This page might take
several seconds to load because of the many YouTube videos
it has embedded
in it.
Unfortunately, Internet Explorer 11 will no longer play these videos. As far as I can tell, they play as intended in other Browsers.
However, if you have
Privacy Badger [PB] installed, they won't play in Google Chrome unless you
disable PB for this site.
[Having said that,
I have just discovered they will play in IE11 if you have
upgraded to Windows 10! It looks like the problem is with Windows 7 and earlier
versions of that operating system.]
If you are using IE 10, you might find some of the links I have used won't work
properly unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu); for IE11
select 'Compatibility View Settings' and add this site (anti-dialectics.co.uk). Microsoft's browser,
Edge, automatically
renders these links compatible; Windows 10 does likewise.
However, if you are using Windows 10,
IE11 and Edge unfortunately appear to colour these links
somewhat erratically. They are meant to be mid-blue, but those two browsers
render them intermittently light blue, yellow, purple and red!
Firefox and Chrome reproduce them correctly.
Several browsers also appear
to underline
these links erratically. Many are underscored boldly in black, others more
lightly in blue! They are all meant to be the latter.
Finally, if you are viewing this
with Mozilla Firefox, you might not be able to read all the symbols I have
used;
this browser often replaces them with an "º'.
There are no problems with Chrome, Edge, or Internet Explorer, as far as I can
determine.
As is the case with all my
work, nothing here should be read as an attack
either on Historical Materialism [HM] -- a scientific theory I fully accept --,
or, indeed, on revolutionary socialism. I remain as committed to the
self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat
as I was when I first became a revolutionary over thirty-five years ago.
The
difference between
Dialectical Materialism [DM] and HM, as I see it, is explained
here.
It is worth pointing out that a good 50% of my case
against DM has been relegated to the
End Notes.
Indeed, in this particular Essay, most of the supporting evidence and
argument is to
be found there. This has been done to allow the main body of the Essay to flow a
little more smoothly. This means that if readers want to appreciate more fully my
case against DM, they will need to consult this material. In many cases, I have
qualified my comments (often adding greater detail and substantiating evidence),
and I have even raised objections (some of which are obvious, many not -- and
some that will have occurred to the reader; indeed, several have actually been
raised by a handful of readers and/or critics; for instance, Brain Jones,
mentioned above) to my own arguments -- which I have then answered.
[I explain why I have adopted this tactic in
Essay One.]
If readers skip this material, then my answers to any
objections they might have will be missed, as will the extra evidence and
argument.
Since I have been
debating this theory with comrades for over 25 years, I have heard all the
objections there are! Many of the more recent on-line debates are listed here.
Several readers have
complained about the number of links I have added to these Essays because they
say it makes them very difficult to read. Of course, DM-supporters can hardly
lodge that complaint since they believe everything is interconnected, and
that must surely apply even to Essays that
attempt to debunk that very idea. However, to those
who find such links do make these Essays difficult to read I say this: ignore them -- unless you want to access
further supporting evidence and argument for a particular point, or a certain
topic fires your interest.
Others wonder why I have linked to familiar
subjects and issues that are part of common knowledge (such as the names of
recent Presidents of the
USA, UK Prime Ministers, the names of rivers and mountains, the titles of
popular films, or certain words
that are in common usage). I have done so for the following reason: my Essays
are read all over the world and by people from all 'walks of life', so I can't
assume that topics which are part of common knowledge in 'the west' are equally
well-known across the planet -- or, indeed, by those who haven't had the benefit
of the sort of education that is generally available in the 'advanced economies',
or any at
all. Many of my readers also struggle with English, so any help I can give them
I will continue to provide.
Finally on this specific topic, several of the aforementioned links
connect to
web-pages that regularly change their
URLs, or which vanish from the
Internet altogether. While I try to update them when it becomes apparent
that they have changed or have disappeared I can't possibly keep on top of
this all the time. I would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if readers
informed me
of any dead links they happen to notice.
In general, links to 'Haloscan'
no longer seem to work, so readers needn't tell me about them! Links to
RevForum, RevLeft, Socialist Unity and The North Star also appear to have died.
It should also be pointed out that
phrases like "ruling-class theory", "ruling-class view of reality",
"ruling-class ideology" (etc.) used at this site (in connection with
Traditional Philosophy and DM), aren't meant to
suggest that all or even most members of various ruling-classes
actually invented these ways of thinking or of
seeing the world (although some of them did -- for example,
Heraclitus,
Plato,
Cicero,
and
Marcus Aurelius).
They are intended to
highlight theories (or "ruling ideas") that are conducive to, or which rationalise the
interests of the various ruling-classes history has inflicted on humanity, whoever invents them.
Up until
recently this dogmatic approach to knowledge had almost invariably been promoted by thinkers who
either relied on ruling-class patronage, or who, in one capacity or another, helped run
the system
for the elite.**
However, that will become the
central topic of Parts Two and Three of Essay Twelve (when they are published); until then, the reader is
directed
here,
here, and
here for
more
details.
[**Exactly
how this applies to DM will, of course, be explained in the other Essays
published at this site (especially
here,
here,
and here).
In addition to the three links in the previous paragraph, I have summarised the
argument (but this time aimed at absolute beginners!)
here.]
Finally, readers will find that in what
follows I repeatedly link to a specific section of a new Essay of mine (Why
Dialectical Materialism Can't Explain Change) -- namely, where I
quote literally dozens of passages from the DM-classics, and lesser DM-works, in
support of several allegations I advance. I have done this since experience has taught
me that the vast majority of DM-fans either haven't read these passages (or
if they have, they have clearly failed to appreciate their implications), and
as a result they reject out-of-hand the
ridiculous consequences implied by 'the
DM-theory of change'. So, in debate with them I find I have to remind them
continually of what their own classics tell them about their own theory!
[In this, I am, of course, following
a cue from Lenin
himself.] And even then, when
confronted with the relevant passages, in black and white, chapter and verse,
staring at them on the page or screen, they
still refuse to believe
their own eyes, and tend to react in a series of predictable ways -- to
which I have also responded,
here.
Hence, I have adopted the same tactic in
this Essay, and have included scores of reminders in the text below (and now
here). In which
case, apologies are owed in advance to neutral readers for this constant
and tedious, but necessary, repetition.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
A US comrade (Brian Jones) has
made a half-hearted attempt to
reply to a letter I sent to the
International Socialist Review concerning several of the issues raised
in this Essay. The original letter can be accessed
here, comrade Jones's response,
here, and my reply
to him,
here.
More recently, a UK comrade has also
tried to reply to some of my criticisms; the details can be found
here and
here.
More recently still, another US comrade has also attempted to
respond to some of the points made in this Essay. On that, see
here.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As of July 2024, this
Essay is just under 214,000 words long;
three very much shorter summaries of some of its main points can be accessed
here.
The material below does
not
represent my final view of any of the issues raised; it is merely 'work in
progress'.
Anyone using these links must remember that
they will be skipping past supporting argument and evidence set out in earlier
sections.
If your Firewall/Browser has a pop-up blocker, you will need to press the
"Ctrl" key at the same time or these and the other links here won't work!
I have adjusted the
font size used at this site to ensure that even those with impaired
vision can read what I have to say. However, if the text is still either too
big or too small for you, please adjust your browser settings!
The aim of Essay
Seven Part One is to argue that Engels's 'Three Laws of Dialectics' are
so vague and confused that it is impossible to determine whether or not they are
true -- or even if they make any sense at all.
While
many dialecticians claim that 'The Three Laws' express the core ideas of
classical DM, others regard them as far too crude and formulaic. The author of
TAR,
John Rees, on the other hand appears to adopt a middle course, slightly
downplaying their significance, while preferring to define DM in terms of
"mediated Totality" and change through "internal contradiction", etc. [p.5.]
Nevertheless, he also notes that:
"The 'three laws' are...useful reminders of forms
in which dialectical contradictions sometimes work themselves out.... The three
laws are not, even in Hegel, the only way in which dialectical
development can take place. They can't be understood without the broader
definition of the dialectic discussed above [pp.3-8]. They are not, as Marx and
Engels were quick to insist, a substitute for the difficult, empirical task of
tracing the development of real contradictions, not a suprahistorical master key
whose only advantage is to turn up where no real historical knowledge is
available." [Rees (1998), pp.8-9.]
[DM = Dialectical Materialism; TAR =
The Algebra of Revolution; i.e., Rees (1998).]
[Alas, Rees forgot to point out
precisely where Marx
"insisted" on any of the above, or, indeed, anything remotely like it. Engels's 'insistence', on the
other hand, can be read
here.]
Be
this as it may, Essay
Two has shown that this isprecisely how these 'Laws' (and other dialectical precepts) have been
interpreted by dialecticians for well over a hundred years -- that is, as just such a
master key.
Indeed, in
an article in Socialist Review, Rees endorsed this 'Law' unreservedly, and, on the basis of just
oneexample -- the hardy perennial, water freezing or boiling
-- he was happy to assert that:
"[T]his is a feature of many different sorts of change, even in the
natural world. Water that rises in temperature by one degree at a time shows no
dramatic change until it reaches boiling point when it 'suddenly' becomes steam.
At that point its whole nature is transformed from being a liquid into a vapour. Lower the temperature of water by a single degree at a time and again there
is no dramatic change until it reaches freezing point, when it is transformed
from a liquid into a solid -- ice.
Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
From this
impoverished evidential base, Rees suddenly "leapt" to the following conclusion:
"This is why Marx described the dialectic as 'an
abomination to the bourgeoisie' and why Lenin said of this method that it 'alone
furnishes the key to "self-movement" of everything existing; it alone
furnishes the key to "leaps", to the "break in continuity"...to the destruction
of the old and the emergence of the new.'" [Ibid. Bold emphasis added. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
So, here we
have yet another example of
a priori dogmatism; that is, we are confronted with ideas that have been read
into nature and society based on little or no evidence. One minute, these
'Laws' aren't a master key, the next they are -- and then they are
peremptorily imposed on
"everything existing".
As we will soon
discover in what follows,
Rees ignored the countless cases where "qualitative" change isn't
even remotely "sudden", just as he ignored the many instances where this
'Law' just doesn't work. [Numerous examples of both have been presented in what follows.]
As
noted above, this Essay aims to show that these 'Laws' are far too
vague and confused for them even to be assessed for their truth or their falsehood. In
that case, they are absolutely no use helping us
understand the world or how to change it.
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
Nevertheless, Engels summarised his
three 'Laws' in the following way:
"The law of the transformation of quantity into
quality, and vice versa; The law of the interpenetration of opposites;
The law of the negation of the negation." [Engels (1954),
p.62.]
Earlier, he had characterised them
a little more fully, adding a little extra detail:
"Dialectics as the science of universal
inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual
penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried
to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation --
spiral form of development." [Ibid.,
p.17.
I have criticised the "spiral form of development" aspect of Engels's 'Laws' in
Essay Ten Part One, here.]
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
Exactly how Engels knew
that it was impossible
to "alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or
motion" he annoyingly kept to himself. His certainty in this regard can't have
been based on the limited evidence available in his day, nor yet from the
meagre evidence he actually scraped together in support of it, plainly since there is no body of evidence that
could confirm that it is "impossible" to alter the "quality" of a body in the
way he says. That remark is also true with respect to the vastly increased body of
evidence we have available today, as we will see.
Indeed,
this is something Engels himself
acknowledged:
Perhaps Engels was simply being careless in his choice
of words in these private notebooks? Maybe so, but no subsequent dialectician
has even so much as noticed that it isn't possible to derive an "impossibility"
(or even a "necessity") from
a set of contingent facts, no matter how large that set is.
But, we already know the answer: Engels didn't derive this 'Law'
from a research tradition established in any of the sciences; he copied it from
that Christian Mystic, Hegel,
who similarly based it on a handful of
anecdotal and trite examples,
which, as we will see, he, too, seriously garbled.
To be sure, Engels went on to argue:
"This is so very correct that it does not follow
from the continual rising of the sun in the morning that it will rise again
tomorrow, and in fact we know now that a time will come when one morning the sun
will not rise. But the proof of necessity lies in human activity, in
experiment, in work: if I am able to make the
post hoc, it becomes identical with the propter hoc." [Ibid.,
pp.229-30. Italic emphases in the original.]
But, it isn't too clear how human intervention can create a
necessity where there was only a sequence of events before human beings
had intervened. Engels seems to think this is obvious when it isn't. In fact, as will
soon be revealed, it is possible to alter the qualitative state of a body
without
the addition of matter or motion. In which case, Engels's conclusions aren't just non-obvious, they are false -- that is, where any sense can
be made of them.
Of course, this is quite apart from the fact that this 'Law' is
supposed to work in the natural world independently of human intervention. If
so, it looks like Engels's appeal to human action in order to derive a necessity
here means
this 'Law' operates only
contingently in nature -- or maybe not at all. How is human intervention able to
guarantee the sunrise or movement of the continents? Add to that the additional fact that the
results of human practice aren't quite as straight-forward as Engels appears to
think; on that, see here.
This
conundrum is rendered all the more puzzling
when we recall that for Engels matter itself is an
abstraction. [Cf.,
Engels
(1954), p.255: "Matter as such is a pure creation of
thought and an abstraction...."]. In that case, it seemsthat energy must be and 'abstraction', too. If so, it isn't easy to see how anything can
be altered qualitatively by the addition or subtraction of an 'abstraction'.
However, in AD
Engels's characterisation of this 'Law' is slightly more 'tempered':
"This is precisely
the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite
nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where
boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which -- under normal pressure
-- the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently
quantity is transformed into quality." [Engels
(1976), p.56.
I have used the online version here, but quoted the page numbers from the Foreign Languages
edition. Bold emphases added.]
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Ibid.,
pp.82-83. Bold emphases added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with
this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at
0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphases added.]
"...laws [have been] foisted
on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them." [Engels
(1954),
p.62.]
He also added the following thought:
"Finally, for me there could be no question of
superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and
developing them from it." [Engels (1976),
p.13. Bold emphasis
added.]
But, Engels's
hasty
deduction of a necessary law (i.e., one that uses the word "impossible")
from only a handful of cases -- largely drawn from a few areas of nineteenth
century chemistry, buttressed by a limited number of quirky,
anecdotal examples derived from everyday
life or the popular science of his day -- is a neat trick
that DM-fans and theists alone seem capable of performing.
Even if Engels had access to
evidence several orders of magnitude greater than we have today, that would
still fail to justify his use of "impossible".
His earlier words are worth re-quoting, therefore:
"The empiricism of observation alone can never
adequately prove necessity." [Engels (1954),
p.229.]
Less partisan observers might be forgiven for
concluding that Engels either did not know what the word "foisted" meant, or he
hoped no one would notice when he had indulged in a little of it himself.
Despite this, some might object that Engels actually had an answer to the above
objections (which is in fact a get-out clause he borrowed from
Hegel, too):
"'Fundamentally, we can know only the infinite.'
In
fact all real exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the individual
thing in thought from individuality into particularity and from this into
universality, in seeking and establishing the infinite in the finite, the
eternal in the transitory. The form of universality is the form of completeness,
hence of the infinite. We know that chlorine and hydrogen, within certain limits
of temperature and pressure and under the influence of light, combine with an
explosion to form hydrochloric acid gas, and as soon as we know this, we know
also that this takes place everywhere and at all times where the
above conditions are present....The form of universality in nature is law,
and no one talks of the eternal character of the laws of nature than the natural
scientists.... All true knowledge of nature is knowledge of the eternal, the
infinite, and hence the essentially absolute.... [This] can only take place in an infinite
asymptotic progress."
[Engels (1954),
pp.234-35. Italic emphases in the original.
Paragraphs merged.]
However, the scientists of Engels's day
-- from whose work he
was here generalising -- were Christians,
as was Hegel himself. In that case, one would expect them all to talk this way.
But, their conclusions (about these alleged "laws") manifestly do not
follow from the evidence that even theyhad gathered, any more than the existence of
their 'God' does. As we will
see in a later Essay, in their attempt to explain the content of their work to
non-specialists,
scientists often indulge in amateur metaphysics, but
this should no more influence us than their political opinions do. Even more
pertinent, perhaps: since
scientists are constantly
changing their minds over
the nature (and even the validity) of these 'eternal' laws, only the
terminally naive would think to base their philosophy,
or their politics, on
such shifting sands.
"How is it possible to translate the word
'infinite' as
'law-governed process'? Now Engels tries to equate the two, but an
'always' and 'at all times' are not an 'infinite'.
"In a later
Essay, we will see that this view of scientific law is a carry-over from ancient
animistic beliefs about nature, and so it is no surprise to see this idea
re-surface here in such
Hermetically-compromised
company." [On this, see
here
and
here;
the first is Swartz (2009), the second Swartz (2003).]
Nevertheless,
there are countless processes in nature
and society that
'disobey' this 'Law', so it can't be a law in any recognisable sense of that word (but see
here). And, even where it
seems to
work, it does so only because Engels left several key terms vague and
equivocal -- in which state they remain to this day. [I will be returning
to this point several more times as this Essay unfolds, giving clear examples.]
Of course,
it could be argued that there are many scientific laws that face similar
problems with respect to isolated or anomalous exceptions. That objection has
been neutralised
here.
[In what follows, I am not denying sudden
change, merely arguing that not all "changes of state" are sudden. So, in this respect
at least, this 'Law' is defective.]
Engels's First 'Law' is supposed to work
discontinuously (i.e., "nodally"), which supposedly allows nature and society to develop
by making "leaps" (a term which DM-fans like to use even while
leaving it studiously vague, too!).
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphases alone added.]
And
here is Engels -- copying Hegel, once more:
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphases added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C
from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
Here, too, is Plekhanov:
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: this has
now been corrected!)]
Finally, this is what Lenin had to say:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality....
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"The identity
of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' --
although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly
important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition
(discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite
tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including
mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world
in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their
real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the
'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically
observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease
and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites
(the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal
relation).
"In the first
conception of motion, self-movement, its
driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the
shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the
second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the
source of 'self'-movement.
"The first
conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of
everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid.,
pp.357-58. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
Unfortunately for these
a priori dogmatists, many
things in nature change qualitatively without passing through any such "nodal"
points -- and not even so much
as a tiny "leap".
These include
the following: melting or solidifying
metals, resin, rock, sulphur, tar
and
asphalt,
toffee, sugar, chocolate, wax, butter, cheese, and
amorphous
solids, such as glasses, gels, and
plastics (polymers).01 As these
materials and substances are heated or
cooled they gradually change (from liquid to solid, or vice versa). There isn't even a
"nodal point" with respect to balding heads! Individuals do not
suddenly become bald.01a
In fact, it is difficult to think of
many state of matter transformations (from solid to liquid -- or vice versa) that
exhibit these "nodal points" of transition -- and that includes the transition from ice
to water (and arguably also the condensation of steam). Even the albumen of
fried or boiled eggs changes slowly (but non-"nodally") from clear to opaque white
while they are being cooked.1
Those
who think the above comments are seriously mistaken
should consult Note One, as well as
this and
this, and then
perhaps think again.
For anyone who doubts the above, there are scores of
videos on YouTube that show metal, plastic,
chocolate,
glass,
and other solids melting slowly -- for example, the following:
Video One: Melting Plastic Spoons
Video Two: Glass Blowing
Video Three: Forging Iron
Video Four: Melting Chocolate
[I
recommend readers mute or turn
the volume right down on Video Three!]
Videos of
volcano eruptions show rock solidifying slowly. A lava stream will gradually
slow down as the molten rock cools and slowly grinds to a halt. Here, for
instance, is footage from
a volcano
in Iceland that began to erupt in March 2021:
Video
Five: Yet Another Refutation Of Engels?
Readers will
no doubt notice that the lava in the above video doesn't suddenly change from
liquid to solid, but does so gradually.
Indeed, this
property (i.e., a slow change of state) allows chocolate, gels and plastics to be shaped,
glass to be blown
and
metals forged.
Naturally, all this depends on how the duration of a
"nodal" point
is defined. Unfortunately, DM-fans have to this day failed to specify the length
of a single "node", nor have
they even so much as mentioned their duration. Indeed, discussions on the
Internet have shown that this objection wrong-foots most DM-fans, so they either ignore it
or call it "pedantry!".
Because of this, dialecticians feel they are free to indulge in bouts of sloppy, subjective, off-the-cuff, a prioriSuperscience
-- in which amateur pastime they all appear to be experts. Hardly one of them
ever fails to come up with
their own
favourite, or idiosyncratic examples, tested, of course, only in the
'laboratory of the mind', and which remain studiously non-peer reviewed.
That is
partly why I have called this aspect of DM, Mickey Mouse
Science.
[Since the above was written, I have discovered that
the above isn't
strictly true. The very first book I have encountered (in over 30 years of
trawling through the wastelands of DM-literature) that at least tries to deal
with this 'difficulty' is Kuusinen (1961) -- a work I first read in 2007. My
response to Kuusinen's attempt to defend Engels can be found here.
I have also responded to several objections to my comments about the length of a
'dialectical' "node" in my other Essay, Engels
And Mickey Mouse Science. Readers are directed there for more details.]
When
faced with the above, DM-fans often point to the precise melting points of
various substances as proof that there are indeed "nodal" points in nature. However,
they all ignore amorphous
solids (such as glasses, gels, and plastics),
which have nosharp melting point, about which we read:
"Amorphous solids do
not have a sharp melting point; they are softened in a range of temperature."
[Quoted from
here; accessed 03/05/2015. Bold emphasis added.]
"Amorphous polymers have a random molecular structure that does not have a
sharp melting point. Instead, amorphous material softens gradually as
temperature rises." [Quoted from
here; accessed 13/12/2018. Bold emphasis added. The rest of this
comprehensive review merits careful study.]
"Amorphous
solids tend to soften slowly over a wide temperature range rather than having a
well-defined melting point like a crystalline solid." [Quoted from
here; accessed 08/04/2015. Bold emphasis added; spelling
altered to conform with UK
English. See also
here.]
And since:
"Almost any substance can solidify in
amorphous form if the liquid phase is cooled rapidly enough...", [Ibid.]
that must
mean "almost any substance" lacks a
melting point if handled in the above manner. This in turn implies that there are
countless non-'nodal' (non-"leap"-like) changes in 'quality' in nature.001a
[See also
this
Encyclopedia Britannica article on Amorphous Solids. Notice once
again: I amnot arguing that
there are no sudden changes in nature and society, only that not everything
changes in this way, refuting this 'law'.]
Do DM-theorists even so much as mention,
let alone consider, these
glaring counter-examples?
Are you
serious!?
[I
have said much more about amorphous solids, especially glasses,
below.]
Another example
recently offered up in support of this 'law' is
Steven Jay Gould's
theory of "Punctuated Equilibria". Unfortunately,
amateur dialectical
palaeontologists have failed to notice that the alleged "nodal" points here
last tens of thousands of years! That is a pretty unimpressive
"leap" -- it is more like a painfully slow crawl. Indeed,
a snail on downers would be
remarkably sprightly in comparison!
[However,
this
DM-joker thinks both that (i) A 'nodal' change is 'instantaneous', and (ii) An 'instant' can last thousands of years!]
Moreover, since no individual organism actually
changes into a new species, there is no obvious object or body here which alters in quality
as quantitative variations accumulate. This contradicts Engels once more:
"Hence
it is impossible to alter the quality of abody without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
added.]
So, we seem to have
neither an Hegelian, nor
yet an
Aristotelian,
"substance" (or Engelsian "body") in which such "qualities" could inhere, and hence
motivate the right sort of change. Worse still, it isn't easy to see what the supposed quantities are supposed to
be here, either.
It could be objected that these "quantities" are quite clearly
the countless minor variations that accumulate over many generations in populations of organisms, which lead at some point
to a qualitative "leap", a species-change. But, many small variations are qualitative
already, and many of them occur in different organisms not
cumulatively in any one of them. [Examples of this phenomenon are given in the
next but one paragraph.] Moreover, novel qualitative changes introduced by
mutation don't arise slowly and then make a DM-"leap" after they have been
accumulated, since they appear suddenly. In other words, there is no slow
gradual change here, hence no "interruption in gradualness",
either -- since there is no
obvious gradualness to be "interrupted" --, leading to a mutational "leap". Mutations
themselves are
sudden and already qualitative.
Recall what Lenin said:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness." [Lenin
(1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
Mutations don't gradually happen.
So,
here at least we appear to have changes in quality caused by no
obvious or straight-forward changes in quantity!
In any case, even if the above comments are rejected for some
reason (or, far more likely, and as experience debating with DM-fans has taught
me, rejected for no reason -- or simply ignored!), the following
questions remain:
(a) What precisely is being
slowly and quantitatively accumulated, here? And,
(b) In what are all these
quantitative changes taking place or inhering?
No one supposes that if, for example, several
hundred thousand
Canada Geese all change colour slightly (for instance, if they all
become marginally pinker), that all these separate changes additively combine somehow into one
big qualitative change -- i.e., resulting in the emergence of a single very deep pink bird! Or, that
if,
say, several thousand
Red Deer all individually
manage to run a little faster that
every one of these extra cm/sec increments in each individual animal's speed
will combine to add an extra km/sec toone incredibly nippy herbivore!
Natural selection, so we are told, will
impact on populations
of organisms
that produce less (surviving) offspring, so that certain characteristics are
eliminated -- others preserved --,
which
then proliferate in populations of the descendants of those who reproduce the most, or which survive
the most. But, speciation is
the result of much more complex processes than mere additive increase (even if
we knew what was being 'added' here, or to which 'body' it was being
added, according dialecticians). [On this, see, for example, Coyne and Orr (2004).]
We
also encounter comments like this:
"Underpinning this conception of human beings as both part of the natural world
-- beings who were wholly physical in nature -- and yet different in crucial
ways from other parts of nature, was a theory of dialectics
adapted from Hegel in which, amongst other things, quantitative change (such as
the evolution of the brain) could turn into qualitative change (such as
consciousness)."
[Rob Hoveman, quoted from
here; accessed 05/05/2018. Bold emphasis added.]
But
no single human brain experiences this quantitative accumulation; no single organism
undergoes this progression in brain size; no single proto-human develops in this way.
So, precisely what is "the body" that Engels talks about that has been changed in quantity so that
a new 'quality' emerges in that body as a result? A least with respect to water we have the
same body of liquid being boiled! At least we have the same elastic band being
snapped, or the same head losing hair. But, all we have here are populations of
proto-humans with a range of individuals who have slightly larger brains (one
supposes), every single one of which dies without a furtherincreasein their own brain size, with the next generation having slightly bigger brains (one
supposes, once more). Again, as this process unfolds there is no one proto-human
being whose brain gradually increases -- from the small brain comparable with
that of our ape-like ancestor to the large brain of
Cro-Magnon 'Man' -- until 'consciousness' finally 'popped into
existence'.
Yet
again, we encounter a less than half-formed DM-'theory' passed off as if it were
cutting edge science, with little or no evidence, or even argument, offered in support. The problem
with this is that the above 'argument' appeared in an article that was meant to
promote Marxism as a scientific theory; but, imposing half-baked ideas on
human development (ideas dreamt up by Hegel) only succeeds in undermining
HM as a science.
[I
take up this sorry tale and further expose its patent absurdities in Essay
Thirteen Part Three, Sections Seven and
Eight.]
On the other hand, if
a species is to be regarded as an object in its own right -- perhaps stretched out in time,
as some taxonomists actually picture them1a --, then that 'object' will
only
seem to alter as 'changes' accumulate. That is because, if a species is
defined in this way (as a temporally-extended 'object', a bit like the
manifolds
embedded the
4-space
of Relativity
Theory), then it
can't actually change in any
straight-forward sense.
Admittedly, that depends on how we define the 'object'/'body' in
question and how we depict change. It is no surprise, therefore, to find both of these
notions have been left impressively vague by comrades who quote this particular example in
support of the First 'Law' (which is clearly part of the reason they
think they can get away with citing it). [For example,
here.]
Hence, if a
certain species is characterised in
this way (as a sort of four-dimensional 'sausage' -- i.e., as a
manifold in 4-space), then, even if the First 'Law' actually applied to it, this
particular 'species' won't have changed as a result of its 'internal
contradictions', or, indeed, as a result of anything else, for that matter. That
is because these manifolds don't change;
four-dimensional objects do not 'exist'
in time to change -- time is one of their 'in-built' dimensions,
as it were. On the contrary, 'time' exists in them; they
neither perdure
nor endurein time. Since everything temporally true of each of these manifolds is
true of the whole of it 'all at once' (so to speak -- because it is a single,
four-dimensional 'object'/'body'), it can't gain or lose
properties or "qualities" --, unless, of course, we insist on embedding it in a
fifth-dimension
and (confusingly) call this new context "Time". But then, of course,
this five-dimensional 'object' wouldn't change, either, and for the same reason.
[There is more on this in Essay Eleven
Part One.]
Without this 'extra-dimension', any predicates
true of this four-dimensional manifold will stay true of it for good, for there
is no past, present or future as far as this 'object' is concerned. In that case, 'change' would
amount to no more than 'our' subjective mis-perception of a
'succession' of
orthogonalhyper-plane 'slices' through this manifold
that we just happen to 'experience', or 'decide to focus upon'.
[This forms part of the so-called "Block
view of time". On this, see the PDF article
here.
Incidentally, I take no stance on this view of time in this Essay; I will do so, however, in a
later post.]
As should now seem obvious, dialecticians can
only afford to view the universe in this way if they are prepared to abandon
their belief in change -- or, if they are willing to consign change merely to our 'subjective'
apprehension of 'reality'.
Alternatively, if a species isn't
to be defined in this way (i.e., as a four-dimensional sort of 'object'), then because no singleorganism actually evolves, change to a species can't be the result of its 'internal
contradictions', once more -- since, on this view, a species is merely a sort of collection,
not an 'object' or 'body'.
Moreover, in
populations, individual organisms change neither by "contradicting" one
another nor their environment, howsoever the word "contradiction" is understood. There are no 'internal
contradictions' in such populations here to cause change -- or, if there are,
dialecticians have yet to identify them. Indeed, no single thing actually changes in
an evolutionary sense, only whole populations, and they
manifestly do so non-dialectically.
Of course, it could be objected that organisms do in fact 'contradict' one
another when, for example, they compete for scarce resources, etc. Contradictions
thus apply to the
'struggle' for survival among
conspecifics.
Or so it might be argued...
But, even
if that were a correct way of picturing 'dialectical contradictions', there
still don't appear to be any that are internal
to a particular organism
which motivates evolutionary change in that organism.
And, that isn't just because evolution works
on populations, not individuals. It is because changes to organisms are both
internally-, and externally-induced. As we will
see,
mutations,
of course, can be internally-generated (as copying 'errors', etc.), but
many are not; they are externally-motivated by radiation, or by viral or chemical agents. Indeed, some organisms even share
mutations (for example,
bacteria). What kind of 'contradiction' is that?
In addition, populations of organisms change
in response to environmental pressure (which, so we are told, 'selects out'
unfavourable variations). This is clearly an external constraint.
Again, as we will also find
out, depicting any of these as 'contradictions' -- howsoever they are caused --
is radically confused. [This topic has been discussed in
much more detail in Essay
Eight Parts One,
Two, and
Three.]
[On
this subject in general, see Ridley (2004); on the 'external'
and 'internal' causes of speciation, see Coyne and Orr (2004).]
Notwithstanding this, it isn't easy to
see how conspecific competition could be 'contradictory'. Not
only do many animals and plants cooperate
(on this see
Kropotkin
(1939), and Ryan (2002)), those that do compete
with
heterospecifics don't in general struggle against members of their own species.
So, for example, if a herd of deer is running away from a predator, and the
fastest individuals escape and survive, no one imagines that they do this by
struggling with those that didn't or couldn't run as quickly -- for example, by deliberately hindering or tripping fellow
conspecifics. Of course, there are many examples of organisms that do compete
conspecifically, but there are just as many (perhaps more) that don't. So, if
this 'Law' applies here, it does so only fitfully. Once more, calling this sort of competition a
"contradiction" is a
serious error.
Why that is so will soon become apparent.
According to the
Dialectical Classics, objects and
processes change because of (a) A "struggle" between "dialectical opposites",
and (b) Those "opposites" change into "one another". But,
competing conspecifics or heterospecifics manifestly do not change into
one another as a result of this alleged 'contradiction' or even this
'struggle'. A well-fed lion does not, for example, change into a escaping
antelope, which it would have to do if the dialectical classics are to be
believed (i.e., when they tell us that objects and processes change into that with
which they 'struggle').
Any who are tempted to question the above inferences are invited to read the
dozens of passages I have quoted from the
DM-classics and other DM-theorists that tell us that this is what such
opposites in fact do. [Follow the above link.]
[I have posted several videos and pictures
that illustrate heterospecific cooperation in Note 1b.]1b
Moreover, but worse, even if we could identify these 'contradictions', they
can't be 'dialectical'. That is because such contradictions are supposed to be
the result of the dynamic relation between dialectically-united "opposites". In
order to count as such "opposites" they have to imply one another,
such that one can't exist without the other (like the proletariat implies
the capitalist class and both can't exist without each other, so we are told).
But
which animal implies the existence of its predator, or vice versa? If all
predators died out, would that instantly wipe out every deer, for example (just
as the proletariat would cease to exist if there were no capitalists)? Can deer
only exist if there are other animals that chase after and then eat them? Do
conspecifics also imply one another? But they must if they 'contradict' one
another (and we naively believe what we read in the DM-classics). So, does, say, duck1
only exist if there is a duck2
that 'implies it into existence'? If the first duck dies does the second automatically
kick the bucket? One might well wonder what the very last
Dodo on earth
was thinking as it defied 'dialectical law' and happily lived out its last few
days/weeks/months all on its lonesome, not beingimplied into existenceby a single conspecific.
Apparently, that flightless bird was killed off by a combination of human and
rat predation. If there were a 'dialectical contradiction' anywhere in this
zoological drama, then those humans hunters and those rats must also have
ceased to exist as the last Dodo popped its clogs, since they were then no more
being 'implied into existence' by a single existent Dodo they could hunt.
None of this makes an ounce of sense,
even in DM-terms!
In that case, not only is Gould's theory not an example of this 'Law' at
work,
not even Darwin's is!
It is worth noting the
response of one comrade,
who offered what amounts to a subjectivist
counter-argument, along the following lines:
"She [i.e., Rosa L] also does not understand that
thousands of years are actually very short periods of time, geologically
speaking."
Which fact isn't, of course, something
that evolution itself understands, possessing neither a memory nor a working
knowledge of Geology. Hence, the processes involved clearly don't know when
something is short or long, nor do they know when to speed up just to make sure
they 'obey' this 'Law'. [The point of those rather odd remarks will become clear
presently.]
As should seem plain, a comparison like this with all of
geological time depends on a subjective
view of events, an opinion that we as observers of the whole process form of the course of evolution
and the development of the Earth. The processes themselves have no appreciation
of the time periods involved. In that case,
to describe these "nodal" points as either "long" or "short" would be
to do so from
our perspective. However, from the 'perspective' of the organisms involved,
tens of thousands of years wouldn't be a short time. In that case, for amateur
dialectical palaeontologists to describe these "nodal" episodes as
either
"long" or "short" would be no less subjective.
It could be argued that a ten-, or twenty-thousand year period
is short when compared with the hundreds of millions of years that
organisms have been evolving; so the above response isn't even remotely
subjective.
Of course, the point is worth making
again: nature
itself can't
take this view -- since, plainly, it isn't conscious! Human observers certainly make
comparisons of this sort, and as such these comparisons aren't
observer-independent -- hence, they aren't objective. [Of course, that depends on how
the word "objective"
is itself understood.] Lenin defined "objective" in terms of "independence" of human cognition:
"To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed
to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not
dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute
truth." [Lenin (1972),
p.148. Bold emphasis added.]
"Knowledge can be useful
biologically, useful in human practice, useful for the preservation of
life, for the preservation of the species, only when it reflects objective
truth, truth which is independent of man." [Ibid.,
p.157. Bold emphasis added.]
Again, exception could be taken to this
in that the above remarks (of Lenin's) don't imply these comparisons aren't objective. That is
because these
time periods exist independently of human observers.
But, once more: comparisons don't exist in nature.
Without conscious beings to do the comparing they would never be drawn. So,
while the processes concerned certainly exist without human observers to record
them, that isn't true of the comparisons themselves. [Which
is the reason for those earlier, rather
odd comments.]
Moreover, the phenomena themselves don't dictate
to us that we should compare the rapid speciation of a certain organism with the
whole of geological time, no more than we would allow similar comparisons
to be made with anything else. So, for example, it certainly won't do for someone
sat in a restaurant,
say, who has been waiting several hours for their food to arrive
to be told that in comparison to the amount of time since the
Pre-Cambrian they have in fact been served rather quickly.
Such comparisons aren't forced on us by
nature, and that is why we can't just use them anyway we please, as
the light-hearted comment in the previous paragraph
sought to bring out. If we insist on drawing lines somewhere, it will require
some sort of justification. As far as I am aware, no such justification has been
offered
by a single dialectician.
Anyway, why should we compare the speciation
underway in one population with all of geological time? If we
have to make comparisons, a more relevant one would seem be
one drawn against the length of time that
that species
has been in existence, which may only be of the order of tens of thousands of years,
anyway. In that case, if we have to draw comparisons, the time period Gould envisaged
for a new bout of speciation would be relatively long (or, rather, it will not
always be relatively short), compared to the time period that the said species has
existed, making this "nodal" point quite
protracted, and
hence not really "nodal" at all.
There is
nothing in nature itself that tells us we have to slice things up
one way rather than another (although it might be possible to give some sort of a
rationale for one specific choice over an alternative, as was done, for
instance, in the previous paragraph). While development may or may not be
punctuated, geological time itself hasn't been punctuated for us, with objective periods
highlighted for our convenience. Certainly geologists have divided up the
past
into the familiar
geological
ages, but that in itself doesn't force any particular choice on
us when it comes to comparing the development of a certain species with the whole of
earth's history.
And we
should certainly resist slicing up the past just to make life easy for
dialecticians.
Naturally, they can parse nature as they see fit,
but then that would merely highlight the subjectivism that we already know is
inherent in this 'upside-down' version of Hegelian Idealism. Of course, if
they were to do this, that would be no different from forcing their theory on
the facts, something they effect
to disavow, as Cornforth pointed out:
"Our party philosophy, then, has a right
to lay claim to truth. For it is the only philosophy which is based on a
standpoint which demands that we should always seek to understand things just
as they are…without disguises and without fantasy…. Marxism, therefore, seeks to base
our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising
from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as
previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphasis added; paragraphs merged.]
In that case, and once more, the comparison of any of these alleged
"nodes" with all of geological time would be no less subjective, no less an attempt to make everything fit into a favoured theory.
Of course, all this sits rather awkwardly with
what Engels himself said about these 'leaps':
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us
is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure
relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the
transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive
change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with
this Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change
suddenly passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr
Dühring had a little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made
use of this line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the
change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure
changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the
liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely
quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the
condition of the water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
It is hard to see how a 'qualitative'
change that took place in a geological time period lasting maybe ten thousand
years could conceivably be described as "sudden" -- Engels's choice of word, not mine. Again, how would
describing such a
change as "sudden", when it takes place in a time period that long, be different from
imposing a certain theory on the facts?
Alternatively, if it is claimed that this
'dialectical' re-description isn't
subjective, then dialecticians need to inform us of the objective criteria upon
which this piece of convenient, self-serving temporal parsing has been based -- and
then show how nature could possibly have agreed to implement these post hoc
(after the event) criteria, and why it
failed to signpost them more clearly for our convenience.
It
would be interesting to see this subjective re-description applied to several
of the other examples DM-theorists regularly wheel out to 'illustrate' this 'Law'. To
that end, consider a man who went bald
over the space of, say, ten years. Because this time interval is short
compared to
all of
geological time, we
could
count this
as a 'rapid' change, with a short "nodal" point. But,is
that sensible?
On the
other hand, and more reasonably, we would surely compare this example of follicular
deterioration with that man's
life up to that point. In that case, let us
assume this individual was, say, thirty when he finally became
follically-challenged, with
the first signs appearing when he was
perhaps twenty.
Given these background details, his subsequent hairless condition can now be
seen as the result of
slow
change and the alleged "nodal" point would have to be adjusted accordingly
to conform with this new
and more
reasonable perspective. Indeed, it would clearly be a rather lengthy "nodal"
point --, in which case, describing it as "nodal" would be about as accurate as describing a
tortoise as "fleet of foot", and
Kier Starmer as "honest,
straight-forward and true".
[However, as is pointed out
below, there
is in fact no "nodal" point in this case; there is no point at which someone who is not
bald becomes bald if they lose just one more hair. Naturally, a person's hair
could
fall out overnight, in which case, we would have a much clearer "nodal" point; but in the majority cases
baldness is progressive and chronic, not acute. But, even if someone were to
lose all their hair that quickly, this still wouldn't be a 'dialectical' change,
and that is because in this case there would have been no "break in
gradualness", required by
the DM classics. Not losing one's hair up to a certain point in time, then
losing it all at once isn't a "break in gradualness".]
Consider another example: what if a certain body of water
were heated up very rapidly (for example, because the heat source was immense --
say, from a nuclear explosion), and it went from water to steam in just a few
seconds. Here, the "nodal" point involved would clearly be very short. Compare
that
with the same body of water heated up very slowly (perhaps as a result of
long-term global warming), so that it evaporated gradually over the space of
several centuries, for the same input of energy. Clearly,
there would be no
"nodal" point at all in that case -- because, in this instance the water would never actually boil,
even though it would still evaporate.
Indeed, evaporation takes place all the time, right round the world as the
oceans re-cycle water into the atmosphere, very
undialectically. Even
if there were a "nodal" point here, it would be protracted, not short.
Calling it "nodal" would therefore do violence to this word, once again.
And
it is no use referring to the rapid breaking of inter-atomic bonds
(when water molecules change into steam)
as examples of "nodal" points, since they don't gradually break and then suddenly break,
which is what they would have to do if this were to take place in accord with
Engels's First 'Law'
-- that is, if the DM classics are to be believed. There is no 'break in
gradualness' in this case.
Here is Lenin again:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality....
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
Notice that Lenin points out that the "leap" and the "interruption of gradualness" are
what distinguish 'dialectical' from non-dialectical change. When inter-molecular
bonds break, they don't gradually break and then suddenly snap. So, there is no
"interruption of gradualness" here, which means this isn't an example of
'dialectical' change -- if Lenin is to be believed.
In that case, the duration of "nodal" points
themselves seem to change from short to long, and back again (or, they
disappear entirely), depending on the context (or the example under
consideration -- or, indeed, on the DM-fan telling the tale), and they appear to
do this without the intervention of a single 'internal contradiction', or
the input/removal of any matter/energy.
However, subjectivist conclusions (like the one
that opened
this
Sub-section) are
of little use even to dialecticians, for if we are now meant to refer to the
entire geological period in order to classify such "nodal" changes
as nodal, then the massive 'qualitative' transition from single-celled
organisms to present day flora and fauna manifestly took place over a "nodal" point lasting several billion years.
Given
that comparison, the phrase "nodal point" must surely lose whatever
connection it might once seem to have had with reality -- since it looks as if it can mean anything to anybody.
Someone might still complain that the above several-billion-year-long "nodal" point isn't a single point at all. There are
in fact tens of thousands of small "nodal" points dotted along its entire length, all illustrating dialectical change.
But, who
says? Where are the objective criteria that decide where a "nodal" point
begins and ends? Or, that help identify them, or
allow them to be
counted? Or, that tell us which periods we are supposed to be compared with which?
Or, even what-the-dickens a "nodal" point
is to begin with!
So far, not
only have DM-fans not thought to define
(or even so much as looselycharacterise) these all-important "nodal" points,
they have signally failed to say how we should count them, distinguish
them, compare them or even ascertain their length.
To that end, DM-theorists
might decide to get their act together and specify a minimum time
interval during which a phase or state of matter transition must take place for it to be counted as
"nodal". In relation to boiling water, say, they could decide that if the
transition from water to steam (or vice versa) takes place in an interval
lasting less than or equal to k seconds/minutes (for some
Real Number, k),
then it is deemed to be "nodal", not otherwise. Thus, by dint of
just such a stipulation their 'Law' could be made to work (at least in this
respect, in this instance). But, there is
nothing in nature that forces any of this on us -- the reverse is, if anything,
the case. Phase/state of matter changes, and changes in general, take different
lengths of time.
Moreover, under
differing circumstances even these intervals can alter, too.
Unfortunately, as noted above, if the "nodal" aspect of Engels's 'Law'
is re-defined in this way, that 'Law' would only become 'valid' because
of yet another
imposition on nature, which would make
it both eminently 'subjective' and conventionally dogmatic.
However, given the
strife-riven and
sectarian
nature of dialectical politics, any attempt to define a DM-"node" could lead to
yet more factions. Thus, we are sure to see emerge the rightist "Nanosecond
Tendency", sworn enemies of the "Picosecond Left Opposition", who will both
take up arms with the 'eclectic' wing at the "It-depends-on-circumstances"
'clique' from the centrist "Femtosecond League".
In low grade Mickey Mouse Science
like this, it looks like it is sufficient to throw a few loose and ill-defined
phrases at the page, or air them in a YouTube video, and then fool oneself into thinking that this constitutes genuine scientific,
or even apodictic philosophical, knowledge.
This
probably helps explain why there isn't (to my knowledge) even so much as one single PhD thesis (in
any
of the sciences) devoted to this aspect of DM, and which attempts to tighten-up
the loose phraseology of any of its 'Laws', or that establishes the truth of
any of them with the sort of detailed, thorough-going, rigorously checked evidence one finds in the genuine sciences. Of course, there are any number of books
and articles produced by DM-fans (which are almost without exception
mind-numbingly repetitive, and which re-cycle
the same 'arguments', and regurgitate the same handful of examples, year in, year out)
that offer a few hastily cobbled-together ideas on this topic, supported by a
smattering of highly selective, anecdotal or secondary 'evidence'. Almost invariably
this 'evidence' fills a few paragraphs, or, at best, a few pages. Compare that with the scores of pages of detailed evidence
and argument that grace the pages of genuine scientific research papers and monographs
-- I have given several examples
of such, here.
Woods and
Grant (1995/2007) is an excellent example of this genre. Even though
their display of 'evidence' is more extensive than is the norm in the
DM-literature, it, too, remains highly selective, and slanted so that it only
cites what seems to fit this 'Law' --, rather than this 'Law' having been being derived from all the available evidence.
The level of detail they give nowhere reaches the standard one sees in the
genuine sciences --, or indeed, the level of detail and precision one tends to
see in Marxist economics, for example (as noted
elsewhere in this Essay). Moreover, they consider none of the
obvious objections raised in this Essay.
In their case, Cornforth's words once
again seem rather apt:
"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas
of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and
tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous
philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…."
[Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15. Bold emphasis added.]
As now seems clear,
none of these forays into sophomoric 'dialectical' science
would satisfy the requirements of even a first year undergraduate paper in
Chemistry, Physics or Biology. Can you imagine saying that about any
branch of the genuine sciences? Or even the essays submitted by any
randomly-selected A-grade science student?
And, as
pointed out above, even
if Gould's alleged "nodal" points were as
subjectively short as they are said to be, during each one of them no individual
organism actually undergoes
speciation, since speciation applies to populations,
or possibly even to 'gene
pools', not individuals.
So, in this case, the alleged passing over of
"quantity into quality" attaches to no identifiable object in nature; hence the
First 'Law' doesn't apply, even
here:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e.
without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphases
alone added.]
"Change of form of motion is always a process
that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite
quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a
corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion,
electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and quality
mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to
convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.,
pp.63-64. Bold emphasis added.]
Naturally,
this sloppy
approach
to science allows dialecticians to imagine that Gould's hypothesis can be used to
'illustrate' their 'theory', but with no 'objective' criteria
or data to support
that assumption. This, once again, shows that DM has been imposed on
nature. Or, to be more precise, in this particular case, it has been foisted on Gould.
Finally, it is worth noting that Gould's theory
was partly developed to help resolve a serious difficulty that Darwin's theory
had
itself faced from the beginning: the (apparent) fact that there are countless 'gaps' in the
fossil record.
[On this,
see Schwartz (1999);
cf., also
this and
this. In fact, since Schwartz's new theory of
origins is pointedly non-gradualist, it ought to appeal to DM-fans more than
Darwin's!]
Now,
without adopting a position on this (since it is outside my area of expertise),
it is important to remember that Gould and Eldredge's theory is still just a theory.
It might not pan out;
most theories don't. [This allegation will be defended in
Essay Thirteen Part Two, when it is published; until then, see
here.] In which case, DM-fans would be wise
not to pin all their hopes on it.
There is an excellent article on this
topic,
here, which stresses the relatively rapid changes that
Gould and Eldredge's theory postulates, but it also underlines the fact that
these changes are still gradual, not saltational (i.e., they are
non-"nodal"):
"Punctuated equilibrium is therefore mistakenly
thought to oppose the concept of
gradualism,
when it is actually more appropriately understood as a form of
gradualism...." [Quoted from
here.]
Others might be tempted to appeal to
what could be called the 'statistical defence', and claim that the insistence that
Engels's 'Law' be applied to individual objects (or organisms) in evolution is yet another
example of 'formal thinking'. However, and on the contrary, Engels's Laws apply to averaged
(etc.) data sets.
Or, so it could be maintained...
Quite apart from the fact that this
objection flies in the face of what Engels himself actually said (repeated below), unless we can specify what it is
-- what body is it -- that bears
the qualities that actually undergo change, this 'Law' can gain no grip, for, in that case,
there would be no "quality" of anything specific that would change because of the increase in some
other
unspecified "quantity".
The only way round this 'difficulty', it seems,
would be
to attribute a "quality" to some sort of 'collective individual', or the
entire population/gene
pool in question. But, as noted above, even there, change is smooth, and
non-"nodal", and largely externally-motivated. In that case, this option is of no use to dialecticians.
[On this see, Coyne and Orr (2004).]
Moreover,
since statistical values nowhere appear in nature (that is, the
world itself does not contain, nor does it calculate,
the mean,
standard deviation,
cumulative frequency, or
Poisson distribution of anything whatsoever), this response is
entirely
subjective, too.
To be sure, we use statistical concepts
all the time to help us understand nature, but that doesn't mean such measures
are 'objective' --, any more than there exist feet, miles, kilometres, the
Prime Meridian,
the Equator, or the Centre of Mass of the Galaxy in nature, and which are hence 'objective'.
Of
course, this rather desperate response (i.e., the aforementioned 'statistical
defence') sits rather badly with Engels's words:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of
a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned....
Change of form of motion is always a
process that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one
loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other
gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical
motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore, quantity and
quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible
to convert motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body."
[Engels (1954),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
"Definite quantity" does not look at all
statistical!
But,
as with everything else connected with this terminally vague 'theory', it is
impossible to decide if even that is correct.
Although, we will see later that Engels
was wrong about this, it is possible to "convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body."
That is because energy is changed from one form to
another inside the bodies of animals and plants. Of course, that depends
on what Engels meant by "a single body",but, as usual,he left that concept totally unclear, too.1c
The
difficulties the First 'Law' faces don't end there, either.
When heated, objects and bodies change in quality from cold to
warm and then to hot with no "nodal" point separating these particular
"qualitative" stages -- hot water is significantly
"qualitatively" different from cold water. [This is even more the case when water is
superheated under pressure.] The same happens in reverse when they cool.
Moving bodies similarly speed up from slow to fast (and vice versa)
without any "nodal" punctuation marks affecting this qualitative transition.
Bodies with a high relative velocity are "qualitatively" different from those
with a low relative velocity -- any who doubt this should stand in front of a
stationary bus, and then in front of one moving at top speed. [Only joking!
Don't do it!] In like manner,
the change from one colour to the next in the normal colour spectrum is
continuous, with no "nodal" points evident anywhere at all; this is also the case
with the colour changes that bodies experience when they are heated until they
are red-, or white-hot. Sounds, too, change smoothly from soft to loud, and in pitch
from low to high, and then back again in a "node"-free environment. In fact, with
respect to wave-governed phenomena in general, change seems to be continuous
rather than discrete, which means that since the majority of objects
in nature move in such a manner, most things in reality seem to disobey this
aspect of Engels's rather unimpressive 'Law' -- at least, at the macroscopic level. Hence,
here we have countless changes in "quality"
that are non-"nodal".
To be sure, somewave-like changes are said to occur
discontinuously (indeed, the word "node" is used precisely here by Physicists),
but that isn't the result
of continuous background changes. For example, quantum phenomena are
notoriously discontinuous; such changes aren't preceded by
continual, or even gradual, quantitative increases, as this 'Law' demands:
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: they have
now corrected it!)]
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
The argument
above is plainly this:
(i)
Quantitative increase or decrease in matter or energy results in gradual change.
Hence,
(ii) At a certain point, further
increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a "leap", a sudden "qualitative"
change.
But, sub-atomic, quantum changes occur
suddenly with no "gradual" build-up. For example, electrons in an atom
don't "gradually" absorb energy and then "leap" to an new orbital. A 'quantum
leap' is exactly that, a sudden change caused by a discrete addition of a unit
of energy. This isn't like poring a liquid into a container, more like dropping a ball into
it. The same can be said when inter-atomic or inter-molecular forces break down. They
don't slowly or
gradually break and then suddenly break; there is no change in "gradualness",
even here.
"Changes of energy, such as
the transition of an electron from one orbit to another around the nucleus of an
atom, is done in discrete quanta. Quanta are not divisible. The term quantum
leap refers to the abrupt movement from one discrete energy level to another,
with no smooth transition. There is no 'inbetween'. The quantization, or 'jumpiness' of action as depicted in
quantum physics differs sharply from classical physics which represented motion
as smooth, continuous change. Quantization limits the energy to be transferred
to photons and resolves the
UV catastrophe problem." [Quoted from
here; accessed 15/12/2015. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected. Paragraphs merged.]
Hence, discontinuous quantum, sub-atomic
and inter-molecular phenomena, can't be
recruited to
fit, or illustrate, this 'Law'.
[Several more comments on the
alleged
application of this 'Law' to microscopic and/or quantum phenomena will be
added at a later date.]
Some might argue that in relation to
the above there are, indeed, sudden changes. For example, at some point a
speeding car will be deemed to be travelling fast (for instance, when it exceeds
local speed limits, or is in excess of, say, 50 mph). However, this response
would actually punch a gaping hole in this 'law', for it will be a human
observer who decides in each case that a car is travelling fast, or
that a lump of metal is hot, or a sound loud.
There
are several problems with that
(proffered) reply:
(a) It is a
human observer that undergoes
the supposed nodal-change, here,
not the objects in question. There is no objective point at which a car
is travelling fast, or a sound is loud. So, in this case, a qualitative change will
have taken place in that observer, not the object in
question. While the car will have had energy added to it, it hasn't changed
in the required manner, the
observer has done that -- but that observer has had no energy added to her.
(b) It is
even less clear what a 'quality' is supposed to be in such instances. Are there
objective laws in nature that decide when a lump of iron is hot and when it is
not? Is that lump objectively hot at, say, 99oC,
but not objectively hot at 98oC?
As we will see below, given the DM-definition of 'quality' there is in fact no
DM-'quality' in such cases. In relation to hotness, there is no point at
which a lump of metal "is what it is and not something else", and which is
also something substantially new, as the
definition requires.
[It
could be objected that a human observer will have had energy added to her, the
light energy that enters her eyes. I have dealt with objection extensively
here,
here and
here; sceptical
readers are directed there for more details.]
Dialecticians often apply this "nodal"
aspect of the First 'Law' to Capitalism in a bid to illustrate by analogy the revolutionary change from
one Mode of Production to another (especially that between capitalism and
socialism), as quantity supposedly builds into quality,
which then, at
some point, initiates a sudden revolutionary 'leap'. An excellent example of
this approach can be found
here, a more recent one here,
Rees (2008),
another
here -- yet another here:
"The point is that revolutionary crisis in society
is an example of the Hegelian 'transition from quantity to quality' -- or, if
one prefers to avoid Hegelian terminology, a 'phase transition' (borrowed from
thermodynamics), 'catastrophe' (borrowed from 'catastrophe
theory') or 'tipping point' [borrowed from right-winger,
Malcolm Gladwell --
RL]. The phrase 'transition from quantity to quality' has the disadvantage of
Hegelianism. But it has the helpful aspect of drawing attention precisely to the
fact that crisis emerges out of prior, gradual processes, which are perfectly
identifiable while they are going on, even if they may happen not to be noticed
until the outbreak of crisis." [Mike Mcnair, quoted from
here; accessed
22/09/2023. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Link added.]
[See also Molyneux (2012), pp.49-50, and Yurkovets (1984), pp.102-05.]
Once more,
what exactly is the 'dialectical'-body that is supposed to be involved in
such circumstances? What matter or energy has been added to what? No good
looking to DM-fans for an answer to these awkward questions since they
never even ask them, content merely to repeat, mind-numbingly, the mantras they
have uncritically imported into Marxism.
Anyway, how do we know that social
changes like these aren't like
the gradual solid-to-liquid phase, or state of matter transformation that metals,
glasses, gels, and plastics undergo? How do we know these social changes aren't gradual,
too? Since Capitalism clearly isn't a liquid,
but a solid (or a collection) of sorts, the transition to socialism should go rather
smoothly, if we really must insist on appealing to this analogy. [On that, see
here.]
Interpreted that way, the First
'Law' is of no
use to revolutionaries since it clearly suggests that they aren't needed,
and that Capitalism can be reformed away smoothly -- a bit like the way
metal, say, can slowly melt, or the way that heads can slowly turn bald as they
lose hair. If that can happen, and if dialectical revolutionaries aren't needed, their
obsolete theory
isn't
either.2
Some DM-fans
argue that the change of money into capital, or the change of a money-owner into
a capitalist, is an example of this 'Law' at work, and they point to Marx's use
of it in Das Kapital:
"The guilds of the middle ages therefore tried to prevent
by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist, by
limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master within a
very small maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a
capitalist in such cases only where the minimum sum advanced for production
greatly exceeds the maximum of the middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is
shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel (in his 'Logic'), that
merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative
changes." [Marx (1976),
p.423. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this
site.]
I have dealt
with the above example in this Essay, here.
[I hasten to add that
I don't think
capitalism can be reformed away, but must be overthrown by a proletarian
revolution; however, the analogy
drawn against Engels's First 'Law' suggests the opposite, as we have seen.]
This 'Law' is in difficulties in other respects,
too. Clearly, not
every change in quantity "passes over" into a change in quality. Why
not? [Don't expect an answer from DM-fans, dear reader!]
Perhaps even
worse, there is an obvious way of
reading the "vice versa"codicil attached
to this law which suggests quality should "pass over" into quantity!
"The first law of the transformation of quantity into quality and
vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Bold emphasis
added.]
"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else.
It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from
quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is
reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as
quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place."
[Ibid.,
p.253. Bold emphasis
added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
Engels
made the same point, this time in published work:
"In proof of this law we might have cited
hundreds of other similar facts from nature as well as from human society. Thus,
for example, the whole of Part IV of Marx's Capital -- production of
relative surplus-value -- deals, in the field of co-operation, division of
labour and manufacture, machinery and modern industry, with innumerable cases in
which quantitative change alters the quality, and also qualitative change
alters the quantity, of the things under consideration; in which therefore, to
use the expression so hated by Herr Dühring, quantity is transformed into
quality and vice versa. As for example the fact that the co-operation of
a number of people, the fusion of many forces into one single force, creates, to
use Marx's phrase, a 'new power', which is essentially different from the sum of
its separate forces." [Engels
(1972), p.160. Bold emphasis alone added.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Engels is quite clear: just as quantity
passes over in quality, the reverse also takes place -- quality passes over into
quantity!
Trotsky concurred:
"Logic involves unchanging
qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities. Dialectics is
constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the reverse." [Trotsky
(1986), p.87.]
However, I haven't been able to find other DM-theorists who interpret this 'Law'
in this way (i.e., "reciprocally", as Engels calls it), so perhaps I am the only
one who has ever noticed this 'loophole' (in fact, it is more like a fissure the
size of the Grand Canyon) in Engels's 'Law'. One
will look in vain for any attempt to address this fatal defect in the highly clichéd
and repetitive writings churned out by DM-fans (on whose pages the quantity of
their words definitely does not
pass over into improved quality) -- or even for some sort of vague recognition that such difficulties
exist. Not even Trotsky thought it was necessary for him to explain how this
'law' can possibly work backwards.
But, the "reciprocal" action of this 'Law' is hard to understand
for other reasons.
Is Engels really saying that a "qualitative" change in matter passes over into
"quantity", i.e., that, say, the change from liquid water to steam adds
matter or energy to the process? Or that bald heads make their owners lose
hair? If not, it isn't easy to see what this "reciprocal" aspect of
this 'Law' implies.
It could be argued that when steam condenses, or when ice melts,
latent heat
is released. So, a change in quality produces energy, just as Engels says.
However, quite apart from the fact that there is no change in quality here
(since the substance involved remains H2O
throughout), the reverse rule, if applied across the board, descends into
absurdity. For example, if a bald man loses his baldness, does this create new
matter or energy? Of course, the change itself is the result of new hair
growing, but that is an application of this 'Law' in forward gear, as it were --
i.e., the gradual addition of new hair will change one supposed quality
(baldness) into another (hirsuteness). But, there is no way of making sense of the idea
that the change in quality here, of itself, creates new hair, which it
would have to do if this 'Law' is to work 'backwards'.
[I consider another example of
this 'law' supposedly working in 'reverse gear', here.]
[Word of warning: When confronted with
many of the counter-examples listed below DM-fans generally respond by pointing out
that Engels's' 'Law' only applies to developing bodies and systems, which
rules them out. I have dealt with that attempted rebuttal
here and
here.]
As we delve deeper
into the murky depths of this 'Law', serious problems
continue to float to the surface. For
example, the same number of molecules at
the same energy level can exhibit widely differing properties/qualities
depending on circumstances. Think of how the same amount of water can act
as a lubricant, or have the opposite effect, say, on wet clothes;
the same amount of sand can help some things slide, but prevent others
from doing so;
the same amount of poison given over a short space of time will kill, but given over a longer period (in small doses) it could benefit the recipient --
Strychnine comes to
mind here.
To be sure, the effect of quantitative
stability of this sort
(supervenient
on qualitative change) is also sensitive to time constraints and the levels of concentration of the substances involved, but this extremely
vague First 'Law' says nothing about such factors. And, try as hard
as one might, it isn't easy
to see how these unquestionably material
aspects of nature (i.e., levels of concentration and duration) can be accommodated to the Ideal
Dialectical Universe Engels
uncritically appropriated from Hegel (upside down or 'the right way up').
But, what sort of scientific 'Law'
ignores details such as these? In fact, if a Mickey Mouse 'Law' like this were
written up and submitted to the peer review system of a reputable
scientific journal, the derision its authors would face would be the least of
their problems. Their reputations would be permanently tarnished. And that would be so even if it had been
presented in an
undergraduate science paper!
However, other recalcitrant examples
rapidly spring to mind: if the same colour is stared at for several minutes it
can undergo a smooth qualitative change into another colour (several optical illusions
are based on this phenomenon). Something similar happens with many
two-dimensional patterns and shapes (for example the
Necker Cube and other
optical illusions); these undergo considerable qualitative change when no
obvious quantitative differences are involved. So, there appear to be numerous
examples where quantity and quality aren't connected in the way
that DM-theorists suppose. [Pictures illustrating these phenomena have been
posted to Note 3.]3
In case someone
is tempted
to
argue that these aren't 'real' objects, but 'mental' entities, it is worth
recalling what Engels had to say:
"Dialectics,
however, is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and
development of nature, human society andthought." [Engels
(1976) p.180.
Bold emphasis added.]
The above Necker cube changes are at least objects of thought, and
so should be subject to this 'Law', if Engels is to be believed.
In fact, there are so many
exceptions to this
'Law' it might be wise to demote it and consign it to a more appropriate
category, perhaps classifying it among the trite rules of thumb that sometimes
seem to work -- a bit
like "An apple a day keeps the doctor away", or even, "A watched kettle
never boils".
Indeed, given the
additional fact that this
'Law' has no discernible mathematical content it is rather surprising it
was called a "law" to begin with. That isn't to say that Engels and others have
tried to apply this 'law' to mathematical objects -- as if they
develop! --; I have responded to unwise moves like that,
here.
[Recall, I have replied to several seemingly obvious objections to
the above points in the End Notes; links were posted several paragraphs
back, repeated below.]
[Word of warning,
again: When confronted with counter-examples like those mentioned below DM-fans generally respond by pointing out that Engels's 'Law'
only applies to developing bodies and systems, hence they argue that
'Isomers objection', for instance, is misguided. I have dealt with that reply
here and
here. Among other things, I
point out that
Engels himself appeals to Isomers to illustrate his 'Law' --
e.g., Engels (1954),
p.67
--, so DM-fans can hardly complain when his own examples are used
against him.]
Nevertheless, the situation is even worse
than the above 'difficulties' might suggest; there are countless examples in nature where significant
qualitative change can result from no obvious quantitative difference. These
include the qualitative dissimilarities that exist between different chemical
compounds
for the same quantity of matter/energy involved.
For instance,
Isomers present a particularly good example of this phenomenon;
and that is especially the case with respect to
molecules that have so-called "chiral" centres (i.e., centres of asymmetry).
In such cases, the spatialordering of the constituent atoms, not
their quantity, affects the overall quality of the resulting molecule -- which,
as we can see, Engels said couldn't happen:
"[Q]ualitative changes can onlyoccur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
In this
instance,
with isomers, a change in molecular orientation
-- a change in geometry, not quantity -- alters quality.
Consider one example of many: (R)-Carvone (spearmint) and
(S)-Carvone (caraway); these molecules are composed of the same number of atoms (and,
indeed, of the very same elements),
with the same bond energies, but they are nevertheless
qualitatively distinct because of the different spatial arrangement of the atoms
involved. The same is true of some of the
Fullerenes. Change in geometry
here once again results inachange of quality.
This non-dialectical aspect of matter is especially true of
the so-called "Enantiomers" (i.e., symmetrical molecules that are mirror images
of each other). These include compounds like
(R)-2-clorobutane and (S)-2-chlorobutane, and the so-called
L- and D-molecules, which
rotate the plane of
polarised light
to the left (laevo) or to the right (dextro), respectively --
such as, L-, and D-Tartaric
Acid. What might at first
sight appear to be small energy-neutral
differences such as these have profound biochemical implications; a protein
with D-amino acids
(instead of L-) won't work in
most living cells since the overwhelming majority of organisms metabolise L-organic molecules. These compounds not only have the same number of
atoms in each molecule, there are no apparent energy differences between them. Even so, they have easily distinguishable physical qualities.
Once
more: change in quality is here based on identical quantity.4
Recall, too, that the above are no less
material changes than any Engels himself considered; so no genuine
materialist should be embarrassed by them. It isn't as if I'm proposing
non-materialist causes here!
In response, it could be
argued that Engels
had already anticipated the above objection:
"It is surely hardly necessary to point out that
the various allotropic and aggregational states of bodies, because
they depend on various groupings of the molecules, depend on greater or lesser
quantities of motion communicated to the bodies.
But what is the position in regard to change of
form of motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or
vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the
same? Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion...; anyone can be
virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of form of
motion is always a process that takes place between at least two bodies, of
which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat),
while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality
(mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore,
quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been
found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single
isolated body." [Ibid.,
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added; paragraphs merged.]
In this way, he is able to argue that
any change in the relation between bodies always amounts to a change in
energy. But, it depends on the nature of the field in which these bodies are embedded.
[On that, see below.]
Engels's profound lack of mathematical knowledge
clearly let him down -- again.
Independently of this, Engels also confused the expenditure
of energy with energy added to a system. The difference between the two
is easy to see. Imagine someone pushing a heavy packing case along a level
floor. In order to overcome friction energy will have to be expended. But that energy hasn't been put into the packing case (as
it were) -- if the case ends up stationary. However, if the same case is pushed up a hill, Physicists tell us that
recoverable energy has been put into the case in the form of
Potential Energy.
Now,
as far as can be ascertained in the examples of interest to dialecticians (but
again, they aren't at all clear about any of this), it is the latter form of
energy (but not necessarily always Potential Energy) that is relevant to this
'Law', not the former. The first doesn't really change the quality of
any bodies concerned; the second does. [Although, of course, in the limit, the
first can. Enough friction will often melt a body or set it on fire, for
example. I will consider that option presently.]
If so, the
above counter-examples (e.g., involving Enantiomers) still applies, for the energy expended in
order to change one isomer into another is generally of the first sort, not the
second.
To be sure,
some of the energy in the packing case example will appear as heat (perhaps also
as sound), and will warm the above case slightly. But
this energy won't be stored there as chemically
recoverable (i.e., structural, or new bond) energy.
Despite this,
there could be a few die-hard dialecticians
who might try to argue
that any expenditure of energy is relevant to this 'Law'. That would be
an unfortunate move since it would trivialise it, for in that case it
would amount to the belief that any change at all (no matter how remote),
since it involves the expenditure of some form of energy somewhere (but
not necessarily energy put 'into' the bodies concerned), is the cause of
qualitative change to other bodies somewhere else. That would make a mockery of Engels's claim that only energy
added to the bodies concerned is relevant to this 'Law'.
"Change of form of motion is always a process
that takes place between at least two bodies, of which one loses a definite
quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a
corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion,
electricity, chemical decomposition)." [Ibid.
Bold emphasis added.]
Several
examples of that sort of change are given
below. The problems this creates
for DM are discussed at length in two later sub-sections,
here and
here, where
attempts to delineate the
thermodynamic boundaries of the local energy budget involved
-- which
would have to be specified in order to prevent remote objects/energy expenditure
being allowed to cause proximate change -- and what exactly constitutes the
addition of matter or energy -- were all
shown to fail. [Readers are referred to those later sections for more details.]
Some have
cp0mplaiend that Isomers can't count as counter-examples to the 'Law' since
there is no development involved between molecules. But, as noted above, Engels himself
included
Isomers as an example of this 'Law', even though there is no "development",
so it can hardly be objected when they are used against him.
"In these series we encounter the Hegelian law in yet
another form. The lower members permit only of a single mutual arrangement of
the atoms. If, however, the number of atoms united into a molecule attains a
size definitely fixed for each series, the grouping of the atoms in the molecule
can take place in more than one way; so that two or more isomeric substances
can be formed, having equal numbers of C, H, and 0 atoms in the molecule
but nevertheless qualitatively distinct from one another. We can even
calculate how many such isomers are possible for each member of the series.
Thus, in the paraffin series, for C4H10
there are two, for C6H12
there are three; among the higher members the number of possible isomers
mounts very rapidly. Hence once again it is the quantitative number of atoms
in the molecule that determines the possibility and, in so far as it has been
proved, also the actual existence of such qualitatively distinct isomers."
[Engels (1954),
p.67. Bold emphases
added.]
Even though there is there is no
"development" here, Engels notes that there are qualitative differences
between such already present molecules. If so, they can't have been produced from
one another. He says they are "qualitatively distinct" from each other
as they
now stand. Hence, not only are they "qualitatively distinct" from any they
might have
been developed from, they are "qualitatively distinct" from those they haven't,
and can't have been, developed from.
Again, if Engels is allowed to refer to
examples where there is no "development", or point to qualitative differences that
don't depend on development, to illustrate his 'Law', dialecticians can't legitimately complain if
similar examples are used to refute it.
Anyway, it is clear that Engels
failed to appreciate how this radically compromised his claim
that:
"It is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned."
[Ibid.,
p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
Once more: here we
have a change in geometry "passing over" into a qualitative change, refuting this
'Law'.
Nevertheless, it could
still be
maintained that Engels is quite clear: he has focused on qualitative change to the
same body. So, the above alleged counter-examples are all irrelevant, since what is being
compared here
are qualitative differences between different bodies.
Or, so it could be argued...
But,
that is just a variation of the 'development objection' we
met earlier, and suffers from all its weaknesses.
Furthermore, Engels's version of this 'Law' also leaves it entirely obscure what
the "addition" of matter and/or energy amounts to, and what even counts as
'the same body'. As we will see in a
later sub-section it is important to be
clear about this, otherwise it turns out that it is possible to show there are
endless
counter-examples waiting in the wings that also refute this 'Law'. [Again,
readers are referred to the aforementioned sub-section for more details.]
Finally, Engels seems to think it is always clear what
constitutes a single body:
"Here, therefore, quantity and quality mutually
correspond to each other. So far it has not been found possible to convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body." [Ibid.]
However, nature isn't quite so accommodating. In fact, when we
look at the material world, and refuse to impose an a priori scheme like
this on it, we see the picture isn't as clear cut as Engels would
have us believe. Indeed, as we will soon discover, it is easy "to convert
motion from one form to another inside a single isolated body."
[The reader is again directed to
here and
here for more
details. And we have already seen
there a problems defining a species as a single body.]
Even more embarrassing for this 'Law' are
Tautomers. One standard Organic Chemistry textbook defines them as follows:
"Tautomers are isomers differing only in
the position of hydrogen atoms and electrons. Otherwise the carbon skeleton is
the same." [Clayden, et al (2001), p.205.]
"In the case of
dimedone, the enol must
be formed by a transfer of a proton from the central CH2
group of the
keto
form to one of the
OH groups.
Notice that there is no change in pH -- a proton is lost
from carbon and gained on oxygen. The reaction is known as enolization as it is
the conversion of a
carbonyl
compound into an
enol. It is a strange reaction in which little happens. The product is almost
always the same as the starting material since the only change is the transfer
of one proton and the shift of the double bond." [Ibid., pp.524-25.
Paragraphs merged; links added.]
Another source adds that tautomerism
involves:
"[I]somerism in which the
isomers change into one another with great ease so that they ordinarily exist
together in equilibrium." [Quoted from
here.]
And, Wikipedia characterises
Tautomers in the following way:
"Tautomers
are
organic compounds
that
are interconvertible by a
chemical reaction
called
tautomerization. As most commonly encountered, this reaction results in
the formal migration of a hydrogen atom or
proton, accompanied by a
switch of a
single bond
and adjacent
double bond. In solutions
where tautomerization is possible, a
chemical equilibrium
of
the tautomers will be reached. The exact ratio of the tautomers depends on
several factors, including temperature,
solvent, and
pH.
The concept of tautomers that are interconvertible by tautomerizations is called
tautomerism. Tautomerism is a special case of
structural isomerism
and
can play an important role in non-canonical
base pairing
in
DNA
and especially
RNA
molecules.
"Prototropic tautomerism refers to the relocation
of a proton, as in the above examples, and may be considered a subset of
acid-base behaviour. Prototropic tautomers are sets of isomeric protonation states with the
same
empirical formula
and
total
charge.
"Annular tautomerism is a type of prototropic
tautomerism where a proton can occupy two or more positions of a heterocyclic
system. For example, 1H- and 3H-imidazole;
1H-, 2H- and 4H-
1,2,4-triazole; 1H- and 2H-
isoindole.
"Ring-chain tautomerism occurs when the movement of
the proton is accompanied by a change from an open structure to a ring, such as
the
aldehyde
and
pyran
forms of
glucose.
"Valence tautomerism is distinct from prototropic
tautomerism, and involves processes with rapid reorganisation of bonding
electrons. An example of this type of tautomerism can be found in
bullvalene. Another
example is open and closed forms of certain
heterocycles, such as
azide
--
tetrazole. Valence
tautomerism requires a change in molecular geometry and should not be confused
with canonical
resonance structures
or
mesomers." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 05/10/2008 (the article has been altered somewhat since then). Spelling
modified to conform with
UK English. Several links added.]
Even though many of these reactions require
catalysts
(which add no energy or matter to the original compounds), in each case the
product is a 'qualitatively' different substance, refuting the First 'Law'. This is a
particularly 'difficult' series of counter-examples (i.e., 'difficult' for
DM-supporters) because it does involve the
"development", the transformation of one substance into another. In
this case, the "same body" (a molecule)
changes while no matter or energy has been added to it, merely re-distributed in
that body.
Of course, it could be argued that the above
Wikipedia source acknowledges
the fact
that there is a change in matter or energy between the resonating isomers -- for
example, when it says:
"Tautomers
are organic compounds that
are interconvertible by a chemical reaction called tautomerization. As most commonly encountered, this reaction results in
the formal migration of a hydrogen atom or proton, accompanied by a
switch of a single bond and adjacent double bond." [Wikipedia. Link
above. Bold
added.]
But,
no energy or matter has been added to the molecule in question; as
already noted, it has simply been re-distributed within the molecule itself, as Clayden, et al pointed out:
"Tautomers are isomers differing only in the position of
hydrogen atoms and electrons. Otherwise the carbon skeleton is the same."
[Clayden, et al, op cit.]
Resonance
(aka "mesomerism") is even more controversial, but no less fatal to this 'Law':4a0
"Though resonance is often introduced in such a
diagrammatic form in elementary chemistry, it actually has a deeper significance
in the mathematical formalism of
valence bond theory (VB).
When a molecule can't be represented by the standard tools of valence bond
theory (promotion,
hybridisation,
orbital
overlap,
sigma and
pi bond
formation) because no single
structure predicted by VB can account for all the properties of the molecule,
one invokes the concept of resonance.
"Valence bond theory gives us a model for
benzene
where
each carbon atom makes two sigma bonds with its neighbouring carbon atoms and
one with a hydrogen atom. But since carbon is
tetravalent, it has the ability to
form one more bond. In VB it can form this extra bond with either of the
neighbouring carbon atoms, giving rise to the familiar
Kekulé ring structure.
But this can't account for all carbon-carbon bond lengths being equal in
benzene. A solution is to write the actual
wavefunction
of the molecule as a linear
superposition
of the two possible Kekulé structures (or rather the wavefunctions
representing these structures), creating a wavefunction that is neither of its
components but rather a superposition of them, just as in the
vector analogy
above (which is formally equivalent to this situation).
"In benzene both Kekulé structures have equal weight, but
this need not be the case. In general, the superposition is written with
undetermined constant coefficients, which are then variationally optimized to
find the lowest possible energy for the given set of basis wavefunctions. This
is taken to be the best approximation that can be made to the real structure,
though a better one may be made with addition of more structures.
"In
molecular orbital [MO --
RL] theory,
the main alternative to VB, resonance often (but not always) translates to a
delocalization of electrons
in
pi orbitals (which are a separate concept from pi bonds in VB). For example,
in benzene, the MO model gives us 6 pi electrons completely delocalised over all
6 carbon atoms, thus contributing something like half-bonds. This MO
interpretation has inspired the picture of the benzene ring as a hexagon with a
circle inside. Often when describing benzene the VB picture and the MO picture
are intermixed, talking both about localized sigma 'bonds' (strictly a concept
from VB) and 'delocalized' pi electrons (strictly a concept from MO)." [Quoted
from here.
Accessed 05/10/2008; the article has since been substantially
re-written.]
Figure One: Examples Of Resonance
In view of the fact that these are distinct qualitative
variations on a common theme, created by no new energy or matter added to the
'body' in question, it seems,
therefore, that this hapless First 'Law' has been refuted yet again.
[Another
word of warning: When confronted with examples
like those listed below, DM-fans generally respond by pointing out that Engels's' Law
only applies to developing bodies and systems, which supposedly rules these
alleged counter-examples out. Once more, I have dealt with that objection
here and
here. Anyway, several of the cases
considered below are in fact examples of "development".]
"In thermodynamics, the triple
point of
a substance is the
temperature and pressure
at which three phases (for example, gas,
liquid, and solid) of that substance coexist in thermodynamic equilibrium.
For example, the triple point of mercury
occurs at a temperature of −38.8344°C and a pressure of 0.2
mPa." [Quoted from
here.]
Once
again, here we have a change in quality (or one such between different qualities) with no addition of energy or matter,
at this point.
(B) Age Hardening
Consider, too, a process called "Age
Hardening" (or "Precipitation
Hardening") in metallurgy, a
process discovered by
Alfred Wilm.
When, for example, an alloy of Aluminium (e.g.,
Duraluminium)
is "quenched"
and then left at room temperature it will harden considerably over time when
left to itself. Once again, we
have here a change in "quality" with no matter or energy added to, or subtracted
from,
the alloy, refuting Engels. To be sure, this process can be controlled if the alloy in
question is maintained at a high temperature, but it still happens if it is left
at room temperature, as Wilm discovered.
If
two or more forces are aligned differently,
the qualitative results will invariably vary even when the overall
magnitude of each force is held constant.
Consider an
example: let forces F1 and
F2 be situated in parallel (but not along the same
line of action),
diametrically opposed to one another. Here, these two forces can exercise a
turning effect on a suitably placed intermediary body. Now, arrange the same two forces in like manner so that they are still
parallel, but act diametrically along the same line (i.e., these
two force vectors have opposite senses). In this new configuration, as seems clear, they will now have no turning effect on the same body.
Here we have a change in quality with no
change in quantity, once more. Since there are many ways to align forces (as there are with
other vectors,
such as velocities and accelerations, etc.), there are countless
counter-examples to this rather pathetic First 'Law', here alone.4a
Some might argue that moving a force in the
manner envisaged requires energy, so these instances aren't in fact
energy neutral. However, just like the example of the
organic molecules quoted by
Engels -- or, indeed, elements referenced in connection with the Periodic Table --, the arrangements listed
elsewhere this Essay could exist side by side. A qualitative difference
then would be obvious, but there would be no quantitative discrepancy between
them.
In addition, as
also noted earlier,
even where there is "development", the expenditure of energy itself depends on the
nature of the force field in which these forces are embedded -- i.e., whether or not the field
in question is "conservative".
[On
conservative forces, see
here
and
here.]
In a conservative field, the work done in moving a force in a
circuit is zero, but certain (non-circuitous)
line integrals
in such fields can also be zero, if they are chosen carefully. So, a force could still 'develop' in this way in an energy neutral
environment.
In either case, we would have a qualitative
difference (and based on development) for no extra quantitative input of matter/energy. Naturally, once again, this 'Law'
could be tightened to exclude these and other awkward counter-examples, but then
it would cease to be a law, and would simply become a narrow,
specially-tailored, subjectively-applied convention (or stipulation) -- and,
incidentally, one that will thus have been imposed on
nature.
It could be objected that moving a force in a circuit, even in a conservative
field, would merely take it back to where it began, which isn't what was
required by the examples given earlier this Essay. There, forces were moved
somewhere different. But, that is to misunderstand the notion of a circuit. The
point is that in a conservative field, movement of a body from A to B
(where A and B could be widely separated, and non-coincidental) is
independent of the path taken.
Perhaps more significantly, this 'Law' takes
no account of qualitative changes that result from (energetically-neutral)
ordering relations in nature and society (several examples of which we have
already met). Here, identical physical
structures and processes can be ordered differently to create significant
qualitative changes. One example of this is the different ordering principles found in
music, where an alteration to a sequence of the same notes in a chord or
in a melody can have a major qualitative impact on harmony, with no quantitative
change anywhere in sight. So, the same seven notes (i.e., tones and semi-tones)
arranged in different
modes (Ionian, Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian,
Aolean and Locrian) sound totally different to the human ear. Of course, there
are other ways of altering the quality of music in an energetically neutral
environment over and above this (such as timing and attack).
Another example
along the same lines concerns the ordering principles found in language, where
significant qualitative changes can result from the re-arrangement of the same parts of
speech. For instance, the same number of letters jumbled up can either
make sense or not, as the case may be -- as in, say, "dialectics" and
"csdileati" (that is "dialectics" scrambled). Which of these two
'words makes more sense I
will leave the reader to decide.
Perhaps more radically, the same
set of words can
mean something qualitatively new if sequenced differently, as in, say: "The cat
is on the mat" and "The mat is on the cat". Or, even worse: "It
is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first
chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's
Logic", compared
with "It
is impossible completely to understand Hegel's Logic, and especially its first
chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Marx's
Capital." Here, there is considerable qualitative difference with no
quantitative change at all.
[What are the odds that Engels would have tried to alter his First 'Law' to
accommodate that awkward fact?]
There are many other examples of this phenomenon, but a few more
should suffice for the purposes of this Essay: a successful strike (one that
is, say, planned first then actioned second) could turn into its
opposite (if it is actioned first and planned second). Now even
though the total energy input here might very well be ordered differently in
each case, the overall energy budget of the system (howsoever that is
characterised) needn't be any different. So, the addition of no extra matter or
energy here can turn successful action into disaster if the order of events is
reversed. Of course, we can all imagine situations where this particular example
could involve different energy budgets, but that isn't necessarily the case, which is all that is required.
There are literally thousands of everyday
examples of qualitative changes such as these where there are no obvious associated quantitative
differences,
so many in fact that Engels's First 'Law' begins to look even more pathetic as
a result. Who, for example, would put food on the table and then a plate on top
of it? A change in the order here would constitute a qualitatively different
(and more normal) act: plate first, food second. Which of us would jump out of
an aeroplane first and put their parachute on second, or cross a road first, look
second? And is there a sane person on the planet who goes to the toilet first
and gets out of bed second? Moreover,
only an idiot would pour 500 ml of water
slowly into 1000 ml of concentrated
Sulphuric Acid, whereas, someone who knew
what they were doing would readily do the reverse. But, all of these have
profound qualitative differences if performed in the wrong order (for the same
energy budget).5
How could Engels have missed
examples like these? Is dialectical myopia so crippling that it prevents
dialecticians using their common sense?
(E)
Context
Pushing these ideas further: context, too, can
affect quality in a quantitatively neutral environment. So, a dead body
in a living room has a different qualitative significance compared to that same
body in the morgue (for the same energy input). A million pounds in my bank
account has a different qualitative feel compared to the same money in yours.
"Ceci n'est pas une pipe"
presents
qualitatively different connotations if appended to a picture of a pipe, compared to its being
attached to a picture of, say, a cigarette. Indeed, "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" itself can change qualitatively
from false to true depending on how it is interpreted. So, as an
expression of what the painting by
Magritte is about (i.e., a pipe) it is false.
But, despite this, it is also literally true, since manifestly a picture
of a pipe isn't a pipe! Change in quality here, but no change in quantity. And
the one interpretation could easily develop into the other with no new
matter or energy introduced.
Figure Two: Gallic Refutation?
Several more examples of contextualised
qualitative change (supervenient on an energy-neutral background)
rapidly come to mind:
think of the way that the 'same' action can assume different qualities if the
circumstances are filled in. For instance, suppose a driver puts her hand out of the window; depending on
the background, that same physical act could be one or more of the
following: a right turn signal, a
friendly gesture to a friend, an effort to cool down, an attempt to throw away or catch something, an aimless act, a coded message, an act of bravado,
an attempt to pay at a toll booth or drive-in fast food outlet, and so on.
As we all know, there
are countless examples of this sort of situation (for each energy-neutral local environment)
where bodily movements can take on qualitatively different aspects if the
surrounding circumstances are filled in.
Other counter-examples include
the following: The wrong signatures on two different localised cheques could
invalidate both. Swap the signatures around and they would become valid. The same number (a large 20, say) printed on a
batch of £20 (or $20) notes would be qualitatively different from the same number (now
acting as the
serial number) printed on every one of these notes, which would invalidate them
all since they
would then all have the same serial number. A gold necklace in your pocket might
lead to your arrest. The same one in my pocket might win me a reward (and vice versa).
Once again,
doubtless the reader can think of
her own examples of such 'dialectically-challenged' facts.6
[Some
readers might lose patience with the triteness of
counter-examples like these, but the same individuals seem infinitely forgiving
of the countless trite examples that litter almost every single DM-book and
-article -- for example, balding heads, boiling/freezing water, snapping rubber
bands, etc., etc.]
(F) Qualitative Change Caused By Other
Qualitative Changes
Furthermore,
qualitative change can be induced by other
qualitative changes, contrary to what Engels asserted:
"...[Q]ualitative changes can
only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or
motion...."[Engels (1954), p.63.
Bold emphasis added.]
For example, in a 1:1
mixture of paint, one litre of brown can be made by mixing two half litres each of red and green,
but the same qualitative effect can be achieved by using less or more of both
(say, 2 litres of each), but in the same ratio. Here a change in the quantity of mixed paints has no
effect on the qualitative properties of the mixture that results (i.e., its colour), while
the qualities that are mixed will havethat effect. In this
case, two qualities (two colours) will have changed into a new quality (a new
colour) when mixed. Not only do the same amounts (and proportions) of red and
green paint exist before and after mixing, for any fixed amount of each, the two former qualities
will have merged
into a single quality. So, here we have qualitative change produced by qualitative change.
Even better, this is an example of development.
Of course, it could be argued that the
mixture contains more paint than it did before (which means that there actually has been a
quantitative increase), but that isn't
so. In general, prior to mixing there were n litres of each colour (and
2n
litres of both) preserving the 1:1 ratio. And, after mixing the same quantity of paint still exists,
namely n litres of each (and 2n litres of both), still preserving the
1:1 proportion. The qualitative
change in colour has nothing to do with the quantities involved, but everything
to do with the mixing of the two previous qualities in the same ratio.
To be sure, if the ratio
of the mixed paints are changed, a different qualitative outcome would also
emerge, but as noted above, even that won't happen "nodally", and so it seems to be of little
relevance to the First 'Law'. Recall what Lenin said:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin
(1961), p.123. Bold emphases alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
So, even if quantity were relevant here,
since there is no "interruption of gradualness", no "nodal line", this still
wouldn't be a 'dialectical change', whatever else it is.
In which
case, if the ratio is kept the same, we would have here a
change in quality initiated by qualitative change only, and not by any increase in
quantity.6a
As noted above, this example also applies to the
development of this 'body of matter'. So, we started with 2n litres of paint
and we finished with 2n litres, but at the end we also had a new quality (a new
colour) emerge, created by no overall increase in matter. And, the same will be true if these
mixtures are increased indefinitely by the continuous addition of paint (in the
same ratio -- say, by pouring both colours into a huge vat at the same rate from two
pipes -- both of which are fed from two tanks, with the entire ensemble (comprised
of the vat, pipes, paint, tanks, room, etc.) located in
one area of a factory or warehouse). In that case, the "same Engelsian object"
would be this entire ensemble -- i.e., this particular room/area
(etc.) in the factory or warehouse (and all it contains), to
which no new energy or matter has been 'added' -- plainly because that "body"
already included/took account of the paint and all that room's contents.
Furthermore, what applies to colour also applies to other qualities, too --
for example, heat (where the mixing of two 2n litres of hot and cold water
creates a warm mixture also of 2n litres).
Indeed, mixing
2n litres of two, n litre batches of different molten metals (exhibiting
severally different qualities) can lead to a qualitatively new
alloy -- for
example, brass
or pewter.
This also applies to any mixing of 2n units (or, indeed, other amounts
in the same or different ratios) of many different
varieties of matter that can be mixed (in solid, liquid or gaseous forms). Indeed, something similar can be achieved with the mixing of chemicals
in general (again, whether they exist as solids, liquids, or gases) capable of being mixed.
This also applies to the mixing of light, sounds, smells, and
tastes.
Indeed, the vast majority of chemical reactions can be characterised this way.7
Matter in general is therefore
reassuringly
non-dialectical.
Any who
object to the above examples need only reflect on the fact that they don't represent a
challenge to materialism (since they are all manifestly
material
changes), they merely throw into doubt Engels's (or, rather, Hegel's) rather pathetic 'Law'.
In which case, only someone more intent on defending Engels
and imposing DM on nature than
they are in understanding it will find reason to cavil at this point.
Another, and perhaps more significant instance of qualitative change, where
there is no implied change in quantity, includes the "Big Bang"
(assuming it actually happened). We are told this led to the formation of a whole
universe of qualitative changes with no overall increase in energy or matterin the
universe. So, here we have a massive change in quality (with Galaxies and
planets, and all the rest, emerging out of the original debris) with no overall
change in the quantity of energy in the universe.
As should
seem plain, that constitutes the
ultimate counter-example to this rather pathetic 'Law': the development of
everything refutes it!
On the other hand, if the
above 'Big Bang'
counterexample is
rejected
-- and an infinite universe is postulated in its place -- since there can be no increase in energy
in such a universe, any qualitative change in the whole of nature will
still occur with no
increase in the universal quantity of energy.
Either way, DM once again crashes to the ground in flames.
As we
are about to find out, it
isn't easy to shoehorn remote changes into this ill-fitting dialectical
straight-jacket.
So,
for example, the largest cut diamond on earth (in a safe, say, in New York) could change
into the second largest if another, bigger diamond is cut in, say, Amsterdam.
Here we would have a change in quality produced by no change in quantity to the
object in question, the diamond in New York. The same considerations also
apply to other remote changes. For instance, the biggest star in a
galaxy could become the second biggest if another star ten thousand
light years distant (but in the same galaxy) grows in size (perhaps over
millions of years) through accretion of matter. So, in both cases, there would
be a qualitative change to the first object with no relevant matter or energy
added to or subtracted from that object.
There are countless examples of remote change like this.
A
cheque drawn, say, in Paris will become instantaneously worthless
(qualitative change) if the issuing bank in Tokyo goes bust -- meaning that no
quantitative change will have happened to the original cheque -- no
matter or energy having been added to, or subtracted from, it.
The President of a given country visiting, say, the
UN Headquarters in Manhattan, can cease to be President if, while she is
away she is deposed at home. This is a significant change in 'quality', even
though no relevant matter/energy has been
added to, or subtracted from, this individual. Some might claim (rather
desperately) that this is a contrived example,
but the actual examples listed below show such remote changes aren't
contrived.
A Silver Medallist in,
say, the Olympic Games, can become the Gold Medal winner in a certain event (qualitative
change) if the former Gold medallist is disqualified because of drug-taking
or cheating -- meaning that no relevant quantitative change will have occurred to that Silver
Medallist. [In case anyone thinks this is another contrived example,
here is just one example of many.]
Here is what
I have just added to Essay Five on this (slightly edited):
The following
example isn't forced, either; it concerns a story (aired by the BBC) concerning the 3000 metre
steeplechase final at the 2014 European Games:
"France's Mahiedine Mekhissi-Benabbad has been stripped of
his 3,000m steeplechase gold medal at the European Championships for taking his
shirt off on the home straight. Mekhissi-Benabbad put his top in his mouth after
pulling clear of the field. Initially he appeared to be shown a yellow card by
an official but was subsequently disqualified. Frenchman Yoann Kowal now wins
gold, Poland's Krystian Zalewski gets silver and Spain's Angel Mullera wins
bronze." [Quoted from
here.
Accessed 15/08/2014. Paragraphs merged.]
As a result of this, Yoann Kowal was moved from second to first,
Krystian Zalewski from third to second, and Angel Mullera from fourth to
third....
The above
story isn't a one-off, either. It happens quite frequently in sport these days
(when those who cheat by taking performance enhancing drugs are found out). Here is a recent example:
"Russia's Natalya Antyukh has been stripped of 400m hurdles
gold from London 2012 on the basis of historical data from a Moscow testing
laboratory. Antyukh, now 41, is already serving a four-year ban
after being named in a World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) investigation into
cheating by Russia. American Lashinda Demus will be promoted to gold
in her place. All three gold medals won on the track by Russian athletes at
London 2012 have now been rescinded on doping grounds.
Mariya Savinova and Yuliya
Zaripova, the initial winners of 800m and 3000m steeplechase gold, have been
disqualified.
Ivan Ukhov's high jump title and Tatyana Lysenko's hammer victory in the
field have also been wiped from the record books....
"Antyukh has struck a defiant tone on social media. Her last
Instagram post on 18 August is a photo of her showing off her silver and bronze
medals from the 2004 Olympics. Those medals remain unaffected by the latest AIU
decision. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) can now promote Jamaica's
Kaliese Spencer to the bronze medal position after Antyukh did not appeal
against her punishment, with Czech Republic's Zuzjana Hejnova in line for an
upgrade to silver." [Quoted from
here; accessed
08/10/2023. Links in the original; several paragraphs merged. Bold emphases
added.]
The above
are yet more examples of remote change in quality induced by no relevant
change in quantity.
But, we
needn't rely on examples drawn from athletics. Back in May 2017,
James Comey,
Director of the FBI,
was fired by President Trump while he (Comey) was away in California. So,
Comey underwent a pretty significant qualitative (and remote) change (he ceased
being 'top cop') even though there was no relevant matter or energy added
to him.
Something similar happened to Rex Tillerson, Trump's ex-Secretary of State,
who found out on TV that he had been fired by Trump, on Twitter. Again,
this is an example of remote change in quality (the loss by an individual of a very powerful political Office
of State) with no relevant matter or energy added to him.
More-or-less the same can be said about Mark Esper, Trump's ex-Secretary of
Defence, who was also remotely fired, on Twitter, in November 2020.
This is yet
another change in quality with no relevant matter or energy added.
It
might be objected that the above argument is defective: When these individuals
saw or heard the news that they had been fired, light or sound energy was added
to them. Maybe so, but their seeing or hearing the news wasn't what fired them
or changed their status. Trump's remote action did that, and they were fired
whether or not they heard or saw the news. Hence, when Trump fired them they
all underwent an instantaneous, remote, political, legal qualitative change -- before
they had even discovered their fate -- but with no relevant matter or energy added
to them.
Consider another example: The
oldest known vertebrate fossil on earth could become the second oldest if
another even older one is discovered.
We
needn't labour the point; as noted above, there are countless examples of remote
qualitative change like this,
so many, in fact, that this Essay could easily be doubled in length if I were to
itemise
a significant number of them.
[Notice,
too, that many of the examples aired in the last few paragraphs concern 'developmental' change.]
(H) Context And Ordering Relations, Again
Two identical "Keep off the Grass" signs can mean
something different (qualitative change) if one of them is posted on a garden lawn and
the other is
positioned near a stand of Marijuana plants, at the same height above sea level
(thus, with no difference in energy).
Should anyone object to that example, we need only alter it slightly: imagine
another "Keep off the Grass" sign, but now in front of, but a few yards/metres
away from a huge picture of a lawn. This large background picture is
then removed and replaced by a huge picture of a Marijuana stand, again a few
yards/metres away from the "Keep off the Grass" sign. The sign itself will have
had no matter or energy added to it, but it will have altered in
'quality' -- it will also have "developed".
Some
might still object that the object here is in fact the "Keep
off the Grass"
sign and the background picture, since it is that picture which gives the
sign its meaning. If so, there will have been an addition of matter to
this sign as each background picture was changed.
In that case, all we need do
is alter the example once again:
imagine another "Keep off the Grass" sign in front of, but a few yards/metres away
from two huge pictures of a lawn and a Marijuana stand, one of which picture is
in front of the other. Imagine one of these background pictures is moved so that
it is now behind the other picture. Imagine also that this move is powered by a
battery operated device. The sign itself will have had no matter or energy added
to it, neither will the entire ensemble -- that is, the sign, the two
large pictures and the battery-operated mechanical moving device will
have had no matter or energy added to them, since this ensemble is self-sufficient in
energy -- but the entire set of objects will have altered in quality as these two large
pictures were swapped.
[The
objection that this, too, is a highly contrived example has been rebutted in the next
sub-section.]
A circle
will look like an ellipse
(qualitative change) if viewed from certain angles, for no change in, or
addition of, matter/energy to that shape.
The same three
mathematical (or physical) points can undergo a qualitative change if, say, from
being arranged linearly they are then re-arranged as the corners of a triangle
-- with no energy added to these points. Here, there would be a qualitative change with no quantitative change,
once again.
There is, of course, a potentially infinite number of examples of this
sort of change imaginable for 2-, or 3-dimensional shapes, for n points (be
they mathematical or physical -- so this isn't necessarily an abstract
set of counter-instances).8
[Any who object to the above might like to
explain how energy/matter has been 'added' to such points.]
Of course, the counter-examples
aired in this Essay could
involve genuine energy differences, that is undeniable -- but it isn't always necessarily
the case.
It would depend on how the 'local system' has been defined. Once again, this terminally vague
First 'Law' omits all mention of such 'trifling' details. Indeed, this
impressive and consistent level of DM-vagueness allows any
number of wild speculations to be advanced for or against this 'Law' -- as
we have already seen, and are about to see. It isn't easy to
think of a genuine scientific law that is quite so
theoretically, systematically and semantically-challenged, or one that is so accommodating
as the First 'Law'.
[On the difficulties of specifying the energetic boundaries of
any given system, see Lange (2002), especially pp.111-65.]
Hence, if we
define the local system as all the energy (chemical, potential, kinetic, etc.)
within a volume interval equal to that which contains the objects and processes
concerned, there would be no discernible energy difference in any of the examples
so far listed. To be sure, no
system in nature is hermetically sealed against all outside influences in this
way, but even slight energy leakage (in or out) at the boundary of such spatial regions will have no significant effect on the potentially huge
qualitative differences one could imagine in such cases.
In what follows, I don't intend to enter into too much technical
detail, but dialecticians have yet to specify whether the
systems (or the "same body"/"bodies") to which this 'Law' applies
are
thermodynamically open or
closed.
Engels lived when many of the core principles of thermodynamics were still being
developed, so it isn't fair to accuse him of serious neglect in this regard.
The same can't be said about subsequent
DM-theorists, those who helped spread this theory after the
Classical Laws of
Thermodynamics had been thrashed out. That isn't to deny Engels had much to say about the work
being done in this area by the scientists of his day, only that he and
subsequent DM-theorists signally
failed to delineate:
(i) The thermodynamic boundaries of the "bodies" he
spoke about;
Naturally, the
above attempt to tighten-up
the vague DM-'definition' of the First 'Law' (i.e., insisting on a clear
delineation of the thermodynamic and physical boundaries of the bodies/systems
involved) will lay it open to
all manner of extra, or novel, counter-examples.
Consider the
(hackneyed) boiling
water example:
If the relevant energy locale is
widened too much, no energy will have been
added to that system (i.e, the water, the kettle or pan, and the stove or
cooker and its energy source). In that case, we would have a qualitative change with no
quantitative increase in the energy locale so widely defined. Such a possibility
would definitely emerge if, say, the local region where the said boiling occurred is
defined as the entire country within which it takes place (or the entire
planet, and so on). So, with respect to such more widely defined systems no energy will have been added
to that system, just transferred from one part (the gas/electricity supplier) to another
(the heated water, etc.).
Engels
actually allowed for this (not perhaps realising it
drives a coach and horses through his non-definition of 'same body'):
"But what is the position in regard to change of form of
motion, or so-called energy? If we change heat into mechanical motion or
vice versa, is not the quality altered while the quantity remains the same?
Quite correct. But it is with change of form of motion as with
Heine's vices;
anyone can be virtuous by himself, for vices two are always necessary. Change of
form of motion is always a process that takes place
between at least two bodies,
of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat),
while the other gains a corresponding quantity of motion of another quality
(mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition). Here, therefore,
quantity and quality mutually correspond to each other. So far it has not been
found possible to convert motion from one form to another inside a single
isolated body." [Engels (1954),
pp.63-64. Bold emphases added.]
If
this 'Law' allows for energy to pass "between at least two bodies", then the system as a whole
(of which they are a part) will have had no energy added to it, but it
will have changed qualitatively, nevertheless. In that case it is worth asking: is the 'body' in question the entire system
containing these two or more 'bodies'? Or is it just one of them? If
the latter -- which means we will have drawn a "fixed, rigid"
thermodynamic boundary here --, then that would clearly violate this other DM-principle:
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay';
for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.]
For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time
be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. [Engels (1976),
p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Bold emphasis added.]
[I won't pull on that rather 'awkward' thread right
now;
the reader is re-directed here for more
details.]
In
the above case -- where the system might be an entire country or planet,
say --, any
energy leakage at the
periphery would be far too remote from the boiling of water in a kitchen somewhere
inside that system to affect that kettle. For example, any energy leakage at the boundary between the
earth and outer space will have no effect on a kettle boiled in, say,
Oswaldtwistle, England.
Moreover, other
instances that involve more rapid energy
exchanges (i.e., possible leakage in or out from remote sources of radiation -- for
instance, exploding stars)
wouldn't affect the
actual boiling of a kettle of water here on earth,
which would be irrelevant, too. Indeed, as things now stand, no dialectician has
thought to argue that when water boils, remote, minute energy inputs from distant stars (etc.)
have a significant, or even a relevant, effect, despite their commitment to DM-Holism and universal
interconnection.
Anyway,
an
energy locale could be defined in terms of a suitable light cone,
ruling-out all external energy inputs or leakages. [On that, see below.]
Now, it takes very little dialectics to see
that if the energy locale is defined widely enough, no (relevant) matter or energy will be
added to any complete system that exhibits a phase or state of matter
change in one or more of its parts. In that case, dialecticians (as a matter of
some urgency!) need to devise a new, non-question-begging definition of:
(a) The
permitted energy locale relevant to the First 'Law'; and,
(b) What counts as one body as opposed to a collection of
bodies.
Of course, even
a kettle is a collection of bodies -- most are an amalgam of a spout, a handle, a water container, a lid,
an electrical element, etc., etc. "Non-question-begging" is meant in this sense: the boundaries of a
given energy locale would need to be
drawn so as to avoid the accusation that this 'Law' only works because of yet
more ad hoc word-juggling --,
or, that it only works because of several convenient stipulations (i.e., 'persuasive definitions')
applied in a piecemeal manner, or subjectively imposed. Unfortunately for DM-fans, there
don't appear to be any objective criteria
to which they can appeal to prevent their 'Law' sinking into just such a
subjectivist black hole.
However,
there are at least two considerations why that
thankless task might prove to be even more challenging than the above remarks seem to suggest:
(1) Since
dialecticians believe that all things are interconnected, there appears to be no
way that they can objectively isolate one part of the universe from the rest so
that they could then assert truthfully that that sub-system is a sealed
unit, with no energy leakage (in or out).
If so, there is no way they can define
a single phase or state of matter transformation that would rule out the above attempt to widen
the relevant energy locale to all of reality, scuppering their
First 'Law'. In that case, no phase or state of matter transformations at all, anywhere
in the entire universe, would have resulted from an overall
increase in matter or energy, since the whole of the
universe would (obviously!) experience no change in energy as a result. Once
again: such
changes would simply have arisen
from a localised re-distribution of matter/energy inside the
universe. Engels's own reference to an increase in
matter or energy would now have to be withdrawn (or re-defined) in terms of
locallyre-distributed 'packets' of energy or matter, otherwise no increase could take place in such
circumstances. [We saw Engels arrive at that conclusion
earlier. Anyway, this
is just a generalisation of a much more limited point made in the next
Sub-section.]
For example, consider object/process, A,
which receives energy or matter from object/process, B, along
lines suggested by
Engels. If the energy locale
is defined as {A, B}, and if the "same body/process" is also
defined as {A, B}, then no energy will have been added to {A,
B}, but merely re-distributed inside{A, B}. In which case, there will have been a change in
"quality" in or to {A, B} with no new energy or matter added to {A, B}, contradicting Engels:
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Emphasis
added.]
On the other hand, consider again object/process, A, which
receives energy or matter from object/process, C,now interpreted as
the rest of the Universe. If the energy locale is defined as {A,
Universe} or, {A, C} -- or, in fact, just {C} --, and if the "same body/process" is also defined as
{A,
Universe} or, {A, C} -- or, just {C} again --, then, plainly, no energy will have been added to
{A, Universe} -- or just {C} -- merely re-distributed internally, once more.
[Henceforth,
I will drop reference to "just {C}", for obvious reasons!]
However, as we are about to
find out,
given DM-'interconnectedness', there is no way
to prevent {A, B} from inflating into {A, Universe}.
[Oddly enough
a similar fate awaits the 'DM-theory-of-knowledge'. On that, see
here.]
(2) The second reason why the aforementioned task
seems impossible to carry out (in DM-terms) is connected with any attempt made to
tighten or shore-up the boundaries of the systems involved. If the latter are
made too restrictive, no change can take place. In that case, either no energy
could be fed into the system -- meaning that (i) no qualitative change will result (according to Engels),
or, (ii) any qualitative change that does occur won't have been created by
new energy fed into the system -- since, in that case, it would be a sealed unit!
For example, consider again object/process,
A: if the energy locale is defined as {A}, and if the "same
body/process" is also defined as {A}, then, plainly, no energy will have been
added, since, plainly, {A} is now a sealed unit! [Which is what Engels
himself pointed out.]
On
the other hand, if the system is made less restrictive, there is no way to avoid
the inflation (mentioned a few paragraphs back, and again below) from occurring
-- i.e., that which in this case would lead from {A} to {A,
Universe}.
Before these knotty problems are addressed more fully, it
might prove useful to consider an obvious objection:
Proffered DM-Answer [DM-1]:
The horns of this
artificial dilemma
could easily be made less
problematic if the boundary to each energy locale (relevant to any phase
or state of
matter
transition) were defined quite naturally
as the immediate surroundings of that change and that energy input. Clearly, this would mean that any energy
that had been fed into a system (which involved, say, the boiling of a pan of water) would be
confined to the immediate causes of this specific change in quality (etc.), and
they would naturally be those that took place inside the space
(loosely) defined by that local boundary.
[Again, on the difficulties of defining
an energy 'locality', see Lange (2002),
pp.1-25, 94-110. Incidentally, Lange's proposed solution is itself defective for
reasons I won't enter into in this Essay.]
Or, so a response might go...
But, in
that case, plainly, no energy could be fed into any system so described
in DM-1.
If we fix our attention on the immediate surroundings in order to
locate or isolate the proximate cause of the above change in quality (aimed at
short-circuiting objections (1) and (2), above), that would
simply force us to look for the source of that
change in slightly more remote events (for example, to those taking place in the power station, or
the gas plant,
which supplied the energy).
On the
other hand, if we don't do that, and seal this system off, then
Engels's requirement that energy be fed into the system, now defined as the
immediate surroundings of the said change that initiated it, won't have been fulfilled. Again, if
that system is a sealed unit, no such outside inputs will be allowed!
That is plainly because:
Z1:
No energy or matter can't be added to, or
removed from, a body/system if it is sealed unit.
Plainly,
energy doesn't come from nowhere; it has to be input from somewhere.
However, if energy is input into any such system, then the local energy boundary
must be re-defined to include the source of that energy (the power station, or gas
plant, etc.). Again, if we don't do that, then the change in quality
witnessed won't have been caused by an input of energy, meaning that the whole
system won't have changed qualitatively as a result of that very input of energy, since none had been fed in!
Z1
again.
[Several obvious objections
to the above argument will be
considered presently.]
We could now try to seal this new and wider
energy locale in
a similar manner to that attempted above. That done all we
would have once more is a transfer of energy from one part of that sealed unit to
another -- in this case, from the power station to the kettle of water, say. But, and again,
if that were so, there would be a change of quality to that
system as a whole -- i.e., the power station, the location of the kettle, and the
kettle itself -- with no new energy added to that system as a whole, since, as now seems obvious, this wider system itself includes
the energy source!
To
repeat: all that will have happened here is that energy will have been
transferred from one part of the system to another, hence none added to that
system.
Consider, once more,
object/process, A, which receives energy or matter from object/process, B.
If the energy locale is again defined as {A, B}, and if the "same
body/process" is also defined as {A, B}, then no energy will have
been added to {A, B}, merely re-distributed internally. Alternatively, if
we widen the local energy boundary to include the energy source,--
call the latter, "S", -- then we will now have {A, B, S}
as our new body/system.
The reader
will no doubt see where this is going,
for the next question forces itself upon us:Is this wider system, {A, B, S}, itself
a sealed unit?
If it is we will have
Z1 again:
Z1: No energy or matter can't be added to, or
removed from, a body/system if it is sealed unit.
As seems
equally plain, the matter/energy produced and processed by a gas or electricity plant had to come from
somewhere. So, in order to comply with Engels's requirement that
energy be added to a given system to initiate qualitative change, we
would have to look outside{A, B, S} for such an input.
In that case, we would now have
to move this already widened boundary to include the field [F] from which the
gas was extracted, or the coal/gas/water/wind systems that generated the
electricity -- yielding {A, B, S,
F}, and so on. Is
this a sealed unit? If it is, then Z1 applies once more. But, in that eventuality, and
to comply with Engels's 'Law',
we would now have to widen this still further to include the organisms that lived
millions of years ago that produced the gas/coal/oil, or the astronomical, geological
or atmospheric processes that produced the water/wind. How then could we prevent
this inflating uncontrollably to include the entire universe,as indicated
earlier?
In that case,
as noted above, {A, B,
S, F} would soon inflate into {A, Universe}!
Hence, Engels's First 'Law' seems to require
inclusion of the entire universe if it is to work. ['Truth is the Whole'?] Not even the
hackneyed DM-boiling-pan-of-water can be isolated from the rest of reality
-- indeed, as
DM-classicists themselves tell us:
"When we consider and reflect
upon Nature at large, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual
activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations
and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what,
where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes
away....
"We see, therefore, at first
the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the
background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections, rather than the
things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, naive but
intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is
not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into
being and passing away....
"[The] new German philosophy
culminated in the Hegelian system. In this system -- and herein is its great
merit -- for the first time the whole world, natural, historical, intellectual,
is represented as a process -- i.e., as in constant motion, change,
transformation, development; and the attempt is made to trace out the internal
connection that makes a continuous whole of all this movement and development."
[Engels (1892),
pp.405-08. Bold emphasis added.]
"The whole of nature
accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by
bodies we understand here all material existences extending from stars to atoms,
indeed right to ether particles, in so far as one grants the existence of the
last named. In the fact that these
bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another,
and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already
becomes evident that matter is unthinkable without motion." [Engels
(1954), p.70. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialectics is the science of
universal interconnections…." [Ibid.,
p.17.
Bold emphasis added.]
"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics
of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts….
This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics:
approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all
notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions
of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel
brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat
constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without
exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain
connection with all the others....
[Among the elements of dialectics are the
following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum
and unity of opposites…. [E]ach thing (phenomenon, process, etc.)…is
connected with every other…. [This involves] not only the unity of
opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
[Lenin (1961),
pp.196-97;
221-22.
Bold emphases alone added; paragraphs merged.]
"Dialectics
requires an all-round consideration of relationships in
their concrete development but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.... A tumbler is assuredly
both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two
properties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an
infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the
world. A tumbler is a heavy object which can be used as a missile; it can
serve as a paper weight, a receptacle for a captive butterfly, or a valuable
object with an artistic engraving or design, and this has nothing at all to do
with whether or not it can be used for drinking, is made of glass, is
cylindrical or not quite, and so on and so forth.... Formal logic, which is as
far as schools go (and should go, with suitable abridgements for the lower
forms), deals with formal definitions, draws on what is most common, or glaring,
and stops there. When two or more different definitions are taken and combined
at random (a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel), the result is an eclectic
definition which is indicative of different facets of the object, and nothing
more. Dialectical logic demands
that we should go further. Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of
an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and
'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely,
but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.
Secondly, dialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in
development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is
not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too,
is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and
connection with the surrounding world. Thirdly, a full 'definition' of
an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of
truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants. Fourthly,
dialectical logic holds that 'truth is always concrete, never abstract', as the
late Plekhanov liked to say after Hegel." [Lenin
(1921), pp.90-93. Bold emphases alone added;
paragraphs merged. Quotation marks altered to
conform to the conventions adopted at this site.]
"Contrary to metaphysics,
dialectics does not regard Nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of
phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but
as a connected and integral whole, in which things…are organically connected
with, dependent on, and determined by, each other. The dialectical method
therefore holds that no phenomenon in Nature can be understood if taken by
itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena…. The dialectical method
therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the
standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the
standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into
being and going out of being….
Speaking of the materialist
views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that 'the world, the all
is one...,' Lenin comments: 'A very good exposition of the principles of
dialectical materialism.' [Lenin (1961),
p.347.]"
[Stalin
(1976a), pp.837-38, 845. Bold emphases
added; paragraphs merged. I have quoted from the online edition of Lenin's
Philosophical Notebooks here.]
[Several
other passages that say the same sort of thing have been quoted
here.]
If all things are interconnected, then not even a
pan of water
is an isolated or sealed unit. It took human beings, energy and countless
different material/energy
inputs to make that pan, as well as a human being to buy it and use it to boil water. It also
takes human beings to procure that
water, clean, sterilise and distribute it. Furthermore, it took a series of natural processes to create that water, and so on.
If we seal any of these off from the rest of the universe, there would be no pan to
begin with, and no one to turn on the gas, connect the gas supply,
prospect for gas; no ancient organisms to die and produce that gas, no water, etc., etc.,
etc.
Moreover, if the above DM-classicists are to be believed, all these objects and processes are still interconnected. As we will see in Essay Eleven
Part One, if we
insist that everything is inter-linked, there is no way to prevent an
absurd inflation to {A, Universe} from taking place, so that even a humble
pan (just like
Lenin's tumbler, above) will now be interconnected
with events remote in space and time -- even including those that no longer exist! If
this Wholist, DM-thesis is correct, all these objects and events are now connected with that
pan,
just as that it is now connected with them in return. Otherwise, why
assert that everything is inter-connected, as opposed to merely being
connected? And, if that is so, it isn't possible to seal even a pan
of water off
from the rest of the universe.
In that
case, there are no isolatable
or sealed units in the DM-universe,
and hence there are no energy inputs -- since that energy will already
be part of the system to which they all belong --i.e., {A, Universe}.
Of course, there is an easy way to neutralise this entire set of
annoying objections: abandon the theory of universal interconnection. In
that case, it might be possible to save the First 'Law' by ditching that other core DM-thesis. On the other hand, if
universal interconnection is to be preserved, then the above inflation is unavoidable. As
soon as the energy boundary is widened to take in the whole universe -- in order
to maintain
the idea that everything is interconnected --
no phase or state of matter
transformation at all would result from an overall increase in matter or energy
to that wider system -- since, plainly, the whole of the material universe would have experienced no
change in total energy or matter in that regard, merely its re-distribution.
Now, it could be objected that it is perfectly clear what
Engels was trying to say. He meant that if energy or matter is fed into an
object or process, at some point it will undergo a qualitative change. The last
few paragraphs have merely complicated a simple and easy to understand description of a familiar
series of events --, such as that of boiling a pan of water.
However, it is worth recalling that
the progressive widening depicted above was initiated in response to a suggested
attempt to define the immediate surroundings of the object or process
undergoing the said qualitative change -- i.e., DM-1. And, that was introduced in order
to be a little clearer about which objects and processes are being referenced --, and that in turn
was required in order to (a) Rule out the awkward counter-examples
listed above. and earlier, and (b) Comply with the DM-thesis that all things are
interconnected. It
is also
worth adding that, (c) Any relevant energy boundary needs to be drawn tightly to stop leakage
at the margins, and hence forestall a cosmic energy inflation,
also
outlined
earlier.
But, if the "immediate surroundings" are defined more tightly to exclude the
input of energy needed to effect the said change in quality, then obviously
no such change will take place (Z1 again!),
which means the doctrine of universal
interconnection will have to be abandoned. On the other hand, if there is a qualitative
change inside that boundary, it can't have resulted from an input of
energy!
Alternatively,
if the boundary to a local system (the "immediate surroundings") is relaxedsufficiently enough to allow
some energy in, and that input itself is included in the immediate surroundings --
yielding {A, B, S, F}, in order to rule out several of the
aforementioned annoying counter-examples --,
that would undermine Engels's requirement that energy must be addedto the system, since that 'added energy' has already been included in theimmediate surroundings,
and so can't have been added!
It could be objected that
the above moves are unfair,
if not ridiculous. As soon as Engels's requirement that energy is added has been
observed, the law will work perfectly well. All that the present critic has done
is rule it out as not having been added!
I
will resist making an easy counter-jibe that anyone who complains along those
lines doesn't "understand 'anti-dialectics'", nor will I go for an easy cop-out
and play a
Nixon card (claiming that
'anti-dialectics' also "grasps" the contradictions in DM, but only in order to
help in the latter's speedy demise). Dialecticians would certainly be hoisted
by
their own petard if their unfair and self-serving argumentative tactics were
now used
against them.
[This is
just a long-winded way of saying that DM-theorists are the last people on the
planet to complain legitimately about such "unfair" moves. Sceptical readers are
referred to the next
Sub-section for a few concrete examples
of this DM-quandary.]
The
reason the above 'unfair' critical moves were aired was to underline the fact that
howsoever we try to repackage the First 'Law' it can't be made to work unless we ditch other core DM-theses.
Of course, if any DM-fans who have read this far think otherwise, they are welcome
to say (clearly) -- and for the first time in 150 years -- what the hell Engels was
banging on about!
So, this
is the quandary facing DM-fans -- and we have found that whichever option they
chose, it can't be made consistent with Engels's terminally vague description of
this First 'Law', nor with other
core DM-theses:
[A] On the one hand, if the boundary
taking in the
immediate surroundings of one of these 'dialectical changes' is drawn too tightly, no energy can be fed into
that system and nothing will change qualitatively in the required manner.
[B] On the other
hand, if energy is
allowed in, that would throw open the doors to the above inflation.
Once more: howsoever we try to
re-define any such local system, the First 'Law' suffers
a mortal wound.
This isn't just a
DM-failing. As we will discover, it is also the fate of all other metaphysical
theories (considered in several other Essays posted at this site, summarised
here). When it comes to
filling in the
details, not only does material reality invariably erect insurmountable obstacles
to such theories -- or, rather, to such theoretical impertinences --,
the language based on, and derived from, humanity's long-term interaction with that reality (i.e.,
ordinary language)
actually prevents such theories from making the slightest sense.
[That
argument was set out in detail in Essay
Twelve Part One.]
As a
last desperate attempt to breath life back into this dying 'Law', someone might try
to argue that the above constraints would be disastrous for science,
too. That isn't so; scientific laws are surrounded by countless ceteris
paribus clauses, and so don't pretend to be metaphysical. Moreover, no
scientist would come out with such woolly vagueness concerning the supposed relation
between "quantity and quality":
"...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body
without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63. Emphasis
added.]
Since
this topic has been dealt with extensively in Essays Eleven
Part One
and Twelve Part One, the
reader is directed there for more details.
Lest the reader be tempted to argue that
there is no pressing need for dialecticians to consider things in such pedantic detail --
their 'Law' is fine as it is --, it is worth pointing out that if scientists
themselves attempted to advance their discipline in such a slap-dash, 'dialectical' manner, few would remain
in their jobs for long, and even fewer would have advanced human knowledge
much beyond the invention of the wheel. If
science is to progress, its practitioners have to analyse their research areas
and question the language they use in even morepedantic detail than has been
attempted so far in this Essay.
[Concerning the 'pedantic' detail they do in fact take into account, see
here; on 'pedantry' itself, see
here.]
Anyone who has studied or practiced
genuine science will already know this, anyway.
[In a future re-write of this Essay, I will add just such detail
to reveal to those who know little of modern theory the extent of the 'pedantic'
detail those who theorise about science actually enter into these days. In the meantime, sceptical
readers are encouraged to visit
this
site for scores of examples. (Philosophy of Science is in fact one of
the few areas of Philosophy that won't be rubbished at this site, even if a critical stance will always be adopted
toward it.) I have now added some of the aforementioned material to this
Sub-section.]
Finally, it might be thought that the above considerations clearly ignore the fact
that we can rule out such vanishingly small, remote effects as
irrelevant. I have
dealt with that objection in Essay Eleven
Part Two.
The above considerations highlight another
serious ambiguity in Engels account of this
embattled 'Law':
"...[T]he transformation of
quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express
this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual
case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or
subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or
subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the
body concerned." [Engels
(1954), p.63.
Bold emphasis alone added.]
As noted earlier, Engels is entirely unclear what
constitutes the "addition" of matter and/or energy to a "body"
-- which considerations partly underlie the counter-objections aired in a previous
Sub-section. In relation to the mixing
of coloured paint, for example, it would seem that those objections take it as
read that one litre of red has been added to one litre of green. But if we
word this differently, even that would become false. Imagine the following
scenario: we have a two-litre can holding one litre of red and one litre of
green separated in the middle by a collapsible barrier (which remains inside the
container where the mixing occurs). Let us assume that the barrier is collapsed so that the red and
green paint begin to mix (we could even have a battery operated mixing device internal
to this container so that no energy is 'added' to the entire ensemble,
comprising the
container, the paint,
the mixing device and the barrier). In this scenario, the object/body in question
would be the
container, along with its contents. At the end of the mixing process we would still have the same
object (i.e., the tin can with exactly the same quantity of paint, the original
collapsed divider, energy source and mixer), only now exhibiting a new quality, the colour brown.
Put this way, we would have a change in
quality to the same object/body (the tin of paint and its contents) with no new matter added
to that object/body, contradicting Engels.
Now, it could be argued that the above examples are
highly contrived, and so can't be considered 'natural' processes. But, these aren't
supernatural processes -- they all take place in this universe --
and yet they still contradict Engels, who said this sort of thing was
"impossible":
"It is
impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of
matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned."
[Engels
(1954),
p.63. Bold emphasis added.]
If a series of events
can be described clearly (and which don't violate any scientific laws), then
this must be possible, not "impossible".
Anyway, even if the above
were a viable objection, there are countless processes in nature and society that
undergo similarly non-dialectical 'development'.
"The beetle's explosive power is derived primarily
from the mixture of two chemical compounds -- hydroquinone
and
hydrogen peroxide -- that are
stored in separate reservoirs in the abdomen. The chemicals then pass through a
valve before meeting in a special chamber, along with an enzyme that catalyzes
the reaction. This creates gases that rapidly expand and give off heat. Beetles
can open and close valves to this reaction chamber rapidly, fast enough to
produce up to up to
500 explosive bursts in a second. These insects can also aim the chemical
sprays at prey, using their rear ends like a noxious water pistol." [Quoted from
here; accessed
29/06/2024. Paragraphs merged. Two links added.]
If the original object/body is the said beetle, then
we have here a change in quality -- i.e., this otherwise quiescent and
placid animal turns into a noxious insect -- with no change in matter or overall energy. Sure, matter is subsequently lost
(to that animal), but
before that happens the beetle has already changed,
otherwise the subsequent loss of matter wouldn't
have taken place!
Even more annoying, the above change is part of that beetle's
'development', so this example isn't susceptible to the sort of challenge we met
earlier.
Or, consider another example -- and one that is
perhaps more familiar to most dialecticians than the Bombardier Beetle -- the Widget in certain cans of beer:
"A can of beer is pressurised by adding
liquid nitrogen, which
vaporises and expands in volume after the can is sealed, forcing gas and beer
into the widget's hollow interior through a tiny hole -- the less beer the
better for subsequent head quality. In addition, some nitrogen dissolves in the
beer which also contains dissolved
carbon dioxide.
The presence of dissolved nitrogen allows smaller bubbles
to be formed with consequent greater creaminess of the subsequent head. This is
because the smaller bubbles need a higher internal pressure to balance the
greater
surface tension, which is
inversely proportional to
the radius of the bubbles. Achieving this higher pressure is not possible just
with dissolved carbon dioxide because of the greater solubility of this gas
compared to nitrogen would create an unacceptably large head.
"When the can is opened, the pressure in the can quickly
drops, causing the pressurised gas and beer inside the widget to jet out from
the hole. This agitation on the surrounding beer causes a chain reaction of
bubble formation throughout the beer. The result, when the can is then poured
out, is a surging mixture in the glass of very small gas bubbles and liquid.
This is the case with certain types of draught beer such
as draught stouts. In the case of these draught beers, which before dispensing
also contain a mixture of dissolved nitrogen and carbon dioxide, the agitation
is caused by forcing the beer under pressure through small holes in a restrictor
in the tap. The surging mixture gradually settles to produce a very creamy
head." [Quoted from
here;
several paragraphs merged. Links in the original.]
Once again, we have a change in quality with no
change in quantity to the can and its contents.
It could be argued that there is in fact a difference
in matter and/or energy in this can, namely the removal of the ring pull and the
escape of gases near the
opening. That is undeniable, but is it significant? What causes the change in
quality is the Widget, not the ring pull. This can be seen by the fact that in
cans where there is no Widget, the above doesn't happen.
However, someone could still object that the above
differences in matter/energy are relevant to the subsequent change in quality;
after all, they set in motion those changes.
[This is yet another particular example of the general
point we met in the previous
Sub-section: if DM-fans want to interconnect this and other cans with
further processes in the vicinity, then
there is no way to prevent the absurd inflation described earlier (link
below).]
There are several problems with the above attempted pro-DM-rebuttal:
First, as we saw
earlier, there is no
question-begging way to define the thermodynamic or energy locale of such 'DM-changes'.
Secondly, it is questionable that the removal of a ring pull, and the loss of
small quantities of vapour amounts to the addition/removal of matter or energy
from the beer-Widget ensemble itself. This, naturally, raises issues also
touched on earlier.
What exactly is the DM-"object"
in this case? Until we are told, this attempted pro-DM-rebuttal can't itself succeed. Even after
we have been told what the DM-"object" is here, that will just beg the question (again, as noted
earlier), for it
would then be plain that any new demarcation lines will have been drawn in order to
save this 'Law', making it entirely subjective -- and, incidentally, it would
have been imposed on the facts.
Finally, after the ring pull has been removed, and the small quantity of
vapour has escaped, the ring-pull discarded, the remaining beer-Widget ensemble will undergo a qualitative change
for no new matter or energy input into that system, violating the First
'Law'. Anyone who objects to the 'line' being drawn just there (i.e.,
cordoning-off this system at the Widget-beer boundary just after the ring pull
has been removed) will need to advance objective criteria for it to be
re-drawn somewhere else.
On the other hand, if that boundary is re-drawn to include the
discarded ring pull and
any escaped vapour, then, once more, no new energy or matter will have been
added to that system (i.e., the beer-Widget-ring-pull-vapour ensemble),
even though it will have undergone a qualitative change.
Anyway, the aforementioned ring-pull could be removed
by a battery-operated device stored inside the can, controlled by an internal timer
(or both could be inside a box holding the can itself),
meaning that the resulting change in quality will have been occasioned by no new
energy added to the can-beer-widget-battery-device system (or more specifically
to the
box-can-beer-widget-battery-device system). And, of course, there
are plenty of such systems already in use. For example, electronic alarm clocks
run on internal batteries. When they change in 'quality' from ticking to
ringing, no new matter/energy has been added to the clock-battery system. The same is true of most battery operated devices,
or any system with its own internal energy source -- and that includes motor
vehicles, aeroplanes, rockets, ships, lap-top computers, mobile/cell phones, pacemakers,
battery operated drills, etc., etc.
In every such case, they regularly undergo qualitative change (and some of these can
be quite dramatic) even though no energy or matter has been added to them.
Consider a car travelling along a level road. In order to change in 'quality'
and
turn left, no new energy will be added to that car. Of course, it could be
argued that friction between the road surface and the car will effect that
change, which involves the input of external energy. But, if all things are
interconnected, then the car-road
ensemble itself will experience no new energy input to it. Alternatively, if we draw
the boundary between the car and the road in order to try to save this theory, then
all those earlier unanswered questions
will force themselves on us once more. If we were to agree with DM-theorists
that everything is interconnected then the car can't be isolated from the road
or any forces between that road and that car's wheels. In which case, there
will be no
increase in energy in this new "whole" (i.e., the car-road complex), merely a transfer from one part of
it to
another. On the other hand, if we insist on isolating these two, then not all things are
interconnected. Either we save the First 'Law' by abandoning 'universal
interconnection', or we abandon the First' Law' to save 'universal
interconnection'.
This is one 'either/or' DM-fans can't glibly explain away -- or ignore.
Of course,
that defence can't even be contemplated with respect to battery operated devices.
No new matter or energy is added to a battery operated alarm clock when the
alarm goes off, for example.
It is always possible for DM-fans to try
to advance their overused "relatively-speaking"
defence at this point -- as might happen by the use of a "relatively true",
"relatively stable", or "relatively interconnected" response to the above --, in order to argue that while objects
and processes in nature are interconnected they are also "relatively
isolated" from one another, and so can be regarded as single units
(this perhaps forming part of an
initial abstract analysis of the world and how it changes).
Well, we certainly wouldn't allow defenders of the capitalist system to argue that
wages are "relatively fair", nor would we even so much as countenance
an
argument offered by a Nazi who claimed that Hitler was "relatively nice to the Jews",
and the same is true with regard to the "relatively-speaking" defence
that might be used here used by
a DM-apologist.
That is quite apart
from the fact that even if a "relatively speaking" clause were allowed here,
that would in no way affect what happens in the real world, which doesn't depend
on how we might or might not attempt to parse it. Whether or not a car is
"relatively" isolated from the aforementioned road, the road-car ensemble has no
energy fed into it.
It is also rather
absurd -- if not desperate -- for anyone to try to claim that a road is
"relatively" isolated from any car that is travelling along it!
Be this as it may, Engels had already rejected any attempt to
isolate objects along the above lines:
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay';
for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.]
For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time
be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. [Engels (1976),
p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Bold emphasis added.]
"The great basic thought that the world is
not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but a complex
of processes…." [Engels
(1888), p.609. Italic emphases in the original.]
Which means
that any attempt to isolate, say, a car from the road it is travelling along
would render that attempt -- shock! horror! -- 'metaphysical'.
It could be countered that Engels also argued as follows:
"When we
consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of mankind or our own
intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of
relations and reactions in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but
everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away. This primitive,
naive but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek
philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by
Heraclitus:
everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is
constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.
"But this
conception, correctly as it expresses the general character of the picture of
appearances as a whole, does not suffice to explain the details of which this
picture is made up, and so long as we do not understand these, we have not a
clear idea of the whole picture. In order to understand these details we must
detach them from their natural or historical connection and examine each one
separately, its nature, special causes, effects, etc. This is, primarily,
the task of natural science and historical research: branches of science which
the Greeks of classical times on very good grounds, relegated to a subordinate
position, because they had first of all to collect the material. The beginnings
of the exact natural sciences were first worked out by the Greeks of the
Alexandrian period, and later on, in the Middle Ages, by the Arabs. Real natural
science dates from the second half of the fifteenth century, and thence onward
it has advanced with constantly increasing rapidity. The analysis of nature
into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and
objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organic bodies
in their manifold forms -- these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic
strides in our knowledge of nature that have been made during the last four
hundred years." [Engels (1976),
pp.24-25. Bold emphases added.]
Indeed, while Engels did say this, he immediately added
the following:
"But this
method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects
and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole;
of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constants, not as essentially
variables, in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at
things was transferred by
Bacon
and
Locke from natural science to philosophy,
it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the preceding
centuries." [Ibid.,
p.25. Bold and links emphases added.]
And soon after that we
meet a passage already quoted:
"To the
metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be
considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of
investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely
irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for
whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' [Matthew 5:37. -- Ed.]
For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing can't at the same time
be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one
another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. [Ibid.,
p.26. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site. Bold emphasis added.]
So, only if DM-fans want to abandon this "great basic thought", and revert to
thinking "metaphysically", will they try to isolate objects in this way.
Independently of this -- and irrespective of what DM-theorists think they
must assume at the first
stage of any analysis --, it is worth underling the following point once again: unless
dialecticians are committed to the idea that what they
know or must assume can actually affect processes in the real world, so that what
they know,
or can assume, makes it true that pans of water, for instance, aren't in fact
connected with anything (or are 'relatively disconnected' from them), this
spurious defence can't work. Even if it might seem to some DM-fans that a pan of
water is
'relatively isolated' -- or, even if they have to assume it in order to make a
start in any analysis of the phenomena -- in the real world, if DM-interconnectivity is
a valid theory (and
it isn't just an easy and
convenient way for DM-fans to imagine they sound profound), pans of water are interconnected with
their surroundings, and with the forces that brought them into existence, as are
the power systems we use to heat them (etc.).
On that basis, whether we like it or
not, whether we know it or not, if DM is true, pans of water and power systems
(and much else besides) are interconnected in this way. Our level of
knowledge, the extent of our ignorance, or even the subjective requirements of
analysis, have
no bearing on what actually happens in the real world. So, the "relatively-speaking" defence is, at best, a stalling tactic, and the above
anti-DM points
still stand.
[However, I have discussed this topic at length, and
in depth, in Essay Eleven Parts
One and
Two, so the
reader is directed there for more details. Incidentally, my acceptance of local
inter-connectivity in no way contradicts my demolition of 'universal
interconnection' in Essay Eleven.]
It is worth adding at this point that the nature of
state of
matter transitions isn't being questioned in this Essay -- only whether
all of them are sudden
or 'nodal'.
The picture nature presents us with in
connection with phase and state of matter changes are highly complex,
which is one of the reasons why Engels's 'Laws' can't possibly capture its
intricacy,
regardless of their other fatal defects.
Indeed, as we
have also seen above, either the 'nodal' aspect of the First 'Law' is defective, or it
only works in some cases, not others, in which case, it can't be a law.
In fact, Physicists tell us that what they
call "second-order" Phase Transitions can proceed smoothly. As
one online source informs us:
"Second-orderphase transitions, on the other hand, proceed smoothly. The old phase transforms
itself into the new phase in a continuous manner."
[See also
here
-- where we will find that "first order" phase change isn't straight-forward, either.]
Moreover, under certain
conditions
it is possible to by-pass phase transformations altogether. [More on that later.]
In addition, it is important to distinguish between states of
matter and phases (a distinction DM-fans in general appear to
ignore):
"Phases are sometimes confused with
states of matter, but
there are significant differences. States of matter refers to the differences
between gases, liquids, solids, etc. If there are two regions in a chemical
system that are in different states of matter, then they must be different
phases. However, the reverse is not true -- a system can have multiple phases
which are in equilibrium with each other and also in the same state of matter.
For example,
diamond
and
graphite
are both solids but they are different phases, even though their composition may
be identical. A system with oil and water at room temperature will be two
different phases of differing composition, but both will be the liquid state of
matter." [Quoted from
here.]
On another page we
read the following:
"States of matter are sometimes confused withphases. This is likely due to the fact that in many
example systems, the familiar phase transitions are also transformations of the
state of matter. In the example of water, the phases of ice, liquid water, and
water vapour are commonly recognized. The common phase transitions observed in a
one component system containing only water are
melting/solidification
(liquid/solid),
evaporation/condensation
(liquid/gas) and
sublimation/deposition(solid/gas).
"Transitions between different states of matter
of the same chemical component are necessarily a phase transformation, but not
all phase transformations involve a change in the state of matter. For example,
there are 14 different forms of ice, all of which are the solid state of matter.
When one form of ice transforms into another, the crystal structure, density,
and a number of physical properties change, but it remains a solid." [Quoted
from
here.
Bold emphasis added. This article has been substantially altered since it was
first accessed. Parts of the original can be found
here,
others
here.]
Here
is a slightly clearer explanation of the difference:
"Basic physics simply tells us about the primary states of matter, namely;
solid, liquid, gas, and plasma. In many occasions, the term 'phase' is also used
similarly as the word 'state.' However, the phases of matter and states of
matter are two different things as they are used in different contexts. Phases
of matter can be described depending on either the region of space to which
there are uniform physical properties or the types of molecular movements
observed at dissimilar temperatures.
"As mentioned, there are four basic states; solid, liquid, gas, and then plasma.
In some resources there are even more. The solid state of matter has its
molecules tightly vibrating onto each other that they seem to be in a fixed
state. Because of this, solid matter is described as rigid and takes a specific
form or shape. For the liquid state of matter, the molecules are looser as
compared to the molecules of solid matter. The molecules are just far enough
apart that they slide against each other. This is the reason why liquids,
although not having a definite shape, still take the form of its holding
container. And so they have a specific volume. Gaseous matter has more loose
molecules that are freely spread apart from each other. That's why their volume
and shape are not that specific. The newer state -- plasma, is said to be
situated only at the core and outer galactic atmospheres of the stars.
"The phase of matter with respect to molecular motion, temperature or heat plays
an integral role. For example, an ice cube (in its solid state) undergoes a
phase change/transition as it melts and becomes liquid water. The molecules of
the ice cube were heated enough to the point where their bonded position has
been overcome thereby making it looser. Hence, it is now in its liquid phase.
When more heat is present to evaporate the water, then it goes into its gaseous
state as its molecules move more liberally.
"The phase of matter can also be its region of space in a physical system. Let's
say there is a sealed plastic container with ice and water inside. This is a
simple physical
system wherein three phases are present: the cubes belong to one phase,
water is the second phase, and then water vapour settling on top of liquid water
is the third phase. The same is true with water and oil. These two substances
have different degrees of solubility specifically broken further into the
hydrophobic (non-polar) substance and the
hydrophilic
(polar) substance. Water is the polar substance that will immediately separate
itself from oil (a non-polar substance). Both liquids have weak solubilities
against each other placing them in different phases.
"Summary:
"1. 'States of matter' is a more specific and precise term than 'phases of
matter.'
"2. State of matter is the state of a particular compound in a physical system
whereas phase is a set of states within such a system.
"3. Phases of matter can refer to the types of molecular motion.
"4. Phases of matter can refer to a certain region in space." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 10/10/2016. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Some links removed, some added. Spelling
modified to agree with UK English.]
From
the above it is plain that there can be phase changes while the supposed
"quality" (e.g., solidity) remains the same! It isn't easy to see how that fact can be made consistent with the
First 'Law'.
Another Wikipedia
article points out the following:
"In general, two different states of a system are
in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties
while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in
the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt
changes." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added. Again, this page has also been altered since it was first
accessed.]
This Harvard University source says more-or-less the same:
"In the physical sciences, a phase is a set
of states of a macroscopic physical system that have relatively uniform chemical
composition and physical properties. A straightforward way to describe phase is
'a state of matter which is chemically uniform, physically distinct, and (often)
mechanically separable.' Ice cubes floating on water are a clear example of two
phases of water at equilibrium. In general, two different states of a system are
in different phases if there is an abrupt change in their physical properties
while transforming from one state to the other. Conversely, two states are in
the same phase if they can be transformed into one another without any abrupt
changes. There are, however, exceptions to this statement, such as the
liquid-gas critical point. Moreover, a phase diagram is a type of graph used to
show the equilibrium conditions between the thermodynamically-distinct phases.
Common components of a phase diagram are lines of equilibrium or phase
boundaries, which refer to the lines that demarcate where phase transitions
occur. A triple point is, in a pressure-temperature phase diagram, the unique
intersection of the lines of equilibrium between three states of matter, usually
solid, liquid, and gas." [Quoted from
here; accessed 10/10/2016. Bold emphasis added. Spelling modified to accord
with UK English. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
So,
it is plain that some "qualitative" changes are non-"nodal",
since
"two states are in the same phase if they can be transformed into one
another without any abrupt changes."
[Emphasis added.]
Indeed, the situation is even more complicated still:
"In the
diagram, the phase boundary between liquid and gas does not continue
indefinitely. Instead, it terminates at a point on the phase diagram called the
critical point. At
temperatures and pressure above the critical point, the physical property
differences that differentiate the liquid phase from the gas phase become less
defined. This reflects the fact that, at extremely high temperatures and
pressures, the liquid and gaseous phases become indistinguishable. In water,
the critical point occurs at around 647K
(374°C or 705°F) and
22.064
MPa." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added.]
"In
physical chemistry,
thermodynamics,
chemistry
and
condensed matter physics,
a critical point, also called a critical state, specifies the
conditions (temperature, pressure) at which the liquid
state
of the matter
ceases to exist. As a liquid is heated, its density decreases while the pressure
and density of the vapour being formed increases. The liquid and vapour
densities become closer and closer to each other until the critical temperature
is reached where the two densities are equal and the liquid-gas line or phase
boundary disappears. Additionally, as the equilibrium between liquid and gas
approaches the critical point,
heat of vaporization
approaches zero, becoming zero at and beyond the critical point. More generally,
the critical point is the point of termination of a
phase equilibrium
curve, which separates two distinct phases. At this point, the phases are no
longer distinguishable." [Wikipedia.
Bold emphasis added. Spelling modified to conform with UK English.]
Again, the second of the above Wikipedia pages has
been altered since it was originally consulted.
However, what the latter had to say is confirmed by
this comment from a specialist site:
"At T6
the two phases cannot be distinguished any more. This point in the p-T-diagram
is called the critical point. The distinction between gas and liquid
cannot be made any more. From the critical point on we call both phases
together the liquid phase in contrast to the solid phase." [Quoted
from
here; accessed 23/02/2015. Bold emphases alone added.]
That can
only mean qualitative differences between the
liquid and gaseous phases of water are energy-neutral beyond this "critical point",
contradicting Engels.
And,
here is what a standard Physical Chemistry textbook had to say:
"[W]e must distinguish the
thermodynamic
description of a phase transition and the rate at which the
transition occurs. A transition that is predicted from thermodynamics to be
spontaneous may occur too slowly to be significant in practice. For instance, at
normal temperatures and pressures the
molar
Gibbs energy
of graphite is lower than that of diamond, so there is a
thermodynamic tendency for diamond to change into graphite. However, for this
transformation to take place, the C[arbon] atoms must change their locations,
which is an immeasurably slow process in a solid except at high temperatures."
[Atkins and de Paula (2006), p.118. Bold emphases added.]
In that case, nature (i.e., the real material world,
not the Ideal world Hegel and Engels dreamt up) is far more complex than
Engels's Mickey Mouse 'Law' would have
us believe. Once more, not every change is "nodal".
Indeed, scientists in the USA recently reported they had
discovered a new state of matter, which, while being solid, appears to behave
like a liquid (so, here we would have a change of quality with no change in quantity):
"In the 15 January 2004 issue of the journal
Nature, two physicists from Penn State University will announce their
discovery of a new phase of matter, a 'supersolid' form of
helium-4
with the extraordinary frictionless-flow properties of a superfluid. 'We
discovered that solid helium-4 appears to behave like a superfluid when it is so
cold that the laws of quantum mechanics govern its behaviour,' says
Moses
H. W. Chan, Evan Pugh Professor of Physics at Penn State. 'We apparently
have observed, for the first time, a solid material with the characteristics of
a superfluid.'
"'The possible discovery of a new phase of
matter, a supersolid, is exciting and, if confirmed, would be a significant
advance,' comments John Beamish, professor of physics at the University of
Alberta and the author of a review of Chan's discovery published in the 'News
and Views' section of Nature. 'If the behaviour is confirmed, there are
enough questions to be answered about the nature and properties of supersolid
helium to keep
both experimentalists and theorists busy for a long time.'...
"'Something very unusual occurred when the
temperature dropped to one-tenth of a degree above
absolute
zero,' Chan says. 'The oscillation rate suddenly became slightly more rapid,
as if some of the helium had disappeared.' However, Chan and Kim were able to
confirm that the helium atoms had not leaked out of the experimental capsule
because its rate of oscillation returned to normal after they warmed the capsule
above one-tenth of a degree above absolute zero. So they concluded that the
solid helium-4 probably had acquired the properties of a superfluid when the
conditions were more extreme....
"If Chan's experiment is replicated, it would
confirm that all three states of matter can enter into the "super" state, known
as a
Bose-Einstein condensation, in which all the particles have condensed into
the same quantum-mechanical state. The existence of superfluid and 'supervapor'
had previously been proven, but theorists had continued to debate about whether
a supersolid was even possible. 'One of the most intriguing predictions of the
theory of quantum mechanics is the possibility of superfluid behaviour in a
solid-phase material, and now we may have observed this behaviour for the first
time,' Chan says." [Science
Daily, 15/01/2004. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site; spelling changed to agree with UK English. Added
February, 2015: It should be pointed out that further work has thrown some of
the above conclusions into considerable doubt;
work is
continuing
to prove the existence of supersolids -- on that, see below.]
The
above was published in 2004, and was subjected to some criticism, but later
work seems to have confirmed the results; here is the New Scientist from
2010:
"New
evidence that weird quantum supersolid exists
"By Kate McAlpine
"The first
supersolid -- a ghostly, quantum form of matter in which a solid
flows, frictionless, through itself -- was reportedly made in 2004.
But a debate has raged ever since over whether the researchers
involved had simply misinterpreted their results. Now two new
studies suggest that genuine supersolids have been made after all.
"According to quantum theory,
supersolidity should kick in at very low temperatures. In a solid,
atoms are bound together in a regular lattice, keeping their
structure rigid under normal circumstances. But if you cool some
solids close to absolute zero, they should become frictionless,
flowing supersolids, while retaining their lattice structure. In the
original experiment,
Eunseong Kim -- now of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science
and Technology in Daejeon, South Korea -- and
Moses Chan of Pennsylvania State
University in University Park cooled and pressurised liquid helium
until the atoms were forced into a crystal lattice. They then made a cylinder filled
with this solid helium spin one way and then the other, over and
over again. As they cooled it, the cylinder switched direction more
frequently. The researchers concluded that some of the helium was
standing completely still, reducing the mass that was rotating along
with the cylinder and allowing it to switch more quickly. They
assumed that this was because some of the helium had
become frictionless due to supersolidity....
"Earlier this year, however, this
interpretation was challenged by
John Reppy of Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. He
suggested that the reason the cylinder switched more quickly at
lower temperature was because the helium had become a wobbly 'quantum
plastic', a previously unknown phase of matter that is distinct
from a supersolid. The increased elasticity of this new material
allowed the cylinder to more easily reverse its rotation, he said.
"To test whether Reppy was right,
Kim spun the larger apparatus in which the cylinder sits: the
apparatus spun in just one direction, while the cylinder spun one
way, then the other, as it had before. He reasoned that elasticity
should affect only how quickly the cylinder switched direction, not
its actual spinning rate. Therefore if Reppy was right, and the
solid helium was a quantum plastic, adding a constant underlying
rotation should not change the results. His team found, however, that it
did. Unlike in the original experiment, the direction switches did
not get faster with a falling temperature. The best way to explain
this, says Kim, is if the helium is indeed supersolid. That’s
because, in a supersolid, the constant rotation should cause
vortices to form, rather as in a liquid, disturbing the material’s
quantum properties, and reducing the supersolidity....
"In a tantalising coincidence,
Yaroslav Lutsyshyn of the Polytechnic University of Catalonia in
Barcelona, Spain, and his colleagues have just found
further evidence of supersolidity. Theory suggests that
supersolid helium flows because holes form in the crystal lattice.
Lutsyshyn's team experimented with how likely these holes were to
form under different pressures; and it turned out that the pressure
under which holes formed most easily matched that at which Kim and
Chan identified the largest proportion of supersolid helium in their
system.
"'It's like rabbit ears sticking
out of the grass,' says Lutsyshyn of his team's results. He also
holds that the experiment by Kim's team is strong evidence -- but
not full proof -- that the solid helium contains a supersolid. Reppy, however, remains
unconvinced that Kim's most recent work rules out quantum plasticity
as the cause of the apparent supersolid effects. He disputes Kim's
assumption that the extra energy added by rotating the whole
apparatus would not affect the rate at which a quantum plastic
switches. 'I'm now fairly certain that the large supersolid signals
that they were seeing are manifestations of the elastic properties,'
he says." [Quoted from
here; accessed 10/10/2016. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs
merged.]
The change
described in that article is sudden (whoever claimed that some
changes weren't?); while that particular aspect of the First 'Law' has been
partially confirmed
in this instance, the
main part (where Engels said it was impossible to alter the quality of an
object/process without the addition or subtraction of matter or energy) has
been refuted by the possible discovery of such
superfluids/supervapors, and now by these
supersolids;
moreover, the substance
in question remained Helium either side of this change.
It
needs to be added that conclusive proof of the existence of supersolids has yet
to be found.
Update, May 2018: The Science Alert website had this to say:
"Physicist Say
They've Created
an 'Impossible'
New Form of
Matter:
Supersolids
"The most
compelling
evidence yet
that supersolids
exist.
"Fiona MacDonald
3 MAR 2017
"Our world just
got a little
stranger, with
physicists
claiming they've
successfully
created a brand
new 'impossible'
form of matter
in the lab --
supersolids,
which have
properties of
both liquids and
solids at the
same time.
Scientists have
predicted that
this exotic
state of matter
could exist for
more than 50
years, but no
one had been
able to
demonstrate that
it's actually
possible. Now,
two independent
teams of
physicists have
used different
techniques to
achieve the same
odd result --
what they claim
are the first
examples of
supersolid
matter. There's
sure to be
controversy over
whether these
new experiments
unequivocally
demonstrate a
supersolid state
-- especially
after a similar
claim in 2004
went on to be
debunked -- but
this is the most
compelling
evidence yet
that supersolids
could actually
exist.
"For those who
aren't familiar
with just how
bizarre that is,
a 'supersolid'
is a strange
state of matter
that has the
crystalline
structure of a
solid, while
flowing like a
liquid
--something
that's pretty
contradictory
when it comes to
traditional
physics.
Usually, matter
exists in just
four simple
states: solid,
liquid, gas, and
plasma. These
states arise
depending on
conditions such
as temperature
and pressure,
and are defined
by the
arrangements of
particles within
the matter.
What's weird
about the
supersolid state
of matter is
that the
particles are
arranged in a
rigid, solid
structure, but
then it can also
flow without
viscosity -- or
'stickiness' --
which is a key
characteristic
of a
superfluid.
"'It is
counterintuitive
to have a
material which
combines
superfluidity
and solidity,'
said lead
researcher of
one of the teams
behind the
discovery,
Wolfgang
Ketterle from
MIT. If your
coffee was
superfluid and
you stirred it,
it would
continue to spin
around forever.'
Supersolids were
first predicted
by Russian
physicists back
in 1969, who
hypothesised
that a helium-4
isotope could
display solid
and liquid
properties
simultaneously,
under certain
conditions. For
a long time,
researchers
generally
assumed that it
would be
impossible to
create such a
structure -- but
that didn't stop
some from
trying.
"A breakthrough
came in 2004,
when
Pennsylvania
State University
researchers
cooled helium to
less than
one-tenth of a
degree above
absolute zero
(around -273
degrees Celsius)
and stumbled
upon what might
have been a
supersolid
state. As
Bec Crew
reported for us
last year,
the team wasn't
confident enough
to say they'd
actually made a
supersolid,
seeing as they
couldn't rule
out the
possibility that
a thin layer of
liquid had snuck
inside the
container and
skewed their
results. Several
experiments in
the decade that
followed
further debunked the
idea that a
supersolid had
been made, by
showing that
helium-4 has a
type of 'quantum
plasticisity'
(sic) under
certain
situations,
which isn't
caused by
supersolidity.
"Most of the
science
community pretty
much decided
that the 2004
sample wasn't an
example of a
real supersolid,
and for the past
few years the
field has been
pretty quiet on
the subject.
But then in
November,
not one, but two
independent
teams both
declared in
pre-print papers
that they'd done
it -- they'd
managed to
create
supersolids in
the lab. The
researchers are
from MIT in
Cambridge,
Massachusetts,
and ETH Zurich
in Switzerland,
and although
they both had
different
processes, the
team had both
used a strange
type of gas
known as a
Bose-Einstein
condensate to
create their
supersolids.
Bose-Einstein
condensates are
a
fifth state of
matter that
appear at
ultra-cold
temperatures,
where atoms
behave like
waves.
"They have
unique
properties of
their own, but
what's good
about using a
Bose-Einstein
condensate to
create a
supersolid is
that it's
already a
superfluid, so
it's halfway
there. The team
took these
ultra-cold gases
and used
slightly
different
techniques to
coax them into a
quantum phase of
matter with a
rigid structure
like a solid,
but the ability
to flow like a
superfluid. At
the time, the
two teams
published their
results on the
pre-print server
arXiv.org. And
now they've both
been
peer-reviewed
and published
in Nature (here
and
here), offering
the most
substantial
evidence to date
that supersolids
are real.
"The Swiss
researchers were
able to achieve
this by taking a
small amount of
rubidium gas and
putting it in a
vacuum chamber,
where they
cooled it to a
few billionths
of a kelvin
about absolute
zero, causing
them to form a
Bose-Einstein
condensate. The
team then put
this condensate
in device with
two optical
resonance
chambers, each
consisting of
two tiny
opposing
mirrors.
Using lasers,
the particles
eventually
adopted a
regular,
crystal-like
structure,
indicative of a
solid. But the
condensate also
retained its
superfluid
properties --
they were able
to flow without
any energy
input, which
isn't possible
in a normal
solid.
"'We were able
to produce this
special state in
the lab thanks
to a
sophisticated
setup that
allowed us to
make the two
resonance
chambers
identical for
the atoms,' one
of the ETH
Zurich team,
Tilman
Esslinger,
told Phys.org.
The MIT team
took a different
approach -- they
used a
combination of
laser and
evaporative
cooling methods
to turn sodium
atoms into a
Bose-Einstein
Condensate. They
then used lasers
to also
manipulate it
into a
crystalline
solid
arrangement by
creating density
variations in
the atoms.
Although the
process was
different, the
end result was
the same as the
Swiss team's --
solid matter
that flowed like
a superfluid.
The fact that
the results has
been verified by
two teams at the
same time makes
it even more
compelling that
these
supersolids are
the real deal.
"'It's certainly
the first case
where you can
unambiguously
look at a system
and say this is
both a
superfluid and a
solid,' Sarang
Gopalakrishnan from
the City
University of
New York, who
wasn't involved
in the research,
told Science
News back in
November. It's
likely there
will now be a
new round of
independent
testing and
verifying, to
make sure that
what has been
produced can
really be called
a supersolid.
There's the
argument that
because the team
used
Bose-Einstein
Condensates
rather than
helium-4 to
create the state
of matter, it
could be seen as
'cheating'. But
it's definitely
our most
compelling
evidence to date
that supersolids
exist. So what
does a potential
new state of
matter for the
rest of us?
Right now, not
much. The fact
that these
materials can
only exist at
extremely low
temperatures in
ultrahigh-vacuum
conditions means
they're not very
useful at the
moment.
"But a further
understanding of
the strange
state of matter
could lead to
improvements in
superconductors
-- incredibly
useful materials
that conduct
electricity
without
resistance.
'With our cold
atoms, we are
mapping out what
is possible in
nature,'
said Ketterle.
'Now that we
have
experimentally
proven that the
theories
predicting
supersolids are
correct, we hope
to inspire
further
research,
possibly with
unanticipated
results.'
Although the
fact that two
teams have both
made this claim
at the same time
might sound
competitive, the
reality is that
both research
groups welcome
the validation
and feedback
from each other.
'The
simultaneous
realisation by
two groups shows
how big the
interest is in
this new form of
matter,'
Ketterle added."
[Quoted from
here;
accessed
27/05/2018.
Quotation marks
altered to
conform with the
conventions
adopted at this
site; many
paragraphs
merged. Minor
typos corrected.
Links in the
original, bold
emphasis added.]
Attentive readers will no doubt have noticed
that "the particles eventually adopted a regular, crystal-like structure,
indicative of a solid. But the condensate also retained its superfluid
properties -- they were able to flow without any energy input, which
isn't possible in a normal solid", contradicting Engels. [Bold added.]
Update, April 2020: We now read the
following:
"Physicists prove the existence of a
supersolid state of matter
"A supersolid is a state of matter that can
be described in simplified terms as being solid and liquid at the same time.
In recent years, extensive efforts have been devoted to the detection of this
exotic quantum matter. A research team led by Tilman Pfau and Tim Langen at the
5th Institute of Physics of the University of Stuttgart has succeeded in proving
experimentally that the long-sought supersolid state of matter exists. In our
everyday lives, we are familiar with matter existing in three different states:
solid, liquid, or gas. However, if matter is cooled down to extremely low
temperatures, quantum effects can also enable other states of matter. This
includes superfluids, which are characterized by a frictionless flow of atoms.
"Moreover, in the quantum world, particles
can exist in superpositions of being unpredictably and randomly in two different
locations. It had long been conjectured that even superpositions of states of
matter are possible. According to these ideas, known states of matter, such as
solid or fluid, can thus be superimposed to form new states of matter with new
properties. A supersolid is exactly such a superposition state, and features
both the crystalline structure of a solid and the frictionless flow of a
superfluid. In such a state every atom is unpredictably and randomly
either part of the solid or of the superfluid.
"In the experiments in Stuttgart, the
supersolid is generated from
dysprosium
atoms that behave like tiny magnets. These atoms are cooled down to near
absolute zero (-273°Celsius). At this point, two types of interaction between
atoms become important: if two atoms come very close together, they collide like
billiard balls. At the same time, they can attract or repel each other over
larger distances due to the magnetic interaction. To generate a supersolid, the
researchers adjusted the relationship between these two forces such that a
crystalline lattice structure and superfluidity are created simultaneously. 'We
were able to observe the periodicity of the crystal directly with a microscope,
and tested the quantum mechanical superposition through interference
experiments' explain Mingyang Guo and Fabian Böttcher, postdoc and doctoral
student at the experiment.
"Detection by
means of sound waves
"The definitive proof that the matter created
in the experiment is indeed a supersolid is based on the observation of two
kinds of sound waves that travel through the supersolid at different speeds.
Such sound waves propagate differently in different materials -- in air, for
example, sound waves travel much slower than in water. This 'normal' sound wave
is also present in the supersolid. However, because the supersolid is at the
same time solid and fluid, a characteristic second form of sound wave can be
observed, in which the crystal and the superfluid move against each other. This
results in sound waves that travel at very low speeds, which the researchers in
Stuttgart were able to observe for the first time in their experiment.
"In recent years, several observations of a
supersolid have been reported, but it later turned out that only one form of
sound wave was present. 'Using our experiment with ultracold dysprosium atoms,
we have now succeeded for the first time in observing simultaneously all
defining properties of a supersolid state' Tilman Pfau summarizes. The
experiments in Stuttgart now open up the possibility to study the exotic
properties of this new state of matter in unprecedented detail." [Quoted from
here; accessed 02/04/2020. Several paragraphs merged. Some bold emphases and
link added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
Update, June 2021: Science Daily has this to say:
"Scrambled
supersolids: Soft form of a solid discovered
"Supersolids
are fluid and solid at the same time.
Physicists have for the first time
investigated what happens when such a state is brought out of balance. They
discovered a soft form of a solid of high interest for science. Researchers
report that they were also able to reverse the process and restore
supersolidity.
"Last year, more than fifty years
after initial theoretical proposals, researchers in Pisa, Stuttgart and
Innsbruck independently succeeded for the first time in creating so-called
supersolids using ultracold quantum gases of highly magnetic lanthanide atoms.
This state of matter is, in a sense, solid and liquid at the same time.
'Due to quantum effects, a very cold gas of atoms can spontaneously develop both
a crystalline order of a solid crystal and particle flow like a superfluid
quantum liquid, i.e. a fluid able to flow without any friction' explains
Francesca Ferlaino from the Institute for Quantum Optics and Quantum Information
of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Department of Experimental Physics
at the University of Innsbruck. 'Much simplified, a dipolar supersolid can be
imagined as a chain of quantum droplets which communicate with each other via a
superfluid background bath,' says Thierry Giamarchi, theoretical physicist from
the University of Geneva....
"In Nature Physics, the researchers now
report how such a supersolid state reacts if the superfluid bath between the
droplets is drained by control of the external magnetic field. 'We were able to
show that without the bath the droplets quickly lose knowledge about each other
and start to behave like small independent quantum systems -- they dephase. The
supersolid turns into a normal solid,' says Maximilian Sohmen from Francecsa
Ferlaino's team. 'This "solid", however, is still soft, it can wobble and
support many collective excitations, called phonons,' adds Philipp Ilzhöfer from
the Innsbruck team. 'This makes this state a very interesting but complex
subject of study with strong connections to solid-state physics and other
fields.'
"Maybe surprisingly, the Innsbruck physicists were
also able to reverse this dephasing process: When they replenished the
background bath, the droplets renewed their communication by particle tunnelling
and re-established supersolidity." [Quoted from
here; accessed 15/06/2021. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site. Some bold emphases added. Italics in
the original.]
Phase
changes occur with no addition of matter or energy, according to the above.
Update, July 2024: Earlier this year,
Chemistry World
reported that there is increasing evidence supersolids do in fact exist.
Be
this as it may, it is entirely unclear whether the term "quality" -- as
that term is
used by dialecticians -- means the same as "state
of matter" or even, "phase",
especially as it appears in such surroundings.
Either way, the substances involved, whether or not they are in different phases or states,
almost always remain the same substance. So, in that sense, if "quality" is defined in terms of
the nature of such substances (in conformity with what Hegel and
Aristotle
had to say about them
-- on that, see here), it is
clear that even though these might be phase/state of matter changes, they can't count as qualitative changes
of the right sort, since they remain the same throughout.
Howsoever
slowly or quickly aluminium melts or solidifies, for example, it remains
aluminium. The same is the case when Nitrogen or Oxygen are frozen into
liquid or even sold form, they remain Nitrogen and Oxygen throughout.
Now, has a single DM-supporter ever given any thought to that
awkward fact? Or even acknowledged it?
Moreover, as noted above, until we are told the exact length of a dialectical
"node", the First 'Law' can't be considered anything other than a vague
(even 'subjective') rule-of-thumb -- at best. If
"nodal" points each turn out to be several minutes long, for
instance, then many of the examples
to which dialecticians refer would cease to be "nodal". On the other hand, if they last, say,
only a
few nanoseconds, none of these examples would survive as such.
Nevertheless, the bemused reader
will scour the
DM-literature till the cows next evolve, and to no avail for any hint of clarity or precision in this
regard. Indeed, DM has been so amateurishly and carelessly cobbled-together that
these considerations
won't even have occurred to the vast majority of DM-fans. And, even now
(should they read this), the latter won't even register. They will either ignore
them or simply hand-wave them aside as pedantic irrelevances -- so
sloppy and atrophied have their thought processes become. [On 'pedantry', see
here.]
We
can be thankful that scientists aren't so slap-dash. Can any of my readers imagine a Physicist
waving aside as irrelevant or pedantic questions being asked about the timing or duration of, say, a nuclear reaction? One
imagines that if ever the Olympics are organised by these cavalier dialecticians,
everyone would get Gold since precise timing and careful observation are both a 'pedantic irrelevance'.
In
that case, it is to be hoped that DM-fans are never given the opportunity to run an ambulance service -- and are allowed nowhere near a demolition
site.
[The above was written before I had read this. On
that, see Note 001a.]
But, worse is to come: as we saw
earlier, the aforementioned
reverse, "vice versa" codicil attached by Engels
to this 'Law' renders it totally useless -- if not completely crazy --, since it
suggests, for instance, that qualitative change can create quantitative
material change. Consider the following example of Trotsky's:
"A housewife knows that a
certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that added salt makes the
soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman guides herself in
cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of quantity into
quality…." [Trotsky (1971),
p.106.]
Engels's vice versa
codicil suggests that a change in quality from "palatable" to "too salty"
is somehow able to produce an increase in the salt content of soup!
That isn't an unsympathetic
interpretation of this 'Law' on my part, for, as we have seen, Engels himself signed up to it:
"Yet the 'mechanical' conception amounts to nothing else.
It explains all change from change of place, all qualitative differences from
quantitative ones, and overlooks that the relation of quality and quantity is
reciprocal, that quality can become transformed into quantity just as much as
quantity into quality, that, in fact, reciprocal action takes place."
[Engels (1954),
p.253. Bold emphasis added; quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site.]
So did
George Novack:
"The
dialectical process of development does not end with the transformation of
quantity into quality…. The process continues in the opposite direction and
converts new quality into new quantity." [Novack (1971), p.92. Bold
emphasis added.]
Trotsky,
too:
"Logic involves unchanging
qualities (a = a) and fixed quantities of these qualities. Dialectics is
constructed on the transition of quantity into quality and the reverse." [Trotsky
(1986), p.87. Bold added.]
This suggests that changes in quality are
capable of
creating a quantitative change -- that is, that new matter or energy can be
produced
by a qualitative change! Is there any other sensible way of interpreting the
above?
If in forward gear, if the addition or
subtraction of new matter of itself creates qualitative change, then, in
reverse gear, qualitative change must of itself add or subtract new matter/energy!
Matter or energy must be created or destroyed by qualitative change!
Hence, in
this case, the vice versa codicil implies that a
qualitative change from, say, acceptable soup to unpalatable soup would in
effect produce
a quantitative pay-off: it must cause soup to have more salt in
it! Clearly this magic trick will be of interest to those who still (foolishly)
think that matter and energy can't be created or destroyed. There
seems to be no other way of reading the vice versa codicil -- except as just
such a 'metaphysical blank cheque'.
It could be objected that such a
qualitative change will have been produced by a quantitative increase in
salt. But, that is just the First 'Law'
applied in forward gear, as it were. If we apply that 'Law' in reverse, as
Engels says we can, then we can't appeal to a quantitative increase leading to a qualitative change,
but
must appeal to a qualitative development inducing a quantitative change -- that is,
that a change in taste is able to create salt out of thin air!
Be
this as it may, it is worth examining
Trotsky's
anecdote more closely in its own terms, since it will help expose the many
serious errors and confusions that afflict what few examples dialecticians have scraped
together to illustrate this ramshackle 'Law.'
"Every individual is a
dialectician to some extent or other, in most cases, unconsciously. A
housewife knows that a certain amount of salt flavours soup agreeably, but that
added salt makes the soup unpalatable. Consequently, an illiterate peasant woman
guides herself in cooking soup by the Hegelian law of the transformation of
quantity into quality…. Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on
the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and
birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the
first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes
that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox
are equipped with Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All
this demonstrates, in passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic
and the dialectic, are not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather
expressions of the actual inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense
the universe is permeated with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky
(1971),
pp.106-07.
Italic emphasis in the original.]
[We
have already found there is
a total lack of clarity in passages like this concerning the nature and extent of the 'dialectical body' to
which matter or energy has supposedly been added or from which it has been
subtracted.]
But, what exactly did Trotsky imagine the change of
'quantity' into
'quality' to be, here?
Does
an increase in the quantity of salt alter that salt's own
quality? Presumably not. Does the quantity of soup
even change? Perhaps only
marginally as salt is added. But even then the quantity of soup isn't what allegedly
changes the quality of the soup; that is supposed to have been the result
of the quantity of salt added.
In fact,
the quantity of the original soup hasn't actually changed, merely the quantity of the
salt/soup mixture; and neither has the quality of the salt altered (just its alleged
quantity, in the soup).
What appears to have happened (in this less than half-formed
'thought experiment') is this: the addition (to the soup) of too much salt is
supposed to have changed the taste of the resulting salt/soup mixture as perceived by the taster. Hence, at a certain ("nodal") point, a further
increase in the quantity of salt alters the quality (i.e., the taste) of the soup, so that its
acceptability has changed either side of that "leap".
But, once more, even here, the
increased quantity of salt has not passed over into any change in
itsown quality. What has occurred is that one quality (a palatable taste) has
morphed into another quality (an unpalatable taste) as a result of a
quantitative change made to one ingredient (salt) added to the salt/soup mixture. So, a
certain
quality of the soup has changed from being acceptable to being
unacceptable as a result of the increased quantity of salt that the mixture
now contains.
However, the relevant quality of the added salt remains the same no matter
how much is added. Salt is (largely)
Sodium Chloride, and it tastes salty whether it is delivered by the spoon, the bucket
or the train-load. In that case, neither the quantity nor the quality of the
salt has "passed over" into anything inthe salt itself.
There
doesn't therefore seem to be
anything in the opening part of this
story for that particular aspect of the salt to "pass over" into.
Consequently, the first half of this 'Law' (the 'increase in quantity' clause)
is either mis-stated or doesn't applyto the substance being
added, thesalt.
As
far as the second half is concerned (i.e., the alleged alteration in the quality either
of the salt or the soup), the postulated change relates to the taste of the
soup. But, manifestly, the soup remains salty no matter how much salt is
poured in, as we saw. What we seem to have here is this soup becomes
increasingly salty as more salt is added.
So, what qualitative change is meant to
have occurred? Again, it looks like the change relates to the acceptability of the
taste of the soup as perceived by the taster. Hence, at or slightly
beyond the alleged "nodal" point, the taste of the soup becomes
objectionable. But, this particular change is confined to the one doing the tasting,
not the soup.
Manifestly, it isn't
the soup that alters in this respect; soups do not taste themselves, or
perceive their own taste. Tasters experience tastes; tastes exist in
tasters, not soups. On one side of the "nodal" point the soup is objectively salty (i.e., it
contains dissolved salt); on the other side it is still objectively
salty, but with more salt in it. The difference is that on one side the taster
tolerated the taste and continued to like it, but on the other side the taste
became intolerable and the cook ceased to enjoy what she was sampling. This means that the soup
itself hasn't actually changed in this respect, merely the taster's
appreciation of it. The relevant change occurs in her not the soup.
It
now seems that a change in the quantity (of salt) doesn't
actually affect the soup –- except, perhaps, its volume (very slightly)
and its composition as a salt/soup mixture. No matter how much salt is dumped
into the soup it remains just that, a salt/soup mixture, only with higher
proportions of salt -– and that remains the case even at the limit where
the soup perhaps turns into sludge or a semi-solid lump, or whatever. A million tons of salt can't
change that.8a
Consequently, even with
respect to the relevant quality (i.e., soup as soup), the concoction doesn't change (or, at
least, not in a way that is relevant to Trotsky's purposes). Hence, a change in
the quantity of salt hasn't "passed over" into a change in the quality of the
soup (as soup), which means that the second part of this 'Law' (the
change in 'quality' part) seems to be defective, too.
If there is a qualitative change
anywhere at all that is relevant to the point Trotsky was trying to make, it seems to
occur in the third party, here -– that is, the taster. We are forced
to interpret his 'thought experiment' this way unless, of course, we are to suppose that tastes
actually reside 'objectively' in soups, as one of their alleged 'primary' qualities,
perhaps. If
that were so, qualities like this (that reside in soups, and not
solely in tasters) would have to be able to
alter 'objectively', evenwhen they aren't being tasted! But, this
example can't
imply that; no sane dialectician (one imagines!) believes that tastes reside in
the objects we eat. Hence, if this 'Law' is to work in this case, the qualitative
change must take place in the taster not the soup.8b
If so, qualitative change
in this case must have been
induced by a quantitative change in the taster, if this 'Law' is to apply
in this case. That is, the taster's 'qualitative' change (if it may be so described) must have been
caused by a quantitative change to her, if Engels's 'Law' is applicable. But, what quantitative
change has taken place in the taster that caused a
corresponding change in (her) quality, or in her changed perception of a
quality (taste)? Does she grow new nerve cells or an extra head? A new tongue or a
larger mouth? In fact, there are none -- or, none that
Trotsky mentioned, and certainly none that are at all obvious.
Plainly, it is a
quantitative change in the salt/soup mixture that resulted in the new quality as
perceived by that
taster. But, that specific quantitative change had no effect on any quality actually in the soup
(as previous paragraphs sought to show -- tastes don't reside in soups!). But, there now seem to be no
relevant quantitative
changes in the taster which could 'pass over' into a corresponding qualitative change in
her.
In that case, the most that can be made
of this half-baked example is that while quantitative change leads to no
qualitative change in some things (i.e., soups), it can prompt certain
qualitative changes in other things (i.e., tasters), even though the latter weren't caused by a quantitative
change in those things themselves, but by something altogether mysterious. That
is, we now have no idea what quantitative change occurred in the taster to
make her change in quality.
So, the second part of the 'Law' is
now doubly defective.
Of course, it could be objected that there is indeed a
quantitative change in the said taster, namely an increase in salt
particles hitting her tongue. But, this just pushes the problem one stage
further back, for unless we are to suppose that tastes reside in salt molecules
(or in Sodium and Chlorine
ions), the qualitative change we seek will still have
occurred in the taster, not in the chemicals in her mouth , But at just
means we are back
to where we were
a few paragraphs ago.
There seems to be no obvious quantitative change to the taster in any of
this. She
does not grow another tongue or gain more taste buds. It is undeniable that
there will have been an increase in salt molecules hitting her tongue,
and that these will have a causal effect on the change in taste as she perceives
it, but even
given that, no change in quantity to the taster herself will have taken
place.
Again, it could be objected that there is a
material or energetic change here; matter or energy will have been transferred to the
taster (or her central nervous system), which causes her to experience a qualitative change in her appreciation of
the soup.
In fact, what has happened is that the original salt has interacted with
the taster's tongue/nervous system upon being ingested. But, it is at precisely
that point that the
earlier problems associated with the salt/soup mixture now transfer to the
salt/nervous system ensemble. Since tastes don't exist in nerves any more than they exist in soups, we
are no further forward. And, as far as changes to any quantity in the
taster herself are concerned, that will depend on how we draw the boundary between inorganic salt molecules
and living cells. Since this 'difficulty' is considered in more detail below, no more will be
said about it here.
[This
is a continuation of the argument set out
in the previous section against Trotsky's attempt to illustrate Engels's First
'Law' by referring to a parable about a cook
adding salt to some soup.]
In any case, it seems rather odd to describe a change in taste
(or in the appreciation of taste) as
a qualitativechange to ataster, whatever it was that caused it. As the term "quality" is
understood by dialecticians, this can't in fact be a qualitative change
of the sort they require. Qualities, as they are characterised by
dialecticians --, or, rather, as they are by those that bother to say
what they mean by this word "quality" -- are those properties of bodies or processes
that make them what they are, alteration to which will change that body or process into
something substantially new:
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of
quality, quantity
and
measure. Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85. Paragraphs merged;
bold emphasis added.]
The Glossary at the
Marxist Internet Archive adds:
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something
else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect
of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby
becoming something else. Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'. In Hegel's
Logic,
Quality
is the first
division of
Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while
Quantity
is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage,
Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here.
Accessed August 2007. Some paragraphs merged; bold emphasis added. Paragraphs
merged.]
This is an Aristotelian notion.
If we apply
the above definition to the hackneyed example used by nearly every DM-fan --
water turning into steam or ice if it is heated/cooled --, this 'Law' can't
apply to it.
Here is why:
As a solid (ice), liquid, or a gas (i.e.,
as steam), water remains H2O
throughout. No new "kind of thing" has emerged. Consider other
examples: Iron is still iron as a solid or a liquid.
Oxygen is still oxygen in its liquid or gaseous state. The same can be said
about all substances that undergo state of matter changes (i.e., those that don't breakdown/disintegrate on
heating or cooling).
Recall:
"Quality is an aspect of something by
which it is what it is and not something else...". [Ibid.
Bold added.]
Furthermore,
all substances exist as solids, liquids, gases or plasmas, so that can't be what makes each of them "what it is
and not something else". What makes lead, for example, isn't whether is it
a solid or a liquid, it is lead because of its atomic
structure, and that remains the same whether it exist in a solid or a liquid
state. The same
goes for every element in the
Periodic Table.
Nevertheless, Cornforth gamely tries to tell us what a 'dialectical quality'
is:
"For instance, if a piece of
iron is painted black and instead we paint it red, that is merely an external
alteration..., but it is not a qualitative change in the sense we are here
defining. On the other hand, if the iron is heated to melting point, then this
is such a qualitative change. And it comes about precisely as a change in the
attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal molecular state
of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state, its internal
character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it undergoes a
qualitative change." [Cornforth (1976), p.99.]
And yet, no new substance emerges as a result;
liquid iron, gold and aluminium are still iron, gold and aluminium. Worse still:
as we have seen, metals melt and solidify slowly, not nodally!
It is worth noting at this point how the
above DM-'definition' has transferred vagueness from "quality"
to "kind". We
aren't told what a 'dialectical kind' is! In what follows, I will however assume we
all know what such a kind is (even though we don't!). Of course, Cornforth
doesn't use the term "kind of thing" -- the second of the above definitions
use it
-- he uses "the nature of a thing" (p.98), and "a new thing" (p.103), which are
both no less vague.
Of course, it could be argued that liquid and solid states of matter are, as
the second definition says, "different kinds
of things". But, to describe something as a liquid isn't to
present a kind of thing, since liquids encompass many different "kinds of
things", as noted above. The same is true of gases and solids. So, a state of matter isn't a
"kind of thing", but a state possessed by kinds of things.
So, we speak about liquid iron, liquid mercury, gaseous oxygen, gaseous
nitrogen, a solid ingot of iron, etc., etc. And if a state changes,
in the overwhelming number of cases the "kind of thing" that that particular
substance is doesn't change. Admittedly, some substances do change into
'something new' when they are heated -- for
instance,
solid
Ammonium Chloride
sublimates into Ammonia gas and Hydrochloric Acid, but that
isn't typical. [In fact, DM-theorists would be on much firmer ground
appealing to this
sort of change than they
are with their
hackneyed water as a liquid, solid or gas
example.] Again, liquid mercury, for instance,
is still mercury, just as solid mercury is. Melted sugar is still sugar. The same
is true of
plastics, and every metal. Liquid chocolate is still chocolate. The elements aren't situated where they are in
the Periodic Table because they are solid, liquid or gas, but because of their
Atomic
Number. This shows that states of matter aren't "kinds of things";
if they were, solid mercury would no longer be mercury, and any cooling of
liquid mercury would move it to a new place in the Periodic Table!8b1
But, the
proffered DM-objection at the beginning of the previous paragraph (i.e., that
different states of matter are different "kinds of things") -- should it ever be
advanced by a dialectician -- only goes to show just how vague their
'definitions' of "quality" are. Indeed, it allows DM-fans to count different
states of matter as different "kind of things", even thoughthey don't
also regard shape, colour,
heat, or motion as different "kinds of things". Hence, for example, an
object in motion isn't counted as a different "kind of thing" from the same
object at rest (relative to some
inertial frame). A spherical ingot of iron, for instance, isn't regarded as different
"kind of thing" compared with a cylindrical ingot of iron. A red box isn't a
different "kind of thing" compared with a green box. Sure, gases, liquids and solids have different physical
properties, but so do moving and stationary bodies, and so do spherical and
cylindrical objects. And the same can be said about different coloured objects. It isn't easy to see why green
and red objects aren't different "kinds of things" when liquids and solids are
allowed to be. And, it is no use pointing to the "objective" nature of states of matter as
opposed to the "subjective" nature of colour, since shape and motion are just as
"objective".
[Anyway,
the "subjective" nature of colour will be questioned in
Essay Thirteen Part One --
as will the philosophical use of the terms
"subjective" and "objective".]
But,
what about this?
"And it comes about precisely as a
change in the attraction-repulsion relationship characteristic of the internal
molecular state of the metal. The metal passes from the solid to liquid state,
its internal character and laws of motion become different in certain ways, it
undergoes a qualitative change." [Cornforth, op cit.]
Are
such "laws of motion" what make iron what it is and not another thing, so that
it is "no longer the same kind of thing"? As we have just seen, even if
Cornforth were right about these "laws of motion", that wouldn't re-classify iron and place it in
a new location in the Periodic Table. Plainly, it doesn't make iron a "new kind of
thing". Furthermore, we have
already seen that rapid changes experienced by sub-atomic, or
inter-molecular, forces (of the sort Cornforth envisages) can't be recruited to this 'Law', either.
Other than Cornforth,
Kuusinen is one of the few DM-theorists who
seems to make any note of this
'difficulty':
"The totality of essential features that make a
particular thing or phenomenon what it is and distinguishes it from others, is
called its quality.... It is...[a] concept that denotes the inseparable
distinguishing features, the inner structure, constituting the definiteness of a
phenomenon and without which it cease to be what it is." [Kuusinen (1961),
pp.83-84. Italic emphasis in the original.]
We
will have occasion to question whether there are any "essential features" or
"essential properties" in nature (these terms are sometimes associated with a 'technical term', "natural kind");
readers are re-directed to Essay Thirteen Part Two for more details. [That Essay
will be published sometime in 2025. Until then, see Note 8c. Since the above was written
I have added several relevant comments about "natural kinds" to Essay Eight
Part Two. Readers are
directed there for more details.]
Independently of this, it isn't at all clear that someone's liking
or not liking
soup defines them as a person -- or as a being "of a particular sort".
While scientists might choose to classify certain aspects of nature by placing
them in whatever categories they deem fit, as far as I am aware none has so
far identified two different sorts of human beings: (i) soup-likers for n
milligrams of salt per m litres of soup versus (ii) soup-dislikers for the same or
different n or m. And even if they were to do so, that would
merely save this part of DM by means of a re-definition, since it is reasonably
clear that these two different sorts of human beings don't actually exist --, or, at least, they didn't until I just invented them.
Once again, that would make this part of DM eminently subjective, too, since it would
imply that changes in quality were relative to a convenient choice ofdescription/re-description.
Once again, that would introduce an element of arbitrariness in relation to
something
dialecticians (at least) claim is a
scientific law. How would that be any different from "foisting" DM on
nature?
Moreover, as has also been noted, H2O
as ice, water or steam, is still H2O.
As a liquid or a gas,
Helium is
still Helium.
If so, these changes can't apply to any of the qualities covered by
the DM/Aristotelian/Hegelian principles quoted above. So, it now seems that these
hackneyed examples of
Q«Q
either undermine the meaning of a key
DM-concept on which this 'Law' had supposedly been based (i.e., "quality"),
vitiating its applicability in such cases; or they weren't examples of
this 'Law' to begin with!8b2
Update, 07/03/2014: I have just received a copy of
Burger, et al (1980), the existence of which I had been unaware until a
few weeks ago. One of the contributors to this book [i.e., Erwin Marquit
(Marquit (1980)] makes a valiant attempt to define "quality", "system"
and "boundary",
among other things.
Unfortunately, his attempt fails badly, too.
I will add some thoughts about this to a future re-write
of this Essay, as well as to Essay Eleven Part Two.
Given
this new twist, it now seems that quantitative change to material bodies (such
as salt/soup mixtures) actually cause changes to the human sensory system (albeit of a vague and perhaps non-quantitative -- or even non-qualitative
-- kind). They in turn bring
about some sort of qualitative change in the sensory perception of any
tasters involved. If so, the original 'Law' (applied in this
area) is woefully wide of the
mark; it should have been something like the following:
E1: A change in quantity merely causes a change in quantity
to the material bodies involved [that is no misprint!], but at a certain
point this causes qualitative alterations (but they might not be Hegelian, or even Aristotelian, qualities)
to the way some human beings perceive the world, even though these
individuals haven't
undergone a quantitative change themselves.
Put like this, it isn't at all clear that anyone would
conclude this (or anything like it) from cooking soup, as Trotsky
tried to suggest. And we can be pretty sure about that-- since not even Engels got close to this more
accurate version of his own 'Law'.
Nor did Trotsky!
It is scarcely
credible that non-dialectical cooks, workers, or anyone else, for that matter,
would advance much further -- or even this far -– based only on their own
experience.
Of
course, this can only mean that peasant cooks aren't "unconscious
dialecticians", and neither is anyone else outside the DM-fraternity --, and
that is probably because they aren't quite so easily
duped by the vague and barely coherent ramblings of Mystical Christians like Hegel.
[I resume my analysis of the other things Trotsky said
about foxes (etc.) below and in Essay Nine
Part One.]
Nevertheless, the above 'definitions' of "quantity" and "quality"
aren't without their own problems.
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of
quality, quantity
and
measure.
"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]
"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something
else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect
of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby
becoming something else.
"Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'.
"In Hegel's
Logic,
Quality is the first
division of
Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while
Quantity is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage,
Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here.]
First of all, it isn't too clear if there is a real distinction
between "quantity" and "quality" here if we rely merely on what Hegel
had to say:
"[A] house remains what it is, whether it be greater or
smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]
For Hegel, house size seems to be the "quantity" here, but
beyond a certain size, houses are no longer houses. Hence, a 'house' the size of
a grain of sand isn't a house. Neither is one the size of a galaxy. Isn't this a
"qualitative" change? So, size is also a "quality". Moreover, extremely dark
blue is no longer blue (since it is indistinguishable from black). Is this
another "qualitative" change? Or is it "quantitative"? In that case, there seems
to be no clear distinction here between what is a "quantitative" and what is
a "qualitative" change. And it is no use appealing to yet another
'get-out-of-a-dialectical-hole-free-card', saying that quantity has "passed over"
into quality in these instances, since this slide in fact affects the
definition of these two terms. If we have no clear idea what we are talking about, then
it isn't possible to say what has "passed over" into what.
Anyway, where is the alleged "development" in this case? Or, are we to
suppose with Hegel that the very same house has been slowly shrunk in size until it
gradually assumed the
size of a grain of sand?
It
could be objected that there could be no houses the size of a grain of sand, so
the above objection is spurious. Of course, that is the very point: if the size
of a house were reduced to that extent, it would cease to be a house, even if one such
has never yet been constructed. Beyond a certain size, what might look like a house
ceases to be of any use, and can't actually house anyone. A Dolls House isn't a
house.
Figure Three: Would Anyone Choose To
Live This?
Secondly, as we have seen, the phrases "something new" and
"ceasing to be what it is" are hopelessly vague, too. We aren't told what
constitutes novelty or what "ceasing to be" amounts to, either. Still less
are we informed what counts as a relevant form of novelty. For instance, consider a raft
of examples from earlier:
So,
for example, the largest cut diamond on earth (in a safe, say, in New York) could change
into the second largest if another, bigger diamond is cut in, say, Amsterdam.
Here we would have a change in quality produced by no change in quantity to the
object in question, the diamond in New York. The same considerations also
apply to other remote changes. For instance, the biggest star in a
galaxy could become the second biggest if another star ten thousand
light years distant (but in the same galaxy) grows in size (perhaps over
millions of years) through accretion of matter. So, in both cases, there would
be a qualitative change to the first object with no relevant matter or energy
added to or subtracted from that object.
There are countless examples of remote change like this.
A
cheque drawn, say, in Paris will become instantaneously worthless
(qualitative change) if the issuing bank in Tokyo goes bust -- meaning that no
quantitative change will have happened to the original cheque -- no
matter or energy having been added to, or subtracted from, it.
The President of a given country visiting, say, the
UN Headquarters in Manhattan, can cease to be President if, while she is
away she is deposed at home. This is a significant change in 'quality', even
though no relevant matter/energy has been
added to, or subtracted from, this individual. Some might claim (rather
desperately) that this is a contrived example,
but the actual examples listed below show such remote changes aren't
contrived.
A Silver Medallist in,
say, the Olympic Games, can become the Gold Medal winner in a certain event (qualitative
change) if the former Gold medallist is disqualified because of drug-taking
or cheating -- meaning that no relevant quantitative change will have occurred to that Silver
Medallist. [In case anyone thinks this is another contrived example,
here is just one example of many.]
Here is what
I have just added to Essay Five on this (slightly edited):
The following
example isn't forced, either; it concerns a story (aired by the BBC) concerning the 3000 metre
steeplechase final at the 2014 European Games:
"France's Mahiedine Mekhissi-Benabbad has been stripped of
his 3,000m steeplechase gold medal at the European Championships for taking his
shirt off on the home straight. Mekhissi-Benabbad put his top in his mouth after
pulling clear of the field. Initially he appeared to be shown a yellow card by
an official but was subsequently disqualified. Frenchman Yoann Kowal now wins
gold, Poland's Krystian Zalewski gets silver and Spain's Angel Mullera wins
bronze." [Quoted from
here.
Accessed 15/08/2014. Paragraphs merged.]
As a result of this, Yoann Kowal was moved from second to first,
Krystian Zalewski from third to second, and Angel Mullera from fourth to
third....
The above
story isn't a one-off, either. It happens quite frequently in sport these days
(when those who cheat by taking performance enhancing drugs are found out). Here is a recent example:
"Russia's Natalya Antyukh has been stripped of 400m hurdles
gold from London 2012 on the basis of historical data from a Moscow testing
laboratory. Antyukh, now 41, is already serving a four-year ban
after being named in a World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) investigation into
cheating by Russia. American Lashinda Demus will be promoted to gold
in her place. All three gold medals won on the track by Russian athletes at
London 2012 have now been rescinded on doping grounds.
Mariya Savinova and Yuliya
Zaripova, the initial winners of 800m and 3000m steeplechase gold, have been
disqualified.
Ivan Ukhov's high jump title and Tatyana Lysenko's hammer victory in the
field have also been wiped from the record books....
"Antyukh has struck a defiant tone on social media. Her last
Instagram post on 18 August is a photo of her showing off her silver and bronze
medals from the 2004 Olympics. Those medals remain unaffected by the latest AIU
decision. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) can now promote Jamaica's
Kaliese Spencer to the bronze medal position after Antyukh did not appeal
against her punishment, with Czech Republic's Zuzjana Hejnova in line for an
upgrade to silver." [Quoted from
here; accessed
08/10/2023. Links in the original; several paragraphs merged. Bold emphases
added.]
The above
are yet more examples of remote change in quality induced by no relevant
change in quantity.
But, we
needn't rely on examples drawn from athletics. Back in May 2017,
James Comey,
Director of the FBI,
was fired by President Trump while he (Comey) was away in California. So,
Comey underwent a pretty significant qualitative (and remote) change (he ceased
being 'top cop') even though there was no relevant matter or energy added
to him.
Something similar happened to Rex Tillerson, Trump's ex-Secretary of State,
who found out on TV that he had been fired by Trump, on Twitter. Again,
this is an example of remote change in quality (the loss by an individual of a very powerful political Office
of State) with no relevant matter or energy added to him.
More-or-less the same can be said about Mark Esper, Trump's ex-Secretary of
Defence, who was also remotely fired, on Twitter, in November 2020.
This is yet
another change in quality with no relevant matter or energy added.
It
might be objected that the above argument is defective: When these individuals
saw or heard the news that they had been fired, light or sound energy was added
to them. Maybe so, but their seeing or hearing the news wasn't what fired them
or changed their status. Trump's remote action did that, and they were fired
whether or not they heard or saw the news. Hence, when Trump fired them they
all underwent an instantaneous, remote, political, legal qualitative change -- before
they had even discovered their fate -- but with no relevant matter or energy added
to them.
Consider another example: The
oldest known vertebrate fossil on earth could become the second oldest if
another even older one is discovered.
We
needn't labour the point; as noted above, there are countless examples of remote
qualitative change like this,
so many, in fact, that this Essay could easily be doubled in length if I were to
itemise
a significant number of them.
[Notice,
too, that many of the examples aired in the last few paragraphs concern 'developmental' change.]
Are such
'remote changes' relevant or not? True to form, 'pedantic' details like those
above are passed-over in silence by DM-fans. But, this isMickey Mouse Science, after
all!
We
have also seen dialecticians -- including Hegel -- regard ice, water and steam as
"something new", when we now know they aren't. But, equivocations like
this 'allow'
them to apply this 'Law' when and where is suits them, just as it
'allows' them to reject or ignore counter-examples when and where that
suits them, too. Indeed, it is reasonably safe bet that several of the
counter-examples listed above (or elsewhere in this Essay) will have been
rejected out-of-hand by dialecticians on that basis alone. For instance, heating water from cold to very hot is a
"qualitative" non-"nodal" change by any standard,
and it also results in something
"new" -- if we leave that word in its current, DM-vague-condition.
And yet, if by "new" we mean something substantially new, then ice and steam
aren't "new".
Nevertheless, there are dialecticians who will airily brush these factors aside as irrelevant.
Either that, or they will simply pass them over in silence.
[An
excellent example of both tactics put to good use can be found
here. There are
plenty more here. Another recent
example can be found in the comments section below this
YouTube Video in
relation to several objections I posted.]
What is finally decided upon here will, of course, depend on how
we view the status of Aristotelian "essences" (or "essential properties").
Further discussion of that topic will take us too far from the main theme of
this Essay, so no more will be said about it here.8c
The confusion over exactly what constitutes a
'dialectical'-body is well illustrated by the following passage -- which is often quoted by Trotskyists,
who appear to do so without ever once noticing
the serious damage it inflicts Engels's 'Law' and Trotsky's reputation:
"Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions…on the basis of the Hegelian
dialectic. Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and birds are nutritious and
tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the first animal which exceeds it
in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes that quantity passes into
quality, and turns to flee. Clearly, the legs of a fox are equipped with
Hegelian tendencies, even if not fully conscious ones. All this demonstrates, in
passing, that our methods of thought, both formal logic and the dialectic, are
not arbitrary constructions of our reason but rather expressions of the actual
inter-relationships in nature itself. In this sense the universe is permeated
with 'unconscious' dialectics." [Trotsky
(1971),
pp.106-07.]
But,
what precisely is the 'body' here that has had matter or energy added to it so
that it becomes bigger, intimidating this imaginary fox (as "quantity passes
into quality")? Where is the development, too? Does anyone imagine that the wolf in this tall tale gradually
expands in size in front of the fox thereby convincing the fox
not to attack and try to eat it? Or are we to suppose there is a line of
animals, or even wolves, in front of this fox,
gradually increasing in size, say, from left to right? Perhaps the fox walks
along it, inspecting each animal or wolf as if he were the colonel-in-chief of this
'vertebrate regiment', until at a
certain point the fox encounters an animal of a certain size and is intimidated by
it? If so, plainly no matter or energy will have been added to anything in
this setup -- hence, the following words of Engels's can't apply to it:
"[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner
exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only
occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called
energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without
addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative
alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954),
p.63.
Bold emphasis
alone added.]
Nor
has there been any 'development', here.
Even if we take Trotsky's words
literally or at face value:
"Thus a fox is aware that quadrupeds and
birds are nutritious and tasty…. When the same fox, however, encounters the
first animal which exceeds it in size, for example, a wolf, it quickly concludes
that quantity passes into quality, and turns to flee...," [ibid.]
it
still difficult to see how Engels's 'Law' applies. Presumably, Trotsky had the
following scenario in mind: one day, the fox encounters a small animal, say, a
mouse, hunts it and eats it. Next day, it comes across a vole, with the same
outcome. Day three sees it chase a chicken, which it catches and eats. On day
four, it rounds a corner, encounters a wolf, takes fright and legs it. But, once
more, which body has had matter or energy gradually added to it so that
"quantity turns into quality" by means of some sort of "leap"?
Here again
is what the dialectical classics have to say about this 'Law', beginning with
Hegel:
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphases alone added.]
Here is Engels -- again
echoing Hegel:
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. --
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphases added.]
"We have already
seen earlier, when discussing world schematism, that in connection with this
Hegelian nodal line of measure relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly
passes at certain points into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a
little accident: in a weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this
line. We gave there one of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the
aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C
from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the
gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative
change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the
water." [Ibid.,
p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
Plekhanov:
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: this has
now been corrected!)]
Finally,
these are Lenin's comments:
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality....
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"The identity
of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their 'unity,' --
although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly
important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition
(discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite
tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including
mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world
in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their
real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the
'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically
observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease
and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites
(the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal
relation).
"In the first
conception of motion, self-movement, its
driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the
shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the
second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the
source of 'self'-movement.
"The first
conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second
alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of
everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to 'leaps,' to the 'break in
continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of
the old and the emergence of the new." [Ibid.,
pp.357-58. Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted
at this site.]
The argument
here is reasonably plain:
(a)
Quantitative increase or decrease in matter or energy results in gradual change; hence,
(b) At a certain point,
a further increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a
"leap", a sudden "qualitative" change.
The
question now is: When did this wolf or these animals suddenly increase in size so that
they were capable of frightening the
fox? And, what new "quality" emerged in any of those animals?
But, wait: this new "quality"
must have emerged in the fox, so that the wolf or the other animals were now perceived by that fox as
intimidating -- when a moment or so earlier there were none of them in front of the
fox, and
no intimidation. It is isn't as if any of these animals gradually became more and
more intimidating until the latter passed a certain point and scared the life out of the fox. So, the change in
"quality" applies to the fox, not the animals confronting it. In that case,
although there had been new matter or energy added to the animals in the months
and years
before they
encountered the fox, that new matter or energy led to no new "quality" in
them. So, Engels's 'Law' can't apply to the wolf or the other animals in this specific
case.
In
the meantime, no new (relevant) matter or energy had been added to the fox,
either, even though it suddenly encountered an intimidator, and ran away.
["Relevant" since we aren't to imagine, it is to be hoped, that, as the fox grew
in size in the months and years leading up to this encounter, it gradually became more
frightened of other animals, until, at a 'nodal'-point, it ran away after crossing
paths with one such for the first time.]
So, precisely which new "quality"
emerged in the fox?
Are we to suppose that in the weeks and months leading up to this imaginary
incident the fox possessed a certain "quality" which then became its opposite
upon running into animal that frightened it? [It has to be the opposite "quality", since,
as we have been told by the DM-classics, all things turn into their
'opposites'.] So the old "quality" must be a tendency not to run
away from larger animals. It must have been that particular "quality" (or
something like it) if the new "quality" became its opposite:
i.e., if it became a tendency
to run away from larger animals, a tendency that was actualised when the
fox ran away from the one confronted it. But, that doesn't even seem right. Do foxes really have a tendency not to run
away from larger animals before they encounter them, which then turns into
its opposite, a tendency to run away? If so, in what way could this be
a tendency not to run away if foxes always do the opposite when they meet
larger animals? If ordinary plate glass, for example, has a tendency to break
when heavy objects are thrown at it, but it always does the opposite when
heavy objects are thrown at it, in what way was this a prior tendency to break,
in the first place? Same
with the fox. So, and once again, what new "quality" has emerged in
the fox?
Let
us suppose that DM-fans manage to come up with a "quality" of some sort
in this instance. If so, the next question would become: what new matter or energy
has been added to the fox -- in the moments preceding its encounter with the
scary animal, up to at the point where it
crossed that animal's path -- that caused this 'change' in "quality"? There
doesn't appear to be any. If so, it doesn't look like Engels's 'Law' applies to
the scary animal or the fox.
No good
leafing through the writings of Trotsky's epigones for help in resolving this
'difficulty'; they all seem to have swallowed this tall
tale whole and, as usual, uncritically. Indeed, they laud it in
adulatory terms.
Is
this yet another catastrophic failure of Engels's 'Law'...?
As if to cap
it all, here is a video of a
domestic cat chasing off a larger dog, which had been attacking a small boy:
Video Eight: Anti-Dialectical Cat?
[Warning: Graphic Footage.]
Of course, Trotsky didn't have access to
YouTube, but his epigones do. In that case, they will no doubt be interested to
see footage of rabbits chasing off larger
cats
and dogs,
and a whole host of other
non-dialectical
animal antics (such as another
domestic
cat chasing away a larger fox).
It would be tedious to list them all so
I will finish by adding
a link to a page with a series of pictures that show a lioness defending a
fox cub from the predatory attention of a much larger male lion.
It looks like the animal kingdom is
over-stocked with conscious anti-dialecticians!
Other
hackneyed examples that DM-theorists regularly roll out to 'illustrate' this
'Law' (boiling/freezing water, balding heads,
Mendeleyev's Table, the seemingly ambivalent fighting ability of Mamelukes --, and, of late,
Catastrophe and
Chaos
Theory) only
seem to work because of the way that the word "quality" has been
'defined' -- or, to be more honest, the way it hasn't been
clearly defined, are no
less defective.9
For example, in the case
of boiling water, the increase in quantity of one item (i.e., heat) is
said
to alter the quality of the second (i.e., water). As noted
above, "quality" was
characterised by Hegel in Aristotelian terms [i.e., as a certain
property that is
essential to a substance
or process without which it changes
into "something else" --, or, to use the jargon, "determinate being"
--; on
this, see Inwood (1992), pp.238-41]. And yet, by no stretch of the imagination is
liquidity an essential property of water. Once again, either side of the alleged
"qualitative" change, this substance remains H2O.
Boling or freezing doesn't change it into another substance;
water in its solid, liquid or gaseous form is still
H2O.
So, quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative
change of the required sort; no new Hegelian or Aristotelian "quality"
emerges. No "new
kind of thing" is formed as a
result.
However, it is worth
looking at this and other hackneyed examples in more detail.
Consider
water again: as it is heated, steam increasingly leaves the surface in a non-"nodal" fashion.
[The sudden breaking of inter-molecular, or even inter-atomic, bonds will be
considered presently.] The rate at which water vapour leaves the surface increases gradually as the temperature
rises. There is no sudden 'leap', in this case, with respect to water vapour. So, even here we have a smooth transition from liquid to gas.
Indeed, if a pan
of water is kept at 99oC
for long enough, all of the water will slowly evaporate as steam. In
fact, who doesn't know that water evaporates slowly at room temperature? Who has never dried
clothes on a line, crockery or cooking utensils on a drainer? Who on earth
doesn't know that some
rivers, ponds and lakes dry up in hot weather? Where is the "leap", in
such cases? Examples like these illustrate a well-known fact:
many, if not most, processes in nature run smoothly, and are non-"nodal".
Back to the
water: at 100oC
(at normal pressure and level of purity) events accelerate dramatically -- but even then they do so
non-"nodally". Some might find that assertion hard to believe,
but a few tenths of a degree below the critical point -- again, depending on the purity of the water,
surrounding conditions
and atmospheric pressure, as well as how the liquid is being heated
(etc.) --, bubbles begin to form more rapidly in the liquid. This process accelerates increasingly quickly as the
boiling point is approached. What we see, therefore, is a non-"nodal" change of phase/state
of matter,
even here. The phase or state of
matter
change in this case isn't sudden
-- like the snapping of a rubber band, or the breaking of glass. We don't see no bubbles
one second and then a microsecond later a frothing or seething mass, which we would do if this were
a "nodal" change.
Of
course, dialecticians might concede the
truth of the above contentions -- i.e., that before the liquid
reaches 100oC
water molecules leave the surface all the time --, even while they reject the
assertion that this isn't an example of "nodal" change. They might even add that
when a water molecule changes from its liquid to its gaseous state certain
chemical bonds are broken, and this is what happens suddenly, and hence
"nodally". But, even that isn't as
clear-cut as they seem to think. Certainly, when a bond is broken, that will be sudden, but there
is no "break in gradualness" (required
by this 'Law' -- on
that, see the passages I have quoted a few paragraphs
below), in this case. Bonds don't gradually break, and then suddenly
break. They just break. There are only "nodes" in this instance, with
no gradualness leading up to them.
So, this vague 'Law' doesn't even apply to the breaking of chemical
bonds!
Naturally, "nodal"-points could be re-defined
thermodynamically, in terms of latent heat (enthalpy
of vaporisation/condensation), etc. But, latent heat is involved
throughout the evaporating process, not just at 100oC.
What happens at the
boiling
point is that the vapour pressure of the liquid equals that of the
surrounding medium. In fact, it is possible to induce boiling (in many liquids,
and not just water) by lowering the surrounding pressure sufficiently enough. This can
also take place without any obvious addition or subtraction of any matter or energy
to or from the liquid concerned.
[Raising or lowering the
pressure in the surrounding medium isn't to add or subtract anything to or from the
actual liquid concerned. It might result in matter leaving the surface of
that liquid, but lowering pressure removes matter from the surrounding
atmosphere, not the liquid itself. The questions is: Is that what Engels meant by the
addition or subtraction of matter and energy? As with many other things connected with
this hopelessly vague 'Law', who can say?]
"What
about latent heat?", someone might interject:
"Heat absorbed or released as the result of a
phase change is called latent heat. There is no temperature change during a
phase change, thus there is no change in the kinetic energy of the particles in
the material. The energy released comes from the potential energy stored in the
bonds between the particles." [Quoted from
here; accessed
30/11/2020.]
Of course, the
idea that the temperature of water stays the same as it boils is an
abstraction. Unless every molecule of water is being heated at the same
rate, at the same time, the convection currents induced in the liquid will mean
that there are micro-differences in temperature throughout the said liquid. We have here what is called a "mixed-phase"
system as bubbles form in some places but not others. [On that, see below.]
As
suggested earlier, the
objections (that focus on the breaking of bonds
and on latent heat) appear to depend on the idea that latent heat
is only involved at the boiling point (or, at the phase/state of matter
transition). If so, that will have nothing to do with
the events in the lead up to that point (the alleged "gradualness" that is finally broken,
resulting in a "leap"), as this
'Law' requires:
"This is precisely
the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite
nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where
boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which -- under normal pressure
-- the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently
quantity is transformed into quality." [Engels
(1976), p.56. I have used the
online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages
edition. Bold emphasis added.]
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error.
Added June 2015: they have
now corrected it!)]
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations' ... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphases alone added. Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!"]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphasis added.]
So, once again, we see this shaky 'Law'
isn't illustrated by this over-used example, even if we were to throw in latent heat.
[I return to latent heat, below.]
Anyway,
the
volunteered DM-reply from earlier
itself depends on how a "nodal point" is defined.
As we have seen, since the length of a dialectical "node"
has also been left hopelessly vague, dialecticians
may only challenge the above assertions if they are prepared to define precisely
the length of a DM-"node".
Otherwise, my opinion is as good as theirs -- which is why I earlier
labelled this 'Law' subjective in the extreme.
Is there a
'DM-Standards Authority' to which we can appeal? Genuine scientists use
this system; that is,
of course, why their results can be
checked, and are even to be described as "objective". But, are there any standards at all in this DM-wing of
Mickey-Mouse Science?
The answer is pretty clear: there aren't.
There never have been
any.
On the other hand, if dialecticians take the
trouble to re-define the word "node"
just to accommodate these awkward non-dialectical facts (as noted earlier, in certain circumstances this tactic is
rightly called a "persuasive
definition"), it would become increasingly difficult to distinguish DM from stipulative
conventionalism.
However, it is worth noting that there isn't in fact a problem with that approach, since scientists do
it all the time. Unfortunately, though, this means that if DM-theorists were to
emulate them, they would
have to abandon their claim that DM is 'objective', and admit that their
'theory' is conventional, after all. [I will return to this specific topic in
Essay Thirteen Part Two.]
On
the other hand, if such phase/state-of-matter changes were to be defined
thermodynamically, then many of them would be far too abrupt. But, even that
isn't as clear-cut as might at first sight seem:
"The first-order phase transitions are those that involve
alatent heat. During such a transition, a system either
absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy. Because
energy can't be instantaneously transferred between the system and its
environment, first-order transitions are associated with 'mixed-phase regimes'
in which some parts of the system have completed the transition and others have
not. This phenomenon is familiar to anyone who has boiled a pot of water: the
water does not instantly turn into gas, but forms a turbulent mixture of water
and water vapour bubbles. Mixed-phase systems are difficult to study,
because their dynamics are violent and hard to control. However, many important
phase transitions fall in this category, including the solid/liquid/gas
transitions and
Bose-Einstein condensation.
"The second class of phase transitions are the 'continuous
phase transitions', also called
second-order phase transitions.
These have no associated latent heat. Examples of second-order phase transitions
are the ferromagnetic transition and the
superfluid transition.
Unfortunately, the above article has since been
changed somewhat since it was first consulted it; here is a later version:
"First-order phase transitions are those that involve a
latent heat. During such a transition, a system either
absorbs or releases a fixed (and typically large) amount of energy. During
this process, the temperature of the system will stay constant as heat is added:
the system is in a 'mixed-phase regime' in which some parts of the system have
completed the transition and others have not. Familiar examples are the melting
of ice or the boiling of water (the water does not instantly turn into
vapour, but forms a
turbulent mixture of liquid water and vapour
bubbles). Imry and Wortis showed that quenched disorder can broaden a
first-order transition in that the transformation is completed over a finite
range of temperatures, but phenomena like supercooling and superheating survive
and hysteresis
is observed on thermal cycling.
"Second-order phase transitions are also called
continuous phase transitions. They are characterized by a divergent
susceptibility, an infinite correlation length, and a power-law decay of
correlations near criticality. Examples of second-order phase transitions are
the ferromagnetic transition, superconducting transition (for a
Type-I superconductor
the phase transition is
second-order at zero external field and for a
Type-II superconductor
the phase transition is
second-order for both normal state-mixed state and mixed state-superconducting
state transitions) and the
superfluid transition. In contrast to viscosity,
thermal expansion and heat capacity of amorphous materials show a relatively
sudden change at the glass transition temperature which enable quite exactly to
detect it using
differential scanning calorimetry measurements....
"Several transitions are known as the infinite-order
phase transitions. They are continuous but break no
symmetries.
The most famous example is the
Kosterlitz–Thouless transition
in the two-dimensional
XY model. Many
quantum phase transitions, e.g., in two-dimensional
electron gases, belong to this class." [Quoted from
here;
accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis and one link added. Italic emphases in
the original. Spelling adapted to UK English; quotation marks altered to conform
with the conventions adopted at this site.]
Another source had this to say:
"Discontinuous
phase transitions are characterised by a
discontinuous change in entropy at a fixed temperature. The change in entropy
corresponds to
latent heatL
=
TΔS.
Examples are solid-liquid and liquid-gas transitions at temperatures below the
critical temperature. Continuous
phase transitions
involve a continuous change in entropy, which means there is no latent heat.
Examples are liquid-gas transitions at temperatures above the critical
temperature, metal-superconductor transitions and many magnetic ordering
transitions." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis
alone added; paragraphs merged.]
A
third added:
"Since the entropy is
continuous at the phase transition, the latent heat is zero. The latent heat
is always zero for a second order phase transition." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]
A
fourth concurs:
"'Discontinuities' at continuous
phase changes (2
nd
order or higher): For continuous transitions, the entropy is continuous crossing
the phase boundary and so there is no latent heat." [Quoted from
here; accessed 20/02/2015. Bold emphasis added.]
[Both
of which agree with the earlier Wikipedia
article before it was revised.]
This is, of course, just another way of
making the same point made earlier: not all changes
are unambiguously "nodal".
Now, with respect to the length of "nodal" points,
Kuusinen had this to say (Kuusinen doesn't use the
word "node", but it is plain that his "leaps" are "nodes"):
"The transition of a thing, through the
accumulation of quantitative modifications, from one qualitative state to a
different, new state, is a leap in development. This leap is a break
in the gradualness of the quantitative change of a thing. It is the
transition to a new quality and signalises (sic) a sharp turn, a radical
change in development." [Kuusinen (1961), p.88. Italic emphasis in
the original; bold emphases added.]
This seems pretty clear: all "leaps" are "sharp" turns,
"radical" breaks in "gradualness". Kuusinen clearly defines
"nodes"/"leaps" exactly as Hegel and Engels had done. So,
how does he handle the
slow
qualitative changes
we met earlier?
"Leaps, transitions from one quality to another
are relatively rapid.... The leaps are rapid in comparison with the
preceding periods of gradual accumulation of quantitative modifications. This
rapidity varies, depending upon the nature of the object and the conditions in
which the leap occurs. Some substances pass at once from the solid to
the liquid state on reaching a certain critical temperature.... Other substances
-- plastics, resins, glass -- do not have an exact melting point. On heating,
the first soften and then pass into the liquid state. We might say that in their
case the qualitative change, i.e., the leap, occurs gradually. But it is still
relatively rapid." [Ibid., p.88. Italic emphasis in the original,
bold added. Paragraphs merged.]
This is all very confusing;
"leaps" are rapid except where they
aren't! That is about as scientifically useful as defining acids (a là Brønsted-Lowry)
as "substances which donate
hydrogen ions, except where they don't"! Would a genuine scientist be allowed
to get away with cop-outs/confusions like this? Would anyone take a Physicist seriously who
said that a
half-life, for instance, is the time taken for radioactive compounds to decay to half their
original mass, except where they don't?
However,
the above sits rather awkwardly with Engels's take on the
matter (no pun intended!):
"We have already seen earlier, when discussing
world schematism, that in connection with this Hegelian nodal line of measure
relations -- in which quantitative change suddenly passes at certain points
into qualitative transformation -- Herr Dühring had a little accident: in a
weak moment he himself recognised and made use of this line. We gave there one
of the best-known examples -- that of the change of the aggregate states of
water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0oC
from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100oC
from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the
merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in
the condition of the water." [Engels
(1976), p.160. Bold emphasis added.]
Engels seems to know nothing of all those protracted "nodes" Kuusinen
dreamt up. Or, does "sudden"
now mean the same as "protracted" on Planet Dialectics? Is this yet another "unity
of opposites"? [See also here on this.]
Kuusinen tries 'handle' this 'difficulty' with the usual
"relatively-speaking"
'get-out-of-jail' clause tacked on at the end. But, the transition
from liquid water to steam (at 100oC)
is genuinely rapid no matter how quickly or slowly the water is heated in the
build-up to that point. By way of contrast, the melting of, say, plastic can be long and drawn out
(lasting weeks, if necessary) if the temperature rise is regulated accordingly.
And we
might well wonder: "Relative to what?" With what may we
'objectively' compare the time it takes for plastic objects to melt so that we
might truly say that their melting was either "relatively slow" or "relatively sudden"?
But,
what about the opposite? Many qualitative changes are very slow and protracted
even though the build-up is rapid. Which means that the "relatively-speaking"
get-out-clause doesn't apply. Consider the larval stage of
moths. The larva or grub will build a cocoon rapidly, but the radical
'qualitative' changes inside that cocoon (from larva to adult moth), in the
pupal stage, are
painfully slow (relative to the previous stage and the lifespan of most
moths and butterflies) -- ranging from a few weeks to many months. To be sure, when the
moth breaks out, that change will be rapid, but the unseen 'qualitative' changes that
have already happened were slow. By no
stretch of the imagination is this unseen development -- these radical qualitative changes
-- a
"leap", even "relatively-speaking".
And, the same comments apply to the development of reptiles,
birds, fish and other animals that grow inside egg sacks. Even a human baby
takes nine months to "leap" from the fertilised egg stage to being a fully-developed foetus before
it is born. As is well known, fertilisation and parturition are pretty rapid in comparison.
So, the "relative" clause isn't just vague, it fails to apply in any
meaningful sense across many such instances.
Even
the countless cell divisions that take place in an embryo's development are
non-"nodal". Cells don't "suddenly" divide. To be sure, some of the processes in cell division are
"sudden", but not all are. The division itself is slow.
Naturally, this depends
on how DM-fans define "sudden" and "nodal", but we have been
there already. They refuse to say.
All this
is, of course, independent of these
comments
concerning the
subjective implications of this "relatively-speaking" get-out clause.
In short, Kuusinen's amateurish,
if not disingenuous, attempt to specify the length
of dialectical "nodes"/"leaps" is no more impressive than the other things
he and his fellow Mickey
Mouse Dialectical Scientists have to say about this ramshackle 'theory'.
Another over-used example
dialecticians have enlisted to their cause is
Mendeleyev's Table.
"Finally, the Hegelian law is valid not only for
compound substances but also for the chemical elements themselves. We now know
that 'the chemical properties of the elements are a periodic function of their
atomic weights' (Roscoe-Schorlemmer,
Complete Text-Book of Chemistry, II, p. 823), and that, therefore,
their quality is determined by the quantity of their atomic weight. And the test
of this has been brilliantly carried out. Mendeleyev proved that various gaps
occur in the series of related elements arranged according to atomic weights
indicating that here new elements remain to be discovered. He described in
advance the general chemical properties of one of these unknown elements, which
he termed eka-aluminium, because it follows after aluminium in the series
beginning with the latter, and he predicted its approximate specific and atomic
weight as well as its atomic volume. A few years later,
Lecoq de Boisbaudran actually discovered this element, and Mendeleyev's
predictions fitted with only very slight discrepancies. Eka-aluminium was
realised in gallium (ibid., p.828). By means of the -- unconscious --
application of Hegel's law of the transformation of quantity into quality,
Mendeleyev achieved a scientific feat which it is not too bold to put on a par
with that of
Leverrier in calculating the orbit of the still unknown planet
Neptune." [Engels
(1954), pp.67-68. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site. Links added.]
[The
example of Neptune and Leverrier isn't in fact a happy one; on
that, see here.]
The claim is that scientists can
(or should) be regarded as 'unconscious
dialecticians' is a DM-induced fantasy. On the basis of this example of wishful thinking,
DM-theorists like to flatter themselves that their theory is scientific, which
is scant compensation for the fact the 99.9% of scientists consciously ignore it
--, that is, if they have ever even heard of it.
Indeed, as Erwin Marquit was forced to admit:
"In
the developed capitalist countries very little has been written on the physical
sciences by scientists and philosophers who consciously base their work on
dialectical-materialist methods of analysis." [Marquit (1980), p.77.]
Marquit offers two main reasons for this:
(i) The harassment and discrimination
dialecticians face from academic institutions; and,
(ii) The complete separation
of philosophy from science in the training of scientists.
Unfortunately, he failed to consider another far more likely option:
So no wonder genuine scientists won't touch it even with
someone else's barge pole.
[I have said more about this topic
here, and here.]
Concerning the Periodic Table, here are Woods and Grant:
"The
science of chemistry made great strides forward in the 19th century. A large
number of elements was discovered. But, rather like the confused situation which
exists in particle physics today, chaos reigned. Order was established by the
great Russian scientist Dimitri Ivanovich Mendeleyev who, in 1869, in
collaboration with the German chemist
Julius Meyer, worked out the periodic table of the elements, so-called
because it showed the periodic recurrence of similar chemical properties. The
existence of atomic weight was discovered in 1862 by
Cannizzaro. But Mendeleyev's genius consisted in the fact that he did not
approach the elements from a purely quantitative standpoint, that is, he did not
see the relation between the different atoms just in terms of weight. Had he
done so, he would never have made the breakthrough he did. From the purely
quantitative standpoint, for instance, the element
tellurium (atomic weight =
127.61) ought to have come after
iodine
(atomic weight = 126.91) in the periodic
table, yet Mendeleyev placed it before iodine, under
selenium, to which it is
more similar, and placed iodine under the related element,
bromine. Mendeleyev's
method was vindicated in the 20th century, when the investigation of
X-rays
proved that his arrangement was the correct one. The new
atomic
number
for tellurium was put at 52, while that of iodine is 53. The
whole of Mendeleyev's periodic table is based on the law of quantity and
quality, deducing qualitative differences in the elements from quantitative
differences in atomic weights. This was recognised by Engels at the time...."
[Woods and Grant (1995),
pp.50-51. Paragraphs merged; links added.]
In this particular case, the argument appears
to be that as elementary particles are added to certain atoms they change qualitatively
into other elements, which isn't, of course, how
Mendeleyev
saw things, nor is it how Engels interpreted his own 'Law'. That is because elementary particles were unknown in
their
day; indeed, the atomic theory of matter wasn't universally accepted until after the
work of
Jean Perrin,
forty or fifty years later still. Indeed, as the above quotations show, Engels interpreted this
example in terms of Atomic Weight, not Atomic Number.
[On this, see Nye (1972). On Mendeleyev, see
Gordin (2004), and on the Periodic Table in general, see Scerri (2007).]
Be
this as it may,
the elementary particles involved don't
themselves appear to change
(in the relevant sense --, that is, they don't change qualitatively),
but, even if they were to do that, the
atoms concerned don't. What happens is that as new particles are added
new atoms come into being with new qualities. So, the old qualities and the old
atoms simply disappear. So, this is as much a change of quantity, followed by
a disappearance of quality, as it is the emergence of a new quality.
Naturally, dialecticians will want to challenge the above and argue that that isn't what Engels's
Law implies in this case, maintaining perhaps that a
change in quantity does indeed lead to a change in quality, and that this is a
classic example, confirming this Law. It is only the deliberate
mis-description above that once again raises spurious objections.
Or, so a response might go...
But, even dialecticians will agree that not
just any old quantitative increase in elementary particles or energy will alter
the relevant qualities to produce the different elements in the Periodic Table. It takes
certain sorts of elementary particles to change one element into another, and
since these particles exhibit their own qualities -- and they effect the changes they
do because of those qualities --, it is clear that it takes
qualitative and structural-geometric change to induce development
of the elements in the Periodic Table. So,
if we ignore for the moment the 'disappearing quality' comment above, when
new qualities (not merely additional quantities) are added to atoms they
change in quality themselves. In which case, the
application of this 'Law' isn't as clear-cut as DM-fans would
have us believe, even in this supposedly classic example. Here, change in
quality leads to further change in quality.
This
point also applies to quantum 'leaps' -- for example, when an
electron jumps from one quantum state to another.
In that case, electrons don't
gradually change and then suddenly 'leap'; there are only 'leaps'. This
'Law' fails to apply even here!
[The relevant passages from the DM-classics and
other DM-sources have been quoted (again!) below.]
Readers who might be tempted to
argue that this as a
minor point, which can be safely ignored, should re-read what Lenin had to
say:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin
(1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
This
very point -- the interruption of
gradualness, ending in a "leap" -- is what distinguishes "the dialectical
transition from the undialectical transition". So, according to Lenin, this is a
core principle of dialectics, which can only be ignored by those who want to
undermine the distinction between dialectical and non-dialectical transitions.
The problem is that this means that the vast
majority of examples DM-theorists list, which they claim illustrate this 'Law'
-- ranging from water boiling to Mendeleyev's Table -- fail to illustrate it!
Of course, dialecticians might still want to insist
that a quantitative increase or decrease is what effects qualitative change in this
instance; but, again, there is nothing
in the phenomena themselves that forces that description on us. Hence,
this 'Law' is subjective, at best, when it is applied in this case; i.e., it
only appears to work if a favourable or a preferred
description is imposed on the facts. But, how is that different from
forcing a certain view on nature?
Furthermore, even dialecticians
will admit that it is only certain
qualities that effect the desired changes in this area, so the
re-description outlined in previous paragraphs is in fact consistent with a more honest qualitative re-appraisal of the phenomena in question. In that case, by clinging to
Engels's First 'Law' as stated, dialecticians are foisting onto
nature a view that isn't even in line with their own more honest appraisal of it!
Of course, Hegel had already appreciated this fact in his 'nodal
line of measure' -- it isn't just a mere increase in quantity that induces
change. As noted above, these changes are also qualitative in a different sense because of the
new
geometry (i.e., the new
orbital structure) of the resulting atoms, and it is this new geometry as
much as anything else which determines the novel properties of the resulting
change. Here quantity is only tangential. And Hegel knew nothing of quantum
change, or orbitals.
Moreover, as we saw earlier, there are many different
ways that change can be depicted in Physics and Chemistry (for example, in relation to
Isomers and the
ordering relations that occur both naturally and artificially in
nature and in relation to human interaction with it). Moreover, the energetics involved can be parsed in many different ways. In that case,
plainly, there is no single law that governs every chemical change
(except, perhaps,
Conservation of Energy), or,
indeed, all change in general (that, see
here). Indeed, in
relation to this,
one of the best examples used by DM-fans, we discover that even if we
accept the standard picture, it is as much geometry as it is quantity that
'determines' quality.
However, far more
problematic for DM-supporters is the observation that the
Periodic
Table doesn't actually conform to Engels's 'Law'! To see why, we need
only re-examine what Engels and others have actually said about this 'Law':
"With this
assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further
about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a
thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state,
and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly
what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives
us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of
measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness,
the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a
decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial
bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally
true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of
molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat,
light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics
of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided
leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary
chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life.Then within
the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible.
--
Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels
(1976),
pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature]; and
ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Hegel
(1999), p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]
"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by
anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that]
quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to
changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps,
interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…."
[Plekhanov (1956),
pp.74-77, 88,
163. Bold emphasis alone added.
(Unfortunately, the Index page for this book over at the Marxist Internet
Archive has no link to the second half of Chapter Five, but it can be accessed
directly
here. I have informed the editors of this error. Added June 2015: they have
now corrected it!)]
"The 'nodal
line of measure relations'... -- transitions of quantity into quality...
Gradualness and leaps. And again...that gradualness explains nothing
without leaps." [Lenin (1961),
p.123. Bold emphasis alone added. (Lenin added in the margin here: "Leaps! Leaps! Leaps!")]
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity)
of Being and not-Being." [Ibid.,
p.282. Bold emphasis added.]
"Dialecticians call this process the transformation of quantity into quality.
Slow, gradual changes that do not add up to a transformation in the nature of a
thing suddenly reach a tipping point when the whole nature of the thing is
transformed into something new." [Rees
(2008), p.24. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted
at this site. Bold emphasis added.]
Again, the argument here is plainly this:
(i)
Quantitative increase or decrease in matter or energy results in gradual change.
Hence,
(ii) At a certain point, further
increase or decrease breaks this "gradualness" inducing a "leap", a sudden "qualitative"
change.
But,
that doesn't happen in relation to the Periodic Table! Between each
element there is no gradual increase in protons and electrons leading to a
sudden change -- there are only sudden changes as they are added!
For example, as one proton and one electron are added to Hydrogen, it suddenly
changes into Helium. Hydrogen doesn't slowly alter and then suddenly "leap" and
become Helium. The same is true of every other element in the Table. In that
case, one of the 'best' examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' this 'Law' in
fact refutes it! There is no "interruption" in gradualness.
This is a more honest reading
from the extant data, is it not? And not a single foisting anywhere in sight!
These comments also apply to the other
examples drawn from Organic Chemistry -- quoted by Engels: cf., Engels (1954),
pp.161-63, and (1976), pp.65-68 (and Woods and Grant
(1995), whose ideas are further examined
in Note 4).
So, between each
of
the organic molecules (to which
DM-theorists refer)and the
next in line there is no gradual increase in atoms leading to a sudden change -- once again, there are only sudden changes as atoms are added!
For example, as one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen are added to
Butyric Acid,
it suddenly changes into
Valeric Acid.
Butyric Acid doesn't gradually alter and then suddenly "leap" and become
Valeric Acid. You can't just add one atom of Carbon, one of Hydrogen, and then
another of Hydrogen. They are added as a unit, as a job lot. The same is true of every other
molecule in other, similar organic series. In that case, another one of the 'best' examples
dialecticians use to 'illustrate' their 'Law' bites the dust! There is no "interruption" in gradualness, here,
either. Recall what Lenin said:
"What
distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The
leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin
(1961),
p.282. Bold emphases added.]
In
all these examples there is no continuity, only discontinuity. This
means that the most widely-, and over-used couple of examples drawn from the DM-box-of-tricks
(that supposedly illustrate this 'Law') fail to do so!
Furthermore, it seems rather odd to describe an increase in heat as an increase
in quantity when what happens is that the relevant water
molecules just move about faster if energy is fed into the system.
Of course, it
could be countered that that is precisely Engels's point; since energy can be
measured (perhaps here as an increase in temperature or maybe even in
Joules, etc.), then that increase in heat would be
an increase in quantity -- in this case perhaps the "quantity of motion"
(translated in terms of the increased velocity of water molecules, if that can
actually be measured). But, the original idea appeared in Hegel's work at a
time when heat was regarded as a fluid,
Caloric.
[For Hegel's view, see
here.] We now know that what really happens is that molecules just move
faster, after having interacted with still other faster moving molecules.
[That
is something Engels admits anyway; cf.,
Engels (1954),
pp.63-64.]
So, when he speaks
about an increase in
energy as a quantitative increase, he was either using a façon de parler,
or he hadn't quite abandoned the old idea that
heat is a substance. Of course, it might still be legitimate to describe this phenomenon
as an 'increase
in energy', but if so, it would only succeed in plunging this part of the First
'Law' into complete darkness, since the word
"energy" (if it, too, isn't just a
façon de parler)
isn't the name of an
identifiable substance that can be qualified in this way, either.
Erwin
Marquit (mentioned in an earlier sub-section) rightly makes much about the lack
of clarity concerning the nature
of energy in modern physical science -- cf., Marquit (1980), pp.80-83 --, but
his definition, which he claims to have found in
DN, isn't much to write home about,
either:
"Energy is a measure
of the capacity for change in the form of motion." [Ibid., p.83. Italic emphasis in
the original.]
In
fact, this isn't much different from the 'definition' offered by many scientists!10
One
standard text defines energy as follows:
"Energy is a measure that is associated with a state (or condition) of one or
more bodies." [Halliday, et al (1993), p.188.]
A
Dictionary of Physics had this to say:
"Energy: A measure of the ability of an object or a system to do work." [Harrison
(1999), p.58.]
This
is all rather odd; we are told elsewhere that matter is really a form of energy
(i.e., that they are basically 'the same thing") -- so, is everything really
made of, or "the same thing" as, "measure of a capacity for change
in the form of motion"? Everything is made of a "capacity"? Or an "ability"?
Is the material world just "the same thing" as a "capacity to do work"? Really?
"E = mc2.
It's the world's most famous equation, but what does it really mean? 'Energy
equals mass times the speed of light squared.' On the most basic level, the
equation says that energy and mass (matter) are interchangeable; they are
different forms of the same thing." [Quoted from
here; accessed
04-07-2024. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at
this site.]
But as Lenin
argued, the question remains: What then is it that moves? [We might add
"What then is this "capacity?"] However, Engels
and Marquit can't answer these questions without going round in circles: It is
matter that moves, and matter is energy which is a capacity to move. But, what
moves? Answer: It is matter that moves and matter is energy, which a capacity to move...
In
fact, Lenin appeared to reject Engels and Marquit's definition because it goes
round in circles, in the above manner:
"If energy is motion, you have only shifted
the difficulty from the subject to the predicate, you have only changed the
question, does matter move? into the question, is energy material? Does the
transformation of energy take place outside my mind, independently of man and
mankind, or are these only ideas, symbols, conventional signs, and so forth? And
this question proved fatal to the 'energeticist' philosophy, that attempt to
disguise old epistemological errors by a 'new' terminology." [Lenin
(1972), p.324. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
But,
Lenin had no answer, either. He also failed to tell his readers what matter and
energy are! No wonder he and
Engels were forced to say that
matter is just an
abstraction!
That can only mean that energy is an abstraction, too!
It is at this point that we hit peak absurdity:
according to DM-theorists, the quality of bodies and processes is changed by the
addition or subtraction of an abstraction to an abstraction! The universe is not only made out of
an abstraction, it is changed by the addition or subtraction of yet more
abstractions!
Is it any wonder
that Lenin preferred Idealists to 'boring materialists'?
"Intelligent idealism is
closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead
of intelligent; (sic) metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of
stupid." [Lenin (1961),
p.274.]
As I
pointed out in Essay Three Part Two, this puts Lenin and other DM-fans
on the side
of the 'Gods',
not the materialists:
"When the
Gigantes
about
Pallene
chose to begin war against the immortals,
Herakles
fought on the side of the gods, and slaying many of the Sons of
Ge
[or Gaia, the 'Earth Goddess' -- RL]
he received the highest approbation. For
Zeus
gave the
name of
Olympian only to those gods who had fought by his side, in order that the
courageous, by being adorned by so honourable a title, might be distinguished by
this designation from the coward; and of those who were born of mortal women he
considered only
Dionysos
and
Herakles worthy of this name." [Diodorus
Siculus, Library of History 4.15.1.]
That
metaphor alludes to an
image painted by
Hesiod (in his
Theogony -- links at the end)
and later by Plato in his dialogue,
Sophist, which is one of his more profound surviving works. Indeed, the
Sophist and two of his other dialogues -- Theaetetus (Plato
(1997e)) and
Parmenides (Plato
(1997d)) -- are together the principle source of much of subsequent Idealism.
The following excerpt from the Sophist reports on a conversation between an
Eleatic
"Stranger" (who appears to be a follower of
Parmenides)
and a character called "Theaetetus":
"Stranger. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who
treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed
to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all,
that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of
not-being....
"...There
appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are
fighting with one another about the nature of essence.
"Theaetetus. How is that?
"Stranger.
Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to
earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and trees; of these they
lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things only which can be touched or
handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if
any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him,
and will hear of nothing but body.
"Theaetetus. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they
are.
"Stranger.
And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from
above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of
certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists,
which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little
bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be, not essence, but generation and
motion. Between the two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict
raging concerning these matters.
"Theaetetus. True.
"Stranger.
Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that which they call
essence.
"Theaetetus. How shall we get it out of them?
"Stranger.
With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty,
for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or
rather an absolute impossibility, in getting an opinion out of those who drag
everything down to matter. Shall I tell you what we must do?
"Theaetetus. What?
"Stranger.
Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us
imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in
accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth
having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which is
acknowledged by inferior men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but
seekers after truth." [Plato
(1997b), pp.267-68, 246a-246d. I have used the on-line version here.]
[As noted
earlier, this battle is described in
Hesiod's
Theogony (lines 675-715), available
here.]
From this it is quite clear that
Marxist Dialecticians are far closer to the 'Idealist Gods'
than they are to the
'Materialist Giants'!
"In order to talk to each other, we have to have words, and that's all right.
It's a good idea to try to see the difference, and it's a good idea to know when
we are teaching the tools of science, such as words, and when we are teaching
science itself. To make my point still clearer, I shall pick out a certain science book to
criticize unfavourably, which is unfair, because I am sure that with little
ingenuity, I can find equally unfavourable things to say about others. There is
a first grade science book which, in the first lesson of the first grade, begins
in an unfortunate manner to teach science, because it starts off an the wrong
idea of what science is. There is a picture of a dog -- a windable toy dog --
and a hand comes to the winder, and then the dog is able to move. Under the last
picture, it says 'What makes it move?' Later on, there is a picture of a real
dog and the question, 'What makes it move?' Then there is a picture of a
motorbike and the question, 'What makes it move?' and so on.
"I thought at first they were getting ready to tell what science was going to be
about -- physics, biology, chemistry -- but that wasn't it. The answer was in
the teacher's edition of the book: the answer I was trying to learn is that
'energy makes it move.' Now, energy is a very subtle concept. It is very, very difficult to get right.
What I meant is that it is not easy to understand energy well enough to use it
right, so that you can deduce something correctly using the energy idea -- it is
beyond the first grade. It would be equally well to say that 'God makes it
move,' or 'spirit makes it move,' or 'movability makes it move.' (In fact, one
could equally well say 'energy makes it stop.')
"Look at it this way: that's only the definition of energy; it should be
reversed. We might say when something can move that it has energy in it, but
not what makes it move is energy. This is a very subtle difference. It's the
same with this inertia proposition. Perhaps I can make the difference a little clearer this way: If you ask a child
what makes the toy dog move, you should think about what an ordinary human being
would answer. The answer is that you wound up the spring; it tries to unwind and
pushes the gear around. What a good way to begin a science course! Take apart the toy; see how it
works. See the cleverness of the gears; see the ratchets. Learn something about
the toy, the way the toy is put together, the ingenuity of people devising the
ratchets and other things. That's good. The question is fine. The answer is a
little unfortunate, because what they were trying to do is teach a definition
of what is energy. But nothing whatever is learned.
"Suppose a student would say, 'I don't think energy makes it move.' Where does
the discussion go from there? I finally figured out a way to test whether you have taught an idea or you have
only taught a definition. Test it this way: you say, 'Without using the new word which you have just
learned, try to rephrase what you have just learned in your own language.
Without using the word "energy," tell me what you know now about the dog's
motion.' You can't. So you learned nothing about science. That may be all
right. You may not want to learn something about science right away. You have to
learn definitions. But for the very first lesson, is that not possibly
destructive? I think for lesson number one, to learn a mystic formula for answering
questions is very bad. The book has some others: 'gravity makes it fall;' 'the
soles of your shoes wear out because of friction.' Shoe leather wears out
because it rubs against the sidewalk and the little notches and bumps on the
sidewalk grab pieces and pull them off. To simply say it is because of friction,
is sad, because it's not science." [Quoted from
here. Spelling modified to agree with UK
English; quotation marks
altered to
conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Minor typo corrected; several
paragraphs merged. Some bold emphases
in the original, some added.]
It is instructive to note that when push comes to shove, even
great physicists have to appeal to
ordinary language
and common understanding to explain why anything actually happens.
[No pun
intended!]
Be
this as it may, another serious problem now rears its ugly head: using "quantity" to depict the
change in motion of molecules is dubious on other grounds. Certainly, we can speak of an
increase or decrease in the velocity of certain molecules, here, but there is no such thing as a quantity of
velocity that could sensibly be said to increase. Velocity isn't a substance, either, and
although we certainly use numbers to depict this
vector, we don't refer to anything
called the "quantity of velocity" (except again, perhaps as a
façon de parler).
Since velocity is a
vector, its magnitude is given by a
scalar,
but velocity itself is just that scalar operating in that
direction. To call the magnitude of a vector a "quantity" would be to confuse a
vector (or indeed a direction) with a substance, or even with a scalar.
And
this isn't just me being pedantic. As we saw above, this is in line
with Hegel's own definition of the word:
"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical
with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its
quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does
not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it
be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85.]
That
point is also underlined by the Glossary at the
Marxist
Internet Archive:
"Quantity is an aspect of somethingwhich may change (become more or less)
without the thing thereby becoming something else. Thus, if
something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this
is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the
same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative
change'. In Hegel's
Logic,
Quality
is the first
division of
Being, when the world is
just one thing after another, so to speak, while
Quantity
is the second
division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is
stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage,
Measure, the unity of
quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change
becomes qualitative change." [Quoted from
here. Bold emphases added;
paragraphs merged.]
Hence, if we strictly adhere to these definitions, there can be no "quantity" of
energy, because it isn't a "thing", or an "aspect" of a thing in
any meaningful sense of those words. In fact, as we have seen: we have
absolutely no
idea what energy is! I make it a point on the many discussion forums I use
and still frequent to ask Professors and Doctors of Physics what energy actually
is. Not one of them has been able to tell me.
Nevertheless,
even if it were appropriate to depict energy in the way Engels thought he could, neither the heat nor the faster
molecules change in quality themselves. Any amount of heat still stays as
heat; motion is still motion. This confirms the obvious fact that energy and heat aren't
"kinds of things", and hence that their increase or decrease isn't even quantitative,
since they can't therefore be "aspects" of something. If they were, then according
to this 'Law', an increase in energy at some point would "pass over" and it
would change into a "new kind of thing". Energy and heat would change
into...., what?
If so, the "quantitative" aspect of Engels's First 'Law' is
fundamentally defective, since,
if "quantity" has to be an aspect of certain "kinds of thing", and energy and
motion aren't "kinds of
things" themselves, they can't increase or decrease in quantity.
Of course,
that is a ridiculous conclusion, since
energy is largely quantized; but this just shows how defective Hegel and
Engels's 'definitions' of "quantity" have turned out to be.
Hence, on close examination -- much
closer than DM-fans have ever subjected this to -- the First 'Law' doesn't appear to apply
to such 'phenomena'!
In that case,
at best, it should now perhaps be re-written along the following lines:
M1: An increase in the
quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item,
while it can induce an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water),
which will in turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative
change itself -- but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it
isn't a quality
definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).
Or, even:
M2: An increase in what
isn't the
quantity of one item (e.g., heat) leads to no qualitative change in that item,
while it can induce an alteration in the quality of another item (e.g., water), which will in
turn have changed in quality while undergoing no quantitative change itself --
but which qualitative change is inadmissible anyway since it isn't a quality
definitive of the latter (e.g., water as H2O).
As we can now see: this isn't an impressive 'Law'.
In comparison, "A stitch in time saves nine" and "An apple a day keeps
the doctor away" are far more noteworthy!
Still
less is this hackneyed example (concerning water) a convincing 'illustration' of
the First 'Law'.
As far as balding heads
are concerned, it isn't easy to see how this other over-worked example illustrates the
First 'Law', either. That is because it is difficult to believe
that someone with, say, n hairs on their head is hirsute when the same
person with n-1 hairs is objectively bald -- even if at some point or other
(and not necessarily the same point) we all might
subjectively choose different words to depict them.
Now, if it could be shown that those with
preciselyn-1 hairs on their heads are always objectively bald, and that this is an essential defining quality of baldness,
or of bald people, or of bald heads (which is the Aristotelian/Hegelian sense
required by DM), so that a
change from n to n-1 hairs always results in baldness, and which rule is true for all hirsute human beings,
then the First 'Law' might have some life left in it in this one instance.
It would then be a dialectical 'Law' that applies only to the balding parts of
the universe, but nothing else. [Which is just longhand for saying it can't therefore
be a law.]
Anyway, is baldness really a "new kind of
thing"? With
respect to that condition human anatomists (and even hairdressers) have yet to define
hair loss in such
Aristotelian/Hegelian terms. Hence, and unfortunately for DM-fans, they have so far failed to categorise all
follically-challenged
individuals in this way, declaring that anyone with n-1 hairs is
essentially bald, whereas anyone with n hairs is still essentially non-coot.
Until they do, there are no "nodal" points here, just as there seem to be no
specifically (Aristotelian/Hegelian) "qualities" definitive of bald human beings
for dialecticians to latch onto. So, in this case, too, it is impossible
to see how an 'objective' example of this dialectical 'Law' applies --, merely a 'subjective' impression
of it,
and, indeed, one that has to rely on a quirky application of an already vague
Aristotelian/Hegelian
'definition' of "quality".
So, it seems that the change in "quality", if
one even occurs
here, takes place not in the one actually going bald, but in the one describing
them
that way. In
which case, with
respect to human balding, a change in
the quantity of hair on one person's head will merely change the quality of someone else'sopinion of the one going bald; and even that occurs subjectively and
(possibly even) non-"nodally", too. And the one judging that qualitative change
in the balding individual will themselves have undergone a qualitative change without any
quantitative change in or to them that could have brought that about!
There isn't much here on which to base a
dialectical 'Law', at least nothing that would fail to brand this part of DM
as 'fringe science', at best.
Not to be
deterred, DM-fan, Clifford Conner, hopes to persuade his readers that the following example of change in
"quality" also 'illustrates' this 'Law':
"Atomic bombs and nuclear reactions have given us
an unsurpassable illustration of this law, and Engels would surely have
appreciated this one, too. When the nuclear fuel is brought together, if there
is less than a certain exact amount, which is called the 'critical
mass', nothing will happen. But, if a little more fuel is added, and a
little more, and a little more, eventually the 'critical mass' will be reached
and the
nuclear chain reaction
will be initiated." [Conner (1992), p.29. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
But, has a new "kind of thing" emerged, here? In fact,
as we have repeatedly seen, no "new
kind of thing" has resulted from this particular process. All that has happened is that a
certain sort of reaction speeds up dramatically:
"Fission chain reactions occur because of
interactions between
neutrons and
fissileisotopes (such as 235U). The
chain reaction requires both the release of neutrons from fissile
isotopes undergoing
nuclear fission and the subsequent absorption of some of these neutrons in fissile
isotopes. When an atom undergoes nuclear fission, a few neutrons
(the exact number depends on several factors) are ejected from the
reaction. These free neutrons will then interact with the
surrounding medium, and if more fissile fuel is present, some may be
absorbed and cause more fissions. Thus, the cycle repeats to give a
reaction that is self-sustaining.
"Nuclear power plants
operate by precisely controlling the rate at which nuclear reactions
occur, and that control is maintained through the use of several
redundant layers of safety measures. Moreover, the materials in a
nuclear reactor core and the uranium enrichment level make a nuclear
explosion impossible, even if all safety measures failed. On the
other hand, nuclear weapons are specifically engineered to produce a
reaction that is so fast and intense it can't be controlled after
it has started. When properly designed, this uncontrolled reaction
can lead to an explosive energy release." [Wikipedia,
accessed 08/11/2011. For those who don't like Wikipedia, the
same is argued
here, at BBC Science.]
Figure Four: A Non-Dialectical Chain Reaction
As another source points out:
"Although two to three neutrons are
produced for every fission, not all of these neutrons are available
for continuing the fission reaction. If the conditions are such that
the neutrons are lost at a faster rate than they are formed by
fission, the chain reaction will not be self-sustaining. At the point where the chain
reaction can become self-sustaining, this is referred to as critical
mass.
"In an atomic bomb, a mass of fissile
material greater than the critical mass must be assembled
instantaneously and held together for about a millionth of a second
to permit the chain reaction to propagate before the bomb explodes. The amount of a fissionable
material's critical mass depends on several factors; the shape of
the material, its composition and density, and the level of purity.
"A sphere has the minimum possible
surface area for a given mass, and hence minimizes the leakage of
neutrons. By surrounding the fissionable material with a suitable
neutron 'reflector', the loss of neutrons can reduced and the
critical mass can be reduced.
By using a neutron reflector, only
about 11 pounds (5 kilograms) of nearly pure or weapon's grade
plutonium 239 or about 33 pounds (15 kilograms)
uranium
235 is needed to achieve critical mass." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 08/11/2011. Quotation marks altered to conform
with
the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.]
So, and again, no "new kind of thing"
emerges from this process
-- the "old kind of thing" merely speeds up. In that case, this can't be an example of
the First 'Law'.
"I was reminded of the transformation of quantity
into quality by an article I read...about resort beaches in New Jersey. Health
inspectors periodically check the ocean water for
faecal
coliform bacteria. They measure it in parts per millilitres of water. If it
is below 200 parts, they allow the beaches to remain open; above that number they
close them down. Some resort owners were caught throwing chlorine tablets into
the ocean just before the inspectors were due to arrive. It was a futile attempt, as it turned out, to
prevent a transformation of quantity into quality, but it was rather remarkable
to see capitalists sneaking around trying to 'unpollute' the environment."
[Conner (1992), p.29. Spelling modified to agree with UK English; quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Paragraphs merged.]
But,
whatever it was that the aforementioned capitalists did or didn't do
isn't as remarkable as the sight of
DM-fans scratching around, desperately trying to impose their ramshackle
'theory' on the world. In this latest example of
Mickey Mouse Science, Conner
failed to tell his readers what the new "quality" is supposed to be
that he thinks has come into being in this case. Plainly, no new "kind of thing"
has emerged, once more. All we have are more bacteria in the water over and
above a figure set by the authorities. Either side of that figure, the water is still polluted, it is just that above 200
parts per millilitre the
authorities have decided that it becomes 'cost effective' to close the beach.
As
Karl Popper
noted, just like Freudians (and he could have added, just like Fundamentalist
Christians), Dialectical Marxists only look for conformation of
their 'theory' -- and even then they have to ignore what that theory
actually tells them!
"I found that those of my friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and
Adler,
were impressed by a number of points common to these theories, and especially by
their apparent explanatory power. These theories appear to be able to explain
practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred.
The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion
or revelation, open your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet
initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirmed instances
everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened
always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were
clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refuse to see it,
either because it was against their class interest, or because of their
repressions which were still 'un-analyzed' and crying aloud for treatment.
"The most characteristic element in this situation seemed to me the incessant
stream of confirmations, of observations which 'verified' the theories in
question; and this point was constantly emphasize by their adherents. A Marxist
could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for
his interpretation of history; not only in the news, but also in its
presentation -- which revealed the class bias of the paper -- and especially of
course what the paper did not say. The Freudian analysts emphasized that their
theories were constantly verified by their 'clinical observations.' As for
Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in 1919, I reported
to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found
no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings,
although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he
could be so sure. 'Because of my thousandfold experience,' he replied; whereupon
I could not help saying: 'And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has
become thousand-and-one-fold.'
"What I had in mind was that his previous observations may not have been much
sounder than this new one; that each in its turn had been interpreted in the
light of 'previous experience,' and at the same time counted as additional
confirmation. What, I asked myself, did it confirm? No more than that a case
could be interpreted in the light of a theory. But this meant very little, I
reflected, since every conceivable case could be interpreted in the light
Adler's theory, or equally of Freud's. I may illustrate this by two very
different examples of human behaviour: that of a man who pushes a child into the
water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his
life in an attempt to save the child. Each of these two cases can be explained
with equal ease in Freudian and Adlerian terms. According to Freud the first man
suffered from repression (say, of some component of his
Oedipus
complex), while the second man had achieved sublimation. According to Adler
the first man suffered from feelings of inferiority (producing perhaps the need
to prove to himself that he dared to commit some crime), and so did the second
man (whose need was to prove to himself that he dared to rescue the child). I
could not think of any human behaviour which could not be interpreted in terms
of either theory. It was precisely this fact -- that they always fitted, that
they were always confirmed -- which in the eyes of their admirers constituted
the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that
this apparent strength was in fact their weakness." [Popper (1974b),
pp.34-35. Spelling modified to
agree with UK English; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphasis and
link added.]
Of
course, Popper used these observations to attack Marx's Theory
of History, too, but as we will see in a later Essay, that move was as unwise as
it was misguided. Even so,
his comments certainly apply to the sort of Mickey Mouse Science
DM-apologists are peddling.
As I noted
earlier (slightly modified):
The phrases
"something new" and "ceasing to be what it is" are hopelessly vague, too. We
aren't told what constitutes novelty or what "ceasing to be" amounts to, either.
Still less are we informed what counts as a relevant form of novelty.... We
have also seen dialecticians -- including Hegel -- regard ice, water and steam as
"something new", when we now know they aren't. But, equivocations like
this 'allow'
them to apply this 'Law' when and where is suits them, just as it
'allows' them to reject or ignore counter-examples when and where that
suits them, too.
More
recently,
dialecticians have begun appealing to
Chaos and Catastrophe
Theory in their vain attempt to argue that Engels's nineteenth century 'Law' is
bang
up-to-date. The natural processes investigated in those areas of science at
some point undeniably change
rapidly. [Again, it is important to note that rapid change in nature and
society is neither
being denied nor asserted in this Essay. What is being challenged is the theory
that all change is "nodal", or rapid. Some changes are, many aren't. I
have found it necessary to repeat this point several times since critics who claim to
have read this Essay seem to think I am denying there are any rapid changes in
nature and society. I am not. Unlike DM-fans, I simply refuse to be
informed about this by a Christian Mystic, and ('foolishly') look to
scientists to educate us about the world and the varied rates of change we
encounter there.]
However, as we will see, the term "quality" is defined in DM-circles in terms
that
rule-out many of these catastrophic changes from even being categorised as 'dialectical'. That is because no
new DM-"qualities" emerge in such transitions.
For example, in the famous "three
body" problem, whatever the outcome, the planetary bodies involved are still
planets and they are still satellites; their orbits are still orbits. What new
DM-"quality" has "emerged"?
[Here is a
JavaScript simulation of this phenomenon. Indeed, the transitions in this example
also appear to be non-"nodal".
(Visitors can alter the parameters in the top left hand corner of the page.)]
Moreover, chaotic (turbulent)
flows, either side of the alleged "node", are still flows, and the liquids/gases
involved are still the liquids/gases. No new
Aristotelian/Hegelian "quality"
has "emerged" here, either.
To be sure, some chaotic systems certainly seem
to conform with this 'Law' -- but, that is because: (a) The phrase "nodal change"
has been left conveniently vague, and (b) Few dialecticians are prepared to ask
awkward (but rather obvious) questions about the precise nature of these DM-"qualities". [On that, see
here,
here and
here.]
However, there are scientific and/or mathematical models of
reality that explain chaotic systems (indeed, they do so with far greater clarity) --,
and they don't fall foul of the many counter-examples listed in this Essay
(that 'refute' this 'Law') -- namely, from the theorists whose popularisations
DM-theorists themselves learnt about these chaotic systems in the first place.
Hence, if we needed a theory of change
(in such cases), DM wouldn't be
it.
Once more, if the "same body" requirement is
indeed part of Engels's 'Law', then many of the examples DM-theorists themselves
use soon fall by the wayside. For example, the following (overworked) example (to which Engels
himself appealed) goes straight
out of the window:
"In conclusion we shall call one more witness for
the transformation of quantity into quality, namely --
Napoleon. He describes the combat between the French cavalry, who were
bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes,
who were undoubtedly the best horsemen of their time for single combat, but
lacked discipline, as follows:
'Two Mamelukes
were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100
Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300
Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes,
and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500
Mamelukes.'" [Engels
(1976), p.163.]
But,
what is the "same body", here? At best, all we have in this
instance is
a changing collection of non-identical Mamelukes and French soldiers
(unless we are to suppose the same collections of Mamelukes and French soldiers
were used each time -- even after they had been defeated, or perhaps
wounded/killed). This is hardly the
"same body".
Does anyone think that Napoleon
(or even Engels!) actually carried out this experiment? At best, this was a 'thought experiment'. But,
that hasn't stopped DM-fans quoting it as if it were gospel-truth/well-established-science.
Unfortunately for them we
don't even have a single material body to consider, here, just a few
vague words by about different collections of warriors!
Plainly, there can be no 'development' here,
either -- since there is no evidence that this series of events ever took place!
--, so the objection directed against many of the
counter-examples mentioned in this Essay (i.e., that they are irrelevant since they
apply to systems or bodies that aren't developing) also fails. Which
DM-fan has ever objected to this example on the grounds that
(a) It doesn't apply to a body/system to which matter or energy has been added,
and (b) It involves a 'thought experiment' about a 'system' that isn't
actually developing?
~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~
As far as
the other examples dialecticians use to 'illustrate' this 'Law' are concerned:
there are few that even appear to work (even when the
above difficulties and equivocations have been ignored), and when added to
the others already considered in this Essay, that hardly justifies the title
"Law" being attached to this key component of Engels's theory.
By way of comparison,
had
Newton's
Second Law of motion, for instance, worked as fitfully as this 'Law' does (or it was
as vaguely-worded and was a mathematics-free-zone, too), physicists would
heartily laugh at anyone who described it as a law. If, say, the rate of change of momentum, even
under controlled conditions, were only occasionally proportional to the applied
force -- and even then, if this were the case only if key terms were either ignored,
remained ill-defined or were twisted out of
shape -- no one would have taken Newton seriously. And rightly so.
But, that's is Mickey Mouse
'Dialectical Science' for you...
The reason why I have
called DM Mickey Mouse
Science should now be quite plain. The examples usually presented by DM-fans to illustrate their
First 'Law' -- which lack clarity and are ill-defined -- are almost without exception
either
anecdotal
or entirely amateurish. If someone were to submit a paper to a science journal
purporting to establish the veracity of a new law, or even support a novel
hypothesis, with the same level of
vagueness, imprecision, lack of detail and supporting mathematics -- failings
that were compounded by profound theoretical wooliness --, it would
be rejected out-of-hand at the first stage, its author's reputation forever
damaged. As even Maurice
Cornforth (an otherwise enthusiastic DM-supporter and
-proselytiser)
was forced to admit:
"But investigation of universal laws of dialectics remains an open field.
It is something that has been projected but not yet systematically done.
And the laws that have been written down, following Hegel,
still lack both the precision of formulation and the systematic derivation to be
expected of anything that can rank as science.
The laws of dialectics should be, as Engels claimed, 'as simple and clear as
noonday'. If they are not, and if their interconnection is not evident, that is
because not enough work has been done on their formulation. (A case in point is
the so‑called 'law of the negation of negation'.)" [Cornforth (1985), p.293;
quoted from here.
Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions
adopted at this site.]
The above
was written many years ago but the situation hasn't markedly changed in the
intervening years. So, this is still the case: "[T]he laws [of dialectics]
still lack both the precision of formulation and the systematic derivation to be
expected of anything that can rank as science."
Indeed, as I
have argued
elsewhere:
Anyone who has studied or practiced genuine science knows the
great care and attention to detail that has to be devoted by researchers, often
over many years or decades, if they
want to add to or alter even relatively minor areas of current knowledge, let
alone establish a new law. This was the case in Engels's day, just as it is the
case today. Moreover, the concepts employed by scientists have to be analytically sound. The use of primary data is essential (or it has at least to
be reviewed or referenced by the scientists involved); supporting evidence has to be
precise, detailed,
meticulously recorded, and subject not only to public scrutiny but also to peer review.
In contrast, the sort
of Mickey Mouse Science one finds in Creationist literature is rightly the
target of derision by scientists and Marxists alike. And yet, when it comes to
DM we find in Engels's writings (and those of subsequent dialecticians) little
other than Mickey Mouse Science. Engels supplied his readers with no original data, and what little
evidence he offered in support of his 'Laws' would have been rejected as
amateurish in the extreme if it had appeared in an undergraduate science paper,
let alone in a research document --, even in his day! DM-theorists
today almost invariably present their readers with a few paragraphs, or, at best, a few pages of
highly selective secondary and tertiary 'evidence' of the sort that Engels
paraded before his readers. It is salutary,
therefore, to compare Engels's approach to scientific proof with that of Darwin, whose classic work is a model of
clarity and original research. Darwin presented the scientific community with
extensive evidence and fresh data, which has been expanded upon greatly over the last 150 years.
All we find in DM-'science' is mind-numbing repetition and vaguely-worded
anecdotes.
Contrast,
DM-Mickey Mouse Science with the real thing; here, for example, is one report of
the accuracy achieved by the instruments aboard the recently launched
Gaia
satellite:
"'Gaia was not designed to take Hubble-like pictures; this
is not its operating mode at all. What it will eventually do is draw little
boxes around each of the stars you see in this picture and send just that
information to the ground.'
"The satellite
has been given an initial mission duration of five years to make its 3D map of
the sky.
"By repeatedly
viewing its targets, it should get to know the brightest stars' coordinates down
to an error of just seven
micro-arcseconds
-- an angle equivalent to a
euro coin on the Moon being observed from Earth." [Quoted from
here. Accessed 06/02/2014. Bold emphasis added.]
Even back in the
16th century, astronomers were concerned with accuracy and precision;
Tycho Brahe,
for instance, was able to observe the heavens with the naked eye down to an
accuracy of one arcminute (1/60th of a degree!). Once again, this is
typical of genuine science, which, unfortunately, starkly distinguishes it
from the 'science' we find in DM.
Genuine science is markedly different from Mickey Mouse 'Dialectical Science'.
Since many DM-supporters appear not to know the difference between their brand
of 'science' and the genuine article, here is an example of the latter:
"'Light-speed' neutrinos point to new physical reality
"Subatomic particles have broken the
universe's fundamental speed limit, or so it was reported last week.
The speed of light is the ultimate limit on travel in the universe,
and the basis for
Einstein's special theory of relativity, so if the
finding stands up to scrutiny, does it spell the end for physics as
we know it? The reality is less simplistic and far more interesting.
"'People were saying this means Einstein is
wrong,' says physicist Heinrich Päs of the Technical University of
Dortmund in Germany. 'But that's not really correct.' Instead, the result could be the first
evidence for a reality built out of extra dimensions. Future
historians of science may regard it not as the moment we abandoned
Einstein and broke physics, but rather as the point at which our
view of space vastly expanded, from three dimensions to four, or
more.
'This may be a physics revolution,' says
Thomas Weiler at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee,
who has devised theories built on extra dimensions. 'The famous
words 'paradigm shift' are used too often and tritely, but they
might be relevant.'
"The subatomic particles -- neutrinos -- seem
to have zipped faster than light from
CERN, near Geneva,
Switzerland, to the OPERA detector at the
Gran Sasso lab near L'Aquila, Italy. It's a conceptually simple
result: neutrinos making the 730-kilometre journey arrived 60
nanoseconds
earlier than they would have if they were travelling
at light speed. And it relies on three seemingly simple
measurements, says Dario Autiero of the Institute of Nuclear Physics
in Lyon, France, a member of the OPERA collaboration: the distance
between the labs, the time the neutrinos left
CERN,
and the time they arrived at Gran Sasso.
"But actually measuring those times and
distances to the accuracy needed to detect nanosecond differences is
no easy task. The OPERA collaboration spent three years chasing down
every source of error they could imagine...before Autiero made the
result public in a seminar at CERN on 23 September. Physicists grilled Autiero for an hour
after his talk to ensure the team had considered details like the
curvature of the Earth, the tidal effects of the moon and the
general relativistic effects of having two clocks at different
heights (gravity slows time so a clock closer to Earth's surface runs a tiny bit slower).
"They were impressed. 'I want to congratulate
you on this extremely beautiful experiment,' said Nobel laureate
Samuel Ting of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after
Autiero's talk. 'The experiment is very carefully done, and the
systematic error carefully checked.'
Most physicists still expect some sort of
experimental error to crop up and explain the anomaly, mainly
because it contravenes the incredibly successful
law of special relativity
which
holds that the speed of light is a constant that no object can
exceed. The theory also leads to the famous equation E =
mc2.
Hotly anticipated are results from other
neutrino detectors, including
T2K in Japan
and
MINOS at
Fermilab
in Illinois, which will run similar experiments and
confirm the results or rule them out (see 'Fermilab
stops hunting Higgs, starts neutrino quest')....
"Even if relativity is pushed
aside, Einstein has worked so well for so long that
he will never really go away. At worst, relativity will
turn out to work for most of the universe but not all,
just as Newton's mechanics work until things get
extremely large or small. 'The fact that Einstein has
worked for 106 years means he'll always be there, either
as the right answer or a low-energy effective theory,'
Weiler says." [Grossman (2011),
pp.7-9. Bold
emphases added; quotation marks altered to conform with
the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged.
(Also
see the report in
Socialist Review.) Subsequent experiments have
confirmed the result, but some scientists think
they have found a flaw.]
This is how genuine science is
practiced. Three years spent looking
for possible errors! Even today, scientists around the world are still
pouring over the data, examining it closely for mistakes in the experimental
details, or in the interpretation of the results. They certainly don't attack each other for having the temerity
to question Einstein. Nor do they
moan about "pedantry" when their work is peer reviewed; and they
definitely don't
retreat into a 'dialectical sulk' and refuse to engage with those who insist on
their work being checked and double-checked.
That is the
difference between science and dialectical quackery. And, it takes a little
more than a few references to balding heads, boiling/freezing water, melting points
and
the ambiguous fighting habits of the Mamelukes to confirm or confute apparent counter-examples to Einstein's theory.
Oddly enough,
hasty
references to the dogmatic ramblings of a Christian and Hermetic Mystic,
who lived 200 years ago, aren't sufficient, either.
Update, March 2012:
The above experiment has been repeated, which confirms that neutrinos don't travel faster than light:
"Neutrinos clocked at light-speed in new
Icarus test
"By Jason PalmerScience and technology reporter, BBC
News
"An
experiment to repeat a test of the speed of
subatomic particles known as neutrinos has
found that they do not travel faster than
light. Results announced in September
suggested that neutrinos can exceed light
speed, but were met with scepticism as that
would upend Einstein's theory of relativity.
A test run by a different group at the same
laboratory has now clocked them travelling
at precisely light speed. The
results
have been posted
online. The
results
in
September,
from the
Opera
group at
the Gran
Sasso
underground
laboratory
in
Italy,
shocked
the
world,
threatening
to upend
a
century
of
physics
as well
as
relativity
-- which
holds
the
speed of
light to
be the
Universe's
absolute
speed
limit.
Now the
Icarus
group,
based at
the same
laboratory,
has
weighed
in
again,
having
already
cast
some
doubt on
the
original
Opera
claim.
Shortly
after
that
claim,
Nobel
laureate
Sheldon
Glashow
co-authored
a
Physical
Review
Letters
paper that
modelled
how
faster-than-light
neutrinos
would
behave
as they
travelled. In
November,
the
Icarus
group
showed
in
a paper
posted
on the
online
server
Arxiv
that the
neutrinos
displayed
no such
behaviour.
However,
they
have now
supplemented
that
indirect
result
with a
test
just
like
that
carried
out by
the
Opera
team.
"Speedy
result
"The
Icarus
experiment
uses 600
tonnes
--
430,000
litres
-- of
liquid
argon to
detect
the
arrival
of
neutrons
sent
through
730km of
rock
from the
Cern
laboratory
in
Switzerland.
Since
their
November
result,
the
Icarus
team
have
adjusted
their
experiment
to do a
speed
measurement. What
was
missing
was
information
from
Cern
about
the
departure
time of
the
neutrinos,
which
the team
recently
received
to
complete
their
analysis.
The
result:
they
find
that the
neutrinos
do
travel
at the
same
speed as
light.
'We are
completely
compatible
with the
speed of
light
that we
learn at
school,'
said
Sandro
Centro,
co-spokesman
for the
Icarus
collaboration. Dr
Centro
said
that he
was not
surprised
by the
result.
'In fact
I was a
little
sceptical
since
the
beginning,'
he told
BBC
News.
'Now we
are 100%
sure
that the
speed of
light is
the
speed of
neutrinos.'
"Most
recently,
the
Opera
team
conceded
that
their
initial
result
may have
been
compromised
by
problems
with
their
equipment.
Rumours
have
circulated
since
the
Opera
result
was
first
announced
that the
team was
not
unified
in its
decision
to
announce
their
findings
so
quickly,
and Dr
Centro
suggested
that
researchers
outside
the team
were
also
suspicious. 'I
didn't
trust
the
result
right
from the
beginning
-- the
way it
was
produced,
the way
it was
managed,'
he said.
'I think
they
were a
little
bit in a
hurry to
publish
something
that was
astonishing,
and at
the end
of the
day it
was a
wrong
measurement.' Four
different
experiments
at
Italy's
Gran
Sasso
lab make
use of
the same
beam of
neutrinos
from
Cern.
Later
this
month,
they
will all
be
undertaking
independent
measurements
to
finally
put an
end to
speculation
about
neutrino
speeds.
The
Minos
experiment
in the
US and
the T2K
experiment
in Japan
may also
weigh in
on the
matter
in due
course
-- if
any
doubt is
left
about
the
neutrinos'
ability
to beat
the
universal
speed
limit."
[Quoted
from
here.
Quotation
marks
altered
to
conform
with the
conventions
adopted
at this
site.
Several
paragraphs
merged.]
Again, this is how genuine science
proceeds; controversial results have to be rigorously tested (often many times) before they are accepted
as fact
-- unlike Mickey Mouse DM-'Science'.
Consider another example: the following
is a brief description of the
precautions (highlighted in bold) taken by one scientist trying to ascertain a more
precise value for the
Gravitational Constant, G:
"Harold Parks's belongings were already leaving for France
when he realised gravity had given him the slip. 'The movers were in my
apartment taking my stuff away,' he says. He was in his lab at the research
institute
JILA in Boulder,
Colorado, making the final checks on an experiment that had taken up the past
two years of his life -- to precisely measure the strength of gravity. 'The
signal shouldn't have changed,' he recalls. 'But it did.' That was 10 years ago. Having relocated, for a while
Parks was tempted to give up on gravity. But the force exerts a mysterious pull
on those who measure it. After a sojourn at the high temple of metrology, the
International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) in Paris, France, Parks was back in Boulder, rebuilding and improving his
old experiment.... Meanwhile, Parks was beavering away in Boulder.
His and [his supervisor] Faller's experiment was a variant of an apparatus that
had been used to try to pin down big G before. It consisted of two free-hanging
pendulum bobs surrounded by four massive stacks of tungsten. Moving the tungsten
masses inwards...draws the bobs closer together by
an amount 1000 times smaller than the diameter of a human hair. Still, the shift
is large enough to be picked up by a laser interferometer.
"Not that it is easy to be sure the movements are
down to gravity alone. 'It's about thinking of all the things the world can do
to you to muck up your experiment,' says Parks. The pair set up the pendulums in
a vacuum to avoid the effects of temperature changes and air resistance slowing
the pendulums' movements. They also floated the tungsten stacks on a thin layer
of air to stop them vibrating unexpectedly. Even so, tiptoeing anywhere near the
experiment was a no-no: the additional mass of a person would weigh down one
side of the floor and nudge the apparatus ever so slightly. The problems didn't stop at the doors of the
lab. Next to, and towering over, the basement where the experiment was situated
was a high-rise block. As the sun crept across the sky during the day, it warmed
first one side of the tower and then the other, causing it to expand unevenly.
The effect was to imperceptibly tilt the tower and everything attached to it,
including Parks's lab, first one way and then the other.
"Even that cruel trick was nothing compared to what was
unmasked the day the fire alarm sounded. 'There had been regular spikes in data
taken during the day,' says Parks. 'They just went quiet.' It turned out that a
surge in current each time the elevator moved in the tower caused a slight
change in the magnetisation of the pendulum bobs, moving them ever so slightly
and skewing the results." [Webb
(2011), pp.45-47. Quotation marks altered
to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added;
several paragraphs merged.]
[Another recent example of
genuine, careful, meticulous
and original science can be accessed
here -- and even more
recent examples,
here and
here.]
Finally on
this topic, the following video is an excellent example of the detail scientists have
to enter into when a well accepted theory is challenged. This is a video of a
PhD candidate in Biological Anthropology challenging the criticisms levelled
against evolutionary theory by a 'Young
Earth Creationist' [YEC] [The latter are Christian Fundamentalists who believe
that the earth is 6000 to 10,000 years old and that the fable presented in The Book of Genesis
is literally true.] Earlier, I underlined the level of detail, the care and
attention to specifics that have to be devoted by researchers if they want to
challenge any area of science, or, indeed, defend science against the wild ideas
of religious bigots. Here, we see this PhD candidate subject the
superficially detailed evidence and argument that one YEC geneticist raised
against the seemingly modest claim that humans and chimpanzees share about 98%
of their genetic material to even more detailed, lengthy and
careful scrutiny in order to expose the bogus nature of YEC itself. [In fact,
most of the videos posted by this PhD candidate at her
YouTube site devote
the same care and attention to detail in relation to other areas of YEC and are
highly recommended as a result.] I have yet to see a single DM-supporter (in
book-, article-, or video-form) enter into even 1% of this detail or
devote a fraction of this care and attention to detail while defending or promoting their
theory, as this PhD candidate, or the other scientists mentioned above. Even
YEC-apologists enter into more detail and show greater care defending their
ideas than DM-fans! How embarrassing and revealing is that?
Video Nine: This Is What "Attention To Detail"
Means In Genuine Science
Do we see such
care and attention to detail in Engels's work on DM
-- or in
that of subsequent dialecticians?
Or, anything even remotely like it?
Are you joking?!
Indeed, dialecticians would themselves treat with derision any endeavour to
establish either the truth of classical economics with an argumentative and evidential display that was as crassly amateurish as
we find in the musings of DM-fans; to say
nothing of the contempt they would show toward theoretical wooliness of
the sort they
regularly serve up to their readers. In
such circumstances, dialecticians who might otherwise be quick to cry "pedantry"
at several issues raised in this Essay and elsewhere at this site, would becomewell-focused 'pedants' themselves, nit-picking with the best of them at
any such attempt to defend classical economics or the capitalist system.
[In
fact,
the aforementioned 'dialectical pedants' already do this with my work. In one breath they complain about my alleged "pedantry", in the
next they home in on what they think are minor errors in detail or wording
in my Essays.
Here is just the latest example; concentrate, for example, on the comments
of one "Gilhyle"; here is another.
At the same time, they show almost limitless patience coupled with endless
understanding when it comes to
Engels, Lenin or Trotsky's writings about DM. Critics like me are pilloried for the
slightest of assumed mistakes; DM-fans are regularly issued with
get-out-of-jail-free cards.]10a
When we
compare this
amateurish approach to evidence, proof and clarity with the opposite
state of affairs apparent in, say,
HM, the contrast is stark indeed.
In economics,
history, current affairs, and politics Marxists display commendable attention to detail
alongside
admirable clarity, almost invariably adding page after page of (often novel)
facts, figures, tables, graphs, references and detailed analyses to
their books and articles -- much of which show signs of painstaking
research and
careful thought.
One only has to look at a handful of the excellent blogs run by Marxist economists
to see how meticulous they are in connection with HM -- for instance,
this one.
In addition, they devote adequate space
to analysing concepts like "ideology", "the falling rate of
profit", "mode of production" and "alienation"
-- indeed, sometimes even publishing entire articles and books
-- but hardly ever even so much as a single paragraph to "quality" or
"node", to say nothing of the missing detail noted earlier (for example,
here, and
here).
At this point we might
wonder where Engels's predilection for
Mickey Mouse Science came from. After all, he was familiar with the
careful and detailed work of contemporaneous scientists (like Darwin and
Helmholtz). Why then was he prepared
to assert that his 'Laws' were indeed laws on the basis of very little primary data
-- or, in some cases, none at all? For instance, how much data did
Engels provide in
support of his theory that motion was contradictory? In fact, he offered zero evidence, just a highly suspect
'thought
experiment'. [I have covered this topic in much more detail in Essay
Five. Readers are directed there for
more details.] In general the sad fact is that in support of his 'Laws'
Engels relied on sketchy, secondary or even tertiary (highly selective) evidence
--,
compounded by seriously compressed, vague and sloppy analyses. Compare that
with the level of supporting detail Marx added to Das Kapital.
We need look no further than Hegel
for an answer to the above question (i.e., where Engels's ideas came from). He
not only derived them from Hegel, he also copied the latter's cavalier attitude
toward the provision of supporting evidence. So,
that Christian Mystic, Hegel,
was the original Mickey Mouse Scientist, which makes Engels, perhaps, the
Sorcerer's Apprentice.
Figure Five: Researching For A 'PhD In
Dialectics'?
Here is
Hegel's 'detailed proof' of the First 'Law':
"The system of natural numbers already shows a nodal line of qualitative
moments which emerge in a merely external succession. It is on the one hand a
merely quantitative progress and regress, a perpetual adding or subtracting, so
that each number has the same arithmetical relation to the one before
it and after it, as these have to their predecessors and successors, and so on.
But the numbers so formed also have a specific relation to other
numbers preceding and following them, being either an integral multiple of one
of them or else a power or a root. In the musical scale which is built up on
quantitative differences, a quantum gives rise to an harmonious relation without
its own relation to those on either side of it in the scale differing from the
relation between these again and their predecessors and successors. While
successive notes seem to be at an ever-increasing distance from the keynote, or
numbers in succeeding each other arithmetically seem only to become other
numbers, the fact is that there suddenly emerges a return, a surprising
accord, of which no hint was given by the quality of what immediately preceded
it, but which appears as an actio in distans [action at distance --
RL], as a connection with
something far removed. There is a sudden interruption of the succession of
merely indifferent relations which do not alter the preceding specific reality
or do not even form any such, and although the succession is continued
quantitatively in the same manner, a specific relation breaks in per saltum
[leaps -- RL].
"Such qualitative nodes and leaps occur in chemical combinations when the
mixture proportions are progressively altered; at certain points in the scale of
mixtures, two substances form products exhibiting particular qualities. These
products are distinguished from one another not merely by a more or less, and
they are not already present, or only perhaps in a weaker degree, in the
proportions close to the nodal proportions, but are bound up with these nodes
themselves. For example, different oxides of nitrogen and nitric acids having
essentially different qualities are formed only when oxygen and nitrogen are
combined in certain specific proportions, and no such specific compounds are
formed by the intermediate proportions. Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are
formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by
colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the
proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific
substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific
compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses
characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not
merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the
solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary,
each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual
succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far
from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap
from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration.
"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no
leaps in nature]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a
ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual
emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in
general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a
transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other
which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something
qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling,
does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually
solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all
at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing
undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state. In thinking about the gradualness of the coming-to-be of
something, it is ordinarily assumed that what comes to be is already sensibly or
actually in existence; it is not yet perceptible only because of its
smallness. Similarly with the gradual disappearance of something, the
non-being or other which takes its place is likewise assumed to be
really there, only not observable, and there, too, not in the
sense of being implicitly or ideally contained in the first something, but
really there, only not observable. In this way, the form of the in-itself,
the inner being of something before it actually exists, is transformed into a
smallness of an outer existence, and the essential difference, that of the
Notion, is converted into an external difference of mere magnitude. The attempt
to explain coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be on the basis of gradualness of the
alteration is tedious like any tautology; what comes to be or ceases to be is
assumed as already complete and in existence beforehand and the alteration is
turned into a mere change of an external difference, with the result that the
explanation is in fact a mere tautology. The intellectual difficulty attendant
on such an attempted explanation comes from the qualitative transition from
something into its other in general, and then into its opposite; but the
identity and the alteration are misrepresented as the indifferent,
external determinations of the quantitative sphere.
"In the moral sphere, in so far as it is considered under
the categories of being, there occurs the same transition from quantity into
quality and different qualities appear to be based in a difference of magnitude. It is through a more or less that the measure of frivolity or thoughtlessness
is exceeded and something quite different comes about, namely crime, and thus
right becomes wrong and virtue vice. Thus states, too, acquire through their
quantitative difference, other things being assumed equal, a distinct
qualitative character. With the expansion of the state and an increased number
of citizens, the laws and the constitution acquire a different significance. The
state has its own measure of magnitude and when this is exceeded this mere
change of size renders it liable to instability and disruption under that same
constitution which was its good fortune and its strength before its expansion."
[Hegel (1999),
pp.368-71, §§774-778.
Italic emphases in the original. Several paragraphs merged.]
"The identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at
first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words, these two
categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent authority. On the
one hand, the quantitative features of existence may be altered, without
affecting its quality. On the other hand, this increase and diminution,
immaterial though it be, has its limit, by exceeding which the quality suffers
change. Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no
consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase of diminution
of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point where this state of
cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water is converted into steam or
ice. A quantitative change takes place, apparently without any further
significance: but there is something lurking behind, and a seemingly innocent
change of quantity acts as a kind of snare, to catch hold of the quality. The
antinomy of Measure which this implies was exemplified under more than one garb
among the Greeks. It was asked, for example, whether a single grain makes a heap
of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair from the
horse's tail. At first, no doubt, looking at the nature of quantity as an
indifferent and external character of being, we are disposed to answer these
questions in the negative. And yet, as we must admit, this indifferent increase
and diminution has its limit: a point is finally reached, where a single
additional grain makes a heap of wheat; and the bald-tail is produced, if we
continue plucking out single hairs. These examples find a parallel in the story
of the peasant who, as his ass trudged cheerfully along, went on adding ounce
after ounce to its load, till at length it sunk under the unendurable burden. It
would be a mistake to treat these examples as pedantic futility; they really
turn on thoughts, an acquaintance with which is of great importance in practical
life, especially in ethics. Thus in the matter of expenditure, there is a
certain latitude within which a more or less does not matter; but when the
Measure, imposed by the individual circumstances of the special case, is
exceeded on the one side or the other, the qualitative nature of Measure (as in
the above examples of the different temperature of water) makes itself felt, and
a course, which a moment before was held good economy, turns into avarice or
prodigality. The same principles may be applied in politics, when the
constitution of a state has to be looked at as independent of, no less than as
dependent on, the extent of its territory, the number of its inhabitants, and
other quantitative points of the same kind. If we look, e.g. at a state with a
territory of ten thousand square miles and a population of four millions we
should, without hesitation, admit that a few square miles of land or a few
thousand inhabitants more or less could exercise no essential influence on the
character of its constitution. But on the other hand, we must not forget that by
the continual increase or diminishing of a state, we finally get to a point
where, apart from all other circumstances, this quantitative alteration alone
necessarily draws with it an alteration in the quality of the constitution. The
constitution of a little Swiss canton does not suit a great kingdom; and,
similarly, the constitution of the Roman republic was unsuitable when
transferred to the small imperial towns of Germany." [Hegel (1975),
pp.158-59.]
If only all scientific papers were as clear, rigorous, detailed and technically
competent as this!
If only Darwin had read Hegel!
Sarcasm to one side, non-partisan readers will no doubt be alarmed to learn that rank
amateurism like this isn't confined to Engels -- or even Woods and Grant. Hegel could
'amateur' and dissemble with the best of them.10a1
We
have already had occasion to note that even though Hegel asserts such changes
in 'quality' represent a break in gradualness, they don't actually do so:
"But we have seen that the alterations
of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a
becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of
something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it." [Ibid.]
But, in no
way does the transition from one number (it is assumed that this is what Hegel
meant by "magnitude") to the next represents an "interruption of gradualness'.
The number two doesn't slowly or gradually morph into the number three, and then at a certain point suddenly change
into it. There is no 'development' here either -- two doesn't develop into three. Hegel's other examples
fare no better: the chemical
compounds he mentioned don't gradually change into whatever he thought they changed into, they do so abruptly
(as we have already seen).
Hegel himself half recognised this, all the while still imagining that
there is gradual change here when there isn't!
"But we have seen that the alterations
of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another,
but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other
which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something
qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling,
does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually
solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all
at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing
undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state."
[Ibid.]
After first
of all asserting
that such processes represent an "interruption of gradualness", he then admits
that water doesn't gradually turn into ice!
It
could be objected that is unfair to Hegel since it is plain that he spoke about an
interruption
of gradualness, here. But, a body of water doesn't suddenly and completely turn into ice (except in
the unusual circumstances mentioned by Hegel). Ice crystals slowly form in what is
called a "mixed-phase"
until all the water has frozen. [Readers are directed back to an
earlier discussion of this
phenomenon.]
Hegel had earlier argued:
"Metal oxides, e.g. the lead oxides, are
formed at certain quantitative points of oxidation and are distinguished by
colours and other qualities. They do not pass gradually into one another; the
proportions lying in between these nodes do not produce a neutral or a specific
substance. Without having passed through the intervening stages, a specific
compound appears which is based on a measure relation and possesses
characteristic qualities. Again, water when its temperature is altered does not
merely get more or less hot but passes through from the liquid into either the
solid or gaseous states; these states do not appear gradually; on the contrary,
each new state appears as a leap, suddenly interrupting and checking the gradual
succession of temperature changes at these points. Every birth and death, far
from being a progressive gradualness, is an interruption of it and is the leap
from a quantitative into a qualitative alteration." [Ibid.]
He
points out that temperature, for example, increases gradually, but that slow
increase is then interrupted by a "nodal" change in the "quality" of the
said water
as it freezes abruptly. We have already seen that what makes water "what it is"
and not something else (which is how Hegel himself defines "quality") is the fact that it is H2O.
Its solid state does not define water. Countless things are solid, so that can't be what makes
this water 'what it is and not something else'. If solidity were the "quality"
here, we would have to say that a rock, a lump of metal or a car is frozen
water, because they are all solid, too.
"Each of the three spheres of the logical idea proves to be a systematic whole
of thought-terms, and a phase of the Absolute. This is the case with Being,
containing the three grades of
quality, quantity
and
measure.
Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so
identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality.
Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not
affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be
greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker."
[Hegel (1975),
p.124, §85. Bold emphasis
added; paragraphs merged.]
Plainly, the
whole point of the above comment is that there must be a change in the "quality"
of water, and that "quality" doesn't change gradually, but abruptly. The
temperature might alter gradually, but not even that changes into
something new (slowly or abruptly).
[But, once more, we have been here already; readers are
directed back to the earlier
discussion of the changes water experiences when it is heated or cooled.]
As we
have seen, this 'Law' can
only be made to
seem to work in a
few selected cases if:
(i) We bend and twist the concepts involved totally out of shape;
(ii) We fail to define "quality", "node", "leap", "same body", "new kind of
thing", and "addition of matter or energy" with any clarity,
consistency -- or even at all!; and,
(iii) We ignore
Hegel's own (vague) 'definition' of "quality", which he also
ignored(!).
In
contrast, there are countless examples where this 'Law' doesn't apply, no matter
how we try to squeeze nature into such an ill-fitting, dialectical boot.10b
Exactly why Engels's First 'Law' was called a
law in the first place is therefore something of a Dialectical Mystery.
Unsurprisingly, the Second 'Law' of dialectics fares little better.
We saw above
that Engels depicted this 'Law' as follows:
"The law of the interpenetration of opposites....
[M]utual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when
carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954),
pp.17,
62.]
In
the following,
published work, he says more-or-less the same:
"Already in
Rousseau, therefore, we find not only
a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's
Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns
of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic,
contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite;
and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation."
[Engels (1976),
p.179. Bold emphasis added.]
Lenin added a few extra details:
"[Among the elements of
dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in
[a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only
the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into
its opposite?]….
"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all
phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of
all processesof the world in their 'self-movement,' in their spontaneous
development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of
opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone
furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing….
The unity…of opposites is
conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive
opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin
(1961),
pp.221-22,
357-58. Emphases in the original.
Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site;
paragraphs merged.]
[UO = Unity of Opposites.]
It is worth noting at the outset that:
(i)
Neither Engels nor Lenin offer any proof of this 'Law', which means this is yet
another imposition of a dogmatic theory on the facts. Subsequent DM-fans have
done likewise, also failing to provide proof. [See Essay
Two for more details.]
(ii)
The
doctrine that nature and all it contains is a UO, and that change is powered
by a 'contradictory' interaction between 'dialectical opposites', is found in all known mystical
religions and philosophies.
[There is more on
that in Essay Fourteen Part One (summary
here). Until
the latter is published, the reader is directed
here and
here for more
details.]
This
only serves to confirm (yet again) Marx's assertion:
"The
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of
mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than
the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant
material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make
the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The
individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness,
and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and
determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do
this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as
producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of
their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch." [Marx and
Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from
here.
Bold emphases added.]
An
up-dated and greatly expanded version of the argument presented in this sub-section has now been
published as Essay Seven
Part Three. Readers are directed there for my more considered thoughts on
this topic (as well as my
replies to several objections), alongside further argument and evidence.
So, I recommend that readers should skip this sub-section,
move across to the above Essay,
and begin again later,
here.
Surprisingly, DM-theorists (like Lenin and Engels,
quoted above) are
decidedly unclear as to whether objects/processes change because
(1) There is
a contradictory relationship between their 'internal opposites'.
(2) They change
into these opposites -- or even because
(3) Change itself creates such
opposites.
[FL = Formal Logic; NON = Negation of the
Negation: UO = Unity of Opposites; DM = Dialectical Materialism.]
Lenin's words merely illustrate this
confusion in an acute form; he speaks, for instance, of the "transitions of every
determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other…."
We will see below the radical confusion such an idea would create, if it were rue.
Engels is equally unclear: "[M]utual penetration of polar
opposites and transformation into each other...." The same can be said of
Plekhanov:
"And so every phenomenon, by the
action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov
(1956),
p.77. Bold emphasis added.]
And, here is Mao:
"Why is it that '...the human mind should take
these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile,
transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are
in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in
objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile,
temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect
transforms itself into its opposite....
"In speaking of the identity of opposites in
given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and
the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....
"All processes have a beginning and an end,
all
processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all
processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of
one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b),
pp.340-42. Quotation
marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Bold emphases added.]
Once more, these
passages inform us that objects and
processes not only
change because:
(a) There is
a struggle going on between their 'internal opposites', and that
(b) They
develop into
these opposites (indeed,
according to Lenin, they change into all
of them!), and
(c)
They produce these opposites while they change
--, or,
they do so as a
result of that change.10b1
[In what follows, I will be ignoring the equivocation (noted
below) whereby dialecticians sometimes seem to mean by "internal opposite",
"spatially-internal opposite", and sometimes they appear to mean "conceptually-",
or "logically-internal opposite" --
the latter of which was certainly what Hegel appeared to mean by this phrase.]
As we are about to see, this idea -- that
there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites"
(etc.), which cause change because they "struggle" with one another
and then change into each other -- presents
DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along
the lines expressed in the DM-classics and in the writings of countless
DM-theorists (quoted above but at greater length
here,
where several objections that have been levelled against the argument presented
in this Essay have also been
neutralised).
In order to
see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of, or
possesses, two
"internal contradictory opposites", or "opposite tendencies", O*
and O**,
and it thus changes as a result.
[Henceforth, in order to save on complexity,
I will omit the phrase "or possesses".]
But, O* can't
itself change intoO**
since O**already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this
theory, O* couldn't change, for there would be no opposite with
which it could "struggle" in order to bring that
about.
[Once more, several obvious objections to
the above have been neutralised below. Incidentally, the same problems arise if these are viewed as
'external contradictions'. (However, as we will see in Essay Eight
Part One, 'external
contradictions'
attract a few serious difficulties of their own.)
I have avoided using "A" and "non-A"/"not-A",
here, in order to prevent certain options from being closed off too soon. Not
much hangs on this, anyway, which readers can confirm for themselves if they replace O*
and O** with "A" and/or "non-A"/"not-A" respectively throughout.
Concentrating on A alone won't help, anyway. If
A changes into non-A/not-A, A will have to exist at
the same time as non-A/not-A, or A and non-A/not-A couldn't 'struggle' with one
another in order for A to change into one or other of non-A/not-A.
Once more: if non-A/not-Aalready exist, A
can't change into either of them, since, plainly, they already exist!]
What is more, these 'opposites'
have to co-exist -- as Gollobin points out:
"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually
exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate
each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects
of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws
in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process
as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the
mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and
opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection,
and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their
unity only in their opposition.' In fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on
to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin
(1986), p.113; quoting Engels (1891a),
p.414. Bold emphases added.]
Mao made the same point:
"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can
exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for
its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a
concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no
death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no
'below'.... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without
tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there
would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie.
Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or
semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist
oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the
one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are
interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this
character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory
aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being
in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are
interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies
'how opposites can be and how they become identical'. How then can they be
identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the
first meaning of identity.
"But is it enough to say merely that each of the
contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is
identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity?
No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for
their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other.
That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a
thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its
opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.
"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by
means of revolutionthe proletariat, at one time the ruled, is
transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is
transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied
by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will
take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity
of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?" [Mao
(1961a), pp.338-39. Bold emphases alone added.
Minor typos corrected; missing words "and how they become",
found in the published version, added. I have informed the MIA of these errors.]
As, indeed, did Engels:
"And it is just as impossible have one side of a
contradiction without the other, as it is to retain the whole of an apple in
one's hand after half has been eaten." [Engels (1891b), p.496. Bold
emphasis added.]
The online version renders this passage slightly differently:
"And one cannot have one side of this
contradiction without the other, any more than a man has a whole apple in his
hand after eating half." [Quoted from
here.]
In that case, these 'opposites' must co-exist.
Anyway, it is
hard to see how
O* could "struggle" with
O** if
O** didn't co-exist with
O*!
Moreover,
it is no use propelling O** into the future so that it is what
O*will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless
O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!
So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of
O* and
not-O*
(interpreting
O** now as not-O*),O* can't change into not-O*
since
not-O*
already exists.
[Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might
allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this
dialectical hole. I have considered some of them in Note 10b1a.10b1a]
Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as
not-O*
readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there
is an
added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O*
in existence to make it happen. In which case, the dialectical process
will simply grind to a halt unless a not-not-O*
pops into existence (out of thin air, it seems) to start things up again or to
keep things going. But, what could possibly engineer, or have engineered, that?
Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how
not-O* itself came about
in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
[Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising the serious problems
it creates
for his theory.]
Returning to the last point: where not-O*
itself came from. It seems it will have to have come fromO*
since
O* can only change because of its struggle with
not-O*,
which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a
'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems -- as
we have seen in Note10b1a, in relation to C,
S, and F -- Capitalism, Socialism and Feudalism.
[NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]
Maybe this is too
quick. In order to see if the above is rather hasty, it might be wise to push
this into the past to see if we can circumvent the above 'difficulties'. To that end, let us suppose
that
O* itself came from object/process X, and
that not-O*
came from object or process Y. However, according to the
DM-classics, X
itself can only change because it "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call
this "not-X". As a result of that "struggle", X changes into not-X. But, and once
again, not-X already exists, so X can't change into it! If
not-X didn't already exist, there would be nothing with which X
could "struggle", and hence change.
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
Of course, this
leaves the origin of not-X itself unexplained! And yet, it can only have come into
existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, X!
However, as we have seen, X can't change into not-X, since not-X already
exists! Once more, if it didn't, X couldn't change since there would be nothing
there with which it could "struggle". In which case, both X and
not-X must have popped into existence from nowhere.
The same problems
afflict Y. Once more, according to the DM-classics, Y itself can
only change because of a "struggles" with its own "opposite" -- call this "not-Y".
As a result, Y changes into that opposite, not-Y. But, and once again, not-Y
already exists, so Y can't change into it! If not-Y didn't
already exist, there would be nothing with which Y could "struggle", and
hence change.
Moreover, this
also leaves the origin of not-Y unexplained. Not-Y can only have come
into existence because of an earlier "struggle" with its own opposite, Y!
But, Y can't change into not-Y, since not-Y already exists!
If it didn't, Y couldn't change. In which case, both Y and not-Y
must have popped into existence from nowhere, too.
It could be objected that
the above seems to place objects and/or processes
in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians have of
FL. Hence, on that
basis, it could be maintained that the argument presented in this Essay is completely misguided.
Fortunately, repairs are relatively easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two
changing
"internal/external opposites" O*
and O** -- the latter once again interpreted as not-O*
--,
andthus develops as a result.
The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing
'dialectical union' of
O* and not-O*,
and
O* develops into not-O*
as a result, then this can't happen. As we have already seen, it isn't possible for
O* to change into not-O*
if
not-O*
already exists, and that is
the case whether or not
O* and not-O*
are changeless or constantly changing objects and/or processes.
Of
course, it could be objected that not-O* develops into O*
while not-O* develops into
O*.
[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian
term-of-art: "sublation".
More on that presently.]
If
that were so, while this was happening,O*
and not-O* would no longer be
opposites of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite"
to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate
object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that
would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently
'subjective', once more. It would also threaten to undermine this 'Law' in other
ways, since, as we will see, each object/process has to have a unique
"opposite" (something Hegel and Lenin called its "other").
Ignoring this 'difficulty' for now --
and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O*
while not-O* 'developed' into
O*, and that such process were governed by the obscure
term "sublation" -- this still won't work (as we are
about to find out).
In order to see this, it might be a good idea to
develop this objection further. To that end, it
could be argued that
Engels had anticipated the above difficulties when he said:
"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is
taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as
it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old
idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless
metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a
grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed
and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are
normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat
and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such
ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has
arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process
of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces
grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its
turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again
the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold.
Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost
the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for
example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from
it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of
the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds,
which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each
fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels
(1976),
pp.172-73. Bold emphases
added.]
"But someone may
object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I
negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it
underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I
negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and
what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is
a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the
metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the
narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean
simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it
in any way one likes.
Long ago
Spinoza
said: Omnis determinatio est
negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation.
And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general
and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first
negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the
particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or
crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made
the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way
of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is
just the same with every kind of conception or idea....
"But it is clear
that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of
alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that
a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness
of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians
try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the
negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid.,
pp.180-81. Bold emphases
and link added.]
Engels's argument is that "dialectical negation" isn't the same as ordinary (or
even logical) negation in that it isn't simple destruction nor is it simple cancellation. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and
preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless,
as we have already seen, Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly
suspect in itself, just as we will also
see this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel
confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as,
indeed, did Engels).
Despite this,
it is worth asking: Does the above comment by Engels neutralise the objections presented earlier? Is the argument here guilty of the following?
"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put
forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of
the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]
To answer this question, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of
two changing "internal opposites"/"tendencies" O* and not-O*, and thus
develops as a result. Given this new scenario, O* would change/develop into a
"sublated"
intermediary --, but not intonot-O* --, incidentally,
contradicting the DM-worthies.
If we are to believe what they tell us, O* should, of course, change into not-O*,
not into some intermediary.
Putting this minor quibble to one side, too: Given this 'revised' view,
we may now suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter,
"Oi*"
(which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation'
which also 'preserves'/'sublates').
If
so, Oi*
must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-Oi*
in existence to make it develop any further!
[Recall that according to this 'theory', everything (and that must include
Oi*)
changes because of a 'struggle' with its 'opposite'.]
So, there must be a not-Oi*
in existence
to make Oi*
change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt Oi*
from this essential requirement on an ad hoc
basis (arguing, perhaps, that Oi*
changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that,
there would seem to be no good reason to accept the version of events expressed in
the
DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process in the entire universe changes because of the
"struggle" of
opposites (and Oi* is certainly a thing/process).
Furthermore, if we allow an exemption here, the whole point of the
exercise would be lost --, for if some things do, and some things do not change
according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which
changes were, and which were not subject to it.
[That would also mean that the Second 'Law' isn't a law, either -- which is what we found
was the case with
the First 'Law', too.]
This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively
applied exemption certificate (issued to Oi*)
would mean that nothing at all could change, for if everything in the universe
is in the process of change, then it is already a 'sublated' version of
whatever it used to be.
Ignoring this 'difficulty', too: Even ifOi*
were to change into not-Oi* (as we suppose it must, given
the doctrine laid down in the DM-classics), then all the problems we met earlier simply reappear, for
Oi*
would only be able to change if not-Oi*
already exists to make that happen! But, not-Oi*
can't already exist, for Oi*
hasn't changed into it yet!
On the other hand, even if we were to suppose not-Oi*
already exists, Oi*
couldn't change into it since not-Oi*
already exists!
Again, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of
O*,
which
produces not-O*,
isn't ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.
In that case, let us now suppose that
O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite, not-Os*.
But, if that is to happen, according to the
Dialectical Classics,
not-Os*
must already exist if
O* is to struggle with it and then change into it!
But, and once again, if that were so,
O* couldn't turn into not-Os*,
for it already exists! Alternatively, if not-Os*
didn't already exist, then O*
couldn't change since
O*
can only change if it "struggles" with what it changes into, i.e., not-Os*!
We hit the same non-dialectical brick wall, once more.
It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the
point; in the real world things manifestly change. For instance, to use Mao's
example, peace changes into war, and
vice versa. Love can change into hate, and so on.
No one doubts this, but,
as we have seen, DM can't explain why it happens. For peace to change
into war, or vice versa, it would have to struggle with it. Has anyone
witnessed this odd event? Can abstractions like these actually struggle with one
another? And yet, both Mao and Lenin informed their readers of the following:
"The
identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually
exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The
condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their
'self-movement,' in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of
opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything
existing…. The unity…of opposites is conditional,
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites
is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961),
pp.357-58.
Bold emphases alone added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the
conventions adopted at this site; paragraphs merged.]
"The
universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is
that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the
other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of
opposites exists from beginning to end.
"Engels said, 'Motion itself is a contradiction.' Lenin defined the law of the
unity of opposites as 'the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory,
mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and
processes of nature (including mind and society)'. Are these ideas
correct? Yes, they are. The interdependence of the contradictory aspects
present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life
of all things and push their development forward. There is nothing that does not
contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist....
"The
contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each
other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained
in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A
simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process
contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one
another.
"That is how all things in the objective world
and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion....
"War and peace, as everybody knows, transform
themselves into each other. War is transformed into peace; for instance, the
First World War was transformed into the post-war peace, and the civil war in
China has now stopped, giving place to internal peace. Peace is transformed into
war; for instance, the Kuomintang-Communist co-operation was transformed into
war in 1927, and today's situation of world peace may be transformed into a
second world war. Why is this so? Because in class society such contradictory
things as war and peace have an identity in given conditions.
"All contradictory things are interconnected; not
only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given
conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full
meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed
'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what
conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another'....
"Why is it that 'the human mind should take these
opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming
themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective
reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things
is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and
relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself
into its opposite. Reflected in man's thinking, this becomes the Marxist
world outlook of materialist dialectics. It is only the reactionary ruling
classes of the past and present and the metaphysicians in their service who
regard opposites not as living, conditional, mobile and transforming themselves
into one another, but as dead and rigid, and they propagate this fallacy
everywhere to delude the masses of the people, thus seeking to perpetuate their
rule....
"All processes have a beginning and an end,
all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of
all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the
transformation of one process into another is absolute.
"There are two states of motion in all things,
that of relative rest and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the
struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing. When
the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only quantitative
and not qualitative change and consequently presents the outward appearance of
being at rest. When the thing is in the second state of motion, the quantitative
change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise
to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change
ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change. Such unity, solidarity,
combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy,
equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as we see in daily life, are all the
appearances of things in the state of quantitative change. On the other hand,
the dissolution of unity, that is, the destruction of this solidarity,
combination, harmony, balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy,
equilibrium, solidity and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite
are all the appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the
transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly transforming
themselves from the first into the second state of motion; the struggle of
opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the
second state. That is why we say that the unity of opposites is conditional,
temporary and relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute.
"When we said above that two opposite things can
coexist in a single entity and can transform themselves into each other because
there is identity between them, we were speaking of conditionality, that is to
say, in given conditions two contradictory things can be united and can
transform themselves into each other, but in the absence of these conditions,
they can't constitute a contradiction, can't coexist in the same entity and
can't transform themselves into one another. It is because the identity of
opposites obtains only in given conditions that we have said identity is
conditional and relative. We may add that the struggle between opposites
permeates a process from beginning to end and makes one process transform itself
into another, that it is ubiquitous, and that struggle is therefore
unconditional and absolute.
"The combination of conditional, relative
identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement of
opposites in all things." [Mao (1961b),
pp.316, 337-38, 339-40, 342-43. Bold emphases alone added; quotation marks
altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]
If the above DM-classicists
were right, how could peace change into war unless it "struggles" with it?
It could be argued that the contradictory aspects (or
underlying processes/tendencies) of a given society, or societies -- which might give the
appearance of peace -- are what turn peace in to war; it is the mutual struggle of
these contradictory aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) that change the
one into the other.
In that case, let us call these underlying contradictory
aspects (or underlying processes/tendencies) UA and UA*.
If the above were correct, it would be the
struggle between UA and UA* that changes Peace (P) into War (W).
But, if that is indeed so, the DM-classics were wrong; P and its opposite, W, do
not actually struggle with one another, even though they are
opposites, and even though they should do this (if the
DM-classics are to be
believed).
What changes P into W is a struggle between their
non-opposites,UA and UA*. And yet, if either UA or
UA* changes
P into W, then
one or both of them must be the opposite(s) of P, and if they are
the opposite(s) of P they should
change into P! Either that, or the DM-classics were wide of the mark.
On the other hand, if UA and UA* are indeed
opposites of one another, they should change into each other. But, they can't do
that since they both already exist!
Once again,we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.
It could be argued that if we consider a more concrete example,
we might be able to understand what the DM-classics meant when they claimed that
things change into their opposites.
[In what follows, I examine 'concrete cases' that have been put
to me in discussion by those who doubt that the general criticisms above are
successful. Apologies are owed in advance for the somewhat repetitive
nature of this material, but those who raised these examples thought they could
circumvent the above criticisms by introducing them. In every case,
they only imagined this by ignoring one or more of the core DM-theses advanced
in
the classics: (1) Everything changes because of a
'struggle' with its 'dialectical opposite', (2) Everything changes in to that
'opposite', and (3) Change produces that opposite. In that case, the following
material is aimed at showing that if we accept what the DM-classics have to say,
the aforementioned general criticisms do in fact apply in each particular case. Hence the
need for repetition.]
Consider "John"
again: While it might be the
case that John is a boy, in a few years time it will be the case that John
is a man (all things being equal). Now, the fact that other individuals are already
men doesn't
stop John changing into a man (his opposite). So, John can change into his
opposite even though that opposite already exists. Hence, the above
objections fail.
Or, so it could be maintained.
And yet, as we have seen, this theory tells us that all things/processes change because
they "struggle" with their 'opposites', and that they "struggle" with what they
will become (i.e., that 'opposite').
First, are we to assume that John has to struggle with his
opposite if he is to change? If so, he must struggle with all the
individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself
(assuming that every other man is his opposite).
Alternatively, are we to suppose that John must struggle with what he
himself is to become, his
individual opposite -- i.e., himself as a man --, even
before he exists as a man?
If not, then the above response is beside the point; John can only
change if he struggles with his opposite, but that opposite does not yet exist.
Plainly, if his opposite doesn't yet exist, he can't struggle with it, and
hence can't change. We hit the same problem.
Moreover, in view of the fact
that John must turn into his opposite, doesn't that mean he has to turn
into these other men, too, if all men are his opposite? Or, does he turn into just one of them? But, it seems he must
do one or the other if the
DM-Classics are to be believed.
Anyway, according to the DM-worthies, John can only
change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now.
If so, are we
really supposed to
believe that "John-as-a-man" is struggling with "John-as-a-boy"
in the here-and-now?
Or, that the abstraction,
manhood, is struggling with that other abstraction, boyhood?
Some might be tempted to reply
(indeed, one comrade did so rely in debate with me over this) that that is precisely what
adolescence is, and yet, if that were the case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would
have to be locked in struggle in the here-and-now. Of course, adolescence
can't struggle with anything, since it, too, is an abstraction. And a struggle
in John's mind over what he is to become can't make him develop into a man,
either! It should hardly need pointing out that a struggle in the mind can't
change a boy into a man. This isn't to deny that such struggles take place, it
is merely to point out that thinking doesn't make something so -- if it did,
beggars would ride.
Nevertheless, John-as-a-man doesn't yet exist, so John-as-a-man can't struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if
John-as-a-man does exist alongside John-as-boy, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful
self, then John-as-boy can't change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already
exists!
To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is
allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that 'opposite' can't now
exist otherwise John wouldn't need to become him! But, and once again, if that
opposite doesn't exist,
John
can't change, for there would be nothing with which he could struggle.
Looking at this a little more concretely: In ten or fifteen years time, John
won't become just any
man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that
John becomes "ManJ".
But, once more, ManJ must exist now
or John can't change into him (if
the
DM-classics are to be believed) -- for John can only become a man if he
is now locked in struggle with what he is to become, his own opposite, ManJ!
Once more: if that is so, John can't
become ManJ since ManJ
already exists!
It could be objected that the DM-classics are arguing that an
object in change takes on an opposite property or quality, expressed as the
negation of the predicate term that once applied to it. So, in abstract terms,
if
A is F (where "A" is perhaps the name of a person, such as John,
or that of some object or process, and "F" is some property or quality he/it
possesses) -- then the A that is F becomes the A that is not-F.
[Or, rather: it used to be the case that "A is F"; now
it is the
case that "A is not-F".] This is
surely possible, indeed, actual; it happens all the time. Moreover, A being F doesn't
prevent it becoming not-F on the grounds that Falready exists, or
even because not-Falready exists (since, plainly, not-Fdoesn't
yet exist). So, dialectical change is not only possible, it is actual.
This is just a generalisation of the point made above about John
becoming a man, and is susceptible to the same sort of rebuttal: if not-F
doesn't already exist, then A can't struggle with it, and hence can't
change.
It could be argued that not-Fdoes exist, so this
struggle can take place. Hence, A can both struggle with not-F
and become not-F. More concretely, tendencies in John that maintain
him as a boy (F) are locked in a struggle with those that are changing
him into a man/not-a-boy (not-F).
But, are we really supposed to believe that John
changes into a tendency (for that is what not-F is, according to this
objection)?
[I have examined the 'opposite tendencies defence' in more detail,
here.]
Independently of that, it is difficult to believe that
anyone who has read the
DM-classics could imagine that this new interpretation
finds any support in what they have to say. For example, if it is indeed the
case that the A that is
F turns into the A is not-F -- or if A's being F
develops into A's being not-F -- then, according to those
classics, they must struggle with one another. But, how can this happen if it is admitted
that the A is not-F doesn't yet exist?
It could be countered that what is important here is that F
applied to A turns into its opposite, not-F. Now, many not-Fs
will typically already exist. For example, John might be alive one day (i.e.,