Essay Eight Part Two: Why Opposing Forces Aren't 'Contradictions'

 

Technical Preliminaries

 

Internet Explorer 11 will no longer play the videos I have posted to this page. As far as I can tell they play as intended in other Browsers. However, if you have Privacy Badger [PB] installed, they won't play in Google Chrome unless you disable PB for this site.

 

[Having said that, I have just discovered that they play in IE11 if you have upgraded to Windows 10! It looks like the problem is with Windows 7 and earlier versions of that operating system.]

 

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Preface

 

As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary thirty-five years ago.

 

The difference between Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained here.

 

In what follows, I have taken the results of Essay Eight Part One -- Change Through 'Internal Contradiction' -- for granted.

 

It is also worth pointing out that a good 50% of my case against DM has been relegated to the End Notes. Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence is to be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a little more smoothly. This means that if readers want fully to appreciate my case against DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have added numerous qualifications, clarifications, and considerably more detail to what I have to say in the main body. In addition, I have raised several objections (some obvious, many not -- and some that will have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments, which I have then answered. [I explain why I have adopted this tactic in Essay One.]

 

If readers skip this material, then my answers to any qualms or objections they might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments and clarifications.

 

[Since I have been debating this theory with comrades for well over thirty years, I have heard all the objections there are! (Many of the more recent debates have been listed here.)]

 

Furthermore, phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality", "ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (i.e., in connection with Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes actually invented these ways of thinking or of seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius). They are intended to highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise, the interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them. Up until recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run the system for the elite.**

 

However, that question will become the central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is directed here, here, and here for more details.

 

[**Exactly how this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays published at this site (especially here, here, and here). In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the argument -- but this time for absolute beginners -- here.]

 

Several readers have complained about the number of links I have added to these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply even to Essays that attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those who find such links do make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain topic fires your interest.

 

Others wonder why I have linked to familiar subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of recent Presidents of the USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of popular films, or certain words that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies', or any at all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them I will continue to provide.

 

Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links connect to web-pages that regularly change their URLs, or which vanish from the Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers informed me of any dead links they happen to notice.

 

In general, links to 'Haloscan' no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

As of February 2024, this Essay is just under 143,500 words long; a much shorter summary of some its main ideas can be accessed here.

 

The material presented below does not represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in progress'.

 

[Latest Update: 14/02/24.]

 

Quick Links

 

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(1) Forces And Contradictions

 

(a) Introduction

 

(b) Gravity Is Reassuringly Undialectical

 

(2) Is This An Apt Analogy?

 

(a) Is "Contradictory Force" Merely A 'Dialectical' Figure Of Speech'?

 

(b) Are 'Contradictions' Simply Mathematical Models?

 

(c) Are 'Contradictions' Properties Of Totalities?

 

(3) What Exactly Do Forces 'Contradict'?

 

(a) Different Types Of Force Couples

 

(b) AA-, And RR-Forces

 

(c) Interlude One: The Classical Problem Of Forces

 

(d) Interlude Two: Several Annoying Technicalities

 

(e) First Attempts At Clarification

 

(f) Interlude Three: Hamlet Without The Prince

 

(g) Interlude Four: Limit Or No Limit -- That Is The Question

 

(h) AR-Forces

 

(i) Interlude Five: 'Opposites'

 

(j) Interlude Six: Magnetic And Other Natural Forces

 

(4) A Contradictory Theory?

 

(a) Literal Forces In Opposition

 

(b) The Revenge Of The Non-Existent

 

(c) Interlude Seven: Further Complications

 

(d) Prevention And Its Discontents

 

(e) Interlude Eight: Tom Weston

 

(f) A Balanced Account Of Prevention?

 

(g) S&M?

 

(h) Hole To Let -- Previous Occupant Self-Destructed

 

(i) Interlude Nine: Objections Neutralised

 

(j) Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth

 

(5) Real Material 'Contradictions'?

 

(a) Sinking In Concrete

 

(b) Interlude Ten: Contradictions, Contradictions Everywhere!

 

(c) Rees, Ollman And 'Concrete Forces'

 

(d) The Impertinent Explanation

 

(e) Conflict Resolution

 

(f) Where The Shoe Pinches

 

(g) Not What The System Ordered

 

(h) An Apparent Contradiction, At Last!

 

(i) Interlude Eleven: Everyday Contradictions

 

(j) Opposite Tendencies I

 

(k) Opposite Tendencies II

 

(l) Interlude Twelve: Opposites, Again?

 

(m) Interlude Thirteen: Ordinary Language

 

(n) Interlude Fourteen: Contradictions In Das Kapital?

 

(o) Heilbroner To The Rescue?

 

(p) Is The Supposed 'Contradiction Between The Proletariat And The Capitalist Class' Even 'Dialectical'?

 

(q) Last Chance Saloon

 

(6) True Contradictions?

 

(7) Last Rites

 

(a) Dialectics In ICU

 

(b) Back To The Drawing-Board?

 

(c) 'Internally Contradictory'

 

(d) Dialectics And The Revival Of Teleology

 

(e) Coup De Grace

 

(f) For Dialecticians, Truth Is The [W]hole -- Alas, It's Six Foot Deep

 

(8) Notes

 

(9) Appendix A: Kant On 'Real Negation'

 

(10) Appendix B: Plato's Allegory Of The Cave

 

(11) Appendix C: DM-Fans Struggle To Explain Use Value And Exchange Value

 

(12) References

 

 

Summary Of My Main Objections To Dialectical Materialism

 

Abbreviations Used At This Site

 

Return To The Main Index Page

 

Contact Me

 

Forces And Contradictions

 

Introduction

 

In this Second Part of Essay Eight I intend to substantiate a claim advanced in Part One, which was that it isn't possible to equate 'contradictions' with 'opposing forces', either literally or figuratively. Hence, the aim is to sever the link that most dialecticians believe exists between opposing forces and 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

In Part Three, I will pose and then answer the question: What sense, if any, can be made of the term "dialectical contradiction"?

 

[Spoiler Alert: none whatsoever.]

 

[As with other Essays at this site, much of the material below has been deliberately restricted to the use of DM-terminology, the employment of which doesn't imply I accept its validity, or that it even makes any sense. It is only being used in order to assist in its demise.]

 

Be this as it may, Marxist dialecticians nevertheless continue to assert that 'dialectical contradictions' (in nature or society) may be understood as, or modelled by, the inter-relationship between "opposing forces". These forces allegedly condition one another, operating either in equilibrium or in disequilibrium, depending on the prevailing circumstances -- and, indeed, on exactly who is telling the tale. But, they also admit that this view of forces is only valid if it is backed-up in each case by a careful scientific and theoretical analysis of all the relevant issues, the results having been thoroughly and repeatedly tested in practice.

 

For example, here is Engels:

 

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter…. All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or another form of motion…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter…. Each separate movement strives toward equilibrium, and the total motion puts an end to the equilibrium...." [Engels (1976), pp.74-77.]

 

"So long as we consider things at rest and lifeless, each one by itself…we do not run up against any contradictions in them…. But the position is quite different as soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence. Then we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction…. [T]here is a contradiction objectively present in things and processes themselves, a contradiction is moreover an actual force...." [Ibid., pp.152-53.]

 

"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…. [This is] the negation of the negation…. [which is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal an the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Ibid., pp.179-80.]

 

"The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable…go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away…. [T]he transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative in the first instance in inorganic nature -- mechanical force and its complement, so-called potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism and chemical energy -- are different forms of manifestation of universal motion…. [W]e have now arrived at the point where we can demonstrate the interconnection between the processes in nature not only in particular spheres but also the interconnection of these particular spheres on the whole…by means of the facts provided by empirical natural science itself." [Engels (1888), pp.609-11.]

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.]

 

"All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else…. Hence, all attraction and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another…. Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on each other, that the separation and opposition of these poles exist only within their mutual connection and union...." [Ibid., p.72. Bold added.]

 

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance...." [Ibid., p.82.]

 

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature...." [Ibid., p.211. Bold added.]

 

"[A]ttraction is a necessary property of matter, but not repulsion. But attraction and repulsion are as inseparable as positive and negative, and hence from dialectics itself it can already be predicted that the true theory of matter must assign a place to repulsion as to attraction, and that a theory of matter based on mere attraction is false…. Equilibrium is inseparable from motion…. All equilibrium is only relative and temporary…. Motion of the heavenly bodies [is an] approximate equilibrium of attraction and repulsion in motion." [Ibid., pp.243-46. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

This is how Bukharin made the point:

 

"[T]he world consists of forces, acting many ways, opposing each other. These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases only. We then have a state of 'rest', i.e., their actual 'conflict' is concealed. But if we change only one of these forces, immediately the 'internal contradictions' will be revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, it will be on a new basis, i.e., with a new combination of forces, etc. It follows that the 'conflict,' the 'contradiction,' i.e., the antagonism of forces acting in various directions, determines the motion of the system…." [Bukharin (1925), p.74. Bold added.]

 

And here are Lenin's thoughts:

 

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

Here, too, is Stalin:

 

"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature." [Stalin (1976b), p.836, quoted from here. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

Veteran communist philosopher, Maurice Cornforth, argued as follows:

 

"If we consider the real, complex movements and interconnections of real complex things, then we find that contradictory tendencies can and do exist in them. For example, if the forces operating in a body combine tendencies of attraction and of repulsion, that is a real contradiction…. [C]ontradiction is the driving force of change…. [O]nly the presence of contradictions in a process…provides the internal conditions making change necessary…. The real universe is…full of contradictions -- the contradictions of attraction and repulsion studied by physics…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-95. Bold added.]

 

The author of TAR, John Rees, had this to say:

 

"The conservatism of Hegel's system is thus buried in his notion of contradiction. Contradictions in Hegel are merely intellectual contradictions to be resolved by merely intellectual methods…. The dialectic is therefore only a pseudo-dialectic; its contradictions are never those of opposed material forces capable of doing real damage or of effecting real progress…. Marx was, however, obliged to transform completely the terms of the dialectic when he altered its starting point from abstract concepts to real material forces…. The contradictions are no longer simply between concepts but between real, material forces…. Marx and Engels's dialectic is utterly different from Hegel's. It starts from real, material, empirically verifiable contradictions." [Rees (1998), pp.67-69, 83. Bold added.]

 

Here is leading Trotskyist theorist, the late George Novack:

 

"The unified process of development is the universality of the dialectic, which maintains that everything is linked together and interactive, in continuous motion and change, and that this change is the outcome of the conflict of opposing forces within nature as well as everything to be found in it." [Quoted in Green Left, 20/10/1993. I owe this reference to Petersen (1994), p.156. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Woods and Grant expressed themselves as follows:

 

"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction.... So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

 

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites.... The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

 

"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls.

 

"Attraction and Repulsion

 

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest. At the base of the atom are immense forces of attraction and repulsion.... Engels points out the universal role of attraction and repulsion:

 

'All motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion. Motion, however, is only possible when each individual attraction is compensated by a corresponding repulsion somewhere else. Otherwise in time one side would get the preponderance over the other and then motion would finally cease. Hence all attractions and all repulsions in the universe must mutually balance one another. Thus the law of the indestructibility and uncreatability of motion is expressed in the form that each movement of attraction in the universe must have as its complement an equivalent movement of repulsion and vice versa; or, as ancient philosophy -- long before the natural-scientific formulation of the law of conservation of force or energy -- expressed it: the sum of all attractions in the universe is equal to the sum of all repulsions.'

 

"In Engels' day, the prevailing idea of motion was derived from classical mechanics, where motion is imparted from an external force which overcomes the force of inertia. Engels was quite scathing about the very expression 'force,' which he considered one-sided and insufficient to describe the real processes of nature. 'All natural processes,' he wrote, 'are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world, and further from terrestrial mechanics, implies that only one part is active, operative, the other part being passive, receptive.'

 

"Engels was far in advance of his time in being highly critical of this notion, which had already been attacked by Hegel. In his History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks that 'It is better (to say) that a magnet has a soul (as Thales expresses it) than that it has an attractive force; force is a kind of property that, separate from matter, is put forward as a kind of predicate -- while soul, on the other hand, is this movement itself, identical with the nature of matter.' This remark of Hegel, approvingly quoted by Engels, contains a profound idea -- that motion and energy are inherent to matter. Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 71-72. Their reference is to Engels (1955), pp.95-96, 110. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

It is interesting to note in passing that Woods and Grant naively record Engels's approving reference to Hegel's depiction of magnets as having 'souls' while failing to notice its mystical implications. How could that notion -- i.e., 'having a soul' -- be given a 'materialist spin' aimed at putting Hegel's theory 'back on its feet'/'the right way up'? Presumably a soul is a soul, upside down or not.

 

Here, too, are Levins and Lewontin:

 

"What characterises the dialectical world, in all its aspects, as we have described it is that it is constantly in motion. Constants become variables, causes become effects, and systems develop, destroying the conditions that gave rise to them. Even elements that appear to be stable are in a dynamic equilibrium of forces that can suddenly become unbalanced, as when a grey lump of metal of a critical size becomes a fireball brighter than a thousand suns....

 

"This appearance of opposing forces has given rise to the most debated and difficult, yet the most central, concept in dialectical thought, the principle of contradiction.... For us, contradiction is not only epistemic and political, but ontological in the broadest sense. Contradictions between forces are everywhere in nature, not only in human social institutions.... [O]pposing forces lie at the basis of the evolving physical and biological world. Things change because of the action of opposing forces on them, and things are the way they are because of the temporary balance of opposing forces....

 

"The dialectical view insists that persistence and equilibrium are not the natural state of things but require explanation, which must be sought in the actions of the opposing forces.... The opposing forces are seen as contradictory in the sense that each taken separately would have opposite effects, and their joint action may be different from the results of either acting alone.... However, the principle that all things are internally heterogeneous directs our attention to the opposing processes at work within the object.... Thus systems are either self-negating (state A leads to some state not-A) or depend for their persistence on self-negating processes.

 

"We see contradiction first of all as self-negation. From this perspective it is not too different from logical contradiction. In formal logic process is usually replaced by static set-structural relations, and the dynamic of 'A leads to B' is replaced by 'A implies B'. But all real reasoning is takes place in time, and the classical logical paradoxes can be seen as A leads to not-A leads to A, and so on.... As against the alienated world view that objects are isolated until proven otherwise, for us the simplest assumption is that things are connected...." [Levins and Lewontin (1985), pp.279-87. Bold emphases alone added. Spelling altered to conform with UK English. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

Quotations like those given above (and in Note 1) can be multiplied almost indefinitely.1

 

Admittedly, such passages are often hedged about with numerous qualifications -- again, depending both on the context and the author in question -- but the overall message is reasonably clear.2

 

Nevertheless, my concern here isn't so much with whether these passages are consistent with one another, or even whether any attempt has (ever) been made to substantiate the sweeping generalisations they make with anything like adequate evidence -- or, indeed, any at all --, but with whether the claim that forces can be used to model, illustrate or explain 'dialectical contradictions' makes any sense at all.3

 

Gravity Is Reassuringly Undialectical

 

However, as we are about to find out, the identification of forces with contradictions is about misconceived an idea as anything else we have so far encountered in the DM-Grimoire -- that is, where any sense can be made of it.4

 

First of all, there here are several obvious 'difficulties' with the whole idea. For example, if the forces in a system are in 'conflict' -- and are thus 'contradictory' -- there would presumably have to be at least two of them, with both operational and both in opposition to one another (actually or potentially), for that to be the case. But, when we consider one of the most important and universal examples of motion in the universe -- i.e., the orbital trajectory of bodies in a gravitational field -- we find that in Classical Physics, at least, this sort of motion is governed by the operation of at most one force, which deflects the otherwise (assumed) rectilinear path of the body in question toward the centre of mass of the system it is affected by or is orbiting. So, if Classical Physics is to be believed, it isn't easy to see how such forces could be viewed as 'contradictions'.5

 

Admittedly, the picture just painted is highly simplified, for even in such circumstances there could be several forces operating on an orbiting body -- the resultant motion will therefore be a function of the vector sum of all the forces acting in, or on, the system. The point at issue here is that relative to the centre of mass of the orbiting body, motion isn't the result of two different sorts of forces -- those of attraction and repulsion -- but a consequence of just one (resultant) force. Hence, orbital motion (at least) is produced by the action of only one (resultant) force (in Classical Physics), and, plainly, if there is only one force, there can be no 'contradiction'. Now, since orbital motion implicates the overwhelming bulk of motion in the entire universe, this means that most of the latter can't be the result of any sort of 'contradiction'.

 

Furthermore, any secondary motion (resulting from the effect of other forces operating in the system), which happens to be superimposed on the primary action, only serves to complicate the above picture, it doesn't alter it. This extra activity might also be the result of other attractive -- but, not repulsive -- forces in Classical Physics (once more), which clearly affect the said resultant. While they might influence that resultant, they don't turn it into two or more resultants. [This topic, along with several other options, is examined again in more detail here.]

 

Nevertheless, it could be argued that the motion of such bodies around others is determined by the operation of the two forces of attraction that pass between them: body, A, attracts body, B, and B does likewise with A.

 

Even so, it is difficult to see how two attractive forces could be regarded as opposites or as 'contradictories' -- nor yet how they are supposed to be 'struggling' with each other. Anyway, Engels himself argues that oppositional forces are those of attraction and repulsion (even though he prefers their translation into different forms of motion), despite the fact that with respect to the vast amount of the bulk motion in the universe they seem to have little or no part to play. Not only that, but the motion of, say, planet, A, around, say, star, B, is caused by forces originating in B, not A. While, the forces originating in A may affect B, they don't affect A itself, or its motion around B.

 

It could be argued once more that the interconnected and reciprocal chain of effects in play between A and B show that such forces are dialectically-linked. Hence, on this view, B would affect A's motion while A reciprocates; this in turn alters B's motion, which must then affect A's movement, and so on. But, even then, these attractive forces don't confront each other as oppositional or as 'contradictory'. At best, such forces affect the motion of the two bodies in tandem, which motion in turn then affects any other forces in play, and so on. In fact, they appear to augment one another. On that basis, if we insist on anthropomorphising nature in this way, shouldn't we say (with more justification, too) that such forces aren't contradictory, they are in fact tautological?

 

[On that, see Note 38, below. See also Note 6b.]

 

Moreover, these attractive forces don't turn into one another, and they certainly don't imply each other, in the way that the proletariat is supposed to imply the capitalist class, where we are also told that the one can't exist without the other (although I have thrown that claim itself into considerable doubt here). So, whatever else they are, these forces can't be 'dialectical opposites'. Either that, or the DM-classics were seriously mistaken.

 

And, even if we take two such forces into account, it is their combination (in a resultant force) which causes, or which changes, the said motion.

 

Notwithstanding this, Thomas Weston has recently made a valiant attempt to find a 'second force' (or cause) in such cases -- which he locates in...'inertia'!

 

"In the classical mechanics pioneered by Newton, elliptical motion of a body will result if it is attracted to another 'central' body by a force inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them, provided that the body has an initial velocity that is not too large or too small, and not directly toward or directly away from the central body. This situation involves only a single force on the body, which, in the case of a planet orbiting the Sun, is the force of gravity. Gravity is not the only cause of this motion, however.

 

"An elliptical orbit is the result of two causes, which produce two tendencies of motion. One tendency results from the force directed toward the central body, which makes the body turn toward that central body. The second tendency is that of the body to continue in a straight line at a constant speed. This tendency is usually called 'inertia'. Inertia is not a force, since forces cause change in speed or direction, and inertia is the tendency not to change speed or direction. Inertia is a causal principle, as Newton recognised, calling it an 'innate force of matter'. He expressed this principle in his first law of motion, while forces are described in the second law. In elliptical motion, these two causes, gravity and inertia, are united by the physical fact that the mass responsible for inertia is proportional to the mass that gives rise to gravity. This fact is an important element in recognising the dialectical contradiction in elliptical motion." [Weston (2012), pp.6-7. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

One moment Weston tells us that inertia isn't a force, the next he quotes Newton to the effect that it is (or, to be more precise, it is "a force of matter")! However, nowhere does Weston explain how gravity and inertia can "struggle" with each other (whether or not they are, or they cause, opposing "tendencies"), or how they could possibly turn into each other -- which the DM-classics tell us they must "inevitably" do. Nor yet how this set-up is even a 'contradiction' to begin with! As is the case with other DM-fans, Weston simply helps himself to that word with no attempt to justify it.

 

Indeed, as Weston admits, Hegel himself argued that the orbital motion of a planet is governed by the operation of only one force:

 

"We must not therefore speak of forces. If we want to speak of force, then there is but one force, and its moments do not, as two forces, pull in different directions." [Hegel (2004), p.65. Italic emphasis in the original. Bold added.]

 

As noted earlier, it is difficult to see how a 'dialectical contradiction' can be cobbled together from only one force.

 

Another serious difficulty arising from Weston's attempt to shoehorn Marx's comments into this ill-fitting dialectical boot is the inconsistent way he uses the word "tendency". One minute "tendencies" aren't causes, but are caused by something else (in the first of the above passages, where it seems that an elliptical orbit "produce[s] two tendencies of motion"), next they are causes:

 

"Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely." [Weston (2012), p.17. I examine variations on this theme later on in this Essay.]

 

However, we have already had occasion to note that tendencies not only aren't, they can't be, causes. They are the result of causes.

 

Finally, Weston only mentions the TOR once (p.7, ftn.17), but even then he fails to notice that one of the components of the 'contradiction' here has been edited out of the picture; 'the force of gravity' has been replaced by motion along a geodesic. According to the TOR, we no longer have even one force operating here, we have no gravitational forces at all!

 

[TOR = Theory Of Relativity.]

 

In which case, post-Classical Physics offers even less assistance to DM-theorists in their endeavour to find a physical correlate for these 'contradictions' in nature. According to the TOR, all such motion is either a function of the topology of Spacetime (gravitational 'force' having been edited out of the picture), or it is the result of the body in question being situated in a tensor, vector, or scalar field, in as many dimensions of phase space as are deemed necessary and appropriate.6

 

As one of the standard textbooks on gravitation points out:

 

"Whatever aspect of gravity one measures, and however one measures it, one is studying the geometry of space-time." [Misner, et al (1973), p.400. Bold emphasis added. (This links to a PDF.)]

 

One history of the concept of force also points out:

 

"In Newton's theory the symbol F in F = ma refers to the cause of the acceleration of the body. Force, then, is an external agent that acts on matter with an inertial mass m, causing it to accelerate at the rate a. In the GTR [General Theory of relativity -- RL], however, there is no external force. Indeed, Einstein was able to derive Newton's equation F = ma from purely geometric considerations. He saw the possibility that all 'external' forces may be only apparent -- that the 'effect' of other matter may be representable by a generalization of the geometry of space-time that describes the motions." [Stinner (1994), p.84. Bold emphases added. (This links to a PDF.)]

 

 

Video One: Why Gravity Isn't A Force

 

Even in Classical Hamiltonian Mechanics, such forces have been edited out of the picture, replaced by dynamical considerations -- indeed, along lines later suggested by Engels himself.

 

Once again, if there are no such forces, there can be no DM-'contradictions', so conceived.

 

[On this, see Goldstein, et al (2002), pp.34-36, and Jammer (1999), pp.158-264.]

 

And, that isn't just the case with respect to gravity, as physicist, Max Jammer, notes:

 

"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates.... In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v. Paragraphs merged; links and bold emphasis added.]6a

 

Even Woods and Grant acknowledge this fact:

 

"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]

 

However, and despite what those two say, it is reasonably clear that a mere "relation" between two bodies is incapable of making either of them move -- unless there were a 'force' of some sort operating between them, or, indeed, something else consequent on that relation, such as a time-based trajectory along a "world-line", perhaps(?) to bring it about.6b

 

Unfortunately, this means that most (if not all!) of the bulk motion in the universe can't be accounted for by DM (that is, if such motion, or, change of motion, is the result of 'contradictions' interpreted as opposing forces). Again: if there is only one force present -- or perhaps even none at all! -- there can't be any 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with.

 

Admittedly, Engels made a weak attempt to solve the orbital 'problem' by inventing a repulsive force, which he implausibly identified with "heat" (for example, Engels (1954), pp.73-80).7

 

[I haven't reproduced those passages here since they are far too long. The reader is invited to check for herself what Engels has to say to see if I have either misrepresented him or have missed something.]

 

Nevertheless, it is far from clear what Engels was driving at in that section. If he meant to say that heat operates as a repulsive force then that would have been a desperate and unconvincing dodge. Not only do cold bodies have satellites (e.g., Neptune), hot bodies swallow matter up all the time. However, it is possible that Engels simply copied this idea off several theorists working in the previous century. [Hesse (1961), Williams (1980).]

 

Admittedly, Engels considered other repulsive forces that could operate in a planetary system, but his ideas weren't just speculative and fanciful, they were manifestly ad hoc. I can find no evidence that anyone else -- DM-fan or otherwise -- has followed up on, or has developed any of these ideas in the intervening years.

 

For example, Engels appealed to the original repulsive properties of the "individual particles of the gaseous sphere" from which the Solar System was formed (as a result of "contraction"), to account for its origin by means of an "interplay of attraction and repulsion." [Ibid., pp.73-74.]

 

It would be difficult to find a better example than this of how the 'dialectical method' has been imposed on nature, not deduced from the phenomena. And we can assert that with some confidence. Even if this 'theory' weren't so obviously fanciful, it certainly couldn't have been deduced from the phenomena since the alleged incidents took place billions of years ago. Admittedly, there might have been theoretical considerations that recommended these ideas to Engels as a tentative 'explanation' of how the Solar System could have formed -- although even that is questionable since Engels explicitly based his theorising on the old Kant-Laplace model, itself nearly a century old in his day. But, even granting all this, Engels's account is superficial, impressionistic and lacks both mathematical and evidential support. It was clearly motivated by his desire to find some force -- any force -- to counterbalance gravity just because DM requires it, not because the phenomena dictate it -- rather like Thomas Weston, in fact. This is a classic example of Engels using the concepts he inherited from Hegel as a dogmatic "form of representation", and, as we will see, a thoroughly confused one into the bargain.

 

Of course, scientists employ formal devices like this all the time, but Engels turned this particular example into a non-sensical metaphysical thesis.

 

[The difference between Metaphysics and Science will be discussed in Essay Thirteen Part Two. On Metaphysics and DM, see Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

Indeed, Einstein himself wasn't above inventing forces to suit his theory (the same was also the case with Newton cf., Cohen (1970) and Jammer (1999), pp.116-57), introducing "the cosmological constant" to account for the fact that the Universe hasn't collapsed in on itself, an idea which has now morphed into Dark Energy. [Cf., Lerner (1992), pp.131-32.] There are countless examples of moves like this in the history of science. Thomas Kuhn called them "paradigms" if or when they gained some traction. [On that, see Kuhn (1970, 1996), and Sharrock and Read (2002).]

 

Incidentally, an appeal to so-called 'centrifugal forces' ("fictional forces" found in Classical Physics) won't save Engels's theory either, since they don't 'exist'. If anything they are the result of misleading shorthand for the way that rectilinear, tangential motion will resume if a force responsible for centripetal acceleration ceases to operate for whatever reason, subjectively experienced in certain rotating systems.

 

John Molyneux also weighed in with the following comment:

 

"If anything (a grain of sand, a mountain, a tree, a fish, a human, a society) gives the appearance of stability and permanence it is because it constitutes a particular moment in a longer process of change. That moment constitutes a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change -- a unity of opposites; much as the earth's, or any planet's, orbit around the sun represents a balance between the force of gravity pulling it into the sun and the momentum which would send it flying off into space." [Molyneux (2012), pp.44-45. Bold added.]

 

Once again, if the TOR is correct, there is no force of gravity.

 

Even supposing there were such a force, in Molyneux's scheme-of-things it isn't balanced by an opposing force, just "momentum", which can in no way be interpreted as a, or even the, 'dialectical opposite' of the force of gravity. [The significance of that particular comment (i.e., why there has to be a unique opposite for each object or process -- something Hegel and Lenin called its "other") is explained here.] But, even if this attempt to impose dialectics on nature could be made to work, or was in any way plausible, and "momentum" was a/the 'dialectical opposite' of the force of gravity, the following aspect of Molyneux's theory would still fail to work:

 

"That moment constitutes a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change -- a unity of opposites...." [Ibid.]

 

What are the opposing forces internal to the Earth that make it orbit the Sun? Or, the internal forces in the Sun that make the Earth orbit it? Molyneux is surprisingly silent on this issue.

 

Of course, it could be replied that these opposites are internal to the Sun-Earth pair, or perhaps even the Solar System itself. But, as we have seen, there are no opposing forces there either! Nor are there any relevant united 'opposites'. And, even if there were, which of them is providing:

 

"a particular balance between forces within it working for and against change...." [Ibid.]

 

Is gravity the cause of change, or is it opposing it? Is "momentum" opposing change, or creating it? Is the 'dialectical union' of these two doing one or the other?

 

[See also my earlier comments about a Thomas Weston's recent attempt to recruit inertia, but not momentum, to the cause.]

 

Moreover, are we really supposed to believe that gravity "struggles" with momentum? Or that they turn into one another (as the DM-classics tell us they should)? In what way does momentum imply gravity, which it should do if they form a UO (rather like the proletariat is said to imply the capitalist class, and vice versa)?

 

As usual, in books and articles on DM, we are presented with what are in effect less than half-formed thoughts and off-the-cuff musings, which don't make sense even in their own terms.

 

Is This An Apt Analogy?

 

Is "Contradictory Force" Merely A 'Dialectical' Figure Of Speech?

 

In view of the above, it might be wise to interpret "opposing forces" exclusively as 'figurative contradictions' -- or, maybe, the other way round, interpreting 'dialectical contradictions' solely as 'figurative forces'. Either one or both of these might then form part of an analogical, or perhaps even metaphorical (but non-literal), depiction of nature and society. Alternatively, forces could be described as 'contradictions' as a sort of shorthand, which would then enable the modelling of different types of accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right. Indeed, Engels seems to have had that in mind in the passage quoted below, where he argues that attraction and repulsion shouldn't be regarded as forces, but as simple forms of motion. This major theoretical retreat perhaps recommended to him by his admission that the concept of "force" was originally derived from ancient animistic/mystical theories of nature, hence its use in DM would smack of anthropomorphism:8

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion...." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appears] as a resistance." [Ibid., p.82. Bold emphasis added.]

 

However, the above revision had two untoward consequences Engels appears not to have noticed:

 

(1) It makes his version of DM look even more positivistic that it might already seem -- at least as Engels presents it in DN. If an appeal to forces in nature is no more than a shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then, plainly, forces will have no real counterpart in nature (since, of course, they have just been edited out of the picture!). Forces would then be little more than "useful fictions", introduced in order to account for the phenomena, instrumentally -- rather like the epicycles of Ptolemaic Cosmology. This would make the identification of forces with 'contradictions' even more problematic (as will be demonstrated below). Once again: if there are no forces, there can be no DM-'contradictions'.

 

[DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954); UO = Unity of Opposites.]

 

(2) Given this re-write of the word "force", the supposed 'contradictory relationship' between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative motion. [Woods and Grant also seem to be thinking along those lines, as we saw earlier.]

 

Unfortunately, in that case, there would be no interconnection between any of these moving bodies, which appears to be an essential factor required by other DM-principles -- for instance, where we are told that everything is "interconnected". The alternative put forward by Engels clearly means that causal interactions of this sort are in fact external, not mediated by forces, and thus can't be internally inter-conditioned. In which case, the 'unity-in-opposition' between objects and processes in the Totality has been broken; the thesis that change is the result of 'internal contradictions' would then be left without any sort of internal, mediating factors. [This confusion was analysed in much more detail in Part One.]

 

Not even the relative motion between bodies travelling in opposite directions could supply a credible dialectical connection in this case -- should an interaction result from this. Without question, this would fail to capture the "internal relations" that DM-theorists claim must exist between such bodies. Once more, objects behaving like this wouldn't be internally interrelated (as part or parts of a UO, the one wouldn't imply the existence of the other, as they should if there were a dialectical relation at work, unlike the relation that is supposed to exist between the proletariat and the capitalist class), since the connection, or mediation, between moving bodies is now missing. In that case, any subsequent interaction would appear to be difficult to account for dialectically, which would be, to state the obvious, bad news for DM-fans.9

 

As already noted, with events and processes sealed-off from each other DM would begin to resemble CAR and 'crude materialism' all the more. Indeed, if this is how DM is supposed to be interpreted, it would differ from 'crude mechanical materialism' in name alone.

 

[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism; follow the above link for more details.]

 

Of course, even if Engels's version of DM could account for motion along a certain line of action -- but in diametrically opposed directions --, it would be of little help because most of the bulk motion in the universe isn't of this sort; it is either orbital motion under the action of a central force, or it is movement along a geodesic (depending on which version of modern Physics one accepts). In fact, as we will see, matter in general moves in complex ways which are difficult, if not impossible, to depict in such crude oppositional terms.

 

Like it or not, DM-theorists need real material forces acting between bodies so that their "Totality" has the holistic, or mediated, integrity we are told it possesses. A theoretical fiction like this is no use at all. If DM is to work, forces must exist, and any reference made to them as 'contradictions' must be concrete and literal, which in turn means that interacting bodies, or even these forces themselves, are 'internally-related' to each other.10

 

Naturally, this exposes an ambiguity brought out by these two questions:

 

(i) Are forces related to each other 'dialectically' -- so that they are 'dialectical opposites' of one another, and their relation is what forms the 'contradiction' here? Or.

 

(ii) Are the bodies and process involved dialectically related to one another?

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here:

 

(a) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(b) Between the forces operating in the system? Or,

 

(c) Both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep it in mind.

 

Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as 'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by dialecticians that what they are offering is an 'objective' account of nature. It isn't easy to see how figurative language is capable of filling the gaps in an explanation of the relationship between objects and processes in the material world -- at least, no more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:

 

"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks? It is the east, and Juliet is the sun." [Romeo and Juliet, Act Two, Scene Two.]

 

Or, indeed, no more than would describing a man as a "pig" imply he has a curly tail, four legs and was a convenient source of bacon.

 

Despite this, in view of the above difficulties -- and in addition to those that will be examined below --, interpreting forces figuratively might prove to be the only viable way that contradictions could be 'interpreted' as 'forces', even if it compromises DM's avowedly 'objective' picture of reality.11

 

Of course, if this view of the nature of forces were to be adopted by dialecticians, it would be difficult to distinguish their theory from a 'poetic' version of Instrumentalism or Conventionalism.

 

On the other hand, it is difficult to see how 'figurative forces' could account for anything. What sort of explanation would it be to say that contradictions -- already suspiciously figurative themselves -- can be modelled by forces, which are themselves just figures of speech? Once more, describing a man as, say, a "pig" might perhaps account for his crude behaviour (but not because his anatomy or physiology is literally pig anatomy or physiology), but the utility even of that metaphor would be virtually nil if it were now admitted that the word "man" was figurative, too. Unlike iterated negation, multiple tropes don't undo each other.

 

Nevertheless, even if this proved to be an acceptable resolution of Engels's problem, it would still fail to provide DM-theorists with a viable way out of this impasse. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation of DM-'contradictions' with forces in nature or society can't work.

 

That is so for several reasons --, to which I now turn.

 

'Contradictions' As Mathematical Models?

 

The first of these is connected with the way that forces are already represented. for example, in Mathematics and Physics, which doesn't appear to be an even remotely appropriate way of depicting DM-contradictions as literal forces. Consider the following:

 

(a) Forces often operate according to an inverse square law. It is difficult to see how the same could be true of contradictions. Presumably, two objects, states of affairs, or processes contradict each other in nature or society or they don't.12 Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a contradiction could operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its oppositional elements is doubled. Do bosses really become more conciliatory if workers walk away from them? Or if the local trade union offices are moved to a new location ten miles further away? Does wealth cause less conflict if the rich stash their money to the Cayman Islands? Do appearances 'contradict' reality any the more -- or less -- if someone used a microscope, or pressed their face against the surface of an object?13

 

Indeed, little sense can be made either of the idea that there is a literal separation distance between components of DM-'contradictions'; for instance, that there is, or could be, a separation distance between Capital and Labour, or that there might be a literal gap between the forces and relations of production, or even between an object and itself as it moves in a 'contradictory' sort of way. What could it possibly mean to suggest, for example, that the "contradiction between use value and exchange value" changes if these two terms (or the commodities to which they are supposed to apply) are moved further apart? Clearly, these two 'entities' can't be separated (except perhaps in thought), since they aren't the sorts of thing that could be physically moved away from, or even closer to, each other -- but even if they could, they would still be just as contradictory as they were before they had been moved (one presumes?). And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote magnitude unaffected by such changes.

 

Admittedly, dialecticians speak about the "contradictions" in the capitalist system "intensifying", but that isn't because the 'separation distance' between the relevant classes has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists think they mean by "intensification" here (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions" become more obvious, intractable, or crisis-ridden), they certainly don't mean it in the same way that physicists mean it when they talk about, say, the strength of a force field intensifying. Nor has there ever been any mathematics applied in such DM-goings-on. So, while a scientist, for example, might be dispatched to measure the intensity of forces in the earth's crust prior to an earthquake (as part of a genuine scientific research programme), no one, it seems, has ever been asked to do the same with these "intensifying" 'dialectical contradictions'. They (or at least their 'strength') appear to be permanently locked in subjective space, stubbornly resistant to scientific investigation.

 

Be this as it may, what sense can be made of the other 'contradictions' alleged to exist in nature? For instance, can a moving object be more 'contradictory' than it used to beat any point along line of action? Increasingly here and not here? Or increasing and not increasing at the same time? Perhaps an object can be In more than two places at once, as it accelerates? Maybe an electron can be more of a particle and a wave, at the same time? Is it possible for 'appearances' to 'contradict' underlying 'essences' more today than last week? Anyone who thinks they can, please email me the numbers, along with the details of the experiment(s) you performed or the measurements you took in order to ascertain them.

 

(b) Forces in nature can be (and are) represented by vectors, the use of which is governed by well-understood rules. As such, for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added, subtracted and multiplied (to give inner, vector or scalar triple products, and the like), by means of which diverse quantities such as areas, volumes, field densities, boundary fluxes (etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors may be parallel or orthogonal to one another, or to previously defined axes, just as they can be decomposed into their components and projected onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can also be used to identify and classify the mathematical properties of various manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined in a given vector space, providing it with a base and spanning set. Modulii can be ascertained for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can also be determined. Furthermore, matrices may be employed to represent vectors more efficiently, their determinants and inverses ascertained (where they exist). The ordinary and partial derivatives of vectors can also be calculated, and they can be integrated (as part of line, surface or volume integrals), too, and so on.

 

It is difficult to see how any of the above (and many more besides) could possibly be the case with a single DM-'contradiction', interpreted literally or figuratively as a force. What, for example, is the angle between the 'contradictions' mentioned on the opening pages of TAR:

 

"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction…. Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line? The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2. Paragraphs merged.]

 

And, while we are at it, what is the cross product of the following 'contradictions' (mentioned in Socialist Worker)?

 

"Elvis's career illuminated a contradiction at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism needs to generate profits in order to survive. But to suck profit out of workers it also needs an ideology to ensure that workers know their place in society...." [Ian Birchall, Socialist Worker, 14/08/2007.]

 

"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers. It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to the strikers.... Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence. Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.' Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Simon Basketter, Socialist Worker, 01/09/2007. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]13a

 

Is it possible to find the inner product of the 'contradiction' between freedom and necessity? Is there an eigenvector applicable to the 'contradiction' between 'appearance' and 'underlying essence'? Is there any way of specifying the extent to which bosses and workers -- Capital and Labour -- contradict one another, individually or as a class? If so, what is the modulus of the 'contradiction' between boss NN and worker MM -- or, between the classes to which they belong? Is the 'contradiction' between ice and water orthogonal to…, well, what?

 

But, what of the div, curl and grad of the 'contradiction' between a grain of barley and the plant that grows from it? Can we ascertain the Jacobian for the contradictory relationship between wealth and poverty? Is the 'contradiction', between "John" and his "manhood" normal to a given direction or manifold?

 

In her otherwise excellent book, Lindsey German had this to say:

 

"The Working class has to have a party to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle by an organised minority…." [German (1996), p.87.]

 

If contradictions were indeed literal forces, we would be able to ascertain, say, the i, j and k components of "the contradiction between [the] potential revolutionary role [of the working-class] and its actual situation", differentiate it/them, and find out how quickly this link was changing, and in what direction.14 The fact that we can't do this -- and no sane Marxist has ever even so much as suggested this was a possibility -- implies that in practice not even DM-fans think this analogy is at all apt, or, indeed, is all that literal.

 

Plainly, if 'contradictions' could be interpreted literally as forces, it would be possible to construct a vector algebra depicting them in nature and society. Do we possess such a 'Vector Algebra of Revolution'? Has anyone ever bothered to construct one?

 

Given the title of his book, the author of TAR was mysteriously silent about this.14a

 

It could be objected that social contradictions were never meant to be interpreted in this crude and inappropriate manner, as vectors (etc.). Maybe not, but this section of the Essay is trying to make some sort of sense of the equation of forces with contradictions, and forces certainly can be represented by vectors. If it isn't possible to represent social forces in this way, then all well and good. But, in that case, we are still no nearer understanding what these 'social contradictions' are, or in what way they can be described as, or be illustrated by, forces. In fact, we are now further away!

 

Also in doubt is exactly how something that actually exists (i.e., the current state of the working class) can 'contradict' in a 'dialectical' sort of way (involving forces) something that does not exist (i.e., the proletariat's potential revolutionary role, as Lindsey German characterised it). We have already seen that dialecticians use the word "contradiction" almost ad nauseam in inappropriate circumstances to depict things that seem quirky, odd, paradoxical, contrary to expectations, and so on -- almost as the mood takes them. [On that, see, for instance, here and here.]

 

"The Working class has to have a party to overcome the contradiction between its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation. To overcome this contradiction requires a conscious struggle by an organised minority…." [German, op cit.]

 

What Lindsey might have had in mind in the above passage is that there is what seems to be a contradiction in revolutionary theory, which depicts the proletariat as the revolutionary class, but it does so in the face of the undeniable fact that workers are often quiescent or compliant (or relatively so) for long periods. But, this is no more a contradiction than it would be if, say, we heard that a heavy object near to the surface of the earth didn't actually fall to the ground. As soon as we learnt that this heavy object was held in place by pillars, cables or magnets, the phenomenon would puzzle us no more.

 

Three questions worth posing in relation to this are the following:

 

(i) Do the above factors struggle with each other?

 

(ii) Do they change into one another (as the DM-classics assert they should)? And,

 

(iii) Do they imply one another (like, say, the proletariat implies the bourgeoisie -- although I have thrown even that inference into considerable doubt here)?

 

The answer is surely in the negative in each case. That being so, whatever else it is, what Lindsey mentioned isn't a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

It could be replied that there is a struggle going on in the working class. Maybe so, but there isn't one going on between "its potential revolutionary role and its actual situation". One of these at least is an abstraction which can't struggle with anything. And are they changing into one another?

 

Another moral here is that no law in Physics is 'true' on its own; each one is hedged about by all manner of ceteris paribus (i.e., "all things being equal") clauses. [On this, see Cartwright (1983). However, there is  a forceful rebuttal to this way of seeing things here. See also Earman, et al (2002), and van Brakel (2000), pp.151-69. Naturally, it would be out of place to pursue that topic any further in this Essay; it will be discussed in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

In that case, and analogously, as soon as we know what is holding the working class back, the above puzzle also disappears.

 

Hence, Lindsey German's worry about overcoming this 'contradiction' can now be shelved -- since there isn't one.

 

Naturally, that doesn't mean that socialists should just let things drift, fail to intervene, or, indeed, sit back and wait for workers to organise themselves, but since further consideration of this topic would take us into areas involving HM, no more will be said about it here (for reasons set out in Essay One).

 

Properties Of Totalities?

 

The second reason why this is an inappropriate way to depict 'contradictions' is in fact connected with a possible response that could be made to the objections outlined above: it could be argued that it is the inter-relationship between contradictory forces that explains change, and hence it is only within a network of forces situated in a Totality of some sort that their contradictory inter-play becomes clear. Indeed, it could be maintained that the above interpretation of contradictions (which seems to picture them isolated from their surroundings) completely misconstrues their role in DM, as well as their operation in nature and society.

 

The above volunteered objection was in fact considered in Part One of this Essay -- but from a slightly different direction (no pun intended) -- where it was pointed out that there are serious ambiguities in DM on this issue. That is because dialecticians are unclear whether 'contradictions':

 

(a) Are internal to objects and processes, causing them to change as a result of an internal dynamic,

 

(b) Arise externally between objects as they form part of a mediated system, group of systems and processes,

 

(c) Merely result from our description of objects and processes as 'contradictory', this perhaps arising from our partial or relative knowledge of reality, etc.,

 

(d) Derive from a combination of all three

 

Or, indeed, whether they,

 

(e) Emerge because of some other factor about which we are currently unaware.

 

This confusion is further compounded by the fact that in the hands of DM-theorists the meaning of "internal" oscillates erratically between "spatially internal" and "logically internal".

 

And, as we also saw in Part One, while each of the above options faces serious difficulties of its own, in the end they all fail to explain change because they merely re-describe it, and they do so in a thoroughly obscure manner. That is why they fall apart so readily when examined closely (as we will see is also the case with the equation of forces and 'contradictions' in what follows).

 

In response, it could be argued that the problem with the analysis of dialectical systems promoted in these Essays is that it attempts to 'objectify' contradictions (i.e., it endeavours to make objects out of them). Hence, it could be countered that in Materialist Dialectics it isn't 'objects' that are subject to contradictions -- or which contain them, or which constitute them --, but systems, or totalities, in change that reveal their inner contradictions, and which motivate further development. In that case, it could be maintained that contradictions are properties of systems, or totalities, in the process of change, not 'objects' as such.

 

In reply to these volunteered DM-responses, it is worth asking where this leaves forces if contradictions are no longer to be viewed as 'objects' or as 'object-like'. Forces presumably have a physical form of some sort. They aren't just relations, are they? Furthermore, this response makes a mockery of many things the DM-classicists themselves say about change. Here is Lenin, for example:

 

"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Italic emphasis added.]

 

[Numerous similar-looking quotations were added to Part One of this Essay.]

 

It could be objected that this misrepresents Lenin, since he went on to argue as follows:

 

"The gist of his [Bukharin's -- RL] theoretical mistake in this case is substitution of eclecticism for the dialectical interplay of politics and economics (which we find in Marxism). His theoretical attitude is: 'on the one hand, and on the other', 'the one and the other'. That is eclecticism. Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces. I have shown this to be so on the example of politics and economics....

 

"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world.... Formal logic, which is as far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring, and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing more.

 

"Dialectical logic demands that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly, dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel. (Let me add in parenthesis for the benefit of young Party members that you cannot hope to become a real, intelligent Communist without making a study -- and I mean study -- of all of Plekhanov's philosophical writings, because nothing better has been written on Marxism anywhere in the world.)" [Ibid. pp.90-93. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

From this it is clear that Lenin in fact argued that an understanding of the inter-relation between an object and the rest of the world was essential to comprehending that object's contradictory development. [I have discussed this topic in much more detail here and here.]

 

Or so it could be argued.

 

[This response creates problems of its own, which will be discussed presently.]

 

But, even if forces were just relations, it is far from easy to see what it is that could possibly physically relate objects and processes in nature and society in this way -- that is, over and above the gratuitous insertion of a few Hegelian 'concepts' (of dubious provenance and even more questionable content).

 

Indeed, in all this, it seems that the idea that objects change because of an 'inner dynamic' has been lost sight of again. If objects change only because of a set of external forces -- albeit, which forces might also be internal to a system of some sort, mediated, or not, by the yet-to-be-explained 'influence' of the "Totality" --, this can only mean that "external" has now become the new "internal". In that case, "internal contradictions" have now in effect become factors that an object merely experiences as part of its external relations with other objects and processes (which are, in turn, internal to the "Totality"). But, once more: what is the point of arguing that change is "internally-motivated" if external mediation is the only show in town, and forces are merely "relations"?

 

[As we will see in Essay Four Part Two (when it is published), these "relations" are supposed to be 'logical' (in a quasi-Hegelian sort of sense), but they are no less bogus for all that. Until then, readers are redirected here.]

 

Before we proceed, my I remind readers of something that was pointed out several sections ago?

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here:

 

(a) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(b) Between the forces operating in the system? Or,

 

(c) Both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep it in mind.

 

We are now about to find out why.

 

In addition, the proffered DM-response outlined a few paragraphs back fails to resolve the problems also mentioned earlier.

 

First of all, as we will also see in Essay Eleven Part One, there is good reason to question the nature of the nebulous DM-"Totality" -- or, to be more honest, there would be if we knew what 'it' was, and there was some sign that dialecticians themselves knew what 'it' was! Its re-appearance here can only hinder comprehension.

 

Secondly, even if a clear account of the "Totality" were forthcoming, this way of depicting forces would still fail to work. If contradictions are properties of totalities -- as opposed to their parts -- then those parts couldn't change, since, on this account, contradictions wouldn't belong to them, but to the whole, taken as a whole. In that case, while the whole might change, it would do so only as a result of the rearrangement of its changeless parts. Given this way of thinking, the "Totality" (or, indeed, any sub-system of the "Totality") would be:

 

(a) Composed of infinitely small changeless elementary particles, or,

 

(b) Composed of infinitely complex further sub-systems, which enjoy no connections among themselves. [The reader is referred back to Part One for a more detailed explanation of this point.]

 

Again, it could be objected that a Totality is constituted by its own internal contradictory relations and processes. That is precisely what a Totality is -- a contradictory, differentiated unity. The account given above seems to want to separate the parts from the whole.

 

However, that reply still won't do, for on that basis it would now seem that it is part and whole which are contradictory (and in a manner that has yet to be explained with any clarity). And yet, such parts can't be contradictory in the same way that wholes are. That is because, on this account, parts mutually condition one another; this is, presumably, the nature of their mediated 'unity in contradiction'. However, the "Totality" is related to nothing else that could condition it (one also supposes, should we ever be told what the Totality is!). So, if the "Totality" is a contradictory whole, then it would appear to be so in a new and so-far-unexplained sense. The 'parts' of a 'dialectical contradiction' are said to imply one another, being a 'reflection' of each other's 'essence' in development, such that one couldn't exist without the other (just as the proletariat both implies and couldn't exist without the bourgeoisie, for example). Not only does the whole here not imply any one of its parts, it could exist without many its parts. Does the universe itself really imply Venus, or the Crab Nebula? The universe could surely have existed without Venus or the Crab Nebula. If so, whatever else is true of the relation between part and whole here, it can't be "contradictory" in the required DM-sense of that word.

 

In fact, as seems obvious from what little DM-theorists themselves have said about the "Totality", it looks like 'it' must be an Unconditioned Absolute. It certainly can't be conditioned from the 'outside', otherwise it wouldn't be the Whole (one presumes!). If, on the other hand, it were conditioned from the 'outside', an infinite 'exgress' (or inflation -- an infinite exgress is the opposite of an infinite regress, sometimes called an "explosion") would be implied. That is because we should now want to know if and how this 'external' object or process (about which we know even less) was itself conditioned, and by what -- and so on, forever. But we have been here already.

 

And, it seems these disconcerting observations must apply otherwise, for the "Totality" to be contradictory, it would have to 'contradict' its parts. [Ex hypothesi it would have to do this anyway, since there is nothing else for it to condition.] Moreover these parts must then contradict each other in turn in the same way, after all.

 

[The opposite supposition will be considered presently.]

 

But, if we ignore the above 'problems' and the "Totality" is composed solely of its parts and their inter-relations (unless, of course, we assume the Totality is "more than the sum of its parts" -- that Wholist cliché was exposed as yet another DM-dead-end in Essay Eleven Part Two), the contradiction between the "Totality" and its parts must be:

 

(i) The same as the contradiction between each of the aforementioned parts, or,

 

(ii) More than the contradiction between its parts (since, as we have just seen, dialecticians believe that the whole is more than the sum of its parts).15

 

As far as (i) is concerned, it seems that the "Totality" must drop out of the picture as a sort of shorthand for the sum total of 'its' parts in contradictory change and development, becoming a mere fiction, only this time a useless one.16

 

On the other hand, if (ii) were the case, we would be owed an explanation of the alleged 'contradiction' between this 'more' and that 'less' -- i.e., between this 'more-of-a-Totality' and its 'lesser parts'. But, as things stand, we have no idea whether this new 'contradictory' relation between whole and part is the same as that which operates between the parts, or is different.

 

[Anyone impatient with all this 'nit-picking' should re-direct their complaints to their local Dialectical Magus. Such 'pedantry' is forced upon us because even now, after more than 200 years, we still have no idea what these 'forces' are, how they can possibly 'contradict' one another, or even what the mysterious "Totality" is. The first two of these allegations will be substantiated as this Essay unfolds; the third was considered in detail in Essay Eleven Part One.]

 

However, and independently of the above 'difficulties', this 'theory' still faces other serious problems. If the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts is the same as (but no more than) that which exists between the parts, then manifestly the whole wouldn't then be more than the sum of the parts (in at least this respect), since the whole would in that case be the entire 'contradictory' ensemble, all of whose elements (whole and part) operate alike. But, this would be contrary to the DM-hypothesis that wholes (whether these are wholes made of 'contradictory' parts or not) are more than the sum of their parts, whose natures (including the nature of their "internal contradictions") are said to be determined entirely by, while not being reducible to, the nature of their parts and the interconnection between these parts. Conversely, if the 'contradiction' between the whole and its parts weren't the same as that between the parts, then we would still have an unexplained type of 'contradiction' -- that which exists between a mysterious whole that is "more than the sum of the parts" and those parts themselves.17

 

Anyway, the idea that the whole 'contradicts' the parts in the same way that the parts 'contradict' each other doesn't appear to be a viable option for DM-theorists. The parts relate to each other by some form of "mediation", so we are told; but how can the part-whole relation be one of "mediation"? The mutually 'contradictory' nature of the parts in development constitutes the whole; if now the whole has its own 'contradictory' relation with the parts over and above this (if, as we are told, this whole is more than the sum of its parts), then this new 'contradictory' relation can't be one of part on part. But, if not, then what is it?

 

Hence, as noted in Part One of this Essay, it seems that a literal interpretation of DM-'contradictions' as forces lapses either into some form of CAR, or it inflates alarmingly into HEX (or, indeed, into Absolute Idealism). Conversely, if the identification of forces with contradictions is merely figurative, then DM would be indistinguishable from, say, metaphysical poetry.

 

[HEX = Hegelian Expansionism; CAR = Cartesian Reductionism. Follow those links for more details.]

 

Notwithstanding this, in order to examine this issue more thoroughly, it might be useful to suppose that some sort of solution to all of the above 'difficulties' can be found -- by someone, at some point, somehow.

 

However, even if we assumed this the analogy drawn between forces and contradictions will still fail to work.

 

The substantiation of that allegation brings us to the third reason for questioning the connection between forces and 'contradictions'.

 

This option is connected with a point made earlier that the reader was asked to keep in mind.

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here:

 

(a) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(b) Between the forces operating in the system? Or,

 

(c) Both?

 

Contradictory To What?

 

Different Types Of Force Couples

 

In a physical system there may be several different combinations of interacting attractive and repulsive forces. If we abbreviate "attractive" and "repulsive" to "A" and "R", respectively, there appear to be only three types of combinations of just two of these: AA-, AR-, and RR-forces.18

 

Of course, this assumes that these relations are symmetrical -- i.e., that AR = RA, which seems reasonable enough. Another simplifying assumption is that these forces are in binary systems; that is, this discussion concentrates exclusively on force-couples. It is reasonably clear, I take it, that this simplification doesn't materially affect the conclusions drawn. Anyway, further complications will be introduced as this Essay unfolds. Naturally, a comprehensive, scientific (or even philosophical) account of the concept of force would have to include modern ideas about gravity, the strong nuclear, weak and electroweak forces, etc.

 

As I noted earlier, forces have now been edited out of the picture in favour either of exchange particles or the geometry of space-time -- here The first option is illustrated in this simplified video:

 

 

Video Two -- Exchange Particles And

Apparent 'Forces'

 

And here is a video of the second option:

 

 

Video Three -- Visual Representation Of Motion Governed

By The Geometry Of Space-Time

 

[I will return to discuss one or two issues raised in Video Three later on in this Essay.]

 

However, it is possible that as science develops, reference to forces (even in school Physics) will progressively disappear [cf., Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi (partially quoted earlier)]. In that eventuality, if DM-theorists continue to promote the idea that 'forces' give their 'contradictions' some sort of materialist/physical grounding, their theory would thereby become 'unscientific' by default. Either that, or they will have to abandon all talk of the 'objective' nature of forces and join with Engels in regarding them as shorthand for relative motion. Of course, in that case, forces wouldn't just be "useful fictions", they would be useless fictions.

 

On the other hand, should that scientific development (i.e., the editing out of all forces from nature) fail to materialise, it would be interesting to see how DM-theorists might try to harmonise their attraction/repulsion scenario with successful attempts to unify the four fundamental forces in a Grand Unification Theory (or even in Superstring/M Theory, etc.) -- and perhaps into one over-arching 'force'. It might finally kill-off informed talk in DM-circles about the existence of 'contradictory' forces in nature.

 

Clearly, if there is only one force, it can hardly 'contradict' itself.

 

Nevertheless, many of the quotations given earlier and in Note 1 clearly imply that in DM only AR-forces are 'contradictory'. This category of force couples will be examined later on. However, AA-, and RR-forces weren't explicitly ruled out, and in a thoroughgoing analysis of every conceivable option available to DM-theorists, they will also need to be addressed. Hence, it is to them that I now turn.

 

AA- And RR-Forces

 

Unfortunately, and upfront, it is difficult to see how an AA-force could be interpreted as a unity of opposites, let alone as 'contradictory'. They are the same type of force, so they can hardly be opposites. But, such forces abound in nature. For example, as noted earlier, the centre of gravity of any conglomeration of matter in the universe is the result of countless such AA-forces. Plainly, in systems like this, kinematic (or, rather, dynamic) changes are caused by non-opposites. So, when, say, a planet is in the process of formation, particles begin to gravitate together under the operation of forces of mutual attraction --, i.e., these aforementioned non-opposites.19

 

[This is, of course, to adopt the vocabulary of Classical Physics. However, no inference should be drawn from this about the present author's views concerning the 'ontological' status of forces. As noted elsewhere, this terminology is only being employed here in order to expose the confusions that abound in DM. It is up to scientists to tell us what the world contains, not Philosophers -- or even yours truly --, and definitely not Mystics like Hegel.]

 

Nevertheless, with respect to the above comments, it is assumed that R-forces prevent the collapse of accumulated matter into a 'singularity' under the action of local AA-forces.

 

[If the gravitational field is strong enough, this should happen -- a singularity should form, at least in theory. [On this see Curiel (2019).] However, physicists get around this fatal flaw in their theory with a handful of ad hoc mathematical dodges. That alone suggests these theories are at least incomplete. This reminds one of the additional epicycles that were required to make Ptolemaic Astronomy 'consistent'.]

 

Clearly, this just complicates the point without altering it. In such circumstances we would have an ARA-system-of-forces, which would be even more difficult to interpret as 'contradictory'. As pointed out below, the meaning of the word "opposite" would have to be altered so that systems of forces could then have any number of 'opposites', components or contributory forces. If so, these artificial 'contradictions' -- "artificial" since they would be the product of an arbitrary choice of words --, won't have been based on 'objective' factors, but on linguistic tinkering.

 

Moreover, if the DM-theory of change is to survive, there has to be only one 'opposite', and that 'opposite' has to be dialectically-, not accidentally-, related to its own 'opposite', or "other", too. [On that, see here.]

 

Finally, and once again, given the classical picture, motion itself is actually altered by the operation of a single resultant force. This is even more difficult to square with the idea that forces are 'contradictions'. [More on that later, too.]

 

Similarly, it isn't easy to see how RR-forces could be interpreted as 'contradictory' -- or even as opposites --, either, and yet these are also found throughout nature. For example, intra-atomic forces of repulsion prevent atomic nuclei from approaching one another.20

 

Even in DM-terns it is difficult to see how such forces could be opposites. As we noted above, 'dialectical opposites' are not only supposed to imply one another, each can't exist without the other. But, which A-force implies another A-force; which one of these can only exist if the other does? Which R-force implies another R-force; which one can only exist if the other does?

 

One objection to the above immediately springs to mind: it ignores the fact that such forces operate in the manner they do because they work in opposition to one another -- that is, they do so in a way that brings them (or the system to which they belong) into, or out of, equilibrium. However, that response in fact concerns forces acting as AR-couples, which will be examined presently. It can't therefore assist us in our attempt to analyse/understand AA-, and RR-forces.

 

Despite this, even if it were true that A-forces are opposites of each other, in order for them still to be regarded as 'contradictory', they couldn't also be regarded as the opposite of R-forces -- unless, that is, these A-forces are now allowed to have two sorts of "opposites": (a) other A-, and (b) other R-forces. But, in that case, this would make a mockery of the notion that there are "polar opposites" at work in natural (or even social) systems of forces (implicated either in change or in equilibria, and in connection with 'contradictions'):

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

 

It is difficult to see how a particular A-force could be the "polar opposite" of another A-force while at the same time being the polar opposite of an R-force -- i.e., it isn't easy to see how A-, and R-forces could have two "polar opposites" without altering the meaning of the phrase "polar opposite". Even then, if the meaning of "polar opposite" were modified to neutralise this 'difficulty', it would succeed in so doing only because of yet more linguistic tinkering. In that case, any 'truths' that suddenly sprang into existence as a result would plainly be a by-product of yet another example of terminological juggling, not because of the way the world happened to be -- which would in turn mean that dialectics had been read into nature, not read from it.21

 

[However, there are dialecticians who claim that objects and processes not only can, they do possess many "opposites"; for example Gollobin (1986), p.122 (but even he says they are "paired").]

 

Of course, this whole metaphysic originated in the defective 'logic' Hegel concocted, who posited a unique opposite (an "other", as he called it) for each and every item implicated in change. He did so in order to forestall the criticism that if everything changes into 'what-it-is-not' (i.e., its 'opposite'), then, since everything else in the universe is 'what-it-is-not' in relation to any given object or process, every object/process could or would change into anything-else-whatsoever. [On that, see here.]

 

In which case, instead of growing into barley plants, a barley seed, for instance, could turn into a volcano, an unexploded bomb, Stalin's moustache or your left hand, and much else besides -- since all of these are 'what-a-seed-is-not'.

 

[However, in Part Three of this Essay we will see that in the end Hegel had to abandon the idea that objects and processes were somehow linked to a logical(?), or unique, 'opposite', or "other". In Essay Seven Part Three it will be shown that this concession fatally damages Hegel's attempt to respond to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation (reposted below).]

 

But, if objects and processes are allowed to have many (and possibly an infinite number of) 'opposites' -- all of which they could change into --, that would completely undermine what little is left of Hegel's already tattered system, which, as we have just seen, postulates that everything is paired with its own unique "other". Naturally, if that were the case, it would mean that the Empire State Building, for example, could change into, say, a T Rex, and the Pacific Ocean could morph into a crate of Tennessee Whiskey, and much else besides. Since things like this don't happen, so far as we know, we must conclude that, either:

 

(i) Hegel was right: objects and processes have only one unique "other" that is either:

 

(a) 'Dialectically'-, or logically-'internal' to that object or process, which would in turn mean that no object or process could turn into this unique 'other', since the latter already exists, or,

 

(b1) 'External' to that object or process, meaning that the cause of change can't be internal to objects and processes, or, perhaps even,

 

(b2) 'External' to that object or process, which object or process turns into that 'other', meaning that change can't have been caused by that 'other' (since it isn't 'dialectically'-related to it) -- and the whole point of accepting this dogma will now have vanished;

 

Or even:

 

(ii) Objects, processes and forces have only one opposite, not many.21a

 

Nevertheless, it could be argued once again that in this context the word "opposite" really means "oppositional". That change of emphasis now highlights the active inter-relation that exists between forces rather than their passive interconnection, which is something the above discussion seems to have ignored. Hence, it would seem perfectly natural to speak of RR-, or AA-forces as contradictory in this respect --, i.e., in the sense that all and only those forces that are oppositional (i.e., which engage in, or are part of, some sort of "struggle") should be classed as contradictory.

 

Or, so it might be objected.

 

However, this latest revision seems to be inconsistent with the claims made in several of the passages quoted earlier. They appear to suggest that only certain forces were to be regarded as inseparable from matter. Others indicate that forces are merely the consequence of the complex inter-play between quanta of energy (or of motion). For example, Engels claimed that:

 

"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Once again, this seems to lose sight of internally-connected oppositionality, since Engels appears to edit out of the picture the dialectical interrelation between forces, replacing it, or them, with mere "forms of motion".

 

Now, "forms of motion" aren't in any obvious way interconnected -- that is, if the relevant forces are edited out of the picture. But, DM requires bodies in motion to be inter-related; that is why intermediary forces seemed to be so useful -- no, strike that, so crucially important -- to its theorists. Forces and 'contradictions' were clearly supposed to assume just such a role -- i.e., forming part of the 'connective tissue' of reality, as it were. If they are now re-classified as little more than "useful fictions" -- i.e., as relative "forms of motion" --,  there would seem to be nothing physical left in nature to act either as the bearer of, or as the mediator between, these interconnections. Without a material substrate (pictured as just such forces), 'contradictions' could only operate on bodies or processes magically --, or, perhaps supernaturally --, it would seem.

 

Ignoring these serious difficulties again -- at least for the present -- perhaps the above objection can be summarised in the following way:

 

F1: All and only those forces that are oppositional -- or are implicated in struggle -- are contradictory.

 

But, if F1 were true, motion itself couldn't be regarded as the product of 'contradictory forces' -- unless we confine our attention solely to accelerated motion -- since, ex hypothesi, no net forces operate in cases where there is no acceleration (in post-Aristotelian Physics, that is). Even then, accelerated motion (under gravity, say) is subject to only one force (or, rather, one resultant force) in classical Physics, and none at all in relativistic Physics.

 

At best, therefore, taking the classical view, most of the accelerated motion in the universe (which covers, as far as we know, all of the bulk, non-rectilinear movement in nature) is the product of only one force (or resultant force). Given F1, it is hard to see how such motion could be viewed as part of a 'contradictory' Totality, if the 'classical view' were correct. So, if F1 does indeed express what DM-theorists mean, then most (perhaps all) of the motion in nature can't have been induced, caused, changed or sustained by a set of DM-'contradictions'.

 

With that observation much of classical DM falls apart.22

 

It could be objected to this that, as a matter of fact, all motion in the universe is the result of a disequilibrium between oppositional forces; that is precisely what a resultant force is. In that case, therefore, bodies would move (or their state of motion would change) because of just such an imbalance between forces. Hence, for example, the planets -- which traverse in what are apparently steady orbits around the Sun -- actually have their trajectories determined by resultant forces internal to the Solar System, the Galaxy, and, indeed, beyond, all of which are induced by complex inter-relating systems of forces.

 

Or, so it could be argued, once more.

 

This objection will be considered in more detail later, but for present purposes it is sufficient to point out that it is difficult to see how such forces could be regarded as oppositional. Presumably, these forces don't affect each other; they operate on, or they merely change, whatever motion is already present in the system. At best, then, such forces would only oppose the impressed motion already apparent, which motion would itself have been the result of still other forces operating earlier, or elsewhere, in the system. This can be seen from the fact that if the moving bodies in question hadn't been in the said 'force field', these forces would have had nothing on which they could act. In 'empty space', plainly, we would see no new motion.23 Forces without bodies to operate on don't interfere with each other, as far as we know -- unless they are themselves regarded as particulate in some way, or are carried by particles, which would, of course, mean they weren't forces, they were bodies, to begin with.24

 

Readers are again reminded of something they were earlier advised to keep in mind (which is connected with the above remarks):

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here:

 

(a) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(b) Between the forces operating in the system? Or,

 

(c) Both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep it in mind.

 

Interlude One: The Classical Problem Of Forces

 

This is, of course, just one aspect of the classical 'ontological problem' concerning the precise nature of forces, and it is partly why it is so difficult to understand them. Indeed, the detection of forces seems to depend only on the effects they have on bodies, or on instruments -- or, rather, a 'force' seems to be little more than the way scientists either depict or measure certain relationships between bodies, as Engels, in an uncharacteristically sober mood, pointed out (on that, see Note 4) -- or, indeed, on other 'fields'.

 

However, if forces are now seen as particulate (that is, if certain particles are viewed as the 'bearers' of forces -- on that, see Video Three), the problem simply reappears at a lower level, and we would be no further forward -- which is a conundrum that Leibniz was, I think, among the first to recognise. [On that, see here, here, here and here.]

 

So, it would seem that an interaction between forces could only take place if they were viewed as particulate in some way -- that is, if they registered some sort of resistance to one another (i.e., if they are impenetrable to a greater or lesser extent).

 

On the other hand, if they aren't particulate, it is hard to see how they could interact at all, let alone 'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no impenetrability that enables them to exert forces of any sort (except, of course, as part of a figurative extension to particulate interaction, after all).

 

[This has been questioned in Smith (2007). My response that article will be posted in Note 30 in the next few weeks.]

 

But, there are well-known classical problems associated with the idea that forces are particulate (they have been outlined here) -- not the least of which is the observation that if forces were particulate then they could only interact if they exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of reaction, and so on, which hold them together or lend to them some sort of coherence), so that they could act on other particulates and hence resist disintegration -- which considerations would, plainly, initiate an infinite regress. That is, in order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another, we would need to appeal to yet more forces internal to a given body to stop, say, one of them penetrating the other, or prevent distortions tearing them apart when two or more collide. But, if the forces internal to bodies are particulate, too -- as it seems they must be, given this view -- that would require further forces to account for the internal coherence of these new, smaller, 'force-particles', and so on...

 

Alternatively, if these 'internal forces' were in fact continuous (i.e., non-particulate), they would be incapable of sustaining their inner coherence -- once again, since they would have no rigidity, etc., etc.

 

In the end nothing would be accounted for since at each level there would be nothing to provide the required resistance or coherence.

 

So, it seems that reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies explains nothing. It also implies that particles can't 'contradict' one another without exerting non-particulate forces on each other -- which would mean, once again, that such entities are incapable of exerting forces, having no rigidity to do so, etc., etc.

 

[It is important to add that I am not arguing that there can be no interactions -- as Kline and Matheson (1987), for example, maintains -- just that we have as yet no idea how they can happen! I have said more about this in Note 30.]

 

Unfortunately, even exchange particles (in Quantum Field Theory) would succeed in exerting forces only if there were still further reaction forces internal to these bodies -- that is, if they were bodies. However, as noted earlier (but in more detail in Essay Seven Part One), many physicists now speak of such 'particles' as perturbations in 'the field':

 

"We learn in school that the basic building blocks of matter are particles. In fact, we often continue to teach this in universities where we explain that quarks and electrons form the lego-bricks from which all matter is made. According to our best laws of physics, the fundamental building blocks of Nature are not discrete particles at all. Instead they are continuous fluid-like substances, spread throughout all of space. We call these objects fields. The most familiar examples of fields are the electric and magnetic field. The ripples in these fields give rise to what we call light or, more generally, electromagnetic waves.

 

"If you look closely enough at electromagnetic waves, you'll find that they are made out of particles called photons. The ripples of the electric and magnetic fields get turned into particles when we include the effects of quantum mechanics. But this same process is at play for all other particles that we know of. There exists, spread thinly throughout space, something called an electron field. Ripples of the electron field get tied up into a bundle of energy by quantum mechanics. And this bundle of energy is what we call an electron. Similarly, there is a quark field, and a gluon field, and Higgs boson field. Every particle your body --- indeed, every particle in the Universe --- is a tiny ripple of the underlying field, moulded into a particle by the machinery of quantum mechanics." [Quoted from here; accessed 13/12/2017. Several paragraphs merged. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

However, this poses serious problems of its own. The forces exerted in the above manner (inside exchange particles or, indeed, other particles they act upon) must themselves be the result of rigidity, cohesion, and contact (etc.), if they are capable of stopping the force carrier particle passing right through the target particle without acting on it. Of course, as noted above, physicists these days appeal to fields, energy gradients, Feynman diagrams and the like, and reject such 'mechanistic' notions like those rehearsed in the previous couple of paragraphs, but if fields and particles are both continuous, the above problems will simply re-emerge at this new level. On the other hand, if they are particulate, after all, this merry-go-round just takes another spin across the metaphysical dance floor.

 

So, the neat picture painted in and by Video Three, where, for example, repulsive forces are explained by an analogy drawn between two individuals stood or sat in two separate but closely aligned boats (on a lake). If one individual throws a heavy ball to the other individual, both boats will move apart, and it will seem that there is a repulsive force acting between the two boats/individuals (as momentum is conserved). But that only works if the first individual's body is rigid enough to allow the ball to be thrown in the first place, and the second individual's body is rigid enough to stop the ball passing straight through their body unopposed. If they are both rigid enough then that will be because of forces internal to those two bodies, which can't also be explained in the same particulate terms without an infinite regress being initiated. So, if forces are communicated by carrier particles, nothing will have been explained. On the other hand if forces aren't particulate, but are continuous, then nothing would actually happen (for reasons explored in the previous few paragraphs).

 

Of course, it could be objected once more that the above approach adopts an out-dated 'mechanistic' view of interaction and is, as a result, completely misguided. However, the modern 'mathematical' approach has clearly abandoned the possibility of giving a causal, or even physical account of forces -- or, at least, an explanation that doesn't itself depend on a figurative use of the sort of verbs we find in the vernacular that allow a physical explanation to be given why things happen in the everyday world (such as "push", "move", "resist", "hit", "collide", "deflect", "interact", and the like).

 

So, if a particle is viewed as the carrier of a force, and that force can be given no physical content, for want of a better word, but is still deemed capable of making things happen, deflecting other particles from their line of action (etc.), then the above verbs must themselves lose contact with the meaning of typographically identical everyday verbs when they are used to talk about macro-phenomena.

 

Now, there is no problem with that providing we are aware of it and don't make the mistake of interpreting the technical use of such verbs literally, understanding them in their everyday sense.

 

Even so, a 'mathematical account' like this would thereby merely be descriptive, not explanatory. Differential Equations, Hamiltonians, vectors, tensors and abstract spaces can't make anything move, or alter the path of a single particle. To be sure, we can describe these phenomena using mathematical language and symbols, thus enabling us to 'balance the books of nature', as it were. But, the downside is that mathematical models can't explain why anything actually happens in the physical world.

 

[Of course, this depends on what one means by "explanation". I will say more about that in Essay Thirteen Part Two. However, for more recent qualms in this area, see Note 30. Cf., also my comments over at Wikipedia, here (at the foot of the page) and here. Readers shouldn't conclude at this point that I am questioning the existence of 'The Field'. What I am doing is questioning whether it can account for anything physical, or explain why anything actually happens in the universe. On that, see the discussion between myself and Paul Cockshott, here, and another between myself and a comrade who posted under the name "Lynx", here. (Unfortunately those links are now dead!)]

 

This, perhaps, helps explain Engels's own suspicion of forces. Ontologically, they appear to be deeply mysterious, if not animistic. He isn't alone. [Other relevant aspects of the nature of forces have been discussed here.]

 

Clued-in physicists already appear to be aware of this problem (i.e., that this presents them with serious difficulties connected with the language they use). Here, for example, is Physicist, David Peat:

 

"It hasn't been a great couple of years for theoretical physics. Books such as Lee Smolin's The Trouble with Physics and Peter Woit's Not Even Wrong embody the frustration felt across the field that string theory, the brightest hope for formulating a theory that would explain the universe in one beautiful equation, has been getting nowhere. It's quite a comedown from the late 1980s and 1990s, when a grand unified theory seemed just around the corner and physicists believed they would soon, to use Stephen Hawking's words, 'know the mind of God'. New Scientist even ran an article called 'The end of physics'.

 

"So what went wrong? Why are physicists finding it so hard to make that final step? I believe part of the answer was hinted at by the great physicist Niels Bohr, when he wrote: 'It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.'

 

"At first sight that seems strange. What has language got to do with it? After all, we see physics as about solving equations relating to facts about the world -- predicting a comet's path, or working out how fast heat flows along an iron bar. The language we choose to convey question or answer is not supposed to fundamentally affect the nature of the result.

 

"Nonetheless, that assumption started to unravel one night in the spring of 1925, when the young Werner Heisenberg worked out the basic equations of what became known as quantum mechanics. One of the immediate consequences of these equations was that they did not permit us to know with total accuracy both the position and the velocity of an electron: there would always be a degree of irreducible uncertainty in these two values.

 

"Heisenberg needed an explanation for this. He reasoned thus: suppose a very delicate (hypothetical) microscope is used to observe the electron, one so refined that it uses only a single photon of energy to make its measurement. First it measures the electron's position, then it uses a second photon to measure the speed, or velocity. But in making this latter observation, the second photon has imparted a little kick to the electron and in the process has shifted its position. Try to measure the position again and we disturb the velocity. Uncertainty arises, Heisenberg argued, because every time we observe the universe we disturb its intrinsic properties.

 

"However, when Heisenberg showed his results to Bohr, his mentor, he had the ground cut from under his feet. Bohr argued that Heisenberg had made the unwarranted assumption that an electron is like a billiard ball in that it has a 'position' and possesses a 'speed'. These are classical notions, said Bohr, and do not make sense at the quantum level. The electron does not necessarily have an intrinsic position or speed, or even a particular path. Rather, when we try to make measurements, quantum nature replies in a way we interpret using these familiar concepts.

 

"This is where language comes in. While Heisenberg argued that 'the meaning of quantum theory is in the equations', Bohr pointed out that physicists still have to stand around the blackboard and discuss them in German, French or English. Whatever the language, it contains deep assumptions about space, time and causality -- assumptions that do not apply to the quantum world. Hence, wrote Bohr, 'we are suspended in language such that we don't know what is up and what is down'. Trying to talk about quantum reality generates only confusion and paradox.

 

"Unfortunately Bohr's arguments are often put aside today as some physicists discuss ever more elaborate mathematics, believing their theories to truly reflect subatomic reality. I remember a conversation with string theorist Michael Green a few years after he and John Schwartz published a paper in 1984 that was instrumental in making string theory mainstream. Green remarked that when Einstein was formulating the theory of relativity he had thought deeply about the philosophical problems involved, such as the nature of the categories of space and time. Many of the great physicists of Einstein's generation read deeply in philosophy.

 

"In contrast, Green felt, string theorists had come up with a mathematical formulation that did not have the same deep underpinning and philosophical inevitability. Although superstrings were for a time an exciting new approach, they did not break conceptual boundaries in the way that the findings of Bohr, Heisenberg and Einstein had done.

 

"The American quantum theorist David Bohm embraced Bohr's views on language, believing that at the root of Green's problem is the structure of the languages we speak. European languages, he noted, perfectly mirror the classical world of Newtonian physics. When we say 'the cat chases the mouse' we are dealing with well-defined objects (nouns), which are connected via verbs. Likewise, classical physics deals with objects that are well located in space and time, which interact via forces and fields. But if the world doesn't work the way our language does, advances are inevitably hindered.

 

"Bohm pointed out that quantum effects are much more process-based, so to describe them accurately requires a process-based language rich in verbs, and in which nouns play only a secondary role....

 

"Physics as we know it is about equations and quantitative measurement. But what these numbers and symbols really mean is a different, more subtle matter. In interpreting the equations we must remember the limitations language places on how we can think about the world...." [Peat (2008), pp.41-43. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Now, I don't want to suggest for one moment that I agree with the above comments about the nature of language (or even about the nature of scientific language), but the above passage certainly shows that at least some leading scientists are aware there is a problem here.

 

[To be sure, Peat agrees with Bohm's suggestion that we need to learn from Native American languages, which seem to have rather odd grammars; but it is to be wondered how a culture that has produced no advanced science or technology has much to teach one that has, least of all about physics. Thus isn't to disparage Native American culture -- far from it -- it is merely to point out that no such culture could be expected to compete with one that is so much more technologically advanced. On this, also see Essay Eleven Part One.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

So, classically, forces seem to work only on bodies by altering their motion. In which case, the supposed opposition isn't between bodies, nor is it between bodies and forces, nor yet between forces and forces -- it is between forces and the motion already in the system. But, this picture is difficult to square with the idea that there is a UO at work here -- nor does it seem to tally with the claim that dialectically polar opposites ultimately induce all motion and change. That is because (once again) forces don't oppose each other; they oppose or augment whatever motion is already present in the system, howsoever it was caused.

 

In short, given this 'revised' view, the term "contradiction" wouldn't apply to opposing or opposed forces (i.e., to forces that oppose one another), nor to bodies; on the contrary, 'contradictions' would now connect forces with whatever movement is already present. But, as yet, no DM-theorist has given any clear sense to the idea that a force could 'contradict' the impressed motion in a system. And rightly so; there are no opposites here for a single DM-'contradiction' to latch onto. How could a force be the 'opposite' of movement -- i.e., the 'opposite' of a change of place?

 

It could be objected that as a matter of fact forces in nature oppose (in the sense of change) motion. Indeed, it could be argued that dialecticians are concerned with forces as they actually operate in nature and society (as opposed to those abstracted from it); such opposites objectively exist and can't be analysed away.

 

That much won't be disputed here (even if its wording might). But, in what way can this set-up be said to involve the interconnection of opposites required by the theory? And, what sense can be given to the idea that motion in one direction is the opposite of any force that affects it? Certainly these aren't unified opposites (i.e., opposites on the same type, so they are 'dialectically'/'logically' connected -- that is, the existence of one implies the existence of the other, in the Hegelian sense of that word, which, as we have seen, is a DM-requirement). So, whatever else it is, this can't be a 'dialectical' interaction. That is because movement itself doesn't imply the existence of the force that is supposedly opposing it, nor does the force imply the existence of the motion it is opposing. They can both exist without the other (unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which supposedly imply one another). If this were a 'dialectical' interaction, they would imply one another and neither could exist without the other.

 

At best, the forces involved might tend to produce an opposite motion (or change of motion, perhaps) to that which already exists -- or even none at all. But, to describe force and motion as "opposites" would appear to make about as much sense as claiming that "left" was the opposite of "television", even if as a matter of fact someone moved a television to the left. Their actual linkage in reality has nothing to do with whether it is sensible to describe such items as unified opposites, or even as oppositional. These terms are categorically different -- as are "force" and "motion". Hence, it isn't a question of whether or not DM-theorists are dealing with 'objective' facts; it is why the above counter-claim can only be 'justified' by mis-describing the phenomena.25

 

Interlude Two: Several Annoying Technicalities

 

Admittedly, when viewed as vectors, velocities, accelerations and forces can, in some circumstances, be represented as 'opposites', but this is given within vector algebra and follows from certain definitions. However, unless we are prepared to admit all the absurdities outlined earlier (arguing, for instance, that vectors 'struggle' among themselves), this approach can't lend any support to DM. That is quite apart from the fact that these forces don't imply one another in a dialectical-sort-of-way, which they should do if they were 'interpenetrated' opposites' -- for example, again, in the way that we are told that capitalist relations of production imply the existence of the proletariat, and vice versa. But, if these forces aren't 'internally related' then the dialectical theory of change simply falls apart.

 

Anyway, if vector, v, has an opposite, -v, that vector could be a billion miles away or it could be co-terminal with v. Either way, these two don't 'struggle' with one another, nor do they turn into each other (which is what they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed). Again, whatever else they are, such vectors aren't 'dialectical'.

 

In addition, as will be argued in Interlude Six, mathematics can in no way be regarded as an abstraction from reality. And, of course, as noted earlier, most vectors aren't opposites, anyway. Many augment, while others operate at various angles to, one another.

 

[In fact, this topic is connected with 'real negation', a concept introduced into Philosophy by Immanuel Kant. I will have much more to say about this in Appendix A. Other related issues will be examined in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published. Finally, this topic is also connected with the fact that, where there is more than one force at work in a system, change in motion is caused by a resultant force, discussed in more detail here.]

 

As already noted, when forces are represented as vectors they can produce accelerations that appear to 'oppose' the motion already in the system. Ignoring for the present the fact that the use of such language is arguably anthropomorphic (or, at best, metaphorical), in such cases we would be establishing connections between objects, events, and processes drawn from the same category (i.e., vectors connected with movement), which clearly makes sense. In this way, forces could be replaced with relative accelerations by means of Newton's Second Law, etc. But, even then, an acceleration in an opposite direction doesn't oppose the original velocity; an acceleration (in vector algebra, which is what we are speaking of here!) just is a description of that changing velocity, it doesn't produce that velocity or create it. A force is supposed to do that (in Newtonian Physics). Even in the physical universe, accelerations aren't 'disembodied beings' that inhabit the world, throwing their weight about, bullying velocities to do their bidding. They just are changing velocities --, no more, no less. Period. And velocities, in like manner, simply represent a rate of change of displacement. Even in DM-terms, the idea that they might 'contradict' one another seems rather odd (to say the least); that is because no accelerating body implies the existence of the velocity in any other body, and both can surely exist without the other -- unlike, once more, the connection between the capitalist class and the proletariat, which do imply one another, or so we are told.

 

However, in vector algebra no sense can be made of the addition (or subtraction) of force and velocity vectors, unless it is mediated by the Second Law (etc.), once more. Even then, the relation between acceleration and velocity vectors has to be established by well-known equations. The various physical quantities represented by these equations can only be connected by means of such translations, which set up analogies between categorically different items, but in a dimensionally consistent manner. That is one reason why no mathematical or physical sense can be given to 'equations' like the following:

 

(1) F = -v (sic)

 

(2) a = kv (sic)

 

[Where "F" stands for "force", "v" for "final velocity", "a" for "acceleration", and "k" is a constant of proportionality.]

 

Equations like these would be regarded as dimensionally incoherent (unless further dimensions were built into the 'constant' -- but now variable --, k). Compare them with the next series of examples:

 

(3) s = ut + ½at2

 

(4) a = -ω2r

 

(5) F = -m2

 

[Where "r" represents radial displacement, "u" is the initial velocity, "t" is time, "ω" is angular velocity, "m" represents mass, "F" centripetal force, and "a" centripetal acceleration in (4), but linear acceleration in (3).]

 

In Classical Physics, by means of translational or analogical equations like these -- or, perhaps to make the same point more clearly --, by the use of algebraic rules that enable inferences involving physical quantities to be drawn in which forces appear as part of a "norm of representation", we can 'convert' forces into accelerations, compare magnitudes, and thus account for change in motion.

 

Unfortunately, this is of little help to DM-enthusiasts, since the translation of forces into relative accelerations means that forces are, indeed, "useful fictions", once more, which would simply re-introduce all the difficulties noted earlier (and again, below).

 

[This isn't a problem for the account presented here, for reasons expressed in the previous paragraph but one.]

 

However, even if the above comments were rejected for some reason, this would still lend scant support to dialecticians, for such representations aren't oppositional; they don't slug it out on the page, screen or whiteboard. And, manifestly, they don't turn into one another (as we are told they should by the DM-classics).

 

Hence, if two ('opposite') forces (for instance, F and G, inclined at θo to the x axis in R2) are in equilibrium and are resolved (into their i and j components), and then equated as follows:

 

|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ = 0,

 

|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ = 0,

 

no one would suppose (it is to be hoped!) that these symbols are locked in a life-or-death 'struggle', and will one day change into each other.

 

Naturally, the above conclusions aren't affected in any way if these forces aren't in equilibrium:

 

|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ > 0

 

|F| cosθ - |G| cosθ < 0

 

and/or:

 

|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ > 0

 

|F| sinθ - |G| sinθ < 0

 

And, it would be little use arguing that while it is true that the above expressions may be lifeless (and thus incapable of struggling and then turning into each other), what they represent in the real world not only can they actually do struggle and then turn into each other. It would be little use because the above considerations were aimed at undermining the idea that the vector calculus is 'dialectical'. The allegedly 'dialectical' nature of forces 'in reality' represented by the above symbols is an entirely separate issue, which has been systematically demolished throughout the rest of this Essay, as well as here. However, it would be interesting to see if there are any DM-fans out there who can explain how these forces manage to struggle with, and then turn into, each other (as they should if the DM classics are to be believed). Exactly how do F and G above turn into one another?

 

[On the allegedly 'dialectical' nature of 'Higher Mathematics' and the Calculus in general, see here.]

 

Incidentally, some readers may be puzzled by the use of the word "analogical" in an earlier paragraph. The use of that word is connected with:

 

(i) The history of the development of mathematical language associated with this area of Physics and Applied Mathematics, and,

 

(ii) The way we make sense of such equations.

 

More specifically, a significant change in terminology (or at least what it signifies) arose out of:

 

(iii) The reservations expressed by Ancient Greek mathematicians concerning the relationship between the so-called "incommensurables" (i.e., physical quantities from different categories for which no common noun or predicate could be found that allowed them to be 'co-measured'), and then with,

 

(iv) How these problems were resolved by European mathematicians in the High Middle Ages.

 

Following on the growth and development of market economies in mid-, to late-feudal society, the artificial barriers between these categories were progressively eroded as new grammars ('concepts') were introduced by merchants and traders to help them account for the exchange of quantities drawn from just such different categories. Since they had to be co-measured (to balance the books!), the language and mathematics involved were adjusted accordingly.

 

Hence, these new concepts were introduced by mathematicians, merchants, and bankers so that what had been regarded as incommensurable quantities could be compared analogically -- enabling, for example, the calculation of the exchange value of a widely diverse range of commodities. As a spin-off, these conceptual innovations -- when they were also incorporated into the physics of the day -- allowed theorists to move beyond an earlier 'commonsense' approach to motion encapsulated in Aristotelian Physics, thus enabling the foundations of modern mechanics to be laid down in the period between the 13th and the 18th centuries.

 

This emphasis on the analogical nature of modern algebraic forms depicting motion follows on from an approach to mathematical development that sees it as conditioned by contingent historico-economic factors predicated on material and social relations. This view of mathematical innovation also helps undermine the idea that mathematics is concerned with, or is derived from, some form of 'abstraction' -- which further undercuts theories predicated on the belief that there is an Ideal World anterior to, but more real than, the world we see around us. Since this Ideal World may only be accessed by thought, it then appeared to make sense that mathematics was solely based on thought, too. In which case, it was then but a short step to conclude that mathematics is founded exclusively on thought processes, on 'abstraction' -- and much later still, on logic itself.

 

To many, this appeared to put mathematics/mathematicians in direct touch with the 'Divine', and hence with a range of pure concepts originally called into existence by 'God', a doctrine explicit in Plato. In fact, the universe itself was regarded as a reflection of 'Divine Thought', which, of course, implied that 'God' was a Mathematician and the world was a mathematical object of some sort -- which is a paradigm that currently dominates Modern Physics (indeed, as we will see in Note 30), and that includes the ideas of physicists who even claim to be agnostics or atheists.

 

Here area just few recent examples of the genre:

 

"All science proceeds from the assumption that the cosmos is ordered in an intelligible way. Beneath the bewildering richness of natural phenomena there lies an elegant mathematical unity. How astonishing that the human mind is attuned to this hidden subtest of nature!" [Physics Professor, Paul Davies, quoted in the flyleaf to Livio (2009), and quoted at the publisher's website (expand the 'Praise' section). Bold added.]

 

"Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes (I mean the universe) but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to comprehend a single word of it, and without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth." [Galileo, quoted in Livio (2009), pp.76-77. Bold added.]

 

"The Higgs Boson was predicted with the same tool as the planet Neptune and the radio wave: with mathematics. Galileo famously stated that our Universe is a 'grand book' written in the language of mathematics. So why does our universe seem so mathematical, and what does it mean? In my new book 'Our Mathematical Universe', I argue that it means that our universe isn't just described by math, but that it is math in the sense that we're all parts of a giant mathematical object, which in turn is part of a multiverse so huge that it makes the other multiverses debated in recent years seem puny in comparison." [Max Tegmark, excerpted from Tegmark (2015). Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis and link added.]

 

"In [Plato's] famous cave analogy, he likened us to people who'd lived their entire lives shackled in a cave, facing a blank wall, watching the shadows cast by things passing behind them and eventually coming to mistakenly believe that these shadows were the full reality. Plato argued that what we humans call our everyday reality is similarly just a limited and distorted representation of the true reality, and we must free ourselves from our mental shackles to begin comprehending it. If my life as a physicist has taught me anything at all, it's that Plato was right: modern physics has made abundantly clear that the ultimate nature of reality isn't what it seems.... Our external physical reality is a mathematical structure." [Tegmark (2015), pp.8, 254. See also Tegmark (2008). Paragraphs merged; bold added. I have added a lengthy passage from Plato (1997b) to Appendix B, where the allegory of the cave first saw the light of day (no pun intended).]

 

One wonders why Tegmark trusts a single experiment or observation in physics or any of the other sciences (which he seems to take for granted in the rest of his book, and which he also appears to think aren't illusory) if it is all just a 'shadow', or based on 'subjective experience' --, and that includes anything written by mathematicians. Does he have direct access to this hidden world that the rest of us don't? Is he able to apprehend mathematical theorems that somehow bypass the senses? If not, then just as soon as anything mathematical has been committed to paper, or typed onto a screen, it too must be a 'shadow', and hence can't reflect 'reality'.

 

Anyone who thinks this misrepresents Tegmark need only read Chapter Nine of his book (Tegmark (2015)), where the author tries to sell the reader a downmarket, revamped view of the world first aired by John Locke and David Hume, but he doesn't once consider how to construct "external reality" out of what he calls "internal reality". Now, I have no wish to praise Immanuel Kant, but Tegmark's amateur metaphysics would put epistemology back to where it was before the Critique of Pure Reason rolled off the presses (this links to a PDF).

 

[I have covered this topic extensively here. Readers are directed there for more details.]

 

Something like this, but which comes across as less extreme, seems to be motivating Greene (1999, 2004) and Penrose (1989, 1995, 2004); it also appears to be (partially) exercising Smolin (2006) and Woit (2006). For example, here is Roger Penrose:

 

"But are mathematical notions things that really inhabit a 'world' of their own? If so, we seem to have found our ultimate reality to have its home within that highly abstract world. Some people have difficulties with accepting Plato's mathematical world as being in any sense 'real', and would gain no comfort from the view that physical reality itself is constructed merely from abstract notions. My own position on this matter is that we should certainly take Plato's world as providing a kind of 'reality' to mathematical notions..., but I might baulk at actually attempting to identify physical reality with the abstract reality of Plato's world.... [Penrose then commits himself to the 'three world' theory, somewhat similar to Karl Popper's view (this links to a PDF), that there are mathematical, physical and 'mental' components to 'the world' -- RL.] I like to think that, in a sense, the Platonic world may be the most primitive of the three, since mathematics is a kind of necessity, virtually conjuring its very self into existence through logic alone." [Penrose (2004), p.1029. Italic emphasis in the original; bold emphases and link added.]

 

Earlier in the same book Penrose argued as follows (with respect to mathematical models):

 

"If the model itself is to be assigned any kind of 'existence', then this existence is located within the Platonic world of mathematical forms. Of course, one might take a contrary viewpoint: namely that the model is itself to have existence only within our various minds, rather than to take Plato's world to be in any sense absolute and 'real'. Yet, there is something important to be gained in regarding mathematical structures as having a reality of their own. For our individual minds are notoriously imprecise, unreliable, and inconsistent in their judgements. The precision, reliability, and consistency that are required by our scientific theories demand something beyond any one of our individual (untrustworthy) minds. In mathematics, we find a far greater robustness than can be located in any particular mind. Does this not point to something outside ourselves, with a reality that lies beyond what each individual can achieve?...

 

"Mathematics itself indeed seems to have a robustness that goes far beyond what any individual mathematician is capable of perceiving. Those who work in this subject, whether they are actively engaged in mathematical research or just using results that have been obtained by others, usually feel that they are merely explorers in a world that lies far beyond themselves -- a world which possesses an objectivity that transcends mere opinion, be that opinion their own or the surmise of others, no matter how expert those others might be." [Ibid., pp.12-13. Bold emphases added.]

 

Clearly, Penrose is a moderate compared to Tegmark, for whom the world is an illusion of some sort, and only mathematical structures/objects are really 'real'.

 

By way of contrast, the approach adopted at this site also helps neutralise yet another core DM-thesis: i.e., that scientific development somehow depends on the ability of theorists to 'abstract' concepts, or general terms, into existence.

 

Abstractionism has already been destructively analysed here and here. There is a detailed discussion of these issues in Hadden (1988, 1994), upon which much of the above was based. Hadden's pioneering work is only prevented from being Marxist classic by the absence of a clear account of the nature of language and the logic of analogical reasoning. However, in view of the fact that the logic of analogy hasn't advanced much since Aristotle's day (although it has proliferated in detail, extensively), this is hardly Hadden's fault. On what has been achieved in this area, see White (2010). White's book is in fact a pioneering study, only slightly spoiled by the author's attempt to divert his many clear insights into trying to make sense of talk about 'God'.

 

[Hadden's conclusions are themselves a development of ideas originally found in Borkenau (1987), Fleck (1979) and Grossmann (1987). Cf., also Sohn-Rethel (1978). Clagett (1959) contains many of the original medieval sources. See also Zilsel (2000), and the more detailed historical study, Kaye (1998).]

 

In that case, the admission that forces can be edited out of the picture (so that relative acceleration and motion can be viewed as opposites) might succeed in winning this particular battle, but only at the cost of losing the war. Once again, that is because it would imply the universe was much more CAR-like than DM-theorists are prepared to admit. On this account, any reference to a DM-UO would be little more than a confused way of alluding to relative acceleration and relative velocity. The connection between events could only then be explained in one or more of the following two ways:

 

(a) An appeal to the topology of spacetime, or:

 

(b) A detailed analysis of the vector and scalar fields in which the said processes were embedded.

 

[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism/Reductionist, depending on the context; UO = Unity of Opposites.]

 

In either case, the connection between events and processes wouldn't be governed by any sort of physical mediation (or, indeed, with the rest of the Totality) -- which is what DM requires, since, on this view, a moving body would have no 'internal connection' with any other moving body.

 

At least an appeal to forces had the merit of appearing to provide some sort of mediating link between bodies in motion, required by DM. They at least appear to be capable of connecting moving bodies in some sort of 'dialectical' relationship. Of course, that is only because the literal interpretation of forces depends on the acceptance of what is in effect an animistic view of nature.

 

In which case, any attempt to edit forces out of the picture would result in the disappearance of the dialectical 'connective-tissue' of reality (as it were); and with that DM would become indistinguishable from mechanical materialism (i.e., a version of CAR itself), which its theorists sought to replace or surpass.

 

As noted earlier, DM-theorists require forces to be part of the ontological fabric of the universe, which is why they become defensive, if not highly agitated and emotional when the existence of forces is questioned. Even after what Engels said about forces has been brought to their attention, they totally ignore the fact that he had already questioned their nature. In which case, DM-fans pick and choose which parts of Engels's work they finally decide to accept.

 

So, in order for DM even to seem to be able to work, its theorists require the existence of a world populated by anthropomorphic concepts (or what they supposedly 'reflect') -- in this case, forces --, which were themselves a result of the fetishisation of the products of social interaction as if they were real objects and processes in nature. This is, of course, just another toxic spin-off of their supposed 'inversion' of Hegelian 'logic'.

 

[Why that is so is explained here, here, here and here.]

 

Hence, whether or not DM-fans acknowledge it, the language they use suggests that objects and processes in nature are quasi-intelligent, engaged in what can only be described as some sort of mystical conversation, or shouting match, with other objects and processes, as they 'contradict' and 'negate' one another.

 

[DN = Dialectics of Nature, i.e., Engels (1954).]

 

As has already been pointed out, in parts of DN Engels pictured motion in dynamic terms, portraying it as no more than the transfer of energy. [Engels (1954), pp.69-102.] That seems to connect these rather sketchy ideas with more recent theories of motion, modelled by vector and scalar fields -- maybe with the Laws of Thermodynamics. Or perhaps even with concepts employed in the study of non-Euclidean Spacetime, where talk is no longer of forces --, which theories began to be constructed late on in Engels's life and completed a generation or so after he died. Unfortunately for DM-fans, such a re-write would mean that familiar DM-concepts (such as "contradiction", "polar opposite", "UO", "internal relation", etc.) would become as obsolete as "natural place", "substantial form", "accident" and "substance" are now --, notions that once featured prominently in ancient scientific and metaphysical theories.

 

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, say, an energy gradient (depicted as a scalar field) could be interpreted as 'contradictory' in any way at all, even though gradients like this often feature in modern theories of motion. Well, no more perhaps than, say, a ladder should be regarded as contradictory if someone fell off it.

 

Far worse: it is even more difficult see how states of affairs involving vector and scalar fields, the geodesics of Spacetime -- or even the 'strings' of M-theory -- could form part of a material universe. If everything in nature is just a complex array of energy gradients, vector fields and differential curvatures in Spacetime (which, as we have just seen, many Physicists now suppose) -- spruced up with a few probability density functions -- there would seem to be no place left for anything that even looks remotely material. Given the 'modern', mathematical picture of reality, matter itself becomes a "useless fiction", too, explanatory of nothing at all. Small wonder then that Lenin was highly suspicious of the Idealism implicit in the Physics of his day (even if he had no answer to it). The situation has only grown worse in the years since.

 

[On that, see Essay Thirteen Part One. I hasten to add -- but it should be obvious by now -- that I don't accept this 'mathematical picture of reality'; or, to be more accurate, I view it as thoroughly metaphysical if interpreted along realist/Platonic lines. (No pun intended!)]

 

Quite apart from this, the 'ontological status' of 'energy' itself is highly problematic -- and that situation is unlikely to change. [On that, see here.] Energetics is thus no friend of DM/'Materialist Dialectics'.

 

[I have said more about this topic in Essay Seven Part One, here. Independently of that, I regularly ask Physicists who post, for example, on Quora what energy actually is. I either receive no answer, or they admit they don't really know -- see, for example, here and here (in the comments section).]

 

Of course, in DM-writings, clear definitions of matter are as rare as hens' teeth -- as we will see in Essay Thirteen Part One. Indeed, when pressed, DM-fans think matter is just an 'abstraction'!

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Only those who feel confident that they can give a clear sense to the claim that forces and motion are ('dialectical') opposites will be in any position to reject an objection from earlier with anything more substantive than a simple wave of the hand. Moreover, as we will see, forces often augment motion, they don't always "oppose" it; indeed, most of the bulk motion in the universe is of this sort, as was pointed out earlier.26

 

However, even if it were possible to give a clear sense to the idea that forces and motion are 'dialectical' opposites, that would still be bad news for DM-fans. That is because any other oppositional force in the system couldn't also be the opposite of the original pairing between this force and that change in movement. And, that in turn would mean that systems of opposing forces couldn't function (in DM) as is currently supposed. In that case, it wouldn't be forces that opposed one another (as had originally been claimed); in such a set-up, forces would oppose motion already present (not other forces), and the idea that change is the result of systematically inter-related forces would have to be abandoned.

 

Readers are again reminded of something they were asked to keep in mind from earlier:

 

So, is the 'contradiction' here:

 

(a) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(b) Between the forces operating in the system? Or,

 

(c) Both?

 

That ambiguity will be explored as this Essay unfolds. Readers are advised to keep it in mind.

 

As should now seem obvious, each constituent part of a complex array of forces like this would have to be viewed as the opposite of every other. Given such an ensemble, moving bodies would have countless 'opposites' (i.e., any other forces or moving bodies in the system).27 This would put a strain on the meaning of the word "opposite", once more, rendering it meaningless -- in which condition it would remain until its meaning had been clarified, or, indeed, modified so that it would now allow several elements to be regarded as the "opposite" of any one or more of the rest. Under such circumstances, as we have already seen, the notion of a polar opposite would lose its key role in DM. In fact, it would become meaningless if everything possessed countless "polar opposites". [This is quite apart from the fact that this would undermine the DM-theory of change, given the fact that none of these forces would imply the others, and each could exist without the rest -- which shouldn't be the case with DM-'opposites'.]

 

Not only that, as we have also seen several times, ad hoc linguistic tinkering like this implies that this theory/method would apply to nature and society only because of yet another bout of subjectively applied terminological juggling.

 

Unfortunately, this jellyfish-of-a-theory can't be squeezed anywhere without some of it slipping through our fingers somewhere else. On this interpretation, what had been touted all along as a grand theory capable of explaining change because it took serious account of the 'contradictory' nature of reality, interpreted as the result of the interplay between opposite forces, now amounts to little more than a few vague ideas about the relation between a force and the motion already in a system compounded by the realisation that the DM-Totality is a mediated system of forces only because the definition of a "polar opposite" had conveniently been 'adjusted'. If this is what DM-theorists mean when they come out with their impressive sounding 'dialectical' ideas, then it would seem that their theory can only be rescued from oblivion if reality were Ideal. As we will see in Essay Twelve, that is a direct consequence of making the 'truth' of DM-theses dependent on ad hoc linguistic 'tinkering'.

 

However, even if the above objections were misguided in some way, in DM-terms none of this theory makes any sense, since not one of these opposites (i.e., force and motion) turns into the other, as the DM-classics tell us they should:

 

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... [M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels  (1954), pp.17, 62. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Engels (1976), p.179. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]…. [Ibid., pp.221-22. Last set of parentheses in the original; bold emphasis added.]

 

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

 

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute."  [Mao (1937), pp.340-42. Bold emphases added.]

 

[Dozens of other quotations that make the same points have been posted here.]

 

Consider any given force and the motion it supposed opposes: Clearly, that force doesn't change into that movement, nor does that movement change into that force.

 

[Incidentally, that disposes of Weston's attempt to interpret the second force in a gravitational field as 'inertia' -- Weston (2012), p.7. It could be objected that modern physics interprets force as an exchange of momentum; so force and movement are connected, contrary to the above claims. But, there are no forces in modern physics; just an exchange of momentum. So force and movement can't be connected if one half of this pair doesn't actually exist.]

 

Someone could further object that they do indeed change into one another -- perhaps via an exchange of energy, or as part of equal and opposite reactions, etc., etc.

 

But, if that were so, another problem would immediately assert itself. If force, F, were to turn into new movement, N, then the second of these two would follow the first -- i.e., F first, N second. But, F would create N at a later time, otherwise it couldn't turn into it. [Recall that, according to the DM-classics, objects and processes turn into that with which they 'struggle'.] Plainly, if N already exists, F can't turn into it. On the other hand, F and N can't 'struggle' with one another for the two of them can't exist simultaneously in order for one to turn into the other. If, on the other hand, F were to change as a result of some (as yet) unspecified factor, say U*, then U*, not N, would be the opposite of F, and F would turn into U*, not N! The same is the case, vice versa. And the same applies if we substitute "inertia" for "momentum", or "movement".

 

Alternatively, consider force, R, and episodic movement, M, the first supposedly opposing, or 'contradicting', the second -- perhaps R is the reaction force of a body that has just collided with another moving body. It could be argued that in this case, the motion, M, of the second body is what produces the reaction, R, and that reaction then alters M in response.

 

[It is worth recalling that we are here considering the relation between a force and the motion already in the system, not the relation of a force with a body. That is because we are trying to make sense of the idea that forces contradict the motion already in the system. We will return to consider the relation between forces and bodies below.]

 

To that end, let us imagine two bodies, A and B, are in collision. Let the motion of both be MA1 and MB1, respectively before the collision, and MA2 and MB2 after. Further, let the reaction force produced in each body be RA and RB, respectively. Hence, in this scenario, MA1 produces RB, and MB1 produces RA. In turn RA then induces MB2, and RB induces MA2. But, according to the DM-classics, an object or process turns into that with which it 'struggles', its 'dialectical opposite'. So, since MA1 turns into MA2 it must have 'struggled' with it. The same must apply to MB1 and MB2. But, this can't happen since neither of MA2 and MB2 yet exist for MA1 and MB1 in order to 'struggle' with anything! If they did, MA1 and MB1 couldn't change into them, since they already exist! On the other hand, if MA2 and MB2 don't exist, then there will be nothing with which MA1 and MB1 could 'struggle' and hence change. That can only mean that, according to this moribund theory, MA1 and MB1 can't change!

 

[At least, not in the above way.]

 

On the other hand, if RA 'struggles' with MB1, then, according to the DM-classics, it must change into it. The same applies to RB and MA1. But, MB1 changes into MB2, not RA, and MA1 changes into MA2, not RB.

 

Once more, we hit the same brick wall. [No pun intended.]

 

Even worse, there is an equal and opposite reaction force in A and B, namely, RC and RD -- both produced by RA and RB, respectively. This means that: RC = -RA and RD = -RB. Exactly how these are now supposed to fit into this 'dialectical' interaction is even less clear.

 

DM-fans are invited to play around with the above as much as they like, the result won't change. [No pun intended.]

 

Howsoever we try to re-package this ill-considered 'theory', none of it seems to make any sense.

 

If a force 'contradicted' a moving body (and not any motion in the system), then this force would change in to the body and the body would change into this force -- if the DM classics are to be believed.

 

[The above are just specific examples of a more general, but fatal, defect that sits right at the heart of the DM-'theory' of change, exposed in detail in Essay Seven Part Three. Nevertheless, this point can and will be generalised in order to show that no two or more forces could 'contradict' one another in the way that dialecticians imagine.]

 

Nevertheless, in order to examine every possible alternative available to DM-fans, I propose to analyse this particular option in even more detail. To that end, I will offer an alternative clarification of what it might mean.

 

First Attempts At Clarification

 

Perhaps then the following re-write might succeed in repairing the holes in the above interpretation of DM at the same time as preventing the theory that UOs operate everywhere in nature from being completely undermined:

 

F2: A UO involves the opposition between a force, P1, and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has produced (or would have produced) in a body, B, had P1 never existed. The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this struggle.

 

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

 

F2 links the operation of one force (P1) with that of another set of forces (Q). However, it is difficult to distinguish what F2 says about these two factors from the vector resultant of two forces if we subjected this system to the usual mathematical analysis. If so, the word "struggle" would amount to little more than an anthropomorphic re-write of the functional relations that exist within the vector calculus, only now applied to just one force, the resultant. In that case, if and when P1 and Q interact, they will produce just one resultant force, R, and it is this force which would induce the recorded change in motion.28

 

But, if that is so, a contradiction between forces can't arise here: if there is only one force operating in the system, there can be no contradiction (if we adopt this interpretation). In that case, F2 threatens to undermine this interpretation of DM, killing it for want of forces.29

 

Interlude Three: Hamlet Without The Prince

 

This section of the Essay might be dismissed as just the latest unsympathetic reading of yet another artificially modified DM-proposition.

 

Maybe so, but the reader will find that dialecticians themselves consistently fail to examine their own theory in anything like the detail attempted here, despite the fact that DM is supposed to represent the best, if not the very epitome, of scientific and philosophical thought. The present Essay, in contrast, has endeavoured to set-out in more detail than has ever been attempted anywhere else before the implications of this area of DM. As such, it ventures into entirely unexplored territory. Hence, it is impossible to say whether or not this misrepresents DM -- indeed, dialecticians themselves would be hard-pressed to decide among themselves whether or not this is the case. For one thing, they can't even decide what matter is! [As Essay Thirteen Part One shows, their 'materialism' is rather like Hamlet without the Prince!]

 

In addition, it is worth pointing out yet again that F2 was motivated by the idea that forces contradict impressed motion. As we have just seen, because change in motion is the consequence of just one resultant force (when analysed classically), the alleged 'contradiction' between two forces simply disappears.

 

F2: A UO involves the opposition between a force, P1, and the impressed motion that another force, or set of forces, Q, has produced (or would have produced) in a body, B, had P1 never existed. The resultant motion of B is the final outcome of this struggle.

 

It would take an especially alert, or eagle-eyed, dialectician, therefore, to be able to spot 'contradictory' forces in a system where there is only one force responsible for the said change in motion!

 

Worse still, F2 postulates a 'contradiction' between a force and the motion that is (or might be) produced as the counterfactual result of the action of other forces, but since some or all of the latter's effects won't have been actualised (having been prevented from doing so by P1), the alleged 'contradiction' here contains only one real term.

 

Even the most committed of DM-fans might find it difficult to visualise (let alone explain) a 'contradiction' between something that is real and something that isn't (in that either it never existed or it was prevented from existing): i.e., the motion that would have occurred if the impeding force, P1, hadn't acted.

 

It could be objected that these other forces don't vanish; they are still there, as is the resultant. If they were to vanish, so would the resultant. That response will be examined later in the Essay.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

This suggests we should reconsider an option left unexplored earlier, where it was argued that forces are the only legitimate candidates to be placed in such oppositional couples, not the motion they change or induce, or the bodies upon which they act -- contrary to what Engels seems to have believed when he tried to replace forces with relative motion. To that end it might prove useful to see whether F2 can be modified to provide support for the idea that the forces involved contradict each other before they combine to create the resultant, R.

 

On this revised view, forces are 'contradictory' only of other forces, and not of bodies or of any motion in the system. The following might, therefore, bring out more clearly this latest alternative:

 

F3: Given a body, B, and a system of forces, V, comprising n vectors, v1-vn, operating on B, a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between these contradictory force vectors. In this scenario, R needn't be fixed, but could itself be subject to countless changes as B moves under the influence of V, which would also change accordingly.

 

One immediate problem with this is that the specification of the forces belonging to V depends on the choice of co-ordinate system and inertial frame.30 This shows that even if F3 were acceptable, the representation of forces as 'contradictions' is perhaps more convention-sensitive than it is reality-driven -- which would mean, of course, that 'dialectical contradictions' are no more 'objective' than, say, latitude and longitude.

 

However, even if this latest difficulty is put to one side, it is still worth asking whether any sense can be made of F3.

 

As noted above, F3 seems to bring us back full circle to the idea that forces -- not bodies, or the motion of bodies -- are mutually 'contradictory'. And yet, as we have seen, it isn't possible to depict AA-, and RR-forces as 'contradictory', unless their effects are involved in some way.

 

On the other hand, as we have noted several times, if force is just a convenient shorthand for relative motion, it would mean that this part of DM is more consistent with a CAR-like picture of reality -- because the elements of the "Totality" would now be externally-, not internally-related to one another.

 

[CAR = Cartesian Reductionism.]

 

To repeat: it isn't easy to see how the motion of one body could be internally-related to that of others without re-introducing the idea that bodies exercise some sort of an effect on one another independently of how they are moving. While this relative motion might subsequently affect their movement, it still wouldn't internally-link such bodies. And yet, this is precisely the difficulty that exercised Traditional Philosophers in relation to the classical metaphysical problem of the nature of forces; DM has simply reproduced this conundrum in an even more obscure form. If relative motion were an internal, or 'logical' link, of the sort required by DM, then the movement of one body in one direction would imply the movement of another body in a different (or even the same) direction. The existence of the one would imply the existence of the other; they would 'interpenetrate' one another, such that one couldn't exist without the other (just like the bourgeoisie couldn't exist without the proletariat, and these two classes imply each other, for example -- although, once more, I have thrown that inference into considerable doubt here). But, unless DM-theorists have been keeping the salient details to themselves, that isn't the case with relative motion. So, the relative motion of bodies can't be a 'dialectical' relation, whatever else it is. The same comment also applies to forces. They don't imply one another, and can exist without each other.31

 

Ignoring this fatal defect for now, perhaps the unwelcome slide into CAR can be forestalled by means of the following re-wording of F3:

 

F4: Given a system of forces, V, comprising n vectors, v1-vn, a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between these n force vectors.

 

F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.

 

F5 is clearly one aspect of the thesis that the whole determines the nature of its parts, and vice versa. Hence, F4 and F5 appear to restore the dialectical unity that earlier paragraphs seem to have sundered.

 

Unfortunately, this just brings us back full circle to a consideration of the relationship between the "Totality" and its parts. That is because F5 introduces its own pernicious version of HEX, for it seems impossible (on this account) to determine whether or not anything is 'contradictory' unless the nature of the whole had already been ascertained. But, since the latter is always changing, no element in this 'cosmic wild-goose chase' will ever be hunted down and trapped, as it were. [We encountered different versions of this fatal defect in DM-epistemology in other Essays at this site; see, for example here, here and here. Readers are directed there for more details. Much of what follows takes the conclusions drawn there for granted.]

 

The most relevant aspect of this latest quandary centres on the idea (entertained by several dialecticians) that the growth of scientific understanding means that the 'contradictions' that now plague our knowledge of the world will somehow diminish (or would somehow be 'resolved') as science progressed. Presumably, this implies that, in the limit (i.e., in an ideal state where humanity possesses (at least in theory) the Absolute Truth about everything), there will be, or should be, no contradictions at all in or between scientific theories, or between theories and 'reality'. The problem with this is that, according to DM-theorists, in order for a scientific theory to be true it must faithfully 'reflect' the world. But the state of knowledge in this hypothetical Ideal Limit can only mean that the world itself can't contain any contradictions, otherwise they would be reflected in theory, even in the limit, which possibility has just been discounted. In turn, this implies that even if humanity never actually reaches this blessed state (i.e., Absolute Knowledge), we can, in the here-and-now, draw this safe conclusion: the Absolute Truth is that not only is the world not contradictory, the motion of bodies and the operation of forces isn't either.32

 

In fact, the above must be true now, for if it weren't now true that there were few, or even that there are no 'contradictions' at all in the ultimate future state of knowledge of the "Totality", then either (a) The DM-view of the limit of knowledge (where most if not all contradictions have been resolved) must be false, or (b) The belief that humanity is converging on that limit must itself be erroneous, since there is no such limit. As we have just seen, that outcome is actually implied by the DM-theory of knowledge itself -- that reality is a largely, or is a completely, contradiction-free zone.33

 

Interlude Four: Limit Or No Limit -- That Is The Question

 

So, either:

 

(i) There is no limit toward which knowledge is converging, or,

 

(ii) As knowledge advances external reality alters accordingly, or even,

 

(iii) It is now true to say that, in the limit, the world contains no contradictions whatsoever.

 

Plainly, unless we are Idealists, (ii) can't be the case. We aren't to suppose (it is to be hoped!) that our understanding of the world alters the 'objective contradictions' that allegedly give life to or which power the whole of reality -- so that as knowledge increases 'objective contradictions' slowly disappear. Of course, many of the latter might vanish in a socialist society (so we are told), but not those in the natural world. Does anyone who believes that motion is  contradictory, for instance, think that anything humans can do, or will or come to understand, will alter this supposed fact -- which would, of course, mean that meaning that motion isn't objectively contradictory?

 

But if not, then as (iii) indicates, it must now be true that absolute knowledge of the world (even if we never attain to it) implies that nature isn't contradictory -- complete knowledge of reality will have removed all the contradictions from our thought, or our theories about it. It doesn't matter if we never reach this blessed state, the possibility of complete knowledge means that nature itself must be a contradiction-free zone. [However, on that see here.]

 

Of course, it might be incorrect to conclude that dialecticians believe that as science advances all contradictions will be resolved -- even though it isn't easy to see how they could consistently deny it. Faced with each new contradiction -- if they are committed to the view that science can only advance if it overcomes or resolves contradictions in our knowledge -- dialecticians must believe they can be resolved, if we but knew more about the world. Otherwise they will have to admit that science can't advance beyond a certain point. But they deny that, too. In that case, they must either believe that:

 

(iv) There is no limit to scientific advance, or that,

 

(v) There is a limit (because there are irresolvable contradictions in nature and hence in our theories about it).

 

But, if they also believe that there is scientific advance has no limit, then they must also believe both of the following:

 

(vi) There is no limit to scientific advance, and,

 

(vii) There is a limit to scientific advance.

 

[(vi) follows from the asymptote metaphor to which Engels referred, and which Lenin and subsequent DM-theorists have lent their credence. On that, see the quotations listed below.]

 

But, the combination of (vi) and (vii) is itself a contradiction, and it lies right at the heart of DM (if this line of reasoning is sound).

 

Of course, this means that DM itself can only advance if this contradiction is resolved. But, since DM-theorists don't even recognise this blatant contradiction in their own theory, that must mean DM can't advance!

 

Hence, either:

 

(viii) DM can't advance, or,

 

(ix) Dialecticians must hold that all contradictions are resolvable.

 

But, and once more, if (ix) is the case, by the above argument, there can be no objective 'contradictions' in reality.

 

So, in terms of DM's own theory, it would seem that nature can't be fundamentally contradictory!

 

Again, the only apparent way of avoiding this fatal result is either to:

 

(a) Deny science can only advance by resolving all contradictions, or,

 

(b) Deny that Absolute Truth 'exists'.

 

However, the rejection of option (i) from earlier  (i.e., "There is no limit toward which knowledge is converging") would mean that there is a (non-Absolute) limit to knowledge, after all. In which case, plainly, the DM-thesis that human knowledge is unlimited would have to be abandoned, and along with that would go the idea that knowledge is converging on it. In addition, the belief that there is an 'objective' reality (out there) for us to know (even if we never fully attain to it) would have to be jettisoned, too.

 

It would also leave dialecticians with no way of deciding which of the allegedly irresolvable contradictions their theory throws up is:

 

(c) An 'objective' feature of reality, or is,

 

(d) A by-product of their own imperfect, or even defective, theory -- which could be resolved if only we had more knowledge.

 

These observations of course assume that the universe might be 'infinite' (a view held by many DM-theorists) and constantly changing. But, neither of those factors affects the idea that there must now be a set of truths (possibly infinite) about reality toward which human knowledge is asymptotically converging (even if that set itself grows over time) -- that is, if Engels and Lenin were correct when they said the following:

 

"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.' In fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory…. All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute…. The cognition of the infinite…can only take place in an infinite asymptotic progress." [Engels (1954), pp.233-35.]

 

"The identity of thinking and being, to use Hegelian language, everywhere coincides with your example of the circle and the polygon. Or the two of them (sic), the concept of a thing and its reality, run side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other but never meeting. This difference between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its own concept. Because a concept has the essential nature of the concept (sic) and does not therefore prima facie directly coincide with reality, from which it had to be abstracted in the first place, it is nevertheless more than a fiction, unless you declare that all the results of thought are fictions because reality corresponds to them only very circuitously, and even then approaching it only asymptotically." [Engels to Schmidt (12/3/1895), in Marx and Engels (1975b), p.457.]

 

"Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object." [Lenin (1961), p.195.]

 

"Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract -– provided it is correct (NB)… -- does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, the law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely." [Ibid., p.171. Emphases in the original.]

 

Of course, if there is no such set of truths, no such limit, then Engels's metaphor is defective and Lenin was mistaken, since, once again, there would be no such thing as 'objective truth' (if the latter is defined as the limit toward which human knowledge is heading).

 

However, in this regard, Woods and Grant quote a revealing passage from DN:

 

"The fact that our subjective thought and the objective world are subject to the same laws, and that consequently too in the final analysis they can't be in contradiction to one another in their results, but must coincide, governs absolutely our whole theoretical thought. It is the unconscious and unconditional premise for theoretical thought." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.349; quoting this source. Bold added.]

 

Admittedly, the above passage wasn't included in the 'official'/final version of AD, but it does tend to suggest that Engels believed either that:

 

(e) Despite appearances to the contrary, the 'objective' world is actually free from contradiction, or,

 

(f) In the end there will be no contradiction between our thoughts about reality and reality itself (the first of which alternatives -- (e), it must be admitted, is impossible to distinguish from the second -- (f)), or even that,

 

(g) In the limit there will be no contradictions at all in any of our theories.

 

So, to take just one example (and assuming Engels is to be believed): if any randomly-selected dialectician were to conclude that motion is 'contradictory', then that subjective thought can't itself contradict 'objective' reality -- or 'objective' theory itself, one presumes, even if that blessed end state is never actually attained. So, if knowledge is to advance, even this 'contradiction' (i.e., the subjective thought that motion is 'contradictory') must itself be resolved, and thus removed. It, too, is a 'contradiction' that should be resolved if and when know more, or when we finally attain 'objective knowledge' of the world.

 

[But, of course, as we saw in Essay Five, it isn't even a contradiction!]

 

Naturally, that doesn't commit Engels to the view that reality is, in the limit, a contradiction-free zone, but if science can only advance by resolving contradictions in our subjective theories (so that they become progressively more 'objective'), the conclusion (given above) seems inescapable: In the limit, human knowledge of the world must picture nature as progressively, if not totally, free from contradictions.

 

However, in the absence of any clear indication from Engels that he genuinely believed what the above passage says, little more can be asserted here with any confidence.

 

It is a reasonably safe bet that because the DM-classics are silent on this topic, modern-day dialecticians won't even be able to decide among themselves about this -- that is, without their being branded 'Revisionists', perhaps sparking yet another dialectical dog fight, and then more debilitating splits.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Again, if this is what dialecticians mean by 'contradictory forces',34 then nothing may be so described until everything has been so described. [Once more, I am taking for granted the conclusions mentioned earlier. If readers find this latest assertion hard to accept, they should consult the full argument presented in the other Essays listed.] And yet, this reverses the dialectical story, for, as we have just seen, some DM-theorists appear to believe that things only look 'contradictory' because we don't possess the Big Picture -- i.e., an 'Absolute View' of reality --, and that if humanity ever were to attain to such an all-encompassing vantage point, 'contradictions' would disappear (or largely disappear -- the story gets a little vague at this point). In contrast, the idea seems to be that we may only depict forces in nature as absolutely 'contradictory' after The Epistemological Trumpet has finally been blown on 'dialectical' Judgement Day -- when humanity at last hits the asymptotic buffers to which Engels referred. The problem here is that this may only be done when all (or most) 'contradictions' have been resolved!

 

Paradoxically, this in turn appears to mean that, 'objectively', these 'contradiction' both exist and do not exist -- or, maybe even, we do and we don't know whether they do or they don't!

 

So, one horn of this dilemma seems to suggest that 'dialectical contradictions' don't really exist (because they are merely the artefacts of 'relative knowledge'), and hence if they don't, they can hardly play any part in change and development. The other horn of this dilemma appears to suggest that we are now in no position to assert that 'dialectical contradictions' do in fact exist (since we aren't in possession of 'Absolute Knowledge'). In which case, because we aren't in possession of the full picture, we can't claim to know whether 'dialectical contradictions' actually cause change! Either way, yet another core DM-thesis self-destructs!35

 

At any rate, and to return to the main theme, if AA-, and RR-forces are mutually oppositional, change would still be caused by resultant forces. But, as we saw in Essay Seven, it is far is easier and more natural to interpret this scenario as 'tautological', not 'contradictory' -- that is, if we insist on viewing nature in such figurative, anthropomorphic or animistic terms.

 

Of course, if we resist such a capitulation to mystical primitivism, as indeed we ought, then both descriptors (i.e., "contradictory" and "tautological") should rightly be fed into the 'obsolete-concept-shredder'. [More on that here.]

 

Perhaps, then, it would be wise to draw a veil over this self-imposed dialectical impasse, and turn to a much more likely source of these DM-'contradictions'. To that end I will return to F4 and F5, but consider them from a more promising angle -- as AR-force couples.

 

F4: Given a system of forces, V, comprising n vectors, v1-vn, a resultant force vector, R, represents the outcome of the struggle between these n force vectors.

 

F5: This ensemble is only contradictory within a Totality of inter-related processes that mutually condition one another.

 

AR-Forces

 

In the previous section, it became clear that little sense can be made of the equation of 'dialectical contradictions' with  AA-, or RR-forces, and this turned out to have nothing to do with the difficulty of seeing whether or not such force-couples contained 'opposites' -- which they manifestly do not. An A-force isn't the opposite of another A-force; the same is true with respect to two R-forces.

 

However, a prima facie case could be made for regarding AR-force couples as the polar opposites to which DM-theorists refer in order to depict 'contradictions' as they supposedly operate in DM and HM.

 

Unfortunately, as we will see, this slender straw once clutched soon turns into a dead weight, sinking this doomed 'theory'. Quite apart from the considerations outlined above, no clear sense can be made of the idea that AR-forces can be co-opted to model 'contradictions', anywhere, any way, anyhow.36

 

 

Figure One: Hey, Comrades! Grab This --

It's A 'Dialectical Straw', Honest It Is!

 

An initial serious difficulty confronts this idea: AR-couples don't appear to operate in nature in quite the manner this handy prefix seems to suggest: i.e., as AR-forces.

 

Consider a straightforward case: the accumulation of matter that formed the stars, planets and their moons (etc.) over billions of years. There, R-forces (operating at the nuclear level) apparently prevent(ed) (for a time) the catastrophic collapse of these growing masses into 'singularities' by balancing-out the A-forces that presumably set the whole thing in motion.

 

The problem with these R-forces is that, while they look as though they oppose any other A-forces in the system, they aren't their polar opposites (in the way that, say, the North and South poles of a magnet are said to be) -- that is, they aren't opposite manifestations of the same type of force. So, the inter-atomic forces preventing the above collapse aren't the same type of force as the gravitational forces that initiated the process.37 While a case might be made for depicting North and South poles of a magnet as polar opposite magnetic forces (but on that, see below), gravitational and nuclear forces aren't 'interpenetrated' opposites of the same type, and so can't, it seems, 'contradict' each other in the 'dialectical' sense required. For example, neither force turns into the other, contrary to what the DM-classics tell us they should.

 

Maybe we need to learn more about 'dialectical opposites'?

 

Interlude Five: Opposites

 

So, even though, for example, male and female, dead and alive are said to be 'opposites', a male dog isn't the opposite of a female flower, and a dead cat isn't the opposite of a live wire. Such contrasts can only work as opposites if they apply to, or implicate, the same substantival (or, at least, if they involve a use of the same common noun). Hence, on this view, a male dog will be the opposite of a female dog, a dead cat the opposite of live cat, and so on. Logical  connections of this sort are essential if objects and processes are to count in DM as 'interpenetrated opposites'.

 

Or, so the story goes.

 

[On substantivals, see here.]

 

Naturally, this undermines much of what dialecticians themselves say about UOs; but since this ground was covered extensively in Essay Seven Parts One and Three, no more will be said about it here.

 

Having said that, a hot oven isn't the DM-'opposite' of a cold can of beer, in which case it is difficult to see how, in DM-terms, they can interact, with the one heating the other up. But who doesn't know a hot oven can heat up all manner of things, including cold cans of beer? Who doesn't know that cold hands can be warmed by a hot fire, even if they aren't 'dialectical opposites', and even if they don't imply one another or turn into each other (which they would have to do if they were 'dialectical opposites')? And yet, if we were to accept what we read in Hegel's work and the DM-classics -- that only 'dialectical opposites' can interact -- then you couldn't warm your cold hands on anything other than another pair of warm hands! You couldn't cool a hot can of beer with anything other than a cold can of beer.

 

[The argument presented here continues in Interlude Twelve.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

At this point, readers are reminded of something they were asked to keep in mind as this Essay unfolds:

 

Is the 'contradiction' here:

 

(a) Between the bodies and processes themselves?

 

(b) Between the forces operating in the system? Or,

 

(c) Both?

 

However, even if A-, and R-forces were opposites of the same type, they manifestly alter the motion of bodies; they don't directly confront each other as opposing forces, and hence don't 'struggle' with one another. Admittedly, they can be represented as 'oppositional' in a vector calculus, but we have already seen that even this formal translation is of little use to DM-supporters -- and that is partly because the relevant forces disappear, only to be replaced by a single resultant force that is the cause of all the subsequent action.

 

It could be argued that these initial difficulties can be neutralised if emphasis is placed once more on the oppositional nature of AR-forces as a way of explaining change.

 

Unfortunately, this detour is no more successful than it was when it was considered above in relation to AA-, and RR-forces. AR-forces don't imply one another such that one can't exist without the other (unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which are supposed to imply one another). In which case, whatever else they are, they can't be 'dialectical opposites'. They don't 'interpenetrate' each other.

 

Even if this further difficulty is shelved for now, it would still be difficult to see how AR-forces could be interpreted literally (or figuratively) as 'contradictions' (especially in HM). That is because of the way in which they can combine and augment one another.

 

For example, consider two forces operating in diametrically opposite directions tangentially placed around a rotating body (and hence not acting in the same line). These two forces -- although 'opposites' at their point of action -- exercise a combined, augmenting effect on the angular acceleration of that body, thus ceasing to be oppositional in any plausible sense of that word.38

 

This is a familiar feature of force vectors. In some instances, they seem to 'oppose', in others they appear to 'augment' one another, while in still others they look like they do both at once.39 , 40

 

Interlude Six -- Magnetic And Other Natural Forces

 

Engels himself regarded the two poles of a magnet as a clear example of the unity of AR-opposites in nature (another idea he borrowed from Hegel and other German Idealists, and which has been parroted down the ages by countless 'highly original' DM-echo-chambers).

 

[AR = Attraction-Repulsion.]

 

Here is Hegel:

 

"Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. The two however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be transferred to the other. Thus, for example, debts and assets are not two particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative to the debtor is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also a way to the west. Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically conditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. The north pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and vice versa. If we cut a magnet in two, we have not a north pole in one piece, and a south pole in the other. Similar, in electricity, the positive and the negative are not two diverse and independent fluids. In opposition, the different is not confronted by an other, but by its other." [Hegel (1975), §119, p.173. There are somewhat similar comments in Hegel (2004), §312, p.165. (This links to a Scribd page which features a photographic reproduction of this book.) Clearly, Hegel lifted these ideas from Kant and his theory of 'real negation'. On that, see Appendix A.]

 

And here Engels:

 

"Dialectics has proved from the results of our experience of nature so far that all polar opposites in general are determined by the mutual action of the two opposite poles on one another, that the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and inter-connection, and, conversely, that their inter-connection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition. This once established, there can be no question of a final cancelling out of repulsion and attraction, or of a final partition between the one form of motion in one half of matter and the other form in the other half, consequently there can be no question of mutual penetration or of absolute separation of the two poles. It would be equivalent to demanding in the first case that the north and south poles of a magnet should mutually cancel themselves out or, in the second case, that dividing a magnet in the middle between the two poles should produce on one side a north half without a south pole, and on the other side a south half without a north pole. Although, however, the impermissibility of such assumptions follows at once from the dialectical nature of polar opposites, nevertheless, thanks to the prevailing metaphysical mode of thought of natural scientists, the second assumption at least plays a certain part in physical theory." [Engels (1954), p.72.]

 

The alleged 'unity' in this case clearly revolves around the presumed fact that the North and South poles of a magnet can't exist independently of each other, or, indeed, without one another; their 'opposite' nature is shown by the affect they have on magnetically susceptible bodies and upon each other.

 

[Of course, if the legendary magnetic monopole is ever discovered (as it seems it might have been!), this classic DM-example will go the way of other defunct ideas --, like, say, the crystalline spheres.]

 

However, upon closer examination, it is clear that the relationship between the poles of a magnet is in fact an example of AA-, or RR-, but not AR-opposites. That is because in this case, non-opposites -- i.e., alike poles --, repel each other (i.e., two Norths or two Souths). On the other hand, opposites attract -- i.e., a North and a South. Consequently, in the way that these poles inter-relate, magnets are thus AA-, or RR-type forces. A moment's thought will also confirm this: since when do magnets attract and repel one another at the same time?

 

In that case, it now turns out that the magnet is hardly a paradigm example of an AR-force -- united in opposition --, as DM-lore would have us believe.

 

Mysteriously, DM-theorists en masse have failed to notice this obvious flaw in one of their key examples!

 

So much for the claim that DM-theses have been read from -- but not imposed on -- the facts.

 

The same comments apply to electrical, and thus also to sub-atomic, phenomena in general -- like charges repel, unlike charges attract. This means that much of the (sub-atomic) dialectical 'evidence' in, say, Woods and Grant (1995), is seriously misguided. How on earth do electrons and protons 'struggle' if they attract one another? [There will be more on this in Essay Seven Part Two (when it is published).]

 

It could be objected that while it might be true that two unlike poles are examples of AA-forces, their continued motion toward one another will be prevented at some point by structural forces within the magnets themselves, and these couples will operate as AR-forces. In that case, R-forces operating between approaching atoms of the material from which the magnets are made will prevent these opposite poles closing in on one another, counteracting the A-forces that brought them together. This implies that the relation between the poles of a magnet is in fact that of an AR-couple,

 

Or, so an objector might claim.

 

Even so, this means that, as magnetic opposites, the poles themselves still fail to be AR-UOs. To be sure, other forces might come into play, but this doesn't affect that salient point. In which case, these new forces and those magnetic forces wouldn't be opposites of the same Aristotelian/Hegelian type (as noted above).

 

Despite this, the above objection would reduce the oppositional relationship between forces originating in these magnets to the effect that these poles have on motion (since, manifestly, these opposite forces don't affect each other, just the relative motion induced by each force). Hence, once more, the two poles aren't inter-related to each other directly as opposite AR-forces; they would simply oppose any motion that either or both of them had induced in the system. We have already had occasion to dismiss this option as inimical to DM.

 

In which case, the inter-atomic forces governing the operation of AA-, RR-, or even AR-couples, actually oppose, limit or augment whatever motion is already present in the system -- or, they restrict the freedom of bodies to move once set in motion. But, they still don't seem to oppose -- i.e., 'contradict' -- each other as force upon force.

 

Again, this is probably one reason why Engels toyed with a positivistic re-interpretation of forces (in DN, as pointed out above, in Note 4), since no physical sense can be given to any such relation between forces (as was also noted earlier) -- that is, over and above seeing any such relation as an obscure way of attempting to represent the relative motion between bodies.

 

Of course, it could be argued that the force field of each pole does in fact affect that of the other; hence, the above claims are incorrect. But, these force fields are merely the expression of the motion of, or the motion induced in, measuring instruments (or, indeed, patterns created by scattered iron filings) placed near the said poles, so the above claims aren't incorrect. Such forces are, as Engels argued, a shorthand for relative motion.

 

 

Figure Two: Force Fields And Iron Filings

 

On the other hand, if by "force field" we mean the mathematical structures postulated by scientific theory, they can't affect one another, for they aren't physical. They certainly affect the theorists in question, those who do the calculations and draw the diagrams. [This was discussed in more detail in Interlude Two, and will be again, below.]

 

Anyway, as we have just seen, the nature of the UO here clearly depends on what is meant by the terms "opposite" and "unity". North and South poles aren't united in the sense that they are one (as DM-theorists would be the first to point out), they are connected in the sense that they 'depend' on each other. But, this 'dependence' is causal, not logical; magnetic properties are the result of the vector configuration of the 'motion' and 'spin' of certain electrons. There is nothing in nature that logically forces this physical interrelation on these poles (as, for example, the capitalist class supposedly 'implies' the proletariat). Indeed, the idea that such a configuration represents a 'dialectical'-UO is misconceived, since the 'forces' involved are the consequence of a vector field, which is no more 'contradictory' than your front and back are. And, as we have also already seen, it isn't easy to see how vectors can be regarded as 'contradictions' (or, indeed, as UOs).

 

Moreover, in ferromagnetic substances, the magnetic field is built up by the cooperative alignment of individual magnetic moments (perhaps illustrating the fundamentally cooperative nature of reality once again, created by those helpful 'dialectical tautologies' we met elsewhere in this Essay).

 

Certainly, given Engels's use of the term "force" (whether interpreted realistically -- or positivistically as a "useful fiction"), this is a rather poor example of a DM-UO, anyway; it is consequent upon a particular sort of mathematical analysis (i.e., it is based on the alignment of electrons, which orients the vector field that arranges the direction of the magnetic field). Calling this a UO would be to substitute an obscure metaphor for a clear mathematical description, for no extra explanatory gain.

 

Of course, there is no UO here anyway, since the field in question is the result of one sort of cause, the electron, which is a single charged elementary particle (or wave?) that isn't itself a UO. (That DM-busting fact has already been commented upon here.) Do these arrows form a UO? But this is how we picture vectors (especially those associated with a magnetic field).

 

→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→

Figure Three: A 'Dialectical Tautology'?

 

 

Figure Four: Where's Waldo? Where's The UO?

 

Naturally, deflationary conclusions like these will satisfy few DM-fans since it depends on a non-standard view of the nature of mathematical 'objects' (i.e., vectors, matrices, manifolds, dimensions, abstract spaces, etc.). Hence, in response it could be argued that mathematics in fact represents what is really out there in the world, since it has been abstracted from nature by human beings as a result of their practical activity and social development. This means that mathematics presents us with an abstract reflection of reality.

 

[Chapter 16 of Woods and Grant (1995) contains a classic (but nonetheless confused) version of this idea. Because of its influence, I will be devoting a special Essay to this book, which will be posted at this site (as Essay Seven Part Two) in the next year or so.]

 

However, this interpretation of mathematics is seriously mistaken. Mathematics can't be a description of the world (nor an 'abstraction' from it) for reasons rehearsed in Essays Three Parts One and Two and Thirteen Part One (as well as earlier). Mathematics is based on systems of concepts that aren't causally inter-linked. The concepts that mathematicians construct do not exercise any sort of causal influence on material bodies; nor do they 'correspond' to anything in reality that could conceivably so behave, unlike material bodies and processes that can and do. [On that, see here and here.]

 

Mathematical propositions and theorems yield neither an abstract nor a concrete picture of reality. That is because they aren't pictures to begin with, nor could they be. They express rules for the manipulation of certain symbols that licence inferences we make about objects and events in nature and society (or, indeed, in formal systems). At best, they set up complex analogies that assist in our understanding of processes in the material world.

 

The development of Field Theory since Maxwell's day doesn't alter this picture in any way. Vector and scalar fields are mathematical structures that not only enable scientists to model nature, they assist in the derivation and interpretation of the empirical consequences of their hypotheses. To imagine otherwise (i.e., to suppose that mathematics is an abstract description or picture of the world) would reduce its structures to absurdity. For example, it would imply that, say, a vector field -- in reality -- is actually composed of a set of infinitely thin and infinitely strong wire-like curves, or curve segments (of mysterious composition and provenance), and which aren't actually made of anything. Or, that a scalar field is actually an invisible array of real numbers 'floating' in (abstract?) space -- or, worse still, that it is an infinite n-dimensional set of dimensionless connected, dense but disjoint points (which can't themselves exist physically -- they have no shape (circular, spherical, or otherwise), or they wouldn't be points, just volume intervals) --, and so on.

 

We might picture, say, a mathematical point as a infinitely small dot if that helps us make appropriate inferences, but, as we have just seen, a dot has a shape (circular to normal vision, irregular under a microscope); but no mathematical point has a shape, circumference, radius, or even centre. What then can a mathematical point possibly share with anything in the universe? What could mathematical points, lines or surfaces be abstracted from, or be a generalisation of, if they share absolutely nothing with the material points, lines, or surfaces they supposedly represent? Of course, at this point (no pun intended), abstractionists go rather quiet. They have in fact nothing with which to work.

 

Here is a comment I left on Quora recently (slightly edited):

 

Clearly, mathematical points have no shape, circumference, diameter or radius -- and they aren't even circular or have a centre! They aren't containers, either, so no other point can 'occupy' them. Otherwise they'd be volume intervals, not points.

 

We sometimes say lines are 'made of points', but that can't be so or they'd fall apart rather quickly (and they would be rather bumpy, like a string of pearls), since there is no 'mathematical' force to hold those points together. Lines are also perfectly strong and rigid, they neither age nor begin to fray at the edges -- and yet they can be easily cut/intersected by other lines and planes, as well as bent into any shape we please by a suitable homeomorphism. But even then the original line is still there in 'mathematical space', 'unbent', so that someone else can use it as many times as they like and for whatever mathematical purpose they choose, as can any number of other mathematicians and they can all do that at the same time. They don't need to form a queue.

 

Lines are supposed to intersect other lines at a 'common point', but if neither line is made of points, they can't have 'common points', can they? How then do they intersect?

And if planes aren't made of points, either -- otherwise we could ask the same questions as those above about lines --, how can a line intersect a plane at a 'common point'? Furthermore, planes can't be made of lines (or they'd be like an array of really thin knitting needles with nothing to 'hold them together'), and if that is so, planes can't intersect at a 'common line', either.

 

Furthermore, there are no 'perfect circles', since there are no mathematical circles to begin with. If there were, we might well ask where they exist, and what their size or thickness is -- or even what they are made of. Are they solid, or do they have a big hole in the middle, like a rarefied polo mint, with an extremely thin non-minty rim?

 

The same goes for rectangles, squares, cubes, cones, ellipses, spheres, ellipsoids, paraboloids…

 

As Philip, the original answerer, rightly says, we mathematicians deal with 'objects’ that not only do not exist, they can't exist, and not just in real life -- but, anywhere. They soon exhibit contradictory properties when we think otherwise or we confuse them with physical objects. But are they even 'non-physical' objects, or, indeed, 'objects' of any sort? If they were 'non-physical', how could they be perfectly rigid, for example? Is a line comprised of 'non-physical' points? And how does that hold together? What exactly are 'non-physical points', anyway? They, too, have no shape, circumference, or centre. They, too, aren't containers, otherwise they'd be 'non-physical volume intervals'! If that is so, no other 'non-physical point' can occupy them, either.

 

Much of traditional analytic and differential geometry, as well as topology, will need to be re-written if we are to free them of such crude ideas, and, indeed, avoid such awkward questions.

 

The traditional approach to mathematical 'objects' and 'processes' thus confuses mathematics with physical science -- and physicists return the compliment with interest by treating the universe as a mathematical object in its own right. Hence all those 'worm holes', 'parallel' universes, 'branched' time zones, 'warped spacetime', 'branes' -- and, of course, the 'paradoxes' of 'time travel'. No wonder physicists face insuperable problems explaining 'force', 'energy', 'space' and 'time' -- not to mention all those particles that seem to be wave and particle all in one go, can be in two places at once and can 'pop into existence' whenever they feel the urge.

 

And such problems don't stop there; the 'paradoxes' of number theory (and, indeed, set theory) also arise from viewing even these as if they were physical objects of some sort.

 

Of course, this means that there are no viable versions of mathematical Platonism, which theory positively invites awkward questions and 'difficulties' such as these.

 

And that also goes for 'bargain basement' Platonism — i.e., 'mathematical realism'.

 

Added on edit: You can see this confusion spreading through many of the comments in this thread as Quorans, for example, try to work out the 'pressure' exerted by a mathematical sphere (!!) (as if such objects are subject to gravity, or any other force!), or when they make comments about the size (!!) of a mathematical point. If it had any size, it wouldn't be a mathematical point, for goodness sake, whatever else it was. They are still conflating mathematical objects with physical objects, hence their puzzlement, the 'contradictions' this generates, and all those inexplicable 'infinities' that so 'effortlessly' emerge from nowhere.

 

Furthermore, if abstractionism were true, no two mathematicians would or could agree with each other. Indeed, if abstractionism were true, they could dispense with all those useless definitions, theorems, lemmas and proofs, and just brain scan one another.

 

[On Maxwell, cf., Buchwald (1985); on mathematics as it features in Physics, see Morrison (2000), pp.62-108. In addition, the last chapter of Harré and Madden (1976) is also relevant. Other literature related to this topic has been listed here. In addition to the links posted above, more will be said about the nature of mathematics and 'mathematical objects' in later Essays -- for example, here; see also here.]

 

But, even if it were conceded that DM-theorists are correct about the nature of mathematics, it would still fail to explain how, for example, the arrows from earlier could possibly be part of a UO. Again: this is how mathematicians represent vectors. So, even if mathematical objects and structures were 'abstractions from reality', or they 'reflected' what exists in the physical world, it still behoves DM-fans to explain exactly how these arrows would be a UO:

 

→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→

Figure Five: Still A 'Dialectical Tautology'?

 

Indeed, it would be as ridiculous to regard the above alignment as a UO as it would be to regard a column of ants as a UO if they were all marching in the same direction.

 

 

Figure Six: Anti-Dialectics?

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Cases like those considered before Interlude Six illustrate a well known fact that forces aren't rigidly fixed as permanent opposites, nor are they always oppositional, even when they are classified as opposites. Hence, it isn't easy to see how viewing forces only as polar oppositional pairs could accommodate this particular property of natural forces.

 

In that case, this is unwelcome news, for little sense can be given in DM to the idea that opposites can switch in this way.41

 

That could be regarded as a serious interpretive error -- given the fact that change is central to DM. But, the point being made here is specifically targeted at the DM-notion that all change is a consequence of the interplay between polar opposites. Clearly, if these alleged polar opposites can combine in some way to augment one another, the term "opposite" can't fail to lose its dialectical bite. If change can occur as a result of 'opposites' that don't work as 'opposites' (still less as "polar" opposites) then this particular dialectical 'law' stands in some danger of violating a dialectical equivalent of the metaphysical Trades Description Act.

 

If this picture is now extended to take in HM, and if, for example, we consider the operation of "opposing" forces in the class war, it isn't easy to see how, say, one social force could switch around in the way that forces operating in nature manifestly can. Is it possible, therefore, for the capitalist class to swap sides in the class struggle (as a class force -- not as individual members of that class) to augment workers' battles in the latter's interests and on their terms? Admittedly, the detailed structure of -- and processes within -- the class war are complex; elements from each side may detach themselves (or be detached), and can work against their own (misperceived) class interests (on a temporary or even semi-permanent basis), but this isn't something upon which revolutionaries can or should depend -- still less ought they to trust in the outcome. If they were to do this, it would clearly encourage reformism and centrism (let alone invite defeat). Even at the margin (where whole class forces aren't involved), switches are sporadic.

 

But, such things occur all the time in nature. Hence, this crude analogy relating opposite forces to 'contradictions' lifted from DM is useless, at best, when it is imported into, and then applied in, HM.

 

Again, it could be objected here that this is a gross distortion since the above phenomena are actually consistent with DM. Dialecticians themselves reject the idea that there are fixed and unchanging forces in nature. Hence, the recognition that forces can change and operate in 'opposite directions' is one of DM's strengths, not one of its weaknesses.

 

Or, so it could be maintained.

 

However, this volunteered response succeeds in achieving one thing: it helps focus on what has been a recurring problem throughout this site: DM is so vague and equivocal that it is impossible to say with any clarity what its consequences amount to, or even if it has any. The claim that 'contradictions' in nature must be understood as opposing forces has, under close examination, turned out to mean that such forces might not actually oppose each other -- indeed, according to Engels, the concept of a force could simply be a convenient shorthand for the complex relative motion of bodies. Now, it seems that even this is incorrect, for oppositional forces may actually augment one another, but only if they aren't viewed as shorthand for the relative motion of bodies. And, to cap it all, we have just discovered that they can't even be 'dialectical opposites'!

 

It is therefore impossible to decide which of these DM-type forces are genuine opposites (or, indeed, which are polar opposites, if any are), or even distinguish any that are from those that aren't. But, if every force can work in any manner whatsoever, then it becomes deeply mysterious why only some are depicted as opposites. And, what has become of the AR-typology Engels regarded as fundamental?

 

Given such vague and ambiguous terminology, little meaning may be given to a single DM-concept in this area; still less to the idea that DM force 'laws' operate anywhere in nature.

 

Imagine a Chemist, say, who identified an element as having just so many protons in its nucleus, except it didn't really have that number of protons, and these alleged protons weren't really protons, and the element rarely if ever had a nucleus, and anyway it wasn't an element to begin with! Suppose further that this chemist claimed that she knew what she was talking about (even if no one else did) because she was an expert player of the 'Nixon Card', and thus skilled in the art of "grasping contradictions", which unfortunate lack of 'flexibility' and slavish adherence to 'formal concepts' prevents her critics from seeing the truth as she sees it.

 

Few, I think, would take her seriously. The same judgement should, I think, be reserved for DM-theorists, too.

 

Unfortunately, such discursive and theoretical 'contradictions' are grist to the DM-mill, but this isn't something about which dialecticians should feel proud. For if Capitalists, say, (as a social force) can indeed operate in such a contradictory manner, who is to say whether a revolution is necessary to overthrow them? Perhaps -- as result of a 'dialectical inversion' -- the class enemy could become the strongest ally of the working class? In such a topsy-turvy 'dialectical universe' anything might happen. Capitalism might be reformed away; Imperialists could assist in the abolition of poverty; the Nazi's might one day help create 'racial' harmony; and the Ku Klux Klan could wind up supporting Black Lives Matter. Who knows? The ruling-class might even overthrow itself42

 

If it is a central postulate of the theory that 'contradictions' are oppositional forces, and that these can change in 'contradictory' ways to become 'non-oppositional', then reformism, centrism, class collaboration (and the prospect of having the Fascists (etc.) as allies) can't be ruled out. On the other hand, if these possibilities are to be rejected (as surely they must), then the importation of such 'contradictory' DM-ideas into HM must be resisted no less emphatically.

 

In fact, as we will see in Essay Nine Part Two, this is indeed how class collaborationists have argued: the supposedly 'contradictory' nature of the Guomindang, for example, 'allowed' the CCP to 'justify' the formation of an alliances with them. DM also supplied the, shall we say, flexible theoretical atmosphere that 'allowed' the Stalinist regime to enter into a pact with the Nazis, and then help rationalise this treachery before the communist movement world-wide. As we will also see, this contradictory theory can be, and has been, used to defend whatever is expedient, and its opposite in the next breath and often by the very same dialectician.

 

Of course, it could be countered that forces operate in history in more complex ways than those we find in nature, so the above analogy with natural forces (and the KKK, etc.) is inapt -- especially if it is applied in the crude manner just illustrated. Unfortunately, if this rebuttal were itself successful then it would be misleading to describe natural and social forces as 'contradictory', for if the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' is inapt, it is inapt. End of story. Of course, that admission would amount to the abandonment of this unhelpful analogy in its entirety: that 'contradictions' may be depicted as oppositional forces anywhere at all.43

 

Nevertheless, even if all of the above points turn out to be completely misguided, there are other far more fundamental reasons for ruling-out the identification of opposing forces with 'contradictions'.

 

It is to these that I now turn.

 

A Contradictory Theory?

 

'Literal Forces' In Opposition

 

Most of the above criticisms were aimed at demonstrating that the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' was seriously misguided. Despite this, it could be argued that this doesn't affect the view that the identification of forces with 'contradictions' is in fact literal, not figurative.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that despite its centrally-important role in DM, and as far as can be ascertained, the precise details of the literal connection between forces and 'contradictions' have never been worked-out by a single dialectician!

 

One reason for this might be that they consider this identification to be so obvious that the specifics either don't matter or they are deemed to be trivial. On the other hand, it could turn out to be the case that nothing could have been said in this respect, which would more obviously explain this protracted, deafening silence. Indeed, as will soon become clear, this in fact seems to be the case: this omission isn't the least bit surprising, for the imagined connection between forces and 'contradictions' turns out to be entirely illusory.

 

In order to substantiate this latest allegation it might help if we back-tracked a little. Part of the argument in favour of the identification of forces and contradictions at first appeared to depend on an analogy drawn between literal contradictions and conflict (which view, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), is a throw-back to ancient and animistic theories about the origin of all forms of conflict, locating them in the activities the 'gods' or other invisible, personified forces at work 'behind the scenes', or 'beneath appearances').

 

Mere contradictions are clearly verbal wrangles, which can indeed look oppositional. When one person asserts p, and another person denies it (or asserts not p, where "p" stands for a spoken token indicative sentence), then at the level of discourse at least some sort of opposition appears to be implied (but on that, see here). So, analogously, it seems that a 'contradiction' in nature signals the existence of real material opposition -- but, alas, only to those who are happy to fetishise social relations as if they represented real relations in nature itself.

 

DM-theorists view real, material 'contradictions' as their primary concern; verbal wrangles are clearly only of peripheral interest. Having said that, many dialecticians refer back to the origin of 'the dialectic' in the verbal wrangles recorded in Plato's dialogues. Here are just a few:

 

"In his Phänomenologie des Geistes [Hegel] compares human life with dialogue, in the sense that under the pressure of experience our views gradually change, as happens to the opinions of disputants participating in a discussion of a profound intellectual nature. Comparing the course of development of consciousness with the progress of such a discussion, Hegel designated it by the word dialectics, or dialectical motion. This word had already been used by Plato, but it was Hegel who gave it its especially profound and important meaning." [Plekhanov (1917), p.601. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

"Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature...." [Stalin (1976b), p.836. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Let us inquire into the sources of dialectics in antiquity. Why was it that in antiquity man had already come upon the foundations of the dialectical method of thinking? 1. The old philosophers of nature, Heraclitus, Anaximander, etc., investigated the emergence and decline of the world. They thus had to arrive at the concept of the universal change and the universal motion of all things. I refer to Heraclitus especially. 2. Social relations, meditation on the form of the State, on religion, etc., stimulated the consideration of all things as changeful and self-contradictory. (This applies especially to Socrates, Plato, etc.) The immediate stimulus was that in public life contradictory viewpoints clashed one with another. Public life in Athens was a very lively affair. In the market-place discussions were constantly taking place concerning what is good and what is evil, how the State should be constituted, etc. One said A, another Not-A. This was true of all things in public and private life. From this there ultimately developed an art of conversation, and this art of conversation became the source of the art of dialectics. Dialectics was originally called the art of discourse because it grew out of discourse." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.98-99. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"This consideration enables us to understand the original meaning of the term 'dialectics.' The word is derived from the Greek dialego, meaning to discuss or debate. It was considered that to discuss a question from all sides, and from all angles, allowing different one-sided points of view to oppose and contradict each other during the debate, was the best method of arriving at the truth. Such was the dialectics employed, for example, by Socrates. When anyone claimed to have a formula which answered some questions once and for all, Socrates would enter into discussion with him and, by forcing him to consider the question from different angles, would compel him to contradict himself and so to admit that his formula was false. By this method Socrates considered that it was possible to arrive at more adequate ideas about things." [Cornforth (1976), pp.60-61. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

"Elaborated first by the Greek philosophers (dialego – I debate), dialectics remained something of an intellectual curiosity, a philosophical cul-de-sac, particularly when religious beliefs dominated." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Dialectics is derived from the Greek word 'dialego' which means to discourse or debate. Many of the old Greek philosophers were dialecticians like, Aristotle and Plato. Heraclitus formulated masterpieces of dialectic. Plato used the 'dialectical method' in his dialogues, whereas Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic intellect among these philosophers, investigated the most essential forms of dialectical thought." [Quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"Dialectics was initially a particular kind of dialogue invented in Ancient Greece in which two or more people holding different points of view about a subject seek to establish the truth of the matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments.... Today dialectics denotes a mode of cognition which recognizes the most general laws of motion, contradiction and new development. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by exposing the contradictions in arguments of opponents and overcoming these contradictions. They thought that the clash of opinions was the best method of eventually getting to the truth." [Quoted from here. Paragraphs merged. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The word dialectics refers to a method of intellectual discussion by dialogue. It is a term of logic. The meaning of dialectics is the conflict between two mutually opposite forces or tendencies. According to the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) it referred to the art of deputation by question and answer." [Quoted from here. Bold emphasis added]

 

Even so, the theory that there are contradictions, even 'dialectical contradictions', in nature and society is still analogical, for we were certainly aware that contradictions involve verbal wrangles well before we were informed (by Hegel) that there were any such in nature and society. In that case, Hegel's argument must have proceeded from the social to the natural world, which is indeed what the history of the subject reveals: Hegelian dialectics didn't exist in pre-historic times (nor even before the 18th century), even though people have been arguing and contradicting one another for tens of thousands of years.43a Hence, social interaction has plainly been projected analogically onto nature, and DM-theorists have manifestly relied on an analogy drawn between the way human beings argue (or fight) and the way conflict seems to occur in the natural and social world. Unfortunately, this makes the literal interpretation of forces as 'contradictions' unavoidably dependent on analogical and figurative language, leaving perplexed non-believers with absolutely no clue what literal meaning, if any, could possibly be attributed to this way of picturing conflict. Even to this day, we are still in the dark about the material grounding that DM-theorists assume exists.

 

We certainly have a much clearer grasp of the use of contradictions in language, and arguably also in logic, but we have none at all when it comes to those that allegedly occur in nature -- or, indeed, in society --, as we will see.

 

Having said that, there is this minimal consideration in favour of the application of DM to society: 'contradictions' in capitalism, for example, are based on the presumed fact that certain concepts (or what they supposedly 'reflect') are dialectically linked. For instance, the capitalist class not only implies the working class (the proletariat), the one can't exist without the other (although I have thrown that clichéd inference into considerable doubt here) -- hence, they are said to be 'dialectically-united opposites', interpenetrating one another (or so the story goes). But, as we have discovered, there is nothing in the natural world that enjoys this sort of 'logical' inter-connection -- as we have already seen, not even the opposite poles of a magnet, or positive and negative poles in atomic theory and electrodynamics can be viewed this way. In that case, the application of DM to the non-social world is, at best, figurative and non-literal, which, as we have found out in the first half of this Essay, won't wash either.

 

Nevertheless, this would at least account for the figurative way that 'dialectical contradictions' continually surface in DM (and which are seriously overused in HM), and why dialecticians regularly conflate their social and material forms with each other.44

 

Once more, even if we ignore this problem, one thing is clear: for DM-theorists verbal contradictions represent perhaps the least significant category of opposition. Changes in nature and society are (for them) the result of much more fundamental 'contradictions' than those occasioned by the mere gainsaying of another person's words. In many cases, of course, discursive contradictions might turn out be a 'reflection' of more basic conflicts in the real world, and it is the latter that are of interest to DM-theorists.

 

However, when this 'neat' picture is examined a little more closely much of it falls apart.

 

The Revenge Of The Non-Existent

 

As has already been noted, DM-theorists have so far failed to offer a clear account of the precise nature of the connection between 'contradictions' and opposing forces that their theory requires. In that case, once again, one will have to be provided for them.45

 

Presumably, when DM-theorists claim that 'contradictions' are represented in nature by opposing forces they have something like the following in mind (if they but knew it):45a

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise respectively from each set form oppositional couples.46

 

[Here, the content of C1 could include any other local or remote forces and/or processes operating in the system; alternatively, the forces themselves may even be 'edited out' on the lines envisaged by Engels (as a sort of shorthand for relative motion, etc.). In addition, all the internal "mediations" between these forces and/or events in the Totality (T) may also be incorporated into the picture at any point. Other 'dialectical' caveats could, of course, be stirred into the mix, as deemed necessary or appropriate.]

 

It is worth emphasising at this point that P1 or P2 must operate 'independently' in C1.47 This seems to be an essential assumption so that sets E1 and E2 may be determinate themselves.

 

[Admittedly, this qualification runs foul of the idea that everything in the Totality (T) is interrelated, but we can avoid that untoward consequence by modifying the stated condition to "relative independence". Naturally, this would mean that several other comments in this part of the Essay (originally aimed at trying to make this aspect of dialectics clear for the very first time ever) would become rather vague by default. However, as will readily be appreciated, a 'theory' like this -- beset as it is on all sides by an internally-generated fog, further aggravated by its supporters lobbing metaphysical smoke bombs in its general direction -- will always resist attempts to dispel the Stygian gloom in which it seems permanently engulfed. Anyway, this 'independence' needn't suggest a CAR-like scenario since it could form part of the 'dialectical development' of new forces and processes as C1 and the rest of T develop. Naturally, this simplifying assumption could be modified at a later stage, as the need arises.]

 

The first problem with the above account centres on the term "opposites", in F9. Something a little more precise than merely an "opposite" seems to be required here in order for DL to surpass FL in its ability to account for change, etc.48

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise respectively from each set form oppositional couples.

 

Unfortunately, the difficulty here lies in seeing whether even this minimal condition is actually implied by F6-F9, and whether the rather weak concept of an "opposite" is capable of bearing all the weight usually put on it. These can't be 'dialectical opposites', anyway, since they don't imply one another. They can surely exist independently of each other (unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, or so we have been told), and hence they aren't 'interpenetrated opposites'.

 

[I have resisted representing E1 and E2 propositionally since I want to concentrate on real material opposites, rather than their linguistic correlates. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling, once again, that in FL two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false at once. One implication of this condition is that the claim that two allegedly contradictory states of affairs could both exist at the same time (expressed by two supposedly true 'contradictory' propositions) must rest on either a mis-description or an un-discharged ambiguity --, or even, of course, on the projection of logical categories onto nature. This topic will be analysed in more detail in a later subsection -- as it has also been in Essay Five -- and will be further examined in Interlude Eleven and Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

However, quite independently of these latest 'difficulties', far more problematic is the fact that given F6-F9, it would be impossible to say what the 'contradictory' state-of-affairs here is meant to be, whether or not it is actually 'dialectical'.

 

That is because F6-F9 imply that E1 and E2 do not in fact obtain together, for if just one of P1 or P2 is operative, then only one of E1 or E2 will be instantiated.

 

Clearly, in such circumstances there could be no 'contradiction' -- even if we were accommodating enough to accept the vague DM-'definition' of a 'dialectical contradiction' -- since, at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction wouldn't actually exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented from acting by the operation of either one of P1 or P2!49

 

Interlude Seven -- Further Complications

 

Of course, this conclusion (i.e., that at least one 'half' of the alleged contradiction wouldn't actually exist for it to contradict anything, having been prevented from occurring by the operation of either one of P1 or P2) itself depends on the peculiar Hegelian doctrine that contradictions can somehow exist. If that thesis is abandoned, DM falls apart, anyway.

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.

 

However, it could be objected that the disjunction of the effects of P1 and P2 (as in "E1 or E2") completely distorts the picture. Indeed, it could be maintained that what is missing here is an account of how P2 interacts with E1, which would itself be dialectical. [One variation on this theme will be considered presently, others later on -- for example, in Interlude Nine.]

 

Indeed, what hasn't been taken account of in this Essay is that alterations induced in E1 by these interactions would mean that the idea that change comes about through contradictions -- modelled by material forces -- could still gain some sort of purchase.

 

Hence, it could be argued that the contradiction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes, say, E1a. In that case, we would have real terms here for the 'contradiction' to reflect, which in turn means we would have here a concrete example of change through 'internal contradiction'.

 

Or, so it could be argued.

 

But, plainly, this would only be the case because a decision had already been taken to describe these forces as "contradictory", when it hasn't yet been established whether this is an accurate, or even an appropriate, way to depict the relationship between them.

 

Nevertheless, and ignoring even that rejoinder for now, and as has been underlined already, what actually happens here is that the resultant of these two forces actually causes the said change. If so, and once more, calling this a change motivated by a 'dialectical tautology' would be far more accurate. [That particular option among others will be examined again below.]

 

Moreover, even if the DM-objection volunteered above were valid -- whereby the interaction between P1 and P2 alters E1 so that it becomes E1a -- it would still be of little use to dialecticians. That is because, in this case, E1 itself will have been altered externally, and so change here wouldn't have been the result of E1's own 'internal contradictions'. That is because, as we have seen many times, these items don't imply one another, so they can't be 'internally-connected', in the way that the proletariat is supposedly internally related to the capital class, so that the one can't exist without the other since they supposedly imply one another. So, whatever else it is, this can't be an example of dialectical change through 'internal contradiction'.

 

Worse still, if this is to be the model for all DM-change, then no change at all would be 'internally-generated'. We saw this problem recur throughout Part One of this Essay, where no matter how we tried to re-package this theory, the result was always the same: if everything is "self-moving" (according to Lenin and several other DM-theorists quoted in Part One), then the universe must be populated by:

 

(i) Eternally changeless simples, or by,

 

(ii) Non-interacting systems.

 

On the other hand, if systems of forces actually change the objects internal to the system to which they belong, then, plainly, those objects can't be "self-moving". The volunteered response above simply reproduces this fatal defect in a more abstract form.

 

["System" and "simples" were defined in Part One.]

 

Anyway, this volunteered DM-response will be tackled later in this Essay -- and in more detail below, in Interlude Nine.

 

Since this Essay was originally written, a superficial attempt has in fact been published which at least endeavoured to specify the precise nature of the link between oppositional forces (or, to be more honest, oppositional "tendencies") and 'dialectical contradictions' -- i.e., Weston (2012).

 

Here are two different translation of Marx's words and what I have said about them in Essay Nine Part One:

 

Tom Weston refers his readers to this passage from Das Kapital (I have quoted it as it appears in Weston's article first, and then as it has been rendered in MECW):

 

"We saw that the process of exchange of commodities includes relations that contradict and exclude one another. The development of the commodity does not overcome [aufhebt] these contradictions, but creates a form within which they can move themselves. This is in general the method through which real [wirkliche] contradictions solve [losen] themselves. It is a contradiction, for example, for one body to continuously fall into another, and just as constantly fly away from it. The ellipse is one of the forms of movement in which this contradiction is actualised [verwirklicht] just as much as it is solved [lost]." [Quoted in Weston (2012), pp.5-6. This links to a PDF; italic emphases in the original.]

 

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Marx (1996), p.113. This links to a PDF; italic emphases in the original.]

 

Weston takes exception to several of the translated phrases in the second of the above two passages, such as "it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another", on the grounds that:

 

"[T]he phrase 'it is a contradiction to depict' conveys an idea directly opposite to the assertions of the German text. The contradiction is not only in the depiction of elliptical motion; it is in the motion itself. This is the clear sense of the German text's assertions that the contradictions are 'real [wirklich]', are 'actualised [verwirklicht]', and that the sides of the contradiction are the two tendencies of motion that are mentioned, not their depictions." [Weston (2012), p.28. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

Weston must mean "not merely their depictions" in the last sentence above since it would seem reasonably clear that if a 'contradiction' is 'real' then its depiction can't fail to be contradictory, too.

 

Be that as it may, for this and other reasons, Weston clearly prefers the first translation to the second.

 

The following is also a passage we have already had occasion to quote in part -- concerning the above obscure throw-away comment in Das Kapital concerning the elliptical motion of planets around the Sun:

 

"As we saw above, an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two sides interfere with each other.... Although tendencies can interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest the following criterion is a sufficient condition for negativity of, or interference between, opposing tendencies A and B:

 

Tendency A, if strong enough, with cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely.  

 

"This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its actually flying away (a parabolic or a hyperbolic orbit [in that case, these wouldn't be orbits, just trajectories -- RL]) if the tangential velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity. On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both may be partially realised." [Weston (2012), pp.17-18. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

I will return to this passage again later on in this Essay, in a section where I plan to discuss these and other possibilities in much greater detail. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that:

 

(a) Just like other DM-theorists, Weston simply helps himself to the word "contradiction" with no attempt to justify its use in such contexts -- that is, over and above stipulating that these phenomena are to be so described. Plainly, this is little other than an attempt to foist this concept on nature (in defiance of what DM-fans tell us they never do);

 

(b) We have already seen that "tendencies" aren't in any way causal, and can only be called forces by those with an agenda;

 

(c) Weston has plainly appealed to "tendencies" as an artificial way of trying to link these phenomena, since "force" won't work here, nor will "inertia" (his other favoured word);

 

(d) Even if the DM-use of "contradiction" were justifiable, how can "less fully realised" be viewed as the equivalent of "dialectical contradiction"? Weston failed to say. Finally,

 

(e) Do these "tendencies" turn into each other? And how exactly do they "struggle" with one another? But they should do both if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

(f) As we saw in Essay Nine Part One, Marx told us he was merely "coquetting" with Hegelianisms like this in Das Kapital. In which case, in conjunction with the points made above (and below), very little, if no weight at all, can be placed on Marx's words.

 

So, whatever else it is, this relation isn't 'dialectical'.

 

It is also worth pointing out that Newton's First Law (which appears to be integral to Weston's attempt to defend this neo-Hegelian world-view) says nothing about "tendencies":

 

"Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon." [Quoted from here. Accessed 04/07/2016.]

 

Moreover, the Classical Law of Gravity also fails to mention "tendencies":

 

"Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation states that any two objects exert a gravitational force of attraction on each other. The direction of the force is along the line joining the objects.... The magnitude of the force is proportional to the product of the gravitational masses of the objects, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them." [Quoted from here. Accessed 04/07/2016.]

 

"Newton's Law of gravitation: every particle attracts any other particle with a gravitational force whose magnitude is given by

 

F = G m1m2

         r2

"Here m1 and m2 are the masses of the particles, r is the distance between them, and G is the gravitational constant." [Halliday, et al (1993), p.412. Link added.]

 

Which means that Weston's theory actually depends on a series of Persuasive Definitions, or, perhaps, Persuasive Re-descriptions. This is the only way it can even be made to seem to work.

 

[I have said more about Weston's 'argument', here, here, here, here and here.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Later on, I will examine the question whether E1 and E2 (from earlier), even though 'opposites', can legitimately be described as 'contradictory'. In what follows, I will simply assume that they are.50

 

Prevention And Its Discontents

 

Despite this, it could be claimed that the following propositions are all that DM-theorists really require:

 

F10: P1 prevents E2, and P2 prevents E1.

 

F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.50a

 

F12: Therefore, P1 and P2 contradict each other's effects.

 

If so, then plainly P1 and P2 don't actually contradict one another, just each other's effects. In that case, it is far from clear whether or not DM-theorists (who are keen to maintain the orthodox view that forces contradict each other) will want to embrace F10-F12 too enthusiastically. It is also worth repeating an earlier, fatal objection to this attempt to do CPR on this dying theory: when, for example, P1 prevents E2, it can't be contradicting it in dialectical sense of that word, since these two factors don't imply one another, and both can exist without the other (unlike the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which do imply one another, so we are told). Hence, whatever else this is, it, too, can't be a 'dialectical contradiction'. That is the same fatal objection to this entire way of viewing 'dialectical contradictions' we have met several times in this Essay. Nevertheless, I will once again ignore it so that other defects of this theory may be highlighted. However, I will introduce it again from time-to-to-time to remind the reader that this is, rather like that Monty Python parrot, an ex-theory, it has gone to meet its maker:

 

 

Video Four: DM -- As Dead As This Parrot?

 

Interlude Eight -- Tom Weston

 

F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.

 

This appears to be a line adopted in Weston (2012):

 

"Hegel distinguished contradiction from opposition by the category of negativity, which means, roughly, conflict of the opposite sides: 'Opposites...contain contradiction in so far as they relate to each other negatively in the same respect or are both mutually canceling...and indifferent to each other.' It is the negativity of a contradiction that is responsible for its key role in dialectical theory, that contradiction causes motion: 'The sides of a manifold only become active and lively against each other when they are driven to the peak of contradiction, and contradiction contains the negativity, which is the indwelling pulse of self-movement and liveliness.'... (p.12)

 

"For  Marx as for Hegel, the main difference between opposition and contradiction is negativity, the internal activity of a contradiction.... (p.13)

 

["Negativity is an abstraction of conflict, not of the absence of something.... (Footnote p.13)]

 

"As we saw above, an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two sides interfere with each other. From Marx's brief comments, he appears to have thought that it is obvious that falling into a body and flying away from it are contradictory tendencies, but we can reinforce his conclusion. Although tendencies can interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest that the following criterion is a sufficient condition for negativity of, or interference between, opposing tendencies A and B:

 

Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely.

 

(α) "This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its actually flying away (a parabolic or hyperbolic orbit) if the tangential velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity. On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both may be partially realised.... (pp.17-18)

 

"A reasonable interpretation of increased intensity or sharpness of a contradiction is an increase in the mutual interference of the two sides. As the contradiction undergoes the fullest possible development and nears resolution, this interference is increased to such an extent that the two sides cannot coexist any longer, and one must defeat the other, either by destroying it or by weakening it so completely that it can no longer interfere with the victorious side.... (p.24)

 

(β) "In that case, the inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity. Thus the two tendencies interfere with each other, and represent a contradiction." (p.34) [Weston (2012), pp.12-34. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

Weston here appeals to a handful of rather obscure ideas connected with "negativity" the latter of which we are told is "an abstraction of conflict" and "interference" (whatever that means!). This suggests that Weston's analysis doesn't rely on 'one side' of a contradiction preventing the 'other' from operating, but merely "interfering" with it. In other words, it is clear that for Weston the two sides of the 'contradiction' in such cases must co-exist.

 

If so, it should be possible to adapt what was said earlier (except, of course, Weston has dropped the use of "force", replacing it with "tendency"), as follows: 

 

W1: Let force/"tendency", P1, oppose/interfere with force/"tendency", P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

W2: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

W3: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1 (comprised of sub-events, E1a- E1n), and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2 (comprised of sub-events, E2a- E2n). For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

W4: By W2, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise respectively from each set form oppositional couples.

 

From what Weston says in paragraphs (α) and (β) above "opposite" can be given a Weston-style spin so that it means something like "the opposite result of...", or maybe "prevent the full realisation of...", one or more events. This means that one or more of E1a- E1n and E2a- E2n will be prevented from occurring. This seems to be the only way of interpreting the following sentence:

 

"[T]he inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity." [Ibid.]

 

So, P1 might prevent, say, event, E2i, while P2 will prevent, say, event, E1j. In which case:

 

W5: P1 and P2 contradict one or more of each other's effects.

 

But, if these effects don't happen, or don't take place (even on Weston's recognition), then they can't exist to be contradicted by anything, let alone by a force/"tendency". More to the point, these two forces/"tendencies" don't actually 'contradict' one another, just each others effects. As noted earlier (edited):

 

In that case, it is far from clear whether or not DM-theorists (who are keen to maintain the orthodox view that forces contradict each other) will want to embrace [the above] too enthusiastically.

 

No surprise, we hit the same brick wall!

 

[I will return this side-argument again later, after a few peripheral 'difficulties' have been ironed out.]

 

To continue: the above passage seems to imply that the aforementioned planet will orbit the Sun when the "tendencies" involved have balanced one another out:

 

"As we saw above, an opposition is a contradiction if negativity is present, that is, if the two sides interfere with each other. From Marx's brief comments, he appears to have thought that it is obvious that falling into a body and flying away from it are contradictory tendencies, but we can reinforce his conclusion. Although tendencies can interfere with each other in numerous ways, I suggest that the following criterion is a sufficient condition for negativity of, or interference between, opposing tendencies A and B:

 

Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely.

 

"This criterion is satisfied by both tendencies that Marx finds in the ellipse case. The tendency of a planet to fly away from the Sun will only result in its actually flying away (a parabolic or hyperbolic orbit) if the tangential velocity is large enough to overcome the counter-tendency produced by gravity. On the other side, the tendency of the planet to fall into the Sun will only result in the planet actually hitting the Sun if the tangential tendency is small compared with the gravitational tendency. Thus unless one of the tendencies is too weak to constrain the other, each tendency prevents the realisation of the other. At least one will not be fully realised, although both may be partially realised.... (pp.17-18)

 

"In that case, the inertial tendency will prevent the full realisation of the gravitational tendency -- falling into the central body -- and the gravitational tendency will prevent the full realisation of the inertial tendency, the tendency to fly off to infinity. Thus the two tendencies interfere with each other, and represent a contradiction." (p.34)

 

So, it looks like the "tendency" to fly off at a tangent is balanced by the "tendency" to fall into the Sun, and when that happens the planet will enter into an orbital trajectory.

 

I take up this notion (i.e., "balancing"), and several other related issues below (here, here, and here), and in more detail in Interlude Nine, where I consider several variations on Weston's theory. [See also here.]

 

Independently of this, we have already had occasion to note that Hegel's invention of 'negativity' was thoroughly misconceived since it was based on

 

(i) An egregious mis-interpretation of the LOI (where we also saw that contradiction has nothing to do with cancellation), and,

 

(ii) Kant's introduction of the concept of "real negation", which has been debunked in Appendix A.

 

[LOI = Law of Identity.]

 

Finally, it is far from clear that the two "tendencies" Weston has recruited to his cause are 'dialectical opposites' of one another in the required manner; they don't seem to imply one another in any sense of that word, which they would have to do in order to qualify as 'internally-connected' opposites. In what way does a "tendency" to fall into a planet imply a "tendency" to continue to move in the same line of action -- in the way that one class under capitalism (the bourgeoisie) is said to imply the existence of the other (the proletariat), such that one can't exist without the other -- or so we have been told? Weston omits consideration of this core Hegelian principle, and it isn't hard to see why: that omission hides the fact that this isn't by any measure a 'dialectical relation' and hence it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction', either, whatever else it is. [On that, see here.]

 

[I will offer a different reading of this passage in Essay Nine Part One -- and one that absolves Marx of any involvement in this 'Hegelian' farce (which, as we have just seen, turns out not to be Hegelian, after all!).]

 

But, what about the "fully realised" aspect of Weston's argument?

 

"Tendency A, if strong enough, will cause the opposite tendency B to be less fully realised than if tendency A were absent, and conversely." [Ibid.]

 

This has already been covered: If a 'tendency' is "less fully realised" then some of its effects won't follow or take place, as we have found out. We have also seen that, whatever else it is, this can't be a 'dialectical' interaction since these 'tendencies' don't imply one another. In which case, Weston's entire analysis is devoid of rational support, at any level -- even in DM-terms!

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

So despite this, in order to examine every possible way of reviving this moribund theory, I will concede for the purposes of argument that E1 and E2 are 'contradictories' after all. However, it now appears from the above considerations, and from F10-F12, that not only does E1 'contradict' E2, but also that P1 'contradicts' E2, and P2 'contradicts' E1, as well. I shall return to consider these added complications, below.

 

F10: P1 prevents E2, and P2 prevents E1.

 

F11: Anything that prevents something else happening contradicts it.

 

F12: Therefore, P1 and P2 contradict each other's effects.

 

But, there now appears to be no good reason to accept F11, and every reason to reject it. Consider the following scenario -- aimed at showing why F11 is unacceptable (even given the truth of other DM-theses):

 

F13: NN saved child MM from drowning.

 

F14: NN prevented the drowning.

 

F15: So, NN contradicted the drowning (by F11).

 

The problem here lies not so much with the non-standard use of language found in the above sentences, but with the fact that if a drowning (or if anything) is prevented from happening then it never actually took place. In that case, if the said incident didn't happen it can't have been 'contradicted' by any of the forces or events doing the preventing -- since there would be no 'it' for anything to contradict. Unless we are prepared to envisage forces 'contradicting' things that don't exist, or we allow them to 'contradict' unrealised possibilities -- or even 'contradict' ideas (perhaps those in NN's mind above) --, the word "contradiction" can gain no grip here, even in DM-terms.

 

It might also become problematic explaining how something that exists can 'struggle' with something that doesn't.

 

It might prove even more problematic explaining how this 'contradiction' is dialectical, since what an individual does or doesn't do in no way implies what they hoped to prevent, in this case, the drowning. The two can certainly exist without one another (unlike the proletariat and the capitalist class, or, so we have been told). If so, whatever else this is, it can't be dialectical'.

 

It could be objected that if NN formed the intention to prevent a drowning that intention implies there is a drowning to prevent. In fact all that is implied here is that NN believed someone was drowning and intended to save that individual. It certainly doesn't imply that there is someone who is drowning since NN could be mistaken, delusional, or a publicity seeker.

 

Even more problematic, did what NN attempt turn into the drowning? But that is what the DM-classics tell us must happen if this is to be counted as a dialectical relation. That is, if these are 'dialectical opposites' locked in struggle, they must change into each other!

 

Again, whatever else it is, this can't be dialectical'.

 

One obvious fall-back position for dialecticians to occupy in response to the above would be to argue that the action mentioned in F13 halted a series of events that would have led to the said drowning. In that case, that intervention contradicted that series of events. This objection will be looked at more closely in Interlude Nine -- and again presently, below.

 

However, in case this latest counter-example is considered prejudicial, or contentious (in that it doesn't deal with real forces, or with the sort of forces over which DM-theorists are exercised), then perhaps the following considerations might prove to be more acceptable. To that end, let us begin with this rather obvious assumption:

 

F16: Any process or series of events that is prevented from occurring does not exist (or take place).51

 

It is clear that while F16 is a truism, it seems to ignore protracted or extended events and processes, so it might not be acceptable as a clarification of the 'contradictions' that are of interest to DM-theorists. Consider, then, the following emendations:

 

F17: Event, E, consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.

 

F18: E1-En form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.

 

F19: Let P2 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.

 

F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist, will never exist, or do not take place.

 

["T" stands for "The Totality".]

 

It is quite plain from this that because of the operation of P2, certain events failed to materialise. But, that simply generalises the point made in relation to the drowning example considered earlier. Even if it were assumed that the vague notion of a 'contradiction' employed by DM-theorists is viable, it would still be difficult to see how anything could 'contradict' something else if the latter doesn't exist or never occurred. Hence, in the example above, if P2 halted certain unspecified elements of the series of events -- perhaps, Ei-En --, which would have led to the said drowning had they not been prevented, then those prevented events never happened (nor did the drowning), and hence didn't exist, and so can't have been 'contradicted'.

 

That objection also appears to be fatal to DM since it appears to tell us that, if anything, forces actually prevent 'contradictions' from arising!

 

Of course, all this is independent of the fact that even if it could be shown that this was a 'contradiction', it couldn't be a 'dialectical contradiction' since the factors involved -- i.e., the actions aimed at preventing the drowning and the events that led up to the drowning -- do not imply one another, and can (surely) exist without one another, unlike, say, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, so we have been told. Nor do they turn into each other.

 

As we have seen time and again, this is a recurring problem which has sunk every such attempt to breath life into this corpse of a theory. [Apologies for that mixed metaphor!]

 

Therefore, far from forces being DM-friendly, they appear to be among its very worst enemies.

 

In that case, if this fatal weakness is to be neutralised, a new and more consistent account of the relationship between 'contradictions' and forces must, as a matter of some urgency, be found.52

 

A More Balanced Account Of Prevention?

 

In order to construct a more viable account, we need to reconsider a difficulty we met earlier that was temporarily put to one side: the claim that forces -- not forces and effects, or simply effects, but forces -- forces are directly contradictory to one another. Consider then the following scenario:

 

F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.

 

Again, this perhaps puts too much weight on the term "prevent"; it might prompt F21 to self-destruct just as fast as F17-F20 did, for if one of these forces fails to operate (it having been prevented), no 'contradiction' would be implied.

 

[Whether or not the actual act of prevention is what constitutes the 'contradiction' here will be considered below, here and in Interlude Nine.]

 

But, perhaps that conclusion is just a little too hasty. For example, both of the above forces could still exist even if one ceased to operate in an F21-style configuration, and no problem need arise because of that since no reference has been made to the non-existent effects of either one of them.

 

This means that even though one of P1 or P2 might have been prevented from acting, they could both still exist in some form or other. If so, F21 might appear to be the viable option that dialecticians require. One further advantage here would be that F21 connects forces directly with 'contradictions', rather than linking 'contradictions' to the effects of forces. Could this be the lifeline DM requires?

 

Alas, upon closer examination, this lifeline soon turns into a noose.

 

 

Figure Seven -- A DM-'Lifeline' Unsurprisingly

Turns Into A Noose

 

The fatal consequences this option presents DM-theorists become apparent when we attempt to unravel what it means for a force to be 'prevented' from operating.

 

Despite disclaimers, it seems that if a force no longer operates, it no longer exists. Perhaps the problem lies not so much with the precise physical form that forces take (which, even to this day, is still mysterious; on that, see Interlude One), but with the fact that the word "operate" is ambiguous. Consider the following examples of forces that are capable of being rendered inoperative:

 

F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate when worker NN threw the switch.

 

F23: An aerofoil produces the lift necessary to keep an aeroplane in the air provided that there is sufficient relative velocity between that aerofoil and the ambient medium to prevent the force of gravity from operating normally, pulling the aircraft to the ground.

 

[In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, I have left F23 in a more colloquial form -- for instance, by my use of "pulling".]

 

In F22, the relevant force simply ceased to exist (or it was converted (or reverted) back into another force, 'potential' force, or some form of energy, etc.) when the switch was thrown. But, in F23, a second force (lift) 'opposes' the effects of the first force (gravity) -- which, of course, still exists (perhaps as part of the resultant force in the system).

 

Can F21 now be interpreted along lines similar to those suggested in F23? This way of viewing the relation between P1 and P2 would see them both as still existing, even while they counterbalance each other. In which case, it might prove helpful to re-write F21 in the following manner:

 

F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.53

 

[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]

 

Now, F24 doesn't appear to face any of the existential problems that F21 encountered since the relevant forces co-exist, counterbalancing each other. Perhaps then we have here the clear statement that DM-theorists require?

 

Alas not.

 

A new difficulty arises just as soon as we ask why only counterbalancing forces should be considered 'contradictory'. This is relevant since F24 simply restricts our attention to situations where there is an equilibrium between forces, and ignores dis-equilibria.54 But surely, it is largely as a result of the latter that change occurs (certainly changes of the sort that interest dialecticians) -- meaning that 'contradictions' should be connected with dis-equilibria, rather than equilibria. If so, F24 must be re-written in the following way:

 

F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.

 

Unfortunately, F25 can't now provide the clarity that was missing from previous attempts to illuminate this part of DM. That is because F25 fails to distinguish between equilibria and dis-equilibria. F24 seemed to express a clear definition of 'contradictory' forces, but in order to make it applicable to the real world, F25 had to be recruited in support, completely undermining F24. F25 informs us that forces are 'contradictory' whether or not F24 is true. Worse still, F25 could be true even when F24 is false:

 

F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

 

F25: P1 contradicts P2 whether it counterbalances P2 or not.

 

Hence, if the following were true, F24 would be false:

 

F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it doesn't counterbalance P2.

 

Now, anyone reading these three sentences (and taking them for an accurate exposition of this area of DM) would rightly complain that nothing had actually been explained, since there is nothing about the relationship between the forces mentioned that indicates what the overall theory is committed to.

 

In response, others could argue that this latest problem is not only spurious, it is solely the result of a use of the phrase "only if" in F24. Its removal should eliminate the difficulty.

 

Unfortunately, the removal of the "only if" in F24 would plunge the theory back into all the existential problems it had been introduced to eradicate. This can be seen if we try to re-word F24 in the following manner:

 

F27: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.

 

Although F27 might look acceptable, it is merely a sufficient condition; hence, it does not rule out the following:

 

F28: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.54a

 

[F21: P1 contradicts P2 in so far as it prevents P2 acting, and/or vice versa.]

 

[F22: The electromagnetic force ceased to operate when worker NN threw the switch.]

 

But, F28 is just a resurrected version of F21, which we found didn't rule out F22, and thus non-existent forces. What was required here instead was a description of 'contradictory' forces that doesn't imply that one of the forces operating ceased to exist as a result of the action of any other force in the system. Furthermore, we also required an account that doesn't rely on forces merely 'contradicting' the effects of other forces -- because of the serious difficulties that that particular alternative encountered earlier.

 

That is why an appeal had to be made to forces that counterbalance one another, since (clearly) they must exist to do this -- hence, the "only if" had to be introduced, making this a necessary condition. But, as we discovered, this more restrictive version ruled out forces that didn't counterbalance one another, which DM seems to need; reintroducing these at a later stage simply ruined this neat picture.

 

Unfortunately, F24 and F26 seem to divorce 'contradictions' from equilibria, since the presence or absence of the latter is in no way affected by the former.

 

F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

 

F26: P1 contradicts P2 even though it does not counterbalance P2.

 

This means that if F24 and F26 reflect the real nature of things, then 'contradictions' are in fact unrelated to the balancing effects of forces. As paradoxical as this might seem, DM-theorists should deny the truth of the conjunction of F24 and F26 if they want to maintain their belief that there is some sort of a connection between forces, 'contradictions', equilibria and disequilibria in nature and society. Alas, in order to account for the 'contradictory' nature of reality, DM-theorists can't actually afford to do this. For, as soon as F24 and F26 are adopted, DM ceases to be explanatory; but the minute these two are rejected, this attempt to render comprehensible the nature of DM-forces collapses.

 

Nevertheless, that annoying conclusion might appear to some to be a little too hasty and contrived. And yet, with so little in the writings of DM-theorists to guide us, how is it possible for anyone to decide whether or not the above attempt to understand DM is misleading or prejudicial? Indeed, how could dialecticians themselves arrive at a clear decision on this score without some form of theoretical innovation, an option that has so far been complete anathema to the 'Orthodox' DM-community, who are only too happy to wave the 'Revisionism' (or even the 'pedantry') card at anyone who has the temerity to try to 'think outside the box' on this and other 'difficulties' this theory faces?

 

Nevertheless, if we adhere to the requirement that 'contradictions' are capable of explaining change -- when pictured as opposing forces (that is, if we give 'contradictions' some sort of physical bite) --, then this theory must self-destruct by the above argument. That is because the theory maintains that forces are 'contradictory' whether what its theorists claim about them is true or not -- if that is, indeed, what DM-theorists claim or what this theory actually implies.

 

Naturally, all this is independent of the far more fundamental question whether the theory that 'contradictory' forces are capable of counterbalancing each other can itself be explained without referring to the sort of 'prevented', or 'non-existent', effects we met earlier. If it can't, this latest detour would prove to be just another dead end, since 'prevented' effects don't exist to be contradicted. On the other hand, if this theory can be explained without referring to such effects, then it would be difficult to decide what impact it could possibly have on the real world. How could such forces be described as "material" if they have no effect on anything material --, except, perhaps, on those seemingly insubstantial 'non-existent' effects?

 

Of course, all this is independent of the fatal defect mentioned earlier; that these forces and effects do not imply one another (unlike the proletariat and the bourgeoisie), so they can't be 'dialectical contradictions', whatever else they are. For example, gravity doesn't imply the existence of the lift created by a wing (or anything else that can provide it). Gravity existed for billions of years, and wings for maybe a couple of hundred million (in winged insects, or plants that use the air to spread seeds, etc., flying dinosaurs and birds). Of course, if there were no gravity, then such things wouldn't have evolved, but then again, if there were no gravity, there would be no universe. Clearly, gravity can exist without such flying devices, so the relation between the force provided by a wing and gravity can't be 'dialectical'. Even if they were 'opposite' in some-as-yet-unspecified way, they don't 'interpenetrate' each other, and can't be 'dialectical'.

 

Well, this is another dialectical hole out of which DM-fans can dig themselves. I am merely content to remind them that it is a hole, it is very deep, and it is one they have dug for themselves.

 

 

Figure Eight: DM-Fan Ignores Sound Advice

 

Yet More S&M?

 

Maybe even this is being a little too hasty. Perhaps we should begin again.

 

To that end, it might help if we re-examined a passage from Cornforth's book, quoted in Part One of this Essay:

 

"The unity of opposites in a contradiction is characterised by a definite relation of superiority-inferiority, or of domination, between the opposites. For example, in a physical unity of attraction and repulsion, certain elements of attraction or repulsion may be dominant in relation to others. The unity is such that one side dominates the other -- or, in certain cases, they may be equal.

 

"Any qualitative state of a process corresponds to a definite relation of domination. Thus, the solid, liquid and gaseous states of bodies correspond to different domination-relationships in the unity of attraction and repulsion characteristic of the molecules of bodies.... Domination relationships are obviously, by their very nature, impermanent and apt to change, even though in some cases they remain unchanged for a long time. If the relationship takes the form of equality or balance, such balance is by nature unstable, for their is a struggle of opposites within it which is apt to lead to the domination of one over the other....

 

"The outcome of the working out of contradictions is, then, a change in the domination relation characteristic of the initial unity of opposites. Such a change constitutes a change in the nature of a thing, a change from one state to another, a change from one thing to another, a change entailing not merely some external alteration but a change in the internal character and laws of motion of a thing." [Cornforth (1976), pp.97-98. Some paragraphs merged.]

 

[This is in fact a differently worded version of Weston's argument, where forces/"tendencies" 'interfere' to a greater or lesser extent with one another -- Weston (2012). I have examined Weston's alternative elsewhere in this Essay.]

 

Now, the above argument might appear to work when applied to human social systems, where agents (individually or in groups) are capable of 'upsetting' any number of 'balanced' configurations, and who don't need too much in the way of external motivation to do that (although, in order for Cornforth to be able to say even that much with any clarity, he found he had no use for the obscure words Hegel employed). However, when this theory is applied to nature as a whole, it can't work. Consider, therefore, the following:

 

F29: Let FD be a set of force 'elements' in a 'dominant' relation to FS, which is a 'submissive' set of forces (i.e.,  FD > FS), and let both operate in system, S, however that is defined or characterised.

 

F30: For this relation to change so that a qualitative transformation occurs in the overall system, S, one or both of FD and FS will have to change first.

 

F31: If the change occurs in FD it will have to do so because of the latter's own 'internal contradictions', otherwise the theory must fail at the first hurdle. [The same applies to FS, or, indeed, to both taken severally or collectively.]

 

F32: But, if that is so, then the same analysis will now apply one more level down, as it were: whatever causes FD to change will have to be the result of further dominance/submissive relations inside, or internal to, FD itself. In turn, the pre-conditions noted in F31 will also apply at, or to, these 'lower level' relations; they must change because of their own 'internal contradictions'.

 

F33: Either this continues forever, or it will halt at some point.

 

F34: If it halts at some point, then there must be fundamental units that don't change because of their 'internal contradictions', and the theory will fail at this point. [In fact, these fundamental units can have no effect on each other for reasons set-out in detail in Part One of this Essay.]

 

F35: If this process continues forever, then there would be nothing to condition anything internal to anything else, just more and more layers, tailing off to infinity (i.e., to "who knows where?"). DM would thus have its own "bad infinity". [We saw that this was a non-viable alternative, anyway, in Part One, as well as here.]

 

F36: All this is independent of whether or not an external cause (or causes) initiated these internal changes in FD or FS. While the latter may be influenced by external causes (according to Cornforth), external causes can't bring about the internal, qualitative changes required (again, according to Cornforth). The latter must be internally-generated in the last analysis.

 

It looks, therefore, like this 'theory' can't be rescued if this line is adopted.

 

Hole To Let -- Previous Occupant Self-Destructed

 

Howsoever we try, there seems to be no way of rescuing this self-destructing theory -- killed-off by its own internal obscurities.

 

In short: if a force prevents something from happening, that force can't contradict it; once prevented, the latter doesn't exist. Moreover, when an effect of that force has been prevented, it can't contradict any other effect that hasn't existed.55

 

Interlude Nine: Objections Neutralised

 

However, some may still object and claim that if a force prevents something coming into being, or happening, it must have contradicted it.

 

Let us say, therefore, that:

 

Ω1: If event, Ei, at time, t, belonging to process, Δ (normally comprising sub-events, E1-En), is prevented from becoming Ei+1, at t+1 by force, P, then Ei will have been contradicted by P. [t+1 > t]

 

[Here, "event" can be interpreted as widely, or as narrowly, as is required so that it is compatible with plausible/acceptable 'dialectical' theories of "causation", or of "mediations", and their effects. I have had to use Greek letters "Ω" and "Δ" here since I have run out of viable Latin capital letter options I haven't already employed! I originally used the letter "T" (now replaced by "Ω"), but decided that it might be confused with the "T"s I have also used to stand for time and for the "Totality".]

 

Hence, it could be argued that in this sense it is clear that forces prevent the effects of other forces from being realised by contradicting certain events, stopping them from occurring.

 

But, even then, forces still fail to 'contradict' one another as force-on-force, they merely prevent the events, or effects, induced by other forces from happening. So, this alternative can't help us understand how forces actually 'contradict' each other.

 

Nevertheless, we need to examine this objection a little more closely so that every conceivable possibility has been explored.

 

Consider then the following:

 

Ω2: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω3: Had these events proceeded as 'normal', Ei would have been followed by Ei+1, but as things turned out, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented it.

 

Ω4: Hence, P contradicted Ei+1.

 

However, since Ei+1 never existed or occurred, it can't have been 'contradicted' by P -- unless, once more, we assume that a force can 'contradict' non-existent objects, events or processes. Moreover, since P didn't prevent Ei itself, it can't have 'contradicted' it, either.

 

And, as we have seen several times, P and Ei+1 don't imply one another and both can (and do) exist without one another (indeed, as we have just seen). Hence, whatever else it is, this can't be a 'dialectical relation/contradiction'.

 

We hit the same brick wall once again.

 

Consider now this variant on Ω3:

 

Ω5: P contradicted Ei by stopping it producing Ei+1.

 

But, this is no good either. That is because events aren't like eggs that produce other egg producers (i.e., chickens!). If so, events themselves can hardly be prevented from producing other events if they don't produce them in the first place.

 

In that case, perhaps the following revision will do:

 

Ω6: P contradicted Ei by stopping Ei+1 following on from Ei.

 

But, again, the alleged 'contradiction' amounts to the prevention of something that doesn't now exist (and never did). If forces can only 'contradict' something by preventing or stopping non-existent objects, process, or events from taking place, then all the above objections still have their place.

 

It could be argued that if the chain of events above is replaced by a series of causes and their effects, the contradiction will become clear -- perhaps along the following lines:

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the 'normal course of events', let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

This looks more promising, but there remain several problems with it:

 

(i) Once again, if this were so, then DM-fans will have to drop their claim that forces contradict each other;

 

(ii) Force, P, and event, Ei, aren't 'internally related' -- how can a force be 'internally related' to an event? So, to repeat, whatever else this is, it can't be a 'dialectical contradiction' (we saw something similar to this obstruct Weston's attempt to recruit Marx to this mystical view of nature, just as we have seen it neutralise other, alternative rescue attempts);

 

(iii) Even if it were a legitimate example of a 'dialectical contradiction', P and event, Ei, would have to turn into one another, if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

Consider, therefore, a more concrete example: Imagine a fire that had been started in a forest by a match inadvertently dropped on some tinder dry grass. All things being equal, the resulting and growing conflagration will be maintained by the following factors, at least: (a) The organic material in the grass, (b) The energy released by this fire, and (c) The oxygen in the surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the burning grass with a fire broom before the conflagration has a chance to grow, putting it out. Plainly the force of the blow from the broom deprived the nascent conflagration of enough oxygen to keep it going and so quelled the blaze. In that case, one cause (the supply of oxygen) was prevented by the force of the broom from further causing a series of damaging events or effects. But, does the blow from the broom turn into the oxygen? Or, into the organic material comprising this tinder dry grass? What if that fire were extinguished by a rain storm? Would such a fire turn into a rain storm? And yet it ought to do all of these if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

[Anyone interested can read the doomed attempts of one comrade to defend the DM-theory of change in the face of objections like this, here.]

 

However, the biggest problem with the above DM-volunteered response lies in the dearth of details, and the difficulty of filling them in on behalf of DM-fans who don't seem to be too bothered to do so!

 

Consider a different example: a match used to light a trail of gunpowder. The match sets off a series of chemical reactions that pass along that trail, each of which causes the next reaction in line. Call this series of events, or causes, C1-Cn. Let us further imagine that some force (say, a violent thunder storm, S, which either blows the trail of gunpowder away, or which drenches it in a downpour) stops this series at the Ci-th stage, preventing the next cause/event, Ci+1, from happening. In that case, should we not say that S contradicted Ci?

 

However, problems (i)-(iii) above still apply in this case (as they also do in relation to the forest fire example considered earlier, when the details are filled in) -- which would involve, for example, a thunder storm turning into a chemical reaction in the gunpowder, and vice versa, if the DM-classics are to be believed!

 

In fact, the idea that causes necessitate their effects (whether or not the latter are themselves causes in their own right), upon which the above depends, is itself predicated upon an anthropomorphic view of nature. Since I have considered this topic in more detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three, I will say no more about it here.

 

Exactly why this view of causation depends on necessitation is connected with the points raised in Essay Seven Part Three (concerning Kant and Hegel's response to Hume's criticisms of rationalist theories of causation). There, it was demonstrated that in order to defuse Hume's attack, Hegel had to find a dialectical-logical, and therefore necessary, link between a cause and its effects:

 

Hume had argued that there is no logical or conceptual connection between cause and effect. This struck right at the heart of Rationalism, and Hegel was keen to show that Hume and the Empiricists were radically mistaken. Kant had already attempted to answer Hume, but his solution pushed necessitating causation off into the Noumenon, about which we can know nothing. That approach was totally unacceptable to Hegel, so he looked for a logical connection between cause and effect; he found it in (1) Spinoza's claim that determination is also negation (which, Hegel rendered "Every determination is negation" -- by the way, neither Spinoza nor Hegel even so much as attempted to justify this 'principle' -- more about that in Essay Twelve; on this, see Melamed (2015)), and in (2) His argument that the LOI "stated negatively" implies the LOC (which, unfortunately for Hegel, it doesn't).

 

[LOI = Law of Identity; LOC = Law of Non-contradiction.]

 

Based on this, Hegel was 'able' to argue that for any concept A, "determinate negation" implies it is also not-A, and then not-not-A. [I am, of course, simplifying greatly here! I have reproduced Hegel's argument below for those who think I might have misrepresented him.]
 

This then 'allowed' Hegel to conclude that every concept has development built into it as A transforms into not-A, and then into not-not-A. This move provided him with the logical/conceptual link he sought in causation. Hence, when A changes it doesn't just do so accidentally into this or that; what it changes into is not-A, which is logically connected with A and is thus a rational consequence of the overall development of reality. This led him to postulate that for every concept A, there must also be its paired "other" (as he called it), not-A, its 'internal' and hence its unique 'opposite'. Hegel was forced to derive this consequence since, plainly, everything (else) in the universe is also not-A, which would mean that A could change into anything whatsoever if he hadn't introduced this limiting factor, this unique "other".

 

From these moves was born the "unity of opposites". So, the link between cause and effect was now given by a 'logical' unity, and causation and change were the result of the interaction between these logically-linked "opposites".

 

Plainly, this paired, unique opposite, not-A, was essential to Hegel's theory, otherwise, he could provide his readers with no explanation why A should be followed by a unique not-A as opposed to just any old not-A -- say, B, or, indeed, something else, C, for example -- all of which would also be not-A.

 

So, since B and C (and an indefinite number of other objects and processes) are all manifestly not-A, Hegel had to find some way of eliminating these, and all the rest, as candidates for the development of A, otherwise he would have had no effective answer to Hume.

 

[Hume, of course, wouldn't have denied that A changes into "what it is not", into not-A, he would merely have pointed out that this can't provide the conceptual link that rationalists require unless all the other (potentially infinite) not-As could be ruled out in some way. He concluded that it is only a habit of the mind that prompts us to expect A to change into what we have always, or what we have in general, experienced before. There is no logical link, however, between A and what it develops into since there is no contradiction in supposing A to change into B or C, or, indeed, something else. (In saying this the reader shouldn't conclude that I agree with Hume, or that Hume's reply is successful!)]

 

Hence, as an integral part of his reply, Hegel introduced this unique "other" with which each object and process was conceptually linked -- a unique "other" that was 'internally' connected to A --, something he claimed could be derived by 'determinate negation' from A.

 

[How he in fact derived this "other" will be examined in Essay Twelve Part Five, but a DM-'explanation' -- and my criticism of it -- can be found in Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

This special not-A was now the unique "other" of A. Without it Hegel's reply to Hume falls flat.

 

Engels, Lenin, Mao, and Plekhanov (and a host of other Marxist dialecticians) bought into this spurious 'logic' (several of them possibly unaware of the above 'rationale'; although, as far as I can see, of the DM-classicists, only Lenin seems to be explicitly aware of it!), and attempted to give it a 'materialist make-over'. And, that is why this Hegelian theory (albeit "put back on its feet") is integral to classical DM. It supplied Engels, Lenin and Mao (and all the rest) with a materialist answer to Hume.

 

[There are in fact far better ways than this to neutralise Hume's criticisms, as well as those of more recent Humeans, which do not thereby make change impossible. More details will be given in Essay Three Part Five. Until then, the reader is directed to Hacker (2007), and Essay Thirteen Part Three.]

 

Here is Lenin's open acknowledgement and endorsement of this theory:

 

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing [tone], each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Lenin (1961), p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995a), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

"But the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated, -- and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentially contained and preserved in the Other. -- To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." [Lenin (1961), p.225, quoting Hegel (1999), pp.833-34, §1795. Emphases in the original.]

 

Lenin wrote in the margin:

 

"This is very important for understanding dialectics." [Lenin (1961), p.225.]

 

To which he added:

 

"Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians and Humists [Humeans -- RL] more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than of Hegel." [Ibid., p.179.]

 

This shows that Lenin understood this to be a reply to Hume, and that it was integral to comprehending dialectics.

 

It is worth quoting the entire passage from Hegel's Logic (much of which Lenin approvingly copied into the above Notebooks -- pp.225-28):

 

"Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated -- contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists of such.

 

"Accordingly, what we now have before us is the mediated, which to begin with, or, if it is likewise taken immediately, is also a simple determination; for as the first has been extinguished in it, only the second is present. Now since the first also is contained in the second, and the latter is the truth of the former, this unity can be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate is put as subject, and the mediated as its predicate; for example, the finite is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal. However, the inadequate form of such propositions is at once obvious. In treating of the judgment it has been shown that its form in general, and most of all the immediate form of the positive judgment, is incapable of holding within its grasp speculative determinations and truth. The direct supplement to it, the negative judgment, would at least have to be added as well. In the judgment the first, as subject, has the illusory show of a self-dependent subsistence, whereas it is sublated in its predicate as in its other; this negation is indeed contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; consequently what is contained in them is not posited -- which would be precisely the purpose of employing a proposition.

 

"The second determination, the negative or mediated, is at the same time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first instance as a simple determination, but in its truth it is a relation or relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of the positive, and includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself. Because the first or the immediate is implicitly the Notion, and consequently is also only implicitly the negative, the dialectical moment with it consists in positing in it the difference that it implicitly contains. The second, on the contrary, is itself the determinate moment, the difference or relationship; therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it. If then the negative, the determinate, relationship, judgment, and all the determinations falling under this second moment do not at once appear on their own account as contradiction and as dialectical, this is solely the fault of a thinking that does not bring its thoughts together. For the material, the opposed determinations in one relation, is already posited and at hand for thought. But formal thinking makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content before it to sink into the sphere of ordinary conception, into space and time, in which the contradictories are held asunder in juxtaposition and temporal succession and so come before consciousness without reciprocal contact. On this point, formal thinking lays down for its principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but as a matter of fact the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. Formal thinking does in fact think contradiction, only it at once looks away from it, and in saying that it is unthinkable it merely passes over from it into abstract negation." [Hegel (1999), pp.833-35, §§1795-1798. Bold emphases alone added. I have used the on-line version here, correcting a few minor typos.]

 

The most relevant and important part of which is this:

 

"It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent -- in that case it would not be an other, nor a relation or relationship -- rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; therefore it includes its own other within it and is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself." [Ibid. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

This "reflection", as Hegel elsewhere calls it, of the "other in its own self", a unique "other", provides the logical link his theory required. Any other "other" would be "indifferent", and not the logical reflection he sought. It is from this that 'dialectical contradictions' arise, as Hegel notes. Hence, Lenin was absolutely right, this "other" is essential for "understanding" dialectics -- except he forgot to mention that dialectics is in fact rendered incomprehensible and unworkable as a result!

 

Hegel underlined this point (but perhaps less obscurely) in the Shorter Logic:

 

"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphases added.]

 

[The problems these rather odd ideas in fact create for Hegel have been highlighted here.]

 

Hence, any attempt to (1) Eliminate the idea that change results from a 'struggle of opposites', or (2) Deny that objects and processes change into these 'opposites', or even (3) Reject the idea that these 'opposites' are 'internally'-related as one "other" to another specific "other", will leave DM-fans with no answer to Hume, and thus with no viable theory of change.

 

[For Hegel's comments on Hume, see Hegel (1995b), pp.369-75.]

 

In which case, Hegel's theory (coupled with the part-whole dialectic) was at least a theory of causation, change and of the supposed logical development of history; so the above dialecticians were absolutely right (as they saw things) to incorporate it into DM. It allowed them to argue that, among other things, history isn't accidental -- i.e., it isn't just 'one thing after another' -- it has an inner logic to it. Hence, Hegel's 'logical' theory enabled them to argue, for example, that capitalism must give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to nothing else. Hume's criticisms -- or, rather, more recent incarnations of them (which, combined with contemporary versions of Adam Smith's economic theory (Smith was, of course, a close friend and collaborator of Hume's) in essence feature in much of modern economic theory and large swathes of contemporary philosophy, and thus in criticisms of Marx's economic and political theory) -- are a direct threat to this idea. If these bourgeois critics are right, we can't predict what the class struggle will produce. Or, rather, if Hume is right, the course of history is contingent, not necessary, not "rational" -- and there is no 'inner logic' to capitalism.

 

[This dependency on Hegel's theory of causation and change also supplies us with an explanation for the implicit teleology and determinism apparent in DM, providing its acolytes with hope in a hopeless world. More on this in Essays Nine Part Two and Fourteen Part Two. The mystical and rationalist foundations of this approach to change are outlined here, here, here and here.]

 

As far as I can tell, other than Lenin, very few dialecticians have discussed (or have even noticed!) this aspect of their own theory. The only authors that I am aware of who take this aspect of DM into consideration are Ruben (1979), Lawler (1982), and Fisk (1973, 1979). I will examine Fisk's arguments, which are the most sophisticated I have so far seen (on this topic), in other Essays published at this site. Lawler's analysis is the subject of Essay Eight Part Three. [However, since writing this I have also come across some of Charles Bettelheim's comments that suggest he, too, understood this point.]

 

Incidentally, this puts paid to the idea that there can be such things as 'external contradictions' (a notion beloved of STDs and MISTs). If there were any of these oddities, they couldn't be 'logically' connected as 'one-other-linked-with-another-unique-other' required by Hegel's theory. For Hegel, upside down or the 'right way up', this would fragment the rational order of reality, introducing contingency where once there had been 'logico-conceptual' or 'necessary' development. Hence, any DM-fan reckless enough to introduce 'external contradictions' into his or her system/theory would in effect be 're-Hume-ing' Hegel, not putting him 'back on his feet'! In which case, it is no surprise to find that 'external contradictions' were unknown to Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Plekhanov.

 

[STD = Stalinist Dialectician; MIST = Maoist Dialectician.]

 

[I have analysed several other fatal defects implicit in the idea that there can be 'external' and/or 'internal contradictions' (in nature or society) in Essay Eleven Part Two, here and here. See also here, where I develop the above argument in response to a 'Marxist-Leninist' who seems not to know his own theory.]

 

Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is precisely this which makes the entire theory unworkable, as points (i)-(iii) above have shown.

 

How this is connected with my reply to the earlier proffered response will now be explained. Here is that response again:

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the 'normal course of events', let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

The first point worth making is that for this to be a 'dialectical contradiction', P and Ei must be "internally-connected opposites"; indeed, P must be the "other" of Ei. But, P and Ei are of logically different categories, so they can't be "internally-related opposites". In which case, the above response falls at the first hurdle! Moreover, P and Ei don't imply one another (and each can exist without the other, unlike the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, so we are told), in which case, they can't be 'dialectical opposites', to begin with.

 

[That depends, of course, on what dialecticians mean by "internally-related opposite" -- but we have already seen they oscillate erratically between a spatial and a logical interpretation of that notion.]

 

Moreover, as we witnessed in detail here, if, in the normal course of things, Ei is to cause, or to change into, Ei+1, these two must also be opposites (which means that P can't be the 'dialectical opposite' of either of them, after all!), and they must 'struggle' with each (i.e., Ei must struggle with Ei+1 ), if the DM-classics are to be believed. But, they can't struggle with one another since Ei+1 doesn't exist yet! [Unless, of course, we suppose it exists before it exists!]

 

On the other hand, if Ei+1 already exists, so that Ei can 'struggle' with it, and thus cause, or change into, Ei+1, Ei can't in fact do that since Ei+1 already exists! In which case, Ei would no longer be the cause of Ei+1, and so P couldn't have prevented it from causing Ei+1, meaning, clearly, that this supposed contradiction simply vanishes! The same applies to the supposed relation between S and Ci mentioned earlier.  

 

Either way, if DM were 'true', change here would be impossible.

 

Of course, there is an obvious clause missing from Ω7-Ω10 above -- namely, Ω11:

 

Ω7: Let there be an event set, E, consisting of sub-events, E1-En, which would all take place, or would all have taken place, had force, P, not stopped things at the Ei-th stage.

 

Ω8: In the 'normal course of events', let each event, Ei, cause the next event, Ei+1.

 

Ω9: However, Ei+1 failed to occur because P prevented Ei causing it.

 

Ω10: Hence, P contradicted Ei.

 

Ω11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of sub-events, W1-Wn.

 

Ω11 must be the case otherwise, at the Ei-th stage we would have to suppose that Ei was no longer part of the 'causal structure of the world', and hence ceases to have an effect on anything around it.

 

Consider again the concrete scenario examined earlier:

 

Imagine a fire that had been started in a forest by a match inadvertently dropped on some tinder dry grass. All things being equal, the resulting and growing conflagration will be maintained by the following factors, at least: (a) The organic material in the grass, (b) The energy released by this fire, and (c) The oxygen in the surrounding air. Imagine further that someone hits the burning grass with a fire broom before the conflagration has a chance to grow, putting it out. Plainly the force of the blow from the broom deprived the nascent conflagration of enough oxygen to keep it going and so quelled the blaze. In that case, one cause (the supply of oxygen) was prevented by the force of the broom from further causing a series of damaging events or effects.

 

No one supposes that if this fire is put out, the grass that was burning, and is now out, disappears from the world or ceases to have a causal effect on anything else ever again. It, too, will initiate or take part in another series of events, depicted schematically perhaps by Ω11:

 

Ω11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of sub-events, W1-Wn.

 

But, if that is so, Ei will now be the dialectical opposite of W1, its new 'unique other' (since, as we have seen, dialectical objects/processes turn into their opposites, into that with which they have 'struggled', their 'unique other'), which would mean that Ei's earlier 'unique other' -- Ei+1 -- will have been deposed, making a mockery of Hegel's argument that each object or process has a 'unique other'.

 

[But we have already shown that this entire theory is a defective, anyway.]

 

Even so, what hasn't yet been made clear is how this is connected with my reply to the proffered response outlined earlier. Given the fact that causes, E1-En, aren't accidentally linked in the DM-scheme-of-things, but are connected by a 'necessary law' (or 'law of necessity') of some sort, Ei itself isn't just plain-and-simple-Ei. In fact, in DM, each one of causes, E1-En, is identified by what it is not -- its 'other'. [This was the whole point of "determinate negation" in Hegel's theory, as we saw above.]

 

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

 

So, Ei isn't just Ei, it is also not-Ei (since, by 'determinate negation', Ei is 'identical' with what it is not -- why that is so is explained here, but more concisely here), which is also Ei+1. That is, Ei+1 is also not-Ei, its Hegelian 'other'. But, by the NON, Ei is also not-not-Ei -- and hence Ei is not-itself, and thus not-itself by 'reflection' -- this is in fact what supposedly causes Ei to develop, according to Hegel -- the lack of identity between itself and its 'concept'. This is 'reflected' in what it subsequently becomes -- Ei+1.

 

This means that Ei is identical with Ei+1 in an identity-in-difference sort of way, and this is what links these two together, 'logically', in an Hegelian sort of way. So, Ei is not now just Ei, it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1 (except, perhaps, this needs translating back into something a little more Hegelian -- maybe along these lines).

 

These 'dialectical' moves now provide the necessary link between a cause and its effect(s) in Hegel's scheme of things -- or between a cause and whatever comes next in this (necessary) causal sequence, or chain. Since Hegel imagined he had 'proved' this 'logically', he clearly didn't feel it needed any confirmation from experience or supporting evidence. So, even if it isn't possible to observe these 'necessary' links -- how could they be observed? -- they nevertheless must exist (if we are prepared to buy into this Idealist fantasy).

 

Denial of this is what provides superficial plausibility to Hume's attack on rationalist theories of causation --, this theory nevertheless tells us these 'necessary' links are there since Hegel had presumably shown they exist of necessity -- a perfect, a priori 'answer' to Hume (and, indeed, Kant).

 

And that is why P 'contradicts' Ei: P isn't now just affecting Ei, it is changing it from Ei-that-causes-Ei+1 into Ei-that-causes-W1 (or, indeed, Ei-that-doesn't-cause-Ei+1):

 

Ω11: Instead of Ei+1 following Ei, because of the operation of P, Ei was followed by alternative event set, W, comprised of sub-events, W1-Wn.

 

So, the following now seems correct:

 

Ω12: It isn't the case that it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1,

 

which is, of course, the contradictory of:

 

Ω13: It is the case that it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1.

 

[I am well aware that this is unsatisfactory as it stands, since P can't 'contradict' Ei by altering it in the above manner, but this is the only way I can make sense of the idea that P could conceivably 'contradict' Ei. If anyone can make clearer sense of it in any other way, please enlighten me.]

 

But, if there are no necessary links here (and we have seen why there can't be any -- in Essays Seven Part Three and Twelve Part One), then P can't affect Ei in this way, since, in that eventuality, it isn't the case that it is Ei-that-causes-Ei+1. And that is because there is no such defining condition for Ei, and hence no such thing as is represented by Ei-that-causes-Ei+1, to begin with, as we have just seen.

 

In short, because of the incoherencies of 'determinate negation', this entire way of viewing 'contradictions' falls apart.

 

[But, the real problems lie much deeper than even this, as we will see in a later Essay.]

 

Of course, in an Ideal 'Hegelian Universe' this 'theory' might be made to work somehow. However, I will pass no comment on that bare possibility here; but, as we will see in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six, this 'theory' in the end collapses faster than a portfolio of Enron shares.

 

However, in the real world, where we are told that change results from a 'struggle' between opposites, and where everything supposedly changes into its opposite, this theory can't work, as indeed we have seen.

 

In which case, P can't 'contradict' anything at all.

 

At this point, it could be objected that this entire approach to 'events' and 'forces' is totally misguided since it atomises them, putting them in rigid categories, compartmentalising and thus fragmenting the flowing nature of reality. In contrast, dialectics deals with the unified, fluid and organic nature of the world, which means it depicts interactions like those above in a totally different, albeit contradictory, light. Hence, the analysis in this Essay is completely misguided.

 

Or, so it might be maintained.

 

Unless and until DM-apologists tell us with some clarity what it is they do intend, or what, for example, the "fluid nature of reality" actually amounts to (that is, over and above the phrase "fluid nature of reality" looking like an inappropriate metaphor -- or, indeed, what this odd metaphor about 'fluidity' could possibly mean), that objection is itself devoid of content (since it contains several empty terms). [Anyway, it has been neutralised here.]

 

Independently of that, in what way does the phrase "fluid nature of reality" help explain how any of the forces involved in change are 'internally-related'? For example, how are force, P, and event, Ei from earlier 'dialectical opposites'; how can a force be 'internally related' to an event? How are a rain storm and a forest fire (also from earlier) 'dialectically' linked if the first extinguishes the second? They don't imply one another (like the proletariat and the capitalist class imply one another, so we are told); rain storms happen all the time with no forest fire anywhere in sight -- and vice versa. But there can be no proletariat without there also being the capitalist class (again, so we are told). Furthermore, rain storms don't turn into forest fires (nor vice versa), which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

So, whatever else it is this, supposed "fluid nature of reality" isn't 'dialectical'.

 

[The allegedly 'fluid nature of reality' will be examined in more detail in a later re-write of Essay Eight Part Three. It is reasonably clear that this metaphor derives from Heraclitus's dogmatic 'theory' that 'everything flows'. However, we have already seen that Heraclitus based that 'universally valid' conclusion solely on what he thought was the case when someone steps into a river! And, he got those details wrong, too! That is quite apart from the fact that there are countless trillion particles in each microgram of matter that don't change (unless acted upon externally).]

 

Once again, faced with the above, there is a simple solution staring us in the face: dialecticians should tell us what, if anything, they do mean by their use of obscure, incoherent Hermetic language/metaphors like this.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Alternatively, if forces affect one another externally (as seems to be the case), then, clearly, change can't be the result of 'internal contradictions'. On the other hand, if forces have an internal influence on one another (in some as-yet-unspecified way), and they change as a result of their own 'internal contradictions', then either they are composed of simple units that don't change, or they are infinitely complex, and nothing internal to them can condition anything else 'internally', for there would be no such thing.

 

[The above points were established in Part One.]

 

Too Many Forces Spoil The Broth -- Or Is It Too Few?

 

It could be objected that these spurious results have been cherry-picked, tailored, and skewed to fit a pre-determined conclusion -- the motivation behind which is which is clearly to malign DM, come what may; the choice of F24 (repeated below) being a prime example of this 'anti-dialectical' mind set.

 

In that case, a much better way of representing the oppositional and contradictory nature forces might prove to be the following -- in fact, with suitable changes in wording, this is the line taken in Weston (2012), for example:

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.

 

[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]

 

This means that the 'contradictory' relation between two or more forces would operate along a sort of continuum, or sliding scale -- as it were -- with no fixed relation between them. The arguments presented above clearly make the link between 'contradictory' forces an "either-or", all-or-nothing sort of affair.

 

Or so a counter-argument might go.56

 

At this point, an example from mechanics might help illustrate the complex relationship that is intended here: un-damped Simple Harmonic Motion. [SHM -- that link requires JAVA; try here if you have no JAVA installed (scroll down the page!).]

 

Consider a particle set in motion under the operation of two forces, such that its acceleration is proportional to its displacement from the point of equilibrium, and directed toward that point. Since the acceleration of this particle changes in proportion to its position, the net force operating on it must also change accordingly. This is due to the fact that the resultant force in this system is the vector sum of these two distinct but changing forces, which at the equilibrium point counterbalance one another, but at any other point they either augment or partially 'nullify' each other, depending on the physics of the situation. Because these two forces work in opposite directions and cause the impressed acceleration (achieving this by their -- let us say for now -- 'dialectical interaction') we appear to have here an example of F37-type motion.

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.

 

[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.]

 

In this highly simplified picture of just one type of motion, the forces present in the system appear to 'contradict' one another in complex but changing ways, as DM seems to require. But, if this scenario actually does illustrate F24-, or F37-type 'contradictions', several untoward consequences also seem to follow from it:

 

(1) Clearly, this analogy means that 'contradictions' (just like forces) operate on a continuum. Hence, at any point along the path of the above particle (other than the equilibrium point), the net force operating isn't equal to the net force at any other point (in the same cycle). So, at a specific displacement, the modulus of the net force might be, say, only 1% of its maximum, at another it might be 99% of that maximum -- while at a symmetrical location on the other side of the point of equilibrium, the same would be true but in an opposite sense. Even so, it isn't easy to see how such a picture may be made to fit seamlessly into the DM-view of 'contradictions'; and as we saw above, such a model would have unacceptable consequences for HM (involving, for example, the Nazis fighting racism!).

 

(2) This trope depends on forces being viewed as basic units of reality, as opposed to the product of the relations between bodies in motion.

 

[Recall, Option (2) appears to be one that Engels himself rejected when he spoke of relative velocities replacing forces. However, if the term "force" is just a shorthand for relative motion (or if it depends on the presence of a "field"), then, as we have also seen, the 'dialectical unity of nature' would be thrown into question. On that basis, the links between bodies and processes would be external, whereas DM requires them to be 'internal', with the existence of forces providing the 'connective tissue' of reality, as it were. However, if forces themselves depend on bodies in relative motion, then reality would be discrete, not continuous.]

 

But, DM-theorists have yet to tell us what the physical nature of a single force is. Physicists themselves have ceased to use this word (except as a sort of shorthand, as noted earlier). If forces have no physical nature, can they really be part of nature? How could such 'useful fictions' feature in a materialist account of the universe?

 

(3) This neat picture, tailor-made to be consistent with F37, obscures the complexity found in nature. Even so, it isn't easy to see how such a tidy model could cope with systems of forces, which, given this view, indicate that several things must be 'contradicted' all at once by countless others, or, indeed, which suggest that bodies and/or processes could have innumerable 'contradictories'. That would, of course, divorce DM-type 'contradictions' completely from both FL-contradictions and Hegelian 'contradictions'. While this might not be totally unacceptable to some, it would mean that the former sort of contradiction would be even more tenuously linked to the latter (or, for that matter, with contradictions that supposedly feature in everyday life). In that case, the meaning of the word "contradiction", as it is used in DM, would be even more obscure than it already is. In addition, it would imply that any object or process in nature had more than one opposite at any point in time. The word "opposite" would thereby cease to have any clear meaning. But, we have been here several times already.

 

Despite these niggling problems, it might be felt that F37 suitably modified could still capture essential features of the 'contradictory' nature of forces.

 

In order to investigate this alternative further, let us suppose that the two forces operating in the above scenario are aligned so that the angle between them is 180°, once more.57

 

F38: Let the first force be F1, and the second, F2.

 

F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.

 

F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.

 

F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0. [t3 > t2 > t1.]

 

[F24: P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.]

 

F39 and F41 imply that there is a net force operating in the system in either direction; F40 expresses the background condition to F24, where no net force exists.

 

But, as we saw earlier, we face immediate problems with this way of depicting forces -- those encountered above in relation to the inappropriate analogy drawn between 'contradictions' and mathematical objects/structures like these -- i.e., forces represented by vectors.

 

Ignoring that 'problem', too, it is worth pointing out once more that F40 in fact implies that there are no forces operating in the system (unless we regard the zero vector as a force by default), and F39 and F41 both mean that there is only one force -- the resultant -- at work. On that basis, F37 would collapse for want of forces. As we have seen, no contradiction seems possible if only one force -- the resultant -- is present in the system. Still less if no forces are at work (as is the case in F40).

 

F39: At t1, let F1 + F2 < 0.

 

F40: At t2, let F1 + F2 = 0.

 

F41: At t3, let F1 + F2 > 0. [t3 > t2 > t1.]

 

F37: Contradictory forces are those that enter into opposition in such a way that they (dialectically) partially or totally cancel each other out.

 

It could be objected that in the above both of the original forces (F1 and F2) still exist, since it is they that create the zero vector and/or any resultant force(s) in the system (as they do in F39 and F41).

 

The problem with this reply is that it is difficult to see how the two original forces may also be said to exist alongside this third force -- the resultant --, whether the latter is zero or not. If they do exist in this way, we would plainly have three forces at work here, not two.

 

That would, of course, create energy out of nowhere.58

 

To be sure, our ability to calculate resultants involves us in applying some mathematics to the relevant components, but that doesn't itself mean nature does the calculating. If it did, that would clearly imply nature was Mind, or the product of Mind! No one, it is to be hoped(!), thinks that in nature there are three forces here where once there were only two. And yet, it is this third force that does all the work.

 

It could be objected that there is no third force at work here, no resultant. That is just how we express the relation between two genuine forces (or their components) in the system. Resultants are therefore just mathematical fictions. The problem with that response is that resultant forces can be measured and what happens to the bodies involved can be predicted from the magnitude and direction of that resultant. If we can reject resultant forces so easily, then what are we to say to those who reject forces altogether, even though they can also be measured and their effects predicted? Aren't forces in general just mathematical fictions that we can edit out of nature in favour of the relative motion of bodies, just as Engels concluded?

 

Rid the world of resultant forces and all forces threaten to follow them into oblivion.

 

Now, if an F37-type model is in fact applicable in HM, we ought to conclude that the 'contradiction' between Capital and Labour (or that between the forces and relations of production), say, produces a resultant third social force, the nature of which has to this day remained not just completely obscure, but totally unacknowledged. Based on this model, since all motion in the Capitalist system is produced by this mysterious "third force", its identification by revolutionaries is, to say the least, of the utmost importance!59

 

It might be felt that this view of forces is simplistic in the extreme. In HM, social forces are far too complex to be represented as vectors, which means that the criticisms aired above are once again exposed as completely misguided.

 

In response, it is worth recalling that the analyses that have been developed in this Essay have been forced upon us (no pun intended) because DM-theorists have so far failed to say what they mean (if anything) when they equate 'dialectical contradictions' with opposing forces. Dialecticians seem quite happy to assert that these 'contradictory' forces operate everywhere in the universe, even though that has been done in the absence of any clear or detailed account having been presented of the supposed relationship at work here. This means, of course, that erstwhile critics of this Essay are objecting when they are almost totally in the dark about their own theory!

 

Is this not yet another example of them foisting dialectics on nature and society?

 

[It is worth reminding the reader here that the existence of forces in HM isn't being questioned by the present author (nor will it be), merely the assumption that they can be equated with, or modelled by, 'contradictions'. But see also Note 61, below.]

 

Apart from simply conforming to tradition -- as was argued here -- DM-theorists appear to use the phrase "contradictory forces" in order to provide their theory with a scientific-looking façade, linking it with a genuine and successful science like Physics. Otherwise, why do this?

 

If that seemingly impertinent allegation is correct, it would be disingenuous of DM-supporters to complain that the analogy given above (i.e., using SHM to illustrate changing forces) doesn't apply to social forces. If the word "force" wasn't meant to be taken in its usual scientific sense (as a vector), the analogy would, indeed, be inapt. But, in that case, the exact meaning of the word "force" (as it appears in DM) would be even more obscure. If "force" isn't being employed in the way that physicists use it, what other scientific way is there?

 

Anyway, as far as the complexity of social forces is concerned, the counter-argument (mentioned above) itself fails to address the problem of the identification of forces with 'contradictions' in nature and society. If it is impossible to give a clear sense to an avowedly simplified picture of forces as 'contradictions' (i.e., as they seem to operate in nature), a more complex one applied elsewhere stands no chance.

 

As has been pointed on many occasions at this site, if dialecticians object to any of the comments made in this Essay, there is a simple remedy: they should say clearly, and in detail, for the first time ever what they mean when they equate forces, or the relations between them, with 'contradictions'.

 

Moreover, forces appear to be 'contradictory' when and only when they produce a third resultant force. This might provide DM-fans with a certain amount of aesthetic satisfaction (in that this picture is triadic), but it would in fact sink the theory faster than a lead-lined diving suit sinks a diver. That is because change would then be a result not of contradictory forces, but of resultant forces.

 

And, as we have seen already, it is just as easy to describe such a set-up as 'tautologious' as it is to picture it as 'contradictory' -- even though both options should rightly be fed into the 'mystical-concept-crusher' as irredeemably anthropomorphic. Moreover, we have already seen that whatever else they are these forces aren't involved in a 'dialectical contradiction' with one another since none of them imply the existence of the other in a force couple, or configuration of forces -- again, unlike the alleged 'dialectical contradiction' between the proletariat and the capitalist class (so we have been told).

 

Howsoever we twist and turn, the equation of forces with 'contradictions' seems to be as misconceived as anything could be. When interpreted metaphorically it turns out to be inappropriate (if not paradoxical and animistic); when interpreted literally it crumbles into incoherence and confusion, even in DM-terms.

 

In order to avoid these difficulties we need to return to an alternative that was considered briefly, earlier -- one that could provide DM-theorists with a successful way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions'. However, before this alternative is re-examined in more detail, it is necessary to counter an objection that should by now have occurred to the reader:

 

This entire analysis is abstract and fails to consider "real material forces".59a1

 

Real 'Contradictions'?

 

Sinking In Concrete

 

As noted above, considerations like those aired above would stretch the patience of most dialecticians. Indeed, they would probably be the first to point out that this Essay fails to consider real material, empirically verifiable contradictions, and by this they generally (but not exclusively) mean the 'contradictions' that feature in HM, in the class war and that help account for the dynamic in history.

 

First of all it is worth reminding ourselves that many of the examples considered earlier were in fact typically concrete, and undeniably material! What else is gravity, for instance?

 

Nevertheless, if no sense can be made of 'contradictory forces' in nature (as we have seen), then that automatically throws into question their role in HM.

 

Now, as is easy to demonstrate, revolutionaries seriously overuse the word "contradiction" in their endeavour to depict not just capitalism, but the class war in general. In fact, comrades seldom bother to justify their almost neurotically profligate application of this word to everything and anything they just happen to be discussing or analysing.59b

 

Interlude Ten: Contradictions, Contradictions Everywhere!

 

Here are just a few examples of the profligate use "contradiction": 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 -- with a particularly crass list posted here (which link will take the reader to a site called Dialectics For Kids, so it can perhaps be forgiven somewhat for its sub-sophomoric over-simplifications). Several more cases in point were itemised earlier. Readers should also check out the handful of egregious examples on offer in that rather poor film, Half Nelson, a movie not unconnected with the aforementioned site; indeed, the director of that film is the son of the owner of Dialectics for Kids!

 

Updates: December 2011 and October 2013: See also my recent debate with Mike Rosen (in the 'Comments' section at the bottom; organise these "Newest First"). [Unfortunately, these comments are no longer available!] See also here, again in the comments section at the bottom.

 

Here is another recent example:

 

"The current debate over stem cells provides a very good illustration of the contradictions inherent within capitalism. On the one hand it is capable of generating amazing new technologies. However, the amount of money flowing into stem cell research is still miniscule compared to that being used for developing new ways to kill people. A recent report concluded that while stem cell research was pioneered in this country, lack of funding was compromising the ability of British scientists to keep things moving forward in this area. Meanwhile, as the leader of the richest country on earth talks about the sanctity of a ball of cells, in Iraq the most sophisticated weapon systems are being used to murder real, living human beings." [Parrington (2007), p.9. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]

 

In fact, this illustrates the by-now-familiar fact that dialecticians like Parrington are only too ready to confuse 'contradictions' with unacceptable, paradoxical, irrational or unexpected events, as I alleged in Essay Five.

 

Even in DM-terms this makes no sense: Does either 'half' of the above 'contradiction' struggle with the other? Does one of them turn into the other (which they should do, if the dialectical classics are to be believed)? Is George W Bush, or the rest of his class, about to 'develop' into a bunch of under-funded scientists or new equipment, and vice versa? Does the one imply the other, such that the first can't exist without the second? Hardly.

 

If not, where is the 'dialectical contradiction' here?

 

Update, October 31/10/2021:

 

Not to be outdone, here is David Harvey, who thinks there are seventeen basic contradictions in capitalism; here they are:

 

"The direct provision of adequate use values for all (housing, education, food security etc.) takes precedence over their provision through a profit-maximising market system that concentrates exchange values in a few private hands and allocates goods on the basis of ability to pay.

"A means of exchange is created that facilitates the circulation of goods and services but limits or excludes the capacity of private individuals to accumulate money as a form of social power.

 

"The opposition between private property and state power is displaced as far as possible by common rights regimes -- with particular emphasis upon human knowledge and the land as the most crucial commons we have -- the creation, management and protection of which lie in the hands of popular assemblies and associations.

 

"The opposition between private property and state power is displaced as far as possible by common rights regimes -- with particular emphasis upon human knowledge and the land as the most crucial commons we have -- the creation, management and protection of which lie in the hands of popular assemblies and associations.

 

"The appropriation of social power by private persons is not only inhibited by economic and social barriers but becomes universally frowned upon as a pathological deviancy.

 

"The class opposition between capital and labour is dissolved into associated producers freely deciding on what, how and when they will produce in collaboration with other associations regarding the fulfilment of common social needs.

 

"Associated populations assess and communicate their mutual social needs to each other to furnish the basis for their production decisions (in the short run, realisation considerations dominate production decisions).

 

"New technologies and organisational forms are created that lighten the load of all forms of social labour, dissolve unnecessary distinctions in technical divisions of labour, liberate time for free individual and collective activities, and diminish the ecological footprint of human activities.

 

"Technical divisions of labour are reduced through the use of automation, robotisation and artificial intelligence. Those residual technical divisions of labour deemed essential are dissociated from social divisions of labour as far as possible. administrative, leadership and policing functions should be rotated among individuals within the population at large. We are liberated from the rule of experts.

 

"Monopoly and centralised power over the use of the means of production is vested in popular associations through which the decentralised competitive capacities of individuals and social groups are mobilised to produce differentiations in technical, social, cultural and lifestyle innovations.

 

"The greatest possible diversification exists in ways of living and being, of social relations and relations to nature, and of cultural habits and beliefs within territorial associations, communes and collectives. Free and uninhibited but orderly geographical movement of individuals within territories and between communes is guaranteed. Representatives of the associations regularly come together to assess, plan and undertake common tasks and deal with common problems at different scales: bioregional, continental and global.

 

"All inequalities in material provision are abolished other than those entailed in the principle of from each according to his, her or their capacities and to each according to his, her, or their needs.

 

"The distinction between necessary labour done for distant others and work undertaken in the reproduction of self, household and commune is gradually erased such that social labour becomes embedded in household and communal work and household and communal work becomes the primary form of unalienated and non-monetised social labour.

 

"Everyone should have equal entitlements to education, health care, housing, food security, basic goods and open access to transportation to ensure the material basis for freedom from want and for freedom of action and movement.

 

"The economy converges on zero growth (though with room for uneven geographical developments) in a world in which the greatest possible development of both individual and collective human capacities and powers and the perpetual search for novelty prevail as social norms to displace the mania for perpetual compound growth.

 

"The appropriation and production of natural forces for human needs should proceed apace but with the maximum regard for the protection of ecosystems, maximum attention paid to the recycling of nutrients, energy and physical matter to the sites from whence they came, and an overwhelming sense of re-enchantment with the beauty of the natural world, of which we are a part and to which we can and do contribute through our works.

 

"Unalienated human beings and unalienated creative personas emerge armed with a new and confident sense of self and collective being. Born out of the experience of freely contracted intimate social relations and empathy for different modes of living and producing, a world will emerge where everyone is considered equally worthy of dignity and respect, even as conflict rages over the appropriate definition of the good life. This social world will continuously evolve through permanent and ongoing revolutions in human capacities and powers. The perpetual search for novelty continues." [Harvey (2014), pp.294-97; I have quoted the above from here. Spelling altered to agree with UK English.]

 

Does Harvey even attempt to derive any of the items in the above pairs from the other in the same pair? Do any of the items in any pair imply the other? Is it the case that each one can't exit without the other? Do they struggle with and then turn into each other? But they ought to do both since that is what the DM-classics insist they should.

 

Readers can check, but Harvey just asserts that the above are contradictions; he nowhere makes any move to show they are even 'dialectical', let alone that they are any other sort of contradiction. But that is par for the course on Planet Dialectics.

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Indeed, this word/concept seems to operate almost as a code word, even a shibboleth, the use of which signals to others of like mind that the one employing it belongs to the same 'speech community' with its own distinctive jargon, thus defining an 'in-group' that excludes those belonging to the 'out-group', rather than genuinely applying in each and every case -- or in any case -- or, indeed, in a way that means anything at all.

 

[Why DM-fans do this will be revealed in Essays Nine Part Two and Fourteen Part Two (when it is published).]

 

But, perhaps this, too, is a little unfair?

 

In order to substantiate the above allegations it might be wise to consider a few (generally agreed upon) examples of "real material contradictions" in capitalism that supposedly underpin and drive social development.60

 

Rees, OLLMAN And 'Concrete Forces'

 

[TAR = The Algebra of Revolution (i.e., Rees (1998); HM = Historical Materialism.]

 

TAR, for example, opens with several apposite and well-observed examples of the irrational and destructive nature of Capitalism. As John Rees correctly points out, while life expectancy, for instance, has increased dramatically over the last hundred years or so (even in the poorest regions of the planet), other factors have grown alongside these developments that counteract or undermine them:

 

"[S]ince the Second World War there have been 149 wars which have left more than 23 million dead…. On an average yearly basis, the numbers killed in wars during this period have been more than double the deaths in the nineteenth century and seven times greater than in the eighteenth century…. Regression, by any criterion. Yet it is the very same development of human productivity that gives rise both to the possibility of life and to its destruction…. Everywhere we look another paradox appears. How can it be, for instance, that in the richest capitalist society in the world, the United States, real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973?… How is it that in Britain, where the economy, despite the ravages of recession, produces more than it has ever done…a full quarter of the population live below the poverty line? The contradictions are no less striking if we shift our gaze from economics to politics. The introduction of the market to Russia and Eastern Europe was supposed to bring stability and prosperity but has actually produced the opposite." [Rees (1998), pp.1-2. Paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added.]60a0

 

Bertell Ollman had something similar to say:

 

"Like virtually everyone else in his day, Marx was astounded by the scope and rapidity of the changes that were occurring all around him, but also by their contradictory nature. The enormous growth in the production of wealth, for example, came along with an increase in the worst forms of poverty; progress in science and technology that had a potential for making work much easier only succeeded in speeding up the pace of work and lengthening the working day; even the increase of personal freedom due to the abolition of various feudal ties came on the back of an even greater decrease in freedom due to the unforgiving conditions in which people were forced under pain of starvation to live and work (or what Marx was later to call the 'violence of things'). Meanwhile, more and more of the world was becoming privatized, commodified, fetishised, exploitable and exploited, and alienated as 'all that is solid melts into air.'" [Ollman (2005); quoted from here. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; bold emphasis added.]

 

First of all, it should be emphasised that in what follows the validity of the above criticisms of Capitalism won't be questioned -- nor will the explanation given by Rees or Ollman for these and other intolerable features of the political, economic and social system that still dominates this planet. The sole aim here is to ascertain what if anything they (or any one else, for that matter) mean by calling unacceptable developments like these "contradictions", or why they and other dialecticians insist on linking that word with material forces in nature and society.

 

Second, I have chosen the above passages since few DM-fans belonging to other wings of Marxism (be they Stalinists, Maoists, anti-Leninists, Orthodox Trotskyists, Libertarian Marxists, or Academic Marxists) would disagree that the things the above two call "contradictions" are indeed contradictions. While they will certainly disagree over some of their causes, or even over what to do to remedy them, they will all characterise them in the same way as 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

In what follows, I will focus mainly on Rees's comments.

 

The Impertinent Explanation

 

Of course, a trite and impertinent answer to the question "Why do DM-theorists use 'contradiction' in the way they do?" would be to point out that they use this word simply because it is part of the 'Marxist tradition', adherence to which helps define a dialectical 'in group', as noted earlier. It is reasonably clear that the use of this word is only part of 'Materialist Dialectics' because of contingent features of the lives of Marx and Engels -- i.e., those related to (i) when and where they were born, (ii) which class they found themselves members of, (iii) how they were educated, and (iv) who they studied -- specifically, Hegel.

 

Hence, as fate would have it, the world-view adopted by the above two was conditioned by their own "social being" -- to use Marx's term.

 

In fact, had Hegel died of Cholera (or whatever it was that finally killed him) 45 years earlier than he actually did, does anyone really think we would be using this term -- "contradiction" -- in the way DM-theorists do, or would even be bothering with 'dialectics'?60a

 

Be this as it may, because of the towering authority that Marx and Engels have assumed ever since, all subsequent dialecticians have been constrained to think and reason along similar lines. They have to use the obscure vocabulary bequeathed to them or risk being be accused of 'Revisionism', branded 'anti-Marxist', and maybe suffer expulsion, political isolation, or even worse.

 

[Or, of course, face the same sort of ritual abuse with which I am constantly regaled. Not that I am complaining; I expect it, and would be puzzled had there been none of it.]

 

In short, it is quite clear that theorists (like Rees and Ollman) use obscure Hegelian concepts and jargonised expressions because prominent comrades have always done so, and they are merely conforming to tradition.

 

Naturally, the impertinent nature of this 'trite' explanation won't win over many dialecticians -- but since a less impertinent one stands no chance either, there is little to lose advancing it here.

 

In that case, there is a pressing need to try to find a better reason why hard-nosed materialists should want to anthropomorphise nature and society in this manner, using terms drawn from Hermetic Mysticism -- such as "contradiction" -- in what is supposed to be a materialist theory.

 

Unfortunately, as we will soon find out, there isn't a better explanation why confirmed materialists have allowed themselves to be conned into accepting the use of Hermetic jargon like this, or for employing it quite so indiscriminately, as we have seen.

 

We have also seen that each and every attempt to render viable the analogy between forces and 'contradictions' fall apart; hence, it should come as no surprise to see the very same thing happen when we examine the use of "contradiction" in HM, below.

 

[Spoiler Alert: The result will be that, apart from the ideological and political motivations mentioned in the next paragraph, the impertinent reason mentioned above turns out to be the only viable one left standing.]

 

[The political setting to the use of "contradiction" is examined in detail in Essay Nine Part Two, and more generally in Essay Twelve (summary here), where I also examine the social and class background of the originators of this theory in order to link it with the reason why DM-theorists were, and still are, pre-disposed to adopt such an ancient, decrepit and class-compromised world-view -- alongside their use of "contradiction". Indeed, as hinted above, there are political and ideological reasons over and above the impertinent explanation offered here for its use. They are also explored in Essay Nine Part Two, specifically here.]

 

Conflict Resolution

 

The underlying cause of the many absurdities caused by capitalism is, as TAR rightly points out, the complex, changing interplay between the "material productive forces of society" and the associated "relations of production". [Rees (1998), p.2, quoting Marx.] That account of the driving force of capitalism (but, interpreted humanistically, in terms of the class struggle), I fully accept.

 

However, this brings us no closer to understanding what it is about opposing (social) forces that merits calling them "contradictions". Why turn a clear employment of an ordinary word drawn from the vernacular into an obscure concept in a doctrine peppered with other impenetrable jargon lifted from mystical Idealism (i.e., phrases such as "determinate negation", "identity of opposites", "negation of the negation", "mediate", and the like), the use of which completely undermines our ability to explain change, anyway?

 

In HM, we can certainly make sense of the term "force" -- and even of words like "opposing" and "struggle" --; but what is there to gain by calling these "contradictions"?61

 

Some might regard this as a harmless use of a certain word, but, as we will see in Essay Twelve (summary here), in this case there is no such thing, just as there is no such thing as a neutral use of the word "oppression". We will also see in Essay Nine Part Two that this particular word 'allows' DM-fans to impose contradictory tactics, strategies and theories on the party faithful in order to 'justify', among other things, class collaboration, substitutionism, splits, expulsions, and even mass murder, all predicated on the idea that if reality is contradictory, the Party should be, too. Indeed, as Lenin noted:

 

"The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts...is the essence (one of the 'essentials,' one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics.... The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute...." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]

 

"Splitting" is therefore an "essential" part of this theory, and "struggle" is an "absolute". That must also involve the relations between comrades. An emphasis on intra-party strife and splitting thus sits right at the heart of Dialectical Marxism!

 

In which case, we needn't sit around waiting for the ruling-class to divide us, we are already experts!

 

[An excellent example of the use of this theory to 'justify' a regressive political dogma (which would be condemned if anyone else were to do it) is the way that Trotsky used dialectics to justify the revolutionary defence of the former USSR on the basis of its 'contradictory' nature as a 'degenerated workers' state', in which workers exercised no power and were systematically oppressed and exploited for their pains -- and hence also the murderous invasion of Finland. Another is the way that Ted Grant, for instance, used 'Materialist Dialectics' to 'justify' his confused and contradictory theory of 'Proletarian Bonapartism' (sic), which then 'allowed' him to rationalise the substitution of the Maoist ruling-clique for the Chinese working class -- a topic I have debated here. (This link is unfortunately now dead!)]

 

So, these mystical concepts aren't 'innocent bystanders', as it were; their use has helped turn Dialectical Marxism into a spectacularly unsuccessful long-term disaster.

 

[Notice the use of "helped" here. DM is just one of the reasons for the protracted failure of Dialectical Marxism.]

 

Where The Shoe Pinches

 

Nevertheless, the relevant part of the argument in TAR appears to be the following:

 

F42: Capitalism seems to offer unprecedented possibilities for human development.

 

F43: But, in reality Capitalism delivers only partial or faltering progress.

 

F44: Alongside this progress we have witnessed major regression.

 

F45: Thus, Capitalism actually delivers a mixture of progress and regression.

 

For Rees, the "contradiction" appears to be based on the fact that Capitalism holds out certain possibilities, which it either can't fully deliver, or can't provide at all; almost invariably the opposite of what it promises (to the majority of ordinary working people, one presumes) is what actually unfolds.

 

Rees clearly believes that the involvement of opposites is important here: instead of peace we find war; in the place of prosperity we find poverty (where it need not be); the growth in human need isn't catered for by the incessant search for profit; the waste of human potential conflicts with the increased capacity society has for augmenting and satisfying its members needs, and so on. So, it looks like 'contradictions' arise either from the incongruity that exists between what might be expected of Capitalism (by those who don't understand its nature, presumably) and what it actually delivers. Or, perhaps this arises from the yawning gap that exists between its potential to satisfy human need and its obvious inability to do so. In that case, forces and structures brought into existence by Capitalism seem capable of freeing humanity from want and oppression also appear to be inextricably linked with structures and forces that only succeed in intensifying or spreading both.

 

However, these by-now-familiar observations still leave the supposed link between forces and 'contradictions' entirely unclear. In order to clarify Rees's point we perhaps need to consider various plausible interpretations of what he might have meant.

 

There appear to be several distinct possibilities:

 

F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.

 

F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A as well as B and C.

 

[The denotation of these capital letters will be revealed as the argument unfolds.]

 

Doubtless there are many other combinations that could be imagined along similar lines, but they would, I think, merely be elaborations on these six possibilities. I propose, therefore, to examine each of them in turn, beginning, naturally, with the first.

 

Not What The System Ordered

 

The first option was:

 

F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.

 

[F46a: Capitalism offers abundance, but delivers only scarcity (i.e., 'not-abundance').]61ao

 

But, F46/F46a presents us with a scenario we have met already; it resembles several earlier unsuccessful attempts to solve this overall problem. As we discovered, whatever forces there are in the system that actually produce not A, no contradiction can arise between A and not A because A itself does not exist, since only not A will have been actualised in place of A. Nor can any forces which are at work in the system contradict what they themselves actually produce (viz., not A in this case) --, especially if whatever they 'offer' (i.e., A) doesn't exist.

 

F46 and F46a are, therefore, of no use in our search to find a viable way of equating forces and 'contradictions' in HM.

 

[But do these factors struggle with and then turn into one another? Does abundance struggle with turn into scarcity, and vice versa? But they would have to do both if these were 'dialectical opposites' (according to the DM-classics). Once again: whatever else this is, it isn't a DM-'contradiction'.]

 

An Apparent Contradiction, At Last!

 

The second alternative went as follows:

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

This seems to be a little more promising since A and not A certainly looks like a genuine contradiction. However, because F47 appears to depict contradictory outcomes it can't illuminate the alleged contradictory connection between forces in nature and society that exist prior to their emergence. That is because F47 is manifestly not about the forces themselves, but about their results.

 

So, even here, we don't seem to have contradictory forces.61a

 

It could be objected that there are forces in capitalism that produce just such opposites, and those forces can, therefore, be described as contradictory. For example, competition forces individual capitalists to accumulate capital, but this accumulation has a tendency to reduce the rate of profit for the whole capitalist class. So, here we have one tendency imposed on individual units in the system (in order to maintain or increase their own share of surplus value), which, when actualised, produces the opposite result for the entire class. The search for increased profit only succeeds in eroding it in the long term.

 

Maybe so, but in what way is this a 'contradiction'?

 

It would be if this were the case:

 

Q1: Individual capitalists search for increased profits and they don't.

 

Or, this:

 

Q2: Profit both rises and doesn't rise at the same time and in the same respect.

 

But, no sane Marxist would argue any of these.

 

Of course, DM-fans might be using the word "contradiction" in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense. If so, what is it? [On that, see here.]

 

It is worth emphasising at this point that I am not objecting to a new use of "contradiction". [However, on this, see Interlude Fourteen.] DM-fans can use words as they see fit (not that they need my permission!). But, when they do, they can't also claim to be using such words with their old meaning in place -- and hence, with respect to "contradiction", they can't also use it to justify claims about, say, the 'contradictory' nature of the former Soviet Union, either -- where this word is now being used in a more ordinary, familiar sense. And, if that is so, this new use of "contradiction" will bear no relation to its use in FL and ordinary language, which in turn means that DL in effect fails to 'surpass' FL and 'banal common sense'. [I go into this in much more detail here. See also here, and here.]

 

Not that ordinary language is the same as 'common sense', anyway.

 

DM-fans can't have it both ways. If their use of this word is indeed new, then 'dialectical contradictions' (whatever they are) can't be a 'superior form' of logical contradiction, as Hegel and all subsequent dialecticians appear to many to have claimed.

 

[Although, there are Hegel scholars who deny this is what Hegel actually intended -- for example, Hahn (2007).]

 

[FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic.]

 

But, far more importantly, do these forces, whatever they are, struggle with and then change into each other, which is what the DM-classics tell us they must do?

 

Call these forces, F1 and F2, respectively. But, if these two forces do struggle with one another they must surely coexist. If so, F1 can't change into F2 since it already exists! If it didn't, no struggle could take place.

 

[This general objection to the 'dialectical theory of change' has been expanded upon in extensive detail in Essay Seven Part Three, where I have responded to several objections, some obvious, some not so obvious.]

 

But, independently of that, it is clear that we are once again talking about the effects of these forces not the forces themselves. Those forces are described as 'contradictory' because their effects are contrary to expectations, not that they actually contradict one another.

 

In fact, what we have here is one economic factor (the accumulation of capital) that somehow produces the opposite effect to what might be expected, not two forces doing this with one of them predominating.

 

But, by no stretch of the imagination can this be the option we are looking for in our attempt to find out what Rees meant. There aren't even two forces at work here!

 

Nevertheless, this section is aimed at considering the last few remaining options available to DM-theorists to make their ideas comprehensible, so F47 won't be abandoned just yet.

 

However, as noted above, F47 corresponds to a relation depicted abstractly in an earlier section (i.e., that between E1 and E2, in F6 to F9, reproduced below) -- but interpreted here concretely (albeit schematically).

 

In which case, it looks like we might at last have found a genuine interpretation of E1 and E2 that is undeniably 'contradictory'.

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.

 

Unfortunately, this appearance is illusory since the conjunction of A and not A can't be considered contradictory until it is clear what interpretation is to be given to the schematic letter "A".

 

At this point, it is worth recalling that we are searching for a literal interpretation of the term "contradiction" that will allow DL to surpass FL -- not a metaphorical or analogical use of this word -- still less one that possesses a secondary or derivative sense (or even one that carries the 'special' DM-sense that has yet to be explained with any clarity). As should seem obvious, this search is of the utmost importance if we are to rescue from oblivion the idea that forces and 'contradictions' may be equated objectively -- and not, for instance, poetically, or even in some other fanciful sense.

 

Clearly, there are several different ways of reading the expression "A and not A"; some of these will be contradictions, others not.

 

In what follows, I shall utilise a further example taken from TAR (quoted above), which seems (at least to many DM-theorists) to be a genuine contradiction (i.e., that which supposedly exists between wealth and poverty). In that case, this might involve interpreting "A" as "wealth", and "not A" as "not wealth" (it clearly can't be "not poverty"!). In that case, "A and not A" would cash out as "wealth and not wealth".62

 

Unfortunately, the problem with this way of interpreting "A and not A" is that it actually creates a phrase, not a clause, indicative sentence or proposition.63 As such, it can't be a literal contradiction.

 

[The vast majority of DM-fans will fail to appreciate this point since their knowledge of logic is woefully defective. That, of course, hasn't stopped them pontificating on the subject as if they were all latter-day Aristotles.]

 

The only apparent way to situate the schematic noun phrase -- "A and not A" -- in a propositional context would be to interpret it a little more loosely -- perhaps along the following lines:

 

F52: Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.64

 

As such, F52 is a paraphrase of:

 

F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not wealth.

 

Or perhaps even:

 

F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not wealth for others.65

 

Again, F53 itself is short for:

 

F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism produces not wealth for others.

 

None of these look at all promising; they are not only stylistic monstrosities, their import is rather unclear. Anyway, F53 and F53a aren't contradictory -- that is, no more than, say, a tap would be contradictory if it supplied water for some but not for others, or any more than the claim that "opposing forces are contradictory" would itself be 'contradictory' if it convinced some but not others. No one would think they had been contradicted if they asserted that a certain factory, say, produced several batches of defective Widgets, and someone else clamed it also produced some that weren't defective.66

 

Anyway, F52a is far too vague as it stands -- it is certainly no more of a 'contradiction' than F53 and F53a were, and probably for the same reason. If sentences like these have no clear meaning they can't possibly assist in any attempt to clarify DM. Hence, a further widening of the interpretation of "A and not A" is called for if we are to gain a clearer understanding of the implications of F47. Perhaps the following will do?

 

F54: Capitalism produces capitalists who are wealthy and workers who aren't wealthy.

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

[F53: Capitalism produces wealth for some and not wealth for others.

 

F53a: Capitalism produces wealth for some and Capitalism produces not wealth for others.]

 

As was the case with F53 and F53a, F54 isn't even a contradiction. Again, anyone asserting the first clause of F54 who was then confronted with the second wouldn't feel that they had been contradicted. That is plainly because the first clause is about Capitalists, while the second is about workers. To be contradictory F55 would have to be:

 

F55: Capitalism produces worker, W1 (or Capitalist, C1), who is both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.

 

But, quite apart from the fact that no one would assent to, or even want to assert F55, it possesses no clear sense. The situation would be no better if it were re-written as:

 

F55a: Capitalism produces a set of workers, W (or Capitalists, C), who are both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time and in the same respect.

 

It is reasonably certain that Rees meant neither F55 nor F55a.

 

[If he had intended either, it would be entirely unclear what he could possibly have meant by one or both of them.]

 

At best, F55 and F55a might be re-interpreted in a comparative sort of way, as follows:

 

F55b: Capitalism produces a set of workers, W, that is both wealthy (in comparison to a set of peasants, P) and not wealthy (in comparison to a set of Capitalists, C), at the same time and in the same respect.

 

But, F55b is no more contradictory than this would be:

 

F55c: John Rees wrote a book that is both long (when compared with an average weekday print copy of The Guardian) and not long (when compared with Das Kapital).

 

The observation that TAR is both long compared to The Guardian and short compared to Das Kapital is not, one imagines, what most DM-theorists mean by "contradiction". If it were, their theory would plainly be based on logico-linguistic naivety, or linguistic incompetence, but little else.

 

Consequently, it looks like F47 can't be shoe-horned into this particular dialectical boot after all.

 

More problematic, however, is the following question: is either one of these options going to turn into the other?

 

In the above example, is W going to turn into C, and C into W? Indeed, is wealth going to turn into poverty? But, if these were 'genuine' 'dialectical opposites' or 'contradictions', they most surely should. In which case, whatever else it is, this can't be a 'dialectical contradiction'.66a

 

Further attempts to interpret "A and not A" can be extended almost indefinitely. DM-enthusiasts are welcome to play around with them as much as they like, the end result will be no different. There are no literally true contradictions that can be manufactured out of "A and not A" -- where these relate to the same person, persons, groups, forces, etc., in the same respect, at the same time. And as we have seen, this can't even be a 'dialectical contradiction'!

 

In addition to the reasons given above: that is because, if a putative 'contradiction' were held true, it would thereby cease to be a literal contradiction. As was established in in Essay Five, if such a 'contradiction' were encountered in everyday life, it would normally be viewed either as figurative or based on an undischarged ambiguity of some sort. There is no way around that socio-linguistic convention this side of altering the meaning of the word "contradiction". [On this, see also Interlude Eleven, below.] And, even that would be of little help to DM-theorists since that would 'solve' this 'problem' by means of yet more subjective, question-begging, linguistic reform, thereby imposing this part of DM on the facts.67

 

And as we have just seen, this can't even be a 'dialectical contradiction'!

 

Interlude Eleven: Everyday Contradictions

 

Linguistic tinkering like this merely creates 'contradictions' by fiat when what is required is an example of a real material contradiction -- not a reified linguistic expression for one, hastily cobbled-together simply to save the theory.

 

Nevertheless, some might argue that the claim advanced earlier (i.e., that contradictions would normally be regarded as figurative or ambiguous, if held 'true') is controversial -- and yet it is based on how we would respond now when faced with a contradiction in ordinary life. So, this claim is controversial only in the sense that some have thought to controvert it.

 

[There is a partial explanation of the background to this approach (based on Wittgenstein's work), here.]

 

Naturally, this means that the earlier observation isn't a consequence of the present author having been 'corrupted' by Analytic Philosophy. On the contrary, it is informed by the way workers themselves speak, and how anyone not suffering from 'dialectics' talks when they operate in the real world. Indeed, it is based on the way DM-theorists themselves would have to speak in order to make themselves understood in everyday life, let alone when they try to communicate with the working class.

 

Nevertheless, the following comments will test the patience of any dialecticians who have made it this far. They will no doubt regard the examples of contradictions given below as discursive, not dialectical, contradictions. That worry will be laid to rest in Essay Eight Part Three, where examples of just such 'contradictions' (i.e., those advanced by DM-theorists themselves) will be considered. The only point of the following argument is to illustrate how we might proceed if anyone were to utter (and try to mean) a contradiction in everyday life.

 

In that case, in order to illustrate how we would now handle such 'contradictions', consider how worker, NN, would respond if she were faced with the following scenario:

 

C1: Boss BB: "NN, you are being paid £9.50 an hour and not being paid £9.50 an hour."

 

[Of course, no one who isn't the worse for drink, drugs or mental confusion speaks like this, but other than the examples considered here it isn't easy to cite instances where ordinary human beings (again, not in the grip a some theory or under the influence of Zen Buddhism) utter 'true contradictions', or, indeed, intend to utter them and genuinely mean them.]

 

At first sight, C1 would in all likelihood be interpreted as a joke of some sort, a slip of the tongue, or a mistake. If the boss insisted that none of these were the case, then the only way to proceed would be to ask what on earth this boss meant by the sentence quoted in C1. In the event, the explication of the use of that sentence might involve interpreting the word "paid" in one of three ways:

 

(1) It might indicate what NN was going to earn, regardless of whether or not she will ever receive the money. Hence, in a round-about sort of way, the sentence quoted in C1 could be alluding to the effect of taxation and other deductions on NN's pay. It might even refer to the boss's intention to pay the worker in 'kind'. Or:

 

(2) It could mean that although the money had been earned, it wouldn't actually be paid to NN for some reason. So, it might be withheld as a part of the boss's attempt to victimise her for helping to lead a successful strike, for example. Or:

 

(3) It could mean that although NN will be paid at the stated rate, the true value of her contribution to production can't be measured in cash terms. Hence, it might suggest that BB intends to reward NN with more than mere money (or maybe with none at all) -- but, with his/her 'highest esteem', etc. A clue to this way of viewing the sentence quoted in C1 would be the inflection in the boss's voice -- a note of sarcasm, perhaps.

 

[Of course, there might be other ways of interpreting C1, but the above seem the most obvious to me.]

 

However, 'contradictions' like this would never be regarded as literally true, for as soon as NN was actually paid the said money the second half of the sentence quoted in C1 would become false -- which means that the conjunction of a falsehood with a truth (in C1) could never become literally true (short of altering the meaning of the words employed, or, indeed, of those used to assert that it is true -- or, without altering the meaning of "literal", of course). We wouldn't be able to make sense of anyone who thought that this sort of eventuality could arise (save in the ways indicated above, etc.). Certainly, without the alternatives outlined in (1)-(3) -- or, perhaps, expressed by several other possible interpretations --, no worker (or anyone else, for that matter) would be able to understand the sentence quoted in C1.

 

C1: Boss BB: "NN, you are being paid £9.50 an hour and not being paid £9.50 an hour."

 

This brings us back to a difficulty DM-theorists must always face if they persist in regarding 'contradictions' as true, or they continue to use the word "contradiction" in the loose and indiscriminate way to which they have become accustomed -- where one minute they sort of half mean the word in its ordinary-, or even its FL-sense, the next they sort of half mean it in this new, and as-yet-unexplained, DL-sense. When we bring this word back to its ordinary meaning, any propositions that contain it -- if they are still to be regarded as true -- could only ever be understood in a non-standard way, and then disambiguated along lines suggested earlier.

 

Exactly why we should want to do that was made clear by Marx himself:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

 

If, on the other hand, the word "contradiction" is meant to be taken in a special or technical (but as-yet-unspecified) sense, DM-theorists risk being misunderstood at every turn -- with their words failing to communicate anything determinate, especially if they hope to depict the sorts of situations in the material world that are familiar to ordinary people and workers. Furthermore, to make the same point once more, that risk will remain in place unless and until DM-apologists make it clear (and for the first time ever) what they mean by their odd use of this word in such contexts.

 

This means that in practice, when faced with sentences like C1, DM-theorists would interpret the alleged "contradictions" they express in a standard way, in line with the vast majority of ordinary human beings -- and hence paraphrase them away. Despite their commitment to dialectics, few DM-fans would understand the words attributed to the fictional boss in C1 literally. In fact, only the most useless trade union organiser in history would allow such a boss to get away with the nonsense reported in C1. Representing and defending the material interests of the working-class certainly doesn't mean that we let bosses off the hook by adopting, or accepting, ways of speaking that have been invented by ruling-class hacks, mystics and Idealists.

 

C1: Boss BB: "NN, you are being paid £9.50 an hour and not being paid £9.50 an hour."

 

However, socialists, who are normally alert to the dangers of class collaboration when they surface elsewhere, seem only too happy to allow ordinary language to suffer from ideological contamination of this sort when it comes to philosophy.

 

Even if the word "contradiction" were intended to be taken literally, DM-theorists themselves wouldn't be able to say what in nature or society a 'true contradiction' would, or could, depict without helping themselves to yet more figurative language.

 

If (per impossible) they could do this, then the word "literal" would have to be taken non-literally!

 

In Essay Five, we saw every attempt to unravel the confusions that plague Engels's (brief) account of motion fail. It turned out that it was impossible to make sense of what Engels thought he might have meant by what he actually said -- that is, if we attempt to take his words literally.

 

So, it is no big surprise to find that DM-theorists have remained consistently unclear and equivocal about core DM-theories like this for well over a hundred years. There is in fact nothing that anyone could say, or could have said, to make the incomprehensible comprehensible. Just like the mysteries of Transubstantiation and the Incarnation of Christ, DM-propositions resist all attempts at clarification. Indeed, as David Stove argued:

 

"If a statement 'p' is impossible to understand if taken literally, it will also be impossible to understand the statement 'So-and-so believes that p', taken literally. If you could understand the statement that knowledge is literally a poached egg, then you could understand the statement that Smith literally believes that knowledge is a poached egg; but since you can't understand the former, you can't understand the latter either." [Stove (1991), p.28.]

 

[Readers should, however, check out the warning I have also posted about Stove, here.]

 

At present, unless DM-theorists come up with the goods, it is impossible to understand a single thing they say about these mysterious 'dialectical contradictions', and hence it is equally impossible to understand anyone who swears that DM-theorists themselves understand them.

 

[This is on a par with Wittgenstein's aside: the negation of nonsense is also nonsense.]

 

When I have made this point to DM-fans in 'debate', they tend to respond with something like the following:

 

"Just because you can't make sense of this use of 'contradiction' doesn't mean it makes no sense. Your failings can't be attributed to our theory!"

 

To which I invariably reply:

 

 "I agree. But in that case, help me out. What do you mean by your odd use of 'contradiction', for example?"

 

That is usually met with silence, abuse or further attempts at deflection. But in the nearly 35 years I have been arguing with DM-fans, not one of them has been able to help me out. Not that I ever expected it, any more than I expect Christians to explain with any clarity, or even candour, the nature of their Trinity to me.

 

At this point, DM-apologists might be tempted to complain about the continual use of contradictions drawn from FL to make points against their use of "dialectical contradiction". The obvious response to this is (once again) to request a clear explanation of what a 'dialectical contradiction' itself could possibly be so that those advancing this complaint could themselves convince critics that they do mean something (anything?) by that phrase, as opposed to their having used an empty string of words for well over a hundred years -- just because it is traditional to do so.

 

Until then, the volunteered complaint (recorded at the beginning of the previous paragraph) would itself be devoid of meaning since it contains a term that is, so far, meaningless -- i.e., "dialectical contradiction". DM-theorists might just as well use "schmontradiction" for all the good it does.

 

Finally, the claim that there are 'literally true contradictions' (advanced by philosophers like Graham Priest) will be examined in a later Essay. [However, it is a moot point whether the examples and paradoxes he considers are, or ever could be called "dialectical". Strike that; they aren't.]

 

Until then the reader is directed toward the following: Goldstein (1992, 2004), Slater (2002, 2007b, 2007c), and this review, by Hartry Field.

 

[Field has now published a book on the paradoxes, where he is able to show that the Dialetheic and Paraconsistent Logic Priest favours can't even handle the paradoxes of truth, which had in fact been one of the main motivators for this branch of non-standard logic -- i.e., Field (2008), pp.36-92.]

 

[An entire sub-section on 'dialectical contradictions' that used to appear here has now been moved to form Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Opposite Tendencies I

 

In that case, perhaps F48 is the reading we are searching for?

 

F48: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only B, where A and B are opposites.

 

Unfortunately, as we have seen several times already, since A doesn't exist -- Capitalism not having delivered it --, it can't 'contradict' B. This means that F48 isn't a viable reading of Rees's intentions, either. Even if B 'contradicted' any forces and/or processes already present in the system, that would just return us to where we were when we considered several earlier examples, such as this one (but substituting the word "society" for "nature"):

 

F6a: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in society.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples. 

 

It seems this is yet another dialectical dead-end, for here we have even more non-existents 'contradicted' by existents.

 

Opposite Tendencies II

 

Does, therefore, F49 provide DM with a lifeline?

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

This looks a little more promising -- but looks can be deceptive.

 

If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we would appear to have the following:

 

F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.68

 

Interlude Twelve: Opposites, Again?

 

[This follows on from Interlude Five. and depends on the conclusions reached there.]

 

But, are opposites always contradictory? At this moment I am sat in front of my computer looking at the house opposite. Is my house therefore in some sort of 'struggle' with that house? Or, indeed, am I 'struggling' with it?

 

Unfair? Perhaps so. Dialecticians will be the first to point out that the opposites they regard as contradictory are those that are involved in a dialectical union of some sort (i.e., as UOs). Since my house and the one opposite aren't so linked (and neither am I), they aren't therefore in 'struggle', nor could they be.

 

Well, how do we know? Clearly we don't. Nature often surprises us. Anyway, isn't everything interconnected in DM?

 

Be this as it may, consider the opposite sides of an equilateral triangle (and one that has been carefully drawn on paper, so this isn't an abstract example). Such a triangle has two opposite sides; do they 'contradict' one another? Are they both battling against the third side, or with each other? Here, these sides are physically-, and logically-, or 'internally'-, linked. Even so, they steadfastly refuse to contradict one another. If we now extend this example to cover more complex manifolds, these 'difficulties' only multiply.

 

But, once again it could be argued that these counter-examples aren't relevant since the items involved aren't dialectically-logically linked.

 

It seems then that only certain logical connections in reality are allowed to be, or to constitute, a DM-UO, which means that objects and processes that are merely physically-, or even those which are formally-, connected can't be so described.

 

However, on a purely empirical basis, since no house has yet been observed to be engaged in a life-and-death struggle with another property across the way, can they be ruled-out conclusively as UOs? Who can say? And yet, who has ever actually witnessed a set of use values slugging it out with a set of exchange values? Or seen 'appearances' locked in a bitter tussle with 'underlying essences'? Or even witnessed a billiard ball struggling with itself as it rolls along. But, which DM-fan would now want to disagree with Engels (who claimed that motion like this is contradictory) simply on the basis that it is impossible to observe this alleged contradiction? If not, empirical niceties (i.e., observation) like this can't be crucially important in such cases.

 

We are still in the dark, therefore.

 

Some might object to the banal examples covered in this Essay. But Hegelian opposites look pretty banal themselves (and so do those that litter most DM-texts -- for example: magnets, males and females, up and down, seeds that negate plants, etc.) -- and they don't work, either, even in their own terms.

 

Oddly enough, and by sheer coincidence (I'm sure), 'dialectical opposites' turn out to be (by-and-large) the kind of 'opposites' dreamt-up by Idealist Philosophers thousands of years ago (and, indeed, more recently). Now, since this doctrine is a central tenet of Hermeticism, that should be enough to malign it in the eyes of anyone concerned to remain consistent with atheistic materialism:

 

"For everything must be the product of opposition and contrariety, and it cannot be otherwise." [Copenhaver (1995), p.38. Bold emphasis added.]

 

[In fact, pointing out that DM has appropriated the ideas of previous generations of mystics has absolutely no effect on dialecticians; why that is so will be revealed in Essay Nine Part Two.]

 

To test this claim, readers should now try to spot the difference (over and above a handful of superficial, stylistic variations) between the following two passages:

 

"CHAPTER X POLARITY 'Everything is dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled.' -- The Kybalion.

 

"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle -- the Principle of Polarity -- embodies the truth that all manifested things have 'two sides'; 'two aspects'; 'two poles'; a 'pair of opposites,' with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: 'Everything is and isn't, at the same time'; 'all truths are but half-truths'; 'every truth is half-false'; 'there are two sides to everything'; 'there is a reverse side to every shield,' etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that 'the pairs of opposites may be reconciled,' and that 'thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree'; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites' is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity. The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything

 

"Light and Darkness are poles of the same thing, with many degrees between them. The musical scale is the same-starting with 'C' you moved upward until you reach another 'C,' and so on, the differences between the two ends of the board being the same, with many degrees between the two extremes. The scale of colour is the same -- higher and lower vibrations being the only difference between high violet and low red. Large and Small are relative. So are Noise and Quiet; Hard and Soft follow the rule. Likewise Sharp and Dull. Positive and Negative are two poles of the same thing, with countless degrees between them....

 

"CHAPTER IX VIBRATION 'Nothing rests; everything moves; everything vibrates.' -- The Kybalion.

 

"The great Third Hermetic Principle-the Principle of Vibration-embodies the truth that Motion is manifest in everything in the Universe-that nothing is at rest-that everything moves, vibrates, and circles. This Hermetic Principle was recognized by some of the early Greek philosophers who embodied it in their systems. But, then, for centuries it was lost sight of by the thinkers outside of the Hermetic ranks. But in the Nineteenth Century physical science re-discovered the truth and the Twentieth Century scientific discoveries have added additional proof of the correctness and truth of this centuries-old Hermetic doctrine.

 

"The Hermetic Teachings are that not only is everything in constant movement and vibration, but that the 'differences' between the various manifestations of the universal power are due entirely to the varying rate and mode of vibrations. Not only this, but that even THE ALL, in itself, manifests a constant vibration of such an infinite degree of intensity and rapid motion that it may be practically considered as at rest, the teachers directing the attention of the students to the fact that even on the physical plane a rapidly moving object (such as a revolving wheel) seems to be at rest. The Teachings are to the effect that Spirit is at one end of the Pole of Vibration, the other Pole being certain extremely gross forms of Matter. Between these two poles are millions upon millions of different rates and modes of vibration.

 

"Modern Science has proven that all that we call Matter and Energy are but 'modes of vibratory motion,' and some of the more advanced scientists are rapidly moving toward the positions of the occultists who hold that the phenomena of Mind are likewise modes of vibration or motion. Let us see what science has to say regarding the question of vibrations in matter and energy.

 

"In the first place, science teaches that all matter manifests, in some degree, the vibrations arising from temperature or heat. Be an object cold or hot-both being but degrees of the same things-it manifests certain heat vibrations, and in that sense is in motion and vibration. Then all particles of Matter are in circular movement, from corpuscle to suns. The planets revolve around suns, and many of them turn on their axes. The suns move around greater central points, and these are believed to move around still greater, and so on, ad infinitum. The molecules of which the particular kinds of Matter are composed are in a state of constant vibration and movement around each other and against each other. The molecules are composed of Atoms, which, likewise, are in a state of constant movement and vibration. The atoms are composed of Corpuscles, sometimes called 'electrons,' 'ions,' etc., which also are in a state of rapid motion, revolving around each other, and which manifest a very rapid state and mode of vibration. And, so we see that all forms of Matter manifest Vibration, in accordance with the Hermetic Principle of Vibration." [Anonymous (2005), pp.59-62, 55-58. The first has been posted here; the second here. Spelling altered to conform with UK English. For more quotations along the same lines (taken from other mystical systems/theorists), see here and here.]

 

Compare the above with this:

 

"The Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites

 

"Everywhere we look in nature, we see the dynamic co-existence of opposing tendencies. This creative tension is what gives life and motion. That was already understood by Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.) two and a half thousand years ago. It is even present in embryo in certain Oriental religions, as in the idea of the ying (sic) and yang in China, and in Buddhism. Dialectics appears here in a mystified form, which nonetheless reflects an intuition of the workings of nature. The Hindu religion contains the germ of a dialectical idea, when it poses the three phases of creation (Brahma), maintenance or order (Vishnu) and destruction or disorder (Shiva). In his interesting book on the mathematics of chaos, Ian Stewart points out that the difference between the gods Shiva, 'the Untamed,' and Vishnu is not the antagonism between good and evil, but that the two principles of harmony and discord together underlie the whole of existence....

 

"In Heraclitus, all this was in the nature of an inspired guess. Now this hypothesis has been confirmed by a huge amount of examples. The unity of opposites lies at the heart of the atom, and the entire universe is made up of molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles. The matter was very well put by R. P. Feynman: 'All things, even ourselves, are made of fine-grained, enormously strongly interacting plus and minus parts, all neatly balanced out....'

 

"The question is: how does it happen that a plus and a minus are 'neatly balanced out?' This is a contradictory idea! In elementary mathematics, a plus and a minus do not 'balance out.' They negate each other. Modern physics has uncovered the tremendous forces which lie at the heart of the atom. Why do the contradictory forces of electrons and protons not cancel each other out? Why do atoms not merely fly apart? The current explanation refers to the 'strong force' which holds the atom together. But the fact remains that the unity of opposites lies at the basis of all reality.

 

"Within the nucleus of an atom, there are two opposing forces, attraction and repulsion. On the one hand, there are electrical repulsions which, if unrestrained, would violently tear the nucleus apart. On the other hand, there are powerful forces of attraction which bind the nuclear particles to each other. This force of attraction, however, has its limits, beyond which it is unable to hold things together. The forces of attraction, unlike repulsion, have a very short reach. In a small nucleus they can keep the forces of disruption in check. But in a large nucleus, the forces of repulsion can't be easily dominated....

 

"Nature seems to work in pairs. We have the 'strong' and the 'weak' forces at the subatomic level; attraction and repulsion; north and south in magnetism; positive and negative in electricity; matter and anti-matter; male and female in biology; odd and even in mathematics; even the concept of 'left and right handedness' in relation to the spin of subatomic particles. There is a certain symmetry, in which contradictory tendencies, to quote Feynman, 'balance themselves out,' or, to use the more poetical expression of Heraclitus, 'agree with each other by differing like the opposing tensions of the strings and bow of a musical instrument.' There are two kinds of matter, which can be called positive and negative. Like kinds repel and unlike attract....

 

"Moreover, everything is in a permanent relation with other things. Even over vast distances, we are affected by light, radiation, gravity. Undetected by our senses, there is a process of interaction, which causes a continual series of changes. Ultra-violet light is able to 'evaporate' electrons from metal surfaces in much the same way as the sun’s rays evaporate water from the ocean. Banesh Hoffmann states: 'It is still a strange and awe-inspiring thought, that you and I are thus rhythmically exchanging particles with one another, and with the earth and the beasts of the earth, and the sun and the moon and the stars, to the uttermost galaxy....'

 

"The phenomenon of oppositeness exists in physics, where, for example, every particle has its anti-particle (electron and positron, proton and anti-proton, etc.). These are not merely different, but opposites in the most literal sense of the word, being identical in every respect, except one: they have opposite electrical charges -- positive and negative. Incidentally, it is a matter of indifference which one is characterised as negative and which positive. The important thing is the relationship between them....

 

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter.

 

"The opposing tendencies can exist in a state of uneasy equilibrium for long periods of time, until some change, even a small quantitative change, destroys the equilibrium and gives rise to a critical state which can produce a qualitative transformation. In 1936, Bohr compared the structure of the nucleus to a drop of liquid, for example, a raindrop hanging from a leaf. Here the force of gravity struggles with that of surface tension striving to keep the water molecules together. The addition of just a few more molecules to the liquid renders it unstable. The enlarged droplet begins to shudder, the surface tension is no longer able to hold the mass to the leaf and the whole thing falls." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.64-68; quoted from here.]

 

"'Everything Flows'

 

"Everything is in a constant state of motion, from neutrinos to super-clusters. The earth itself is constantly moving, rotating around the sun once a year, and rotating on its own axis once a day. The sun, in turn, revolves on its axis once in 26 days and, together with all the other stars in our galaxy, travels once around the galaxy in 230 million years. It is probable that still larger structures (clusters of galaxies) also have some kind of overall rotational motion. This seems to be a characteristic of matter right down to the atomic level, where the atoms which make up molecules rotate about each other at varying rates. Inside the atom, electrons rotate around the nucleus at enormous speeds....

 

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based upon contradiction. Whereas traditional formal logic seeks to banish contradiction, dialectical thought embraces it. Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites...." [Ibid, pp.45-47; quoted from here. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that the same brand of Mickey Mouse Science is prominent in the Hermetic tract and the Dialectical mantra intoned by comrades Woods and Grant.

 

Even so, DM-texts still make no attempt to explain with any clarity what it could possibly mean to suggest that 'dialectical opposites' could contradict one another. For example, who taught them to speak?

 

Unfair once more?

 

Not so.

 

Not, unless dialecticians mean something else by their use of "contradiction", which they have so far kept to themselves. If these 'opposites' do indeed 'contradict' one another, they must be able to talk.

 

[On this, see here, Interlude Eleven and Essay Eight Part Three. There is more on this in Essay Seven Part One. See also the discussion of Kant's concept of "real negation" in Appendix A.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

Returning to the main feature:

 

If we now read "A" as "wealth" and "B" as "poverty" once more, we would appear to have the following:

 

F63: Capitalism offers wealth, but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.

 

However, there are several problems with this paraphrase and, indeed, this option. One of these concerns the supposition that capitalism actually does offer wealth. Admittedly, for propaganda purposes its ideologues often claim it does -- but who believes them? Certainly, blatant lies like this can't serve as part of a socialist analysis.69

 

The following might therefore be regarded as a more viable option:

 

A1: Capitalism has the potential to offer wealth to all but delivers wealth and poverty, where wealth and poverty are opposites.

 

[F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.]

 

In fact, this alternative has already been considered; it is just a variant on F49a. Once again, an unrealised potential can't contradict anything since it doesn't exist. So, even if it were true, A1 would be of no help in understanding what DM-theorists mean by their equation of forces with 'contradictions' in HM.

 

Someone could argue, for example, that the fact that there will be a sea battle tomorrow is contradicted by the fact that there won't (to use Aristotle's example). Neither of these scenarios is actual, but that doesn't stop them from contradicting one another.

 

Or so it could be maintained.

 

Certainly, those two sentences look contradictory (who has ever denied it?), but the question is, can both be true? That would have to be the case if this were an example of a 'dialectical contradiction' -- and, not insignificantly, they would have to imply one another (like the proletariat implies the capitalist class, so we have been led to believe), which they don't.

 

Once again: whatever else this, it isn't a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

[The reader is also referred back to my earlier discussion of the distinction between "contradictory" and "contradiction".]

 

DM-enthusiasts regard their 'contradictions' as real material forces (they are a consequence, or they are the effects of such forces -- DM-fans are somewhat unclear about this, as we have seen), and the latter can only 'contradict' (in their sense of the word) whatever they can materially interact with, which plainly means that such factors have to co-exist -- as, indeed, Mao himself argued:

 

"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below'.... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'how opposites can be and how they become identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity." [Mao (1937), p.338. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Indeed, as Ira Gollobin also opined (quoting Engels):

 

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

The proletariat could hardly 'contradict' the capitalist class if one of them didn't exist! Same with the forces and relations of production --, and, indeed, with forces of attraction and repulsion.

 

Hence, while propositions about unrealised potentialities (or 'tendencies' -- or, indeed, sentences about future contingencies) might contradict one another (in the sense that they can't both become true, or both become false), in DM-terms an unrealised potential (or 'tendency') can't 'contradict' (in the sense that it actively opposes) something that isn't actual.

 

While it is possible to speak about 'contradictory tendencies' in an object or process, the point of referring to these as "contradictory" is that they can't both be actualised at once. So, for example, while it is possible for one end of a rather long iron bar to cool down while the other end is being heated (at the same time), it makes no sense to suppose that the same section of that bar (which could be specified in terms of precise volume intervals) can be in both states at once.

 

[If anyone thinks differently, they can e-mail me with their best shot. On the alleged 'contradictory tendencies' in capitalism, see here, here, here, here, and here.]

 

Perhaps then we should re-interpret F49 in the following manner?

 

F57: Capitalism develops productive forces capable of delivering wealth to all, but it actually delivers wealth to a minority, and poverty to most of the rest, where wealth and poverty are opposites.

 

[F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.]

 

However, in F57 we are confronted with a subtle change in the way that the "A" of F49 has been interpreted in the opening clause: it now stands for something like the "capacity to develop productive forces capable of delivering wealth". But, in the last clause it simply stands for "wealth", as before. Hence, F57 is actually equivalent to the following:

 

F49a: Capitalism develops D, but actually delivers B and C instead, where B and C are opposites.

 

Or perhaps:

 

F49b: Capitalism develops D (which has the potential to produce B or C), but in the end delivers B and C, where B and C are opposites.

 

Here, the 'contradiction' would seem to be between either:

 

(a) The capacity Capitalism has for delivering wealth and its actual delivery of poverty, or,

 

(b) The wealth it delivers to some and the poverty it imposes on the rest.

 

In the first case, clearly we don't have a contradiction. That is because, as we have just seen, a capacity is an unrealised potentiality, and as such it can't contradict something which does exist -- no more than, say, a woman's un-actualised capacity to play the flute contradicts her actualised expertise with the piano, or even her actualised state of not having a flute -- or, indeed, that of not being able to play the flute while she has to make do with a piano.

 

The second alternative above is no contradiction either, however much it offends our sensibilities. Option (b) is no more a contradiction than, say, £10,000 ($13,000) in one pocket contradicts £0.15 ($0.20) in another. Or no more than a £5 (or a $10) note in a millionaire's wallet (assuming this is all she has on her at the time) contradicts the £1000 ($1300) in a worker's pocket (who has just won a compensation claim, say) -- even if these two are sat next to each other at a UK Labour Party rally. To call these "contradictions" would be bizarre -- even on DM-terms. Are they 'struggling' with each other? Do they turn into one another? Does one imply the existence of the other?70

 

As we saw earlier, anyone who thought otherwise would be openly drawing attention to their own logico-linguistic naivety, if not perversity.

 

In any case, as we have also seen, there can be no literal contradiction between something that doesn't exist (i.e., the prospect of wealth under Capitalism, where this is 'meant to be' wealth for all) and something that does exist (i.e., the mixed fortunes of the people who have to endure conditions as they are).

 

Despite this, it might still be felt that the situation isn't as bad as the above makes out. The emphasis in F49 is on what Capitalism actually delivers, not on what it genuinely (or otherwise) offers. If "wealth" and "poverty" are real opposites, F49 could still serve in the way DM-theorists intend -- or, so it might seem.

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

Unfortunately, this rather desperate alternative reading diverts attention away from allegedly 'contradictory forces' onto their effects, once more. In that case, the nature of the direct relation between whatever the forces are that manage to produce these effects is still obscure, and not the least bit contradictory.

 

Nevertheless, even when consideration is given to such effects and the relation between them, a nagging question remains: just what is so contradictory about wealth and poverty existing side by side? Admittedly, to any socialist, this state of affairs is as intolerable as it is indefensible, but there still doesn't seem to be a literal contradiction involved here. True, this state of affairs may be paradoxical (but not to a Marxist); even so, the presence of one of these alleged opposites doesn't entail that an assertion that the other opposite also obtains is false, as would have to be the case if a literal contradiction were intended. They don't appear to imply one another, like the proletariat and the capitalist class supposedly do.71

 

If, on the other hand, we wish to re-define the word "contradiction" so that it becomes the equivalent of "paradox", "unjust", "something contrary to expectations", "deplorable" (and so on), all well and good. But that would merely concede the point being made in these Essays: that social reality is only 'contradictory' because of linguistic tinkering to that end, which naturally means that the claim that DM-'contradictions' haven't been imposed on the facts will have to be withdrawn. Seen in this way, DM-'contradictions' would, at best, be either figurative, or they would depend on the use of a word ("contradiction") that has been 'redefined' in order to produce the right result.72

 

Interlude Thirteen: Ordinary Language

 

Of course, someone might foolishly try to 're-define' their financial status by declaring that their bank balance of £5 ($7) was really one of £1,000,000 ($1,300,000). While this audacious ploy might make an ideal millionaire out of a fake one, it would have no material impact on their finances (except, perhaps, negatively, when they are found out).

 

Since the ordinary word "contradiction" already has a sense -- or, even a range of senses -- in everyday life, redefining it in ways that are unconnected with it/them, similarly has no physical effect on reality, no matter how ideal a temporary fix it might seem to be for one's ailing theory.

 

To be sure, and once again, it could be argued that dialecticians are at liberty to use words any which way they like, and that it isn't up to the 'thought-police' (such as the present author) to try to stop them.

 

As we saw here, DM-theorists can indeed use words as they please (not that they anyone's permission), but they can't then claim connotations for these words that wholly or partially apply to other words that already have an established use, which they then try to emulate, import, co-opt, or replace. So, they aren't at liberty to claim their use of "contradiction" is in any way connected with its ordinary use, or even with its role in FL, not without causing confusion -- but mercifully, so far, only to themselves.

 

In that case, this novel use of "contradiction" requires an explanation -- since the connections it once enjoyed with its supposed vernacular-, or FL-'twin' have long since been severed, leaving it adrift, and hence meaningless -- something that dialecticians have signally failed to provide (not that they have tried all that hard to produce one for well over a century).

 

And, that is why I have repeatedly been asking for such clarification in this Essay. [More on that in Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

However, as a matter of fact, DM-apologists aren't employing this word in any which way they please. DM-jargon has a chequered history and an equally chequered origin, which means it already possesses specific connotations, which they had no part in choosing or establishing. Just like those who use jargon associated with, say, the Christian Trinity (whose terminology, unsurprisingly, emerged from the same cess-pit of Neo-Platonic Thought that gave birth to Hegel's fantasies), dialecticians have appropriated this particular word (i.e., "contradiction") from Hermetic/Hegelian Philosophy alongside the confused ramblings of other mystics, which means that DM is in fact Mystical Christianity's direct descendant and now poor relation.

 

Dialecticians should feign no surprise, therefore, when they are accused of being covert mystics; because they can't explain what their words mean in comprehensible terms -- using the vernacular (as Marx enjoined) -- their terminology is as big a mystery to them as it is to anyone else!

 

Those who think that ordinary language is far too limited to be of any use in such contexts should read this and this, and then perhaps think again. They should also take issue with Marx himself:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world...." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

 

On the other hand, if the word "contradiction" possesses a special, DM-sense, which allows for its legitimate use in such circumstances, then DM-theorists have yet to say what that is.

 

In response, it could be argued that their use of the word "contradiction" implies opposition and/or tension. But, even though "wealth" and "poverty" are opposites in the ordinary sense, they don't seem to oppose each other in an active way, as one would expect they should if they genuinely illustrated the validity of the equation of 'contradictions' with forces. Admittedly, poverty acts as brake on development of the productive forces at certain points in history (warping the development of those who have to endure it, etc.), stoking up resentment, class hatred and (as a result) fomenting 'labour unrest'. But, over and above the influence these states of affairs have on human agents, these lifeless concepts appear to have no active connection with one another. Sure enough, the material conditions they express, or 'reflect', might indeed create tension in those who have to endure them, but none of the latter would describe what they feel by using the word "contradiction", unless, of course, a fast-talking DM-evangelist had sold them on the idea. In ordinary language the word can't be given such a meaning without altering the sense it already has.73

 

Furthermore, if this set of consequences is meant to be taken as a new gloss on F49 (by way of illustrating the alleged 'contradiction' between E1-, and E2-type events discussed earlier) then it, too, reduces to the claim that it is the effects of effects that are 'contradictory', and not the original effects themselves. Down this road there lies, I fear, yet another "bad infinity" --, which ends "who knows where?"

 

F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.

 

The second difficulty with this reading is that although wealth and poverty are genuine opposites (again, in the ordinary sense), they don't appear to be classic examples of dialectical-UOs (even if we knew what they were!). To be sure, under Capitalism the wealth of one class is connected with the poverty of others, but this is a familiar causal connection. They aren't internally-, or logically-related, despite claims to the contrary. That this is so can be seen from that fact that were this not the case, we would find we couldn't agree (with Engels) that under Capitalism poverty exists "where it need not be".

 

If there were a 'dialectical' (or "internal") "unity in difference" connecting poverty and wealth (like that which dialecticians allege between, say, the north and south poles of a magnet, or that between capitalist and worker (as classes)), then we couldn't argue that socialism will eliminate one at the same time as abolishing the other. But, the whole point of a socialist society is that all should become as wealthy as the productive forces will allow. If there were a logical link between these two states (poverty and wealth) then they would be inseparable in all modes of production and we would have to temper our slogans somewhat. We might then have to point out that in eradicating poverty, workers would be eradicating wealth, too. That we do not so argue -- we actually claim the opposite that socialism can produce wealth for all -- indicates that the relation between wealth and poverty isn't a logical (or internal) connection, but causal.

 

Of course, it could be argued that there is an internal/logical link between "wealth and poverty under capitalism". The above treats these terms abstractly. That objection will be dealt with below.74

 

A genuine example of an "internal relation" might help here: if the Prime Meridian at Greenwich were to be abolished, the whole system of longitudes would automatically go with it. Moreover, anyone employing this system correctly is able to derive conclusions about where they are on the planet in relation to the Prime Meridian. Where they are in terms of their latitude is therefore 'internally related' to that Meridian by a series of inferences based on a set of measurements and conventions established by international agreement. Of course, these days this is all done automatically, and has been greatly augmented by GPS guidance systems. But the point is still valid. This isn't at all like the elimination of poverty. Poverty will be eradicated not by destroying wealth, but by extending wealth production and establishing equitable forms of distribution -- and, of course, by abolishing class division (etc.).

 

It could be argued here that this misconstrues the nature of the link between poverty and wealth under Capitalism, turning it into something abstract that supposedly exists between two unchanging concepts. Contrary to this, dialecticians hold that wealth and poverty are dialectically linked --, and not just to each other. They are related to, and are constituted by, the Mode of Production in which they both exist. Hence, under Capitalism, wealth can't exist without the creation of poverty. To eradicate the latter, Capitalism must be abolished. In a fully socialist society, the present connection between wealth and poverty would vanish.

 

However, the link between wealth and poverty is still causal (wealth creates poverty under capitalism, and it does so for well-known historical, economic and social reasons); dressing these up in pseudo-logical/'dialectical' finery can't change that fact -- even if it does succeed in mystifying something that has clear social and material roots.

 

But, even if that weren't so, none of it makes sense in DM-terms, since wealth and poverty don't "struggle" with one another, nor do they change into each other, which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

The basic problem here, of course, revolves around the anthropomorphism implicit in the idea that concepts can enter into struggle with one another. This mystification appears as part of the belief that because wealth and poverty are opposites they are actively oppositional and cause or initiate struggle, in and of themselves. On this account, it is the opposite/oppositional nature of concepts that creates or induces struggle -- whereas in reality it is clearly material conditions that cause it. Only by confusing a causal with a conceptual connection can DM even seem to gain some purchase -- that is, if this is what dialecticians mean here. But, as we have seen, this entire thesis is just one more consequence of the RRT and LIE (both defined in Essay Twelve -- this was also a conclusion reached in Part One of this Essay).75

 

It could be objected that DM-theorists don't disagree with this, even though they maintain that these material forces are "dialectically inter-linked". Hence, no dialectician of any sophistication thinks that concepts can, of themselves, cause, change, or initiate struggle, only that the material roots of struggle are mediated by the ideas people form of their circumstances and the contradictory interests these generate.

 

Worded differently, this wouldn't be inconsistent with anything written in these Essays, since it involves concepts drawn from HM.

 

Nevertheless, if the above is meant to illustrate the real meaning of F50, then we would once more have an example of the effects of the effects being used to illustrate the action of a force or set of forces. That impasse was criticised at length earlier.

 

F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.

 

However, dialecticians might object to the accusation that they believe that concepts enter into conflict with one another; they would surely point out this is vaguely how Hegel might have things (if it is worded more carefully). By way of contrast, they emphasise the fact that it is real people, and real forces in the material world that enter into conflict.

 

But, when the language dialecticians use is examined, the allegation that dialecticians anthropomorphise nature and society by projecting human qualities onto both of these forces itself upon us (no pun intended). [On this see Interlude Thirteen.]

 

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]

 

The animated contrast that is imagined to exist between dead concepts like these seems plausible only because they are viewed as the idealised equivalents of the real relations between human beings, reified in an inappropriate metaphysical or linguistic form. Human beings give life to the concepts they use, but under circumstances not always of their own choosing, and they do so as a result of their practical activity modified and shaped by ambient class and social relations. The reverse doesn't take place. 'Concepts' don't give life to human relations, although their use by human agents can affect the roles they play or assume in everyday life. They certainly modify the ideas that individuals from antagonistic classes form of their own material interests, etc. Unless we suppose concepts are agents in their own right (in a sort of inverted Hegelian form, whereby they perhaps walk the earth in place of human beings), they can't 'reflect' things that human beings haven't already sanctioned for them as a result of their own social relations (and by means of the above constraining factors). History is, after all, the result of the class war, not a consequence of the struggle between concepts.

 

[DM-supporters might be tempted to argue that the above is a travesty of  their theory; no Marxist dialectician believes that concepts enter into struggle with one another. I have already tackled that objection above.]

 

As should seem obvious, these comments are based on theoretical considerations drawn from HM, but this is precisely where that scientific theory can provide the interpretative sophistication which DM and 'Materialist Dialectics' obscure and then invert in an idealised or fetishised form.76

 

This shows, once again, that the inversion DM-theorists say they have inflicted on Hegel was, at best, merely formal, at worst, illusory.

 

In which case, it seems their theory can only 'work' in an Ideal or Mystical 'universe'.

 

Nevertheless, it could be objected once more that the above assertions are unfair because it was in fact dialecticians who first pointed out that FL uses lifeless and dead concepts, as a result of which it can't explain change.

 

[FL = Formal Logic; DL = Dialectical Logic; HM = Historical Materialism.]

 

However, the unwelcome truth is that it is DM-theorists who employ concepts that come to life only when they are anthropomorphised and are viewed as the abstract expression of conflict (i.e., in effect, these are the fetishised analogues of social forms, as we have seen -- for example, in Interlude Thirteen). This is revealed, for example, by their profligate use of words like "contradiction" and "negation" in connection with natural processes, and now in relation to social change (on this, see Interlude Ten).

 

In contrast, the rejection of this fetishistic approach re-humanises concepts -- but only in relation to social development and interaction -- by revealing them for what they are: the conditioned products of social relations among human beings. So, in HM, in place of the fetishised theories we find in DM, we have concepts enlivened by human practice, expressed in the material language of ordinary life (indeed, as Marx enjoined). In this way, it is possible for our description and analysis of the social world to become fully humanised -- a small but important step in the fight to make it fully human.

 

Once again, if this is regarded as unfair or inaccurate, the reader is referred back to:

 

(i) Essay Three Part One (for example, here and here), where the archaic linguistic moves underlying this pernicious form of Idealism were unmasked;

 

(ii) Essay Three Part Two, where the roots of this abstract approach to theory were traced back to traditional ruling-class and Idealist forms-of-thought;

 

(iii) Essay Two, where the dogmatic and Idealist nature of DM was exposed;

 

(iv) Essay Four, where the anthropomorphic nature of DL was laid bare;

 

(v) Essay Five, where the confused nature of the language Engels used (to depict motion) was debunked;

 

(vi) Essay Seven, where it was shown that the 'Three Laws of Dialectics' were based on a fetishised view of discourse, compounded by an unhealthy dose of Mickey Mouse Science;

 

(vii) Essay Eight Part One, where further aspects of this anthropomorphic doctrine were uncovered;

 

(viii) Earlier sections of this Essay, where the application to nature of Hegelian concepts was shown to be openly animistic; and,

 

(ix) Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here), where these sordid details are traced back to ancient, ruling-class dogmas that no self-respecting socialist or materialist should want to touch with someone else's bargepole.

 

Indeed, it has been a unifying theme of all the Essays posted at this site that the application to nature of concepts drawn from Hermetic Philosophy has branded DM as an irredeemably Mystical and Idealist theory, and, further, that this has only succeeded in compromising the scientific status of HM. Anyone who still takes exception to the claim that dialecticians use animistic notions drawn from Hermetic Philosophy (where conflict is re-configured in linguistic terms, and then projected back onto nature and society) should feign no surprise when that is where this sorry tale has in fact been heading all along.

 

The solution is, therefore, for recalcitrant comrades to stop complaining, and point their fingers in the right direction: at the DM-classicists who imported these "ruling ideas" (upside down or 'the right way up') into Marxism.

 

Interlude Fourteen: Contradictions In Das Kapital?

 

[This used to form part of Note 70.]

 

However, Scott Meikle makes a valiant attempt to argue that some sort of sense can be made of the idea that there are indeed 'dialectical contradictions', for example, in capitalism. His case revolves around a short and relatively clear account of the alleged 'contradiction' between use-value and exchange-value -- or more pointedly, between the "relative form" and the "equivalent form" of value -- in Volume One, Chapter One, of Das Kapital.

 

Now, I don't want to enter into whether or not Meikle's interpretation of Marx is accurate; my concern here is whether he can explain how and why the relation between the relative and the equivalent form of value is indeed an example of a 'dialectical contradiction'. Moreover, since Meikle's comments are typical of the way that many Dialectical Marxists use language in this area -- and, indeed, how they conceptualise 'contradictions' supposedly at work in HM (this is especially true of theorists belonging to the HCD-tendency) --, an examination of his argument will help illustrate where many of them descend into a irredeemable confusion.

 

[Of course, in what follows I am well aware that many will take issue over Meikle's specific interpretation of Marx, or with some of the more detailed points he raises -- or even with his entire approach. I will, however, be looking at the work of others who have tried to make sense of a 'dialectical' interpretation of Das Kapital (with "dialectical" understood, not in its classical, but in its post-Hegelian sense) in a later re-write of this Essay. Until then, readers are redirected to the discussions here and here.]

 

This is how Meikle initially approaches the topic:

 

"All the contradictions of capitalist commodity-production have at their heart the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value. Marx reveals this contradiction to lie at the heart of the commodity-form as such, even in its simplest and most primitive form....

 

"The simple form of value itself contains the polar opposition between, and the union of, use-value and exchange-value.... [Marx writes that] 'the relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.' Concerning the first he observes that the value of linen can't be expressed in linen; 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is not an expression of value. 'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'

 

"This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Meikle (1979), pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original.]76a

 

But, what evidence (or argument) is there to show that these are "polar opposites", let alone that they are 'dialectically-united'? Or, indeed, that there is a distinction here with a difference? And, why call this a "contradiction"? However, like so many others, Meikle neglected to say; he was nevertheless happy to help himself to the use of this word.

 

[There is, however, a relatively clear attempt to justify its use in Heilbroner (1980), pp.29-58, but more specifically, pp.41-42). I have examined Heilbroner's interpretation, below. Readers should note that I am not questioning Marx's use of non-dialectical terms, such as "relative form" and "equivalent form" [RF and EF, henceforth]. I have also discussed his use of the word "contradiction" here.]

 

Nevertheless, as we will see in Essay Eight Part Three, this way of talking is based solely on Hegel's egregious misconstrual of the 'negative form' of the LOI as equivalent to the LOC. In that case, what has Meikle got to offer the bemused reader that stands some chance, any chance, of filling the gaping hole Hegel left behind in his misbegotten 'theory'?

 

Apparently, only this:

 

"Marx's absolutely fundamental (Hegelian) idea [is] that the two poles united in an opposition necessitate one another ('belong to and mutually condition each other')...." [Ibid., p.19.]

 

But, what precisely is the source of this necessitation? Well, after a brief discussion of Quine's ill-considered views concerning logical 'necessity' (which, it is worth pointing out, confuse logical 'necessity' with extremely well-confirmed empirical veracity -- but, the inference between these two 'concepts' -- RF and EF -- is apparently immune from this reduction, since that inference itself can hardly be a well confirmed empirical truth -- Quine only just having dreamt it up a few generations ago, and on which few if any scientists have done any work).

 

Be this as it may, Meikle rejects the idea that the source of 'necessity' can be found in logic as such:

 

"So, 'logical necessity' does not promise to account for the necessity that unites opposites within a contradiction. The unity of use-value and exchange-value within the commodity is certainly not something which, despite all necessitation between the two poles, may be abrogated (on Quine's conventionalist account). Not, that is, without 'abrogating' the commodity itself; for the commodity is precisely the unity of use-value and exchange-value. Use-value can exist alone. But exchange-value can't; it presupposes use-value because only what has use-value can have exchange-value. What has exchange-value, a commodity, is, thus, necessarily use-value and exchange-value brought into a unity. The commodity-form of the product of labour has as its essence the unity of the two. That is what it is. Their conjunction or unity constitutes its essence." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

However, Meikle has just admitted that "Use value can exist alone". But that just means this can't be a dialectical concept. Unlike the paradigmatic 'dialectical relation' between the proletariat and the capitalist class, neither of  which can't exist alone and both of which imply one another (so we are told), here we have use value which can. In what way is the relation between use value and exchange value 'dialectical' if one of these (use value) can exist without the other, and hence one of which (use value) does not imply to other?

 

But, can't an exchange value also exist where there is no use value at all? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange value but many don't have a use value. Same with most works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins). And can't criminals exchange useless items in order to launder money? [I have raised these and similar objections in more detail, here. Readers are invited to see how DM-fans disagree with each other and flounder in their attempt to respond to me on this topic. Added on Edit: I have decided to add a few sections of that 'debate' to Appendix C.]

 

However, even if Meikle were 100% correct, why isn't this just a de dicto (that is, merely a verbal) necessity?

 

Not so fast, RL! Meikle had that particular base covered:

 

"Use-value and exchange-value are, therefore, not 'merely' abstractions arrived at in thought about reality; they are constituents of reality in partaking in the essence of the commodity. And the opposition or contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the original. Bold emphasis added.]

 

But, whatever else is true of these value-forms, how can they 'contradict' one another if they can't co-exist -- i.e., if they can't "act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value"?

 

As we saw earlier:

 

"'The value of linen can therefore only be expressed relatively, that is in another commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen therefore presupposes that some other commodity confronts it in the equivalent form.' Concerning the second: 'on the other hand, this other commodity which figures as the equivalent, can't simultaneously be in the relative form of value.... The same commodity can't, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites.'

 

"This polar opposition within the simple form is an 'internal opposition' which as yet remains hidden within the individual commodity in its simple form: 'The internal opposition between use-value and exchange-value, hidden within the commodity, is therefore represented on the surface by an external opposition,' that is the relation between two commodities such that one (the equivalent form) counts only as a use-value, while the other (the relative form) counts only as an exchange-value. 'Hence, the simple form of value of the commodity is the simple form of the opposition between use-value and value which is contained in the commodity.'" [Ibid., pp.16-17. Italic emphases in the original. Bold added.]

 

In fact, this is what Marx actually wrote:

 

"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.

"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]
 

[I have dealt with what Marx said about elliptical motion earlier in this Essay, taking into account a recent article by Tom Weston -- on that, see here, here, here, here, here, and here. I have also criticised the "mutually exclusive" criterion below. I will be tackling Weston's claim that this passage can be recruited to support the belief that Marx accepted the idea that there is a 'dialectic in nature', in a future re-write of Essay Seven Part One.]

 

If these items "mutually exclude" one another, how can they both exist at the same time? On the other hand, if both do in fact co-exist, so that they can indeed 'contradict' one another, how can one of them "exclude" the other?

 

[We have already seen this insurmountable barrier stand in the way of earlier attempts to comprehend what 'dialectical contradictions' are and how they are supposed to work.]

 

Of course, it could be argued that the concept of one of these forms both implies and excludes that of the other, perhaps by definition. If so, we seem to have a de dicto, not a de re, necessity, here, after all. And if this is merely a verbal necessity, how can it have any effect on the economy?

 

[The second of the above two links provides a much clearer explanation of the distinction between these two forms of necessity than the first.]

 

Otherwise, this would be a real exclusion (and not merely verbal), so the two halves couldn't co-exist (indeed, as Marx clearly indicated, above). Consider a different example: the class of proletarians and capitalists mutually condition and exclude one another, but one can't exist without other, so we are told. However, this sense of "exclude" isn't one of opposition (even though it can and does lead to opposition), which is what is required. This use of "exclude" here means that no member of one class can belong to the other class; that is, there is no one who is a member of both classes at the same time. [This alleged 'contradiction' will be examined in a future re-write of Essay Eleven Part Two.] Once more, this sort of exclusion doesn't imply opposition. In order to derive that conclusion more is need than mere exclusion. After all, if an organism is a tulip, that excludes it from being an elephant. But does that imply opposition? Or conflict? Hardly.

 

To be sure, this introduces issues connected with Kant's concept of "real negation", later rendered completely obscure by Hegel's use of the term, "determinate negation". However, we have already seen that Hegel dropped the ball on this one, so his ideas are no help at all. In addition, I have dealt with Kant's rather confused ideas on this topic in Appendix A. [I will return to consider "real exclusion" when I examine Heilbroner's arguments later on in this Essay.]

 

Even so, this isn't the case with commodities, where the same item's category can and must appear in each class, as relative form of value and as equivalent form of value -- but apparently not at the same time. [That is, they are both forms of value, whether or not they co-exist.]

 

"'[T]he relative form of value and the equivalent form are two inseparable moments, which belong to and mutually condition each other...but at the same time they are mutually exclusive and opposed extremes.'" [Meikle (1979), p.17.]

 

"...the opposition or contradiction between the two poles is a constituent of reality also, (although in the simple commodity or value-form it appears only primitively in the fact that the same commodity can't act simultaneously as relative and as equivalent form of value)." [Ibid., p.22. Italic emphasis in the original. Bold emphasis added.]

 

So, this is the implication of the phrase "mutually exclude" applied in the present case -- otherwise it doesn't appear to do any work. "Mutually exclude" here means "can't co-exist" -- not merely "must be from different categories or sets" -- unlike capitalist and worker who have to co-exist, so we are told.

 

[Marx is quite clear: "A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms." So, they can't co-exist.]

 

Once again, if the EF and the RF can't co-exist, how can they 'contradict' one another? Meikle failed to say.

 

[And, as far as can be determined, no one else has been able to say, either -- and I have asked this of several comrades, including one prominent Marxist Professor of Economics (as noted earlier), who, in an e-mail response told me to "Eat sh*t and die!" Or, failing that, "Drink some hemlock" for even thinking to pose such blasphemous questions!]

 

Meikle has either failed to notice this serious flaw in his theory, or he thinks the answer is obvious. It isn't.

 

Putting this 'difficulty' to one side for now, why is this particular 'necessity' not merely the result of a determination to use the relevant words in certain ways? Why is this not simply a de dicto necessity?

 

[In fact, it is a bit rich of Meikle to employ ideas drawn from Quine to criticise logical necessity, when the latter would have taken an even dimmer view of de re (real world) necessities himself. (On Quine's ideas, see the references listed here).]

 

Of course, this has become a hot topic ever since Saul Kripke upset the de dicto apple cart a generation or so ago. [Kripke (1977, 1980).] Hence, it is no surprise to see Meikle appeal to Kripke's work to buttress the argument that these aren't merely de dicto, but are also de re, necessities.

 

Unfortunately, Kripke's arguments aren't quite as sound as Meikle seems to think. [On this see, Dupré (1993), Ebersole (1982), Hallett (1991), and Hanna and Harrison (2004), pp.278-88. See also this entertaining article by Jerry Fodor: Fodor (2004). More on this in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published, sometime in 2022.]

 

Nevertheless, in support, Meikle draws attention to a (by now) hackneyed series of examples:

 

"The commodity is the unity of use-value and exchange-value, in precisely the same way that water is H2O, that light is a stream of photons, and that Gold is the element with atomic number 79. All these statements are necessarily true. They state truths that are true of necessity, not in virtue of any logical or 'conceptual' connexions, but in virtue of the essences or real natures of the entities in question. Water is necessarily H2O. Anything that is not H2O can't be water..., and the 'can't' is ontological not epistemic.... We did not always know this, of course; it was a discovery people made about the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical development requires it)." [Ibid., pp.22-23. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

The Gold example isn't too clever, either, since its Atomic Number depends on our counting system (and on the number of protons and electrons the element possesses -- but Gold has many different isotopes and thus has variable numbers of neutrons). So why isn't this 'necessity' simply de dicto? It could be argued that the Atomic Number of an element defines it as a natural kind -- in this case, Gold has Atomic Number 79. Once again, Gold has at least 19 isotopes (18 of which are radioisotopes, one is stable), so, unless we are prepared to classify all 19 of these isotopes (all of which have different properties) as part of the same natural kind, an appeal to the Atomic Number is of little use.

 

It could be argued in response that all and only Gold atoms have an Atomic Number 79. In that case, we might just as well include, say, all vertebrates in the same natural kind on the grounds that all and only vertebrates have vertebra. Moreover, as with all the other elements, Gold doesn't exist anywhere in an absolutely pure state (appearing in all cases in ionic form (see below), with various 'impurities'), but that doesn't stop us calling it "Gold". Hence, there are substances that even scientists call "gold", which don't exclusively have an Atomic Number 79, samples of which contain other atoms with a different Atomic Number.

 

Of course, this won't stop determined necessitarians from insisting that an Atomic Number 79 defines a natural kind; the only problem is that this 'natural kind' appears nowhere in nature, so far as we know. It is only in the abstract world of Traditional Philosophy that Gold is Absolutely Pure Gold. And, if it doesn't exist in nature, it can hardly be a natural kind, can it?

 

The 'light' example isn't too convincing, either, since there are scientists who question the existence of photons; they could hardly do that if light was necessarily a de re, or even a de dicto, stream of photons. And, of course, light is also a wave (so we are told), hence it isn't true that light is a stream of photons.

 

[However, there are other, far more serious problems defining theoretical objects -- like photons, electrons and protons -- than this. They will be explored in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

The water example is even worse, since water isn't even contingently H2O! Hydrogen bonding means its structure is far more complex. Indeed, because both Hydrogen and Oxygen have several isotopes (Hydrogen, for example, exists as Deuterium and Tritium, and there are three stable isotopes of Oxygen) not even these elements are "natural kinds". Furthermore, just like Gold, no elemental atom of Hydrogen actually appears in its atomic form; Hydrogen atoms invariably exist in ionic form, so far as we know.

 

The idea (that Kripke and Putnam advanced) is that the word "water", for example, "rigidly designates" H2O, even though most people who have ever lived have been totally unaware of this supposed fact. However, as a result of the above considerations (and those outlined below) not even chemists are referring to H2O when they use the word "water"; because of the aforementioned isotopes and hydrogen bonding, they tell us water is H2nOn, or  D20, D4O2, D6O3,..., D2nOn, etc. ["D" is the abbreviation for "Deuterium".]

 

Moreover,

 

(i) Because of impurities and ionisation (etc.), pure water (as H2O) is nowhere to be found on earth, or anywhere else for that matter;

 

(ii) Much that isn't water is also H2nOn, etc. -- for instance, ice, steam, and what comes out of your tap, or the liquid in that bottle of water you just bought at the store (it contains impurities, atoms that aren't hydrogen or oxygen, or which are compounds of other elements). Moreover, the liquid that fills most lakes, seas and oceans is also water, but it most certainly isn't H2O, and,

 

(iii) A molecule of 'H2O' possesses none of the physical properties of water: it isn't a liquid, it doesn't boil at 100oC, it doesn't have a density of 0.99707, it exerts no surface tension, it can't extinguish fires, wash clothes, or quench a single thirst. So, a lone molecule of H2O isn't water in any sense of the term. Hence, not only does the word "water" not refer to H2O, it can't refer to that molecule!

 

It could be argued that Kripke merely claimed that the following is the case:

 

K1: If water is H2O, then water is necessarily H2O.

 

However, K1 could be true even if its antecedent were false -- and we already know it is false. [Just as, "If 2 is odd, then 2+2 is necessarily odd" is true even though the antecedent is false.]

 

But, despite Kripke, even if this weren't the case, why isn't this just a de dicto necessity?

 

[On that and other serious difficulties confronting Essentialism, see VandeWall (2006). See also van Brakel (2000), and Hacker (2007), pp.29-56.]

 

It could be argued that Meikle had that base covered, too, for he added:

 

"[I]t was a discovery people made about the essence of water (and one which may need to be recast if future theoretical development requires it)." [Ibid.]

 

But, if such things can be revised, that just makes them epistemic truths and not the least bit essential, or de re, 'ontological'. [And, as we have just seen, there is in fact no "essence" of water!]

 

However, let us assume for the moment that these 'difficulties' can be ironed out in some way, somehow -- although, in Essay Thirteen Part Two we will see that that isn't the case. There it will be shown that contemporary Essentialism is a confused dead end, at best.

 

[In addition, Essentialism also faces the serious objections I have raised against all forms of 'Ontology' in Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

So, again, even if we assume the above 'problems' can be cleared up in some way, Meikle's account faces further difficulties -- not the least of which is the fact that the sort of essentialism he lionises depends on Possible World Semantics [PWS] in order to work. To be sure, Meikle attempted to down-play this untoward implication (pp.23-25), but in so doing he only succeeded in undermining the case he had just constructed for accepting this brand of essentialism, in the first place. That is because PWS turns de re necessities into super-duper empirical, extensional truths, and, as a result, each putative de re 'essence' simply de sappears.

 

That fatal defect will also be put to one side (for the present).

 

[However, readers should consult this paper, which outlines several serious objections to modern-day Essentialism -- but, it comes with a health warning attached: its author then proceeds to defend an Aristotelian version of the same doctrine!]

 

In addition, I won't be asking (here) other awkward questions about the precise origin of 'natural necessities' like this, or how they can possibly cause change, but the following passage (taken from Part One) will give the reader some idea of how it will be tackled later:

 

A passage from Baker and Hacker (1988) underlines the futility of this aristocratic approach to knowledge (although they don't use that particular word, and are not making any political points) -- which, incidentally, also reveals why dialecticians (like Rees and the others quoted here) have become fixated on a futile search for a metaphysical (and thus ultimately rational) "why" of things:

 

"Empirical, contingent truths have always struck philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained…. Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere, e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in quantum mechanics today. One feature that explains philosophers' fascination with truths of Reason is that they seem, in a deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential relations of Simple Natures; mathematical truths are apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build upon them mythological structures.

 

"We think of necessary propositions as being true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as the truth-functions or (in Frege's case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics. So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a supra-empirical domain (a 'third realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however these authors record this erroneously as p.139 -- RL] or the 'mineralogy of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g., Pascal, admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal. Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again, these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41 -- RL]. Logic seems to investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….

 

"In our eagerness to ensure the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent 'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell (1937), p.xv (this links to a PDF); again these authors record this erroneously as p.v; although in the edition to which I have linked, it is p.xliii -- RL], then the mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of physical theorising, such as Planck's constant." [Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original have been altered to conform with those adopted at this site.]

 

As should be clear from all that has gone before, DM-theorists have bought into this view of 'necessary truths' (even if few of them use that particular phrase -- although Lenin and Dietzgen seem to have been rather fond of it; more on that in a later Essay).

 

For example, dialecticians in general locate the cause of change in the relation they believe holds between internally-linked opposite (logical?) properties of objects and processes. But, why this should cause change is left entirely unexamined. Indeed, it is left as a brute fact, as the above passage suggests it always must remain -- in which case, it is just a fact about the world that 'contradictions' cause change. No further explanation is necessary.

 

In reality, this account of change is plainly a consequence of a certain way of describing things (and in a fetishised way, into the bargain), as we will discover in Essay Twelve Part One.

 

[I have explained the term 'brute fact', here.]

 

Nevertheless, as we have already seen, there is no reason why contradictory states of affairs should cause change any more than there is a reason to suppose that non-contradictory states should. Both of these options rely on descriptions of the presumed, or even imposed, relations between objects and processes (but not on evidence since (i) no further explanation is possible and (ii) it isn't possible to verify or confirm their existence); they supposedly capture or picture processes in nature that are held capable of making other objects or processes change or 'develop'. Again, how and why they are able to do this is left as a brute fact.

 

Even an appeal to 'contradictory forces' -- in order to explain why things change -- merely involves yet more objects and processes, more brute facts, none of which adds anything to the 'necessitation' that such an account promised, and now requires. In the end, these forces depend on certain descriptions of them being translated into the vocabulary of QM (or some other branch of Physics), and hence into another set propositions expressing yet more brute facts. When asked why forces must do what they do (or even why a Field, say, is capable of making anything move) the only response possible is: "They just do.... It's just a fact about forces/fields/...". Indeed, as should seem plain, Differential Equations, Hamiltonians, Matrices and the Kronecker Delta can't actually move anything about the place, or even deflect a single particle from its path.

 

Moreover, the infinite regress (or even a "bad infinity") dialecticians hoped to avoid by appealing to 'internal contradictions' now simply reappears elsewhere in their theory. When it is fleshed-out, DM just relates objects and processes to yet more objects and processes (or, to be more honest, yet more words about objects and processes), as well as to 'negations', 'opposites', and 'interpenetrations', and the like (i.e., yet more "brute facts", either about the world, or about how human beings are supposed (by dialecticians) to think and talk), 'internal' to other objects and processes.

 

In all this, the necessitation that had originally been sought simply vanishes in an impenetrable mist of jargon (which leads "who knows where?"). In this regard, the logical, or 'rational', foundation for knowledge constructed by DM-advocates turns out to be no different in form from any concocted by Traditional Metaphysicians. In place of the reasons we were promised (i.e., the "why and the how" of things), all we find are yet more DM-objects and processes (or, again, yet more words about what they think are objects and processes) -- except, these have now been shunted off into a mysterious, 'abstract' realm, fluffed-up with a handful of vague terms-of-art (like, "mediation", "unity in difference", "internally related", "thing-in-itself"), of convenient and permanent obscurity, all of which possess impressive Idealist credentials.

 

While DM-theorists promised the world a brand new set of explanations, all they delivered was a batch of shop-soiled goods imported from Traditional Philosophy, comprised almost entirely of jargonised expressions, masking the 'brute facts' hidden beneath, indeed, as Lenin himself acknowledged:

 

"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.

 

"The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

Despite this, how does Meikle address the problem of change? Indeed, how does he introduce opposition?

 

"The poles of an opposition are not just united. They also repel one another. They are brought together in a unity, but within that unity they are in tension. The real historical existence of the product of labour in the commodity-form provides an analogue of the centripetal force that contains the centrifugal forces of the mutual repulsion of use-value and exchange-value within it." [Meikle (1979), p.26.]

 

Well, the first point is that opposition here is simply asserted, it isn't derived logically or conceptually. In which case, this appears to be just another brute fact and not the least bit necessary, as we had been led to believe.

 

Unfortunately, there are so many metaphors in the above passage it isn't easy to make much sense of it. Anyway, it is reasonably clear that Meikle has reified the products of social relations (e.g., use-, and exchange-value, etc.), and in this reified state they have become the actual agents, with human beings (or, perhaps, even commodities themselves) the patients. How else are we to understand the word "repel", here? Do they actually repel each other (like magnets, or electrical charges)? Or, do we do this 'repelling' because of the way we manufacture use values and then exchange them?

 

And do these "opposites" show any sign of turning into one another? Does use value struggle with and then change into exchange value -- as the DM-classics assure us they must?

 

[Incidentally, I am using the word "patient" here in its older sense; that is, it relates to that which is acted upon, not that which acts.]

 

Independently of this, it is worth asking: How can the forms that underpin use-, and exchange-value (EF and RF) provide an analogue of the forces Meikle requires? If forces are to act on other forces, or on other bodies, they need to fulfil a handful of crucial conditions first, the most important of which is that they should at least have the decency to exist. But, as we have seen, these two forms can't co-exist. So, other than conceptually, how can they possibly repel -- or provide the wherewithal for other objects and processes to repel -- anything?

 

That is, of course, the non-dialectical rock upon which we have seen all such Idealist speculations founder.

 

It could be argued that these 'repulsions' occur in our thought about the simple commodity form. But, even there, they can't co-exist, for if they could, they wouldn't "mutually exclude" one another! On the other hand, if they do genuinely "exclude" one another, we can't even think of them acting on one another, for if we were so to think of them both at once, we would, of necessity, be misconceiving them.

 

Or, are we supposed to imagine there is some sort of wrestling match taking place in our heads, such that, when we think of the one it elbows out of the way (out of existence?) the other? Perhaps then, depending on circumstances, we could declare EF the winner over RF by two falls to a submission (UK rules)?

 

 

Figure Nine: EF Slam Dunks RF

In A Skull Near You

 

Furthermore, even if in thought they could exist together, that would be of little help since it makes a mockery of Meikle's appeal to de re necessities. This retreat into the Ideal leaves him with two seriously undernourished de dicto 'skeletons' shadow boxing each other instead of the robust de re 'pugilists' we had all along been promised.

 

Of course, it could be objected that the fact that something is an RF excludes it from being an EF. That is where the opposition arises; the one is the opposite of the other.

 

But, "opposite" isn't the same as "oppositional", as we have already seen.

 

Despite this, it could be maintained that these are opposite poles of the same kind -- that is they both qualify the commodity form. But, "commodity" isn't a specific term (unlike "domestic cat", which is species specific), it is generic (that is, it is a general term applying to many different kinds of use values).

 

And we have also seen that if an organism is a tulip, that excludes it from being an elephant without implying opposition; and "organism" is a generic term, too.

 

So, we still lack a derivation of opposition from exclusion; the assertion that the former implies the latter clearly isn't enough.

 

Is there a way out of this Dialectical Quagmire? Meikle thinks there is:

 

"But in its simple form, the commodity is an unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities, or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Ibid., p.26.]

 

It now seems that metaphor is all Meikle has to offer his bemused readers in support of his attempt to make this mysterious process comprehensible. And, it is quite clear where all this reification has landed him: the commodity itself invented money, not human beings! Or, perhaps even: the commodity form mesmerised human beings into inventing money.

 

Once again, if that were the case, we would be the patients, while those metaphorical beings (i.e., these disembodied 'commodities') are the real agents of social change!

 

In which case, given this approach, the Ideal constitutes the Real, just as Idealists have all along maintained.

 

How else are we to understand the above passage?

 

[There is a faint echo here of Leibniz's "monads" (which he regarded as a logical extension to Aristotle's concept of substance (ousia) -- on that see here, here, here, and here). We may think we control some objects and the events they cause (or in which they find themselves embroiled --, or even the bodies with which they interact), but they in fact control themselves since they are self-motivated, self-propelled beings, miniature intelligences whose 'necessities' follow from the fact that they 'contain' every predicate that is, has been, or ever will be true of them. So, while we might think that commodities have value (exchange-, and/or use-value), because of the relationship they have to human activity, in reality they possess an intrinsic value which force us to employ them in the way we end up doing. In this case, it seems they coerced or bamboozled our ancestors into inventing money! As we will soon see, that interpretation of Meikle's theory isn't as crazy as might at first sight seem.]

 

Is there any way of re-configuring this theory so it can be rescued from the shredder before the switch is thrown? Well, Meikle turns to Aristotle for assistance; but before he does that he (in effect) concedes the truth of the above observation, for it seems that these value forms do indeed force us humans to do their bidding:

 

"This line of development is not accidental or fortuitous; it is not a process of aggregating contingent and extraneous additions. It is, rather, process of development of the potentialities within, and the increasing differentiation of, an original whole. If history does not block the growth of exchange activity, then that growth will find out the inadequacy of the simple form of value. Then, looked at from the point of view of efficient causation, those engaged in that activity, being rational and inventive in the face of the problems thrown up by their developing class interests, will act so as to solve their practical difficulties by measures that overcome that insufficiency to the requirements of their developing commerce. The solution to their practical problems is the money-form." [Ibid., pp.26-27.]

 

Now, this either means that:

 

(i) Those involved in the invention of money were hapless puppets of these (pre-existing) value forms, or,

 

(ii) They had a clear understanding of the nature of use-, and exchange-value -- which must at least have been equal to Marx's, but more than two-and-a-half thousand years before he was born --, so that they could make the 'correct' set of rational choices in such circumstances.

 

Otherwise, how could these value forms exercise any sort of causal influence on those who invented money? As we have already seen:

 

"But in its simple form, the commodity is an unstable equilibrium. It is pregnant with possibilities, which history may present either with the conditions for the realisation of these possibilities, or with the indefinite variety of conditions that will frustrate their realisation. Given the right conditions, the embryo will develop its potentiality; and the simple form of value will undergo the metamorphoses that will take the commodity from its embryo through infancy to early adolescence with the attainment of the universal form of value, money." [Ibid., p.26.]

 

But, doesn't this pantomime make dangerous concessions to teleology, to final causation?

 

No problem; Meikle tackles that unexpected difficulty head-on:

 

"Looked at from the point of view of final causation, money is the final cause of this phase of social development. This is not to say that final causation is a form of efficient causation in which the future acts on the past, such that the developed form beckons from the future to the past less developed form; rather, the embryonic entity has a structure that develops, if it develops, along a certain line. Thus, final causation and efficient causation, here, are not mutually exclusive but mutually supportive: the one explaining the emergence of the other, and the other the success and development of the one. What we have here is a development that, barring accidents, will take its course -- an evolution that is necessary; its final form immanent as a potentiality within its original one." [Ibid., p.27.]

 

Fine words, but merely asserting that final and efficient causes are "mutually supportive" won't cut mustard. How is it possible for "the future [to act] on the past"? Meikle resolves this conundrum by telling us that "the embryonic entity has a structure that develops, if it develops, along a certain line".

 

And yet, this solves nothing, for, as we saw earlier, it seems to mean that some sort of plan or program must have been written into these value forms that 'determined' how they should --, indeed, must -- develop, rather like a fertilised seed or egg has a genetic code that (we are told) does likewise -- which suspicion has only been prompted by Meikle's frequent use of embryonic language.

 

[That, of course, implicates this view of social development with other, well known ancient and mystical ideas connected with belief in the Cosmic or Orphic Egg (a topic briefly mentioned in Part One of this Essay, and again in Essay Eleven Parts One and Two, but more fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary here)). And, as we will see in a later re-write of Essay Eight Part Three, this represents an anthropomorphic (Leibnizian or Hegelian) view of development, and is, of course, part of the reason why DM itself is inherently teleological.]

 

But, perhaps this is once again being a little too hasty, for Meikle now introduces the aforementioned Aristotelian concepts in order to neutralise these annoying 'difficulties':

 

"The necessity that Marx sees in the line of development of the value-form is that which Aristotle contrasts with events that are 'accidental' and it is bound up with organic systems and Aristotle's conception of ousia. Where there is constant reproduction there is a whole system, an ousia." [Ibid., p.27.]

 

Meikle then quotes Stephen Clark in support:

 

"[E]verything that happens phusei, 'by nature', happens always or for the most part, but nothing that happens apo tuches, by 'chance', or apo tautomatou, 'just of itself', happens thus frequently. Therefore, no natural events are thus purely accidental, and therefore all natural events are non-accidental. But all non-accidental events are heneka tou, 'serve some purpose', are given sense by their ends.... The fact that rain is always being produced makes it impossible to doubt that there is an organic system here, and such systems are 'finalistically' identified. To answer the question 'what is it?' we must reply in terms of its natural line of development...genesis, the process of coming-to-be-, is what it is because ousia is what it is, and not vice versa." [Clark (1975), pp.60-61, quoted in Meikle (1979), pp.27-28. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

In this we see clear references to 'divine providence', and the nauseating stench of Christian Mysticism, which once again helps explain why so many DM-fans (especially those who hale from the HCD-wing of Dialectal Mysticism) revert to open and honest mysticism quite so often and so readily. Indeed, this is no surprise at all given Marx's opinion of Philosophy in general:

 

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Unfortunately, linguistic chicanery like this fails to solve the problem, for the necessities pictured here work only if one is prepared to anthropomorphise nature. That is because as soon as it is asked why events can't proceed otherwise than they in fact do, it becomes obvious (from the above) that events must exercise some sort of control over others that have yet to occur (which is problematic in itself since they don't yet exist to be acted upon, or controlled!), directing them along the right "natural line" (which is why Meikle found he had to use that phrase). Either that, or they develop in "line" with their 'entire concept', in accordance with the complete list of predicates that has somehow been programmed into them.

 

And this, too, is quite clearly the point of all that talk about "ends" and "purposes" in both Aristotle and Leibniz's theories; they formed part of an overtly mystical doctrine, the nature of which Meikle simply ignores, and which only works if nature is controlled by some sort of 'Mind', as Aristotle certainly believed -- or, it is populated with 'tiny minds', 'programmed' by 'God' to behave the way they do, as Leibniz also imagined.

 

So, it is worth pointing out once again: dialecticians can only make their 'theory' even seem to work if they adopt the a priori thought-forms concocted by earlier ruling-class thinkers and card-carrying mystics. [Aristotle and Plato are in fact the two most important figures in this respect, with Leibniz and Hegel on the subs' bench.] Meikle nails his colours firmly to this mystical mast: if nature has a purpose, as it had for Aristotle and Leibniz, then that implies the status quo must be, and is in fact, in harmony with it -- or, is perhaps developing toward that end. And, if that is so, the status quo can't legitimately be challenged. Indeed, if this were the case, the future would be as determined as any Second International theorist ever supposed it was. In which case, the rule of the elite isn't 'accidental', either, but serves some rational, 'god'-ordained 'end' (and we all know what that is), which further implies human beings are mere puppets of 'history', there being no such thing as 'human agency' in such a universe.

 

Again, in that case, we are the patients, history is the agent.

 

Or, so this approach to theory would seem to imply.

 

The reader will now no doubt now appreciate more fully why I asserted this back in Essay Two:

 

As will soon become apparent, for all their claims to be radical, when it comes to Philosophy DM-theorists are surprisingly conservative -- and universally incapable of seeing this even after it has been pointed out to them!

 

[An excellent example of this phenomenon, and one that has been highly influential on how DM-theorists receive and then respond to such criticism, has been posted here.]

 

At a rhetorical level, this conservatism is camouflaged behind what at first sight appears to be a series of disarmingly modest denials --, which are then promptly flouted.

 

The quotations listed...in Note 1 show that DM-theorists are anxious to deny that their system is wholly or even partly a priori, or that it has been imposed on the world, not merely read from it. However, the way that dialecticians actually phrase their theories contradicts these superficially modest-looking claims, revealing that the opposite is in fact the case.

 

This inadvertent dialectical inversion -- whereby what DM-theorists say about what they do is the reverse of what they actually do with what they say -- neatly mirrors the distortion to which Traditional Philosophy has subjected ordinary language over the last two millennia (outlined in Essays Three Parts One and Two, and Twelve Part One), a point underlined by Marx himself:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

However, unlike dialecticians, Traditional Metaphysicians were quite open and honest about what they were doing; indeed, they brazenly imposed their a priori theories on reality, and hung the consequences.

 

But, because dialecticians have a novel (but nonetheless defective) view of both Metaphysics and FL (on that, see here and here), they are oblivious of the fact that they are just as eager as Traditional Theorists have always been to impose their ideas on the world, and equally blind to the fact that in so-doing they are aping the alienated thought-forms of those whose society they seek to abolish.

 

Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked before they were even loaded; with such weapons, it is no wonder that DM-theorists fire nothing but philosophical blanks.

 

[FL = Formal Logic; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

 

DM is a conservative theory precisely because its adherents have imported and then adopted the distorted methods, a priori thought-forms, theories and meaningless jargon of Traditional Philosophy.

 

[This topic was discussed at length in Essay Three Part Two; the reader is referred there for more details. It will again be covered in Essay Three Part Five. The theoretical background to all this will be analysed more fully in Essay Twelve Parts Two and Three (summary here).]

 

Of course, Meikle should have paid heed to Marx's warning not to take philosophical jargon seriously:

 

"...[A]nd even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him [Hegel]." [Marx (1976), p.103. Bold emphasis added.]

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]

 

[More on that here, and here.]

 

Now, there are far better ways than this to make sense of Das Kapital; there is no need to appeal to  Leibnizian or even mystical Hegelian concepts to make it work. [I will, however, leave that to another time.]

 

It might seem to some that an effective response to the above could be constructed along lines suggested, for example, by Roslyn Bologh:

 

"A contradiction occurs when a term refers to two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A. This is the case with the category, exchange value. It is both a use value and not a use value. A commodity has a calculable exchange value regardless of the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of any use value. Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a use value." [Bologh (1979). Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

However, Bologh's 'definition' of "contradiction" leaves much to be desired, and looks suspiciously like it was tailored to fit the example chosen -- in other words, this is a persuasive definition. [On that, see here.] Independently of the latter, her definition is defective in its own right -- not the least because, and once again, we aren't told what these As are. Furthermore, Bologh seems rather confused, since her 'contradiction' occurs when a "term" refers to letters "A" and "not-A", as opposed to 'things':

 

"A contradiction occurs when a term refers to two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A." [Ibid.]

 

Nevertheless, it looks like Bologh's example might help to resolve this minor difficulty:

 

"This is the case with the category, exchange value. It is both a use value and not a use value." [Ibid.]

 

So, the contradiction appears to be this:

 

B1: Exchange value is both a use value and not a use value.

 

From this it appears that these As are (in this case) noun phrases, or they are what the latter supposedly designate. Earlier we had occasion to point out that when these As are interpreted as phrases (or, again, what they supposedly designate), no contradiction is implied, but Bologh has circumvented that difficulty by situating them in a propositional context.

 

However, the other things she says only succeed in undermining the status of B1 as an example of a genuine contradiction:

 

"A commodity has a calculable exchange value regardless of the demand or the need for it, i.e., regardless of any use value. Hence, in determining exchange value, all consideration of use value is excluded. On the other hand, in order to realize its exchange value, the commodity must have a use value." [Ibid.]

 

This means that B1 actually becomes this:

 

B2: An exchange value isn't a use value when it is being determined as an exchange value, but it is a use value when that exchange value has to be realised.

 

In other words, B1 becomes:

 

B3: Exchange value is A at t1 and not A at t2 (t2 > t1).

 

But, that is no more a contradiction than this is:

 

B4: Tony Blair was the UK Prime Minister but he no longer is.

 

For B1 to be a contradiction it would have to become this:

 

B5: Exchange value is both a use value and not a use value at the same time and in the same respect.

 

The following might assist the reader in more fully appreciating this point (partially quoted from here).

 

Added by a supporter of this site ('Nemesis'): At Marxism 1990, in separate meetings on dialectics I was given two, three minute impromptu slots in the discussion period at the end. It is only possible to make highly superficial points in such short intervals, which, because they challenge fundamental ideas, are quite easy to dismiss. However, the level of argument advanced in response to what I had said was quite lamentable....

 

In the refectory [later], I engaged in debate with Andy Wilson...who attempted unsuccessfully to explain what a 'dialectical contradiction' is. His example (that the revolutionary party both is and is not a part of the working class) was easy to dispose of as an undischarged ambiguity. That is, the revolutionary party is part of the working class in so far as..., while it isn't part of the working class in so far as.... (Readers can fill in the blanks according to their own theory of the party.) But this is no more a contradiction, let alone a 'dialectical contradiction', than this would be: Das Kapital is part of my personal library and not part of my personal library. It is part of my library in so far as I have a copy of the book on my shelves. But, it isn't part of my library in so far this particular book (i.e., the original) isn't identical with any of its copies. So, the actual book Marx wrote (in his own hand-writing) isn't on my shelves.... [Compare this with the examples Rosa gives of ambiguous pseudo-contradictions in Essay Five.]

 

Filling in the missing "in so far as..." that Bologh omits, her example is really of this form:

 

B6: Exchange value is an A that is F, but not an A that is G.

 

Where the phrase "in so far as..." expands as follows:

 

B6a: Exchange value is an A in so far as it is F, but not an A in so far as it is G.

 

Consequently, as soon as the ambiguity in Bologh's original persuasive definition is discharged (via B6/B6a) we can see that no contradiction is implied.

 

Later in the book, Bologh repeated the above 'definition' in a slightly modified form:

 

"A contradiction occurs when a term means two mutually exclusive things, A and not-A. A contradictory form of life of life is a totality of opposing moments, moments that negate each other. This is the case with the commodity in the form of capital." [Ibid., p.64.]

 

As we saw above, it isn't too clear how these "moments" succeed in "negating" each other. Does exchange value "negate" use value? Do objects actually become useless at any point in this process? Do objects that have a use cease to be exchangeable? Do they 'oppose' one another like the two wrestlers we met earlier? But, they would have to do this if the above were the case.

 

In the next few paragraphs Bologh does make some attempt to explain what she means, but those passages merely repeat what we saw earlier, only with more jargon thrown in for good measure.

 

In fact, Bologh's whole book is a classic example of a Marxist intellectual (seemingly haphazardly) throwing Hegelian jargon, unintelligible phrases and dogmatic assertions at the page. Convoluted prose like this is de rigeur in HCD circles. HCDs dote on it and positively refuse to regard anything that isn't couched in such terms, expressed in prolix jargon, as 'genuine theory'. [On that, see here. Recent classic examples of that intellectual malaise can be found in this exchange.]

 

In which case, it is still far from clear what either Meikle or Bologh (or Rees from earlier) mean by "dialectical contradiction", or, even if such ill-defined beings exist, and how they can actually make anything change -- unless, that is, DM-theorists think we should anthropomorphise nature and society to order, and read human traits into inanimate objects and processes at every turn.

 

[I pick this theme up again in Essay Thirteen Part Three. On Quine, see Arrington and Glock (1996), Glock (2003), Hacker (1996), pp.189-227. See also this PDF (which is an article about Quine's method, written by Peter Hacker).]

 

Heilbroner To The Rescue?

 

Having said that, a genuine attempt was made in Heilbroner (1980) to try to render the term "dialectical contradiction" comprehensible. Heilbroner's account, although not always sympathetic to Marxism, has the distinct advantage of being much clearer than most DM-theorists care to be, especially when it comes to explaining what a 'dialectical contradiction' is (and in a much less jargon-polluted environment, too).

 

However, after making a rather poor attempt to define a logical contradiction, Heilbroner added the following thoughts:

 

"This kind of logical contradiction is not, however, the meaning of contradiction that applies to dialectics. In dialectics, the word does not refer to the simultaneous assertion and denial of the existence of static things; instead it refers to the nature of those conflicting elemental processes that are believed to constitute the essence of reality itself. As a first rough description of what such a 'contradiction' implies, we can resort to another famous Hegelian phrase -- 'the unity of opposites'. Contradictions therefore refer to the idea that all of reality is changeful because it consists, in its very innermost being, of the unstable coexistence and successive resolution of incompatible forces....

 

"Hegel gives us a famous example of this...in his discussion of the terms Master and Servant. The very concept of Master, he shows, implies the opposite of such a concept in the Servant, one who is mastered. Without the idea of one, we cannot form the idea of the other, although each idea 'by itself' is the contradiction (the 'negation,' in Hegel's terminology) of the other. Note that this use of contradiction does not assert that a Master 'is' and 'is not,' which would involve us in the same absurdity as making that assertion about a stone. [From earlier: "Thus, we cannot say that a stone exists and that it does not exist, referring to the same stone at the same instant." (p.34) -- RL] Rather, the point is that a Master is a being who can only be defined or described by using a concept that is its meaningful opposite or negation. Without Servants there are no Masters, and vice versa." [Heilbroner (1980), pp.35-36. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

What we are still owed, however, is some explanation why any of this constitutes a contradiction. It isn't as if the following is true "MM is a master and not a master", or even "SP is a servant and not a servant". To be sure, as part of our understanding of the word "master" (used in this way) we associate the word "servant", just as we understand that a servant isn't a master. In that sense then it would be true to say: "SP isn't a master" -- or more generally "A servant isn't a master". But, not even that is a contradiction, so why such things have been called 'dialectical contradictions' is still far from clear. [But, see below.]

 

Of course, DM-theorists are at liberty to call anything they like a 'dialectical contradiction' (not that they need my permission -- but see here), however, what they aren't entitled to do is claim this cobbled-together theory of theirs represents a superior form of logic when compared with FL, and that is because this term ("dialectical contradiction") has been introduced by means of a stipulation -- i.e., it is an imposition on the facts by any other name. As such, it bears no connection with the criticism of Aristotle's concept of a contradiction (which at least was supposed to be one point of departure for Hegelian dialectics). This means, of course, that Hegel and DM-theorists might just as well have chosen "coffee grinder", and have called putative 'dialectical contradictions', "dialectical coffee grinders" for all the good that would have done. There seems to be just as much justification for calling these 'contradictions', "coffee grinders", as there is for calling them "dialectical contradictions".

 

[If we throw in Kant's comments about 'real opposition', it might seem we could construct an acceptable rationale for linking these terms together, and hence for calling such things "dialectical contradictions". That seemingly promising 'dialectical life-line' has been permanently cut, the rope incinerated, in Appendix A.]

 

But, Heilbroner adds the following thoughts which might appear to clarify things somewhat:

 

"...[T]he presence of conflicts within social processes does not in itself suffice to establish these conflicts as contradictions. The social world, like the natural world, is full of opposing forces, most of which have no more 'contradictory' significance than the chance encounter of two particles.... Contradictions refer to those oppositions that are both necessary for, and destructive of, particular entities." [Ibid., p.39. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

Quite apart from still failing to explain exactly why the word "contradiction" is appropriate here, we have seen in this Essay that no sense can be made of attempts to equate opposing forces with contradictions, at any level. So, the above words turn out to be no help at all.

 

Heilbroner now gets to the heart of the problem (which, to some, might seem to be an effective response to many of the points made in the last few paragraphs):

 

"The difficulty arises, I believe, because many critics continue to interpret 'contradiction' in its logical, Aristotelian sense in which the contradiction (sic) of A is not-A. This easily reduces dialectical usage to violations of sense and meaning.... But that is not the meaning that contradiction holds as a relational view of the world. The logical contradiction (or 'opposite' or 'negation') of a Master is not a Slave but 'not-Master', which may or may not be a slave. But the relational opposite of a Master is indeed a Slave, for it is only by reference to this second 'excluded' term that the first is defined." [Ibid., p.41.]

 

Once again, the above is a caricature even of Aristotle's understanding of contradiction, as we saw in Essay Four, but we can let that annoying niggle slide for now. Independently of this, A can only be part of a contradiction (A and not-A) if it stood for a proposition or a clause; but we can see that, according to Heilbroner, "A" stands for "Master" and "not-A" for "not-Master", two phrases! So, we don't even have a contradiction here, let alone the mutant 'dialectical' variant.

 

However, Heilbroner's use of "excluded" calls to mind the words Marx used to characterise the connection between RF and EF, we met earlier:

 

"The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes -- i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only relatively -- i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity -- here the coat -- under the form of an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed. Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is expressed.

"No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, so soon as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive." [Marx (1996), pp.58-59. Bold emphases added.]

"We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it." [Ibid., p.113. Bold emphasis added.]

 

But, this 'exclusivity' falls foul of what Hegel and Engels had argued elsewhere:

 

"Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words, its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence also the acid is not something that persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realise what it potentially is." [Hegel (1975), p.174; Essence as Ground of Existence, §119. Bold emphasis added. The serious problems this dogmatic and a priori diktat creates for Hegel, which he nowhere tries to justify, are detailed here.]

 

"To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.

"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels (1976), p.26. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Engels (1954), pp.212-13. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

Plainly, this would make Marx's economic and social theory metaphysical, since his distinction between these two forms of value is a hard and fast dichotomy!

 

If RF and EF are mutually exclusive -- "A single commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity of these forms makes them mutually exclusive...." -- then we would have here a reasonably clear 'either/or'! On the other hand, if there is no exclusivity in this case, the sort of 'dialectical relationalism' that Heilbroner describes falls apart. If no master can be a slave -- which means that MM, say, is either a master or a slave, but not both -- then a core principle of Hegel's dialectic disintegrates. On the other hand, if a worker can be a boss as well as a worker, and a boss can be a worker as well as a boss, too -- if the two main classes under capitalism aren't mutually exclusive -- then Marx's social theory bites the dust that was left behind by Hegel's decayed corpse.

 

Is the Supposed 'Contradiction Between The Proletariat And The Capitalist Class' Even 'Dialectical'?

 

This brings us to a consideration of a 'problem' that has been touched on several times throughout this Essay: if the capitalist class and the proletariat imply each other, such that one can't exist without the other, and both are mutually exclusive classes, then:

 

(a) Engels should have labelled Marx's work 'metaphysical' (since, as we saw at the end of the last sub-section, this idea is based on an overt use of 'either'/'or');

 

And,

 

(b) There should be a very clear distinction between the two classes such that, concerning any given wage or salary earner, it should be crystal clear to which class they belong.

 

If this were a logical question the answer to (b) would be crystal clear; but it isn't. That is why Marxists have for decades spilt much ink in an attempt even to define the proletariat and the capitalist class, as well as specify exactly who falls into which category, often markedly disagreeing with one another. Is every white collar worker a proletarian? What about the unemployed or the families of proletarians? Their children, their partners, their retired grandparents? What about strike-breakers, security guards, community police, those on zero-hour contracts, unpaid interns, 'self-employed' gig-economy workers (Über and Lyft drivers, etc.), or those who are between jobs? What about individuals on long-term stay in hospital or the terminally ill? What are we to say about those who have taken a year off to do charity work in, for example, Indonesia, or public servants tasked with pressuring the unemployed to 'find work'? What about members of the military (squaddies and the lower ranks), cops, prison guards, immigration workers, or junior managers who perhaps have a second job as bar-tenders or salesmen/women? What about professional footballers, entertainers, rock, media and film stars? What about pensioners? What do we say about those who work in public relations, marketing, or advertising? What about workers who own shares? What about bloggers, or those who now derive most or all their income from social media? And how do we classify sex workers? How does the unpaid housework of "homemakers" fit into this paradigm? Or students who have part-time jobs? What do we even say about 'professional revolutionaries'?

 

If the class to which any or all of the above belong were simply a logical question, and the connection between them and the capitalist class were a 'dialectical-logical relation', the answer would be perfectly clear, just as it is clear to which set of numbers, π, for instance, belongs, or which grammatical category "to be" should be assigned. But, it isn't. Deciding to which class a group or an individual belongs is one of the thorniest areas of Marxist theory. Any who doubt this should check out Callinicos (1983), and Callinicos and Harman (1987). I happen to agree with much of what Callinicos and Harman have to say, but there will be many who don't. Indeed, Callinicos even admitted that readers of Socialist Worker objected to his analysis -- and that must include members of his own party! [Callinicos (1983), p.87.] Clearly, it wouldn't be necessary to write such articles -- or even books like Wright (1985/1998, 1989/1998) -- if this were a plain-and-simple, logical distinction.

 

[Update October 2023: See also this excellent video (and my response to it in the comment section).]

 

As Dominic Alexander recently admitted:

 

"Class is not a fixed and positivistic position that can be defined by exact boundaries. Rather, it is a social relationship, and individuals are always bound within a mesh of different such connections. The result is a complex of social tendencies, not static categories." [Quoted from here; accessed 20/02/2021.]

 

But, not even Alexander attempted to derive one class 'logically' from any other, or, indeed, from anything else. His reference to "positivism" was slightly misleading since even he will have to refer to (empirical) data at some point in order to identify the relevant classes -- indeed, as Callinicos and Harman did (in the studies mentioned above).

 

Unfortunately, Marx left us with no clear or comprehensive guidance on this issue. Indeed, Volume Three of Das Kapital notoriously breaks off with the section on Classes left unfinished:

 

"The owners merely of labour-power, owners of capital, and land-owners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and ground-rent, in other words, wage-labourers, capitalists and land-owners, constitute then three big classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of production.

 

"In England, modern society is indisputably most highly and classically developed in economic structure. Nevertheless, even here the stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere (although incomparably less in rural districts than in the cities). However, this is immaterial for our analysis. We have seen that the continual tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of production is more and more to divorce the means of production from labour, and more and more to concentrate the scattered means of production into large groups, thereby transforming labour into wage-labour and the means of production into capital. And to this tendency, on the other hand, corresponds the independent separation of landed property from capital and labour, or the transformation of all landed property into the form of landed property corresponding to the capitalist mode of production.

 

"The first question to he answered is this: What constitutes a class? -- and the reply to this follows naturally from the reply to another question, namely: What makes wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords constitute the three great social classes?

 

"At first glance -- the identity of revenues and sources of revenue. There are three great social groups whose members, the individuals forming them, live on wages, profit and ground-rent respectively, on the realisation of their labour-power, their capital, and their landed property.

 

"However, from this standpoint, physicians and officials, e.g., would also constitute two classes, for they belong to two distinct social groups, the members of each of these groups receiving their revenue from one and the same source. The same would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into which the division of social labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and landlords -- the latter, e.g., into owners of vineyards, farm owners, owners of forests, mine owners and owners of fisheries."

 

"[Here the manuscript breaks off.]" [Marx (1998), pp.870-71.]

 

In which case, the question now becomes: To whom does this comment apply: "Unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of the direct producers"? [Marx, quoted in Callinicos (1983), p.82.] But, not every worker produces "surplus value" -- or do they? That, too, is controversial. It is connected with what Marx called "productive labour". Here is Callinicos, again:

 

"Marx defines productive labour as follows: 'Productive labour, in its meaning for capitalist production, is wage-labour which, exchanged against the variable part of capital...reproduces not only this part of capital (or the value of its own labour-power), but in addition produces surplus-value for the capitalist.' Productive labour is thus labour productive of surplus-value. Unproductive labour, on the other hand, 'is labour which is not exchanged with capital, but directly with revenue, that is, with wages or profit.'

 

"The distinction between productive and unproductive labour is, therefore, one between labour which contributes to the self-expansion of capital and labour which does not. Marx's main example of the latter is that of domestic servants, the largest single category of workers in Victorian Britain, employed out of the revenue of the middle and upper classes. The precise implications of Marx's theory of productive and unproductive labour are not wholly clear. However, the interpretation most consistent with the version of the theory expounded in Capital volumes 2 and 3 suggests that only those wage-labourers involved in the production of commodities (including their transportation to the point of final consumption) are seen by Marx as productive labourers.

 

"Marx argues, for example, that time devoted to the circulation of commodities -- buying and selling, book-keeping and so on -- is a pure cost to capital, creating no surplus-value. A commercial capitalist who invests in these activities merely creates a claim to the surplus value created elsewhere, and thus reduces the general rate of profit. If the capitalist employs wage-labourers 'this advance of capital creates neither product nor value. It reduces pro tanto [to such an extent -- RL] the dimensions in which the advanced capital functions productively.' However, wage-labour employed to transport goods does create surplus-value, since 'the use-value of things is only materialised in their consumption, and their consumption may necessitate a change of location of these things, hence may require an additional process of production in the transport industry.'

 

"If we accept productive labour thus conceived as defining the working class, then only wage-labourers in extractive, manufacturing, and freight industries would form the proletariat. On such a view, the working class would apparently be narrowed down to its nineteenth-century stereotype of male manual workers.... This approach contradicts that pursued by Marx in Capital. Marx himself insisted that many white-collar workers were themselves productive labourers. This was a result of the increasing socialisation of production, which meant that:

 

'the real lever of the overall labour-process is increasingly not the individual worker. Instead, labour-power socially combined and the various competing labour-powers which together form the entire production machine participate in very different ways in the immediate process of making commodities.... Some work better with their hands, others with their heads, one as a manager, engineer, technologist, etc, the other as overseer, the third as manual labourer or even drudge. An ever-increasing number of types of labour are included in the immediate concept of productive labour, and those who perform it are classed as productive workers, workers directly exploited by capital and subordinated to its process of production and expansion.' [Callinicos is here quoting from the Results of the Immediate Process of Production -- Productive and Unproductive Labour, published in the Appendix to the Penguin edition of Capital Volume One, i.e., Marx (1976), pp.1039-1040, although the version on-line is clearly a different translation. Italic emphases in the original published version, although Callinicos has emphasised sections of this passage differently.]

 

"Thus, all those who form part of what Marx called 'the collective worker', the complex division of labour involved in producing commodities, are productive workers, even if they do not work with their hands. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Marx regarded only productive workers as forming the proletariat. On the contrary, his analysis of commercial employees, whom we have already seen he did not believe produced surplus-value, suggests the opposite. Marx writes:

 

'In one respect a commercial employee is a wage-worker. In the first place, his labour-power is bought with the variable capital of the merchant, not with money expended as revenue, and consequently it is not bought for private service, but for the purpose of expanding the capital advanced for it. In the second place, the value of the labour-power, and thus his wages, are determined as those of other wage-workers, i.e., by the cost of production and reproduction of his specific labour-power, not by the product of his labour-power.' [Callinicos is here quoting Capital Volume Three; i.e., Marx (1998), p.291 -- RL.]...

 

"As Erik Olin Wright puts it:

 

'both productive and unproductive workers are exploited; both have unpaid labour extorted from them. The only difference is that in the case of productive labour, unpaid labour-time is appropriated as surplus-value; whereas in the case of unproductive labour, unpaid labour merely reduces the costs to the capitalist of appropriating part of the surplus-value produced elsewhere. In both cases, the capitalist will try to keep the wage-bill as low as possible; in both cases the capitalist will try to increase productivity by getting workers to work harder; in both cases, workers will be dispossessed of control over their labour-process. In both cases, socialism is a prerequisite for ending exploitation. It is hard to see where a fundamental divergence of economic interests emerges from the position of unproductive and productive labour in capitalist relations of production.' [Callinicos is here quoting Wright (1985), pp.49-50 -- RL.]

 

"If we accept this reasoning, then we must reject the 'narrow' definition of the proletariat as comprised only of productive workers. Ernest Mandel offers the following broad definition: 'The defining structural characteristic of the proletariat in Marx’s analysis of capitalism is the socio-economic compulsion to sell one’s labour-power. Included in the proletariat, then, are not only manual industrial workers, but all unproductive wage-labourers who are subject to the same fundamental constraints: non-ownership of means of production; lack of direct access to the means of livelihood (the land is by no means freely accessible!); insufficient money to purchase the means of livelihood without more or less continuous sale of labour-power'. [Callinicos is here quoting Ernest Mandel's Introduction to the Penguin Edition of Capital Volume Two -- RL.]...

 

"The implication of the previous section is that the proletariat should broadly be identified with the mass of wage-labourers. It follows that the present century has seen a considerable expansion, rather than a decline in the size of the working class...." [Callinicos (1983), pp.87-94. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

Of course, if we don't accept this definition, or, indeed, the reasoning behind it, then everything is up for grabs again. The point is that if this were a 'dialectical-logical relation', it would be much clearer cut and wouldn't depend on a contestable definition, a long and tortuous argument, or the collection of data.

 

So, because the decision about which class an individual or group belongs requires in-depth analysis, complex argument, evidence and debate, the distinction between the proletariat and the capitalist class can't be 'dialectical-logical'. Like much else in science, this distinction is convention-based, dependent on decisions theorists make, in tandem with the discussions, arguments and negotiations that take place between theorists as they collectively arrive at some sort of consensus (that is, if they do --, which, in Marxism, is, alas, all too rare). So the relation between workers and capitalists isn't in the end de re it is de dicto.

 

This now means that the best example of a 'dialectical relation' in a DM-theorist's box of tricks -- the link between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie -- isn't 'dialectical' after all! Workers and capitalists don't imply one another existentially -- at best, they do so conceptually, and even then they do that only after much argument, re-definition, stage-setting, debate, data collection and analysis!

 

But, the question remains: Can one such class exist without the other? Plainly not, but that is only because the two main classes in Capitalism have been inter-defined, and that definition turns out to be about as clear as mud. Which explains all the attendant theory, compounded by years of debate -- in an endeavour to come to some sort of consensus, which has yet to be achieved! Now, as I noted above, I largely accept Callinicos's conclusions, but I had to be persuaded to that end. My agreement wasn't to be had by asking me to think really, really hard about the definition of each class.

 

Contrast that with deciding to which (number) set the fraction, two-fifths, belongs, or whether a regicide is a king-killer.

 

[As a side note, if readers want to provoke a 'lively' (and interminable) debate online, in a meeting, in a journal or even down the pub, just try asking for a definition of productive labour or surplus value. Even better, ask exactly who belongs to the proletariat and/or the capitalist class. You will be hard pressed to find two Marxists who agree, or even agree how to decide on the answer. But if this were a dialectico-logical or a dialectico-conceptual question (on a par with deciding whether or not a vixen is a female fox, or even if 2 + 3 = 5) there would be almost 100% consensus -- not the endless confusion we still see concerning such issues, over 150 years since Das Kapital was published! A small clue as to how such a discussion might go can be gleaned by checking out the comment section below the video to which I linked earlier. Or the 'discussion' I have reproduced in Appendix C, concerning use value and exchange value. Readers will no doubt notice how easy it was for me is to sow confusion in the minds of the dialectical dogmatists who tried to take me on. In both cases, conceptual chaos doesn't quite capture the nature or mood of that 'debate'.]

 

All this is quite apart from the fact that we have yet to be told why it is appropriate to call such things, or such relations, "contradictions", to begin with. After, well over one hundred-and-fifty years, we are still owed an explanation. Just as it also quite apart from the additional fact that none of this is of any use explaining how Hegel's 'relationalism' can conceivably apply to objects and processes in the natural world. As we have seen in Essay Eleven Part Two, it isn't at all easy to identify a 'Master-Slave dialectic' at work anywhere in the universe outwith human society. How, for example, could the Sun 'imply' the planet Mercury as part of its 'concept'/'definition', or vice versa? While employees might not be able exist without employers, the Sun can surely exist without Mercury or Neptune. Hegel tried to justify the application of the 'dialectic' beyond the social sphere by appealing to a link that was supposed to exist between acids and bases, but we have already seen that not even that can be made to work. In which case, whatever one thinks of Hegel's 'logic' applied to social development, its application to nature looks about as convincing as UK Tory and US Republican Party election videos.

 

And this, too, is quite apart from the extra additional fact that, if the DM-classicists are to be believed, and such things are actually related to one another as 'dialectical opposites', they should struggle with and then turn into each other! Has anyone noticed Mercury locked in a life-or-death struggle with the Sun and then turn into it? Or the Sun turn into Mercury?  Or, indeed, every master turn into a slave/servant, and vice versa?

 

Heilbroner's 'life-line' thus turns into a much less appealing anvil:

 

 

Figure Ten: Hey! Comrades! Catch This! It Will 'Dialectically'

Prevent You From Drowning...

 

Last Chance Saloon

 

In that case, the only options left open to us in our endeavour to understand what John Rees had to say are F50 and F51. They were:

 

F50: Capitalism offers A, but delivers C instead, where C is a paradoxical outcome.

 

F51: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and not A, as well as B and C.

 

However, since these two are clearly variations upon F48 and F49, they don't appear to be viable alternatives. DM-apologists are welcome to make of them what they can.

 

True Contradictions?

 

Even so, dialecticians maintain that there are indeed 'true contradictions' in reality. By far and away the most sophisticated of these endeavours is to be found in the work of Graham Priest. However, it is far from clear whether the 'contradictions' upon which he focuses are actually 'dialectical' -- that is, should we ever be told with any clarity what a 'dialectical contradiction' actually is!

 

[Priest's work will be considered in more detail in an Additional Essay to be posted at this site at a later date. In the meantime, readers should consult this and this.]

 

Veteran communist theoretician, the late Maurice Cornforth, also attempted to argue that there are 'true contradictions' in the natural and social world -- contrary to the view endorsed at this site, which is that a contradiction (in its simplest form, in logic and ordinary life) is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, which has nothing to do with 'what exists':

 

"The contradiction in things is a very familiar state of affairs. There is nothing in the least abstruse about it, and it is often referred to in everyday conversations. For example, we speak of a man as having a 'contradictory' character, or as being 'a mass of contradictions'…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.92-93.]

 

In which case, presumably, when we describe someone as a "bit of a puzzle" Cornforth thinks we mean that he or she can be purchased in a magic store or a toy shop. Or that when we read this:

 

"All the world's a stage,

 

"And all the men and women merely players;

 

"They have their exits and their entrances", [William Shakespeare, As You Like It, 2/7]

 

we should all try and remember our lines and stage cues, pay attention to the director, make sure the audience can hear us and ignore the reviews?

 

Clearly, Cornforth has never heard of metaphor.

 

[Why the above isn't a literal use of "contradiction" is considered in more detail below, where we will also see that "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradict", or even "contradiction".]

 

It is worth recalling that Hegel attempted to show that logical contradictions, and not so much ordinary contradictions, were far too one-sided, abstract and philosophically limited. His reconfiguration of this troublesome word was intended to transcend an alleged 'Aristotelian' view of contradiction. (As far as I am aware, he was silent about the everyday use of "contradict", and its cognates.) Now, DM-theorists might want to use "contradiction" in a different way to Hegel -- whether or not his theory and its 'contradictions' have been turned "the right way up" or have been left upside down --, but, if that were so, their 'contradictions', the DM-variety, might not in that case (obviously) transcend FL-contradictions. On the other hand, if that were indeed so -- if they intended their use of this word to be the same as Hegel's --, that would make their criticisms of FL rather empty, since they wouldn't be addressing the same term or concept. Nevertheless, they certainly intend that their employment of this word should transcend the use of "contradiction" in FL, and that is why I have largely restricted my attention to the latter area of discussion (in this Essay).

 

However, it is also clear (from the examples they themselves give) that DM-theorists -- like Cornforth and the others considered below -- focus on what look like ordinary contradictions (as opposed to FL-contradictions, or even 'dialectical contradictions') when they try to argue that there are 'true contradictions', or that 'contradictions' exist in nature and society. It is clear, too, why they do that: FL-contradictions are totally uninteresting (even when translated into the vernacular), and, what is worse, they are politically useless, too. Who, for example, is going to get excited about the following (these have been taken from a letter sent to Socialist Review a few years back by a supporter of this site):

 

A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate and there isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

A2: Capitalism is governed by a blindly competitive market and it isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

Even these two are merely discursive equivalents of FL-contradictions. They are totally useless and exceedingly boring.

 

As we saw in Essay Four Part One, DM-theorists concentrate their attention on the simplest form of FL-contradictions, namely: p & ¬p. Seldom (in fact never) do they consider more complex FL-contradictions. Here are just two of the latter:

 

V1: ¬[(p q) v (p → r) ↔ (p (q v r))].

 

V2: ¬[¬(Ex)(Fx & ¬Gx) (x)(Fx Gx)].

 

[In the above, "(E...)" is the existential quantifier (and often stands for "There is at least one..." or even just "There is..."); "" is a biconditional sign (and stands for "if and only if"); "(x)" is the universal quantifier (and often goes proxy for "All..." or "Every..."); "&" stands for "and"; "v" is the inclusive "or" (i.e, "and/or"); "¬" stands for the negation operator ("It is not the case that..."); "" is the conditional sign (i.e., "If...then"); "p", "q", and "r" are propositional variables; "F" and "G" are one-place, first-level predicate letters; and "x" is a second-level predicate-binding variable. (More details can be found here and here.)]

 

V1 reads: "It isn't the case that [(if p then q or if p then r) if and only if (if p then q or r)]."

 

V2 reads: "It isn't the case that [(there isn't something which is F and not G) if and only if (everything which, if it is F, is also G)]."

 

V2a: "It isn't the case that [(there isn't anything which is F and not G) if and only if (everything which, if it is F, is also G)]."

 

[V2a is perhaps a more colloquial semi-translation.]

 

Some might wonder when sentences like V1 and V2 would ever be used; however, theorists employ and study propositions like these all the time, in Mathematical Logic, the Foundations of Mathematics, Discrete Mathematics, and Number Theory -- to mention just a few subject areas --, and, indeed, others that are far more complex still. [This links to a PDF.]

 

These V1 and V2 are, of course, just two examples of the potentially infinite number of logical contradictions which can be generated in MFL, with ease. Nevertheless, DM-theorists would be hard-pressed to find space -- even in their quirky universe -- for contradictions like these (i.e., once they have been interpreted).

 

[MFL = Modern Formal Logic; LEM = Law of Excluded Middle; PB = Principle of Bivalence.]

 

Moreover, dialecticians often conflate the LEM, the PB (or propositional bi-polarity) and the LOC with one another -- and, indeed, all of them with opposites, inconsistencies, absurdities, contraries, paradoxes, puzzles, quandaries, oddities, irrationalities, oppositional processes, antagonism, interacting forces, events that go contrary to expectations alongside a whole host of other idiosyncrasies. In fact, they are so eager to see contradictions everywhere that they find they have to tinker with the meaning of that word, so that (for them) it becomes synonymous with "struggle", "conflict", "opposition", or even "antagonism", as we will see.

 

Indeed, in debate DM-fans are often genuinely surprised to see examples of discursive FL-contradictions -- like those repeated below (i.e., A1 and A2) --, or even the more formal examples posted a few paragraphs back (i.e., V1 and V2). From this it is clear they are totally oblivious of (genuine) contradictions like these, and when they see them they hastily reject them as relevant examples of what they intend when they use this word.

 

A1: In capitalism, there is a drive to accumulate and there isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

A2: Capitalism is governed by a blindly competitive market and it isn't (at the same time and in the same respect).

 

[Here is a recent example of this (in the comments section at the bottom -- unfortunately, these comments are no longer available!). When confronted with an FL-contradiction, the comrade with whom I was debating -- Mike Rosen, no less(!) -- denied that this was what he meant. He had wanted to show that there was a perfectly ordinary use of this word that picked out what Marx and other Marxists mean by it. And yet none of his examples were 'dialectical contradictions', either, which rendered the whole exercise rather futile -- as, indeed, I pointed out to him. There are many more examples like this in the debates recorded here. See also, here.]

 

On the one hand, whatever else DM-'contradictions' are supposed to be, they appear to be totally unrelated to FL-contradictions, and so can hardly surpass them. On the other hand, they have to be related to FL-contradictions, otherwise dialecticians will have to drop any pretence that DL is superior to FL.

 

In that case, in what follows, I will continue to refer to FL-contradictions in my criticism of DL-'contradictions'. If DM-fans mean something different by their use of this word, they should tell us -- and for the first time in over 150 years -- exactly what that is.

 

[There is much more on this topic here and here.]

 

Returning to Cornforth; he concedes the point that describing someone as "contradictory" involves a reference to their dispositions (or "tendencies"):

 

"This means that [they evince] opposed tendencies in [their] behaviour, such as gentleness and brutality, recklessness and cowardice, selfishness and self-sacrifice." [Cornforth (1976), p.93.]

 

Unfortunately, that prevents Cornforth's own examples from being literal contradictions. He seems not to have noticed that fact.

 

Be this as it may, if the above quote is meant to commit Cornforth to a dispositional account of contradiction, then much of classic DM would become obsolete by default. The fact that someone might have, say, a disposition to be brave in certain circumstances, but cowardly in others, in no way suggests he/she can be both of those at once. Indeed, what could that possibly amount to? Standing one's ground while running away? Putting oneself in harms way to save or rescue someone else while shrinking from doing one or both? What is open to question, however, is whether the simultaneous actualisation of these dispositions (in certain states or performances) may be expressed by means of true propositions (and without ambiguity), and which are (or can be) both true at the same time.

 

Indeed, the fact that an iron bar, for example, can be red hot at one end and icy cold at the other at the same time isn't a contradiction (even though, plainly, an iron bar is at any time disposed to be either of these, and much else besides, at all times). But, no one supposes (it is to be hoped!) that such a bar could actually be red hot and freezing cold all over, and in the same respect, at the same time.

 

[To be sure, the supposition that the entire bar could be both of these at the same time might be thought by some to be a contradictory supposition; and yet even that would merely be an inconsistency, not a contradiction, since both could be false if the said bar was in fact merely warm.]

 

Anyway, as noted above, the emotions Cornforth imagines capable of being expressed by contrary suppositions are inconsistent, not contradictory. For example, if NN was said to be both angry and calm at the same time, that would only be a contradiction if it couldn't be false to assert NN was both. But, it would be false to assert both if NN were only slightly agitated (in which state NN would be neither angry nor calm), for instance.

 

[Recall, two propositions are contraries, or are inconsistent, if they both can't be true, but they can both be false, at once. Two propositions are contradictory only if they can't both be true and they can't both be false, at once.]

 

So, even if both of these states were actualisable at the same time (which is, of course, a rather difficult scenario to imagine, to put it mildly!), it still wouldn't be a contradiction!

 

On the other hand, if NN could be described (without ambiguity) in the following way:

 

N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger,

 

we might have a genuine contradiction here. But, it is unlikely that Cornforth meant his words to be understood that way, and it is even more doubtful whether he would have been able to say under what conditions he, or anyone else for that matter, would or could hold N1 true -- or under what conditions he/they could or would attribute to NN such odd dispositional actualisations.

 

Consider the following more precise example of the above scenario:

 

N2: At time, t, NN is angry with MM for lying to her at t, and not angry with MM for lying to her at t.

 

Or, perhaps even more precisely:

 

N2a: At times, t1 and t2, NN is angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t2 for lying to her at t1. [t2 > t1]

 

Or, in more ordinary terms:

 

N2a1: NN is angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday and not angry with MM today for lying to her yesterday.

 

Naturally, there are several other possibilities allowed for in logic and ordinary language, such as the following:

 

N2b: At time, t1, NN is angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1, and not angry with MM at t1 for lying to her at t1.

 

Or, in ordinary (if somewhat stilted) terms, again:

 

N2b1: NN is currently angry with MM for lying to her just now and currently not angry with MM for lying to her just now.

 

Of course, someone could object that it is possible to have mixed emotions at one and the same time. Perhaps, then, they might mean the following (confining our attention to N2, but not N2a or N2b, for simplicity's sake):

 

N3: At time, t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she fully understands the pressures on MM when he lied).

 

In that case, N3 is really this:

 

N4: At time, t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.

 

Here, we have two different 'actions', or emotional states, involving different objects of a particular emotion (this is an example of the sort of ambiguity mentioned earlier): anger at MM because it was a violation of trust (i.e., "φ-ing"), and lack of anger at MM because of extenuating circumstances (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was mentioned:

 

N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.

 

[Greek letters like "φ" and "ψ" are used in FL and Analytic Philosophy to help distinguish action-, or state-predicates (like "...walks", "...sits", or "...has refuted DM") from others (such as, "...is a man" or "...is a confused dialectician"). Naturally, several of the latter might overlap somewhat.]

 

As soon as we fill in the details concerning the nature of the emotion involved we can see that we have two different objects of the said anger, or two different states/actions, and hence no contradiction.

 

To be sure, someone might still object, but they will (like Cornforth) find it hard to say what the content of that objection is without ignoring or editing out of the picture some object or other of the said anger/emotion, thus misrepresenting the intended situation.

 

[Which is, perhaps, why DM-fans dislike precision (i.e., they call it 'pedantry'); indeed, attempts to state precisely what they might mean always seem to undermine rather too many of the doctrines they unwisely imported from Hegel -- as we can now see happening with these 'contradictions'.]

 

In fact, by his use of the word "tendencies", Cornforth himself seems half ready to concede this point. But, not even he would want to describe the same action (performed by the same person) as, say, literally both gentle and brutal at the same time (without equivocation). While it is possible to ascribe contrary properties to the same object (e.g., one part of the aforementioned iron bar could be hot while another part is cold, as we have seen), a 'contradiction' may only be extracted from such familiar facts by someone who has never heard of ambiguity -- or, of course, who is terminally confused or who has no idea about the difference between contraries and contradictories. No one would think they had been contradicted by someone who asserted that the far end of an iron bar was red hot just after they themselves had asserted the near end was ice cold. Nor would they think they had been contradicted if someone had said they were angry today, but calm the day before -- or, indeed, that they were angry and calm about different things at the same time.

 

Anyway, as noted above, any description of the same action (that asserted it was literally both gentle and brutal at the same time, in the same respect and without equivocation) would merely be an inconsistency -- since both alternatives would be false if the said act was in fact neutral (i.e., if it was neither gentle nor brutal, but performed, or displayed, with equanimity, or indifference).

 

Once more we ask: Do these emotions imply one another such that they must co-exist (like the proletariat and the capitalist class, so we are told)? No, they neither imply one another, and they can all exist independently of each other. Nor do they struggle with and then change into each other, which they would have to do if they were dialectically related -- and if the DM-classics were to be believed.

 

So, whatever else they are, these aren't 'dialectical opposites', so they can't even be 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

[However, the slow disintegration of the Communist Block finally caught up with Cornforth; in one of his last works [Cornforth (1980)], he systematically retracted many of the theories he had once declared were cornerstones of the "world view of the proletariat".]

 

Another benighted comrade has remained undeterred by such contradictory antics, and has vainly tried to defend the employment of this obscure notion (i.e., "dialectical contradiction"), appealing to (yes, you guessed it!) an everyday use of "contradiction" (re-posted below), in connection with contradictory behaviour, when it isn't at all clear that the examples he himself gave were even 'dialectical contradictions', to begin with!

 

But, what did this comrade mean by "contradictory behaviour"? Perhaps someone who actually stands and sits all at once? Or, maybe an individual who has a 'tendency' to do both? But, a 'tendency' to do what? Stand and sit all at once? Or, who threatens to do both? But what sort of threat would that be if it is impossible to carry out? Maybe this applies to someone who goes on strike and refuses to go on strike at the same time?

 

We aren't told. As usual, DM-fans offer their bemused readers what are in effect less than half-formed thoughts and theories.

 

This benighted comrade tried to argue along these lines in a 'debate' he had with me concerning the UK Prison Workers' Strike, which took place a few years ago:

 

"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it. Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?" [Paragraphs merged. I have reproduced core parts of this 'debate' here.]

 

Now, in relation to the aforementioned strike, it looks like this comrade meant his comments to apply to workers who support the state one minute, but act against it the next, or perhaps those who hold what appear to be inconsistent beliefs about one or both. But, put this way, that isn't even a contradiction (ordinary, or otherwise)! On the other hand, if these workers both supported and didn't support this strike at the same time (without ambiguity), that would have been a contradiction, but he plainly didn't mean that.

 

Of course, as we have seen, contraries aren't contradictions, and "contradictory" isn't the same as "contradiction". As indicated earlier, concerning two contrary propositions both can't be true, but they both can be false (i.e., in this case, they would merely be inconsistent with one another), at once.

 

For example, the contraries "All swans are white" and "No swan is white" can't both be true (in a non-empty domain), but they can both be false -- for instance, if either or both of "Some swan is not white", or "Some swan is white" were true (the first of which turned out to be the case when black swans were discovered in Australia). But, two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once.

 

Again, dialecticians invariably ignore such "pedantic" details.

 

Moreover, if someone were asked to consider these two propositions: "All swans are white" and "Some swan is not white" they will have been presented with two contradictory propositions, but we would only have a contradiction if they were conjoined to give: "All swans are white and some swan is not white". "Contradictory" applies to propositions or clauses that could be conjoined to form a contradiction (or one of which could be used to contradict someone who asserted the other), whether or not they are so conjoined, or so used. "Contradictory" also applies to states and performances (among other things), which, if expressed in propositional or clausal form, could also be conjoined to yield a contradiction, whether or not they are so conjoined. Analogously, a vase, for example, can be described as breakable -- that is, it can be broken, whether or not it is actually broken. The term ("contradictory") can also apply to imperatives which would undo one another when obeyed or acted upon, such as "Open the door!" and "Do not open the door!" -- which are contradictory imperatives --, while "Open the door!" and "Close the door!" are merely contraries. That is because they would both be countermanded by "Leave the door alone!"

 

[There are analogous distinctions and complications that also apply to "contradict" and "contradiction". See also here. We will see later how Kant succeeded in confusing himself and his readers by failing to notice such fine distinctions. Indeed, we have already seen how Hegel also fell headlong into this trap.]

 

But even if the above responses of mine are misguided in some way, do any one of the paired items that the benighted comrade came out with imply the other in the pair, such that they both couldn't exist without one another (like the proletariat and the capitalist class, so we are told)? But that would have to be the case if they are to be counted as 'dialectical contradictions'. Do any of them struggle with and then change into one another? Once again, they would have to do that if the DM-classics are to be believed. The aforementioned comrade was, unsurprisingly, silent about such issues.

 

In that case, and once more: whatever else they were, his examples weren't 'dialectical contradictions'.

 

There is another excellent example of 'dialectical confusion' like this in Simon Basketter's article in Socialist Worker about the same strike:

 

"However, there are contradictions in the role of prison officers. It is summed up by Cardiff prisoners chanting 'you're breaking the law' to the strikers.... Prison officers' work, upholding law and order, frequently pushes them to accept the most right wing ideas and actions of the system. One of their main jobs is to control prisoners –- and throughout the prison system, many officers have a proven record of racism and violence. Some of the contradictions can be seen in the strike. In Liverpool the POA shop steward Steve Baines responded to the high court injunction by telling fellow strikers, 'Tell them to shove it up their arse, we're sitting it out.' Yet when prisoners in the jail protested against their treatment, the POA members rushed back in to control the situation and end a roof top protest." [Paragraphs merged.]

 

Once more, what is the 'contradiction' meant to be, here? Maybe, it has something to do with the following?

 

P1: Prison officers uphold the law.

 

P2: This either results from, or leads them into, holding right-wing ideas.

 

P3: But, this strike has forced some to defy or disrespect the law.

 

P4: However, later, when some prisoners protested, the same officers rushed back to work in order to re-establish control.

 

Now, I have already commented on the loose, indeterminate and often indiscriminate way that dialecticians like to use "contradiction", but even given such conceptual profligacy, what precisely is the contradiction here?

 

Let us try again -- using "NN" this time to stand for the name of a randomly selected prison guard who thinks and acts along the above lines, and "L1" to stand for a law he/she rejects, or opposes, even if only temporarily:

 

P5: NN upholds the law.

 

P6: NN has adopted a number of right-wing ideas.

 

P7: One day, as a result of the strike, NN says "Screw law, L1!" [No pun intended.]

 

P8: Later that day he acts in support of a totally different law.

 

Once more, where is the contradiction, here?

 

Now, if NN had said, "Screw all laws!" we might be able to cobble-together an inconsistency of some sort in this case (such as "Screw all laws!" -- i.e., "All laws ought to be screwed!" and "No laws ought to be screwed!"), but not even that is implied by the above story.

 

In fact, a contradiction in this case could (perhaps) be formed from something like the following: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that shouldn't be screwed." Or, maybe: "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed."

 

To be sure, people say all sorts of odd things, and it is relatively easy to utter contradictory sentences. Who has ever denied that! [Look, I have just posted several contradictory sets of propositions in the last few paragraphs.] The question is, can both be held true, or held false (or, in this case, advocated and repudiated, asserted and denied, as a moral or political code), at the same time and in same respect? Well, did anyone from Socialist Worker try to ascertain from the aforementioned prison guards if any of them would have assented to and rejected the following, at the same time: "All laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that shouldn't be screwed"; or, "No laws should be screwed" and "There is at least one law that should be screwed"? Apparently not.

 

Indeed, if NN had assented to "No laws should be screwed", we could safely infer from his later strike action that he no longer held it true. Plainly, as a result of the strike he must have come to accept the following alternative in its place: "I now think there is at least one law (namely, law, L1) that should be screwed".

 

And that would still be the case even if tomorrow NN went back to holding his former beliefs about every law. Dialecticians, least of all, shouldn't need reminding that people and things change!

 

Unless, that is, we think NN holds this odd belief: "I don't believe that there is at least one law that should be screwed and I also believe there is at least one law that should be screwed." Or, perhaps, "Screw L1 and do not screw L1!"

 

Even so, it is also reasonably clear that we could only attribute schizoid beliefs like this to NN if he were about to go insane, or had suffered a blow to the head. We certainly couldn't rely on such a confused character to help win a strike -- nor could we depend on him to report his genuine beliefs with any accuracy, either! He is just as likely to tell anyone who asks him: "Yes I believe this and I do not...". Would Socialist Worker have even quoted such a confused individual? Hardly.

 

[No wonder 'dialectical reasoning' has (rightly) been described as a form of "mental confusion".]

 

Elsewhere at this site, I argue that 'dialectics' was itself originally based on little more than a series of egregious logical blunders committed by Hegel (be they those that are still supposedly on their feet, the 'right way' up, or those that even remain 'upside down', it matters not), but I also pointed out that DM-fans base their assertions on half-formed thoughts, seriously garbled caricatures of logic (both formal and discursive) and laughably thin evidence -- which is why I have called DM a Mickey Mouse Science.

 

Simon Basketter's obscure claims amply confirm allegations like these. For example, do these odd beliefs, held by prison officers, imply each other, like the proletariat implies the capitalist class, such that one can't exist without the other? No. Do they struggle with and then turn into each other, which they should do, according to the DM-classics? Again, no, they don't. But, if not, they can't be 'dialectical contradictions', whatever else they are.

 

Did, Basketter even ask himself these questions? Apparently not. Then why on earth did he use the word "contradiction"?

 

In answer to that question, the Impertinent Explanation (from earlier) only gains in credibility.

 

But, let us return to the benighted comrade and re-examine what he had to say, in order to see if anything at all useful can be extracted from it.

 

"I can contradict someone's statements. Can I also have contrary interests to yours? Could it reasonably be said that someone's behaviour was contradictory? Or that someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it. Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?" [Paragraphs merged.]

 

Consider this, first:

 

"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."

 

Well, who can blame theorists for wanting to use old words in new ways? But, the above examples seem to be framed in ordinary language already. So why then the following question?

 

"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"

 

Of course, these examples relate to what humans beings do, or can think, so they aren't much use in showing how there are, or can be, 'true contradictions' in nature.

 

Now this benighted comrade might not have noticed (but it was staring him in the face in the example I gave, and in the ones he listed) that contradictions can relate to the inner workings of one proposition just as they can apply to the connection between several propositions, at once, both in ordinary language and in logic. In which case, neither the complexities of logic nor the confused state of his thought processes can be used to defend this comrade from his self-inflicted errors -- for he himself provides his own counterexamples!

 

Consider this, for instance:

 

"Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."

 

Unfortunately, that is far too vague to do much with. Perhaps he meant something like the following (taking an example from Astronomy)?

 

D1: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D2: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.3 million light years.

 

But, these don't contradict one another, since the true distance to YY could be 4.5 million light years, making both D1 and D2 false.

 

And, it is irrelevant whether the true distance to YY is actually 4.8 or even 4.3 million light years. The fact is that it might not be, or might not have been, either of these.

 

It is worth recalling that if this were a genuine contradiction, D1 and D2 couldn't both be true and couldn't both be false at once (whether or not one of them was either of these). At best, therefore, D1 and D2 are inconsistent -- they are contraries not contradictories. So, even if D1 were true, it is still the case that both D1 and D2 couldn't both be true but could both be false, at once. That wouldn't happen if they were contradictories -- unlike the following two, which are:

 

D3: The measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D4: It isn't the case that the measured distance to star, YY, is 4.8 million light years.

 

D4a: The measured distance to star, YY, isn't 4.8 million light years. [This is a colloquial version of D4.]

 

Now, D3 and D4 have to have opposite truth values (assuming, of course, that there is such a star); they both can't be true and they both can't be false. Given what we mean by "star", YY has to be some distance or other from the earth. One or other of D3 and D4 has to be true, and they have to have opposite truth-values. Either YY is 4.8 million light years from earth or it isn't (otherwise the meaning of the words used must have changed -- or the star itself has ceased to exist, etc., etc.).

 

Some might object that the above is misleading; the star will have moved while its distance is being measured so the above 'either-or' is misguided. FL can't cope with such changes, whereas DL can.

 

Or so it might be argued...

 

However, even though this star might have moved, all that this would mean is that D3 used to be true, and now it is false; and this in turn will imply that D4 was false but now it is true. My point still stands, therefore. They would still have opposite truth-values -- in spite of any changes that might have occurred.

 

[Again, always assuming the star still exists! Any who object to the use of the LEM in the above should read this, and then perhaps think again.]

 

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

 

To be sure, an inconsistency here might imply a contradiction, but it is far from clear that the benighted comrade meant this. But, even if he did, who has ever denied two propositions can contradict one another (if conjoined)? [Again, I have posted two of them above!] The point is, they can't both be true and they can't both be false, at once.

 

DM-fans seem to want both propositions to be true -- but, alas, that would automatically prevent them from being contradictory, from forming a contradiction, or from even being propositions, to begin with!

 

Now, this comrade might have meant that raw data (not yet expressed in a propositional context or form) could contradict some theory or other. Perhaps then he meant these examples of raw data:

 

D5: 4.8 million light years.

 

D6: 4.3 million light years.

 

But, neither of these is capable of being true or false since they aren't even indicative sentences. And, if that is so, they can't contradict anything (since in order to do that they would both have to be capable of being true or false). Moreover, as soon as a (sentential) context is provided for them, they would merely be inconsistent, once more.

 

But, couldn't D3 and D4, or even D5 and D6, contradict the predictions of some theory/enquiry or other? Perhaps this is what was meant?

 

D7: Theory, TT, predicts that star, YY, is 5.7 million light years away.

 

D8: Observation tells us that YY is 4.8 million light years away.

 

And yet, the proposition "YY is 5.7 million light years away" is merely inconsistent with D8. This star could actually be 4.4 million light years away, making D7 and D8 both false. So, D7 and D8 are dealing with contraries.

 

In which case, we still don't have a contradiction!

 

So, until this comrade supplies us with clearer or more precise details about what he means, little more can be done with his rather vague comments.

 

[I will, however, be looking in detail at how data can 'contradict' scientific theory, alongside the confused things DM-fans have to say about it, in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

Be this as it may, is it possible for an individual to have contradictory interests or goals in a relationship, as this comrade asserts?

 

Perhaps by that he meant the following (for simplicity's sake, I will concentrate on potential or actual interests an individual might have; the argument can easily be extended to cover actual or potential goals -- those details will be left to the reader):

 

B1: NM has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

B2: It is not the case that NM has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

This appears to be a genuinely contradictory pair. If B1 and B2 were conjoined they would form a contradiction -- always assuming they both applied simultaneously and with no equivocation:

 

B2a: NM has interest, A, in relationship, R, and it is not case that NM has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

But, did the benighted comrade mean this?

 

According to his own wording, apparently he did not:

 

"Could it reasonably be said that...someone's interests were contradictory (in relationship perhaps to some goal they had)? Or that my interests contradicted yours? Certainly some data might appear contradictory in relationship to some enquiry we have about it."

 

Well, what about the following?

 

B3: NM has interest, A, in relationship, R.

 

B4: NM has interest, B, in relationship, R.

 

B5: Interest, A, in relationship, R, contradicts interest, B, in relationship, R.

 

But, if we are talking about literal contradictions here (and not the loose and ill-defined dialectical-sort-of-contradictions we have come to know and loathe) then A and B in relationship R can only contradict one another if they are expressed in propositions (or in clauses), as indicated in B5a-B7:

 

B5a: Interest, A, contradicts interest, B.

 

B6: "A" stands for "I, NM, must love my partner".

 

B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I, NM, must love my partner".

 

It is hard to see how anything could be called an interest (as opposed to it being a vague sort of non-linguistic 'feeling') unless it were expressed in this way, or their equivalent.

 

The question is can anyone assent to such conflicting interests all at once? Well, as we saw with NN earlier, people can assent to all manner of odd ideas and feelings, so there is nothing to prevent B6 and B7 from forming the content of someone's overall intentional or emotional make-up.

 

However, before we hastily slap a 'contradiction' label ('dialectical' or otherwise) on this scenario, it is plain that this alleged contradiction can be disambiguated along lines that were suggested, and attempted, above (in relation to N3 and N4, reproduced again below), providing we supply plausible background details (ignoring, however, the complexities mentioned in N2a and N2b). That is because people don't just have interests simpliciter any more than they have emotions simpliciter.

 

[For something to be an emotion it has to be object directed; so, we are angry with someone or something, fearful of something or someone, in love with someone or something, etc. Of course, an individual could just be in a fearful state, with no object of that fear, but that would be enough to diagnose him/her as (acutely or chronically) mentally disturbed or ill (in this case, they would be in the grip of an "irrational fear"). This wouldn't count as a genuine emotion, otherwise a mental disturbance wouldn't have been diagnosed. We can tell the difference between a genuine emotion and a mental disorder by the fact that the latter don't have clear objects (that aren't also delusional).]

 

As with most things connected with intentional behaviour, such episodes are goal-, or object-directed (which is why we use transitive verbs to characterise them). We wouldn't be able to make sense of someone who was just in love, but with no one or nothing in particular.

 

N3: At time, t, NN is both angry with MM for lying to her at t (because it was a violation of trust), and not angry with MM for lying to her at t (because she fully understands the pressures on MM when he lied).

 

N4: At time, t, NN is both φ-ing at t, and not ψ-ing at t.

 

[The reader is directed here for an explanation of these symbols.]

 

Hence, in this case, we would have something like the following (in an abbreviated, even if slightly stilted form, for clarity's sake):

 

N3c: NN feels she must love MM because of his caring for her, and NN feels she mustn't love MM for sleeping with her best friend.

 

[I have left N3c in a slightly stilted form so that it is clear what is being said.]

 

In that case, N3c is in fact this:

 

N5: NN feels she must love MM for φ-ing, and not love MM for ψ-ing.

 

As before, we have in effect two different objects of NN's love: his caring for her (i.e., "φ-ing") and his violation of her trust (i.e., "ψ-ing"). Which is, of course, why caveat N1 was added earlier (now re-written as N1a):

 

N1: NN is both angry and not angry at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that anger.

 

N1a: NN both loves and does not love MM at the same time, and with respect to the same object of that love.

 

Plainly, in N5, we have two different objects of the said love, and thus no contradiction -- or, at least, no more than there would be here:

 

N6: NN saw MN in the distance with her binoculars.

 

N7: NN saw NM in the distance with her binoculars.

 

Here we have two different objects of NN's sight, MN and NM. If anyone thought these two propositions were contradictory, that would provide clear evidence they were in the grip of linguistic confusion, not the author of a breakthrough in the science of optics -- or even philosophy.

 

[N6 and N7 aren't even inconsistent with one another. NN might be able to see both MN and NM, after all!]

 

It could be argued that the above examples in fact express the cause of those emotions, or whatever it was that occasioned them, not their objects. In fact, it isn't too clear that this is a distinction with a difference, any more than these are:

 

N8: MN in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.

 

N9: NM in the distance caused NN to see him with her binoculars.

 

So, whatever the cause happens to be, the aforementioned emotions had different objects (in N3 and N43, for instance), and so aren't contradictory.

 

Of course, if this benighted comrade meant something other than this, he should perhaps learn to be a little clearer.

 

However, it could t be objected that it is reasonably obvious that the contradiction here is this:

 

B7a: NN: "I must love my partner and it isn't the case that I must love my partner".

 

Once more, it is far from clear how this qualifies as a 'dialectical contradiction' -- that is, should we ever be told what one of these is. [Do these two contradictory states both turn into one another, as the DM-classics insist they should? Do they imply one another, as the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are supposed to?]

 

Ignoring this minor niggle for now, it is undeniable that human beings experience conflicting emotions like this all the time, but when faced with B7a, the normal reaction would be to respond with: "Er..., what on earth do you mean by that?". And, we wouldn't be surprised if NN found it impossible to say why she felt this way. We would certainly expect some form of disambiguation or clarification of what she meant, perhaps along the following lines:

 

N3a: NN feels she must love MM because of his caring for her, and NN feels she mustn't love MM for sleeping with her best friend.

 

N3b: "I, NN, must love my partner MM because of his caring for me, and I, NN, feel I mustn't love MM for sleeping with my best friend".

 

If so, and once more, no contradiction would be implied.

 

But, even if B7a were an unambiguous contradiction, that would simply confirm the fact that contradictions in ordinary language and in logic are built around the content of propositions, and the logical links we hold between them -- undermining this benighted comrade's point:

 

"Does this not suggest that the notion of a contradiction is not exhausted by what might go on inside a proposition? In ordinary usage?"

 

The question now is, has anyone ever held the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true or both false at the same time? Or anything like them? Perhaps they have (who can say?), but how that shows that there are in fact 'true contradictions' in nature and society still remains unclear.

 

B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".

 

B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I must love my partner".

 

[B5: Interest, A, in relationship, R, contradicts interest, B, in relationship, R.]

 

As should seem obvious, the fact that someone believes (or holds) something to be true, or even believes something to be false, doesn't automatically make it true or make it false!

 

[Once again, it is worth recalling here that two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once. So, if someone does assent to two contradictory propositions, they must believe both can be true or both can be false, at the same time and in the same respect. That is they must (implicitly, or possibly even, explicitly) deny the following: "Two contradictory propositions can't both be true and can't both be false, at once." But, that would just mean they had misunderstood the word "contradiction" (or had perhaps been led astray by a persuasive definition of some sort). We certainly can't build a new science of human behaviour on the basis of confusion like this -- still less revolutionary theory and practice.]

 

However, it could be argued that because NN holds the quoted propositions in B6 and B7 both true -- if coupled with the fact that NN is an individual who exists in the real world --, that shows that it is at least possible to assert the existence of true contradictions. Once that possibility is allowed, the objections set out in this Essay can be seen for what they are: empty rhetoric.

 

B6: "A" stands for "I must love my partner".

 

B7: "B" stands for "It is not the case that I must love my partner".

 

Or, so it might be claimed.

 

Indeed, an argument somewhat like that was aired by Roy Edgley a few years ago:

 

"Since thought and theory are also part of reality and thus real objects that can be thought about, contradictions in thought, though not true of reality, certainly exist in reality; and it is only because they do exist in reality that they can be the object of criticism -- criticism for failing to be true of reality. Moreover, it is because two contradictory theories can't both be true that each bears a critical relation to the other: instantiated in actual thought this relation of logical opposition is in fact a critical relation of real opposition, Kant notwithstanding. It is no less logical opposition and no more simply natural 'conflict of forces' for taking the form of real historical and social struggle." [Edgley (1979), pp.24-25. Italic emphases in the original; bold added.]

 

The following would presumably be one such contradiction (although Edgley himself was apparently interested in more overtly scientific propositions), and one such existential claim:

 

B8: Let "p" be "I must love my partner and it is not the case that I must love my partner".

 

B9: In so far as p exists, contradictions exist in reality.

 

Edgley's argument appears to be the following: While a proposition like p wouldn't actually be true, it would still exist, and hence contradictions exist (at this minimal level, at least). Admittedly, it is an entirely different matter whether p is true or false. [I will return to consider that option later on.]

 

So, what about the claim that this argument shows that contradictions at least exist?

 

Well, certainly those words exit, but that is no more illuminating than the following would be:

 

B10: Let "G" = "God". [I.e., "G" stands for the word, "God".]

 

B11: In so far as G exists, God exists in reality.

 

The question would still remain as to whether there is a 'God' or not.

 

[As those who know their logic will also appreciate, Edgley has confused a propositional sign with a proposition (and perhaps also use with mention). B10 and B11 partially expose that muddle.]

 

Someone might object: the above argument in fact confirms that the word "God" exists just as Edgley's argument shows that contradictions exist.

 

Well, all it shows is that a propositional sign or a simple sign exists (in some form or other, but the details become rather unclear when we look to Edgley to tell us where he thinks such signs actually exist), but who has ever denied that? Put another way, Edgley's argument is no more illuminating than would be an argument that had been aimed at showing 'God' exists, but which instead showed that the word "God" exists!

 

Once more, no one has ever questioned the existence of inscriptions of contradictions (indeed, these Essays contain scores of them), but that sheds no light at all on the claim that there are 'real contradictions', or 'true contradictions', in nature and society. If the mere thought of a contradiction, or an actual inscription on the page (or screen), were enough to show that DM-contradictions exist in the real world, then we should have to admit that there were 'real tautologies', too. But worse, we should have to accept LIE -- that is, the doctrine that solely from thought, or from words alone, substantive ontological conclusions (as opposed to trivial inscriptional conclusions) may be deduced. [There will be more on this in Essay Twelve.]

 

[The word "inscription" above applies to physical marks on a page/screen/wall/blackboard/whiteboard/cavewall that aren't considered random, but are held to be the product of intentionality, part of a natural-, or even a formal-language -- or perhaps even a work of art, no matter how 'primitive' or 'advanced' they are.]

 

[LIE = Linguistic Idealism; FL = Formal Logic.]

 

But, signs and inscriptions don't have such existential implications. If they did we should all have to believe in the actual existence of The Tooth Fairy and Bigfoot. At best, therefore, all that Edgley's argument shows is that inscriptions of contradictory sentences exist.

 

Edgley then argues:

 

"Though a system of thought that is contradictory can't be true of its real object, this isomorphic relation between the structure of a society's thought and the structure of its material life thus gives sense to the idea that such thought is true to that material life: in being contradictory it 'reflects', and so discloses, though its content does not explicitly assert, the contradictory structure of the material life of that society." [Ibid., p.25. Italic emphasis in the original.]

 

Unfortunately, some writers are a little careless over the use of words like "isomorphic". How, it might be wondered, can a set of words be isomorphic to items in the world that they don't in any way resemble. Especially since some of these words are abstract common nouns, and many aren't even referential? With what are "if" and "or", for example, isomorphic?

 

Putting this 'niggle' to one side for now, we might further wonder how Edgley knows this is indeed an "isomorphism" if none of his contradictions are true of capitalism, as he concedes. Moreover, his claim that this theory is "true to" capitalism is far from clear; how something can be "true to", but not "true of", a social system is something Edgley failed to explain.

 

Edgley also asserts that these linguistic contradictions (or at least the more theoretical examples to which he refers) are a "reflection" of "real oppositions" in society. That claim is partly defused below, and will be further laid to rest throughout this Essay. [See also here.]

 

Independently of this, Edgley makes a serious mistake (one that all DM-fans are victims of): confusing contradictions in FL with what might or might not exist. As noted above, and again in Essay Four Part One, FL makes no existential claims. To be sure, logicians as individuals might make such claims, but logic itself is neutral in this regard (since logic isn't an agent, and is capable of making no assertions, still less any about the world). While it is true that certain logical systems might need an ontology (or even a model) in order to work, even then, contradictions don't make existential claims. The background 'ontology', if there is one, does that.

 

To repeat: in its simplest form, a contradiction in logic is merely the conjunction of a proposition with its negation, such that both can't both be true and both can't be false at once. So, the fact that inscriptions of contradictions exist has no bearing on that logical principle. Furthermore, FL doesn't rule out the existence of contradictions, since FL isn't a science, nor is it an agent (as already noted). It neither rules in, nor rules out, the existence of anything. In fact, in the construction of indirect proofs, logicians and mathematicians make use of contradictions all the time! The study of logic, in this specific respect, revolves around the truth-functional implications that hold between a proposition and its negation. So, it isn't about existence, in any shape or form.

 

In that case, contradictions can't "reflect" anything, for they represent one form of the disintegration of the expressive power of language, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

 

[Admittedly, there are many different definitions of "contradiction" in FL and Philosophical Logic; that topic is discussed in Essay Eight Part Three. Readers are directed there for more details. There is also more on this here, here and in Essay Twelve Part One.]

 

But, wait! The benighted comrade mentioned earlier has a powerful ally, none other than that charlatan, Freud:

 

"Perhaps someone is in the midst of an unhappy love affair and says 'I love him but I also hate him'. It's not just the statement but the feeling which is a contradiction surely? If Freud is held to describe the human individual not as a unified subject but a bundle of contradictory drives and desires, might one not imagine contradictory drives (if not desires) in a particular social system? Can I not have contradictory emotions about a subject, situation or person (I know I do about all sorts of things!)." [Paragraphs merged.]

 

Thus, on the back of some rather egregious Freudian Pseudo-Science, this comrade is content to build his 'case'.

 

But, is there anything in these fraudulent Freudian fancies (even if we put to one side all the lies, deceit, client abuse, intellectual bullying, cocaine-induced fantasy, paranoia, and fabricated evidence that marked Freud's career)?

 

Well, once more, can people have, or be subject to, contradictory emotions?

 

Perhaps these will suffice?

 

B12: NN hates Tony Blair.

 

B13: It is not the case that NN hates Tony Blair.

 

However, and once again, I rather think that the benighted comrade didn't mean a contradiction like that.

 

Maybe, then, he intended the following?

 

B14: NN both hates and loves Tony Blair.

 

This is entirely possible, if unusual (but it can surely be disambiguated along the lines suggested earlier).

 

However, it is worth noting that love and hate aren't automatically contradictory (when put in a propositional context), unless, say, hating someone implies not loving them; but, as the above quotation shows, it doesn't imply this! [That must be so unless by "contradiction" we mean something entirely different. If so, what?]

 

Moreover, we have already seen that B14 isn't even a contradiction, since it could be false -- that is, if NN were indifferent toward Tony Blair.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth drawing attention to the following points:

 

The reader is advised to re-read the caveats posted here. She should note that in order to give content to the above ideas idea (if that is what was meant by the benighted comrade, or if his ideas actually mean anything at all), we had to use a propositional context to make their implications clear, once more.

 

This rather makes a mess then of the following rather rash remarks courtesy of the aforementioned comrade:

 

"I'm just very puzzled about what it means to restrict the meaning of the term contradiction to a rule of formal logic. It's always been the least compelling of your arguments it seems to me. I don't understand the linguistic scandal that is supposed to be involved in talking about the human subject as a 'bundle of contradictory drives and desires' or talking about the capitalist system as encompassing contradictory tendencies (how TRPF [the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall -- RL] is held to operate inside a concrete capitalist social formation for example).... I don't see how there can be anything ipso facto absurd or meaningless about such statements to anyone familiar with ordinary language." [Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

There is no "scandal" here at all. This comrade's badly garbled and ill-considered examples themselves imply the conclusions reached earlier -- that is, when we try to make sense of them. Even he had to use propositions to inform us of these Freudian foibles.

 

[Supposedly contradictory drives and emotions were disambiguated earlier. The alleged 'contradictions' in capitalism have been dealt with here and here. Finally, it has already been pointed out, just as it was pointed it out to this comrade, several times (since he tended to develop selective blindness when it suited him), my concerns aren't solely with FL-contradictions!]

 

Of course, it could be argued that certain brain states (that at some level provide a material basis for psychological or social forces) are what lie behind these contradictory emotions and tendencies -- details about which seem to have exercised this benighted comrade -- and it is perhaps here that these contradiction are to be found. [This also appears to be what motivated Professor Edgley's comments examined earlier.]

 

Unfortunately, the thesis that there are such things as 'contradictory forces' has been laid to rest in this Essay; but, the overall idea is susceptible to the next series of objections, anyway.

 

[The argument below also applies to the claim that there might be certain brain states, process, or psychological 'drives' -- or even social forces and tendencies -- at work, about which we are as yet unaware, that constitute such 'material contradictions', or which cause or 'mediate' them. They could even turn out to be those mythical Freudian fancies mentioned above. Who knows?]

 

To that end, let us define "Φ" as the brain states, processes, psychological 'drives', and/or social forces/tendencies that result in, 'mediate', or from which "emerge", the following:

 

B15: NN loves Tony Blair.

 

Or, which can be expressed in the first person:

 

B15a: I, NN, love Tony Blair.

 

Let us also define "Φ*" as the brain states, processes, psychological 'drives', and/or social forces/tendencies, that result in, 'mediate', or from which "emerge", the following:

 

B16: NN hates Tony Blair.

 

Or, which can again be expressed in the first person:

 

B16a: I, NN, hate Tony Blair.

 

So, "Φ" stands for the social or psychological forces (etc., etc.) that 'mediate' (etc., etc.) "NN loves Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent), and "Φ*" stands for the social forces (etc., etc.) which 'mediate' (etc., etc.) "NN hates Tony Blair" (or its first person equivalent). We can also stipulate that Φ and Φ* aren't fixed and immutable, but change in accord with whatever dialectic laws or processes DM-fans care to throw at them.

 

Let us further assume that Φ 'contradicts' Φ*, i.e., that they are 'dialectically-united opposites'.

 

Now, even given these give-away and recklessly profligate assumptions, this theory still won't work!

 

According to the DM-classics -- where we are told that all things change into their opposites, and that they do so because of a "struggle" going on between them -- Φ must change into Φ*, and vice versa. But, Φ can't change into Φ* since Φ* already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this theory, Φ couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with which it could 'struggle' in order to make it do just that!

 

And, it is no good propelling Φ* into the future so that it now becomes what Φ* will change into, since Φ* will do no such thing unless Φ is already there to make that happen!

 

Now, it could be objected that love can surely turn into hate, and vice versa. Indeed, it can, but the whole point of introducing Φ and Φ* was to show that if and when that happens, dialectics can't account for it -- and for the above reasons! This is quite apart from the fact that Φ and Φ* aren't the abstractions love and hate, they are real material states and processes (etc., etc.) -- so, and once more, Φ can't turn into Φ* since Φ* already exists. 

 

[For those interested, this argument has been developed in extensive detail here, where 'social contradictions' have also been taken into account, and several objections -- some obvious, some not so obvious -- have been also neutralised.]

 

Of course, if they aren't 'dialectically-united opposites' to begin with, then the above comrade's objection fails by default. So, do these brain states (etc., etc.) imply one another? But one of them can surely exist without the other. If so, they can't 'interpenetrate each other -- again, unlike, say, the capitalist class and the proletariat-- which, so we are told, imply one another such that one can't exist without the other, and vice versa.

 

Once again, none of this makes sense, even in DM-terms!

 

Finally, the following represents an edited version of an exchange between myself and a far more reasonable comrade (whose name has been withheld at their request):

 

Comrade M (commenting on the dialectical use of the word "contradiction"): I mean what most people mean -- conflict, inner tension...

 

Rosa: Do they really? Give me one sentence drawn from ordinary language (the vehicle most people do in fact use, so what you say should appear there, somewhere) where such an interpretation could be put on the word "contradiction" -- i.e., one not infected with the sort of idealist guff you read in Hegel. An idealist will have no problem with asserting such things; if reality is Mind it can surely argue with itself. Not so a materialist who bases his/her science on the language of ordinary workers (ordinary language).

 

But, even then, why call such things "contradictions"? What link does this particular use have with the "gain-saying" of someone, which is what the word usually means? How is a conflict in society a contradiction?

 

Sure, you can re-define the word to mean whatever you like, but if we all did that we could re-define anything to mean anything, and we'd lose touch with meaning altogether.

 

Apart from that, you'd be forcing a view onto reality (contrary to what 'dialecticians' tell us they never do), not reading one from it. Linguistic Idealism -- as I asserted in those parts of my work I sent you -- would then automatically have raised its ideal head. Society would be 'contradictory', not because it really is so, but because we have re-defined it to be so. A linguistic dodge would have created a few empirical 'truths'; this is 'science' on the cheap...

 

Comrade M: Rosa said: "Give me one sentence..." Okay, what about "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!" Or "That's a contradiction in terms".

 

Suppose someone says "military intelligence" is a contradiction in terms. What they mean is that there is a conflict or a tension between the first and the second word, thus conjugated.

 

At any rate, you are berating a new convert. I can't be expected to know everything at once, much less know it as wisely as the central committee (you).

 

Rosa: First, the phrase "contradiction in terms" is either a misnomer or a rhetorical device. Why? Well, since contradiction has to do with truth and falsehood as much as it has to do with "gain-saying", and since one term on its own can't be true or false (only sentences and clauses can be), and since single words do not say anything, no term can contradict another.

 

In that case, "contradiction in terms" means something like "incompatible phrase(s)", as in "round square". Now, "A is round and it is square" would only be a contradiction if "A is round" were taken to mean "A is not square", but then you would not now have a contradiction in terms, just a sentential contradiction with no "conflict (or) inner tension" anywhere in sight.

 

And, if the above conclusion were rejected (for some reason), you still wouldn't have a "contradiction in terms" that expressed some sort of "conflict (or) inner tension", since, once more, words can't conflict (or be tense, or be in tension) because they aren't agents. Moreover, anyone who uttered a "contradiction in terms" would not necessarily be in "conflict (or) inner tension", just confused. And even if they weren't confused, the "contradiction in terms" they uttered wouldn't necessarily indicate "conflict (or) inner tension"; it could be a sign of all manner of things (ranging from lack of clarity, through puzzlement, to playfulness).

 

As to the idea that such a phrase could indicate the presence of "conflict (or) inner tension" I have no doubt, but if a "contradiction in terms" meant that a "conflict (or) inner tension" had to be present, it would mean this, and not merely could mean this, just as the truth of "not p" would mean the falsehood of "p" (as opposed merely to "not p" could mean the falsehood of "p"). So they can't be synonymous, as you allege.

 

[Apologies for the prolixity of that paragraph, but logic is a pain in the dictionary!]

 

But, even if this weren't so, "contradiction" here still wouldn't mean "conflict (or) inner tension", it would mean "gainsaying oneself or another", which could be true without an inner conflict being implied. It might be a joke, an attempt to puzzle, part of a game, a mistake, etc. The possibilities are endless. The attempt to squeeze this into an idealist boot can only succeed if the almost endless possibilities allowed for by ordinary language are ignored, or can be ruled out.

 

As for "Don't you contradict me you little bastard!", the verb "to contradict" in this command (it isn't in fact a proposition, so it can't itself be a contradiction, literally speaking -- not that you suggested it was) clearly means "gain-say". No quibble there. But, if it meant "conflict, inner tension", you would have:

 

"Don't you conflict/inner tension me you little bastard!", which is meaningless.

 

Even if we were to edit this down to:

 

"Don't you conflict with me you little bastard!",

 

it wouldn't mean the same as:

 

"Don't you contradict me you little bastard!"

 

One can conflict with someone without contradicting them, and vice versa (e.g., two friends could contradict each other (out of fun) without conflicting with each other, say). Hence these can't mean the same.

 

However "Don't you inner tension with me you little bastard!" can't be beaten into shape at all.

 

Of course, I should have also pointed out that if we already have words (such as "conflict") that capture what we mean, why do we need to repurpose the word "contradiction" in this way, especially since it brings in its train such unwelcome baggage? [I have explained just what this 'baggage' is in Essay Nine Part Two -- to which we can now add the multiple confusions exposed in this Essay.]

 

Final Round-Up

 

Because dialecticians have so far neglected to explain with any clarity, or in any detail, what it means to equate forces in nature and society with 'contradictions', I have been forced to offer my own attempts at clarification (no pun intended). All have so far failed. In this final main section I will endeavour to present what I think is the only viable interpretation of the presumed link between forces and 'contradictions'.

 

Dialectics In ICU

 

We have seen that the concepts DM-theorists have imported from Hermetic Philosophy have badly failed them when any attempt is made to apply them to, or connect them with, the forces operating in nature and society. In that case, other that the ideological reasons outlined in Essay Nine Part Two (summarised below), the impertinent answer to the question why hard-nosed revolutionaries insist on using such obscure, mystical jargon (which terminology they struggle to explain) is the only one left standing:

 

Dialecticians use obscure jargon like this simply because it is traditional to do so.

 

This means that this part of DM (already under intensive care in the Emergency Resuscitation Ward) is now ready to be measured for a pine overcoat and then lowered six feet closer to the Earth's core.

 

A Last Desperate Attempt

 

However, before we call for the local Hermetic High Priest to read DM its Last Mystical Rites, we should, I think, make one last attempt to resuscitate this moribund 'theory'.

 

In fact, we are now in a position to reconsider some abandoned alternatives from earlier in an attempt to rescue this part of DM from its long overdue funeral.

 

Back To The Drawing Board

 

Below, I present another re-interpretation of the alleged connection between forces and 'contradictions', based on F6-F9, above:

 

F6: Let force, P1, oppose force, P2, in configuration, C1, in nature.

 

F7: Here, opposition amounts to the following: the normal effects produced by P1 in C1 (had P2 not been present) are the opposite of the effects P2 would have produced in C1 (had P1 similarly not been operative).

 

F8: Let P1's normal effects in C1 be elements of an event set, E1, and those of P2 be elements of an event set, E2. For the purposes of simplicity, let E1 and E2 be disjoint.

 

F9: By F7, E1 and E2 contain only opposites, such that elements of E1 and E2 taken pair-wise, respectively, from each set form oppositional couples.

 

To these we can add the following:

 

F58: Force, P1, contradicts P2 in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (internally, or with one another).

 

Unfortunately, this latest re-interpretation can't work, either. That is because if one or both of E1 and E2 don't exist (as a result of the operation of P1 and P2) there can be no contradiction. As we have seen several times already, F58 would imply a 'contradiction' between sets of events not all of which co-exist.77

 

'Internally Contradictory'

 

However, we also need to consider events that are 'internally contradictory':

 

F58: Force, P1, contradicts force, P2, in so far as some or all of E1 and E2 are contradictory (internally, or with one another).

 

F58a: Force, P1 contradicts force, P2, in so far as the event set that one or other produces (i.e., E3) is internally contradictory.

 

Given that one or more of the elements of E3 (or even E3 itself) could be 'internally contradictory', F58, or perhaps F58a, might allow the interpretation of 'contradictions' as opposing forces to stand.

 

Unfortunately, even if sense could be made of contradictory contemporaneous events, the link between forces and 'internally contradictory' sets of events would once again have been severed. Hence, even if F58 and F58a were completely acceptable, they would still fail to connect 'contradictions' with opposing forces, merely with the inter-relationship between the effects of forces.

 

Now, let us suppose P1 and P2 operate as the above propositions suggest; in that case, plainly, given the truth of F58a, only E3 would take place or exist. But, if E3 were 'internally contradictory', presumably parts of it (i.e., sub-events of E3, say, E3i and E3k) would constitute the postulated 'internal contradiction'. In that case, F58a would collapse back into a variant of F58.

 

[Of course, if, as we are told, 'dialectical contradictions' are "mutually exclusive", they can't co-exist. In which case, E3i and E3k can't co-exist, either, and so can't 'contradict' one another.]

 

On the other hand, if all of E3 were in this state because of its 'internally contradictory' dispositional properties, then that, too, would be an non-viable option, and for reasons that have already been considered. [On this, see the discussion of F57 earlier this Essay.]

 

However, as far as F58 itself is concerned, if one event prevents another from happening, no contradiction is implied since such a 'conflict' would have only one real term -- as noted several times already. [See, for example, Interlude Nine]

 

[Nevertheless, this might allow for the consideration of more complex examples allegedly drawn from HM. On this, see the discussion aired here.]

 

As far as events being 'internally contradictory' is concerned, we saw that this was a dead-end, too (in Part One of this Essay).

 

It might be felt that "mutually exclusive" doesn't imply that the items involved can't co-exist. After all the capitalist class and the proletariat are mutually exclusive, but plainly they can and do co-exist.

 

However, as we saw earlier, dialecticians simply assume there is a link between "mutually exclude" and "oppositional" and/or "contradictory". But, many things in nature and society mutually exclude one another without implying a contradiction, or even "opposition". The reader is referred to Interlude Fourteen for more details, where I have shown that this entire idea is both seriously misguided and hopelessly vague.

 

It looks, therefore, like this particular interpretative seam has been thoroughly worked-out; there is no gold in it, only slag. Unfortunately, what little apparent 'gold' there was, mined long ago by Hegel & Co., turned out to be nothing but Iron Pyrites.

 

We need to find a new approach to save this rapidly fading 'theory' from being sent to the knackers yard.

 

DM And The Revival Of Teleology

 

The last remaining escape route left open to DM-theorists relies on reviving yet another interpretation which was postponed from earlier (no pun intended), wherein 'contradictions' were said to exist between the effects of forces (or between forces and the effects of other forces), rather than between forces themselves. One such alternative involved taking Engels's suggestion seriously: that forces should be edited out of the picture, leaving behind only the relative motion between bodies to give some content to the idea that 'contradictions' can cause change.

 

However, the first of these had to be abandoned because it meant that forces 'contradicted' prevented effects, implicating this part of the theory with the idea that forces could 'contradict' non-existent entities, once more. The second appeared to undermine the dialectical unity of nature.

 

Nevertheless, I now propose to examine a re-vamped version of the first of these alternatives, which is aimed at circumventing the difficulties noted above.

 

The good news is that this new option solves the problem created by the second alternative.

 

The bad news is that it introduces far worse difficulties of its own.

 

The aforementioned earlier attempt was based on the following:

 

F17: Event, E, consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.

 

F18: E1-En, form a complex of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T.

 

F19: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.

 

F20: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist, will never exist, or do not take place.

 

["T" stands for "The Totality".]

 

As we saw above, an existing force, P1, appears to 'contradict' a non-existent event (or series of events), which rendered this interpretation useless. The following re-vamped version appears to fix that problem:

 

F59: Event, E, consists of a set of inter-connected sub-events, E1-En.

 

F60: E1-En, form complexes of material interactions (of a sufficiently mediated and contradictory nature) within T, if ever they occur.

 

F61: Let P1 prevent some or all of E1-En from taking place.

 

F62: Therefore, some or all of E do not exist, will never exist, or do not take place.

 

F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.

 

Since, an expectation can exist alongside a realisation that it has been thwarted (in some cases), this appears remove the difficulty.

 

However, F63 is clearly of little use since, not only would it be inapplicable throughout the Universe at all times, it doesn't even record a contradiction.

 

[That is because the propositions it contains are of the form "p and q" not "p and not p", as required -- where "p" is, say, "Ek has been prevented", and "q" is, say, "Ek was expected" --, when these were required: "Ek has been prevented" and "Ek has not been prevented", etc.]

 

F63 may be altered to circumvent this latest problem, perhaps along the following lines:77a

 

F64: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En from taking place contradict propositions that depict the dispositional properties of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.

 

One immediate problem with F64 is that it isn't at all clear what the "dispositional properties" of forces are. Objects certainly have dispositional properties as a result of their microstructure and their relationship with other bodies -- if, that is, the term "dispositional" is read in its traditional sense. [More on that in a later Essay.]

 

Even so, since forces aren't obviously body-like (although they can apparently be carried by bodies/particles -- if certain theories in modern Physics are accepted --, but even then this phenomenon is now explained in terms of transferred momentum, i.e., along neo-Engelsian lines),78 the ascription of dispositions to forces themselves perhaps amounts to a disguised reference to the affect forces could or would have on certain bodies under specific circumstances. In that case, we would have here an explanation of "contradiction" that appealed to the effect of effects, once more.

 

[Anyway, F64 doesn't even record a contradiction since the propositions it expresses are of the form "p and q" not "p and not p", as noted earlier.]

 

Nevertheless, perhaps F64 can be re-jigged -- maybe in the following way:

 

F65: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En from taking place contradict propositions that depict the normal operation of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En, but for the presence of P1.

 

Unfortunately, not only does F65 fail to record a contradiction (yet again: the propositions it expresses are of the form "p and q" not "p and not p"), so what it says returns us to a consideration of the inter-relationship between forces as a way of understanding 'contradictions', instead of the present model, which sought to interpret 'contradictions' as the relationship between forces and the effects of other forces.

 

Anyway, F65 is of little use: if the normal operation of Pn is prevented (so that it doesn't take place) there would be nothing for P1 to 'contradict'. This annoying, but recurring, 'problem' is precisely what prompted a turn to the current consideration of the actual effects of forces, since they do exist, as opposed to the prevented effects of forces -- or even forces which cease to operate --, which don't.

 

It now seems that unless we can specify how the effects of forces can 'contradict' other forces (or other effects), this part of DM will be as good as dead -- even if not yet buried or cremated. Maybe the following option will help revive it:

 

F66: Propositions that express the prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradict propositions that express the operation of Pn, such that the presence of E1 (i.e., an effect of P1) excludes some or all of E2-En.

 

However, this is no use, either, since it matters not how effectively some or all of E2-En are excluded; E1 may only 'dialectically contradict' that which exists, and, ex hypothesi, once excluded, E2-En would no longer be around to be 'contradicted' in this way.

 

The next suggestion constitutes, in my view, the only way to keep this critically ill part of DM alive:

 

F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.

 

[However, F67 will need to be re-written in 'propositional' form, but since that would make this example even more unwieldy than it already is, that task has been left to the reader to figure out.]

 

The good news is that since aims can exist where results and effects do not, we seem at last to have a genuine 'contradiction'.

 

The bad news is that this seeming tonic soon turns into a dose of strychnine. That is because, of course, not only does F67 not record a contradiction (for reasons given several times already -- the propositions it expresses to are of the form "p and q" not "p and not p"), we can't attribute aims to forces unless we wish to introduce teleology and anthropomorphism into nature and society.

 

F67 can therefore only apply to forces under the control of human agents -- or to their animistically projected counterparts in reality -- that is, if we are determined to go down this route and picture nature in such mystical terms.

 

It is therefore no surprise that the only interpretation that appears to make this part of DM viable is one that reveals the anthropomorphism implicit in the concepts its theorists have imported from Hegel and Mystical Hermeticism.

 

Alternatively, it is equally unsurprising that this is the only option that underlines the reading that works in HM, one that puts forces under human control (but with no 'contradictions' anywhere in sight).79

 

Unfortunately, this now means that F67 can't help revivify this DM-corpse.

 

Coup De Grace

 

It was pointed out earlier that there are insurmountable problems facing any attempt to identify forces with 'contradictions' -- i.e., if they are viewed as dialectically-united 'opposites'. In connection with that, we have also seen that DM-classicists maintained that all such opposites inevitably turn into one another, into that with which they have struggled. But, is it even plausible to suppose forces are capable of doing this? Is it credible that a gravitational force, say, can turn into a magnetic force, or an electrical force? Do all R-type forces turn into A-type forces? Where in Physics is it postulated that gravity can become a repulsive force, its opposite?

 

Do any of them really 'struggle' with one another? Undoubtedly, electricity and magnetism are inter-linked in modern Physics (and are in fact manifestations of one of the four fundamental forces, so we are told), but they certainly don't 'struggle' with one another, and neither do the particles on which they depend. According to current theory, such forces are "carried" by exchange particles, but they aren't an expression of a 'struggle' going on between such particles, either. [It turns out that if Quantum Field Theory is correct, there are no particles anyway! That surprising denouement was covered in Essay Seven Part One.]

 

Admittedly, magnetic fields are reversible, as are electrical fields, but this isn't true of all fields (even though all four forces can change in a variety of ways), but it is far from clear that this is because of any 'struggle' going on between them. For example, the origin of the reversal of the Earth's magnetic field may lie deep inside the planet's core, or, perhaps, inside the crust --, or it may even have an external cause (with one set of theorists blaming meteor impact); scientists aren't sure. But, not one single Geophysicist, to my knowledge, is investigating the alleged 'contradiction', or even 'struggle', between North and South to find its 'real' cause. And if an electric field has reversed, what exactly has been struggling with what?

 

[Of course, this magnetic phenomenon is a consequence of the direction of a field carried by certain particles, which simply reverses. But, it doesn't turn into its opposite. It could be argued that the direction of that field does indeed turn into its opposite; maybe so, but that isn't the result of one of those directions struggling with the other!]

 

If so, then even if it should turn out that every single one of the objections aired in this Essay is misguided in some way, the 'dialectical' equation of forces and contradictions doesn't work even in its own terms!

 

Do the Relations of Production really turn into the Forces of Production? Does a use value struggle with and then change into an exchange value? Do any of these imply the other like the proletariat implies the bourgeoisie (so we are told)?

 

But they should if the DM-classics are to be believed.

 

For Dialecticians, Truth Is 'The [W]hole' -- Alas, it's Six foot Deep

 

Since there appears to be no way that DM-'contradictions' can be given a literal, or even a figurative, interpretation as forces (opposing or otherwise, when applied in nature or society, in abstract or in concrete form) that is capable of surviving scrutiny, this part of DM can at last be given a decent burial.

 

Indeed, we can even call its time of death: August 27th, 1770.80

 

 

Figure Eleven: Send No Flowers...

 

Notes

 

1. Much of the material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

One of the more recent dialecticians to try to connect forces with 'dialectical contradictions' is Thomas Weston [Weston (2012)]. I have now added some thoughts about Weston's failed attempt, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

 

Here also is Maoist, Lenny Wolff:

 

"To begin with, the method forged by Marxism -- materialist dialectics -- is the most systematic concentration of the scientific method ever achieved, the most accurate and critical tool of inquiry into the world (indeed, the universe) and how it works. Marxism is materialist: it focuses on the material world for the ultimate causes and directions of every event and phenomenon in nature or society. And it is dialectical in that it comprehends all phenomena in their changingness (sic) and development and in their interaction with other phenomena, and because it studies the struggle of opposites within a thing or process as the underlying basis of its motion and change.... (p.12)

 

"Constant development and transformation, explosiveness and changeability, all based on the struggle of opposites, drives forward not only the sun but the entire material universe; and this fundamental law forms the basis of materialist dialectics. 'Marxist philosophy,' Mao wrote, 'holds that the law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man's thinking.' ('On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,' MSR, pp.442-443).

 

"To grasp the contradictory properties within a phenomenon and the character of their constant struggle and mutual transformation, to understand how that struggle in turn gives rise to qualitatively new things -- that is the heart of the dialectical method....

 

"The struggle and interpenetration of opposites that actually give a thing or process its character generally goes on beneath the surface. Dialectics uncovers the hidden mainsprings not apparent to 'sound common sense,' which as Engels once remarked, while a 'respectable fellow...in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures' when he enters 'the wide world of research.' (Anti-Dühring, p.26)

 

"...[After quoting Lenin] Note that Lenin underscores 'All phenomena' in his opening sentence. Can this be true? Is everything driven forward by internal contradiction?... Contradiction is universal, propelling every process and thing. But universality also means that in the development of each thing, a movement of opposites goes on from beginning to end. The growth of a child, for instance, unfolds in contradictions between bursts of rapid growth and periods of relative consolidation, dependence and independence, learning the old ways and forging and trying out (their own) new ideas. Where, at any point in the process, is there not contradiction and struggle?...

 

"Lenin lays great stress on internal contradictions as the 'driving force' of development; but this does not mean that external causes play no role at all. Ice, when heated enough, changes into water, which is certainly a change in quality, and not just degree (as one can test by diving into a swimming pool full of ice cubes, or pouring water into a Coke). Still, this does not make external causes principal; no amount of heat can transform ice into chocolate milk, or molten Iead. The ability of ice to undergo certain qualitative changes and not others results from its internal contradictions, in this case the contradictory properties of hydrogen and oxygen in their simultaneous interdependence and struggle with each other. Yet that example alone doesn't sufficiently address the question of the relation between internal and external contradictions. Can it not be said, for example, that the transformation of water into steam is the result of the contradictory struggle between heat and water -- in other words, that on a different level (e.g., considering a steam engine) the contradiction between water and heat is internal and not external? And that ultimately the very concept of external cause is meaningless?

 

"No, it is not meaningless...but it is relative. This is bound up with the fact that there are qualitatively different levels to the structure of matter (speaking here of all matter, whether subatomic particles, human societies or galaxies). Water molecules, for example, contain atoms. These atoms, however, are not 'mini-molecules,' but qualitatively different organizations of matter with distinct contradictory characteristics, properties and structures. Their combination into a molecule is conditional -- and in the absence of certain underlying conditions, the molecule will break down. But, at the same time, the behaviour of these atoms when they are integrated into the structure of a molecule will be more determined by the contradictions of the molecule than by their own internal particularities as atoms....

 

"The point here is that the concrete character of the process or thing being analyzed must be kept to the forefront. There are different levels of structure to matter, and any level is both relatively autonomous and at the same time linked to and influenced by other levels. Therefore clarity on what exactly is under study, and on that basis which contradictions should be considered internal and which external, and how they relate, is critically important to dialectical analysis. Mao emphasized understanding the 'law of contradiction in things in a concrete way.' ('On Contradiction,' MSR, p.90) The actual opposites which constitute and push forward the development of a thing or process must be ascertained, their interaction and struggle studied and understood....

 

"To begin with, identity has both a popular and a philosophical meaning. Philosophically, the identity of opposites does not mean that the two aspects of a contradiction are the same as each other, or can't be told apart; it refers instead both to the coexistence of opposites within a single entity, and to their property under certain circumstances of transforming into each other, thereby qualitatively transforming the character of the thing or process at hand. To begin with the first aspect of the philosophical meaning of identity, the coexistence of opposites: while every entity or process is a contradiction composed of opposing forces, through most of their existence entities exist in a relatively stable state. To put it another way, within any entity or process there are new and rising forces struggling against the framework of the thing, striving to negate its character and bring something new into being; nevertheless, at any given time a thing is still more itself than 'not itself.'... The opposites in a contradiction coexist with one another, and this (temporary) coexistence is one aspect of what is meant by the 'identity of opposites.'

 

"Such coexistence, however, is not static; it's more in the character of a relatively stable framework within which the ceaseless struggle of opposites goes on. And this ongoing struggle of opposites partially alters the character of the identity itself even before it reaches a point of intensity which fundamentally ruptures the identity (or the framework). Let's look at a few other cases of mutual coexistence and interdependence of opposites. Life is obviously diametrically opposed to death -- but really, wouldn't the very concept of life be meaningless without death, and vice versa? Death only has meaning as a limit to life, and life itself only continues so long as organisms break down and synthesize elements from dead plants and animals (and simultaneously expel the dead cells and toxic waste from their own selves).

 

"Such coexistence, however, is not static; it's more in the character of a relatively stable framework within which the ceaseless struggle of opposites goes on. And this ongoing struggle of opposites partially alters the character of the identity itself even before it reaches a point of intensity which fundamentally ruptures the identity (or the framework). Let's look at a few other cases of mutual coexistence and interdependence of opposites. Life is obviously diametrically opposed to death -- but really, wouldn't the very concept of life be meaningless without death, and vice versa? Death only has meaning as a limit to life, and life itself only continues so long as organisms break down and synthesize elements from dead plants and animals (and simultaneously expel the dead cells and toxic waste from their own selves).

 

"Or take war; war is qualitatively different from peace -- still the two have identity as well. Peace treaties turn out to be nothing but the framework within which rival bourgeoisies compete with each other and prepare for new wars, while war itself is not conducted for its own sake, but to set the terms for new (and more favourable) peaceful arrangements. And there is identity and struggle in the contradiction between just and unjust wars, too -- as when the Russian proletariat transformed the unjust, imperialist war waged by its own bourgeoisie in World War 1 into a revolutionary civil war in Russia. Further, wars waged by oppressed classes and nations for their liberation develop as a qualitative leap out of the -- relatively -- nonmilitary struggle of the oppressed against the oppressor.

 

"But the matter, does not end with the dependence of opposites upon each other for their existence. As Mao wrote:

 

'...what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction. ("On Contradiction," MSR, p.119)'

 

"While the struggle between its two aspects goes on throughout the life of the contradiction, and both aspects undergo partial transformations through different stages as a result of this (as well as other contradictions influencing the process), there inevitably comes a point when the old identity can no longer comprehend the contradictory aspects in their changed character. The subordinate aspect bursts forth, overcomes the formerly principal aspect, and brings a qualitatively new and different entity into being. The shell of the egg is destroyed and replaced by ifs opposite, the chicken; the shell of capitalist society is ruptured by the proletarian revolution and a new society begins to be created.... (pp.24-31)

 

"The identity of opposites in the preceding examples resides not only in their coexistence, but also in their change of place in their relationship within the contradiction. In the leap from water to ice, the contradictory identity between the energy of the individual molecule (which tends to random motion) on the one hand, and the bonding force between molecules on the other, goes from a state in which the molecular energy is dominant enough to permit a degree of fluidity to one in which the molecular bonding force becomes principal, and the molecules are frozen. Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie (as noted) does not vanish immediately after the socialist revolution but continues to exist and wage struggle (speaking here specifically of the internal makeup of socialist countries) as a dominated and subordinate aspect of the contradiction (as long as the society remains on the socialist road); what has changed is the respective position of the two aspects in the contradiction. This transformation of opposites into each other changes the qualitative character of the entity as a whole and the forms assumed by its contradictory aspects - from water to ice, or capitalism to socialism. In the latter case, the period in which the bourgeoisie is dominated (first in various countries, later on a world scale) will eventually result in its full disappearance -- at which point the proletariat itself will also go out of existence (after all, how could there be a proletariat without its opposite?) and another new entity, communist society, with its own contradictions and struggle, will arise....

 

"Identity, to sum up, is contradictory: opposites both coexist and transform themselves into one another. Their coexistence is itself a process of mutual transformation, and their transformation into each other is generally not absolute but goes on in wave-Iike, or spiral-like, development (more on this later).... Further, in the relationship between the opposite aspects of a contradiction, identity and struggle do not exist on a par. Struggle is principal over identity. Identity, or relative order, is a temporary condition, but struggle never ceases; it permeates a process from beginning to end and leads to the transformation of opposites and the eventual annihilation of the process (and its replacement by something new). In fact, when struggle ceases, identity goes out of existence as well, since the process itself has come to an end....

 

"The stars, the planets, different organisms -- all are forms of matter in motion in which the constituent opposites coexist for a time in one form, only to eventually be severed through struggle and dissolve (and become in different forms the elements of new entities). Each individual person, for example, is nothing but a particular and conditional combination of matter...matter which existed in different forms previously and will exist in other forms in the future.... Again, Lenin's warning to take the identical opposites in a thing or process 'not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another' ('Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic,' LCW, Vol.38, 109) rings home; and his characterization of socialism (in another work) as a combination of dying capitalism and nascent communism is an important application of just this principle of the identity and struggle of opposites.... (pp.32-35)

 

"At the same time, contradictions do not necessarily develop in a predetermined path; different processes and things interpenetrate and influence one another, and relatively external contradictions (in one context) can alter a process' direction of development and even eliminate it altogether.... (p.47) Change does not proceed by simple addition, nor simply from within a given process. While internal causes are principal over external, contradictions cannot be viewed simply as 'things unto themselves.'... (p.59)

 

"But back to the central point -- the opposition of materialism to idealism. The basic split between idealism and materialism concerns the nature of the contradiction between matter and consciousness. Matter has existed eternally, in an infinite and everchanging variety of forms; but through it all it exists, whether as mass or energy, a block of steel or an exploding supernova. As life on earth developed, matter began to give rise to its opposite, consciousness. The rudiments of this are found in the earliest, most primitive organisms and their ability to respond to environmental stimuli. This reaches a qualitatively higher state in the more intelligent animals, who can draw conclusions about their immediate environment and make decisions, and it takes another leap with human consciousness. Humans have the capacity to analyze their experience, dream up different ways the future might be, and work to make reality conform to their ideas and dreams, constantly comparing one to the other. Still, developed as it is, consciousness is nevertheless based on material reality and the product and property of a highly organized form of matter, the brain. This much is basic to all materialism." (p.61) [Wolff (1983), pp.12-61. (This links to a PDF.) Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered, and in some cases added, in order to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

Fortunately, fellow Trotskyist, Peter Mason, was a little more concise:

 

"Dialectics is a holistic philosophy, which always considers things in their relations and their development, as Lenin said.... [The development of Ionian philosophy] emerged from internal conflict, a war of opposing forces within all things, a 'unity of opposites' as Lenin called it, an 'interpenetration of opposites' as Engels termed it. These warring opposites were what drove the eternal flux of change. Dialectics is a philosophy born of revolution. Marxists have a unique definition [of materialism]. For Marxists, in this context, materialism can be described as the philosophy that the world is primary, and thought is secondary." [Mason (2012), pp.114, 116. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Here are few others found on the Internet:

 

[1] "Dialectics was initially a particular kind of dialogue invented in Ancient Greece in which two or more people holding different points of view about a subject seek to establish the truth of the matter by dialogue with reasoned arguments.... Today dialectics denotes a mode of cognition which recognizes the most general laws of motion, contradiction and new development. There exist four 'laws' to the dialectical method. They are:

 

"1) Everything is in a constant state of motion, development and change.

 

"2) Everywhere there exist opposing forces which are mutually exclusive yet cannot exist without the other. Their conflict results in movement.

 

"3) Change occurs suddenly, all at once. A quantitative amount of something results in a qualitative change (a 'breaking' point).

 

"4) Development moves in spirals, from lower to higher planes of development....

 

"Dialectical materialism is the recognition of a transient nature -- a physical reality in constant motion and change. What makes dialectical materialism a revolutionary scientific method is that it excludes all static states, all metaphysical views of reality, all one-sidedness and inflexibility. Because it recognizes the concrete and present side of things, at the same time it acknowledges that this present state is bound to end. For dialectal materialism, the only absolute is that there are no eternal absolutes....

 

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. As we mentioned earlier, everything in nature is transient, finite, and in motion. Matter cannot exist without motion. Everything has its beginning and its end. People are born, grow and eventually pass away. Stars such as our sun eventually begin to die, either slowly burning out or self-destructing. Species evolve, adapt, or go extinct. Rain falls from the clouds, evaporates back into the clouds where it will once again rain. Human society is also part of nature and is therefore subject to the same laws....

 

"The principle governing all growth and development is the idea of opposition and contradiction. Two mutually exclusive forces which at the same time cannot exist without each other has been a common theme in many philosophies for a long time (i.e. yin and yang) exactly because such processes occurring around us reflect this concept upon our minds...." [Quoted from here. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typos corrected.]

 

[2] "The modern materialist dialectical method developed by Marx is much more definite and therefore, able to provide us with a much clearer understanding. Materialist dialectics goes beyond just seeking the truth of a statement, beyond just understanding that contradictions are present in statements, into understanding that contradictions exist throughout nature and the whole material world. The Marxist dialectical method has four basic features. First, all phenomena of nature (or simply put, all real things) are connected. Second, everything is in constant motion. Third, all phenomena are undergoing constant change. Fourth, the change and development of things is the result of the interaction of opposing forces or internal contradictions within everything. All this is in opposition to what is called metaphysics. Metaphysics sees the world and things in it as static, isolated, one-sided. It views any change there is as simply one of magnitude, a mere increase or increase in quantity on a set stage. Metaphysics is the common philosophy advanced by capitalist thinkers and is taught in U.S. schools. In general it is the type of world outlook the capitalist system tries to foist on us so we stay in the dark about what's really going on....

 

"[B]esides all the outside influences on a thing (and let us remember we are talking about everything that exists), the thing in question has internal contradictions. Everything has two opposing aspects (internal contradictions) and each set of these opposite aspects forms a contradiction. When we speak of a thing we are really talking about a set of opposites that struggle with each other, yet coexist and combine to form the thing itself. There is no up without down, no cold without hot, no victory without defeat, no capitalist class without a working class, etc. When a ball is thrown in the air two contradictory forces are at work simultaneously -- the force propelling the ball upward and the force of gravity. While gravity is weaker, the ball goes up. When gravity becomes stronger the ball changes direction and comes down....

 

"This last point, then, says that there is a constant movement, constant struggle, between the two opposing aspects of the thing in question and this conflict of the internal contradictions is the most important single force that leads the thing to change. Or, to put it briefly, there is an internal contradiction in every single thing and this, more than all else, causes its motion and development. External forces are also important, but dialectics understands that external causes are the condition of change, while internal causes are the basis of change. For example, a chicken sitting on an egg will lead to a baby chick, while the same chicken can sit on a rock forever and hatch nothing -- the internal contradictions are the most important factor in the development and motion of not just the egg, but all things...." [Quoted from here; accessed 22/02/2014. Minor typos corrected. Bold emphases added.]

 

[3] "The world is full of opposing forces. In philosophical language we would say that the world is full of contradictions. But opposing forces always exist together. For example, the positive pole of a magnet attracts the negative pole of another magnet. But every magnet has both a positive and negative poll (sic). If you cut the magnet up it always has a positive and negative poll (sic). These opposites exist together -- they 'interpenetrate'. Let's examine the apple. The chemical bonds that hold its atoms together are being opposed by chemical processes causing those bonds to break leading to the rotting of the apple. The forces are in opposition to each other. They contradict each other but are contained within the same object." [Quoted from here; accessed 22/12/2016. Bold emphases added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

[4] "Fundamentally, everything that exists is a combination of opposites. It is in the nature of existence for things to occur as a synthesis of opposite entities. In fact, it is said that development occurs only where opposites do exist. Therefore, the way of nature presupposes that in everything material which exists, there must be a unity of opposites. Taking the human being as an example, man is a conglomerate of numerous opposites. It is in the nature of man to be a moral being i.e. to be inclined towards the doing of virtuous deeds, for the sake of peace in society. However, it is also presupposed in the nature of man that he should desire to carry out some acts that are vicious. Paradoxically, man is a contradictory; a synthesis of both good and evil, virtue and vice. It is a natural law that both these elements must exist in man, without these, no development can occur. This is what the unity of opposites mean.
 

"As it is a fact that opposites necessarily presuppose each other, it is also a fact that they must clash. The very fact that they are contradictories implies their destiny to struggle with each other. Thus, two sides of a dilemma cannot exist peacefully; no way! They must move, and in doing so, clashes must occur between them. There is usually a continued struggle between them as to which one must prevail over the other. So, when one of them prevails, then we can say development has taken place. For example; as usual, it is when one willingly refuses to do vice and embrace virtue, that one is said to be exhibiting a virtuous character and vice-versa. Thus, without the existence and clashing of opposites, there can be no movement, change and development. Therefore, development is when an element moves against the influence of its opposite. This is what the struggle of opposites mean.
 
"The conclusion of all this is that, every material system in reality by default, contains within it, elements that would certainly lead to its disfunctionality; and this is based on which has the stronger force or power...." [Quoted from here and here; accessed 22/12/2016.]

 

[5] "...Marxist materialism makes use of dialectics -- a way of thinking which explains how things develop and change. The laws of dialectics can be summarised as follows:

 

"Everything is part of the whole, interconnected, an element in the material unity of the universe. So we should not be partial, blinkered or narrow in our outlook and analysis. Everything is in flux, in motion, in the process of changing. Movement or change may be dramatic, sudden, obvious -- or small, gradual, virtually invisible. Although on the surface nothing appears to be happening, underneath elements are growing or declining, moods are changing -- sometimes through connections with things happening elsewhere. So nothing is unchanging forever. No form of human society is infinite and unchangeable. Movement and change occur through the conflict of opposites.

 

"Within any particular thing there are elements, forces and tendencies opposed to one another. They give rise to the internal contradictions within a given thing. At the same time, these conflicting elements, forces and tendencies are parts of the whole of that particular object or phenomenon, co-existing within it as a 'unity of opposites'. However, this object also exists in a wider context or environment, thereby giving rise to external contradictions between it and other particular things, and between the object and its environment as a whole. Internal or external contradictions which reflect conflicting interests that cannot be reconciled are said to be fundamentally antagonistic. Such conflicting elements and forces will not be able to co-exist permanently in the same unity or environment. Something has to give. Eventually, an antagonistic contradiction sharpens to the point where one force has to vanquish the other. The old unity is broken, and a new unity has to be constructed under the leadership of the victorious force.

 

"In the process of struggle, the opposing forces have an impact on one another, changing each other to a greater or lesser degree. This is what Marxism calls the 'interpenetration of opposites'. The struggle itself will also have an impact on the contending forces. At the conclusion of the struggle, the victorious force is not the same as it was at the beginning. It may, for example, have absorbed some features of the contrary force, themselves transformed in the conflict. Changes of degree -- of quantity -- will at some point produce a fundamental change in the quality of something -- a change in its essence or character. For instance, a workplace may begin with just a few workers in a trade union. But as the level of unionism increases and the employer is compelled to negotiate collective terms and conditions, so the whole character or quality of industrial relations in that workplace will change. Recruitment to the union multiplies—an example of qualitative change in turn producing quantitative change. The same processes can come to embrace whole industrial sectors and whole national economies." [Quoted from here. Accessed 18/05/17. Underlining removed. Bold emphases alone added. Some paragraphs merged.]

 

We have already seen that one on-line dictionary 'defines' contradiction in somewhat similar terms -- as 'opposing forces' -- but since that has already been covered no more will be said about it here.

 

2. Engels, for example, went to great lengths to qualify what he meant by "force" -- cf., Engels (1954), pp.69-86 -- where he doesn't even once consider the classic problems associated with interaction that had been highlighted by Leibniz, and echoed, for example, by Schelling.

 

3. This was established in Essay Two.

 

Nevertheless, as we saw in that Essay (and Twelve Part One), DM-theories (like those quoted in the main body and Note 1) in fact function as a "form of representation", not as a summary of the available evidence. Indeed, in many cases, sweeping DM-generalisations like these have invariably been advanced on the basis of little or no evidence at all. For example:

 

"Dialectics…prevails throughout nature…. [T]he motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites…determines the life of nature." [Engels (1954), p.211.]

 

"Processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain internal contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite…[is] the negation of the negation…. [This is a] law of development of nature, history and thought; a law which…holds good in the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy…. [D]ialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." [Engels (1976), pp.179-80.]

 

Engels was quite happy to call such sketchy, half-formed, sub-hypotheses, "laws", even though they were based solely on a superficial survey of a limited range of examples -- each specially-selected and highly simplified -- drawn from the sciences of his day. And, even then, they were all either superficially described or were entirely misconstrued -- indeed, as we saw in Essay Seven Part One. No wonder then that I have labelled this aspect of DM, "Mickey Mouse Science".

 

[Their role as a "form of representation" will be further analysed in the section dealing with the RRT in Essay Twelve Part Four.]

 

[RRT = Reverse Reflection Theory.]

 

[The phrase "form of representation" was taken from Wittgenstein's work; a brief outline of its meaning can be found in Glock (1996), pp.129-35. We will see Engels employing one such in Note 7, below. Also, follow the link to "norm of representation" given in Interlude Two.]

 

4. However, in one of his comments in DN, Engels openly questioned the identification of contradictions with forces:

 

"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Even though Engels elaborated on this theme in the succeeding pages of DN, this passage alone completely undermines the subsequent DM-equation of forces with contradictions -- or, at least, forces with attraction and repulsion.

 

[Of course, this quotation was taken from unpublished notebooks, so it might not have represented Engels's more considered views. But, as far as I can determine, he nowhere repudiated it.]

 

[DN = Dialectics of Nature; i.e., Engels (1954).]

 

Nevertheless, this re-interpretation of the word "force" as a sort of shorthand for "simple forms of motion" is consistent with contemporary approaches to the nature of forces, which sees them as an expression of the exchange of momentum between 'force-carrier particles' (which are themselves interpreted as 'perturbations in the field', as we also saw in Essay Seven Part One). Even so, Engels's 'revised view' itself presents DM with serious problems which he appears not to have noticed. Several of the latter are examined in the main body of this Essay, and again in Interlude Two.

 

5. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

I have said more about this, here.

 

Thomas Weston has made a recent attempt to find a 'second force' (or cause) in such cases -- which he locates in..., 'inertia', which isn't, of course,  a force. I return to consider other aspects of Weston's ill-advised article, here, here, here, and here, as well as in the material that used to be here but is now in the main body -- link in the last but one paragraph.

 

6. Not that these two aren't complementary.

 

Again, this is an oversimplification but the point is still valid. Even if it could be shown that gravity is a property either of matter (as a result, perhaps, of the activities of the by now legendary "graviton"), of Spacetime, or, indeed, of something else, 'motion' through Spacetime would still fail to be a function of attractive and repulsive forces. [On this, see Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi. It is also worth noting that this view has recently been challenged by, for example, Wilson (2007). There is more on this below.]

 

[In the previous paragraph, the word "motion" has been put in 'scare' quotes, since it is a moot point whether anything actually moves in four-dimensional Spacetime.]

 

6a. This isn't, of course, how nature is pictured in school or Physics textbooks used in college, where the word, "force", is still employed for heuristic purposes. But, as Jammer notes, in higher Physics "force" has been edited out of the story, replaced by exchange particles.

 

This development is re-iterated by Nobel Laureate, Professor Wilczek:

 

"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

 

"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote

 

'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Quoted from here. By "sense-suggested", Tait is obviously referring to the origin of the concept of force in human interaction with the world and with other humans, a fact also acknowledged by Engels.]

 

[The above now appears in Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38. It should be pointed out that, compared with Jammer, Wilczek is in the end a little more equivocal about this issue.]

 

Again, this view has been criticised quite effectively in Wilson (2007).

 

[I will add a few comments here concerning Wilson's article in the next few weeks.]

 

However, there are alternative versions of Classical Physics (for example, Newton-Cartan Theory) in which the force of gravity can be "geometrised" away in like manner. On this, see Malament (2012), Manchak (2012) and Trautman (1965).

 

Anyone wanting to pursue this topic further might like to consult the following (although a knowledge of contemporary Philosophy of Science, Modern Logic and Applied Mathematics will be required in order to appreciate them all fully): Bigelow, et al (1988), Cartwright (1983), Chao and Reiss (2017), Coelho (2021), Cohen (1970), Creary (1981), Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976), Hanson (1965a, 1965b), Hesse (1961), Hunt and Suchting (1969), Jammer (1999), Massin (2009, 2012), Moore (2012), Rowbottom (2017), Stinner (1994), Williams (1980), and Wilson (2002, 2007, 2009, 2010). 

 

I will return to consider several of the above when we have occasion to examine the 'ontological status' of component forces, later in this Essay, and in Note 57. [See also Note 30.]

 

6b. Despite this, it could be argued that it is the relation between bodies that determines any subsequent change in motion, which supports the idea that there is a contradiction in this case. But, in relativistic physics, it is the 'relation' between a body and the gravitational field in which it is embedded that changes its motion, and once that is admitted we have left far behind the idea that there are "contradictory forces" at work in any meaningful sense of the term.

 

Once more, it could be objected that there is still a relation between bodies in this case, since a more massive body will deform the gravitational field that surrounds it, thus changing the motion, for example, of a secondary orbiting body. Maybe so, but exactly how this is a 'contradiction' has yet to be explained. There seems to be no "struggle" going on here, or are we to imagine that bodies 'struggle' with tensor fields or even with abstract spaces (i.e., with mathematical structures), and that these then turn into one another (which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed)? There is no 'unity' or 'identity in opposition' here; one body just happens to be situated in the deformed results of another body's field, and so moves along local geodesic trajectories. Once again, if anything -- and if we absolutely have to employ fanciful metaphors here --, because of the regular and smooth (non-developmental) nature of such movement, this looks much more like a 'dialectical tautology'!

 

7. I return this topic again, here and here.

 

The material that used be here has now been moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

8. In that case, for once, Engels's views would appear to be consistent with contemporary Physics (indeed, as indicated by Max Jammer)! He also noted the anthropomorphic origin of this concept (something Woods and Grant, for example, failed to spot -- even though they quoted this very passage!):

 

"All natural processes are two-sided, they are based on the relation of at least two operative parts, action and reaction. The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Engels (1954), p.82. Bold emphasis added.]

 

[On the animistic and anthropomorphic origin of the concept of force, see Hesse (1961), Jammer (1999), and Agassi (1968), who references Francis Bacon's Novum Organum (Book One: Aphorisms; Aphorisms XXXVII-LXVIII) as a locus classicus of this idea.]

 

DM-theorists aren't alone in finding their ideas embarrassed by an over-ambitious and incautious use of anthropomorphic concepts; the theories of metaphysically-motivated Philosophers and scientists have been similarly compromised in this way for far too many centuries.

 

[The ideological origin of theories like this is exposed in Essays Twelve and Fourteen (summaries here and here).]

 

9. Of course, not all objects that collide would be, or would have been, moving in opposite directions. Many will be on trajectories inclined at some angle or other to those of the rest. Indeed, many move in the same direction, only at different speeds. It isn't easy to see how any of these can be seen as 'contradictory'.

 

[Classical problems associated with the 'ontology of interaction' have now been posted in Interlude One. See also Note 6a. This was also dealt with in Essay Eight Part One.]

 

10. It could be argued that forces are 'abstractions', which concept has been constructed to assist in the scientific study of nature and society, the comprehension of which helps revolutionaries change the world.

 

But, this means that the concept, "force", is little more than a "useful fiction", only it is now located in a 'metaphorical' universe all of its own, situated somewhere between genuine fantasies (such as ghosts and apparitions) and mathematical fictions (such as the centre of mass of the Galactic System to which our Galaxy belongs, the Virgo Supercluster). If that were so, the 'objective' status of forces, and hence of 'contradictions', would be fatally compromised. Forces and 'contradictions' would now have no physical counterpart, which would in turn mean that the real material correlates of DM-'contradictions' must be non-existent, too. I'm far from sure many DM-fans will want to adopt that option too enthusiastically.

 

All this is quite apart from the fact that if forces were 'abstractions', no two individuals would agree about their nature. [That result was established in Essay Three Parts One and Two.]

 

11. Once more, this isn't a problem confined to DM-circles. Scientific theories are themselves shot-through with metaphor, and scientists use analogical reasoning all the time. Not that this is a problem in and of itself.

 

On the nature and use of metaphor and analogy in the sciences, cf., Baake (2003), Brown (2003), Benjamin, et al (1987), Guttenplan (2005), Hesse (1966), Ortony (1993), and White (1996, 2010). [Several of these base their ideas on Max Black's work in this area, which is extensively criticised in White (1996).]

 

However, there is as yet no satisfactory or definitive treatment of the content and significance of the use of figurative language in science. Unfortunately, given the ubiquity of such language, this means that the precise nature of scientific knowledge is, as yet, poorly understood. [I hope to say more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published.]

 

12. This might be one particular use of the LEM that DM-fans would be wise not to question. If objects, states of affairs and processes were held to be both non-contradictory and contradictory at the same time, little sense could be made of the theory, even before it was examined.

 

[LEM = Law of Excluded Middle.]

 

Nevertheless, as with any application of the 'laws' of FL (but I prefer to called them rules), in any application to complex situations some sensitivity is required. In that case, it could be argued that DM is only committed to the view that parts of one system or process 'contradict' parts of another, while still others do not.

 

To be perfectly honest, it is impossible to give a clear answer to this volunteered response since DM is far too vague and sketchy for anyone (supporter or critic alike) to decide whether or not this is a legitimate reading. Perhaps it is both and neither at the same time?

 

Nevertheless, dialecticians do in fact speak about contradictions "growing", "intensifying", and "lessening" -- or, even about them being "resolved". [Indeed, Thomas Weston covers these factors in detail, explaining how 'contradictions' can 'intensify' or be 'resolved', in Weston (2012), pp.19-25 (this links to a PDF).] But, this is clearly a subjective opinion since we are supplied with no units by means of which these supposed changes to various 'contradictions' themselves may be measured, no data to support these contentions or even make comparisons. Nor do DM-theorists even so much as attempt to quantify them in any way at all (which, on its own, is a rather odd thing to have to say about for those who claim that DM is the very epitome of scientific and philosophical knowledge).

 

However, if DM-apologists ever do decide to invent a unit applicable to the 'contradictions' they see everywhere, we might make some progress.

 

Until then, may I suggest the 'Neg' as just such a unit?

 

So, one Neg could be defined as that strength, level, or intensity of a 'contradiction' necessary to make either (i) a stick (of arbitrary size) look bent in water, (ii) an object (again of arbitrary dimensions) look smaller as it recedes from the viewer, or maybe even that which is required to make (iii) at least one capitalist or employer look fair to a randomly chosen trade union bureaucrat (and one that might even have been 'confused' or misled by "banal commonsense").

 

In that case, a Nano-neg would be enough to make an electron move, and a Pico-neg would enable it to be both a wave and a particle. Extending this, a Milli-neg would be strong enough to move a millipede. [The reader can decide for herself what a Centi-neg would be capable of setting in motion.] A Deci-neg would be sufficient to represent a formal contradiction in logic, while a Deca-neg (colloquially, "A Blair") would be enough to spin a pack of capitalist lies (about the affordability of, say, pensions), or even publish and endorse at least one 'dodgy' Iraq dossier.

 

Perhaps then, a Hecto(r)-neg would be sufficient to set off a factional dispute in yet another dialectically-distracted Trotskyist, Communist, or Maoist sect, while the class war itself would need a Kilo-neg to initiate a strike, a Mega-neg to motivate a massive anti-war movement, and a Giga-neg to prompt a proletarian insurrection. Moving up the scale, a Tera-neg would be enough to keep the Earth in orbit around the Sun, and, of course, a Yotta-neg sufficient to kick-start the 'Big Bang'.

 

We could even introduce a special unit to measure or record the contradictory stench created in the nostrils of most working-class people by the oppression, mass murder, counter-revolutionary antics and sectarian in-fighting this misbegotten theory has helped motivate Dialectical Marxists to engage in throughout the twentieth century: the Rotta-neg.

 

All we would need then is an intrepid dialectician (perhaps one of those who claim to be able to derive fundamental scientific truths from thought alone simply by juggling with obscure Hegelian jargon, upside down or the 'right way up') to invent a "Neg-ometer" (and they would surely be able to do that if they stopped wasting time writing yet another identical 'Introduction to DM' -- perhaps instead by just cutting and pasting large sections from the 'classics', as has usually been the case up to now) to measure these super-scientific 'dialectical contradictions'. That done, Mystical Marxism might at least begin to look a little more precise and scientific. After all, if Scientologists have the E Meter, DM should at least have their Neg-ometer.

 

[To be honest, I would have suggested the "Con", here, instead of the "Neg" as a suitable unit with which to measure the strength of DM-'contradictions', but when I typed "Mega-con" into an earlier version of the above, that seemed to me to be a little too on-the-nose, a little too facetious. (Compare these comments with the suggestions made about dialectical "nodes"/"leaps" posted here.)]

 

13. This assumes, of course, that 'contradictions' have (metaphorical) 'geometric centres' and possess (figurative) 'separation radii'. [Well, maybe they can be photographed, weighed, have their toe- nails clipped and be given a new hair-do, too?]

 

Cheap debating points? Maybe so; but if all parts of nature (animate and inanimate, macroscopic or microscopic) behave as if they can argue amongst themselves -- which is how things are depicted in DM when its theorists try to sell us the idea that objects and processes can 'contradict' one another, bickering away (that is, if the word "contradict" is understood literally) --, in comparison, the above 'cheap shot' is hardly worth mentioning. So, instead of the 'gods' being attributed with human characteristics, DM-fans tell us that is true of inanimate objects!

 

DM takes the p*ss out of itself. It needs little help from me.

 

13a. Indeed, when asked to explain why this is a 'contradiction', Ian Birchall [aka 'Grim and Dim' -- his choice of pseudonym, not mine -- and I am not 'outing' a comrade here!] failed to respond. However, in a later thread he made another unsuccessful attempt to reply, as did a few other confused comrades. [Unfortunately, these links are now dead!] Readers are encouraged to read this lengthy exchange on this topic. [Unfortunately, this link is dead, too!] My thoughts on the 'arguments' of one of the egregious participants in this debate ('JohnG') can be found here and here, and now in a revised form here. [In general on this comrade, see here.]

 

The same always seems to happen whenever I ask dialecticians to explain why these are 'contradictions' -- even knowledgeable comrades soon begin to flounder!

 

As I noted in Essay One:

 

One wonders, therefore, what would become of us Dialectical Dissidents in the unlikely event that fellow Trotskyists ever managed to secure real power. The vitriol, hostility, lies and smears I have had to face now for many years suggest I, for one, wouldn't last long in such circumstances!

 

[Please note, I am not complaining about this; I expect this level of vitriol. If I hadn't received it, I would have concluded I had gone wrong somewhere!]

 

For example, in an e-mail exchange a few years ago, one prominent Marxist Professor of Economics -- Andrew Kliman no less -- expressed the fervent hope that I would "Eat sh*t and die!" -- either that or quaff some Hemlock -- simply because I had the temerity to question the 'sacred dialectic'. I had asked him to explain exactly what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, which he signally failed to do. His DM-inspired vitriol was subsequently repeated in October 2013, here (in the comments section -- again, this link is now dead!), but it was deleted by the moderators because of the violent and intemperate nature of the language the good Professor thought to use. Another SWP comrade (implicitly) accused me of being worse than the Nazis, and for the same reason! Incidentally, this particular comrade has now left the UK-SWP. Apparently, he still thinks that 'truth is tested in practice'.

 

I have also critically evaluated what I consider the best (Marxist) response to the question 'Exactly What is a Dialectical Contradiction' ever published, here.

 

February 2009 Update: Another attempt can be found here (this link is also now dead!). In fact, the owner of that site (a Marxist economist) deleted my replies, since he found it far too problematic to defend his own use of "contradiction".

 

Autumn 2009 Update: Yet another attempt -- this time involving academic dialecticians, which began here (this link is dead, too!) and continued here, here, here, here, here, and here -- was no less unsuccessful.

 

December 2011 Update: Here's another discussion (in the comments section), mainly between myself and Mike Rosen, on the nature of these obscure 'contradictions'. [Unfortunately, when Disqus -- the hosting service for the site to which the first of these links will take the reader -- was re-organised a few years ago, older comments sections were lost.]

 

[And here (this link is also now dead!) are another three attempts. (In order to access the second of these, click on 'Comments').]

 

Several more examples of this DM-tendency to label anything and everything as "contradictory" can be found here and here.

 

Indeed, a recent (March 2013) example illustrates this cavalier attitude shown toward the use of this word:

 

"In the Communist Manifesto Marx makes two contradictory assertions: 1. The ruling ideas in any epoch are the ideas of the ruling class. 2. The emancipation of the working class is the act of the working class itself." ['Mark', quoted from here, p.24. Italic emphasis in the original. In fact, Marx said this: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas...", and it wasn't in the Manifesto, it was in the German Ideology.]

 

But, why are these contradictory? As usual, we aren't told. Even so, it isn't hard to guess a possible answer -- as Tony Cliff points out:

 

"The fact that the working class needs a party or parties is in itself a proof of the cleavages in the working class. The more backward culturally, the weaker the organisation and self-administration of the workers generally, the greater will be the intellectual cleavage between the class and its Marxist party. From this unevenness in the working class flows the great danger of an autonomous development of the party and its machine till it becomes, instead of the servant of the class, its master. This unevenness is a main source of the danger of 'substitutionism'...." [Cliff (1960), p.126.]

 

In other words, the working class can't emancipate itself since it is dominated by ruling-class ideology -- and yet it must emancipate itself if socialism is to be won. This seems to be the 'contradiction' here. Indeed, as 'Mark' from earlier went on to argue:

 

"When workers fight back they find that some of the ideas once held, ruling class ideas, are challenged in the very process of struggle. Workers discover they can make speeches and organise solidarity. Racist or sexist ideas are challenged as people unite and fight back together. People change their ideas in struggle. Consciousness is contradictory. Those fighting back make up the vanguard of the class. The uneven nature of the class struggle across the class means we need a revolutionary party, one that orients on those engaged in struggle, the 'vanguard' of the class. Unevenness in the Party, as well as the need to totally reject ruling class ideology, means we need a central leadership in the Party." ['Mark' quoted from here, p.24. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Hence, the "self-emancipation of the working class" can only materialise with the intervention of the party, which is somehow capable of freeing itself from bourgeois ideology. Or, rather its "central leadership" is capable of performing that seeming miracle, while the working class isn't! Of course, in struggle, as 'Mark' points out, workers often change their ideas, but nowhere does he suggest that they can free themselves completely from ruling-class ideology. If they could, there would be no need for the party! 

 

Well, this conundrum is ironic in view of the fact that Bolshevik-style parties -- and especially their "central leadership" -- and Marxists in general have themselves been held in thrall to 23-carat gold, ruling-class thought-forms (upside down or 'the right way up') for well over one hundred and fifty years, as these Essays have amply demonstrated.

 

But, and once more, why is the above example a contradiction, as opposed to an impossibility? Or yet another example of confused thought?

 

Again, we are left in the dark.

 

Here is another typical example of DM-profligacy in this respect, which surfaced in a letter sent to Socialist Worker at the end of August 2011:

 

"China's elite is contradictory

 

"I'm writing regarding Charlie Hore's article on economic growth during the reform period in China (Socialist Worker, 20 August). It doesn't mention the powerful contradictions that emerged within the ruling bureaucracy as a result of the reforms. Not all sectors of the bureaucracy have benefited from the reforms. There has been a shift from ideological campaigns towards a performance-based notion of state legitimacy. This has meant that many officials have experienced anxiety about their relevance in Chinese politics and have been dragged into protest movements. A socialist analysis has to make sense of these contradictions." [Bold emphasis added. Paragraphs merged.]

 

Again, no one ever bothers to explain why such things should rightly be called "contradictions" when they are obviously far better described as "tensions" or "conflicts". For example, do the above factors imply one another? No. Can one exist without the other? Yes. This is quite unlike the alleged 'contradiction' between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, where one supposedly implies the other, and neither can exist without the other (although I have thrown even that widely accepted inference into considerable doubt here).

 

Some might conclude that this is just another example of Ms Lichtenstein's pedantry, but that isn't so. [On 'pedantry', see here.] There are important political reasons for rejecting the use of "contradiction" in the way it is used by Dialectical Marxists. [On that, see Essay Nine Part Two.]

 

Specifically:

 

(1) It 'allows' dialecticians to argue in favour of anything they like and its opposite (often this is done by the very same dialectician, on the same page or in the same speech!), no matter how anti-Marxist or counter-revolutionary this "anything" might prove to be. These are then often 'justified' on the basis that since everything is 'contradictory', Marxist theory and practice should be contradictory, too!

 

(2) "Contradiction" is used to rationalise a whole raft of substitutionist tactics, strategies and moves on the basis that even though Marx insisted on the self-emancipation of the working class, we can substitute one or more of the following for the proletariat: (i) The Party, (ii) The Red Army, (iii) 'Third World' guerrillas, (iv) 'Progressive' nationalists, (v) Students, (vi) Sympathetic, left-leaning politicians, and/or (vii) An assortment of social forces, 'rainbow coalitions', and minority rights movements, no matter how contradictory this might otherwise seem. And those who object to all this? Well they just don't 'understand' dialectics and the 'contradictory' nature of Marxism, the class war, the former USSR..., etc., etc.

 

(3) The use of this word 'allows' DM-fans to look at the protracted failure of Dialectical Marxism and fail to see it for what it is: a long-term and profound refutation of their core theory, 'Materialist Dialectics'. It also 'allows' them to interpret this abysmal record as the opposite of what it is -- on the grounds that appearances 'contradict' underlying 'essence'. So, if Dialectical Marxism looks hopelessly unsuccessful, a catastrophic failure, the opposite is in fact the case. This then encourages dialecticians to stick their heads in the sand while our movement slowly runs into it.

 

(4) Because of (3), the word "contradiction" provides DM-acolytes with a source of consolation for the long-term ineffectiveness of their entire movement, its serial divisiveness and ever present internecine warfare -- "Well, what else can you expect in a contradictory universe? Marxism should look the opposite of what it really is! Dialectics allows us to grasp this contradiction." Indeed, as Lenin himself pointed out.

 

So, this isn't the present author's 'pedantry', nor is it merely 'academic' point-scoring. The use of "contradiction" has had, and continues to have, disastrous political and ideological implications.

 

14. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

14a. It could be argued that in so far as forces in nature can be represented as vectors, this is also the case with contradictions. That option will be considered presently.

 

15. E.g., Rees (1998), pp.5-8.

 

Any who object to my presumed use of the LEM here should check this out, and then perhaps think again.

 

16. It may be felt that this completely misconstrues the relation between parts and wholes in DM (wherein "the whole is more than the sum of the parts", etc.). However, that dubious dialectical doctrine has been examined in extensive detail in Essay Eleven Part Two, where it was shown to be no less confused as other aspects of DM are.

 

17. Of course, it could be argued that this objectifies the Totality, thereby distorting it. But, if the Totality isn't a kind of object (even if it might be a changing 'object' of some sort), how can 'it' have any relation to 'its' parts, and how could 'contradictions' be properties of 'it'?

 

It could now be objected that the Totality is in fact a process, and hence it would be an 'it' (or, a sort of 'it') in that sense. Naturally, the answer to these (and other) questions concerning this mysterious entity/process, the Totality, will have to be put to one side until DM-advocates tell us (if ever) what (if anything) they think 'it' is.

 

[They might find a few useful ideas (consistent with much else we find in DM) set out here.]

 

Despite this, it could be further objected that abstract reasoning like this demonstrates nothing since DM is concerned with verifiable, concrete material contradictions, which exist in the real world. That response has been examined here and here.

 

18. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

19. The material that used to be here has been moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

20. This rather simple picture is, of course, ruined to some extent by the complexities we find in nature. However, the more complications there are, the less applicable DM-concepts seem to be. In this case, we would have here an RARA-system-of-forces. Again, a choice would now have to be made whether we should widen the meaning of the word "opposite" in order to accommodate DM, or change DM in order to accommodate the facts. To date, DM-theorists have generally preferred the former over the latter.

 

Since AR-forces are discussed below, I will postpone comment until then.

 

21. This needn't be as serious a problem as is suggested in the main body of this Essay. As pointed out elsewhere, scientists do this sort of thing all the time. Unfortunately, this is bad news for DM since it confirms the view that science is a conventionalised social practice, and further substantiates the claim made at this site that metaphysical theses arise from a misconstrual of conventionalised linguistic forms as if they were fundamental features of reality. In short, the conventions we use in order to represent the world are conflated with material truths about it.

 

This is about as egregious an error as would, say, an assumption that reality itself must have an edge to it simply because every photograph or painting has one.

 

[This topic is examined in detail In Essays Twelve Part One and Thirteen Part Two, when the latter is published.]

 

21a. Or, perhaps even:

 

(iii) This way of looking at the world is indeed as crazy as it looks!

 

[This topic is examined more extensively in Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

22. It might be felt that this Essay, indeed, this site, is so heavily biased against DM and any way of interpreting forces as 'contradictions', that scientific facts and theories have regularly been twisted and slanted so that they appear to be prejudicial to DM -- this latest assertion (that much of DM has fallen apart) being the most recent example. Surely -- it could be argued -- accelerated motion in the real world is the result of several forces operating on a body; the ensuing motion simply follows as a result of their oppositional nature.

 

This volunteered response will be examined presently in the main body of this Essay.

 

23. Once more, it could be objected that there is no such thing as "empty space". But even if that were so, and the objects referred to in the main body of this Essay weren't situated in the said force field, any forces present would still fail to operate on each other, but only on any bodies present in the system. In which case, forces seem to affect bodies, not each other. [See Interlude One on this, too.]

 

24. It could be argued that force fields do in fact interact, and they certainly alter one another. That objection, too, will be examined presently.

 

The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude One.

 

25. The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Two.

 

26. Those who still think that forces are capable of opposing motion, and can therefore contradict it, should consult the arguments presented in Interlude Two, and presently in the main body of this Essay, where this idea will finally be laid to rest.

 

Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that if it were correct that forces were capable of opposing motion, and could therefore contradict it, the thesis that forces 'contradict' one another will have already flown out of the non-dialectical window. Plainly, if forces oppose motion, they can hardly also oppose each other directly. [Unless, of course, we agree with Engels that the concept of "force" should be ditched and replaced by talk about "relative motion".]

 

27. In which case, it might be wondered whether only those bodies that approach each other along the same line of action (where the angle between their trajectories is 180°), or which operate in a force field (where the 'lines of action' of that field are similarly orientated at 180°) are to be counted as 'opposites'.

 

If not, will any angle (other than 90°) work?

 

However, since forces and velocities are vectors -- or, rather, may be represented by vectors -- they can be resolved to circumvent this difficulty. Even so, any solution sought along these lines -- no pun intended -- would clearly be conventional, since the components of vectors don't exist in nature in any meaningful sense; they are merely integral to the calculating procedures we use to help us make sense of change in motion (etc.).

 

[On this, see Interlude One and Interlude Two -- as well as Note 30, below.]

 

28. Anyone who thinks that the vector calculus is a description of reality would be suffering from the same sort of confusion as someone who, for example, thought that the weather actually is the wavy lines, or even the tangent fields, on a map, which show, for example, wind direction and speed, simply because a TV weather forecaster had used them. [On this see Interlude Two and Interlude Six.] And, for reasons set out earlier, mathematics isn't even a 'model of reality'.

 

29. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Three.

 

30. Admittedly, some vectors are invariant under certain transformations, but the physical interpretation of the operation of forces isn't a given; it is set by convention. On this, cf., Ellis (1963, 1965, 1976), as well as the books and articles listed in Note 6a.

 

[Ellis (1976) was written in reply to Hunt and Suchting (1969). See also Hanson (1965a, 1965b), and Jammer (1999).]

 

Mysteriously, however, Ellis has backtracked on his earlier views (for what appear to be instrumentalist reasons); cf., Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter (1988), and the response to this in Jammer (1999), pp.iv-vi.

 

The difficulty with finding a physical analogue of, or a correlate for, vector spaces (or, worse, for any tensor extension to them) is examined in Cartwright (1983), pp.54-73; see also Hesse (1961). A recent challenge has been registered to this way of seeing forces in Wilson (2007); on that, see Note 6a, again.

 

[Material in response to Smith (2007) will appear here in the next few weeks.]

 

31. On this, see Interlude One, Interlude Two and Note 30, above.

 

32. This topic was discussed in much more detail in Essay Seven Part One, where I have called it The Dialecticians' Dilemma. [See also, here. The supposed contradictory nature of motion was destructively criticised in Essay Five.]

 

33. On this, see, for example, here.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Four.

 

34. As noted in Interlude Four, it is entirely possible that this isn't what DM-fans really mean by "contradictory forces"; but then again it is no less doubtful that they have ever subjected their own theory to this level of scrutiny before so that even they would be in any position to accept or reject this interpretation. Hence, as things now stand, there would be little point asking a DM-supporter for an answer to such questions -- i.e., "Is this what you mean by 'contradictory force'?".

 

And good luck to anyone who doubts my assessment of DM-fans' knowledge of their own theory! Personal experience stretching now across over thirty years has taught me that anyone foolish enough to ask a DM-fan to devote even so much as one minute to this topic will face no little personal abuse, misrepresentation, and 'scatological hostility', at best, for even thinking to ask. (Here is just the latest example -- unfortunately that link is now dead! Here then is the next most recent.)

 

Compare this slipshod and superficial approach to theory with the care and attention to detail devoted by fellow Marxists when they try to analyse concepts employed in HM -- such as "the forces and relations of production", "ideology", "racism", "class", or "the tendency of the rate of profit to fall". Whole books have been written about ideology, class, and racism. Not one single book has been written about forces interpreted as 'contradictions' -- not even so much as one chapter!

 

35. It is worth repeating here that these assertions are aimed neither at affirming nor denying DM-theorists' claims about the Totality, and that includes its supposedly 'contradictory' parts, since both of those alternatives would be metaphysical, hence non-sensical and incoherent. [That is because the 'negation' of non-sense is also non-sense. The reasons for saying that take up most of Essays Twelve Part One and Eleven Parts One and Two.] As pointed out earlier, their intention here is simply to make patent the latent non-sense they contain.

 

Moreover, an appeal to 'relative truth' would be of little help, either -- surprising as it might seem, that notion was (inadvertently) torpedoed by Lenin himself!

 

36. As we saw earlier, these 'difficulties' revolved around the question whether it is:

 

(a) A force's effects,

 

(b) The relative motion between objects, or

 

(c) The interrelationship between bodies and/or processes, that are supposed to be 'contradictory'.

 

37. This is so on Hegelian and Aristotelian grounds.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Five.

 

38. So, this appears to be yet another ironic "dialectical inversion" -- the said forces wouldn't actually 'contradict' each other since they augment one another -- even though they are still supposed to be 'opposites'. Perhaps then we should call such configurations "dialectical tautologies"?

 

On that basis, therefore, we might be able to construct an entirely new -- and, it must be openly admitted, a wholly insincere -- theory of universal harmony. This is especially so if we recall that forces 'naturally combine' to form resultants, and opposites more often than not attract rather than repel each other (on that, see Interlude Six and here), both of which phenomena are also connected with motion and change. As a result of such an 'inversion' -- putting DM 'back on its heels', as it were -- change would then be an expression of cooperation, not conflict. We could even re-introduce the idea of an 'Immanent Deity' (a suitable -- but no less mysterious -- analogue of the DM-'Totality') to give this novel, insincere 'theory' the unity and cohesion it requires, all the while claiming that these ideas haven't been imposed on nature, merely 'read from it'.

 

Since this insincere 'theory' is based on a more realistic appraisal of the interplay between forces, who could reasonably object? We could even call this 'theory' "Anihalectics" (in that it eliminates dialectics). Any subsequent 'contradictions' implied by this 'theory' could, of course, be Nixoned away along classical DM-lines.

 

We could even declare -- with equal pomposity and 'justification' -- that anyone who rejects this new 'theory' just doesn't "understand" Anihalectics, ending all discussion. On the positive side, this 'theory' enjoys much more evidential support than the average DM-thesis -- given the fact that resultant forces govern every example of change in motion in the entire universe, so far as we know.

 

On the negative side, however, this 'theory' would mean that class collaboration and harmony will 'inevitably' usher in the 'revolution'. [We saw that this was an implication of DM, anyway, here and here.]

 

Anyone critical of the above wholly insincere, fanciful and off-the-wall 'theory' should now point an equally censorious finger at DM, and for the same reason.

 

39. Even so, and once again, howsoever it is imagined that forces finally manage to combine, change itself isn't initiated by contradictory forces, but by the above annoyingly 'harmonious' resultants -- those 'dialectical tautologies'.

 

40. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Six.

 

41. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

42. At this point, it is worth recalling how the Stalinists attempted to 'justify' the frequent, sometimes overnight tactical and strategic 180° changes of direction which they regularly performed in the 1930s, on the basis that they were 'dialectical', when they had in fact been made for hard-headed political reasons. So, a pact with the Nazis appeared to make eminently good, 'dialectical' sense. Anyone who disagreed with this zig-zag approach to politics clearly didn't "understand" dialectics. Indeed, the 1939, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was as good an example of a UO as one could wish to find. Who could possibly complain? -- Except, perhaps, those motivated by "bourgeois" prejudice compounded by an antiquated reliance on 'formal thinking'? Or maybe even those in the grip of an excessive "tenderness" toward treaties with fascists?

 

[Topsy-turvy dialectically-inspired phenomena like this have been illustrated with dozens of examples in Essay Nine Part Two. Except, of course, the above pact wasn't a UO, since the existence of the Soviet State did not imply the existence of the Nazi State, or even a 'non-aggression treaty' with them. In DM-terms it actually made no sense, but that is just par for the course with this screwy theory.]

 

Nevertheless, any number of equally incongruous and counter-revolutionary UOs have been rationalised by this theory. For instance, John Rees attempted to justify the "united front of a special kind" -- entered into by the UK-SWP a few years ago -- by appealing to yet another 'UO argument'. But, as we have seen over and over, neither side of this 'UO' implied the other, unlike the supposed connection between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Hence, this, too, didn't even make sense in DM-terms. But, because DM glories in contradiction it can be and has been used to 'justify' any conclusion deemed expedient and its opposite -- this trick often performed by the same individual (or party hack) in the same speech, book or article. in which case, DM has proved itself to be an invaluable tool in the hands of substitutionists, opportunists and sectarians of every stripe.

 

[Again, more details can be found in Essays Nine Part Two and Ten Part One.]

 

43. Is this yet another 'dialectical tautology'?

 

43a. Of course, Hegel's ideas were themselves inspired by countless centuries of mystical thought, but the explicit use of "contradiction", and the key role it assumed in his work is unique and, except for its presence in Zen Buddhism, it is almost without precedence. This isn't to deny that philosophers and mystics have always appealed to oppositional forces (and UOs) in order to account for change and stability in nature and society, but they, too, had to co-opt words and concepts drawn from the vernacular -- as the late Professor Havelock pointed out (quoted earlier):

 

"As long as preserved communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is gods. Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas, mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be --  the copula of analytic statement.

 

"The history of early philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it.... Nevertheless, the Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference." [Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links added; some paragraphs merged.]

 

On this, see Essay Twelve and Essay Fourteen Part One (summaries here, here and here). Cf., also Barnes (2009), Kahn (1994, 2003), Lloyd (1971), and Seligman (1962).

 

44. That insurmountable obstacle lies in the path of all forms of Metaphysical Realism, so this isn't just a problem for DM-theorists. [More on that in Essays Twelve Part One and Thirteen Part Two (when it is published).]

 

45. Admittedly, this could turn out to be a complete distortion of DM, but, as we have repeatedly seen, over the last hundred years or so dialecticians have been more intent on reproducing almost word-for-word yet another repetition of the dogmas handed down to them (by the Dialectical Classicists -- on that, see Essay Two) than they have been analysing them with a critical eye they so readily apply to other forms of ruling-class ideology. Far worse, there is precious little in the DM-Classics that is of much assistance to dialecticians themselves so that even they would be hard-pressed specifying exactly where or how the points advanced in this Essay misrepresents their theory.

 

Once again, there is an simple solution: DM-apologists are invited to produce their own clear account of the precise nature of the link between forces and 'contradictions', making this aspect of DM perspicuous for the very first time in its history.

 

Wisely, though, neutral bystanders won't be holding their breath, and for reasons aired in Essay One.

 

45a. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

46. Of course, this initial attempt at clarification is unclear itself! We should normally want to distinguish the opposition between forces, P1 and P2, from that between event sets, E1 and E2, or indeed any pair-wise combination of all four. Complications like these will be examined in what follows (in fact, some of them were examined earlier).

 

47.  The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

48.  The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

49. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Seven.

 

50. It could be objected that forces actually make things happen, as opposed to preventing them. But, even then this would be the case if only one force were to 'win out', as it were -- the resultant. Furthermore, making something happen is even less easy to interpret as a 'contradiction' than opposing or preventing something from taking place. In that case, once more, calling this a 'dialectical tautology' would be far more appropriate.

 

Be this as it may, the analysis in the main body of this Essay was based on the idea that one of P1 or P2 brings about, or causes, its own event set as opposed to initiating the other set. So, even here, these forces do "make things happen".

 

Finally, it is rather odd arguing in one breath that forces don't prevent things, while in the next asserting that forces oppose one another! [On this, see the next sub-section.]

 

Maybe this DM-conundrum should simply be Nixoned...

 

50a. The material that used to be here has been moved to Interlude Eight.

 

51. The terminology I have employed here isn't what I should prefer (for reasons also set out in Essay One), but tinkering around with it won't make the conclusion any clearer. Nevertheless, the following is, perhaps, a little more 'correct':

 

F16a: Anything that is prevented from occurring does not happen.

 

But, F16a is just a discursive tautology -- although I should prefer to call it a "grammatical remark", since it expresses a linguistic convention, or rule for the use of certain words.

 

52. It should be pointed out (once again!) that this 'new' account of the connection between forces and contradictions (advanced in the main body of this Essay) is only being offered here tentatively since DM-theorists are as hopelessly unclear in this area as we have seen they are elsewhere.

 

53. The phrasing of F24 might be considered prejudicial; F24a is perhaps a slightly more acceptable version:

 

F24:  P1 contradicts P2 only if it counterbalances P2.

 

F24a: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.

 

That option will be considered presently in the main body of the Essay (as F27).

 

54. We saw in the passages quoted at the beginning of this Essay that several DM-authors regard disequilibria in nature and society as just important as corresponding equilibria, and in need of explanation. [Indeed, Weston also seems to accept that reading, at least in so far as it pertains to the orbit of planets around stars (etc.).]

 

54a. To see this, compare F27 with the following:

 

S1: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the M1.

 

[F27: P1 contradicts P2 if it counterbalances P2.]

 

But, S1 is a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition, so it doesn't rule out S2 or S3:

 

S2: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the A1.

 

S3: All things being equal, NN will arrive in London, UK, if she takes the M40.

 

Since there are many different ways to travel to most cities -- even though none of them is necessary, they could each be sufficient; none is unique in this regard, which they would be if they were necessary.

 

So, S1-S3 are sufficient, not necessary, conditions. Of course, if there were one and only one way to get to London, that would be both a necessary and sufficient condition.

 

[Often the former is expressed by the use of "only if". Unfortunately, the Wikipedia article on this topic isn't a model of clarity; the Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article is much better, but it is far more complicated. This is perhaps the best article on-line about this distinction for those new to logic.]

 

The verb phrase "All things being equal" (also called a ceteris paribus clause) is required, here, since it is assumed that other adventitious events don't prevent NN reaching her destination, such as a crash, a breakdown, a phone call cancelling the trip, an illness, etc., etc. If this caveat is allowed, then S1-S3 are sufficient conditions, otherwise, plainly, they wouldn't be -- simply travelling along a road doesn't guarantee you'll arrive at your destination!

 

There are in fact several suppressed ceteris paribus clauses in most of the (futile) attempts I have made to render this part of DM clear. I have omitted them in order to reduce complexity.

 

55. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Nine.

 

56. Admittedly, this is to use dialectical-terminology (of obscure meaning and dubious provenance). This doesn't imply I accept that any of it makes the slightest sense.

 

In fact, this whole idea is an echo of Kant's concept of "real negation" [Kant (1763, 1998)], which we met in Essay Seven Part One. I have critically evaluated Kant's theory in Appendix A.

 

57. Of course, in an analysis of situations where the smallest angle between these two forces lies between 0°and 90°, or, indeed, between 90°and 180°, the components of these forces would be put in the required relation.

 

Unfortunately, the prospects for a realist, or even a metaphysical, account of forces (given such an analysis) do not look at all promising. Indeed, it is worth asking this question: Are the components of such forces in effect merely shadow forces -- that is, are they just mathematical fictions? Are they genuine forces in the first place? And how might we distinguish them from 'real forces'?

 

Does anyone think that these components actually exist? If they don't exist, how can splitting forces into non-existent components help us in any way? On the other hand, if they do exist, and we can split such forces in a potentially infinite number of ways (as we rotate the relevant axes, or move into other coordinate systems), then does every single one of these components co-exist with each other and with the original force? Or, do they exist only when we think about them? [I have discussed this further in Note 58.]

 

In fact, as is suggested in this and other Essays at this site, it is more fruitful and less problematic to regard mathematical structures as rules we use to make sense of, or manipulate, nature for our own purposes. That being the case, the above 'difficulties' simply vanish.

 

[This topic is discussed in more detail in Interlude One, Interlude Two, Note 27 and Note 30.]

 

[I will add a few more thoughts about component forces to this Note in a future re-write of this Essay. (On this see the books and articles listed in Note 6a.)]

 

58. Hegel-fans might not object too much at this point since they have become inured to the hypnotic, if not narcoleptic, affect of obscure terminology like this -- indeed, just as they are inured to the Word Magic upon which it depends. The latter amounts to a series of verbal tricks that attempt to derive fundamental truths about all of 'reality' for all of time, solely from the supposed meaning of a few jargonised expressions. Anyone who doubts this only has to leaf through a few academic studies of, or commentaries on, Hegel's Logic to be convinced that these Captains of Confusion will happily swallow such guff whole before breakfast, seldom blinking as they comment (favourably) on Hegel's ability to conjure 'Nothing' out of 'Being', and then 'Becoming' out of both -- miraculously 'deriving' all three from a quirky re-configuration of the diminutive verb "to be"!

 

However, at this point genuine materialists will no doubt pause and see the above 'derivation' for what it is: Idealist word-juggling at its best -- as, indeed, George Novack inadvertently conceded:

 

"A consistent materialism can't proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added. "Inadvertently", since Novack was himself an expert at "proceeding" from "abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source", as we discovered in Essays Two and Four.]

 

And, as Engels himself emphasised (in relation this time to Dühring's a priori 'system'):

 

"The general results of the investigation of the world are obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every species of materialism hitherto existing.... As Dühring proceeds from 'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one can only read something into them...." [Marx and Engels (1987), Volume 25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

 

[Hegel's attempt to 'derive' Nothing and Becoming from Being will be destructively criticised in Essay Twelve Part Five.]

 

Even so, this latest twist once again brings into question the 'ontological' status of forces, and whether 'resolved forces' actually exist. And if they don't, what are we to say about those forces that had been their source -- those that had just been resolved to create those very components? Again, if resolved forces don't exist, then what are we to say of resultant forces that have in effect been 'reverse resolved' from them, for want of a better phrase? If we now decide that resultant forces do exist, then when we try to resolve them back into their components, so that those components are now themselves resolved forces, do they thereby cease to exist? But, that can only mean that the original forces that had been combined to make that resultant must both exist and not exist!

 

[On this, see also the comments and links added to Note 57 above.]

 

59. How have revolutionaries managed to overlook this 'third force' for so long?

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

59a1. In fact, we have been considering real material forces since the beginning of this Essay! After all, what are gravity, magnetism and other fundamental forces if not real and material? What we haven't done (fully yet) is consider forces at work in class society, but that is all. See also, here.

 

59b. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Ten.

 

60. Several examples of 'real material forces' that are supposed to be 'contradictions' (such as those between the forces and relations of production, or between use and exchange value) will be analysed in Interlude Fourteen [See also, here.]

 

60a0. Bertell Ollman has a somewhat similar story to tell:

 

"Marx’s approach to the future could not be more different. Like virtually everyone else in his day, Marx was astounded by the scope and rapidity of the changes that were occurring all around him, but also by their contradictory nature. The enormous growth in the production of wealth, for example, came along with an increase in the worst forms of poverty; progress in science and technology that had a potential for making work much easier only succeeded in speeding up the pace of work and lengthening the working day; even the increase of personal freedom due to the abolition of various feudal ties came on the back of an even greater decrease in freedom due to the unforgiving conditions in which people were forced under pain of starvation to live and work (or what Marx was later to call the 'violence of things'). Meanwhile, more and more of the world was becoming privatized, commodified, fetishised, exploitable and exploited, and alienated as 'all that is solid melts into air.'" [Quoted from here. Accessed 22/12/2017. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English.]

 

True to form, Ollman helped himself to the word "contradictory" without even once thinking to explain why what he says is contradictory is contradictory.

 

60a. Those who disagree with this comment:

 

Had Hegel died of Cholera (or whatever it was that finally killed him) 45 years earlier than he actually did, does anyone really think we would be using this term -- "contradiction" -- in the way DM-theorists do, or would even be bothering with 'dialectics'?

 

might perhaps like to inform the rest of us from where else the DM-classicists might have derived their odd use of "contradiction", or its equivalent? Other than a long line of mystics, who else employed it/them this way?

 

61. As noted above, if this phrase is to assume a viable role in HM, it must be understood analogically.

 

[The details surrounding my own interpretation of such a core HM-concept will have to wait on another occasion.]

 

In the main body of this Essay, however, I am questioning both the literal and the metaphorical application of the word "contradiction" to situations that present themselves in HM and DM.

 

61a0. In relation to the first alternative interpretation (i.e., F46), I will offer what I take to be a plausible interpretation of it in the context of HM (i.e., F46a). I won't, though, do that for all the other alternatives.

 

F46: Capitalism offers A, but delivers only not A.

 

F46a: Capitalism offers abundance, but delivers only scarcity (i.e., 'not-abundance').

 

61a. The material that used to be here has been now moved to the main body of this Essay.

 

62. The negation of wealth might appear to be poverty, but that is so in only a very loose and figurative sort of sense. Recall that something could fail to be wealth without automatically becoming a cause of, or being identical with, poverty. Naturally, that is because the two words have a complex set of application conditions. So, for example, £10,000 ($13,000) (invested as capital, or held in cash) doesn't constitute wealth in and of itself, and the lack of it doesn't automatically amount to poverty, either. Both options obviously depend on the surrounding historical and social circumstances.

 

Of course, in Marxist economic theory, wealth is associated with use-value and capital.

 

[That isn't being denied here. It is unclear, anyway, whether or not the introduction of that technicality at this stage would alter things in any significant way. However, on this see Note 70 and Interlude 13.]

 

Some might want to interject at this point that the contradiction here is between the forces that create wealth and those that produce poverty -- or, perhaps, the contradictions inherent in the processes that operate toward either or both ends. Furthermore, social forces like this are inextricably interlinked and work in opposite directions in capitalist society. [On this, see the material that used to be in Note 61a, above, but which has now been moved here.]

 

Even so, do these forces turn into one another? They should do if the DM-classics are to be believed. I have yet to read, meet, or engage in discussion with a single DM-fan who claims they either do, or will one day, turn into each other.

 

Be this as it may, and once again, why call these "contradictions"? The only apparent reason seems to be that this word was imported from Hegel's work, who in turn based his use of it on some seriously garbled 'logic'. [More on that in Essay Eight Part Three.]

 

Anyway, this topic has been covered more thoroughly in this Essay, here and here.

 

63. Earlier, we encountered similar problems over the simplistic interpretation of schematic letters (such as "A" and "not A") in connection with Trotsky's criticism of the LOI (i.e., in Essay Six), as well as part of an extended and detailed analysis of DL and FL (in Essay Four). There, it was demonstrated that these apparently simple-looking schematic letters are deceptively complex.

 

I have also ignored the couplet "A and non-A" here, which has a different logic, even though dialecticians don't appear to be aware of the difference between "A and non-A" and "A and not A". [On that, see here.] I have done so because: (i) The use of predicate-term negation (as this use of "non-" is itself called) isn't in general colloquial and (ii) It is even less easy to derive a contradiction from this use of the negative particle.

 

[This topic will be explored at greater length in Essay Twelve Parts Five and Six. Anyway, the comments in the main body of this Essay aren't affected by this particular distinction.]

 

It is also worth adding that it is only the sloppy, it not slap-dash, way these letters have been employed by dialecticians (beginning, of course, with Hegel) that 'allows' their 'theory' even appear to be viable. [More on that, here.]

 

64. Unfortunately, F52 requires the use of some rather stilted language if it is to remain literal. Anyway, the "poverty" reading will be adopted presently (in connection with F49).

 

F52: Capitalism produces wealth and not wealth.

 

[F49: Capitalism offers A, but delivers A and B, where A and B are opposites.]

 

A much more detailed analysis of the alleged 'contradiction' between use-value and exchange-value can be found in Interlude 13. [See also here.]

 

65. F52a has to be interpreted this way otherwise it might suggest that Capitalism had in fact made the very same person (or group of people) both wealthy and not wealthy at the same time. Not even Mad Dog Dialecticians, I presume, would want to accept that as a valid interpretation!

 

F52a: Capitalism produces wealth and Capitalism produces not wealth.

 

66. This would, of course, be a contradiction if the first person in this fictional conversation had said "There are no defective Widgets" while the second came out with "There are some defective Widgets", or the first had said "Every Widget is defective!" and the second retorted "Some Widgets aren't defective", but, plainly, they aren't the examples at issue, since there is no way any of them can be viewed as interpretations of A and not A in F47:

 

F47: Capitalism offers A, but delivers both A and not A.

 

[Since Aristotle, logicians have recognised that (in a non-empty universe) "Every F is G" is the contradictory of "Some F is not G", and "No F is G" is the contradictory of "Some F is G". Both can't be true and both can't be false at the same time; they have opposite truth-values.]

 

Someone might object that these are rather trite examples, and not at all the sort of contradictions of interest to dialecticians. Maybe so, but since the nature of the 'contradictions' they do in fact intend has been left permanently obscure, they will have to do for now -- and that will continue to be the case until such objectors manage to say clearly, and for the first time ever, what they do mean by their odd use of "contradiction". Moreover, if this DM-concept/word fails to work with respect to these allegedly 'trite' examples, it stands no chance in relation to more complex objects and/or processes.

 

However, on that, see here, here and Interlude Fourteen.

 

66a. On that, see here and here.

 

67. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Eleven.

 

68. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Twelve.

 

69. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

70. If, say, an abundance of money in one pocket (or even a large horde of "use values" in, for example, a warehouse somewhere) did, per impossible, manage to 'contradict' another empty warehouse, locally or remotely, it would make no sense, even in DM-terms. Presumably, since such lifeless objects have no effect on one another they could effect no change, nor could they develop into each other (as DM-'contradictions'/UOs are all supposed to do). Even worse, the existence of one does not imply the existence of the other; so they aren't 'interpenetrated opposites', either.

 

So, even in DM-terms, it is unclear what sense it makes to say that such things are part of, or could even constitute, a 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Thirteen.

 

71. Naturally, and once again, these comments will have to remain tentative until we are told what (if anything) DM-theorists mean by the phrase "dialectical contradiction". Since this ground has been raked over several times, yet another pass here will be avoided.

 

72. The material that used to be here has now been moved to Interlude Fourteen.

 

73. On this, see Interlude Thirteen and Interlude Fourteen.

 

74. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

75. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

76. The details underlying this allegation will be set out in Essay Fourteen Part Two, when it is published.

 

The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

76a. For those not too familiar with the terms "relative form" and "equivalent form, this might help:

 

"In the simple expression of value the two types of commodities, linen and coat, obviously play two different roles. The linen is the commodity which expresses its value in the body of a commodity different from it, the coat. On the other hand, the commodity-type coat serves as the material in which value is expressed. The one commodity plays an active, the other a passive role. Now we say of the commodity which expresses its value in another commodity: its value is represented as relative value, or is in the relative value-form. As opposed to this, we say of the other commodity, here the coat, which serves as the material of the expression of value: it functions as equivalent to the first commodity or is in the equivalent form." [Quoted from here; italic emphases in the original. Accessed 01/11/2021.]

 

77. The material that used to be here has now been moved to the main body of the Essay.

 

77a. The reference to "p and q" and "p and not p", in relation to F63, might seem a little obscure to some:

 

F63: Hence, propositions that express the fact that one or more of E1-En have been prevented from taking place contradict propositions that express an expectation that they will occur.

 

If "p" stands for, say, "E1 has been prevented from taking place", then "not p" will stand for "It is not the case that E1 has been prevented from taking place". "Not p" can't therefore stand for "E1 is expected to take place". Since the latter is clearly not of the form "not p", so "q" was recruited in order to represent that logically unconnected sentence.

 

78. The import of this particular claim is obscure, at best, even if many physicists believe this doctrine to be true. However, since this idea seems to have no real bearing on the issues at hand, no more will be said about it here.

 

79. This alternative provides us with a clue as to why it is that HM works and why it does so just where DM self-destructs. Clearly, only human beings (as individuals or as members of a class) can form contradictory aims and intentions -- even if they and the connection between them are often only dimly perceived, or not perceived at all. Plainly, therefore, this would allow F67 to be re-written in a way that rendered it conducive to HM -- the exposition of which will not, alas, be attempted here.

 

F67: The prevention of one or more of E1-En taking place contradicts the aims of Pn, the set of forces that would have produced all of E1-En but for the presence of P1.

 

80. To be fair, analogous problems afflict every account of causality concocted by Traditional Philosophers and Metaphysicians, and not just DM-theorists. [This topic is discussed in more detail in Essays Thirteen Part Three and Three Part Five.]

 

In that case, DM is clearly the runt of the ruling-class litter.

 

Appendix A: Kant And 'Real Negation'

 

Hegel scholars have attempted to argue that 'dialectical contradictions' (partly) derive from Kant's introduction of the concept of 'real negation'/'opposition' (in Kant (1763)). In this Appendix I propose to examine only those sections of Kant's writings that are relevant to the aims of this Essay and this site.

 

[Some of the background to this topic can be found in Redding (2007), Chapter Three.]

 

Kant begins by distinguishing between two types of opposition:

 

"Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is to say, without contradiction.

 

"The first opposition, namely logical opposition, is that upon which attention has been exclusively and uniquely concentrated until now. The opposition consists in the fact that something is simultaneously affirmed and denied of the very same thing. The consequence of the logical conjunction is nothing at all [nihil negativum irrepraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is incapable of being represented' -- translation on p.439; RL], as the law of contradiction asserts. A body which is in motion is something; a body which is not in motion is also something (cogitabile -- 'Capable of being thought' -- translation on p.439; RL); but a body which is both in motion and also, in the very same sense, not in motion, is nothing at all.

 

"The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile). The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body. The consequence of such an opposition is rest, which is something [repraesentabile -- 'Capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439; RL]. It is, nonetheless, a true opposition. For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously. The consequence of the opposition is also nothing, but nothing in another sense to that in which it occurs in a contradiction [nihil privativum, repraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439; RL]. We shall, in future, call this nothing: zero = 0. Its meaning is the same as that of negation (negatio), lack, absence -- notions which are in general use among philosophers -- albeit with a more precise determination which will be specified later on." [Kant (1763), p.211. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

We have already seen that contradiction has nothing to do with 'cancellation', nor has opposition. If, for example, you and others oppose fascists on the streets, they aren't thereby cancelled. Would that it were this easy to 'cancel' fascists! Furthermore, it is quite clear from the above that, just like many other Traditional Philosophers, Kant has confused talk about talk with talk about things (that is, talk about language with talk about the world). This is obvious enough from the opening sentence:

 

"Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either logical through contradiction, or it is real, that is to say, without contradiction." [Ibid. Bold added.]

 

"Things", of course, can't "posit" anything since they possess neither brain, intellect nor language. A similar muddle 'allowed' Hegel, for example, to confuse what we might say when we contradict one another with how the universe itself works! Hence, Kant's jumping-off point was misguided and confused from the start since he began with a 'definition' of opposition that was itself based on two serious errors (i.e., the conflation of opposition with cancellation, and a confusion over the nature of language). We have also seen that two opposing forces don't cancel one another, even where one force nullifies, or partially nullifies the effects of the other. This in turn means that if it is true that Hegel derived this doctrine (in whole or part) from Kant's ruminations about opposing forces, then his ideas were no less defective as a result.

 

[However, we have already noted that Hegel's 'logic' was seriously flawed for other reasons -- on that, see here and here.]

 

Despite this, we can determine from the above passage where the idea that opposing forces are 'contradictory' probably originated:

 

"The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile). The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body." [Ibid.]

 

Exactly how predicates can be 'opposed' to one another Kant neglected to say. Having said this, it turns out that the examples he subsequently offered his readers only succeeded in undermining other things he wanted to say about this type of opposition (as we will soon see).

 

Indeed, this entire notion derives from ancient, mystical ideas about the nature of opposition -- explored in Essay Two -- except in Kant's work they were translated into what it is that predicates are capable of doing, as if they are agents in their own right!

 

That in turn connects these archaic doctrines with religious notions about the creation of the world by the 'Word' of 'God'. If the world (or if 'things') are fundamentally linguistic, mind-like, then they can surely 'posit' whatever they like and can, therefore, be said to 'oppose' one another, should they so choose. Otherwise not.

 

As noted in another Essay published at this site:

 

Super-Scientific Truths, which Ancient Greek Philosophers had 'derived' solely from the meaning of a set of specially-selected and 'surgically-enhanced' words, began to mirror the abstract view of reality adopted by this new layer of theorists, just as the theories they concocted also reflected their daily experience of class society. In this way, their mode of being mirrored their view of 'Being'. The lifestyle of these theoretical drones was largely dominated by leisure -- leisure bought (directly or indirectly) at the expense of the necessary labour-time of those whose language and experience they also denigrated. In order to give expression to this form of estrangement, they concocted obscure, Idealist 'jargon' deliberately set in opposition to the 'debased' and 'unreliable' language of those who had to work to stay alive.

 

In earlier myths and Theogonies, conflict in this world was viewed as a reflection of the rivalries that existed between warring 'gods' -- struggles that took place in a hidden world beyond the reach of the senses. Their verbal wrangles and machinations became the model upon which later Idealist and Hermetic thinkers based their shiny new, Super-Scientific Theories, theories that attempted to explain all of 'Being', which they then happily imposed on nature and society.

 

Language, originally the product of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, is ill-suited if pressed into service as a means of representation (especially when it is interpreted as means of representing the thoughts of 'God'). In order to transform the vernacular into a representational device, theorists found they had to take words that had grown out of, and which expressed, relations between human beings as well as those they enjoy with nature, applying them to the relations between objects and processes in nature itself --, or, indeed, between these warring 'deities', as the late Professor Havelock noted:

 

Language, which was originally the product of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, is ill-suited when pressed into service as a means of representation (especially when it is interpreted as a medium for representing the thoughts of 'God'). In order to transform the vernacular into a representational device, theorists found they had to take words that had grown out of, and which expressed relations between human beings, and apply them to the relations between objects in nature --, or, indeed, between those warring 'deities' --, as the late Professor Havelock noted:

 

"As long as preserved communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is gods. Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas, mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be --  the copula of analytic statement.

 

"The history of early philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it.... Nevertheless, the Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference." [Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English. Links added; some paragraphs merged.]

 

Unfortunately, these ordinary expressions carried with them (into these new ideological surroundings) the connotations they possessed in their everyday use in connection with inter-human relations. These moves then had a inevitable result: when imposed on nature the traditional view of the world became a projection of human social relations. This only succeeded in anthropomorphising nature.

 

Again, as Marx pointed out:

 

"Feuerbach's great achievement is.... The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [Marx (1975b), p.381. Bold emphasis and link added.]

 

As we will see in other Essays published at this site: because they appropriated and then elaborated upon these anthropomorphic concepts, later generations of thinkers (including Marxist dialecticians and the vast majority of post-Renaissance Philosophers) anthropomorphised nature in like manner. In this way, much of subsequent thought failed to break free from this ancient, animistic view of reality.

 

[This process has been analysed in detail in Essay Thirteen Part Three (especially here, here, and here), but in relation to the anthropomorphisation of the human psyche -- where the brain is pictured as 'seeing' things, sending 'messages' or conveying 'information' to other parts of the body, employing 'signals' and 'codes' in order to so do.... It will be further illustrated in Essay Three Part Five (when it is published), where it will be shown that this view of nature and humanity lends superficial plausibility to 'determinism' (and by default to metaphysical theories concerning the 'freedom of the will'), as nature and society were themselves attributed with capacities, 'laws', and powers that enabled it to 'determine' the course of events with 'iron necessity'. Until that Essay is published, the reader is directed here and here for more details.]
 

Superstitious individuals had earlier tried to interpret natural processes as the work of various assorted 'spirits' or 'deities', using anthropomorphic language to that end. Subsequently, in more developed class societies, priests and theologians indulged in these thought-forms for ideological reasons, in order to suggest that the natural and social order are 'divinely-ordained', the legitimacy of which not only couldn't, it shouldn't be questioned, let alone resisted. Subsequently, as we can see from the record, Ancient Greek Thinkers began looking for increasingly secular ways of theorising about the world in order to construct a less animistic rationale for the new forms of class society beginning to emerge in the 6th century BC. However, they also retained use of this transformed language, not noticing they had in fact banished the aforementioned 'spirits' and 'gods' in name alone (as Feuerbach half recognised), but the anthropomorphic connotations still lingered on, and there they remain to this day.

 

Unfortunately for humanity, these developments also meant that it became 'natural' for theorists (like Anaximenes and Heraclitus) to see conflict in conceptual, logical and linguistic terms. And this is from where Hegel appropriated these archaic and terminally obscure ideas.

 

That, of course, set this new form of discourse in direct opposition to the language of everyday life. Again, as noted above, this alienated thought-form was bequeathed to all subsequent generations of thinkers, since the latter largely shared the same privileged material conditions, ruling-class patronage and ideological predispositions that came with this slice of the intellectual territory.

 

In this artificial 'intellectual' world, populated by indolent thinkers like these, words appeared to exert their own irresistible authority; commands, edicts and orders seemed to possess their own secret, magical power (which, of course, accounts for the ancient and early modern search for the original language that 'God' gave to mankind; on this, see Eco (1997), partially quoted here).

 

In this artificially-constructed 'intellectual' world, populated by indolent thinkers like these, words appeared to exert their own irresistible authority; commands, edicts and orders seemed to possess their own secret, magical power (which, of course, accounts for the ancient and early modern search for the original language that 'God' gave to mankind; on this, see Eco (1997), partially quoted here).

 

Words were, after all, capable of moving slaves, servants, and workers effortlessly about the place. Codified into law, words also appeared to possess genuine coercive power, which helped mask the class domination on which this parasitic social form was predicated. Naturally, this entirely superficial aspect of official language would blind those who benefited from these social forms to its material roots in class society.

 

The very real social power that words seemed to possess would 'naturally' suggest to such theoretical 'drones' that if language underpinned the authority of the State, and if the State mirrored Cosmic Reality, then the universe must run along discursive lines.

 

These theorists would therefore begin to misinterpret a conventionalised social form as a secret code that powered the universe -- mastery of which would help those inducted into these mysteries to grasp the 'essential' aspects of 'Being', and then, perhaps, control it.

 

In that case, Traditional Theorists would start to see reality as not simply 'rational', but as ultimately linguistic, constituted by the word of some 'god', or other. In ancient creation myths, the 'Deity' spoke and everything not only popped into existence, it sprang to attention and thereafter always did as it was told. On this view, seemingly inert matter had the capacity to obey orders (but only when addressed with the right sort of language -- hence, once again, the search initiated by generations of sorcerers for these magical words), as if matter was intelligent and possessed of a will of its own. Nature thus came to be viewed as an enchanted 'Being', with 'secrets' hidden 'beneath the surface', and because of the distorted view of language that underpinned it, this 'Being' could be recruited to the 'legitimation' and 'rationalisation' of class power.

 

Indeed, as these Ancient Theorists saw things, nature was governed by opposing forces: good and evil, light and dark, order and chaos, love and hate, hot and cold. All of these were either personified as good/evil intelligences, or were viewed as discursive principles (i.e., as 'logical' laws -- which weren't in fact just 'laws of thought', but were principles that governed all of reality, and had been established and stitched into the fabric of nature by the supreme Logos, who made everything in 'His' image). Here is Hegel:

 

"This objective thinking, then, is the content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.

 

"Anaxagoras is praised as the man who first declared that Nous, thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic.

 

"What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel (1999), pp.50-51, §53-54. Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original.]

 

These ideas feature in ancient creation myths, in Greek Philosophy, in Hindu, Buddhist and Chinese thought (appearing in the latter as Yin and Yang, for instance -- for more examples, see here). Hence, for such thinkers, the internal source of movement and development was ultimately linguistic, determined by these discursive opposites. Either that, or reality was founded on an Intelligence or Will of some sort (thus also on language), and, once again, all this was directly linked to the rationalisation of ruling-class power.

 

Material reality was thus not so much congealed energy as condensed language, no less the slave of 'God' than human servants were subjects of the state. "Ruling ideas" were thus derived from the alienated thoughts either (i) of those who in fact ruled or (ii) those who rationalised that rule on their behalf. "Ruling ideas" thus ruled society because, for such Idealists and Mystics, these ideas ruled the world. As above, so below; the microcosm mirrored the macrocosm, just as their thought supposedly mirrored the world.

 

Few Traditional Thinkers have strayed far from these archaic forms-of-thought, even if they had to be expressed in a different idiom as each Mode of Production came and went, and as each state altered its legal form and developed new ideological priorities....

 

These thought-forms represented both a significant ideological leap for alienated mankind and a major step backward for oppressed humanity.

 

That is because Traditional Theorists carved these "ruling-ideas" into the very fabric of the heavens.

 

And, in one form or another, there they remain to this day.

 

It is no surprise, therefore, to see Kant's thought processes travel along these well trodden intellectual paths. Indeed, as Wittgenstein noted:

 

"Language has the same traps ready for everyone; the immense network of easily trodden false paths. And thus we see one person after another walking down the same paths.... One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really doesn't make any progress, that the same philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But those who say that don't understand the reason this must be so. The reason is that our language has remained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. So long as there is a verb 'be' that seems to function like 'eat' and 'drink', so long as there are the adjectives 'identical', 'true', 'false', 'possible', so long as there is talk about a flow of time and an expanse of space, etc., etc. humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties, and stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove.

 

"And this, by the way, satisfies a longing for the transcendental [an alternative version of the manuscript has 'supernatural' here -- RL], for in believing that they see the 'limit of human understanding' they of course believe that they can see beyond it. I read '...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of 'Reality' than Plato got...'. What a strange state of affairs. How strange in that case that Plato could get that far in the first place! Or that after him we were not able to get further. Was it because Plato was so clever?" [Wittgenstein (2013), pp.311-12e. Italic emphases in the original; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]

 

While Kant himself rejected the application of the word "contradiction" to opposing forces, it didn't take much effort for subsequent Idealists to stretch the meaning of "opposition" so that it finally became synonymous with "contradiction", especially after Kant had stirred the terms "real opposition" and "negation" into the pot. The 'intellectual' slide from the one to the other was further motivated by his sloppy use of "cancel". If that word applies to both terms (i.e., if it applies to "contradiction" and "real negation" alike), then what might at first sight appear to be 'passive opposition' -- for want of a better term -- was all the more easily transformed into 'active opposition', and then into 'dialectical contradiction'.

 

We can also see in the above passage where the equation of "forces" with "tendencies" -- an equivalence subsequently appropriated by Tom Weston, as we discovered earlier -- might have originated:

 

"The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile). The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body. The consequence of such an opposition is rest, which is something (repraesentabile -- 'Capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439; RL). It is, nonetheless, a true opposition. For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously. The consequence of the opposition is also nothing, but nothing in another sense to that in which it occurs in a contradiction (nihil privativum, repraesentabile -- 'A negative nothing which is capable of being represented' -- translation on p.439; RL). We shall, in future, call this nothing: zero = 0. Its meaning is the same as that of negation (negatio), lack, absence -- notions which are in general use among philosophers -- albeit with a more precise determination which will be specified later on." [Kant (1763), p.211. Bold emphases alone added.]

 

We have already seen that Traditional Philosophers regularly confused predicates with properties; i.e., they interpret predicates one minute as linguistic expressions the next as the properties of bodies, or even of forces, themselves. Hence, they too confused talk about talk with talk about things. And we find Kant doing likewise here, when he says, for instance:

 

K1: "The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other.... The motive force of a body in one direction and an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body." [Ibid. Bold added.]

 

K2: "For that which is posited by the one tendency, construed as existing on its own, is cancelled by the other tendency, and the two tendencies are true predicates of one and the self-same thing, and they belong to it simultaneously." [Ibid. Bold added.]

 

In K1, predicates are properties of bodies and forces --, like, say, colour and size are. In K2 they can truly be posited, so they are now linguistic expressions, although they are also the properties of 'things'.

 

Not content with that, Kant also confused "nothing" with "zero", which is another serious error. As Blaise Pascal pointed out, if zero (i.e., 0) and nothing were the same, then 10 would equal 1 since both are immediately followed by nothing!

 

Be this as it may, Kant expanded on what he thought he meant by appealing to a series of examples taken from elementary arithmetic and, for want of a better term, navigation:

 

"Mathematicians make use of the concepts of this real opposition in the case of mathematical magnitudes. In order to indicate them, the mathematicians designate them by means of the signs '+' and '−'. Since every such opposition is reciprocal, it can easily be seen that one magnitude cancels the other, either complete or in part.... Suppose that a ship sails from Portugal to Brazil. Let all the distances which it covers with the east wind be designated by '+', while those which it covers with the west wind are designated by '−'. The numbers themselves signify miles. The week's journey is +12 +7 −3 −5 +8 = 19 miles; this is the distance the ship has sailed westwards." [Kant (1763), pp.212-13. There is a similar argument advanced in Hegel (1975), pp.172-74. Bold emphasis added.]

 

Several years later, Hegel regurgitated a garbled version of the same argument:

 

"If +W mean 6 miles to the West, and -W mean 6 miles to the East, and if the + and - cancel each other, the 6 miles of way or space remain what they were with and without the contrast. Even the mere plus and minus of number or abstract direction have, if we like, zero, for their third: but it need not be denied that the empty contrast, which understanding institutes between plus and minus, is not without its value in such abstractions as number, direction, &c." [Hegel (1975), p.172, §119. Good luck trying to understand what this bumbler was trying to say -- without first having read Kant!]

 

But, Kant's ship example undermines his (and Hegel's) claim that these mathematical operations "cancel" one another. If the ship in question has indeed sailed the above miles, then it has clearly travelled a total of 35 miles (not 19). Just because it has sailed 8 miles (west), that doesn't mean it hasn't also travelled those -8 miles (i.e., the -5 and -3 miles) to the east. Of course, the ship has in the end sailed a net total of 19 miles west (and a gross distance 27 miles west), but the 8 miles west it has also travelled fail to cancel anything, nor do the -8 miles (again, the -3 and -5) it has travelled east. The ship has still sailed those miles. If you replace that ship with a car, then the odometer in that vehicle will show a total of 35 miles travelled -- unless, of course, it was driven backwards at some point. But, even then, that car will still have covered 35 miles, and its petrol tank will have consumed a commensurate amount of fuel. Consider a car with a full tank that will (all things being equal) allow it to be driven, say, 400 miles. No one supposes that if it is driven 200 miles west, and then 200 miles east, that the petrol tank will miraculously re-fill itself on the second leg of the journey -- that is, that  the use of petrol to travel in one direction is somehow 'cancelled' by the use of petrol travelling in the opposite direction -- even though +200 −200 = 0 (to use for the present Kant and Hegel's rather confused symbols -- more on that presently).

 

As is the case with many others, Kant and Hegel have muddled an operation that undoes another operation with cancellation. Cancellation would mean that the said operation wasn't carried out; an inverse operation on the other hand undoes whatever another operation had achieved. So, if the captain of a ship wants to cancel part of her journey, she will just not sail. In order to cancel it what she wouldn't do is sail west and then sail the same distance east! If you cancel your holiday, you just don't go. What you don't do is go to Ibiza, Cancun, Florence, or Costa Rica and then come straight back! Of course, if  your holiday had been cancelled by someone else while you were on your way to your destination, that might involve you having to return, but no one in their left mind would cancel their own holiday by travelling to that destination and then promptly returning home.

 

Kant continues:

 

"The magnitudes preceded by '−' have this sign in front of them simply to signify opposition, for they are to be combined with those magnitudes which are preceded by '+'.... And since subtraction is a cancelling which occurs when opposed magnitudes are taken together, it is evident that the '−' cannot really be a sign of subtraction, as is commonly supposed; it is only the combination of '+' and '−' together which signifies subtraction. Hence the proposition '−4 −5 = −9' is not a subtraction at all, but a genuine increase and addition of magnitudes of the same kind. On the other hand, '+9 −5 = 4' does signify a subtraction, for the signs of opposition indicate that the one cancels as much in the other as is equal to itself. Likewise, the sign '+' on its own does not really signify addition itself. The sign '+' only signifies addition in so far as the magnitude which it precedes is supposed to be combined with another magnitude which is also preceded by '+', or is thought of as preceded by '+'. If, however, it is to be combined with a magnitude preceded by '−', this can only occur by means of opposition, and then both the sign '+' and the sign '−' signify a subtraction, one magnitude cancelling as much in the second magnitude as is equal, namely, to the first, as for example '−9 +4 = −5'. For this reason, the sign '−', as it occurs in the example '−9 −4 = −13', does not signify a subtraction but an addition, in exactly the same way as the sign '+', as it occurs in the example '+9 +4 = +13' signifies addition." [Ibid., p.213. Bold emphases added.]

 

First of all, Kant has again helped himself to the word "opposition" with no attempt to justify his odd use of that word in such contexts. In what way is a "−" sign oppositional? Consider, for example, a temperature of -5°C. Is the sign in front to the "5" here in 'opposition' to anything? Perhaps it 'opposes' +5°C? But, when we turn these temperatures into Fahrenheit, we obtain 23°F and 41°F, respectively. [Something analogous occurs if we switch to degrees Kelvin.] Where has the alleged 'opposition' gone?

 

Second, Kant has plainly confused positive and negative integers with the operations of addition and subtraction. 7, for example, is a positive integer; adding 7 is what we do with it. Running the two together would be like confusing, say, a pencil with what can be done with it. This muddle hasn't been helped either by mathematicians using "−", for instance, to indicate both an operation and a sign attached to a numeral to map it onto an element in the set of negative integers. Hence, in order to distinguish these two different uses of what look like the same sign, novices in arithmetic are often taught to distinguish a number from an operation by the use of brackets. Hence, the integer 7 would be written as "(+7)", and the integer -5 as "(-5)"; so, when the latter is subtracted from the former that would be written as "(+7) - (-5)". However, even this is far from perspicuous, and often causes confusions of its own. In which case, I will henceforth distinguish the operation of subtraction from the negative integer sign itself in the following way: "─" (a long dash) signifies the operation of subtraction, and "-" (a short dash) the negative sign used to signify elements of the set of negative integers. 

 

[Of course, Kant wrote at a time when mathematicians themselves were unclear what they meant by numbers in general --, or, indeed, operations and functions. Subsequent philosophers who uncritically draw on Kant's ideas are less easy to absolve.]

 

Now, it isn't too clear how Kant would classify, for instance, the following: -8 ─ -3 = -5. Is this subtraction or addition? Well, according to Kant's comments above, since there is no '+' and '-' sign together, it can't be a subtraction!

 

Consider an overdraft of £8. Suppose the bank manager discovers an error of £3 in the said account and wipes £3 off that overdraft in order to correct this mistake. The overdraft will now be £5. Plainly, the owner of that account won't have any more money in her account as a result (she is still overdrawn!) -- so, nothing has been added. All that has happened is that some of the debt has been subtracted -- taken away or removed.

 

This nicely illustrates what happens when operations are conflated with numbers --, or, for that matter, mathematical operations are muddled with cancellation (or, indeed, with "opposition"). "Mighty thinker" though he was, Kant's thought is confused from beginning to end on these issues. Hegel's doubly so.

 

Someone might object that the above bank manager did in fact cancel part of the debt, but that isn't so. An error was rectified, that is all. Of course, debts can be cancelled, but the cancellation of a debt isn't itself a mathematical operation (you don't learn your 'cancellation tables' at school, nor are there 'cancellation theorems' in Number Theory). The cancellation of a debt involves one or more of the following: an act of goodwill (or of charity), a rectification, a humiliation, or, indeed, a host of other incidental social or interpersonal actions/relations. We can certainly work out the mathematic result or consequence of a cancellation, but that doesn't remove the clear distinction between how we calculate and how we describe the causes or the results of such moves socially, should we so choose. If someone pays off a debt, that is different from cancelling it, and the same applies to errors that are put right -- although the end result in each case might be the same.

 

Finally, if a debt is cancelled simpliciter, then someone else will have lost out (willingly or otherwise), which isn't the case with debts that have been paid off, or where an error has been rectified. So, let us assume that NN has $100 in his bank account and that he also owes MM $25; if MM cancels NN's debt, then someone other than NN will lose out (in this case MM will have voluntarily lost $25). But if NN pays MM the $25, only NN will lose out. The result in each case for NN will be the same in some respects but not others. It will be the same in that NN will now no longer owe that money (this being the result whether the debt is paid or wiped), but it will be different in that in the second instance (if the debt is paid), NN will be $25 worse off, not MM. In the first instance, however, if the debt is wiped, NN will be free of the debt, but nothing will have been added to his bank balance, which remains $100. The debt will just be forgotten and it is MM who will have lost out. So, as we can see, paying off a debt is significantly different from that debt being cancelled.

 

Kant once again ran these notions together and only succeeded in confusing himself and others, who should, perhaps, have known better.

 

It might help to consider a more perspicuous example: imagine a collection of eight marbles all labelled with "-" signs. If three of those marbles are removed then there will only be five of those labelled marbles left: -8 ─ -3 = -5. Nothing has been cancelled.

 

Kant then proceeded to sink himself into even deeper confusion:

 

"In order to extract what is philosophically significant from this concept and to do so without particularly looking at magnitude, we shall begin by offering the following remark. The mathematical concept of negative magnitudes involves the opposition which we have above called 'real opposition'. Suppose there are +8 units of capital and -8 units of passive debt; no contradiction is involved in attributing them to the same person. However, one of these magnitudes cancels an amount which is equal to that which is posited by the other, and the consequence is zero." [Ibid., p.214. Bold emphasis added.]

 

But, Kant's running together of concepts that should be kept separate (e.g., confusing the repaying of a debt with cancelling that debt) now means he has to answer these two distinct questions in the same way:

 

(i) Does the +8 cancel the debt of -8?

 

Or,

 

(ii) Does the -8 debt cancel the +8 of capital?

 

If he is consistent he will have to say "Yes" to both. These options are indistinguishable if you work with such confused ideas. For Kant, if the result is zero, then it matters not how we arrived at that result. So, we could say that we 'cancelled' a debt of -8 with +8 capital, or we could say that we 'cancelled' capital of +8 with a debt of -8! Or, more colloquially, someone could say (if he were a Kantian in this respect) "I paid off my bank balance of $8 with a debt of $8."(!) In reply to that, a neutral observer could only respond incredulously, "How can you pay off a bank balance of $8! You pay with the money in your bank account, surely? You can't pay with a debt. A debt isn't currency!"

 

Of course, one can pass a debt on so that someone else gets paid instead (when that debt is finally discharged by the debtor); but, even then, no debt has been used as payment. It has merely been transferred.

 

Couldn't that be regarded as payment in such a case? Mightn't this be how an IOU could work? Sure, just as swapping cigarettes in prison, or bartering, say, an Ox for two wagons of hay can be so regarded. But, in the case of passing on a debt, what has in effect been transferred is a hold on someone else's money (the original creditor's), and that is what has in the end made the payment. Debts and IOUs still fail to be currency, despite what Jim Carrey appears to believe:

 

 

Video Five: Dumb And Dumber -- IOU's Are 'As Good As Money'

 

No one plans a bank heist to steal a load of debts! No mugger has ever demanded "Hand over your IOUs!" A robber might, indeed, steal someone's IOUs so that those debts can't be redeemed, but that still doesn't make IOUs currency. Next time you want to buy something, try paying for it with an IOU. See how far you get. While you are at it, check on Google what the exchange rate is for IOUs. Who has ever been banged up for counterfeiting an IOU?

 

Someone might point out that banknotes originally grew out of the use of IOUs, or promissory notes. That isn't quite right; they were originally introduced into Europe (from China by Marco Polo) as "value received" notes, as opposed to "sight bills", which were promissory notes. Even so, that doesn't elide the clear distinction that exists today between legal currency and an IOU. There is a world of difference between promissory notes issued by a public authority and an IOU written by a guy at the pub.

 

Although we can see there is a real difference here between currency and debts, Kant's confused analysis can't distinguish between the two.

 

He continues -- and it is here where see the above implicit confusion become explicit:

 

"I shall, accordingly, call the debts 'negative units of capital'. But in doing so I do not mean they are negations or mere denials of units of capital, for it they were they would themselves be designated by zero.... What I mean when I call debts 'negative units of capital' is this: debts are positive grounds of the diminishment of the units of capital. In order to make this clear, we shall adopt the method of the mathematicians and call descent 'negative ascent'; falling 'negative rising', retreat 'negative advance'. In this way, it is instantly apparent from the expression itself that, for example, falling is not to be distinguished from rising merely in the way in which 'not a' is distinguished from 'a'. It is rather the case that falling is just as positive as rising.... I can just as well call descent 'negative rising' and I can call rising 'negative descent'. Similarly, units of capital are just as much negative debts, as the latter are negative units of capital. But it is rather more appropriate to apply the name 'negative' to that on which the intention is primarily focused in a given case, if one wishes to designate its real opposite. For example, it is rather more appropriate to call debts negative (sic) 'negative units of capital' than to call units of capital 'negative debts', although there is no difference to be found in the reciprocal relation itself.... 'The negative of rising is setting'. What I intend to convey by this expression is not that the one thing is the negation of the other, but rather that there is something which stands in a relation of real opposition to something else." [Ibid., pp.214-15. Italic emphasis in the original. There is clearly a serious misprint in this passage, where the text has "negative 'negative units of capital'". I have however left the above as it is in the published version. Bold emphases added.]

 

Clearly, it is this rather careless attempt to connect certain noun phrases with other noun phrases (that can be used to describe operations, actions or states (and their inverses)), but this only succeeded in compounding Kant's confusion. For if we insist on calling debt, "negative capital", then the choice will become indifferent between the questions posed earlier -- so 'paying off a negative debt' or 'paying off capital' will make some sort of crazy sense --, which helps explain this rather odd comment:

 

"[D]ebts are positive grounds of the diminishment of the units of capital." [Ibid.]

 

Which isn't a million miles distant from this:

 

Z1: "I paid off my bank balance of $8 with a debt of $8."

 

In addition, while it might make some sort of rhetorical sense to call ascent "negative descent", that won't work in every case. Is murder really "negative life-saving"? Is birth "negative death", or is it "negative burial"? When a mother gives birth does she really "negatively kill" her baby? What about painting a door red? What is that the negative of? Indeed, what is the negative of Kant writing the above comments?

 

It has been asserted many times at this site that dialectics -- indeed, much of Traditional Philosophy -- arose out of a careless and sloppy use, or indeed misuse, of language and it looks like Kant's argument above hasn't strayed too far from that intellectual quagmire -- as we saw Marx concur:

 

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world...." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases added.]

 

Kant merely elaborates on these confusions throughout the rest of this work (except, he later attempts to derive several sweeping, if not decidedly odd, metaphysical theories from them), so there seems little point pursuing this Kantian detour into dialectical disaster any further, given the aims of this site.

 

More-or-less the same can be said with respect to Kant's masterpiece, Critique of Pure Reason [Kant (1998), pp.369, 373 (this links to a PDF)], which adds nothing to the above. [Readers are invited to check the veracity of that assertion for themselves.]

 

In which case, as we have seen, it is hardly surprising that Kant's many confusions found their way into the even more muddled ramblings of The Caliph of Confusion, Hegel. Hence, there is no good reason to suppose there are any 'real negations' out there that somehow power the universe -- even if sense could be made of the supposition that there could be.

 

Or, perhaps more accurately: it makes no sense to suppose such confusions power anything other than an over-active imagination.

 

As Bertrand Russell pointed out:

 

"This illustrates an important truth, namely, that the worse your logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise." [Russell (1961), p.715.]

 

One or two DM-fans, when confronted (by yours truly) with the above quote, thought Russell was somehow advocating the use of sub-standard logic on the basis that it results in "more interesting" consequences. They failed to note that Russell was being sarcastic.

 

Appendix B: Plato's Allegory Of The Cave

 

This allegory appears in a 'discussion' between Socrates and a character called Glaucon (who was Plato's older brother and who was in effect both a sounding board and nodding dog to much of what Socrates just baldly asserts). Readers will no doubt recognise the right-wing, aristocratic tone of this passage (I have highlighted in bold those sections where that is the clearest). I have also made one or two minor changes to the text in light of the published version.

 

The dialogue begins with Socrates, and each paragraph alternates between Socrates and Glaucon:

 

And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: -- Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.


And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

 
Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

Yes, he said.

 
And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

Very true.

 
And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

No question, he replied.


To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.


And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision -- what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them -- will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.


And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take and take in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

True, he [would].

 
And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

Not all in a moment, he said.

 
He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

Certainly.

 
Last of [all] he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

Certainly.

 
He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

Certainly, he would.

 
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer, 'Better to be the poor servant of a poor master', and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything [rather] than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such an [individual] coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

To be sure, he said.

 
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

 
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

 

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

 
Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

 
And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

 
Any one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

That, he said, is a very just distinction.

 
But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

They undoubtedly say this, he replied.

 
Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

Very true.

 
And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed.


And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue -- how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness.

 

Very true, he said.

 
But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below -- if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

 
Yes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely. or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

Very true, he replied.

 
Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all -- they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean?

 
I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.

 

But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.


Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus our State which is also yours will be a reality, and not a dream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States, in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager, the worst.

 

Quite true, he replied.

 
And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light?

Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present rulers of State.

Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after [their] own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

 
And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other?

Indeed, I do not, he said.

 
And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question.


Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a better life than that of politics?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.


And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light -- as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods?

By all means, he replied.


The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell [tossing a coin -- RL], but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to be true philosophy? [Plato (1997b) Book VII, pp.1132-38, 514-521c. I have used the on-line version here, even though the edition I have cited is a far superior translation. Bold added.]
 

From this we can see that Plato connects this wild fantasy -- that the world of common experience is in effect a series of shadows, which are themselves merely reflections of artefacts, not of real objects, and that only those who have 'seen the light' after they have exited the cave know 'true being' -- with those who are fit to rule, the Philosophers(!). It is this fantasy upon which Professor Tegmark, for instance, hoped to base his theory. Now, he might not have known of the connection this allegory had with the 'justification' of anti-democratic, aristocratic rule, but that just shows how insidious the "ideas of the ruling-class" are (of which class Plato was a card-carrying member). Be this as it may, that idea is still, over two millennia hence, a remote paradigm that motivates the idea that the universe is a mathematical object, and the world of experience is but a shadow of that hidden world.

 

However, Plato's allegory doesn't work even in its own terms, not least because those trapped in this cave from birth (which they have all been) will have no language, and hence won't be able to name anything, conclude anything or talk about anything -- whether they are inside or outside the cave. This entire fairy-tale collapses as a result.

 

Exactly how this fantasy managed to influence so many and for so long, and why anyone took it seriously, is, therefore, a mystery we will just have to pass over in silence for now...

 

Appendix C: Dm Fans Struggle To Explain Use Value And Exchange Value

 

Here follows the relevant parts of a 'debate' I had with several DM-fans over at Libcom back in 2012.

 

This material has been slightly edited to remove spelling errors and typos, and the quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. In addition many paragraphs have been merged and material that isn't relevant to the relation between Use Value and Exchange Value [UV and RV] has largely been omitted (as have some of the off-topic disputes among DM-fans themselves). Any other edits have either been explicitly acknowledged or they have been put in square brackets. Other than the name abbreviations, all emphases are in the original (unless otherwise stated). Finally, spelling has been modified to agree with UK English.

 

It is worth pointing out that in what follows I am not questioning the validity of Marx's distinction between UV and EV, merely pointing out that:

 

(i) We have as yet no clear idea concerning what we now mean by these two terms (that can be seen by the way that even my adversaries can't agree among themselves); and,

 

(ii) The connection between UV and EV can't be 'dialectical', whatever else it is. As we will see, UV and EV don't imply one another (unlike the proletariat and the capitalist class, so we are told), nor do they 'struggle' with and then turn into each other (which they should do if the DM-classics are to be believed).

 

Finally, in this discussion, I am clearly RL.

 

RL (the following short passage was in fact quoted from an earlier version of this Essay):

 

"Can't exchange values exist where there is no use value at all? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange value but many do not have a use value. Same with many works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins). And can't criminals exchange useless items in order to launder money?"

 

Jura (whose first language isn't English):

 

"This is laughable, but not that surprising in a 21st century Trotskyist. You don't even understand the basic relationships between value, exchange value and use-value, i.e. the fundamental concepts of Marx's analysis (first five or six pages of Ch1 of Volume 1). How can anything you say be relevant to questions of the structure of Marx's theory -- which is exclusively what the Marxian dialectic relates to -- if you don't understand its actual content?..."

 

S Artesian (henceforth, SA -- SA is one of those all too frequent DM-fans who liberally mix abuse in with their responses to me, and not just in this particular debate, but over at RevLeft and elsewhere, which helps explain my dismissive and irreverent attitude toward him):

 

"This claim of Rosa's was answered long ago on revleft. Marx is concerned with the organization of social production, the dominant, determining mode. The accumulation of curios, pets, antiques is exactly what he is not talking about, no more than he is discussing a tailor who is 'kept' by a wealthy individual, producing suits only for that individual. Get rid of the troll."

 

Jura (replying to SA):

 

"That's not the issue at all. Marx would never deny that antiques, pets or works of art are use-values. It's right there on the first page."

 

SA (replying to Jura):

 

"The issue isn't if these objects are use-values, but are they commodities. Of course they can have a use-value; and they can even claim exchange value when sold, but are they 'produced as commodities'? Are they values? Is the suit made by the private tailor a value? Absolutely not. There are objects of individual desire that are not results of social production, consequently their 'values' have nothing to do with the socially necessary labour time of their reproduction, just as the value of an artist's painting has absolutely nothing to do with the labour time embedded in its production. Marx is dealing with the organization of labour as abstract labour; an antique, curio, work of art claims its identity as an antique, curio, work of art precisely because it is not a product of abstract labour."

 

Jura (replying to SA):

 

"I agree with the substance of your posts, but you're not paying attention to what Rosa said. Rosa claims that some commodities (like some antiques) don't have use-value (how their value is determined is not important right now). I'm saying -- repeating Marx -- that this is nonsense: all commodities, regardless of whether their price is regulated by SNLT [Socially Necessary Labour Time -- RL] or not, must have a use-value in order to be sold to someone."

 

SA (replying to Jura):

 

"Well of course it has a 'use value.' Somebody wants it, likes it, exchanges something for it -- represents or translates its use value into an exchange value. That very process, of finding the translation of use value into exchange value is what Marx is examining -- how is it that the use value of one object can be expressed as an exchange value with another object, a value in exchange with all other objects. But antiques, curios, etc. are not the organizing principle of commodity production and their status or magnitudes of use and exchange have nothing to do with Marx's explication of value and of the social fusion of use value with exchange value."

 

RL:

 

"What is the 'use value' of an antique chair, stored in a cellar, which everyone has forgotten about? Perhaps: its use is to collect dust, or provide a framework for spiders to spin their webs? Or maybe its use is to puzzle you?"

 

Jura (replying to RL):

 

"You don't seem to understand Marx's definition of use-value at all (Jura now quotes Marx):

 

'The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity. A commodity, such as iron, corn, or a diamond, is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value, something useful.' [Quoted from here. Link added on edit.]

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"So, what is the use value of that chair?"

 

Jura (replying to RL):

 

"My point is that as long as someone buys it, it has to have one. Marx is very clear about this. Perhaps the old chair satisfies a need for historical furniture associated with certain aesthetic or other properties (as with antiques). Or someone's need for just something solid to sit on (as with old shit sold at flea markets). As long as it is brought to market and sold (becoming a commodity), it must have a use-value (for at least one person, regardless of whether they end up actually using it or find out it's useless), otherwise it wouldn't have found a buyer in the first place."

 

SA (attempting to reply to RL's question about that chair -- note the abuse; it gets worse):

 

"Says all that needs to be said about Rosa's supposed understanding of Marx, of the commodity, of value. What a display of ignorance. The chair that is stored in a cellar may have been produced in a factory, or it may have been produced by a craftsman working in a guild-type arrangement, or it may have been home-produced for home use. In any and all cases, in the first two cases it was produced as a [commodity?] in order to claim, receive an exchange value; it was produced for the purpose of exchange. Such purpose can only be realized if the chair has a use. In the third circumstance, the chair is produced as a use value, and only a use value. There is no exchange value in this case. It is produced for direct consumption, for self-subsistence. 100 years later the chair becomes an 'antique' -- antique is a market, and marketing designation. Does the chair have 'use'? Of course it does, as it satisfies the need of someone who will provide a value in exchange for the chair. Does the chair have use as a chair? Perhaps not, and that's not necessary. If a photographer buys the chair because he/she wants to photograph it for an article in the Sunday Times, does the chair have use? Of course it does. If a museum buys the chair to display the method and styles of chair construction 200 years ago, is that use? Of course it is. That our troll thinks of use only as simple, immediate, direct consumption shows how little she understands about social production, accumulation, use, and........Marx. It makes her, fundamentally, a peasant."

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"So, all the labour power congealed in that chair, which vanishes if it stays in that cellar, suddenly comes back, does it? Even so, I asked what use value it has in that cellar, gathering dust -- not when it was being sold." [I have very slightly altered my last sentence to make its meaning clearer -- RL. The original was this: "Even so, I asked what use value it has in that cellar, gathering dust -- not as it was being sold."]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"Where did I deny this? The question is what use value has it got in a cellar, gathering dust, and forgotten about? Maybe this: to annoy SA? You seem to want to duck that question -- or raise side issues that have nothing to do with what I asked."

 

Jura (replying to RL -- and becoming irate):

 

"Now you're asking about value, which has nothing to do with the present problem. Even things that don't have value can be use-values. Even things that are not products of any labour can be use-values. For how much that chair is going to be sold at an antiques auction or at the flea market is irrelevant. You said (in your writings) that some commodities namely antiques, don't have use-value. I'm saying it's nonsense.... You're saying something which has (exchange) value does not have to have use-value. Utter nonsense!"

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"But, I thought all things were interconnected in that quirky dialectical universe of yours? So, what is the use value of an antique chair, in a cellar, forgotten about and gathering dust? Maybe this: to get you to ignore the question?"

 

Jura (replying to RL):

 

"Anyway, it depends. It can be stored away as a memory of someone's old times as the chairman of the SWP. It can be stored away due to lack of space. You know, whether a thing has a use-value or not is a different question than whether this use-value is being realized in consumption (as long as the thing is not destroyed or does not decay). But remember: you said this (notice the lack of cellars and dust in the paragraph).

 

'Can't exchange values exist where there is no use value at all? What about antiques? They seem to have an exchange value but many do not have a use value. Same with many works of art and other collectables (such as stamps and old coins).'

 

"You're saying something which has (exchange) value does not have to have use-value. Utter nonsense!" [Emphasis in the original.]

 

RL (replying to Jura):

 

"Jura:

 

'Anyway, it depends. It can be stored away as a memory of someone's old times as the chairman of the SWP. It can be stored away due to lack of space. You know, whether a thing has a use-value or not is a different question than whether this use-value is being realized in consumption (as long as the thing is not destroyed or does not decay).'

 

"Sure, but that wasn't my example, it's yours. If you don't like, and can't answer, that one, try this: What is the use value of an antique chair, washed up on a desert island, hidden under tons of sand?

 

"Imagine this scenario: An antique dealer buys a house with its contents, and pays $1,000,000 for it. In the cellar (which she never visits) there is an antique chair, forgotten about, and gathering dust. Ten years later, after still not visiting the cellar, she sells the house and contents for $1,500,000. The new owner, a fan of Hegel, also never goes into that cellar. Ten years later, the house burns down, and all the contents are destroyed. So, the chair has an exchange value (part of the $2,500,000), but no use value (before it was burnt). Plenty more examples like that to keep you busy...."

 

SA (replying to RL -- note the continued abuse):

 

"You are so completely ignorant. Clearly you never bothered to read the 1st volume of Capital, or at least beyond the afterward to the 2nd edition. Whether it sits in a cellar, or on the floor of the NYSE [New York Stock Exchange -- RL], or in the National Academy of Design, it's still a chair. Whether the queen's bum graces it or it is used simply as a place to stack old magazines, or it's forgotten about completely, it's a chair with a use value. The question is in the transformation, the expression of the use value as an exchange value -- in the chair establishing itself as an object that can command labour, or the expression of labour as it exists in all other objects, as value.

 

"Does scrap metal sitting in a junkyard have use value? Of course it does, even if it is not being consumed at the moment. Does a 1958 Chevrolet Corvette have a use value? Of course it does. Even if it sits in its owners garage and he only looks at it on national holidays? Yes, even then. You've claimed antiques have an exchange value without a use value. Clearly you're the one who thinks Marx was an imbecile to point out that the commodity must have a use value to carry, circulate, forward the value the capitalist seeks to realize from its exchange. Even without realizing that value, however, the commodity still retains its use value.

 

"Do the fleets of jets stored in the desert due to the downturn in 2008 still have a use value? Of course they do. Does the 10% of the world's maritime capacity currently at anchor have a use value? Of course those ships have a use-value; but that utility can only be expressed under certain economic conditions -- when a profit can be had. This is why Marx refers to the contradiction between use-value and exchange value; at some point the production of one, which is the production of the other, negates the impulse, and the ability, for the accumulation of capital. I'd like to thank you for exposing the full range of your ignorance regarding Marx's critique of capital....

 

"Tell us again Rosa why chairs not being directly and continuously sat upon have no use value. According to you, every night when the lights are turned out, and people are in bed, the chairs in the dark have no use value. And in the day when people awake? Then the beds have no use value, clearly. Dunce. Or Ignoramus. Or both."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"From this it seems that it's not the object itself, but the intention to treat something as a chair that gives it a use value. In that case, if the chair in question has been forgotten about, locked away in that cellar, so that no one knows it's there and can thus form no intention toward it, it has no use value. In which case, you agree with me! Alas, the rest of what you say, fascinating though it was, does not seem to address my point."

 

Kambing (who now enters the debate, replying to RL):

 

"OK, I'm going to agree with you that it doesn't really make sense to talk about the 'use-value' for an object that no people are relating to in any way, but nor does it make any sense to talk about such objects having 'exchange value' or any other sort of value for that matter. 'Value' is not a static quality of an object, but refers to the social relations in which an object is embedded. So without people 'relating' to the objects in some fashion, they do not have value. Furthermore, the value categories and relationships that Marx establishes in Capital refer specifically to the social relations of generalised commodity production, so they have relatively little utility with respect to objects that are not mediating the capital-labour relation.

 

"'Use-value' loses most of its utility as a coherent category if you are talking about an object outside of a market relation -- it is really more of a catch-all category for all the various qualitative ways that people relate to objects (or to other people through objects), which really only has analytical applicability in distinction from (and as a necessary precondition for) 'exchange-value', in the context of market exchange. I think that the way you have framed your discussion on value demonstrates that if you attempt to remove the dialectical logic from Marx's concepts of value (value as a dynamic, contradictory social relation) you evacuate those concepts of their useful meaning."

 

RL (replying to Kambing):

 

"Kambing, I largely agree with what you say, but I'm not too sure about this:

 

'I think that the way you have framed your discussion on value demonstrates that if you attempt to remove the dialectical logic from Marx's concepts of value (value as a dynamic, contradictory social relation) you evacuate those concepts of their useful meaning.'

 

"Well, I deny these relations are 'contradictory', to begin with, and I don't see how dialectics helps in any way at all. Indeed, I argue that it gets in the way, mystifying Marx's work for no gain at all. After all, you tried, largely successfully, to explain yourself in the first two paragraphs of your reply without any dialectics at all (except perhaps that vague reference to 'mediating'). And there is no need to use 'dialectics', either, since, as I have shown, Marx abandoned this way of looking at things in Das Kapital." [That refers to earlier pages in this debate. I have omitted the rest of the discussion I had with Kambing since it drifted off into other, off-topic issues.]

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"First, it's your claim that the chair, locked away in the cellar and forgotten about has NO use value but.......retains exchange value. Remember? Your claim is that antiques have exchange value with no use value, right? So Rosa, do the fleets of airplanes in the desert, or the ships at anchor, or the rail cars in storage maintain their use value, or does it disappear? Do they have an exchange value without a use value?

 

"This issue, BTW, is one of the reasons Keynes 'make 1/2 dig holes, and the other 1/2 fill them back up' theory falls apart.... no use values are being created. To be a commodity the object must have a use value. Use values can exist without being commodities, but commodities in order to be values must have a use value. Try reading more than just the afterward to volume 1. It might help you. Then again it might not."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"My answer is that this is a problem for you, not me. I'm not going to try to solve it for you. Read the Afterword again, yourself -- you seem to have missed the section where Marx endorses a summary of 'the dialectic method' (the only one he published in his entire life) which contains not one atom of Hegel." [Link added -- RL.]

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"Problem for me? No, it's not a problem for me, because I assert that the old chair has a use value, whether it's in a cellar or in the kitchen or in a museum or a flea market; just as wood has a use value even when it simply lays on the ground in a forest with no one 'knowing' it's there or looking for it, much less collecting it. Wood burns; its combustibility is a physical characteristic, independent of the social relation that harvests, processes, distributes the wood. In any case, your ignorance of Marx's most fundamental categories, and the relations of those categories has been exposed for all to see. That's a fair day's work."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"Once more: so it's the intention to use an object in a certain way that gives it a use value, not the object itself. In other words, it's not an intrinsic property (or an 'essential property') of the object in question, but an extrinsic property -- one we supply to the object concerned. We can see this from the way you word your reply:

 

'just as wood has a use value even when it simply lays on the ground in a forest with no one 'knowing' it's there or looking for it, much less collecting it.'

 

"This either means that wood had a use value long before human beings existed, or it only assumed a use value when we evolved sufficiently enough to form an intention to use it. Otherwise you might be committed to the view that wood can have a use value for lightning, since it can set wood on fire. However, given the fact that you also want to regard use value as a social concept, it seems that the latter is the case: only when something can be used intentionally in a certain way is it a use value. Which is it to be? Do objects have an intrinsic use value, or do they acquire one extrinsically when we form an intention to use them in some way?

 

"Think carefully before you reply. I have a rather nice trap waiting for you if your answer is pitched at your usual, sloppy and slapdash level. Alas, that [often] happens since you let your emotions rule your head. We can see that by the way you rapidly become abusive. So, this might be a good time to put away those childish traits we have come to know and loathe, and act like a man, for a change. Give it a go, you might get to like it. Tantrums don't win arguments...."

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"You're the one arguing that use-value is a matter of intent. You essentially have a version of the old 'If a tree falls in the forest and nobody's around to hear it, does the tree make a sound?' Your argument by intent is really nothing but childish idealism. A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire. Nature can certainly provide use values without human intent. Wood does not have a telos, a purpose, to be burnt in its make-up; it has the intrinsic quality of combustibility whether or not it sits in the forest or is sold in the supermarket. It has the property of combustibility intrinsic to it. It does not need a human being to buy or sell it to provide warmth. If there's a fire in the forest, and nobody is there to see it, or feel it, is the fire hot? The chair retains its use value even when not being used. Intent does not endow wood with its ability to provide warmth in combustion. Intent to sit in the chair does not make it useful. Its existence as a chair, as something of utility for sitting upon exists whatever your intent may be. As an antique, the chair can only claim value in exchange if it has use. The exchange is based upon the chair's usefulness in satisfying the need of a collector to collect, or as a representative of some form of craftsmanship, as a decorative piece, or even as a decorative piece to be used as a chair. It does not derive its utility from exchange in any of these cases; exchange is derived from the utility of the chair, the different utilities in these scenarios."

 

RL (replying to SA -- in what follows, emphases are in the original):

 

"SA (oh dear, into the trap this numpty falls -- I did try to warn him):

 

'You're the one arguing that use-value is a matter of intent. You essentially have a version of the old "If a tree falls in the forest and nobody's around to hear it, does the tree make a sound?" Your argument by intent is really nothing but childish idealism.'

 

"In fact, I have expressed no opinion about the nature of use value. I have, though, posed several problems for you with your odd view of this subject, since it's not too clear whether you accept an intentional view of use values or an essentialist view -- your social interpretation suggests the former, while your comments about wood suggest the latter.

 

"[As seems plain, you have not given this much thought, but have blundered around in the usual way, oblivious of this distinction -- until I kindly pointed it out to you.]

 

'If a tree falls in the forest and nobody's around to hear it, does the tree make a sound?" Your argument by intent is really nothing but childish idealism'

 

"Not at all. I posed a series of problems for you; if you now want to divert attention from your predicament, as I predicted you would (in that other thread), that's up to you. Now, if we adopt an unsympathetic interpretation of your views, wood had a use value for lightning long before we evolved, since it can be set alight by it. (Before you complain I have ignored what you said about human need etc., be patient -- we'll get to that soon enough.) Is that your view? But it follows from what seems to be your essentialist view of wood. If wood has been flammable since it first evolved, then it must have acquired this essential property long before we emerged. In that case, if you do indeed hold an essentialist view of use values, you must also believe that wood is a use value for lightning. [Again, patience, please!] This has nothing to do with trees falling in forests unheard, since the hearing of sound is not an essential property of falling trees. But, as seems to be the case with your odd theory, the capacity of wood to burn is an essential property of that wood. And if that is so, it must be a use value for lightning. (Again, patience, please!)

 

"[This isn't my belief, I hasten to add -- just in case you try to foist it on me, as you have several other things! -- but a consequence of your sloppy approach to HM [Historical Materialism -- RL]. (I blame dialectics. However, you can console yourself with the thought that you're not the first comrade to have his brains addled by Hegel -- upside down or the 'right way up'.)]

 

"On the other hand, if you hold an intentional view of use values, then wood can't be a use value until someone decides to use it, but not before. This would absolve you of the ridiculous belief that wood is a use value for lightning. However, this option would create other problems for you -- since it implies that antique chairs are only use values if someone decides to use them to sit upon. However, between episodes of sitting, they'd not be use values -- unless there was someone always present with that intention. That's because, of course, intentions can't be stored in chairs. This is indeed why many prefer the essentialist view, since a chair, they hold, is essentially a chair, even if no one ever actually uses it. Hence it's always a use value. But, as we have seen, a consistent application of this idea implies wood is a use value for lightning -- and a field is a use value for a worm that burrowed into it -- 50 million years ago. (Patience please!)

 

"Now I sympathise with the predicament you are in. The Hegelian tradition has bequeathed to the sad souls whose brains it has colonised far too few and crude conceptual tools to extricate you from it. But, hey, that's why I am here, to help you poor sods out.

 

"Ah, but you now fall into the trap:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire.'

 

"So, you do favour the intentional interpretation, after all. In which case, wood isn't a use value per se -- only if someone decides to use it. But then you back-sass and say this:

 

'Nature can certainly provide use values without human intent.'

 

"This either means nature has intentions, or you favour the essentialist interpretation. So, 'nature' provided the earth with wood many million years ago, which one day humans would use. In that case it was a use value 50 million years ago. And, its use value, according to your earlier comments, is its capacity to burn. But that capacity is actionable by lightning, too. So it seems that wood is a use value for lightning, also provided by nature. (Patience please!) Now the only way out of this predicament is to emphasise this clause:

 

'satisfies a human want, need, desire.'

 

"But if nature:

 

'can certainly provide use values without human intent...'

 

"Then it looks like you are committed to a teleological/anthropomorphic view: that nature provides the intention here. But then you have this answer:

 

'Wood does not have a telos, a purpose, to be burnt in its make-up; it has the intrinsic quality of combustibility whether or not it sits in the forest or is sold in the supermarket. It has the property of combustibility intrinsic to it.'

 

"So, we are back to the essentialist view of use values, again! But, this just means that anything that is capable of being burnt is a use value. So, since it is possible to burn almost anything (if the energy input is high enough) then practically everything in the universe is a use value! Hence, the moon is a use value, so is the Kuiper Belt and Proxima Centauri. Hence your 'definition' is far too generous. You will thus have to modify it so that you include a reference to attainability (since most of the universe will be forever unattainable to us humans). I'll leave that to you.

 

"But, let us examine that definition again, to see how you fell into the trap:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"In which case, we are back full circle: if an object (like an antique chair) is in a cellar, forgotten about and gathering dust, it no longer 'satisfies a human want, need, desire', since no one knows about it.

 

"Now, I did tell you to frame your response carefully, and not in your usual slap-dash manner. Here we can see you ignored my good advice. You unwisely put your definition in the present continuous tense. That means that anything that isn't at the moment satisfying a "human want, need, desire" can't be a use value. [Your definition, not mine!] Hence, if a piece of wood isn't actually being used, or lies unknown in the forest, it can't be a use value after all. In trying to unite an intentional definition with an essentialist definition you end with an unworkable theory. The rest of what you say, interesting though it is, falls foul of this serious screw-up on your part. I did try to warn to warn you...

 

"Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines:

 

'A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire.' [These aren't SA's words; this is my suggestion.]

 

"Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use value for lightning. Hence, it is.

 

"QED."

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"I agree. Use value is relational. It cannot exist for the human relation without the human relation. Wood is combustible. Combustibility is not an intrinsic use value. Combustibility is useful for human beings. Human beings purposefully utilizing objects makes use values. So once again, do the fleets of jets stored in the desert have a use value? The 10% or so of the world's container fleet at anchor... does it have use value? If they're not being used, do they have a use value? But more importantly, getting back to the original assertion...... do they have value, exchange value? The argument after all is that objects can have an exchange value without a use value. Remember, supposedly the antique chair in a cellar has no use value, but has an exchange value. As the warehoused jets and ships show us, the use value continues to exist. Whether or not the use value is expressed is determined by the needs of capital accumulation."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'Wood is combustible. Combustibility is not an intrinsic use value. Combustibility is useful for human beings. Human beings purposefully utilizing objects makes use values.'

 

"But, your definition of use value:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire...',

 

"implies that if an object isn't at this moment satisfying a 'human want, need, desire', then it can't be a use value. So, that chair, in that cellar, forgotten about, which is not now satisfying a 'human want, need, desire' can't be a use value, contrary to what you assert elsewhere. And, if you relax your definition (which would make your theory a version of stipulative conventionalism -- that is, you'd be aiming to solve a scientific problem by means of linguistic tinkering), that would be no help either, as I pointed out earlier:

 

'Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines: "A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire.' [Again, these aren't SA's words; this is my suggestion.] Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use value for lightning. Hence, it is. QED'"

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"And in your argument; everything loses its use value, except the bed and the blankets, when humans go to sleep. Again, do the jets parked in the desert have use value? Yes or no? Does a jet, not officially removed from the roster of equipment of an airline, not being utilized on any particular day, lose its use value? In short, your argument becomes 'A chair is only a chair when being sat upon' -- which has nothing to do with Marx's analysis at all. Marx is talking about human appropriation of nature, through labour, and what factors determine the expression, the mode of that appropriation. In the case of capital that mode is value.

 

"And this:

 

'Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use value for lightning. Hence, it is',

 

"is exactly what artists do. The wood can be used to represent lightning -- that's its use value to the artist. That's the point. Wood can't be [useful to?] lightning, but it can, to an individual, satisfy a need to represent lightning. Now the artist can buy the wood, in which case the exchange value cannot exist separate from the use value. Or the artist may find the wood, in which case the use-value exists without a coincident exchange value. The mode of appropriation for society, however, is determined by the social organization of labour."

 

[Added on edit: From this we can see that SA hasn't got the point about wood and lightning. There were no artists around 50 million years ago!]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'And in your argument; everything loses its use value, except the bed and the blankets, when humans go to sleep.'

 

"Well, in fact, that's a consequence of your definition. Or do you deny that you posted this?

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"Given this definition that chair can't be a use value!

 

'Again, do the jets parked in the desert have use value? Yes or no? Does a jet, not officially removed from the roster of equipment of an airline, not being utilized on any particular day, lose its use value?'

 

"Given your defective definition, they don't appear to [have a use value], either! May I suggest, therefore, that you re-think your definition? (And good luck with that one, given the impoverished conceptual tools Hegel dumped on all those who think he had anything of value to say!)

 

'In short, your argument becomes "A chair is only a chair when being sat upon" -- which has nothing to do with Marx's analysis at all. Marx is talking about human appropriation of nature, through labour, and what factors determine the expression, the mode of that appropriation. In the case of capital that mode is value.'

 

"Once more, this follows from your definition, not mine (since I haven't defined use value).

 

'The wood can be used to represent lightning -- that's its use value to the artist. That's the point. Wood can't be lightning, but it can, to an individual, satisfy a need to represent lightning. Now the artist can buy the wood, in which case the exchange value cannot exist separate from the use value. Or the artist may find the wood, in which case the use-value exists without a coincident exchange value. The mode of appropriation for society, however, is determined by the social organization of labour.'

 

"But, what about a lump of wood that is lying in a forest, unknown to any artist, or to anyone at all, 50 million years ago? Given your defective definition, it can't be a use value -- since it is not now:

 

'an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"But if you relax your useless definition, then it can be a use value to lightning, if I want it to be:

 

[RL from earlier] 'Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines:

 

[SA from earlier, my words in his mouth] "A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire...."

 

[RL from earlier] "'Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use value for lightning. Hence, it is. QED.'"

 

SA (replying to someone else -- but note the fatal admission -- I have only included this passage here because of that):

 

"I agree that the assertion that there can be exchange value without use value is nonsense.... but moreover the 'pretence' of exchange value without use value is indicative of fraud, swindling, scams... all those things that accompany capital like pilot fish accompany the shark. We can look at the flim-flam scams of the emerging US railroad industry in the 1830s and 1840s to see all sorts of examples of 'exchange value' without use value -- every single occurrence collapsed leaving the holders of the paper values, exactly that: holders of the value of the paper and nothing else." [Bold added.]

 

SA (replying to RL -- SA has a habit of ignoring anything he can't answer (he has just ignored my last comment in its entirety(!)), a trait he perfected over at Revleft):

 

"Tell us again how antiques have exchange value without use value."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"I see that you have once again ducked a question you can't answer:

 

[RL from earlier] 'But if you relax your useless definition, then it can be a use value to lightning, if I want it to be.... Back to that lightning. It seems that the only way you can extricate yourself is to widen your definition along these lines: "A use-value is an object that has, is now, or could satisfy a human want, need, desire...." Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use value for lightning. Hence, it is. QED.'

 

"But, to answer your (spurious) question: A woman buys a house and contents for $1,000,000. In the cellar there is an antique chair which she knows nothing about, and neither does anyone else. Five years later she sells the house and contents for $1,500,000, still knowing nothing of that chair. Now according to your defective definition of use value (which, despite being warned [about being] careful, you unwisely put in the present continuous tense):

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"that chair isn't a use value -- since it does not satisfy, and has not (for at least five years) satisfied a: 'human want, need, desire....'

 

"And that's because no one knows about it. Even so, it has an exchange value. Now it's all the same to me if this has stumped you, but when, in x months or years time, you claim yet again to have answered all my questions, I will quote this conundrum back at you (and this page, too) to show you are just as full of hot air now as you were at RevLeft."

 

Kambing (replying to RL):

 

"While the ownership of the chair may have legally changed hands due to the 'contents' being included in the sale, it clearly hasn't actually been specifically factored into the exchange value. By your logic, used tissues that got left under the bed would also have an exchange value. Besides, typically in a home and contents sale the exchange value of the contents is not all precisely determined, presumably because the owner (or their agent) has decided that the time it would take to sell off the contents individually is worth more than the lost income.

 

"Regardless of its legal status, unknown contents don't really factor into it at all. I mean, what if there was a lost $10,000,000 work of art hidden in the attic? Or several million dollars in cash? Has their 'exchange value' suddenly plummeted and then risen again? (Ok, presumably there may be laws that may exclude such things from the sale itself, I'm not sure). But the point is that exchange value and use value are both ascribed by human beings, they are social phenomena. It seems like your 'non-dialectical' approach is a bit metaphysical and fetishistic, with objects being magically imbued with value without any human action or thought whatsoever."

 

L Bird (replying to RL -- L Bird is henceforth LB):

 

"Rosa, my tentative answer to your question would be that this issue of 'use value/exchange value' can't be addressed at the level of individual objects, whether 'known about' or not. The theory is intended to explain exploitation at the level of society, and is not intended to compete with psychological theories of what individuals think of isolated objects. I suppose the simple answer to your question is that 'it is immaterial' (poor joke)."

 

RL (replying to Kambing):

 

"Kambing:

 

'While the ownership of the chair may have legally changed hands due to the 'contents' being included in the sale, it clearly hasn't actually been specifically factored into the exchange value. By your logic, used tissues that got left under the bed would also have an exchange value. Besides, typically in a home and contents sale the exchange value of the contents is not all precisely determined, presumably because the owner (or their agent) has decided that the time it would take to sell off the contents individually is worth more than the lost income.'

 

"Not my 'logic': it follows from the sloppy wording being bandied about by SA and one or two others."

 

'Regardless of its legal status, unknown contents don't really factor into it at all. I mean, what if there was a lost $10,000,000 work of art hidden in the attic? Or several million dollars in cash? Has their 'exchange value' suddenly plummeted and then risen again? (Ok, presumably there may be laws that may exclude such things from the sale itself, I'm not sure). But the point is that exchange value and use value are both ascribed by human beings, they are social phenomena. It seems like your 'non-dialectical' approach is a bit metaphysical and fetishistic, with objects being magically imbued with value without any human action or thought whatsoever.'

 

"This is a problem for the mystics here, not me. I have attempted to define nothing, nor have I posted a single theoretical statement about use and/or exchange value. So pick a fight with SA, not me."

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB, thanks for at least trying to answer my question:

 

'Rosa, my tentative answer to your question would be that this issue of "use value/exchange value" can't be addressed at the level of individual objects, whether 'known about' or not. The theory is intended to explain exploitation at the level of society, and is not intended to compete with psychological theories of what individuals think of isolated objects.'

 

"Well, with all due respect, that's a bit like arguing that Newton's theory of gravitation, say, is not intended to deal with single objects (like that apple, for example), but the solar system/the galaxy etc. as a whole. The only reason I aired this example was to embarrass the intentional definition of use value SA here was trying to sell us, since that does introduce psychological factors. Recall, I am not offering my own views here, merely putting pressure on SA by drawing out the ridiculous consequences of his characteristically sloppy approach in this area. (True to form, he has gone rather quiet. If he replies, expect more prevarication and delaying tactics from him.)"

 

LB (replying to RL):

 

"I think you've chosen a poor counter-example, Rosa. Gravity does work at the level of single objects, as well as at the level of systems like the solar system. I think a better example is the property of 'dog protection', which works at the level of 'walls', not at the level of wall components, like bricks. One can't find a mysterious property of 'dog protection' in a brick, no matter how hard one looks!...

 

'Recall, I am not offering my own views here, merely putting pressure on SA by drawing out the ridiculous consequences of his characteristically sloppy approach in this area.'

 

"Hmmm... well, since I don't believe in 'objective positions' from which to view the world (social or physical), I think you are 'offering your own views', because this is an inescapable component of criticism, but your views have always remained unspoken, in this debate, at least. Well done, for arguing from a hidden position, like the good sniper you are! The troops in the open trying to attack you are taking a terrific mauling!"

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB:

 

'I think you've chosen a poor counter-example, Rosa. Gravity does work at the level of single objects, as well as at the level of systems like the solar system.'

 

"In that case, this seems to mean that SA's version of Marx's theory can't explain a single thing.

 

'I think a better example is the property of "dog protection", which works at the level of "walls", not at the level of wall components, like bricks. One can't find a mysterious property of "dog protection" in a brick, no matter how hard one looks!'

 

"Sorry, but I can't see what this has got to do with my example -- my choice of example doesn't depend on being able to see a property in anything. So, I'll stick to my example, if that's Ok with you."

 

'Hmmm... well, since I don't believe in "objective positions" from which to view the world (social or physical), I think you are "offering your own views", because this is an inescapable component of criticism, but your views have always remained unspoken, in this debate, at least.'

 

"Well, I don't pretend to be arguing from an 'objective' position (in relation to this, or anything else, for that matter), since I do not accept this use of 'objective' -- and that's because I reject all philosophical theories of 'objectivity' as non-sensical. And, of course, my views have remained unspoken, but if you adopt this line, then you will be forced to argue, for instance, that my view of the taste of butter is part of my argument here, since it too was unspoken -- just as your unspoken view of [the] history of, say, the Eiffel Tower motivated your choice of 'dog protection'. [Link added.]

 

'Well done, for arguing from a hidden position, like the good sniper you are! The troops in the open trying to attack you are taking a terrific mauling!'

 

"As I pointed out to SA, the reason for this is that the vast majority of comrades who have allowed 'dialectics' (in the post-Hegelian sense of that word) to colonise their brains, have also bought into an impoverished intellectual tradition. Unfortunately, that tradition in 'continental thought' has bequeathed to its acolytes 'logics' and methods that are far too weak, conceptually impoverished, and confused for them to be able defend themselves. This has been compounded by the fact that they also reject analytic philosophy and the advanced analytic techniques it has developed that expose the poverty of thought that has devolved from this mystical tradition. And they refuse to be told too. So, they only have themselves to blame..."

 

LB (replying to RL):

 

"RL:

 

'Sorry, but I can't see what this has got to do with my example -- my choice of example doesn't depend on being able to see a property in anything. So, I'll stick to my example, if that's Ok with you.'

 

"Yeah, sure, I was merely trying to point out that 'value', etc., work at the conceptual level of 'dog protection', not at the lower level of 'bricks'. You can 'stick to your example' in your debate with SA, et al, but if you do then I think you are missing the 'social' meaning: of course, if SA wants to fight you on that level, I think you'll triumph.

 

'And, of course, my views have remained unspoken, but if you adopt this line, then you will be forced to argue, for instance, that my view of the taste of butter is part of my argument here, since it too was unspoken -- just as your unspoken view of history of, say, the Eiffel Tower motivated your choice of "dog protection".'

 

"This is poor logic from you, Rosa. The fact that one relevant thing is unspoken doesn't logically lead to every unspoken thing being relevant.

 

'This has been compounded by the fact that they also reject analytic philosophy and the advanced analytic techniques it has developed that expose the poverty of thought that has devolved from this mystical tradition.'

 

"While I have a lot of sympathy for your characterisation of 'dialectics' as the 'mystical tradition', I also think that 'analytic techniques', 'advanced' or not, have to be located within some assumptions and axioms. I feel that, perhaps, it's in that discussion that I'll be revealed to be closer to our 'dialectics' experts. Perhaps, not. You say you think historical materialism, of some sort, is useful, and I think I, and even syndicalistcat [another character in this debate, whose comments I have omitted -- RL] and others, would agree with that."

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB:

 

'This is poor logic from you, Rosa. The fact that one relevant thing is unspoken doesn't logically lead to every unspoken thing being relevant.'

 

"I'm not too sure that is anything to do with logic, but even supposing it has, I don't think you will be able to advance a non-question-begging way to exclude my examples while maintaining the allegation that unspoken views lie behind my argument. And it wasn't part of the point I wished to make that 'every unspoken thing being relevant', only that you are guessing -- and without any evidence, too.

 

'While I have a lot of sympathy for your characterisation of "dialectics" as the "mystical tradition", I also think that "analytic techniques", "advanced" or not, have to be located within some assumptions and axioms. I feel that, perhaps, it's in that discussion that I'll be revealed to be closer to our "dialectics" experts. Perhaps, not. You say you think historical materialism, of some sort, is useful, and I think I, and even syndicalistcat and others, would agree with that.'

 

"Sure, in many areas of Analytic Philosophy there are just such assumptions, but there are no philosophical (in the traditional sense of that word) assumptions underlying the Wittgensteinian method I use. Indeed, if there are, and you can identify any to which I adhere, I will abandon them immediately, and apologise profusely."

 

LB (replying to RL):

 

"RL:

 

'And it wasn't part of the point I wished to make that "every unspoken thing being relevant", only that you are guessing -- and without any evidence, too.'

 

"But, Rosa, what counts as 'evidence' depends on one's conceptual schema, so to maintain I haven't supplied 'evidence' means that you must have a way of measuring 'evidence', to be aware of its absence. How do you measure 'evidence'?"

 

'Sure, in many areas of Analytic Philosophy there are just such assumptions, but there are no philosophical (in the traditional sense of that word) assumptions underlying the Wittgensteinian method I use.'

 

"You'll have to define 'traditional' for us, Rosa. I think Wittgenstein's method has philosophical assumptions, just like every other human method."

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"I think it would be helpful if Rosa could demystify the first three chapters of vol 1 for LB, who finds Marx's presentation 'magical, religious, mystical' in the mode of dialectics. All Rosa's nonsense about exchange value without use value is exactly that, nonsense from the perspective of Marx's examination of value, because Marx's explication is an analysis of how and why the use value of any single commodity is expressed as, or translated into, the exchange value of any and all other commodities. If Rosa's 'Anti-dialectics' has any validity, any practical consequences for Marx's analysis, then surely that consequence will become evident in Marx's examination of value.

 

"Now I certainly don't expect Rosa to engage such a challenge -- what we will get is more puffery about 'as soon as you answer my questions' blahblahblah... but I'm not the person asking for clarification of those chapters, LB, who substantially agrees with Rosa's 'critique' is, and he thinks those chapters are examples of Hegelian obfuscation. So it would be nice to see, since clearly those three chapters are critical to Marx's work, to see them 'demystified.'

 

"Edit: Here's where Rosa takes the argument rather than deal with the concrete issue at hand:

 

'But, your definition of use value: "A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire...", implies that if an object isn't at this moment satisfying a "human want, need, desire", then it can't be a use value.'

 

"No such implication is contained in Marx's description of a use-value. The inference is particularly and peculiarly Rosa's. We can state Marx's definition this way: a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire." [Added on Edit: Readers will no doubt have noticed that my prediction -- "expect more prevarication and delaying tactics from [SA]" -- has been amply confirmed.]

 

SA (replying to LB -- whose comment I have omitted):

 

"But Rosa believes that Marx extirpated Hegel in volume 1 of Capital. So why then are these three chapters so mystifying and difficult for many people to grasp? Is it that Marx, 'flirting' with Hegel, like a moth flirts with a flame, got way too close? Is it possible that Marx, writing volume 1 for the 'general public' deliberately mystified this analysis of value and the commodity, of the basic unit of capital? There have been numerous explanations of Marx's first three chapters. Some have even been provided in the discussions at this site. Others in books by Rubin and many other writers. If the first 3 chapters have a significance for all that follows in the volume, and in capitalism, surely Rosa's anti-Hegelianism should be able to clarify Marx's analysis of value."

 

[I have also omitted several exchanges between SA and one or two others since they don't directly impact on my comments.]

 

RL (replying to LB):

 

"LB:

 

'But, Rosa, what counts as "evidence" depends on one's conceptual schema, so to maintain I haven't supplied "evidence" means that you must have a way of measuring "evidence", to be aware of its absence.'

 

"Well, I don't have a 'conceptual scheme', and I doubt anyone else has, either. (The idea that we all operate with one is based on some highly dubious a priori psychology, which can be shown to be non-sensical, too.)

 

'How do you measure "evidence"?'

 

"Are you asking me what I mean by the word 'evidence'? I have to ask this since I am sure evidence can't be measured (except with a tape measure or weighing scales, etc.).

 

'You'll have to define "traditional" for us, Rosa. I think Wittgenstein's method has philosophical assumptions, just like every other human method.'

 

"By 'traditional', I mean, of course, philosophy as it has been practiced 'in the west', by the vast majority of philosophers since Ancient Greek times. And I challenge you to show us one philosophical assumption that Wittgenstein adopts. And even if per impossible you succeed, I will promptly reject that assumption and criticise Wittgenstein for adopting it."

 

[I have omitted the rest of my reply to LB since it strays into areas that aren't relevant to the purpose of this Appendix.]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

[I have omitted most of my reply to SA since it concerns other matters unrelated to this specific discussion.]

 

"SA:

 

'Now I certainly don't expect Rosa to engage such a challenge -- what we will get is more puffery about "as soon as you answer my questions" blahblahblah... but I'm not the person asking for clarification of those chapters, LB, who substantially agrees with Rosa's "critique" is, and he thinks those chapters are examples of Hegelian obfuscation.'

 

"Which questions you have failed to answer [also in other discussions on other boards] -- and here at LibCom there are now two more: 1) You can't respond effectively to my demonstration that your definition of use value implies that an antique chair, left in a cellar, and forgotten about, can't be a use value; 2) That the only justification you can offer for your odd use of 'contradiction' is tradition.

 

'No such implication is contained in Marx's description of a use-value. The inference is particularly and peculiarly Rosa's. We can state Marx's definition this way: a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire.'

 

"This is your intentional definition again, and it implies that the aforementioned chair can't be a use-value. Or do you suppose that this chair, which no one knows about is satisfying 'a human, want, need, or desire'?

 

"But you now alter your earlier definition. It's no longer:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"But:

 

'a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire....'

 

"Ok, so I want it to be the case that wood is a use value for lightning. So, it is. QED."

 

[Again, I have omitted several more exchanges between myself and several others for the same reason.]

 

SA (replying to RL):

 

"I haven't ducked a thing. I've refused to engage in your absurd, irrelevant discussions about whether or not a chair hidden in an attic that nobody knows about is a use value. You have ducked all practical inquiries regarding your [assertion] -- that there are exchange values without use values...."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'I haven't ducked a thing. I've refused to engage in your absurd, irrelevant discussions about whether or not a chair hidden in an attic that nobody knows about is a use value.'

 

"But my conclusions followed from your changing definitions of use value. First you tried to palm this off on us:

 

'A use-value is an object that satisfies a human want, need, desire....'

 

"Then this:

 

'a use-value is an object that can satisfy a human, want, need, or desire....'

 

"The first, since it's in the present continuous tense, implies that if no one knows about that chair, then they can't want, need or desire it. So, it can't be a use value. The second implies that if I want something to be a use value, it is -- so if I want wood to be a use value for lightning, it is. Your definitions sunshine; you deal with them."

 

[Again, I have omitted several paragraphs from my reply to SA for the same reason.]

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"Whimped out, I see... No worries, SA, I'll just link to these threads the next time you try to con the members of another board into thinking you have answered my questions."

 

SA (replying to RL -- and here comes the extreme abuse I generally receive from this 'comrade' (and others) -- on one board he even accused me of being a cop in disguise!):

 

"GFY [Go F*ck Yourself -- RL] Rosa, nobody's whimped out. There's just no point engaging with a pathological shirker like you. I've answered every point you've raised.... Go troll somewhere else."

 

RL (replying to SA):

 

"SA:

 

'There's just no point engaging with a pathological shirker like you.'

 

"In other words, you can't answer this question (which I have been asking you now for at least two years, here and at RevLeft):

 

"Assuming you are 100% right about Marx and the 'dialectic' -- in that case, other than merely copying his use of 'contradiction', what is your justification for using it? And I predict that you will deflect attention from it and/or avoid it some more -- since you can't answer it without admitting that the only reason you have for using 'contradiction' in the way you do is a slavish adherence to tradition.

 

'I've answered every point you've raised and showed how nothing you raise makes any practical difference to Marx's critique of capitalism.'

 

"Not [in] the above, nor have you shown how or why your intentional 'definition' of use value does not imply that an antique chair, forgotten about in a cellar, has no use value."

 

The discussion breaks off at this point -- with SA slinking away and retreating into his usual dialectical sulk.

 

Reference

 

Several of Marx and Engels's works listed below have been linked to the Marxist Internet Archive, but since Lawrence & Wishart threatened legal action over copyright infringement many no longer work.

 

However, all of their work can now be accessed here.

 

Agassi, J. (1968), 'Anthropomorphism In Science', in Weiner (1968), pp.87-91.

 

Anonymous (2005), Kybalion: By The Three Initiates (Digireads).

 

Arrington, R., and Glock, H-J. (1996) (eds.), Wittgenstein And Quine (Routledge).

 

Baake, K. (2003), Metaphor And Knowledge. The Challenges Of Writing Science (State University of New York Press).

 

Baker, G., and Hacker, P. (1988), Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity Volume Two (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).

 

Barnes, J. (2009), Truth, Etc. Six Lectures On Ancient Logic (Oxford University Press).

 

Benjamin, A., Cantor, G., and Christie, J. (1987) (eds.), The Figural And The Literal (Manchester University Press).

 

Béziau, J-Y., Carnielli, W., and Gabbay, D. (2007) (eds.), Studies In Logic Volume Nine: Handbook Of Paraconsistency (College Publications).

 

Bicchieri, C., and Alexander, J. (2006), (eds.), PSA 06 74, 5 (University of Chicago Press).

 

[PSA = Philosophy of Science Association; the PSA volumes comprise papers submitted to its biennial meeting.]

 

Bigelow, J., Ellis, B., and Pargetter, R. (1988), 'Forces', Philosophy of Science 55, pp.614-30.

 

Bologh, R. (1979), Dialectical Phenomenology: Marx's Method (Routledge).

 

Borkenau, F. (1987), 'The Sociology Of The Mechanistic World Picture', Science In Context 1, pp.109-27.

 

Brown, T. (2003), Making Truth. Metaphor In Science (University of Illinois Press).

 

Buchwald, J. (1985), From Maxwell To Microphysics. Aspects Of Electromagnetic Theory In The Last Quarter Of The Nineteenth Century (University of Chicago Press).

 

Bukharin, N. (1925), Historical Materialism (George Allen & Unwin).

 

Callinicos, A. (1983/2006). 'The "New Middle Class" And Socialist Politics', International Socialism 2, 20, pp.82-119. [The 2006 reprint of this article also has an Appendix devoted to replying to Erik Olin Wright.]

 

Callinicos, A., and Harman, C., (1987), The Changing Working Class (Bookmarks).

 

Cartwright, N. (1983), How The Laws Of Physics Lie (Oxford University Press).

 

Chao, H-K., and Reiss, J. (2017) (eds.), Philosophy Of Science In Practice. Nancy Cartwright And The Nature Of Scientific Reasoning (Springer).

 

Clagett, M. (1959) (ed.), The Science Of Mechanics In The Middle Ages (University of Wisconsin Press).

 

Clark, S. (1975), Aristotle's Man: Speculations Upon Aristotelian Anthropology (Oxford University Press).

 

Cliff, T. (1960), 'Trotsky On Substitutionism', reprinted in Cliff (1982), pp.192-209, Cliff, et al (1996), pp.56-79, and Cliff (2001), pp.117-32.

 

--------, (1982), Neither Washington Nor Moscow (Bookmarks).

 

--------, (2001), International Struggle And The Marxist Tradition (Bookmarks).

 

Cliff, T., Hallas, D., Harman, C., and Trotsky, L. (1996), Party And Class (Bookmarks, 2nd ed.).

 

Coelho, R. (2021), 'On The Composition Of Forces: Algorithm And Experiment', Axiomathes 31, 2, pp.199-210.

 

Cohen, I. (1970), 'Newton's Second Law And The Concept Of Force In The Principia', in Palter (1970), pp.143-85.

 

Colodny, R. (1965) (ed.), Beyond The Edge Of Certainty (University Press of America).

 

Copenhaver, B. (1995), Hermetica. The Greek Corpus Hermeticum And The Latin Asclepius In A New English Translation With Notes And An Introduction (Cambridge University Press).

 

Cornforth, M. (1976), Materialism And The Dialectical Method (Lawrence & Wishart, 5th ed.). [A PDF of the 2015 reprint of this book (which appears to be slightly different from the 1976 edition used in this Essay) is available here.]

 

--------, (1980), Communism And Philosophy (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

Creary, L. (1981), 'Causal Reality And The Reality Of Natural Component Forces', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62, pp.148-57.

 

Curiel, E. (2019), 'Singularities And Black Holes', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2021 Edition).

 

Deser, S., and Ford, K. (1965) (eds.), Space-Time (Prentice-Hall).

 

Dupré, J. (1993), The Disorder Of Things. Metaphysical Foundation Of The Disunity Of Science (Harvard University Press).

 

Earman, J., Glymour, C., and Mitchell, S. (2002), (eds.), Ceteris Paribus Laws (Kluwer Academic Press).

 

Ebersole, F. (1982), 'Stalking The Rigid Designator', Philosophical Investigations 5, pp.247-66; reprinted in Ebersole (2002), pp.301-23, as 'Proper Names And Other Names'.

 

--------, (2002), Meaning And Saying (Xlibris Corporation, 2nd ed.).

 

Eco, U. (1997), The Search For The Perfect Language (Fontana).

 

Edgley, R. (1979), 'Marx's Revolutionary Science', in Mepham and Ruben (1979a), pp.5-26.

 

Ellis, B. (1963), 'Universal And Differential Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14, pp.177-94.

 

--------, (1965), 'The Origin And Nature Of Newton's Laws Of Motion', in Colodny (1965), pp.29-68.

 

--------, (1976), 'The Existence Of Forces', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 7, pp.171-85.

 

Engels, F. (1888), Ludwig Feuerbach And The End Of Classical German Philosophy, reprinted in Marx and Engels (1968), pp.584-622.

 

--------, (1891), 'Letter To Conrad Schmidt', 01/11/1891, in Marx and Engels (1975), pp.414-15.

 

--------, (1954), Dialectics Of Nature (Progress Publishers).

 

--------, (1955), Dialectics Of Nature (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

--------, (1976), Anti-Dühring (Foreign Languages Press).

 

Field, H. (2008), Saving Truth From Paradox (Oxford University Press).

 

Fisk, M. (1973), Nature And Necessity (Indiana University Press).

 

--------, (1979), 'Dialectics And Ontology', in Mepham and Ruben (1979b), pp.117-43.

 

Fleck, L. (1979), Genesis And Development Of A Scientific Fact (University of Chicago Press).

 

Fodor, J. (2004), 'Water's Water Everywhere. Review Of Kripke: Names, Necessity And Identity By Christopher Hughes', London Review of Books, 21/10/2004.

 

Förster, E., and Melamed, Y. (2015) (eds.), Spinoza And German Idealism (Cambridge University Press).

 

German, L. (1996), A Question Of Class (Bookmarks).

 

Glock, H-J. (1996),  A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Blackwell).

 

--------, (2003), Quine And Davidson On Language, Thought And Reality (Cambridge University Press).

 

Goldstein, H., Poole, C., and Safko, J. (2002), Classical Mechanics (Addison Wesley, 3rd ed.).

 

Goldstein, L. (1992), 'Smooth And Rough Logic', Philosophical Investigations 15, pp.93-110.

 

--------, (2004), 'The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God And More: A Defence Of A Wittgensteinian Conception Of Contradiction', in Priest, et al (2004), pp.295-313.

 

Gollobin, I. (1986), Dialectical Materialism. Its Laws, Categories And Practice (Petras Press).

 

Greene, B. (1999), The Elegant Universe (Jonathan Cape).

 

--------, (2004), The Fabric Of The Cosmos. Space, Time And The Texture Of Reality (Allen Lane).

 

Grossmann, H. (1987), 'The Social Foundations Of Mechanistic Philosophy And Manufacture', Science In Context 1, pp.129-80.

 

Guttenplan, S. (2005), Objects Of Metaphor (Oxford University Press).

 

Hacker, P. (1996), Wittgenstein's Place In Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell).

 

--------, (2007), Human Nature, The Categorial Framework (Blackwell).

 

Hadden, R. (1988), 'Social Relations And The Content Of Early Modern Science', The British Journal of Sociology 39, pp.255-80.

 

--------, (1994), On The Shoulders Of Merchants (State University of New York Press).

 

Hahn, S. (2007), Contradiction In Motion. Hegel's Organic Concept Of Life And Value (Cornell University Press).

 

Hallett, G. (1991), Essentialism: A Wittgensteinian Critique (State University of New York Press).

 

Halliday, D., Resnick, R., and Walker, J. (1993), Fundamentals Of Physics (John Wiley & Sons, 4th ed.)

 

Hanna, P., and Harrison, B. (2004), Word And World. Practice And The Foundations Of Language (Cambridge University Press).

 

Hanson, N. (1965a), 'Newton's First Law: A Philosopher's Door Into Natural Philosophy', in Colodny (1965), pp.6-28.

 

--------, (1965b), 'A Response To Ellis's Conception Of Newton's First Law', in Colodny (1965), pp.69-74.

 

Harré, R., and Madden, E. (1975), Causal Powers (Blackwell).

 

Harvey, D. (2014), Seventeen Contradictions And The End Of Capitalism (Oxford University Press).

 

Havelock, E. (1983), 'The Linguistic Task Of The Presocratics', in Robb (1982), pp.7-82.

 

Hegel, G. (1975), Logic, translated by William Wallace (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed.).

 

--------, (1995a), Lectures On The History Of Philosophy Volume One: Greek Philosophy To Plato, translated by E. S. Haldane (University of Nebraska Press).

 

--------, (1995b), Lectures On The History Of Philosophy Volume Three: Medieval And Modern Philosophy, translated by E. S. Haldane (University of Nebraska Press).

 

--------, (1999), Science Of Logic, translated by A. V. Miller (Humanity Books).

 

--------, (2004), Hegel's Philosophy Of Nature. Part Two Of The Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences (Oxford University Press). [This links to a Scribd page which features a photographic reproduction of this book.]

 

Heilbroner, R. (1980), Marxism For And Against (W. W. Norton & Company).

 

Hesse, M. (1961), Forces And Fields (Thomas Nelson).

 

--------, (1966), Models And Analogies In Science (University of Notre Dame Press).

 

Hunt, I., and Suchting, W. (1969), 'Force And "Natural Motion"', Philosophy of Science 36, pp.233-51.

 

Jammer, M. (1999), Concepts Of Force (Dover Publications, 2nd ed.).

 

Kahn, C. (1994), Anaximander And the Origin Of Greek Cosmology (Hackett Publishing)

 

--------, (2003), The Verb 'Be' In Ancient Greek (Hackett Publishing).

 

Kant, I. (1763), Attempt To Introduce Negative Magnitudes Into Philosophy, in Kant (2003), pp.203-41.

 

--------, (1998), Critique Of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood (Cambridge University Press).

 

--------, (2003), Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, translated and edited by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge University Press).

 

Kaye, J. (1998), Economy And Nature In The Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, And The Emergence Of Scientific Thought (Cambridge University Press).

 

Kline, A., and Matheson, C. (1987), 'The Logical Impossibility Of Collision', Philosophy 62, pp.509-15.

 

Kripke, S. (1977), 'Identity And Necessity', in Schwartz (1977), pp.66-101.

 

--------, (1980), Naming And Necessity (Blackwell).

 

Kuhn, T. (1970), 'Reflections On My Critics', in Lakatos and Musgrave (1970), pp.231-78.

 

--------, (1996), The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 3rd ed.).

 

Lakatos, I., and Musgrave, A. (1970) (eds.), Criticism And The Growth Of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press).

 

Lawler, J. (1982), 'Hegel On Logical And Dialectical Contradictions, And Misinterpretations From Bertrand Russell To Lucio Colletti', in Marquit, Moran, and Truitt (1982), pp.11-44. [A good 90% of this article has been  reproduced here and here.]

 

Lenin, V. (1921), 'Once Again On The Trade Unions, The Current Situation And The Mistakes Of Comrades Trotsky And Bukharin', reprinted in Lenin (1980), pp.70-106.

 

--------, (1961), Collected Works Volume 38 (Progress Publishers).

 

--------, (1972), Materialism And Empirio-Criticism (Foreign Languages Press).

 

--------, (1980), On The Question Of Dialectics (Progress Publishers).

 

Lerner, E. (1992), The Big Bang Never Happened (Simon & Schuster).

 

Levins, R., and Lewontin, R. (1985), The Dialectical Biologist (Harvard University Press).

 

Livio, M. (2009), Is God A Mathematician? (Simon Schuster).

 

Lloyd, G. (1971), Polarity And Analogy. Two Types Of Argument In Early Greek Thought (Cambridge University Press).

 

Malament, D. (2012), Topics In The Foundations Of General Relativity And Newtonian Gravitational Theory (University of Chicago Press).

 

Manchak, J. (2012), 'Review Of Malament (2012)', Philosophy of Science 79, 4, pp.575-83. [This links to a PDF. This version is different from the published article.]

 

Mao Tse-Tung, (1937), 'On Contradiction', in Mao (1964), pp.311-47.

 

--------, (1964), Selected Works, Volume One (Foreign Languages Press).

 

Marquit, E., Moran, P., and Truitt, W. (1982) (eds.), Dialectical Contradictions And Contemporary Marxist Discussions, Studies in Marxism, Volume 10 (Marxist Educational Press).

 

Marx, K. (1975a), Early Writings (Penguin Books).

 

--------, (1975b), Economical And Philosophical Manuscripts, in Marx (1975a), pp.279-400.

 

--------, (1976), Capital, Volume One (Penguin Books).

 

--------, (1996), MECW, Volume 35 (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

--------, (1998), MECW, Volume 37 (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

Marx, K., and Engels, F. (1968), Selected Works In One Volume (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

--------, (1970), The German Ideology, Students Edition, edited by Chris Arthur (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

--------, (1975a), Selected Correspondence (Progress Publishers, 3rd ed.).

 

--------, (1987), MECW, Volume 25 (Lawrence & Wishart).

 

Mason, P. (2012), Science, Marxism, And The Big Bang. A Critical Review Of 'Reason In Revolt' (Socialist Publications, 3rd ed.).

 

Massin, O. (2009), 'The Metaphysics Of Forces', Dialectica 63, 4, pp.555-89.

 

--------, (2017), 'The Composition Of Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68, 3, pp.805-46.

 

Meikle, S. (1979), 'Dialectical Contradiction And Necessity', in Mepham and Ruben (1979b), pp.5-33.

 

Melamed, Y. (2015), '"Omnis Determinatio Est Negatio"; Determination, Negation, And Self-Negation in Spinoza, Kant, And Hegel', in Förster and Melamed (2012), pp.175-96.

 

Mepham, J., and Ruben, D-H. (1979a) (eds.), Issues In Marxist Philosophy, Volume Three: Epistemology, Science, Ideology (Harvester Press).

 

--------, (1979b), (eds.), Issues In Marxist Philosophy, Volume One: Dialectics And Method (Harvester Press).

 

Misner, C., Thorne, K., and Wheeler, J. (1973), Gravitation (W.H. Freeman and Co.). [This links to a PDF.]

 

Molyneux, J. (2012), The Point Is To Change It. An Introduction To Marxist Philosophy (Bookmarks).

 

Moore, D. (2012), 'A Non-Reductive Model Of Component Forces And Resultant Force', International Studies In The Philosophy of Science 26, 4, pp.359-80.

 

Morrison, M. (2000), Unifying Scientific Theories (Cambridge University Press).

 

Novack, G. (1965), The Origins Of Materialism (Pathfinder Press).

 

Ollman, B. (2005), 'The Utopian Vision Of The Future (The And Now): A Marxist Critique', Monthly Review 57, 3, July-August, 2005.

 

Ortony, A. (1993) (ed.), Metaphor And Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed.).

 

Palter, R. (1970) (ed.), The Annus Mirabilis Of Sir Isaac Newton, 1666-1966 (MIT Press).

 

Parrington, J. (2007), 'Stem Cell Research Is Not An Ethical Question', Socialist Worker 2034, 20/01/2007, p.9. [The on-line and the hard copy version of this article have different titles.]

 

Peat, D. (2008), 'Trapped In A World View', New Scientist 197, 2637, 05/01/08, pp.42-43.

 

Penrose, R. (1989), The Emperor's New Mind. Concerning Computers, Minds, And The Laws Of Physics (Vintage).

 

--------, (1995), Shadows Of The Mind (Vintage).

 

--------, (2004), The Road To Reality. A Complete Guide To The Physical Universe (BCA Books).

 

Petersen, E. (1994), The Poverty Of Dialectical Materialism (Red Door).

 

Plato (1997a), Plato. Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper (Hackett Publishing).

 

--------, (1997b), The Republic, translated by G. Grube, revised by C. Reve, in Plato (1997a), pp.971-1223.

 

Plekhanov, G. (1917), From Idealism To Materialism, reprinted in Plekhanov (1976), pp.600-43.

 

--------, (1956), The Development Of The Monist View Of History (Progress Publishers).

 

--------, (1976), Selected Philosophical Works, Volume Three (Progress Publishers).

 

Priest, G., Beall, J., and Armour-Garb, B. (2004) (eds.), The Law Of Non-Contradiction. New Philosophical Essays (Oxford University Press).

 

Redding, P. (2007), Analytic Philosophy And The Return Of Hegelian Thought (Cambridge University Press).

 

Rees, J. (1998), The Algebra Of Revolution (Routledge). [This links to a PDF.]

 

Robb, K. (1983) (ed.), Language And Thought In Early Greek Philosophy (Monist Library of Philosophy).

 

Rowbottom, D. (2017), 'On Component Forces In Physics: A Pragmatic View', in Chao and Reiss, pp.111-26.

 

Ruben, D-H. (1979), 'Marxism And Dialectics', in Mepham and Ruben (1979b), pp.37-85.

 

Russell, B. (1937), The Principles Of Mathematics (George Allen & Unwin, 2nd ed.). [This links to a PDF of the Routledge 2010 edition.]

 

--------, (1961), History Of Western Philosophy (George Allen & Unwin).

 

Schofield, M., and Nussbaum, M. (1982) (eds.), Language And Logos. Studies In Ancient Greek Philosophy (Cambridge University Press).

 

Schwartz, P. (1977) (ed.), Naming Necessity And Natural Kinds (Cornell University Press).

 

Seligman, P. (1962), The Apeiron Of Anaximander. A Study In The Origin And Function Of Metaphysical Ideas (The Athlone Press).

 

Sharrock, W., and Read, R. (2002), Kuhn: Philosopher Of Scientific Revolution (Polity Press).

 

Slater, H. (2002), Logic Reformed (Peter Lang).

 

--------, (2007a), The De-Mathematisation Of Logic (Polimetrica).

 

--------, (2007b), 'Dialetheias Are Mental Confusions', in Slater (2007a), pp.233-46. This can also be found in Béziau, Carnielli and Gabbay (2007), pp.457-66.

 

--------, (2007c), 'Response To Priest', in Béziau, Carnielli and Gabbay (2007), pp.475-76.

 

Smith, S. (2007), 'Continuous Bodies, Impenetrability, And Contact Interactions: The View From The Applied Mathematics Of Continuum Mechanics', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, 3, pp.503-38.

 

Smolin, L. (2006), The Trouble With Physics. The Rise Of String Theory, The Fall Of Science, And What Comes Next (Houghton Mifflin).

 

Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978), Intellectual And Manual Labour (Macmillan).

 

Spurrett, D. (2001), 'Cartwright On Laws And Composition', International Studies In The Philosophy Of Science 15, 3, pp.253-68.

 

Stalin, J. (1976a), Problems Of Leninism (Foreign Languages Press).

 

--------, (1976b), 'Dialectical And Historical Materialism', in Stalin (1976a), pp.835-73.

 

Stinner, A. (1994), 'The Story Of Force: From Aristotle To Einstein', Physics Education 29, pp.77-85. [This links to a PDF.]

 

Robb, K. (1983) (ed.), Language And Thought In Early Greek Philosophy (Monist Library of Philosophy).

 

Tegmark, M. (2008), 'The Mathematical Universe', Foundations of Physics

 

--------, (2015), Our Mathematical Universe. My Quest For The Ultimate Nature Of Reality (Penguin Books).

 

Thalheimer, A. (1936), Introduction To Dialectical Materialism. The Marxist World-View (Covici Friede Publishers).

 

Trautman, A. (1965), 'Foundations And Current Problems Of General Relativity', in Deser and Ford (1965). [I haven't been able to check this reference yet.]

 

Truesdell, C. (1991), A First Course In Rational Continuum Mechanics, Volume One (Academic Press, 2nd ed.)

 

Van Brakel, J. (2000), Philosophy Of Chemistry. Between The Manifest And The Scientific Image (Leuven University Press).

 

VandeWall, H. (2006), 'Why Water Is Not H2O, And Other Critiques Of Essentialist Ontology From The Philosophy Of Chemistry', in Bicchieri and Alexander (2006), pp.906-19.

 

Weston, T. (2012), 'Marx On The Dialectics Of Elliptical Motion', Historical Materialism 20, 4, pp.3-38. [This links to a PDF.]

 

Weiner, P. (1968) (ed.), Dictionary Of The History Of Ideas: Studies Of Selected Pivotal Ideas (Scribner).

 

White, R. (1996), The Structure Of Metaphor (Blackwell).

 

--------, (2010), Talking About God. The Concept Of Analogy And The Problem Of Religious Language (Ashgate Publishing).

 

Wilczek, F. (2006), Fantastic Realities. 49 Mind Journeys And A Trip To Stockholm (World Scientific).

 

Williams, L. (1980), The Origins Of Field Theory (University Press of America).

 

Wilson, J. (2002), 'Causal Powers, Forces, And Superdupervenience', Grazer Philosophische Studien 63, pp.53-77.

 

--------, (2007), 'Newtonian Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, 2, pp.173-205.

 

--------, (2009), 'The Causal Argument Against Component Forces', Dialectica 63, 4, pp.535-54.

 

--------, (2010), 'Non-Reductive Physicalism And Degrees Of Freedom, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61, pp.27-311.

 

Wittgenstein, L. (1976), Wittgenstein's Lectures On The Foundation Of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, edited by Cora Diamond (Harvester Press).

 

--------, (1978), Remarks On The Foundations Of Mathematics, edited by Elizabeth Anscombe (Blackwell, 3rd ed.).

 

--------, (1998), Culture And Value, edited by G. H. von Wright (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).

 

--------, (2013), The Big Typescript: TS 213, edited and translated by C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Blackwell).

 

Woit, P. (2006), Not Even Wrong. The Failure Of String Theory And The Continuing Challenge To Unify The Laws Of Physics (Vintage). [This links to a PDF.]

 

Wolff, L. (1983), The Science Of Revolution. An Introduction (RCP Publications). [This links to a PDF.]

 

Woods, A., and Grant, T. (1995), Reason In Revolt. Marxism And Modern Science (Wellred Publications).

 

Wright, E. (1985/1998), Classes (Verso Books). [The version of this book published at Wright's homepage appears to be the first edition.]

 

--------, (1998) (ed.) The Debate On Classes (Verso, 2nd ed.) [The version of this book published at Wright's homepage appears to be the first edition.]

 

Zilsel, E. (2000), The Social Origins Of Modern Science (Kluwer Academic Press).

 

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