Essay Twelve Part One:
Why All Philosophical Theories -- Including Dialectical Materialism -- Are
Incoherent Non-Sense
Technical Preliminaries
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Preface
As is the case with all my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept --, or,
indeed,
on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the self-emancipation of the
working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary
thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between Dialectical Materialism
[DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
First
of all, it is important to point out that
phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed
here,
here, and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how this applies to DM will be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially
here,
and
here,
as well as later in this Essay).
In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the
argument (but this time aimed at absolute beginners!)
here.]
Second, this has been one of the most
difficult Essays to write, since (i) It tackles issues that have sailed right
over the heads of some of the greatest minds in history, and (ii) It far from easy to expose the
core weaknesses
of Traditional Philosophy in everyday language, even though, after well over
fifty
re-writes, I
think I have largely managed to do this.
I hasten to add, though, that I claim no
particular originality for what follows (except, perhaps its highly simplified
mode of presentation and its
political re-orientation); much of it has in fact been
derived from
Wittgenstein's work, and, less importantly,
from that of other Wittgensteinians.
However, I have tried as far as possible to keep the
material presented below
free of academic complexities since it is aimed at fellow revolutionaries, not
scholars or professional philosophers. In that case, those who would like to
read more substantial versions
of the approach to language and Traditional Philosophy I have adopted here
should consult the relevant works I have referenced in the
End Notes (and in
several other Essays on
language to be published at this site over the coming years -- for example,
Essay Thirteen
Part Three).
Apologies are therefore owed in advance to
those who know enough of Wittgenstein's work to make the ideas rehearsed in this
Essay seem rather trite and banal, but experience has taught me that the vast
majority of Marxists aren't well-versed in this area of
Analytic
Philosophy -- nor do they find it at all
easy to appreciate the relevance
of this approach to theory, let alone grasp
its
significance. [I have addressed some of their qualms about Wittgenstein,
here,
here, and
here.]
So, I have
worded this Essay with them in mind, which means that I have had to make things as
straight-forward as possible.
Several readers have complained about the number of
links I have added to these Essays because they say it makes them very difficult
to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly lodge that complaint since they
believe everything is interconnected, and that must surely apply even to
Essays that attempt to debunk that
very idea. However, to those who find these links do make these Essays
difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have added links to subjects
or issues that are part of common knowledge (such as recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, films, or certain words
that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update these links when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared, I cannot possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
Incidentally, some might
be tempted to conclude that the
ideas presented in what follows are indistinguishable from the discredited
theories put forward by the
Logical
Empiricists/ Positivists. I respond to that
erroneous inference
here.
Nevertheless, the ideas presented below in no way affect
the negative case against DM developed at this site --
but they do help form the basis of my positive account of the origin of the a
priori doctrines
found in both DM and Traditional Thought.
Third, connected with the above are the following
words of warning: This Essay is much more repetitive than many of the others
published at this site. Experience has also taught me that if the difficult
ideas it contains aren't
repeated many times they either tend not to sink in or their significance is
easily lost --
this is especially so with respect to the Marxist readers mentioned above.
Fourth: a good 50% of my case
against DM and Traditional Philosophy has been relegated to the
End Notes.
This has been done to allow the Essay itself to flow a little more smoothly.
Naturally, this means that if readers want to appreciate more fully my case against DM and
Traditional Thought, they should also consult this material. In many cases, I have
added numerous qualifications, clarifications, and considerably more detail to what I have
had to say
in the main body. In addition, I have raised several objections (some obvious,
many not -- and some that might have occurred to the reader) to my own arguments, which I have then answered. [I explain why I have adopted
this tactic in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any
qualms or objections readers might have will be missed, as will my expanded comments,
references
and clarifications.
Fifth, on a more technical note: In this Essay,
although I refer to the
sense of a proposition (i.e., those conditions under which
it would be deemed true or those under which it would be deemed false), this is merely shorthand
for the requirement of (true/false) bi-polarity for empirical propositions
(i.e., propositions concerning matters of fact). This contraction has been adopted to
save on needless complexity in what is not meant to be an academic Essay.
Bipolarity (not to be confused with the so-called 'Law of Excluded Middle'
[LEM]) is taken to be a constitutive requirement for anything to be counted as an
empirical (i.e., factual) proposition.
[However, concerning my alleged appeal to,
or use of, the LEM, see
here
and
here.]
The subtle differences between these two ways
of characterising the sense of a proposition -- indeed, what the sense
of a proposition and what the LEM actually are -- are explained
here,
here,
here,
and
here. [See also Palmer (1996).] However, because this isn't meant to be an
academic Essay, I have deliberately on occasion blurred the distinction between bi-polarity
and the LEM. In addition to this, the reader's attention is also drawn to the
difference between
"non-sense" and "nonsense", as these two terms are
used throughout this Essay. Incidentally, "sense" is explained
here.
01
Sixth: I have also blurred the distinction one would normally
want to draw between propositions, sentences and statements since I do not want
to become bogged down with technical issues in the Philosophy of Logic
or the
Philosophy of Language; even so, it will soon become apparent that I prefer to
use "proposition".
[On this, see Geach (1972b, 1972c). Also see Glock
(2003), pp.102-36, and Hacker (1996),
p.288, n.65. (Nevertheless, it shouldn't be assumed that Geach would agree with
everything the other authors have to say, nor vice versa -- or, indeed, with anything
posted at this site!)]
Finally: throughout this Essay, I have used rather
stilted expressions such as: "It is possible to understand an empirical
proposition without knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false",
as opposed to "It is possible to understand an empirical proposition without
knowing whether it is true or false". I explain why I have adopted this odd way
of expressing myself
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of July 2023, this Essay is just
over
167,000 words long; a much shorter summary of some
of its main ideas can be found
here.
I have now written an even more concise summary of
one
of the core ideas presented in this Essay, entitled
Why
All Philosophical Theories Are
Non-sensical.
The material presented
below does not
represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in
progress'.
[Latest Update: 15/07/23.]
Quick Links
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work,
anyway!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
(1)
Introduction: The Aims Of
Essay Twelve
(2)
Lenin
And Metaphysics
(a)
Matter And Motion
(b)
Indicative Sentences Aren't What
They Appear To Be
(c) Certainty Based
On Language Alone
(d)
The 'Logical Form Of Reality' Ascertained From Pure Thought
(e)
Traditional Philosophy -- Based
On "Distorted" Language
(3)
Lenin Disobeys Himself
(a) Unthinkable?
(b)
Motion Without Matter
(c)
Thinking The
Unthinkable
(i) Lenin's
'Psycho-Logic'
(ii) Contradictory --
Or Just 'Unthinkable'?
(4)
Metaphysics And Language -- Part 1
(a)
The Conventional Nature
Of Discourse
(i) Camera Obscura
(ii) 'Dialectical'
Atomism
(iii) The Conventional Response From
Dialecticians
(iv) Meaning Precedes Truth?
(v) Avoiding An Infinite Regress
(b)
The
Inevitable Collapse Into Non-Sense
(i)
Private Ownership In the Means Of
'Mental' Production
(ii)
Semantic Overlap
(iii) Semantic Suicide
(iv) Content
(v)
Metaphysical Fiat --
Dogma On Steroids
(vi) The
'Evidential Pantomime' --
Mickey
Mouse Science Strikes Back
(vii) Short-Circuiting
The 'Power Of Negativity'
(c)
Metaphysical Camouflage
(i) While Mathematics Adds Up
(ii) Dialectics Doesn't
(d)
Metaphysical Gems
(i)
Incoherent Non-Sense
(ii)
Atomised Humanity Versus Socialised Language
(5)
Lenin's Rules -- Not OK
(6)
Metaphysics And Language
-- Part 2
(a) Distortion By The Barrel
-- Confusion By The Ton
(b)
On The Impossibility Of Any
Future Metaphysics
(7)
Marx Anticipates
Wittgenstein
(a)
Quotations
(b)
Marx
Anathematises Philosophy
(8)
What Lies Beneath
(9)
Scientific Knowledge
(10)
Appendix A -- Marx
On Philosophy
(11) Notes
(12)
References
Summary Of My Main Objections To
Dialectical Materialism
Abbreviations Used At This
Site
Return To The Main Index Page
Contact Me
Introduction -- The Aims Of Essay Twelve
Parts One To Seven
Among the
aims of Essay Twelve Parts One to Seven are the following --
to:
(1) Substantiate the
claim that
DM is a metaphysical theory
(Part One);
(2) Demonstrate how and why all philosophical theories (and not just
DM) collapse into
incoherent non-sense (Part One);
(3) Show
that Metaphysics and hence (derivatively) DM are ruling-class forms-of-thought (Parts Two and Three);
(4) (i) Trace
Metaphysics and DM (again) back to their origin in early forms of class society;
(ii) Connect them with the
various 'world-views'
directly or indirectly promoted or patronised by successive generations of ruling elites;
(iii) Demonstrate that, despite their many differences,
there is an identifiable theoretical thread running through all of the above; and,
(iv) Connect
these with a servile ideology that finds expression in Traditional Thought (Parts Two, Three, and
Four);
(5)
Substantiate the accusation that DM is a third-rate version of LIE (Part
Four);
(6) Expose the Mystical Christian and
Hermetic doctrines
found in Hegel's work for what they are: sub-logical
and incoherent
non-sense (upside down or 'the right way up') (Parts Five and Six);
(7)
Argue that the defence of ordinary
language is a class issue (Part Seven).
[LIE =
Linguistic Idealism
(follow that link for an explanation); DM = Dialectical
Materialism/Materialist depending on the context; MEC = Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,
i.e., Lenin (1972); TAR = The Algebra of Revolution, i.e., Rees (1998).]
This will make Essay Twelve
easily the longest
work at this site, hence
its division into Seven Parts.
However,
my ideas on many of these issues are still in their
formative stage, so much of this material will be published far more slowly than
they have been in other Essays at this site, and as such they will all be revised continually.
As indicated above, each of these
topics will be tackled in
various Parts of this
Essay, but to address the first two we need to examine a rather odd assertion
advanced by
Lenin.
Part One:
Lenin And The 'Unthinkable'
Matter And Motion
In MEC,
Lenin quoted the following comment by Engels:
M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable."
[Lenin (1972), p.318.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
Which
we can paraphrase slightly more neatly as:
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
Here, is Engels
on this:
"The whole of nature accessible to us forms a
system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here
all material existence extending from stars to atoms, indeed right to ether
particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the last named. In the fact
that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one
another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It
already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion."
[Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]
Both Lenin
and Engels were asserting typically
metaphysical
'propositions'. Dialecticians will, of course, reject that particular
claim, but that repudiation would itself be as hasty as it is
misguided. [Why that is so is explained below, and in
Note 1, but more specifically,
here.]
Sentences like M1/M1a purport to inform us of fundamental truths about
'reality', valid for all of space and time -- albeit in this case disguised as part of Lenin's admission of his own
incredulity. [Henceforth, I will simply refer to M1a.]
Nevertheless,
we aren't to conclude from M1a that Lenin was merely recording his own personal
feelings or opinions. On the contrary, he certainly believed that
matter and motion were fundamental aspects of "objective reality", that they
were inseparable and that this was a scientific, or even a philosophical, fact.
That was because, just like Engels, he held the view that motion was "the mode of the existence of matter" -– that is, he believed that
matter couldn't exist without motion, nor vice versa. Motion was
therefore one
of the principal ways, if not the principle way, that matter expressed itself
"objectively", exterior to the mind.1
Indeed, we find Engels saying things like the following:
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion,
nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it
can only be transmitted." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe,
from mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels (1954),
p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]2
As we
will see, Lenin fully agreed with Engels on
this.
In
that case, the import of M1a may perhaps be paraphrased in one or more of the following ways:
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
P3:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is necessarily false.
[M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.]
All
of which are based on the presumed truth of P4:
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[There is more
about these and other alternatives later in this Essay.]
The metaphysical nature of Lenin's
pronouncement can be seen by the
way it bypassed the need for any supporting evidence. For Lenin (and Engels),
this was such an obvious truth about
the connection between matter and motion that to deny it was deemed "unthinkable".
Nevertheless, if humanity had
access to evidence and information about motion and matter many orders of magnitude greater than is available
even today, that still wouldn't be enough to show that the
separation of matter from motion is impossible, let alone unthinkable. No amount of data could
warrant such an extreme view. While it might in the end prove to be false that the
two can be separated, its
"unthinkability" can't be derived from any body of evidence, no matter
how large it happened to be. As, indeed, Engels admitted:
"The empiricism of observation alone
can never
adequately prove necessity." [Engels (1954),
p.229. Bold emphasis added.]
So,
evidence alone can't supply the necessity, the inconceivability or the
unthinkability that these two DM-theorists claim to be able to see here. If not,
the question immediately arises: from where does this idea originate? As is the
case with
other DM-'Laws', maybe it arises from a "law of cognition"?
"This aspect of dialectics…usually
receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum
total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and
as a law of the objective world)." [Lenin (1961)
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Be
this as it may,
the above claims (about the metaphysical nature of DM-theories like this and
the lack of conclusive evidential support) might strike some readers as rather controversial, if not completely misguided. In
that case, much of the rest of this Essay
will be
aimed at explaining, defending and substantiating them.
Indicative
Sentences Aren't What They appear To Be
The seemingly profound nature of
statements like M1a is linked to
rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed; that
is, they are connected with
the fact that their main verb is often in the
indicative
mood. Sometimes,
subjunctive
and
modal
qualifying terms are thrown in for good measure, which only succeeds in creating
an even more misleading
picture.
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
As we are
about to discover, this
superficial indicative veneer hides a much deeper logical form that only becomes
obvious if sentences
like these are examined more closely.
As noted above,
expressions like these look like they reveal, or express, profound truths
about reality, and that is because they resemble empirical propositions -- i.e., propositions
about matters of fact. In the event, they
turn out to be nothing like them.
This can be seen if we examine the following,
similar-looking, indicative sentences:
M2: Two is a number.
M3: Two is greater than one.
M4: Green is a colour.
M5: "Green" is a word.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
M7: A material body is extended in space.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.3
M2-M9 appear to share the same form: "ξ
is F" -- or sometimes "ξ
is a φ-er", or perhaps more accurately "ξ
φ-ies".
Despite this, there are
profound differences between them.
[The use of Greek letter gap markers (i.e., "ξ") was explained
in Essay Three Part
One. "F(...)" is a
general
predicate variable,
while "φ(...)"
is a more specific variable letter standing for clauses like "...owns a
copy of TAR", "...fibs more often than not", "...runs tens miles at least four
times a week", or "...thinks something is unthinkable", etc.
In what follows, when I refer to logical differences, I generally have in mind
those aspects of indicative sentences that affect their capacity to be true or their
capacity to be false, or, indeed, those that are relevant to the inferences we can validly
draw from, or with, them.]
The
logical difference of concern here between, for instance, M6 and M2 lies
in the fact that knowing that M2 is true goes hand-in-hand with
(at least claiming to) understand it; and vice versa: (claiming to) understand M2 is of a piece with knowing
it is true. These conditions are inextricably linked. That is,
(any claim to be able to) comprehend M2 is one and the same as knowing it is true.
Anyone who failed to see things the way they are expressed in M2 would be judged not to understand the use of
number words like this.3a
On the other hand,
it isn't necessary to know whether M6 is true,
or to know whether M6 is false, in order to (claim to) understand it. Indeed, it is a
pretty safe bet that everyone reading these words will understand M6 even though they haven't
a clue whether or not it is true. So, comprehending M6 isn't the same as knowing it is true.
[In future,
I will omit the prefixing clauses "claim to" and "claiming to" (etc.), but they
should be understood to be applicable where relevant in what follows -- unless
stated otherwise.]
Nevertheless, knowing what would
make M6 true, or would make it false, is integral to understanding it -- even if neither of those options has
yet been ascertained,
or will ever be ascertained. Again, it is a pretty safe bet that the vast
majority of those reading this Essay will be able to say what would make M6
true and what would make it false even if they have no idea which of these is
actually the case. Indeed, they will understand M6 even if they never find out whether
it is true, or whether it is false -- or care about ascertaining either option.
[The significance of these comments will
become apparent as this Essay unfolds -- for instance,
here.]
So, it isn't necessary to know whether Blair in
fact owns a copy of TAR to be able to
understand someone who asserted he does. In contrast, comprehending that two is a
number is to know it is true (except in relation to trivial cases, about which more later).
M2: Two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M1a: Motion without matter is
unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
P3:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is necessarily false.
M9 (which is, perhaps, a more 'objective' version of M1a) is
somewhat
similar to M2. For Lenin (and anyone who agrees with him), comprehending M9 involves
automatically acknowledging its
veracity. The truth-status of sentences like M9 seems to follow from the 'concepts' they express, which is
why their veracity can be ascertained without examining any evidence.
Their validity appears to be based on
thought alone -- or, again, perhaps on a "law of cognition".4
Or, indeed, its truth follows from a specific definition -- such as:
P4:
"Motion
is the mode of the existence of matter."
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M2: Two is a number.
In
that case, it looks like the truth of M9 is based
solely on the meaning of certain words -- those in P4.
Hence, with respect to M2 and M9,
meaning
and 'truth' appear to go hand-in-hand -- so much so that as soon as their
constituent words are comprehended, the 'truth' of both becomes obvious, even self-evident. The source
of their veracity is 'internally generated', as it were. Indeed, that is
why the negation (or the rejection) of M9 (or the repudiation of its content, expressed in, for example,
of P1-P3) was so "unthinkable" to
Lenin and Engels. Plainly, this certainty followed from the definition (in P4)
that motion is "the
mode of the existence of matter". That particular thought
represents
the core idea here, the bedrock principle that Lenin and Engels considered integral to the nature of,
and the connection between, matter and motion -- which explains why they
asserted it so dogmatically, why Engels declared its opposite "nonsensical" and
Lenin pronounced it "unthinkable".5
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
P3:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is necessarily false.
In stark contrast, once more, it is possible to understand M6 without
knowing whether it is true or whether it is false -- or even without ever
knowing it is the one or the other.5a0
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
In fact, it is quite easy to suppose
M6 is false (which it probably is). Even if M6 were true, and known to be
true, it would still be
possible to imagine it to be false (and vice versa). On the other hand,
it isn't possible to imagine that M2 or M9 -- but particularly P4 -- are false,
not without altering the meaning of
key words in those sentences. [Why that is so will be explained
below.]
M2: Two is a number.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
The
actual or possible falsehood of M6, on the other hand,
doesn't affect the
meaning of any of its constituent words.
Despite this, in order to establish the actual truth or actual
falsehood of M6 evidence isn't an optional extra. An examination of the concepts
involved wouldn't be enough. No matter how much 'pure thought' were devoted
to M6, it would still be impossible to ascertain its truth or determine its
falsehood. So, the veracity of M6 can't be established by thought alone; its
truth-status isn't 'internally generated', but 'externally' confirmed or disconfirmed,
as the case may be.
Plainly, an appeal to evidence is essential here.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
However, it isn't possible for anyone who agrees with Lenin to regard,
or even to suppose, surmise, imagine or even entertain the idea
that that M9 or P4 are false. This
shows that there is a fundamental difference between these two sorts
of indicative sentences -- one that their apparently identical grammatical outer
form
conceals. As it turns out, the pseudo-scientific status and much of the 'plausibility' of metaphysical
(or essential
'truths')
like M9 derive from just this masquerade.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
In that case, it looks like the obviousness of M9 is what motivated
Lenin's incredulity (reported in M1a), for it certainly seemed to him that as soon as the
words it contains (or their DM-equivalents) are read, or thought, the truth of M9
would be clear for all to see.
[The objection that M1a and M9
in fact express a summary of
the then current level of scientific evidence has been neutralised in Note 4
and Note 5a.]
So, for Lenin, the first half of M1a was "unthinkable" (i.e., the
"Motion without matter..." part). As we will see, that is because its denial
-- or the repudiation of M9 -- would undermine (or, at least, change) the
meaning of words like "motion" and "matter", and hence would countermand the import the concepts
these words supposedly express (when
put in sentential form), given that the definition of "motion" is that it is the
mode of the existence of matter (P4). This would indicate that
anyone foolish enough question the veracity or P4 had failed to understand
the words "matter" and "motion".
It is also why the
rejection of M9, P1 and P4 can be ruled
out without any need to examine evidence. What these
sentences say gains our assent on linguistic or conceptual grounds
alone. Hence, it also seems impossible to deny the truth of M1a. Such a
denial would be inconceivable -- or, as Lenin himself said, it would be
"unthinkable". That is also why claims like M1a (P1 and M9) require no evidence in
their support, and why none is ever given -- and why it is difficult to imagine
any
evidence that could even begin to substantiate them.5a
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Certainty Based On Language Alone
In that case, the actual state of the world drops out of
the picture as irrelevant in this respect; when assessing M1a, P1, P4 and
M9 for their veracity. No experiments need to be performed, no data collected,
observations planned and executed, or surveys undertaken.5b
That fact alone
should have given someone like Lenin
-- who wasn't ignorant of the scientific method -- pause for thought.
Unfortunately, like so many others before him -- indeed, just like the vast
majority of theorists since Ancient Greek times -- he failed to notice the
significance of these seemingly trivial facts.6
The certainty that M1a,
M9, P4
and P1 seems to generate in all those who accept their veracity
plainly derives from what their constituent terms appear to mean; the subsequent
projection of P1, for instance, onto the world is therefore a reflection of that
conviction. If such ideas express
indubitable truths, who could possibly deny they apply across the entire
universe? And that is, of course, why DM-theorists like Engels, Plekhanov and
Lenin were -- and others still are -- happy to impose them on
reality and regard them as valid across all regions of space and time.
But, the alleged truth of M1a, P1,
M9, and particularly P4, bears no relation to the
possibilities that material reality itself presents. This can be seen from the
fact that if the truth of these sentences were related to what might or might not
obtain in the world, evidential
support would have been not only appropriate and imaginable, but absolutely
essential. However, with respect to these sentences no
such evidence is even conceivable. What fact or facts could possibly show that motion
is inseparable from matter? Or that motion without matter is "unthinkable"?
Or that motion is the mode of existence of matter?6a
This
shows that M1a, M9, P1, and P4
aren't about the material world; they are (indirectly) about (or rather they
arise from) a specific
use of certain words -- or
they reflect the presumed relation between the concepts they supposedly express.
[They are in fact indirectly about an Ideal
World, anterior to experience, that had been invented by
ruling-class theorists, who began such talk in Ancient Greece, as the rest of
Essay Twelve will seek to show.]
The 'Logical
Form Of Reality' Ascertained From 'Pure Thought'
Compare M1a, P1, P4, and M9 with M7 and M8:
M7: A material body is extended in space.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Ideas like these can be found right throughout
the history of Metaphysics, but the
above considerations help explain why Traditional Philosophers were only too
ready
to project them onto the world. The content of such 'super-truths' seemed to
them to be based on something much deeper than anything that empirical
evidence or factual confirmation could provide. Indeed, they appeared to express
indubitable, 'necessary truths' about 'God', 'The Mind', 'Essence', 'Being',
'Time', 'Existence', and the like. The truth of Cosmic Verities like these was
prior to, but not dependent on, the deliverances of the senses. In fact,
theories like these determined the logical boundary of reality itself; that is, they express concepts and categories that
constitute not just human judgement and thought, but the
logical form of
the world.
Indeed, in
subsequent versions of this underlying idea, Super-Truths
like this delineated the nature of any possible world.
In short, they pictured not just the logical form
of any conceivable/possible world, they governed any and every 'philosophically true'
thought about 'Reality Itself'.
In previous centuries, it was believed that such
Cosmic Verities expressed
'God's' thoughts about the world, or they depicted 'divinely-ordained laws' governing,
all of reality, which meant that Metaphysics was then widely seen
as an attempt to re-present or 'reflect' 'Divine Truth' in the human
mind,
and hence it was traditionally seen as a legitimate extension to Theology.7
This now intimately connected
Metaphysics with the rationalisation of the status
quo, and hence with 'justifying' the inequality, oppression and exploitation that fed off it.
[There will be more on this in
Parts Two and Three of this Essay (summary
here).]
This
meant that if these Super-Truths reflected 'The Divine Mind' -- or, indeed, the
'Cosmic Order' --, they could legitimately and dogmatically be projected back onto nature.
No world was conceivable
without them. Indeed, if no configuration of matter and energy could fail to conform to
Universal Truths like these, supporting evidence becomes irrelevant. The material
world could thus drop out of consideration, at least in so far as confirmation
was concerned.
[To be sure, an after-the-event appeal to nature
might be made in order to illustrate
such 'Super-Truths', perhaps so that they could be sold more readily to the
easily fooled -- which is, indeed, what we find dialecticians doing with their
reception of
Engels's Three 'Laws', for example.
But that would be the only use to which evidence derived from the material world could be put.]
As
far as those
who propounded them were concerned, Metaphysical 'truths' appeared to be so obvious
that few theorists were in any way concerned that they had been
imposed on reality. Quite the contrary, in fact; the role each
philosophical theory was supposed to occupy (i.e., a sort
of "master key" capable of unlocking
the 'Secrets of Being') justified the whole sordid affair.
Of course, Super-Verities
like these had to be distinguished from ordinary, contingent, everyday, hum-drum
empirical truths. So, because they looked as if they pertained to a set of 'essences' that under-pinned any and every
possible world, these Cosmic-Truths
were subsequently given a grandiose title -- they were now dubbed "necessary truths".8
However, philosophical
theses like this were (and
still are) predicated on the misuse of a severely restricted set of words, and thus
on an aberrant and distorted use of language (as
Marx himself noted -- quoted in the next sub-section). Their
projection onto any and all possible worlds (based on no evidence at all)
is proof enough of that. How else would it be possible for theorists to
delineate what must be true of all possible worlds other than by a
use of language that is rooted in this corner of the universe? Since the semantic
status of these 'Super-Truths'
is
'known' prior to the examination of any evidence, their supposedly 'necessary' truth-status can't have been derived from anything other than the
presumed meaning of the words they contained, and hence on the (presumed) linguistic rules
that governed their employment in such highly specialised contexts.9
[Semantic status --
this pertains to the truth or falsehood of an indicative sentence -- whether or
not that has already been established, always assuming it can be. Any
other (possible) option -- such as it being permanently truth-valueless
(depending on the reason for that) -- would mean it isn't an (empirical)
proposition (i.e., concerning matters of fact), whatever else it is.]
In Essay Two
(and several others posted at this site), numerous examples were given of the
many
dogmatic assertions advanced by dialecticians, which were supposedly
true for all of time and space, even though they were in fact supported by
little or no evidence and argument --, that is, over and above a superficial
gesture toward the analysis of a handful of specially-chosen examples, sketchy "thought experiments",
compounded by the presence of ill-defined, obscure
jargon
imported from Hegel and other assorted mystics.
Traditional Philosophy -- Based On
Distorted Language
As
Marx noted:
"The
philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. Bold emphasis added.]
With the above in mind, we are
now in a position to see why DM-theories appear to possess such a priori
and universal validity. As we have seen, that is because they are (i) Based on a radical misuse of
language, or they (ii) Depend on a misconstrual of linguistic rules as if they represented substantive
truths about of reality. In short, such theorists confuse the means
by which we represent the world for the world itself.
The rest of this Essay (and the other Parts of Essay Twelve) aim to substantiate these
seemingly controversial claims.
Of
course, Traditionalists and
DM-theorists will both reject this way of seeing things, but their opinion of how
they think they use certain words is at odds with how they actually
employ them.
Why that is so will also become clearer as this Essay unfolds.
Once more, as we saw in
Essay Two, while DM-theorists never
tire of telling anyone who will listen that they
don't impose their ideas on nature and society, they simply 'read' them
from the facts, their
actual practice belies this. Dialecticians, en masse, regard their doctrines as universal
truths, valid for all of space and time. Hence, in practice
dialecticians do the exact opposite of what they say they do; they are quite
happy to impose their ideas on the world, declaring them true
prior to and independent of sufficient (or, in some cases, any)
supporting evidence or argument. This dogmatic approach to knowledge places DM way beyond
confirmation by any conceivable body of evidence.9a
M1a,
P1, and P4 are just the latest
examples of dogmatic DM-apriorism. In common with other metaphysicians, the projection
of DM-theories like these onto any and all possible worlds reveals that they are
based solely on linguistic and conceptual grounds. Since the status of these
Super-Truths is 'known' well in advance of supporting evidence,
their veracity can't have been derived from anything other than the meaning of the
words they employ, and thus on the linguistic rules that supposedly govern them.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Moreover, the
actual origin of every single
DM-doctrine lends support to the above allegations. They weren't derived from a scientific study of nature but from
Ancient Greek, Hermetic and
Mystical Hegelian thought (upside down or 'the right way up'). DM-doctrines date back to a time when there
was very little, or no, scientific evidence. And, as Marx pointed out, those
theories
back then were based on distorted language.
Hence, the class-compromised origin of DM means that aprioristic, ruling-class ideas and patterns-of-thought
have been imported into revolutionary
theory -- and "from the outside", too.10
Unfortunately for Lenin and other DM-apologists, a priori theories
like this are incapable of reflecting reality. As we will soon see,
reality can't be as metaphysical-, or as DM-theories attempt to depict it.11
There are logical features of language that prevent
theorists like Lenin and Engels from (truthfully) saying the sorts of things they clearly want to say about the
world, and which won't allow them to 'depict' nature in the way they think they
can. Or, rather, they can't do this without those ideas collapsing into incoherent non-sense, as we will
see.
This means that,
in the end, DM ends up saying nothing
at all.
These observations aren't
unconnected with the origin and nature of metaphysical
theories themselves. As will be demonstrated in later parts of Essay Twelve, at a linguistic level,
Traditional Philosophy was motivated by a
determination to use a narrow range of expressions idiosyncratically
-- that is, Ancient Greek thinkers they were determined to employ words in ways they wouldn't normally be used in every day life.
This odd use of language in turn involved a failure on the part of these
'linguistic innovators' to notice that it is only a misuse and distortion of language that
'allows' them to derive the universal and necessary 'truths' we find in
Traditional Philosophy, and now in DM.
[The
mechanics (if that is the right word) underlying the above moves was explained in detail in Essay Three
Part One.]
As the detailed analysis below
shows, the distortion and misuse of language
to which that Marx referred results in the production, not of 'necessary' or
universal truths, but of incoherent non-sense.11ao
Lenin Disobeys Himself
Unthinkable?
To see this more clearly with respect to the DM-theory on hand, we need to examine Lenin's words
a little more closely.
With
regard to Lenin's avowal reported in M1a and P1 (and based on P4), it is worth
asking the following question: What is it about these words (or what they
express or 'reflect') that made them seem so "unthinkable"?
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Curiously, in Lenin's case at least, it is obvious
that he must have thought the above words (or what they
'expressed', 'represented' or 'reflected') in order to declare that they
were unthinkable! The phrase "motion without matter" must have gone
through his head at some point. [The objection that this confuses
use with mention will be dealt with
presently.] Even if Lenin also went on to think the additional
words tacked on at the end (i.e., "…is unthinkable"), he must have
skipped past
the three 'offending' words first (i.e., "motion without matter"). No one imagines that his brain switched his
thoughts on just as they reached the relative safety of the last two expressions in
that sentence!
In that case,
Lenin must have done what he declared couldn't be done; he must have thought the "unthinkable" in the act of declaring
that no one could do what he himself had just done.
Naturally, this means that in practice
Lenin appears to have contradicted himself, for he managed to do what he said
couldn't be done. That is why in practice Lenin's theory becomes
not just impossible to
comprehend, it is impossible even to state. That is, it is impossible to
say what on earth Lenin meant by what he said. If he managed to do what he said no
one could do (in the very act of telling us they couldn't), why can't anyone else do it?
What is so special about Lenin? How was he able to think the "unthinkable" in
the act of telling us it can't be done?
[I have
responded to another counter-claim that this was just hyperbole on Lenin's
part in Note 11a.]11a
Worse still, if the rest of us can think the offending words
("motion without matter" -- or even "motion can exist without matter"), and understand their content, whenever we read Lenin telling us that we
can't do the very thing we must have done in order to grasp his point, we, too, must contradict
Lenin in practice whenever we peruse his work. Indeed, the very act of
telling us we can't think
these words (or what they express) prompts us to do just that!
Even those who agree with Lenin that "motion without matter
is unthinkable" must think the three 'illicit' words.
Hence, even the most slavishly obedient Lenin-groupie can't avoid disobeying the
master every time he or she reads this controversial sentence.
Have such characters not noticed that to
read Lenin and try to think the content of his words is to disobey him in that
very act?
As
noted above, it
could be objected that I have confused these two propositions
(in other words, I have confused
use with mention):
R1: "Matter without
motion" is unthinkable.
R2: Matter without
motion is unthinkable.
Where R1 means:
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
Or even:
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
Or, indeed, from earlier:
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
Clearly, R3 is susceptible to the points I have already made. But, it could be
argued that Lenin plainly
didn't mean this. He obviously meant R2. It is certainly possible to think the
'offending words' without imagining them to be true. So, the above
argument is entirely spurious.
Or so it could be argued...
The question therefore becomes: Is R2
vulnerable in the same way? Is the claim valid that Lenin had to contradict himself
in order to make this point?
R2: Matter without
motion is unthinkable.
Indeed, it is. As we will see, in order to rule motion without matter out of
court, Lenin would have to know what he was trying to exclude. In order
to do that he would have to
know what 'motion without matter' amounted to so that he could exclude that
possibility from consideration on the grounds that it is unthinkable -- otherwise, for all he knew,
he could be ruling out the wrong condition, or, indeed, he might be ruling out nothing at all.
Hence, the content of R2 (i.e., what it was supposedly being used to say) would have to be
thinkable so that Lenin could tell us it wasn't a viable possibility.
It
could be objected that R3, R4, P1, and P2 aren't what Lenin was asserting when
he argued that motion without matter is unthinkable. But, as we will see, it
isn't possible to make sense of what he was trying to say if he didn't intend
one or more of R3, R4, P1, and P2.
[That is a brief summary of a much
longer argument I have developed
below.
I also explain what I mean by content,
here. See also
Note 11a.]
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
Now,
if we assume for the moment that
Lenin was right, what on earth could he possibly have meant by what he
said if it seems that everyone
(including himself) could so easily disprove in practice this allegedly
self-evident truth? If it is so easy to think about matter devoid of motion?
Precisely what is so unthinkable here that is also so
easily thought? What is it about M1a that is supposed to command
our assent --
but only in
the very act of undermining what it appears to say?
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Perhaps this
is
being too hasty? Maybe Lenin merely meant that the
truth of an indicative sentence like M1a (containing the unqualified words "motion without matter")
is unthinkable? Or, that such a sentence could never be true, or thought of
as true? Maybe he did mean one or more of
R3,
R4, P1, and P2?
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
But, are even these
options faithful to Lenin's intentions --, or, even viable in themselves?
Motion Without Matter
Maybe not, for when Lenin's words are examined even more closely, it becomes
impossible to understand what it was he was trying to say, or, indeed, precisely what 'truth' he
was attempting to communicate to his readers. Or even whether what he appears
to be saying could in any way be true, or even thought of as true.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
R3: The words "Matter without motion"
can't be thought.
R4: Sentences that assert that matter without
motion is possible are unthinkable.
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
Consider the following as a possible variant of M1a,
P1 and M9:
M10: Motion without matter can never be thought
of as true.
P2:
The proposition "Motion exists without matter" is never true.
This looks a little awkward, and it isn't obviously correct.
P2 looks a little less awkward. But, is it correct? Well, it is possible to
think of many examples of motion that don't involve the
movement of matter or the locomotion of bodies as such. Several dozen such were
aired in
Essay
Five. Readers are directed there for more details.
Here is
another -- a few more have been posted in
Note 12:
M11: NN's thoughts moved to a new topic.
Indeed, Engels indirectly endorsed this possibility:
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from
mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels (1954),
p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]
M11 could be true even if no matter
was relocated in the
process, or as a result.12
Alternatively, maybe Lenin meant the following?
M12: The occurrence of literal motion
without matter can never be thought of as true.
Which appears to imply, or be implied by, the following:12a
M13: Literal motion without
matter can never take place.
This seems to be closer to what Lenin
might have meant, even if
it still looks a little stilted. Be this as it may, M13 presents problems of its
own. Consider this apparent counter-example:
M14: NM moved the date of the strike from Monday
to Tuesday.13
Now, this seems to depict literal
movement, and yet it isn't easy to see whether any matter has to be
re-located as a result. Perhaps we might appeal to the movement of atoms in NM's
brain, or the re-arrangement of ink molecules in a diary or on wall planner --
when the new date is committed to paper, etc., as examples of matter in motion, here.
But, at best, this would simply mean that motion was indirectly associated
with matter, since even in a real life situation
the supposed strike itself wouldn't actually exist to be moved anywhere -- even though it has still
been moved.
It
might be objected here that this sense of "move" wasn't at
all what Lenin had in mind. But, Lenin himself appealed to a wider sense of
"move" in his argument against the Idealists he was criticising:
"Let us imagine a consistent idealist
who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take
'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical
idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that
the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas,
sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject
and regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his
ideas come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' --
and that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of
thinking. And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the
solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view.
"The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Here,
Lenin appeals to the movement of ideas as examples of motion (as did
Engels before him), so it can
hardly be objected when this wider meaning of the relevant words is used against his
assertion in M1a.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Again, it could be objected that in this
particular example what has
actually changed is the date of the said strike. It is this that has been moved not the
strike itself. But again, if it is only a date that has been moved, it would
still be unclear whether any matter has to be relocated as a consequence.
Once more, the date is in the future, and doesn't exist yet, even though it
has still been moved.
Now,
it would be little use referring to the altered marks in a diary or on a
wall-planner (or located anywhere else, for that matter) in order to illustrate
the material changes implied here. Certainly, such things may alter, but if
anyone were to imagine that the dates of strikes, or even strikes themselves,
are just marks on paper, then bosses could easily put a stop to trade union
militancy by simply tippexing-out the relevant marks (or by destroying such
wall-planners/diaries), and be done with it. The class struggle surely can't be so easily erased, can
it?
At best, therefore, the movement reported in M14 is indirectly
associated with matter. Nevertheless, M14 appears to indicate that we can at least
understand sentences where the connection between motion and matter isn't
obvious or clear-cut. So, maybe we can think the unthinkable, despite
what Lenin said?
M14: NM moved the date of the strike from Monday
to Tuesday.
This
still leaves the status of M12 and M13 unresolved. Now, if we ignore awkward
cases like M14 and concentrate on examples of movement located only
in the present, we might perhaps be able to ascertain Lenin's intentions.
[Unfortunately, this restriction would make the temporal quantifier
(i.e., "never") in M12 and
M13 seem rather superfluous, if not redundant. I will ignore that awkward complication.]
M12: The occurrence of literal motion
without matter can never be thought of as true.
M13: Literal motion without
matter can never take place.
However, if we are careful to stipulate that "literal motion" involves
change of place, then maybe the following re-write of M12 and M13
might work?
M15: Literal motion without
matter is unthinkable.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Of course, M15 is just a variant of M1a. But, is it/are they, true?
Maybe
not.
One obvious example of literal
movement that takes place without matter -- which is not only thinkable,
it is actual
-- is the motion of the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy [CMG].
The CMG is located in empty space, but it exerts a decisive causal influence on
everything in the Galaxy while not being material itself (it isn't made of
anything, it is
merely a theoretical point, a mathematical abstraction). In its turn, it moves under the
influence of something else that isn't material either -- the centre of
mass of the cluster of galaxies of which ours is a part, and so on.14
Perhaps we should
modify M15 to accommodate or neutralise this
annoying counterexample, in the following way:
M16: Literal motion without
some matter somewhere causing it is unthinkable.
Alas, M16 now concedes the point that motion can take place while
spatially-, or, perhaps even temporally-, divorced from matter, since M16 isn't
specific about contiguous or concurrent causation (which, of course, may not be
what Lenin meant by M1a anyway -- who can say?). And, as we will see in Essay
Thirteen
Part One,
Lenin's concept of matter (if such it might be called) is so vague and confused
that little sense can be made of it.15
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Nevertheless, despite these apparent problems, M15 and M16 face far more serious
difficulties than the inconvenient astronomical (or even ordinary)
facts noted above.
Thinking The Unthinkable
As pointed out earlier,
it seems that Lenin must have thought the words
"motion without matter" (or their content) in order to deny they were
thinkable. If so, it is difficult to see what he was driving at if the very act of saying what he
said appears to undermine the point he wished to make.
Perhaps, then, Lenin meant the following?
M17: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
[M15: Literal motion without
matter is unthinkable.]
However,
that won't do either. Just as soon as the quoted sentence in M17 (i.e., M15)
is entertained, it seems that that cognitive act itself would make M17 false!
Plainly that is because the embedded sentence in M17 (i.e., M15) appears to be false whenever anyone thinks it.
It could be objected that the above argument confuses M17 with
the following:
M17a: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.
Lenin
certainly didn't mean M17a. That riposte will be
considered presently. [And anyone who thinks this confuses use with mention is
referred back to the
sub-section that dealt with this.]
Moreover,
it seems that M17 itself becomes false whenever M15 is itself thought; and yet
by thinking M17, M15 must be entertained. The only way anyone could agree with
M17 is by thinking M15. Unfortunately, this just means that we may only agree
with M17 by doing what M15 says can't be done -- it looks like we have to think the unthinkable,
thereby making M17 false. In that case, M17 would be true just in case it is false; we may assent to it only if
we never allow its content to cross our minds.
M15: Literal motion without
matter is unthinkable.
M17: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
It could be argued that this shows that M17 is true since it is
indeed the case that matter without motion is unthinkable. And yet, that is
precisely the point: even to assert this alleged fact requires that the 'forbidden' words
"matter without motion" (or their content) pass through the mind,
so it looks like it isn't the case that these words can't be thought.15a
But,
what about the counter-claim that the above confuses M17 with M17a? That objection will be
considered in the next sub-section (and again later in
this Essay).
M17a: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.
Lenin's 'Psycho-Logic'
It could be objected that it is perfectly clear what Lenin meant:
it is impossible to think about matter
without conceiving of it as also moving in some way, and vice versa. In other
words, M17 doesn't imply M17a.
M17: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
M17a: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is unthinkable.
In that case, perhaps Lenin was merely making a
psychological point. Maybe he was saying that given what we know about the
world (and, indeed, about ourselves), we are psychologically, conceptually or physically incapable of forming the thought
that motion is possible without matter (and/or vice versa), or of
conceiving of that thought as true.
[This line of defence was partly neutralised in
Note 11a.]
Alternatively, that it is impossible to agree with P1a:
P1a:
It is thinkable that motion can exist without matter.
But, if Lenin was saying
we are psychologically, conceptually or physically incapable of forming
the thought that motion is possible without matter, he offered no
evidence to substantiate what would now be a scientific claim about
what human beings are capable of cognising. And, if that was his line-of-thought, it is pretty clear why he wouldn't have been able to produce such data (even had he
tried to do so) -- plainly,
to pose this very question is not only to think the forbidden words (or their content), it prompts or encourages others to think
them, too!
Moreover, and alas for Lenin, there is abundant evidence to the contrary. As we
know, previous generations managed to think this very thought, and they
managed to do so for many centuries. The
passivity of matter was a basic tenet of
Aristotelian
Physics.16
However, if this alternative interpretation of Lenin's claim is to remain
viable (i.e., that his claims about motion and matter relate to
the psychological
limitations of human beings), then, at best, we would have to interpret it
perhaps as a confession of
Lenin's own limited powers of imagination,
even though, and paradoxically, he too was able to
rise to the occasion and think the forbidden words (or their content) while casting them into
outer psychological darkness in the very act of bringing us this good news!
Furthermore, Lenin offered no
evidence in support of the supposed limits on credibility, or otherwise, of anyone else, and he mentioned only
two other DM supporters who thought as he did: Engels and Dietzgen. That being so, his
confession merely records the limits of his, Engels and Dietzgen's own credulity
(which, as we have seen, appeared to undermine itself in the very act of its own confession). Clearly, such
asseverations (no matter how sincere) are out of place in what purports to be a
scientific or philosophical analysis of matter and motion.
In any case, what could Lenin have said to someone who
claimed that they could imagine motion without matter, or vice versa?
What if Lenin had encountered a latter-day Aristotle? Several
examples were given
earlier where it was quite natural to speak about
motion without matter. These may
only be ruled out if it can be shown that they are either metaphorical, or they are deemed irrelevant. But, who is to say that Lenin's
employment of these
words was itself literal?
Or
that this is
their only correct use? Or even that it is the most natural way
to use them? In fact, a rejection of the above counter-examples could only ever be based on Lenin's own
lack of imagination (or on that of his modern day epigones) -- or,
perhaps, on other criteria which Lenin unwisely kept to himself (as have DM-theorists
ever since).
However, as the above indicates, it is possible to
form the thought that motion can take place without matter. Nothing is easier.
Not only does the last sentence itself prompt such a cognitive infringement, so
do the sentences Lenin himself wrote. If these sentences are objectionable, it
can't be for psychological
reasons -- for, manifestly, they are ridiculously easy to think. If either
one of M18 and M19, for instance, is to be ruled out as an example of a thought, that
would have to be done on logical or linguistic, not psychological, grounds,
especially if to read Lenin each time seems to disprove what he says in the very act
of reading it.
M18: This particular instance of motion is
separated from matter.
M19: This lump of matter is motionless.
At
this point, it is worth noting that Lenin himself acknowledged that this
forbidden thought can be thought, after all (perhaps not realising
what it was he was admitting):
"From the standpoint of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely
unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential
is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in
thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism."
[Lenin
(1972),
p.321.
Bold emphases alone added.]
Here,
Lenin entertains the thought that motion could be "divorced from matter" (even
if only to brand it "Idealist"), which means that he was wrong to conclude this
was "unthinkable". He had just thought it! So, it can't be
psychologically impossible to think these forbidden words.
But that, of course, just takes us right back to the beginning.
We are still no clearer what Lenin could possibly have meant by what he said.
Contradictory -- Or Just
Unthinkable?
At this point, it is worth asking why Lenin concluded that
motion without matter was "unthinkable", as opposed to claiming it was
merely
contradictory. Apart from saving him the trouble of having to think the very
thoughts he wanted to convince the rest of us were "unthinkable", it would at
least have allowed him to make his point much more succinctly -- and, dare I say
it, more 'dialectically'. Indeed, it would seem to be the obvious thing to say about
matter and motion; that is, that immobile matter (or mobile non-matter) is
contradictory -- or, rather, that propositions asserting such things imply a contradiction, given other DM-precepts.
Indicative sentences used to assert that matter is, or can be, motionless would
certainly contradict sentences used to claim motion is
the
mode of the existence
of matter.
On the other hand, it seems pretty clear why he didn't
do this: if Lenin had done it, it would have given the 'dialectical' game away.
That is because, if he had ruled certain things out on the basis that they were
contradictory then much of DM would have disappeared down the
U-bend with it.
Clearly, the next question he would have been asked is: And why is just this
contradictory state of affairs considered so objectionable in contradistinction to all the
other contradictions that DM-theorists believe litter the entire universe, but which
aren't declared "unthinkable"? Why don't dialecticians tell us that motion,
for example, is impossible (or "unthinkable")
since it implies a contradiction? Or, that
wave-particle duality is impossible (or "unthinkable"), and for the same
reason?
In fact, the existence of matter without motion ought to make
perfectly good 'dialectical' sense, if only because it is contradictory.
After all, the Hegelian roots of DM seem to imply that matter moves because of its
inherently contradictory nature (even though the precise details
are somewhat hazy).
As Hegel himself declared:
"[B]ut contradiction is the
root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a
contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Hegel (1999),
p.439,
§956. Bold emphasis added.]
Indeed, it would seem from this doctrine that bodies must move because mobility
and passivity are a product of the internal struggle in all objects (or between
every object), since they are UOs: a
'unity of motion and non-motion', perhaps? Anyone inclined to believe cracked
logic like this shouldn't find it too much of a "leap" to derive motion
itself from the
'contradictory
nature of matter'. The mobility of matter could thus be predicated on its lack of
motion! Hence, far from immobile matter being "unthinkable", this theory seems to require
it!
[Indeed, as this suggests
it, too.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
It
could be objected here that this is ridiculous. Dialecticians don't believe that
motion is a UO of itself and its opposite, lack of motion. Indeed, it could be
pointed out that the above caricature isn't the contradiction, or even the sort
of contradiction, to which Hegel
was referring when he spoke about motion --, as Engels himself indicated:
"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change,
their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in
contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change
of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in
another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same
place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution
of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976),
p.152.]
Or, so a response might proceed...
However, this (proffered, hypothetical) DM-reply merely highlights the
profound confusions lying at the heart of the DM-'theory-of-change' -- highlighted
here,
here
and here. The problem is that
according to what
DM-theorists themselves tell us, it is unclear whether things
change:
(a) Because of their 'internal contradictions' or
'opposites'; or whether,
(b) They change into these 'opposites'; or, indeed, whether,
(c) They create such 'opposites' when they change.
So, if all things are UOs, and can only change because of
that, it seems that a moving body must be a dialectical union of motion and
rest, otherwise it couldn't change.
In that case, if the
above objection is
"ridiculous", it is only because it makes plain the incoherence implicit in the DM-'theory-of-change'.
Moreover, as we saw in
Essay Five, the alleged contradiction to which Engels refers
(i.e.,
that a moving body is "both in one place
and in another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the
same place and also not in it") can't be what makes an object move;
in fact, it seems that that is what becomes apparent as it moves.
So, if Hegel is right, and objects
move because of their inherently contradictory nature, they must be a UO of
some sort. And what else could that be but a union of motion and rest.
Nothing else appears remotely relevant.
Other objectors might be tempted to argue that this is precisely the point: because
matter is contradictory, it is incessantly mobile.
But once more, if matter is
truly contradictory -- if we accept no half measures and no "excessive
tenderness" toward moving things --, matter must be mobile and at rest all at
once. In that case, resolute Hegelians must at least
be able to think, and actually do think, the illegitimate words (or
what they 'represent'), that matter is
motionless (at least, in part).
In fact, the good news is that there is no need to speculate any
further around this Hermetic conundrum, for this is precisely what we observe in reality.
The seemingly 'contradictory' nature of matter (i.e., that it both moves and
does not move) is not only an everyday occurrence, it is a scientific fact --, for it is true that
with respect to one
inertial frame
an object can be at rest, but with respect to
another it can be in motion, and these can both be true at the same time,
and concerning the same body.
Unfortunately for beleaguered dialecticians, however, this familiar fact doesn't
imply that motion is
fundamentally contradictory 'in itself' (whatever that means!), but that given
different reference
frames we can picture it in no other way: as mobile with respect one
frame, at rest with respect to another, at the same time. There is nothing deeply
metaphysical about this; it is a spin-off of the conventions we use
to depict the world.
This socially-motivated fact, though, does give sense to propositions about the
mobility (or otherwise) of matter, and that is because we would currently have no other way of conceiving of movement
scientifically except this way --, even if this doesn't actually make anything move (or,
indeed, sustain locomotion), as DM/Hegelian
'contradictions' should.
Of course, the thrust of unhelpful conclusions like these can only
be resisted on linguistic, or conceptual, grounds. That is, they may only be defused by clarifying what words like "motion", "immobile", "inertial frame",
"same time", and "contradiction" should be taken to mean. Naturally, anyone
tempted to go down that route would merely end up underlining the fact that Lenin's own ideas
in this area are, at best, creatures of convention, and are thus not the least bit "objective".
Moreover, given the additional fact that
Lenin's philosophical ideas fall apart so
readily,
this DM-'convention' is never likely to be accepted by the scientific community. In
fact, we should feign no surprise if his ideas fail to make the bottom of the
reserve list of viable candidates that scientists might even deign to consider.
Metaphysics And Language -- 01
The
Conventional Nature Of
Discourse
As we have seen,
and as we will see as the rest of Essay Twelve unfolds, the problems Lenin and
other metaphysicians face are connected with the peculiar nature of the language
they use. But, there are other aspects of language that are less well
appreciated (or, rather, they aren't appreciated at all), which means that this
slide into metaphysical incoherence doesn't just afflict DM. With respect to
Metaphysics in general this slide is unavoidable.
While it is true that Marxists
hold that language is both a
social product and a means of communication, few seem fully to have thought through the
ramifications
of these two basic tenets.17
On the contrary, one of its least recognised implications is that language is
conventional. Indeed, if language is social, how could it be other
than conventional? Human beings invented language; it wasn't bestowed on them
from 'on high' or introduced by aliens. This means that at some point in their history
human beings must have
adopted or acquired linguistic conventions of some sort or description.17a
Furthermore, an even less well appreciated corollary of this view of discourse is that language is
primarily a means of communication, not representation.18
It is undeniable that some Marxists have acknowledged the
(perhaps limited)
applicability of the former corollary -- that language is conventional --, but hardly any
(perhaps none at all) have considered the full implications of the second (that
language isn't primarily
representational). Certainly Marx and Engels failed to do this, as have
subsequent
Marxists. Indeed, much of what they have to say about this topic -- especially about
'abstraction', 'cognition' and knowledge --
suggests the
opposite is in fact the case.18a
Camera
Obscura
In this respect once more, dialecticians aren't alone. Until recently, little critical attention has
been paid to the traditional view that language
is primarily representational, i.e., that it enables
human beings to re-present the world in "thought", in the "head", the "mind",
"consciousness", or "cognition" first before communication can begin.18b
This
underlying assumption has rarely been questioned (again until recently): that only after language users have learnt to picture reality
to themselves that they are then able to communicate their thoughts to others, and that observation
also applies to those who at least
give lip service to the idea that the primarily role of language lies in communication. This means that, despite what
they might say, the social nature of language is
seen by the vast majority of Marxists as a consequence of the isolated (but later pooled) cognitive
resources of each individual, as an expression of their attempt to share
the 'contents' of their 'minds', their 'abstractions' with one another,
not the other way round.19
It seems to many (even on the revolutionary left) that here
(at least)
we have an example of private (mental) production
that somehow contributes to public gain; for on this view, it is the isolated activity of lone abstractors
that
enables cognition, and it is this that supposedly helps drive the social advancement
of knowledge, but only after these abstractions have somehow been pooled or
shared. The order of events is therefore: sensation, abstraction,
representation/reflection, communication. This is something that
at least one dialectician has acknowledged (indeed, as noted in Essay
Three Part Two):
"What, then, is distinctive about Marx's abstractions? To begin with, it
should be clear that Marx's abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely
from the abstractions of other thinkers both then and now. There has to be a lot
of overlap. Otherwise, he would have constructed what philosophers call a
'private language,' and any communication between him and the rest of us would
be impossible. How close Marx came to fall into this abyss and what can be
done to repair some of the damage already done are questions I hope to deal
with in a later work...." [Ollman (2003),
p.63. Bold emphases added.]
Well, it remains to be seen if Professor Ollman can
solve a problem that has baffled everyone else for centuries -- that is,
those who have even so much as acknowledged this problem!
It
is to Ollman's considerable credit, however,
that he is at least aware of it.
[In fact,
Ollman is the very first dialectician I have read (in over thirty years)
who even so much as acknowledges this
'difficulty'!
Be this as it may, I
have devoted Essays Three Part Two
and Thirteen Part Three
to an analysis of this topic; the reader is referred there for more
details.]
Hence, this approach
to the acquisition of language by each user relegates meaning to the private
domain of an individual's 'mind', something that each one brings to
language --, perhaps as an expression of their own biography or the ideological
influences that constrain them. So, the individual comes first, the social
second and is constructed out of their separate contributions to an overall
'pool of meaning'.
[In Essay Thirteen
Part Three, Section (4) onward, we will see
that this is
certainly true of the approach taken by theorists like Voloshinov and Vygotsky.]
Alternatively, meaning is
viewed a consequence of the
'objective rules' which nature has supposedly hard-wired into each brain,
perhaps as a 'language
of thought' or as a 'transformational
grammar' (now "unbounded
merge").
Dialecticians will even speak of ideas living in 'tension' with
one another, in our heads!
"How do
our brains and our consciousness develop? That's one of the biggest
conundrums in science, and one that Engels' work on human evolution
brings us on to. Some of the most interesting arguments came from
thinkers in revolutionary Russia, before it was crushed by Stalinist
counter-revolution in the 1920s and 30s.
Lev
Vygotsky helped develop a number of sophisticated views on how we
develop consciousness. Building on Engels' theory of how humans evolved,
he argued that language can be understood as a tool that early humans
used -- a tool that then shaped their consciousness.
"This
is important in theories of teaching. A child's ability to learn is not
predetermined by some limit in their DNA. If children are nurtured they
have the potential to achieve and to develop in ways that you couldn't
imagine.
Valentin
Voloshinov took this further. He argued that our consciousness
develops through struggle. There's a constant dynamic tension between
the ideas inside our head. Through struggle our ability to consider new
ideas increases." [Parrington
(2012), p.15. Several paragraphs merged.]
This odd theory -- which transforms ideas into agents and
humans
into
patients -- is examined in more detail in Essay
Thirteen Part Three. Suffice it to
say that Parrington's commitment to the social nature of language and thought is
fatally compromised by his
bourgeois
individualist theory of 'consciousness'.
[I am here
using the word "patient" with its older meaning, as that which is acted upon not
that which acts.]
Whatever the
aetiology, this is one idea that has
ruled in one form or another for centuries.
As we saw in Essay Three
Part Two, post-Renaissance
thinkers (Rationalists and Empiricists alike) took the public domain (where meaning is created), inverted it, and
then projected
it back into each individual skull, privatised and then re-configured as the
social
relations among 'images', ideas or 'concepts'!
This resulted in the systematic
fetishisation of language and thought, leading to the conflation of the
'objective' world with the subjective contents of the 'mind'. ["Fetishised",
since, as we will see, words were now viewed as agents.] The outer, social
world was thus re-located in each individual head, the latter seen as primary, the former as secondary
(or non-existent, in some cases!). In this way, the social was
privatised, internalised and hence neutralised. No wonder then that
modern philosophy soon descended into full-blown Idealism (subjective
at first, later 'transcendental',
later still, 'objective'), with
Immanuel Kant complaining that
it was scandal that philosophers had so far failed to prove the existence of the 'external' world!
Small
wonder, too, that Dialectical Marxists felt they had to invert things once more --
supposedly putting them 'back on their feet' -- all the while failing to
notice that their theory of language and cognition actually prevents them from doing
precisely that.
More recently, this ruling-class thought-form has re-surfaced in
several new
disguises: sometimes reduced and re-configured as the inter-relationship between neurons (as
they
'communicate' with one another), supposedly controlled by the overarching
power of the gene, which now seems to operate as a sort of surrogate inner
Bourgeois
Legislative and Executive Authority; sometimes as the expression of a computational device
lodged in each head (or at
least a device that helps 'the mind' write/use the 'software').
Given this view, while human beings might be
born free (of language), everywhere
they
are chained by linguistic constraints manufactured and controlled by an inner
surrogate 'state' -- 'consciousness' -- and a cognitive system comprised of
'modules' or 'neural
nets', dominated by each individual's genetic inheritance). The social
doesn't even get a look in -- except perhaps as a by-product, or even as a mere
afterthought.
The
aforementioned inversion (the political and social roots
of which will be analysed briefly below,
but more fully in Parts Two and Three of this Essay)
completely undermines the claim that language is a social phenomenon.
And no wonder: it perfectly mirrors
the bourgeois view of language and 'mind',
not Marx's view of the social nature of language and cognition.
In fact, this is one ideological inversion that has remained
upside down (but in different forms), not just for hundreds but for thousands
of years, and which is largely the source of the other 'inverted ideas'
concocted by Traditional Philosophers and dialecticians alike. Inverted now, as in a camera obscura, these rotated
concepts cloud
the thoughts of all those whose brains they have colonised -- which, of course, helps
explain why the ideas of the ruling-class always rule.
'Dialectical' Atomism
Nevertheless, there seems little point arguing that
language is a social phenomenon -- its key role lying in
communication -- if it is in fact primarily representational (or, if
it is representational first, and only communicational second). If that were
the case, the social nature of language would be anterior to, if not parasitic
upon, its supposedly primary, private nature. No surprise then that this
view of discourse introduced its own
Robinsonades,
analogous to those that
Marx railed against in politics and economics. Except in this case Robinsonades were
introduced to explain the supposed origin of language in each privatised
-- if not atomised, skull --
and not just in connection with the 'social
contract' or the economy.
If there is a point to be made
here, it is
perhaps as much ideological as it is anything else: If language is primarily
representational then human beings must acquire language, meaning and knowledge
first (as social atoms) before they are capable of entering or joining a linguistic community.
But,
that presents this approach with intractable problems: How is it even possible for anyone
to represent the world to themselves first, as an
individual, and then later use language to communicate with others? Given this
view, as far as language is concerned, each human being would be first and foremost a semantic
individual, and only
second a communicating, social being.
[That was the point of referring to
those
Robinsonades, earlier; the same worry also lay behind
Ollman's comments.]
In fact, as is easy to show, given
this approach to language, communication would be impossible. Indeed, if it were the case
that we represent the world to ourselves first before are capable of conversing with
others, we would find ourselves
incapable of
communicating and humanity would be, for all intents and purposes, universally autistic.
[This
point will be elaborated upon and substantiated in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
Given the
representational approach, the role that communal life plays in the shaping of
language would drop out as irrelevant.
Atomistic implications like these shouldn't be lost on those cognisant of the
History of Philosophy and its relation to ruling-class interests and their
associated ideologies
(particularly as the latter are represented in thought-forms that have dominated
Traditional Thought since the Seventeenth Century
-- i.e., ideas that are intimately connected with
Bourgeois
Individualism). However, the record shows that as far
as Marxists are concerned
they
almost invariably have been.
The Conventional Response From
DM-Theorists
Revolutionaries have generally resisted the idea that language is
conventional because it would seem to imply that science is conventional, too, which
would in turn threaten to undermine its 'objectivity'.21
In fact, revolutionaries have in general rejected the connection between the
conventional nature of language and the 'objectivity' of science with arguments
that have only
succeeded in undermining both. Either that, or they have simply assumed that conventionalism
must always collapse into relativism or into some form of Idealism.22
However, the truth is the exact opposite: it is the rejection of the
conventional nature of language and science that compromises both. How and why
that is so will be explained briefly below, but in more detail in Essay Thirteen
Part Two. In this Essay, I propose only to examine the
connection between the above considerations and Metaphysics.
Meaning Precedes Truth
If
language is a social phenomenon, then, clearly, what human beings say, or write,
must be guided by normative
conventions that govern discourse in general if they are to make sense. That is
why it isn't possible to utter absolutely anything, make random noises,
and hope to be understood. Naturally, scientific language will have its own specialist
and technical
protocols layered on top over-and-above the ordinary conventions underlying the
vernacular. In addition, this entire ensemble will change and develop in accord
with wider social and historical forces.
But one thing is reasonably clear: if language is to be a means of communication, whatever lends sense to its empirical propositions must be independent of
(and prior to) any truths they supposedly express.23
If that weren't so, language users would have to know whether
an empirical proposition was true before they could understand it!
That is patently absurd,
since no one
could even assent to the truth, let alone repudiate the falsehood, of a proposition before they had
first comprehended it. Indeed, as seems obvious, if they failed to understand
what was said, they
wouldn't even be able to begin finding out whether or not it was true.24
This, naturally, connects the social nature of language with the
earlier discussion of propositions like M1-M9. There, we saw that in the case of
ordinary empirical propositions (like M6), it is possible to understand them before
their truth-status is known:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
The overwhelming majority of English language
speakers will understand M6 on hearing it (or reading it) -- providing, of course, they know who Tony Blair
is
and that The Algebra of Revolution is a book -- even if they haven't a
clue whether it is true or whether it is false (or, indeed, whether or not they
ever find out which of these is the case, or even care to know which is the
case). Communication (at least with respect to the conveying of information)
would cease if that weren't so.
After all, how would
anyone be able to convey their thoughts to someone else if that individual had to
ascertain that what was said to them was true before they could
understand it? How could they even go about discovering its truth if they hadn't
the faintest idea what they
were being told?
In contrast, it was argued
earlier that with respect to
metaphysical/DM-propositions things are radically different: understanding a
proposition like M9 is of a piece with knowing it is true. To reject it as
false amounts to changing the meaning of "matter" and/or "motion".
Why that is so will be explained later on in this Essay, but it is
intimately connected
with the status of P4:
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
These two
options hang together: to understand M9 is
ipso facto to
accept it as true; to reject M9 as false is to change the meaning of some of its key terms.
We are now in a position to understand
why
that is so.
Avoiding An
Infinite
Regress
If,
per impossible, the sense of an empirical proposition were dependent
on truth, or, indeed, on other truths (which would themselves have to be expressed
by still
further propositions), they, too, would have to be
understood first before their truth-status could be ascertained. If not,
then it would be impossible to determine their truth-status. Once again, it
isn't possible to ascertain the truth of a proposition before it has
been
comprehended.
[CNS = Central Nervous System.]
So, if the sense of an empirical proposition were
dependent on knowing still further truths, on knowing the facts of the matter, or
even on some form of
ontology,
this process or hierarchy of dependency (of facts upon facts, upon facts,
upon...) couldn't continue indefinitely. There appear to be
only two ways that an infinite regress
[henceforth, IR] like this can be avoided in such circumstances
as language users learn and then employ that medium (in what follows I have left the word 'truths' deliberately vague
so that several options aren't closed off from the start):
(1)
Language users must have, or have had programmed, in their minds or brains a 'set of truths'
(possibly even a 'set of rules') that aren't themselves expressed in, or
expressible by, empirical propositions. That is, such speakers must have direct access to
what can only be called 'non-linguistic truths', or maybe even 'linguistic
rules' that have been 'hard-wired' into the CNS -- perhaps written in a 'code'
of some sort (which, paradoxically, wouldn't be a code or the above IR would simply kick in again;
why that is so is explained in Note 25).25
Or:
(2) The
'truths' upon which the sense of empirical propositions depend must be 'necessary truths', whose own truth can't be
questioned (hence the word "necessary"), and which
semantic status follows directly
from the meaning of the words or concepts they use --, but not from still further truths. In other
words, these 'necessary truths' act rather like the buffers at the end of a
railway line. The buck
stops here -- at least in terms of semantic status.

Figure One: Are Buffers Necessary
To Halt A Train-Of-Thought?
Unfortunately, as we will soon see, 'necessary truths'
themselves have no
sense and are incapable of being either true or false (so, they incapable of
acting like literal or metaphorical buffers). That will, of course, rule
out Option (2).
Anyway, Option (2) concedes
an earlier point -- that meaning has to precede truth -- since the truth-status of such 'necessarily' true propositions follows from
the meaning of their constituent terms. In that case, there would be no
good reason to postulate the existence of such 'necessary' truths in order to
support the opposite idea -- that meaning in the end depends on truth, not
truth on meaning -- since,
as seems plain, Option (2) relies on the fact that meaning is
sui generis,
and hence that truth depends on meaning, after all.
With respect to
Option (1), as we will
discover, the idea that
there could be sets of 'non-linguistic truths' (or 'rules') in nature (whether
we are aware of them or not) that govern the sense of propositions is based on the ancient
theory that Nature is Mind, the product of Mind, constituted by Mind, or that it
is thoroughly Ideal (i.e., comprised of ideas "all the way down", as it were).
In this
particular case, this overall theory originally traded on the (quasi-religious) belief that language itself is governed by:
(i) Nature's
own 'pre-linguistic ideas' (perhaps those that are lodged in the 'Mind of God',
or which are expressed in physical form, somewhere, somehow); or,
(ii)
Physical 'laws' of some sort;
and hence that it is the intelligent or rational universe
(or, indeed, its originating supernatural cause)
that lends to human
discourse the meaning it has.
As should now seem obvious, this set of
ideas meshes seamlessly with certain forms of
Representationalism, for, given this approach,
human beings
represent meaning to themselves automatically and naturally (by means of
principles 'programmed' into us 'lawfully' by 'God', nature or even evolution).
On this view, meaning is once again created in
each individual human being, as if each one were a social or linguistic atom.
Hence, on
this account,
meaning is a 'natural', not a social, phenomenon.
[The
above ideas are explored at greater length in Essays Three
Part Two and Thirteen
Part Three.]
In fact,
more-or-less the same comment could be made about
the idea that language is governed by rules that are genetically programmed in
the CNS. This would,
of course, make such 'rules' part of the 'rational structure' of the universe
more widely understood. However, as we will see (mainly in Essay Thirteen
Part Three), that idea would only be acceptable if we
were prepared to anthropomorphise the brain, and
view it -- rather than human agents -- as
intelligent.
The
(traditional) view of discourse is now also based on the (suppressed) premise that
language users rely on 'intelligent' neurons that 'communicate' with one
another, sending or carrying 'messages' to various areas of the body, or to one
another. They are the linguists; we merely bend to their 'will'. This
further implies that 'intelligent' neurons decide for each user what their words mean,
and it is this that enables our brains to mirror the outside world -- and
as a spin-off, it helps explain how we
use language that suggests nature is intelligent/'rational'. This view
clearly implies
that language or something pre-linguistic and the neurons underlying one or both are
the agents here, we are the patients. In turn,
that approach fetishises the products of social interaction as if
(a) they mirrored the
real relation among things, (b) they represented or reflected the real relation between
intelligent neurons, or
(c) they were those things themselves
(to paraphrase Marx). In short, once again, this confuses the means by which we
hope to represent the
world with the world itself.
[The liberal use of metaphor, neologisms
and 'scare' quote encrusted words in theories that give
expression to this ideological inversion (i.e., that nature is the agent
while human beings are the patient, at least with respect to the meaning of words) rather gives the game away, one feels.]26
Naturally, philosophers of a more 'robust' theoretical
temperament might be inclined to rejected responses like this (for all manner of reasons), arguing that there
must be physical or causal laws of some sort governing the way human beings form
empirical propositions or sentences,
or which give meaning to the words they use --, concluding, perhaps, that
our understanding of language should be 'naturalised' accordingly.26a
There are however
several
serious difficulties with that approach. [That links to a PDF.]
First,
we have as yet no idea what such 'laws' would even look like, let
alone what they are.
Second, this account of the origin and nature of language
would in fact reduplicate the 'problem' it was meant to solve. There is and could be no
conceivable 'law' (or set of 'laws') capable of doing all that is claimed
for 'it' (or 'them') which doesn't at the same time anthropomorphise nature, or read into it the very linguistic
categories it was originally introduced to explain.27
Third, if language is a product of,
or has been caused by, a set of laws (that allows users to acquire language in
order
picture the world to themselves -- i.e., if discourse is fundamentally representational) then reference to its
social nature will, of course, be an empty gesture. As noted above,
Marxists who have been seduced into accepting one or other version of the above
'robust view' -- as a result perhaps of their unwise adherence DM-concepts
(originating, for instance, with Lenin and what he had to say in
MEC) concerning the nature of cognition, or, indeed, ideas based on
Chomsky
or
Quine's work --
have universally failed to appreciate this anti-Marxist corollary.28
Finally, but more importantly, another implication of the idea that
understanding language is at some point parasitic on truth
(as set out
in Option (1) and Option
(2) from earlier)
is that if, per impossible,
that were so,
paradoxically, it couldn't be so. That is because this way of viewing
discourse gets things the wrong way round (i.e., the supposed relation here has once more been inverted)
-- the establishment of the truth-value of a proposition is
consequent on its already having been understood. Humans do not first
appropriate or ascertain 'truths' and then proceed to comprehend them. Both communication
and representation would be impossible if that were the case.29
On the contrary, as was also noted
earlier, if the sense of a proposition weren't
independent of its actual truth-value, then, plainly, the mere fact that
a proposition had been understood would entail it was true, or, as the case may
be, it would entail
that it was
false! Naturally, if either
were correct, linguistic or psychological factors would determine the
truth-status of
empirical propositions and science would become little more than a branch of
hermeneutics.29a
Hence, given the above 'inverted' approach, as soon as a proposition had been understood its
truth (or its falsehood) could be inferred automatically. Clearly, this would destroy the
distinction between empirical and non-empirical propositions, for, on that basis,
as soon as anyone understood M6, for example, they would know it was true --
or they would know it was false.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
Evidence either way would be irrelevant.
In this way,
we can see how representationalism requires all indicative sentences to be of
the same logical form (whether or not it was
immediately obvious). At some point, given representationalism, all indicative propositions
would be, or would depend on, a 'necessary truth' or set of such 'truths', which
would 'reflect' in our 'minds' how
things must be and can't be thought of as otherwise -- i.e., that their opposite is
"unthinkable".
And, that is why this view of language, knowledge and 'mind' so
naturally aligns itself with aprioristic dogmatism, with the idea that
fundamental truths about nature are accessible to thought alone, and which can therefore
be safely imposed on reality.
Hence, if in
the end M6 depends on a necessary truth of some sort (or if it is a disguised necessary truth itself -- that is, in this case, if Blair had no choice, his ownership of TAR was determined by the operation
of a necessary law of some sort (a là DM), or by the unfolding of his 'concept'
(a là Hegel), by his implicit predicates (a là Leibniz), or by 'God' (a là
Calvin)), then ultimately its
truth may be ascertained without the need to examine any evidence. All one would
have to do is 'comprehend' the associated indicative sentence, or the 'concepts'
it supposedly expresses, for it to be deemed true.
[Naturally, that
would make falsehood difficult, if not impossible, to explain; why that is so is
reasonably obvious, however, the answer is hinted at
below.
A much
fuller explanation will be set out in in Essay Three Part Four, where it will be
shown that this theory also implies there can't be any false propositions!
Until that Essay is published the argument supporting this controversial claim
has been summarised here.]
]
As
should now seem plain, this theory, or family of theories, would imply that scientific
knowledge is based on some form of LIE; that is, it would be founded on the
belief that truths about
the world may legitimately follow solely from language or 'thought'. The 'mind', when it reflects
the world, would merely be reflecting itself, or even the
thoughts of a more grandiose version of
itself -- perhaps even a 'Cosmic Mind' in 'self-development' -- because,
on this view,
the world is either 'Mind', or it is the product of 'self-developing Mind'.
[LIE =
Linguistic Idealism.]
[The last of the above was, of course,
the conclusion Hegel drew. It is revealing,
therefore, to find out that the same result follows from the alleged 'inversion'
of Hegel.]
Apriorism and LIE thus go hand-in-hand
-- indeed, as George Novack noted:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Small
wonder then that Marx connected Philosophy with religious idealism:
"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but
religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form
and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally
to be condemned...." [Marx
(1975b), p.381. I have used the on-line version, here. Bold emphasis
and link added.]
Fortunately, this way of looking at language and knowledge
is undermined by
the vernacular itself -- which is, perhaps, one reason why
Marx himself recommended
a different approach.30
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an independent existence in
consequence of the personal circumstances and relations of individuals acquiring
independent existence. We have shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with
these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the
systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and
that, in particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German
petty-bourgeois conditions. The
philosophers have only to dissolve
their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order
to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that
they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphases
alone added.]
In that case, whatever lends sense to empirical propositions (i.e.,
whatever sets the conditions under which they are true or under
which they are false) can't itself be a set of antecedent truths. Neither could it be a set of
ex post facto truths
(that is, truths established, or recognised as such, at some later stage).
In contrast, since the socially-motivated rules governing our
ordinary use of language are incapable of being true or false, they
aren't subject to the above constraints. [These points will be explained more fully below
and defended.]
The above constraints also apply to scientific language
--
if it is to function as a
means of communication (and, derivatively, as a means of representation).
[On that see
Note 31 and
Note 33. But this particular topic will be
covered in much greater detail in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Hence, we can add: whatever lends sense to empirical, scientific propositions can't
be a set of truths, either. If the sense of an empirical proposition were dependent on
just such a set, scientists would only be able to understand each other after
they had ascertained or learnt their truth-status. In which case, of course, they couldn't
be learnt. Clearly, there are no propositions by means of which this could be
achieved that
are exempt from the above constraints.31
32
33
Furthermore, if the sense
of empirical, scientific propositions were dependent on certain truths about the
world -- so that, for example, their the comprehension implied they were automatically true --, that would mean that
scientists could abandon experimentation and simply take up linguistic analysis.
Science would then become indistinguishable from Metaphysics, or, indeed, from LIE.
In that case, the simple expedient of understanding an empirical proposition would
automatically mean that that proposition was true.34
Naturally, this confirms the claim (surely uncontroversial for Marxists) that scientific language is,
like the vernacular, conventional.
Admittedly, these claims are controversial.35
They appear to imply that science isn't 'objective'. However,
that belief is itself based on a misconception.
[As noted above this
entire topic will be addressed in
more detail in Essay
Thirteen Part Two.]
The above assertions are
in fact a consequence of a commitment to the social nature of language. They
can't be swept under the 'dialectical carpet' or negotiated away without seriously
undermining that fundamental Marxist insight.36
[The rest of this Essay will be devoted (i) to
explaining in more detail why the above conclusions are valid, and (ii)
defending them.]
The
Ineluctable Slide Into
Non-Sense
Private Ownership In the Means Of
'Mental' Production
We are now in a position to understand what went
wrong with Lenin's claim (recorded in M1a) and explain why it is that certain indicative sentences
(i.e., in particular those that litter metaphysical theories) lapse so readily into non-sense --
and some even follow that with a collapse into incoherence as an encore.36a
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
As argued above, this problem is
associated with the use of what appear to be empirical
sentences to state necessary truths (or even rule out falsehoods) about the world, for it is this
confusion which
ends up distorting fundamental features of language, rendering them non-sensical.
But, exactly why that is so hasn't been explained yet.
The supposed truth of metaphysical sentences seems to follow from
the meaning of the words they contain; because of that, Traditional Theorists claim
to be able access Cosmic Super-Verities, reflecting
fundamental features of reality in the 'mind' of anyone who so indulges. In this way, metaphysical theories go hand-in-hand
with accepting representational theories of language and thought.
Moreover, as noted above (and as we saw
here),
this entire way of viewing language and meaning inverts and then internalises
externally-sanctioned social and interactive practices (i.e., comprehension and
communication), rendering them private, individual acts of intellection, 'immediate to
consciousness', etc.
On this view, meaning isn't a social
aspect of discourse, it is the result
of the internal processing of 'images', 'ideas' and 'concepts' in the 'mind' --
perhaps by the 'faculty of reason' -- integrated these days (maybe) in and by
our supposed use of "inner speech",
or, even more recently, as an integral component of the 'language of thought'.
Plainly, this is a
thoroughly bourgeois
way of viewing language, thought and meaning, an accusation that is itself motivated by an
earlier allegation
that this area of Traditional Cognitive Theory and Dialectical-Marxist
Philosophy hasn't advanced much beyond the method and ideas concocted by
Hobbes,
Descartes
and Locke.
Alas, DM-theorists who
have accepted this way of doing philosophy have clearly failed to
appreciate how it undermines their commitment to the social nature of language, meaning
and knowledge, just as they have failed to see that this approach to 'cognition'
doesn't even deliver what had all along been claimed for it.37
Semantic Overlap
To recap: in trying to inform us about matter and motion Lenin
asserted that "motion without matter" is "unthinkable". Unfortunately,
the content of that assertion involved
him in doing the exact
opposite of what he said was impossible. It meant he had to
think the very thoughts (the content) he was trying to rule out as "unthinkable". Hence, he had to
understand what it meant for motion to exist without matter so that he could
rule it out as something that could
be entertained. That involved him in a radically non-standard use of
language (in this context), which meant he was unable to say what he imagined he wanted
to say. In
practice his words implied the opposite of what he thought he had
intended.
In fact, this suggests that there wasn't actually anything there
for Lenin to have intended to say. That is because it isn't possible to say (in one sense of "say") anything meaningful
that is in principle incomprehensible, even to the one saying it. While
a speaker might give voice to complete babble, it isn't possible for them to mean
anything by it (unless, of course, it is part of some code, or it is aimed at simply creating
a desired effect of some sort -- such as eliciting surprise or inducing puzzlement and consternation). One might intend to utter babble, but
not intend to mean anything comprehensible by it (if trivial examples like those are put to one side).38
With respect to sentences like M1a, it now becomes impossible say
what it was that Lenin intended to communicate to his readers. Every attempt to
translate his words into less confusing terms only seems to undermine them further.
Hence, it is pertinent to wonder what (if anything) Lenin could
possibly have meant by what he said.39
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
We have already encountered similarly incoherent DM-claims (for
example,
in connection with 'dialectical logic',
Trotsky's attempt to critique
the LOI, Engels's 'analysis' of the
'contradictory' nature of
motion, Lenin's attempt to argue
that everything is "self-moving"
and "interconnected", and
TAR's attempt to
explain
DM-Wholism, among other things).
This regular slide into unintelligibility isn't just bad luck, it is a direct
result of the careless use and distortion of language, among other things --
such as viewing claims (like the one expressed in M1a) as
super-empirical propositions that purport to inform humanity of fundamental
aspects of reality
when they turn out to be nothing
of the sort.39a
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
An empirical proposition derives its
sense from the truth
possibilities it appears to hold open, which options can be decided
one way or the other by a confrontation with the evidence. That is why the actual truth-value of, say, M6 (or
its contradictory, M6a) doesn't need to be known before it is understood,
but it is also why evidence is relevant to establishing that truth-value as
"true" or rejecting it as "false".
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
All that is required here is some grasp of the
same possibility that both of the above hold open. M6 and M6a both have the
same content, and are both made
true or false by the same situation obtaining or failing to obtain.40
For a proposition and its negation to picture
the same state of affairs, they must have
the same content; this is what connects the two and make one the negation of the
other. If that weren't so, they wouldn't be contradictories,
for there would be nothing (relevant) that linked them. One of them has to be capable of being used to deny what the other one can be used
to assert, or vice versa. If they failed to 'overlap' in this way, they couldn't be used to
contradict one another. So, if a given proposition is true, the state of affairs it
expresses will obtain; if it is false, the same state of affairs won't obtain.
[Of course, what constitutes a specific/relevant state of affairs will be intimately
connected the
proposition concerned.]
This enables us, for example, to know what to look for or what to expect
in order to ascertain whether
the proposition in question is true or, indeed, declare it
false (if we were so minded).
This is just another way of saying that negation does not alter the content
of an empirical proposition. If negation could alter content --
or, as we will see, if it seemed to do this -- then the sentence involved can't have been empirical to begin with.
[The significance of that observation
will become clear as this Essay unfolds.]
Consider again the following two empirical propositions:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
The same situation obtaining --
i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of M6 or M6a true and
one of them false. If he does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false;
conversely, if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate
intertwining of the truth-values of M6 and M6a is a direct
consequence of the same state of affairs linking them.
If a speaker didn't know that M6 was
true (and hence M6a was false) just in case Blair owned a copy of the said book,
and that M6 was false (but M6a was true) just in case Blair didn't own a
copy of the said book -- or they were unable to tell anyone
else what to look for or to expect if they wanted to ascertain the truth-value of M6
or M6a -- that would be
prima facie
evidence they didn't understand either or both of M6 and M6a. These two stand or fall
together.
This might seem an obvious point, but its ramifications are
all too easily missed, and have been missed by the vast majority of Philosophers.
[More on
that in these references and much
of the rest of this Essay (especially here
and
Note 45a).]
[It could be argued that (1)
Owning or not owning a book is a complex social fact, and (2)
Owning something is a rather vague term. Both of these objections (which overlap
somewhat) will be considered in more detail in
Note 40a.]
It is also why it is easy to imagine
M6 as true even
if it turned out to be false -- or false if it is in fact true. Vice versa
with M6a. In general, the comprehension of an empirical
proposition involves an understanding of the conditions under which it
would or could be true, or would or could be false. As is well known, these are otherwise
called their
truth conditions. That, of course, allows
anyone so minded to confirm the actual truth status of any given empirical proposition
by an appeal to the available evidence,
since they would in that case know what to look for or expect.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
These non-negotiable facts about
(at least this area) of discourse also turn out to underpin the Marxist emphasis on the social nature of
language and knowledge
(advocated at this site).
This facility allows interlocutors to exchange information which they can grasp
independently of knowing whether what they have been told is true and
independently of knowing whether what they have been told is false. If that
weren't the case, if they had to know something (i.e., some other proposition) was true
before they could understand any given empirical proposition, the entire process would stall, and
communication (at least in such contexts) would be impossible.
[Naturally, it is certainly possible -- in fact, it is quite common -- that
in order to ascertain the actual truth-value of an empirical proposition,
the truth-value of other such propositions will also have to be known; but, as
has already been indicated, truth-values aren't the same as truth conditions.]
These everyday truisms
about language fly in the face of metaphysical
theories, which emphasise the opposite -- that in order to understand a
metaphysical proposition is
ipso facto to
know it is true (or
ipso facto to know it is false, depending on circumstances), by-passing the confirmation
and disconfirmation stage, reducing
the usual 'truth conditions'
to one option only.
[How this
relates to what we might call 'patent truths' (about matters of fact) -- such as
"Fire is hot" and "Water is wet" -- has been dealt with in Note 40a, link
below.]
Which is, of course, why
Traditional Theories of knowledge found it
hard to account for falsehood.
If we represent the world to ourselves 'in our heads', how could anything be
false? It is no use replying that we can check these representations against the
facts, or against the world, since, if that were so, all we would be doing is checking one set of representations against another.
Moreover, relying on the testimony, evidence or argument provided by other
individuals would be no use either. Again, if representationalism were true, all
we would be relying on
here would be representations of testimony, evidence or argument. We have as
yet found no way of 'leaping out of our heads' in order to check our
'representations' against 'reality'.40a
[For example, how would the 'contents' of one mind be communicated to
another if there was no
prior means of communication by means of which it might be achieved? (In fact,
this is something
representational theories undermine -- or even sometimes deny.) Indeed, how would
it be possible for anyone to communicate with anyone else if they could only
figure out what their interlocutors had meant, or what their words might mean, after they had ascertained the truth
of what was said? (There is more on this in Essays Three Part Two
and Thirteen Part Three.)]
However, there are other serious problems that this approach to
language faces over and above the fact it would make knowledge incommunicable,
if not impossible.
Semantic Suicide
As we are
about to see, intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such supposedly empirical but
nonetheless
metaphysical sentences) if an attempt is
made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired
semantic
possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and
falsehood.
This occurs, for example, when an
apparently empirical, or seemingly
Super-Empirical, proposition is
declared to be "only true" or "only false" -- or, more pointedly, 'necessarily'
the one or the other -- perhaps as consequence of a "law of cognition". Or, more likely, when a
'necessary' truth or a 'necessary' falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly
profound sort of empirical claim that utilises the indicative mood (etc.), once more.
As we will soon see, this tactic results in the
automatic loss of both options, and with that goes any sense the
original proposition might have had, rendering it
non-sensical.
That is because an empirical proposition
leaves it open whether it is true or whether it is false. That is why its
truth-value (true/false) can't simply be read-off from its content, why
evidence is required in order to determine its semantic status (true/false), and why it is possible to understand it before its truth or its
falsehood is known. If that weren't so, it would be impossible to
establish its truth-status; once again, it isn't possible to confirm or confute an
'indicative sentence' if no one understands what it is saying, or what it is
being used to say.
When this isn't the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or
falsehood) is closed-off, or when a proposition is said to be "necessarily true"
or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant.
So,
whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition can't be ascertained
on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood
of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the
basis of such linguistic, logical, or structural factors, that proposition can't be empirical --
despite its use of the indicative mood.
If, however, such a proposition is still regarded by those who
hold it true --, or, indeed, promote it as a Super-Truth about the world, about its "essence"
--
then it plainly becomes metaphysical.40b
Otherwise the
actual truth or
the actual falsehood of such a proposition would be world-sensitive not
solely
meaning-, or concept-dependent. That is, its actual truth or actual falsehood would
depend on how the world happens to be, not solely on what its words mean. [Note
the use of "solely" here.]
And that
explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appears to go hand
in hand with 'knowing' their 'truth' (or 'knowing' their 'falsehood', as the
case may be): their
truth-status is based solely on thought, language or meaning, not on
evidence.
Of course, it could always be claimed that
such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' deeper truths about the world,
those that are far more philosophically significant than mere 'empirical truths'.
But, if thought
does indeed 'reflect' the world, it
should be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a
thought in advance of knowing whether it is true, or knowing whether it is false, otherwise confirmation in practice, by comparing it with the world, would become an
empty gesture.
In
response, it could be argued that "essential" truths are different. That
particular objection will be examined presently.
So, if the truth of such a
thought, or proposition, could be ascertained from that proposition alone (i.e., if it were "self-evidently
true"), then plainly the world would drop out of the
picture,
which would in turn mean that this 'thought', or proposition, couldn't be a reflection
of
the world, whatever else it was.41
Furthermore, and worse, if a proposition is still
supposed to be empirical
(or if it is allegedly about underlying "essences"), and can only be true, or can only be false (as seems to be the case with, say, M20, below, according to
Lenin), then, as we will see, intractable paradox must ensue.
Consider the following sentence (which Lenin would presumably have declared necessarily false, if not "unthinkable"):
M20: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Unfortunately for Lenin, in order to declare M20 necessarily and always false
(or "unthinkable"), the
possibility of its truth must first of all be entertained even if only to be
ruled out immediately, otherwise he would have no idea what he was ruling out. But, if the possible truth of M20 couldn't even be entertained
by Lenin (howsoever briefly), then that would either mean M20 was incomprehensible or that even if it were
comprehensible, Lenin himself couldn't understand it. Either way, Lenin
wouldn't know what it was he was rejecting. As we will see, that would have
a knock-on affect on the status of M1a itself
Of course,
it could be argued Lenin needn't entertain M20 in the first place, still less
its possible truth. But, as we are about to see, if Lenin (or anyone else for
that matter) didn't, or couldn't, do that,
they would be in no position to assert M1a, or comprehend its alleged
content, either.
Thus, if the
truth of M20 is to be permanently excluded by holding it
necessarily false, then whatever would make it true would have to be ruled out
conclusively. But, anyone doing that would have to know what M20 rules in
so that they could comprehend what was being ruled out by its rejection
as always and necessarily false. And yet, that is precisely what can't be done
if what M20 itself says is permanently ruled out on semantic or conceptual grounds.42
[I
cover this ground again from a different and perhaps more profound angle,
below.]
Consequently, if a proposition like M20 is necessarily
false this charade (i.e., the permanent exclusion of its truth) can't actually take
place, since it would be impossible to say
(or even to think) what could possibly count as making it true so that
that possibility could be rejected. Indeed, Lenin himself
had to declare it "unthinkable", so he not only
couldn't inform his readers what would make it false, he couldn't even think these words
(in the sense that he couldn't think their supposed content -- the state of
affairs this sentence supposedly pictured -- more on this
presently).
Hence, because the possible truth of M20 can't even be conceived,
no one, least of all Lenin, is in any position to say
what is excluded by its rejection.43
M20: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.
Unfortunately, this now prevents any account being given of what would make M20
false, let alone 'necessarily' false. Given this twist, paradoxically,
M20 would now be 'necessarily false' if and only if it wasn't capable of being
thought of as necessarily false! But, according to Lenin, the conditions that would make M20 true
can't even be conceived,
so this train of thought can't be joined at any point. And, if the truth of M20
-- or the conditions under which it would be true -- can't be conceived, then
neither can its falsehood, for we wouldn't then know what was being ruled out.43a
In
that case, the supposed negation of M20 can neither be accepted nor rejected by
anyone, for no one would know what its content committed them to so that that
content could be countenanced or repudiated.
Hence, M20 would lose any sense it had, since it couldn't under any circumstances be
considered true, and hence under any circumstances be considered false.
If, according to Lenin, we are incapable of thinking
the content of the following words, we certainly can't think of it
as false.
M20: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.
Content
[In what follows, by "content" I mean what an indicative empirical sentence purports to tell
us about the world (or any other legitimate subject matter) -- what state of affairs it
supposedly expresses.]
Our
inability to conclude that certain 'propositions' -- or indicative sentences -- are false
is in fact a consequence of several of the points made earlier: i.e., that an
empirical proposition and its negation have the same content (they express the
same possible state of affairs). If one of these options is ruled out, the other
automatically goes out
of the window with it. And that is what we have just seen happen with Lenin's words.
In
order to appreciate why this is the more fundamental reason for the
collapse of his -- and other metaphysical -- sentences into non-sense we need to
back-track a little.
We can see why
these problems arise if we consider another typical metaphysical sentence,
L1, and
its supposed negation, L2:
L1: Time is a relation between events. [Paraphrasing Leibniz.]43b
L2: Time isn't a relation between events.
As we have seen, the alleged truth of L1 is derived directly from the meaning of the
words it contains (or the concepts it supposedly expresses), or even in some
cases from related principles, precepts and definitions (that also dependent on the
meaning of the words they contain). That truth manifestly hasn't been derived from
evidence (even if some attempt were made to "illustrate" its truth from
'evidence' or it was used to help explain certain phenomena -- more about that in
Note 45a). However, the unique
semantic status of sentences like L1 has the consequence that if some attempt
were made to deny its truth by means of, say, L2,
that would amount to a change in the meaning of the word "time".
That is because sentences like L1 define what a given philosopher means by
"time", how he or she intends to use that word or conceive of its
related
'concept'. Elsewhere these are sometimes call "essential propositions".
They
purport to reveal or even define 'the essence' of the concept(s) involved. So, "time" with a
different 'essence' -- or the one that had been attributed to it were denied of it
--
would now have a different meaning. If time isn't a relation between
events then the word "time" (used to assert this) can no longer mean the same
as it does in L1.
So, if time isn't a relation between events, the word "time"
can no longer mean the same. It must
either have no meaning in L2, or possess a new meaning yet to be given it. But the
bottom line is that the meaning of "time" now has a different meaning in L1
and L2 -- that is, if we also understand by "no meaning" a "different
meaning". (But even then "time" would not mean the same between these two
sentences). And, if that is so, L1 and L2 can't represent or 'reflect' the same state of affairs. They have a different (supposed) content.
In that case, and despite appearances to the contrary, L2 isn't the negation of L1!
That is because the subject of each sentence is different.
To see this point, compare the following:
L3:
George W Bush crashed his car on the 3rd of May 2012.
L4:
George H W Bush didn't crash his car on the 3rd of May 2012.
Whether or not one or both of them is true, L3 and L4 aren't negations of one another
since they relate to two different individuals, George W Bush and his father,
George H W Bush. L3 and L4 thus have two different
subjects. They are true, or
they are false, under entirely different circumstances; they don't have the same
sense,
the same empirical content. Plainly, they express different possible states of affairs.
[That isn't to suggest L3 and L4 are
like L1 and L2 in any other respect. The change of subject matter is less easy to see in relation to L1 and L2 since
they both use a typographically identical word, "time". The difference
between them is made obvious by the fact that L1 defines a specific meaning for
the word "time" while L2 denies it that very meaning. L3 and L4 are
only being used to make this particular point abundantly clear.]
Mutatis mutandis, the same comment applies in general to all metaphysical propositions (like L1) and what
appear to be their negations (i.e., in the case of L1, that was L2).
L1: Time is a relation between events.
L2: Time isn't a relation between events.
Why is this important?
Well,
if L1 is deemed "necessarily true", that would
be tantamount to declaring its
alleged negation (L2) "necessarily false". And yet, L2 isn't the
negation of L1. Again, L1 and L2 are logically unrelated sentences since they have
a different content, they express different states of affairs. The 'truth' or
'falsehood' of the one has no bearing on the 'truth' or 'falsehood' of the other
-- unlike M6 and M6a.43c
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution. [TAR]
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
As
was argued earlier:
The same situation obtaining --
i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of M6 or M6a true and
one of them false. If he does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false;
conversely, if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate
intertwining of the truth-values of M6 and M6a is a direct
consequence of the same state of affairs linking them.
If a speaker didn't know that M6 was
true (and hence M6a was false) just in case Blair owned a copy of the said book,
and that M6 was false (but M6a was true) just in case Blair didn't own a
copy of the said book -- or they were unable to tell anyone
else what to look for or to expect if they wanted to ascertain the truth-value of M6
or M6a -- that would be
prima facie
evidence they didn't understand either or both of M6 and M6a. These two stand or fall
together.
This might seem an obvious point, but its ramifications are
all too easily missed, and have been missed by the vast majority of Philosophers....
It is also why it is easy to imagine
M6 as true even
if it turned out to be false -- or false if it is in fact true. Vice versa
with M6a. In general, the comprehension of an empirical
proposition involves an understanding of the conditions under which it
would or could be true, or would or could be false. As is well known, these are otherwise
called their
truth conditions. That, of course, allows
anyone so minded to confirm the actual truth status of any given empirical proposition
by an appeal to the available evidence,
since they would in that case know what to look for or expect.
So, if
and when we find out that M6a is true, we can automatically infer the falsehood of M6
-- and vice versa. In that case, we can reject M6 if
M6a is true, just as we can reject M6a if M6 is true. The same content tells us what
we can rule in and what we can rule out. Again, it is this shared content that
connects the two sentences.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
However, as we have
seen, between a
metaphysical proposition and what might appear to be its negation there is no
shared content because of that change of subject. Two metaphysical sentences
like L1 and L2 fail to relate to the same supposed state of affairs which
means they have a different
content. [In fact, as we are about to discover, they have no content at all.]
Hence, there is nothing that connects them in the above manner.
In which case, the truth of L1
can't be ruled out by means of the truth of L2 (nor vice versa),
since we
now have no idea what we are ruling out -- and thus no idea what we are ruling
in.
L1: Time is a relation between events.
L2: Time isn't a relation between events.
[Why that is so will also be explained presently,
but it is connected with the fact that L1 and L2 express no actual or
possible state of
affairs.]
Or, rather, what we might imagine we are
trying
to rule out by the use of L1 (i.e., L2) won't in fact have been ruled out
since L2 has a different subject and hence a different 'content'.
This is important because, to declare a sentence "true" is
ipso facto to declare it "not false". The two go hand-in-hand.
[Some might
think the above represents an unwise concession to the so-called 'Law
of Excluded Middle' [LEM]. I can't enter into that topic here, so any who do so
think are advised to read
Note 39a (and follow the link at the end of that Note).]
But, if we can't do
that,
if we can't declare L1 "not false" (and we plainly can't do that if we have no idea what we are ruling out -- indeed, as soon as we
attempt to do
so
by means of L2 we end up changing the subject!), we can't then say the original sentence is
true.
Why that is so will now be explained.
By declaring a
sentence like L1 "necessarily true", we appear to be ruling something
in conclusively, and thus ruling something else out conclusively -- as "necessarily false".
That is, we seem to be talking about, and hence ruling out, the same state of affairs.
But, in this case there is no shared state of affairs to be ruled out.
In
fact, there is no state of affairs here at all, shared or otherwise. L1
picks out no state of affairs -- even in theory.
[As we will see, L1 concerns the use of words in a certain way, it isn't
about the world as such. That sentence
actually expresses an idiosyncratic rule for the use of "time" -- but
it is usually interpreted, or misconstrued, as a fundamental truth
about the world.]
If, per impossible,
there were a state of affairs that L1 expressed, we would be able
to negate L1 (i.e., using L2) legitimately, and conclude that that state of affairs doesn't obtain, even in
theory. But, as we have just seen, we can't even do that. In relation to L1, what we
think we are ruling out is what L2 expresses. But, L2 has a
different content to L1, so we aren't in fact ruling out what L1 says!
L1
thus has no content at all, and neither has L2. They
are both telling us nothing at all.
L1: Time is
a relation between events.
L2: Time
isn't a relation between events.
When sentences like L1 are entertained, a pretence (often
genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean (i.e., "say") something
determinate, that they are
capable of being understood and hence that they are capable of being true or
are capable of being false. That is, in this case, that they at least depict a theoretical state of
affairs. To that end, a further pretence has to
be maintained that we understand what might make such propositions true -- and
ipso facto,
what might make
their 'negations' false -- so that propositions like L2 can be declared "necessarily false",
and ruled out accordingly.
So, we imagine they (both) actually depict (at least) a theoretical
state of affairs -- which, as we have just seen, they can't.
Again: if there were a state of affairs that
L1 pictured, we would be able to negate L1 legitimately, but as we have seen we
can't do that without changing the subject.
Hence, the use of philosophical 'propositions' like L1 and
L2 is completely vacuous; the entire exercise is an empty charade, for no
content can be given to such indicative sentences. They depict no state of affairs, even in theory.
Again, in order to declare L1 true, we pretend that a
theoretical state of affairs (at least) is being ruled out (i.e., that which is
expressed by L2); but, we have just seen that that isn't so. Nothing is being ruled in or
rule out, since L1 is
incapable of depicting anything, even theoretically! It has no content.
Hence, no one who accepts L1
as true is in any position say what it depicts, even in theory. That isn't because it would be psychologically
impossible for them to do so; it is because it is logically impossible to do it. If
L1 could depict something (even in theory), we
could legitimately negate it; but doing so changes the subject (in L2).
It isn't possible to specify conditions that would make L2 false, even in
theory, without
changing the subject.
But, if we
can't say under what conditions L1 is true (since it depicts nothing at all),
we can't say it is or isn't false, either. In which case, we are in no position to declare
L1 either true or
false! Any attempt to do so falls apart, for that would imply that two
logically unrelated sentences (L1 and L2) were related after all.
Hence, metaphysical propositions can't be true and they
can't be false. They have no content. They express no state of affairs,
even in theory.
In that case, given what was said
here about sense and non-sense,
metaphysical 'propositions' lack a sense, and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the
situation.
Our use of language actually prevents
them from expressing a sense, let alone being true.
They are therefore non-sensical, empty strings of words.
And that includes the 'propositions'
DM-theorists have cobbled-together (or have borrowed from Hegel, upside down or
the 'right way up').
[Incidentally,
the word "proposition"
is in 'scare quotes' above, since it isn't clear what is being
proposed, or put forward for consideration (since, in such cases, sentences like
these have no
content). Hence, nothing (i.e., no content) has been proposed
or put forward for consideration. (On vagueness, see
here.)]
Some might
wonder why there can't be necessary states of affairs (that are independent of
language), which are, or can be, reflected by
(true) metaphysical or necessarily true propositions. The above argument just
assumes without proof that there can't be any such.
In fact, the
answer to that objection was given earlier.
Let us
assume that L1 is necessarily true and that there is a necessary state of
affairs in the world (independent of language) it accurately reflects -- i.e., that time is indeed a
relation between events.
L1: Time is
a relation between events.
L2: Time
isn't a relation between events.
As we have
seen, that would automatically throw the semantic status of L2 into doubt, since
L2 has changed the subject and so isn't talking about what L1 is talking about,
despite appearances to the contrary. If L2 is deemed true, it can't be about
time, and if it is declared false, it can't now suddenly be about
time. That is, it would be impossible to explain how L2 could fail to be about
time if it were true, and yet be about time if were false! But as we have also
seen, if L1 is declared necessarily true, its falsehood is automatically ruled
out. However, it would now become impossible to rule out the falsehood of L1,
for to do so we should have to entertain the truth of L2. By declaring L1 true
we are ruling out its falsehood and hence also ruling out the truth of L2.
But L2 is totally unrelated to L1. They have different subjects. In that
case, we can't rule out the falsehood of L1 and hence declare L1 necessarily
true. If so, L1 can't reflect a necessary state of affairs in 'reality'.
As noted
earlier, our use of language actually prevents metaphysical sentences from being either
true or false. In that case, they are incapable of reflecting anything.
But,
maybe
there are states of affairs in the world that language can't reflect that are
still necessary. The incapacity of language to reflect the world does not imply
there are no such necessary states of affairs.
However, as
soon as it is asked what is implied by "necessary states of affairs" the whole
sorry mess falls apart. A "necessary state of affairs" is one that can't be
otherwise -- for instance, if time is necessarily a relation between events
(independently of language) it can't fail to be a relation between events -- it
is necessarily a relation between events and "can't be otherwise". Here,
for "otherwise" to be the case would clearly be for time to fail to be a relation between events.
But as we have seen there is no such thing as "otherwise" when it comes to such
'necessary' states of affairs. In that case, it is impossible even to define a
'necessary state of affairs' for to do so would be to change the subject again!
And if we can't even define this phrase (i.e., "necessary state of affairs"), no
coherent (or even comprehensible) possibility has been presented for
consideration -- at least, no more than would be had someone asked about offside
in chess. No one can theorise about offside in chess, and the same is the case
with "necessary states of affairs".
So, because the negations of DM-propositions also fail to picture anything that could be the case in any possible world
(for logical, not evidential or scientific reasons), they,
too, have
no content. Naturally, that automatically empties the content of the original
non-negated DM-'proposition' (such as "Motion is a mode of existence of
matter"), rendering it non-sensical, too.
The
above might appear to be yet another example of a priori dogmatics pushed
at this site, in
that it denies that
DM-propositions could "picture anything that could be the case in any possible world",
but that isn't so. It is rather to say that it makes no sense to suppose they
could. We have been presented with nothing that could be given a sense, even in
theory. For all the 'sense' they make, DM-propositions might just as well have
been taken from The
Jabberwocky:
Twas
brillig, and the slithy toves,
Did gyre and
gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy
were the borogroves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
[On
that, see also here.]
Except, of course, The Jabberwocky is more obviously incoherent non-sense.
This brings us full circle to a point made earlier:
[I]ntractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such supposedly empirical but
nonetheless
metaphysical sentences) if an attempt is
made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired
semantic
possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and
falsehood.
Hence, it isn't possible to
restrict or exclude one of these
paired semantic options -- for instance, falsehood -- in favour of the other (i.e., truth), as metaphysicians in general try to do, without the above problems
preventing them for doing so.
On the other hand,
if a proposition and its negation have the same content (which they will have if
one is to count as the negation of the other) they
will stand and fall together. But, that isn't the case with DM-propositions;
they stand alone, since they have
no content and hence can't share content with anything, least of all their
supposed negations. But
that just means they too collapse into incoherent non-sense, indeed, as we have seen happen with M1a.
This means that we have to find another way of
explaining why DM-propositions were invented in the first place. [More on that presently.
Why they all (and not just M1a) collapse into incoherence will also be explained
below.]
As we can now see, the radical misuse of language
motivating the production of
what look like empirical propositions (e.g., M1a, again) in fact involves
an implicit reference to the sorts of conditions that underlie the normal
employment and/or reception of such claims.44
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M20: Motion sometimes occurs without matter.
Hence,
and once again, when sentences like these are presented for consideration or are entertained, even for a short while, a pretence (often
genuine) has to be maintained that they actually mean something, that they
are capable of being understood, and hence that they are capable of being true or
are capable of being false.45
[This is done even if certain restrictions are later placed on
'theoretically processing' them any further, as was the case with M1a.]
In that case, a
further pretence has to be maintained
that we understand what (in nature or society) might make such propositions true
or their 'negations'
false -- so that those like M20 can be declared 'necessarily' false, or
even "unthinkable".
[This
'display of comprehension' (if that is the right way to put this) can be seen
whenever dialecticians are confronted with the fact that they don't actually
understand the weird sentences they come out with. They are genuinely shocked,
if not offended, by an accusation that they don't understand their own words. I
used to make this point in public debates I had with DM-fans many years ago --
that is, when they were actually prepared to discuss such things. Comrades used
to heckle me, shouting out: "You don't understand dialectics!", to which I
always replied "Well, in that case I'm in good company since no one understands
dialectics!" That used to shut them up. But, those days are long gone. The 'DM-Counter-Reformation'
has well and truly set in, and, en masse, DM-fans have circled the wagons
and now refuse even to debate this misbegotten theory, content merely to post
abuse and personal attacks (even when they deign to respond!).
Here is an example
from a few years ago. (I have covered that non-debate in more detail
here.) And
here is a recent example where I accused an HCD of not understanding the
obscure quasi-Hegelian gobbledygook he kept spouting. Needless to say, he
was somewhat miffed that I had the temerity to so accuse him, but, try as hard
as I could, I couldn't get him to explain what he actually did mean by his use
of such odd language. The irony of his total incapacity to make himself
understood without using yet more obscure jargon (which he also couldn't
explain) to try to 'explain' the last batch was clearly lost on him -- despite
the fact that I kept making that very point to him! Of course, he isn't the only
comrade who has bought into this 'pretence' --, in effect ideologically selling
their 'radical souls' to the other side in the class war. They haven't a clue
what their theory means any more than Christians have about the Doctrine of the
'Holy Trinity'.
Nevertheless, theologians and dialecticians are both avid users of jargon they
can't actually explain to anyone, least of all one another.]
[HCD =
High Church
Dialectician; follow the link for an explanation.]
This entire exercise is a
theoretical and practical pantomime, for no content can be given to propositions like
M20, or M1a, nor in fact to any metaphysical
'proposition'.45a
Metaphysical Fiat
-- Dogma on Steroids
There
is another rather odd feature of metaphysical theories that is also worth highlighting: since the
supposed truth-values of defective sentences like those below aren't determined by the
world, they have to be given a 'truth-value' by fiat. That is, they have
to be declared "necessarily true", or rejected as "necessarily false", and that
in turn is because their supposed truth-status hasn't been derived from the world,
but from the supposed meaning of the words they contain. As we will see, that
divorces them from the world,
with which they can't now be compared.
Or,
perhaps much more grandiosely, their opposites are anathematised and
declared "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure -- an 'Edgy',
'Radical' Philosopher, a Dialectical Magus,
even a "Great
Teacher".
Metaphysical pronouncements like the
following are as common as dirt
in Traditional Thought -- and, as we can now see, in DM, too:
P4:
Motion is the mode of existence of
matter. [Engels and Lenin.]
L1: Time is
a relation between events. [Paraphrasing Leibniz and Kant.]
L5: To be is to be perceived. [Paraphrasing
Berkeley.]
L6:
God and God only is the Truth. [Hegel.]
L7:
Self-relation in Essence is the form of
Identity or of reflection-into-self. [Hegel.]
L8:
Everything is opposite. Neither in
heaven nor in Earth...is there anywhere such an abstract 'either-or'. [Hegel.]
L9:
Contradiction is the very moving
principle of the world. [Hegel.]
L10:
All bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour etc. They are never
equal to themselves. [Trotsky.]
L11:
And so every phenomenon...sooner or
later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite. [Plekhanov.]
L12:
Motion
is a contradiction. [Paraphrasing
Zeno,
Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin.]
L13:
Internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature
['The Great Teacher Himself' -- Stalin.]
L14:
It
is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion. [Engels.]
L15: All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of
the eternal, the infinite, and essentially absolute. [Engels.]
L16: Cognition is the eternal, endless
approximation of thought to the object. [Lenin.]
L17:
Truth
is
always concrete. [Hegel, Plekhanov and Lenin.]
L18:
Every universal is (a fragment, or an
aspect, or the essence of) an individual. [Lenin.]
L19: Contradiction is universal and
absolute...is present in the...development of all things and
permeates every process from beginning to end.
[Mao.]
L20:
The unity of opposites...is
relative and transient...the struggle of opposites is absolute, expressing the infinity...of development.
[Kharin, paraphrasing Lenin.]
[Most
of the above have been quoted or excerpted from
Essay Two. The incoherence of many
of them has been exposed in Essays Two to Thirteen Part One.]
Of course,
the aforementioned 'ceremony' (whereby a sage-like figure promulgates the
Cosmic Veracity of sentences like the above) must be performed in abeyance of
the
evidence (as we saw in Essay Seven Part
One). Indeed, none need ever be sought. Quite the contrary, in fact;
evidence would detract from the pre-eminent status granted these Super-Truths -- since they are
Metaphysical Gems, many now credited with completely
undeserved apodictic
certainty by their promoters. Claims such as these by-pass, by
mere decree, the usual 'grubby' social
practices that govern the determination of the truth-values of
ordinary, boring empirical propositions. Such
banausic protocols
are way too proletarian for the soft, un-calloused, clean hands of The
Philosopher.
We
have already seen Lenin declare that:
"This aspect of dialectics…usually
receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum
total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and
as a law of the objective world)." [Ibid.,
p.357. Bold emphasis alone added.]
So it
seems that
the need to provide evidence is a distraction, one that a dedicated
dialectician should rightly eschew. In this particular case, the claim that
such 'opposites' exist everywhere in nature and society -- governing every
single example of change, right across the universe, for all of time --, expresses
a "law of cognition", a "law of the objective world", and it is these
very "laws"
that
legitimate the imposition of dialectical dogmas like this on nature and society. The search for evidence
begins and ends with a DM-fans leafing through Hegel's Logic, or
the work of some other obscure Mystic, like
Heraclitus, Zeno,
Plotinus,
Spinoza
and Jakob
Boehme.
Indeed, here is
Herbert Marcuse endorsing this a priori approach to knowledge:
"The doctrine of Essence seeks to
liberate knowledge from the worship of 'observable facts' and from the
scientific common sense that imposes this worship.... The real field of
knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical
evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form. Knowledge
deals with appearances in order to get beyond them. 'Everything, it is said, has
an essence, that is, things really are not what they immediately show
themselves. There is therefore something more to be done than merely rove from
one quality to another and merely to advance from one qualitative to
quantitative, and vice versa: there is a permanence in things, and that
permanent is in the first instance their Essence.' The knowledge that
appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. The mark of
dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the
apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation." [Marcuse (1973),
pp.145-46. Marcuse is here quoting
Hegel (1975), p.163,
§112. Minor typo corrected.
Bold emphasis added.]
'Observable facts' just get in the way of these dogmatists.
[Again, I
have posted well over a hundred examples of this dogmatic frame-of-mind in
Essay Two.]
James White
highlighted this attitude to 'philosophical knowledge', in this case exhibited
by the German Idealists, the intellectual grandparents of DM:
"Already with
Fichte the
idea of the unity of the sciences, of system, was connected with that of finding
a reliable starting-point in certainty on which knowledge could be based.
Thinkers from
Kant
onwards were quite convinced that the kind of knowledge which came from
experience was not reliable. Empirical knowledge could be subject to error,
incomplete, or superseded by further observation or experiment. It would be
foolish, therefore, to base the whole of knowledge on something which had been
established only empirically. The kind of knowledge which Kant and his followers
believed to be the most secure was a priori knowledge, the kind embodied in the
laws of Nature. These had been formulated without every occurrence of the
Natural phenomenon in question being observed, so they did not summarise
empirical information, and yet they held good by necessity for every case; these
laws were truly universal in their application." [White (1996), p.29. Bold
emphasis added.]
In fact, this approach to 'philosophical truth' has dominated this
ruling-class discipline since the earliest days in Ancient Greece, reinforced more
recently and more forcefully in the work of early modern
Rationalists like
Descartes,
Spinoza,
Leibniz
and
Wolff.
In this,
they follow in Plato's footsteps (minus the overt polytheism) -- true knowledge
is 'of the mind' and bypasses the senses:
"If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I
say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and
apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in
no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be
regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm that to be distinct, for
they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted
in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by
true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by
persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said to share in
true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men.
Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is
always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into
itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and
imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to
intelligence only." [Plato (1997c), 51e-52a,
pp.1254-55. I have used
the on-line version here. Bold emphases added. The published version translates
the third set of highlighted words as follows: "It is indivisible -- it cannot be perceived
by the senses at all -- and it is the role of the understanding to study it."
Cornford renders it thus: "[It is] invisible and otherwise imperceptible;
that, in fact, which thinking has for its object." (Cornford (1997), p.192.)]
As we saw in
Essay Three Part Two (here
and
here), DM-theorists do likewise -- that is, when they speak about unreliable
'appearances' and tell all who will listen that genuine knowledge is based on
all those invisible 'underlying essences' (which 'contradict appearances').
[Follow the
previous two links for quotes in support.]
Nevertheless,
Cosmic Gems like these had to be exclusivised. They had to have their
semantic pre-eminence bestowed on them, as a gift. They can't be
expected, nor must they be allowed, to consort with vulgar empirical utterances,
besmirched as the latter are by so much worldly, working-class 'grime' --
otherwise known as the "banalities
of common sense".
Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their (supposed)
truth-status, the veracity of these Super-Truths was derived solely from,
or compared only with, other related claims of similar Intergalactic Stature,
and part of a
'terminological gesture' at 'verification'. 'Confirmation', therefore, takes place only in the head of
the theorists who cuts and polishes these Philosophical Gems.
Their
bona fides
are thus thoroughly Ideal -- and hence100% bogus.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M1b:
Motion without matter isn't unthinkable.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
As we
have seen in
previous section, in relation to M1a, it is impossible even to outline
the material conditions under which M1b could be declared true so that
DM-theorists could specify what was
in fact being
ruled out by the 'necessary' status of M1a. As with other metaphysical
theses there is no legitimate negation of M1a that would make
M1b true. That is because the DM-concept of matter is predicated on the
supposed truth of P4. The latter tells us what DM-theorists mean by the word
"matter". So, it isn't just an empirical fact about matter that it moves
(which could be otherwise in some other possible world, or even this world had
the universe developed differently), it is its
defining characteristic. Change that and the meaning of the word
"matter", as DM-theorists conceive of it, must change, too.
So,
Lenin's acceptance of P4 is what makes 'motion without matter' "unthinkable".
Anyone who attempted to deny M1a by means of M1b would be operating with a
different understanding of the word "matter" -- in effect, they would be
rejecting P4. In turn, that would mean that there had been a change of
subject moving from M1a to M1b. M1b is therefore no longer about "matter", as DM-fans
conceive of it, but about 'matter'. Hence,
despite appearances to the contrary, M1b isn't the negation of M1a. They both
have different subjects.
Unfortunately, this means that there is no state of affairs in the world that
M1a could 'reflect'. If there were, there would be a legitimate negation of M1a.
But, as we have just seen, M1b can't adopt that role since it is no longer about
matter, but about 'matter'. This means that M1a has no content, since, as we
have also seen, there is
no state of affairs answering to it. It is
devoid of content; there are no circumstances under which it could be false, and
hence none under which it could be true.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M1b:
Motion without matter isn't unthinkable.
M1a
can't be false, since if it were, M1b would be true. But, M1a and
M1b aren't logically linked. There is no state of affairs they share because of
the change of subject between them, and hence no state of affairs answering to either.
Once again, compare M1a and M1b with M6
and M6a, from earlier:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution. [TAR]
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution....
The same situation obtaining --
i.e., Tony Blair's owning a copy of TAR -- will make one of M6 or M6a true and
one of them false. If he does own a copy, M6 will be true and M6a false;
conversely, if he doesn't, M6a will be true and M6 false. This intimate
intertwining of the truth-values of M6 and M6a is a direct
consequence of the same state of affairs linking them....
These two stand or fall
together....
So, if
and when we find out that M6a is true, we can automatically infer the falsehood of M6
-- and vice versa. In that case, we can reject M6 if
M6a is true, just as we can reject M6a if M6 is true. The same content tells us what
we can rule in and what we can rule out. Again, it is this shared content that
connects the two sentences.
So, DM-'propositions' lack a sense and there is nothing that can be done to rectify the
situation. Once again, our use of language actually prevents
them from expressing a sense, let alone being true.
They are therefore non-sensical, empty strings of words.
Just
like other metaphysical 'propositions', M1a was conceived out of, and
was then born into, an Ideal World divorced from the language of ordinary
workers. The Super-Verities concocted in the brains of individual thinkers as if they 'reflected' the 'essential' nature of the world relate to nothing whatsoever
in nature or society (despite appearances to the contrary or the intentions
of those who invent them). The conventions of ordinary language -- the language
of the proletariat -- actually prevent them from doing this, rendering them
contentless, as we have seen.
Since
it isn't possible to specify what would count as
evidence that showed a proposition like M1a was true -- or even that showed it
was false -- as a result such 'propositions' fail to be
materially-grounded, That is, their semantic status isn't sensitive to any state of
affairs in the world, since they have no such status. As such they can't help
humanity understand the world nor can they be used to assist in changing it.
[But, as we
will see in Essay Nine Part Two,
they can and often do get in the way.]
That, of
course, helps explain why we concluded that DM-theories can't be used to
propagandise and agitate workers, nor can they be employed during a revolution, such as 1917
--
as we have also seen.
Instead of reflecting the world, these sentences do the
exact opposite. They determine the way the world must be, not the way
it happens to be. The artificially-constructed, Ideal World
of Traditional Philosophy reflects the
distorted language
and ruling-class interests on which it is based. It doesn't reflect the material
world, it reflects an
ersatz 'world' that exists only in the imagination of ruling-class theorists.
And, just like Traditional Philosophers, DM-theorists also dictate to the world
how it must be and how it can't be otherwise.
By way of contrast, scientists allow the world
to tell us how it happens to be.
That is why 'profound
truths' can only be read from a priori claims like M1a and P4
-- not from nature --, since they represent an attempt
to impose a set of ideas on the world.
They are 'true' because they reflect the Ideal World of their inventors, not the
material world we see around us. And that is why their actual truth, or their actual falsehood,
was never, and could never, be determined by
a confrontation with the facts, but has to be bestowed on them by those
who dreamt them up.46
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
The
normal cannons that determine when something is true or false (i.e., the
systematic
search for evidence we witness, for example,
in the genuine sciences) have to be set aside, a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it.47
The 'Evidential Pantomime' --
Mickey
Mouse Science Strikes Back
With
respect to DM, this bogus ceremony is
invariably carried out after the
event -- that is, after a set of ideas have been imported from Hegel's 'Logic'.
DM-theories are then illustrated by
a narrow range of specially-selected examples (as we found, for instance, was
the case with Trotsky's criticism of the
LOI, Engels's analysis of motion,
his Three 'Laws' and
Lenin's theory of knowledge).
This evidential
'display'
has four inter-connected aspects:
(1)
It is almost invariably performed in the 'mind' as part of a hasty consideration of the
'concepts' supposedly involved. Instead of being compared with material
reality in order to ascertain their truth-values, DM-theses are compared with
other related doctrines -- such as P4 -- or more often, they are compared with yet more
obscure ideas lifted from Hegel --
as part of a jargon-riddled gesture at 'verification'.
As we have
found, this means that DM-theories are
both
quintessentially Ideal
and consistently anti-materialist.48
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
(2) It often
consists of a series of superficial thought experiments, which are accompanied by
an ill-informed 'logical' analysis of a few key terms,
'supported' by the frequent use of modal (or quasi-modal) terms -- such as "must", "inconceivable",
"demand", "insist", "unthinkable", and "impossible". A classic example of this
approach is Engels's 'analysis' of motion, which is based
exclusively on the words (or the concepts) involved. He nowhere appeals to evidence in support of what he claimed
was true of
every moving body in existence. In fact, it is impossible to imagine any
evidence that could be offered in
support. [I have dealt with this specific topic at greater length in
Essay Five; readers are referred
there for more details.]
(3) Almost
without exception the application of
DM-'laws' is illustrated by an
appeal to a few specially-selected (and endlessly repeated) 'supportive'
examples -- which are themselves often mis-described or left unfathomably vague.
In Essay
Seven, we saw that DM-theorists offer their readers what can only be
described as laughably superficial
'evidence' in support of Engels's Three 'Laws'. As a result I have
called DM a classic example of "Mickey Mouse
Science". We can now see why it merits such a name: the supposedly "self-evident"
or "obvious"
nature of DM-theories means
that little (or no) empirical support is required. Hence, a few trite,
specially-selected examples
are used merely to 'illustrate' (they certainly don't prove) these 'laws', which are
then repeated, ad nauseam, year-in, year-out.
Incidentally, that is why DM-fans soon come out with the following knee-jerk response, "You
don't understand dialectics" directed at critics. That is because their theory isn't based on evidence, but on a certain
(and rather quirky) 'understanding' of a limited range of 'concepts'.
(4) On other occasions, the
'evidence' used to 'illustrate' DM-'propositions' turns out to be the
result of superficial forays into 'linguistic' or 'conceptual' analysis often based on a series of 'persuasive definitions'
or even more mysterious 'abstractions' (of dubious provenance).49
More specifically, as we saw in Essay Three
Part One, this
'method' is applied to predicative expressions that supposedly 'name' these
invisible 'abstractions', the latter of which turn out to
be Proper Names of abstract
particulars, vitiating the whole exercise by destroying the generality of
the concepts they supposedly 'reflect'. [Follow the above links for an
explanation.]
Whatever
linguistic sleight-of-hand is
involved in all this, direct or indirect reference has at some point to be made to the ordinary
meaning of the words used so that their meanings can be 'revised'. Unfortunately, since the opening moves involve
a misuse of these terms these words no longer
possess their usual meaning, which in turn means that the whole exercise now
becomes
doubly pointless.
For example, DM-theorists en masse
repeatedly, almost neurotically,
use the term "contradiction", but they don't mean that word in its ordinary sense,
nor yet in its FL-sense. What
they think they mean is the subject of Essay Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three. (Spoiler -- in those
Essays we discover
that it is completely obscure what they mean by this term, as,
indeed, was Hegel before them.
[As I also
demonstrate in
Essay
Five, while dialecticians tend to 'see' contradictions everywhere they look,
they never derive them logically. Except in relation to the supposed link
between the proletariat and the capitalist class, they never even attempt
to show these 'contradiction' are in any way 'dialectical'.]
In fact, no
process of revising a word can begin if that word has been
distorted from the
beginning. It
isn't possible to revise such words if they aren't actually being used -- a distorted term substituted for them -- or they have been replaced by
a typographically identical
inscription, which is then used
idiosyncratically.
[There are more details about this 'process',
here.]
Hence, in such circumstances
what at first sight might appear to be ordinary
terms manage to put in a brief appearance -- e.g., "motion", "unthinkable", "opposite", "equal", "place",
"moment", "quality", "identical", "negation", "contradiction",
"change", etc., etc. -- by no stretch of the imagination do they mean the same as their
intended
equivalent in the vernacular. That is
because of the extraordinary use to which they are now being put.
This can be seen
when an actual appeal is made to the usual, often diverse, meaning these ordinary words already possess (an
approach that has been adopted on numerous occasions at this site -- for example,
here and
here), the seemingly obvious
validity of every single DM-claim soon falls apart.
Nevertheless, this is precisely what creates the spurious 'obviousness' and
'self-evidence' that DM-'laws' might seem to possess. This also helps explain
the consternation DM-fans often display when their theory is demolished in front
of them (as it has been at this site), their reaction almost invariably
involving a predictable appeal to the "pedantry"/"semantics"
defence. The rationale behind the repudiation of DM at this site is completely
mystifying to those held in its thrall. How
such apparently
"self-evident", 'obviously true' DM-'laws' could fail to be true
becomes "unthinkable".
Indeed, as noted above, critics just don't "understand" dialectics.
This also helps explain why
DM-fans soon become abusive.
Naturally,
such incredulity
is a direct result of the fact that the 'truth' of these 'laws' has been built into them by linguistic or conceptual fiat
-- or as a mere gift by a DM-Prophet.
That is also
why DM-fans find it difficult to understand anyone who denies, for
instance, that 'a moving object is in two places at once, in one place and not in it at the same time', even though our
ordinary use of words associated with motion and place shows that our ideas in
this area are far more complex than
Hegel,
Zeno or DM-theorists imagine.
As Essay Five shows, our use of the
vernacular
allows for examples of movement that demonstrate Engels's theory of motion is seriously
flawed -- that is, where any sense can be made of it.50
This novel of what superficially
look like ordinary words appears to generate paradox.
That is because the everyday meaning of such terms seems to 'carry over' into these new contexts,
bringing in its train endless confusion. This, of course, explains why
'contradictions' seem to sprout faster in the DM-literature than
Japanese Knotweed.
[Detailed examples of the above were given in Essay Three Part
One, in Essay Four, here
and here, and throughout
Essays Five and
Six.]
To compound the problem,
these paradox-inducing moves are often
based on what are claimed to be the real meaning
of the words involved. To this end, the wide diversity of ordinary connotations
such words possess are brushed aside as 'unscientific', 'un-philosophical', "valid
only within certain
limits" --, or they are rejected as uninteresting, inessential, compromised by banal "commonsense"
or
"formal thinking". For example, the real meaning of
motion is supposed to imply that it is 'contradictory' and
paradoxical; the real meaning of 'identity' is actually its opposite
when confronted with change; the real
meaning of "matter" implies motion; the real meaning of
"contradiction" means this, or that..., and so on.50a
The original
terms are then discarded as of limited use, or even as defective and
unsuitable for use in either philosophy or science. However, as we have seen,
and will see, ordinary language is castigated
because its use actually disallows 'philosophical' moves like these.
Hence, according to Traditional Theorists (and now
DM-fans), if ordinary language stands in the way, it is ordinary language
which is to blame, not the moves themselves!51
The late
Professor Havelock
pinpointed the origin of such trickery in the moves the
Presocratics tried to pull; but similar comments could very well apply,
mutatis
mutandis, to Traditional Philosophy and DM-theorists in general:
"As long as preserved
communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained
only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is
gods.
Hesiod
takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great
story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of
gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas,
mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a
style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the
manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of
events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the
Presocratics
were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated
philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking
was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could
describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter,
body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity,
quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of
abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of
doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour
of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms
systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished
by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic
statement.
"The history of early
philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary
was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own
language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....
"Nevertheless, the
Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They
had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of
orally memorised speech, in particular the language of
Homer
and
Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and
manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had
the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a
cosmic rather than a particular reference."
[Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases added; quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling adapted to agree with
UK English. Links added.]
Ordinary
language is thus caught in a philosophical vice, as it were. On the one hand,
the everyday meaning of words doesn't sanction the theories metaphysicians try
to derive
them, on the other, ordinary terms are said to be inadequate because they
generate 'paradox', when, in reality, that 'defect' is a direct result of a
cavalier misuse
of them.52
As Glock pointed out:
"Wittgenstein's ambitious claim is that it is
constitutive of metaphysical theories and questions that their employment of
terms is at odds with their explanations and that they use deviant rules along
with the ordinary ones. As a result, traditional philosophers cannot coherently
explain the meaning of their questions and theories. They are confronted with a
trilemma: either their novel uses of terms remain unexplained
(unintelligibility), or...[they use] incompatible rules (inconsistency), or
their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary use --
including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts in terms
of which the philosophical problems were phrased." [Glock (1996), pp.261-62.
See also,
here.]
In
view of the above,
Marx's advice becomes all the more
relevant:
"The philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
Short-Circuiting The 'Power Of
Negativity'
The
story so far: the exclusion of one
or other of the
semantic options open to indicative sentences completely undermines their capacity to
accommodate the logical role of the non-excluded, twin -- truth in favour of
falsehood, or falsehood in favour of truth.
For, as we have seen, if such sentences can
only be false, and never true, they can't actually be false -- nor vice
versa. That is because, if an empirical proposition is false, it
isn't true.53
But, if we can't say under what circumstances such a sentence is true
then we certainly can't say in what way it falls short of this so that it
could be untrue, and hence false. Conversely, if it can only be true,
the conditions that would make it false are similarly excluded; if we can't say under what circumstances such
a sentence is
false then we certainly can't say in what way it falls short of this condition so that it
could be true, and hence not false. In which case, its
truth similarly falls by the wayside.
Again, this forms part of understanding the
sense of a proposition; in order to grasp
its sense, a
speaker
has to know under what conditions a given empirical proposition could be true or
could be
false. The two stand or fall together -- so, knowing what would make such a proposition
true is ipso facto to know what would make it false, and vice versa.
Consider the following:
C1: Barak Obama owns a copy of Das Kapital.
C2: Barak Obama doesn't own a copy of Das
Kapital.
Anyone who knows the English language, and knows who and what
Barak Obama and Das Kapital are will understand this sentence. Even if
they haven't a clue whether it is true or whether it is false, they would
know what state of affairs would have to obtain for it to be true, the absence
of which would make it false. The same state of affairs serves in both cases
-- to
make C1 true or make C1 false. If that weren't the case, if a speaker didn't (explicitly or implicitly)
know this, then that would
provide prima facie evidence that they didn't
understand C1 or C2.
Of course, DM-theorists aren't really interested in banal
propositions like C1 and C2; they are more interested in change and hence in propositions
that express this. In such circumstances, the negative particle seems to them to
add
content to a given sentence. Perhaps via the NON.
[NON = Negation of the
Negation.]
This
supposition involves 'the
power
of negativity', which drives change, supposedly by adding content. This idea will
be examined in more detail in Parts Five and Six of Essay Twelve. Suffice it to
say here that if this were the case,
it would prevent the following two
propositions from being contradictories:
C3: Moving object, B, is located at
<x1, y1,
z1>, at t1,
C4: Moving object,
B, isn't located at <x1,
y1, z1>, at t1.
[Where
"x1",
"y1", and "z1"
are Cartesian
ordinates, and "t1"
is a temporal variable.]
Which is, of course, contrary to what Hegel and Engels
maintained:
"[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change,
their life, their reciprocal influence…[t]hen we immediately become involved in
contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction; even simple mechanical change
of place can only come about through a body being both in one place and in
another place at one and the same moment of time, being in one and the same
place and also not in it. And the continual assertion and simultaneous solution
of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]
"If, now, the first
determinations of reflection, namely, identity, difference and opposition, have
been put in the form of a law, still more should the determination into which
they pass as their truth, namely, contradiction, be grasped and enunciated as a
law: everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that
this law in contrast to the others expresses rather the truth and the
essential nature of things. The contradiction which makes its appearance in
opposition, is only the developed nothing that is contained in identity and that
appears in the expression that the law of identity says nothing. This
negation further determines itself into difference and opposition, which now is
the posited contradiction.
"But it is one of the
fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking
that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a
determination as identity; but in fact, if it were a question of grading the two
determinations and they had to be kept separate, then contradiction would have
to be taken as the profounder determination and more characteristic of essence.
For as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple
immediate, of dead being; but contradiction is the root of all movement and
vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it
that it moves, has an urge and activity.
"In the first place,
contradiction is usually kept aloof from things, from the sphere of being and of
truth generally; it is asserted that there is nothing that is contradictory.
Secondly, it is shifted into subjective reflection by which it is first posited
in the process of relating and comparing. But even in this reflection, it does
not really exist, for it is said that the contradictory cannot be
imagined or thought. Whether it occurs in actual things or in
reflective thinking, it ranks in general as a contingency, a kind of abnormality
and a passing paroxysm or sickness....
"Now as regards the assertion that
there is no contradiction, that it does not exist, this statement need not
cause us any concern; an absolute determination of essence must be present in
every experience, in everything actual, as in every notion. We made the same
remark above in connection with the infinite, which is the
contradiction as displayed in the sphere of being. But common experience itself
enunciates it when it says that at least there is a host of
contradictory things, contradictory arrangements, whose contradiction exists not
merely in an external reflection but in themselves. Further, it is not to be
taken merely as an abnormality which occurs only here and there, but is rather
the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all
self-movement, which consists solely in an exhibition of it. External,
sensuous movement itself is contradiction's immediate existence. Something
moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at
one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at
once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions
that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is
no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction
itself.
"Similarly, internal self-movement
proper, instinctive urge in general, (the appetite or nisus of
the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple essence), is nothing else but the
fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained and
deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity
has no vitality, but the positive, being in its own self a negativity, goes
outside itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive
only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this
power to hold and endure the contradiction within it. But if an existent in its
positive determination is at the same time incapable of reaching beyond its
negative determination and holding the one firmly in the other, is incapable of
containing contradiction within it, then it is not the living unity itself, not
ground, but in the contradiction falls to the ground. Speculative thinking
consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and in it,
its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary
thinking, where its determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other
determinations or into nothing
"If the contradiction in
motion, instinctive urge, and the like, is masked for ordinary thinking, in the
simplicity of these determinations, contradiction is, on the other hand,
immediately represented in the determinations of relationship. The most
trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on
ad infinitum, all contain opposition in each term. That is
above, which is not below; 'above' is specifically just this, not to be
'below', and only is, in so far as there is a 'below'; and conversely,
each determination implies its opposite. Father is the other of son, and the son
the other of father, and each only is as this other of the other; and
at the same time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other; their
being is a single subsistence. The father also has an existence of his
own apart from the son-relationship; but then he is not father but simply man;
just as above and below, right and left, are each also a reflection-into-self
and are something apart from their relationship, but then only places in
general. Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction in so far as they are, in
the same respect, negatively related to one another or sublate each other
and are indifferent to one another. Ordinary thinking when it
passes over to the moment of the indifference of the determinations,
forgets their negative unity and so retains them merely as 'differents' in
general, in which determination right is no longer right, nor left left, etc.
But since it has, in fact, right and left before it, these determinations are
before it as self-negating, the one being in the other, and each in this unity
being not self-negating but indifferently for itself.
"Opposites, therefore, contain
contradiction in so far as they are, in the same respect, negatively related to
one another. Ordinary thinking when it passes over to the moment of the
indifference of the determinations, forgets their negative unity and so
retains them merely as 'differents' in general, in which determination right is
no longer right, nor left left, etc. But since it has in fact right and left
before it, these determinations are before it as self-negating, the one being in
the other, and each in this unity being not self-negating but indifferently for
itself." [Hegel (1999),
pp.439-41,
§955-§960.
Bold emphases alone added.]
However, we
have
already seen that the negative particle can't do what DM-fans require of it.
With respect to metaphysical-, and DM-'propositions', we have seen that negating them
changes the subject, which in turn means that such 'propositions' and their
supposed negations are devoid of content. So, instead of adding
content, 'dialectical negation' reveals they had no content to begin with.
On the other
hand, if negation did in fact add content, then
C3 and C4 would as a result have a different content.
So, if as DM-theorists insist, 'dialectical negation' adds content, then
any propositions involved couldn't be "contradictories".
Of course,
they might mean something different by "contradiction";
if so, what?
C3: Moving object, B, is located at
<x1, y1,
z1>, at t1.
C4: Moving object,
B, isn't located at <x1,
y1, z1>, at t1.
[However, as we have seen in Essay
Eight Parts
One,
Two and
Three, it is in fact impossible
to ascertain what DM-fans do mean by their odd use
of the word "contradiction". And, as we
will discover in Parts Five and Six of this Essay, it is equally impossible to decide
what, if anything, Hegel meant by his idiosyncratic use of it, too.]
So, our comprehension of empirical propositions is
intimately connected with the inter-relation between these logical 'Siamese Twins'
(i.e., truth and falsehood) --, and hence with the social norms governing the use of
the negative particle -- coupled with the that an empirical proposition and its
negation have the same content. The abrogation of socially-sanctioned
rules like these means that 'necessarily' true and 'necessarily' false sentences
(like those considered earlier) aren't
just senseless, they are non-sensical. That is, they are incapable of
reflecting anything in the world, and hence they are incapable of
being true and incapable of
being false
-- i.e., they are incapable of expressing a
sense.
Whatever we try to do with them collapses into incoherence.54
For the last two-and-a-half millennia, metaphysicians have consistently
overlooked or ignored this logical feature of empirical propositions. [So, DM-theorists are merely
Johnny-come-latelies
in this regard.]
This ancient error
conned Traditional
Philosophers into thinking that the 'necessity' of metaphysical
'propositions' derives from the nature of reality, not from the distorted
language on which their ideas were based.
Innocent-looking
linguistic false-steps like these helped motivate the invention of theories that were
supposed to 'reflect'
the 'essential' nature of 'reality', accessible to thought alone. But, if such 'truths'
are based on nothing more than
linguistic chicanery, on distortion and/or misuse, then no evidence could
be offered in their support,
except, of course, that which is based on yet more linguistic
legerdemain.
Metaphysical 'necessity' is thus little more than a shadow cast
on the world by distorted language
(to paraphrase both Wittgenstein and
Marx).
Over the centuries, metaphysical systems
were
developed, not by becoming empirically more refined or by becoming
increasingly useful (in connection with, for instance, technology or medicine) -- which
has proved to be the case with the growth of science -- but by becoming
increasingly labyrinthine, convoluted and
baroque as
further incomprehensible layers of jargon were deposited on earlier formations of
linguistically
deformed bedrock.
Hegel's
system provides ample evidence of that.
Heidegger's perhaps
even more.
Naturally, this confirms the fact that these two semantic
possibilities -- truth and falsehood -- must remain open options
if a proposition is to count as empirical, subject to evidential confirmation,
and thus for it to count as "thinkable", in this sense.
In which case, as the above shows, no sentence can
express a 'necessary truth' about the world while remaining empirical.55
So, despite appearances to the contrary,
Lenin's appeal to the 'unthinkability' of motion without matter doesn't in fact say anything
at all --, that is, it doesn't say anything empirically determinate.
Metaphysical Camouflage
While Mathematics Adds Up...
[This section represents something of a side-show
and may be skipped by anyone wanting to concentrate on the main theme. The only
caveat is that the next
section might not be fully understood if this material is by-passed.
However, readers who want to skip this section can begin again
here.]
Considerations like these show that indicative sentences
conceal their diverse logical forms, which is why it is unwise to take the superficially
similar grammatical features of language at face value. This in turn demonstrates that
while sentences like M2-M9 might well be indicative -- with several of them also
appearing to be empirical -- they are masquerading as empirical
propositions and as such fail to express a sense.
That in turn is a consequence of the
conventions ordinary language users have established over the millennia -- by
their practice, not in
general by their deliberations --, which alone constitute the nature of empirical propositions.
Even so, not
every indicative sentences is, or need be, metaphysical.
For example, consider the following:
M2: Two is a number.
This appears to be unconditionally,
or even necessarily, true. However, its 'negation':
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number,
isn't false; it is
either incomprehensible or, despite appearances to the contrary, it
isn't
about the number two. [On that, see below.]
[In what follows, I have confined my comments to
seemingly banal sentences, like M2 and M21, in order to explain in what way they
are true and to help distinguish them from metaphysical-, and
DM-'propositions'. However, this isn't meant to be an Essay about 'the nature of
mathematics', so more complex mathematical 'propositions' will in general be
ignored.]
M21
isn't just contingently false -- if it is taken to be a mathematical and not
simply a terminological proposition (that is, if it isn't viewed
as a proposed revision to the names we use in our number system, what I later
call the "trivial" option) -- it appears to be necessarily false.
But, if we put trivial examples
to one side for now (on that, also see below), it is impossible to specify
what could possibly make M21 true. In that case, we are in no position to
specify what M21 is trying to rule out, and hence we are in no position to say in
what way it falls
short of that for it to be false.
Unlike empirical propositions, M2 and M21 don't have the same content, nor do they relate to the
same state of affairs, since neither relate to any state of affairs, to
begin with. If they did, a comparison with the world, a reference to facts, would be relevant to
ascertaining their truth or establishing their falsehood. In turn that is because (as we saw
earlier), between M2 and M21 there is a
change of subject, since if two isn't a number (according to M21) then that use
of "two" is different from its use in M2.
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M2 expresses a rule for the use of the number word "two"
(as a number), since
it reflects the role this word occupies in our number system. At best,
M21 (perhaps) records the rejection of that rule -- again, if we ignore
trivial examples.
To think
otherwise -- i.e., that M21 could express a supposed
truth or a supposed falsehood (again assuming M21 doesn't represent a simple terminological revision,
which would be the trivial case mentioned earlier) would be to misconstrue the
ordinary use
of the word "two" (in such a context). Such a major change of meaning would significantly alter any of the mathematical
propositions (equations, etc.) in which this word (or the numeral "2") occurred,
and that in turn would have a knock-on effect throughout the number system..
Some might
think that M21 is "logically false" (and thus that M2 is "logically true"), but that would merely attract the sort of questions posed
earlier about "necessarily false" and "necessarily true". If it isn't possible to specify
conditions under which M21 would be "logically true" (trivial examples
excepted, once more), then it would be equally impossible to
say under what conditions it would fail to be "logically true", and hence
"logically false" (or "necessarily false").
[Of
course, it could be argued that M2 is "definitionally true", but that would
merely amount to acknowledging that M2 was an expression of a rule, after all.]
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
Consider now one of the aforementioned trivial cases:
suppose that in the
course of development of the English language a
different word had been chosen in place of "two". In such an
eventuality, plainly, not much would change. Suppose,
therefore, that in English "Schmoo", or a different symbol for "2"
(perhaps "ж"), was used in
place of "two" (or "2"). M2 and M21 would then become:
M2a : Schmoo is a number.
M21a: It isn't the case that Schmoo is a number.
But, as
noted above, that, too, would simply represent another minor terminological
revision. If this word (or this new symbol) were used as we now use "two" (or
"2") then there would be no substantive difference. [On this, see also
Note 60.] Clearly, the same
would apply to number words
(and symbols) used in other languages.
Others might argue that M21 is self-contradictory.
When spelt-out this 'self-contradiction' might be expressed as
follows, in M21b or M21c:
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M21b: It isn't the case that the number two is a number.
M21c: The number two is a number and the
number two isn't a number.
But, as seems plain, the first use of
the word "two" in M21c isn't the same as the second use of "two"
in this sentence. In that case, M21c is no more
self-contradictory than this would be:
M21d:
George W
Bush is President of the USA and
George
H W Bush isn't President of the USA.
Of
course, M21d isn't meant to express the same logical form
as M21c (plainly M21c contains definite descriptions); it is merely meant
to make explicit a change of denotation between the first and the second use of
the relevant words. Plainly, in M21d, the first name refers
to a different individual from the second. Similarly, in M21c, while the first
occurrence of "two" is the familiar number word; the second isn't.
Indeed, the second actually says it isn't! Hence, the two halves of M21c do not constitute a contradiction.
If so, M2 can't be a logical truth,
either.55a
So, M2 would itself only become 'false' if one or more of
its constituent words changed their meanings (this is the trivial case
once more -- for example, if "two" was no longer used to designate the
whole number between one and three, and instead came to be the name of, say, a newly
discovered planet).
But even then, M2 wouldn't be about what we now call "two". Plainly, as soon as anyone
attempts to deny that number two is a number, they automatically cease to talk about the
number two. [Once more, what they might be doing in such circumstances is
rejecting a rule, but that wouldn't affect how the rest of us use
the rules or the number vocabulary we now have.]
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M21e:
Two isn't a number.
Hence, despite appearances to the contrary, M21/M21e and
M2 don't
in fact contradict one another. That is because M21 and/or M21e are either incomprehensible,
or they are about something else -- this would be the trivial case, once more. Again,
a use of negation here
would, at best, amount to the rejection of a rule, or it would be trivial.56,
56a
Conclusions to the contrary may only be sustained by
maintaining (i) The false belief
that M2 actually stands alone as a mathematical unit, and isn't is
part of a number system, or (ii) The idea that M2 is a
contingent (or even perhaps an empirical) proposition.
But, what makes M2 mathematical is its use in a system of propositions,
which is itself one aspect of a historically-conditioned
set of practices inter-linked by rule-governed operations,
direct and indirect proofs,
inductions and definitions, etc., etc. Moreover, M2 isn't a contingent proposition (except
with respect to trivial cases, once more), it the expression of a rule. M2 it tells us how we use,
and
are supposed to use, this
word or symbol. It situates both in an wider system of symbols.
The 'truth'
of M2 doesn't derive from the way it relates as an 'atomic unit' to an alleged
mathematical fact hidden away in some sort of
Platonic Heaven (or, indeed, by the way it might relate to an 'abstraction'
lodged in
someone's brain/'consciousness'), but from its role in the aforementioned
system of propositions, connected by proofs -- and by the way it has grown out
of, and
developed in, wider social practices. [On this, see
Note 56.]
That is why none of us would be able to comprehend an investigation aimed at testing the truth of M2
empirically. In fact, the inappropriateness of any sort of empirical verification of
propositions like M2 is connected with their total
lack of truth conditions.57
Our use of such propositions -- which,
as we can see, differs markedly from the way we use and comprehend empirical
propositions -- indicates that they have a radically different logical form. The
failure of a proposition like M2 to correspond with anything in the world (or,
indeed, in 'Platonic Heaven') is
revealed by the fact that (barring trivial cases, once
more) we
would ordinarily fail to understand its 'negation' -- i.e., M21. Trivial cases
to one side, again, anyone who asserted M21 wouldn't be making an ordinary sort
of factual error -- as
they would had they said the following on or after the 25th of June, 2016: "It isn't the case that
David Cameron has resigned as UK Prime Minister".
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
This can also be seen by
the way that mathematics is learnt. Children learn this by one or more of the
following: repetition (number drilling/recitation), rote learning, repetitive
calculation, practical application, problem solving, or by the use of
simple proofs. They do not do so by 'abstraction'. Children aren't taught to
'abstract' numbers, but to count, and at
some point the 'penny drops', as it were -- at which point parents and carers
often find it impossible to stop their pupils counting on and on.... But this is
true in general. Understanding mathematical propositions goes
hand-in-hand with mastering a skill or a technique, and subsequently by learning proofs,
in tandem with the
completion of a variety of operations and guided tasks, etc.57a
In
that case, it wouldn't be possible to declare M2 true because
it 'corresponded' to a fact --, or, indeed, false because it didn't -- either in reality or
in 'Platonic Heaven'. And that is because it isn't possible to determine what M2
rules out, and hence what it rules in (trivial cases to
one side, again).
This
is, of course, independent of the fact that it wouldn't be possible to confirm M2 by comparing it with an abstract fact (even
if we could make sense of such a 'fact', never mind how a sentence can be
compared with
any sort of 'abstraction'). To understand M2 and its use is to master a technique or a rule; it
isn't to have identified a confirming fact or 'abstraction against which it is
to be evaluated. No fact could tell a pupil how to proceed
mathematically, or how to use M2 correctly. Only the mastery of a rule could
do that. In addition, as we have seen, contingent facts can
be false. If M21 were an empirical or a contingent proposition, the 'falsehood
of M2' would appear to make it true. But, there is a change of subject between
M2 and M21, so the supposed truth of M21 would have no bearing on the
semantic status of M2 (trivial cases to one side, again). As we have seen, M2 has
no negation.
In that case, the mere insertion of a negative particle into a
sentence doesn't automatically create the negation of that sentence
(where "the negation" here means "A proposition with the opposite
truth-value"), as we have repeatedly seen.58
In this way we can see once more that the superficial grammatical structure of
indicative sentences often obscures their deeper logical form. While empirical sentences may be
mapped onto
their contradictories by means of the (relevant) addition of a negative
particle, that isn't so with non-empirical
indicative sentences. This isn't, of course, unconnected with the
fact that empirical sentences can be understood before their truth-values are
known, whereas propositions like M2 are comprehensible independently of that
pre-condition -- they are fully grasped only by those who know how to count and
to calculate, etc. In that case, the meaning of
M2 must be accounted for in a different way to that of, say, M6:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra of
Revolution.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
As
has already been noted, M6 can be understood well in advance of its truth-value
being known; that truth-value can't be ascertained on linguistic
or logical grounds alone. That is quite unlike, say, M2 (or even, M1a).
This means that sentences like M2 aren't empirical. In fact, they express rules for the use of certain words (or they are the
consequence of the application of those rules); that is, they express the
normative
application of their key terms, because of which they are incapable
of being empirically true or empirically false. Any attempt to view them as
empirical soon
collapses into incoherence, as we have seen.
[Of
course, it isn't being suggested here that children are taught mathematics by
leaning to repeat, or internalise, sentences like M2. Children demonstrate they
(implicitly) understand M2 by being able to count and do simple arithmetic, etc.]
As it turns out, the confusion of rules with empirical
sentences underlies the failure on the part of theorists to see language as a
social phenomenon.59
That is because such a failure is itself motivated by a determination to view the
'foundations of language' as
solely truth-based. Given an approach, language is thought to be predicated on empirical or
quasi-empirical factors -- such as a capacity to 'represent reality', on its
ability to function as medium that allows the world to be reflected in the 'mind' or in 'consciousness'
--
rather than on socially-sanctioned rules, conditioned by social practices and norms.
Given the (traditional)
view, falsehood is merely an erroneous or a 'partial' application of the
'contents of consciousness', howsoever they are conceived, or it is
the result of an incorrect connection established between these factors.
However, because these 'representations' are
compared only with other 'representations', this leaves the world out of
the account, obviating the whole exercise!
[As we will see in Essay Three Part Four, this 'traditional view of falsehood' is not
just circular, it is also incoherent.]
Hence, this approach to knowledge misconstrues social norms
(such as those expressed in sentences like M2)
as
if they were empirical, or even Super-Empirical, propositions. In that case, normative aspects of language
(i.e., rules), which are the result of a lengthy process of social
development and human interaction, are
re-interpreted or re-configured as if they expressed the real relation between things, or
were even those things
themselves. That is, they are misconstrued as 'necessary' truths that underpin
reality, reflect its "essence" or 'mirror' abstract truths in 'Platonic Heaven'. In this way, they become
Self-Certifying Super-Empirical Truths, in no need
of evidential support. It is this slide that underpins the fetishisation of
language upon which Metaphysics (and now DM) is based.
That
is why the falsehood of M6, for example, isn't like the 'falsehood' of M2. To
repeat, in order to understand M6, no one need know whether it is true or
whether it is false. The falsehood of M6 (in this case expressed by the possible
truth of its
negation, M6a) doesn't affect the meaning of any of the terms it contains.
That isn't so with M2 and its apparent negation, M21:
M2: Two is a number.
M21: It isn't the case that two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
M2 can't be false. Its 'falsehood' would amount to a
change of meaning, not of fact. Hence, M2 may only be accepted or rejected
as the expression of a rule of language -- or, indeed, mathematical language.60
In fact, modification to sentences like M2 -- by means of
analogy or metaphorical extension -- underlies the many major and minor
conceptual revisions that mathematical or scientific concepts regularly undergo
(saving, of course, trivial examples, once more).
In
stark contrast, the rejection, or modification, of propositions like M6 wouldn't herald profound change.
It is unlikely that Blair's failure to
own a copy of TAR will initiate a significant conceptual revolution.
The fundamental conceptual changes that are set in motion
by alterations to the rules that 'govern' a mathematical, scientific
or empirical use of language are also connected with factors that make metaphysical-,
and DM-theses
seem so
certain, their rejection so completely "unthinkable" by those who
dote on this way of talking. Because metaphysical sentences arise out of a
distorted use of language.
In fact, they often rely on a misconstrual of rules that seek to establish, or which
actually constitute,
new meanings, and it is this
that generates the impression that they represent novel/profound 'truths' about 'Being',
'consciousness', 'essence', or even 'truth' itself. All of which are generated from language alone,
not from a practical interface with the world, or even with one
another. This further motivates the impression that their truth-status is resolvable,
or verifiable, by 'thought' alone.61
Consider M2 and M9, again:
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M2: Two is a number.
At first sight,
it might
look like M9 resembles M2 -- in that its apparent truth-value (true) is
given by the meaning of its constituent words.
However, M2 isn't a rule because of the meaning of the
terms it contains; it is a rule because the social and historical practices upon
which it is based constitute and hence express the meaning of its terms. It is
how human beings have already used such terms (in this case, counting,
measuring, calculating and proving, etc.) that establishes their meaning. These rules (i.e.,
those like M2) merely express what is part of established practice.
This can be seen from the additional fact that mathematics was invented by human beings
who were already social animals; it wasn't given to humanity by visiting aliens,
nor was even
'a gift the gods'.62
On the other hand, if M2 were a rule because of
the prior meaning of its terms, determined by separate individuals -- as they 'abstracted' them into existence,
de novo, each time (which is what Traditional Theory suggests happened), then
their meaning would be independent of use. Plainly, in that case, meaning
wouldn't be based on social
factors but on metaphysical or even psychological principles of dubious provenance, and even more
suspect logical status, as we have seen. [I have covered this topic in much more detail in
Essay Three Parts One and
Two, and Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
Indeed, if that were the case, the
meaning of M2's constituent terms would have to have been established before they were
used in any social practices, such as in counting, measuring, calculating or proving
-- and that could only have been achieved by independent 'abstractors' relying
(piecemeal) on just such metaphysical or psychological principles as socially
atomised 'thinkers'.63
In sentences like M2,
each word would gain its meaning
by 'naming' a 'particular' or a 'universal', or by representing this or
that 'abstract' concept/'essence' underlying reality, the entire process having
taken place in the head of each lone abstractor.
It would then be the atomised meaning of a term (its 'representation in the
mind') that would tell each user how it should be used. That would transform each word
(or its inner 'representation') into an agent and each human being in a
patient, once more.64
That is because no fact,
abstraction, mental image or 'inner
representation' is capable of supplying the normativity that social
reinforcement, education and training provides. Hence, if the
Traditional Picture is to work, these 'abstractions', 'images',
'representations' or 'concepts' would have to replicate inside each head all
that external social factors already provide. So, they would have to become agents in their
own right, thus fetishising them. This aspect of the social world would
therefore need to be projected into each head.
As Peter Hacker noted:
"It is indeed true that a
sign can be lifeless for one, as when one hears an alien tongue or sees an
unknown script. But it is an illusion to suppose that what animates a sign is
some immaterial thing, abstract object, mental image or hypothesised
psychic entity that can be attached to it by a process of thinking.
[Wittgenstein (1969), p.4: 'But if we had to name anything which is the life of
the sign, we should have to say that it was its use.'] One can try to rid
oneself of these nonsensical conceptions by simple manoeuvres. In the case of
the idealist conception, imagine that we replace the mental accompaniment of a
word, which allegedly gives the expression its 'life', by a physical correlate.
For example, instead of accompanying the word 'red' with a mental image of red,
one might carry around in one's pocket a small red card. So, on the idealist's
model, whenever one uses or hears the word 'red', one can look at the
card instead of conjuring up a visual image in thought. But will looking at a
red slip of paper endow the word 'red' with life? The word plus sample is no
more 'alive' than the word without the sample. For an object (a sample of red)
does not have the use of the word laid up in it, and neither does the
mental image. Neither the word and the sample nor the word and the mental
pseudo-sample dictate the use of a word or guarantee understanding.
"...It seemed to
Frege,
Wittgenstein claimed, that no adding of inorganic signs, as it were, can make
the proposition live, from which he concluded that [for Frege -- RL] 'What must
be added is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere
signs'. [Wittgenstein (1969), p.4.] He [Frege -- RL] did not see that such an
object, a sense mysteriously grasped in thinking, as it were a picture in which
all the rules are laid up, 'would itself be another sign, or a calculus to
explain the written one to us'. [Wittgenstein (1974a), p.40.].... To understand a
sign, i.e., for it to 'live' for one, is not to grasp something other than the
sign; nor is it to accompany the sign with an inner parade of objects in
thought. It is to grasp the use of the sign itself." [Hacker (1993a), pp.167-68.
Italic emphases in the original. Link added.]
But the normative use of language can only be based
on, or arise out of, by social
factors.
Given what
Marx and
Engels said about language, this shouldn't have to be pointed out to fellow Marxists.
Hence, the atomisation of
the meaning of words amounts to a fetishisation of language (on this, see
Note 64). It would make the 'social' interaction of words (or their inner
'representations') the determinant of
how human beings use, or are supposed to use, language. This would be to invert
what actually happens: it is human agents who determine the
meaning of their words by their social interaction and their relation to the
world; it isn't words, 'abstractions', 'representations', 'ideas', 'images' or 'concepts'
that do it for them.65
In that case, it is the
pattern underlying the linguistic and social contexts that sentences like M2
encapsulate which gives expression to our rule-governed use of symbols like
these, and
which therefore constitutes their meaning. That
is because patterns like this are based on generality of use -- i.e., on the possibility and
the actuality of norm-governed, open-ended social
employment of such expressions.65a
The stark
difference between mathematical and ordinary (indicative) sentences can perhaps
be seen by the way the use of their terms may be justified. So, if someone were
challenged and asked why they had used "2" in the following way, "2 + 7 = 9"
(trivial cases to one side, again), all that the one questioned could appeal to would be
sentences like M2, and the other rules of arithmetic. Either that, or simply
retort "That's what I was taught! Were you taught differently?" The above simple equation couldn't be confirmed or justified
(nor would it) by comparing it with anything in the world
-- or, indeed, with any 'abstractions', 'representations', 'concepts' or 'images' in anyone's head
or brain, still less with any 'objects' tucked away in an Ideal form in 'Platonic
Heaven'.
It might be thought that an attempt could be made to justify "2 + 7 = 9" by
actually counting some objects. Certainly an attempt could be made
to do that, but
that attempt itself would only work if the parties
involved already understood how to use the relevant vocabulary, rules of
arithmetic and how to count. So, this 'justification' (by actually counting) would in effect be an
application of rules already understood and agreed upon.
This can be seen from the fact that if someone were to count two
objects, and then count another seven, but declare that there were in total ten objects,
they would be told they had made a mistake. Manifestly, we use the rules
of arithmetic
to decide if counting has been done correctly. We wouldn't even think to revise our rules,
or our use of sentences like M2,
if they had been so easily 'falsified' in this way.
Once more, that response is entirely different
from our reaction if M6 were shown to be false. In that eventuality, no one would think
to revise the application or the meaning of any of the words used in M6.
In which case, sentences
like M2 are used to
decide whether or an interface with reality (such as counting) has been carried out correctly.
The opposite is the case with M6. Facts are what determine if M6 is true; M6
isn't used to decide if the world is correct.65b
M2: Two is a number.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
This is how mathematical words gain their meaning: as
'cogs' in systems of concepts that have grown in relation to our social
development across many centuries.66 They didn't acquire the meaning they now have piecemeal; that is, they didn't gain their meaning atomistically, before
being
used socially, practically or contextually.66a
Mathematical
propositions don't gain their semantic status from the way they correspond with objects or structures
tucked away in some Ideal, Platonic Realm, or from the way they match
'abstractions' and 'representations' lodged
in each individual head.67
This means that they aren't 'true' because a process of abstraction
established their status (which is
quintessentially an
individualistic
process). They are 'true' because of the proof systems to which they belong
(which are themselves reliant
on highly regimented social
practices), or because they are in some cases constitutive of the practices to which they belong.68
Consequently, two isn't a
number because of what the word "two" (or its original equivalent in ancient
languages) 'meant' before it was used in mathematical propositions
or in counting, and the like.69
On its own divorced from such practices, the sign "2" (or the word "two")
would mean nothing.69a
It would just be a mark
on the page -- or a sound pattern in the air. It gains its life from its use in
rule-governed, socially-conditioned contexts, which were (and still are) those
that occur in everyday life.
More formally, a
mathematical context is a system of propositions that has grown up alongside
specific social practices that are an extension to the above. So, "two" doesn't gain the meaning it
has in isolation, as might appear to be the case if
examples like M2 were read as trivial, terminological expressions. M2 can't supply "two"
with a meaning that wasn't already there in a surrounding system of
practices. Unless the logical space already existed for "two" to slot into as a
number term, "two" could be the name of a cat, or the colour of the sky,
or it might even be a meaningless
inscription. "Two"
gains its meaning from the rule-governed, normative role it plays in everyday
life, and hence in mathematics, linked by systems of proof, not as a result of
any correspondence relations, or
even by means of the process of abstraction.
This can be seen by the
way mathematical propositions are confirmed. We don't subject them to empirical
test or perform experiments on them. Nor do we run brain scans to see if others
have understood number words in the same way. We apply
them successfully within the systems and practices in which members of
a speech community
were socialised to apply them.70
In which case, M2 is empirically neither true nor false; it expresses a normative convention,
a rule.71
...Dialectics Does Not
In a way that might seen
analogous to mathematical propositions, it could be argued that M9 is true because
of what its constituent words mean, but the status of sentences like M9 is much more problematic.72
As noted above, M2 expresses a rule whose use constitutes the
meaning of the number words it uses; hence, it is
incapable of being either true or false. Rules like M2 are either useful or
they aren't,
either practical or they aren't.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M9a. Motion is separable from matter.
M9b. Motion is possible without matter.
M9c. Matter without motion is possible.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M2: Two is a number.
But,
as far as DM-fans are concerned, M9 seems to be 'necessarily true'. Its supposed opposite
(which would appear to be M9a, or perhaps more naturally, M9b or M9c)
is, according to Lenin, "unthinkable". That might help explain why any attempt made to question the veracity of
sentences like M9 would be met with the counter-claim claim that sentences like M9
are true because of what words or concepts like "motion" and "matter"
really mean, or even because of the nature of reality, perhaps
expressed by P4. This can be seen from the fact that if critics were to
reject
M9 (for whatever reason), it would be no use dialecticians asking such a sceptic to look harder
at the evidence -- of which there is none anyway in this respect. After all, what evidence
could show M9 is the case? As we know, many Ancient Greek theorists accepted the
evidence of their senses -- indeed, everyone's senses, it seems -- that
matter is 'naturally motionless' and has to be set in motion by some motive
force. In that case, all that a dialectician could do in such circumstances is appeal to the
words or concepts involved, and then, with Lenin, declare that motion without
matter is "unthinkable" -- which is, of course, why Lenin didn't
simply say "It is false/incorrect to claim that motion can occur without matter, and here's the evidence
that proves it".
It is also why dialecticians (almost to an individual) respond to
critics with a "You just don't understand dialectics. They never say
-- concerning the veracity of P4 or M9 -- "You should
look at the evidence more carefully".
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
This hypothetical response
-- that dialecticians could only
refer doubters to what certain words or concepts 'really' mean or imply --
itself depends on an archaic
way of viewing language. That approach sees discourse as a system of labels
attached to -- or which 'represent' or 'reflect' (individually, as linguistic atoms) -- objects and processes in the world.
Either that, or words stand for or name 'Forms', 'Essences' or 'Substances' that
exist
in an 'abstract world', 'Platonic Heaven', Aristotelian 'concept-space', or even as
'images, 'ideas'
and 'concepts' in 'the
mind'), but they don't serve as a means of communication, a dynamic expression of our communal and
inter-personal life.73
Once more, this helps
explain why the (proffered) rejoinder
noted earlier (i.e., "M9 is true because of what its
constituent words mean") could only ever be
the last court of appeal for DM-theorists. There is nothing more that
could be said to a sceptic who doubted the 'truth' of such DM-sentences. What
little evidence there is that 'substantiates' even a narrow range of its 'laws' soon proves to be of no
help at all (as
we have seen in other Essays posted at this site --, especially
this one). It would be no use a
prospective defender of Lenin pointing to more
evidence if the meaning of his words is what causes the problem.
This 'linguistic defence'
(i.e., "M9
is true because of what its constituent words mean")
gives the game away.
In the end, DM-sentences are amenable to no other defence. Evidence is in the end
irrelevant. DM-'laws' are the product of an idiosyncratic/odd use of language, and, as
such, can only be defended linguistically, or 'conceptually'.74
But,
DM-apologists are social
agents, too, so, their theories are sensitive to, or are reflective of, their
class origin, current class position and/or ideas they had forced down their throats
when they were socialised as children -- indeed, as I have argued elsewhere at this site:
The founders of
[Dialectical Marxism] weren't workers; they came from a class
that educated their children in the Classics, the Bible and Philosophy. This tradition
taught that behind appearances there lies a 'hidden world', accessible to thought
alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.
This world-view was concocted by ideologues of the ruling-class, initially over
two thousand years ago. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from,
or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and
exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.
The first and most obvious way is through violence. That will work for a time,
but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation
(among other things).
Another way is to win over the majority -- or, at least, a significant
proportion of 'opinion formers' (bureaucrats, judges, bishops, imams, 'intellectuals', philosophers, teachers, administrators,
editors, etc., etc.)
-- to the view that the present order either: (i) Works for their benefit, (ii) Defends 'civilised
values', (iii) Is ordained of the 'gods', or (iv) Is 'natural' and so can't be
fought against, reformed or negotiated with.
Hence, a world-view that rationalises one or more of the above is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling
"in the
same old way". While the content of ruling-class thought may have changed with
each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same
for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth (about this 'hidden world') can be
ascertained by thought alone, and therefore
may be imposed on reality dogmatically and
aprioristically.
{Some might think this violates central tenets of
HM, in that it asserts
that some ideas remained to same for many centuries; I have addressed
that concern, here.]
So, the non-worker founders of our movement -- who had been educated from
childhood to believe there was just such a 'hidden world' lying behind
'appearances', and which governed everything -- when they became
revolutionaries, looked for 'logical' principles relating to this abstract world
that told them that change was inevitable and part of the cosmic order.
Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of that ruling-class mystic,
Hegel. The dialectical classicists were quite happy to impose
their 'new' theory on the world (upside down or the "right way up") -- as,
indeed, we saw in
Essay Two --
since that is how they had been taught 'genuine' philosophers
should behave.
That 'allowed' the founders of
[Dialectical Marxism] to think of themselves as special, prophets of the new order,
which workers, alas, couldn't quite comprehend because of their
defective education, their reliance on ordinary language and the 'banalities
of commonsense'.
Fortunately, history has predisposed these dialectical prophets to ascertain truths about
this invisible world on their behalf, which 'implied' they were the
'naturally-ordained' leaders of the workers' movement -- 'Great Helmsmen', no
less. That in turn meant that
they were in addition teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who
could thereby legitimately substitute themselves for the majority -- in
'their own interests', of course -- since workers have in general been
blinded by 'commodity fetishism', 'formal thinking', or they have been bought off
by imperialist 'super profits'. This meant that 'the masses' were 'incapable' of seeing the truth for themselves....
In
that case,
and in view of what has
gone before in this Essay (and this site), DM-theories are little more that
misconstrued, or mis-applied linguistic rules. Appearances to the contrary,
DM-'laws' aren't expressed by means of what turn out to be empirical propositions; they are
mis-interpreted rules for the use of Hegelian jargon, imported into Marxism
from an ideological tradition that has unimpeachable ruling-class credentials.74a
This also helps account for the
frequent use of
modal, emphatic, almost hyperbolic expressions
right across the DM-literature; for example: "Motion
must involve a contradiction" (several of which were quoted
earlier, but more
fully in Essay Two), which follow from this comment by
Engels:
"Motion is the
mode of existence of matter.
Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes)
expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same.
Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted….
"A motionless state of matter therefore
proves to be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976),
p.74. Bold emphases alone added.]
Engels elsewhere informs his readers that
certain things are "impossible":
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
alone added.]
Add to that
Lenin's comment from earlier -- "Matter without motion is 'unthinkable'"
-- and his statement that dialectical logic "requires" or "demands" this or that:
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)….
[D]ialectical logic holds that 'truth'
is
always concrete, never abstract, as the late Plekhanov liked to say
after Hegel." [Lenin (1921),
pp.90, 93. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Flexibility, applied objectively,
i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is
dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world."
[Lenin (1961),
p.110. Bold emphasis added.]
The Great Teacher was no less dogmatic, no less hyperbolic:
"Dialectical materialism is the world
outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party.... The dialectical method therefore holds
that
no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself....; and that,
vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its
inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by
surrounding phenomena.
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics
holds that
nature is not in a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability,
but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and
development.... The dialectical method therefore
requires
that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their
interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their
movement and change....
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics
holds that
internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature,
for they all have their negative and positive sides...; and that the
struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new,
between that which is dying away and that which is being born..., constitutes
the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the
transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes....
"If there are no isolated phenomena
in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent,
then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history
must be evaluated not from the standpoint of 'eternal justice'.... Contrary to idealism..., Marxist
philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable,
that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is
authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there
are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are
as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of
science and practice." [Stalin (1976b), pp.835-46. Bold emphases added;
several paragraphs merged.]
Likewise with Mao:
"The law of contradiction in things,
that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist
dialectics.... As opposed to the metaphysical world
outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to
understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its
relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be
seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in
its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....
"The universality or absoluteness of
contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in
the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the
process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from
beginning to end.... There is nothing that does not
contain contradictions; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"Thus it is already clear that
contradiction exists universally and is in all processes, whether in the
simple or in the complex forms of motion, whether in objective phenomena or
ideological phenomena....
Contradiction is universal and
absolute, it is present in the process of the development of all things and
permeates every process from beginning to end...." [Mao
(1937),
pp.311-18. Bold emphases added;
several paragraphs merged.]
A lesser DM-parrot,
Maurice Cornforth, similarly chirped:
"The dialectical method demands
first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in
their interconnections with other things.... This struggle is not external and
accidental….
The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from
the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not
independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or
aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the
basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….
"Movement and change result from causes
inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions…. Contradiction is a universal feature
of all processes…. The importance of the [developmental]
conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly
expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes
place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal
law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.72, 90, 95, 117; Bold emphases alone added;
several paragraphs merged.]
Finally, John Rees's comment, "Totality is an insistence...",
also sprang straight out of this emphatic/dogmatic tradition.
This is so
whether or not such hyper-bold claims are
accompanied by an appeal to
the alleged definitions of certain words/concepts (e.g., "Motion is the mode
of the existence of matter"). Empirical propositions have no
need of modal 'strengtheners' of this sort. Whoever says, "Copper must conduct
electricity!", or "Science demands that light travels at
such-and-such a velocity!"
The opposite is the case with
respect to DM-'laws', as Lenin himself admitted:
"This aspect of dialectics…usually receives
inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum total of
examples…and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective
world)." [Lenin (1961), p.357.]
So, a "law of cognition" needs no help from the grubby,
working class world of
evidence and facts. Which fact reminds us why DM-theorists are quite happy to
impose their ideas on nature. [On
this topic, see also here.]
That is
also why
the following wouldn't normally be asserted by anyone:
M6b: Tony Blair must own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
That is, not unless
M6b were itself the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he
owned a copy, so he must own one", or it were based on a direct observation statement
-- for example, "I saw his wife give him a copy as a present, and I later
spotted in his bookcase". But even then, the truth or falsehood of
M6b would
depend on an interface with the facts at some point.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
With M6-type
propositions,
it is reality
that dictates to us whether or not they are true. Our use of sentences
like this means we aren't dictating to nature what it must contain or what
must be true of
it. The exact opposite is the case with metaphysical and
dialectical theories.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M9-type sentences purport to tell us what really must
be like, what it must contain. The world has to conform to what
they say. Such propositions can't be based on an inference
from the evidence, either, since there is no body of evidence that could
confirm, or even hint at, the truth of any claim that motion
is inseparable from matter, or even that it is "The mode of the existence of matter".
Nevertheless,
despite appearances to the contrary, M9 can't
be true solely in virtue of what its words mean. Normally, the ordinary-looking
words that sentences like M9 employ gain whatever meaning they have from the
part they already play in other areas, in wider human practices, those that
involve their application in everyday contexts. Divorced from that background the isolated use of specialised or jargonised
expressions in sentences
like M9 means that they are like fish out of water, as it were. Even though the
words used in DM-theories look like ordinary words, their odd use divorces them from the vernacular
-- rather like the way that the theological use of words like
"father" and "son" to describe 'God' and 'Christ' divorce them from their
everyday meaning, too.
There are no
real world systems -- i.e., systems pertaining to material practice and everyday
life -- in which the idiosyncratic employment of M9's constituent terms has a life (hence,
a meaning) other than these novel, specialised, isolated contexts. And, as we saw in
Essay Nine Part One,
DM-theories play no part even in the day-to-day activity of revolutionaries, nor do
they feature in their agitation and propagandisation of the
working class.
Indeed, metaphysical 'sound
bites' like M9 provide the only semantic backdrop for the use of such
words. Artificial and contrived DM-contexts provide a unique background for these
'dialectical nuggets', and this they do in non-practical (hence, non-material)
surroundings
-- quite unlike mathematical propositions, which they might appear to
emulate.
Isolated from material contexts in this way, the connections that the
ordinary-looking words dialecticians use have with the typographically similar, everyday words (from
which they have allegedly been 'derived', or 'abstracted') have been
irreversibly cut. Because DM-jargon isn't based on
material practice (that was demonstrated in Essay Nine
Part One) -- and
can't be used in connection
with the working class, or even the day-to-day activity of revolutionaries -- it
either has
no meaning, or the usual meanings of the words employed denies
sentences like M1a
any sense, as we have seen. This,. of course, renders them not just
non-sensical, but incoherent to boot.74a1
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
It is no surprise, therefore, to find that
the use of such terms in sentences like these results in confusion and incomprehension. Nor is it any
surprise to see Lenin's words fall apart and then collapse
into incoherence so readily.74b
Metaphysical Gems
Incoherent Non-Sense
However, sentences that
express (or attempt to express) the rules governing our use of words are invariably mis-interpreted by DM-theorists
and metaphysicians in general as empirical propositions
of
a special, more profound sort. That is, they are viewed as
Super-Scientific Truths,
capable of revealing the underlying 'secrets' of nature. Unfortunately, we have seen
this means that the
sentences used turn out to be non-sensical.
Even worse, because they misuse and thereby
distort language they are incoherent non-sense.75
Theories like M9 -- but more
specifically, P4 --, tend to depend on, just as they give rise to, a range of associated 'propositions' from which they have
been 'derived', or which help 'explain' their supposed content. But, as
'metaphysical statements', they stand-alone. That is, they confront the reader as isolated philosophical
'gems', as fundamental 'truths': "I think, therefore I am" (the
Cogito
of
Descartes); "To be it be perceived" (Berkeley); "Time is a
relation" (paraphrasing
Kant and Leibniz); "The whole is more than the sum of the parts"
(Metaphysical Holists of every
stripe), "Every determination
is also a negation" (Spinoza
and Hegel); "Truth is always concrete, never abstract" (paraphrasing Plekhanov
and Lenin);
"All bodies
change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour...they are never equal to
themselves" (Trotsky), and so on.75a0
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Philosophical 'jewels' like
these have traditionally been
mined, cleaned and polished into their glittering state by socially-isolated thinkers,
who 'discovered' these treasures buried just below the surface of
'appearances' by the
exercise of thought alone.75a
[By
"socially-isolated, I don't mean to suggest they weren't part of, or weren't
operating within, a philosophical tradition, or that in some cases they didn't belong to a
group or school of other thinkers, or even that they all lived
alone, like hermits. What I am suggesting is that, as far as their philosophical
'discoveries' were concerned, they were in general divorced from ordinary life (i.e.,
they were in general isolated from the working class and ordinary human beings).
In addition, the vast majority enjoyed a privileged lifestyle, free from daily toil,
and were often
supported, subsidised or patronised by a member of the ruling-class. Either that
or they were 'employed' by the Church, had
'independent means' or belonged to the 'privileged elite' themselves. (I will cover this
topic in more detail in Part Two of Essay
Twelve.)]
But, ideas like these were never based
on -- nor were they even
derived from -- ordinary practice and everyday language,
otherwise the rest of us wouldn't need to be informed of them.75b
Indeed, if 'philosophical discoveries' like these had ever been based on
the above, they wouldn't have struck their inventors (or anyone else, for that matter) as
especially 'profound', excavated for us by their valiant efforts, aided or not by what is, in effect,
the metaphysical
equivalent of a
JCB: Hegel's Logic.
In fact,
theories like these stage a dramatic entrance
into the world of 'learning' as glittering linguistic 'jewels' (solitaire diamonds,
if you will).
They gain their 'meaning'
-- their metaphysical shine -- solely from the artificial setting
arranged for them by their inventors, making such an entrance as if they were "news
from nowhere", shafts of metaphysical light, 'Cosmic Verities' written
as if on tablets of
stone.
They thus appear before humanity as if from
On High.
Or, to be more honest, many look
as if
their
inventors
were
high!
[In Freud's case,
that was
literally true!]
And, surprise, surprise: the vast majority of educated individuals fall for these
linguistic con-tricks time and again.75c
Nevertheless, the 'Metaphysical
Prophets' who invent such Scintillating Truths -- acting like Divine
Intermediaries, each a latter day Hermes
(who was the Greek Messenger of the 'Gods') -- act as if the 'real' meaning of the ordinary-looking words they use
in fact arise from the novel role bestowed on them by such pioneering efforts in
reconstructive linguistic surgery. To that end, these 'intrepid thinkers' often
concoct a series of Proper Names/Neologisms as labels for the
'abstract' objects and concepts they now re-christen, "Essences",
"Forms", "Universals" and the like.76
The above
supposition (whereby Traditional Theorists imagined they were dealing with
'real meanings' and not 'distortions') was further motivated by the idea that
words gain their meaning individually, atomistically, as linguistic or semantic 'units'.
That is because of (i) A direct, unmediated connection they supposedly enjoyed with reality
(since, as we saw in Essay Three Part One,
despite appearances to the contrary they were all really the Proper Names of
'Universals', 'Ideas', 'Concepts', 'Essences', 'inner representations',
'images', etc., etc.), or
(ii) The intimate link the concepts involved in all this had with various 'mental processes' taking place in
each individual
theorist's brain (via the mythical 'process of abstraction'). That helps explain why such an
'innovative' (or distorted)
use of language is central to Metaphysics and DM --
again, as
we saw in Essay
Three Part One
and elsewhere at this site.
Hence, for Traditional Thinkers, the assumption that
such 'names' gain
their meaning directly and solely from whatever they allegedly named seems
entirely
plausible, just as it seems no less plausible to suppose that language (i.e., real
language, philosophical language -- not the 'woefully defective
vernacular') is based on an atomised, socially-isolated naming
ritual of some sort, which is uniquely able to home in on the 'Essence' of "Being" by the mere expedient of wishing
that were so. Naturally, this trades on the further (unsupported) idea that there are
such things as 'Essences', to begin with. This is yet another dogma which
was simply assumed
to be true, but never actually shown to be so.77
That is, of course, one reason why Traditional Philosophers
insisted that the meaning words is determined by such atomistic criteria (as part of a
'private language' of some sort -- these days 'inner speech', or maybe even a 'language of thought'), the result
perhaps of an 'inner act' of naming
certain Ideas, Categories, or Concepts 'in the
mind'/'consciousness', a 'process of abstraction', a
stipulative re-definition, or the "unfolding
of a genetically determined program".
This
is a danger
Bertell
Ollman warned about (in relation to 'abstractionism') a few years ago, noted in Essay
Three Part Two
(quoted earlier):
As is the case with
Ollman, and, indeed, everyone
else who has pontificated about this obscure 'process' [abstractionism], we aren't told how we
manage to do this, still less why it doesn't result in the construction of a
'private language'.
Indeed,
this is something Ollman himself pointed out:
"What, then, is distinctive about Marx's abstractions? To begin with, it
should be clear that Marx's abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely
from the abstractions of other thinkers both then and now. There has to be a lot
of overlap. Otherwise, he would have constructed what philosophers call a
'private language,' and any communication between him and the rest of us would
be impossible. How close Marx came to fall into this abyss and what can be
done to repair some of the damage already done are questions I hope to deal
with in a later work...." [Ollman (2003),
p.63. Bold emphases added.]
Well, it remains to be seen if Professor Ollman can
solve a problem that has baffled everyone else for centuries -- that is,
those who have even so much as acknowledged it exists!
It
is to Ollman's considerable credit, therefore,
that he is at least aware of it.
[In fact, Ollman is the very first
dialectician I have encountered (in nigh on thirty years) who even so much as
acknowledges
this 'difficulty'! Be this as it may, I
have devoted Essay Thirteen Part Three
to an analysis of this topic; the reader is referred there for more
details.]
It is no accident,
therefore, that this approach not only torpedoes belief in the social nature of language, it is based on a class-motivated
rejection of the material roots of
discourse in everyday life (explored in Part Two of Essay Twelve -- summarised
here).
Nor is it merely coincidental that thinkers openly sympathetic to wider ruling-class interests
who almost invariably favoured this anti-Marxist view of language.78
Conversely, it is no coincidence either
that ordinary language assumed its central role in
Analytic Philosophy, among
left-leaning "Linguistic Philosophers" (and those influenced by Marx,
like Wittgenstein),
just when the working class was entering
the stage of history as a significant political force.79
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M8: Time is a relation between events.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
The truth of 'atomic'
sentences (like the above) is
supposed to depend somehow on the meaning of the words they contain. But, such a use of words can't determine the sense of any sentences formed
from them.80
Words gain their meaning from their applicability in an indefinitely large set
of socially-sanctioned, communally-crafted contexts.81
They don't have a meaning bestowed upon them first, divorced from
linguistic or social contexts, which 'meaning' then enables them to
function in sentences, any more than a lump of gold first gains its value in nature,
or even in society, on its own, as an isolated 'commodity' unconnected with
certain forms of social
organisation and collective labour, only to enter the economy afterwards with
a value
already attached to it. Meaning is no more a natural,
individualistic property than value. If the contrary supposition were the
case, communication would be impossible (as Ollman pointed out).82
However, ex hypothesi, there are no
other contexts
in which metaphysical atoms (like M1a, M9 and P4) can feature -- that is, other than
those that
fuel endless academic debate. The fundamental
propositions of Metaphysics (such as, P4, M8 and M9) stand alone as isolated nuggets
of truth, foundational principles, core precepts. This means that in such
airless surroundings the
constituent words of M9, for instance, are in fact meaningless
-- despite the typographical similarity they have with ordinary words. That is because they possess no connection with ordinary contexts
that are themselves embedded in, or related to, material practice. That is, of
course, one reason why M1a, for example, so readily collapses into incoherence.
[Of course,
the above depends on how we interpret the word "meaning"; I will say more
about that presently.]
In a
similar vein (no pun intended), Gold isn't just valueless in nature,
it is incapable of gaining a value by itself and of its own
efforts -- or, indeed, by the efforts of lone prospectors and refiners. And gold,
too, would remain valueless if it had no connection with
historically-conditioned material practice in a sufficiently developed economy.
Atomised Humanity
Versus Socialised
Language
Of course, to suppose otherwise --, i.e., to imagine that words,
or their 'inner representations', determine their own meaning independently of the use to which human
beings
put them in everyday contexts -- would be to fetishise them, as noted
above.
Indeed, this would be
tantamount to believing that words (again, or their 'inner representations') enjoyed a social life
of their own anterior to,
and explanatory of, the linguistic communion that takes place between human beings.
If words (etc.) did in fact acquire their own meanings, piecemeal, in
such a manner, and those meanings followed words about the place like
shadows, then the idea that language is a social phenomenon would itself assume
an entirely different meaning. In that case, discourse would still be social, but
that would be because words were the social beings here. That would in
turn mean that they had gifted that property to our use of language, not
the other way round!
If that were so, humanity would be
social because our words already were!83
We are now in a position to understand
why: the supposition that a word (or, at least,
its physical embodiment, its 'inner representation', perhaps) can motivate a
human agent (causally or in any other way)84
to regard it as the repository of its own meaning -- so that inferences can be
made from ink marks on the page (or from 'images', 'ideas', and 'representations' in the
head) to 'Super-Empirical Truths' about 'Being', or whatever -- would be
to misconstrue the products of the social relations among human beings (i.e.,
words) as if they were their own autonomous semantic custodians, as creators and
carriers of meaning themselves. In effect, that would be to anthropomorphise words, treating them as if they had
their own history, social structure and mode of development. In this way, the
social nature of language would reappear in an inverted form as an expression of
the social life of words (etc.). Humanity would be atomised, linguistic signs
(etc.) socialised!85
In that case, M9
and P4 can't be true in virtue of the meanings of any
of their words -- for no meaning has yet been given to such an idiosyncratic use of
language by human beings engaged in any form of material practice.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
If, however, an attempt
were made to specify the meaning of constituent words in a
piecemeal fashion, a rule would be
required.86
To suppose that there is some sort of connection between a rule and
reality (determined, perhaps, by a physical law) would be to no avail, either. If a rule were to depend on such a
connection,
it would become an empirical proposition, and thus cease to be a rule.87
Unfortunately, the vast majority of philosophers have
so far overlooked
this seemingly insignificant point.88
Lenin's Rules -- Not OK
[This
sub-section is a recap of earlier results, but from a slightly different angle.
It can be skipped by anyone who has 'got the point'. Begin again
here.]
Elsewhere in MEC, Lenin went on to say:
M22: "[M]otion [is] an inseparable property
of matter." [Lenin (1972), p.323. Italic emphasis added.]
In so far as M22 purports to inform us about the properties of
matter (in the real world), it looks like a scientific statement. However,
as we have seen, when examined it turns out to be nothing of the sort. Contrast
M22 with the following:
M23: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
water.
M23a: Liquidity isn't an inseparable property of
water.
Here, we can imagine
conditions under which M23 would be false and M23a true (think of ice or steam).
But, M22 is a very much stronger claim than M23, and is clearly connected with
M1a (or, indeed, with M9 and P4). We can see that if we
examine it more closely.88a
If M22 is re-written slightly and tidied up to eliminate the
unnecessary detail, it would become M24:
M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
M24 is
apparently always true; its 'truth' is clearly connected with the supposed meaning of words like "motion" and
"inseparable", etc., both of which were ultimately based on the
presumed truth of P4.
By
asserting M24, Lenin certainly didn't mean to suggest that
even if we were to try really hard we would still fail to separate the two
words or 'concepts', "motion" and "matter" (what they meant
or what they allegedly referred to) in our thoughts. Lenin plainly wasn't informing us that while such a
separation was a
particularly difficult physical or mental task, we could still make some
attempt to imagine a scenario where they were separated. He was claiming that we would always find we
would always fail
-- even more so that any suggestion an individual could eat an entire adult Blue Whale in less than two minutes.

Figure Two: Tuck In! You
Have All Of 120 Seconds To Beat...
Lenin was clearly alluding to a connection between matter and
motion that was much tighter than this. He was perhaps reminding us of the
futility of even trying -- that this wasn't an
option --, just as it wouldn't be an option for anyone to try to disassociate
oddness from the number three, or the concept, king-killer, from
regicide, for instance.89
Hence, if we were to view M23 exactly as
Lenin viewed M24, it would mean that not only could water not be
non-liquid, nothing
other than water could be liquid, either. It would thus imply that water
wasn't just the only liquid, it was the only one that could exist in the
universe -- and that liquidity was the only conceivable form of water.
M23: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
water.
M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.
That is because, for Lenin, motion wasn't just
one of the defining characteristics of matter,
nothing that moves (outside of the 'mind') would fail to be material. Motion is, as it were,
super-glued to matter, and only to matter --
and, indeed, vice versa -- according to Lenin. [Lenin says this over and over
again in
MEC; on that see
here.]
Hence, the same would have to
be true with respect to water, if we were to read M23 as strictly as we are meant to
interpret M24.
M23: Liquidity is an inseparable property of
water.
M23a: Liquidity is not an inseparable property of
water.
M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.
M24a: Motion is not an inseparable property of
matter.
The main verb in M24 is clearly in the indicative mood.
But, if M24 were an empirical proposition, its negation, M24a, would make sense,
but for Lenin it doesn't -- indeed, it is "unthinkable", unlike the negation of
M23 (i.e., M23a). That is because, once again, M24 holds open no truth
possibilities; it asserts only one
envisaged necessity.
Lenin obviously believed that
it was impossible even to think the falsehood of M24 -- any more than it
might be possible to think there were or could be triangles with four vertices. As we
have seen, in this he openly agreed with Engels:
"Motion in the most
general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of
matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe,
from mere change of place right up to thinking."
[Engels (1954),
p.69. Bold emphasis
added.]
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion,
nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it
can only be transmitted. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to be one of the most empty
and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
Nevertheless,
and once again, the indicative mood of the main verb in M24 hides its real
nature. Only a consideration of the overall use of this claim (that is, its role
within Lenin's 'system' of ideas) in the end reveals it is a metaphysical sentence,
which hasn't been derived
from the evidence but from the supposed meaning of a handful of words, once more.
To this end,
it is worth asking what could possibly make M24 'true', and,
a fortiori, what could conceivably make it false.
Indicative sentences are normally true or false according to the way the world
happens to be, but this sentence can't be false no matter what happens in
the world. So, its falsehood can't be based on any conceivable state of
affairs. As noted
earlier, its truth seems to arise from linguistic (or conceptual) considerations
alone, not from reality. This can be seen not just because of its imputed necessity
but from the way Lenin actually imagined he had established its veracity. He simply relied on
its supposed
self-evidence, the self-evidence of P4 and his 'definition'
of matter. He didn't even think to support it with any data (or
even with much of an argument!). Its semantic status was underpinned by what Lenin
plainly took its words to
mean. Its truth was thus internally-generated, not 'externally'
confirmed.89a
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Nevertheless, what could possibly make this set of words
'necessarily true', according to Lenin? M24 is just a string of words. It
would have to have some sort of projective or representational relation to the real world for it to
be true, for it to be a true
picture of our world, and some alternative, 'parallel', or fictional 'universe'.90
Well,
whatever it is that succeeds in achieving that must also make the following sentences
false:
M18: This particular instance of motion is
separated from matter.
M19: This lump of matter is motionless.
[M24: Motion is an inseparable property of matter.]
But,
ex hypothesi, M18 and M19
(or their content) are "unthinkable",
according to Lenin. As soon as we think either of them (or their content) we face the sort of
problems we encountered earlier.
Such 'necessary' truths make the possibilities they rule out
(such as M18 or M19) not just 'false', but Super-False, and hence
"unthinkable". This they do while at the same time requiring us to have to think about
whatever it is
they seek to exclude so that it can be rejected out-of-hand.
But, in order to do that, we should have to be able to separate, in thought,
motion from matter in order to be able to declare that it can't be done --
even in thought! Unless we could separate motion from
matter in thought we would have no idea what we are supposed to rule out,
and hence no idea what we were meant to rule in by accepting
M24.
Hence, if we are capable of grasping the truth of M24, we must
already have some comprehension of what would make it false, i.e., what M24 is
ruling out.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
This
(by-now-familiar) problem has arisen from the fact that Lenin entertained a 'necessary' truth (M24)
the content of which is impossible to state in any comprehensible form.
Hence, sentences
like this are above reproach and beyond exoneration.
Metaphysics consigns countless 'propositions' like M18 and M19 to
linguistic limbo in this way. By adopting this approach to 'knowledge',
DM-theorists similarly consign their ideas to outer darkness.
Metaphysics And Language -- 02
Distortion By The Barrel -- Confusion By The
Ton
As we have seen several
times throughout this site, both metaphysical and DM-sentences readily decay into non-sense.
They can't fail to do this.
While
appearing to mimic empirical propositions they turn out to be radically different, masquerading as ordinary, but
far more profound,
declarative
sentences. Central to this role as especially deep 'truths' is
their distorted use of language; in many cases they also turn out to be garbled rules of linguage.91
Such
sentences often attempt to say what
can only be shown by the ordinary use of language.92
And this they do surreptitiously and dishonestly.
Metaphysics misconstrues
conventions and forms of representation expressed in and by our socially-, and
materially-conditioned use of language, but in a form that re-configures
whatever this supposedly uncovers as Super-Empirical, 'necessary truths',
quite
unlike the ordinary, mundane truths associated with everyday practice -- or even
with genuine science. Empirical propositions hold open two possibilities: truth or
falsehood. Metaphysical sentences, while purporting to be empirical, close one
of these off. In doing that, they end up denying for themselves any
sense whatsoever; they collapse into incoherent and non-sensical strings of words.93
On The Impossibility Of Any
Future Metaphysics
Despite appearances to the contrary, the complete rejection of Metaphysics
outlined at this site doesn't draw an a priori limit to the search
for knowledge -- it merely reminds us that truths about nature can't be
stated by misusing language. Moreover, they can't be formulated in a way
that makes supporting evidence irrelevant, either.
Since
metaphysical theses don't present genuine empirical
possibilities, their repudiation and subsequent eradication can't adversely affect the
scientific investigation of the world, nor can they interfere with any attempt to change it.
Metaphysical theses don't represent profound, ambitious or risky conjectures
that merit our attention or even respect. They contain nothing but empty phrases -- they are
indeed
"houses of cards" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein -- Investigations,
§118) --, which at best express
self-important confusion, at worst a ruling-class 'view of reality'.
[More on
that in Parts Two and Three of this Essay.]
Metaphysical pseudo-propositions violate the rules governing the formation
of comprehensible empirical sentences by undermining the semantic possibilities
that the latter hold out.
In addition, they misuse ordinary words while pretending to extend, alter or
'sharpen' their meaning. Supposedly providing insight into the "essential"
structure of reality, metaphysical and
DM-theses
attempt derive substantive truths about the world from
thought or
from words alone. They thus possess an entirely undeserved
mystique,
which arises from their chameleonic outer facade -- that is, they resemble ordinary empirical
propositions, but pretend to inform us of 'necessary', aspects features of
reality. But that outer facade only succeeds in concealing the fact that they thereby reduce
themselves to non-sensicality
and incoherence.
As should seem clear, these deflationary conclusions rule
out the possibility of any future Metaphysics (including that fourth-rate
version, DM). This of course means that this
approach to philosophical knowledge isn't a viable option.
But that doesn't mean that if we were cleverer than we now are,
if we knew much more, we would be able to
formulate and comprehend such
Super-Truths. There is nothing
there which Metaphysics could even pretend to find -- nor vaguely hint at -- so that anyone might go in search of it. The
language that metaphysicians (and DM-theorists) themselves use rules this out as a
viable option
from the start. This ancient 'discipline' presents us with no
viable possibilities --, any more than the supposition that there is or might a
'free kick' in chess
or LBW
in basketball. The search for metaphysical 'truth' is therefore analogous
to looking for a goal in tennis or a home run in snooker. We should therefore treat the
search for
such 'truths' as we
would a proposed expedition to hunt and then capture the
Jabberwocky.93a
Contrary to expectations, the repudiation of Metaphysics in fact opens up the conceptual
space for science to flourish. In this way, scientists are free to formulate
theories that possess true or false empirical implications.
A fortiori,
such truths won't depend solely on the meanings of the words they
contain, but on the way the
world happens to be. This couldn't be the case if science
were based on Metaphysics; in such an eventuality scientific truth would depend
solely on the meaning of words, not on any
actual state of the world.
Hence, to paraphrase Kant: it is necessary to destroy Metaphysics
-- and thus DM -- in order to make room for science.94
Appendix A -- Marx On Philosophy
This subsection has now been extensively updated and
re-posted
here.
I have already quoted the following passages:
"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and
almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine
that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity
existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple,
etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy –- I am declaring
that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the
almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the
apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence,
perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and
then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -– 'Fruit'…. Particular real
fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the
substance' -– 'Fruit'….
"Having reduced the different real fruits to the
one 'fruit' of abstraction -– 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order
to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from
'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary
real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real
fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this
abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the
opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….
"The main interest for the speculative philosopher
is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to
say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins.
But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative
world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances
of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for
they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of
the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind….
When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the
mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the
contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into
sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of
'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the
mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the
Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses,
for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond.
Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their
natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which
gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute
Fruit'.
"The ordinary man does not think he is saying
anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when
the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says
something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the
real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal
creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….
"It goes without saying that the speculative
philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally
known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as
determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the
real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of
reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes
from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity
of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit.'
"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation
is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an
inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension
constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx
and Engels
(1975a), pp.72-75. Italic emphases in the original.]
"The philosophers have only to dissolve their
language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to
recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise
that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that
they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis
alone added.]
"With the theoretical equipment inherited from Hegel
it is, of course, not possible even to understand the empirical, material
attitude of these people. Owing to the fact that Feuerbach showed the religious
world as an illusion of the earthly world -- a world which in his writing
appears merely as a phrase -- German theory too was confronted with the
question which he left unanswered: how did it come about that people 'got' these
illusions 'into their heads'? Even for the German theoreticians this question
paved the way to the materialistic view of the world, a view which is not
without premises, but which empirically observes the actual material
premises as such and for that reason is, for the first time, actually a
critical view of the world. This path was already indicated in the
Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher -- in the
Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie and Zur Judenfrage.
But since at that time this was done in philosophical phraseology, the
traditionally occurring philosophical expressions such as 'human essence',
'species', etc., gave the German theoreticians the desired reason for
misunderstanding the real trend of thought and believing that here again it was
a question merely of giving a new turn to their worn-out theoretical garment --
just as
Dr. Arnold Ruge, the
Dottore
Graziano of German philosophy,
imagined that he could continue as before to wave his clumsy arms about and
display his pedantic-farcical mask.
One has to 'leave philosophy aside' (Wigand, p.187, cf., Hess,
Die letzten Philosophen, p.8), one has to leap out of it and devote
oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, for which there exists
also an enormous amount of literary material, unknown, of course, to the
philosophers. When, after that, one again encounters people like
Krummacher
or 'Stirner',
one finds that one has long ago left them 'behind' and below.
Philosophy and the study of the actual world have
the same relation to one another as
onanism
and sexual love.
Saint Sancho, who in spite of his absence of thought -- which was noted by us
patiently and by him emphatically -- remains within the world of pure thoughts,
can, of course, save himself from it only by means of a moral postulate, the
postulate of 'thoughtlessness' (p.196 of 'the book'). He is a bourgeois
who saves himself in the face of commerce by the banqueroute cochenne
[swinish bankruptcy -- RL] whereby, of course, he becomes not a proletarian, but
an impecunious, bankrupt bourgeois. He does not become a man of the world,
but a bankrupt philosopher without thoughts." [Marx
and Engels (1976), p.236. Bold emphases
alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Links added. I have quoted the whole passage so that readers can see
this is not out of context.]
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world,
in various ways; the point is to change it." [Theses
on Feuerbach.]
"If we had M. Proudhon's intrepidity in the matter of Hegelianism we should say:
it is distinguished in itself from itself. What does this mean? Impersonal
reason, having outside itself neither a base on which it can pose itself, nor an
object to which it can oppose itself, nor a subject with which it can compose
itself, is forced to turn head over heels, in posing itself, opposing itself and
composing itself -- position, opposition, composition. Or, to speak Greek -- we
have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For those who do not know the Hegelian
language: affirmation, negation and negation of the negation. That is what
language means. It is certainly not Hebrew (with due apologies to M. Proudhon);
but it is the language of this pure reason, separate from the individual.
Instead of the ordinary individual with his ordinary manner of speaking and
thinking we have nothing but this ordinary manner purely and simply -- without
the individual.
"Is it surprising that everything, in the final abstraction -- for we have here
an abstraction, and not an analysis -- presents itself as a logical category? Is
it surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that constitutes the
individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which it is
composed, then the form that distinguishes it, you end up with nothing but a
body; that, if you leave out of account the limits of this body; you soon have
nothing but a space -- that if, finally, you leave out of the account the
dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but pure quantity,
the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged
accidents, animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in
the final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical category. Thus the
metaphysicians who, in making these abstractions, think they are making
analyses, and who, the more they detach themselves from things, imagine
themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of penetrating to their
core -- these metaphysicians in turn are right in saying that things here below
are embroideries of which the logical categories constitute the canvas. This is
what distinguishes the philosopher from the Christian. The Christian, in spite
of logic, has only one incarnation of the Logos; with the philosopher
there is no end to incarnations. If all that exists, all that lives on land, and
under water can be reduced by abstraction to a logical category -- if the whole
real world can be drowned thus in a world of abstractions, in the world of
logical categories -- who need be astonished at it?
"All that exists, all that lives on land and under water, exists and lives only
by some kind of movement. Thus, the movement of history produces social
relations; industrial movement gives us industrial products, etc.
"Just as by dint of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical
category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic
distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition
-- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement. If one finds
in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has found in
the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only
explains all things, but also implies the movement of things....
"Up to now we have expounded only the dialectics of Hegel. We shall see later
how M. Proudhon has succeeded in reducing it to the meanest proportions. Thus,
for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just what is
happening in his own mind. Thus the philosophy of history is nothing but the
history of philosophy, of his own philosophy. There is no longer a 'history
according to the order in time,' there is only 'the sequence of ideas in the
understanding.' He thinks he is constructing the world by the movement of
thought, whereas he is merely reconstructing systematically and classifying by
the absolute method of thoughts which are in the minds of all." [Marx
(1976), pp.162-65. Italic emphases
in the original. Minor typos and a few major errors corrected. (I have informed
the editors at the Marxist Internet Archive about them!) Quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
For all the
obsessive interest shown in the subject by subsequent Marxists, there is
little more that Marx says about Philosophy after
the late 1840s. Clearly, he meant what he said when he told us he had
"left philosophy aside". Even in the 1840s -- when compared to the vast
majority of subsequent Marxists on this topic -- it is clear that Marx
wasn't "a Marxist"!
Notes
01.
Much of the background to this Essay is based on Wittgenstein's work, helpfully
outlined for us in Harrison (1979) and Hanna and Harrison
(2004). See also, Baker and Hacker (1984, 1988, 2005a). Some of what I have to
say here coincides with the anti-metaphysical views expressed in
Rorty (1980)
(this links to a PDF). I distance myself, however, from Rorty's anti-Realism,
his (inconsistent) attempt to establish a
'metaphysics of mind', and his rather odd equation of Philosophy with some form of literary criticism.
[Rorty defends his view of Wittgenstein in Rorty (2010). On that, see Horwich
(2010), which is an effective reply (not that I agree with
everything Horwich has to say!).]
1.
Some might take exception to my use of "metaphysical" to describe such
sentences. If so, they can substitute the words "dogmatic", "essentialist"
or "necessitarian" for "metaphysical" in phrases like "metaphysical theory" used
throughout this Essay. That done, not much will be changed by such
terminological alterations. It is the logical status of such sentences
that is important, not what we call them. [More on that
below.]
Here are a few
relevant quotations about motion and matter from
Engels and Lenin.
Here,
first, is Engels:
"Motion
is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable
as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and
indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes)
expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same.
Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred. When motion is
transferred from one body to another, it may be regarded, in so far as it
transfers itself, is active, as the cause of motion, in so far as the latter is
transferred, is passive. We call this active motion force, and the
passive, the manifestation of force. Hence it is as clear as daylight
that a force is as great as its manifestation, because in fact the same
motion takes place in both. A motionless state of matter is therefore one of
the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphasis alone added.
Paragraphs merged.]
"Motion in the most general sense, conceived as the
mode of existence, the inherent attribute, of matter, comprehends all changes
and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to
thinking." [Engels
(1954), p.69. Bold emphasis added.]
Here,
second, is Lenin quoting Engels:
"In
full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it,
Frederick Engels wrote in
Anti-Dühring
(read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....'
'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin
(1914), p.8. Bold emphasis added.]
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with
whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Lenin
(1972), p.311.]
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically
implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human
mind and reflected by it." [Ibid.,
p.312.]
"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole
unconditional recognition of nature's existence outside the mind and
perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist
agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid.,
p.314.]
"The fundamental characteristic of materialism is
that it starts from the objectivity of science, from the recognition of
objective reality reflected by science." [Ibid.,
pp.354-55.]
Nevertheless,
as we will see in Essay Thirteen
Part One, even though these two dialecticians believe motion
and matter are inseparable, Lenin's other defining criteria for anything to be
classified as matter
fail to exclude the existence of motionless matter.
Anyway, as these passages reveal, Lenin characterised matter in a rather odd
way: i.e., as that which exists "objectively" outside, and independently of, the
mind. He also quoted Engels approvingly to the effect that motion is the "mode" of the existence of matter.
But, if
all motion is relative to a given
reference frame, then it is entirely possible to
picture certain bodies as motionless with respect to some frame or other. The contrary
view may only be maintained if space is held to be
Absolute.
That condition aside, this means that motion is reference
frame-sensitive. If it can disappear when we change reference frames, motion
can't be the
mode of the existence of matter, as Lenin and Engels surmised. In which
case, it is perhaps more appropriate to characterise Engels and Lenin's way of
depicting motion as a
form of
representation and, as such, regard it as
convention-sensitive.
[Anyway, this form of relativity is
apparently a consequence of the
principle of equivalence postulated by the TOR.]
[TOR =
Theory Of Relativity.]
"Form of representation"
will be explained more fully Essay Thirteen Part Two; however, it is
connected with the following comments of Wittgenstein's:
"Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description
of the world. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on
it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always
approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the
surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every
square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a
unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional, since
I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or
hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the
description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the
surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than with a fine
square mesh (or conversely), and so on. The different nets correspond to
different systems for describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of
description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the
description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of
propositions -- the axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for
building the edifice of science, and it says, 'Any building that you want to
erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these bricks,
and with these alone.'
"And
now we can see the relative position of logic and mechanics. (The net might
also consist of more than one kind of mesh: e.g. we could use both triangles
and hexagons.) The possibility of describing a picture like the one
mentioned above with a net of a given form tells us nothing about the
picture. (For that is true of all such pictures.) But what does characterize
the picture is that it can be described completely by a particular net with
a particular size of mesh.
"Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian
mechanics tells us nothing about the world: but what does tell us something
about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these
means. We are also told something about the world by the fact that it can be
described more simply with one system of mechanics than with another."
[Wittgenstein (1972),
6.341-6.342, pp.137-39.]
Of course, a form of representation is much more involved than
this passage might suggest (for instance, it leaves out of account how
theories are often inter-linked or are coordinated with one another, and it seems to suggest that physics is an
a-historical, non-social discipline).
Thomas
Kuhn's more considered thoughts about what he calls a "paradigm"
are, in some
respects, a little closer to what is meant by "form of representation" at
this site; on this, see Kuhn (1970, 1977, 1996, 2000). See
also Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) -- especially Masterman (1970) --, as well as Sharrock
and Reed (2002). This topic
is also connected with Wittgenstein's ideas about "criteria" and "symptoms". [On
that, see here. Cf., also, Glock (1996), pp.129-35. As noted above, I will say more about this
in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
Update October 2011: A recent example of the employment of just
such a form of representation (or, rather, several such forms) might assist the reader understand this phrase a
little more clearly. In
late September 2011, the
news media were
full of stories about
an experiment which appeared to show that a beam of
neutrinos
had
exceeded the speed of light. Here is how the New Scientist handled the
story (the relevant aspects of a range of different but intersecting forms of representation
being employed here -- albeit expressed rather sketchily -- have been highlighted
in bold):
"'Light-speed' neutrinos point to new physical reality.
"Subatomic particles have broken the
universe's fundamental speed limit, or so it was reported last week.
The speed of light is the ultimate limit on travel in the universe,
and the basis for
Einstein's special theory of relativity, so if the
finding stands up to scrutiny, does it spell the end for physics as
we know it? The reality is less simplistic and far more interesting.
'People were saying this means Einstein is
wrong,' says physicist Heinrich Päs of the Technical University of
Dortmund in Germany. 'But that's not really correct.'
"Instead, the result could be the first
evidence for a reality built out of extra dimensions. Future
historians of science may regard it not as the moment we abandoned
Einstein and broke physics, but rather as the point at which our
view of space vastly expanded, from three dimensions to four, or
more.
'This may be a physics revolution,' says
Thomas Weiler
at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee,
who has devised theories built on extra dimensions. 'The famous
words 'paradigm shift' are used too often and tritely, but they
might be relevant.'
"The subatomic particles -- neutrinos -- seem
to have zipped faster than light from
CERN, near Geneva,
Switzerland, to the OPERA detector at the
Gran Sasso lab near L'Aquila, Italy. It's a conceptually simple
result: neutrinos making the 730-kilometre journey arrived 60
nanoseconds
earlier than they would have if they were travelling
at light speed. And it relies on three seemingly simple
measurements, says Dario Autiero of the Institute of Nuclear Physics
in Lyon, France, a member of the OPERA collaboration: the distance
between the labs, the time the neutrinos left
CERN,
and the time they arrived at Gran Sasso.
"But actually measuring those times and
distances to the accuracy needed to detect nanosecond differences is
no easy task. The OPERA collaboration spent three years chasing down
every source of error they could imagine...before Autiero made the
result public in a seminar at CERN on 23 September.
Physicists grilled Autiero for an hour
after his talk to ensure the team had considered details like the
curvature of the Earth, the tidal effects of the moon and the
general relativistic effects of having two clocks at different
heights (gravity slows time so a clock closer to Earth's surface
runs a tiny bit slower).
"They were impressed. 'I want to congratulate
you on this extremely beautiful experiment,' said Nobel laureate
Samuel Ting
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after
Autiero's talk. 'The experiment is very carefully done, and the
systematic error carefully checked.'
Most physicists still expect some sort of
experimental error to crop up and explain the anomaly, mainly
because it contravenes the incredibly successful
law of special relativity
which
holds that the speed of light is a constant that no object can
exceed. The theory also leads to the famous equation E =
mc2.
"Hotly anticipated are results from other
neutrino detectors, including
T2K in Japan
and
MINOS at
Fermilab
in Illinois, which will run similar experiments and
confirm the results or rule them out (see 'Fermilab
stops hunting Higgs, starts neutrino quest').
In 2007, the MINOS experiment searched for
faster-than-light neutrinos but didn't see anything statistically
significant. The team plans to reanalyse its data and upgrade the
detector's stopwatch. 'These are the kind of things that we have to
follow through, and make sure that our prejudices don't get in the
way of discovering something truly fantastic,' says
Stephen Parke
of Fermilab.
"In the meantime, suggests
Sandip Pakvasa of the University of Hawaii, let's suppose the
OPERA result is real. If the experiment is tested and replicated and
the only explanation is faster-than-light neutrinos, is E =
mc2 done for? Not necessarily. In 2006, Pakvasa, Päs and
Weiler came up with a model that
allows certain particles to break the cosmic speed limit
while leaving special relativity intact.
'One can, if not rescue
Einstein, at least leave him valid,' Weiler says.
"The trick is to send neutrinos on a
shortcut through a fourth, thus-far-unobserved dimension of space,
reducing the distance they have to travel. Then the neutrinos
wouldn't have to outstrip light to reach their destination in the
observed time.
In such a universe, the particles and forces
we are familiar with are anchored to a four-dimensional membrane, or
'brane',
with
three dimensions of space and one of time. Crucially, the brane
floats in a higher dimensional space-time called the bulk, which we
are normally completely oblivious to.
"The fantastic success of special
relativity up to now, plus other cosmological observations, have led
physicists to think that the brane might be flat, like a sheet of
paper.
Quantum fluctuations
could make it ripple and roll like the
surface of the ocean, Weiler says. Then, if neutrinos can break free
of the brane, they might get from one point on it to another by
dashing through the bulk, like a flying fish taking a shortcut
between the waves....
"This model is attractive
because it offers a way out of one of the biggest
theoretical problems posed by the OPERA result: busting
the apparent speed limit set by neutrinos detected
pouring from a supernova in 1987.
As stars explode in a
supernova,
most of their energy streams out as neutrinos. These
particles hardly ever interact with matter (see 'Neutrinos:
Everything you need to know').
That means they should escape the star almost
immediately, while
photons of light will take about 3
hours. In 1987, trillions of neutrinos arrived at Earth
3 hours before the dying star's light caught up. If the
neutrinos were travelling as fast as those going from
CERN to OPERA, they should have arrived in 1982.
"OPERA's neutrinos were about 1000
times as energetic as the supernova's neutrinos, though.
And Pakvasa and colleagues' model calls for neutrinos
with a specific energy that makes them prefer tunnelling
through the bulk to travelling along the brane. If that
energy is around 20
gigaelectronvolts -- and the team don't yet know
that it is -- 'then you expect large effects in the
OPERA region, and small effects at the supernova
energies,' Pakvasa says. He and Päs are meeting next
week to work out the details.
"The flying fish shortcut isn't
available to all particles.
In the language of string
theory, a mathematical model some physicists hope will
lead to a comprehensive 'theory
of everything', most particles are represented by
tiny vibrating strings whose ends are permanently stuck
to the brane. One of the only exceptions is the
theoretical 'sterile
neutrino', represented by a
closed loop of string. These are also the only type of
neutrino thought capable of escaping the brane.
"Neutrinos are known to switch
back and forth between their three observed types (electron,
muon
and
tau
neutrinos), and OPERA was originally designed to
detect these shifts. In Pakvasa's model, the muon
neutrinos produced at CERN could have transformed to
sterile neutrinos mid-flight, made a short hop through
the bulk, and then switched back to muon before
reappearing on the brane.
"So if OPERA's results hold up,
they could provide support for the existence of sterile
neutrinos, extra dimensions and perhaps string theory.
Such theories could also explain why gravity is so weak
compared with the other fundamental forces. The
theoretical particles that mediate gravity, known as
gravitons, may also be closed loops of string that
leak off into the bulk.
'If, in the end, nobody sees
anything wrong and other people reproduce OPERA's
results, then I think it's evidence for string theory,
in that string theory is what makes extra dimensions
credible in the first place,' Weiler says.
"Meanwhile, alternative theories
are likely to abound. Weiler expects papers to appear in
a matter of days or weeks.
Even if relativity is pushed
aside, Einstein has worked so well for so long that
he will never really go away. At worst, relativity will
turn out to work for most of the universe but not all,
just as Newton's mechanics work until things get
extremely large or small. 'The fact that Einstein has
worked for 106 years means he'll always be there, either
as the right answer or a low-energy effective theory,'
Weiler says." [Grossman (2011),
pp.7-9. Bold emphases added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Some links added.
Several paragraphs merged. See also a report in
Socialist Review.]
The long-term success of Einstein's theory and the fundamental
nature of the speed of light mean that physicists will search for other
explanations of this anomaly while remaining committed to the TOR (even if
this implicates other theories, such as
M-theory, for example). So, the TOR (combined or not with other theories) is used as a
form of representation; that is, it is employed -- analogously like the square or the triangular mesh to which
Wittgenstein alluded above --, in order to make sense of, or re-interpret,
experimental evidence, even if the latter might seem to have refuted already
accepted theory, so that it no longer appears to
do so. This approach also sanctions certain inferences as 'legitimate', others as
'illegitimate' or 'suspect'. In this way, too, scientists police their own discipline
(otherwise known as "peer
review").
[QM =
Quantum
Mechanics;
TOR = Theory of Relativity.]
As we now
know,
several errors were later discovered in the above readings, meaning that this
experiment in the end failed to threaten fundamental tenets of modern physics.
But, other forms of representation were used to decide even
this!
It is interesting to note, however, that some scientists were quite happy to
weave these bogus results -- before they were 'exposed' -- into new, or
into other, theories in order to make sense of them, so that this anomalous data
(rather than accepted theory) remained 'valid'. The significance of that observation will become
clearer in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.
[Incidentally, this highlights a growing problem in contemporary science,
covered in more detail in Essay Eleven
Part One --
science by press release.]
Returning to the main theme (i.e., whether or
not motion is reference-frame sensitive or a "mode of the existence of matter"):
Some might think that QM has shown this
to be incorrect (in that it holds that all forms of matter are in ceaseless
motion), but this is 'true' only because of a theoretical inference.
There is no conceivable way that this supposedly universal truth can be
confirmed throughout nature, for all of time. In that case, it has to be read
into nature, or imposed on it, metaphysically -- or, indeed, perhaps
also as a "form
of representation" in its own right.
But, even if it could be confirmed,
the depiction of motion as a "mode
of the existence of matter" (rather than as a highly confirmed property of matter) would still depend on
space being Absolute.
Moreover, there is no conceivable observation, or body of observations, that could confirm
the supposed fact that motion is a "mode of the existence of matter". Indeed, as noted
above, if a relevant reference frame is chosen, which is moving at the same relative velocity as any
'particle' it is 'tracking', that would render it motionless relative to that frame (even if
the location of one or both of these was thereby
indeterminate, according to certain interpretations of QM).
Of course, it is controversial whether or not there are any
sub-atomic particles, as opposed to probability waves (or excitations of
'the field' -- I have covered this in more detail in Essay Seven
Part One), but, even if such particles were viewed as probability waves (or
the like), the specification of a particle's probable
velocity (relative to some frame) would similarly mean it was zero. [On this in
general,
see Castellani (1998).]
It could be argued that this just shows that all bodies are in
constant motion relative to one another, which is all that DM-theorists
need. But, as was pointed out above, even then motion would still
be reference-fame sensitive, and hence it couldn't be a "mode" of the existence
of matter, otherwise that wouldn't be the case.
It would
seem, therefore, that Lenin and Engels need space to be Absolute if their claim
that motion is a "mode of the existence of matter" is to
hold water.
It could be objected once more that Lenin's views aren't
metaphysical. That objection might itself be based on Engels's own loose
characterisation of Metaphysics:
"To the metaphysician, things and their mental
reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and
apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for
all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is
"yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.'
[Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.] For him a thing either exists or does not exist;
a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and
negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid
antithesis one to the other.
"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us
very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound
common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four
walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide
world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even
necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the
nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a
limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in
insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets
the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets
the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their
motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." [Engels
(1976), p.26. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Italic emphasis in the original.]
Other
DM-fans have also endorsed this view of Metaphysics (as we will see below)
So,
Engels appears to believe that metaphysicians are committed to the belief that:
(1)
"Things" exist in isolated units with no interconnections.
(2)
They don't change.
(3)
They exist in "irreconcilable
antitheses", which appears to imply that the LEM applies across the board.
And that:
(4)
Metaphysics is the same as, or is expressed by, "commonsense", which works
reasonably well in everyday circumstances, but beyond that, in scientific or
even philosophical surroundings it soon becomes "one-sided, restricted,
abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions", and, among other things, can't
see "the wood for the trees".
[LEM = Law Of Excluded Middle.]
Given
the above description, it could be argued that DM isn't metaphysical.
First
of all, Engels offered his readers absolutely no evidence in support of these
sweeping allegations (for example, taken from the History of Philosophy).
Second, there have been countless Philosophers and Mystics who believed that
everything is interconnected, and which changed as a result of a "unity of
opposites". [On that, see
here, here
and here.] Of
course, DM-supporters classify thinkers like this as fellow-travellers (of
sorts), who thought 'dialectically' not metaphysically. However, it is even more
revealing to classify this tradition as just another strand of the set of ideas of the
ruling-class that always rule.
Third, we have already seen that it is impossible to make sense of DM-criticisms
of the LEM -- on that see
here. If so, 'commonsense' (whatever it is!) would be well advised to stick with the
LEM.
Finally, in the Essays posted at this site, we have witnessed DM-theses regularly
collapse into incoherence, so there is little room for DM-fans to crow about
the superiority of their theory. Indeed, Essay Seven
Part Three shows that if DM were true, change would be impossible.
However, Engels's depiction of Metaphysics would unfortunately rule out
as non-metaphysical much of previous 'non-dialectical' philosophy. Even Plato would have admitted
that things change (albeit if only with respect to appearances).
It could be countered that this
is incorrect; only DM pictures things as fundamentally
changeable, fundamentally
Heraclitean,
and only DM relates this to change through internal contradiction (etc.).
Well, we have seen, here,
here and
here that that isn't really
so. Even in DM, some things stay the same until or unless a sufficient
quantitative change induces a commensurate qualitative change -- namely,
and at least including, all those "essences" that Hegel borrowed from Aristotle, which Engels
also
unwisely appropriated from one or both of them -- just as dialecticians also
tell us that some things are 'relatively stable'
(whatever that means!).
"It is even more important to remember this point when we
are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of
development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one
cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old
and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a
dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their
struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a
whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for
opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the
unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and
transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex-pressing the infinity
of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a
relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite
objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its
constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of
thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They
are constantly in conflict, fighting each other." [Spirkin
(1983), pp.143-144. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"All rest is however
relative, while motion and change are absolute. This is to be understood
as an indication of the self-activity of matter, rather than in the sense
that motion is possible without rest.... Any state is temporary and
transient, and any thing or phenomena has a beginning and end to its existence.
The motion of matter is uncreatable and indestructible. It can only change
its forms. No single phenomenon or object can lose its ability to change or
be deprived of motion under any conditions....
"The source of the
internal activity of matter lies within it, in its inherent potentiality for the
perpetual changeability of its concrete shape and form of existence.
Motion is absolute, for it is unrelated to anything external that could
determine it. There is nothing else in the world except eternally moving matter,
its forms, properties and manifestations...." [Kharin (1981), pp.62-63. Bold
emphases added.]
"To
say that everything is in a constant process of development and change is not,
of course, to deny that things can be relatively unchanging and stationary. It
is, however, to say that rest is 'conditional, temporary, transitory [and]
relative' whereas 'development and motion are absolute'...." [Sayers (1980a), p.4. Sayers is here
quoting
Lenin (1961), p.358, and not p.360 as Sayers has it. Bold emphasis added.]
It
isn't easy to see how the above can be reconciled with the idea that "motion is
the mode of existence of matter".
Be this as
it may, Engels's view of Metaphysics is (yet again!) a crude version of Hegel's
ideas on this topic. As Houlgate points out:
"Metaphysics is characterised in the Encyclopedia
first and foremost by the belief that the categories of thought constitute 'the
fundamental determinations of things'.... The method of metaphysical philosophy, Hegel maintains,
involves attributing predicates to given subjects, in judgements.
Moreover just as the subject-matter of metaphysics consists of distinct
entities, so the qualities to be predicated of those entities are held to be
valid by themselves.... Of any two opposing predicates, therefore, metaphysics
assumes that one must be false if the other is true. Metaphysical philosophy is
thus described by Hegel as 'either/or' thinking because it treats predicates or
determinations of thought as mutually exclusive, 'as if each of the two terms in
an anti-thesis...has an independent, isolated existence as something substantial
and true by itself.' The world either has a beginning and end in time or it does
not; matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; man is either a rigidly
determined being or he is not. In this mutual exclusivity, Hegel believes, lies
the dogmatism of metaphysics. In spite of the fact that metaphysics deals with
infinite objects, therefore, these objects are rendered finite by the employment
of mutually exclusive, one-sided determinations -- 'categories the limits of
which are believed to be permanently fixed, and not subject to any further
negation.'" [Houlgate (2004), pp.100-01. Paragraphs merged.]
But, as has been argued
elsewhere
at this site, this puts Hegel himself in something of a bind, for he certainly
believed that metaphysics was this but not that (i.e., it was
either this or it was that, not both), and that unfortunately
means
even he
had to apply the LEM to make his point!
Of
course, it could be argued that the above observations aren't
"judgements" about the fundamental nature of things -- but then again,
that objection itself must use the LEM to make its point, for it takes as
granted that the above paragraph is saying this, but not that
(again, that it was either this or it was that, not both) about the
fundamental nature of things. Indeed, even
Hegel's
conclusions about the content of any metaphysical 'judgement' (i.e., that it says
either this or that, not both) would require an implicit, or even an explicit, use of the LEM.
We can go
further, any 'leap' into 'speculative' thought to the effect that this or that, or whatever,
has been
'negated', must implicate the LEM, too; for it will either be the case, or
it will not, that for any randomly-selected dialectical 'negation', it will have
taken place
or
it won't. Naturally, this would imply that Hegel's thought (and that of
anyone who agrees with him) -- i.e., that Hegel said this or that, not
both -- was
as
metaphysical as anything
Parmenides
or Plato came out with.
That is,
if we were foolish enough to rely on Hegel to tell us
what "Metaphysics" means!
The
conventions of ordinary language (partially codified in the LEM, in this case)
aren't so easily side-stepped, even by a thinker of "genius".
[Again,
on
the LEM and Hegel, see Essay Nine
Part One.]
Independently of that, it
might now be wondered: What marvellous solution to the
antinomy concerning the origin of the universe did Houlgate manage to find
in Hegel's work? Or even the one concerning the infinite divisibility of matter?
Apparently
only this:
"Oh dear! It's
all so contradictory!"
Well, that
clears things up and no mistake.
Hegel's
ideas, not science, were the source of Engels's confused musing in this
area, although, oddly enough,
much of what Hegel had to say about Metaphysics in the Preface
to the First Edition of The Science of Logic, actually agrees with much of what is
said about it in this Essay (even though Hegel also drops a heavy hint that this
characterisation is now obsolete, or so he thought). Here is part of it:
"That which, prior to this period, was
called metaphysics has been, so to speak, extirpated root and branch and has
vanished from the ranks of the sciences. The ontology, rational psychology,
cosmology, yes even natural theology, of former times -- where is now to be
heard any mention of them, or who would venture to mention them? Inquiries,
for instance, into the immateriality of the soul, into efficient and final
causes, where should these still arouse any interest? Even the former proofs of
the existence of God are cited only for their historical interest or for
purposes of edification and uplifting the emotions. The fact is that there
no longer exists any interest either in the form or the content of metaphysics
or in both together. If it is remarkable when a nation has become indifferent to
its constitutional theory, to its national sentiments, its ethical customs and
virtues, it is certainly no less remarkable when a nation loses its
metaphysics, when the spirit which contemplates its own pure essence is no
longer a present reality in the life of the nation.
"The exoteric teaching of the Kantian
philosophy -- that the understanding ought not to go beyond experience, else
the cognitive faculty will become a theoretical reason which by itself generates
nothing but fantasies of the brain -- this was a justification from a
philosophical quarter for the renunciation of speculative thought. In support of
this popular teaching came the cry of modern educationists that the needs of the
time demanded attention to immediate requirements, that just as experience was
the primary factor for knowledge, so for skill in public and private life,
practice and practical training generally were essential and alone necessary,
theoretical insight being harmful even. Philosophy [Wissenschaft] and
ordinary common sense thus co-operating to bring about the downfall of
metaphysics, there was seen the strange spectacle of a cultured nation without
metaphysics -- like a temple richly ornamented in other respects but without a
holy of holies. Theology, which in former times was the guardian of the
speculative mysteries and of metaphysics (although this was subordinate to it)
had given up this science in exchange for feelings, for what was popularly
matter-of-fact, and for historical erudition. In keeping with this change,
there vanished from the world those solitary souls who were sacrificed by their
people and exiled from the world to the end that the eternal should be
contemplated and served by lives devoted solely thereto -- not for any practical
gain but for the sake of blessedness; a disappearance which, in another context,
can be regarded as essentially the same phenomenon as that previously mentioned.
So that having got rid of the dark utterances of metaphysics, of the colourless
communion of the spirit with itself, outer existence seemed to be transformed
into the bright world of flowers -- and there are no black flowers (there
are now! -- RL), as we know." [Hegel (1999),
pp.25-26, §§2-3. Bold emphases alone added. Minor typo corrected; I have
informed the on-line editors.]
Of course, modern metaphysicians would laugh at
Hegel's question "Where are they now?" since metaphysics (as traditionally
conceived) has roared back over the last century-and-a-half. and is, alas, alive
and well and being practiced in a University/College near you.
Independently of that, we have also seen that Hegel was the main source of the slippery reasoning
one encounters time and again in 'dialectical thought', the sort that 'allows'
dialecticians to ignore the contradictions and equivocations in their own theory while
pointing fingers at others for the very same alleged misdemeanours and sins. [There is
much more on this in Essay Eleven Part
One and
here.]
However, Cornforth (1950)
presents two main arguments aimed at
countering the standard view of Metaphysics employed in this Essay:
(1) Cornforth claims that the modern characterisation of
Metaphysics derives from
John
Locke (p.94), even though Cornforth himself had already pointed out that the term was
in fact introduced by Aristotle (p.93). [And it seems to be inconsistent with
Hegel's depiction of it, above.] He makes this connection because he wants
to maintain that modern
Philosophers reject Aristotle's search for the "essential nature of the real"
(p.94), deliberately running-together the ideas of the
Positivists
he is attacking with the views of every modern (non-Communist) Philosopher. This allows him to
reject the Positivists' understanding of Metaphysics as if it were held by each and every
non-Communist Philosopher!
First of all,
even when Cornforth was writing
this (circa 1950), only a
tiny minority of Analytic Philosophers (never mind the rest of the profession) were Positivists, so this can't be a valid reason for rejecting
the standard interpretation handed down from Aristotle. And it can't be a good reason
either for present-day dialecticians
to reject the interpretation promoted in this Essay, which in no way depends on Locke.
[Although Cornforth is right when he says that
Empiricism
and Positivism are both metaphysical; but then so is DM.]
Second, even if every (non-communist) Philosopher on the planet in 1950 had been
a Positivist, it is clear that they would have rejected Metaphysics because, as Positivists,
they accepted
the traditional view of Metaphysics, which itself stretches way back beyond Locke. Cornforth just asserts
that these Philosophers could trace their understanding of this word
(i.e., "metaphysics") back to
Locke, but he provides us with no evidence whatsoever that this is so -- not even one citation!
Anyone who reads the work of the Positivists, or even the
Logical Positivists, will see that they weren't just hung up on the nature
of "substance" (which Cornforth focuses on simply because of what Locke had
said about it), but all areas of Traditional Metaphysics.
A good place to start here is
Ayer (2001)
-- this links to a PDF -- which is
an excellent representative of the Simplistic Wing of Logical Positivism.
A more substantial version can be found
in, say,
Carnap (1950). [See also Carnap (1931) --
'The Elimination Of Metaphysics Through
The Logical Analysis Of Language'.]
More reliable accounts of this
(now) obsolete current in
Analytic
Philosophy can be found, for example, in the following: Copleston (2003b), Friedman (1999), Hacker (2000c), Hanfling (1981), Misak (1995), and
Passmore (1966). See also, Conant (2001).
[I
would recommend Soames (2003a, 2003b), here, but Soames is
highly unreliable in his discussions of Wittgenstein and
Ordinary Language Philosophy. On that, see
Hacker (2006); this links to a PDF.]
(2) Cornforth then argues
as follows:
"Such an attempt, however, to define 'metaphysics' in
terms of its subject-matter, is hardly satisfactory. For in a sense all science,
as well as philosophy, is concerned with the substance of things and with the
nature of the world. If, then, to speak of the substance of things and the
nature of the world is 'metaphysical', then science itself has a 'metaphysical'
tendency." [Cornforth (1950), p.94. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
To be sure,
metaphysical ideas have dominated much of science, but that is because "the
ideas of the ruling-class always rule". And yet, science has progressively
distanced itself from the influence of metaphysics, especially in areas where an
interface with the material world becomes paramount (for instance, in Chemistry,
Geology, much of Biology, most of Physics -- and, of course, Technology). [Why
that is so will discussed in Essay Thirteen Part Two,
when it is published.]
Even so, Cornforth's argument still depends on
the
unsupported claim that Metaphysics is as he says Positivists define it.
Anyway, Cornforth is being disingenuous here, for DM itself goes way beyond modern science in seeking
to pontificate, for
example, about motion, telling us that it is a "mode of the existence of matter",
or that it is "contradictory"
-- or, indeed,
about the "essence of Being" ("Thing-in-Itself"), the "interpenetration of opposites", the "negation of the negation",
and so on. These
vague and dubious 'concepts' certainly fit the traditional interpretation of Metaphysics.
To be
sure, the exact boundary between Metaphysics and Science might be hard to
define, but that doesn't mean there is no difference between the two. There is a
difference between night and day even though the boundary between them is
impossible to delineate. [Again, I will say more about this in Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
These
appear to be the only two substantive arguments Cornforth offered in support of
his rejection of the traditional interpretation of Metaphysics, and thus in
favour of his adoption of the characterisation he found in Hegel and Engels
(pp.95-98) -- although, oddly enough, Cornforth doesn't mention from whom Engels
pinched this idea. But, it is quite clear that all three had to modify
considerably the meaning of "metaphysics" to make their fanciful ideas seem
to work -- plainly in order to try both to distinguish and to distance Metaphysics from DM
(pp.98-101). This is, of course, just another excellent example of the sort of
special pleading DM-fans are well practised at invoking.
Of course, all this is independent of Marx's
own characterisation of Metaphysics. For example, in The Poverty of
Philosophy, he had this to say:
"We shall now have to talk
metaphysics while talking political economy. And in this again we shall but
follow M.
Proudhon's 'contradictions.' Just now he forced us to speak English, to
become pretty well English ourselves. Now the scene is changing. M. Proudhon is
transporting us to our dear fatherland and is forcing us, whether we like it or
not, to become German again. If the Englishman transforms
men into hats, the German transforms hats into ideas. The Englishman is
Ricardo,
rich banker and distinguished economist; the German is Hegel, simple professor
at the University of Berlin.
"Louis
XV, the last absolute monarch and representative of the decadence of French
royalty, had attached to his person a physician who was himself France's first
economist. This doctor, this economist, represented the imminent and certain
triumph of the French bourgeoisie. Doctor
Quesnay
made a science out of political economy; he summarized it in his famous
Tableau économique. Besides the thousand and one commentaries on this table
which have appeared, we possess one by the doctor himself. It is the 'Analysis
of the Economic Table,' followed by 'seven important observations.'
M. Proudhon is another Dr.
Quesnay. He is the Quesnay of the metaphysics of political economy.
"Now metaphysics -- indeed
all philosophy -- can be summed up, according to Hegel, in method. We must,
therefore, try to elucidate the method of M. Proudhon, which is at least as
foggy as the Economic Table. It is for this reason that we are making seven more
or less important observations. If Dr. Proudhon is not pleased with our
observations, well, then, he will have to become an
Abbé
Baudeau and give the 'explanation of the economico-metaphysical method'
himself....
"Apply this method to the
categories of political economy and you have the logic and metaphysics of
political economy, or, in other words, you have the economic categories that
everybody knows, translated into a little-known language which makes them look
as if they had never blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason; so much do
these categories seem to engender one another, to be linked up and intertwined
with one another by the very working of the dialectic movement. The reader must
not get alarmed at these metaphysics with all their scaffolding of categories,
groups, series, and systems. M. Proudhon, in spite of all the trouble he has
taken to scale the heights of the system of contradictions, has never been able
to raise himself above the first two rungs of simple thesis and antithesis; and
even these he has mounted only twice, and on one of these two occasions he fell
over backwards." [Marx
(1976), pp.161-65. Quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Links added; several paragraphs merged. I have used the on-line version here, but
have also corrected any typos I managed to spot.]
As seems clear from the above, Marx doesn't
appear to agree with Engels over the nature of Metaphysics, clearly linking
it with "dialectics" (albeit the 'dialectical method' Proudhon extracted from
Hegel's work).
Be
this as it may, I don't want to get hung up on a
terminological point, so I recommend that anyone who objects to the
usual definition of "Metaphysics" (and its cognates) -- or even
the phrase "Traditional Philosophy" -- used at this site,
perhaps, preferring Engels's own characterisation, substitute the following for
it:
"[T]he branch of philosophy concerned with
explaining the ultimate nature of reality, being, and the world."
The
above is a description of Metaphysics we find over at
Wikipedia,
which is, I think, reasonably accurate, if a little brief. The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy is a little more specific:
"Metaphysics, most generally the philosophical
investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality. It is
broader in scope than science..., since one of its traditional concerns is the
existence of non-physical entities, e.g., God. It is also more fundamental,
since it investigates questions science does not address but the answers to
which it presupposes. Are there, for instance, physical objects at all, and does
every event have a cause?" [Butchvarov (1999), p.563.]
Here is how the Stanford Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy characterises it (re-formatted):
"If metaphysics now considers
a wider range of problems than those studied in
Aristotle's
Metaphysics, those problems continue to belong to its subject-matter. For
instance, the topic of 'being as
such' (and 'existence as such', if existence is something other than being) is one of the matters that belong to metaphysics on any conception of
metaphysics. The following theses are all paradigmatically
metaphysical: 'Being is; not-being is not' [Parmenides];
'Essence precedes existence' [Avicenna,
paraphrased]; 'Existence in reality is greater than existence in the
understanding alone' [St
Anselm, paraphrased]; 'Existence is a perfection' [Descartes,
paraphrased]; 'Being is a logical, not a real
predicate' [Kant,
paraphrased]; 'Being is the most barren and abstract of all categories' [Hegel,
paraphrased]; 'Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the
number zero' [Frege];
'Universals
do not exist but rather subsist or have being' [Russell,
paraphrased]; 'To be is to be the value of a
bound variable' [Quine];
'An object's degree of being is
proportionate to the naturalness of its mode of existence'
[McDaniel]."
[Inwagen, Sullivan and
Bernstein (2023).
Italic emphases in the original. Links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
This is how
Paul Moser
defines it:
"Philosophers of all stripes have theories to offer, for
better or worse.... Theories in philosophy, whether good or bad, aim to explain
something, to answer certain explanation-seeking questions.... What is being?
What is thinking? What is knowledge? What are we?... Rare is the philosopher
with no theory whatsoever to offer. Such would be a philosopher without a
philosophy...." [Moser (1993), p.3. I owe this reference to Hutto (2003),
pp.194-95.]
Finally, here is Dario
Cankovic's characterisation of 'Western Philosophy' (with which I largely
agree):
"Philosophy, at least in the Western tradition
(and this includes Islamic philosophy which is a direct continuation of the
tradition of Late Classical-era philosophy), goes through two-phases. The first
metaphysical pre-Kantian phase of philosophy conceives of its activity as
investigation of the mind-independent necessary metaphysical structure of the
world. The second transcendental Kantian phase conceives of its activity as
investigation of the mind-constitutive world-constituting necessary
transcendental structure or structuring principles of thought itself. While
Kant's Copernican revolution is certainly a revolution in philosophy, insofar as
in trying to render philosophy scientific it radically changes the way
philosophy is done, it doesn't represent a complete break with philosophy.
Philosophy remains an effort to understand the world and ourselves a priori.
Furthermore, both conceive of the objects of their investigation, whether
metaphysical or transcendental, as necessary and immutable, as ahistorical
or transhistorical, without or outside of history.
"Self-conceptions of philosophers aside,
philosophy is not a transhistorical category, it is a human activity and a body
of theories with a history. It is conceptual investigation and invention
born out of a fascination with and misunderstanding of necessity. It is
decidedly pre-scientific in that it is an attempt to understand nature,
ourselves and our place in it through the lens of language, though not
self-consciously so. This fascination and misunderstanding is a consequence of
our alienation from our collective agency. While humanity shapes and is shaped
by nature and our concepts, this collective capacity doesn't extend to
individual human beings. We create concepts in an never-ending exchange with
nature, but you and I as individual human beings are inducted into a community
of language-users of an already formed language and brought forth into an
already reformed world. We -- collectively and individually -- we are ignorant
of our own history." [Quoted from
here.
Italics in the original. The rest of this article is an excellent antidote
to the idea that Marx was a philosopher. Typo corrected; link and bold
emphases added.]
Even so, whatever this
ancient
intellectual pursuit is
finally called, it is abundantly clear that DM-theorists attempt to do
some of the above themselves --, i.e., they endeavour to "explain the ultimate nature of reality, being
and the world" in their own idiosyncratic, dogmatic, sub-Hegelian
fashion. They also ask and attempt to
answer similar questions along similar lines, albeit
with a view to changing the world.
Indeed, they
have adopted
much the same approach to Philosophy
as the Traditional Metaphysicians to whom Moser (above) alludes -- that is, they attempt to derive fundamental
truths about reality from a handful of jargonised expressions, which are then imposed on
nature, and said to be valid for all of space and time.
[This was demonstrated in detail in
Essay Two. Precisely how this
series of verbal tricks
works is, of course, the subject of Parts One to Seven of the present Essay! See also Essay Three
Part One, where
much that will be argued here in Essay Twelve was set up.]
As far as the attempt to define Metaphysics as
the study of things that don't change, this is what
the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
had to say:
"Ancient and Medieval philosophers might have
said that metaphysics was, like chemistry or astrology, to be defined by its
subject matter: metaphysics was the 'science' that studied 'being as such' or
'the first causes of things' or 'things that do not change.' It is no longer
possible to define metaphysics that way, and for two reasons. First, a
philosopher who denied the existence of those things that had once been seen as
constituting the subject-matter of metaphysics -- first causes or unchanging
things -- would now be considered to be making thereby a metaphysical assertion.
Secondly, there are many philosophical problems that are now considered to be
metaphysical problems (or at least partly metaphysical problems) that are in no
way related to first causes or unchanging things; the problem of free will, for
example, or the problem of the mental and the physical." [Inwagen,
Sullivan and Bernstein (2023).
Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this
site; bold emphasis added.]
And, one might add, the 'problem' of change itself.
A useful (and thoroughly traditional) account of the nature of Metaphysics can be
found in Van Inwagen (1998), but there are countless books that cover the same
ground. For a
useful review of attempts to define Metaphysics, see Moore (2013), pp.1-22
-- although, it is revealing that philosophers can't even agree among
themselves what this
word means!
This
underlines what I posted on Quora recently (in answer to the question:
"Where should I begin if I want to study Philosophy?"):
First, dial down
your expectations. Not one single 'philosophical problem' posed by Ancient Greek
thinkers (or any others since) has been solved, or even remotely solved. Nor are
they likely to be. After 2500 years of this, we don't even know the right
questions to ask, for goodness sake!
As Oxford University Philosopher, Peter Hacker, noted:
"For two and a half millennia some of the best minds in European culture have
wrestled with the problems of philosophy. If one were to ask what knowledge has
been achieved throughout these twenty-five centuries, what theories have been
established (on the model of well-confirmed theories in the natural sciences),
what laws have been discovered (on the model of the laws of physics and
chemistry), or where one can find the corpus of philosophical propositions known
to be true, silence must surely ensue. For there is no body of philosophical
knowledge. There are no well-established philosophical theories or laws. And
there are no philosophical handbooks on the model of handbooks of dynamics or of
biochemistry. To be sure, it is tempting for contemporary philosophers,
convinced they are hot on the trail of the truths and theories which so long
evaded the grasp of their forefathers, to claim that philosophy has only just
struggled out of its early stage into maturity.... We can at long last expect a
flood of new, startling and satisfying results -- tomorrow.
"One can blow the Last Trumpet once, not once a century. In the seventeenth
century Descartes thought he had discovered the definitive method for attaining
philosophical truths; in the eighteenth century Kant believed that he had set
metaphysics upon the true path of a science; in the nineteenth century Hegel
convinced himself that he had brought the history of thought to its culmination;
and Russell, early in the twentieth century, claimed that he had at last found
the correct scientific method in philosophy, which would assure the subject the
kind of steady progress that is attained by the natural sciences. One may well
harbour doubts about further millenarian promises."
[Hacker (2001c), pp.322-23.]
Second, begin with Bertrand Russell's Problems of Philosophy, which as about
as good an introduction to Traditional Philosophy as you could wish to find --
which is also well written.
Then, perhaps read some of the more accessible 'classics', such Descartes's
Meditations, or his Discourse, Hume's Enquiries, Berkeley's
Three
Dialogues, Plato's Republic, or his Meno (Aristotle is, alas, far too
difficult!), Kant's Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics -- steer clear of
Hegel (who is impossibly difficult).
All of the above
(except Hacker) -- and much more besides -- are available here:
http://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/philclassics.html
Then, check out a
completely different approach to the subject:
Ludwig
Wittgenstein's Blue Book.
http://www.geocities.jp/mickindex/wittgenstein/witt_blue_en.html
Traditionally
Philosophy has been regarded as a sort of 'super-science', a discipline capable
of revealing fundamental truths about 'reality', valid for all of space and
time, ascertainable from thought, or from language, alone -- or, indeed, as some
sort of uniquely authoritative moral or political guide, or perhaps even a clue
to the 'meaning of life'. But it isn't like any science you have ever heard of.
Traditional Philosophers typically spend a few hours in the comfort of their own
heads -- by-passing all those boring observations and experiments, with their
expensive equipment and a requirement that the individual concerned becomes
technically competent --, and, hey presto, they emerge with a set of
super-cosmic verities.
This isn't to deny
that some philosophers engaged in empirical work -- for example, Aristotle --
but that wasn't a core aspect of their work. Moreover, the sciences have
gradually freed themselves from Traditional Philosophy by subjecting their work
to empirical test (howsoever one interprets this). Nor is it to deny that
scientists don't indulge in amateur metaphysics (especially in their
popularisations), speculating about the nature of space or time, for example.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
But, Traditional
Philosophy is quintessentially a 'conceptual enquiry', which, directly or
indirectly, revolves around what certain words mean (such as, 'time', 'space',
'matter', 'knowledge', 'belief', 'existence', 'identity', 'meaning', 'language',
'causation', 'justice', 'freedom', 'fate', 'good', 'evil', 'god', 'soul', etc.,
etc.), but this is in fact provides us with a clue to its fatal defects, and why
it hasn't advanced one nanometre closer to a 'solution' to its 'problems' than
Plato or Aristotle themselves managed.
I have attempted
to explain why that is so, here (using Wittgenstein's ideas):
http://www.anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why_all_philosophical_theories_are_non-sensical.htm
[Which essay
actually part of a political debate on the Marxist left. But you don't have to
know anything about the latter to follow my argument!]
The deflationary
approach to Metaphysics adopted at this site is discussed in more detail in
Baker (2004b) and
Rorty (1980)
-- however, concerning Rorty's work, readers should note the caveats I posted
earlier.
Incidentally, the ideas presented in this Essay shouldn't be
confused with those developed by the
Logical
Positivists (henceforth, LP-ers) -- although there are several
superficial similarities, 'only at the margins', as it were -- for example, a handful
of those expressed in
Ayer (2001), pp.1-29.
[This links to a PDF.]
Even so, the differences between my ideas and those
expressed by LP-ers are
quite profound. For instance, I am not offering a criterion of meaning
(in fact, I hardly mention this term (i.e., "meaning") as LP-ers intended it
to be understood, in
this Essay. Moreover, and by way of contrast, I begin with how we
ordinarily understand empirical or factual propositions, and to that end I use a term Wittgenstein
introduced, "sense", to capture
it. This approach shows that the LP-ers got things the wrong way round; it is
our grasp of the sense of a proposition that enables us to determine
whether or not it is capable of being verified or falsified, not the other way
round. As I point out,
if we didn't already understand a given proposition, we wouldn't be able to
verify/falsify it, or, for that matter, know whether or not it is capable of being
verified/falsified. Indeed, how would anyone go about trying to verify a proposition they
hadn't already understood? Finally, "meaning" is a highly complex term that was
grossly oversimplified by the LP-ers. [I say more about this in Essay Thirteen
Part Three; see
also here, and
below.]
So, verification can't be
a fundamental, or
even a significant, factor in
connection with our ordinary use of factual language. Hence, even though
The
Verification Principle has now been totally abandoned, its defects (real or
imagined) have absolutely nothing to do with the ideas expressed in this Essay,
or at this site.
2.
Again,
Essay Two highlighted
the many occasions where modal terminology was employed by DM-theorists (in place of more tentative or
reasonable summaries of the available evidence, or intended to 'beef up' their use of the
indicative mood).
Here are a few such
passages from
the DM-classicists and 'lesser' DM-luminaries:
"Dialectics requires an all-round
consideration of relationships in their concrete development…. Dialectical logic
demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should
be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…."
[Lenin (1921), pp.90. Bold emphases added.]
"As we already know that all things change, all
things are 'in flux', it is certain that such an absolute state of rest
cannot possibly exist. We must therefore reject a condition in which
there is no 'contradiction between opposing and colliding forces' no disturbance
of equilibrium, but only an absolute immutability…." [Bukharin (1925), p.73.
Bold emphases added.]
"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook,
the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand
the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations
with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as
their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its
movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it
lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal
contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development...." [Mao
(1961), pp.313. Bold emphasis added.]
"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist
without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This
'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and
events. Both attraction and repulsion are
necessary properties of matter. Each attraction in one place is
necessarily compensated for by a corresponding repulsion in another place…."
[Conze (1944), pp.35-36. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Nature cannot be unreasonable or reason
contrary to nature. Everything that exists must have a necessary and
sufficient reason for existence…. The material base of this law lies in the actual
interdependence of all things in their reciprocal interactions…. If
everything that exists has a necessary and sufficient reason for existence,
that means it had to come into being. It was pushed into existence and forced
its way into existence by natural necessity…. Reality, rationality and
necessity are intimately associated at all times…. If everything actual is necessarily rational,
this means that every item of the real world has a sufficient reason for
existing and must find a rational explanation…." [Novack (1971), pp.78-80. Bold
emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Positive is meaningless without negative. They
are necessarily inseparable....
This universal phenomenon of the unity of
opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in
nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible
as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the
heart of all forms of matter." [Woods and Grant (1995/2007), pp.65-68. Bold emphases
added; paragraphs merged.]
[See also this Essay,
above.]
3.
Plainly, this isn't meant to
be an exhaustive list of such sentences; the examples listed were chosen
to make a particular point about the connection between metaphysical sentences
and what look like ordinary empirical propositions. Several more
examples, taken from Traditional Metaphysics and DM-sources, have been quoted
below.
As Glock
makes this point:
"Wittgenstein's ambitious claim is that it is
constitutive of metaphysical theories and questions that their employment of
terms is at odds with their explanations and that they use deviant rules along
with the ordinary ones. As a result, traditional philosophers cannot coherently
explain the meaning of their questions and theories. They are confronted with a
trilemma: either their novel uses of terms remain unexplained
(unintelligibility), or...[they use] incompatible rules (inconsistency), or
their consistent employment of new concepts simply passes by the ordinary use --
including the standard use of technical terms -- and hence the concepts in terms
of which the philosophical problems were phrased." [Glock (1996), pp.261-62.]
3a.
However, I will have to qualify this comment
later on in this Essay since it is clear that mathematical
propositions can't be true in the same way that empirical propositions plainly can.
4.
It could be
objected that to acknowledge, say, M9 as true does in fact require some input from the
material world.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
Certainly, human beings have to live
in this world to be able to assert things like M9 -- if only to
learn what
the relevant words mean. But, as we will see later,
even though ordinary-looking words are being used in such sentences, they (or, rather,
the novel expressions invented by metaphysicians and the ordinary words they use in radically new ways) can't
be
part of the vernacular, as
Glock pointed out above.
Notwithstanding this, the
fact remains that, unlike M6, it isn't possible to establish the (alleged) truth-status of M9 by
comparing it with reality.
In response, it could be
argued that M9 is a general proposition whereas M6 is particular.
That is undeniable
-- but
it isn't relevant. Consider another general, but no less empirical proposition:
E1: All
badgers living within a five mile radius of the centre of
Luton
on August 25th 2017 have eaten hazel nuts at least once that day.
Now,
you can 'reflect' on E1 until the cows next evolve, but that will still fail to tell you whether or
not it is true. Even though E1 might never be fully confirmed (although, it
wouldn't be
impossible to do so if it were to be investigated promptly with enough resources devoted to
the task -- even if it might prove easier to falsify),
observation alone would be accepted as relevant to
that end. Understanding E1 in fact tells us what to look for, what will confirm
it and what will confute it, even if we never succeed in ascertaining
either, or had no desire to do so.
That isn't
the case with
M9.
Finally, it could be
objected that M9 (and M1a) are in fact summaries of the evidence we
currently possess. This objection
has already been fielded in Note Two,
but more fully in Essay Two. [See
also here.]
Anyway, as we will see
later, M9 and M1a aren't
even empirically true -- if we were to insist on reading them that way.
[But, on
this, also see Note 5
and Note 5a, below.]
5. As should seem obvious, M9
has been included in this list not just because of its connection with M1a and other DM-claims,
but because dialecticians appear to regard it (or, at least, P4) as an
a priori truth which
they feel they can assert dogmatically
--, or, rather, the language they
use makes
it difficult to defend them from just such an accusation.
However, even though M9 might look self-evident
(to DM-theorists), not everyone
would agree. Up until relatively recently (i.e., before, say, 1600), the idea
that matter was naturally motionless (or, rather, the belief that effort had to be
expended in order to put material bodies into motion and keep them
moving) was uncontroversial. Indeed, that theory was
a cornerstone of Aristotelian Physics,
supported by countless observations over many centuries. It took a conceptual revolution
to persuade post-Renaissance theorists to accept the idea that motion is a
'natural' state of material bodies (or, to be more honest, Aristotelians had to
die out before such a conceptual shift became possible). Of course, that
intellectual development was itself motivated by
NeoPlatonic
and
Hermetic
ideas circulating around Europe at the time, and wasn't based on observation,
either.
M9: Motion is inseparable from matter.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[References supporting the above assertions can be accessed
here. The idea that matter is self-moving
originated in Plato, but it is arguable that it pre-dated even him; on that see
here.]
We have also seen -- here
and here -- that Lenin's theory that
matter is 'self-moving' would in fact make of Newtonian mechanics obsolete, and was itself
based on the ancient, mystical
dogma that
nature is in effect a
self-developing
Cosmic Egg.
The point is, of course, that even though DM-theorists themselves believe that matter is always in
motion, it is possible to think of it otherwise.
Indeed, as noted above,
if a suitable reference frame is chosen, a moving body
can be regarded as stationary with respect to that frame. Hence, not only is matter
without motion 'thinkable', most people who have thought about this topic have
found little difficulty in so thinking. Indeed, the idea is now
theoretically respectable. Anyone who doubts that claim should check
this and this
out, and then perhaps reconsider.
5a0. If this weren't the case, then nothing determinate will have been proposed (i.e., put forward for
consideration) and sentences like M6 would fail even to be propositions.
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The Algebra
of Revolution.
Hence, it is possible to understand M6 without knowing whether or not it is true
-- or even if M6a were the case:
M6: Tony Blair owns a copy of The
Algebra of Revolution.
M6a: Tony Blair doesn't own a copy of
The Algebra of Revolution.
On the other hand, if neither
were the case (whether we knew so or not), or could be the case,
M6 and M6a would both fail to be propositions. In that eventuality, it
would be entirely unclear precisely what they were proposing or putting forward for consideration.
Of course, to those of a 'dialectical' frame-of-mind, the above
application of the LEM
is
anathema, a sure sign of 'formal thinking' (i.e., the implication that
M6 and M6a are either true or false). In response, it is worth
pointing out that this endlessly recycled DM-objection is in fact self-refuting, since it, too,
relies on the LEM. That is because it must be the case that any application of
the LEM is either an application of the LEM or it isn't -- it can't be both.
Indeed, an
example of 'formal thought' is either an example of 'formal thought', or it
isn't -- it can't be both. A defect in the LEM is a defect or it isn't. Hence, any DM-fan brave enough to attack the LEM will
have to use it (explicitly or implicitly) in order to criticise it or highlight its supposed limitations, rendering that
criticism null and void.
[Of course, if it is unclear whether or not a supposed application
of the LEM is in fact an application of the LEM, then that, too, is either unclear
or it isn't, and we are back where we started.]
However, as will also be pointed out later, the above application
of the LEM in fact follows from the
bi-polarity of empirical propositions.
Incidentally, throughout this
Essay I have used
rather stilted phrases like "It is possible to understand every word of M6
without knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false". That is because there is a world of difference between
the following:
A1: It is possible to understand every word of M6 without
knowing whether it is true or false;
and,
A2: It is possible to understand every word of M6 without
knowing whether it is true or knowing whether it is false.
As will be explained later, it is
implicit in the rules we have for
the application of words like "empirical" and "factual" -- that
is, that an empirical
proposition can only assume one of two truth-values (true or false). In other
words, such propositions are "bivalent" and have true-false polarity --, but it
isn't part of those rules that we must know whether such a
proposition is true or know whether such a proposition is false in order
to understand it. All we
need know is that it could be one or the other, not both. In fact, this rule lies
behind the fact that we can understand such sentences before we know
whether they are true or whether they are false. That involves comprehending
what would make them true or would make them false.
If that weren't so, it would be indeterminate what
was being proposed or put forward for consideration -- which
would in turn be enough to deny that the sentence in question was an empirical proposition
to begin with.
[I
have explained this idea in greater detail
below. On Hegel's 'apparent rejection' of the LEM, or his attempt to
criticise it, see
here. Even so, the limitations of this 'Law' lie elsewhere;
on that, cf., Peter Geach's article 'The Law of
the Excluded Middle', in Geach (1972a), pp.74-87.]
5a.
It could be objected that DM-theorists do
in fact supply evidence in support of this theory. Often they appeal to the
'whole of science', or, perhaps, the 'human experience in general' in support. Molyneux (2012), quoted
below, is just the latest example
of DM-hand-waving,
Mickey Mouse Science of this sort.
However, this doctrine
also follows from the idea that motion is
the "mode of the existence of matter" (i.e., P4):
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
Hence,
for dialecticians, these two
'concepts', matter and motion, can no more be separated than, say,
the words "number" and "six".
"Motion is the mode of existence of matter.
Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be….
Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as
the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing
in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be
created; it can only be transmitted…. A motionless state of matter therefore proves to
be one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas…." [Engels (1976), p.74.
Italic emphasis in the original. Paragraphs merged.]
While evidence can and has been used to show that matter
moves (not that it was ever in doubt!), no
amount of evidence could show that motion is the "mode of the existence of matter",
or that motion without matter is "unthinkable" --,
that is, that matter can't exist unless it is moving, or that we can't
think about it except in this way.
And that is what
makes the 'evidential display'
aired in the DM-literature the charade it is. What little evidence DM-theorists bother to scrape-together is used solely illustratively;
i.e., it isn't
used to establish the truth of a given DM-claim, merely to make it seem
clearer, more plausible, or perhaps even more 'scientific' -- and plainly to novices.
No independent expert in the relevant fields would accept it a proof. In
Essay Seven, this approach to knowledge was
dubbed, "Mickey
Mouse Science". And the accuracy of that observation is itself
confirmed by the further fact that this particular thesis (about the universal
nature of motion) is based on Hegel's dogmatic assertions (as is much
else we find in
DM), who arrived at such conclusions before
very much evidence was available.
Of course, this particular idea was ultimately derived from
Heraclitus, who
advanced claims like this before there was any
scientific data at all! Indeed, he arrived at this 'Super-Scientific
truth', valid for all of space and time, by merely thinking about the
possibility of stepping into the same river more than once!
Unfortunately, Heraclitus even screwed this up! [On that, see
Essay Six.]
All
DM-theses possess little other than a priori, dogmatic credentials like this, so it is
no use dialecticians pretending their doctrines were originally motivated by evidence,
or even by a summary of contemporaneous evidence.
[There is more on that
here and in the next few
Parts of Essay Twelve (when they are published).]
5b.
In fact, it is hard to imagine single experiment that could be carried
out aimed at confirming such hyper-bold theories. Because they are derived from
thought/language alone, they reflect their inventor's determination to use words
idiosyncratically. Each of these
Cosmic Verities is then used as a rule to interpret
experience (as a form of
representation -- albeit an incoherent form or representation, as we will see), and
hence they
are used to dictate to nature how it must be, what it must contain and how it
must
act. That is, of course, why they seem so 'self-evident' to those who
concoct them, why so
many modal terms are used in their formulation, why
no confirming experiments are called for and why none are ever carried out.
After all, has a single DM-supporter ever even so much as proposed a method for testing -- let
alone actually proceeding to test -- the veracity of the vast majority of DM-theses?
After all, why test what appear to be self-evident truths? Who ever tests
whether vixens are female foxes?
So, what test,
for example, could be proposed for checking whether motion was the
'mode of existence of matter'? Or, indeed, whether all change is the result of
'internal contradictions'? Or,
for that matter,
whether everything in the
entire universe is inter-connected? Or even whether
Being is different from but at the same time identical with Nothing, the
contradiction resolved in Becoming?
It could be objected that Trotsky, for
example, did in fact propose an experiment -- whereby bags of sugar could be
weighted to test the validity of the LOI. However, anyone who thinks that what
Trotsky proposed could rightly be described as an "experiment" has a novel
understanding of the nature of that word. Since I have covered this
topic at length in Essay
Six, the reader is directed there for more details.
[LOI = Law of Identity.]
Unfortunately for dialecticians, this
immediately divorces their 'Super-Truths' from a materialist account of nature
and society. If, however, the 'truth' or the 'falsehood' of DM-theories like these
is dependent on thought alone, how could these 'Cosmic Verities' be anything other than Ideal?
As George Novack
pointed out:
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]
Worse still: if DM-claims are indeed
Idealist, how could they be used to help change
the world?
Well, as we saw in Essay Nine
Part Two, that
isn't strictly true. They can be so used -- but only negatively
--, in
ways that benefit the ruling-class, heaping ordure on Marxism.
Small wonder
then that DM has presided over 150 years of almost total failure. [More on
that in Essay Ten
Part One.]
6.
Metaphysical statements like the following: "I
think therefore I am", "To
be is to be perceived", and "To
be is to be the value of a bound variable" are all in the indicative mood.
[A dozen or so examples have been posted
below.]
Admittedly, some
of these pronouncements are 'supported' by a series of short, or even a few
protracted
arguments, which are merely used to help 'derive' these 'Super-Truths' from
still other a priori
theses, 'self-evident truths', assorted 'thought experiments,
stipulative definitions and hence, ultimately from words. However, their 'veracity' isn't
based on evidence, but on what their constituent words or concepts (and those of any
supporting ideas) seem to mean. The nature of their derivation means they
can be viewed as universal truths in no need of evidential support.
We saw this was the case with Engels and Lenin, whose conclusions about matter
and motion followed from P4:
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[The
significance of the above comments will be explored as this Essay
unfolds.]
6a. Again, it could be
objected that Lenin actually devoted an entire
section in MEC to supporting this claim of his. Hence, the allegations advanced
in this Essay are entirely baseless.
Or, so it could be claimed....
Unfortunately, Lenin
actually spent the bulk of the aforementioned section
of MEC to picking
a fight with various Idealists, which makes much of what he had to say irrelevant to the
concerns addressed in this Essay (and, indeed, irrelevant to supporting the above objection!).
However, in order to consider every conceivable avenue
open to DM-fans to defend Lenin, it is necessary to check whether or not his arguments hold together,
even in their own terms.
Lenin's opening point
in this part of MEC (I am ignoring the preamble on pp.318-19
since it seems to add nothing substantial) is this:
"Let us imagine a consistent idealist
who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take
'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical
idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that
the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas,
sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject and
regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his ideas
come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' -- and
that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of thinking.
And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the solipsist
if he consistently adheres to his view." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20.
In the above, and in what follows, the quotation marks have been altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
As we will see in Essay Thirteen
Part One, Lenin's principal tactic
when confronting ideas he doesn't like is to caricature them -- the above being
an excellent example of this. "The entire world is his sensation"?! I can think of
no Idealist of note who has ever argued this. [Email
me if you disagree and can name a few such (with proof!).]
Even so, the force of Lenin's
argument depends on his running-together two senses of "move". This allows him
to insinuate that any Idealist who claims that "the world is motion" must
somehow be contradicting herself, since her thoughts (and hence her world,
presumably) "move". Now, even if we allow Lenin to get away with this
conflation, how this shows that "motion without matter is unthinkable"
is still far from clear.
It could be argued in defence of Lenin that for an
Idealist, even
thinking about matter involves motion, namely the motion of their own
thoughts. In that case, motion without matter is indeed unthinkable. But,
and once again, even if we accept Lenin's equivocation between these two senses
of "move", we have already seen that he declared that:
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
In that case, if an Idealist thinks of something non-material
(such as 'god'), and his/her thought 'moves' in order to do this, then motion
without matter is thinkable, nay actual, after all! [Whether 'God' is material or not
will be discussed in Essay Thirteen
Part One, but it is difficult to think of a single DM-fan who would want to argue
that 'He/She/It' is!] Moreover, a consistent Idealist (of the sort Lenin is
caricaturing) would probably conclude that while her ideas might move this
doesn't
imply the motion of matter, since she denies there is such a thing as
matter (i.e., as conceived by materialists).
Nevertheless, what
devastating dialectical argument does Lenin deploy in order to cast even
this straw doctrine into oblivion? Wonder no more:
"The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation. Therefore, to divorce motion from matter is equivalent to
divorcing thought from objective reality, or to divorcing my sensations from the
external world -- in a word, it is to go over to idealism. The trick which is
usually performed in denying matter, and in assuming motion without matter,
consists in ignoring the relation of matter to thought. The question is
presented as though this relation did not exist, but in reality it is introduced
surreptitiously; at the beginning of the argument it remains unexpressed, but
subsequently crops up more or less imperceptibly.
"Matter
has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to draw epistemological
conclusions. But has thought remained? -- we ask. If not, if with the
disappearance of matter thought has also disappeared, if with the disappearance
of the brain and nervous system ideas
and sensations, too, have disappeared -- then it follows that everything has
disappeared. And your argument has disappeared as a sample of 'thought' (or lack
of thought)! But if it has remained -- if it is assumed that with the
disappearance of matter, thought (idea, sensation, etc.) does not disappear,
then you have surreptitiously gone over to the standpoint of philosophical
idealism. And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to
conceive of motion without matter, for tacitly, by the very fact that
they continue to argue, they are acknowledging the existence of thought
after the disappearance of matter. This means that a very simple, or a very
complex philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a very simple one, if it is
a case of frank solipsism (I exist, and the world is only my
sensation); a very complex one, if instead of the thought, ideas and sensations
of a living person, a dead abstraction is posited, that is, nobody's thought,
nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, but thought in general (the Absolute Idea,
the Universal Will, etc.), sensation as an indeterminate 'element,' the
'psychical,' which is substituted for the whole of physical nature, etc., etc.
Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism are possible and it
is always possible to create a thousand and first shade; and to the author of
this thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for example) what
distinguishes it from the rest may appear to be momentous. From the standpoint
of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely unessential. What is
essential is the point of departure. What is essential is that the attempt to
think of motion without matter smuggles in thought divorced
from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism." [Ibid.,
pp.320-21. Emphases in the original.]
This passage more than most
exposes Lenin's philosophical naivety, if not incompetence; this topic will be discussed in detail in Essay Thirteen
Part One.
However, for present purposes, we need only note that all that the above 'argument' demonstrates is that
Lenin based his own ideas on the fact that he had 'images' of
something-or-other, and that what they 'reflect' must therefore exist. He supported
this inference with a dubious claim that whatever is reflected in the mind must
exist in the external world -- on that, see
below.
But,
even if we were recklessly charitable, the very most that this 'argument'
could conceivably establish is that Lenin's images correspond to his own image of reality,
since all he has are images with which to compare his other images! He has
no way of comparing his images with anything which isn't also an image. He
couldn't jump 'out of his head' to access the world 'directly' in order to
check his images against the reality he thinks they 'reflect'.
An appeal to
practice at this point would be to no avail
either, since, if Lenin were right, all he would have are images of
practice!
[I
hasten to add that this doesn't imply that I doubt the
existence of the external world! But, anyone who agrees with Lenin faces serious
problems, since they can only
appeal to faith in support of their belief in 'objective reality'. In which case,
they are philosophically no better off than
Bogdanov and the others Lenin was criticising in MEC -- the "Fideists", as he
called them. (As noted above, I have gone into this at much greater length in Essay Thirteen
Part One.)]
Hence, at most
all that the above passage shows is that materialists (according to Lenin's
definition of them) have a different view of reality from Idealists, not that
Idealists can't think about motion. Indeed, he all but admits that they
can do so:
"And this always happens with people who wish, for 'economy's sake,' to conceive
of motion without matter...." [Ibid.]
"We
thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable
without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this
point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is
the connection between philosophical
idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from
force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter?"
[Ibid.,
p.319. Bold emphasis and link added.]
"What is essential
is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in
thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism."
[Ibid.,
p.321.]
He
does, however, lay this rather odd argument across his readers:
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only
an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot
exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists
independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes
the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge."
[Ibid.,
p.69.
Bold emphasis added.]
This one is even clearer
and more direct:
"The image inevitably and
of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'"
[Ibid.,
p.279.
Bold emphasis added.]
[Nevertheless, how
Lenin knew the above was true for other minds -- which
can't actually be minds, since they exist outside his mind, since, by his own
criterion means they must be material! -- he kept
to himself.]
Now,
the inference that images imply the existence of the thing imaged is manifestly
absurd. If that were the case, we would have to start believing in the
real existence of Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy, for example. [On this,
see
here and the
extended discussion
here. Of course, since Lenin didn't believe in Santa Claus and the
Tooth Fairy, it is clear that he either didn't really believe
"The image inevitably and
of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'",
or he hadn't thought through the implications of his theory too well. And the same can be
said of his epigones, who have uncritically swallowed this view of perception
and knowledge.]
But, even if Lenin were right,
how does any of this show that motion without matter is inconceivable or "unthinkable"? Indeed, not only is motion without
matter conceivable, it is actual. Several examples of this everyday
phenomenon have been itemised later on in this
Essay.
Again,
the most this argument is
capable of
establishing is that the idea of motion and the idea of matter are
inseparable, or that the idea of motion without the idea of matter
is unthinkable, but then only for "materialist" and "matter" defined in Lenin's rather odd way.
Lenin had no way of breaking out of this Idealist circle.
However, Lenin has another argument up the image of his sleeve. After a detour
that took him into a consideration of
Bogdanov's ideas, he declared:
"Ostwald's
answer, which so pleased Bogdanov in 1899, is plain sophistry. Must our
judgments necessarily consist of electrons and ether? -- one might retort to
Ostwald. As a matter of fact, the mental elimination from 'nature' of matter as
the 'subject' only implies the tacit admission into philosophy of thought
as the 'subject' (i.e., as the primary, the starting point, independent
of matter). Not the subject, but the objective source of sensation is
eliminated, and sensation becomes the 'subject,' i.e.,
philosophy becomes
Berkeleian, no matter in what trappings the word 'sensation' is afterwards
decked. Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative
(materialism or idealism) by an indefinite use of the word 'energy,' but this
very endeavour only once again goes to prove the futility of such artifices. If
energy is motion, you have only shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the
predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the
question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place
outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas,
symbols, conventional signs, and so forth? And this question proved fatal to the
'energeticist' philosophy, that attempt [sic] to disguise old epistemological errors
by a 'new' terminology." [Ibid.,
p.324.]
This
amounts to arguing against 'energeticists' (i.e., those who claim that matter does not exist, or that
it is
simply energy) that they have merely:
"shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the
predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the
question, is energy material?" [Ibid.]
Well, if Lenin's words alone were sufficient, they would
settle the issue. Unfortunately, they aren't. So, what argument does he offer in support of his idiosyncratic
'translation' of "Does matter move?" into "Is energy material?"
Apparently none
at all -- or, none other than the following idiosyncratic re-definition of
"matter" (which he repeats endlessly
throughout MEC without once trying to justify it):
"The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation." [Ibid.,
p.320.]
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with
whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind." [Ibid.,
p.311.]
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically
implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human
mind and reflected by it." [Ibid.,
p.312.]
"[I]t is the sole categorical, this sole
unconditional recognition of nature's existence outside the mind and
perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist
agnosticism and idealism." [Ibid.,
p.314. Italic emphases in the original.]
So, Lenin's only justification seems to be that to deny, or
reject, what he
or Engels asserts is to brand oneself an Idealist. However, since Lenin failed to show that
his own ideas (supposedly about reality, 'reflected in the mind', etc.) don't
collapse into Idealism themselves this is no help at all.
Exactly how Lenin's ideas collapse into Idealism will be examined
at length in Essay Thirteen Part One, but the argument will revolve around his only apparent argument
for the existence of the external world (which we examined briefly above):
that an image implies the existence
of the thing imaged!
"Our sensation, our consciousness is only
an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot
exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists
independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes
the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge."
[Ibid.,
p.69.
Bold emphasis added.]
"The image inevitably and
of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 'images.'"
[Ibid.,
p.279.]
But, as pointed out earlier, all that Lenin had to
rely on here was his own image of a mirror
-- assuming that this is what lay behind his use of this
ancient Hermetic
metaphor. His knowledge of mirrors was his only guide when it came to using that figure of speech
-- i.e.,
the trope concerning 'reflection'. So, all he had were images of mirrors!
In which case, the most
this argument establishes is that images reflect other images!
Now, it could be argued that mirrors actually reflect the images
of objects, or they reflect objects themselves. This is undeniable; but
that response can only be maintained by those who reject Lenin's hopelessly confused epistemology,
who don't think that all we have available to us are images. That is because Lenin has yet to show that there
are real mirrors, as opposed to images of mirrors. Or, indeed, show that these images of mirrors
reflect objects as opposed to reflecting the images of images of 'objects'. His version of the traditional
representative theory of knowledge, whereby we represent the world to
ourselves (as 'ideas', 'concepts', 'images', or even 'representations') in our heads undercuts all
talk of an 'objective' world independent of our knowledge of it, as was
abundantly clear to
18th century Idealists
like Berkeley.
Now Lenin, and/or his apologists, might try to belittle, deny or repudiate that
line-of-argument, and then maybe kick up an image of
a cloud of dust (by
the use of the sort of repetitive bluster they learned from Lenin) to hide the fact that this image of Lenin's argument
doesn't work. But, to all but true believers it is plain that his
'theory' would transform the world into a set of images and, indeed, images of images.
And, as we will see below, it is no use Lenin, or one of his epigones, appealing
to the 'commonsense' ideas of ordinary folk to bail him out:
"Materialism deliberately makes the 'naïve' belief of mankind the foundation of
its theory of knowledge." [Ibid.,
p.69.]
However, if we now to address Lenin's actual inference, images don't in
fact imply the
existence of anything, since they are 'uninterpreted inner objects of cognition'
(to use traditional jargon). And an act of interpretation (i.e., which re-configures such objects as the images of this, or of that) would have nothing but
still other images
(interpreted or not) to assist it to that end. And, as we will see in
Essay Ten, practice can't turn
an image into something it isn't.
Still
less is it any use arguing that the human race wouldn't
have survived had their images of the world not approximately, or
even
exactly, corresponded with the world (or at least local parts of it),
since all Lenin and his supporters have in their heads are images of humanity
surviving. Both have yet to show that their images of humanity
doing anything actually correspond with anything outside the image they
have inside their heads/brains. Whatever evidence
they produce will be no more than another set of images, given this
defective epistemology and even more ridiculous starting point. Lenin has given us
no way of producing anything other than these yet-to-be-authenticated-images.
After all, no image can authenticate itself or, indeed, validate another image.
In addition, we have
already seen that Lenin's
approach to knowledge implies extreme scepticism. Hence, far from beginning with
the "naive beliefs" of ordinary folk, his theory in fact obliterates them
and their beliefs! If we were to believe what he says, both would just
be 'images' in his head.
The rest of Lenin's 'argument' in this section of MEC adds little
to the above (as will become apparent in Essay Thirteen
Part One); in that case, Lenin
failed to demonstrate by argument or evidence that motion without matter is "unthinkable".
7.
Of course, it is worth adding here that metaphysical theories aren't set in
concrete; they change and develop in accord with the rise and fall of each Mode
of Production, in line with the
ideological imperatives of each ruling elite, or those of any insurgent class
intent on replacing the old ruling elite -- or, indeed, in line with those of
these "prize fighters". [On this, see Shaw (1989).] Having said that, there is a common thread
running through each version of ruling-class Philosophy: the doctrine that Cosmic
Verities, valid for all of space and time, can be inferred from thought or language
alone.
To be sure, the very first Greek Philosophers didn't use the
word "metaphysics";
that term was introduced much later, by Aristotle. Nevertheless, the
various world-views on which
Super-Knowledge like this feed certainly date back (in the
'West')
at least to Anaximander
and Anaximenes.
In the 'East',
of course, it stretches even further back. [More on that in Note I above, and
in Parts Two and Three of this Essay.]
8.
These days 'necessary truths' tend to be defined
extensionally,
that is, they are said to be
true in every possible world [Kirkham (1992)]. That
odd idea will be examined
elsewhere at this site.
However, this isn't to suggest that all metaphysicians attached such modal
qualifications to the word "truth" -- certainly not pre-Leibniz. Hence, the use of the phrase "necessary truth" in these Essays (in
order to highlight the confusion that is alleged to exist between necessary and
contingent truths) is merely a handy way of underlining a common thread running
through the entire history of Metaphysics.
Clearly, some sensitivity needs to be shown when
analysing the metaphysical ideas of thinkers who wrote before this phrase
entered philosophical currency. Having said that, it is the use to which
a theorist puts his/her ideas that is important. If that use is no different from
the employment of genuinely necessary truths (as these have been conceived more recently), no serious distortion of
the original ideas need result.
On this, see the extended comments in "Grammar and Necessity" in
Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.263-347. Much that these two authors have to say is
consistent with the view adopted at this site -- but that work of theirs should be read in the light of
other references given below, particularly the work of David Bloor and
Martin Kusch. Nevertheless, it greatly extends and amplifies the comments made
about that topic in this Essay.
9. The
ease with which all metaphysicians perform this trick (i.e., deriving necessary truths
from a handful of words) isn't the only clue we
have about the real nature of the dogmatic theories Traditional Philosophers
conjure out of less than thin air. A detailed consideration of different
interpretations of the words used -- coupled with a demonstration that there are
other ways of viewing them (which are equally,
if not more, plausible) -- shows that metaphysical theories depend on little
other than a grim determination to use language in odd ways and/or
distort it.
Hence, it is possible to show that these 'Super-Truths' decay into incoherence
because they:
(a) Undermine key semantic features of discourse; and,
(b) Are based on a highly specialised,
limited, distorted or implausible use of language.
In which case, they can't be reflections of the 'necessary' or 'essential' features of
this universe
(or, indeed, of any universe). Far from depicting the 'logical
or essential form
of the world', they either express, or depend on, identifiable ruling-class
assumptions about the sort of universe that is conducive to their interests,
their determination to maintain power and reproduce contemporaneous relations of exploitation, or
they reflect
their inventor's determination to use language
idiosyncratically.
[These contentions will be substantiated in the next two Parts
of Essay Twelve; the other allegations will be substantiated in the later
Parts of the same
Essay.]
It
could be argued that the philosophical language is legitimate in itself, and
shouldn't be beholden to ordinary usage.
In response, the reader is referred back to
Glock's comments above, as well as
the following -- even though these words were largely aimed at Cognitive Scientists
and the analogy they draw is with
computers, they still in general apply to the point at issue:
"As
to the widespread disparagement of attempts to
resolve philosophical problems by way of appeals to 'what we would ordinarily
say', we would proffer the following comment. It often appears that those who
engage in such disparaging nonetheless themselves often do what they
programmatically disparage, for it seems to us at least arguable that many of
the central philosophical questions are in fact, and despite protestations to
the contrary, being argued about in terms of appeals (albeit often inept) to
'what we would ordinarily say...'. That the main issues of contemporary
philosophy of mind are essentially about language (in the sense that they
arise from and struggle with confusions over the meanings of ordinary words) is
a position which, we insist, can still reasonably be proposed and defended. We
shall claim here that most, if not all, of the conundrums, controversies and
challenges of the philosophy of mind in the late twentieth century consist in a
collectively assertive, although bewildered, attitude toward such ordinary
linguistic terms as 'mind' itself, 'consciousness', 'thought', 'belief',
'intention' and so on, and that the problems which are posed are ones which
characteristically are of the form which ask what we should say if
confronted with certain facts, as described....
"We have absolutely nothing
against the coining of new, technical uses [of words], as we have said. Rather,
the issue is that many of those who insist upon speaking of machines' 'thinking'
and 'understanding' do not intend in the least to be coining new, restrictively
technical, uses for these terms. It is not, for example, that they have decided
to call a new kind of machine an 'understanding machine', where the word
'understanding' now means something different from what we ordinarily mean by
that word. On the contrary, the philosophical cachet derives entirely from their
insisting that they are using the words 'thinking' and 'understanding' in the
same sense that we ordinarily use them. The aim is quite
characteristically to provoke, challenge and confront the rest of us. Their
objective is to contradict something that the rest of us believe. What the 'rest
of us' believe is simply this: thinking and understanding is something
distinctive to human beings..., and that these capacities set us apart from the
merely mechanical.... The argument that a machine can think or understand,
therefore, is of interest precisely because it features a use of the words
'think' and 'understand' which is intendedly the same as the ordinary use.
Otherwise, the sense of challenge and, consequently, of interest would
evaporate.... If engineers were to make 'understand' and 'think' into technical
terms, ones with special, technical meanings different and distinct from
those we ordinarily take them to have, then, of course, their claims to have
built machines which think or understand would have no bearing whatsoever upon
our inclination ordinarily to say that, in the ordinary sense, machines do not
think or understand." [Button, et al (1995), pp.12, 20-21. Italic
emphases in the original. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
Hence, if philosophers use, for example, the word "knowledge" in
an attempt to inform us what knowledge really is, but their use bears no
relation to how that word is normally employed, then what they have to say will
relate to 'knowledge', not knowledge, leaving the 'philosophical problem' of knowledge unaffected. [On that, see also Baz (2012)
and Coulter and Sharrock (2007).]
9a. Some might object
at this point and counter-claim that this emphasis on evidence, confirmation
and proof shows that the present author is indeed a
positivist,
or at least an
empiricist. Neither
is the case.
The present author is merely
holding DM-theorists to their word:
"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]
"All
three are developed by Hegel in his idealist fashion as mere laws of thought:
the first, in the first part of his Logic, in the Doctrine of Being;
the second fills the whole of the second and by far the most important part of
his Logic, the Doctrine of Essence; finally the third figures
as the fundamental law for the construction of the whole system. The mistake
lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of
thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and
often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be
arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the
product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [Engels
(1954),
p.62. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment.
"Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the
dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin
Hegelians of the older and younger line." [Ibid.,
p.47. Bold emphases alone
added.]
"The general results of the investigation of the world are
obtained at the end of this investigation, hence are not principles, points
of departure, but results, conclusions. To construct the latter in
one's head, take them as the basis from which to start, and then reconstruct the
world from them in one's head is ideology, an ideology which tainted every
species of materialism hitherto existing.... As Dühring proceeds from
'principles' instead of facts he is an ideologist, and can screen his being one
only by formulating his propositions in such general and vacuous terms that they
appear axiomatic, flat. Moreover, nothing can be concluded from them; one
can only read something into them...." [Marx and Engels (1987), Volume
25, p.597. Italic emphases in the original; bold emphasis added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
"The dialectic does not liberate the investigator from
painstaking study of the facts, quite the contrary: it requires it."
[Trotsky (1986), p.92. Bold emphasis added]
"Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the
Marxist cognition of the world. But this does not mean at all that they can be
applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever ready master key. Dialectics
cannot be imposed on facts; it has to be deduced from facts, from their
nature and development…." [Trotsky (1973),
p.233.
Bold emphasis added.]
The above source renders this passage slightly
differently, though:
"Dialectics and materialism comprise the basic elements of
the Marxist cognition of the world. But this by no means implies that they can
be applied in any field of knowledge like an ever-ready master-key. The
dialectic cannot be imposed on facts, it must be derived from the facts, from
their nature and their development." [Ibid.
Bold added.]
"Whenever any Marxist attempted to transmute the
theory of Marx into a universal master key and ignore all other spheres of
learning, Vladimir Ilyich would rebuke him with the expressive phrase
'Komchvanstvo' ('communist swagger')." [Ibid.,
p.221.]
"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from
principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition,
self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms
may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken
from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...."
[Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphases added.]
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right to lay
claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a standpoint
which demands that we should always seek to understand things just as they
are…without disguises and without fantasy….
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphases added.]
"[The laws of dialectics] are not, as Marx and
Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult empirical task of
tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key
whose only advantage is to turn up when no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998), p.9. Bold emphasis added.]
"'[The dialectic is not a] magic master key for
all questions.' The dialectic is not a calculator into which it is possible to
punch the problem and allow it to compute the solution. This would be an
idealist method. A materialist dialectic must grow from a patient,
empirical examination of the facts and not be imposed on them…."
[Ibid., p.271. Bold emphases added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
If this means I'm an empiricist/positivist,
then so was Marx:
"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones,
not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the
imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material
conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing
and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in
a purely empirical way....
"The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are
productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and
political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance
bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the
connection of the social and political structure with production. The social
structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of
definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or
other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate,
produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits,
presuppositions and conditions independent of their will." [Marx
and Engels (1970), pp.42, 46-47. Bold emphases added.]
Was Engels an
empiricist/positivist when he wrote the following?
"We all agree that in every field of science, in natural
and historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in
natural science therefore from the various material forms of motion of matter;
that therefore in theoretical natural science too the interconnections are
not to be built into the facts but to be discovered in them, and when discovered
to be verified as far as possible by experiment." [Engels
(1954),
p.47. Bold emphases alone
added.]
10. These allegations will also be
substantiated in later parts of Essay Twelve, as well as Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here).
However, it is important to note the following caveat (added to
Essay Nine Part One):
Having said that, it needs stressing up-front that it isn't being maintained here that leading
revolutionaries adopted ruling-class ideas duplicitously or
willingly. What is being alleged is that they did this
unwittingly. Exactly how and why they did so will be revealed in
Part Two.
11.
The word "can't" isn't meant to suggest a physical limit, here. It expresses
the fact that metaphysical theories soon descend into incoherent non-sense, and can't fail to do
so. That is because they attempt to transcend the expressive limitations of
language. [More on that below; see also
Note 9.]
11a0.
It is worth pointing out that at this site "non-sense"
is not the same as "nonsense". The latter term
has various meanings ranging from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a
shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$
6y3n3& 8FT34n").
"Non-sense", as this word is being used here, characterises indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of
expressing a sense no matter what we try to do with them. ["Sense" is
explained below.] That is, such sentences are
incapable of being true and they are incapable of being false. In
Metaphysics, as we have seen,
the indicative or fact-stating mood is plainly being mis-used, mis-applied or
misconstrued. So, when
sentences like these
are employed to state supposedly 'fundamental truths about reality', they badly misfire
since they can't possibly do that. [Later sections of this Essay will explain why that is so.]
Hence, non-sensical sentences as such are neither patently false nor plain
gibberish. [However, there are different sorts of non-sense. More about that later.]
Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the
following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case for the
proposition in question to be true or what we understand to be the case for the
proposition in question to be false, even if we don't know whether it is
actually true or whether it is actually false -- and may never do so or even wish
to do so.
T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.
For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair is, and that
Das Kapital is a book that is capable of being owned) will understand T1 upon hearing or reading it.
They grasp its sense --, that is, they understand what (certain parts of) the
world would have to be like for it to be true and what (certain parts of) the
world would have to be like for it to be false.
More importantly, the same situation that makes T1 true (if it obtains)
will make T1 false
(if it does not obtain).
[The significance of that
comment will become clearer later on
in this Essay.]
These conditions are integral to our capacity
to understand empirical propositions before we know whether they are true
or before we know whether they are false. Indeed, they explain how
and why we know what to look for (or what to expect) in order to show,
ascertain or
recognise that such propositions are true, or in order to show, ascertain or
recognise that they are false
--
again, even if we never succeed or even wish to succeed in doing either.
[Alternatively, if we didn't know
such things (implicitly or explicitly), that
would indicate we didn't actually understand T1.]
11a.
Some might try to defend Lenin by claiming this is just
hyperbole. Hence, it could be argued that Lenin certainly didn't think that the words "motion without
matter" were literally unthinkable, merely that it made no sense to suppose
there could be motion without matter. It could even be maintained that the
wording of Lenin's 'controversial' sentence merely meant he was rejecting the
immobility of matter out of hand, as a ridiculous supposition.
Or so the case for the defence might go...
If so, that
must mean the section in MEC entitled "Is
Motion Without Matter Conceivable?" was misnamed. But, that is the very section in which M1 occurs
-- and Lenin even italicised the word "unthinkable":
M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable."
[Lenin (1972),
p.318.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
The entire passage reads as follows:
"Is Motion Without Matter Conceivable?
"The fact that philosophical idealism
is attempting to make use of the new physics, or that idealist conclusions are
being drawn from the latter, is due not to the discovery of new kinds of
substance and force, of matter and motion, but to the fact that an attempt is
being made to conceive motion without matter. And it is the essence of this
attempt which our
Machians
fail to examine. They were unwilling to take account of Engels' statement that
'motion without matter is unthinkable.'
J.
Dietzgen in 1869, in his The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind,
expressed the same idea as Engels, although, it is true, not without his usual
muddled attempts to 'reconcile' materialism and idealism. Let us leave aside
these attempts, which are to a large extent to be explained by the fact that
Dietzgen is arguing against
Büchner's
non-dialectical materialism, and let us examine Dietzgen's own statements on the
question under consideration. He says: 'They [the idealists] want to have the
general without the particular, mind without matter, force without substance,
science without experience or material, the absolute without the relative'
(Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit, 1903, S.108). Thus the endeavour
to divorce motion from matter, force from substance, Dietzgen associates with
idealism, compares with the endeavour to divorce thought from the brain. 'Liebig,'
Dietzgen continues, 'who is especially fond of straying from his inductive
science into the field of speculation, says in the spirit of idealism: "force
cannot be seen"' (p.109). 'The spiritualist or the idealist believes in the
spiritual, i.e., ghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force' (p. 110).
'The antithesis between force and matter is as old as the antithesis between
idealism and materialism' (p.111). 'Of course, there is no force without
matter, no matter without force; forceless matter and matterless force are
absurdities. If there are idealist natural scientists who believe in the
immaterial existence of forces, on this point they are not natural scientists...but seers of ghosts' (p.114).
"We
thus see that scientists who were prepared to grant that motion is conceivable
without matter were to be encountered forty years ago too, and that 'on this
point' Dietzgen declared them to be seers of ghosts. What, then, is
the connection between philosophical
idealism and the divorce of matter from motion, the separation of substance from
force? Is it not 'more economical,' indeed, to conceive motion without matter?
"The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of
idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation,
perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective
reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our
consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds
the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more
than the objective reality which is given us in sensation. Therefore, to
divorce motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from objective
reality, or to divorcing my sensations from the external world -- in a word, it
is to go over to idealism. The trick which is usually performed in denying
matter, and in assuming motion without matter, consists in ignoring the relation
of matter to thought. The question is presented as though this relation did not
exist, but in reality it is introduced surreptitiously; at the beginning of the
argument it remains unexpressed, but subsequently crops up more or less
imperceptibly.
"Matter has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to draw
epistemological conclusions. But has thought remained? -- we ask. If not, if
with the disappearance of matter thought has also disappeared, if with the
disappearance of the brain and nervous
system ideas and sensations, too, have disappeared -- then it follows that
everything has disappeared. And your argument has disappeared as a sample of
'thought' (or lack of thought)! But if it has remained -- if it is assumed that
with the disappearance of matter, thought (idea, sensation, etc.) does not
disappear, then you have surreptitiously gone over to the standpoint of
philosophical idealism. And this always happens with people who wish, for
'economy's sake,' to conceive of motion without matter, for tacitly, by
the very fact that they continue to argue, they are acknowledging the existence
of thought after the disappearance of matter. This means that a very
simple, or a very complex philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a very
simple one, if it is a case of frank solipsism (I exist, and the world
is only my sensation); a very complex one, if instead of the thought,
ideas and sensations of a living person, a dead abstraction is posited, that is,
nobody's thought, nobody's idea, nobody's sensation, but thought in general (the
Absolute Idea, the Universal Will, etc.), sensation as an indeterminate
'element,' the 'psychical,' which is substituted for the whole of physical
nature, etc., etc. Thousands of shades of varieties of philosophical idealism
are possible and it is always possible to create a thousand and first shade; and
to the author of this thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for
example) what distinguishes it from the rest may appear to be momentous. From
the standpoint of materialism, however, the distinction is absolutely
unessential. What is essential is the point of departure. What is essential
is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in
thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism."
[Lenin
(1972),
pp.318-21.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
[I have
reproduced this passage at length to prevent
accusations that I have quoted Lenin 'out of context'!]
It clear from this
passage that Lenin was denying what "these
scientists" claimed -- i.e., that motion without matter is conceivable.
Or,
once again, as he puts it:
M1: "[M]otion without matter is unthinkable."
[Lenin (1972),
p.318.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
Later he added the caveat that
matter and motion
were
inseparable (quoting Engels):
"In
full conformity with this materialist philosophy of Marx's, and expounding it,
Frederick Engels wrote in
Anti-Dühring
(read by Marx in the manuscript): 'The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved...by a long and wearisome development of philosophy and natural science....'
'Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, or motion without matter, nor can there be....'" [Lenin
(1914), p.8.]
M22: "[M]otion [is] an inseparable property
of matter." [Lenin (1972), p.323.
Bold emphasis added.]
Hence, the unthinkability of the
separation of matter and motion is integral to his case against Idealism.
Indeed, if motion is the "mode of the existence of matter" -- its "mode of
expression" -- then these two 'concepts' can't be
separated, even in thought. As soon as an attempt is made to separate
them, you are no longer talking about matter, or even about motion.
P4: Motion is the mode of the existence of
matter.
[Incidentally, Lenin is wrong. Marx didn't read Anti-Dühring
"in the manuscript"; in fact, after Marx's death, Engels claimed he read that
book to Marx. Just think how long that would have taken. Can you imagine,
too, how many times
the ageing Marx will have nodded off, not realising the sub-logical material that would later be
attributed to him, or with which some would subsequently claim he acquiesced? Does anyone think that Marx would have approved of the
ridiculous things Engels
said about mathematics in that book? Marx was a competent mathematician
(even though his knowledge in this area was at least half a century
out-of-date), whereas
Engels wasn't. Those who now tell
us that Marx agreed with everything Engels said have plainly not thought through
the implications of that unwise claim. (I have considered this issue in much more detail
here and
here.)]
As
noted above, Lenin
was simply echoing Engels's
'non-hyperbolic' language:
"Motion
is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter
without motion, nor can there be. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable
as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and
indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes)
expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same.
Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transferred....
"A motionless state of matter is therefore one of
the most empty and nonsensical of ideas...." [Engels
(1976), p.74. Bold emphases added.]
Not much 'hyperbole' in there from Engels, then.
In fact, this is a core DM-principle. Both Lenin and Engels meant what
they
said.
The problem is: What on earth did they mean?
At this point, someone could argue that contradictions
like this are only to be expected (i.e., when Lenin argued that what he had just
thought couldn't in fact be thought). After all, this is dialectics! In that case,
in the very process of thinking these controversial words, thought is driven to
the opposite pole and is forced to conclude that these words (or what they
express) can't be thought.
[This is in fact a variant of the
Nixon defence.]
Except, Lenin did say they could be thought, after all!
"What is essential
is that the attempt to think of motion without matter smuggles in
thought divorced from matter -- and that is philosophical idealism."
[Lenin
(1972),
p.321.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
However, and far more likely: those who
read Lenin, and whose thought hasn't been compromised by studying the
work of Mystical Idealists, will conclude that in view of the fact that they,
too, have just thought those very words (or their content) in the act of being
told they can't do
that,
motion without matter (or its
sentential equivalent, P1) is
plainly not unthinkable!
P1:
It is unthinkable that motion can exist without matter.
Indeed, in view of the
additional fact that belief in motionless matter was an integral part of
Aristotelian Physics (which idea
dominated scientific thought for the best part of fifteen hundred years), they
would be right to conclude that the claim that motionless matter can exist is thinkable. Manifestly, the latter thought is
plainly more thinkable
than its opposite!
Hence, far from thought being driven to an
"opposite pole", the above suggests it will be riveted to just the one.
It could be countered that the above is a
specious
argument. Indeed, one critic has so argued:
"3. It is impossible to build a perpetuum mobile....
"An also quite clear illogicality
-- or perhaps even a sophism -- is the discussion
of Lenin's assertion that 'motion without matter is unthinkable'. It is held
that, since Lenin obviously thought the words 'motion without matter', he has
contradicted himself, showing that it is perfectly possible to think 'motion
without matter'. But this is clearly an invalid reasoning. The use of the words
'motion without matter' doesn't actually imply thinking motion without matter.
The example of sentence 3. above may explain what I am saying. A similar idea
can be expressed by
"6. A functioning perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.
"If we follow the text, we will exclaim, 'but you have just thought of a
functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!'
What happens, though, is that when I think the words 'functioning perpetuum
mobile' I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile.
Indeed, any machine of that kind that I -- or anybody else -- can think of is
either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably,
neither). So while I can utter the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile',
I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for
'triangular circle', 'the opposite side of a
Moebius
strip' (sic), or 'a man who is
his own father'. And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that
a correct analysis easily shows are different." [From
here. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this
site. Emphases in the original. Minor typos corrected.]
However, a supporter of this site argued in reply:
"Rosa actually
considered that objection in the long Essay she wrote (she had to since I posed
that very point to her back in 1998 or 1999!), and posted a short version of it
in the passage Chris quoted. The point is that Lenin would have to know what any
sentence containing the phrase 'motion without matter' implied.
"As she says at
her site:
'In order to
rule motion without matter out of court, he would have to know what he was
trying to exclude. He would have to know what motion without matter was so that
he could exclude it as unthinkable, otherwise he might be ruling out the wrong
thing. Hence, it would have to be thinkable for Lenin to tell us it wasn't!'
"So, he would have to
think these words just to rule out the possibility that there was any motionless
matter in the world. Otherwise, he would have no idea what he was ruling out.
But, if he had no idea what he was ruling out, he'd have no idea what he was
ruling in, either. So, the real problem is not that Lenin was contradicting
himself, it's that not even Lenin knew what he was talking about.
"Moreover, as Rosa goes on to point out (I
think you must have missed this), it's not possible to contradict non-sense.
Since a non-sensical sentence cannot take a truth-value, no sentence can count
as its contradictory. So Lenin wasn't contradicting himself (Rosa toys with that
possibility until she shows that he isn't even doing that!); he is far
too confused to be doing it. [It's the same point she makes about dialectics;
it's far too confused for anyone to be able to say if it's true or if it's
false, let alone contradict it!]
"You then offer us this example:
'6. A functioning
perpetuum mobile is unthinkable.'
'If we follow the text, we will exclaim, 'but you have just thought of a
functioning perpetuum mobile! You have just used those precise words!'
What happens, though, is that when I think the words 'functioning perpetuum
mobile' I am not actually thinking of a functioning perpetuum mobile.
Indeed, any machine of that kind that I -- or anybody else -- can think of is
either not functioning or not a perpetuum mobile (or, more probably,
neither). So while I can utter the words 'functioning perpetuum mobile',
I am at most thinking of the words, not of the actual thing. Same goes for
'triangular circle', 'the opposite side of a Moebius strip', or 'a man who is
his own father'. And so the text incurs in a conflation between two things that
a correct analysis easily shows are different.'
"And yet, how
would you know what you were ruling out? Unless you know what a functioning
perpetual motion machine is, or could be, your claim that it is unthinkable is
just an empty phrase. [Suppose I say I can think it? Suppose inventors of these
machines,
who still turn up regularly, also say they can think it? And, isn't
the universe in perpetual motion? According to
some scientists, it is. So they
can think of perpetual motion; even if they are wrong, they can certainly think
it.]
"Same with the
other examples you mention. If time travel is possible, a man can be his own
father. Now, time travel might not be possible, but we can still think a man
could be his own father. A triangular circle is also a possible object of
thought; given
homeomorphisms, it is possible to map a triangle onto a circle.
So, topologically, a circle is the same as a triangle,
hence, we can think it in mathematics! And we can easily
define the opposite side of a
Möbius Strip
as follows: hold the strip between thumb and forefinger; the opposite side to
that which
touches your thumb is the side that touches your index
finger. That might be a cheat, sure, but
it allows us to think of the opposite side of a Möbius Strip.
"So, instead of
asserting that, say, 'A triangular circle is unthinkable', you'd be better off
following Wittgenstein's advice here (albeit given in another context) and say
that certain combinations of words aren't part of the language; we have no use
for them.
"However, this
can't even be the case with Lenin's declaration, since immobile matter is not
unthinkable; indeed, motionless matter had been a cornerstone of Aristotelian
physics, which went largely unquestioned for over a thousand years....
"Now, the real
problem with Lenin's declaration isn't that he ends up in an awful muddle, but
that it follows from an a priori thesis invented by Engels: 'Motion
is the mode of the existence of matter'. So, his declaration that 'motion
without matter is unthinkable' wasn't based on evidence (since the latter is
ambiguous), or on argument, but on this a priori thesis, which Rosa has shown is
non-sensical."
And,
as we
have just seen, Lenin admitted it was possible to think what he said
was "unthinkable".
Finally, it could be objected that this line-of-attack is
thoroughly misguided. Consider, for example, the following sentence:
C1:
Abandoning Taiwan is 'unthinkable,' ex-Obama administration official says.
Now, this doesn't imply that the individual alluded to above has
actually thought of abandoning Taiwan, which they would have to have done if
the criticisms aired in this work are correct.
Or, so it could be argued...
[VP = Verb Phrase.]
Of course the clause "VP is unthinkable" can mean many things;
for instance (in this case):
C2: "We will never abandon Taiwan."
C3: "I can't think of any circumstances under
which we would abandon Taiwan."
C4: "Abandoning Taiwan isn't an option,
and never will be."
C5: "I personally can't bring myself to imagine
we'll ever abandon Taiwan."
And so on.
Many of these alternative readings allude to the incredulity
or intellectual stubbornness of
the individual concerned; that is, they record the psychological impossibility,
or refusal,
of that individual ever coming to believe that the USA would abandon
Taiwan. Now, if Lenin meant what he said in this sense, that would weaken
considerably his opposition to the immobility of matter -- since it would sever
the link Lenin's thesis had with Engels's claim that motion is "the mode of the
existence of matter", which is a defining characteristic of matter,
not a throw-away property which is dependent on the limitations of human
credulity. [Anyway, I have discussed that option
below.]
More-or-less the same can be said of the other readings; they,
too, sunder that link.
I will return to this topic when we consider the deeper, logical
problems associated with this statement of Lenin's -- i.e., M1a.
M1a: Motion without matter is unthinkable.
[See
also Note 43a.]
12.
However, if 'thought itself' is to be linked with the motion of matter -- at
however deep or complex a level it is deemed to take place -- then the second of these sentences (i.e., "This could be true even
if no matter was in fact relocated in the process") would plainly be incorrect. Anyway,
such a theory (about 'thought' and matter) seems to depend on the truth of
reductive materialism, a doctrine Lenin would certainly have
rejected.
M11: His thoughts moved to a new topic.
But, even if M11 were contestable on other
grounds, it wouldn't be difficult to think of other examples that aren't so easily dismissed. Consider, therefore,
the following:
E1: The author moved his characters to a new
location.
E2: The date of the
Battle of Hastings
moves
further into the past each year.
E3: You say you will mend the fence, but that job
seems to move further into the future by the day.
E4: Easter moves to a new date every year.
E5: The
Prime Meridian
moves with the rotation of
the earth.
E6: Multiplying –2 by –3 moves it from the set of
Negative Integers
to the set of Positive Integers (= 6), even while all three remain
in the set of
Real Numbers.
E7: The disqualification of Leaping Lena in the
3.30 at
Belmont moved
Mugwump into first place.
E8: The back of the
Necker Cube
moves to the
front (and vice versa) depending on how you view it.
E9: The result of the strike ballot moved the
question of tactics to the top of the agenda.
E10: The chairperson moved to strike the
objection from the record.
The above senses of "move" cannot easily be reconciled with
Lenin's ideas about matter and motion.
[Many more examples like this
were given in Essay
Five. See also
Note 13, below.]
To be sure, some might want to dismiss one or more of the above
examples (and, indeed, those in Essay Five) by refining Lenin's 'definition' of matter,
or even of motion -- in tandem with the use of a several other (ad hoc) dodges, perhaps.
Alternatively, still others might point out that these examples employ the word
"move" in different senses to the one intended by Lenin. But, even if
that were so, it still wouldn't mean Lenin's construal was the correct way --
or, indeed, the only way -- to use this word. Clearly, what Lenin actually
meant by "motion" (that is, if he did mean anything by it!)
must be ascertained before a decision can be made either way. However, Lenin's
intentions aren't at all easy to fathom; in fact, it is difficult to make head or tail of
much that Lenin's has to say
in this area, or even throughout MEC, as will be demonstrated in the main body of this Essay
and Essay
Thirteen Part One.
If further exception is still taken to the counter-examples given above
(which, incidentally illustrate perfectly ordinary uses of the word "move" and its
cognates), then that would amount to finding fault with ordinary language,
not with the present author or even with the examples given. And we
have
already seen the
serious problems
that
that would entail for anyone foolish enough to do that.
Indeed, these examples represent a much wider
and representative selection of
the use
of "move" than is generally the case in the scribblings of Idealists and
metaphysicians (and that includes Lenin). As seems clear, they show how ordinary human beings regularly
employ this word (and others related to it)
in their interface with the world and with one another, in ways undreamt of in
and by
Traditional Thought.
Whatever else Lenin might have imagined he
meant by his use of the words "motion"/"move", it is clear that ordinary speakers do not
employ them this way, and neither do scientists. The use of this word by everyday materialists -- i.e.,
workers --
is
surely a better and more reliable guide to its overall connotations than is that of
inconsistent materialists
and closet Idealists -- i.e., dialecticians. If Lenin's employment of
this word diverges from its materially-grounded use in everyday life, then so much the
worse for him and anyone who agrees with him.
However, it could be countered that it is perfectly clear what
Lenin intended; he was
alluding to the physical or literal meaning of the word "move" -- i.e.,
connected with locomotion and "change of place", studied by the physical sciences and
applied mathematics.
Hence, the above anti-DM considerations are
irrelevant.
Or
so it could be claimed...
In
response, it is worth noting that the alleged physical sense of "move"
(interpreted as "change of place") isn't without its own problems. Since
that was discussed in detail in
Essay Five, the
reader is referred there for further details.
Moreover, we have already seen Lenin speak about the movement of thought:
"Let us imagine a consistent idealist
who holds that the entire world is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take
'nobody's' sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of philosophical
idealism but not its essence). The idealist would not even think of denying that
the world is motion, i.e., the motion of his thoughts, ideas,
sensations. The question as to what moves, the idealist will reject
and regard as absurd: what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his
ideas come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. 'It moves' --
and that is all. It is impossible to conceive a more 'economical' way of
thinking. And no proofs, syllogisms, or definitions are capable of refuting the
solipsist if he consistently adheres to his view.
The fundamental distinction between
the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact
that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man
generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this
objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas,
perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The
concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given
us in sensation." [Lenin (1972), pp.319-20.
Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
Lenin
here speaks about "the movement of ideas" and the "motion of...thoughts, ideas,
sensations". He can't have meant "change of place" by this use of "move"/"motion"!
So, if Lenin is allowed to employ a
(slightly) wider use of "motion" (and/or its cognates), DM-fans can hardly complain
when that tactic is adopted by those who don't accept DM.
Independently of this,
it is easy to show that Lenin is entirely unclear what he meant by "move" (and/or its
cognates), just as he was unclear about "matter" -- on that, see
here and
Note One.
Finally, since many of the above examples relate to events that take place,
or might take place,
outside the mind, they clearly relate to material movement, as defined by
Lenin. If they are unacceptable, then the problem
lies with Lenin's characterisation of matter and motion, not with these examples.
12a. Note the
use of "appears" here:
M12: The occurrence of literal motion without matter can never be thought of as true.
Which appears to imply, or be implied by, the following:
M13: Literal motion without
matter can never take place.
The
use of that word is deliberate because M12 could be true while M13 is false (which means that M13 can't follow from M12).
On the other hand, M13 could follow from M12 if an extra
Idealist (perhaps even suppressed) premiss were added, namely:
M12a: Thought determines the
nature of reality.
Since it is central to my case against DM that its theorists
(covertly) accept M12a (on that, see EssaysTwo
and Thirteen
Part One), then, at least for them, M13 would follow from M12
(via M12a).
[The
reverse implication, too, is problematic, for M13 could be true and M12 false.
However, that invalid inference is less relevant to the aims of this Essay and
will be ignored.]
13. Another example of the indirect
connection of motion with matter is the following:
E11: The shadow moved across the surface of
water.
Even though something material would have to move for the shadow
itself to move, the latter's motion is clearly non-material, and depends on the
absence of matter (i.e., light).
Other examples include the following:
E12: The surface of the water moved in the
breeze.
E13: The hole in the crowd moved from right to
left.
Surfaces are rather puzzling; no one seems to be sure
whether they are material or not. [Cf., Stroll (1988).] Few doubt they can move.
The same goes for shapes, holes, corners, boundaries and edges [Cf., Casati and
Varzi (1995, 1999,
2023), and Varzi (1997,
2023)], all of which can move (indeed, some
do; e.g., Mexican
Waves).
The same applies to reflections and shadows. [On reflections and shadows, see Sorensen (2003,
2008). On shapes, see Bennett (2012).]
Hence, not only is motion without matter conceivable, it is
actual, as many of the above show.
14. This example, of course, omits any
reference to the geodesics of
Spacetime
as causal factors in this case. However, introducing that complication at
this stage wouldn't affect the point being made since geodesics
are, of course, non-material. Arguably, they aren't even 'extra-mental'.
Of course, exactly what makes matter, or, indeed, anything, move
along geodesics is a moot point, which I will leave no less moot for now.
Despite this, it could be argued that because matter 'creates'
these geodesics, all movement in the end is related in some respect to
matter. If so, Lenin's original claim needs to be watered-down to something like
the following:
N1: Motion without matter causing it
somewhere is unthinkable.
[Of course,
that response assumes geodesics are extra-mental
entities when they are in fact mathematical objects, and, like lines of force,
their physical status is rather puzzling, if not entirely dubious. (On that, see
here and below.) If so, it isn't easy to see how matter can 'create' a
single
geodesic.]
But,
N1 mightn't even be true (and that is quite apart from the
fact that it, too, is "thinkable"; you, dear reader, have just
thought it -- or what it supposedly 'represents'!) -- and that could even be
the case with or without the need to appeal to a single DM-precept. Anyway, as
we saw in
Note One, according to
DM-fans, motion is the "mode of the existence of matter"; its demotion to
a factor that merely plays a causal role in the whole affair would seriously undermine yet another core DM-theory.
More importantly,
of course, it isn't what Lenin actually
said.
[QM =
Quantum Mechanics;
CMG = Centre of Mass of the Galaxy.]
The reason why N1 might not be true is discussed in more detail
in Essay Thirteen Part One.
Briefly, that is because we do not as yet have a theory that
connects QM with
General Relativity,
and, to date, the leading candidates manifestly depend on the
reification
of some highly abstruse mathematics, which strategy itself has serious Idealist
implications for Physics (as Lenin himself recognised).
Such acts of reification either imply -- or are based on the unacknowledged
pretence -- that mathematical entities (differential
equations, tensor,
vector and
scalar fields,
(or 'the
field' in general),
and the like) can act as causal agents. Unless we subscribe to some
form of
Mystical,
Cosmic,
Pythagorean-Platonism,
that idea isn't even plausible.
It could be argued that the CMG
is external to the mind, and so
the above claims are subject to the following rebuttal by Lenin:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the
predicate, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the
question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place
outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas,
symbols, conventional signs, and so forth?" [Lenin (1972),
p.324.]
Hence, in view of the fact that scientists' ideas about the
nature of matter and energy are constantly changing and developing, the facts of Relativity in no
way embarrass DM. Whatever is objective and external to the mind is matter, and
that includes the CMG. Again, as Lenin argued:
"[T]he sole 'property' of matter with
whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of
being an objective reality, of existing outside our mind....
"Thus…the concept of matter…epistemologically
implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human
mind and reflected by it." [Ibid., pp.311-12. Italic emphasis in the
original.]
Or so it could be
maintained, once more...
But,
the CMG doesn't actually exist -- at least, no more than any
other averaged quantity does. Is there in existence anywhere an
individual answering to "The average man/woman in
the UK"? How then either the latter, or the CMG, can be 'objective' is
still mysterious.
[Naturally, the above comment about averages depends on whether we are talking
about
the mean, the median or the mode.]
Of
course, Lenin's catch-all definition -- that whatever has "objective existence outside the mind" is material
-- would
plainly
include the CMG by definitional fiat. But, why should we accept such a
definition? Lenin's continual assertion that this is what matter is, isn't,
I'm sorry to have to announce, a sufficient reason for the rest of us to accept it -- unless, of course,
we conclude that Lenin was a Minor Deity of some sort.
Would we be prepared to accept a
'definition' of "fairness" promulgated by a supporter of the current
system which
meant that word applied to everything and anything that happened inside Capitalism
and had been initiated by the ruling-class or their ideologues? Or that wages
paid to workers were "fair"? I suspect not.
Indeed, would we be happy to accept a definition of 'God' as "The Supreme and
Eternal Being who exists of necessity but whose existence can't be proved"?
Well,
since 'His'/'Her'/'Its' existence can't be proved, the sentence "God is The Supreme
and Eternal Being who exists but whose existence can't be proved" must be true,
by definition.
But
then, if 'His'/'Her'/'Its' existence can be proved, 'He'/'She'/'It' exists
anyway. So, either way, 'He'/'She'/'It' must exist.
Now, it is
little use pointing to the weaknesses, nor even the
'contradictions' in the above 'argument', since a smart theologian will
simply play the Nixon card
(beloved of DM-fans) to silence all opposition. And, if you persist, you will
simply be accused of not "understanding" 'Theological Dialectics'.
The problem, of course, began with the definition.
Same
with Lenin's.
Now,
I don't expect the DM-fraternity to accept any of this, but
when they see what odd entities permitted by Lenin's over-generous definition of
words like "material" and "matter", I think
they might be among the first to disown it.
A guided tour through Lenin's Whacky World Of Wonders
will begin in Essay Thirteen Part One.
15. Also, see
Note
12, above.
15a.
Conversely, it could be argued that this shows M17 is false. That
possibility will be tackled presently.
M17: The sentence: "Literal motion without matter is unthinkable" is true.
16.
Aristotle's ideas about
earthy
matter are more complex than these comments might at first sight suggest.
Nevertheless, it is still true that he believed that when situated at the centre of the universe,
earthy matter would be motionless.
[On this, see Morison (2002), Sorabji (1988), and Copleston (2003a), chapter 30.]
As Aristotle himself argued:
"Now all things rest and move naturally and by
constraint. A thing moves naturally to a place in which it rests without
constraint, and rests naturally in a place to which it moves without constraint.
On the other hand, a thing moves by constraint to a place in which it rests by
constraint, and rests by constraint in a place to which it moves by constraint.
Further, if a given movement is due to constraint, its contrary is natural." [Aristotle
(1984b), p.458, 276:22-26.]
[By
"constraint",
Aristotle meant "enforced motion"; that is, something "forcibly moved by some other
mover". On this see
Bodnar (2023), Dijksterhuis (1986), pp,24-32, Guthrie (1990), pp.243-76, and
Sorabji (1988), pp.219-26.]
So, Aristotle and his many followers could, and
actually did
think about matter and its lack of motion (i.e., its rest).
Moreover, as my former colleague, "Babeuf", pointed out, it has
been possible to think of motion without matter since at least Biblical times:
"1. In the beginning God created the heaven and
the earth.
"2. And the earth was without form, and
void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. And the spirit of God moved upon
the face of the waters." [Genesis,
Chapter One, verses 1 and 2.]
Now,
it won't do to argue that the above is false, mythical or
even ideological, since the only reason it has been quoted is to show that,
whether or not it is one or other of these, some human beings (hundreds
of millions, possibly even billions, in fact) can
think about motion without matter, and have been able to do so for at least
3000 years.
[PN = Philosophical Notebooks, i.e.,
Lenin (1961).]
Later, in PN, Lenin
added the following comment about
Feuerbach's essay on
Leibniz:
"The feature that distinguishes Leibnitz (sic)
from
Spinoza: In Leibnitz (sic) there is, in addition to the concept of
substance, the concept of force 'and indeed of active force...' the
principle of 'self-activity'....
Ergo. Leibnitz (sic) through theology arrived at
the principle of the inseparable (and universal, absolute) connection of matter
and motion." [Lenin (1961), p.377. Italics
emphasis in the original; paragraphs merged.]
This confirms, of course, the a priori nature and origin of this
particular theory, since Leibniz manifestly did not obtain this notion via
observation, and would have had a stroke at any suggestion he had done so. Also
worthy of note is the fact that Leibniz was as heavily influenced by
Hermetic
mysticism as Hegel. [This will be
one of the many topics discussed in
Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here); until then, see Ross (1983, 1998).]
As Lenin notes, the doctrine of the inseparability of
matter and motion is connected with "self-activity", which is
intimately linked with the contradictory nature of matter, as we saw in Essay
Eight Part One. So, the 'inseparability thesis' is a
'logical' notion which 'follows' from
Engels's Second 'Law'. Small wonder
then that Lenin found its rejection "unthinkable".
But, once more,
why didn't Lenin simply declare that immobile matter was "self-contradictory"?
Why did he say it was "unthinkable" instead?
17. Marx
Anticipates Wittgenstein
[This forms part of Note 17.
I
have covered this topic in much more detail
here.]
Marx's belief in the social nature of language, and the
fundamental role it plays in communication (not representation), is confirmed by the following
passages:
"The production of ideas, of conceptions, of
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and
the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving,
thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct
efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as
expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics,
etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. --
real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its
furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious
existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all
ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical
life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical
life-process. [Marx
and Engels (1970),
p.47. Bold emphasis added.]
"Only now, after having
considered four moments, four aspects of the primary historical relationships,
do we find that man also possesses 'consciousness,' but, even so, not inherent,
not 'pure' consciousness. From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the
curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the
form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as
old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for
other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well;
language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of
intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me:
the animal does not enter into 'relations' with anything, it does not enter into
any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist
as a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very
beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.
Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the
immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with
other persons and things outside the individual who is growing
self-conscious.... On the other hand, man's consciousness of the necessity of
associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the
consciousness that he is living in society at all...." [Ibid., pp.50-51. Bold emphases added.]
"One of the most difficult tasks confronting
philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world.
Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as
philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to
make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical
language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The
problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned
into the problem of descending from language to life.
"We have shown that thoughts and ideas acquire an
independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances and relations
of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have shown that exclusive,
systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and
philosophers, and hence the systematisation of these thoughts, is a consequence
of division of labour, and that, in particular, German philosophy is a
consequence of German petty-bourgeois conditions. The
philosophers have only
to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is
abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual
world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a
realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life."
[Marx
and Engels (1970), p.118. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"The object before us, to begin with,
material production.
"Individuals producing in Society -- hence
socially determined individual production -- is, of course, the point of
departure. The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom
Smith and
Ricardo
begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century
Robinsonades, which in no way express merely a reaction against
over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural
historians imagine. As little as
Rousseau's contrat social, which brings naturally independent,
autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract, rests on such
naturalism. This is the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the
Robinsonades, great and small. It is, rather, the anticipation of 'civil
society', in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides
towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition, the
individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier
historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human
conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of
the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century
individual -- the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of
society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the
sixteenth century -- appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the
past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the
Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising
historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new
epoch to this day.
Steuart avoided this simple-mindedness because as an aristocrat and in
antithesis to the eighteenth century, he had in some respects a more historical
footing.
"The more deeply we go back into history, the
more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as
dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the
family and in the family expanded into the clan [Stamm]; then later in
the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions
of the clan. Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various
forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards
his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this
standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the
hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations. The
human being is in the most literal sense a
Zwon politikon not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which
can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an
isolated individual outside society -- a rare exception which may well occur
when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically
present is cast by accident into the wilderness -- is as much of an absurdity as
is the development of language without individuals living together and
talking to each other. There is no point in dwelling on this any longer. The
point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle, which had sense and reason
for the eighteenth-century characters, had not been earnestly pulled back into
the centre of the most modern economics by
Bastiat,
Carey,
Proudhon
etc. Of course it is a convenience for Proudhon et al. to be able
to give a historico-philosophic account of the source of an economic relation,
of whose historic origins he is ignorant, by inventing the myth that Adam or
Prometheus
stumbled on the idea ready-made, and then it was adopted, etc. Nothing is more
dry and boring than the fantasies of a
locus communis." [Marx
(1973), pp.83-85. Bold emphasis added.]
"The main point here is this:
In all these forms -- in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of
the economic order, and where the economic aim is hence the production of use
values, i.e., the reproduction of the individual within the specific
relation to the commune in which he is its basis -- there is to be found: (1)
Appropriation not through labour, but presupposed to labour; appropriation of
the natural conditions of labour, of the earth as the original
instrument of labour as well as its workshop and repository of raw materials.
The individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being
his; [relates] to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the
latter realizes itself; the chief objective condition of labour does not itself
appear as a product of labour, but is already there as nature;
on one side the living individual, on the other the earth, as the objective
condition of his reproduction; (2) but this relation to land and soil,
to the earth, as the property of the labouring individual -- who thus appears
from the outset not merely as labouring individual, in this abstraction, but who
has an objective mode of existence in his ownership of the land, an
existence presupposed to his activity, and not merely as a result of
it, a presupposition of his activity just like his skin, his sense organs, which
of course he also reproduces and develops etc. in the life process, but which
are nevertheless presuppositions of this process of his reproduction -- is
instantly mediated by the naturally arisen, spontaneous, more or less
historically developed and modified presence of the individual as member of
a commune -- his naturally arisen presence as member of a tribe etc. An
isolated individual could no more have property in land and soil than he could
speak. He could, of course, live off it as substance, as do the animals. The
relation to the earth as property is always mediated through the occupation of
the land and soil, peacefully or violently, by the tribe, the commune, in some
more or less naturally arisen or already historically developed form. The
individual can never appear here in the dot-like isolation...in which he appears
as mere free worker." [Ibid.,
p.485. Bold emphasis added.]
[This
anticipates Wittgenstein, except, he would have questioned this particular use of
"consciousness".]
Here, too, is Engels:
"Much more important is the direct, demonstrable
influence of the development of the hand on the rest of the organism. It has
already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously
impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from
non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the
development of the hand, with labour, and widened man's horizon at every new
advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in
natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily
helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of
mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this
joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the
point where they had something to say to each other....
First labour, after it and then with it
speech -- these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of
which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all
its similarity is far larger and more perfect...." [Engels (1876),
pp.356-57. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
[I defend a particular interpretation of this
general idea in Essay Thirteen Part
Three.]
This
isn't to suggest that Marx and Wittgenstein would have seen eye-to-eye (quite
the reverse, in fact), or that Marx was a proto-Wittgenstein -- far from it.
However, as I
have noted
here, anyone who is tempted to conclude the
contrary will face serious difficulties over interpretation, at the very least.
Having said that, there are clear indications that
Wittgenstein adopted his 'anthropological' approach to language as a result of
long conversations with
Piero Sraffa,
a
noted Marxist, and
because of his clear sympathies with the left. [More details
can be found here.]
So, far from Marx being a proto-Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein is, in
some (limited) respects, a latter-day Marx. In fact, in many ways, Wittgenstein
stands to Marx as
Feuerbach did to Hegel. [I hope to defend that particular analogy in a later
Essay.
However, see Note 18.]
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
17a.
The only other alternative here would be a theory that language is innate, and hence
isn't a social phenomenon. Despite what some say, there is no way that idea
can be made consistent with Marxism. [I have dealt with this specific topic in Essay Thirteen
Part Three.]
The comments in the main body of this Essay at
this point do not, of course, imply these conventions are set in stone. Many
such have changed over the millennia,
while some
plainly have not and cannot.
18.
The attack on the social roots of language -- replacing a Marxist commitment to
that idea
with what turns out to be a mystical theory that language in effect contains a secret
code capable of reflecting the underlying 'Essence' of 'Being', and which has somehow
also been stitched into the fabric of reality so that the one can 'reflect' the
other
-- helped motivate the theory that
language is primarily
representational (as we will see in the next two Parts of Essay Twelve
-- summary here).
According
to this ancient doctrine, language itself contains hidden clues -- clues that can only be
accessed, or 'understood', by the elite, their ideologues, their hangers-on, lackeys, or by specially-trained
'thinkers'. Cosmic verities like this lie
way beyond the grasp of ordinary humans -- so the story goes --, trapped as they
are in a world of 'commonsense', dominated by ordinary language and 'formal
thinking'. This
'Divine Code' was thought to have been written into, or actually was, the
'primary language' given
to Adam by God
-- but, similar myths are also found in other religions and cultural traditions. Much of
Hermetic,
Neo-Platonic,
Alchemical
and Kabbalistic mysticism is
largely based on this dogma.
[On this, see Bono (1995), Eco (1997), and Vickers (1984b). This topic
will be explored more fully in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here), and
other Parts of Essay Twelve.]
Signs,
or 'hidden messages', were believed to be written in the stars,
too, or in
sacred books, tea leaves, the flight of birds, the organs and entrails of slaughtered animals -- or,
indeed, in its more recent incarnation, encrypted somehow in our central nervous system as a
"transformational grammar"
("unbounded
merge") or
"language of thought".
[Again, on this see Essay Thirteen Part Three.]
In DM-circles, this doctrine surfaces as part of the a
priori dogma that thought is dialectical because reality is dialectical
(which 'profound secret' is, alas, hidden from those who refuse to see, or who
just do not
"understand" dialectics). Hence, DM can
be called an "Algebra of Revolution", which works because it alone is tuned into the "pulse of reality"
--
or, perhaps even: because reality
'dances'
to its tune.
I argued the following in Essay Four Part One (slightly modified
here) in relation to the ancient dogma
that there is an objective 'dialectical logic' running the entire universe:
To be sure, the confusion between rules of inference
and logical/metaphysical 'truths' dates back to Aristotle himself. This error
merely re-appeared in Hegel's work as part of a mystical/ontological doctrine
connected with the alleged self-development of concepts, itself the result of an
egregious error over the nature of predication (examined in Essay Three Part
One), and an even worse one with
respect to the
LOI.
To be sure, the confusion between rules of
inference and logical or metaphysical 'truths' dates back to Aristotle himself.
And, it isn't hard to see why this should be so. If a theorist (or, indeed, an
entire culture) believes that everything had been created by a 'deity', then
fundamental truths about nature can't help but reflect how that 'being' must
'think' and thus how 'he/she/it' actually went about creating everything. This would 'naturally'
connect 'correct' thinking about nature, 'mind' and society with divinely-instituted, fundamental
principles that govern, or even constitute, 'reality'.
As
Umberto Eco
points out (in relation to the 'Western' Christian tradition, which, of course,
drew heavily on Greek Philosophy):
"God spoke before all things, and
said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for
with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation
itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names
that he created them and gave them their
ontological status....
"In Genesis..., the Lord
speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke
to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior
illumination, in which God...expresses himself....
"...Clearly we are here
in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of
the
nomothete, the
name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.
Fast forward a score or
more centuries and this
ancient presupposition re-surfaced in Hegel's (supposedly
presuppositionless) work as part of a mystical or
ontological doctrine connected with allegedly 'self-developing' concepts -- which
idea was itself the result of an egregious error over the nature of
predication (a topic covered in detail in Essay Three Part One)
-- seriously compounded an even worse error
concerning the nature of the LOI.
[LOI = Law of identity; FL = Formal
Logic]
'Presuppositionless' -- my foot!
"This objective thinking, then, is the
content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it
standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it
is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to
employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not
external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the
absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of
pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is
without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the
creation of nature and a finite mind.
"Anaxagoras
is praised as the man who first declared that
Nous,
thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be
defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual
view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic.
"What we are dealing with in logic is
not a thinking about
something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from
it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks
of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of
thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel
(1999), pp.50-51,
§§53-54.
Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. I have
reproduced the published version, since the on-line version differs from it; I
have informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. They
have now corrected the on-line version!]
In the above book alone,
readers will find page-after-page of 'presuppositionless', a priori
dogmatism like this.
Be this as it may, when this misbegotten 'ontological'
interpretation of FL is abandoned (or 'un-presupposed'), the temptation to identify logic with science
(with the "Laws of Thought" or even
with 'absolute' or 'ultimate' truth) loses whatever
superficial plausibility it might once seemed to have had. If FL is
solely concerned with inference, then there is no good reason to
saddle it with inappropriate metaphysical baggage, and every reason not to. On the other hand, if there
is a link between FL and metaphysical, scientific or 'ultimate' truth -- as both
legend and Hegel would have us believe --, then that thesis needs substantiation.
It isn't enough just to assume, or to assert, that such a link exists, as
has
generally been the case in Idealist and DM-circles.
In addition, the idea that truths about
fundamental aspects of reality can be uncovered by an examination of how
human beings reason is highly suspect in itself; but, like most things, so much
depends on what is supposed to follow from that assumption. As we will see, the line
taken on this issue sharply distinguishes materialist thought from
Idealist
myth-making. Unfortunately, to date, DM-theorists have been more content with
tail-ending Traditional Philosophy in supposing
that logic functions as a sort of cosmic code-cracker, capable of unmasking profound
truths about (otherwise) 'hidden' aspects of 'reality' -- aka the search for 'underlying essences' -- than they
have been with justifying this entire line-of-thought with evidence and
argument, as opposed to assumption and assertion. Nor have they been
concerned to examine the motives that gave life to this class-compromised
approach to
Super-Knowledge, concocted over two millennia ago in
Ancient Greece.
[Concerning the other ancient idea that language
somehow 'reflects'
the world, and that truths about nature can be derived from words or thought alone, see Dyke
(2007). The reader mustn't assume, however, that I agree with Dyke's
metaphysical conclusions (or, indeed, with any metaphysical conclusions whatsoever).
As this Essay shows,
the opposite of this is in fact the case -- I regard them all as
both
non-sensical and
incoherent.]
Of course, modern logicians are much clearer
about the distinction between rules of inference and logical truths than their
counterparts were in the Ancient World (or even in the Nineteenth Century!), but that fact just makes the criticisms DM-theorists
level against FL even more anachronistic and hard to fathom.
Anyway, if materialists are to reject
the 'mythical' view of nature prevalent in Ancient Greece -- and which is both
implicit and explicit in Hegelian
Ontology --, as surely they must, then the idea that FL is a
branch of the sciences becomes even more difficult to sustain.
Indeed, how is it possible for language
to 'reflect' the logic of the world if the world has no logic to it?
Which it couldn't have unless Nature were 'Mind',
or the product of 'Mind'.
If the development of Nature isn't in fact the
(disguised) development of
'Mind'
(as Hegel supposed),
how can concepts drawn from the development of 'Mind' apply to
Nature, unless it is 'Mind'?
Of course, dialecticians have responded to
this with an appeal to the RTK (i.e., the sophisticated version of this
theory); but, as we shall see (in Essays Three and
Twelve), that, too, was an unwise move.
[RTK = Reflection Theory
of Knowledge, to be covered in Essay Twelve Part Four.]
It is instructive to recall
that since the Renaissance 'western' humanity has (largely) learnt to separate
religion from science so that the sorts of things that used to be said about
science (for example, that it was the "systematic study of God's work", etc.)
look rather odd and anachronistic today (that is, to all but the incurably
religious). In like manner, previous generations of logicians used to confuse
logic with science and the "Laws of Thought", and they, too, did this for
theological and ideological reasons. In that case, one would have thought that
avowed materialists (i.e., dialecticians) would be the very last ones to perpetuate this ancient confusion.
Clearly not.
As will be argued at length later
on at this site,
only if it can be shown (and not simply assumed or asserted) that nature has a
rational structure would it be plausible to suppose that there is any
connection at all between the way human beings think and reason and the underlying
constitution of
nature. Short of that, the idea that there is such a link between the way we
draw conclusions and fundamental aspects of 'reality' loses all credibility. Why
should the way we knit premises and conclusions together mirror
the structure of the universe? Why should our use of words have such profound 'ontological'
implications, valid for all of space and time?
Even to ask these questions
is to answer them: there is no reason to suppose any of this -- other than the
class-compromised motives
that stem from religious or ideological considerations.
Indeed, how is it possible that certain metaphysical
truths are only capable
of being derived from, or expressed in,
Indo-European grammar? Was this group of humans blessed by the 'gods'?
Are there really "subjects", "copulas"
and "predicates" out there in nature for language to 'reflect' --
which are relatively minor grammatical features found
almost exclusively in this one family of languages?
On the other hand, if it could be shown that
the universe does have an underlying, 'rational' structure, then the
conclusion that nature is 'Mind' (or, that it has been constituted by 'Mind') would
be difficult to resist. If all that is real is indeed 'rational', then the
identification of rules of inference with the "rules of thought" -- and with
fundamental metaphysical truths about "Being" itself -- becomes irresistible.
As the histories of
Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism reveal, from such esoteric assumptions it is
but a short step to the derivation of truths from thought alone. A
priori thesis-mongering and Idealism thus go hand-in-hand; if nature is
Ideal, then truths can legitimately follow from thought/language alone. In other
Essays posted at this site
(for example,
here and
Essay Twelve Part One) we will see that this is a step DM-theorists (and
metaphysicians of every stripe) have been only too happy to take -- and many times
over, too.
Alas, there is precious little
evidence to suggest that DM-theorists have ever given much thought to this
particular implication of the
idea that
DL
reflects the underlying structure of reality -- i.e., that
their brand of logic in fact implies that reality is Ideal. If logic does
indeed reflect the structure of 'Being', then 'Being' must be Mind. [On this,
see Essay Twelve Part Four (not yet published -- summary
here).]
Nevertheless, there is precious little
evidence to suggest that DM-theorists have ever given much thought to this
particular implication of the
idea that DL reflects the underlying structure of reality -- i.e., they
have given little thought to the idea that
their brand of logic implies
reality is Ideal. If logic does indeed reflect the structure of 'Being', then
'Being' must be 'Mind'.
This conclusion only
further strengthens the suspicion that the
much-vaunted materialist "inversion" -- supposedly inflicted on
Hegel's system/'method' by early
dialecticians -- was merely formal, which in turn implies that DM is
simply inverted Idealism -- a form of Idealism nonetheless. If so, then questions about the nature of Logic cannot but be related to the serious doubts raised at this site about the scientific
status of DM. In that case, if Logic is capable of revealing fundamental scientific
truths about nature -- as opposed to being a systematic study of inference,
and only that --, then
it becomes harder to resist the conclusion that DM is indeed just another
form
of Idealism that has yet to 'come out of the closet'.
Whatever the precise details turn out to be in each case, this almost
universally held doctrine, this
ruling idea, only succeeded in 'populating' nature with invisible
"essences", and immaterial 'rational'
principles, which were somehow capable of being reflected in language
or 'thought'. These hidden precepts were supposedly encoded in language in
an abstract form, and were available, or were revealed, only to those capable of performing complex
feats of mental gymnastics (and, of course, only those with enough leisure time to
indulge in the sport) -- a skill compounded by an even more impressive ability to invent
increasingly
baroque,
but nonetheless vacuous, terminology.
This meant that the attack on the social nature of discourse
(which began in early class society) was
one wing of a class-motivated assault on ordinary language -- and hence on
grass-roots materialism --, which soon degenerated into LIE. [More details will be
given in the next two Parts of this Essay.]
[LIE =
Linguistic Idealism.]
As noted above, this
anti-materialist view of language sees discourse as primarily
representational.
However, we will soon discover that, instead of the arcane languages
Philosophers invent that are able to mirror
nature, their jargon actually
reflects constantly changing ruling-class interests and hence ruling-class-inspired perceptions
of the 'natural order' -- i.e., those that are conducive to their aims and priorities.
Theorists who, because of their class position,
were removed or alienated from the everyday world of work, were
naturally pre-disposed to remove (or 'abstract') ordinary words from their home in communication.
This helped reinforce the idea reality was fundamentally abstract, the
product of some 'Mind' or other. This in turn implied that only those capable of
forming greater or broader abstractions (based less and less on
any real connection with the material world) were capable of truly appreciating
such esoteric
mysteries -- or, since Hegel's day, were capable of "understanding" the 'dialectic of
reality'.
Unfortunately, as we will
also see, metaphysical 'profundities'
can't be based on ordinary language; that is, they can't be derived from a
medium that serves
primarily a means of communication. The vernacular actually prevents such
flights-of-fancy from being concocted in a comprehensible form. It is precisely for this reason that ordinary language -- along with its roots in the
communal life and the experience of working people --, had to be
denigrated, and then set-aside by theorists with a well-focussed, boss-class agenda.
Such theorists were
intent on showing that the oppressive and exploitative social systems from which
they just so happened to benefit were ordained of 'god', or were 'natural', predicated on a hidden, 'rational' order
comprised of those underlying 'essences'. This complex web of ideas was
motivated by a systematic fetishisation of language,
so that what had once been the product of the relation between human beings
(language) was inverted and transformed into the relation between these 'essences' and
the human mind -- or, indeed, those
'essences' themselves. In Hegel (and later in DM), 'dialectical logic',
supposedly implicit
in discourse, thus became the logic that ran the world (behind the backs
of the producers, as it were):
"This objective thinking, then, is the
content of pure science. Consequently, far from it being formal, far from it
standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition, it
is its content alone which has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to
employ the word matter, it is the veritable matter -- but a matter which is not
external to the form, since this matter is rather pure thought and hence the
absolute form itself. Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of
pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it is
without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the
creation of nature and a finite mind.
"Anaxagoras
is praised as the man who first declared that
Nous,
thought, is the principle of the world, that the essence of the world is to be
defined as thought. In so doing he laid the foundation for an intellectual
view of the universe, the pure form of which must be logic.
"What we are dealing with in logic is
not a thinking about
something which exists independently as a base for our thinking and apart from
it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or distinguishing marks
of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and self-determinations of
thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." [Hegel
(1999), pp.50-51, §§53-54.
Bold emphases and link added. Italic emphases in the original. I have
reproduced the published version, since the on-line version differs from it; I
have informed the editors over at the Marxist Internet Archive about this. They
have now corrected the on-line version!]
"[B]ut contradiction is the
root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a
contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity." [Ibid.,
p.439, §956. Bold emphasis added.]
"Instead of speaking by the
maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we
should rather say: Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in
Earth, neither in the world of mind nor of nature, is there anywhere such an
abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is
concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things will
then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being, and what
they essentially are....
"Contradiction is the very
moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is
unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction
is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when
cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of
the contrariety. The proximate result of opposition (when realised as
contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference
superseded and deposited to elements in the completer notion." [Hegel
(1975), p.174;
Essence as Ground of Existence, §119.
Bold emphases added.]
This
ancient, theoretical and ideological adulteration
-- imported into the workers' movement by the appropriation of Hermetic
Mysteries Hegel himself lifted from earlier Mystics and Idealists (whether or
not these are left upside-down or subsequently flipped the 'right way up') -- was facilitated by erstwhile
revolutionaries who also
unwisely then introduced into revolutionary socialism
this alien-class approach to language, 'cognition' and logic, and who thus implicitly rejected the roots of discourse in communal life.
[More details on this
were given in Essay Nine Parts
One and
Two; they will be elaborated upon
in later Parts of this Essay, Essay Thirteen Part Three, and in Essay Fourteen Parts One and Two.]
Finally, it is also worth pointing out at this juncture that
neither the social, nor the representational, nature of language is being
asserted or denied (as philosophical theses) in this Essay. It is possible, however, to
develop an understanding of the social and communicative role of language as a
"form of representation" -- indeed, as just such a form integral to
HM -- which is
also expressible with ease in ordinary language, and which is thereby consonant with the
experience of
working people.
[However, that won't be attempted in this Essay.
The term "form of representation" is explained
here. See also Note 18b,
and Note 19.]
Nevertheless, what is taken for granted
here is the fact that
ordinary material language is "alright as it is" (to paraphrase Wittgenstein).
Having said that, it will be agued -- indeed,
demonstrated -- that any attempt to undermine the
vernacular results in the inevitable production of
incoherent
non-sense.
The rest of Essay Twelve
(all Seven Parts)
will be devoted to substantiating many of these rather bald assertions.
18a.
It could be
objected that Voloshinov's work is a clear exception to these sweeping
allegations. That
objection has been well-and-truly neutralised in Essay Thirteen
Part Three, Sections (4)-(6).
18b. As Baz points
out: