abrogating' the commodity itself; for the commodity is precisely the unity of use-value and exchange-value. Use-value can exist alone. But exchange-value can't; it presupposes use-value because only what has use-value can have exchange-value. What has exchange-value, a commodity, is, thus, necessarily use-value and exchange-value brought into a unity. The commodity-form of the product of labour has as its essence the unity of the two. That is what it is. Their conjunction or unity constitutes its essence." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]
Can't exchange values exist where there is no use value at all? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange value but many do not have a use value. Same with many works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins). And can't criminals exchange useless items in order to launder money?
Be this as it may, even if Meikle were correct, why is this not just a de dicto (that is, a merely verbal) necessity?
Fortunately, Meikle had that particular base covered, too:
"Use-value and exchange-value are, therefore, not 'merely' abstractions arrived at in thought about reality; they are constituents of reality in partaking in the essence of the commodity. And the opposition or contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the original. Bold emphasis added.]
But, whatever else is true of these value-forms, how can they 'contradict' one another if one of them can't exist (i.e., "act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value") alongside the other? As we saw earlier:
"'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'
"This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Ibid., pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original. Bold added.]
In fact, this is what Marx wrote:
"The relative
form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent
and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are
mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression.
They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into
relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in
linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the
contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else
than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of
the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other
commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore,
the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an
equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent
cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not
the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the
material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.
"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are
worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1
coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation,
in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that
the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity
cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both
forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive."
[Marx (1996),
pp.58-59. Bold emphasis added.]
"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of
commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The
differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away
these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can
exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are
reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly
falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from
it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to
go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid.,
p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
[In will deal with what Marx says about falling bodies (etc.) elsewhere.]
If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at the same time? On the other hand, if they both exist simultaneously, so that they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "mutually exclude" the other?
[We have already seen this insurmountable barrier stymie earlier attempts to comprehend how 'dialectical contradictions' are supposed to work.]
Of course, it could be argued that the concept of one of these forms both implies and excludes that of the other, perhaps by definition. If so, we seem to have a de dicto, not a de re necessity here, after all.
In that case, this is a real exclusion, so the two halves can co-exist (despite what Marx appears to have said above). Consider a different example: the class of proletarians and capitalists mutually condition and exclude one another, but the one can't exist without the other. However, this sense of "exclude" is not one of opposition (even though it can and does lead to opposition), which is what is required. This use of "exclude" here means that no member of one class can belong to the other; that is, there isn't anyone who is a member of both classes at the same time. [This alleged 'contradiction' will be examined in Essay Eleven Part Two.] Again, this sort of exclusion does not imply opposition. In order to derive that, more is need than mere exclusion. After all, if an organism is a tulip that excludes it from being an elephant. But does that imply opposition? Or conflict? Hardly.
Of course, this introduces issues connected with Kant's concept of "real negation", compounded by Hegel's introduction of "determinate negation". However, we have already seen that Hegel dropped the ball on this, so his ideas are no help at all.
Even so, this is not the case with commodities, where the same item can and must appear in each class, as relative form and as equivalent form, but apparently not at the same time.
"'[T]he relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.'" [Ibid., p.17.]
"...the opposition or contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the original. Bold emphasis added.]
This is the force of the "mutually exclude" descriptor applied in this case (otherwise it doesn't appear to do any work). Once again, if they can't co-exist, how can they "contradict" one another? Meikle doesn't say. [And as far as can be determined, no one else has either -- and I have asked this of many comrades, including one prominent Marxist Professor of Economics, who, in an e-mail response told me to "Eat sh*t and die!".] He has either not noticed this serious difficulty, or he perhaps thinks the answer is obvious. But it isn't.
Putting this serious problem to one side for now, why is this 'necessity' not merely the result of a determination to use certain words in odd ways? Why is this not just a de dicto necessity?
[In fact, it's a bit rich of Meikle to employ ideas from Quine to criticise logical necessity, when the latter would have taken an even dimmer view of de re (real world) necessities. (On Quine's ideas, see the references listed here).]
Of course, this has become a hot topic ever since Saul Kripke upset the de dicto apple cart a generation or so ago. [Kripke (1977, 1980).] Hence, it is no surprise to see Meikle appeal to Kripke's work to buttress his argument that these are not merely de dicto, but are also de re necessities.
Unfortunately, Kripke's arguments are not quite as sound as Meikle appears to believe. [On this see, Ebersole (1982) and (Hallett (1991), Hanna and Harrison (2004), pp.278-88. See also an entertaining article by Jerry Fodor, in Fodor (2004). More on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
Nevertheless, in support, Meikle quotes a (by now) hackneyed series of examples:
"The commodity is the unity of use-value and exchange-value, in precisely the same way that water is H2O, that light is a stream of photons, and that Gold is the element with atomic number 79. All these statements are necessarily true. They state truths that are true of necessity, not in virtue of any logical or 'conceptual' connexions, but in virtue of the essences or real natures of the entities in question. Water is necessarily H2O. Anything that is not H2O can't be water..., and the 'can't' is ontological not epistemic.... We did not always know this, of course; it was a discovery people made about the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical development requires it)." [Ibid., pp.22-23. Italic emphasis in the original.]
The Gold example is not too clever, since its atomic number depends on our counting system (and on the number of protons and electrons the element has -- but Gold has many different isotopes and thus has variable numbers of neutrons), so why isn't this fact a de dicto necessity? It could be argued that the Atomic Number of an element defines it as a natural kind -- in this case, Gold has Atomic Number 79. Once more, Gold has at least 19 isotopes (18 of which are radioisotopes, one is stable), so, unless we are prepared to classify all 19 of these isotopes (all of which have different properties) as part of the same natural kind, an appeal to the Atomic Number is of little use. It could be pointed out in response that all and only Gold atoms have an atomic number 79. In that case, we might just as well include, say, all vertebrates in the same natural kind on the grounds that all and only vertebrates have vertebra. Moreover, as with all elements, Gold does not exist anywhere in an absolutely pure form (appearing in all cases in ionic form (see below), alongside various 'impurities'), but that doesn't stop us calling it "Gold". [So, there are substances, which even scientists call "gold", which do not exclusively have an Atomic Number 79.] It is only in the abstract world of Traditional Philosophy that Gold is pure Gold.
The light example isn't too convincing, either, since there are scientists who question the existence of photons; they could hardly do that if light was necessarily (a de re or even a de dicto) stream of photons. [However, there are other, far more serious problems defining theoretical objects -- like photons, electrons and protons -- than this. They will be explored in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]
The water example is even worse, since water is not even contingently H2O! Hydrogen bonding means its structure is far more complex. Moreover, because both Hydrogen and Oxygen have several isotopes (Hydrogen, for example, exists as Deuterium and Tritium, and there are three stable isotopes of Oxygen) not even these elements are "natural kinds". Furthermore, like Gold, no elemental atom appears in its atomic form; they invariably exist as ions.
The idea (that Kripke and Putnam advanced) is that the word "water" for example "rigidly designates" H2O, even though most people who have ever lived are/were unaware of this fact. However, as a result of the above considerations (and those below), not even chemists are referring to H2O when they use the word "water" -- because of isotopes and hydrogen bonding, they tell us it is H2nOn, or D20, D4O2, D6O3,..., D2nOn, etc. ["D" is the abbreviation for "Deuterium".]
Moreover, (1) Because of impurities and ionisation (etc.), pure water (as H2O) is nowhere to be found on earth, or anywhere else, for that matter; (2) Much that isn't water is also H2nOn etc., (for instance, ice and steam), and (3) A molecule of 'H2O' possesses none of the physical properties of water -- it isn't a liquid, it doesn't boil at 100oC, it doesn't have a density of 0.99707, it has no surface tension, and it can neither put fires out nor quench anyone's thirst. So, a molecule of H2O isn't water in any sense of the term, either. Hence, the word "water" can't refer to H2O.
It could be argued that Kripke merely claimed that the following:
K1: If water is H2O, then water is necessarily H2O.
However, K1 could be true even if its antecedent were false -- and we already know it is false. [Just as "If two is odd, then 2+2 is necessarily odd" is true even though the antecedent is false.]
But, and despite Kripke, even if this weren't the case, why isn't this just a de dicto necessity?
[On this and other serious difficulties that afflict Essentialism, see VandeWall (2006). See also van Brakel (2000), and Hacker (2007), pp.29-56.]
It could be argued that Meikle had this base covered, too, for he added:
"[I]t was a discovery people made about the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical development requires it)." [Ibid.]
But, that just makes this an epistemic truth, and not the least bit essential, de re, or ontological. [And, as we have just seen, there is in fact no "essence" of water!]
However, let us assume for the moment that these 'difficulties' can be neutralised in some way -- although, in Essay Thirteen Part Two we will see that this is not the case; there it will be shown that modern-day essentialism is a confused dead end, at best. [In addition, Essentialism also faces the serious objections I have raised against all forms of 'Ontology' in Essay Twelve Part One.]
So, even assuming the above 'problems' can be cleared up in some way, Meikle's account faces further difficulties -- not the least of which is the fact that the sort of essentialism he lionises depends on Possible World Semantics [PWS] in order to work. To be sure, Meikle tried to down-play this implication (pp.23-25), but in doing so he undermined the case he had constructed for accepting this brand of essentialism in the first place -- for PWS merely turns de re necessities into super-duper empirical, extensional truths, by means of which each putative de re simply de sappears.
This 'difficulty' will also be put to one side for the present. [However, readers should consult this paper, which outlines several serious objections to modern-day essentialism -- but, with a health warning that its author then proceeds to defend an Aristotelian version of the same doctrine!]
In addition, I will not be asking (here) other awkward questions about the precise origin of such 'natural necessities', and how they can possibly cause change, but the following passage (taken from Part One) will give the reader some idea of how I will be tackling that topic at a later stage:
A passage from Baker and Hacker (1988) underlines the futility of this 'aristocratic' approach to knowledge (although they do not use that particular word, and are not making this particular political point!) -- which, incidentally, also reveals why dialecticians (like Rees and the others quoted here) have become fixated on a search for a metaphysical (and ultimate/rational) "why" of things:
"Empirical, contingent truths have always struck philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some can't be explained…. Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere, e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in quantum mechanics today. One feature that explains philosophers' fascination with truths of Reason is that they seem, in a deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they can't be otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential relations of Simple Natures; mathematical truths are apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build upon them mythological structures.
"We think of necessary propositions as being true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as the truth-functions or (in Frege's case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics. So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a supra-empirical domain (a 'third realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.139 -- RL] or the 'mineralogy of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g., Pascal, admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal. Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again, these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41 -- RL]. Logic seems to investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….
"In our eagerness to ensure the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent 'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell (1937), p.xv; again these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.v -- RL], then the mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of physical theorising, such as Planck's constant." [Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original have been altered to conform to those adopted at this site.]
As should now be clear from all that has gone before, DM-theorists have bought into this view of 'necessary truths' (even if few of them use that particular phrase -- although Lenin and Dietzgen seem to have been rather fond of it; more on that in a later Essay).
For example, dialecticians in general see change as the result of the relation between internally-linked opposite (logical?) properties of objects and processes. But, why this should cause change is left entirely unexamined (indeed, it is left as a brute fact, as the above passage suggests it always must -- in which case, it is just a fact about the world that 'contradictions' cause change). In reality, this account of change is a consequence merely of a certain way of describing things (and a fetishised way, at that), as we will discover in Essay Twelve Part One.
Nevertheless, as we have already seen, there is no reason why contradictory states of affairs should cause change any more than there is a reason to suppose that non-contradictory states should. Both of these options rely on descriptions of the alleged relations between objects and processes (not on evidence since it isn't possible to verify or confirm their existence); they supposedly capture or picture processes in nature that are held capable of making other objects or processes change and/or 'develop'. How and why they are able to do this is left as a brute fact.
Even an appeal to 'contradictory forces' -- in order to explain why things change -- merely implicates yet more objects and processes, more brute facts, none of which adds anything to the 'necessitation' that such an account supposedly promised, and now requires. In the end, such forces depend on certain descriptions of them being translated into the vocabulary of QM (or some other branch of Physics), and hence into another set propositions expressing yet more brute facts. When asked why forces must do what they do (or even why a Field, say, is capable of making anything move) the only response possible is: "They just do.... It's just a fact about forces/Fields...". Indeed, as should seem plain, Differential Equations, Hamiltonians, Matrices and the Kronecker Delta can't actually move anything about the place, or even deflect a single particle from its path.
Moreover, the infinite regress (or "bad infinity") dialecticians hoped to avoid by appealing to 'internal contradictions' now simply reappears elsewhere in their theory. When it is fleshed-out, DM just relates objects and processes to yet more objects and processes (or yet more words about objects and processes), as well as to 'negations', 'opposites', and 'interpenetrations', and the like (i.e., yet more "brute facts" either about the world, or about how human beings are supposed (by dialecticians) to think or talk), 'internal' to other objects and processes.
In all this, the necessitation that was originally sought simply vanishes in an impenetrable mist of jargon (which leads "who knows where?"). In this regard, the logical/'rational' foundation for knowledge constructed by DM-advocates turns out to be no different in form from that concocted by traditional metaphysicians. In place of the reasons we were promised (i.e., the "why and the how" of things), all we find are yet more DM-objects and processes (or yet more words about objects and processes) -- except, these have now been shunted off into a mysterious, 'abstract' realm, fluffed-up with a handful of vague terms-of-art (like, "mediation", "unity in difference", "internally related", "thing-in-itself"), of convenient obscurity, all of which possess impressive Idealist credentials.
While DM-theorists promised the world a brand new set of explanations, all they have served up is a batch of shop-soiled goods imported from Traditional Philosophy comprised almost entirely of jargonised expressions, masking the 'brute facts' hidden beneath....
Despite this, how does Meikle tackle the problem of change? Indeed, how does he introduce opposition?
"The poles of an opposition are not just united. They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and exchange-value within it." [Ibid., p.26.]
Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted, it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, this is just another brute fact and not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe.
Even so, there are so many metaphors in this passage, it isn't easy to make much sense of it. Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has reified the products of social relations (use- and exchange-values, etc.), and in this reified state they have become the actual agents, with human beings (or, perhaps, commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the word "repel" here? Do they actually repel each other (like magnets, or electrical charges)? Or, do we do this because of the way we manufacture use values and then exchange them?
[And do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one another, as the DM-worthies assured us they must?]
Furthermore, how can the forms that underpin use- and exchange-value (i.e., the equivalent and relative form) provide an analogue of the forces Meikle mentions? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial conditions first -- the most important of which is that they should at least have the decency to exist. But, as we have seen, these two forms can't co-exist. Other than conceptually, how then can they repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other objects and processes to repel -- anything?
This is, of course, the unyielding rock upon which we have seen all such Idealist speculations founder.
It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thought about the simple commodity form. But, even there, they can't exist together, for if they could, they would not 'mutually exclude' one another! On the other hand, if they do genuinely "exclude" one another, we can't even think of them acting on one another, for if we do think this, we must, of necessity, misconceive them.
Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling match taking place in our heads, such that, when we think of the one, it elbows out of the way (out of existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we can declare equivalent form the winner over relative form by two falls to a submission (UK rules)?
Figure Two: Equivalent Form Slam Dunks Relative Form In A Skull Near You
Furthermore, even if they could exist together in thought, this wouldn't help, since it makes a mess of Meikle's appeal to de re necessities. This retreat into the Ideal leaves him with two seriously undernourished de dicto 'skeletons' to shadow box each other in place of the robust de re 'athletes' we had been promised all along.
It could be objected that the fact that something is a relative form excludes it from being an equivalent form. This is where the opposition arises; the one is the opposite of the other.
But, "opposite" is not the same as "oppositional", as we have already seen.
However, it could be argued that these are opposite poles of the same kind -- that is they both qualify the commodity form. But "commodity" isn't a specific term (unlike "domestic cat", which is species specific), it is generic (that is, it is a general term applying to many different kinds of commodity). We have also seen that if an organism is a tulip that excludes it from being an elephant without implying opposition, and "organism" is a generic term, too.
So, we still await the derivation of opposition from exclusion -- as opposed to the mere assertion that the former implies the latter (no pun intended).
Is there a way out of this dialectical ditch? Meikle thinks there is:
"But in its simple form, the commodity is an unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities, or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Ibid., p.26.]
It now seems that metaphor is all Meikle has to offer his bemused readers in his attempt to make this mystical process the least bit comprehensible. And it is quite clear where all this reification has led him: the commodity itself invented money, not human beings!
Or, perhaps even: the commodity form mesmerised human beings into inventing money.
Once again, on this view, we are the patients, while these metaphorical beings are the real agents of social change!
In which case, the Ideal constitutes the Real, as Idealists have all along maintained.
[There is a partial echo here of Leibniz's approach to "monads" (which he saw as a logical extension to Aristotle's concept of a substance (an ousia) -- on that see here, here, here, and here. We may think we control some events, but they control themselves. They are self-motivated beings, miniature intelligences, whose 'necessity' follows from the fact that they 'contain' every predicate that is, has been, or ever will be true of them. So, while we might think that commodities have value (exchange and/or use), because of the relationship they have with human activity, in reality, they possess intrinsic values which forces us to employ them in the way we do -- in this case, they coerced us into inventing money! As we will soon see, this interpretation of Meikle's theory is not as wild as it might at first sight seem.]
[Independently of this, we have already seen that this view of change can't work.]
Is there any way of re-configuring this theory so it can be rescued from the materialist shredder before the switch is thrown? Well, Meikle turns to Aristotle for assistance -- but before he does that he (in effect) concedes the truth of the above observation, for it seems that these value forms do indeed force us humans to do their bidding:
"This line of development is not accidental or fortuitous; it is not a process of aggregating contingent and extraneous additions. It is, rather, process of development of the potentialities within, and the increasing differentiation of, an original whole. If history does not block the growth of exchange activity, then that growth will find out the inadequacy of the simple form of value. Then, looked at from the point of view of efficient causation, those engaged in that activity, being rational and inventive in the face of the problems thrown up by their developing class interests, will act so as to solve their practical difficulties by measures that overcome that insufficiency to the requirements of their developing commerce. The solution to their practical problems is the money-form." [Ibid., pp.26-27.]
Now, this either means that those involved in the invention of money were the sad puppets of these (pre-existing) value forms, or they had a clear understanding of the nature of use- and exchange-value -- and one which was the equal of Marx, but more than two and a half thousand years before he was born! --, so that they could make the correct rational choices. Otherwise, how could these value forms exercise any sort of causal influence on those who invented money?
But, doesn't this pantomime make dangerous concessions to teleology, to final causation? No problem; Meikle tackles this unexpected difficulty head-on:
"Looked at from the point of view of final causation, money is the final cause of this phase of social development. This is not to say that final causation is a form of efficient causation in which the future acts on the past, such that the developed form beckons from the future to the past less developed form; rather, the embryonic entity has a structure that develops, if it develops, along a certain line. Thus, final causation and efficient causation, here, are not mutually exclusive but mutually supportive: the one explaining the emergence of the other, and the other the success and development of the one. What we have here is a development that, barring accidents, will take its course -- an evolution that is necessary; its final form immanent as a potentiality within its original one." [Ibid., p.27.]
And yet, this solves nothing, for, as we saw above, it seems to mean that some sort of plan or program must have been written into these value forms that determined how they should develop, rather like a fertilised egg or seed has a genetic code that we are told does likewise -- which suspicion is amply confirmed by Meikle's frequent use of embryonic language.
[That, of course, implicates this view of social development with other, well known ancient and mystical ideas connected with belief in the Cosmic or Orphic Egg (a topic briefly mentioned in Part One of this Essay, and again in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two, but more fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here). And, as we will see in a later re-write of Essay Eight Part Three, this is an anthropomorphic (Leibnizian or Hegelian) view of development.]
But, perhaps this is once again too quick, for Meikle now introduces the aforementioned Aristotelian concepts in order to neutralise this 'difficulty':
"The necessity that Marx sees in the line of development of the value-form is that which Aristotle contrasts with events that are 'accidental' and it is bound up with organic systems and Aristotle's conception of ousia. Where there is constant reproduction there is a whole system, an ousia." [Ibid., p.27.]
Meikle then quotes Stephen Clark in support:
"[E]verything that happens phusei, 'by nature', happens always or for the most part, but nothing that happens apo tuches, by 'chance', or apo tautomatou, 'just of itself', happens thus frequently. Therefore, no natural events are thus purely accidental, and therefore all natural events are non-accidental. But all non-accidental events are heneka tou, 'serve some purpose', are given sense by their ends.... The fact that rain is always being produced makes it impossible to doubt that there is an organic system here, and such systems are 'finalistically' identified. To answer the question 'what is it?' we must reply in terms of its natural line of development...genesis, the process of coming-to-be-, is what it is because ousia is what it is, and not vice versa." [Clark (1975), pp.60-61, quoted in Meikle (1979), pp.27-28. Italic emphases in the original.]
Once more, linguistic juggling like this fails to solve the problem, for the necessities pictured here work only if one is prepared to anthropomorphise nature. That is because as soon as it is asked why events can't proceed otherwise than they in fact do, it becomes obvious (from the above) that events must exercise some sort of control over others, directing them along the right "line" (which is why Meikle found he had to use that phrase) -- either that, or they develop in "line" with their entire concept, in accordance with the complete list of predicates that has somehow been programmed into them.
And this, too, is quite clearly the point of all that talk about "ends" and "purposes" in Aristotle and Leibniz's theories; they were part of an openly religious doctrine that Meikle just ignores, and which only work if nature is controlled by some 'Mind' or other, as Aristotle certainly believed -- or, it is populated with tiny minds 'programmed' to behave the way they do, as Leibniz imagined.
So, it is worth pointing out once again: dialecticians can only make their 'theory' seem to work if they adopt and/or copy the a priori thought-forms of boss-class thinkers (Aristotle (alongside Plato) is in fact one of the two most important figures in this respect, followed closely by Leibniz and Hegel). Meikle nails his colours firmly to this particular mystical mast: if nature has a purpose, as it had for Aristotle and/or Leibniz, then that implies the status quo ought/must be in harmony with it. And, if that is so, the status quo can't legitimately be challenged. In which case, the rule of the elite is not merely 'accidental', either, but serves some rational, god-ordained 'end'. [And we all know what that is.]
[The reader will no doubt now appreciate more fully why I asserted this back in Essay Two.
This topic was discussed at length in Essay Three Part Two, and the reader is referred there for more details. It will also be covered in Essay Three Part Five. The theoretical background to all this will be discussed in more detail in Essay Twelve Parts Two and Three (summary here).]
Of course, Meikle should have paid heed to Marx's warning not to take philosophical jargon seriously:
"...[A]nd even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him [Hegel]." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added.]
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
[More on that here, and here.]
Now, there are far better ways then this of making Das Kapital comprehensible; we don't need to appeal to mystical Hegelian, Leibnizian and/or Aristotelian concepts to make it work. [I will, however, leave that to another time.]
It might seem to some that an effective response to the above could be constructed along lines suggested by Roslyn Bologh:
"A contradiction occurs when a term refers to two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A. This is the case with the category, exchange value. It is both a use value and not a use value. A commodity has a calculable exchange value regardless of the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of any use value. Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a use value." [Bologh (1979. Italic emphasis in the original.]
However, Bologh's 'definition' of "contradiction" leaves much to be desired, and looks suspiciously like it was tailored to fit the example chosen -- in other words it is a persuasive definition. [On that, see here.] This definition is defective not the least because, and once again, we aren't told what these "A"s are. Bologh's example clears this up somewhat:
"This is the case with the category, exchange value. It is both a use value and not a use value." [Ibid.]
So, the contradiction appears to be this:
B1: Exchange value is both a use value and not a use value.
From this it appears that these "A"s are noun phrases (or what they supposedly designate). We had occasion earlier to point out that when these "A"s are interpreted as phrases (or what they supposedly designate), no contradiction is implied, but Bologh has circumvented that difficulty by putting them in a propositional context.
However, the other things she says only succeed in undermining the supposed status of B1 as a contradiction:
"A commodity has a calculable exchange value regardless of the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of any use value. Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a use value." [Ibid.]
This mean that B1 actually becomes this:
B2: An exchange value isn't a use value when it is being determined as an exchange value and it is a use value when that exchange value has to be realised.
In other words, it becomes:
B3: Exchange value is A at T1 and not A at T2 ( T2 > T1).
But, that is no more a contradiction than this is:
B4: Tony Blair was the UK Prime Minister but he no longer is.
For B1 to be a contradiction it would have to be this:
B5: Exchange value is both a use value and not a use value at the same time and in the same respect.
The following might assist the reader in more fully appreciating this point (partially quoted from here).
Added by a supporter of this site ('Nemesis'): At Marxism 1990, in separate meetings on dialectics I was given two, three minute impromptu slots in the discussion period at the end. It is only possible to make highly superficial points in such short intervals, which, because they challenge fundamental ideas, are quite easy to dismiss. However, the level of argument advanced in response to what I had said was quite lamentable....
In the refectory [later], I engaged in debate with Andy Wilson...who attempted unsuccessfully to explain what a 'dialectical contradiction' is. His example (that the revolutionary party both is and is not a part of the working class) was easy to dispose of as an undischarged ambiguity. That is, the revolutionary party is part of the working class in so far as..., while it isn't part of the working class in so far as.... (Readers can fill in the blanks according to their own theory of the party.) But this is no more a contradiction, let alone a 'dialectical contradiction', than this would be: Das Kapital is part of my personal library and not part of my personal library. It is part of my library in so far as I have a copy of the book on my shelves. But, it isn't part of my library in so far this particular book is not identical with any of its copies. For example, the actual book Marx wrote (in his own hand-writing) is not on my shelves.... [Compare this with the examples Rosa gives of ambiguous pseudo-contradictions in Essay Five.]
Filling in the missing "in so far as..." that Bologh omits, her example is really of this form:
B6: Exchange value is an A that is F and not an A that is G.
Where the "in so far as..." appears as follows:
B6a: Exchange value is an A in so far as it is F and not an A in so far as it is G.
Consequently, when the ambiguity in Bologh's original persuasive definition is discharged (in B6/B6a) we can see that no contradiction is implied.
Later in her book, Bologh repeated the above 'definition' in a slightly modified form:
"A contradiction occurs when a term means two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A. A contradictory form of life of life is a totality of opposing moments, moments that negate each other. This is the case with the commodity in the form of capital" [Ibid., p.64.]
As we saw above, it is not too clear how these "moments" succeed in "negating" each other. Does exchange value "negate" use value? Do objects actually become useless at any point in this process? Do objects that have a use cease to be exchangeable? Do they 'oppose' one another like the two wrestlers we saw above?
Bologh does try to explain what she means in the next few paragraphs, but they merely repeat what we saw above, only using more jargon.
In fact, Bologh's whole book is a classic example of a Marxist intellectual throwing Hegelian jargon, unintelligible phrases and dogmatic pronouncements at the page. Such convoluted prose is de rigeur in HCD circles. HCDs all dote this stuff and refuse to regard anything that isn't expressed in such prolix terms as 'genuine theory'. [On that, see here.]
In which case, it is still far from clear what either Meikle or Bologh (or Rees from earlier) mean by "dialectical contradiction", or how the latter can actually make anything change --, unless, that is, they think we should anthropomorphise nature and society, and read human traits into inanimate objects and processes at every turn.
I pick this theme up again in Essay Thirteen Part Three.
[On Quine, see Arrington and Glock (1996), Glock (2003), Hacker (1996), pp.189-227. See also this PDF (which is an essay on Quine's method written by Peter Hacker).]
71. Naturally, and once again, these comments will have to remain tentative until we are told what (if anything) DM-theorists mean by the phrase "dialectical contradiction". Since this ground has been raked over several times already, yet another pass here will be avoided.
72. Of course, someone might foolishly try to 're-define' their financial status by declaring that a bank balance of £5 ($8) was really one of £1,000,000 ($1,600,000). While this neat ploy might make an ideal millionaire out of a fake one, it would have no material impact on his or her finances (except, perhaps, negative).
Since the ordinary word "contradiction" already has a sense in everyday life, redefining it in ways that are unconnected with the latter similarly has no physical impact on reality, no matter how ideal a cure it might prove to be for one's ailing theory.
To be sure, it could be argued that dialecticians are at liberty to use words any which way they like, and that it isn't up to the 'thought-police' (such as the present author) to try to stop them.
As we saw above, DM-theorists can indeed use words as they please (not that they need my permission to do so), but they can't then claim connotations for these words that partially or wholly apply to other words that already have established uses, which theirs then try to emulate, import or replace. So, they are not at liberty to claim their use of "contradiction" is in any way connected with its ordinary use, or even with its employment in FL -- not without causing confusion (but, mercifully so far, only to themselves).
In that case, this novel use of "contradiction" needs to be explained -- since the connections this word once had with its supposed vernacular/FL-'twin' have long since been severed, leaving it adrift and, as yet, meaningless -- something that dialecticians have signally failed to do (after not trying all that hard for over 150 years).
And that is why I have been repeatedly asking for such clarification in this Essay. [More on this in Essay Twelve Part One.]
However, as a mater of fact, DM-apologists are not using this word in any which way they please. Their jargon has a chequered history behind it, which means that the words they use already possess a set of connotations, and one they had no hand in choosing. Just like those who use jargon associated with, say, the Christian Trinity (whose terminology (not surprisingly) emerged from the same wing of Neo-Platonism that gave life to Hegel's theories), dialecticians have imported this particular term-of-art (i.e., "contradiction") from Hermetic/Hegelian Philosophy, which plainly classifies DM as mystical Christianity's poor relation.
Dialecticians should feign no surprise, therefore, when they are accused of being mystics; because they can't explain what their words mean in comprehensible terms -- using the vernacular -- their terminology is as big a mystery to them as it is to anyone else.
[Those who think that ordinary language is far too limited to help out here should read this and this, and then think again.]
73. On this, see Note 70 and Note 72, above.
74. A genuine example of an "internal relation" might help here: if the meridian at Greenwich were to be abolished, the whole system of latitudes would automatically go with it. This is not at all like the elimination of poverty. Poverty will be eradicated not by destroying wealth, but by extending wealth -- and, of course, by abolishing class division (etc.).
It could be argued here that this misconstrues the nature of the link between poverty and wealth under Capitalism, turning it into something abstract that exists between two unchanging concepts. Contrary to this, dialecticians hold that wealth and poverty are dialectically linked --, and not just to each other. They are related to, and are constituted by the Mode of Production in which they occur. Hence, under Capitalism, wealth can't exist without the creation of poverty. To eradicate the latter, Capitalism must be abolished. In a fully socialist society, the present connection between wealth and poverty would vanish.
However, the link between them is still causal (wealth creates poverty under capitalism, and it does so for well-known historical, economic and social reasons); dressing these up in pseudo-logical finery can't change that fact -- even if it does succeed in mystifying something that has clear material/social roots.
But, even if this weren't so, none of it makes sense in DM-terms, since wealth and poverty do not "struggle" with one another, nor do they change into each other, which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed.
75. It could be objected that DM-theorists do not disagree with this, even though they maintain that these material forces are "dialectically inter-linked". Hence, no dialectician of any sophistication thinks that concepts can, of themselves, cause change or initiate struggle, only that the material roots of struggle are mediated by the ideas people form of their circumstances and the contradictory interests these generate.
Worded differently, this would not be inconsistent with anything written in these Essays, since it involves concepts drawn from HM.
Nevertheless, if the above is meant to illustrate the real meaning of F50, then we would once more have an example of the effects of the effects being used to explicate the action of a force, or set of forces. That impasse was discussed at length earlier.
F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.
However, dialecticians might object to the accusation that they believe that concepts enter into conflict with one another; they would surely point out this is how Hegel saw things. By way of contrast, they emphasise the fact that it is real people and real forces in the material world that conflict.
But, when the language dialecticians use is examined, this accusation (that dialecticians anthropomorphise nature and society by projecting human qualities onto both) forces itself upon us, once again. [On this see Note 70 above and Note 76, below.]
76. The details underlying this allegation will be set out in Essay Fourteen Part Two, when it is published (but see below).
Nevertheless, it could be argued once more that this assertion is unfair because it was in fact dialecticians who first pointed out that FL uses lifeless and dead concepts, and thus can't explain change.
However, the truth is that it is DM-theorists who employ concepts that come to life only if they are anthropomorphised, and are viewed as the abstract expression of conflict (i.e., in effect these are the fetishised analogues of social forms, as we have seen -- for example, in Note 70). This is revealed, for example, by their profligate use of words like "contradiction" and "negation" in connection with natural processes, and now in relation to social change (on this see Note 59b). In contrast, the rejection of this approach allows concepts to live by re-humanising them (but only in relation to social development), by revealing them for what they are: the conditioned products of social relations among human beings.
So, in HM, in place of the fetishised theses found in DM, we have concepts enlivened by human practice, expressed in the material language of ordinary life. In this way, it is possible for descriptions of the social world to become fully humanised -- a small but important step in the fight to make it fully human.
Once again, if this is regarded as unfair or inaccurate, the reader is referred back to Essay Three Part One (here and here), where the (ancient) linguistic moves underlying this pernicious form of Idealism were exposed, Essay Three Part Two, where the roots of this approach to theory were traced back to traditional ruling-class and Idealist forms-of-thought, Essay Two, where the dogmatic and Idealist nature of DM was unmasked, Essay Four, where the anthropomorphic nature of DL was highlighted, Essay Five, where the confused nature of the language Engels used (to depict motion) was laid bare, Essay Seven, where it was shown that the 'Three Laws of Dialectics' were based on a fetishised view of discourse, Essay Eight Part One, where further aspects of this anthropomorphic doctrine were uncovered, earlier sections of this Essay, where the application to nature of Hegelian concepts was shown to be openly animistic, and to Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here), where these sordid details are traced back to ancient, ruling-class doctrines that no self-respecting socialist, or materialist, should want to touch with someone else's bargepole.
Indeed, it has been a unifying theme of all the Essays posted at this site that the application to nature of concepts drawn from Hermetic Philosophy has branded DM as an Idealist/mystical theory, and further, that this has only succeeded in compromising the scientific status of HM. Anyone who still takes exception to the claim that dialecticians use animistic notions drawn from Hermetic Philosophy (where conflict is re-interpreted in linguistic terms, and then projected back onto nature and society) should express no surprise when this is where this sorry tale has in fact been heading all along.
The solution is, therefore, for recalcitrant comrades to stop complaining, and point their fingers in the right direction: at the DM-classicists who imported these ruling-class ideas into Marxism.
77. However, we need to consider events that are 'internally contradictory':
F58: Force P1 contradicts P2 in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (internally, or with one another).
F58a: Force P1 contradicts P2 in so far the event set that one or other produces (i.e., E3) is internally contradictory.
Given that one or more of the elements of E3 (or even E3 itself) could be 'internally contradictory', F58, or perhaps F58a, might allow the interpretation of 'contradictions' as opposing forces to stand.
Unfortunately, even if sense could be made of contradictory contemporaneous events, the link between forces and 'internally contradictory' sets of events would once again have been severed. Hence, even if F58 and F58a were completely acceptable, they would still fail to connect 'contradictions' with opposing forces, merely with the relationship between various effects of forces.
Now, let us suppose P1 and P2 operate as the above propositions indicate. In that case, in F58a, only E3 would take place/exist. If the latter was 'internally contradictory', presumably parts of it (i.e., sub-events of E3, say, E3i and E3k) would constitute the postulated 'internal contradiction'. In that case, F58a would collapse back into F58.
[Of course, if, as we are told, 'dialectical contradictions' are "mutually exclusive", then they can't co-exist. In which case, E3i and E3k can't co-exist, either, and so can't 'contradict' one another.]
On the other hand, if (all of) E3 was in this state because of its 'internally contradictory' dispositional properties, then this too would be an non-viable option, for reasons that have already been considered; see the discussion of F57 in the main body of this Essay.
However, as far as F58 itself is concerned, if one event prevents another from happening, no contradiction is implied since such a 'conflict' would have only one real term -- as noted several times already. [See, for example, Note 55.]
[Nevertheless, this might allow for the consideration of more complex examples allegedly drawn from HM. On this, see the discussion above, in Note 70.]
As far as events being 'internally contradictory' is concerned, we saw this was a dead-end, too, in Part One of this Essay.
It might be felt that "mutually exclusive" does not imply that the items involved can't co-exist. After all the capitalist class and the proletariat are mutually exclusive, but plainly they can, and do, co-exist.
However, as we saw earlier, dialecticians simply assume there is a link between "mutually exclude" and "oppositional"/"contradictory". But, many things in nature and society mutually exclude one another without implying a contradiction, or even "opposition". The reader is referred back to Note 70 for more details.
77a. The reference to "p and q", and "p and not p", in relation to F63 might seem a little obscure to some:
F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.
If "p" stands for, say, "E1 has been prevented from taking place" then "not p" must stand for "It is not the case that E1 has been prevented from taking place".
"Not p" can't therefore stand for "E1 is expected to take place".
Since the latter is clearly not of the form "not-p", "q" was used to represent this logically unconnected sentence.
78. The import of this claim is obscure at best, even if many physicists hold this doctrine true. However, since this idea seems to have no real bearing on the issues at hand, no more will be said about it here.
79. This alternative presents us with a tiny clue as to why it is that HM works just where DM self-destructs. Clearly, only human beings (as individuals or as members of classes) can form contradictory aims and intentions (even if these are sometimes only dimly perceived); plainly, therefore, this fact would allow F67 to be re-written in a way that makes it conducive to HM -- the exposition of which will not, alas, be attempted here.
80. To be fair, these problems afflict every account of causality found in Traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics), and not just DM. [This topic is discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three, and Essay Three Part Five.]
In that case, DM is simply the runt of the traditional, boss-class litter.
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